1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PALVINDRA SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 20

- 72614

Agency Nos. A208

- 549

- 493

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 14 , 202 2 * * San Francisco, California Before: SILER, ** * S.R. THOMAS , and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Palvindra Singh (“Singh”) petitions to review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. §

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by des ignation. 

# FILED

MAR 29 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

1252. We deny the petition regarding the removal order because the BIA’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal , and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) is supported by substantial evidence. Plancarte v. Garland , 9 F. 4th 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cordon

- Garcia v. INS , 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000).
1. Singh claims he is entitled to asylum and withholding of removal as he cannot return to India “because of persecution or a well

- founded fear of persecution on account of . . . membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A). To establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution, “an applicant must show: (1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is on account of one of the statutorily

- protected grounds; and (3) is committed by
the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.”
Navas v. INS , 217 F.3d 646, 655

- 56 (9th Cir. 2000). 1 Singh claims he was persecuted twice on account of his membership in the Bahujan Samaj Party (“BSP”), a minority politica l party; first, by a group of four men from a rival political party that physically assaulted him near his hometown;

1 A similar, more stringent, standard applies to withholding of removal eligibility. 217 F.3d at 655. A petitioner requesting withholding of removal must show a clear probability of future persecution, which is presumed if the petitioner can esta blish past persecution. Id

.3

and second , by local police that hit him and tore his clothes, allegedly because of his
affiliation with BSP. Both instances resulted in minor, temporary pain

. 2 Considering these events, t he BIA concluded that Singh suffered past persecution. Establishing past persecution for either asylum or withholding of removal relief entitles the petitioner to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. 8
C.F.R. §§ 1208 .13(b)(1); 1208.16(b)(1)(i). One way that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) can rebut a petitioner’s presumption of future persecution is to demonstrate the “[petitioner] could avoid future perse cution by relocating to another part of the [petitioner’s] country of nationality . . . and, under all circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the [petitioner] to do so.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B); see Singh v. Whitaker , 914 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2019). DHS provided substantial evidence that Singh could reasonably relocate within India to avoid future persecution. The BIA agreed. There are regions in India where Singh’s party is the dominant and controlling party. In th ose regions, BSP members are not at risk of persecution on the basis of their political opinion. Moreover, the law in India provides for freedom of movement and the government generally respects those rights. The BIA and IJ conducted an individualized anal ysis

2 Following these encounters Singh fled to Mumbai, over 900 miles away from his home in Khutar, India, and boarded an international shipping vessel that eventually berthed in Davant, Louisiana.4

and reasonably concluded that Singh could relocate within India. Substantial evidence does not compel a contrary conclusion to the one reached by the BIA regarding Singh’s petition for asylum or withholding from removal.
2. Next, Singh argues the BIA failed to conduct a proper analysis of whether he is eligible for CAT relief. For CAT relief a petitioner must establish: (1) it is more likely than not he will suffer harm severe enough to constitute torture; and (2) the
torture would occur at the hands o f a government official, or with the acquiescence of a government official. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2); 1208.18(a)(2), (a)(1). Further, a petitioner must demonstrate that he or she faces a “particularized threat” of torture,
not a threat of torture in the a bstract nor merely a showing that torture occurs in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see Almaghzar v. Gonzales , 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006). Singh does not meet his burden for CAT relief. First, the two instances of violence against Singh do not constitute torture. Torture is “severe pain or suffering” resulting from extreme or cruel treatment. 8
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a). Singh was hurt in the encounters; he had some abdominal
discomfort both times and a bloody nose from his police interrogation. Afterwards Singh visited a doctor, obtained pain medication, and did not express any significant
health concerns
. Record evidence does not suggest he endure d severe pain or suffer ed . Singh, in short, was not tortured in the past

.5

Second , even if Singh suffered torture in the past his demonstrated ability to reasonably relocate within India makes it improbable that he will face torture in the
future. We have held that reasonable relocation is a relevant consideration when
det ermining whether a petitioner is eligible for CAT protection. Singh , 914 F.3d at 663. Substantial evidence shows that Singh is unlikely to be tortured for his political
affiliation in other areas of India. Third, to be eligible for CAT protection Singh mu st show that he faces a particularized threat of future torture. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)

. Singh has shown that political violence occurs in India, but he has failed to show how that amounts to a particularized threat to him should he be repatriated.
The administrative record demonstrates that Singh has not be en tortured in the past, he is not likely to be torture d in the future, and he can reasonably relocate within India to mitigate the risk of future torture. The petition for review is denied and peti tioner’s motion for stay of removal
is denied as moot

.