Page 1 GAO-04-305R Defense Logistics 

December 18, 2003 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the 

Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is one of the largest logistics supply and 

support efforts that the U.S. military has ever undertaken. For example, of 

the $28.1 billion that the Department of Defense (DOD) has obligated for 

OIF, the services and the Defense Logistics Agency have reported that 

$14.2 billion is for operating support costs and $4.9 billion is for 

transportation costs. This operation required the movement of large 

numbers of personnel and equipment over long distances into a hostile 

environment involving harsh desert conditions. 

You asked us to study a number of issues related to logistics support to 

deployed forces. In April 2003, shortly after the onset of OIF, we began 

work that focused on DOD’s accountability and control over supplies and 

equipment shipped to that theater of operation. Based on the early results 

of this work, we subsequently broadened our scope to include other 

logistical issues, such as the deployment of support units and the 

transportation of supplies and equipment. 

At the outset of this assignment, we agreed to keep you periodically 

informed of the status of our work. On November 6, 2003, we provided 

your office with a briefing on our preliminary observations of the 

effectiveness of logistics activities during OIF. As we emphasized at the 

briefing, these observations are based on the limited work we have done 

to date. As requested, we are transmitting the briefing (enc. I) in this 

report. In conducting our preliminary work, we relied on data gathered 

through our visits and interviews with military logistics personnel 

deployed to the theater of operations. We visited logistics support 

activities in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, but we did not visit activities in 

Iraq. We also met with senior officials at DOD and military service 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-305R Defense Logistics 

headquarters and logistics support activities in the United States and 

Europe. We also reviewed the military services’ and DOD’s “after-action” 

reports, “lessons learned” studies, and other similar documents. The scope 

of our work included all types of supplies and equipment used during OIF, 

including such items as repair parts, food, clothing, and construction 

material. 

Although we have done some limited analysis, we have not verified all of 

the data and plan to more fully address the issues identified in this briefing 

in subsequent work. We expect to complete our work and issue a report, 

including recommendations for executive action, during 2004. In addition, 

we are planning to provide DOD with a short letter of inquiry concerning a 

serious condition we came across relating to the return of materiel from 

units in the theater, which we believe warrants DOD’s immediate 

attention. A copy of the draft letter will be provided to you, and the 

response from DOD will also be provided. 

Although major combat operations during the initial phases of OIF were 

successful, our preliminary work indicated that there were substantial 

logistics support problems in the OIF theater, as evidenced by 

• a backlog of hundreds of pallets and containers of materiel at various 

distribution points due to transportation constraints and inadequate asset 

visibility; 

• a discrepancy of $1.2 billion between the amount of materiel shipped to 

Army activities in the theater of operations and the amount of materiel 

that those activities acknowledged they received; 

• a potential cost to DOD of millions of dollars for late fees on leased 

containers or replacement of DOD-owned containers due to distribution 

backlogs or losses; 

• the cannibalization of vehicles and potential reduction of equipment 

readiness due to the unavailability of parts that either were not in DOD’s 

inventory or could not be located because of inadequate asset visibility; 

• the duplication of many requisitions and circumvention of the supply 

system as a result of inadequate asset visibility; and 

• the accumulation at the theater distribution center in Kuwait of hundreds 

of pallets, containers, and boxes of excess supplies and equipment that 

were shipped from units redeploying from Iraq without required content 

descriptions and shipping documentation. For example, at the time we 

visited the center, we observed a wide array of materiel, spread over many 

acres, that included a mix of broken and usable parts that had not been 

sorted into the appropriate supply class, unidentified items in containers 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-305R Defense Logistics 

that had not been opened and inventoried, and items that appeared to be 

deteriorating due to the harsh desert conditions. 

We noted a number of factors that, in combination with other conditions, 

may have contributed to the logistics support problems we identified. 

Such factors include the following: 

• Poor asset visibility. DOD did not have adequate visibility over all 

equipment and supplies transported to, within, and from the theater of 

operations in support of OIF. For example, although the U.S. Central 

Command issued a policy requiring, whenever feasible, the use of radio 

frequency identification tags to track assets shipped to and within the 

theater, these tags were not used in a uniform and consistent manner.1

 In 

addition, units operating in the theater did not have adequate access to, or 

could not fully use, DOD’s logistics and asset visibility systems in order to 

track equipment and supplies because these systems were not fully 

interoperable and capable of exchanging information or transmitting data 

over required distances. Furthermore, DOD and military service personnel 

lacked training on the use of radio frequency identification tags and other 

tracking tools, which also adversely affected asset visibility. 

• Insufficient and ineffective theater distribution capability. DOD did 

not have a sufficient distribution capability in the theater to effectively 

manage and transport the large amount of supplies and equipment 

deployed during OIF. For example, the distribution of supplies to forward 

units was delayed because adequate transportation assets, such as cargo 

trucks and materiel handling equipment, were not available within the 

theater of operations. The distribution of supplies was also delayed 

because cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets had to be 

separated and repackaged several times for delivery to multiple units in 

different locations. In addition, DOD’s lack of an effective process for 

prioritizing cargo for delivery precluded the effective use of scarce theater 

transportation assets. Finally, one of the major causes of distribution 

problems during OIF was that most Army and Marine Corps logistics 

personnel and equipment did not deploy to the theater until after combat 

troops arrived, and, in fact, most Army personnel did not arrive until after 

major combat operations were underway. In addition, logistics personnel 

 1

 Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are used to track shipping containers and 

pallets and their contents while in transit. These tags identify what items are in a container 

or pallet and continuously transmit that information through radio signals, which can be 

read electronically using hand-held scanners or fixed interrogators placed at various points 

along supply routes. 
Page 4 GAO-04-305R Defense Logistics 

were not adequately trained in various logistics functions, such as 

operating material handling equipment and managing theater distribution 

centers. 

• Failure to apply “lessons learned” from prior operations. The failure 

to effectively apply lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm and other military operations may have contributed to the 

logistics support problems encountered during OIF. Our prior reports, as 

well as DOD and military service after-action reports and other studies of 

prior military operations, have documented some of the same problems 

that appear to be occurring in OIF. For example, our September 1992 

report concluded that accountability and asset visibility were lost during 

Operation Desert Storm due to the lack of container documentation and 

an inadequate transportation system to distribute these supplies.2

 DOD’s 

April 1992 report to Congress on the conduct of the Persian Gulf War 

reported that, in addition to a lack of asset visibility and poor materiel 

distribution, the logistics effort was weakened by the long processing time 

for supply requisitions, which resulted in the loss of confidence and 

discipline in the supply system, the abuse of the priority designation 

process, and the submission of multiple requisitions.3

 In addition, DOD’s 

after-action report from the more recent operation in Kosovo concluded 

that military leaders had limited visibility over supplies because the 

communications support needed to fuse data from multiple collection 

points was inadequate.4

 Based on the preliminary observations from our 

current work, it appears that the same or similar problems continue to 

exist in OIF. 

• Other Logistics Issues. DOD and military service officials raised a 

number of other logistics-related issues with us during our review. 

Although these issues need to be explored further, they are included in 

this report because they may have contributed to the recent logistics 

problems. There were indications of the following: 

• At times there were shortages of some spares or repair parts needed by 

deployed forces. Military personnel we spoke with noted shortages of 

 2

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Lack of Accountability Over 

Materiel During Redeployment, GAO/NSIAD-92-258 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992). 

3

 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to the Congress 

(Washington, D.C.: April 1992). 

4

 Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report: Report to 

the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2000). 
Page 5 GAO-04-305R Defense Logistics 

items such as tires, tank track, helicopter spare parts, and radio 

batteries. As a result, units resorted to cannibalizing vehicles or 

circumventing normal supply channels to keep equipment in ready 

condition. 

• Army prepositioned equipment used for OIF was not adequately 

configured to match unit needs. For example, parts inventories 

contained in the prepositioned stocks were not sufficient to meet the 

needs of the units that relied on them. 

• DOD contractors used for logistics support during OIF were not always 

effective. For example, we were told that some commercial shippers 

were unable to provide “door-to-door” delivery of supplies to units in 

the theater, as was required by their contracts. 

• Physical security at ports and other distribution points in the theater 

was not always adequate to protect assets from being lost or taken by 

unauthorized personnel. For example, Army officials noted cases 

where vehicles and expensive communications and computer 

equipment had been lost from various distribution points in Kuwait. 

In developing these issues for this briefing, we held discussions with 

officials from key DOD and military service organizations responsible for 

logistics support and materiel management policies and procedures in the 

United States, Europe, and the OIF theater of operations in the Middle 

East. Our audit work primarily focused on Army and Marine Corps 

operations. In the theater of operations, we visited logistics support 

activities in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, but we did not visit activities in 

Iraq. We also reviewed policies, procedures, and processes in place to 

maintain accountability and control over materiel as it moved to, within, 

and from the theater of operations. In addition, we reviewed lessons 

learned reports and other assessments of logistics support for Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm and other military operations, including 

OIF. We performed our review from April 2003 through December 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In providing oral comments on the briefing slides, DOD representatives 

from the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Supply Chain Integration) and other military logistics officials stated that 

they generally concurred with the observations we presented. They 

pointed out that the problems we identified were ones that they were also 

familiar with and noted that DOD was already taking a number of actions 

Scope and 

Methodology 

Agency Comments 
Page 6 GAO-04-305R Defense Logistics 

that address some of them. For example, they stated that the Secretary of 

Defense has designated the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics) as the Defense Logistics Executive with the 

authority to address all logistics and supply chain issues. In addition, the 

Secretary of Defense designated the U.S. Transportation Command as a 

single distribution process owner to address problems with the 

distribution process that hampered DOD’s ability to optimally support 

deployed forces. Finally, the DOD representatives noted that, in October 

2003, DOD issued a policy directing the use of radio frequency 

identification technology as a standard business process across the 

department to address visibility problems. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 

Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and 

subcommittees that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for 

DOD. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available 

at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-8365 or e-mail me at solisw@gao.gov. Key contributors to this 

report were Kenneth Knouse, Cary Russell, Gerald Winterlin, Jason 

Venner, Kenneth Daniell, Tinh Nguyen, and Nancy Benco. 

Sincerely yours, 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosure 
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