The Honor able Ka rl S. Fore ster, Senior United States District Judge for the E astern * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0339n.06 Filed: May

15, 2007 Nos. 06-1192 and 06-1657 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
ERI C CARL YL E DEAN a nd EL I Z AB ETH DEA

N, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , V.
CI TY OF BA Y CI TY, MI CHI GAN, ROBERT V. B EL L EMAN, and JAMES PAL ENI CK, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Before: MERRITT and MARTIN, Cir cuit Judges; F OREST ER, Senior District

Judge. * KA RL S. FORESTER, S enior Distric t Judge. The P laintiffs-Appe llants, Eric Carly le Dean and Eliz abeth De an, filed a

civil rig hts complaint ag ainst the d e f e n d a nts a ll e g in g

c o nstitut ional violations and var ious state law cla ims based upon the alleg ed wr ong ful termin at i on of Eric Dea n’s employ ment. After the fil ing of the def endants’ motions for summar y judgme nt, the Dea

ns sought to amend their Complaint to assert a dditional claims, i n cludi ng a cla im under Title I of the2

Americ ans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (here inaft er the “ADA ”). The district court
su bs e qu e ntl y

g ra nte d th e de fe nd ants ’ m oti on s for su mma ry jud g me nt, de nie d th e De ans ’ m oti on to amend, a nd judgme nt was ente red in fa vor of the defe ndants. There afte r, the Dea ns moved the cour

t to rec onsider dismissing their c laims and for le ave to amend their Complaint to add a cla im under Title I I o f t h e ADA. The district cour t denied the De ans’ motion to rec onsider. This appe al followed. I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND On J uly 10, 2000, Eric De an was hired as Direc tor of P ower & Technolog y for the City

of B ay City , M ic hig an. As Di re c tor of Pow e r & Te c hn olo g y , De an ser ve d as a de pa

rtme nt h e a d w ith oversig ht authority

of B ay City ’s elec tric powe r supply . Dea n repor ted direc tly

to Ba y City Manag er J ames Palenic k. Over the cour se of the next y ear , Palenick develope d signific ant conc erns r eg ardingDea n’s abilities to administ er the depar tment, ma n age employ ees, a nd overse e B ay

City ’s elec tric powe r supply . When Dean r eturne d to work after underg oing a gastric by pass operation in November 2001, Palenick and othe rs noticed that De an’s c og nitive think in g , lu c id it y , a n d th o ug ht proce ss was slowed, that he dozed in and out of consciousness at staff meeting s, spoke with a slow, slurred speec h, and failed to re spond coher ently to questions posed by

supervisors. An e x te n s iv e p e r f o r ma n c e e valuation of De an d a te d July 27 , 20 02 re ve a le d a lit any of sp e c if ic job pe rf

or manc e de fi c ie nc ie s. As a re su lt, Palenick hire d a private investigat ions firm to conduct a ba ckg round investig ation and employ ee productivity

surveillance of Dean. Be fore completion of the investig ation, howeve r, Palenick w as terminated a s City

Manag er on Aug ust 5, 2002. Robert B ell em an wa s h ired to re place Palenick as City Manag er on Aug ust 9, 2002.3

S u rv eillance ag ainst Dea n continued, and reve aled no evidenc e that Dea n used alcohol o r d ru gs during his employ

ment with Ba

y City
. Another perf

ormanc e evaluation of Dea n was c ompleted on No ve mbe r 2 1, 20 03 . T his e va luatio n a lso no te d D e an’ s fa ilure to ad e qu a te ly pe rf or m hi s jo b d

uti e s. On Novembe r 24, 2003, B elleman ter minated Dean’s employ

ment, citing poor job perfor mance and the unprofitability

of the e lectric utilit y

as the re asons for his ter

mination. A g ri e va nc e he ari ngwa s h e ld o n D e c e mbe r 8 , 2 00 3. De an a dv ise d th at he ha d n oth ingto prese nt and wante d the matter to g o to arb i t ration. On April 7, 2004, Dean withdre w from arbitration. This civil rig hts action wa s subsequently filed pursua

nt to 42 U.S.C . § 1983 on May 3, 2004. I n their C omplaint, the Deans alleg e that Eric Dean was terminated in reta liation for eng ag ing in p ro te c te d s pe e c h und e r the F ir st Ame ndme nt an d in viol a tio n of his pr oc e dura l due pr oc e ss r ig hts under the Four

teenth Amendmen t
. T h e C o mplaint also asserts state tort a nd brea ch of c ontrac t claims. The named def

endants, the City

of B ay City , Michig an, R o bert B elleman, a nd J ames Palenick, filed the ir answe rs deny ing the Dea

ns’ claims. Di sc ov e r y s o o n c o m m e n c e d an d r e v e a l e d t o t h e d e f e n d an t s t h a t D e an h a d a p r o b l e m w ith alcohol and pr escr iption pain pill s during his employ ment. At the conc lusion of the di s co v ery period, the de fenda

nts filed their motions for summary judgme nt. B efor e the district cour t ruled on the motions for summary judgme nt, the Dea

ns filed a m o t i o n to amend their Complaint to assert claims for inva sion of privac y , violation of Title Iof the AD A, and wr ong ful dischar g e. On Oc tober 28, 2005, the district c ourt denied the Dea ns’ motion to amend on the g rounds it was untimely and the amendme nt would be futile. Th e n, on De c e mbe r 3 0, 20 05 , th e dis tr ic t c ourt dis mi ss e d, wi th p re

jud ic e , th e De a ns ’
c on sti tut ion a l c la ims against B ay City and B e lle man. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de c lin e d to e xer c ise4

supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed without prejudice the D eans’ state law c laims ag ainst Ba y City , Be lle m an , and P alenick. O n J anuar y 9, 2006, the Dea

ns filed a motion for r econside ration seekingrec onsideration of the district court’s orde r ente ring judgme nt in favor of the def endants a nd de nying th e Dean s’ mot ion to a me nd the Com pla int , a nd fo r t he fi rs t ti me se e kin g to a

me nd the ir
c omp la int to a dd a c la im und e r T itl e I Iof

the AD A. On Janua

ry 13 , 2 00 6, the De ans fi le d th e ir notice of a

ppeal r eg ardingthe district court’s ord er gra nting the de fenda nts’ motion for summary judgme nt, but not the dist rict cour t’s order of October 28, 2005 denying the Dea n’s motion to amend. The district cour

t, on Febr uary 16, 2006, denied the D eans’ motion for rec onsideration. On April 11, 2006, the Dea ns filed a motion see king an extension of time to file an ame nded
no tic e of a pp e a l to c ha lle ng e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of its mot ion fo r r e c on sid e ra tio n. On Ap ri l 21, 2006, the district c ourt g rante d the Dea ns’ motion to extend time to f ile an ame nded appe al. An amende d notice of a

ppeal wa s filed on April 24, 2006 cha lleng ing the district court’s De cembe r 30, 2005 order and judgment and the Februa ry 16, 2006 order denying the motion for rec onsideration. II. JURISDICTION OVER THE DEANS’ AP P EAL Be fore turning to the merits of the Dea ns’ appea l, this Court must first addre ss whether it has jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

his ma tte r. Th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e dure re qu ir e lit igants in c ivi l
case s to file a notice of

appea l “with the district cler k within 30 day s af

t er t h e judgme nt or order
a pp e a le d is e nte re d. ” F e d. R. A pp . P. 4( a )( 1) (A ). Th is 30 day pe ri od , how e ve r, is t oll e d b y c e rt a in post-decision m otions, including a m otion for reconsider ation, provided the tolling m otion is filed wi thi n 10 da y s a ft e r e ntr

y of the jud g me nt. F e d. R. A

pp . P. 4( a )( 4) ; see also M

yers v . Ace Hardware, Inc. , 777 F.2d 1099, 1103 ( 6 Cir. 1985). I n this case, the district c ourt enter ed its Opinion and th Orde r and judg ment on Dec ember 30, 2005 and the De ans filed a timely notice of a

ppeal on JanuaryDef endant Palenic k argues that the De ans’ motion for r econside ration and notice of 1 a pp e a l are un tim e ly

wi th r e sp e c t to the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s Oc tob e r 2 8, 20 05 or de r d e nyingthe ir motion for leave to file an amended a ppeal. How ever , the denial of a re quest for le ave to f

ile an amende d complaint is not im mediately appea lable. Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Pe ndleton , 889 F.2d 1509, 1511 n.11 ( 6 Cir. 1989). Only afte r entry

of final judg ment does such a non-final th ruling become appea lable. McLaurin v. Fische r , 768 F.2d 98, 102 ( 6 Cir. 1985). th 5 13 , 2 00 6. Ho we ve r, pr ior to fi lin g the ir no tic e of a

pp e a l, the De ans fi le d, on Janu ary 9, 20 06 , th e ir motion for rec onsideration of the district cour t ’s entry of judg ment in favor of

the def endants a nd denial of the Dea

ns’ motion to amend the complaint to a dd a claim under Title I Iof the AD A. The notice of a

ppeal wa s fi l ed afte r the c ourt enter ed a judg ment, but before the cour t disposed of the motion for rec onsideration; there fore , the notice of appea l becomes e ffe ctive on the date the district
co u rt denied the D eans’ motion for rec onsideration - F ebrua ry 16, 2006. See F e d
. R. A pp . P. 4(a) (4)( B)
. Be cause the orde r deny

ing their motion to rec onsider wa s entere d on Fe bruar y 16, 2006, the Dea ns had thirt y d ay s fr o m Fe bruar y 16, 2006 to file an amended notice of appe al of that orde r. 1 F e d. R. A pp . P. 4( a ). Al tho ug h th e De ans fa ile d to fi le an ame nd e d noti c e of a pp e a l with in t

his thi rt y day period, they did f

ile a motion for extension of time to amend their appe al to include the district court’s de nial of their motion to rec onsider on April 16, 2006. Under Rule 4(a) (5), the district c ourt may extend the time to file a notice of a ppeal by thirty day s if a par

ty files a motion fo r extension of time no later tha

n thirty day s after

the time presc ribed for

filing a notice of a

ppeal, pr ovided the pa r t y s h o w s e xc u s a

b l e n e g l e c t o r g o o d c a

u s e . F e d
. R
. A p p . P
. 4 ( a ) ( 5 )
. I n t h i s c a s e , the De a ns ’ motion for extension of time to amend their appea l was filed within the pre scribed sixty day period and the district cour

t found g ood cause for the delay based on rec ent events in related l itigation. The district court thus g rante d the Dea ns’ motion, and order ed that an ame nded notice of appea l be filed6

on or bef ore Ma y 3, 2 0 0 6
. The De ans’ amended notice of appe al was f iled on April 21, 2006. Acc ording ly , this court has juris diction to hear the Dea ns’ appe al of the district c ourt’s orde rs of Dec ember

30, 2005 and F ebrua

ry 16, 2006. III . THE D ISTRIC T C OU RT ’S DE CISI ON TO DE NYLEA VE TO A M EN D I S AF F IRMED ON ALTERNATIVE GROUN DS The De ans orig inally broug ht this wrongf ul termination action alleg ing va rious fede ral a

nd state law the ories. Howeve r, afte r discovery reve aled evidenc e of Er ic Dea n’s alcoholism and drug depende nce, the Dea

ns attempted to asser

t, i nte r a lia , an additional wr ong ful termination theory
un de r t he AD A ba se d on the ir a lle g a tio n tha t the de fe nd ants re g ard e d E ri c De an a s d isa ble d b y his alcoholism and drugdepende nce. Reviewing the Dea ns’ motion to amend under Rule 15 ( a) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, the district cour t noted t hat di scover

y was c losed and a llowing the amendment would r esult in the reope ning of discovery and undue prejudice to the def endants. More imp or tantl y , th e dis tr ic t court he ld that the pr op os e d cla im und e r Tit le I of the AD A w ou ld b e futil e beca use the De ans fa iled to pur sue the requisite administrative r elief pr ior to filing suit. The De ans d o n o tap p ea l t h i s ru l i n g. The district cour

t then entered summ ary judgme nt on the Deans’ federa l claims, and dec lined to exercise jurisdiction over the Dea ns’ state lawclaims. I n an ap p ar en t effort to avoid the administrative exhaustion require ment contained in Title I of t he ADA , and af ter judg ment had bee n
e nte re d in fa

vo r of the de fe nd ants , th e De ans so ug ht t o ame nd the ir c omp la int

to a sse rt fo r t he fi rs t time a claim for wrong ful termination under Title I I of the ADA. Be cause the Dean s ’ p ro p osed amendment wa s contained in a motion to reconsider, the district court re viewed this matter pur suant to Rule 59(e) a

nd Rule 60(b) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e.7

Whil e no tin g tha

t th e Sixth C ir c uit

ha d n ot y e t reso lve d th e iss ue of wh e the r T itl e I Iis applicable in employ

ment case s, the district court re viewed the curr ent state of the law and
c on c lud e d th a t “ it i s unli ke ly tha t th e Sixth C ir c uit

wo uld ho ld t hat Ti tle I Iof

the AD A a

pp lie s to
e mpl oy me nt c a se s, wh ic h a

re c ov e re d e xplic itl y

by Ti tle I . M oreove r, even if Ti tle I Ia pp lie s to employ ment case s, the administrative rul e requires a claimant to abide by

the exhaustion require ments stated in Title I .” I t is on these g rounds that the district court de nied the De ans’ attempt to proce ed on the Ti tle I I claim. Whil e thi s Court ag ree s that the district court wa s corr ect in deny ing the Dea ns’ motion, the decision will be aff irmed for other re asons supported by the re cord. See Salve Re gin a Co lle

ge v . R us se ll , 4 99 U. S. 2 25 , 2 31 (1 99 1) (“ The ob lig a tio n o f r e sp on sib le a pp e llate jurisdiction impl ies the re quisite authority to reviewindepende ntly a lower court’s de terminations”); An dr e ws v . S

tat e of O hio , 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6 Cir. 1997) (holding that this c ourt may aff irm on any th g rounds supported by

the re cord, e ven if diff

ere nt from the district cour t’s g rounds). Although the Dea

ns’ motion was couc hed as a motion for rec onsideration under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) , the Dea

ns were actua lly

attempting to asser

t a new claim for the first time. A motion for r econside ration base d on Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) is not t he prope r vehic le for a sserting a new claim for the first time. Rather, Rule 15(a) g overns motions for lea ve to amend ple ading s, and states in pertinent par

t that “a pa

rty may amend the pa

rty ’s pleading only by

leave of cour

t or by written consent of the adver se par ty ; and leave shall be fr eely g iven when justice so require s.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 1 5( a ). Whil e thi s is a

lib e ra l st and ard , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ne e d n ot g ra

nt l e a ve to a

me nd if the re is evidenc e of de lay , p re

j u d i ce, or futility
. Fo ma n v . D av is , 3 71 U. S. 1 78 , 1 82 (1 96 2) ; Midkiff v. Adams County Regional W ater District , 4 09 F .3 d 7 58 , 7 67 (6 Cir . 2 00 5) ; Inge v. Rock Financial th Corp. , 388 F.3d 930, 937 ( 6 Cir. 2004). I n this case, discove ry was c losed , dispositi ve motions th8

wer e filed, and judgme nt had already been entere d in favor of t he defenda nts. Allowing the Dea

ns to p ro c e e d w iththe ir

pr op os e d ame ndme nt at th is j un c tur e wo uld have ne c e ssi ta te d, a t a

min imum, the re opening of discover

y and anothe r round of

dis p o sitive moti ons. Given the substantial pre judice thi s w ou ld i mpa

rt up on the de fe nd ants , th e dis tr ic t c ourt wo uld no t ha ve a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in denying the Dea

ns’ attempt to asser

t a claim under

Title I Iof the ADA. Conseque ntly , the dec ision of the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nyingthe De ans le a ve to a sse rt a c la im und e r T itl e I Iof

th e AD A i s AFF I RMED on these alter native g rounds, and this Court declines to reac h the novel issue of w hether Ti tle I I of the AD A a

pp lie s to e mpl oy

me nt c a se s. IV . THE D ISTRIC T C OU RT DI D N OT ERR I N D ISM ISSI NG THE DEAN S’ P RO CE DU RA L D UE P RO CE SS C LA IM S. Wit h respe ct to t h e district court’s de nial of the De ans’ motion to rec onsider the or der g ranting summary

judgme nt on their fede ral c laims, this cour t should apply

a de novo standard of revie w using the s ame standard employ ed by the di strict court. Gage Produc ts. Co. v. Henke l Corp. , 393 F.3d 629, 637 ( 6 Cir. 2004). Summary judgme nt is proper wher e no g enuine issue of materia l th fac t e x ists and the movant is e ntitled to judgme nt a s a matter of law. Mo r o s s Ltd. Partnership v. Fleck enstein C a

p i t a l , Inc. , 4 66 F .3 d 5 08 , 5 15 (6 Cir . 2 00 6) ; se e als o F e d
. R
. C i v . P
. 5 6 ( c )
. In th

c onsi deri ng a mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, e vid e nc e is t o b e c on str ue d, and a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces the ref

rom are to be construed, in the light most fa vorable to the non-movant. The issue is whether the evidenc e presents a sufficient disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one par ty must preva il as a matter of law. Mo ro ss , 466 F.3d at 515. “The me re
e xist e n c e o f

a s c i n t i l l a o f e v i d e n c e i ns u

p p o rto f t h e [n o n - m o v an t ]’ s p o s i t i o nw i l l b e i n s u f f i c i e nt; there must be evidenc e on which the jury could re asonably

find for the plaintiff.” Id
.9

Th e De ans c on te nd

tha t E ri c De an’ s te rm ina

tio n vio la te d h is r ig hts un de r t he Du e Pr oc e ss Clause of the F ourtee nth Amendment b ecause the pr e- a nd post-termination proce dures we re
c on sti tut ion a lly

ina de qu a te . T he F ourteent h Ame ndme nt’ s g ua ra nte e of pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss
assure s that the deprivation of life, liberty , or property “be prec eded by notice and opportunity for
a hear ing appropr iate to the nature of the c ase.” Cle v e lan d Bd. of E du c ati on v . Lo ud

e rm ill , 4 70 U. S. 53 2 (1 98 6)
. Whe n fa c e d wi th a c la im fo r vio la tio n o f d ue pr oc e ss r ig hts , f

e de ra l c ourt s e ng a g e in a two-step a

naly sis. First, the court must deter mine whether a prote cted pr operty interest exists, and
sec o n d , wh at proce dures a re r equire d to protect that intere st. Singfield v. Akron Me tropolit an Housing Auth. , 389 F .3 d 5 55 , 5 65 (6 Cir . 2 00 4) ; Johnston-Taylor v. Gannon , 907 F.2d 1577, 1581 th (6 Cir. 1990). th Gene rally , state civil serva nts may have a proper

ty interest in c ontinued employ ment under
cer tain circ umstances a

nd must be aff

orded due proce ss before being discharg ed. Lou de rm ill , 470 U. S. 5 38 ; Relford v. Lexington-Fa ye t t e Urban County Gove rnment , 390 F.3d 452, 460 ( 6 Cir. th 2004). Howe ver, c ourts must look t o an indepe ndent s ource , such as state law, to deter mine whether or not a property

interest exists. Lou de rm ill , 470 U.S. at 539. A showing that a civil serva nt may be fire d only

for c ause, by

operation of s t at e co n t rac t law, statute, administrative rule s and regulations is suff

icient to satisfy

the first step of the analy sis. Farhat v. Jopk e , 370 F.3d 580, 595 (6 Cir. 2004). th Under

Michig an law, a

plaintiff ca

n prove he is a “just cause ” employ ee by three means: “( 1) proof of a ‘co n trac tual provision for a de finite term of e mploy ment or a pr ovision forbidding dis c ha rg e a bs e nt j us t c a

us e ;’ (2 ) a n e xpre ss a g re e me nt, e ith e r w ri tte n o r o ra l, r e g ard ingjob se c ur ity that is clear

and unequivoc al; or (3) a contr actua l provision, impl ied at law, wh ere an e mploy er’ s10

policies and proc edure s instil l a ‘le g itimate expectation’ of job sec urity in the employ ee.” Lytle v. Malady , 5 7 9 N. W
. 2 d

9 0 6 , 9 1 1 (M i ch
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan , 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)). There is no dispute among the parties that no c ontrac tual p r o v i s i o n g u ar an t e e i n g “

j u s t c a u s e ” t e r m i n a t i o n e xi s t s . N o r i s t h e r e an y e v i d e n c e of a n e xpre ss written or or al ag ree ment. Howeve r, the e vidence does sugg est that Ba y City ’s policies and pr oc e dure s c re a te d a

le g iti ma te e xpe c ta tio n o f a se c ur e job that wou ld not be wi thd ra wn wi tho ut j us t
cause . For

instance, B ay

City ’s employ

ment manual sets out a deta iled g rieva nce pr ocedur e in which
e mpl oy e e s ma

y c ha lle ng e de c isi on s to te rm inate , in c lud ingthe ri g ht to a hearin g be fo re the c ity commission. S uch a pr ocedur e is inconsistent with an employ er’ s pri v i l ege o f dischar g ing employ ees at wi l l
. Moreove r, B ay City indeed of

fer ed Eric Dea

n the rig ht of g rieva

nce to be followed by

arbitration, ag ain sug g esting that he is not an at-will employ ee. T hus, the Dea ns have
e sta bli sh e d th a t E ri c De an ha d a pr op e rt y int e re st s uf

fi c ie nt t o tr ig g e r t

he se c on d s te p o f t

he ana ly sis
. The for mality of the proc ess due unde r fe dera l law “de pends upon the importanc e of the [property ] i ntere st” at stake. Farhat , 370 F.3d at 595. I n this case, the D eans c hallenge the sufficie ncy

of both the pre -termination and post-te rmination hear ings. With respec t to t h e pre te rm inatio n d

ue pr oc e ss, the Sixth C ir c uit sim ply re qu ir e s n oti c e and

an o pp or tun ity to p re se nt h is
o r h e r s id e o f th e s to r

y to th e o f

f ic ia l r e s p o n s ib le f

o r th e te r mi n a ti o n . Id .; B u ck

ner v. City of Hi gh lan d P ar

k , 901 F.2d 491, 494 ( 6 Cir. 1990). Eric De an’s job per formanc e re views, which he th dis c us se d w ithde fe nd ant B e lle man, g a ve him no tic e of his defi cie nc ie s w e ll i n a dv anc e of his te rm inatio n. Th e fact th at th e no tic e ma de no re fe re nc e to h is d e pe nd e nc e on dr ug s o r a lc oh ol i s irrele vant since the defe ndants cl ea rl y had no knowledg e that his poor job per formanc e may have been r elated to his drugand alc ohol depende ncy . Certainly , the not ice provided to Eric De an wa s11

constitutionally

adequate. Er ic De an w a s a lso a ff

or de d a pr e -t e rm inatio n o pp or

tun ity to me t w ithB e lle man to dis c us s his perf ormanc e evaluation on November 21, 2003. Eric Dean reviewe d the eva luation, challeng ed the alleg ations that he had lied, a nd left the mee ting without furthe r discussion. By letter of November

24, 2003, Eric De an wa s notified of his termi n at i o n . Pursuant to Ba y City ’s rules, on Dec ember 8, 2003 a grie vance hear ing was held wher ein Eric Dea n advised he had nothing to present and simply

wanted the matter to g o to arbitration befor e a neutral de cision-maker as allowe d under the ru le s. Ho we ve r, on

Ap ri l 7, 2004 , Eri c De an w ith dr e w f ro m arb itr a tio n. B y

de c lin ingto participate in the post-termination ar bitration, Eri c D e a

n w a iv e d w h a te v e r r e ma in e d o f his proce dural due proc ess claim. Farhat , 370 F.3d at 596. Th e Dea ns argue that E ri c De an w ith dr e w f ro m arb itr a tio n b e c a

us e he c ou ld n ot a ff

or d to obtain the necessar

y documents re quested pursua nt to the Fre edom of Information Ac t. Howeve r, th e r e le v an t a

r b it r ati o nr u le s c le ar ly

p r o v id e th a t a

nar b it r a to r ma y in d e p e n d e n tl y

s u b p o e n a a ny
nece ssa r y w it n e s s e s an d d o c u me n ts
. A c c o r d in g ly , th e d e c is io n o f th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d e n y ing the Dea ns’ proc edura l due proc ess cha lleng es to Eric D ean’ s termination is AFF I RMED.