[J-49A-2019 and J-49B-2019] [MO: Todd, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

SAMANTHA SAYLES, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS 

SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Appellee

v.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant

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No. 58 MAP 2018

Certification of Question of Law from 

the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Third Circuit at No. 17-3463.

ARGUED: May 15, 2019

WILLIAM H. SCOTT,

Appellee

v.

TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant

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No. 59 MAP 2018

Certification of Question of Law from 

the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Third Circuit at No. 17-3769.

ARGUED: May 15, 2019

CONCURRING OPINION

JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: November 20, 2019

I join the well-reasoned Majority Opinion in full. I write separately to emphasize 

that, in my view, the circumstances of this case evince what may be an unsettling trend 

among automobile insurance companies to attempt to circumvent clear statutory 

language through contrary policy provisions.
Here, the plain language of Subsection 1796(a) of the Motor Vehicle Financial 

Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1796(a), demonstrates that in passing this 

statutory provision, the Legislature intended “to set the irreducible requirements all 

insurers issuing policies of automobile insurance in this Commonwealth must meet in 

order to compel their insured to submit to an [independent medical examination (“IME”)] 

when the insured does not voluntarily comply with the insurer’s request to do so.”1 

Majority Opinion at 22. The IME insurance policy provisions at issue in this case clearly 

allow insurers to circumvent these statutory mandates. Thus, as concluded by the 

Majority, the IME provisions violate public policy and consequently are void.

We have seen this practice before. Indeed, we recently concluded that an 

insurance policy’s “household vehicle exclusion” conflicted with the clear mandates of 

Section 1738 of the MVFRL, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738. Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnity 

Company, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019). In Gallagher, we noted that the MVFRL made it

clear that to effectuate a waiver of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, an 

insurer must obtain the insured’s signature on a statutorily-prescribed waiver form in order 

 

1 Subsection 1796(a) states, in full, as follows:

(a) General rule.--Whenever the mental or physical condition of a person 

is material to any claim for medical, income loss or catastrophic loss 

benefits, a court of competent jurisdiction or the administrator of the 

Catastrophic Loss Trust Fund for catastrophic loss claims may order the 

person to submit to a mental or physical examination by a physician. The 

order may only be made upon motion for good cause shown. The order 

shall give the person to be examined adequate notice of the time and date 

of the examination and shall state the manner, conditions and scope of the 

examination and the physician by whom it is to be performed. If a person 

fails to comply with an order to be examined, the court or the administrator 

may order that the person be denied benefits until compliance.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1796.
to confer the insured’s knowledge of her rights to obtain coverage and her rejection of 

that coverage.

Gallagher, who was the insured, did not sign a staking waiver form. Nevertheless, 

GEICO, Gallagher’s insurance company, attempted to deny stacking coverage based 

upon a “household vehicle exclusion” “buried in an amendment” to the insured’s policy. 

Id. at 138. As in this case, we found that the insurance company’s practice of including 

policy provisions that conflict with the clear language of the MVFRL renders those 

provisions invalid and unenforceable. Id.

Likewise, in Generette v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Company, 957 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 

2008), we found that an “Other insurance” clause included in an automobile insurance

policy violated public policy as expressed in the MVFRL, requiring excess rather than gap 

underinsured motorist coverage. Generette emphasized that “the language triggering 

gap insurance is only in the policy, which cannot conflict with the MVFRL.” Id. at 1191. 

Accordingly, we found the “Other insurance” language of the policy to violate the express 

public policy of the MVFRL. 

I write now to highlight that, given these multiple cases in which we have 

encountered insurance companies including policy provisions inconsistent with the 

Legislature’s intent as set forth in the MVFRL, courts of this Commonwealth should be 

cognizant of this practice. Additionally, I respectfully suggest that the insurance industry 

should be more circumspect when it is tempted to “adjust” provisions of the MVFRL to its 

benefit notwithstanding contrary statutory provisions.