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90–096 PDF 2003

S. HRG. 108–186

AN ENLARGED NATO: MENDING FENCES AND

MOVING FORWARD ON IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 29, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., T1DELAWARE

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 8

Corzine, Hon. Jon S., U.S. Senator from New Jersey, prepared statement ....... 57

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement .. 37

Contributions of NATO Members Toward Iraq Reconstruction ................... 35

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, prepared statement ............. 27

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3

Powell, Hon. Colin L., Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18

Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Biden ........ 67

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, prepared statement ......... 45

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

American Hungarian Federation of Metropolitan Washington DC, Frank

Koszorus, Jr., president ....................................................................................... 58

American Jewish Committee, Jason F. Isaacson, director ................................... 60

Statement of David A. Harris, executive director .......................................... 61

Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, La ́szlo ́ Ha ́mos ........................................ 63

Transatlantic Security and NATO Enhancement Resolution of 2003 .......... 64

Slovak League of America, John Karch, Ph.D., executive director ..................... 64

(III)

(1)

AN ENLARGED NATO: MENDING FENCES AND

MOVING FORWARD ON IRAQ

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2003

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SH–

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Voinovich, Coleman, Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order. Today the committee is very pleased

to welcome Secretary of State Colin Powell. Members are anxious

to hear the Secretary’s views on the status of our alliances, the

Bush administration’s plans for Iraq, the developing situations in

the Middle East region and the Korean Peninsula, and estimates

of the State Department’s role in these critical endeavors.

The hearing begins an extraordinary month of activity for the

Foreign Relations Committee. Tomorrow we will meet to consider

a Resolution of Ratification to expand the NATO alliance to include

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I am confident the Senate will choose to pass the Protocols

of Accession for all seven candidates prior to President Bush’s

scheduled trip to Europe later this spring.

On Thursday we will hold a hearing on the President’s nominee

for Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs

and we will hold a coffee for President Uribe of Colombia. As early

as this week, we may begin floor consideration of the State Department authorization bill. Next week we plan to take NATO expansion to the floor and the following week to mark up a Foreign Assistance Authorization bill. Depending on the floor schedule, we

also hope to complete action on legislation to fight the global HIVAIDS pandemic.

All this must be done while the committee evaluates and responds to the evolving situations in Iraq, North Korea, Afghanistan, and other regional hot spots.

Secretary Powell, when you were last before our committee in

early February our Nation stood at the brink of war with Iraq.

Since that time, the intransigence and depravity of the regime of

Saddam Hussein has led to its destruction. Our military forces, led

by President Bush and joined by many coalition partners, executed

a swift and decisive battle plan that ejected the Iraqi Government

2

from power. All of us commend the skill, the bravery, the humanity

of our Armed Forces in executing this plan.

Despite our satisfaction with the outcome of the combat phase of

the war, we must recognize that we are probably closer to the beginning than to the end of our endeavors in Iraq. I have stated that

it may take up to 5 years of effort by coalition countries in Iraq

to fully achieve our goals of stability, reconstruction, disarmament,

and democracy.

This committee has been particularly interested in hearing from

the administration about its long-term strategy toward Iraq, commencing with hearings held by Chairman Biden last year and continuing with our hearings this year. Given substantial funding requirements, the need to inform the American people of the magnitude of the burdens to come, Congress and the administration

must work closely together if we are to succeed in Iraq.

I think many Foreign Relations Committee members would share

my opinion that the inter-branch partnership has yet to materialize, as it should. This committee has many questions, for which

we have received few answers. Congress provided emergency supplemental funding for relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and

we have not yet been consulted or informed, however, about the administration’s plans for use of those funds. We continue to strive

to determine the distribution of duties between various departments and agencies within the U.S. Government for reconstruction

activities, to identify the strategy of coordinating our efforts with

those of foreign governments and international organizations.

Our military forces and reconstruction teams are facing numerous hurdles in Iraq. The challenges include the rise of the Shiite

majority, the infiltration of Iranian agents, unilateral statements of

authority by various Iraqi nationals, the omnipresent threat of terrorist acts, reestablishing electricity, water service, securing Iraqi

antiquities, creating a police force to keep the peace, fairly and effectively distributing food and medicine and securing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and those with knowledge of them.

Over the long term, the challenges of developing a constitution

and establishing an Iraqi Government that is independent, stable,

and self-sufficient are truly enormous, and we understand that.

Our policies must be clear, transparent, and discussed in terms of

long-term security of the people of Iraq, the Middle East, and for

ourselves.

Even as we focus on Iraq, we realize the events of the last several months have sharply altered our relationship with allies and

the entire international community. The application of overwhelming U.S. military power in Iraq has changed the calculations

of some of our opponents. Meanwhile, differences over the U.S. approach to Iraq and revelations that some of our allies may have assisted Saddam Hussein’s government have chilled relations with

long-time friends.

It is in this context the committee will vote tomorrow on the expansion of NATO. In doing so, we will reaffirm the utility and the

necessity of our alliance relationships. But we are cognizant that

some of those relationships have suffered deep wounds.

Mr. Secretary, as the principal United States negotiator with foreign governments, we are anxious to hear from you on the status

3

of our alliances. How can these relationships be repaired and

strengthened? How can we ensure that military and economic burdens related to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism

do not fall overwhelmingly on the United States?

As we expand NATO, we must also retool it so it can be a mechanism of burden-sharing and mutual security in the war on terrorism. NATO should not be circumscribed by geographic boundaries when the principal threat against all alliance members is

global in nature.

Last week NATO announced its intention to take over the leadership of ISAF in Afghanistan. I applaud this move and congratulate

the administration on a crucial step toward peace and stability in

Afghanistan. Although NATO is not in a position at this time to

perform the same role in Iraq, a strong commitment by individual

NATO nations to contribute to long-term peacekeeping and humanitarian duties in Iraq would help heal alliance divisions and reaffirm its relevance.

As always, Mr. Secretary, it is an honor and a pleasure to have

you with us today. We look forward to your insights on these matters and others of your choosing and ask for a chance to engage you

in the dialog that we have called for.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Today the Foreign Relations Committee is very pleased to welcome Secretary of

State Powell. Members are anxious to hear your views on the status of our alliances,

the Bush administration’s plans for Iraq, the developing situations in the Middle

East region and on the Korean Peninsula, and your estimates of the State Department’s role in these critical endeavors.

This hearing begins an extraordinary month of activity for the Foreign Relations

Committee. Tomorrow we will meet to consider a resolution of ratification to expand

the NATO alliance to include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I am confident that the Senate will pass the Protocols of Accession for all seven candidates prior to President Bush’s scheduled trip to Europe later

this Spring. On Thursday we will hold a hearing on the President’s nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and we will hold a coffee

for President Uribe of Colombia. As early as this week, we may begin floor consideration of the State Department Authorization bill. Next week we plan to take NATO

expansion to the floor, and the following week we intend to mark up a Foreign Assistance Authorization bill. Depending on the floor schedule, we also hope to complete action on legislation to fight the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. All this must be

done while the Committee evaluates and responds to the evolving situations in Iraq,

North Korea, Afghanistan, and other regional hot spots.

Secretary Powell, when you were last before our committee in early February, our

Nation stood at the brink of war with Iraq. Since that time, the intransigence and

depravity of the regime of Saddam Hussein has led to its own destruction. Our military forces, led by President Bush and joined by many coalition partners, executed

a swift and decisive battle plan that ejected the Iraqi Government from power. All

of us commend the skill, bravery, and humanity of our Armed Forces in executing

this plan.

Despite our satisfaction over the outcome of the combat phase of the war, we must

recognize that we are probably closer to the beginning than to the end of our endeavors in Iraq. I have stated that it may take up to five years of effort by coalition

countries in Iraq to fully achieve our goals of stability, reconstruction, disarmament,

and democratization. This committee has been particularly interested in hearing

from the administration about its long-term strategy towards Iraq.

Given substantial funding requirements and the need to inform the American people of the magnitude of the burdens to come, Congress and the administration must

work closely together if we are to succeed in Iraq. I think many Foreign Relations

Committee members would share my opinion that this inter-branch partnership has

yet to materialize. This committee has many questions for which we have received

few answers. Congress provided emergency supplemental funding for relief and reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
4

construction efforts in Iraq. We have not yet been consulted or informed, however,

about the administration’s plans for use of these funds. We continue to strive to determine the distribution of duties between various departments and agencies within

the U.S. Government for reconstruction activities and to identified the strategy for

coordinating U.S. efforts with those of foreign governments and international organizations.

Our military forces and reconstruction teams are facing numerous hurdles in Iraq.

Challenges include the rise of the Shiite majority, the infiltration of Iranian agents,

unilateral statements of authority by various Iraqi nationals, the omnipresent

threat of terrorist acts, re-establishing electricity and water service, securing Iraqi

antiquities, creating a police force to keep the peace, fairly and effectively distributing food and medicine, and securing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and those

with knowledge of them. Over the long term, the challenges of developing a constitution and establishing an Iraqi Government that is independent, stable, and selfsufficient are enormous. Our policies must be clear, transparent, and discussed in

terms of long-term security for the people of Iraq and the Middle East.

Even as we focus on Iraq, we realize that the events of the last several months

have sharply altered our relationships with allies and the entire international community. The application of overwhelming U.S. military power in Iraq has changed

the calculations of some of our opponents. Meanwhile differences over the U.S. approach to Iraq and revelations that some of our allies may have assisted Saddam

Hussein’s government have chilled rFlations with long-time friends.

It is in this context that the committee will vote tomorrow on the expansion of

NATO. In doing so, we will re-affirm the utility and necessity of our alliance relationships. But we are cognizant that some of these relationships have suffered very

deep wounds. Secretary Powell, as the principal U.S. negotiator with foreign governments, we are anxious to hear from you on the status of our alliances. How can

these relationships be repaired and how can we ensure that military and economic

burdens related to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism do not fall

overwhelmingly on the United States?

As we expand NATO, we also must retool it, so that it can be a mechanism of

burden sharing and mutual security in the war on terrorism. NATO should not be

circumscribed by geographic boundaries when the principal threat against all alliance members is global in nature. Last week NATO announced its intention to take

over leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan. I applaud this move and congratulate

the administration on a crucial step toward peace and stability in Afghanistan. Although NATO is not in a position at this time to perform the same role in Iraq,

a strong commitment by individual NATO nations to contribute to long-term peacekeeping and humanitarian duties in Iraq would help heal Alliance divisions and reaffirm its relevance.

Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you with us today. We look forward to your

insights on these matters and to the chance to engage you in a dialog on the administration’s global strategic vision.

The CHAIRMAN. I call now upon the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, for his opening comments.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. It always is a pleasure, and I mean that

literally, to have you before us. The only problem is there is so

much on our plate and so much on your plate. We could take any

one of these subjects and I think fruitfully spend the entire day on

it and longer. We understand that you are being pulled in 75 different directions. And I mean it sincerely, we appreciate that. We

understand that and we appreciate your being here.

I know we will only be able to touch the surface on a number

of the issues that the chairman raised. But before I turn to the

business at hand this morning, NATO and our transatlantic alliance and Iraq, not to mention North Korea and a few others, I

want to take this opportunity to state—my mom has an expression.

She says: If there is something good about someone, tell them, because it is not told often enough. I want you to know how much

I personally and I know the chairman and everyone here admires

your performance over the last several months.

5

You have epitomized professionalism. You have brought not only

your military bearing, but your deep understanding of international relations, and your contacts and respect that you have

throughout the world has served us very, very well. You are the

very best spokesman in my view this country has or could have at

this time, and I just want you to know I personally appreciate it.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, sir.

Senator BIDEN. And I greatly welcomed your decision to go to

Brussels earlier this month, and I expect you will tell me everyone

thought that was a good idea, but I would not believe you. I

thought it was a hell of a good idea, you going, and you did it and

you did it well, at a very important moment with members of the

North Atlantic Council and representatives of the EU. The coalition

plans for the postwar Iraq and the possible roles for NATO and the

EU; you laid the groundwork for some discussion for that.

Your presence in Brussels and your personal credibility, which I

referenced earlier, with the European leaders in particular in my

view, most effectively underscored the administration’s stated commitment to involving the alliance and our partners in the reconstruction effort.

I suspect that this reassurance contributed to NATO’s consensus

decision to assume command of ISAF in Afghanistan, probably beginning as early as August. I hope it will also lead to an appropriate and effective role for NATO in Iraq. I also very much hope

that we will involve as many of our allies in key international organizations as possible, including the dreaded United Nations, the

way some people talk about it in securing and rebuilding Iraq in

more than a perfunctory way.

Bringing these players into the game offers two things that I

think we badly need in Iraq, legitimacy and a way to share the

burden. I know the members of this committee are not and I doubt

whether you or any other key people are surprised by what is transpiring now in Iraq. The public at large, not having been acquainted with what is likely to happen, seem very surprised, including by the incident that occurred in a town just outside of

Baghdad last night by our time today actually.

I do not think any of this, any of this, is surprising. I think there

is a whole lot more to come, and I know we have anticipated some

of this. But there are two understandable and competing pressures

in Iraq, to state the obvious, and I know you know this better than

any of us. The first is to withdraw quickly. It is the instinct. I became a broken record along with the chairman on this committee

talking about Johnny and Jane ain’t going to come marching home

right away like after the last war.

We all talked about, I think the public initially thought that

would be the case, but, on the one hand, there is this instinct, desire, and some rationale to bring our troops home as soon as we

can so we are not seen as occupiers. The second competing pressure

is to stay for the duration, to build a secure, stable, pluralistic Iraq

that is on the path to democracy. This is going to require significant time and significant resources.

I agree with the chairman. We have both been talking about this

notion that this could happen in months as being preposterous and

it is going to be somewhere in the range of five or maybe more

6

years. There was a very disturbing, but interesting, cartoon in today’s paper where the statue of Saddam was going down and a

statue of an Ayatollah was being raised in its place, and the caption said, ‘‘You wanted regime change.’’

I know that is not what we want, what the administration wants,

but to prevent that kind of thing from happening we are in for the

long haul. There is only one way to square this circle, it seems to

me, these competing instincts of avoiding leaving too early or, alternatively, bearing alone the massive burden of a prolonged U.S.

occupation or U.S. responsibility, and that is to internationalize the

problem.

The best way in my view to open the door to maximum participation by other countries and organizations is to get the United Nations to endorse, not run, not run, endorse, the security, humanitarian, rebuilding, and administrative missions in Iraq. Without

that endorsement, in my view—and I would be obviously very interested in your view—I think it will be very hard for leaders

whose people opposed the war in the first place to convince them

to pay for and run the risks of peace.

Iraq is not a prize, Mr. Secretary, as you well know, that we

should be fighting over. It is a complex society in a very tough

neighborhood, with incredibly, incredibly difficult problems to undertake being solved now. If we do not get help from other countries in a significant way, then we will soon find ourselves making

decisions in the most minute detail about the governance of Iraq.

If we are the only ones in charge, then we are the only ones going

to be there for the blame when anything goes wrong, and there will

be a lot to go wrong.

If we are the ones picking the new Iraqi Government, it will be

seen as a puppet regime by the Iraqi people and by the Iraqi neighbors. And if we are the only ones running this show, it will be our

sons and daughters patrolling the streets in Kirkuk and Tikrit,

running the risk of suicide bombers and snipers. It will be our taxpayers footing the entire bill in an overstretched budget, and we

will be the ones not only to pay totally for the war, but for the

peace.

So I hope that we have the wisdom to seek help and share responsibility for Iraq’s transition, and I would respectfully suggest

that retaliating against longstanding allies who were not with us

in the war, no matter how right we were and how wrong they were,

is beneath a great nation. It is beneath a great nation such as ours

and profoundly against our own interests.

I would also like to take this opportunity to commend your personnel, the State Department personnel responsible for NATO affairs. Under Secretary Grossman, Deputy Assistant Secretaries

Bradtke, Conley, and Bogue, and our Permanent Representative,

Nick Burns, our Ambassadors to the seven invited countries and

their staffs, they have all done an outstanding job in advising those

countries on their candidacy for membership and in preparing the

Members of the Senate to consider them.

Tomorrow this committee will mark up an amendment of the

North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, that was signed on April 4, 1949,

and we are going to enlarge that membership. I agree with the

7

chairman; I would be surprised if it is not unanimous and I think

we will move very quickly.

Five years ago, I had the privilege of being the floor manager for

the ratification for the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic. In the spirited Senate debate on NATO enlargement in 1998, there was already a larger agenda emerging, and

that was the entire future of the alliance. In the last months, Mr.

Secretary, that issue has taken center stage, so to speak. In fact,

the enlargement of NATO has become critical to the integrity of

our entire transatlantic relationship.

If we go about it the right way, it can also be helpful to our success in postwar Iraq. Moreover, the alliance as a whole will be

strengthened by the extension of Europe’s zone of stability eastward. It will be enhanced by the specialized capabilities of those

countries and their development of those capabilities in the current

combat and peacekeeping operations.

There is no doubt in my mind, the alliance will be fortified by

the admission of members whose passionate commitment to democracy and to the transatlantic relationship stems from the recent

raw and painful memory of having suffered under totalitarian rule.

As you know, national leaders at the Prague summit intricately

tied enlargement to the transformation of NATO’s mission and capabilities and responsibilities to the modern threats. Yet today,

only 5 months later, the leaders of France, Germany, Luxembourg

and Belgium met in Brussels to discuss the EU-based security arrangement as an alternative to NATO.

Now, I am not particularly concerned about the strategic implications of this meeting, but I am, however, concerned by the extent

to which it reflects dissension, maybe even some disarray, in the

alliance.

So I would welcome your views, Mr. Secretary, on the state of

our relationship with our current NATO allies and whether or not

the meeting in Brussels merely represents a lingering resentment

stemming from the raucous disputes in the run-up to this war with

Iraq, or does it indicate a parting of the ways with some of our allies regarding how to respond to fundamental security threats, and

if so, will that hinder a successful transformation of the alliance

mapped out in Prague earlier?

Without any further comment—and I would ask the remainder

of my statement be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in in full.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. I want to welcome you again. I look

forward to your testimony and want to state for the record—and

I know it holds for the chairman—that I appreciate—for those who

wonder whether we are kept informed, we are kept informed. You

never hesitate to call me. I appreciate your calls. I appreciate your

updates, and I just want to state that publicly so that people know

it is not just merely when we have you before the hearing. There

are constant contacts with you on the telephone and I want you to

know it is much appreciated.

Thank you.

[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]

8

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. It’s always a pleasure to have you speak with the Foreign

Relations Committee, and we particularly appreciate your coming up here at this

especially busy moment in our diplomacy.

Before I turn to the business at hand—NATO, the transatlantic relationship, and

Iraq—I would like to take this opportunity to say how much I admire your performance over the last several months.

You have epitomized professionalism and have been the very best spokesman for

and practitioner of U.S. foreign policy.

I greatly welcomed your decision to go to Brussels earlier this month and discuss

with members of the North Atlantic Council and representatives of the European

Union the Coalition’s plans for post-war Iraq and possible roles there for NATO and

the EU.

Your presence in Brussels, and your personal credibility with European leaders,

in my view, most effectively underscored the administration’s stated commitment to

involving the alliance and our European partners in reconstruction efforts.

I suspect that this reassurance contributed to the NATO’s consensus decision to

assume command of ISAF in Afghanistan, probably beginning in August. I hope

that it will also lead to an appropriate and effective role for NATO in Iraq.

I also very much hope that we will involve as many allies and key international

organizations as possible—including the United Nations—in securing and rebuilding

Iraq in more than a perfunctory way. Bringing these players into the game offers

two things that we need in Iraq—legitimacy and a way to share the burden.

The first is to withdraw quickly—to bring our troops home as soon as we can and

to not be seen as occupiers.

The second is to stay for the duration and build a secure, stable, and pluralistic

Iraq that is on the path to democracy. This will require significant time and resources.

There’s only one way to square this circle . . . to avoid leaving too early or, alternatively, bearing alone the massive burden of a prolonged U.S. occupation. And that

is to internationalize the problem.

The best way to open the door to maximum participation by other countries and

organizations is to get the United Nations to endorse—not run—the security, humanitarian, rebuilding and administrative missions in Iraq. Without that endorsement, it will be hard for leaders whose people opposed the war to convince them

to pay for and run the risks of the peace.

Iraq is not a prize that we should be fighting over. It is a complex society in a

tough neighborhood.

If we do not get the help of other countries in a significant way, then we will soon

find ourselves making decisions in the most minute details of Iraqi governance.

If we are the only ones in charge, then we will also get the blame for everything

that goes wrong.

If we’re the ones picking the new Iraqi government, it will be seen as a puppet

regime by the Iraqi people and by Iraq’s neighbors.

And if we’re the only ones running the show, it will be our sons and daughters

patrolling the streets of Kirkuk and Tikrit, running the risk of suicide bombers and

snipers. It will be our taxpayers footing the entire bill on an overstretched budget—

and after we’ve had to pay for the war.

So, I hope that we have the wisdom to seek help and share responsibility for

Iraq’s transition. And I would respectfully suggest that retaliating against long

standing allies who were not with us in the war—no matter how right we are and

how wrong they were—is beneath a great nation such as ours and profoundly

against our own interests.

I would also like to take this opportunity to commend your personnel responsible

for NATO affairs.

Under Secretary Grossman; Deputy Assistant Secretaries Bradtke, Conley, and

Bogue; our Permanent Representative to NATO Ambassador Burns; our Ambassadors to the seven invited countries, and their staffs have all done an outstanding

job in advising those countries on their candidacies for membership and in preparing the Members of the Senate to consider them.

Mr. Secretary, tomorrow this committee will mark up an amendment to the North

Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 to enlarge the membership of NATO.

Five years ago, I had the privilege of being the floor manager for the ratification

of the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

In the spirited Senate debate on NATO enlargement in 1998 there was already

a larger agenda emerging—the entire future of the alliance.

9

In the last few months, Mr. Secretary, that issue has taken center-stage, so to

speak. In fact, the enlargement of NATO has become critical to the integrity of our

entire transatlantic relationship. If we go about it the right way, it can also be helpful to our success in post-war Iraq.

Moreover, the alliance as a whole will be strengthened by the extension of Europe’s zone of stability eastward.

It will be enhanced by the specialized capabilities that these countries are developing and deploying in current combat and peacekeeping operations.

And there is no doubt in my mind that the alliance will be fortified by the admission of members whose passionate commitment to democracy—and to the transatlantic relationship—stems from the recent raw and painful memory of having suffered under totalitarian rule.

As you know, national leaders at the Prague Summit intricately tied enlargement

to the transformation of NATO’s missions and capabilities in response to modern

threats.

Yet today—only five months later—the leaders of France, Germany, Luxembourg

and Belgium met in Brussels to discuss an EU-based security arrangement as an

alternative to NATO.

Now I am not particularly concerned by the strategic implications of this confabulation. I am, however, concerned by the extent to which it reflects dissension—

maybe even disarray—in the alliance.

Mr. Secretary, I would welcome your views on the state of our relationship with

our current NATO allies.

Does today’s meeting in Brussels merely represent a lingering resentment, stemming from the rancorous disputes in the run-up to the war in Iraq?

Or does it indicate a parting of the ways with some of our allies regarding how

to respond to fundamental security threats?

If so, will that hinder the successful transformation of the alliance mapped out

last fall in Prague?

With respect to specific operational issues, can we ‘‘agree to disagree’’ in the future without calling into question the underpinnings of our alliance relationship?

I believe we have made headway in just the last few weeks in healing some of

the bruises from our heated disagreements over the use of force in Iraq.

Again, I would cite NATO’s decision on ISAF as a positive development and an

indication of the commitment of our allies to maintaining the relevance of NATO.

Coming to terms on a NATO role in Iraq is the next step. While I know there

is ongoing discussion among allies and with the coalition leaders on what a NATO

role might look, I would welcome your thoughts on what we might expect.

Once again, Mr. Secretary, let me say how delighted I am to welcome you to the

Foreign Relations Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Mr. Secretary, let me just say for the benefit of members of the

committee that there will be a rollcall vote at noon and we know

that you must leave to go to your duties at noon. So that will effectively be the end of the hearing. With that in mind, with the members’ permission, we will adopt a 5-minute question period at this

time. We have good attendance. That probably will mean that all

of us will have an opportunity to ask questions, and the Chair will

be somewhat more rigorous this morning in trying to keep things

within the confines of that, in fairness to all members.

We so much appreciate your coming and will you please proceed

with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF

STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Secretary POWELL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It

is a great pleasure to be here again and thank you for your opening

statement. Senator Biden, I thank you for your statement. Mr.

Chairman and members of the committee, I will try to be as rigorous in my answers within the 5-minute rule as you are with respect to your questions.

10

1The report referred to can be accessed on the Department of State’s Website at: http://

www.state.gov/m/rm/c6113.htm

Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, for your favorable comments directed toward the Department and the work

we have been doing. Senator Biden, your comments directed toward me really go right through me to the wonderful men and

women of the State Department who work so hard every day to

serve their Nation.

There has been a lot of discussion about this in recent days, some

of you may have noticed. Let me just take the privilege of being

here to put some of the criticism directed toward the Department

and our transforming efforts into a little bit of perspective. I take

the liberty of doing it now, here, because every time I have appeared before this committee over the last 3 years I have talked

about my role as foreign policy adviser to the President, but also

my role as the leader and manager of the Department of State.

When I became Secretary of State, the President announced my

nomination, I immediately assembled all of the reports that have

been written about the Department of State in recent years. There

were five or six such reports describing changes that the authors

believed were needed, and I even found one report that represents

the work of a panel that I was on. So in effect I was now being

given the opportunity to act on recommendations that I myself had

made as part of a panel.

I am very pleased that over the last 2-plus years we have worked

hard to fix some of the problems that were real within the State

Department or imagined about the State Department. We have

presented our case to this committee and other committees of the

Congress. You have supported us in a way that the Department

has not been supported in recent years. We went for years with our

budget being cut, with our personnel being cut. We went for years

in the nineties with the Congress not allowing us to hire any new

people in the State Department. We went for years with a broken

overseas building operation. We went for years without getting into

some of the personnel policies that we needed to take a look at.

We have not just been talking about transformation for the last

couple of years or studying it any longer. We have been working

out all of these issues. The instructions I gave to my staff when I

took over Department of State is we are not doing any more transformation studies; we are going to start working from the studies

that are before us.

I am pleased that, as the chief steward of the Department, that

I have reported what we have done to the Members of Congress as

well as to those organizations that were critical of us. Recently we

have been given a report card by these organizations and it has

been written up rather widely about how the State Department is

transforming in a positive way.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this report available to the members of the committee at an appropriate moment.1

To show the kinds of things that are happening in the Department, we have instituted leadership training at every single level

from junior officer all the way up to career officials going out to be

ambassadors. We have got tens of thousands of young Americans

11

wanting to become part of the Department. We gave the Foreign

Service exam three Saturdays ago and 20,000 young Americans

took the test that day because they want to be a part of the work

that we are doing.

We have fixed our information technology system so that we are

now working at the speed of light and we are making sure that

every member of the Department has access to information technology. We have a Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, so we are dealing with all of the structural issues that have been problematic

within our personnel system.

We have lost lives along with our colleagues in uniform. Since I

have been Secretary of State, three members of our family have

lost their lives to terrorist incidents, two in Pakistan and one in

Jordan. So we are out there on the front lines of offense. We are

out there carrying the Nation’s message. We are out there taking

the values of this Nation to the people of the world, and we are

dedicated people, committed to the values, committed to the values

of this President.

One can disagree about a particular policy. One can criticize

about a particular policy and take issue with a particular policy,

and that is all fine and good. But one has to do it in a manner that

does not undercut the people who are carrying out those policies.

There is no more loyal, faithful, group of employees in this Federal

Government than the employees who are in the Department of

State working for me, but more importantly working for the policies of the President of the United States and, above all, working

for the values of the American people.

We will continue to transform the Department, not talk about it,

not have panel meetings on it, but get on with the work of transformation. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that remains my goal,

and at least some people who have more than passing knowledge

of the situation have given us a pretty good grade as to what we

have done. I also take as a statement of endorsement the increased

funding that this Congress has provided, the increased hiring authority that you have given to the Department so that we can make

the Foreign Service vibrant and more relevant, and I give you my

commitment to continue to move in that regard.

Mr. Chairman, I do have a prepared statement with respect to

the issue at hand, the expansion of NATO, which I would like to

submit for the record and then present a shorter statement.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in full.

Secretary POWELL. My statement is a little bit shorter, but I

think it is important that I go through it in some detail because

of the significance of the step that the Congress, the Senate, will

be taking tomorrow. But I am very pleased to testify that the enlargement of NATO agreed to in Prague last November is a positive step forward and it is a significant achievement in the future

of the alliance.

I have to kind of go back to January 1989, when I had just left

my position as National Security Adviser to President Reagan, and

I had been through a number of summit meetings with then-President Gorbachev and President Reagan, and I returned to the Army,

and the Army, in either a moment of weakness or a moment of wisdom, made me a four-star general and gave me responsibility over

12

all of the deployable forces in the United States, most of them designed to reinforce our forces in Europe in time of war against the

Soviet Union.

Because I had seen so much in the 2 years that I worked with

President Reagan about the way in which the Soviet Union and

Europe and the world was changing, I said to my Army colleagues

in one of our early commanders conferences: ‘‘Guys, a day is coming

soon when the Warsaw Pact is going to go away and all of those

countries are going to be asking for membership applications in

NATO.’’

They all looked at me somewhat askance because it meant that

the world that we had known for all those years since the late forties was now about to be fundamentally changed. We have seen

that change. We have seen the change to the point where, Mr.

Chairman, members of the committee, I stand before you to ask

that you give your advice and consent to the ratification of the Accession Protocols that will welcome into NATO seven former members of the Warsaw Pact and now new members-to-be of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most powerful alliance in the

world of its nature, an alliance that has as its unique character the

connection between Europe and the North American continent. No

other alliance does it. That is why these nations want to be a part

of NATO.

It not only integrates them more fully into Europe; more importantly, it integrates them into this great transatlantic alliance. It

gives them a security relationship with Canada and the United

States of America.

This enlargement is part of an ambitious agenda whose goal is

to transform the alliance. Mr. Chairman, before I continue let me

acknowledge your leadership and the leadership of other members

of the committee in this process of enlargement. I know that you

and your staff have provided an invaluable guidance to the entire

executive branch team. We could not have asked for better cooperation and support from you, Mr. Chairman, or from the committee

and other committees of the Congress.

My friends, the West’s victory in the cold war and the defeat of

Soviet communism signaled a decisive turning point in modern history, a victory for freedom and democracy. But the troubles and

tragedies of the past decade have made clear that new threats are

rising. We have seen these threats take many shapes, from ethnic

cleansing in the Balkans to the terrorist attacks of September 11.

To deal with these new threats, the United States has continued

to rely on NATO and will do so in the future. This great alliance,

which has kept the peace for more than 50 years, is more than a

treaty for collective defense. It is the central organizing force in a

great web of relationships that holds North America and Europe together. It represents a community of common values and shared

commitment to democracy, free enterprise, and the rule of law.

This was never more evident than on September 12, 2001. On

that day the alliance invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty,

the basic NATO treaty, and told the world that it regarded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as attacks on

all of its members. From this historic decision, we know that NATO

13

has the will to combat terrorism and to address the new threats

that face us.

But the alliance must also have the means, so it must transform

militarily and politically to secure our collective defense on into the

21st century and to sustain the transatlantic link.

At the historic Prague summit last November, NATO heads of

state made decisions that have put us solidly on the path to transformation. Their strong and unanimous endorsement of the U.S.-

crafted transformation agenda of new capabilities, new members,

and new relationships will help ensure that NATO remains relevant in the days and years ahead.

President Bush and I were particularly pleased that Senator

Voinovich of this committee, and Senator Frist, along with other

Members of Congress, were able to join us in Prague. There in

Prague, our leaders agreed to expand the NATO membership to include all of the new democracies in Europe who are prepared to undertake the responsibilities of leadership and of membership.

Such an enlargement will help to strengthen NATO’s partnerships to promote democracy, the rule of law, and promote free markets and peace throughout Eurasia. Moreover, it will better equip

the alliance to respond collectively to the new challenges we face.

This enlargement will revitalize NATO by expanding its geographic

reach, enhancing its military capabilities, and inducting seven

countries committed to a strong transatlantic link. It will serve

U.S. interests by strengthening both NATO and our bilateral ties

with these new allies, who have already done a great deal to support our vision for NATO and for collective security. All seven of

the invitees have demonstrated that they are in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to

the security of the North Atlantic area.

The countries invited at Prague have been working intensively in

NATO’s membership action plan since 1999. In this process they

have focused not only on security and defense issues, but also on

democratic and market reforms. During these intensive preparations, each invitee has received both support and feedback from

NATO.

The United States has also had its own dialog with the seven

countries about their reforms. In addition to the day-to-day work

of our embassies, we sent an inter-agency team headed by Ambassador Nick Burns, our very able representative in Brussels, in February and October of last year to visit each of the countries to

make specific reform recommendations and to evaluate progress.

The prospect of NATO membership helped to create in each

country a political atmosphere that encouraged governments to

adopt needed reforms. These reforms are in each country’s own

best interest. In many cases they would have been difficult to bring

about without the demands of NATO candidacy.

The record of each invitee government demonstrates powerfully

its commitment to NATO. Reform areas included treatment of minorities, creation of a viable political opposition, restoration of private property, willingness to confront the past, combating corruption, and support within that population for NATO membership.

For example, Estonia and Latvia have taken important steps to

protect the rights of their Russian-speaking minorities. Their govVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
14

ernments have eased requirements for citizenship and adopted

other measures which provide assurances that all of the people of

those countries will be treated with dignity and with respect.

The Baltic States have acknowledged the dark times in their history. When Estonian Prime Minister Siim Kallas visited Washington last September, he publicly recognized Estonians’ collaboration with the Nazis and the participation of Estonians in the murder of Jews during the Holocaust. He did not hide from their history.

All seven invitees have also adopted sweeping measures to combat corruption. Parliaments in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia

have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, tough anti-corruption legislation. These three states have also established special

prosecutors to root out public corruption. The new Latvian Government under Prime Minister Repse has instituted a major anti-corruption program. Slovenia has taken important strides in reducing

the State’s involvement in private enterprise and Slovenia already

has one of the highest Transparency International ratings for clean

government among NATO members.

The public support for NATO membership at each of these new

member States is very high. In Romania it is above 80 percent. In

Slovenia’s referendum last month, 66 percent voted for NATO

membership. A clear majority in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

supports membership.

Mr. Chairman, of course there are disappointments. For example,

we remain troubled by reports of continuing grey arms sales. Bulgaria and Romania have extensive arms industries with longstanding ties to the Middle East. We have had considerable success

in stopping transfers of arms to countries of concern from these

countries.

More important for the long term, we are working with these

countries to help them improve their system of export controls and

to tighten oversight of defense industries. We must not forget as

well that the seven invitees also bring tangible security assets to

the alliance. Enlargement will bring more than 200,000 additional

troops into the alliance, as many as in 1999. It will extend NATO’s

reach from the Baltic to the Black Sea both politically and geographically. And the new members will make the alliance stronger

and they will bring fresh ideas and energy to the alliance.

I am pleased to report that all seven invitees are already de facto

allies in the war on terror. All of them have contributed to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan through Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force. Romania sent

its Carpathian Hawks Battalion to Afghanistan and did so using

its own airlift rather than asking the U.S. for lift, a feat that several current allies could not have accomplished. That Romanian

battalion is now patrolling and fighting beside U.S. soldiers in the

most dangerous regions of Afghanistan.

All of the new members have expressed support for the United

States’ position on Iraq. In February 2003, immediately following

my presentation to the United Nations Security Council on the

threat posed by Saddam’s regime, they jointly called for the international community to take decisive action against Iraq’s continued

violation of international law in defiance of the Council. They also

15

issued a joint statement at the Prague summit in November 2002

supporting the United States’ position on Iraq.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, all of the new invitees sent military liaison officers to CENTCOM, to CENTCOM headquarters in

Tampa, ahead of possible operations in Iraq. Several of the invitees

have provided military support to the international coalition. A Slovak CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—unit is

stationed in Kuwait, incorporated into a Czech unit. The Romanians are providing a similar unit. The Bulgarians provide us with

the use of their air base at Burgas.

It is clear that the seven invitees are already demonstrating

their military value to the alliance. This value has been particularly noticeable given current circumstances wherein some on both

sides of the Atlantic are questioning the health of the alliance and

the solidity of the transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to minimize the challenges that the

relationship faces today as we attempt to shape both it and the alliance for a world no longer fenced off by the cold war. In February

we had a bruising debate in NATO over providing assistance to

Turkey. In the end, we achieved our goal by providing support for

Turkey’s defense. We would have preferred to make that decision

at 19 nations instead of at 18, but France would not permit it. The

United States and many of its NATO partners found it regrettable

that some members so readily discarded their obligations to support an ally with purely defensive assistance. That is all we were

asking for. But they did not follow through on their obligation, in

order to press their own agendas on Iraq.

Make no mistake, and I make no mistake about it, the disagreement was serious and our delay in responding to Turkey’s request

damaged the credibility of our alliance. Nevertheless, outside of the

alliance we have been able to come through this one side of a bruising battle and this is the one at the U.N. Security Council with respect to Iraq.

The war is now all but over, although there are still dangers, and

the defensive measures that were taken to help Turkey are ended.

We can look back at these disagreements and debates with

dispassion and against the backdrop of almost a half century of

solid cooperation. Such cooperation is not a thing of the past. It is

a thing of the future as well.

On April 16, for example, the alliance agreed to assume the lead

of ISAF IV in August. This is the International Security Assistance

Force in Afghanistan. So notwithstanding all of the fights that we

had in NATO, the disagreement over providing support to Turkey,

once that issue was behind us, we were able to come together

again. And as note was taken during my meeting in Brussels a few

weeks ago with all of the alliance members present and in another

setting with all of the EU members present as well, we were able

to agree in principle and then follow through with action to send

the NATO alliance out of area to Afghanistan. Something that

would have been unthinkable just 10 years ago is now being done.

And we also got an agreement in principle that perhaps something

similar might be done with respect to Iraq, although we are nowhere near as close to making a decision on that.

16

This action with respect to ISAF will bring added continuity to

the vital mission of helping to stabilize Afghanistan and take

NATO beyond its traditional areas of responsibility. It was a unanimous decision taken by the NAC at 19 without the kind of rancor

that characterized the debates over Article IV obligations to Turkey.

One of the challenges we face is understanding the threat. September 11 burned itself irrevocably into the mind of every American. To say international terrorism is just another threat is to defy

the instinctual reality that all Americans feel in their heart of

hearts. Every American who watched the World Trade Center Towers burn, crumble, disintegrate, with thousands of people inside

and who watched the Pentagon in flames knows what terrorism

can bring to our homeland.

That reality leads Americans to conclude that terrorism must be

eradicated, especially the terrorism that seeks nuclear weapons

and other means of mass destruction. Some in Europe see it differently. Some see terrorism as a regrettable but inevitable part of

society and they want to keep it at arm’s length and as low-key as

possible. It is our job to convince them otherwise. This is a threat

we share and must combat together, indeed can only combat together.

The United States must continue to lead NATO, as we have for

more than 50 years, to deal with this new threat, just as we dealt

with old threats. Of course there will be disagreements. We are democracies. None of us follows blindly. We debate, we disagree. On

those occasions when we disagree, we roll up our sleeves, put our

heads together, and find a way to work things out. At the end of

the day, that is our great strength and that is why the transatlantic link will not break. The glue of NATO is too strong and

it holds too fast to let it break.

When I was in Europe at the beginning of this month, I also

stopped in Belgrade to deliver personally my condolences over the

death of Serbia’s Prime Minister Djindjic, brutally assassinated

earlier this year. I was struck by the speed with which the government of President Marovic and the new Serbian Prime Minister

Zoran Zivkovic is leading a renewed and vigorous political effort to

rid that nation of its dangerous criminal elements, to hand over

those wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal at The

Hague, and to strengthen democracy in Serbia and Montenegro. I

was impressed.

Later that day and the next in Brussels, I was heartened, as you

heard earlier, by the discussions I had with 21 European ministers

as well as European Union High Representative Solana and NATO

Secretary General Lord Robertson. A majority of these allies had

joined the coalition to disarm Iraq. Those allies who did not have

welcomed our success even though they were against the effort of

going in. They have now welcomed our success and we are all together as an alliance again exploring ways to support stabilization

and reconstruction.

Those who write about the demise of NATO are going to be

wrong, just like they have been wrong many times in the past. We

heard this story after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of

the cold war. We heard it during the troubled times in the Balkans.

17

I give naysayers of NATO credit for their persistence, but they are

persistently wrong. Any alliance that countries are knocking on the

door to get into is anything but dead.

After the heated debate over Turkey, Secretary General Robertson said that the damage to NATO was ‘‘a hit above the waterline,

not below.’’ The same can be said about the fallout in NATO from

the debate in the U.N. Security Council over Iraq. Nevertheless,

NATO must continue to adapt to changing circumstances. It must

address the central challenges of this era: rogue States, terror, and

weapons of mass destruction.

Increasingly, NATO members will have to be prepared to focus

their energies beyond Europe, a reality that will require that member nations possess military forces with the capability to go and

fight beyond Europe. The alliance will recover. We will persevere

and we must. It is essential that we recover and endure because

there is much work which needs to be done and many allies who

want to do it.

In Afghanistan we need to ensure the changeover in August goes

as smoothly as possible. This operation will constitute NATO’s largest step to date beyond its traditionally Europe-focused role.

In Southern Europe, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia will still demand our attention and our presence. In Macedonia, right now, the

European Union has made its first deployment of forces with over

300 troops. These troops and this deployment in no way contradict

NATO. In fact, they reinforce the importance of the alliance and

complement its work, as the commander of the EU force reports to

NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander through NATO’s Regional Command South, a blending of NATO and the European

Union as anticipated in the ESDP.

As I have referred to, in Iraq we are exploring what NATO collectively can do to secure the peace. All members have said they

are prepared to discuss a role in NATO. We have noted possible alliance roles in stabilization, humanitarian assistance operations,

and NATO assistance to coalition partners. These preliminary discussions, if they lead to concrete results, could be the next big step

in NATO’s transformation.

In line with this new orientation, Supreme Allied Commander

General Jim Jones pointed out at the beginning of this month that

NATO will undergo another sea change when it stands up a highly

ready Allied Response Force with global reach, as agreed to in

Prague last November.

So I believe very, very much that there will be more than enough

work to go around, and if NATO can play a role it should. We

should not ask ourselves what can NATO do to prove its relevance.

We should ask what can NATO do to advance the peace.

The essential elements of the alliance remain firm. NATO’s integrated military structure creates a reservoir of working, planning,

and training together that is irreplaceable. The alliance itself can

call upon this rich reservoir or, as seems increasingly likely, coalitions of the willing can be drawn from it.

For example, the EU-led operation in Macedonia that I referred

to a moment ago is drawing on NATO assets and capabilities to do

the job under an EU mandate. Moreover, NATO’s Council provides

a valuable forum for discussing matters of war and peace. FunVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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damentally, NATO binds together nations that share the same beliefs and values, nations who accept that vigorous debate is the

hallmark of an alliance of democratic nations.

NATO is an alliance within which the seven future members invited at Prague, with the advice and consent of the Senate, will be

able to join their colleagues and be welcome to stand and be heard

and not be told to sit and be silent.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot outline specific roles for NATO in the future. In some instances we will operate as an alliance, in some as

members of a coalition of the willing. We may wage war and we

will maintain the peace. For over half a century, NATO was indispensable to security on both sides of the Atlantic. That has not

changed. Today the alliance remains indispensable to our security

and to meeting the security challenges in a world of diverse

threats, multiple challenges, and unprecedented opportunities. The

alliance remains crucial to the links that bind North America to

Europe and Europe to North America.

Let me also stress, Mr. Chairman, as I come to my conclusion

that the door to NATO will remain open. Prague was not the end

of the enlargement process, just one step on the way. We welcome

the applications of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and other future

applicants as well. We will continue to enlarge the alliance as

emerging new democracies and perhaps some established ones as

well pursue membership and as they demonstrate their ability to

contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic community as required under Article X of the NATO Treaty.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I ask the Senate to make its vital contribution by performing its constitutional duty in helping us transform the alliance. I again urge the committee to act swiftly to recommend that the Senate provide its advice and consent on the

NATO Accession Protocols that will welcome our new allies into

our alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Mr. Chairman, I know this committee plans to mark up tomorrow and that you plan to take the protocols to the floor for a vote

on May 7. If that occurs, and I have every confidence that it will,

President Bush and I will be very grateful, but even more grateful

will be these nations and the people that they represent.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. I will stop here

and respond to questions and I am sure that all of the other issues

that have been raised in opening statements will be dealt with in

the course of the questions and answers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary of State Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to testify on the enlargement of NATO agreed in

Prague last November, and on the future of the alliance.

With respect to enlargement, Mr. Chairman, I strongly encourage the Senate to

provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the Accession Protocols that will

welcome into NATO seven new members—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

This enlargement is part of an ambitious agenda whose goal is to transform the

Alliance.

And Mr. Chairman, before I continue, let me acknowledge your leadership and vision in this process of enlargement. I know that you and your staff have provided

19

invaluable guidance to the entire executive branch team. We could not have asked

for better cooperation and support.

THE BACKGROUND

The West’s victory in the Cold War and the defeat of Soviet communism signaled

a decisive turning point in modem history—a victory for freedom and democracy.

But the troubles and tragedies of the past decade have made clear that new threats

are rising. We have seen these threats take many shapes, from ethnic cleansing in

the Balkans to the terrorist attacks of September 11. To deal with these new

threats, the United States has continued to rely on NATO and will do so in the future.

This great Alliance, which has kept the peace for more than fifty years, is more

than a treaty for collective defense. It is the central organizing force in a great web

of relationships that holds North America and Europe together. It represents a community of common values and shared commitment to democracy, free markets and

the rule of law. This was never more evident than on September 12, 2001.

On that day the Alliance invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty and told the

world that it regarded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as

attacks on all of its members. From this historic decision we know that NATO has

the will to combat terrorism and to address the new threats that face us. But the

Alliance must also have the means. So it must transform, militarily and politically,

to secure our collective defense on into the twenty-first century and to sustain the

transatlantic link. At the historic Prague Summit last November, NATO heads of

state and government made decisions that have put us solidly on the path to transformation.

Their strong and unanimous endorsement of the U.S.-crafted transformation

agenda of New Capabilities, New Members and New Relationships will help ensure

that NATO remains relevant in the days and years ahead.

President Bush and I were particularly pleased that Senator Voinovich, of this

committee, and Senator Frist, along with other Members of Congress, were able to

join us in Prague. There, our leaders agreed to expand NATO membership to include all of the new democracies in Europe who are prepared to undertake the responsibilities of leadership. Such an enlargement will help to strengthen NATO’s

partnerships to promote democracy, the rule of law, free markets and peace

throughout Eurasia. Moreover, it will better equip the Alliance to respond collectively to the new dangers we face.

THE CURRENT ENLARGEMENT

The United States and other NATO Allies signed the Enlargement Protocols last

month in Brussels. President Bush has transmitted them to the Senate. Your swift

action on these Protocols will bring us a major step closer to realizing President

Bush’s vision for a ‘‘Europe free, whole and at peace.’’

This enlargement will revitalize NATO by expanding its geographic reach, enhancing its military capabilities and inducting seven countries committed to a

strong transatlantic link. It will serve U.S. interests by strengthening both NATO

and our bilateral ties with these new Allies, who have already done a great deal

to support our vision for NATO and collective security.

All seven of the invitees have demonstrated that they are in a position to further

the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to the security of the

North Atlantic area.

The countries invited at Prague have been working intensively in NATO’s Membership Action Plan since 1999. In this process, they have focused not only on security and defense issues, but also on democratic and market reforms. During these

intensive preparations, each invitee has received both support and feedback from

NATO.

The United States has also had its own dialogue with the seven countries about

their reforms. In addition to the day-to-day work of our Embassies, we sent an

inter-agency team headed by Ambassador Nick Burns in February and October of

last year to visit each of the countries to make specific reform recommendations and

to evaluate progress.

The prospect of NATO membership helped to create in each country a political

atmosphere that encouraged governments to adopt needed reforms. These reforms

are in each country’s own best interest. In many cases, they would have been difficult to bring about without the demands of NATO candidacy.

The record of each invitee government demonstrates powerfully its commitment

to NATO. Reform areas included treatment of minorities, creation of a viable politVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
20

ical opposition, restoration of private property, willingness to confront the past, combating corruption, and support for NATO membership.

For example, Estonia and Latvia have taken important steps to protect the rights

of their Russian-speaking minorities. Their governments have eased requirements

for citizenship and adopted other measures which provide assurances that all of the

people of those countries will be treated with dignity and respect.

All three of the Baltic States have acknowledged dark times in their histories.

When Estonian Prime Minister Siim Kallas visited Washington last September, he

publicly recognized Estonians’ collaboration with the Nazis and participation in the

murder of Jews during the Holocaust.

All seven invitees have also adopted sweeping measures to combat corruption.

Parliaments in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia have adopted, or are in the process

of adopting, tough anti-corruption legislation. These three states have also established special prosecutors to root out public corruption. The new Latvia government

under Prime Minister Repse has instituted a major anti-corruption program.

Slovenia has taken important strides in reducing the state’s involvement in private enterprise. And Slovenia already has one of the highest Transparency International ratings for clean government among NATO members.

The public support for NATO membership in each of the new member states is

high. In Romania, it is above 80%. In Slovenia’s referendum last month, 66% voted

for NATO membership. A clear majority in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania supports

membership.

Among the positive developments, there are disappointments. We remain troubled

by reports of continuing gray arms sales. Bulgaria and Romania have extensive

arms industries with longstanding ties to the Middle East. We have had considerable success in stopping transfers of arms to countries of concern. More important

for the long term, we are working with these countries to help them improve their

systems of export control and to tighten oversight of defense industries.

We must not forget as well that the seven invitees also bring tangible security

assets to the Alliance. Enlargement will bring more than 200,000 additional troops

into the Alliance—as many as in 1999. It will extend NATO’s reach from the Baltic

to the Black Sea, both politically and geographically.

And the new members will make the Alliance stronger and they will bring fresh

ideas and energy to it. I am pleased to report that all seven invitees are already

de facto Allies in the war on terror. All of them have contributed to stabilization

efforts in Afghanistan through Operation Enduring Freedom and the International

Security Assistance Force.

Romania has sent its ‘‘Carpathian Hawks’’ battalion to Afghanistan and did so

using its own airlift rather than asking the U.S. for a lift—a feat that several current Allies could not have accomplished. That Romanian battalion is now patrolling

and fighting beside U.S. soldiers in the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan.

All of the new members have expressed support for the United States’ position

on Iraq. In February 2003, immediately following my presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the threat posed by Saddam’s regime, they jointly called for the

international community to take decisive action against Iraq’s continued violation

of international law and defiance of the Security Council. They also issued a joint

statement at the Prague Summit in November 2002, supporting the United States’

position on Iraq.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, all of the new invitees sent military liaison officers to

CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, ahead of possible operations in Iraq. Several

of the invitees are providing military support to the international coalition.

A Slovak CBRN unit is now stationed in Kuwait, incorporated into a Czech unit.

The Romanians are providing a similar unit. The Bulgarians provided us with the

use of their airbase at Burgas. It is clear that the seven invitees are already demonstrating their military value to the Alliance.

THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE

This value has been particularly noticeable given current circumstances wherein

some on both sides of the Atlantic are questioning the health of the Alliance and

the solidity of the transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to minimize the challenges that the relationship

faces today as we attempt to shape both it and the Alliance for a world no longer

fenced off by the Cold War.

In February we had a bruising debate in NATO over providing assistance to Turkey. In the end we achieved our goal of providing support for Turkey’s defense. We

would have preferred to make that decision at 19, instead of at 18, but France

would not permit it. The United States and many of its NATO partners found it

21

regrettable that some members so readily discarded their obligations under Article

IV to provide purely defensive assistance to Turkey in order to press their own

agendas on Iraq.

Make no mistake. The disagreement was serious, and our delay to Turkey’s request damaged the credibility of our Alliance. Likewise, outside of the Alliance we

have come through another bruising battle, this one at the UN Security Council

over Iraq. This battle included five current and one future member of NATO. This

too has raised troubling voices about the long-term health of the Alliance.

But now that the war in Iraq is over and the defensive measures taken in Turkey

are ended, we can look back at these disagreements and debates with dispassion

and against the backdrop of almost half a century of solid cooperation.

Such cooperation is anything but a thing of the past. On April 16, for example,

the Alliance agreed to assume the lead of ISAF IV in August. This action will bring

added continuity to the vital mission of helping to stabilize Afghanistan, and take

NATO beyond its traditional area of responsibility to address today’s threats at one

of their sources. This decision was taken unanimoulsy by the NAC without the rancor that characterized debates over Artcile IV obligations to Turkey.

Lets be clear. One of the challenges we face is understanding the threat.

September 11 burned itself irrevocably into the mind of every American. To say

international terrorism is just another threat is to defy the instinctual reality that

every American knows in his or her heart and soul. Every American who watched

the World Trade Towers burn, crumble and disintegrate, with thousands of people

inside, and who watched the Pentagon in flames, knows what terrorism can bring

to our homeland. That reality leads Americans to conclude that terrorism must be

eradicated—especially the terrorism that seeks nuclear weapons, and other means

of mass destruction.

Some in Europe see it differently. Some see terrorism as a regrettable but inevitable part of society and want to keep it at arms length and as low key as possible.

It is our job to convince them otherwise. This is a threat we share and must combat

together—indeed, can only combat together.

Of course there will be disagreements. But the United States must continue to

lead NATO to ensure our collective security, as we have for more than 50 years.

But we must not forget also that we are democracies in NATO. None of us follows

blindly. We debate. We disagree. On those occasions when we disagree, we roll up

our sleeves, put our heads together, and find a way to work things out. At the end

of the day, that is our great strength. And that is why the transatlantic link will

not break. The glue of NATO is too strong and holds us too fast to let it break.

When I was in Europe at the beginning of this month, I stopped in Belgrade to

deliver personally my condolences over the death of Serbia’s Prime Minister

Djindjic, brutally assassinated earlier this year. I was struck by the speed with

which the government of President Marovic and the new Serbian Prime Minister

Zoran Zivkovic is leading a renewed and vigorous political effort to rid the nation

of its dangerous criminal elements, to hand over those wanted by the International

Criminal Tribunal at the Hague, and to strengthen democracy in Serbia and Montenegro. I was impressed.

Later that day and the next, in Brussels, I was heartened by the discussions I

had with 21 European ministers, as well as EU High Representative Javier Solana

and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. A majority of these Allies had joined

the coalition to disarm Iraq. Those Allies who did not have welcomed our success

and are now exploring ways to support stabilization and reconstruction.

So I caution those who, yet again, will write about the demise of NATO. We heard

this story after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. We

heard it during the troubled times in the Balkans. I give naysayers of NATO credit

for their persistence—but they are persistently wrong. Any alliance that countries

are knocking on the door to get into, is anything but dead.

After the heated debate over Turkey, Secretary General Robertson said the damage done to NATO was a hit above the waterline, not below. The same can be said

about the fallout on NATO from the debate in the UN Security Council over Iraq.

Nevertheless, NATO must continue to adapt to changing circumstances. It must address the challenges central to this era: rogue states, terror, weapons of mass destruction.

Increasingly NATO members will have to be prepared to focus their energies beyond Europe—a reality that will require that member nations possess military

forces with the capability to go and fight beyond Europe. The Alliance will recover.

We will persevere. We must.

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THE FUTURE

It is essential that we recover and endure because there is much work which

needs to be done and many allies who want to do it.

In Afghanistan we need to ensure the changeover in August goes as smoothly as

possible. NATO will take over and run ISAF headquarters in Kabul, coordinate

operational planning, appoint the ISAF commander and supervise the troop contribution process. This operation will constitute NATO’s largest step to date beyond

its traditionally Europe-focused role.

In southern Europe Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia will still demand our attention and our presence.

In Macedonia right now, the EU has made its first deployment of forces with over

300 troops. These troops and this deployment in no way contradict NATO; in fact,

they reinforce the importance of the alliance and complement its work, as the commander of the EU force reports to NATO’s Deputy SACEUR through NATO’s Regional Command South.

And, as I have referred to, in Iraq we are exploring what NATO collectively can

do to secure the peace. All members have said they are prepared to discuss a NATO

role in Iraq. We have noted possible Alliance roles in stabilization, humanitarian assistance operations, and NATO assistance to coalition partners. These preliminary

discussions, if they lead to concrete results, could be the next big step in NATO’s

transformation to an alliance willing and able to take on any role in any region

where it feels it can make a contribution to the peace or meet a common threat.

In line with this new orientation, as SACEUR General Jones pointed out at the

beginning of this month, NATO will undergo another sea-change when it stands up

a highly ready Allied Response Force with global reach, as agreed last November.

So I believe there will be more than enough work to go around, and if NATO can

play a role, it should.

We should not ask, what can NATO do to prove its relevance? We should ask,

what can NATO do to advance the peace?

The essential elements of the Alliance remain firm:

• NATO’s integrated military structure creates a reservoir of working, planning,

and training together that is irreplaceable;

• The Alliance itself can call upon this rich reservoir or, as seems increasingly

likely, coalitions of the willing can be drawn from it. For example, the EU-led

operation in Macedonia I referred to earlier draws on NATO assets and capabilities.

• Moreover, NATO’s Council provides a valuable forum for discussing matters of

war and peace;

• And fundamentally, NATO binds together nations who share the same beliefs

and values. Nations who accept that vigorous debate is the hallmark of an alliance of democratic nations.

NATO is an alliance within which the seven future members invited at Prague,

with the advice and consent of the Senate, will be able to join their colleagues and

be welcomed to stand and be heard and not be told to sit and be silent.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot outline specific roles for NATO in the future. In some instances we will operate as an Alliance. In some as members of a coalition of the

willing. We may wage war and we will maintain the peace.

For over half a century NATO was indispensable to security on both sides of the

Atlantic. That has not changed. Today the Alliance remains indispensable to our security, and to meeting the security challenges in a world of diverse threats, multiple

challenges, and unprecedented opportunities. The Alliance remains crucial to the

link that binds North America to Europe and Europe to North America.

Let me stress also, Mr. Chairman, that the door to NATO will remain open.

Prague was not the end of the enlargement process, just one step on the way. We

welcome the applications of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and other future applicants as well.

We will continue to enlarge the Alliance as emerging new democracies—and perhaps some established ones as well—pursue membership, and as they demonstrate

their ability to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic community as required under Article 10 of the NATO Treaty.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I ask the Senate to make its vital contribution by performing its own Constitutional duty in helping us transform the Alliance. I again

urge this Committee to act swiftly to recommend that the Senate provide its advice

and consent on the NATO accession protocols that will welcome our new allies into

our Alliance.

23

I understand that the committee will mark up tomorrow and that a floor vote will

likely occur on May 7th. If I am correct in that understanding, I am grateful for

such speed, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, and I will be pleased to take your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We will have a round of questions with a 5-minute limit. I will

begin my questioning first of all just by saying what a remarkable

celebration your testimony was of the hearings that we have had

on the issue of the enlargement. We have been joined once again

by the Ambassadors of the seven countries that are invitees, who

have been faithful in all of these hearings.

We very much wanted you—and the ranking member and I have

looked forward to this moment—to outline once again the importance of NATO for the world, for our country, for the relationships

we have, and for these seven great nations that will be coming together. We look forward to tomorrow and to May 7 and we are

hopeful we will be able to fulfill our objective.

I want to also mention that I just applaud very much your opening comments about reform in the State Department. For 28

months this committee has witnessed and celebrated that, too.

What a remarkable phenomenon, 20,000 young Americans taking

the Foreign Service exam just 3 weeks ago as a testimony of their

own patriotism, their interest in this country, their interest in

statecraft and in what you do.

As you know, our request often has been a difficult one for you

because we have said, ask us for what you want. You have to work

within the confines of an administration and have to work with

others, starting with the President, and other people, OMB and so

forth. Nevertheless we have asked you to be ambitious. You have

been.

When for some reason the Budget Committee before our floor debate cut back that request by $1.050 billion, you called the chairman of the Budget Committee, you called us, and we responded. An

amendment that we offered in fact was adopted unanimously,

which I think is testimony to something different occurring. As you

pointed out, that had not occurred for several years as the budget

of the Department was truncated and moved downward, not upward.

So we ask you again: Be bold, be ambitious; call upon us. We

would like to help that reform because we have seen it occur.

Let me ask as my question: General Jones, as you have mentioned, has talked about the potential bases and training areas in

Eastern Europe. He has mentioned specifically Bulgaria and Romania that have been very helpful recently. Do you have any comment

today about those base situations, about repositioning of troops in

NATO, or for that matter about what NATO may do in Iraq in the

future months, given the desire of many members to be very, very

helpful to the coalition?

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

your opening comments about the Foreign Service. By the way,

when you said 28 months that struck a bell. It used to take us 28

months to access somebody into the Foreign Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

24

Secretary POWELL. We have now gotten that down to 12 months

and we are going to drive it further down.

The CHAIRMAN. Great.

Secretary POWELL. Also—and I cannot resist this—as you know,

we have opened one office up on Capitol Hill to serve Members of

Congress. It happens to be on the House side—I know, Chris, I am

being as shameless as I can be. Just give me some slack.

Senator DODD. Call Trent Lott.

Secretary POWELL. And I am dying to get an office opened on the

Senate side.

Senator DODD. If we get one more member over here and we are

in the majority, I will get you an office.

Secretary POWELL. With respect to what General Jones said, it

is very sensible, as the alliance has enlarged itself, moving to the

East to take a look at a base structure that essentially was created

back in the fifties. During my term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, we reduced the size of our forces in Europe from something like 310,000 down to roughly 100,000 to 150,000. A lot of

bases went away, but the base structure was not fully rationalized

at that time. It was still Armed Forces of the United States along

the Iron Curtain, ready to fight the Soviet Union.

Well, most of those nations we were ready to fight are now a part

of this transatlantic alliance. So it is very sensible to take a look

at the base structure, and not to take a look at it with this intent

of how do we get closer to the Russian Federation. That is not the

point at all. Anybody who thinks we are somehow creeping back up

to a new cold war line, that is not it at all.

It is just sensible to see whether there are other places where we

should have facilities, which I think is a better term even than

‘‘bases,’’ facilities that will allow us to move more quickly to other

parts of the world as we do out-of-area missions. As General Jones

said in the article that I read this morning along with you, Mr.

Chairman, we are looking not for a recreation of Fort Hood, Texas,

in Bulgaria or Romania, but perhaps barebones facilities where you

can go and use it when you need it for exercise purposes or for

transit purposes.

So I think if we look at it in that spirit, it is a very sensible idea.

We also have obligations with respect to the Russian Federation,

previous commitments we made to them to make sure that they do

not view this in any way as threatening to them, and I do not think

they will see it that way when it has been fully explained.

I am sure that in due course my colleagues at the Defense Department, Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and General Jones

will come forward with fuller explanations for the committee as to

what their needs are and what their plans are.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Time is short. I have one question, Mr. Secretary, and I realize

you may not have an answer and you may not wish to opine the

answer, but I hope you will consider talking about it. You indicated

in your statement that NATO has to focus its attention beyond Europe, in addition to Europe. It seems to me that we are at a moment right now where we have an opportunity to begin to impleVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ment the objective we set out in Prague about an out of area concept, which my chairman has been talking about since the early

eighties, the late eighties, or in the eighties, and at the same time

have a win-win situation where we are able to get some significant

assistance as it relates to Iraq, which is obviously out of area, as

well as continue the process of repairing some frayed nerves, if

nothing else, if not fundamental relationships, repairing some of

the discord that occurred as a consequence of whether to go to Iraq.

I had the opportunity, at the request of the French Ambassador,

to spend some considerable time with him. You know him well, a

very impressive fellow, and he is very, very well connected to the

administration in Paris, beyond being the Ambassador here. There

was, in Newsweek, a little blurb in ‘‘Periscope.’’ I am not suggesting it is correct or incorrect. I am not asking you to verify this,

but it indicated that, what we all know, Chirac did call President

Bush, and indicated, according to Newsweek, indicated that France

and Chirac leading France would not object to NATO peacekeeping

presence in Iraq and suggested that France implied, according to

the article, that it would be willing to contribute a brigade and put

NATO presence under overall American control.

Now, without necessarily commenting on that, although I welcome a comment on that if you think it is appropriate, can you give

us some sense of whether or not it is necessary, even if the decision

was made by the President, that this would be a useful outcome?

That is, a formal role for NATO in Iraq under U.S. command.

Whether or not you have been told by your NATO counterparts

that they would need an overall U.N. resolution, not authorizing

but sanctioning that approach?

So it is a two-part question: A, as a predicate to the possibility

of a formal U.N. and/or NATO role in Iraq—and I know we have

the coalition of the willing, including some NATO members. I am

talking about a formal NATO decision out of the NAC to in fact deploy troops for peacekeeping under U.S. command in Iraq. Is there

an antecedent requirement of the U.N. to sanction that, A?

B, can you give us any insight as to how far this has percolated

up within the administration as to whether or not such a policy

would be a wise one, that is to seek a formal NATO role in Iraq?

Secretary POWELL. First with respect to NATO, as I think I said

earlier, at the NAC meeting a couple of weeks ago, they certainly

reinforced what President Chirac and our President spoke about,

the possibility of NATO playing a role. We have suggested to

NATO some of the roles they might play and I touched on it in my

presentation. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz first broached this with

NATO last December when he visited and I reinforced it during my

trip to Brussels a few weeks ago.

Some planning is going on and some ideas are being pursued

within the Military Committee of NATO. The specific question

about whether there is an antecedent requirement of some kind for

a U.N. endorsement in some fashion, I think that is an open question, because there are some members of NATO who will say we

do not need anything. They are there now and they do not need

anything.

Senator BIDEN. Right, I understand.

26

Secretary POWELL. But there are others who might say, before

we can go off to that kind of peacekeeping operation, we need chapter VII action or some kind of action on the part of the United Nations.

We are studying all of this, which allows me then to talk about

the United Nations role if I may, Senator Biden. The President

said, along with Prime Minister Blair and other members of the

willing coalition, that the United Nations has a vital role to play.

We believe that strongly. We are hard at work now trying to structure what that role should be and how best to get U.N. endorsement of the role that we think is appropriate.

We are in serious conversation with our allies on the Security

Council. We have some ideas as to what we think the U.N. should

do with respect to the lifting of sanctions, with respect to the endorsement of an interim authority, with respect to an endorsement

of our presence. We do not need any U.N. action with respect to

legitimizing the act. The actual war in our judgment was completely legitimate—— Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting you do.

Secretary POWELL [continuing]. Under 1441. So there is a major

role for the U.N. to play. They are playing a role already on the

humanitarian grounds. The UNWFP and other U.N. agencies are

working with the coalition now.

To go beyond the humanitarian role and get into more of an endorsement role and get the U.N. to have a representative of the

Secretary General actually participate in the political work that is

now going on it seems to me is important. So in the days ahead

we will be moving forward with an appropriate resolution, one resolution, perhaps more than one resolution, to seek U.N. involvement and endorsement of the plan to move forward both for the

purpose of getting rid of the sanctions, lifting the sanctions, which

are no longer relevant, and determining what is the appropriate

role to play on the part of the U.N. as a coalition and the Iraqi

leaders themselves who are now emerging out of the process we

started as they start to put in place a government of Iraqis, by

Iraqis, for Iraqis, to paraphrase a great American, and how the

U.N. should play a role in endorsing that emergence of Iraqi embryonic leadership.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, you made a very profound statement in my view when you said that the role of NATO far exceeds

its military role. I would respectfully suggest that a formal NATO

vote and presence in Iraq would have a consequence that far exceeds the military role they would play, and I could not urge it

strongly enough. I know it is difficult, but I would strongly urge

that take place.

Secretary POWELL. There is support within the administration

for such a role, as long as it is consistent with what the coalition

has to do to achieve its objectives.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]

27

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Thank you, Chairman Lugar, for calling this hearing. Let me begin by expressing

my appreciation and admiration for our witness, Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Secretary Powell has led the State Department during a time of historic change and

challenge. His diplomatic achievements include an unprecedented international coalition against al-Qaeda and international terrorists and simultaneous management

of crises in Iraq, Korea, South and Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as

confronting disease and poverty in Africa and Asia. Secretary Powell has brought

a unique confidence and prestige to American diplomacy. His remarkable popularity

is testimony to the confidence the American people place in his leadership.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the bedrock of international security since its establishment 54 years ago this month, in April 1949. Although the military dimension of the alliance was instrumental in containing the

Soviet Union, NATO was always about more than military security. America’s relationship with our NATO allies has symbolized the common values, as well as the

common interests, of democracies united against those international actors who represent tyranny and aggression.

We live at a time of danger, unpredictability, and potential global instability. But

we also live in a time of historic opportunity. Alliances are not absolved from the

forces of change in world affairs. The ability to adapt to the challenges of this new

era in world affairs—challenges from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction—

speak to the importance of NATO and other international institutions, including the

United Nations, that have played such key roles in promoting and protecting our

common interests since World War II.

NATO’s decision in November 2002 to expand its current membership of 19 by

inviting Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria to

begin accession negotiations acknowledges the imperatives of change. I strongly endorse this action and will vote for it. Today, member and candidate countries are

expected to do what they can to modernize their forces, including development of

niche capabilities and the establishment of a NATO Response Force. But we know

that the contributions of an enlarged NATO will not be defined solely by military

capabilities. Expanding NATO also encourages a process of political and economic

reform in candidate states.

There is a deep security dimension to an expanded NATO. The threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction cannot be handled by the United States

or any country alone. Defeating terrorism requires unprecedented international cooperation in the diplomatic, military, law enforcement, intelligence and economic

areas. If our purpose in an expanded NATO is about defeating these threats to our

common security, than bringing these seven new members into NATO is critical to

our national security.

Although America’s military power may be unprecedented in world history, NATO

will continue to play a vital role in American and global security. In Afghanistan,

the German proposal for NATO to take charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) represents a new and significant turn in NATO’s mission. At

some point, when there is an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, NATO troops

may be called upon to help guarantee that peace. NATO might well also play a role

in maintaining security in post-war Iraq.

I believe NATO’s next fifty years will be just as important for world peace as its

first fifty years.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing, and for placing the issue of

NATO enlargement in the larger context of re-building relationships in the aftermath of Iraq. I look forward to Secretary Powell’s testimony.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

At the risk of embarrassing you, Mr. Secretary, and heaping

more unending adulation upon your broad shoulders, I would like

to associate myself with Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden’s comments about the job that you and your colleagues have done at the

State Department. I do not always agree with polls, especially if

my poll numbers are not good, but you consistently arrive at 85,

90 percent job approval in this country. Being the most trusted——

Senator BIDEN. Ninety-two percent in Delaware. Why do you

think I am so nice to him?

28

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. The most trusted leader in this

country is a pretty remarkable thing and I think it points to what

you have heard thus far this morning about your leadership and

what you pointed out, the people that you lead, the remarkable

people that serve in the State Department, which we owe great

thanks to, the professionals there.

I would just make one comment on that. About 2 years ago, a

young woman who worked for me came in and said: ‘‘Senator, my

husband and I want to do something for our country and the

world.’’ I said, ‘‘well, Erin, I thought you were, working for a distinguished Senator from Nebraska.’’ She did not dismiss that astute

observation that I had made, but she wanted to reach beyond, beyond where she was, and informed me that she and her husband— and they had just had their first baby—were going to take the Foreign Service exam.

Moving forward now to April 29, 2003, she and her husband are

both in Nepal with a baby and a 3-year-old, junior Foreign Service

career officers, and very, very proud of the work that they are

doing for this country and for the world. I think that says as much

about the kind of work that you are doing, you are all doing over

there in your Department, than any one example, to have people

like that quality of people want to be part of that and part of doing

something more important than just serving their own self-interest.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, the questions that rotated around

Iraq, Afghanistan, the role of NATO, have been obviously key to

what you have been talking about this morning, the future of

NATO. I would be interested in getting your thoughts on some of

the great challenges within NATO that you foresee, one being

something that we have been dealing with, I suspect will continue

to deal with, and that is somewhat of a technology gap between

some of our NATO partners.

We recall in Afghanistan that there was some question about

whether NATO could participate, should participate, because they

were not up to the task in the sense that it would just complicate

U.S. efforts there. That was I think the position of some in the

Pentagon.

How do you see all of that developing? First, is there a technology gap? Second, what role can these nations coming into NATO

play, niche capabilities? Are there such? Is that part of what we

will see evolve over the next 10, 15, 20 years? Everybody can play

a role, but obviously not the same role.

Secretary POWELL. There is a huge technology gap. There is a serious capability shortfall. Ten years ago at the time of the gulf war,

everybody saw what modern warfare was going to be like. Ten

years later, it has gone up several more notches with respect to

what modern warfare is all about, what the use of military force

is all about—digitization, information technology, intelligence system, knowledge of the battlefield.

These young soldiers of ours are wearing things, Senator Hagel,

that you and I do not even recognize from our days in the Army

as infantrymen. State of the art equipment. It is expensive, but if

you want to be serious, if you want to have top forces and if you

want to send your people into battle or into other kinds of operVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
29

ations and to give them every advantage to come out alive as well

as successful, then you have got to be prepared to invest in the

technology. You have got to be able to rationalize your defense industries. You have got to be able to go to your people and say, this

costs money and we have got to make the investment in this if we

would be relevant.

The Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, speaks about

this all the time. Every time we have a NATO meeting we talk

about capabilities. But the individual members of NATO have not

met the task of increasing their defense expenditures in order to

achieve that capability. It does not come cheaply.

Reference was made to the meeting today in Belgium where four

of the nations of the union have come together and created some

sort of a plan to develop some sort of a headquarters. I will let my

European colleagues discuss that one in the course of the next 2

days. It is only four of the many nations that could have attended,

only four did attend. But what we need is not more headquarters;

what we need is more capability and fleshing out the structure and

the forces that are there with the equipment that they need.

So there is a technology gap and there is a capability gap, and

we should not expect countries such as Slovakia to show up as a

first world force. They do not have that capability and we should

not expect it and they could not afford it and we do not need it.

But they can perform niche responsibilities of the kind we have discussed, whether it is with CBRN kind of equipment or a civil affairs kind of function to be performed or a logistics function to be

performed or a commando or special forces kind of capability to

build into their capacity.

You do not want to ask them to do something that they really

cannot do and they will fail at it and they will be disappointed and

you do not get what you need. You examine each one of these countries. What are they able to do? What experience do they have?

What resources can they put into it? And what can we do to enhance their capability? And that is what they contribute to the alliance, and it becomes part of the reservoir of capabilities that the

alliance has available to it.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator DODD.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank

you again for this hearing this morning.

Mr. Secretary, welcome, and I will just add my voice as well. I

think you have done a great job and the country is lucky to have

you. And to be the subject of some criticism by the former Speaker

puts you on my all star list, so I will leave it at that. But I think

the State Department under your leadership has done a remarkable job.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DODD. I appreciate your comments about them as well.

They work very hard all the time and make a significant difference.

In the limited amount of time, Mr. Secretary, just two quick

questions if I can. One is in the structure with NATO itself. We

are going from 16 countries obviously back in the period of the cold

30

war now to 26, and I guess it is going to be 29 with Macedonia,

Croatia, and Albania possibly coming on board. My concern, and I

will not take a lot of time in posing the question, is the obvious one

I suppose one would think about here. That is, in the past this has

been a basis of consensus. NATO made decisions based on consensus. Obviously we have played a very important role in developing that consensus. Certainly today, as nations seek to become

members there is a certain willingness to probably be a bit more

supportive on certain matters they might otherwise be a little more

hesitant about.

My concern is not today, but looking down the road as we try to

develop NATO decisionmaking with 29 nations involved in the

process, what can we expect from all of this? If we have an organization and obviously it can play a critical role both militarily and

politically, and yet trying to get consensus out of 29 nations with

very different political, domestic kinds of problems and situations,

it seems to me it is going to get harder and harder maybe for

NATO to respond as quickly and as rapidly as we like.

I read with some note these reports done by Secretary Grossman,

which seem to me more pointed to the NATO Response Force militarily, as well as one other one that had been done that seems as

well to address the question. The President’s comments in fact

seem to deal more with the military aspect of this.

Back in November, I submitted a piece for the Washington Post

in which I suggested something along the lines of possibly sort of

a Security Council apparatus here, where you would have those nations, obviously our own, that played a major role here both financially and militarily in some sort of a decisionmaking process, so

that as we need to have a rapid response and quick decisions down

the road the ability to get that from 29 nations may be extremely

difficult.

I wonder if you might comment on the general concept or idea,

what sort of your reaction might be to something like a Security

Council operation here, No. 1.

No. 2, I saw this report, and it is quickly turning to Iraq, but the

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, and it is a

flow chart here that sort of lays out the various offices and so forth

that will flow here. I am just concerned, I do not see much of a role

here for the State Department in any of this, particularly in this

line over here that deals with the national governance issue that

goes directly back up through General Garner, up to the Secretary

of Defense.

Again, just it seems to me lacking in having a heavier role for

the political-diplomatic function of State. I do not know if you have

had a chance to look at this flow chart, but I wonder if you might

comment on that.

Secretary POWELL. On the first question of consensus, clearly

when you go from 16 to 19 to 26 to 29, decisionmaking becomes

more difficult. When you have that many sovereign nations, each

one represented at the Council table and all the baggage that

comes with them in terms of public opinion and the political dynamic within their Parliament or legislature, it makes it much

more difficult.

31

But I do not think it makes it impossible to act at 29 or even

that much more difficult, that much more unwieldy. I think long

before you get into the Council chamber, discussions take place, negotiations take place, and you essentially come in with a pretty

good lineup. We have been quite effective in bringing people around

to our line of thinking within 19. When I look at the next seven

coming in and I see how they helped us and how they stood by us

in this recent debate over Iraq, I have some confidence that they

also would be inclined toward our point of view. But they are sovereign nations to make their own decisions.

So I think that we have been effective in playing a leadership

role in the alliance which will help the alliance get through to a

consensus decision quickly, and that leadership role will not be diminished as we move forward to either 26 or 29.

I do not see a real solution to the challenge. It will be a challenge, Senator, but I do not see a quick solution in the form of

some sort of voting procedure or in the creation of a group of elders

or those who are richer. That seems to me to change the fundamental nature of an alliance of free nations coming together, each

one as important as any other. It kind of reminds me of the Senate,

that same kind of approach.

Senator BIDEN. All the kinetics and compromise.

Senator DODD. Do not use that as an example of efficiency and

speed. You are making my point with that analogy.

Secretary POWELL. No, but I am making the original point that

the founding fathers made back some time ago. I think all NATO

members have to be represented and they all have to be seen as

equals in that representation. Does it make things harder? Yes.

But does it make things impossible? No. Does it make it a little

more unwieldy? Perhaps. But I think it just means we will have

to work harder at gaining consensus.

The point was made earlier, and this gives me a chance to respond to it, that we had this disarray within NATO and we have

frayed relations, but with how many? Most of them were for us. I

mean, most of the nations of NATO were supportive of our position,

even in the face of overwhelming resistance from within their domestic constituencies. Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, a lot of

the smaller countries as well as some of the countries up north.

We had major disagreements with France and major disagreements with Germany and major disagreements with Belgium and

a couple of the others, but most of them were for us. So we will

work our way through this, and I just think this is one of the costs

of doing business when you have an alliance of democratic sovereign nations. So I do not see an immediate solution to the problem. We are looking at it, as we were asked to do. Mr. Grossman

has been in touch with our authorities in Brussels to at least examine this as food for thought. Let us take a look at this, see if there

is another way, a better way, to do business.

An even greater challenge will exist for the European Union as

it expands. So it is worth looking at, but at the moment I do not

see an alternative that, to me anyway, would be superior.

With respect to ORHA, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, at the moment I have dozens and dozens of

State employees who are working with General Garner. I think at

32

the last count I have five ambassadors who are over there. Ambassador Bodine is in charge of the central part of the country, to include Baghdad. Other ambassadors are going over.

It was really quite a logical progression as to how we thought

this would evolve. In the first instance, when you are essentially

going into a country with a military force to take down an entire

regime and take out the entire ruling infrastructure, there was no

question that this is a military mission, has to be under a military

commander, and the military commander has to be the governing

authority for some period of time until stability is established and

until you are prepared to start handing off to civilian authorities.

As Secretary Rumsfeld, Dr. Rice, and I, as well as the other

members of the administration worked on ORHA and what it

should look like, it clearly should have a very, very, heavy military,

DOD, Pentagon tint to it, and it is well known that we had some

discussions as to how strong a tint that should be. But we worked

that all out, and so now I have solid representation within ORHA.

I think as time goes on, as General Garner, who is doing a tremendous job, by the way, but as he and the military authorities establish security and stability in the country, as the humanitarian

part gets taken care of—nobody is starving. There turned out not

to be a starvation problem and food is now flowing into the country. Fix the water system, fix the hospitals, things of that nature;

slowly but surely, we will get into institution-building and slowly

but surely the political process will rise up out of the Interim Authority and the State Department will begin to play a more significant role, as will other civilian agencies of government.

I have already started to put in place the early infrastructure of

a diplomatic presence in Iraq. We have got some fly away kits that

will be going in as soon as the security situation allows them to go

in, and I have got many more members of the Department ready

to go in. We are working very closely with General Garner and

with General Franks and his people.

Sure, the gears always tend to grind a little bit when you start

down on one of these things, but those gears are now being welllubricated and I do not anticipate a major problem.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to recognize Senator Biden for a moment.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to explain the absence

of Senator Sarbanes. His failure to be here is only because he is

at Johns Hopkins. He underwent successfully surgery this morning

to remove a benign tumor and we expect him to be back home in

a few days and back here shortly after that. But I just wanted to

explain why he was not here.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. I would say that Senator Sarbanes, always very conscientious, was together with the

committee telling us of his regret he could not hear you today. But

our thoughts are with him for his recovery.

Secretary POWELL. Indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

33

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for all you are doing for the country.

Senator Biden was asking about the relationship with NATO and

the United Nations, particularly in out-of-area missions. I do not

know; can you testify as to the candidate States’ position on whether we need to go to the U.N. on out-of-area missions?

Secretary POWELL. Let me provide an answer for the record because I do not want to speak for each one of them individually, and

I am not sure that we have asked them that specifically. But I really do not think it will be a problem for most of the candidate states

because some of them are already out of the area with us in what

we are doing. They have units in the area even without the U.N.

resolution that specifically talks to this follow-on mission for

NATO.

But I do not want to speak for each one of them individually

without at least checking with my staff and checking with those

countries before I speak for them, sir. But I am not expecting a

problem with the candidate States on this issue. There may be a

problem in their legislature I am NATO familiar with yet.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, May 7, 2003.

The Honorable LINCOLN CHAFEE,

United States Senate

DEAR SENATOR CHAFEE:

The Secretary has asked that I follow up on his behalf with regard to the views

of the seven NATO invitees on whether UN Security Council endorsement is required for NATO out-of-area operations.

In their support for coalition operations in Iraq, six of the seven NATO invitees—

all but Slovenia—have shown by their actions that they do not believe all operations

require UN approval, including NATO out-of-area operations. For its part, Slovenia

supported NATO military action in Kosovo in 1999 without UN endorsement.

Slovene domestic law allows Slovene participation in military actions approved by

NATO.

All seven invitees also joined the ‘‘Vilnius Group’’ statements of November 21,

2002, and February 5, 2003: ‘‘In the event of non-compliance with the terms of

[UNSC 1441] we are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce

its provisions and the disarmament of Irag.’’

This statement demonstrates the invitees’ support for U.S. action in Iraq as well

as for NATO’s agreement at the Prague summit to undertake out-of-area operations.

We hope this information is helpful to you and appreciate your interest in the

subject of NATO Enlargement. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have further questions on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL C. POLT,

Acting Assistant Secretary,

Legislative Affairs.

Senator CHAFEE. I just would comment that as we see the

growth of the U.N. and this particular initiative of these member

States, these candidates probably being agreed to, and the relationship with the United Nations, particularly at Reykjavik and endorsing more out-of-area missions, just the relationship of the

United Nations—I think Senator Biden was asking, do we need to

have Security Council or United Nations action as we go to out-ofarea missions.

Secretary POWELL. Not for every mission, and I would submit

that NATO is not subordinate to the United Nations. I think misVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
34

sions will come along that will have nothing to do with NATO with

respect to out of area. The out-of-area mission that NATO performed, which we sometimes forget, was right after 9/11. NATO

AWACS planes came to the United States of America and for

months guarded our air space, an example of the kind of out-ofarea mission that nobody had ever thought of when we put that capability in NATO.

Some of the things that are going on in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, as well as in Afghanistan, there are nations that were signing up immediately, with or without U.N. endorsement. So I think

each one will be reviewed individually in terms of what we are trying to do and whether or not the individual countries, as they consult with their legislatures, believe that there is a requirement for

a U.N. resolution, as opposed to NATO as a body in Brussels asking for U.N. permission to do something.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Chafee.

Senator FEINGOLD.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Would you just say a little bit, Mr. Secretary, about what kind of capacities do NATO member States and

the proposed members have to bring to the table in terms of postconflict reconstruction? What can they really do?

Secretary POWELL. A number of them, interestingly, have a great

deal of experience in reconstruction activity that will be relevant to

Iraq because a lot of them were involved in construction activity.

There is knowledge of what has been done in Iraq previously. We

are drawing on that knowledge, and even some of those nations

that are hoping to get in there in the future, have done work in

Iraq and that knowledge of what has been done previously has

been helpful.

I would not expect that these nations are going to be able to

make significant financial contributions. They are small and their

budgets are modest, but I think we can still expect them to make

a contribution that is appropriate to their financial means. Some

have offered up small units, some have offered up medical assistance, and each one is trying to respond within their capabilities.

I would be more than pleased to give a complete answer for the

record. We are still putting out our net call, so to speak. What is

it you can do and what are you willing to do, and between my Department and the Defense Department we are in touch with all

these nations to see what contribution they are able to make. We

can give you a current status of that for the record, sir.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, May 7, 2003.

The Honorable RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,

United States Senate

DEAR SENATOR FEINGOLD:

The Secretary has asked that I follow up on his behalf in regard to your inquiry

at his April 29 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on NATO members’ capabilities for the reconstruction of Iraq.

35

As the attached paper of our most current estimates demonstrates, the 19 current

NATO members and the seven invitees have contributed or pledged a great deal toward the reconstruction of Iraq in financial, material and other assistance.

We hope this information is helpful to you and appreciate your interest in the

subject of NATO Enlargement. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have further questions on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL C. POLT,

Acting Assistant Secretary,

Legislative Affairs.

Enclosure: as stated.

Contributions of NATO Members Toward Iraq Reconstruction

Belgium: Pledged: $4,400,000

Delivered: $4,305,705

Canada: Pledged: $72,000,000

Delivered: $41,088,422

Also pledged: Disaster Assistance Teams; 3 C–130 aircraft

Czech Republic: Pledged: $400,000

Also pledged: 30 water treatment stations, 5 generator stations, staff

for ORHA

Delivered: Convoy of medicines, tents, blankets, field kitchens

Denmark: Pledged: $50,000,000

Delivered: $1,156,069

Also pledged: Staff for ORHA

France: Pledged: $10,752,688

Delivered: $10,764,264

Germany: Pledged: $86,561,497

Delivered: $10,936,638

Greece: Pledged: $4,627,000

Also pledged: Treatment of wounded children

Delivered: 80 tons of relief supplies

Hungary: Pledged: $190,000

Delivered: $52,000

Also pledged: Medical and non-lethal defense items

Iceland: Pledged: $3,750,000

Also pledged: Medical teams and equipment

Italy: Pledged: $18,000,000

Delivered: $16,236,396

Also pledged: Staff for ORHA

Luxembourg: Pledged: $3,743,316

Netherlands: Pledged: $20,534,759

Delivered: $20,291,846

Also pledged: Participation in stabilization force with UN cover

Norway: Pledged: $60,271,089

Delivered: $4,992,015

Poland: Pledged: Field hospital

Portugal: Pledged: $1,069,519

Spain: Pledged: $56,000,000

Delivered: $32,303,818

Also pledged: 12,000 blankets

Also delivered: Humanitarian supplies & 150 military medical personnel

Turkey: Pledged: $5,000,000

Also pledged: Food for contingency of 276,000 Turkomen refugees

United Kingdom: Pledged: $329,000,000

Delivered: $178,547,935

Also pledged: Staff for ORHA

Contributions of Proposed NATO Members:

Bulgaria: Pledged: Staff for ORHA

36

Contributions of NATO Members Toward Iraq Reconstruction—Continued

Estonia: Pledged: $64,000

Latvia: Pledged: n/a

Delivered: n/a

Lithuania: Pledged: $30,000, plus, willing to provide Turkey assistance with

refugees

Delivered: Military medical team to Kuwait

Romania: Pledged: 278 non-combat troops

Delivered: Humanitarian assistance staff for ORHA

Slovakia: Pledged: n/a

Delivered: n/a

Slovenia: Pledged: $200,000, pediatric care

Note: Deliveries, especially of smaller contributions, may not yet have been noted due to timelags in calculating receipts.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would appreciate that. In light of that answer, if NATO does play a role in peacekeeping in Iraq, will the

organization be stretched thin by also working in Afghanistan,

given what you said about their limited capacities and resources?

Secretary POWELL. I do not know until I have a better understanding of what role they might play. Right now the peacekeeping

forces that we are looking at for Iraq to come in behind the coalition forces are being structured and headquarters are being identified. We are not yet looking for a NATO headquarters per se.

Whether NATO’s involvement in Iraq might actually involve the

deployment of one of the NATO headquarters to Iraq or whether

it can be done from a present location and sending units under

NATO flag to Iraq as opposed to a full headquarters coming in I

think is a judgment for the Military Committee to make. But at the

moment I do not think it would overstress the capability of NATO,

as long as we do not start creating more headquarters that draw

resources away from existing headquarters, one of my concerns

about the action that was taken in Belgium today.

Senator FEINGOLD. To what degree does public opinion regarding

Iraq and potential NATO member States affect the domestic political consequences of joining the alliance for these governments?

Have our posts reported on any public manifestations of opposition

to membership recently? In general, how stable can NATO be if

new members are attempting to withdraw regularly to respond to

domestic political pressures?

Secretary POWELL. I think every nation has domestic political

pressures it has to deal with, depending on the situation or the crisis before them. In a number of the new candidates, there were

concerns about our going into Iraq, just as there were among current member nations. But all of them dealt with that challenge and

every one of them got a successful vote when they needed it from

their populace.

The one I was most concerned about was Slovenia when they

took it to their Parliament at the height of the tension over Iraq.

To be very frank, Senator Feingold, I was biting my fingernails

figuratively over the weekend the vote was taken, because it looked

like it was going to be very close. If they had not gotten the successful vote, then they would not have been able to sign the accession document and we would have had a major problem.

37

But they got the vote at 66 percent, which was handy, handily

over the amount needed, of course. It also means that there are

questions among the remaining 34 percent as to whether or not it

is the right thing for them or not. So yes, there are public opinions

in these nations that sometimes question whether the nation

should be part of this alliance, just like you would find public opinion differences in any one of the existing member nations.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I thank the Chairman and Senator Biden for calling this important hearing, and

thank Secretary Powell for being here today.

In the wake of the horror of September 11, 2001, NATO decided that those attacks on the United States could be considered an attack on the whole alliance, and

by the beginning of October, NATO had formally invoked Article V for the first time.

I can remember quite clearly how meaningful that news was for Americans, how

important that sense of resolve and solidarity with our allies was in strengthening

our own morale and determination.

There were important questions to be asked then about how NATO can contribute

to the fight against terrorism, and many of those questions remain. At the time, it

seemed that we would answer this question in close collaboration with our allies,

rolling up our sleeves together to re-examine NATO’s role in post-September 11 context. But today, we are coping with a serious diplomatic rift between NATO member

States, with the echoing ramifications of rhetoric about new verus old Europe, and

with press reports speculating on how the U.S. will punish those who did not support our policy in Iraq. It is in this context that we are considering questions of enlargement and of NATO’s future. I fear that the earlier question—the question that

deals with our most important policy priority, the question that asks what role

NATO should play in helping to combat global terrorism—may be lost in the shuffle.

In the midst of this murky situation, a few points are quite clear. NATO has a

role to play in maintaining European stability and in maintaining transatlantic cooperation. It should have a role to play in combating global terrorism, which threatens the security of all. It follows that new member States should have something

to offer relative to all of these objectives.

It is also clear that the United States military and British forces have done an

admirable job of defeating the forces of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, but are now confronted by the awesome and costly task of restoring order. We should welcome burden-sharing in various forms to help us manage this task. And we should welcome

burden-sharing in part to reassure the rest of the world that ours is not a policy

of unilaterally imposing our will by force without consultation or cooperation. This

is not about wanting to be liked, or about being popular in the halls of the U.N.

or European capitals. It is about wanting to be secure and to maintain cooperation

in the fight against terrorism.

I look forward to the testimony today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator ALLEN.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you again for your magnificent job and that

of your whole staff. Senator Lugar allowed me to have the gavel

for various hearings on these aspirant countries. I have been a

long-time advocate for those who meet the criteria to join with us

since the days I was Governor working in those days for Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Some of these ambassadors that you are putting forward and

their willingness to serve, you saw those families that are going to

be separated as their duty stations are in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,

and a variety of countries. They are good patriots and we commend

them.

38

I also want to say I am glad to hear your positive comments in

response to Chairman Lugar’s comments insofar as the basing in

other countries than Germany, where we have 80,000 troops stationed. In this most recent military action in Iraq, clearly other facilities, including Costanza in Romania and also facilities in Bulgaria, were helpful. These countries have been helpful to us in the

Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq as well, and will be of continuing

importance in the war on terrorism.

So I am one who is a strong advocate for at least reevaluating

our options, and I think that having some of our forces, our capabilities, whether for staging or for various facilities, closer to the

current threats makes sense. I think it is also important to recognize that those countries, Bulgaria and Romania in particular,

want us there, and I think they will be cost-effective. So I look forward to working with you and others in that regard.

Now, insofar as Iraq is concerned, the President on many occasions has said Iraqi oil, is to go to the people of Iraq. I have been

interested in a concept which has been adopted here in the United

States, in the State of Alaska, where a portion of the oil revenues

goes to the citizens of Alaska. I think that helps individual rights.

So I think one of the keys, actually the foundational key to the

success of Iraq’s Government, is a recognition of individual rights,

not rights derived by religious groups, or ethnicity. So a country

and their government, their constitution and their laws, need to

recognize those individual rights.

On the economic aspect, as far as oil is concerned, if a small dividend can actually go to the people as individuals as opposed to

whomever is in control, I think that helps economically. It provides

a sense of property rights, which are a important individual right.

I would like to hear any comments or thoughts you may have on

the constitution in Iraq of creating something like the Alaska Permanent Fund so that the people of Iraq indeed are the owners, not

only of their government, but of that key resource of oil.

Secretary POWELL. There is an economic theory that we have

been examining that is very much related to that. It essentially

says if you want to get the most use out of the revenues that come

from oil, rather than give it to the government for the government

to decide what to do with it, just give it to the people and let them

decide what to do with it. It sounds like very familiar economic policy. I will stop there.

Senator ALLEN. I do not know. There are some people who could

use some convincing on this point.

Secretary POWELL. The clear point is that the people, if they had

access to that money directly, as is the case in Alaska to some of

the money that is generated by Alaskan oil, then they can make

choices in their own lives with respect to how they will use that

money. The money will not go off to bureaucracies and the money

will not go to Swiss bank accounts, although we hope we are correcting that once and for all so that is not a risk. But decisions will

be made about investing that money in a business or educating a

child or building a house or buying clothing, but it will circulate

in the economy and it will contribute to the economy.

39

So yes, Senator Allen, we are looking at this as an alternative.

But I have to come back to the first point. It is up to the Iraqi people to decide how they will use the wealth that they have in oil.

Senator ALLEN. I would suspect if they had some sort of a plebiscite or referendum on it, I think that they would all like to get

a little dividend on those revenues.

Secretary POWELL. I think I would bet on that.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Allen.

Senator BOXER.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Secretary, for all you

do. I have a couple of comments and a couple of questions.

Let me just say, the idea of a dividend to the folks is good. We

have to see what their needs are as a society. If you decided to disband your Department tomorrow, all that money could go back to

the taxpayers. Now, they may like that in the short run, but if we

did not have you and the good people you talk about that would

be a real problem for us. So I think it is all a question of balancing

the needs of the people, which is the debate that we are in constantly, obviously, here.

I am a very strong supporter of NATO expansion. I think back

to the days of the cold war when all those folks had no freedom,

no countries really. As far as I am concerned, the larger it gets the

better if the nations meet the qualifications.

I want to actually mention something. You started off in a way

defending your Department, which I understand why you did it,

and praising the people in your Department, and I understand why

you did it. I think it is a chance for me to just make a statement,

not so much to you but perhaps to the broader audience of our

country, which is I think there is an attempt in this country by certain leaders to really launch personal attacks against leaders and

it is very discouraging to me.

I have seen it with you. I have seen it on the moderate Republicans that I enjoy working with. I have seen it on my own leader,

Tom Daschle, about as good a human being you could get. And I

am not talking about political attacks. Those are fine. We are

grownups, we know that. But it is more a personal type of attack.

So I think whenever we have a chance as colleagues, whether Republican or Democratic, to say that we do not appreciate that—you

know, I do not agree with you, Mr. Secretary, in a lot of issues; you

do not agree with me. We have never had an ill word between us,

and when we can work together we do; and when we cannot, we

cannot.

I held up a picture and a book showing the Arctic Wildlife Refuge, beautiful photographs by this photographer, and the Smithsonian now degraded that exhibit to the downstairs level because it

was used politically—to hold up a picture of a polar bear and say,

look at this, let us consider this. This is not the America I know

and love. It is not the kind of Iraq anyone wants to see.

So I just mention it because you spent about 5 minutes defending

your Department. There is not one person on this committee, at

least I do not know of any, that does not fully respect the work you

do and the work that they do.

40

Now, I have two hard questions. One has to do with the search

for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and I wanted to know

your opinion on how it is proceeding. I am one who believed that

they were there. That is why I supported more and more intrusive

inspections and I supported the Levin amendment that said we

have got to get in there, we have got to find them.

You absolutely put the credibility of the United States on the line

in front of the United Nations when you said that you believed that

they may have 400 bombs filled with chemical agents and 7 mobile

biological agent factories and 4 spray tanks from planes, 550 shells

with mustard gas, 30,000 empty munitions, enough precursors to

stockpile 500 tons of chemical agents, 6,500 bombs from the IranIraq war, 1,000 tons of chemical agents.

So you laid it out very specifically. My question is, do you feel

that our people who are searching for these weapons are the very

best qualified in the world to do this, and do you think we will get

more results when some of these Iraqis that we are capturing now

on the list, the card deck—by the way, I am making a card deck

of all the people who stole our energy, you know, the Enron people

and all that. I have a card deck of those. I love it. I think it is a

great idea. Do you think that when we have these people speaking

that we will be led to these weapons?

The second question has to do with my Syria Accountability Act

that I introduced on a bipartisan basis last year and am about to

introduce again. It would increase economic and political sanctions

against Syria unless the President certifies that the Syrian Government has ended its support of terrorism, it has withdrawn from

Lebanon, it has ceased the development and production of biological and chemical weapons.

This legislation does not in any way condone, urge, or authorize

the use of force against Syria. But it does indicate a real concern

about their policies. Now, last year the White House stated, ‘‘it was

not the right time,’’ to pursue the Syria Accountability Act. But I

think now maybe is a chance that we can work together and get

it done, because my own view is, rather than the sabre-rattling or

the threats of war, I think we should just go ahead and start these

sanctions if they do not cooperate.

Thank you.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator,

and thank you for your support.

On the first question of weapons of mass destruction, they will

be found. The presentation I made before the United Nations on

the 5th of February was at the end of 4 straight days of living with

the entire intelligence community and going over every single thing

we knew. Every day and every night leading up to the 5th of February, I was closeted with our very best experts.

What I presented on that day was information that was allsource and that had other backup to it and not just what they saw

in the presentation. Everything we had there had backup and double sourcing and triple sourcing. A lot of the things that were

talked about at my presentation and have been talked about in

other presentations and Director Tenet has presented to the Congress on a number of occasions had to do with gaps in knowledge,

gaps that the Iraqis could have filled if they had intended to fill

41

them. So whether something is there or not with respect to a certain number of liters of one kind of agent or another could have

been reconciled if they had chose to reconcile it, and they did not.

So we will try to reconcile it, see whether it is there or not.

It is also important to remember that when Resolution 1441 was

passed it began with a clear statement of Iraq guilt. All 15 members of the Security Council who approved and voted for 1441 were

saying in the beginning that they believed that Iraq had weapons

of mass destruction and had not properly accounted for them. So

the question of what we find and I am confident that we will find

was really resolved when 1441 was passed. Resolution 1441 really

was the key element in this conflict in the sense that it not only

gave legitimacy to what we did, but it brought the Council together

15 to 0 to say that Iraq is guilty and it is condemnable, and if they

do not fix themselves they are subject to serious consequences.

I agree with you—or let me pick up what you said about interviews. We will learn more and we are learning more right now. I

am getting almost daily reports of little nuggets that are coming

out with respect to what was done, what might have been destroyed in recent days, where certain records are. So I am confident

that we will be able to deal with that.

With respect to Syria, I will be traveling to Syria in the very,

very near future and all of the issues that are of concern to us,

whether it has to do with support of terrorism or weapons of mass

destruction or some of the activity that was taking place across the

Syria-Iraq border that caused us concern or the fact that Syria is

still present in Lebanon, it is still under a state of martial law, all

of these issues I expect to have full and very direct conversations

with the Syrian leadership about.

My hope is that President Bashar Assad and his colleagues are

looking at what is happening in the region and factoring that into

their policymaking apparatus—the complete change in circumstances as a result of the end of the Saddam Hussein regime,

so they have a different neighbor on their doorstep now, a neighbor

that is going to be moving in a democratic way, and hopefully they

have factored that in.

The other element that I hope they are factoring in is that some

time in the next 24 to 72 hours, I hope, the PLC will confirm Mr.

Abu Mazen as the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, and

when that happens a road map will be delivered by members of the

quartet—the United States, Russian Federation, the United Nations, and the European Union—which will lay out obligations and

commitments and responsibilities of both the Palestinian side and

the Israeli side.

It is going to be controversial. If people want to change and people want to comment on it, let them comment on it and start talking to one another. But above all, let them start taking action, both

sides, beginning with ending violence and terror, to move down this

road map to the creation of a Palestinian state. The President is

committed to put the full weight of his office and all of us behind

this. When that starts, I hope the Syrians will recognize that they

have a role to play in all of this as we move toward a comprehensive solution that must include Syria and Lebanon.

42

So I think these two changed elements fundamentally should reshape the manner in which Syria is examining its policies, and I

hope that I have a full, candid, and open discussion with President

Bashar Assad about this in the very near future.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, just—will you take another look at the Syria Accountability Act, please?

Secretary POWELL. Yes, ma’am.

Senator BOXER. I think it will help you when you meet him.

Secretary POWELL. I will take a look.

Senator BOXER. Tell him we have got it out here. Thanks.

Secretary POWELL. Yes, ma’am.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, May 30, 2003.

The Honorable RICHARD LUGAR, CHAIRMAN,

Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

On April 29, during the Committee on Foreign Relations’ hearing ‘‘An Enlarged

NATO: Mending Fences and Moving Forward on Iraq,’’ Senator Boxer requested

that Secretary Powell consider the Syria Accountability Act.

The United States is at a very challenging time in our bilateral relationship with

Syria. We are in the process of intense dialogue with the Syrian regime on a host

of issues of concern, including terrorism, connections to the regime of Saddam Hussein, its pursuit of WMD, and the Syrian military presence in Lebanon.

As you are aware, the President asked Secretary Powell to visit Syria for candid

discussions on the future of our relationship. We are prepared to brief the Committee on those conversations and offer an assessment of how U.S. policy goals can

most effectively be pursued.

In light of this current fluid environment, we ask that you not move forward on

this bill at this time.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration’s program there is no objection to the submission of this letter.

I hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to call if we can

be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

PAUL V. KELLY,

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.

Senator VOINOVICH.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to congratulate you and your team on

the outstanding job that you have done. I think you have got more

on your plate than any Secretary of State at least in my memory

and you are handling it all quite well.

I am really pleased that you are taking your CEO responsibilities

very seriously and moving in the personnel area, and technology,

and I know you are working to secure the embassies. On another

committee in which I am involved, Governmental Affairs, I am

chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the Federal Work Force, and we are going to be

marking up some bills one of these days for the Defense Department, for NASA, and some other legislation that gives departments

flexibility. I know that you have a real problem of compression in

the State Department, also with bonuses that accrue and cannot be

43

taken because of unrealistic pay caps. I would really like your

human resources people to look at that legislation, to come back

with recommendations on perhaps how we can respond to some

particular problems that you may be experiencing as Secretary of

State.

Secretary POWELL. We would be delighted, Senator. Thank you.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, May 7, 2003.

The Honorable GEORGE V. VOINOVICH,

United States Senate

DEAR SENATOR VOINOVICH:

This is in response to your request to the Secretary at the April 29 SFRC hearing

for recommendations concerning Congressional assistance for the Department as the

Federal government considers civil service reforms.

We would like to offer to brief your staff on human capital issues at the Department of State and our management agenda and offer some comments on the legislation currently pending before your committee.

Doug Wertman of my staff will contact your office to arrange such a meeting at

your convenience.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL C. POLT,

Acting Assistant Secretary,

Legislative Affairs.

Senator VOINOVICH. The other thing that I would like to ask you

about is this, when I was with you and the President at the Prague

summit, there was a great deal of discussion about the ability of

NATO to field forces quickly and effectively to do whatever the

forces are needed to do around the world. We also know that the

DCI has not worked and now we are talking about the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and we are talking about the NATO Response Force.

The question I have is, are we really serious about this? Have

we, for example, underscored to the other members of NATO that

they are not stepping up to the plate and doing the job that they

are supposed to be doing, reminding them that some of the ambassadors that are here from the aspirant countries are doing more in

their defense budgets than members currently of NATO, that they

have got to step up and do their job?

Have we specifically identified what the NATO Response Force

is going to look like and what individual responsibilities are going

to be within that structure? Now, you are talking about going into

Afghanistan and visualizing perhaps going into Iraq, but it seems

to me that if you are going to do something like this you have got

to really be specific about what it is that this rapid response unit

is going to be and what people’s responsibilities are going to be,

and then monitor the performance of individuals that are involved

to make sure they move forward.

I would like to know just how formal this is—have we formalized

this at all or is it just kind of, well, we are going to move into Afghanistan and whoever has got whatever it is, they will pitch in,

and if we go into Iraq they will pitch in?

Secretary POWELL. With respect to your first question, there is

no NATO meeting that I go to or that my colleague Don Rumsfeld

44

goes to that we do not press on the need to increase the capabilities

of individual countries, not just to go out and buy things, but to

buy the right things. Lift, the ability to go out of area, is critical.

And if you are going to go out of area and be far away from your

home bases, then you have to have the logistics systems, the intelligence systems, and the communications systems that allow you to

do that.

Frankly, NATO has not, the individual countries of NATO, have

not done a good enough job on this. They talk about it and we have

plans and, as you noted, there are always new initiatives coming

along, but the initiative we need more than any other initiative is

the political will on the part of each and every one of these countries to go to their people and say there are still threats in this

world, we are still part of a great alliance, and we have to pay, and

we have to make sure that we have first class, world class forces

if we are going to send them to Afghanistan or Iraq, a Bosnia or

a Kosovo or a Macedonia or anywhere else.

We continue to press at political levels, not just military levels,

at political levels for Prime Ministers and Presidents to take this

case to their people and to their Parliaments and legislatures. We

are not having the kind of success we need. George Robertson, Lord

Robertson, has been in the forefront of asking for these increased

capabilities.

With respect to the rapid response unit, it is still being created.

I cannot answer your specific questions with respect to it, but I will

certainly talk to my colleagues both in Brussels and in the Pentagon to see if we can give you a more fulsome answer for the

record, sir.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, May 7, 2003.

The Honorable GEORGE V. VOINOVICH,

United States Senate

DEAR SENATOR VOINOVICH:

The Secretary has asked that I follow up on his behalf with regard to what a

NATO rapid response force will look like and how individual responsibilities will be

delegated within that force, questions you raised in the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee’s April 29, 2003 hearing on NATO Enlargement.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is still in its early stages of creation. General

Jones, as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has his staff working on the details

of this force and a timeline to make it a reality. We expect those details to become

clear within the next two months.

Although specific composition is yet to be defined, Allies agree that the NRF will

consist of air, ground and maritime forces at very high readiness and rapidly

deployable for the full range of Alliance missions. While individual responsibilities

have not been assigned, all Allies will be expected to make appropriate NRF contributions. These forces will be as multinational as possible without compromising

military effectiveness. Initial operational capability is planned for October 2004,

with final operating capability planned for October 2006.

We hope this information is helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us

if you have further questions on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL C. POLT,

Acting Assistant Secretary,

Legislative Affairs.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

45

One other thing, Mr. Chairman. I am very interested as a member of this committee in growing anti-Semitism and organized

crime in the world. One of the things that I am very concerned

about is that we are bringing some new nations into NATO and a

couple of them specifically have had some problems with corruption

and with organized crime. I would like to know, what are we doing

as a country to respond to what I consider a very, very formidable

organized crime effort in the old Balkans area and that region in

terms of coordinating the EU, SECI, OSCE?

It seems like the opposition is very well organized and we are

still trying to get our act together.

Secretary POWELL. We of course speak about it rhetorically and

let them know that admission to NATO brings with it responsibilities and we are expecting the rule of law, we are expecting transparency, and we are expecting you to root out corruption. Then

with each nation, we dial in and speak specifically to them as to

their particular needs.

In the case of Bulgaria, when that was of interest we helped

them to realize the need to establish an inter-agency anti-corruption commission, which they have just created, chaired by their

Minister of Justice. The Bulgarian Parliament just passed new

anti-corruption legislation, anti-bribery legislation, and asset forfeiture legislation to take assets away from criminals is pending

now before the parliament.

Romania is crafting bills that are aimed at reforming the judiciary, civil service, and political party financing activities. Creation

of an anti-corruption prosecutor’s office last fall I think will also

help. The media is being turned on within these countries to this

kind of corruption that is absolutely corrosive of the democracy

that they are now trying to strengthen.

So we are working hard with them. There were a number of

other countries that I will not mention by name where we had specific problems with specific individuals and we made it clear to the

leaders of those countries, both I did directly and members of my

Department, that there was a limit as to what we could do with

respect to cooperation either bilaterally or within NATO if these

kinds of individuals were going to be around.

Through constant pressure and not letting the pressure up, that

problem was dealt with. So we will continue to make clear to these

countries that obligation. The obligation that comes with membership in NATO is not just having troops that can go somewhere, but

living up to the highest standards of the democratic values that

hold this alliance together.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

[The preparded statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

I would like to thank the chairman and the ranking member for convening this

hearing today, and our distinguished witness, Secretary Powell, for taking the time

to appear before the committee this morning. It is clear that there are many demands on your time, and your presence here today is greatly appreciated. I would

also like to congratulate you on your efforts during the past several months. You

are doing an outstanding job, particularly with so many irons in the fire.

It is good to have the chance to talk with you again about enlargement of the

NATO alliance. I was thrilled to be with the President and with you at the NATO

Summit in Prague last November, and I will always be grateful for the opportunity

46

to be in the room when Secretary General Lord Robertson announced the historic

decision to invite seven countries Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,

Slovakia and Slovenia—to join the alliance. I also appreciated the reception that you

held for members of the congressional delegation to the summit.

Much has taken place since we spoke in Prague last fall. We find ourselves discussing enlargement as we are at a crossroads in Iraq, with the military campaign

to liberate the Iraqi people coming to a close and efforts to promote a democratic,

peaceful and secure future for the country just beginning.

Without a doubt, the support of the international community—including our

NATO allies—will be crucial as we move forward in Iraq. Many of our NATO allies,

including the candidate countries, have already made significant contributions in

our efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein and secure a better future for the people of

Iraq. Their continued support is highly important as we look not just to win the

war, but to win the peace in Iraq.

The question of NATO enlargement has been considered in a changed world following the events of September 11, 2001. The alliance has been challenged to confront new threats, and to develop the capabilities necessary to meet them. As we

come together to confront growing challenges to global peace and security, including

terrorism and its dangerous link to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

I continue to believe that an enlarged NATO will enhance the security of United

States, Europe and the world at large.

While the candidate countries still have work to do on their Membership Action

Plans (MAPs), they have already demonstrated their willingness and ability to contribute to efforts to combat threats to world peace. They have acted as de facto allies, and I am glad that the Senate is taking the necessary steps to move forward

on the ratification process and make membership a reality for these new European

democracies.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony and time with us this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to

thank you personally for raising the issue with your colleagues on

Scott Speicher. There is a team in there that is looking for him.

The fact that he is on the priority list along with weapons of mass

destruction to find is in no part a small measure due to you raising

this issue, and I appreciate that.

I just returned with a delegation led by the majority leader from

the Far East, with the primary issue being North Korea. We leaned

pretty hard on the Chinese leadership, suggesting that where they

had in the past yanked the chain of North Korea by shutting off

the fuel for 3 days that sent a fairly strong message. I was a little

distressed to hear President Hu talk like that they were merely

going to be conveners of the meetings.

In that meeting and in subsequent meetings, then we bored in

pretty hard on how it was clearly in China’s interest that there be

no nukes in North Korea as well as our interest. Since then, Secretary Kelly has been there and I would like to have you give this

committee the benefit of your thought on the progress.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator. Let me thank you for

making that trip and for your interventions with the Chinese leadership.

The President has said from the very beginning—and by the beginning I mean last October when we confronted the North Koreans with our knowledge that they were trying also to develop nuclear weapons via enriched uranium technology in addition to the

plutonium activity that had been taking place at Yongbyon and

which we thought we had capped since the Agreed Framework of

1994.

47

When confronted last October, they admitted it and the President made it clear that this was unacceptable, but that he believed

a diplomatic solution could be found. He charged me and the members of my team to pursue a diplomatic solution. The President also

made it clear that it had to be a solution that was of a multilateral

nature. It had to involve the other countries of the region. It was

not to be simply a U.S.-DPRK problem, that we would somehow cut

a deal around the interests of our friends in the region.

But beyond that, these weapons, if they existed, and if the North

Koreans continued to pursue them, were a greater threat to their

neighbors than even to the United States, so the neighbors had to

be involved. We held to that position despite a great deal of pressure suggesting that, well, why don’t you just make this problem

go away by talking directly to the North Koreans.

It took us a number of months, but we finally persuaded in

straightforward discussions with our Chinese colleagues, finally

persuaded the Chinese to play an active role, not just as conveners

of a trilateral or multilateral meeting, but to be a full participant

in that meeting. And they agreed and, frankly, they participated

with considerable relish, and it is now with some pride that they

talk about what happened last week.

We would have liked to have seen it be a multilateral meeting

with four and five members present, participants. South Korea and

Japan we would have preferred to see in the room. That was more

than the traffic could bear right now. But I can assure you, they

were in the room in terms of their equities, in terms of their interests, and in terms of the representations that we made on their behalf by Assistant Secretary Kelly.

The meeting I have characterized as useful and I think it was.

The Chinese in that meeting reaffirmed their position, the position

of their government, not only of the government that just left office

but President Hu’s government coming in, that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized. They made that clear at the meeting

and made it clear to the North Koreans, and of course reinforced

our position.

The Chinese did something else. They also acknowledged the existence of a 1992 agreement between South Korea and North Korea

where North Korea previously agreed and entered into this agreement with South Korea that there would be no nuclear weapons on

the peninsula. So the Chinese participated fully and presented

their case fully.

The North Koreans said a number of things, always with the

usual ambiguity around their statements. But they said they had

reprocessed all of the rods at Yongbyon. We have no independent

evidence to suggest that that is the case, but nevertheless that is

what they said. We are not sure it is true, but that is what they

said.

They also indicated in an aside that they did have nuclear weapons and they said they told it to the United States 10 years ago

during the period when the Agreed Framework was being negotiated. We have checked with every single one of the negotiators on

our side from that period and none of them say that the North Koreans actually told them that, although they came close. They certainly made some inferences that could have led somebody to beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
48

lieve that and they may have believed it themselves, but they

never told us that.

So we have always attributed to the North Koreans the possession of one or two nuclear weapons, our best intelligence estimate

they might have or could have one or two nuclear weapons, but

they have said that they had it.

But then they went on to say: And there is a way to move on.

So they gave us a proposal and that proposal would, if it were followed through, according to them, lead to the removal of the nuclear capability and maybe even deal with their missile capability.

It is a proposal of a kind we have seen previously from them and

it is something that of course I believe that, because our other

friends are interested in, we will study. But it is a proposal that

is not going to take us in the direction we need to go.

But nevertheless we will study it. I think that is appropriate. We

will not be intimidated by their claims and threats. As the President has said often and repeatedly, and there should be no question about it, we will not be blackmailed. We are going to work

closely with our friends and allies. We are going to keep this multilateral. We are going to consult with our colleagues in the Security

Council. The Security Council has a role to play in all of this and

we will continue to hold North Korea, accountable for its behavior

in a variety of areas. The President still believes, and I still believe,

that a diplomatic solution is possible.

So we had a useful meeting last week. What happens next remains to be seen. We will be consulting here within the administration and we will be consulting with our friends and colleagues.

But the North Koreans have pretty much said they are doing these

things and they have these things. What that does is makes it clear

to everybody in the neighborhood, the South Koreans, the Chinese,

the Japanese, the Russians, the Australians, let there be no doubt

that the North Koreans have been doing what we said they were

doing. Now they must be brought to understand that the presence

of this kind of capability will buy them nothing of any use and only

the total elimination, verifiable elimination, of this kind of capability, these sorts of programs, and other, more responsible behavior on their part will bring about a solution to this problem and

will allow them to do something that they ought to be doing, and

that is taking care of 24 million starving people who deserve better

than what they are getting from this regime.

So we are clearheaded and openminded about the way forward.

The President has given us very strong and clear guidance. We

keep all of our options available, but the President continues to believe a diplomatic solution is possible and something that has to be

done on a multilateral basis. We are not the only ones with an equity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator COLEMAN.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want the join in the chorus of voices in applauding you and your team for the things that you have done in articulating the vision of the President and in securing the 15 to 0 vote

on 1441, for building a very broad international coalition, and for

how we are handling the North Korean situation, understanding

49

that we do not do it alone, that we bring others to the table. So

I want to thank you for that.

Second, I also want to state for the record, I strongly support the

expansion of NATO and I want to thank my chairman for the

speed in which he has pulled all this together. I noted you noted

that in your comments.

My question has to do, Mr. Secretary, with the issue of mending

fences. I was a Republican mayor in a city in which there was not

another elected Republican city official, so I understand about

working with those who do not always agree with you and mending

fences. But I do believe—and my concern is, I am a strong believer

that future behavior is influenced by reaction to past behavior.

The seven invitees strongly supported our efforts in Iraq. They

took risks. They did it in spite of concern perhaps among the body

politic. Tony Blair took great risks. So my concern is how do we

deal with this issue of past behavior—I am going to be very blunt— with France and with Germany? There was a report and it was just

one news report about whether France was consulting with Iraq.

I am not going to ask you to comment on it, on a single news report.

But I will ask you to address the broader question of consequences for behavior. I would note, perhaps reflecting what I

thought was the concern of my distinguished colleague from Connecticut in terms of the operation of NATO, perhaps we do not do

consensus any more, that we perhaps go by majority vote.

But again, do you recognize or believe that in fact there should

be consequences of behavior and that those who were not supportive should somehow—as we build this future relationship, that

we somehow respond to that in an appropriate way?

Secretary POWELL. Yes, and it is not a matter of punishing anyone. It is not a word that I use. But I was asked last week in an

interview situation, as a result of the difficulties we have had with

France in particular, how do we go forward? I said, France has

been a friend of the United States for 225 years. We have gone

through many things together as two nations that are friendly and

are allies, and that is not going to go away. I do not think anybody

should suggest that we forget what France did for us and what we

have done for France over the years.

But at the same time, their attitudes and some of the actions

they took in the course of this debate, we were very much regretful

of. Therefore, when the question was then put to me, well, should

there be consequences of this, my answer was yes. So we will review all the things we do with France to see whether they are appropriate to the circumstances that have been modified slightly by

this disagreement. We will do that.

There is no secret about this. I have had very candid conversations with my French colleague. I speak to him now almost every

day. I have spoken to him for the last 3 days, and I had a long

meeting with the French Ambassador who was made reference to

earlier, Ambassador Levitte, on Friday afternoon. Because we are

friends, we can speak candidly.

I also had to point out that the United States has been going

about our review of what we should do rather quietly. It sometimes

pops out in the paper. But on occasion France has made it quite

50

clear to some of the nations that did support us, especially some

of the aspirant or the candidate nations here, that they were going

to pay a price for supporting us. They made it clear it might affect

accession in the EU, and they were lectured rather severely for

daring to support the United States.

Well, those are consequences. So just do not point to the United

States, that we should not review the bidding and we should not

consider whether or not there are consequences to be paid for certain kinds of behavior when at the same time and almost in the

same voice they are administering consequences to those nations

that stood with us.

Senator COLEMAN. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary,

being the optimist I am and ending on the positive note——

Secretary POWELL. This is not personal. It is business.

Senator COLEMAN. I would hope that for the aspirant nations, because they were so supportive, that we do raise our voice with

those whom they seek to punish and that we do, when we bring

them into NATO, that we reflect, the Senate reflects, our support

for the things they have done.

Secretary POWELL. We have. We will not forget that they were

small nations in the face of public opinion that would have suggested that they sort of duck or just say nothing, that stood up for

us. They came forward and they said, we see the rightness of this

cause and we align ourselves with the United States of America,

and they received quite a few bricks thrown their way. The United

States will not forget that they stood up with us at a time we needed people to stand up with us.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

We will continue questioning until noon with a 5-minute limit.

Mr. Secretary, during previous debates on NATO, either for one

reason or another, NATO itself or accession debates, two issues

have arisen and they were addressed by some of the witnesses that

we have had. The first is should consensus, which means unanimity, be the voting structure? The suggestion is made from time

to time, and it has been alluded to today, that with more and more

members perhaps a large majority would suffice, as opposed to all.

Now, most of the witnesses have dismissed this idea for one reason or another, including an administration witness from our own

administration, believing it is in our interest, the United States’ interest, to retain the consensus situation. I raise this issue not preemptively, but in the event that there will be amendments when

we have our floor debate. Such have occurred in the past.

The second amendment that is sometimes suggested is, should

there be some method of expelling members from NATO or for

some departure procedure? Given the fact that this grows larger

and larger, at some point in history there may be among NATO

members one or more who reject altogether the freedom of speech,

freedom of religion, the democratic ethic, human rights. There we

are, left with such a member in our midst. What do we do about

that?

51

So the suggestion is there ought to be, while we are thinking

about expansion, some way of curtailing and pruning the tree if

necessary.

Can you offer your suggestions before we launch into either

markup tomorrow or the floor debate with regard to either of these

two propositions?

Secretary POWELL. I think these are reasonable questions to ask

at a time that we are seeing such a marked increase in the size

of the alliance. But I think let us study these questions before offering legislative solutions of any kind. NATO is not a committee,

it is not a council, it is not a group. It is an alliance, and when

you call something an alliance I think that means that everybody

has to be together for the alliance to take action.

It has been a successful alliance for all these many years under

the rule of consensus. Sometimes we run into problems, just as you

do in the U.N. and elsewhere. For the most part we can find workarounds, as we did with the Turkish issue earlier this year. But it

seems to me we would probably lose more than we would gain if

we tried to find some other way to do it besides consensus. Majority vote, what do the others do, just sit around and fume? I mean,

it is not an alliance acting any more; it is part of an alliance acting.

So I have a problem with that. But I believe it is worthy of study

and analysis.

With respect to bouncing somebody or expulsion, why should

there not be membership standards that if you do not meet or if

you somehow no longer comply with the original terms of your admission, you should not be rejected? But the Washington Treaty

does not provide for that, nor do I know many international organizations that do provide for such rejection. There are some, but not

that many.

So this also is worthy of consideration, but right now I would

argue against trying in any way to condition the accession to that

kind of idea or that suggestion in any legislative manner.

The CHAIRMAN. I picked up just one other item. Senator Boxer

has mentioned correctly that she and others have offered legislation with regard to Syria in the past and that she might do so

again at this point. You have taken that under advisement. Let me

just say that in the event legislation is offered or even if it is not,

your advice to this committee as to how best we ought to proceed

diplomatically with Syria would be much appreciated.

In other words, we do not want to have a debate in the committee or on the floor on Syria while you are in Syria or dealing

very directly with a very serious problem. I ask you to be as forthcoming as possible on the issue.

Secretary POWELL. We are dealing with a very serious problem,

but we are dealing with it in a changing environment, is the point

I made to Senator Boxer. It would not be helpful for me right now

to also have something that would be pending in the way of legislation. I hope that this is one that Congress will allow the diplomacy

to remain in the hands of the President.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator DODD.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

52

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, again. I do not want to dwell on the

point you just discussed with the chairman, but I just express to

you again my concern down the road. I do not suggest there is any

simple solution to this, and clearly you make a very good point.

This is an alliance, it is not a club as such. But once the enthusiasm—once you are in and given the difficulties of expelling someone that is in, and knowing we want this NATO, new NATO, to

be a responsive organization that can move beyond the original

geographical limitations and with the clear objective at its creation

of dealing with the potential of the Soviet Union pouring through

the Fulda Gap, as we heard over the years, clearly today we are

going to be looking for NATO as I understand it to be performing

missions that we cannot even begin to envision. But we know we

are going to want to do it fairly quickly.

Knowing down the road that you can have 29 nations that can

have opinions—we have used consensus, but it has almost been a

veto power among the 16. As I understand it, and you correct me

if I am wrong, but almost any one country who has strong feelings

against taking some action can pretty much stop the action from

happening over the years. At least that is how I understood it.

I am not sure that the Security Council idea is the right one, either, but I get nervous about us setting this up and doing it and

not sort of addressing this issue in some way, or at least creating

a framework for it to be addressed.

Mr. Chairman, we might want to think about some language

that will at least put on notice that we have got to look at this

issue so that we will not be surprising new members later on, having brought them into the organization, that we may have some

different means by which we allow NATO to respond as quickly as

we would like them to to both military and political situations.

I do not really—you have responded to this.

Secretary POWELL. The only point I would make, Senator Dodd,

even an Iceland or Luxembourg could express an objection and we

not achieve consensus. But the practice has tended not to be that

way.

Senator DODD. I agree.

Secretary POWELL. You tend to find a way forward, and the

usual voting style of NATO is, when there is an issue before the

Council Lord Robertson sends it out to all of the member nations

and says: Here is what we believe we ought to do and does anybody

want to break consensus on this by Monday morning at noon? And

so we all work all through the weekend to talk to those who might

be thinking of breaking consensus and persuade them and convince

them and cajole them and go through all the diplomatic dance

steps necessary to get consensus.

I have played ‘‘The Perils of Pauline’’ almost every other weekend

since I got this job on some NATO proposal that we are worried

about somebody breaking consensus. Sometimes consensus is broken and then we go through another week of debate. But usually

we can achieve consensus and on those rare occasions where we

cannot then we find other ways to deal with the problem, as we

did with the Turkey situation. It went from NAC down to the DPC.

Senator DODD. Just jumping back if I can, and I wonder if you

might comment a little further on the new Palestinian Prime MinVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
53

ister and the cabinet. Give us some sense of what your sense of optimism is about this new individual and the cabinet that is being

formed around him, particularly in light of the issues of obviously

these perpetuating attacks, terrorist organizations, and the like.

Give us some sense of that if you could.

Secretary POWELL. In his speech last June 24, the President

made it clear that he was committed to the creation of a Palestinian state in a relatively short period of time to live side by side

with Israel, and he also said in order to achieve that vision we

have to have transformed leadership. Chairman Arafat was not a

partner for peace and he had missed his opportunities.

And we waited until now. We watched this transformation start

to take place. We watched the new Finance Minister put in place,

who has brought a level of accountability and transparency to the

Palestinian Authority that we have not seen before, Mr. Fayad. He

has done a very good job, and we are working with him and the

Israelis are allowing the revenues to flow back. That was a transformational activity.

Then the Palestinians really came to the conclusion that they did

need a Prime Minister, somebody who would have authority, not

just a figurehead, but somebody with authority and influence and

the respect of the Palestinian people and who could be seen as one

of the leaders of the Palestinian people coming forward.

They had to go through their process of, one, creating such a position, empowering it by the PLC, Palestinian Legislative Council,

and sometimes directly fighting President Arafat in order to do it.

They created the position. Then after more debating, Mr. Abu

Mazen emerged as the gentleman destined for that position. There

were fights, as you watched last week, between Mr. Abu Mazen

and Mr. Arafat as to the nature of his Cabinet, and Mr. Abu Mazen

prevailed and that Cabinet is now being presented to the PLC.

So we have a man who has stepped forward to assume a position

of leadership and he has fought for it, he has won. I hope he will

be confirmed and I hope he will use that leadership. We made it

absolutely clear that when the road map is released performance

is what counts, not the particular language of a particular paragraph. It is performance.

I hope that the new Prime Minister will speak out immediately

and clearly about terrorism and about violence, and I think that,

with Mohammed Dahlan as his new Minister of State Without

Portfolio, but for security matters, he will act quickly and aggressively to work with Israeli authorities and bring the situation into

control, to go after those individuals and organizations who have

been conducting these kinds of terrorist attacks.

If we see that kind of not only rhetorical action, and not just one

speech, but a constant drum beat to the Palestinian people that it

is time to move in another direction, if we see that coming from

the new leadership, then I am quite confident that we might be on

our way somewhere. I am also confident from my conversations

with Prime Minister Sharon, with Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom,

the new Israeli Foreign Minister, and other Israeli authorities that

they are anxious to move forward. They are not in a situation that

they like, with their economy in disarray, with the Palestinian

54

economy destroyed, and with the Israeli Army deployed as it is trying to keep things under control.

So both parties have every motivation and every incentive to

move forward. The road map gives them a way to do that, but it

is going to require acceptance of responsibility and performance of

obligations on the part of both sides.

Senator DODD. Are you going to plan on making this part of your

upcoming trip to Syria?

Secretary POWELL. I expect to be making several trips in the

next few weeks.

Senator DODD. This will not be part of the one——

Secretary POWELL. Well, he has not been—it may be happening

while I am sitting here, but I will certainly be looking for an opportunity to see him. I am not sure he is ready. He has some work

to do and I do not want to burden him with a visit on day one.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator HAGEL.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, this is a unique opportunity, maybe even historic,

I believe, and we have talked about some of the dynamics of this

this morning to strengthen our ties with our allies. We have talked

about this morning including seven new members into NATO, expanding that base of this alliance. We have talked about NATO

taking on a new role in Afghanistan in August, maybe being called

upon to take on a role in Iraq, depending on how events develop.

With that unique opportunity presenting itself to reconnect with

our allies through the United Nations, certainly through NATO, I

first want to recognize what you and the President are doing to not

squander this time. You cannot force something that does not fit,

but we should not squander this time that we have.

With that, two questions. As you view NATO, as we have discussed the future of NATO this morning, you have just talked a bit

about prospects for the road map, peace prospects for the Israelis

and the Palestinians, any possibility down the road, once we get a

peace agreement, NATO could be called in to help guarantee that

peace?

Second question: As we reestablish relationships and recertify

and strengthen those ties with our allies, what is the current status of NATO and Russia?

Secretary POWELL. With respect to the first question, we are a

long way away from considering what kind of monitoring mechanism might be appropriate if we see progress in the Middle East.

I think in the first instance it would have to be the United States.

I think that is the only thing that would be acceptable as we get

started and try to buildup confidence.

We have made that commitment to this process and it is a commitment we have made 2 years ago now. So we stand ready to do

that. Whether it can be expanded into something more, it would be

premature to suggest that at this point, Senator Hagel.

With respect to NATO?

Senator HAGEL. And Russia.

55

Secretary POWELL. The NATO-Russia Council is performing

work. I am very pleased that after the meetings of last year where

it was formed we gave it some low-hanging fruit to go after just

to get some experience and it did a pretty good job on some

counterterrorism and other efforts. Now we are looking for some

more substantial work to be done between NATO and Russia within the Council, working—I guess it will soon become 27.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator NELSON.

Senator NELSON. Following back up on North Korea, since it is

clearly in our interest that we not let them become a nuclear peddler and a peddler of weapons systems, including missiles, what

was the reasoning that we let that shipment of missiles go on to

Yemen after we boarded the boat on the high seas?

Secretary POWELL. We detected the ship, we tracked it. We tried

to learn more about its origin and its destination. Based on what

we knew, we thought we better stop it and see really what was in

it, not just what our intelligence said was in it, and make sure we

knew where it was going. There was a concern that, wherever it

was going, it might be a transshipment point for those missiles to

then go on to Iraq or other places in the region.

Working with our Spanish colleagues who were participating in

the interdiction effort, the Spanish Navy stopped it, did a terrific

job, boarded the ship, and after moving some cargo out of the way

discovered the Scuds. So it is exactly what our intelligence system

said it would be.

But then in the process of looking into its destination, we found

that it was destined for Yemen. We contacted the Yemeni President. As you know, we have a good relationship with Yemen. They

have been cooperating with us on our counterterrorism efforts in

the global war on terrorism. And the Yemeni Government had

given us some earlier assurances that they were no longer procuring this kind of equipment and this was really grandfathered as

the last shipment of a contract that they had entered into.

Because there was nothing inherently illegal about what they

were doing and it was a purchase which by international law was

acceptable, and with the assurance of the Yemeni President that

the missiles were not going anywhere but Yemen and we could

check any time we wanted to, and also the assurance that his earlier commitment that no more such contracts were under way or

would be placed in the future. It was on that basis and because of

our friendship and relationship with Yemen that the judgment was

made that it was in the best interest for those missiles to go forward.

But we have demonstrated that we have a capacity to find such

things and intercept them and make different judgments at different times depending on what is in the ship and where it is

going.

Senator NELSON. Would that have sent a signal to North Korea

that they could proliferate?

Secretary POWELL. I do not think so because they are not getting

any more sales in that place. But one of the things we have to do

56

is, when we find situations such as this, we need to go to those who

are buying and say: This really needs to stop. If you have self-defense needs that are legitimate, there are better places and better

sources to deal with those needs than North Korea.

North Korea is exporting not only missiles, but, as we saw in an

Australian bust the other day, drugs. So this is a regime that

thrives in criminality, and that also has to be part of our comprehensive approach to deal with the regime, going well beyond nuclear weapons and missiles, but their criminal activities, which we

have to spend more time and energy dealing with.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

We have a few moments before noon and so therefore, Senator

Chafee, you will have the final question.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I will just followup. I was on the trip with Senator Frist and Senator Nelson and without fail each of the Chinese ministers from

President Hu on down lacked passion for the North Korean issue,

but they got passionate about Taiwan getting into the WHO. It

would seem to me if we need China to help us broker talks with

North Korea we might want to reassess the swift passage of the

resolution I think that is before the Senate on allowing Taiwan into

the WHO. Without fail, every one of the ministers we met with was

very passionate about that issue.

But I do want to get back—I know there is a few minutes—on

the NATO enlargement. It seems to me as though there are members of the administration that espouse a stronger NATO at the expense of the U.N. I believe—correct me if I am wrong—it was only

a year ago that in Reykjavik that NATO was endorsed to go out

of area. So it seems to me that this ascension of NATO could come

at the expense of the U.N. as an alliance or an organization that

acts around the world.

Obviously, NATO does not have the diversity of the United Nations. It is a European, Christian-based organization largely and

the U.N. of course is very, very different. So could you comment on

that? Are there members of the administration that are pushing for

a stronger NATO at the expense of the United Nations?

Secretary POWELL. I think we are all pushing for a stronger

NATO, but I do not think it necessarily competes with the United

Nations or is at the expense of the United Nations. Of course,

NATO has Turkey as a member, a very, very productive member

of NATO over the years, a Muslim country, a Muslim democracy.

So I do not see them as competing. We need both. We need both

organizations. Very often, in trying to forge a consensus in NATO,

you will find NATO members who are also U.N. members asking

for U.N. approval of the action being taken. So I think they serve

as complementary organizations.

If I may end my answer with a reference to something that I

think Senator Dodd said about kicking a member out. Sometimes

when a member is not meeting the highest standards of the organization, the best place for the member to be is in the organization.

I can think of a couple of situations over the past 50 years where

we have governments representing nations inside NATO that certainly were not meeting our standards of representative government, and I think it was well in the interest of NATO and the

57

transatlantic alliance to have that country and that government inside NATO, where it could be pressured, where it could be brought

into consensus, where it could be tutored and cooperated with to

eventually get back to the kind of government that we expected it

to be when it became a member of the alliance in the first place.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

The record will be kept open of this hearing until the end of the

day.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, just briefly again.

I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, I do not have a copy of this myself.

I am looking at this chart.

Secretary POWELL. Do you have a date on it?

Senator DODD. That is the September—April 11. I will get one

for you.

Mr. Chairman, I raise this not so much—I do not want the Secretary to comment. It is just troubling to me. There is a line here

that I just draw your attention to if you get a copy: Deputy for Policy, I do not know who—Lawrence Di Rita and Ryan Henry are the

two names. ‘‘National governance, local governance’’ directly back

up through General Garner. We are talking about nation-building.

I am just concerned, Mr. Chairman, about—the Secretary answered

the question, so I am not asking him to respond to this. But this

is troubling to me, that we sort of bypass all of this here directly

through the Defense Department. I think the State Department

ought to be playing at least, in the role of national governancebuilding or local governance-building—the fact that we are going to

lay that on the Pentagon seems to me to be getting rather excessive.

So I just raise this with you. I do not know much more about it.

I do not even know who these individuals are. But I start seeing

a line that bypasses everybody else and shoots up——

Secretary POWELL. All of that, this is not a current and accurate

chart, and it will be even less accurate within the next few days.

Senator DODD. Thank you. That is the best news all day.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JON S. CORZINE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on NATO enlargement. I thank the distinguished Secretary of State for appearing before this committee and sharing some of his views on this topic.

Even as the U.S. addresses dangers in the Middle East, it is critical to consider

the other serious threats to global security, including the awful possibility that foreign terrorist organizations will gain access to weapons of mass destruction. Iraq

was not and is not the only country with access to weapons of mass destruction,

and we should not feel completely secure until we are confident that those weapons

will not fall into the hands of terrorists.

I have no doubt that an enlarged NATO can be of tremendous assistance to combat that mutual threat. NATO is not a throwback to the cold war as some have

charged, but a dynamic institution that needs to be enlisted in the global fight

against terrorism. Recent events, particularly the approval of a rapid response force

to combat terrorism, only act to confirm NATO’s importance in that effort. Only a

58

dynamic and adaptable force can have any hope of prevailing over a dynamic and

adaptable enemy, and NATO is building such a force.

Although recent events may have placed a strain on alliance relationships, the institution itself endures and will need to take on greater and greater responsibilities

in countering a diffuse and virulent threat. And that includes ‘‘out-of-area’’ activities

in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the global nature of the threat facing NATO countries, as the distinguished chairman of this committee explained at an earlier hearing, unless NATO operates ‘‘out of area’’ it could be ‘‘out-of-business.’’ I think we can

all be gratified by NATO’s recent decision to operate ‘‘out-of-area’’ and take over responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Now we must actively seek a role for the alliance in post-conflict Iraq. I understand

that despite early opposition, France has committed to consider a role for NATO and

I hope such a role can be arranged.

As part of the effort to improve NATO’s capacity to counter terrorism, I believe

expanding NATO to include seven new countries makes a great deal of sense. These

seven burgeoning democracies will present a united front in the fight against terrorism, will help share our burden, and will confer additional international legitimacy to our cause. It will improve intelligence cooperation and interdiction cooperation, two areas that have increased in importance tremendously in the past decade.

It would be absolutely tragic if recent transatlantic tensions stymied efforts to improve and expand what has been a tremendously important and effective institution

for more than five decades.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMERICAN HUNGARIAN FEDERATION OF METROPOLITAN

WASHINGTON, DC, FRANK KOSZORUS, JR., PRESIDENT

Since the 1960s the American Hungarian Federation of Metropolitan Washington,

D.C. (the ‘‘Federation’’) and its predecessor organization have monitored developments in Central Europe and United States policy toward that region. The Federation supports NATO’s enlargement because it believes that (1) an enlarged NATO,

consisting of stable and secure countries and as an organization of collective defense, is in the vital interest of the United States; and (2) since an indispensable

component of security in Central and Eastern Europe is a commitment to democracy, including the respect for the rule of law and the rights of national and religious minorities, Romania and Slovakia should be encouraged to continue their reforms to promote that vital American interest.

NATO’S ENLARGEMENT ADVANCES UNITED STATES INTERESTS

During the Cold War, NATO successfully kept the peace in Europe by deterring

outside aggression. The United States recognized that threats to European security

represented threats to American security as well. That common purpose shared by

Western democracies was the glue that ensured that NATO would not falter in its

mission and prevail over the Warsaw Pact.

At the end of the Cold War and as a result of the strong leadership exercised by

the United States, the Alliance enlarged to take on Poland, Hungary and the Czech

Republic. That enlargement not only served American moral objectives, it also advanced United States security interests in Europe. A security vacuum was filled as

the three new NATO members were reintegrated with the West. They helped stabilize Europe by contributing to NATO’s new mission of stopping ethnic cleansing

in Kosovo and keeping the peace in the Balkans. All three also served as models

for the other countries aspiring to be NATO members.

While NATO invoked Article V in response to September 11 and sent AWACS to

patrol American airspace, it must continue to transform and implement the Prague

commitments to meet the new threats presented by terrorism. Despite the current

rift in the wake of the war against Iraq, the United States must remain engaged

in Europe and NATO to carry out the war against international terrorism. As Senator Biden noted on May 1, 2002 before this Committee, ‘‘no one should doubt that

NATO . . . remains essential to the security of the United States.’’ At the same

meeting, Senator Lugar stressed that ‘‘the war on terrorism makes it all the more

important to accelerate the task of consolidating democracy and security in Central

and Eastern Europe.’’

The current round of enlargement will continue this process and further stabilize

Europe from the Baltics to the Balkans and the center of the continent. In sum, a

secure Europe and an enlarged NATO with members committed to Western values

and prepared to assist in the war against global terrorism will advance American

strategic concerns.

59

THE INVITED COUNTRIES MUST CONTINUE TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS, INCLUDING MINOR- ITY RIGHTS, TO ENSURE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Minority Rights. Long-term American interests in maintaining a strong and stable

alliance capable of joining the war against terrorism, however, will be served only

if the invited countries are required to push through much needed political reforms.

In order to promote this fundamental American interest, NATO must ensure that

the new members are committed to Western values by deeds, not just by verbal assurances. They must be prepared to contribute to the security of Europe. Security,

however, is as much a function of the stability that is associated with democracy

and minority rights as it is a function of military reforms and equipment in the context of multi-ethnic Central and Eastern Europe.

This was recognized during the first round of NATO’s enlargement. The March

26, 1997 RFE/RL report titled, ‘‘Europe: U.S. Senator Outlines Criteria for NATO

Expansion,’’ reported that Senator Biden ‘‘said Senators will determine whether the

prospective members maintain democratic institutions, respect civil and minority

rights and keep their military forces under civilian control before they vote their

consent.’’ (Emphasis added.) In his article, ‘‘Slovakia and NATO: The Madrid Summit and After,’’ National Defense University Strategic Forum, April 1997, Jeffrey

Simon wrote: ‘‘In sum, the major stumbling block to Slovakia’s candidacy to NATO

arises from questions about the most fundamental criterion—the shared democratic

values of respect for the rule of law and minority rights.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The Membership Action Plan (‘‘MAP’’), developed after the first round of enlargement, also embraces minority rights. As Robert A. Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs testified before the House International

Relations Committee on June 19, 2002, ‘‘[t]he success of the MAP is reflected in the

real progress that all of the aspirants have made in addressing difficult and sensitive issues. . . . They are all working hard to consolidate democracy and the rule

of law, to strengthen judicial systems . . . to improve the treatment of minorities

. . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

The question of minority rights and European stability is not an academic exercise. As the tragic events in the Balkans in the nineties demonstrated, a primary

cause of tensions and violence in the region is discrimination against and intolerance toward national, ethnic and religious minorities by the majority. Moreover, a

government that fails or refuses to respect minority rights can hardly be deemed

genuinely democratic, even if it has come to power through the ballot.

The genesis of today’s inter-ethnic challenges in the middle of Europe can be

traced back to the beginning of the last century. The Peacemakers following the

First World War created a new European order by drastically redrawing the map

of the continent, often ignoring the vaunted principle of self-determination in the

process. When the dust settled after the peace conference, over 30 million people

found themselves living as minorities in the new Europe. This system was perpetuated by Stalin and lasted until the end of the Cold War.

Now with the end of the Cold War, the governments of the region should be held

accountable to the international community, especially on questions of human and

minority rights. Some minorities are still denied a host of rights and subjected to

continuing discrimination, however. A persistent problem in many parts of Central

and Eastern Europe is the mistreatment of the Roma and conspicuous anti-Semitism. As noted below, Romania and Slovakia have yet to fully respect the rights of

their respective Hungarian minorities. Regardless of its target, discrimination is not

only inconsistent with Western values, the rule of law and inter-ethnic harmony, it

also undermines regional security.

The prospect of NATO membership has motivated the invitees to address minority

rights. Lithuania, a strong and deserving candidate for NATO membership, has

gone far in respecting the rights of its Polish and Russian minorities and providing

them schooling in their mother tongue. This process needs to continue if NATO is

to be strengthened as it enlarges.

Romania is strategically significant and has contributed military forces to NATO

and coalition actions. Its democratic reforms, while undeniable, have been overstated. As Adam LeBor in his article, ‘‘Alliance bends its rules for strategic Romania,’’ Times Online on November 20, 2002, noted, ‘‘Romania will be invited to join

Nato this week despite its endemic corruption, a systematic lack of government

transparency and poor progress towards a Western-style civil society.’’ The 2002

Country Reports on Human Rights released by the Department of State documents

many of these problems as well.

Romania must continue its reforms in the area of human rights to approach Western norms. More than a decade after the Revolution, Romania has yet to fulfill its

promises to its more than 1.5 million strong ethnic Hungarians. While Bucharest

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lavishly funds the Orthodox Church engaged in a church building spree, it has returned less than 1% of the more than 2000 religious and communal properties illegally seized during the Communist era to Romania’s Hungarian minority. Romania

disregards the constitutional guarantee relating to the right to an education in the

mother tongue. Romania has even failed to establish Hungarian language departments at the Babes/Bolyai University, much less restore the independent Hungarian

state university in Cluj/Kolozsvar.

Slovakia has progressed since the Meciar government. Nonetheless, the 2002

Country Reports notes that ‘‘[e]thnic minorities . . . faced considerable societal discrimination.’’ Id. at 1. Moreover, ‘‘[d]ecentralization to provide more autonomy to regions in education, land ownership, and restitution of confiscated property continued

to be an issue for the large Hungarian minority.’’ Id. at 12. In addition to the denial

of adequate representation as a result of gerrymandered Meciar-era territorial units

and curtailed opportunity to use their mother tongue, agricultural and religious

communal properties have not been returned to Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarians because of the discriminatory effect of the Benes Decrees.

CONCLUSION

NATO must be enlarged to fulfill its mission and serve the security interests of

the transatlantic community. At the same time, the United States and the alliance

should take steps to promote continued progress by Romania and Slovakia in developing laws and practices toward their minorities that are compatible with Western

values and NATO’s security goals. The time is now for NATO to seize the moment

and help countries with less than adequate records accelerate, consolidate and institutionalize enlightened minorities policies. The carrot of NATO membership has

been a strong incentive for every serious invitee to undertake much needed reforms.

The review and reform process should not stop with full NATO membership, however. The United States and NATO will have to continue to monitor the pace of

progress and reform to ensure that the new members live up to their commitments

and promote regional security by respecting the human rights of their national and

religious minorities. As part of this process, Romania and Slovakia should be expected to expeditiously resolve the long-pending religious, educational and other

Hungarian minority community property restitution matters.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE,

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,

156 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W.,

Washington DC, May 5, 2003.

DEAR SENATOR:

As the Senate prepares to take up the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of

1949 on the Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia,

and Slovenia, I want to be sure you are aware of the American Jewish Committee’s

strong support for this measure.

AJC Executive Director David A. Harris testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the first round of NATO enlargement, in November

1997. Last summer, in advance of the November 2002 Prague summit in which accession was approved for the seven additional Eastern and Central European states,

Mr. Harris convened the ambassadors of those states at a Washington news conference to express AJC’s support for that important step and for the follow-up ratification by our and other NATO member governments. He asserted:

‘‘. . . We now have the remarkable opportunity—on our watch—to extend

the democratic zone of security, stability, tranquility, and mutual assistance

to embrace the seven candidate countries. . . .’’

‘‘To act in Prague in November is to address the legitimate security interests of the seven candidate countries, to expand the borders of the transAtlantic community at peace, to extend the reach of—and deepen the commitment to—democratic values and respect for human rights, and to

strengthen America’s global role, especially in the wake of September 11,

as we face such transnational threats as international terrorism.’’

‘‘History has given us a previously unimaginable chance. The choice

should be clear. The time to act is now. The beneficiary will be the collective security of the democratic family of nations. . . .’’

61

A copy of Mr. Harris’s statement of last summer follows. On behalf of the more

than 125,000 members and supporters of the American Jewish Committee, I urge

the Senate’s ratification of the second round of enlargement of the North Atlantic

Alliance.

Respectfully,

JASON F. ISAACSON, DIRECTOR.

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. HARRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE AMERICAN JEWISH

COMMITTEE, AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, JULY 30, 2002

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us at this press briefing.

I would like to extend a special welcome to the distinguished diplomats from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia who have joined

us here today, as well as to Bruce Jackson, the president of the U.S. Committee on

NATO, and to my colleague Rabbi Andrew Baker, the director of International Jewish Affairs for the American Jewish Committee and a participant in the recent Riga

Summit.

On November 5, 1997, I had the privilege, on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the first round

of NATO expansion, involving the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. We were

the first American Jewish organization to come out publicly in favor of NATO enlargement, a fact of which I am most proud.

Moreover, I might add that, in the very same spirit and motivated by the same

post-Cold War considerations, we were the first American Jewish organization to

support the unification of Germany, to call for the recognition of the independence

of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and to endorse the lifting of trade restrictions imposed by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on Bulgaria and Romania.

I would like to quote from our 1997 Senate testimony on NATO enlargement:

We are convinced that opportunity is temporary, not permanent. Either

it is seized or it is lost. The opportunity presented by an expanded NATO

is one that should not, must not, be lost. An expanded NATO means greater

stability for Central Europe, a region that was the cockpit for the two world

wars that brought such horror to the twentieth century.

Retaining the North Atlantic alliance in its Cold War configuration would

have meant continuing an historic injustice—the abandonment by the

democratic West of the small nations of Central Europe. Let me remind us

all that it happened in 1938 at Munich and 1945 at Yalta, and the West

watched from the sidelines as Soviet power squashed fledgling and promising democratic movements in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968,

and Poland in 1981.

An expanded NATO not only strengthens democracy in those nations embraced by the alliance at Madrid, but encourages the other countries in the

region to accelerate their own democratic and economic reforms, as well as

resolve long-simmering disputes. The 1994 Poland-Lithuania agreement on

good neighborly relations and military cooperation and the 1996 HungaryRomania bilateral friendship treaty are just two examples. Moreover, integration in the Western alliance offers a real safeguard for the rights of Jews

and other minority communities, historically the target of national, religious, or ethnic hatreds in too many places.

It would be premature to become too specific today about the scope of a

second, or a third, tranche of NATO expansion, but it is important to keep

very much alive NATO’s openness to further waves of expansion. To do otherwise is to dash the hopes of tens of millions of Europeans, from the Baltics to the Balkans, that their future might include membership in NATO,

and to imply a recreation of European spheres of influence, a profoundly

destabilizing step that could have unintended, even unforeseen, consequences.

That was 1997. At the time, we heard a number of respected voices speak out in

opposition to NATO expansion.

George Kennan, the legendary architect of the U.S. postwar containment policy

of the Soviet Union, said that expansion ‘‘is the beginning of a new cold war,’’ and

added that such a step ‘‘would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over

in their graves.’’

Tom Friedman, the admired New York Times columnist, criticized the proposed

policy in a number of op-ed pieces, citing fear of the Russian reaction and worrying

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that enlargement would ‘‘dilute [NATO’s] power every bit as much as baseball expansion diluted Major League pitching and made every 90-pound weakling a homerun threat.’’

Other critics voiced concern that America could be dragged into a war not of our

choosing because of Article 5, which commits all NATO countries to help defend any

member that is attacked, or cited the prospect of stratospheric costs to help the

three new member countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—modernize their forces and integrate militarily into the collective security pact.

In point of fact, the critics were wrong.

There has been no new cold war with Russia. To the contrary, we have witnessed

a promising new chapter evolve in the relationship between NATO and Russia, and

this development is to be heartily welcomed.

NATO strength has not been diluted by the addition of its three newest members,

but rather enhanced by the laudable efforts of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and

Poland to contribute to the alliance by providing additional security for the collective defense of the member nations.

Article 5 has indeed been invoked—in fact, for the first time since NATO’s founding in 1949. The country that sought the decision was none other than the United

States, and it happened exactly one day after this nation was attacked on September 11, 2001. In other words, America’s ability to respond to the menace of international terrorism was actually helped, certainly not hindered, by an enlarged

NATO.

And those who floated estimates of tens, even hundreds, of billions of dollars in

costs to the U.S. taxpayer for expansion were way off. Indeed, the U.S. taxpayer has

barely felt the impact.

In sum, the first round of NATO enlargement to the east has been a success. It

is now time for a second round.

The American Jewish Committee urges the 19 NATO member countries gathering

in Prague on November 22 to seize the moment and extend formal invitations for

full membership to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and

Slovenia. Our position, needless to say, assumes that nothing will change between

now and then in these countries’ commitment to the core democratic values enshrined in NATO. We would also encourage NATO to make clear that, down the

road and subject to performance, further enlargement is possible for other aspiring

nations.

As the American Jewish Committee noted in a statement just adopted by our

leadership:

Through continued adherence to the membership action plan for new

countries, these [seven] countries will demonstrate their commitment to democracy and the rule of law, peaceful conflict resolution, and the protection

of human rights. Their accession to NATO membership will serve the national security interest of the United States. For these reasons, the American Jewish Committee voices its support for the continued expansion of

NATO and the accession of these new member nations.

The American Jewish Committee also calls on these countries to redouble

their efforts in the months ahead to complete the still open process of

restituting Jewish communal property and preserving Holocaust memory

and its integrity. [There remains much work to be done in both respects,

and any delay would only complicate matters.]

Ladies and gentlemen, this is potentially a moment of historical definition. We

dare not let it pass.

The twentieth century began with territorial conflicts throughout Europe, most

notably in Central and Eastern Europe. They led directly to the First World War

and planted the seeds for the Second World War as well. After the massive devastation wrought by these two wars, as well as numerous regional conflicts, the second

half of the century was largely defined by the Cold War and the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, followed by the devastating events in the

Former Yugoslavia.

In sum, it was a brutal, bloody century, but at the end of the day the ideologies

of Fascism, Nazism, Communism, and ethnic cleansing were vanquished and democracy, open societies, and the rule of law prevailed.

We now have the remarkable opportunity—on our watch—to extend the democratic zone of security, stability, tranquility, and mutual assistance to embrace the

seven candidate countries.

Of course, there will be significant transitional challenges in integrating the seven

countries into the NATO framework. Given the scale of the project, how could it be

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otherwise? The fear-mongers, no doubt, will once again invoke the same issues as

they did in 1997, but they will be as wrong today as they were then.

To act in Prague in November is to address the legitimate security interests of

the seven candidate countries, to expand the borders of the trans-Atlantic community at peace, to extend the reach of—and deepen the commitment to—democratic

values and respect for human rights, and to strengthen America’s global role, especially in the wake of September 11, as we face such transnational threats as international terrorism.

History has given us a previously unimaginable chance. The choice should be

clear. The time to act is now. The beneficiary will be the collective security of the

democratic family of nations.

On April 12, 1949, President Harry Truman sent the NATO Treaty to the United

States Senate for approval. On that occasion, he said:

This Treaty is an expression of the desire of the people of the United

States for peace and security, for the continuing opportunity to live and

work in freedom.

Events of this century have taught us that we cannot achieve peace independently. The world has grown too small, The oceans to our east and west

no longer protect us from the reach of brutality and aggression.

Together, our joint strength is of tremendous importance to the future of

free men in every part of the world.

We must continue to work patiently and carefully, advancing with practical, realistic steps in the light of circumstances and events as they occur,

building the structure of peace soundly and solidly.

The times may have changed rather dramatically since 1949, but, strikingly, the

words of President Truman are as applicable in today’s world as they were then and

serve to underscore the case for NATO enlargement.

We at the American Jewish Committee shall do our utmost, working with likeminded institutions, to ensure that the vision of an expanded NATO becomes a reality.

HUNGARIAN HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION,

P.O. BOX J, GRACIE STATION,

New York, NY, May 6, 2003.

The Honorable RICHARD G. LUGAR

Attention: Ken Myers, Legislative Assistant

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR,

When the Resolution of Ratification of NATO Enlargement comes to the Senate

floor, we appeal to you to voice the expectation that:

• Romania quickly restore 2,140 church and community properties illegally confiscated under communism from the 1.5 million-strong ethnic Hungarian population; and that

• Slovakia reverse the discriminatory, present-day legal impact of the 1945 Benes

Decrees which prevent the restitution of properties confiscated from the 520,000

ethnic Hungarians of that country.

These, and other longstanding human rights deficiencies, should have been resolved during the 13 years since the downfall of communism. We urge you to call

upon these countries to now comply with, and actually implement, the common values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and minority rights

shared by NATO members.

As expressed by Congressman Tom Lantos of California, ‘‘Only by the safeguarding of religious and minority rights and freedoms will the NATO zone of stability be extended to nations that share a demonstrated commitment to democracy

and a true community of values.’’ (See attached statement, October 7, 2002)

Your 35,715 Hungarian-American constituents (2000 census) will be grateful for

your statement, or any assistance you may provide in restoring the rights long-denied to Hungarian minority communities.

For further details regarding these human rights issues, please feel free to contact

us, or visit http://www.hhrf.org/natoexpansion. Thank you in advance for your concern and action.

Very truly yours,

LA ́SZLO ́ HA ́MOS

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TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND NATO ENHANCEMENT RESOLUTION OF 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—OCTOBER 7, 2002

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues in urging adoption of House Resolution 468, which expresses the support of the House for the enlargement of NATO

that is planned for the Prague Summit later this fall. Millions of Americans of Central and East European descent share that view, as they demonstrated since the

NATO expansion of 1999, when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to become members of the North Atlantic Alliance. They—and most other

Americans—recognize that a vital U.S. foreign policy interest will be served by continuing to expand the zone of democracy and stability in Europe.

I have been and remain a strong proponent of NATO enlargement to include those

countries that have demonstrated their commitment to democratic reforms, including frill protection of minority rights of the diverse ethnic communities that live in

these countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. Speaker, I want to mention a particular interest and concern regarding minority rights of two large historic Hungarian communities—the 1.5 million Hungarians in Romania and the 520,000 in Slovakia. The major unresolved issue affecting

the minority communities of both countries is the continued postponement of the implementation of laws for restitution and/or compensation for communal property

confiscated from Hungarian religious and educational institutions. Although both

Romania and Slovakia have taken important steps to address this critical question

of property restitution, progress has been both slow and disappointingly limited.

Mr. Speaker, I urge both countries to pursue restitution more vigorously in the

coming months, until fair and complete restitution is implemented according to the

rule of law. Only by the safeguarding of religious and minority rights and freedoms

will the NATO zone of stability be extended to nations that share a demonstrated

commitment to democracy and a true community of values. I urge the governments

of Romania and Slovakia to work to resolve these important issues, and I urge all

of the countries who seek admission to the North Atlantic Alliance to remember that

we in the United States consider treatment of ethnic minorities as an important

measure of a democratic society.

SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA,

205 MADISON STREET,

Passaic, NJ, May 5, 2003.

To: The Honorable RICHARD G. LUGAR

Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

From: John J. Karch

Slovak League of America

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR:

Faxing you a five-page letter on behalf of the Slovak League of America regarding

Slovakia’s membership in NATO. We appreciate your outstanding leadership and

support.

Many thanks and very best wishes,

JOHN KARCH, PH,D.

Executive Director

SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA,

205 MADISON STREET,

Passaic. NJ, May 2, 2003

The Honorable RICHARD G. LUGAR

Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

United States Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN LUGAR:

On behalf of the Slovak League of America (League) and the two million Americans of Slovak ancestry, many thanks for your leadership and positive comments

leading to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s 19–0 vote for NATO enlargement, your strong support for continuing Voice of America broadcasting to Central

and Eastern Europe, as well as for the restoration of SEED funding. We are, of

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course, particularly gratified that the Republic of Slovakia is among the seven

invitees and signers of the Protocols of Accession for membership in NATO.

Now, with the upcoming deliberations in the Senate for ratification of the Protocols, we again request your strong support of Slovakia as a qualified, worthy candidate for NATO membership.

The League, organized in 1907, is composed of the following major Slovak American organizations: The First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association, First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S. and Canada, Slovak Catholic Sokol, National Slovak Society

of the USA, Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union, Slovak Newspapermens

Association of America, and the Slovak Garden, Inc. in Florida.

The Slovak-American connection is historical. Living under oppressive conditions,

some half-million Slovaks emigrated to the U.S. in the second half of the 19th century. The League fought for Slovak autonomy and later independence of Slovakia

which culminated on January 1, 1993. Slovak and American values were similar:

Western orientation, independence, liberty, democracy, rule of law, family, morals.

They are industrious, loyal, and dedicated to commitments.

In the first NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, Slovakia was one

of the Visegrad Four cited in Senate Bills—with Poland, the Czech Republic, and

Hungary but was subsequently excluded because of various domestic and foreign

problems. However, following the 1998 Parliamentary elections, new government

embarked on a determined course of needed reform, commitment, and political will

to meet the criteria for NATO membership.

The results of the September 2002 Parliamentary elections encouraged the new

coalition government to continue the policies of military, political, economic, and social reform internally and meeting the requirements established by the Membership

Action Plan (MAP). The results were gratifying to NATO members, including the

United States, and at the Prague Summit Slovakia, along with six others, was invited to join NATO.

Over recent years the Slovak government not only unveiled a comprehensive plan

leading to NATO membership but was determined to pursue vigorously its implementation. Slovakia’s prodigious efforts have not gone unnoticed. In Bratislava

March 10, his third visit since November 2001, the Secretary General of NATO,

Lord Robertson, said: ‘‘I have witnessed firsthand the progress made in preparing

for NATO membership.’’ He cited the country’s ‘‘shared democratic values’’ with

NATO members and commended the ‘‘hard work . . . to promote the goal of NATO

membership,’’ the ‘‘hard work . . . to actually implement political, military and other

reforms, and meeting NATO standards. . . . to create a Europe whole and free, democracy and common values.’’

TESTIMONY

In their testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. officials and experts reflected a positive response about the invitees. On April 29, Secretary of

State Colin Powell said: ‘‘I strongly encourage the Senate to provide its advice and

consent to the ratification of the Accession Protocols that will welcome into NATO

seven new members.’’ All seven, he reported, ‘‘are already de facto Allies in the war

on terror’’ and support the U.S.. position on Iraq. Specifically, he cited Slovakia’s

strong anti-corruption legislation and NBC unit in Kuwait.

On April 10, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz also characterized the seven invitees as de facto

allies. He visualized two imperatives for enlargement: moral and strategic, the

moral to help the new democracies, and the latter a ‘‘united Europe of common values will help avoid the major wars.’’ He was followed by Vice Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace who said that ‘‘each of these nations has demonstrated the ability to make a contribution to the Alliance. They have made a firm

commitment to the basic principles and values set out in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The accession . . . will enhance NATO’s military effectiveness.’’ Noting they exhibit

‘‘member-like’’ behavior, General Pace said they ‘‘demonstrate their readiness to accept the responsibility of membership,’’ providing assistance. He cited Slovakia’s engineering unit in Afghanistan and an NBC unit to support the war in Iraq.

On April 8, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman asked the Foreign Relations

Committee ‘‘to act swiftly and positively’’ to the President’s request on ratification

of the Accession Protocols. He said ‘‘This enlargement will strengthen democracy

and stability in Europe, revitalize NATO and benefit the United States.’’ He elaborated on the progress of all seven and cited individual contributions on a chart, including Slovakia’s deployment of an engineering unit to Kabul.

Regarding Slovakia specifically, State Department’s Robert Bradtke testified that

Slovakia ‘‘has demonstrated its readiness and commitment to supporting U.S. naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:57 Nov 24, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90096 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
66

tional security interests by contributing to the global war on terrorism, operations

in the Balkans/Afghanistan, and in Iraq.’’ The U.S. Ambassador to NATO, R. Nicholas Burns, Slovakia has been reducing its ‘‘antiquated military machine’’ with ‘‘suc- cess,’’ now is capable of ‘‘making a significant contribution to Alliance defense’’ and

the country is also on a ‘‘very positive political and economic trajectory.’’ Defense

Department’s Ian Brzezinsk said ‘‘Slovakia’s current reforms are solid and follow the ‘Force 2010’ Long Term Plan, which is the product of a comprehensive defense review created with U.S. assistance.’’ In commenting on, and recommending for accession all seven invitees, Bruce P.

Jackson said ‘‘Slovakia’s democratic credentials are, in many ways, the most impressive of all the Vilnius states.’’ He emphasized the ‘‘sweeping reform’’ of the Ministry

of Defense and cited some of Slovakia’s programs abroad. National Defense University’s Jeffrey Simon said: ‘‘Slovakia has made substantial progress’’ and its government has ‘‘fully supported the war on terrorism.’’ He, too, supports the ratification

of all seven, as did Dr. Ronald Asmus without commenting on them individually.

SLOVAKIA’S PREPAREDNESS

Many references have been made about the qualifications of the invitees, including democracy, rule of law, free market economy, armed forces, human rights, values, reforms, progress, capabilities, and some concerns. The Slovak Republic is a

Parliamentary Republic reflecting Western democratic principles. It has three

branches. The Executive consists of the President, as Head of State, the Cabinet,

headed by the Prime Minister and Ministers; the Legislative (National Council or

Parliament), a unicameral body of 150 deputies; and the Judiciary with a Supreme

Court and a Constitutional Court. Since 1999, the President is elected by direct vote

for a five-year term. Slovakia has universal suffrage (from 18 years of age). The legislature is elected on the basis of proportional representation for four-year terms.

The SR has a wide spectrum of political parties.

The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Minister of

Defense is a civilian. The Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights and

freedoms that are familiar to us. In its just released annual report ‘‘Freedom of the

Press 2003’’ on worldwide mass media, Freedom House classified Slovakia in the

top—‘‘FREE’’—category. Slovakia has very good relations with the U.S. and Western

countries, as well as others. At the signing of the Protocols of Accession, March 26,

Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan singled out three of Slovakia’s neighbors—the

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—‘‘who unselfishly have been sharing with us

their lessons learned from the process of the adhesion to the Alliance.’’

The newly-elected government in 1998 inherited substantial fiscal and economic

problems domestically, low international investment, and a foreign image not conducive to NATO membership. The Dzurinda-led coalition embarked on an ambitious

program with impressive results. Today, Slovakia exhibits a free market economy

while continuing vigorously with its reform program. Slovakia is a member of import organizations, including Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), World Bank,

International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development.

In its 2002 country brief, the World Bank reported that ‘‘Slovak Republic’s economic transformation over the last four years has positioned the country well for

European Union (EU) accession. Indeed, Slovakia satisfied EU’s stringent requirements, signed the Accession Treaty in April, and will hold a referendum May 16-

17 on EU membership. Since polls indicate a highly favorable outcome, Slovakia will

become a member in 2004. The country’s GDP growth has been increasing, from 2.2

percent in 2000 to probably over 4 percent in 2003, inflation continues decreasing,

from 12 percent in 2000 to possibly the 4 percent range this year, and unemployment is dropping below 18 percent this year. Based on performance, prospects for

the future appear promising domestically and increasingly attractive to international investors.

SLOVAKIA’S ARMED FORCES

For years the Slovak public has judged its Army a most trusted institution.

Slovakia’s Armed Forces have performed magnificently in their missions abroad. To

find a contrary view would be difficult. In their testimony, officials and experts have

cited some, most recent, of their performance abroad. I add others.

Slovakia was an early signatory to Partnership for Peace and a participant in its

programs as well as with the Indiana National Guard. The Government had embarked on a revolutionary transformation of its Armed Forces, adopting a new strategy and an extensive reform program, as reflected in the Membership Action Plan

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(MAP) and its progress is ongoing. The two percent budgetary requirement for the

Armed Forces is being reached, again reflecting Slovakia’s determination to keep its

commitments and guarantees. The objective is for the military to be fully interoperable with those of NATO members.

One such commitment is to fulfill Slovakia’s international treaties. Accordingly,

Slovakia has participated, and continues to participate, in numerous international

(NATO, UN, OSCE, EU, and Coalition) peacekeeping, peace support operations, and

humanitarian missions. These are:

• UN: Engineering Battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-98) • UN: Observation Mission in Angola (1997-99) • NATO: Engineering unit for Peace Support in Albania (1999) • UN: Disengagement Observer Mission in Golan Heights (1998- ) • UN: Peacekeeping in Cyprus (2001- ) • UN: Military Field Hospital in East Timor (July 2001-6/03) • UN: Observation Mission in Lebanon and Syria (1998- ) • UN: Observation Mission in Sierra Leone (1999- ) • UN: Humanitarian Operations in Iraq (2000-03) • NATO: Peace Support Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1998- ) • Also, AF deployed 2-helicopter unit (2002- ) • NATO: Stabilization in Kosovo, SR Mechanized Company, part of a Czech-Slovak Bn, of multinational Brigade under UK Command (2002- ) • EU: Monitoring Mission on former Yugoslav territory (2000- ) • OSCE: Observation Mission in Republic of Georgia (1999- ) • OSCE: Observation Mission in Moldova (1998- ) • FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM: Engineering unit for Operation Enduring

Freedom, Afghanistan (September 2002- )

Mr. Chairman, we, of the Slovak League of America, have been aware of the criteria for NATO membership, and have observed developments in Central and Eastern Europe generally, and in Slovakia intensely. As loyal American citizens, we believe Slovakia has made impressive strides in ten years of independence, that it

meets NATO requirements superbly, and that it is in the vital national interest of

the Senate to ratify the Accession Protocol with Slovakia. We appeal to you, Mr.

Chairman, to again apply your commendable leadership qualities in the Senate’s discussion of its advice and consent.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. KARCH,

Executive Director.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO ADDITIONAL

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question 1a. Have your counterparts in Europe, Japan and elsewhere told you

that UN endorsement for the post-conflict phase would improve chances for gaining

contributions of troops and money? Do our key allies believe that the UN should

play an important role in managing Iraq’s political transition?

Answer. A number of our Allies and others in the international community had

expressed a preference for UN Security Council support of their participation in

post-conflict Iraq. In addition to responding to UN humanitarian appeals, a number

of countries sought to contribute to Iraq’s economic reconstruction and recovery in

cooperation with the Coalition. Some states also expressed interest in the possibility

of providing security forces either individually or through a regional framework such

as NATO.

UN Security Council Resolution 1483 facilitates the participation of our Coalition

partners and others in the international community in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The resolution notes that states that are not ‘‘occupying powers’’ may

work under the Authority and welcomes their willingness to contribute personnel,

equipment and other resources. The first Operative Paragraph of the resolution includes an explicit appeal by the Security Council to member states and concerned

organizations to help the people of Iraq reform their institutions and rebuild, and

to ‘‘contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq.’’ The resolution also

calls upon states to help meet humanitarian needs and provide resources for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s economic infrastructure, thereby opening the

door for a broad range of assistance. Member States and regional organizations,

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such as NATO, are further called upon to contribute to the overall implementation

of the resolution.

UN Security Council Resolution 1483 fulfills the President and Prime Minister

Blair’s promise made at Hillsborough of a vital UN role in all aspects of Iraq’s re- construction, including the political process. Other Allies and Council members also

believed the UN should play an important part in the political transition. Specifically, the resolution mandates the Secretary General’s Special Representative to

work intensively with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the people of Iraq to

advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including facilitation of a process leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq. In adopting SCR 1483 by a vote of 14– 0, Council members expressed broad satisfaction with the UN role outlined in the

resolution and the fact that the UN Special Representative would be closely involved in the political process. The resolution allows the Coalition Provisional Authority and the UN Special Representative the needed flexibility to assist the Iraqi

people in determining their own political future. We look forward to working with

the Secretary-General’s newly appointed Special Representative Sergio De Mello,

who brings a great deal of experience to this position.

Question 1b. Are our allies comfortable making their contributions through the

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which is in the Defense Department chain of command?

Answer. There are a number of different methods for our international partners

to support Iraqi efforts to rebuild their country. Currently, there are coalition officials working directly with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on the ground in Iraq. Of the approximately 1,000 personnel working

in ORHA, 40 percent are from our coalition partners. In many cases these officials

are coordinating bilateral assistance for the people of Iraq.

Other donors have chosen to provide assistance through UN agencies, including

in response to the UN Humanitarian Flash Appeal, other international organizations and NGOs. The Coalition, through ORHA and the USAID/State DART teams

on the ground, are working to ensure that this assistance is effectively provided and

is coordinated with other donor efforts and those efforts of the Iraqis in various sectors.

As specified in UN Security Council Resolution 1483, the UN Special Representative will work closely with the Coalition Authority to ensure that humanitarian and

reconstruction assistance coming through UN channels and NGOs is coordinated

and supports overall efforts to improve the quality of life for Iraqi citizens.

Question 1c. What is the Administration doing to bring other countries into the

Iraq reconstruction effort? What success are you having? What additional support

could you gain with a UN Security Council resolution?

Answer. We have been engaged in a long-running effort to develop international

support for our efforts to disarm Iraq and assist the Iraqi people in establishing the

foundations of a prosperous, democratic nation. Our efforts to engage other countries on post-conflict support began before Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of our

coalition building exercises. Numerous countries have already committed either inkind or cash contributions to the post-conflict effort, and others indicated that they

would be able to do so following the adoption of a UN Security Council on post-conflict resolution. UNSCR 1483 facilitates and encourages the participation of the

international community in the reconstruction of Iraq. We expect that there will be

a donors pledging conference later this year attended by a broad representation of

countries and international organizations to contribute to the effort.

Question 1d. Where do we stand on the issue of recruiting international police

forces to help improve the law and order situation in Iraq? How many forces have

been pledged and by whom? When will they arrive? Who will undertake that mission in the interim?

Answer. We continue to seek assistance from the international community for contributions to assist in post-conflict Iraq. As has been reported in the press, there

have been conferences in London and Warsaw to firm up troop contributions to stability operations. We are confident that approximately 16 countries will be contributing troops. In addition, there are approximately another 16 countries with which

we (along with the UK and Poland) have been in discussions; we are confident that

a number of these countries will also contribute troops.

However, we are not planning to deploy an international civilian police force in

Iraq, but instead are standing up an Iraqi national civilian police force within existing structures. While CENTCOM still has primary responsibility for stabilization

and security, over half of the pre-war Baghdad police force has reported to work and

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is conducting joint patrols with U.S. military forces. The objective is to transfer civilian police functions from military forces to Iraqi civilian police as quickly as they

are able to assume the responsibilities.

To help us determine what will be needed to fully reconstitute Iraq’s criminal justice system, a Department of Justice-led international team is on the ground to conduct an initial assessment of the sector needs throughout Iraq. We expect the initial

assessment will be completed in early June.

Following the assessment, DynCorp International, under contract to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), will provide up to 1,000 civilian advisors to help the government of Iraq organize effective

civilian law enforcement, judicial, and correctional agencies.

We are also approaching selected other governments to request assistance and

contributions. Britain, Canada and Denmark have contributed senior police and judicial experts as members of the DOJ-led assessment team that will determine the

type and extent of assistance needed. We are also discussing offers from other countries for criminal justice expertise and equipment, and will coordinate all offers of

assistance to avoid confusion and duplication of efforts.

Question 1e. Have you had any success in recruiting other nations to share in the

burden of serving as the senior advisors in the various Iraqi ministries?

Answer. Yes, there are a number of international staff participating on the ground

in Iraq, including a senior Italian official serving as the senior advisor in the Ministry of Culture and an Australian expert serving as one of the two senior advisors

to the Agriculture Ministry. In addition, UK Major General Tim Cross serves as one

of the three Deputy Directors and Danish Ambassador Ole Olson serves as Regional

Coordinator for the Southern Region.

Question 1f. Given the particular sensitivity of oil, would you be open to recruiting

someone from a friendly oil-producing country instead of having direct American

control of the oil sector?

Answer. We recognize the political sensitivity of Iraqi oil and have appointed an

Iraqi oil official, Thamir Ghadhban, to serve as the interim head of the oil management team. As such, Mr. Ghadhban will make the day-to-day management decisions

in the oil sector, including sales, marketing and production decisions. We have also

established an advisory board, headed by an experienced international oil executive,

Phillip Carroll, to provide advice to Mr. Ghadhban and his staff. The advisory board

will include Iraqi and non-Iraqi oil experts.

Question 2a. Do you think the United States should choose the members of the

Interim Authority or otherwise indicate our preferences, or should we remain neutral in the process?

Answer. The United States, acting with our coalition partners, will engage in a

broad range of consultations with all sectors of Iraqi society as part of the process

to establish an interim authority in Iraq. Given the lack of democratic institutions

in the country after decades of Ba’athist rule, it will be very important that the coalition ensure that the interim authority represents the full diversity of Iraq’s population, including women and religious and ethnic minorities.

Question 2b. Will insiders or exiles form the majority on the interim authority?

Answer. The Coalition Provisional Authority, working with the UN Special Representative, will help the Iraqi people form an Iraqi interim administration (IIA) to

serve as a transitional administration until an internationally recognized, representative government is established by the people of Iraq. Both Iraqis recently liberated

from Saddam’s rule and those Iraqis who have been living abroad, often in democratic societies, will have important roles to play in the IIA.

Question 2c. What are the critical ingredients of a successful political transition?

Answer. The Coalition is working to create the conditions for the people of Iraq

to form an Iraqi interim administration (IIA). We are also working with Iraqis to

ensure the effective administration of justice, the formation of an independent judiciary, and to help to establish the rule of law. We are also looking at steps to promote transparency and anti-corruption, and establishing an appropriate mechanism—probably a constituent assembly—to draft a new constitution.

We have facilitated elections in several areas at the local government level to

speed the delivery of basic services and begin the process of establishing representative government. Other local, regional and, ultimately, national elections must follow. We are engaged in efforts to support civic education, promote independent and

professional media, and establish civil society institutions as key elements of a successful political transition.

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We are supporting Iraqi efforts to develop a new system that will be built around

personal freedom and of law, a system that will provide increased economic opportunities for Iraqis and support the country’s political transformation.

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Sergio de Mello, can and

should play a vital role in the political and economic transformation of Iraq.

We recognize the need to provide the IIA, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and

the UN Special Representative the flexibility needed to assist the Iraqi people in

determining their own political future. Just as non-Iraqis cannot impose a government on Iraq, we cannot impose a particular process in what is a dynamic situation.

In these circumstances, an attempt to produce a firm ‘‘blueprint’’ for the formation

of Iraqi political institutions would be doomed to failure.

Question 2d. What will be the State Department’s role in guiding Iraq’s political

transition? Will State play a subordinate role to the Defense Department?

Answer. The President has appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as Presidential

Envoy to Iraq and, as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),

Ambassador Bremer has the overall responsibility for overseeing Iraq’s political and

economic transformation. At the President’s direction, Ambassador Bremer reports

directly to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.

There are a number of USG agencies, including the State Department, currently

in Iraq supporting Ambassador Bremer as part of the CPA.

FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL

Question 3. Regarding the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, why

has the United States decided to re-open the negotiation of an issue that has already been decided by prior negotiations? Is it your opinion that re-opening the negotiations on the FCTC does not imperil international support for and eventual enactment of the Treaty? If the U.S. position is again defeated, will the United States

continue to insist on opening the treaty or will the U.S. permit the treaty to go forward, which appears to be the desire of the vast majority of the WHO member nations?

Answer. As of April 29, the U.S. was engaged in discussion with countries to determine the level of interest in adoption of the treaty with a limited amendment removing the article prohibiting reservations.

The U.S. endeavored over the past three years to negotiate a treaty that would

help the world advance toward the level of tobacco control we have achieved in this

country. At the same time, we tried to ensure that the Framework Convention

would be a treaty that the United States would be able to sign and likely ratify.

The Administration will carefully review the treaty language before making a

final decision on signing.

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