IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1243

Filed April 29, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

KALANDIS R. McNEIL,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John Telleen, Judge.

Kalandis McNeil appeals his conviction for failure to comply with sexoffender registry requirements. AFFIRMED.

G. Brian Weiler, Davenport, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

Kalandis McNeil appeals his conviction for failure to comply with sexoffender registry requirements as a habitual offender. We find the district court’s 

denial of his motion for a new trial was not an abuse of discretion and affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

In November 2017, McNeil was on parole serving a special sentence for 

sex offenders pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.2 (2013). Due to the nature of 

his offense, McNeil was also required to register as a sex offender pursuant to 

Iowa Code section 692A.103(1). He wore a GPS tracking device as a condition of 

his parole. McNeil had last reported his residence to law enforcement in 

September.1

On November 13, a warrant was issued for McNeil’s arrest for failing to 

report to his parole officer and failing to attend treatment. On November 14, McNeil 

removed his GPS device. When the device stopped tracking, law enforcement 

were unable to locate it or McNeil. 

In February 2018, officers tried to contact McNeil at his registered address, 

but a “For Rent” sign was displayed, and the apartment appeared abandoned. The 

officers located McNeil at a nearby hotel and arrested him. During the subsequent 

interview with the officers, McNeil stated he did not have a home address, had 

been staying “here and there,” including at a different hotel the previous week, and 

 

1 Persons on the sex offender registry are required to register with the sheriff of 

the county within five days of changing their residence or employment. Iowa Code 

§ 692A.104. If the offender stays away from the primary residence for more than 

five days, the new location must be provided to the sheriff of the county of principal 

residence. Id. § 692A.105. 
3

had cut off and thrown the GPS device in the river. McNeil even stated, “I was 

surprised they didn’t update my warrant.” When the officer said McNeil did not 

come down and tell the registry officers where he was or what he was up to, McNeil 

answered, “I couldn’t. I had a warrant.”

McNeil was charged with violating the sex-offender-registration 

requirements, second or subsequent offense as a habitual offender. He was also 

charged with criminal mischief in the third degree for the damage done to the GPS 

device. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on May 29 and 30. 

After all the evidence had been presented and before closing arguments, 

the court reviewed the jury instructions with the State and McNeil. McNeil did not 

object to any of the proposed instructions.2

During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the court asking, “Is the 

GPS part of the parole or part of the sex-offender registry requirements?” McNeil’s 

 

2 The marshalling instruction, for failure to comply with sex-offender registry 

requirements, Instruction 14, directs:

The State must prove all of the following elements for failure to 

comply with sex offender registry requirements, under count 1:

(1) The defendant was convicted of indecent exposure in 

Scott County Case No. SRCR35111, which required him to register 

as a sex offender as provided by chapter 692A.

(2) That on or about 14th day of November, 2017, the 

defendant did knowingly:

(a) Fail to notify the Scott County Sheriff’s Office of a change 

in relevant information within five business days; or

(b) Fail to appear in person within five business days to report 

any change of residence to the Scott County Sheriff’s Office.

(3) Defendant knew or should have reasonably known of his 

duty to fulfill requirements specified in chapter 692A.

If the State has proved all of the elements, the defendant is 

guilty of failure to comply with sex offender registry requirements, 

under count 1. If the State has failed to prove one of the elements, 

the defendant is not guilty of failure to comply with sex offender 

registry requirements, under count 1.
4

counsel suggested the answer should be “the GPS system is not part of relevant 

information under jury instruction 16 and is not part of the sex offender registry 

requirement.”3 The court told counsel, 

In my view this question by the jury in effect asks the court to tell

them about the fact testimony from the witnesses that have already 

been provided or comment on or clarify the evidence. In other words 

whether the State’s evidence did or did not cover this topic. That I 

don’t think I can do. . . . I don’t think I can comment on or should 

comment on whatever evidence was or was not given, which is in 

effect what this jury question asks me to do.

The court answered the jury, “Ladies and gentlemen, you must base your 

verdict upon the evidence already provided and the jury instructions. Please reread the instructions with particular attention to instruction number 16.” Instruction 

16 defined “relevant information” for the first of the two alternatives in the 

marshalling instruction. McNeil objected to the answer, stating the court could 

provide a specific answer indicating wearing the GPS was not part of the registry 

requirement. The court overruled the objection.

The jury convicted McNeil of failure to comply with sex-offender registry 

requirements and criminal mischief and also made a special finding that McNeil 

was a habitual offender. 

McNeil filed a motion for a new trial, claiming the State misrepresented the 

law to the jury resulting in confusion, the court failed to clarify the law, and the 

 

3

Instruction 16 provides:

Relevant information as used in element 2 of Instruction 14 includes 

the following information with respect to a sex offender:

(1) Criminal history, including warrants, articles, status of 

parole, probation, or supervised release, date of arrest, date of 

conviction, and registration status; or

(2) Temporary lodging information including dates when 

residing in temporary lodging.
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verdict was based on a mistaken understanding of the law as it related to the GPS 

device and the sex-offender registry requirements. 

The court denied the motion, and McNeil appeals on the same grounds.4

II. Standard of Review

“A district court should grant a motion for a new trial only in exceptional 

circumstances.” State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 705 (Iowa 2016). “To the extent 

the motion [for a new trial] is based on discretionary grounds, we review it for an 

abuse of discretion.” State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774, 781–82 (Iowa 2001). 

III. Analysis

McNeil claims the State offered an invalid theory of guilt for the offense of 

violating the sex-offender registry requirements based on the removal of his GPS 

device. He contends this invalid theory led to jury confusion, as shown by the 

question they submitted to the court. McNeil argues the court’s answer directing 

the jury to reread the instructions, particularly instruction 16, did not correct the 

confusion and resulted in a general verdict that some members of the jury may 

have based on his alleged invalid theory of guilt. 

First, it is the province of the court, not the attorneys, to inform the jury of 

what the law is, and this is done via a set of numbered instructions without 

comment or explanation. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(5)(f); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.924

(applying civil jury instruction rules to criminal cases). The court instructed the jury 

at both the beginning and end of the trial that questions, comments, and arguments 

 

4 McNeil asserts the alleged errors deprived him of his due process rights. McNeil 

makes no argument and cites no authority supporting this claim, so we deem it 

waived. Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3).
6

by the lawyers are not evidence. The court further instructed “I as a judge will 

instruct you as to the law that is to be applied to the case.” McNeil had the 

opportunity to object to the jury instructions at the close of evidence and before 

they were read to the jury—he made no objection to any of them, including the 

marshalling instruction or the instruction defining “relevant information” for the jury. 

Nor did McNeil object during closing arguments to alert the court he thought the 

State was making a misstatement of law and presenting an invalid theory of guilt 

at which point he could have requested a curative instruction.

The jury instructions offered three alternative theories of guilt the State had 

to prove: (1) McNeil failed to notify the Scott County Sheriff’s office of a change in 

relevant information respecting his “criminal history, including warrants, articles, 

status of parole, probation, or supervised release, date of arrest, date of conviction, 

and registration status”; (2) McNeil failed to notify the Scott County Sheriff’s office 

of a change in relevant information on his “temporary lodging information, including 

dates when residing in temporary lodging”; or (3) McNeil failed “to appear in person 

within five business days to report any change of residence to the Scott County 

Sheriff’s Office.”

“[J]uries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.” State v. Becker, 

818 N.W.2d 135, 162 (Iowa 2012), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott 

Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 n.3 (Iowa 2016). Therefore, we presume the jury 

disregarded any confusion of the law or evidence presented in counsel’s closing 

argument and instead relied on the evidence presented through testimony and 

exhibits and the law as set forth in the approved jury instructions. 
7

As to the court’s answer to the jury’s question, the court expressly stated it 

wanted to avoid commenting on the evidence provided. Our supreme court has 

directed the trial court to “avoid drawing attention to specific evidence,” and avoid 

arguing the case for either side. State v. Massick, 511 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Iowa 

1994). 

The testimony offered linked the removal of the GPS device with the warrant 

for McNeil’s arrest and the status of his parole. McNeil does not argue that the 

warrant and parole status were not relevant information in the context of 

instructions 14 and 16. Giving McNeil’s requested instruction as the court’s answer 

would have constituted court comment on the evidence presented by the State. 

See id. Instead, the court directed the jury to reread the law as set forth in the 

instructions—instructions that McNeil had approved. The court did not abuse its 

discretion in its answer to the jury.

Finally, McNeil claims the jury entered a general verdict that may have been 

entered on an invalid theory of guilt. Our supreme court has stated: “[I]n Iowa we 

have consistently held if a general verdict is returned in which one theory should 

not have been submitted and we cannot determine which theory the jury 

embraced, the verdict is flawed.” State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 681 (Iowa 

2017). The State offered three alternative theories of guilt, all of which had 

supporting evidence in the record—evidence which included McNeil’s own words 

during the police interview. The jury could reasonably have found McNeil failed to 

update the sheriff’s office of the change in his relevant information, temporary 

housing, and change in residence.
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We find the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new 

trial.

AFFIRMED.