Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

May 2003 CAMPAIGN FINANCE 

REFORM 

Early Experiences of 

Two States That Offer 

Full Public Funding 

for Political 

Candidates 

GAO-03-453 
In both Maine and Arizona, the number of legislative candidates who chose 

to use public financing for their campaigns increased greatly from 2000 to 

2002. In perspective, 59 percent of Maine’s and 36 percent of Arizona’s 

current legislators successfully ran as publicly financed candidates in the 

2002 election. Also, in Arizona’s 2002 election, publicly financed candidates 

won seven of the nine available seats in races for statewide offices, including 

Governor. 

Legislative Candidates and Election Results in Maine and Arizona 

In comparing the 2000 and 2002 elections to those in 1996 and 1998, GAO’s 

findings regarding changes in electoral competition were inconclusive. 

Various measures—contested races (more than one candidate per race), 

incumbent reelection rates, and incumbent victory margins—reflect mixed 

results. Also, these results may have been affected by term limits, 

redistricting, and other factors. Average legislative candidate spending 

decreased in Maine but increased in Arizona in 2000 and 2002, compared to 

previous years. Further, particularly in 2002, both states experienced 

increases in independent expenditures—a type of campaign spending 

whereby political action committees or other groups expressly support or 

oppose a candidate. The extent of spending for public policy messages 

without explicit election advocacy is not known. 

In sum, with only two elections from which to observe legislative races and 

only one election from which to observe most statewide races, it is too early 

to draw causal linkages to changes, if any, that resulted from the public 

financing programs in the two states. 

In 2000 and 2002, Maine and 

Arizona held the nation’s first 

elections under voluntary programs 

that offered full state funding for 

political candidates who ran for 

legislative and certain statewide 

offices. The goals of these 

programs, passed as ballot 

initiatives by citizens in these 

states, included increasing 

electoral competition and curbing 

increases in the cost of campaigns. 

Congress has considered 

legislation for public financing of 

congressional elections nearly 

every session since 1956, although 

no law has been enacted. In the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

(P.L. 107-155 (2002)), Congress 

mandated that GAO study the 

results of the unique public 

financing programs in Maine and 

Arizona. 

For the 2000 and 2002 elections in 

Maine and Arizona, this report 

provides: 

• Statistics on the number of 

candidates who chose to 

campaign with public funds 

and the number who were 

elected. 

• Observations, based on limited 

data, regarding the extent to 

which the goals of the public 

funding programs were met. 

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 

Early Experiences of Two States That 

Offer Full Public Funding for Political 

Candidates

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-453.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Norman Rabkin 

at (202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-453, a report to 

Congressional Committees 

May 2003
Page i GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Program Participation: More Candidates Opting to Use Public 

Financing 11

Voter Choice: Legislative and Statewide Candidates in Publicly 

Funded Elections 17

Electoral Competition: Analysis of Elections in Maine and Arizona 29

Influence of Interest Groups: Mixed Views on Effects of Public 

Financing of Campaigns 44

Campaign Spending: Average Candidate Spending Decreased in 

Maine but Increased in Arizona; Independent Expenditures 

Became More Prominent in Both States; Extent of Issue 

Advocacy Spending Not Known 51

Voter Participation: No Clear Link to Public Financing Program 61

Concluding Observations 64

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 67 

Objectives 67

Overview of Our Scope and Methodology 67

Scope and Methodology: Statistical Information Regarding the 2000 

and 2002 Elections 68

Scope and Methodology: Extent to Which Goals of Public 

Financing Programs Were Met 69

Appendix II Overview of the Public Financing Programs for 

Election Campaigns in Maine and Arizona 83 

Purposes of the Public Financing Programs 83

Candidates Must Qualify to Receive Public Funding 85

Amounts of Allowable Public Funding for Participating Candidates 86

Revenue Sources for the Public Financing Programs 88

Administration of the Public Financing Programs 90

Reduced Contribution Limits and Additional Reporting 

Requirements for Nonparticipating Candidates 92

Appendix III Summary of Legal Challenges to Maine’s and 

Arizona’s Public Financing Programs 94 

Legal Challenges to the Maine Clean Election Act 94

Legal Challenges to Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act 97

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Appendix IV Survey of Candidates for Office in the Maine 2000 

Elections 101 

Appendix V Survey of Candidates for Office in the Arizona 2000 

Elections 109 

Appendix VI Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for 

Office in Maine’s and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 117 

Comments Provided by Maine Candidates 117

Comments Provided by Arizona Candidates 129

Appendix VII GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 140 

GAO Contacts 140

Staff Acknowledgments 140

Other Acknowledgments 140

Bibliography 141 

Tables 

Table 1: Maine’s Primary and General Elections in 2000 and 2002—

Number of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and 

Number of Races with at Least One Participating 

Candidate 12

Table 2: Results of Maine’s General Elections in 2000 and 2002—

Campaign Status and Number of Participating Candidates 

Elected by Office 13

Table 3: Arizona’s Primary and General Elections in 2000 and 

2002—Number of Candidates Who Used Public Financing 

and Number of Races with at Least One Participating 

Candidate 15

Table 4: Results of Arizona’s General Election in 2000 and 2002—

Campaign Status and Number of Participating Candidates 

Elected by Office 16
Page iii GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 5: Average Number of State Legislature Candidates Per 

District Race in Maine and Arizona (1996, 1998, 2000, and 

2002) 19

Table 6: Percentage of Participating Legislative Candidates by 

Political Party Affiliation in Maine and Arizona (2000 and 

2002) 22

Table 7: Number of Third-party or Independent Candidates In 

Maine and Arizona State Legislative Races (1996, 1998, 

2000, and 2002) 23

Table 8: Number of Arizona Corporation Commission Candidates 

(1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) 24

Table 9: Number of Candidates for Maine and Arizona Statewide 

Races (1994, 1998, and 2002) 25

Table 10: Maine and Arizona Citizenry Views (in Percentages) on 

Clean Election Law 49

Table 11: Spending by Candidates for Statewide Offices in Arizona 

(1998 and 2002) 57

Table 12: Spending by Candidates for Statewide Offices in Arizona 

by Participation Status (2002) 58

Table 13: Independent Expenditures in Maine and Arizona (1998, 

2000, and 2002) 59

Table 14: Voter Turnout in Maine, Arizona, and the United States, 

1988 through 2000 62

Table 15: Results of Logistic Regression Models Testing the Effect 

of Public Financing Programs on Competitive Races 72

Table 16: List of Organizations (and Title of Individuals) 

Interviewed in Maine 75

Table 17: List of Organizations (and Title of Individuals) 

Interviewed in Arizona 76

Table 18: Seed Money Limits and Number of Qualifying $5 

Contributions 86

Table 19: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate 

in 2000 88

Table 20: Revenue Sources and Amounts for Public Financing 

Programs in 2000 89

Table 21: Maine Clean Election Act Litigation 95

Table 22: Arizona Litigation – Title of Ballot Initiative 98

Table 23: Arizona Litigation – Nomination and Appointment 

Process to the Citizens Clean Elections Commission 98

Table 24: Arizona Litigation – Sources for Public Funding 100

Table 25: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for 

Office in Maine’s 2000 Elections 118
Page iv GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 26: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for 

Office in Arizona’s 2000 Elections 130

Figures 

Figure 1: Response of Candidates in the 2000 Election Regarding 

Which Factor (Term Limits or Public Funding) Played a 

Greater Role in Attracting New Candidates to Run for 

Office 20

Figure 2: Percentages of Participating Candidates Who Answered 

That the Availability of Public Funding Was a Great or 

Very Great Factor in Their Decision to Run for Office in 

2000 21

Figure 3: Reasons Why Candidates Chose to Participate in the 

Public Financing Program 26

Figure 4: Reasons Why Candidates Did Not Participate in the 

Public Financing Program 28

Figure 5: Contested and Uncontested Races in Maine’s Legislative 

(House and Senate) Primary Elections (1996, 1998, 2000, 

and 2002) 32

Figure 6: Contested and Uncontested Races in Arizona’s Legislative 

(House and Senate) Primary Elections (1996, 1998, 2000, 

and 2002) 33

Figure 7: Publicly Financed Candidates in Maine’s Contested 

Legislative Primary Races (2000 and 2002) 34

Figure 8:Publicly Financed Candidates in Arizona’s Contested 

Legislative Primary Races (2000 and 2002) 35

Figure 9: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine’s Legislative Races 

(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) 37

Figure 10: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Arizona’s Legislative 

Races (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) 38

Figure 11: Competitive Legislative Races in Maine (1996, 1998, 

2000, and 2002) 41

Figure 12: Competitive Senate Races in Arizona (1996, 1998, 2000, 

and 2002) 43

Figure 13: Candidate Responses about Public Financing Program 

and Interest Group Influence 45

Figure 14: Candidate Responses about the Public Financing 

Program and Confidence in Government 46

Figure 15: Average Maine and Arizona Legislative Candidate 

Spending (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) 54
Page v GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 16: Average Maine and Arizona Legislative Candidate 

Spending by Participation Status (2000 and 2002) 55

Figure 17: Extent to Which Candidates in the 2000 Elections 

Agreed with the Statement That Independent 

Expenditures Would Become Increasingly Important in 

2002 and Future Elections 60

Figure 18: Extent to Which Candidates in the 2000 Elections 

Agreed with the Statement That Issue Advocacy Spending 

Would Increase in the 2002 and Future Elections 61

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Page 1 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

May 9, 2003 

The Honorable Trent Lott 

Chairman 

The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Rules and Administration 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Robert W. Ney 

Chairman 

The Honorable John B. Larson 

Ranking Member 

Committee on House Administration 

House of Representatives 

Because the subject involves both politics and money, campaign finance 

reform can be contentious as well as complex. Congress has considered 

legislation for public financing of congressional elections nearly every 

session since 1956, although no law has been enacted. Traditionally, to 

identify promising ways to address complex or contentious issues, the 

federal government has drawn upon the diverse experiences of the 

“laboratories of democracy,” the states. In this regard, Section 310 of the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 20021

 mandated that we study and 

report on the year 2000 elections in two states, Maine and Arizona. To 

provide a broader perspective, we also obtained statistics and related 

information regarding the 2002 elections in the two states. 

The 2000 and 2002 elections in Maine and Arizona were the first instances 

in the nation’s history where candidates seeking state legislature seats or 

certain statewide offices had the option to fully fund their campaigns with 

public monies. Our review of the history of Maine’s and Arizona’s public 

financing programs, including discussions with key officials in each state, 

identified five goals of the programs. That is, the programs generally were 

intended to increase voter choice by encouraging more candidates to run 

for office; increase electoral competition by, among other means, having 

fewer uncontested races; reduce the influence of special interest groups 

 1

P.L. 107-155 (2002). 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

and, thereby, enhance citizens’ confidence in government; curb increases 

in the cost of campaigns; and increase voter participation (e.g., increase 

turnout for elections). Both programs became law through the respective 

state’s ballot-initiative process—Maine (1996) and Arizona (1998). 

Under the new campaign financing programs in Maine and Arizona, 

“participating candidates”—those who agreed to forego private 

fundraising and who qualified to take part in the respective state’s public 

financing program—received a set amount of money for their primary and 

general election campaigns. Also, publicly financed candidates could 

receive additional matching funds based on spending by or for privately 

financed (“nonparticipating”) candidates, who—while subject to state 

limits and disclosure rules—engaged in traditional means to raise money 

from individuals, corporations, and political action committees. 

In accordance with the mandate specified in Section 310 of Public Law 

107-155, and as agreed with your offices, this study: 

• Provides statistics showing the number of candidates who chose to use 

public funds to run for legislative seats or statewide offices in the 2000 

and 2002 elections in Maine and Arizona, the seats or offices for which 

they were candidates, whether the candidates were incumbents or 

challengers, whether the candidates were successful in their bids, and 

the number of races in which at least one candidate ran an election 

with public funds. 

• Describes the extent to which the goals of Maine’s and Arizona’s public 

financing programs were met in the 2000 and 2002 elections. 

Specifically, we describe what changes occurred, if any, regarding five 

indicators—voter choice (number of candidates), electoral 

competition, interest group influence, campaign spending, and voter 

participation (voter turnout)—indicators related to the goals of the 

programs. 

In conducting our study, we reviewed relevant studies and reports 

regarding campaign finance reform in the United States generally, as well 

as in Maine and Arizona specifically. We visited Maine and Arizona to 

interview responsible election officials and representatives of various 

interest groups. Also, for both states, we obtained and analyzed available 

statistical data and related information about the 2000 and 2002 elections. 

To obtain further perspectives on the effects of public financing, we 

surveyed all candidates, including those who used public financing as well 

as those who did not, who ran in the 2000 primary and general elections in 
Page 3 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Maine and Arizona. Further, we contracted with professional pollsters to 

obtain the views of projectable samples of citizens in Maine and Arizona. It 

should be emphasized that describing or interpreting the effects of public 

financing in Maine and Arizona should be approached cautiously, partly 

because one election cycle’s results or even two election cycles’ results 

may not be representative. Also, term limits, redistricting, the ambiguous 

environment that surrounded the implementation of the new campaign 

finance programs, and other factors not directly related to public or 

private financing can affect electoral campaigns and results. We conducted 

our work from April 2002 to March 2003 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I presents more details 

about our objectives, scope, and methodology. 

In both Maine and Arizona, the number of legislative candidates who 

chose to use public financing for their campaigns increased greatly from 

2000 to 2002. In the 2000 primary and general elections, approximately one 

of every three candidates in Maine and one of every four candidates in 

Arizona chose to participate in the state’s public financing program. In the 

2002 primary and general elections, participation increased significantly in 

both states, with about one-half or more of all candidates participating. In 

perspective, after the 2000 general elections, the elected legislators who 

had run with public funds held 33 percent of the total seats in Maine’s 

legislature and 18 percent of the total seats in Arizona’s legislature. After 

the 2002 general elections, the proportions increased to 59 percent of 

Maine’s legislature and 36 percent of Arizona’s legislature. Also, of the 

seven statewide offices in Arizona’s 2002 general election, publicly funded 

candidates won seven of nine seats, which included Governor, Secretary 

of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, State Mine Inspector, and 

Corporation Commissioner (two of three seats).2

It is too soon to determine the extent to which the goals of Maine’s and 

Arizona’s public financing programs are being met. That is, with only two 

elections from which to observe legislative races and only one election 

from which to observe most statewide races, limited data are available to 

draw causal linkages to changes, if any, that occurred in voter choice 

(number of candidates), electoral competition, interest group influence, 

 2

Nonparticipating candidates won election for the third seat on the Corporation 

Commission and for the other statewide office (Superintendent of Public Instruction). 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

campaign spending, and voter participation (e.g., voter turnout)—five 

indicators related to the goals of the programs: 

• Voter choice. While one goal of public financing was to encourage 

more candidates to run for office, the average numbers of state 

legislature candidates per district race in Maine and Arizona in the 2000 

and 2002 elections were not notably different than the averages for the 

two previous elections, 1996 and 1998. In both states, a higher 

proportion of Democratic candidates participated in the public funding 

program, and the number of participating third-party or independent 

candidates generally increased from the 2000 to the 2002 primary and 

general elections. Regarding races for statewide offices, most 

candidates in Arizona opted to participate in the public funding 

program in the 2002 elections. Our survey of candidates in Maine’s and 

Arizona’s 2000 elections found mixed perspectives as to which of two 

factors—public funding for campaigns or open seats due to termlimited vacancies—played a greater role (or equal roles) in attracting 

new candidates to run for office. However, most of the participating 

candidates who responded to our survey—55 percent in Maine and 56 

percent in Arizona—answered that the availability of the public 

financing program was a great or very great factor in their decision to 

run for office in 2000. 

• Electoral competition. The public financing programs were expected to 

make elections more competitive, but our analyses were inconclusive. 

Experts generally agreed on three measures of competitiveness—

increases in the percentage of contested races (races with more than 

one candidate), decreases in incumbents’ reelection rates, or 

reductions in the incumbents’ victory margins. The percentages of 

contested legislative races in Maine’s primary elections were relatively 

unchanged in 2000 and 2002, compared with 1998, and were less than 

the percentage of contested legislative races in 1996. The percentages 

of contested legislative races in Arizona’s primary elections increased 

in 2000 and 2002, compared with1998; however, the percentage of 

contested races in 2000 was about the same as 1996. About 85 percent 

of the contested legislative primary races in Maine’s and Arizona’s 2002 

elections had publicly financed candidates. Legislative incumbent 

reelection rates remained about the same in both states after public 

financing was introduced. Incumbent victory margins, which we used 

to identify competitive races, reflected a mixed picture. That is, we 

defined a competitive race as one in which the difference in the 

percentage of vote garnered between the winning incumbent and the 

runner-up was 15 points or less; and, under this definition, trends (if 

any) were not clearly evident. Further analysis—examining several 
Page 5 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

factors such as incumbency and candidate spending—showed that 

candidate participation in the public financing programs in Maine and 

Arizona had no effect on competitive races as defined by incumbent 

victory margins. However, the results of this analysis should be 

interpreted with caution, given the relatively few variables we used and 

the limited amount of data available. 

• Interest group influence. Responses to our surveys of candidates and 

citizens in Maine and Arizona, as well as our interviews with interest 

group representatives, reflected mixed views. In our survey of 

candidates in Maine’s and Arizona’s 2000 elections, we asked them to 

what extent, if at all, they agreed with the statement that, once elected, 

candidates who participated in the public financing program have been 

more likely to serve the broader interests of their constituents as a 

whole and less likely to be influenced by specific individuals or groups. 

The survey results reflected mixed views. Most of the responding 

nonparticipating candidates—67 percent in Maine and 68 percent in 

Arizona—answered to “little or no extent.” In contrast, many of the 

responding participating candidates—42 percent in Maine and 56 

percent in Arizona—answered to a “great or very great extent.” Also, in 

our fall 2002 survey of voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona, of the 

respondents who acknowledged some awareness of the respective 

state’s applicable law, almost two-thirds in both states answered that 

there was no effect on their confidence in government or it was too 

soon to tell. Additionally, slightly more respondents in each state 

answered that the law had greatly or somewhat increased their 

confidence in state government—17 percent in Maine and 21 percent in 

Arizona—than did respondents who answered that the law had greatly 

or somewhat decreased their confidence—8 percent in Maine and 15 

percent in Arizona. 

• Campaign spending. Under the public financing programs in the 2000 

and 2002 elections, average legislative candidate spending decreased in 

Maine but increased in Arizona, compared to previous elections. Also, 

particularly in the 2002 elections, both states experienced increases in 

independent expenditures—a type of campaign spending whereby 

political action committees, other groups, or individuals communicate 

messages to voters that support or oppose a clearly identified 

candidate but without coordination with any candidate. The 2002 

increases in independent expenditures largely were associated with the 

gubernatorial races in both states. Because it is not regulated, the 

extent of spending for issue advocacy—that is, public policy messages 

that do not refer to a particular candidate—is not known. 
Page 6 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

• Voter participation. Although a goal of the public financing programs 

was to increase voter participation, turnout in Maine’s and Arizona’s 

2000 elections did not significantly differ from prior presidential 

election years. While turnout can be influenced by many factors, 

including the level of media interest and the extent of grassroots efforts 

to get out the vote, public financing of candidates was probably not a 

major factor in the 2000 elections. Our survey of voting-age citizens in 

Maine and Arizona in the fall of 2002 indicated that large segments of 

these populations—an estimated 60 percent in Maine and an estimated 

37 percent in Arizona—were still unaware of the respective state’s 

public financing program. 

Overall, in response to our survey of candidates in Maine and Arizona, 

many of the respondents’ comments followed ideological lines, as may be 

expected. For example, although there were some exceptions, 

nonparticipating candidates generally commented that public financing of 

political campaigns was an inappropriate use of tax dollars, whereas 

participating candidates usually endorsed public financing. Collectively, 

the widely divergent and sometimes virulent comments seem to indicate 

that reaching a consensus regarding the merits of the public financing 

programs may be unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, 

irrespective of political ideologies or partisanship, state agency officials 

and other observers told us they anticipate that—based on election 

strategies or other decisional factors—increasing numbers of candidates 

will choose to run with public funding in future years. If so, the 

continuation of the public financing programs may depend not only on 

efforts to substantiate the programs’ merits but also on efforts to sustain 

public support for providing the larger amounts of total funds that will be 

needed. 

We are not making any recommendations in this report. 

As with most campaign finance reform issues, the concept of public 

funding for political campaigns—that is, a finance system in which the 

public treasury provides cash grants to candidates or political parties—

generates impassioned arguments from both proponents and opponents. 

Generally, proponents of public funding assert that privately financed 

election campaigns (1) give disproportionate influence to special interest 

groups, other organizations, and wealthy individuals and (2) present 

fundraising burdens or barriers that dissuade many potential candidates 

from running for office, particularly women and minority candidates. On 

the other hand, opponents assert that public funding forces taxpayers to 

Background 
Page 7 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

contribute to candidates whom they do not support, inappropriately 

inserts the government into the electoral process, and uses tax dollars that 

could be spent for higher-priority needs. Further, given an inherent link 

between political speech and political spending, some opponents argue 

that any limitation on campaign contributions restricts free speech and 

violates the First Amendment. 

Competing arguments aside, there is widespread recognition that 

designing and implementing an effective campaign finance system is 

difficult due to the inherent complexities and the need to consider and 

reconcile multiple goals that are diverse and at times conflicting. For 

instance, according to one report:3

“A well-functioning campaign finance system must protect freedom of speech, advance 

competitive elections, curtail special interest influence, and promote the equal political 

voice of all citizens, while minimizing the burden of regulation on candidates, contributors, 

[and] other participants in the process ... Campaign finance reform requires respect for the 

open and dynamic character of the American political process, the evolving nature of 

campaigns, and the variety of circumstances and campaign styles across the country. 

Campaign finance reform must avoid burdening particular candidates or groups or 

providing advantages to their opponents. Reform must also take into account how 

candidates, contributors, and others will respond to particular efforts to regulate their 

behavior.” 

In fact, in nearly every session since 1956, Congress has considered 

legislation for public financing of congressional elections, although no law 

has been enacted. Most recently, in the 107th Congress, companion bills 

were introduced in the House (H.R. 1637) and Senate (S. 719) proposing 

public funding and certain media benefits to congressional candidates who 

would qualify by collecting a set number of $5 contributions and by 

refusing all other contributions to their campaign. The declarations 

section of H.R. 1637 states that public financing would enhance American 

democracy by, among other means, creating a more level playing field for 

incumbents and challengers, eliminating the potentially inherent conflict 

of interest caused by the private financing of election campaigns, and 

allowing elected officials more time to carry out their public 

responsibilities without the constant preoccupation with raising money. 

 3

The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Commission on Campaign Finance 

Reform (Richard Briffault, Executive Director), Dollars and Democracy: A Blueprint for 

Campaign Finance Reform, Fordham University Press (New York, NY: 2000). 
Page 8 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

These bills were referred to committee in 2001, but no further action was 

taken before the Congress ended. 

Despite the various complexities or challenges, several states, cities, or 

other local jurisdictions across the nation currently have public financing 

programs, although most are relatively limited in scale, covering only a 

small number of offices or providing only a small amount of the funds 

needed to finance a campaign. For example, programs that provide some 

public funding for state legislative candidates were introduced by 

Minnesota in 1976 and Wisconsin in 1977. Minnesota’s program, which is 

funded by an optional state income tax check-off and by a fixed general 

fund appropriation, is available to candidates for state legislative seats and 

certain statewide offices who agree to set spending limits.4

 Eligible 

candidates may receive up to 50 percent of the spending limit in public 

funds, which are allocated based on a statutory formula. Wisconsin’s 

program is also funded through an optional state income tax check-off and 

is available for legislative candidates as well as candidates for certain 

statewide offices who agree to spending limits and restrictions on 

contributions from political action committees.5

 Public funds are awarded 

in the general election to candidates who received a set percentage of the 

total primary vote and are limited based on a statutory ceiling and the total 

number of candidates who applied for public funding. 

More recently, in 1997, Vermont’s legislature passed a campaign finance 

reform law that established a voluntary, full public financing program for 

candidates for statewide offices. The program was first implemented in 

the 2000 election for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor and 

was expanded in 2002 to include additional statewide offices.6

 In 1998, by 

ballot initiative, voters in Massachusetts passed a law that created a 

voluntary, full public financing program for candidates for the state 

legislature and certain statewide offices, including governor and lieutenant 

 4

Minn. Stat. Ann. ch. 10A (2002). 

5

Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 11 (2001). 

6

1997 Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 2801-2883 (2002). 
Page 9 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

governor.7 However, the law was not fully implemented due to funding 

controversy. In particular, for the 2002 elections, the state legislature did 

not release money to fund the law’s implementation. After intervention of 

Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court,8

 some candidates in the 2002 

election were funded with proceeds generated by the auctioning of state 

assets. 

Published studies reviewing some of the longer standing public financing 

programs have reported mixed findings regarding effects. For example, a 

1995 study of Minnesota’s public financing program for legislative 

candidates reported that, after the program was introduced in 1976, 

incumbents’ overall vote shares did not decrease, although challengers 

who received significant amounts of public funds due to the program’s 

grant structure fared better against incumbents than those who had less 

money to spend.9

 Similarly, a 1995 study of Wisconsin’s program of public 

funding for legislative candidates reported that elections did not become 

more competitive after the program was introduced in 1977, but the 

spending gap between incumbents and challengers was narrowed.10

Further, recent studies of public funding programs in New York City and 

Los Angeles—programs that provide matching funds to participating 

candidates—reported that the programs have generally increased electoral 

competition and have helped challengers to mount credible campaigns 

 7

The Massachusetts Clean Elections Law, Ma. Gen. Laws ch. 55A (2002). From one 

perspective, Massachusetts’ program can be characterized as a “partial” public financing 

program. That is, publicly financed candidate must collect campaign contributions, ranging 

from $5 to $100, which can be solicited only during the relevant qualifying period. In the 

2002 gubernatorial race, for example, a publicly financed candidate could have collected 

$486,000 in cash contributions and $37,800 of in-kind contributions. Similarly, a publicly 

financed candidate for the state house of representatives could have collected $6,500 in 

cash contributions and $3,200 of in-kind contributions. 

8

Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Case No. SJC-08677 

(Jan. 2002). 

9

Patrick D. Donnay and Graham P. Ramsden, “Public Financing of Legislative Elections: 

Lessons from Minnesota,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3 (1995). 

10Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, “The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral 

Competitiveness: Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964-1990,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 

20, no. 1 (1995). 
Page 10 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

against incumbents.11 However, the studies noted that participating 

candidates in these programs were disadvantaged by spending limits or by 

limited funding when faced with high spending by opponents or large 

independent expenditures on their opponent’s behalf. 

Of the approximately 14 states with direct public financing programs, 

Maine and Arizona are unique in having functioning programs that offer 

full public funding for qualified candidates for the state legislature and 

certain statewide offices. In November 1996, Maine voters approved a 

citizen’s initiative—the Maine Clean Election Act12—establishing the 

nation’s first program of full public financing for qualified candidates for 

the state legislature and for one executive branch office (governor). 

Similarly, in November 1998, Arizona voters passed the Citizens Clean 

Elections Act,13 which provides full public funding for qualified candidates 

for the state legislature and various statewide (executive branch) offices.14

In both Maine and Arizona, candidates who choose to participate in the 

public funding programs must first qualify by raising a set number of 

$5 contributions from voters. Regarding implementation of these acts, in 

both states, the public financing programs became available for candidates 

beginning with year 2000 elections. 

Appendix II provides more detailed information about the design and 

implementation of Maine’s and Arizona’s public financing programs, and 

appendix III presents summary information about various legal challenges 

to Maine’s 1996 statute and Arizona’s 1998 statute, including challenges to 

funding sources for Arizona’s program. 

 11Paul Ryan, “A Statute of Liberty: How New York City’s Campaign Finance Law is 

Changing the Face of Local Elections (2003),” and “Eleven Years of Reform: Many 

Successes-More to be Done: Campaign Financing in the City of Los Angeles (2001),” reports 

in the series “Public Financing in American Elections” sponsored by the Center for 

Governmental Studies, (Los Angeles, California), http://www.cgs.org/publications 

(downloaded Feb. 20, 2003). 

12Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A § 1121, et seq. 

13Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-940, et seq. 

14Applicable executive branch offices are Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, 

Treasurer, Corporation Commissioners, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Mine 

Inspector. 
Page 11 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

In the 2000 primary and general elections, about one of every three 

candidates in Maine and one of every four candidates in Arizona chose to 

use public financing for their campaigns. In the 2002 primary and general 

elections, participation in the public financing program increased 

significantly in both states, with about one-half or more of all candidates 

participating. Regarding results, 62 of the 116 publicly funded candidates 

in Maine’s 2000 general election were elected to office, as were 110 of the 

231 publicly funded candidates in the state’s 2002 general election. In 

Arizona’s 2000 general election, 16 of the 44 publicly funded candidates 

were elected to office, as were 39 of the 89 publicly funded candidates in 

the state’s 2002 general election. 

In perspective, after the 2000 general elections, the elected legislators who 

had run with public funds held 33 percent of the total seats in Maine’s 

legislature and 18 percent of the total seats in Arizona’s legislature. After 

the 2002 general elections, the proportions increased to 59 percent of 

Maine’s legislature and 36 percent of Arizona’s legislature. Also, of the 

seven statewide offices in Arizona’s 2002 general election, publicly funded 

candidates won seven of nine seats, which included Governor, Secretary 

of State, Attorney General, and State Treasurer. 

Maine’s 1996 voter-initiated system provides full public funding to 

qualified candidates for state legislative seats and the governor’s office. 

The state legislature consists of 151 seats in the House of Representatives 

and 35 seats in the Senate. Incumbents in all 186 legislative seats serve 

2-year terms. Thus, in the primary and general elections, which are held 

biannually (i.e., in each even-numbered year), all legislative seats are on 

the ballot. In 2000, the first year for which public funds were available for 

election campaigns in Maine, candidates potentially eligible for such funds 

included all candidates for the state legislature.15

In Maine’s 2000 primary and general elections, approximately one of every 

three candidates chose to participate in the state’s program for pubic 

financing of campaigns, as table 1 shows. Also, 33 percent of the primary 

election races and 47 percent of the general election races in 2000 had at 

least one participating candidate. In the next election, 2002, participation 

in the public financing program increased significantly. Specifically, in 

 15Under Maine’s 1996 law, qualified candidates for office of Governor became eligible to 

receive public funding beginning in 2002. 

Program 

Participation: More 

Candidates Opting to 

Use Public Financing 

Participating Candidates 

and Results Statistics for 

Elections in Maine 
Page 12 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Maine’s 2002 elections, 51 percent of all candidates in the primary election 

and 62 percent of all candidates in the general election were publicly 

funded. Further, 52 percent of the primary election races and 79 percent of 

the general election races in 2002 had at least one participating candidate. 

Table 1: Maine’s Primary and General Elections in 2000 and 2002—Number of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and 

Number of Races with at Least One Participating Candidate 

Candidates and races Maine primary election Maine general election 

2000 elections 

Candidates: Number Percentage Number Percentage

Nonparticipating (used private financing) 253 69% 236 67%

Participating (used public financing) 116 31 116 33

Total 369 100% 352 100%

Races:a 

With no participating candidates 231 67% 98 53%

With at least one participating candidate 112 33 88 47

Total 343 100% 186 100%

2002 elections 

Candidates: 

Nonparticipating (used private financing) 196 49% 144 38%

Participating (used public financing) 208 51 231 62

Total 404 100% 375 100%

Races:a 

With no participating candidates 176 48% 39 21%

With at least one participating candidate 194 52 148 79

Total 370 100% 187 100%

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note: Maine has 151 House districts and 35 Senate districts. Voters elect one legislator for each 

district. The ballot for the 2002 election cycle included gubernatorial candidates, who were eligible to 

participate in the public financing program. 

a

In counting election races, we included all races in which there was a candidate on the ballot 

regardless of whether or not the candidate faced a challenger. 

In Maine’s 2000 general election, of the 116 candidates who ran with public 

financing, 62 were elected to office. As table 2 shows, the 62 elected 

participating candidates consisted of 35 incumbents and 27 challengers. In 

Maine’s 2002 general election, of the 231 candidates who ran with public 

financing, 110 were elected to office (55 incumbent and 55 challengers). 

In perspective, after the 2000 general election, the elected legislators who 

had run with public funds (62 candidates) held 33 percent of the 186 total 

seats in Maine’s legislature. After the 2002 general election, with 110 
Page 13 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

successful publicly funded candidates, the proportion increased to 59 

percent of the state legislature. 

Table 2: Results of Maine’s General Elections in 2000 and 2002—Campaign Status and Number of Participating Candidates 

Elected by Office 

Participating candidates: Incumbents, challengers, and results 

Maine House of 

Representatives Maine Senate Governora

Totals

2000 general election 

Campaign status of participating candidates: 

Number of incumbents 26 11 b 37

Number of challengersc 55 24 b79

Total number of participating candidates 81 35 b116

Participating candidates elected: b

Number of participating incumbents elected 24 11 b35

Number of participating challengers electedc 21 6 b27

Total number elected 45 17 b 62

2002 general election b

Campaign status of participating candidates: b

Number of incumbents 42 20 0 62

Number of challengersc 136 32 1 169

Total number of participating candidates 178 52 1 231

Participating candidates elected 

Number of participating incumbents electedc 36 19 0 55

Number of participating challengers electedC 47 8 0 55

Total number elected 83 27 0 110

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

a

In Maine’s 2000 election, the public financing program was not applicable to the Office of Governor. 

In the 2002 election, term limits prohibited the incumbent governor from running. 

b

Not applicable. 

c

As used in the table, “challengers” consist of all nonincumbent candidates. Thus, any candidate who 

was not an incumbent is counted as a challenger, even if that candidate did not face an opponent. 

As mentioned previously, Arizona’s 1998 statute provides a system for full 

public funding to qualified candidates for state legislative seats and certain 

statewide offices. The state legislature consists of 60 seats in the House of 

Representatives and 30 seats in the Senate. Members in all 90 legislative 

seats serve 2-year terms. Thus, in the primary and general elections, which 

are held biannually (i.e., in each even-numbered year), all legislative seats 

are on the ballot. In 2000, the first year for which public funds were 

available for election campaigns in Arizona, candidates potentially eligible 

Participating Candidates 

and Results Statistics for 

Elections in Arizona 
Page 14 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

for such funds included all candidates for the state legislature, as well as 

the candidates who ran for seats on the Corporation Commission.16

In Arizona’s 2000 primary and general elections, approximately one of 

every four candidates chose to participate in the state’s program for public 

financing of campaigns, as table 3 shows. Also, 40 percent of the primary 

election and 34 percent of the general election races in 2000 had at least 

one participating candidate. In the next election, 2002, participation in the 

public financing program increased significantly—with about half of all 

candidates choosing to participate and with about two-thirds of all races 

having at least one participating candidate. 

 16Under Arizona’s 1998 law, qualified candidates for other statewide offices—Governor, 

Secretary of State, Attorney General, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and 

Mine Inspector—can also qualify to receive public funding. Candidates for these offices 

were eligible to receive public funding beginning in 2002, the first year after passage of the 

law in which elections were held for these offices. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-951. 
Page 15 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 3: Arizona’s Primary and General Elections in 2000 and 2002—Number of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and 

Number of Races with at Least One Participating Candidate 

Candidates and races Arizona primary election Arizona general election 

2000 elections 

Candidates: Number Percentage Number Percentage

Nonparticipating (used private financing) 174 75% 117 73%

Participating (used public financing) 59 25 44 27

Totala

233 100% 161 100%

Races: 

With no participating candidates 74 60% 28 45%

With at least one participating candidate 49 40 34 55

Total 123 100% 62c

 100%

2002 elections 

Candidates: Number Percentage Number Percentage

Nonparticipating (used private financing) 126 48% 90 50%

Participating (used public financing)b

136 52 89 50

Total 262 100% 179 100%

Races: 

With no participating candidates 46 36% 23 34%

With at least one participating candidate 81 64 45 66

Total 127 100% 68 100%

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note: Arizona has 30 legislative districts. Voters elect two representatives and one senator for each 

district. For House races, the top two vote-getters in each district’s general election win the seats. The 

2000 election cycle included only one statewide office, the Corporation Commission, with two of the 

Commission’s three seats up for election. The ballot for the 2002 election cycle included seven 

statewide offices—Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, Superintendent 

of Public Instruction, State Mine Inspector, and three seats for the Corporation Commission, which 

was expanded from three to five Commissioners. The number of candidates and races in this table 

include the relevant statewide offices for both years. For example, in 2000, the 62 general election 

races consisted of 30 races for House of Representatives seats (with each race involving 2 seats), 30 

races for Senate seats, and 2 races for seats on the Corporation Commission; and, in 2002, the 68 

general election races consisted of 30 House, 30 Senate, and 8 statewide office races. 

a

 In the 2000 primary and general elections combined, a total of 237 candidates ran for seats in the 

legislature or the Corporation Commission. Of this total, four candidates—two who ran as 

Independents and two with general election write-in status—did not run in the primary elections. 

Thus, the number of candidates in the primary elections was 233. In the 2000 elections, all 59 of the 

publicly funded (participating) candidates ran in the primaries; in contrast, in the 2002 elections, 3 of 

the total 139 participating candidates ran in the general election only (see note b). 

b

Three participating candidates in the 2002 election cycle did not run primary campaigns; these were 

one Independent candidate for Governor and two Independent candidates for the legislature. 

Including the 3 Independents, a total of 139 candidates participated in the public financing program in 

the 2002 primary and general elections combined. 

In Arizona’s 2000 general election, of the 44 candidates who ran with 

public financing, 16 were elected to office—14 for legislative seats and 

2 for the Corporation Commission. As table 4 shows, the 16 elected 

participating candidates consisted of 6 incumbents and 10 challengers. In 
Page 16 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

the 2002 general election, of the 89 candidates who ran with public 

financing, 39 were elected (9 incumbents and 30 challengers) to office—32 

for legislative seats and 7 for statewide offices. 

In perspective, after the 2000 general election, the elected legislators who 

had run with public funds (14 candidates) held 18 percent of the 90 total 

seats in Arizona’s legislature. After the 2002 general election, with 32 

successful publicly funded legislative candidates, the proportion increased 

to 36 percent of the state legislature. Also, of the seven statewide offices in 

Arizona’s 2002 general election, publicly funded candidates won 7 of 

9 seats, which included the state’s chief executive (Governor), as well as 

the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the State Treasurer. 

Table 4: Results of Arizona’s General Election in 2000 and 2002—Campaign Status and Number of Participating Candidates 

Elected by Office 

Participating candidates: Incumbents, challengers, 

and results 

Arizona House of 

Representatives Arizona Senate 

Statewide 

officesaTotals

2000 general election 

Campaign status of participating candidates: 

Number of incumbents 5 1 0 6

Number of challengersb 25 10 3 38

Total number of participating candidates 30 11 3 44

Participating candidates elected: 

Number of participating incumbents elected 5 1 0 6

Number of participating challengers electedb 7 1 2 10

Total number elected 12 2 2 16

2002 general electionc

Campaign status of participating candidates: 

Number of incumbents 9 1 2 12

Number of challengersb 47 16 14 77

Total number of participating candidates 56 17 16 89

Participating candidates elected: 

Number of participating incumbents elected 6 1 2 9

Number of participating challengers electedb 21 4 5 30

Total number elected 27 5 7d 39

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

a

In Arizona’s 2000 elections, the public financing program was available to qualified candidates for 

only one statewide office (Corporation Commission). In the 2002 elections, in addition to the 

Corporation Commission, qualified candidates for six other statewide offices became eligible to 

receive public funding—Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, 

Superintendent of Public Instruction, and State Mine Inspector. 

b

As used in the table, “challengers” consist of all nonincumbent candidates. Thus, any candidate who 

was not an incumbent is counted as a challenger, even if that candidate did not face an opponent. 
Page 17 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

c

A 5-member independent redistricting commission was created with the passing of a ballot 

proposition in 2000 and was charged with redrawing Arizona’s 30 legislative districts for the 2002 

elections. Because all 30 legislative districts were redrawn for the 2002 elections, most incumbents 

who chose to run for reelection did so in a district that was numbered differently from the district they 

represented in the previous term. In comparing the 2002 list of legislative candidates and the 2000 

legislative roster, we labeled a 2002 candidate as an incumbent if he or she held a seat from the 

previous session in the same chamber. 

d

These seven successful candidates involved races for the following statewide offices: Governor, 

Secretary of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, State Mine Inspector, and Corporation 

Commission (two seats). 

In Maine and Arizona, there were not any notable changes in the average 

number of state legislature candidates per district race when comparing 

the 1996 and 1998 traditionally financed elections with the publicly 

financed elections in 2000 and 2002. While there were some instances of 

multiple-candidate races for legislative seats in Arizona, there was not a 

large presence of participating candidates in these races. In both states, a 

higher proportion of Democratic candidates participated in the public 

funding program, and the number of participating third-party or 

independent legislative candidates generally increased from the 2000 to 

the 2002 primary and general elections. In the 2002 elections, one-half or 

more of Maine’s and Arizona’s third-party or independent legislative 

candidates participated in the public financing program. Regarding races 

for statewide offices, most candidates in Arizona opted to participate in 

the public funding program in the 2002 elections. 

Our survey of candidates in Maine’s and Arizona’s 2000 elections found 

mixed perspectives as to which of two factors—public funding for 

campaigns or open seats due to term-limited vacancies—played a greater 

role (or equal roles) in attracting new candidates to run for office. Most of 

the nonparticipating candidates who responded—64 percent in Maine and 

58 percent in Arizona—answered that open seats were a greater factor 

than public funding. Of the participating candidates who responded, the 

largest percentage in Maine (43 percent) answered that both factors 

played equal roles, and the largest percentage in Arizona (39 percent) 

answered that public funding was a greater factor. 

Proponents of the public financing initiatives in Maine and Arizona 

contended that public funding would encourage more individuals to run 

for office, thereby giving voters more choices on the ballot. Opponents 

have said that an increase in the number of candidates on the ballot alone 

Voter Choice: 

Legislative and 

Statewide Candidates 

in Publicly Funded 

Elections 

Increasing Voter Choice 

Was a Goal of Public 

Financing Programs 
Page 18 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

would not necessarily result in more diversity17 or representation of a 

wider range of political views, nor guarantee that a broader array of issues 

would be debated in campaigns. During our study, the state officials and 

researchers we interviewed said that changes in the number of candidates 

per race—as well as changes in the breadth of party affiliations, such as 

third-party or independent representation—would be important indicators 

to measure over several election cycles. 

As table 5 shows, the average number of state legislature candidates per 

district race in Maine and Arizona did not vary greatly over the 4 election 

years examined. In Maine, on average, there was about one candidate per 

race in the primary elections and about two candidates per race in the 

general elections. 

In Arizona, the average number of candidates in the house primary 

elections was about two candidates per race, since up to two candidates 

per political party can be nominated for the general election. In the house 

general elections, two candidates are elected per district; the average 

number of candidates was about three per race in each of the election 

years. For Arizona’s senate elections, the average number of candidates 

was about one for primary election races and about two for general 

election races. 

 17Officials from the Maine and Arizona Secretary of State offices told us that they do not 

collect data on state candidates’ race or sex. Therefore, we did not compare these 

demographics of candidates in the recent (2000 and 2002) and the previous elections. 

Little Variance in Average 

Number of State 

Legislature Candidates Per 

District Race 
Page 19 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 5: Average Number of State Legislature Candidates Per District Race in Maine and Arizona (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) 

State Legislature 

Primary and general 

election 

Average number of candidates 

per district race 

 1996 1998 2000 2002

Maine House of Representatives Primary 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1

 General 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.0

 Senate Primary 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1

 General 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.0

Arizona House of Representatives Primarya 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.7

 Generalb 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.5

 Senate Primary 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4

 General 1.8 1.5 1.9 1.7

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note: All Arizona legislative districts were reconfigured in the 2002 elections. 

a

The two candidates receiving the most votes in the Arizona primary are the party nominees in the 

general election. 

b

The two candidates in each house district receiving the most votes in the general election are 

elected. 

Although there were no notable changes in the average number of 

candidates per race, there were some races in the Arizona 2000 house 

primary election that had large numbers of candidates on the ballot. For 

example, in one House district, nine Republicans ran for the party 

nomination; none of these candidates were publicly funded. In another 

district, eight Democrats ran for the party nomination, of which three were 

publicly funded. According to Arizona officials, the availability of public 

funding was not the main reason for the large numbers of candidates in 

some districts. The officials speculated that the increase in certain races 

resulted from open seats due to term limits. 

As mentioned previously, we surveyed all candidates who ran for state 

legislature seats and applicable statewide offices in Maine’s and Arizona’s 

2000 elections. The survey results showed mixed perspectives as to which 

of two factors—public funding for campaigns or open seats due to termlimited vacancies—played a greater role (or equal roles) in attracting new 

candidates to run for office. As figure 1 shows, most of the 

nonparticipating candidates who responded—64 percent in Maine and 58 

percent in Arizona—answered that open seats were a greater factor than 

public funding. Of the participating candidates who responded, the largest 

percentages in Maine (43 percent) and Arizona (39 percent) answered that 

both factors played equal roles. 
Page 20 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 1: Response of Candidates in the 2000 Election Regarding Which Factor (Term Limits or Public Funding) Played a 

Greater Role in Attracting New Candidates to Run for Office 

Further, most of the participating candidates who responded to our 

survey—55 percent in Maine and 56 percent in Arizona—answered that 

the availability of the public financing program was a great or very great 

factor in their decision to run for office in 2000 (see fig. 2). 

Open seats due to

term-limited

vacancies

Maine candidates

GAO survey question: In your opinion, which played a greater role in attracting 

new candidates to run for office?

Total possible: 100%

64%

24%

Public funding for

campaigns

3%

25%

Both factors played

equal roles

19%

43%

Open seats due to

term-limited

vacancies

GAO survey question: In your opinion, which played a greater role in attracting 

new candidates to run for office?

Total possible: 100%

58%

16%

Public funding for

campaigns

8%

37%

Both factors played

equal roles

29%

39%

Arizona candidates

Source: Responses to GAO’s survey (see app. IV and V).

Nonparticipating

Participating
Page 21 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 2: Percentages of Participating Candidates Who Answered That the Availability of Public Funding Was a Great or Very 

Great Factor in Their Decision to Run for Office in 2000 

Note: This question was asked only of candidates participating in the public financing program. All 

104 Maine respondents were state legislative candidates. In Arizona, of the 39 respondents, 35 were 

state legislative candidates and 4 were Corporation Commission candidates. 

As shown in table 6, for the 2000 and 2002 elections in both states, about 

one-half or more of all participating candidates were affiliated with the 

Democratic party. Further, in both states, the percentage of participating 

Republican candidates generally increased from 2000 to 2002 in the 

primary and general elections. 

Political Party Affiliation 

of Publicly Funded 

Candidates in Maine and 

Arizona 

Great or very

great extent

Maine candidates

GAO survey question: Overall, to what extent, if at all, do you agree with the 

statement that the availability of public funding was a factor in your decision to

run for office in 2000?

Arizona candidates

Total possible: 100%

55% Great or very

great extent

GAO survey question: Overall, to what extent, if at all, do you agree with the 

statement that the availability of public funding was a factor in your decision to

run for office in 2000?

Total possible: 100%

56%

Participating

Source: Responses to GAO’s survey (see app. IV and V).
Page 22 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 6: Percentage of Participating Legislative Candidates by Political Party Affiliation in Maine and Arizona (2000 and 2002)

 Percentage of participating candidates 

State Legislature 

Primary and 

general 

elections 

Number of 

participating 

candidates Democrat Republican Othera 

Maine - 2000 House of Representatives Primaryb 80 68% 29% 4%

 Generalb 81 70 23 6

 Senate Primary 36 56 44 0

 General 35 54 46 0

 2002 

 House of Representatives Primaryb

156 62% 35% 4%

 General 177 58 34 8

 Senate Primary 50 48 48 4

 General 52 46 50 4

Arizona -2000 House of Representatives Primaryb 40 68% 23% 10%

 Generalb 30 73 13 13

 Senate Primary 14 86 14 0

 General 11 82 18 0

 2002 

 House of Representatives Primary 86 50% 47% 3%

 General 56 57 36 7

 Senate Primary 25 64 28 8

 Generalb 17 65 18 18

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note: All Arizona legislative districts were reconfigured in the 2002 elections. 

a

Includes third-party (e.g., Green, Libertarian, and Reform) and independent candidates. 

b

Does not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

As table 7 shows, the number of third-party or independent legislative 

candidates who participated in the public funding program increased 

almost twofold or greater from the 2000 to the 2002 primary and general 

elections in Maine and the general elections in Arizona. In 2002, over onehalf of Maine’s third-party or independent candidates participated in the 

public financing program, as did one-half or more of Arizona’s third-party 

or independent candidates. In Maine, most were candidates of the Green 

Independent Party, which had primary election ballot status in 2000 and 

2002. Representatives of the Maine Green Independent Party told us that 

one of their goals was to qualify candidates for public funding in order to 

promote the party’s platform. 
Page 23 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 7: Number of Third-party or Independent Candidates In Maine and Arizona State Legislative Races (1996, 1998, 2000, 

and 2002) 

State Legislature 

Primary and 

general elections Number of third-party or independent candidates 

 1996 1998 2000 2002 

Total Total Total

Participating 

(% of total) Total

Participating 

(% of total)

Maine House of 

Representatives and 

Senate 

Primary 0 1 4 3 (75%) 12 8 (67%)

 General 24 17 30 5 (17%) 28 16 (57%)

Arizona House of 

Representatives and 

Senate 

Primary 17 8 22 4 (18%) 8 5 (63%)

 General 17 7 19 4 (21%) 14 7 (50%)

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

In Maine, the public financing program was not applicable for any 

statewide office races in 2000. In Arizona, candidates for one statewide 

office—the Corporation Commission—were eligible for public funds 

beginning in the 2000 elections. As table 8 shows, in Arizona’s 2000 

primary election, five of the eight candidates for the Corporation 

Commission chose to participate in the public financing program, as did 

three of the six candidates in the general election. Two of the participating 

candidates were elected to office in 2000. 

In 2002, five of the eight primary election candidates for the Corporation 

Commission were publicly funded, and five of the six general election 

candidates were publicly funded. Participating candidates won two of the 

three available seats. 

Most Statewide Office 

Candidates Opted for 

Public Financing in 

Arizona’s 2002 Election 
Page 24 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 8: Number of Arizona Corporation Commission Candidates (1994, 1996, 1998, 

2000, and 2002) 

Election Candidates and seats 1994 1996 1998 2000a

2002

Primary Number of candidates 5 2b 3 88

 Number of participating candidates c c c 5 5

General Number of candidates 3 4 2 6 6

 Number of open seats 1 1 1 2 3

 Average number of candidates per 

open seat 

3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0

 Number of participating candidates c c c 3 5

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

a

 Public financing was first available in 2000 for this statewide office. 

b

 Does not include 2 write-in candidates. 

c

 Not applicable. 

In Maine, the governor’s election is the only statewide office race eligible 

for public campaign financing, and the 2002 elections were the first time 

public financing was available for this race. The Republican and Green 

Independent Party candidates were publicly funded in the gubernatorial 

primary, and the Green Independent candidate also ran in the general 

election. During the campaign, the Green Independent Party candidate 

spent about $837,000 in public funds to run his gubernatorial campaign 

against three traditionally financed competitors in the general election—a 

Democrat, a Republican, and an Independent. In the general election, the 

Green Independent Party candidate received about 47,000 votes, or about 

9.3 percent of the total votes cast. 

In Arizona, candidates for six statewide offices were eligible for public 

funding for the first time in 2002 (see table 9). For these six statewide 

offices, 20 of the 30 candidates who ran in the primary election were 

publicly funded, and 11 of the 17 candidates who ran in the general 

election were publicly funded. Five of the six winners of these statewide 

races were publicly funded—that is, participating candidates won races 

for the offices of Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State 

Treasurer, and State Mine Inspector. 
Page 25 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 9: Number of Candidates for Maine and Arizona Statewide Races (1994, 1998, 

and 2002) 

Election year 

1994 1998 2002a

Total Total Total Participating

Maine 

Governor 

Primary election 13 5b 42

General election 4 5b 41

Arizona 

Governor 

Primary election 6 7 9 5

General election 3 4 4 2

Secretary of State 

Primary election 5 3 5 4

General election 3 2 3 2

Attorney General 

Primary election 2b 3 5 2

General 2b3 3 2

State Treasurer 

Primary election 2 2 3 3

General election 3 2 2 2

Superintendent of Public 

Instruction 

Primary election 4 1b 64

General election 2 1b 31

State Mine Inspector 

Primary election 1b1b 2b 2

General election 1b 1b 2b 2

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note: The term of all offices is 4 years. The number of candidates in the primary elections is the total 

of all candidates listed on the ballot for all political party primaries (including Democrat, Republican, 

Libertarian, Reform, Green, and Independent). Write-in candidates are not included. 

a

 Public financing was first available in 2002 for these statewide offices. 

b

 Incumbent candidate ran for reelection. 

Reasons why candidates chose to participate in the public funding 

program in the 2000 elections are presented in figure 3, which shows the 

results of our survey of candidates. Most of the participating candidates 

who responded—76 percent in Maine and 81 percent in Arizona—agreed 

to a great or very great extent with the statement that they chose to 

participate in the public funding program because they did not want to feel 

Candidates’ Views about 

Participation and 

Nonparticipation in the 

Public Funding Program 
Page 26 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

obligated to special interest groups or lobbyists. Further, about threefourths of the responding participating candidates from both states (77 

percent in Maine and 74 percent in Arizona) agreed to a great or very great 

extent with the statement that receiving public funds allowed them to 

spend more time discussing issues in their campaign. 

Figure 3: Reasons Why Candidates Chose to Participate in the Public Financing Program 

On the other hand, an analysis of why candidates chose not to participate 

in the public funding program in the 2000 elections is presented in figure 4. 

About 60 percent or more of the nonparticipating candidates who 

responded to our survey answered that they agreed to a great or very great 

extent with the following statements: 

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you 

agree with the following statements as to why you

chose to run your campaign with public funds in the 

2000 elections: 

Note: Percentages are candidates who agreed with the statement to a great

or very great extent.

Maine

I did not think I would be able to raise enough funds through traditional

means to run a competitive campaign.

Total possible: 100%

34%

Arizona 45%

Maine

Receiving public funds allowed me to spend more time discussing

issues.

Total possible: 100%

77%

Arizona

Maine

Other than collecting "seed money" and $5 contributions, I am opposed 

to traditional methods of funding election campaigns.

Total possible: 100%

45%

Arizona 50% 74%

Maine

I believe that the public financing program promotes the accountability

of legislators to the public.

Total possible: 100%

60%

Arizona

Maine

I did not want to feel obligated to special interest groups or lobbyists.

Total possible: 100%

76%

Arizona 81% 68%

Source: Responses to GAO's survey (see app. IV and V).

Participating
Page 27 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

• Public funds are better used for purposes other than election 

campaigns (59 percent in Maine and 64 percent in Arizona). 

• Public funding forces taxpayers to fund candidates that they may not 

support (61 percent in Maine and 68 percent in Arizona). 
Page 28 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 4: Reasons Why Candidates Did Not Participate in the Public Financing Program 

a

Given the status of legal challenges to the respective state’s clean election law (see app. III), this 

question was asked only of Arizona candidates. 

Figure 4 further shows that, in Arizona, unresolved legal challenges to the 

state’s public financing program during the 2000 election cycle was a 

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you

agree with the following statements as to why you 

chose to run your campaign with private rather than 

public funds in the 2000 elections: 

Maine

I did not want restrictions on my campaign spending.

Total possible: 100%

31%

Arizona 30%

Maine

I had sufficient funds without using public funds.

Total possible: 100%

47%

Arizona

Maine

I am opposed to public funding of election campaigns.

Total possible: 100%

50%

Arizona 54% 36%

Maine

I believe that public funding forces taxpayers to fund candidates that they

may not support.

Total possible: 100%

61%

Arizona

Maine

I believe that public funds are better used for purposes other than

election campaigns.

Total possible: 100%

59%

Arizona 64% 68%

Maine Not applicable

I did not want to participate in the public financing program because the legal 

status of the program was uncertain for much of the 2000 election cycle.a

Total possible: 100%

Arizona

Maine

I believe that the use of public funds adds burdensome reporting

requirements to election campaigns.

Total possible: 100%

41%

Arizona 63% 42%

Source: Responses to GAO's survey (see app. IV and V).

Note: Percentages are candidates who agreed with the statement to a great

or very great extent.

Nonparticipating
Page 29 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

decisional factor to a great or very great extent for 42 percent of the 

nonparticipating candidates who responded to our survey. Legal 

challenges to Arizona’s public financing program (see app. III) persisted 

throughout the 2000 and 2002 election cycles. 

To date, two election cycles (2000 and 2002) have occurred under the 

public financing programs in Maine and Arizona. In comparing data from 

these and the two most recent nonpublic financing years (1996 and 1998) 

using three measures of electoral competition—contested races, 

incumbent reelection rates, and incumbent victory margins—our analysis 

showed: 

• The percentages of contested legislative races in Maine’s primary 

elections were relatively unchanged in 2000 and 2002, compared with 

1998, and were less than the percentage of contested legislative races 

in 1996. The percentages of contested legislative races in Arizona’s 

primary elections increased in 2000 and 2002, compared with 1998; 

however, the percentage of contested races in 2000 was about the same 

as 1996. About 85 percent of the contested legislative primary races in 

Maine’s and Arizona’s 2002 elections had publicly financed candidates. 

• Legislative incumbent reelection rates remained about the same in both 

states after public financing was introduced. 

• Incumbent victory margins, which we used to identify competitive 

races, reflected a mixed picture. That is, we defined a competitive race 

as one in which the difference in the percentage of vote garnered 

between the winning incumbent and the runner-up was 15 points or 

less and under this definition, trends (if any) were not clearly evident. 

Further analysis, which examined several factors related to election 

outcomes, found that whether a race included publicly financed 

candidates in 2000 and 2002 had no effect on this measure of 

competitiveness. However, the results of this analysis should be 

interpreted with caution, given the relatively few variables we used and 

the limited amount of data available. 

A principal goal of public financing laws is to increase electoral 

competition. The term “electoral competition” refers to the level of 

competition for elected positions as demonstrated by whether races were 

contested and by the percentage of the vote candidates received. For 

example, levels of electoral competition can vary from none at all in the 

case of an uncontested race in which the sole candidate receives 100 

Electoral 

Competition: Analysis 

of Elections in Maine 

and Arizona 

Increasing Electoral 

Competition Was a 

Principal Goal of Public 

Financing 
Page 30 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

percent of the vote, to an election in which several candidates vie 

competitively for a position, each winning a significant portion of the vote. 

Proponents of the initiatives to adopt public financing laws in both states 

supported the goal of increasing electoral competition. In Maine, 

proponents said that the initiative would level the playing field so that 

challengers would have a chance against incumbents. The findings section 

of Arizona’s Act states that the traditional election financing system gave 

incumbents an unhealthy advantage over challengers and discouraged 

qualified candidates without personal wealth or access to other funds 

from running. Further, state officials and other stakeholders we 

interviewed in both Maine and Arizona agreed that one purpose of the 

states’ public financing laws was to increase electoral competition. 

According to some political observers, “A chief standard of success for a 

public finance scheme is increasing competitiveness, which increases the 

voters’ ultimate check on other abuses and is a measure of the 

responsiveness of a legislature.”18 Proponents of public financing for 

campaigns contend that public funding could increase electoral 

competition by allowing candidates, especially candidates challenging 

incumbents, to overcome the financial hurdles that would otherwise 

prevent them from entering a race. Further, proponents argue that public 

funding promotes competition by giving more candidates the opportunity 

to effectively communicate with the electorate once they have entered the 

race.19 On the other hand, opponents we interviewed in Maine and Arizona 

believe that public financing does not attract candidates who have a broad 

base of constituency support and, therefore, even though more new 

candidates may enter races and win, the quality of representation will be 

questionable. 

As a part of this review, we examined changes in electoral competition in 

state legislative races by comparing the two most recent nonpublic 

funding election years (1996 and 1998) with the two public funding 

election years (2000 and 2002). In reviewing public finance and election 

literature, we did not find a standard approach for measuring changes in 

electoral competition. However, we did identify three widely used 

 18Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, “The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral 

Competitiveness: Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964-1990,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 

20, no. 1 (1995), 75. 

19Richard Briffault, “Public Funding and Democratic Elections,” University of 

Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 148 (1999), 568-572. 
Page 31 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

measures of electoral competition—percentages of contested races, 

incumbent reelection rates, and incumbent victory margins. The first 

measure refers to the percentage of all races that had more than one 

candidate running for the position. Because the concern about competitive 

races is particularly focused on the ability of challengers to mount credible 

campaigns against incumbents, the other two measures specifically 

involve incumbents. Incumbent reelection rates examine the percentage of 

incumbents (running for reelection) who were reelected. Incumbent 

victory margin examines the difference between the percentage of the vote 

going to winning incumbents and the runners-up. 

One measure of electoral competition is the percentage of all races for 

seats in the legislature that are contested. As previously mentioned, a chief 

goal in making public funds available for campaigns was to help potential 

candidates overcome the financial barriers that deterred them from 

running, which would result in fewer uncontested races. In Maine and 

Arizona, uncontested races were much more common in the primary than 

in general elections from 1996 to 2002.20 Thus, we focused solely on the 

primary elections and considered a primary election race contested if 

more than one candidate ran in the political party’s district race.21 If public 

financing had enticed more candidates to run in the primary election 

races, we would expect that after 1998, increasing percentages of races 

would be contested. 

In Maine, as figure 5 shows, the introduction of public financing in the 

2000 election did not correspond with a significant increase in contested 

primary races. The percentages of contested legislative races in Maine’s 

primary elections remained relatively unchanged in 2000 (7 percent) and 

2002 (8 percent), compared with 1998 (6 percent), and were less than the 

percentage of contested legislative races in 1996 (12 percent). More 

 20The number of contested general election races for seats in Maine’s and Arizona’s house 

and senate averaged 77 percent of the total applicable races in election years 1996 through 

2000, while the number of contested primary election races averaged 19 percent of the total 

applicable races. There were more contested general election races because candidates 

from both the Democratic and the Republican parties usually ran. In contrast, there was 

often only one candidate in the primary party races. 

21Arizona has multimember house districts, so that two representatives are elected from 

each district. Due to the multimember district arrangement, a contested primary race was 

one in which three candidates ran in a primary race, since two candidates automatically 

advanced to the general election race. 

Contested Races in Maine 

and Arizona 

Changes in Contested-Race 

Percentages 
Page 32 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

detailed analysis, including coverage of additional years, would be 

necessary to determine whether the percentage of contested legislative 

primary races in 1996 (12 percent) was historically high and if the change 

from 1998 to 2002 differs from past changes in Maine. 

Figure 5: Contested and Uncontested Races in Maine’s Legislative (House and Senate) Primary Elections (1996, 1998, 2000, 

and 2002) 

Note: Of the 343 races in the 2000 elections, 25 (7.3 percent) were contested. 

In Arizona, as figure 6 shows, the percentages of contested legislative 

races in the state’s primary elections were higher in 2000 (30 percent) and 

in 2002 (38 percent) than in 1998 (18 percent). However, the percentage of 

contested races in 2000 was about the same as in 1996 (29 percent). More 

data encompassing additional election years before and after public 

financing was introduced would be necessary to identify any trend. 

Total races: 364 Total races: 342 Total races: 343 Total races: 367

88%

12%

94%

6%

93%

7%

92%

8%

Public financing not available

1996 1998 2000 2002

Public financing available

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Uncontested races

Contested races

Maine
Page 33 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 6: Contested and Uncontested Races in Arizona’s Legislative (House and Senate) Primary Elections (1996, 1998, 2000, 

and 2002) 

Two election cycles provide a limited basis for projecting whether the 

percentage of contested races will increase in Maine’s and Arizona’s 

primary elections. However, we examined the 2000 and 2002 races in 

Maine and Arizona to determine the extent to which contested races had 

publicly financed candidates. In Maine’s legislative primary elections, as 

figure 7 shows, 56 percent of the contested races in 2000 had publicly 

financed candidates, and the percentage increased to 86 percent in 2002. 

Overall, however, there were still many more uncontested races (318 and 

338) than contested races (25 and 29) in both 2000 and 2002. 

Publicly Financed Candidates 

and Contested Races 

Total races: 112 Total races: 100 Total races: 118 Total races: 107

71%

29%

18%

30% 38%

82% 70% 62%

Public financing not available

1996 1998 2000 2002

Public financing available

Uncontested races

Contested races

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Arizona
Page 34 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 7: Publicly Financed Candidates in Maine’s Contested Legislative Primary 

Races (2000 and 2002) 

If publicly financed candidates had not run in Maine’s 2000 and 2002 

primary elections, there would likely have been fewer contested races. For 

example, in our survey of candidates in Maine’s 2000 election, we asked 

the publicly financed candidates to what extent the availability of public 

funding had been a factor in their decision to run for office. Of the 20 

publicly financed challengers who ran in contested races in Maine’s 2000 

legislative primaries, 13 returned our survey questionnaire. Eight of those 

13 candidates answered that the availability of public funding influenced 

their decision to run to a great extent. Only one candidate answered that 

the availability of public funding was of little or no importance in the 

decision to run. 

In Arizona’s legislative primary elections, as figure 8 shows, a significant 

percentage of the contested races in 2000 (40 percent) had publicly 

financed candidates, and the percentage more than doubled in 2002 (85 

percent). Similarly to Maine, however, there were still more uncontested 

races (83 and 66) than contested races (35 and 41) in 2000 and 2002. 

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

 Races with all traditional candidates.

Races with publicly financed candidates

Total races: 25 Total races: 29

2000 2002

56%

44%

86%

14%
Page 35 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 8:Publicly Financed Candidates in Arizona’s Contested Legislative Primary 

Races (2000 and 2002) 

Since such a high percentage of the contested primary legislative races in 

Arizona’s 2000 and 2002 elections had publicly financed candidates, as in 

Maine, there would likely have been fewer contested races if those 

candidates had not run. In our survey of candidates in Arizona’s 2000 

election, we asked the publicly financed candidates to what extent the 

availability of public funding had been a factor in their decision to run for 

office. Of the 19 publicly financed challengers who ran in contested races 

in Arizona’s 2000 legislative primaries, 12 returned our survey 

questionnaire. Half of those candidates answered that the availability of 

public funding influenced their decision to run to a great extent. Three of 

the 12 candidates answered that the availability of public funding was of 

little or no importance in their decision to run. 

A second measure of electoral competition is incumbent reelection rates 

in the general legislative elections in Maine and Arizona. Some political 

observers have asserted that electoral competition is primarily determined 

by the ability of challengers to mount credible campaigns against 

Incumbent Reelection 

Rates in Maine and 

Arizona 

Total races: 35 Total races: 41

2000 2002

40% 60%

85%

15%

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

 Races with all traditional candidates.

Races with publicly financed candidates
Page 36 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

incumbents.22 Also, many believe that incumbents begin a race with 

numerous advantages over challengers—advantages such as name 

recognition with the public, free media attention, and the opportunity to 

provide constituency services.23 For these reasons, incumbent reelection 

rates are typically high in states throughout the nation. For example, a 

1991 study—covering 10 election cycles (during 1968 through 1986) for 

legislative seats in 16 states—found that 92 percent of 11,711 house 

incumbents seeking reelection were successful. The same study reported 

that 88 percent of 2,547 senate incumbents were successful.24 If public 

financing in Maine and Arizona helped to improve challengers’ ability to 

mount credible campaigns against incumbents, one indication might be 

lower incumbent reelection rates in 2000 and 2002, as compared to 

election years before public financing was introduced. 

As figure 9 shows, the incumbent reelection rates in Maine’s house 

remained relatively unchanged over the 4 years, with the exception of a 

slight increase in 2000 (91 percent). Comparatively, these reelection rates 

in Maine’s house were near, but slightly below the 16-state average (92 

percent) reported by the 1991 study mentioned previously. Although 

incumbent reelection rates for Maine’s house did not change much over 

the 4 election years we reviewed, 4 of the 10 incumbents who were 

defeated in 2000, and 10 of the 14 incumbents who were defeated in 2002 

lost to publicly financed candidates. 

 22Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, “The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral 

Competitiveness,” 74. 

23Richard Briffault, “Public Funding and Democratic Elections,” 569. 

24James C. Garand, “Electoral Marginality in State Legislative Elections, 1968-86,” 

Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1 (1991), 14-15. The states included in this 

analysis were California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, 

Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and 

Wisconsin. 

Incumbent Reelection Rates in 

Maine 
Page 37 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 9: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine’s Legislative Races (1996, 1998, 

2000, and 2002) 

Note: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of incumbent victories over total number of 

incumbents running for reelection in that year. 

As shown in figure 9, incumbent reelection rates in Maine’s senate also did 

not change significantly after public financing was introduced. The 

incumbent reelection rates ranged from 91 percent to 100 percent—91 

percent in 1996 and 2000, 100 percent in 1998, and 92 percent in 2002. 

These rates for all 4 election years in Maine’s senate were higher than the 

senate average (88 percent) from the 1991 study mentioned above. 

However, of the two senate incumbents who lost in 2000, one lost to a 

publicly financed candidate, and in 2002, both incumbents who were 

defeated lost to publicly financed candidates. 

Figure 10 shows incumbent reelection rates for Arizona’s house and senate 

for the 4 most recent general election cycles. The house incumbent 

reelection rate was 98 percent in 1998 and then dropped 4 percentage 

Incumbent Reelection Rates in 

Arizona 

Public financing not 

available

Public financing

available

80

0

84

88

92

96

100

1996 1998 2000 2002

House

Incumbent reelection rates in percentages

Senate

86

(88/102)

89

(105/118)

91

(105/115)

85

(81/95)

91

(21/23)

100 (31/31)

91

(20/22)

92

(23/25)

Source: GAO analysis of state data.
Page 38 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

points in each of the two publicly funded elections.25 The 90-percent rate in 

2002 was slightly lower than the 16-state average (92 percent) mentioned 

previously. On the other hand, the incumbent reelection rate in Arizona’s 

senate was 96 percent in 1998 and then increased to 100 percent in both 

2000 and 2002, the same rate as in 1996. 

Figure 10: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Arizona’s Legislative Races (1996, 1998, 

2000, and 2002) 

Note 1: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of incumbent victories and the total 

number of incumbents running for reelection in that year. 

Note 2: Because all 30 legislative districts were redrawn for the 2002 elections, most incumbents who 

chose to run for reelection did so in a district that was numbered differently from the district they 

represented in the previous term. In comparing the 2002 list of legislative candidates and the 2000 

legislative roster, we labeled a 2002 candidate as an incumbent if he or she held a seat from the 

previous session in the same chamber. 

 25None of the incumbent losses in Arizona’s house in the 2000 and 2002 general elections 

were to publicly financed candidates. 

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Public financing not 

available

Public financing

available

Incumbent reelection rates in percentages

80

84

88

92

96

100

1996 1998 2000 2002

0

House

Senate

95

(41/43)

100 (19/19)

96

(23/24)

98

(44/45)

94

(33/35)

100 (20/20)

90

(27/30)

100 (13/13)
Page 39 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

A third measure of electoral competition is incumbent victory margins. 

This measure involves examining the difference between the percentage of 

votes received by the winning incumbents and the second-place finishers. 

As discussed previously, incumbents enjoy many inherent advantages over 

challengers. One disadvantage most challengers face is the difficulty in 

raising campaign funds, which impacts their ability to run an effective 

campaign. In order to make their name and campaign message known to 

the public, challengers need to raise money for advertisements and other 

campaign activities. However, challengers are faced with a circular 

problem. Campaign contributors generally view challengers as more likely 

to lose an election than an incumbent; yet, challengers cannot run a 

competitive campaign unless they can raise money.26 For these reasons, 

according to proponents, public financing programs would allow 

challengers to compete more effectively. An indicator of competing more 

effectively would be a narrowing of the electoral gap between the 

incumbent winners and the runners-up, not simply whether some 

incumbents were defeated. 

Although our review of applicable literature and our discussions with 

experts confirmed that measuring incumbent victory margins in legislative 

races is a good indicator of electoral competition, there is disagreement on 

which margin of difference indicates a competitive race. The studies we 

reviewed were essentially split between using a difference of 10 

percentage points or less of the vote or using a difference of 20 percentage 

points or less of the vote. A margin of 10 percentage points is considered 

to be more conservative than 20 percentage points because the former 

represents a higher bar for challengers to meet. We took a central 

approach and defined a competitive race as one in which the difference in 

the percentage of the vote garnered between the winning incumbent and 

the runner-up was 15 points or less. For example, consider a race with two 

candidates, one the incumbent and the other a challenger. If the 

incumbent garnered 57 percent of the vote and the challenger garnered 43 

percent of the vote, the incumbent’s margin of victory would be 14 

percentage points. Under our definition, this hypothetical race would be 

competitive because the incumbent won by 15-or-less percentage points. 

Using our definition, we analyzed all of the legislative general election 

races in Maine and Arizona that had incumbent wins against at least one 

 26Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, “The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral 

Competitiveness,” 74. 

Incumbent Victory Margins 

in Maine and Arizona 
Page 40 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

challenger during the four most recent elections—1996, 1998, 2000, and 

2002. If the public financing programs helped challengers to run more 

competitive races against incumbents, we would expect to find larger 

percentages of competitive races in 2000 and 2002 than in 1996 and 1998. 

Changes in the percentages of contested races after public financing was 

introduced varied between Maine’s house and the senate. As figure 11 

shows, the percentages of competitive house races in 2000 (31 percent) 

and 2002 (29 percent) were greater than the percentage in 1998 (21 

percent) but similar to the percentage in 1996 (32 percent). On the other 

hand, the percentage of competitive senate races in 2002 (50 percent) was 

greater than each of the three previous election years. 

In order to more thoroughly explore the relationship between publicly 

financed elections and competitive races, in further analysis we examined 

the effects of several factors relevant to election outcomes and found that 

whether a race included publicly financed candidates in 2000 and 2002 had 

no effect on incumbent victory margins. That is, we analyzed the effect of 

participation in the public financing program on competitiveness after 

controlling for other factors, such as candidates’ campaign status 

(incumbent or not) and candidates’ spending.27 However, the results of this 

analysis should be interpreted with caution, given the relatively few 

variables we used and the limited amount of data available. 

 27See appendix I for a discussion of the scope and methodology of our analysis. 

Competitive Legislative Races 

in Maine 
Page 41 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 11: Competitive Legislative Races in Maine (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) 

Note: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of competitive races divided by the number 

of total races with incumbent wins, which gives the percentage at each data point. 

Since incumbent victory margins, as a measure of electoral competition, 

exclude races in which a challenger won, we also examined the general 

legislative races in 2000 and 2002 to determine the funding status of 

winning challengers. Of the 79 publicly financed legislative challengers 

who ran for a seat in Maine’s 2000 general election, 27 won, representing 

44 percent of the total number of winning challengers that year. In Maine’s 

2002 general election, of the 168 publicly financed legislative challengers 

who ran, 55 won, representing 67 percent of the total number of winning 

challengers that year. 

In Arizona, changes in the percentages of competitive general legislative 

races across the 4 election years were mixed. For Arizona’s legislative 

elections, our analysis was limited to senate races only because the state’s 

Competitive Legislative Races 

in Arizona 

0

10

20

30

40

50

Public financing not available

Percentage of competitive races

1996

32

21

(24/75)

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

(4/19)

21

(16/77)

22

31

21

29

50

(6/27)

(24/78)

(4/19)

(19/65)

(10/20)

1998 2000 2002

Public financing available

Maine Senate

Maine House
Page 42 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

house races involve multimember districts, which does not lend itself to 

analysis using incumbent victory margins.28

As figure 12 shows, 29 percent (2 of 7) of Arizona’s senate races were 

competitive in 1998. This percentage increased to 40 percent (6 of 15) in 

2000 and then dropped to 33 percent (2 of 6) in 2002. No trends are 

apparent in simply comparing the change in the percentages of 

competitive races across the 4 election years. However, similar to the 

finding in Maine, we analyzed the effects of several factors relevant to 

election outcomes and found that the presence of publicly financed 

candidates in a race had no effect on incumbent victory margins in 

Arizona’s 2000 and 2002 senate races.29

 28This measure of competition, incumbent victory margins, involved looking at the 

difference in the percentage of the vote garnered by winning incumbents and runners-up. 

Therefore, all races included in this analysis had a winning incumbent. In Arizona’s 

multimember house districts (two representatives are elected in each district), there were 

several possible combinations of winning incumbents, including cases in which one 

incumbent won while the other lost. These possible combinations meant that incumbent 

victory margins in Arizona’s house races could not be readily compared with victory 

margins in Arizona’s senate races, nor to races for Maine’s legislature. 

29See appendix I for a discussion of the scope and methodology of our analysis. 
Page 43 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 12: Competitive Senate Races in Arizona (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) 

Note 1: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of competitive races divided by the 

number of total races with incumbent wins, which gives the percentage at each data point. 

Note 2: Because all 30 legislative districts were redrawn for the 2002 elections, most incumbents who 

chose to run for reelection did so in a district that was numbered differently from the district they 

represented in the previous term. In comparing the 2002 list of legislative candidates and the 2000 

legislative roster, we labeled a 2002 candidate as an incumbent if he or she held a seat from the 

previous session in the same chamber. 

Again, because the measure of incumbent victory margins excludes races 

in which a challenger won, we also examined Arizona’s general election 

senate races in 2000 and 2002 to determine the funding status of winning 

challengers. Of the 10 publicly financed challengers who ran for a senate 

seat in Arizona’s 2000 general election, only one succeeded, representing 

10 percent of the total number of winning challengers in the senate that 

year. In Arizona’s 2002 general election, of the 16 publicly financed 

challengers who ran for a senate seat, four won, representing 24 percent of 

the total number of winning challengers in the senate that year. 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Public financing not available

Percentage of competitive races

1996

10

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

(1/10)

29

40

33

(2/7)

(6/15)

(2/6)

1998 2000 2002

Public financing available

Arizona Senate only
Page 44 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Proponents and opponents of public financing programs have competing 

perspectives regarding the effect of such programs on the influence of 

interest groups. For instance, an operative question can be posed as 

follows: Do citizens feel that, once elected, candidates who ran their 

campaigns with public funding have been more likely to serve the broader 

interests of their constituents as a whole and less likely to be influenced 

by specific individuals or groups? This question is not readily amenable to 

quantitative analysis, and responses to our surveys of political candidates 

and citizens in Maine and Arizona—as well as our interviews with interest 

group representatives—reflected mixed views. 

As mentioned previously, proponents assert that an intended effect of 

public financing programs is to enhance the confidence of citizens in 

government by reducing the influence of special interests and increasing 

the integrity of the political process. For instance, the “findings and 

declarations” section of Arizona’s 1998 Act stated, in part, that the current 

election-financing system “effectively suppresses the voices and influence 

of the vast majority of Arizona citizens in favor of a small number of 

wealthy special interests” and “undermines public confidence in the 

integrity of public officials.” 

On the other hand, opponents assert that, under the traditional campaign 

finance system, the voices of all citizens are represented through 

competing interest groups. Opponents further assert there is no evidence 

that government-financed campaigns attract more worthy candidates than 

does the traditional system or that, once elected, the publicly subsidized 

candidates vote any differently as legislators than do traditionally financed 

candidates. Moreover, some opponents question whether the voters in 

Maine or Arizona read much beyond the title—”clean elections”—of the 

ballot initiatives. 

As mentioned previously, we surveyed all candidates who ran for state 

legislature seats and applicable statewide offices in Maine’s and Arizona’s 

2000 elections. Among other questions, we asked candidates to what 

extent, if at all, they agreed with the statement that once elected, 

candidates who participated in the public financing program have been 

more likely to serve the broader interests of their constituents as a whole 

and less likely to be influenced by specific individuals or groups. As figure 

13 shows, the survey results reflected mixed views. Most of the responding 

nonparticipating candidates—67 percent in Maine and 68 percent in 

Arizona—answered to “little or no extent.” In contrast, many of the 

Influence of Interest 

Groups: Mixed Views 

on Effects of Public 

Financing of 

Campaigns 

Reducing the Influence of 

Interest Groups Was a 

Goal of Public Financing 

Mixed Responses from Our 

Survey of Political 

Candidates 
Page 45 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

responding participating candidates—42 percent in Maine and 56 percent 

in Arizona—answered to a “great or very great extent.” 

Figure 13: Candidate Responses about Public Financing Program and Interest Group Influence 

In our survey, we also asked candidates to what extent, if at all, they 

agreed with the statement that their respective state’s public financing 

program enhanced the public’s confidence in government. Here again, the 

survey results reflected mixed views from nonparticipating and 

participating candidates. Of the responding candidates, figure 14 shows 

that most of the nonparticipating candidates answered to “little or no 

extent,” whereas many of the participating candidates answered to a 

“great or very great extent.” 

Great or very

great extent

Little or no extent

Maine candidates

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the statement

that, once elected, candidates who participated in the public financing program

have been more likely to serve the broader interests of their constituents as a

whole and less likely to be influenced by specific individuals or groups?

Arizona candidates

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the statement

that, once elected, candidates who participated in the public financing program

have been more likely to serve the broader interests of their constituents as a

whole and less likely to be influenced by specific individuals or groups?

Total possible: 100%

7%

42%

67%

16%

Great or very

great extent

Little or no extent

Total possible: 100%

7%

56%

68%

23%

Source: Responses to GAO's survey (see app. IV and V).

Nonparticipating

Participating
Page 46 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 14: Candidate Responses about the Public Financing Program and Confidence in Government 

Further, our survey of candidates for office in Maine’s and Arizona’s 2000 

elections contained an ending statement inviting respondents to provide 

any comments they believed were important about the effects of the 

respective state’s public financing program. Examples of comments from 

participating candidates included the following (see app. VI): 

• To be elected to the state legislature and not feel beholden to anyone 

except constituents is a liberating feeling. 

• The most important effect of the public financing program has been to 

free legislatures from the influence of campaign contributors. 

• Public financing takes special interest money out of government. This 

approach is the only way that elections should be run, at the state level 

and nationally. 

• Arizonans seem well aware that the link between special interest 

money and special interest laws is strong and want to change it. 

Arizona and Maine are leading the way in the nation. 

On the other hand, examples of comments from nonparticipating 

candidates included the following (see app. VI): 

Great or very

great extent

Little or no extent

Maine candidates

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the statement 

that the public financing program enhanced the public’s confidence in 

government?

Total possible: 100%

3%

35%

64%

Nonparticipating

14%

Great or very

great extent

Little or no extent

Arizona candidates

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the statement 

that the public financing program enhanced the public’s confidence in 

government?

Total possible: 100%

3%

51%

71%

15%

Participating

Source: Responses to GAO’s survey (see app. IV and V).
Page 47 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

• Special interests continue to exert tremendous influence on both 

privately and publicly funded candidates. The only difference is that 

the influence on privately funded candidates is fully disclosed and 

reported, while the influence on “clean” candidates is not disclosed 

anywhere. 

• Under the public funding program, lobbyists are able to continue their 

influence by simply “volunteering” to collect $5 qualifying contributions 

for participating candidates. 

• People voted for the public funding program because they thought dirty 

campaigning (e.g., personal attack ads) would stop. Yet, the 2000 

election was one of the dirtiest campaign scenes in years. 

• The “clean election” designation for those taking advantage of the 

public funding program implies that the traditional candidate may not 

be “clean.” This is unfortunate and should be changed. 

We contracted with professional pollsters to obtain the views of 

projectable samples of voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona. Generally, 

this polling effort was designed to determine the extent to which the 

citizenry were aware of the respective state’s public financing program 

and to obtain citizenry views about whether the program has increased 

citizens’ confidence in government and decreased the influence of special 

interest groups. The wording of the specific questions was developed by 

us, with some assistance from the polling organizations (see app. I).30

As table 10 shows, we asked voting-age citizens their views regarding the 

effect of the public financing program on the influence of special interest 

groups. Of the polled citizens who acknowledged some awareness of the 

respective state’s applicable law, over one-half in both states answered 

that there was no effect or it was too soon to tell. In Maine, more 

respondents answered that the law had greatly or somewhat decreased 

special interest influence (25 percent) than did respondents who answered 

 30In designing the questions, we used the term “clean election” because this wording has 

been widely used in the media, was used in the ballot initiatives, and also is part of the title 

of the respective state’s law. Thus, in reference to voter awareness, the term “clean 

election” likely is more commonly recognized than an alternative term such as “public 

financing program.” 

Mixed Responses from Our 

Survey of Citizens 
Page 48 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

that the law had greatly or somewhat increased special interest influence 

(7 percent). 

As table 10 further shows, we also asked voting-age citizens their views 

regarding the effect of the public financing program on their confidence in 

government. Of the polled citizens who acknowledged some awareness of 

the respective state’s applicable law, almost two-thirds in both states 

answered that there was no effect or it was too soon to tell. Additionally, 

slightly more respondents in each state answered that the law had greatly 

or somewhat increased their confidence in state government—17 percent 

in Maine and 21 percent in Arizona—than did respondents who answered 

that the law had greatly or somewhat decreased their confidence—8 

percent in Maine and 15 percent in Arizona. 
Page 49 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 10: Maine and Arizona Citizenry Views (in Percentages) on Clean Election 

Law 

Topic 

GAO survey questions and response 

options 

Maine 

voting-age 

citizensa

Arizona 

voting-age 

citizensa

Influence of 

special 

interest 

groups 

Would you say that the state’s clean election law has greatly increased, 

somewhat increased, has had no effect, has somewhat decreased, or 

greatly decreased the influence of special interest groups on legislators, 

or is it too soon to tell?a

 Greatly increased 2% 4%

 Somewhat increased 5 12

 Had no effect 21 25

 Somewhat decreased 21 9

 Greatly decreased 4 2

 Too soon to tell 34 39

 Unsure or declined to answer 12 9

Citizens’ 

confidence in 

state 

government 

Would you say that the state’s clean election law has greatly increased, 

somewhat increased, has had no effect, has somewhat decreased, or 

greatly decreased your confidence in state government, or is it too soon 

to tell?a

 Greatly increased 2% 2%

 Somewhat increased 15 19

 Had no effect 39 33

 Somewhat decreased 5 10

 Greatly decreased 3 5

 Too soon to tell 26 26

 Unsure or declined to answer 9 4

Source: Summary statistics of GAO-contracted polling of voting-age citizens of Maine and Arizona (see app. I). 

Notes: These two questions were asked only if the citizen indicated some awareness of the state’s 

clean election law. For Maine, the number of respondents for these questions was 157, and the 

maximum 95-percent confidence interval for these survey results is plus or minus 8 percentage 

points. For Arizona, the number of respondents for these questions was 433, and the maximum 95-

percent confidence interval for these survey results is plus or minus 5 percentage points. 

a

Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding. 

We interviewed interest group representatives31 in Maine and Arizona to 

obtain their views on the effects of the public financing programs—

including changes, if any, in how they interact with political candidates 

and legislators after inception of the programs. Unlike our surveys of 

 31These representatives included, for example, officers of and/or lobbyists for organizations 

such as the Maine Bankers Association, Maine Medical Association, Arizona Chamber of 

Commerce, and Arizona Education Association (see app. I). 

Interest Group Views on 

Effects of Public Financing 

Programs 
Page 50 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

candidates and citizens, the results of our interest groups interviews are 

anecdotal and may not be representative of all interest groups in the 

states. Nonetheless, similar to the candidate and citizen survey results, the 

lobbyists we interviewed had mixed views. 

Representatives of one interest group told us that traditional campaign 

contributions do not necessarily influence an elected candidate’s 

subsequent voting record; rather, the contributions help donors obtain 

access to discuss issues. Another lobbyist said that public funding had not 

reduced the influence of special interests. This individual noted that 

publicly funded candidates often are beholden to unions, trade 

associations, or other organizations instrumental in helping these 

candidates raise the required number of $5 qualifying contributions. In 

contrast, another lobbyist said that public financing of campaigns has had 

a positive effect on the political process and has improved government. 

This individual explained that the relationship between a lobbyist and a 

candidate/legislator now tends to be more professional and focuses on the 

contents or merits of proposed legislation rather than on campaign 

contributions. 

Some interest group representatives commented that the public funding 

programs—particularly as increasing numbers of candidates participate—

are causing changes in the roles of lobbyists and interest groups. For 

instance, the representatives noted that (except for seed money and $5 

qualifying contributions) publicly funded candidates are prohibited from 

soliciting campaign contributions, which results in fewer opportunities for 

lobbyists to inform these candidates about the interests of clients. The 

representatives also noted that more contribution money now is going to 

political action committees or other groups, which has led to increased 

spending (“independent expenditures”) to support or oppose certain 

candidates. 

Generally, the interest group representatives noted that it is too soon to 

tell whether legislators who ran with public funds serve the broader 

interests of their constituents any differently or better than do traditionally 

funded candidates. 
Page 51 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Under the public financing programs in the 2000 and 2002 elections, 

average legislative candidate spending decreased in Maine but increased in 

Arizona, compared with previous elections. Also, particularly in the 2002 

elections, both states experienced increases in independent 

expenditures—a type of campaign spending whereby political action 

committees, other groups, or individuals communicate messages to voters 

that support or oppose a clearly identified candidate but without 

coordination with any candidate. The 2002 increases in independent 

expenditures largely were associated with the gubernatorial races in both 

states. Because it is not regulated, the extent of spending for issue 

advocacy—that is, public policy messages that do not refer to a specific 

candidate—is not known. 

According to proponents of the public financing programs in Maine and 

Arizona, escalating campaign costs helped deter candidates from running 

for office. For example, a 1992 study conducted by the Maine Citizens 

Leadership Fund, a group cited as a catalyst behind Maine’s law, 

concluded in part that, “The cost of running for the Maine legislature is 

exploding.” Additional findings in that report suggested that “next steps” 

should include eliminating access to wealth as a determinant of a citizen’s 

influence within the political process, halting and reversing the escalating 

costs of elections, and challenging the assumptions that public elections 

can and should be privately financed. Similarly, the “findings and 

declarations” preamble to Arizona’s law states that the “current electionfinancing system” allows Arizona elected officials to accept large 

campaign contributions from private interests; favors a small number of 

wealthy special interests; and drives up the cost of running for state office, 

discouraging otherwise qualified candidates who lack personal wealth or 

access to special-interest funding. 

Accordingly, the public funding programs in Maine and Arizona each were 

designed to have a two-pronged approach for reducing campaign 

spending. That is, each program 

• imposed spending limits and certain other requirements on candidates 

who chose to participate in the public financing program and 

Campaign Spending: 

Average Candidate 

Spending Decreased 

in Maine but 

Increased in Arizona; 

Independent 

Expenditures Became 

More Prominent in 

Both States; Extent of 

Issue Advocacy 

Spending Not Known 

Campaign Spending was a 

Principal Concern of 

Public Financing 

Proponents 
Page 52 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

• reduced the total amount of money that nonparticipating candidates 

were allowed to accept from each campaign contributor. 

The intended outcome of this approach was to lower the cost of running 

for office by reducing and capping the amount of money available for 

campaign spending.32 Generally, campaign spending comprises two 

components—spending by candidates and independent expenditures. 

Both of these spending components are tracked by the agencies 

responsible for administering the public financing programs—Maine’s 

Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices and Arizona’s 

Citizens Clean Elections Commission. Such tracking is important because 

publicly financed candidates can receive matching funds based on 

spending by or for traditionally financed candidates, or spending opposing 

a participating candidate. 

On the other hand, neither commission tracks issue advocacy spending. 

Issue advocacy—interpreted by the courts as being protected free 

speech—usually takes the form of media advertisements that do not 

expressly advocate for or against a clearly identified political candidate. 

Generally, there are no requirements for reporting issue advocacy 

spending to any state or federal agency. 

Compared to the 1996 and 1998 elections, average legislative candidate 

spending decreased in Maine in the 2000 and 2002 elections but increased 

in Arizona, as figure 15 shows. Specifically, for Maine house races, average 

candidate spending in the recent elections (2000 and 2002) was lower than 

the averages for previous elections (1996 and 1998), although the 2002 

average reflected an increase from 2000. For Maine senate races, average 

candidate spending decreased in each of the two recent elections. In 

Arizona, however, average legislative candidate spending increased 

substantially—by about 55 percent for house candidates and 80 percent 

for senate candidates—in the first year that public funding became 

available. These dissimilar spending trends may be partly due to 

differences in the two states’ provisions for distributing funds to 

candidates who participated in the public financing program. In Maine’s 

program, distribution amounts were based on whether the participating 

 32For the 2000 elections, appendix II shows the amount of campaign funds provided to 

candidates who participated in the public funding programs and the contribution caps 

applicable to nonparticipating candidates. 

Average Legislative 

Candidate Spending 

Declined in Maine but 

Increased in Arizona 
Page 53 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

candidate ran for a house or a senate seat. But, in Arizona’s program, equal 

amounts were distributed to participating legislative candidates, 

regardless of legislative office type (see app. II). Thus, in Arizona’s 2000 

elections, a participating house or senate candidate who faced a 

challenger in both the primary and general elections received a minimum 

of $23,389.33 This guaranteed minimum allocation was $6,189 more than 

the average amount that house candidates spent in 1998. If the release of 

matching funds34 had been triggered, the potential maximum allocation to 

a house candidate in Arizona would have been $70,166 in 2000, after 

adjustment for inflation. 

 33This is the actual 2000 election total allocation of $25,000—adjusted for inflation to 1996 

dollars to permit comparison to the inflation-adjusted average amount shown in figure 15 

for 1998 and other years—for a participating candidate who faced a challenger and did not 

receive any matching funds. 

34After initial funding allocations, publicly financed candidates can receive additional funds 

(i.e., matching funds) based on spending by or for privately financed (nonparticipating) 

candidates, who—while subject to state limits and disclosure rules—engage in traditional 

means to raise money from individuals, corporations, and political action committees (see 

app. II). 
Page 54 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 15: Average Maine and Arizona Legislative Candidate Spending (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) 

Note: In the figure, we did not include any candidate who reported spending zero dollars or did not 

run in the general election. For those candidates, spending includes primary and general election 

amounts combined. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all spending amounts for inflation using 

the Department of Commerce’s (Bureau of Economic Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price 

deflator. 

a

Includes one candidate who spent $143,199. When this candidate is excluded, the average drops to 

$15,065. 

For the two elections (2000 and 2002) under the public financing programs 

in Maine and Arizona, we compared average spending by nonparticipating 

and participating legislative candidates. As figure 16 shows: 

• In Maine house races, average spending by each type of candidate was 

roughly equal each year—with nonparticipating candidate spending 

slightly higher in 2000, and participating candidate spending slightly 

higher in 2002. For Maine senate races in 2000, average spending by 

nonparticipating candidates was comparatively higher. However, one 

candidate in the 2000 senate race spent $143,199 in winning the 

election (fig. 16, note a). In 2002 senate races, participating candidates 

spent more than nonparticipating candidates, on average. 

• In Arizona, for house races in both years, average spending by 

participating candidates was considerably higher than average 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

0

5

10

15

20

25

Thousands of Dollars Thousands of Dollars

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Public financing

available

Public financing

available

1996 1998

Public financing

not available

Public financing

not available

2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002

Public financing

available

Public financing

available

1996 1998

Public financing

not available

Public financing

not available

2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002

Maine Senate

Maine House

Maine

Arizona Senate

Arizona House

Arizona

$4.8 5.5

3.8 4.5

$18.4

20.3

16.8a 16.4

$15.8 17.2

26.7 25.3

$16.9 18.1

32.6

27.1
Page 55 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

spending by nonparticipating candidates. For senate races, 

nonparticipating candidates had the higher spending average in 2000, 

whereas participating candidates had the higher spending average in 

2002. 

Figure 16: Average Maine and Arizona Legislative Candidate Spending by Participation Status (2000 and 2002) 

Note: In the figure, we did not include any candidate who reported spending zero dollars or did not 

run in the general election. For those candidates, spending includes primary and general election 

amounts combined. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all spending amounts for inflation using 

the Department of Commerce’s (Bureau of Economic Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price 

deflator. 

a

Includes one candidate who spent $143,199. When this candidate is excluded, the average drops to 

$15,664. 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

0

5

10

15

20

Thousands of dollars Thousands of dollars

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Participating

candidates

Nonparticipating

candidates

Participating

candidates

Nonparticipating

candidates

2000 2002

Maine Senate

Maine House

Maine

Arizona Senate

Arizona House

Arizona

$3.9

19.1a

3.5

14.5

$4.4

15.3

4.5

16.8

Participating

candidates

Nonparticipating

candidates

Participating

candidates

Nonparticipating

candidates

2000 2002

$20.0

28.3 29.0

27.0

$19.8

26.8 26.3

28.5
Page 56 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

In Maine, the gubernatorial election is the only statewide office race where 

candidates may choose to participate in the public financing program. The 

first election in which candidates for this office were eligible to participate 

was 2002. We compared candidate spending35 for the two most recent 

gubernatorial elections (2002 and 1998) in Maine: 

• Total spending by gubernatorial candidates was about $930,000 in 1998 

and about $3.4 million in 2002.36 Average gubernatorial candidate 

spending was about $186,000 in 1998 and about $843,000 in 2002. 

• In 2002, only one gubernatorial candidate (Green Independent Party) 

ran with public funding in both the primary and the general elections. 

This candidate spent a total of approximately $837,000. One other 

candidate (Republican Party) ran and lost as a participating candidate 

in the primary election. This candidate spent approximately $296,000. 

In Arizona, there are seven statewide office races where candidates may 

choose to participate in the program—Governor, Attorney General, 

Secretary of State, Corporation Commissioner, State Treasurer, 

Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Mine Inspector. In 2000, only 

candidates for Corporation Commissioner were eligible to participate in 

the public funding program. Candidates for the other statewide offices 

became eligible to participate in 2002. Table 11 compares spending for 

statewide offices in 1998 and 2002, the 2 most recent years where all 

statewide offices were on the ballot in Arizona. 

 35Candidates who reported spending zero dollars or did not run in the general election are 

not included. Total and average spending amounts include primary and general election 

spending combined, unless otherwise described. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted 

all spending amounts for inflation using the Department of Commerce’s (Bureau of 

Economic Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price deflator. 

36The 1998 gubernatorial race included the incumbent, who received approximately 59 

percent of the popular vote. In the 2002 election, the incumbent was prohibited by term 

limits from running. 

Spending by Statewide 

Office Candidates in Maine 

and Arizona 
Page 57 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 11: Spending by Candidates for Statewide Offices in Arizona (1998 and 2002) 

Dollars in thousands 

Average and total candidate spending by 

election year 

Office 1998 2002 

 Average Total Average Total

Governor $833.3 $3,333.0 $1,131.3 $5,656.6

Attorney General $762.4 $1,524.8 $292.6 $585.3

Secretary of State $239.3 $478.7 $159.9 $479.6

Corporation Commissionera $139.2 $278.3 $97.2 $583.0

State Treasurer $69.0 $69.0 $106.5 $213.1

Superintendent of Public Instruction $14.4 $28.8 $349.5 $699.0

State Mine Inspector $8.2 $8.2 $54.6 $109.3

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note 1: Spending amounts do not include any candidate who reported spending zero dollars or did 

not run in the general election. For those candidates, spending includes primary and general election 

amounts combined. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all spending amounts for inflation using 

the Department of Commerce’s (Bureau of Economic Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price 

deflator. 

Note 2: Because some races had a very small number of candidates, and some candidates spent a 

very small or very large amount, averages may be misleading. For example, in the 2002 race for 

Superintendent of Public Instruction, one of the three general election candidates spent nearly 

$600,000. 

a

In 1998, there was one open seat for Corporation Commissioner. In 2000, there were two open seats 

for Corporation Commissioner—one for a term ending in 2005 and one for a term ending in 2007, 

where a total of about $311,000 and an average of about $78,000 was spent. In 2002, there were 

three Corporation Commission seats open; one race was for two seats with terms ending in 2005, 

and the other race was for one seat with a term ending in 2007. 

For the 2002 election in Arizona, table 12 compares spending by 

nonparticipating and participating candidates for statewide offices. As 

shown, four of the seven statewide office races had both nonparticipating 

and participating candidates—Governor, Secretary of State, Corporation 

Commissioner, and Superintendent of Public Instruction. In three of the 

four races, the average and total spending amounts by participating 

candidates exceeded those of the nonparticipating candidates. In the race 

for the other statewide office—Superintendent of Public Instruction—the 

nonparticipating candidate spent about five times more than the 

participating candidate. 
Page 58 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 12: Spending by Candidates for Statewide Offices in Arizona by Participation 

Status (2002) 

Dollars in thousands 

Office 

Average and total candidate spending by participation 

status 

Nonparticipating candidates Participating candidates

Average Total Average Total

Governor $658.3 $1,974.9 $1,840.8 $3,681.8

Attorney General a a $292.6 $585.3

Secretary of State $3.3 $3.3 $238.1 $476.3

Corporation 

Commissioner 

$38.5 $38.5 $108.9 $544.5

State Treasurer a a $106.5 $213.1

Superintendent of 

Public Instruction 

$590.6 $590.6 $108.4 $108.4

State Mine Inspector a a $54.6 $109.3

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note: Spending amounts do not include any candidate who reported spending zero dollars or did not 

run in the general election. For those candidates, spending includes primary and general election 

amounts combined. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all spending amounts for inflation using 

the Department of Commerce’s (Bureau of Economic Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price 

deflator. 

a Not applicable. 

Maine’s definition of “independent expenditures”37 generally follows that 

established by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1976 ruling.38 That is, 

independent expenditures are for campaign communications in the form 

of “express advocacy”—explicitly endorsing or opposing one candidate by 

using words such as “vote for,” “elect,” “cast your ballot for,” “vote 

against,” or “defeat.”39 Arizona’s definition includes the same guidance, but 

also broadens the definition of “express advocacy” to include, “A 

campaign slogan or words that can have no other reasonable meaning than 

to advocate the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified 

candidate(s).”40 In both states, all other political communications not 

falling into the express advocacy category, such as public policy messages 

 37Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A §1019. 

38Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 

39Id. at 44. 

40Arizona Citizens Clean Election Commission, Independent Expenditures A.R.S § 16-941 

(D): Candidates for Statewide and Legislative Offices, available at 

http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecscr/pub/indExpend.asp (last visited April 25, 2003). 

Independent Expenditures 

Increasing in Maine and 

Arizona 
Page 59 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

that do not explicitly endorse or oppose a candidate, are called “issue 

advocacy” communications.41

Typically, independent expenditures are undertaken in federal and state 

elections by political action committees to support or oppose candidates 

to a greater extent than permitted by rules applicable to direct campaign 

contributions. The Director of Maine’s Commission on Governmental 

Ethics and Election Practices told us that, for 1998 and earlier years, the 

amounts of reported independent expenditures in the state were 

negligible. However, in the 2000 and 2002 elections in Maine, and in the 

2002 elections in Arizona, independent expenditures increased 

significantly. The 2002 increases were largely associated with 

gubernatorial races in both states. More specifically (see table 13): 

• In Maine, of the $595,000 total independent expenditures in 2002, about 

67 percent were associated with one gubernatorial candidate. The 

other 33 percent was associated with 118 legislative candidates. 

• In Arizona, of the $2.6 million total independent expenditures in 2002, 

more than 92 percent was associated with two gubernatorial 

candidates.42

Table 13: Independent Expenditures in Maine and Arizona (1998, 2000, and 2002) 

Dollars in thousands 

State Independent expenditures by election year 

 1998 2000 2002

Maine negligible $136.0 $595.0

Arizona $80.7 $38.3 $2,610.4

Source: Data provided by state officials. 

Our survey of Maine’s and Arizona’s candidates in the 2000 elections 

included a question asking for views about the role of independent 

expenditures in future elections. Figure 17 shows that most of the 

traditionally funded candidates who responded—55 percent in Maine and 

 41Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 Colum. L. 

Rev. 620, 631 (2000). 

42In 2002, two registered campaign committees spent a combined total of $2,408,834 in 

Arizona. According to campaign finance reports filed with the Arizona Secretary of State, 

all of this spending was associated with the race for governor. 
Page 60 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

52 percent in Arizona—agreed to a great or very great extent with the 

statement that independent expenditures will play an increasingly 

significant role in the 2002 and future elections. Also, many of the publicly 

funded candidates who responded—47 percent in Maine and 33 percent in 

Arizona—expressed similar agreement. Further, this view was shared by 

many of the other knowledgeable individuals we interviewed in the two 

states. 

Figure 17: Extent to Which Candidates in the 2000 Elections Agreed with the Statement That Independent Expenditures 

Would Become Increasingly Important in 2002 and Future Elections 

Because spending for issue advocacy is not regulated, we found no 

sources to quantify these funds in Maine and Arizona. Our survey of 

Maine’s and Arizona’s candidates in the 2000 elections included a question 

asking for views about future levels of issue advocacy spending. As figure 

18 shows, most of the traditionally funded candidates who responded— 

63 percent in Maine and 55 percent in Arizona—agreed to a great or very 

great extent with the statement that increasing amounts of money will be 

spent for issue advocacy ads in the 2002 and future elections. Also, many 

of the publicly funded candidates who responded—45 percent in Maine 

and 28 percent in Arizona—expressed similar agreement. 

Views on Issue Advocacy 

Spending in Maine and 

Arizona 

Great or very

great extent

Maine candidates

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the statement

that independent expenditures will play an increasingly significant role in the

2002 and future elections?

Arizona candidates

Total possible: 100%

55%

47%

Great or very

great extent

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the statement

that independent expenditures will play an increasingly significant role in the

2002 and future elections?

Total possible: 100%

52%

33%

Source: Responses to GAO’s survey (see app. IV and V).

Nonparticipating

Participating
Page 61 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Figure 18: Extent to Which Candidates in the 2000 Elections Agreed with the Statement That Issue Advocacy Spending Would 

Increase in the 2002 and Future Elections 

In the 2000 election, voter turnout in Maine increased 4 percentage points 

compared with the previous presidential election year (1996), whereas 

Arizona’s turnout remained unchanged. Because voter turnout can be 

influenced by numerous factors, the extent (if any) to which the public 

financing programs in these states affected turnout is not easily 

quantifiable. However, these programs probably had limited effect on 

turnout in the 2000 elections, particularly given that many of Maine’s and 

Arizona’s voting-age citizens were unaware of their respective state’s 

public financing program. 

Voter turnout—usually defined as the number of votes cast in a race 

divided by the voting-age population—is an important component of 

citizens’ participation in the political process. As a multiyear trend, 

turnout percentages in the United States indicate that much of the 

electorate is largely disengaged from politics, although turnout 

percentages consistently have been higher in presidential election years 

than in mid-term congressional election years. Regarding individual states, 

Maine’s turnout generally has exceeded the national turnout percentages, 

while Arizona’s turnout has been below the national figures. 

Specifically, to provide an overview perspective, table 14 shows voter 

turnout in Maine, Arizona, and the United States for the 4 most recent 

presidential election years and 3 recent mid-term congressional election 

Voter Participation: 

No Clear Link to 

Public Financing 

Program 

Comparison of 2000 

Turnout to Previous 

Elections 

Great or very

great extent

Maine candidates

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the statement

that increasing amounts of money will be spent for issue advocacy ads in the 

2002 and future elections?

Arizona candidates

Total possible: 100%

63%

45%

Great or very

great extent

GAO survey question: To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the statement

that increasing amounts of money will be spent for issue advocacy ads in the 

2002 and future elections?

Total possible: 100%

55%

28%

Source: Responses to GAO’s survey (see app. IV and V).

Nonparticipating

Participating
Page 62 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

years. As shown, for the 2000 election (a presidential election year), voter 

turnout in Maine was 68 percent, which was an increase of 4 percentage 

points over turnout in the previous presidential election year, 1996—

whereas, Arizona’s turnout was 42 percent in both of these years (2000 and 

1996). 

Table 14: Voter Turnout in Maine, Arizona, and the United States, 1988 through 2000 

Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 

population 

Election year Maine Arizona United States

1988a62% 46% 50%

1990 57 36 37

1992a73 53 55

1994 55 39 39

1996a64 42 49

1998 45 29 36

2000a 68 42 51

Average of 1988, 1992, and 1996 66% 47% 51%

Average of 1990, 1994, and 1998 52% 35% 37%

Source: GAO analysis of state, Federal Elections Commission, and U.S. Census Bureau data. 

Note: At the time of our study, data were unavailable to calculate turnout as a percentage of the 

voting-age population for the 2002 elections. 

a

Presidential election year. 

According to some analysts, voter turnout can be predicted based on 

various factors, such as age, income, recency of registration, and previous 

voting history. For example, studies have shown that much higher 

percentages of older Americans vote than do younger citizens. 

Nevertheless, the extent (if any) to which Maine’s and Arizona’s public 

financing programs affected these states’ voter turnout in the 2000 

elections is not easily quantifiable. That is, voter turnout can be influenced 

by a broad range of factors, including the following: 

• The candidates and their messages: Do the candidates have personal 

popularity, or are the candidates uninspiring? Are there sharp issue 

distinctions? 

• Mobilization efforts: How extensive are the parties’ grassroots efforts 

to get out the vote? 

• Media interest: Are there high-profile, competitive contests? Do the 

races have statewide or national importance? 

Voter Turnout Influenced 

by Many Factors 
Page 63 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

• Campaign spending: What amounts of financial resources have 

candidates, parties, and interest groups expended on the campaign? 

Increased campaign spending, however, does not necessarily translate 

into greater numbers of voters at the polls. 

• Negative advertising: Has negative advertising resulted in voter 

cynicism and disaffection? According to the Committee for the Study of 

the American Electorate,43 negative advertising does tend to decrease 

voter turnout. 

In short, voter behavior is a complicated, multivariate topic—with no one 

reason explaining voting or nonvoting. 

There is some indication, however, that Maine’s and Arizona’s public 

financing programs probably had limited effect on voter turnout in the 

2000 elections. That is, as part of our study, we contracted with 

professional pollsters to determine the extent to which a projectable 

sample of voting-age citizens in these two states were aware of the 

respective state’s public financing program. According to the polling 

results, an estimated 60 percent of Maine’s voting-age citizens and an 

estimated 37 percent of Arizona’s voting-age citizens answered that they 

knew “nothing at all” about the public financing program.44

In actuality, these “unawareness” percentages may be understated in 

reference to the time of the 2000 elections. Our polling of voting-age 

citizens in Maine and Arizona was conducted in October 2002, which was 

almost 2 years after the 2000 elections. During this 2-year period, the 

respective public financing program received considerable amounts of 

publicity—based on the promotional efforts of program proponents, as 

well as on the legal challenges or other opposition voiced by opponents. 

Had our polling been conducted in late 2000, the unawareness percentages 

may have been even greater than 60 percent and 37 percent, respectively. 

 43Based in Washington, D.C., the committee is an independent research organization that 

focuses on issues involving citizen engagement in politics. 

44Appendix I discusses the scope and methodology of the polls of voting-age citizens. The 

maximum sampling error for the Maine survey at the 95-percent level of statistical 

confidence is plus or minus 8 percentage points, and the maximum for the Arizona survey 

is plus or minus 5 percentage points. 

Many Citizens Unaware of 

Public Financing Program 
Page 64 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

In sum, high levels of citizenry unawareness, coupled with a broad range 

of other potentially relevant factors, lessen the likelihood that the public 

financing program was a significant influence on voter turnout in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 elections. 

Under Maine’s and Arizona’s public financing programs, with only two 

elections from which to observe legislative races and only one election 

from which to observe most statewide races, it is too early to precisely 

draw causal linkages to resulting changes, if any, involving voter choice, 

electoral competition, interest group influence, campaign spending, and 

voter participation. Many factors can affect elections—factors such as 

term limits and redistricting, state and local campaign issues, and even 

whether the particular year involved a presidential or a gubernatorial 

election. In implementing these new wide-ranging campaign finance 

reforms, state officials told us that many factors contributed to an 

uncertain and constantly changing environment—such as legal challenges 

to the program—which also affected these elections. Thus, it is difficult to 

separate or disassociate the effects of these factors from the effects of the 

public financing programs. 

Moreover, even for other states that have a longer history with more 

limited forms of public financing, published studies have reported mixed 

findings on the effects of the programs. As represented in the available 

literature, there seems to be little agreement as to how public financing 

programs affect elections. 

Our work indicated that perceptions of Maine’s and Arizona’s public 

financing programs are widely divergent and frequently ideologically 

based. Irrespective of differences in perceptions or ideologies, it is clear 

that—in both states—considerably larger numbers of candidates chose to 

participate in the public funding programs in 2002 than in 2000. In both 

states, many observers told us they expected that future elections will 

experience continued growth in program participation. For example, 

political party officers we interviewed said that, even though they may 

oppose the program for ideological or other reasons, public funding 

presents strategic opportunities that any candidate must consider. 

Some researchers have pointed out that, in some instances, electoral 

competitiveness may be enhanced by increased campaign spending. Thus, 

two goals of the public financing programs—increase electoral 

competition and curb increases in campaign spending—can be at odds 

with each other. Also, state officials and candidates told us that campaign 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 65 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

spending can increase when political action committees, other groups, or 

individuals make independent expenditures in a competitive race to 

support a traditionally funded candidate—which, in turn, could trigger 

matching funds for a publicly financed candidate. Further, critics have 

argued that, in Maine, the public financing program’s goal of curbing 

increases in campaign spending is undermined because participating 

candidates are allowed to form political action committees to raise funds 

and make independent expenditures to support or oppose other 

candidates. 

Finally, in terms of legislative flexibility for making adjustments to meet 

future fiscal circumstances or other needs, one aspect of the two states’ 

public financing programs is distinctly different. As mentioned previously, 

the respective programs became law in Maine and Arizona through citizen 

initiative. In Maine, once such an initiative has been supported and 

becomes law, the standard legislative process can be used to make 

subsequent changes or modifications. In Arizona, however, any law 

enacted through such a process is afforded unique protection. For an 

initiative-based law to be changed in Arizona, the modification (e.g., 

amendment) must be supported by three-fourths of the members of each 

body of the legislature, and the modification must also further the intent of 

the initial law. Thus, while Maine’s public financing program is as flexible 

as any other general statute, Arizona’s program is relatively inflexible. In 

response to our inquiries, for example, staff of Arizona’s Citizens Clean 

Elections Commission told us that, although there were concerns that the 

reporting requirements of the state’s 1998 Act were too complex and had 

led to many honest mistakes on the part of campaign volunteers, the 

prospects for changing the law were limited, given the legislative hurdles. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees and subcommittees. We will also make copies available to 

others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 66 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report or wish to 

discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or Danny 

R. Burton at (214) 777-5600. Other key contributors are acknowledged in 

appendix VII. 

Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 67 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

In accordance with the mandate specified in Section 310 of the Bipartisan 

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-155, 2002), this study: 

• Provides statistics showing the number of candidates who chose to use 

public funds to run for legislative seats or statewide offices in the 2000 

elections in Maine and Arizona, the seats or offices for which they were 

candidates, whether the candidates were incumbents or challengers, 

whether the candidates were successful in their bids, and the number 

of races in which at least one candidate ran an election with public 

funds. 

• Describes the extent to which the goals of Maine’s and Arizona’s public 

financing programs were met in the 2000 elections. That is, we studied 

what changes, if any, occurred in voter choice (number of candidates), 

electoral competition, interest group influence, campaign spending, 

and voter participation (voter turnout)—five indicators related to goals 

of the programs. 

To provide a broader perspective, as we agreed with the offices of the 

Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Rules and 

Administration and the Committee on House Administration, this study 

also presents available statistics and related information regarding the 

2002 elections in Maine and Arizona. 

Initially, we conducted a literature search to identify relevant reports, 

studies, articles, and other documents regarding campaign finance reform 

in the United States generally, as well as in Maine and Arizona specifically. 

Because campaign finance reform can be both complex and contentious, 

we wanted to ensure that our background reading included a broad 

spectrum of views, encompassing both proponents and opponents of 

public financing. (See bibliography.) 

Also, we reviewed information available on the Web sites of the state 

agencies responsible for administering the respective public financing 

program in the two study states—Maine’s Commission on Governmental 

Ethics and Election Practices (www.state.me.us/ethics) and Arizona’s 

Citizens Clean Elections Commission (www.ccec.state.az.us). 

Generally, in directly addressing the objectives, we analyzed available 

statistical data on the 2000 and 2002 elections in Maine and Arizona, 

visited both states to interview election officials and interest group 

representatives, analyzed responses from a survey of all candidates who 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Objectives 

Overview of Our 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 68 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

ran in the 2000 elections for seats in the Maine and Arizona legislatures 

and the Arizona Corporation Commission, and contracted with 

professional pollsters to obtain the views of voting-age citizens in both 

states. Further details about the scope and methodology of our work 

regarding each of the objectives are presented in separate sections below. 

To obtain the congressionally mandated and the agreed-upon statistical 

information regarding the 2000 and 2002 elections, we contacted officials 

at Maine’s and Arizona’s Office of the Secretary of State—the agencies 

responsible for supervising and administering elections laws and activities, 

including certifying state candidates for the ballot and tabulating official 

election results. Also, we contacted officials at Maine’s Commission on 

Governmental Ethics and Election Practices and Arizona’s Citizens Clean 

Elections Commission—the agencies responsible for administering the 

respective state’s public financing program, including certifying that 

applicable candidates have met qualifications for receiving public funds. 

Specifically, for each state, we obtained data showing 

• the number of candidates who chose to use public funds to run for 

legislative seats or statewide offices in the 2000 and the 2002 elections, 

• the seats or offices for which they were candidates, 

• whether the candidates were incumbents or challengers, 

• whether the candidates were successful in their bids, 

• and the number of races in which at least one candidate ran an election 

with public funds (see tables 1 through 4). 

As used in our report, “challengers” consist of all nonincumbent 

candidates. Thus, a candidate who was not an incumbent is called a 

challenger, even if that candidate did not face an opponent. Also, in 

counting races, we included all races in which there was a candidate on 

the ballot regardless of whether or not the candidate faced a challenger. 

Scope and 

Methodology: 

Statistical Information 

Regarding the 2000 

and 2002 Elections 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 69 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

In studying the extent to which the goals of the public financing programs 

in Maine and Arizona were met, we focused on identifying what changes, if 

any, occurred regarding five indicators—voter choice (number of 

candidates), electoral competition, interest group influence, campaign 

spending, and voter participation (voter turnout). The scope and 

methodology of our work included 

• conducting various data-based analyses of the 2000 and 2002 elections 

in both states; 

• interviewing individuals in both states—e.g., elected officials, political 

party leaders, and interest group representatives—to obtain a wide 

range of perspectives; 

• surveying all candidates who ran in the 2000 elections for seats in the 

Maine and Arizona legislatures and the Arizona Corporation 

Commission; and 

• contracting with professional pollsters to obtain the views of votingage citizens in both states. 

Specifically, the following sections separately discuss the scope and 

methodology of our work for each the five goal-related indicators. It 

should be emphasized that describing or interpreting the effects of public 

financing on elections should be approached cautiously, partly because 1 

election cycle’s results or even 2 election cycle’s results may not be 

sufficient. Also, term limits, redistricting, the ambiguous environment that 

surrounded the implementation of the new campaign finance programs, 

and other factors not directly related to public or private financing can 

affect electoral campaigns and results. 

To determine whether public financing encouraged more state legislative 

candidates to run for office, we calculated the average annual number of 

candidates per legislative primary and general election race for the 4 most 

recent election years (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002). Also, to determine 

whether there were different types of candidates running for office, we 

compared candidates’ party affiliations and the number of third-party or 

independent legislative candidates for these 4 election years and 

determined if these candidates participated in the public financing 

program. Further, for applicable statewide offices, which generally have 

4-year terms, we compared the number of candidates in the 3 most recent 

election years (1994, 1998, and 2002) and determined to what extent these 

Scope and 

Methodology: Extent 

to Which Goals of 

Public Financing 

Programs Were Met 

Voter Choice 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 70 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

candidates were publicly funded (2002). To conduct these analyses, we 

obtained data on candidates from 

• the state of Maine’s Department of the Secretary of State and the Maine 

Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices and 

• the state of Arizona’s Secretary of State Office and the Citizens Clean 

Elections Commission. 

Also, our survey (discussed below) of candidates in Maine’s and Arizona’s 

2000 elections included questions about voter choice. 

In designing our approach, we first reviewed public finance literature and 

identified three widely used measures of electoral competition—number 

of contested races (races with more than one candidate), incumbent 

reelection rates, and incumbent victory margins. We then analyzed 

election data in Maine and Arizona using these three measures: 

• Number of contested races. We measured whether there was an 

increase in the number of contested (more than one candidate on the 

ballot) legislative primary election races in Maine and Arizona over 

4 election years (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002). For 2000 and 2002, we 

identified the extent to which the contested races had publicly funded 

candidates. 

• Incumbent reelection rates. We measured whether there was a change 

in the number of incumbents being reelected to office in Maine and 

Arizona over 4 election years (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002). 

• Incumbent victory margins. For legislative general election races in 

Maine and Arizona, we measured the margin of difference between the 

incumbent winners of the races and the runners-up. Based on our 

literature review and discussions with researchers, we defined races as 

being “competitive” if the difference in votes garnered between the 

winning incumbent and the runner-up was 15 percentage points or less. 

We then examined the extent to which these competitive races had 

publicly funded candidates. 

Also, our survey (discussed below) of candidates in Maine’s and Arizona’s 

2000 elections included questions about electoral competition. 

Electoral Competition 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 71 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

To test the overall effect, if any, of Maine’s and Arizona’s public financing 

programs on competitive races as defined by incumbent victory margins, 

we used logistic regression models. Logistic regression is a standard 

multivariate statistical procedure for estimating the size and significance 

of the effects of categorical or continuous variables on dichotomous 

outcomes, such as whether or not election races were competitive. We 

tested the effect of five independent variables on our dependent variable, 

competitive races. As mentioned previously, we defined a competitive race 

as one in which the difference in votes garnered between the winner and 

the runner-up was 15 percentage points or less. Our five independent 

variables were four categorical variables—public financing program 

participation or nonparticipation, winning candidate campaign status 

(incumbent or not), election year (2000 or 2002), and legislative seat 

(House or Senate)—and one continuous variable, that is, total candidate 

spending by the winner and runner-up. 

The size of the effects is measured by odds ratios, which indicate how the 

odds on being in one category of the outcome measure (in our case, an 

election race being competitive) vary across categories or values of the 

different variables being considered. Essentially, the odds of an election 

race being competitive were obtained by simply dividing the number of 

competitive races by the number of races that were not competitive. For 

example, among total races in which either candidate (the winner or the 

runner-up) participated in the public financing program, if 50 candidates 

were competitive while 10 were not, the odds on races with a participating 

candidate being competitive were 5.0 (or 50 divided by 10). If, among total 

races in which neither candidate (the winner or the runner-up) 

participated in the public financing program, 100 were competitive while 

10 were not, the odds on races with a nonparticipating candidate being 

competitive were 10.0 (or 100 divided by 10). The odds ratio obtained by 

dividing the former odds by the latter (i.e., 5.0 divided by 10.0 equals 0.50) 

provides an estimate of the difference between races with and without 

publicly financed candidates and can be interpreted as indicating that the 

races with a participating candidate are half as likely to be competitive 

compared with races with nonparticipating candidates. 

Table 15 shows the results—the odds ratio coefficients—of our tests using 

the logistic regression models. As indicated, the odds ratio coefficients 

associated with participation in Maine’s public financing program (0.65) 

and Arizona’s program (3.43) were not significant at the 0.05 level. That is, 

the results indicate that participation did not significantly affect 

competitive races. However, these results should be interpreted with 

Logistic Regression Models 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 72 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

caution, given the relatively few variables and the limited amount of data 

included in the models. 

Table 15: Results of Logistic Regression Models Testing the Effect of Public Financing Programs on Competitive Races 

Variables Odds ratio coefficients 

Categorical variables MaineaArizonab

Public financing program participation: Races in which at least one candidate (the winner or the 

runner-up) participated in the program (versus races in which neither candidate participated) 0.65 3.43

Winning candidate campaign status: Races in which the winner was an incumbent (versus races in 

which the winner was not an incumbent) 0.34c 1.18

Election year: Races in year 2000 (versus races in year 2002) 0.54c

3.99

Legislative seat: Races for House seats (versus races for Senate seats) 1.56 d 

Continuous variable 

Total candidate spending: Total amount spent in a race by both candidates (winner and 

runner-up) combined 1.03c 1.02c

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note: Our analysis included data for only the winner and the runner-up in elections with more than 

two candidates. 

a

Includes both House and Senate races. 

b

Includes only Senate races. 

c

Odds ratio coefficients that are significant at the 0.05 level. 

d

Data not applicable. 

To address this topic, we included relevant questions in our survey of 

candidates in Maine’s and Arizona’s 2000 elections. Also, we contracted 

with professional pollsters who conduct omnibus telephone surveys with 

representative samples of voting-age citizens specifically in Maine and 

Arizona. Our surveys of candidates and citizens are discussed in more 

detail in separate sections below. Further, in both states, we interviewed 

various interest group representatives (see tables 16 and 17). 

To determine changes in candidate spending in Maine and Arizona, we 

calculated average legislative candidate spending over 4 election years 

(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) and statewide candidate spending over 

2 election years (1998 and 2002). For comparisons across years and to 

observe any trends, with 1996 as the base year and using the Department 

of Commerce’s (Bureau of Economic Analysis) gross domestic product 

implicit price deflator, we adjusted all candidate spending for inflation. 

Data on candidate spending in Maine were available for 1996, 1998, and 

2000 in annual and biennial reports published by Maine’s Commission on 

Interest Group Influence 

Campaign Spending 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 73 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Governmental Ethics and Election Practices. Candidate spending data for 

Maine’s 2002 elections were available electronically from the Maine Public 

Access Campaign Finance site.1

 Data for candidate spending in Arizona 

were provided to us electronically by the Office of the Secretary of State. 

To the extent possible, we also identified independent expenditures as 

they related to these elections. Also, in both states, we obtained 

testimonial evidence regarding the significance of issue advocacy 

spending. Further, our survey (discussed below) of candidates in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 elections included questions about campaign spending. 

To provide an overview perspective, we used data from the Federal 

Elections Commission and the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate voter 

turnout as a percentage of the voting-age populations in Maine, Arizona, 

and the United States for election years 1988 through 2000.2

 We focused in 

particular on comparing turnout in 2000—the first year of the public 

financing programs in Maine and Arizona—and turnout in the 3 previous 

presidential election years (1988, 1992, and 1996). We focused on these 

years because turnout percentages across the nation consistently have 

been higher in presidential election years than in mid-term congressional 

election years. 

Also, we reviewed various studies, articles, and other literature to obtain 

an understanding of the various factors that can influence voter turnout. 

Further, as discussed in more detail below, we contracted with 

professional pollsters to conduct a survey in October 2002 to determine 

the extent to which projectable samples of voting-age citizens in Maine 

and Arizona were aware of the respective state’s public financing program. 

We interviewed various individuals in Maine and Arizona to obtain 

perspectives on the effects of the respective state’s public financing 

program. We judgmentally selected interviewees to ensure coverage of one 

or both chambers of the state legislature, the major and independent 

political parties, candidates who participated in the state’s public 

financing program and those who did not, agency officials responsible for 

 1

www.mainecampaignfinance.com/public/home.asp 

2

At the time of our study, data were not available to calculate turnout as a percentage of 

voting-age population for the 2002 elections. 

Voter Participation 

Interviews in Maine and 

Arizona 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 74 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

administering the program, and interest groups (see tables 16 and 17). 

Regarding the last category (interest groups), our selections were based 

on a number of considerations, including (1) suggestions made by state 

agency officials knowledgeable about political activism in the state and 

(2) the amounts of financial contributions or expenditures made by 

groups, as reported in publicly available records. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 75 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 16: List of Organizations (and Title of Individuals) Interviewed in Maine 

Name of organization Title of individuals contacted Notes 

House of Representatives Speaker of the House (District 31) Democrat. Ran in 2000 as a participating candidate; 

prohibited by term limits from running in 2002. 

 Floor Leader (Minority) (District 38) 

 Assistant Floor Leader (District 85) 

Republicans. Opposed to public financing for 

candidates. 

 Representative (District 99) Democrat. Elected in 2000; ran as a participating 

candidate in the public financing program. Formerly 

was Executive Director of the Commission on 

Governmental Ethics and Election Practices. 

Senate Floor Leader 

(District 15) 

Democrat. Ran in 2000 as a participating candidate. 

Was lead plaintiff in lawsuit challenging the 

constitutionality of the public financing program (see 

app. III). 

 Senator (District 6) Republican. First-time candidate elected in 2000; ran 

as participating candidate in public financing program. 

Defeated 16-year incumbent. 

 Senator (District 23) Democrat. Elected in 2000 in a race for an open seat; 

ran as a participating candidate. 

Maine Democratic Party Chair 

Maine Republican Party Executive Director 

Green Independent Party Co-chairpersons 

Provided party views on effects of the Maine Clean 

Election Act. 

Commission on Governmental 

Ethics and Election Practices 

Executive Director Responsible for administering the Maine Clean 

Election Act. 

Department of the Secretary of 

State 

Deputy Secretary of State (Bureau of 

Corporations, Elections and 

Commissions) 

Responsible for supervising and administering all 

elections of federal, state, and county offices and 

referenda; preparing ballot types and other elections 

materials; and tabulating official election results. 

Department of Audit (State 

Auditor) 

Director of Audit Responsible for determining whether monies in the 

Maine Clean Election Fund have been managed 

appropriately. 

Maine Citizens for Clean 

Elections (a project of the Maine 

Citizen Leadership Fund) 

Steering Committee Consists of many of the groups that promoted the 

ballot initiative that led to passage of the Maine Clean 

Election Act. Among others, the groups represented 

include the League of Women Voters, Common 

Cause, Northeast Action, and the Dirigo Alliance. 

Maine Bankers Association President-Treasurer A trade organization representing the interests of 

Maine’s banking industry, trust companies, and 

financial service providers. 

Maine Medical Association General Counsel A voluntary association of Maine physicians. Services 

include legislative and regulatory assistance, such as 

tracking bills and facilitating dialogue with the 

legislature and the bureaucracy. 

Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios 

& Haley, LLC 

Attorney One of Maine’s largest law firms. Client services 

include lobbying representation. 

Colby College (Waterville) Associate Professor of Government A nationally recognized expert on campaign finance 

reform. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: These individuals held these positions at the time of our interviews. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 76 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 17: List of Organizations (and Title of Individuals) Interviewed in Arizona 

Name of organization Title of individuals contacted Notes 

House of Representatives Representative (District 1) Democrat. Ran in the 2000 election as a 

participating candidate in the public financing 

program. 

 Representative (District 6) Republican. Opposed to the public financing 

program. 

Citizens Clean Elections Commission Commissioner (Chair) Responsible for administering the Citizens 

Clean Elections Act. 

 Commissioner Served as first chairman of the Commission. 

Current appointment expires in 2004. 

 Executive Director Responsible for administering the Citizens 

Clean Elections Act. 

 Deputy Director 

Office of the Secretary of State Election Services Division Responsible for certifying state candidates, 

initiatives, and referenda for the ballot; 

certifying the results of statewide elections; 

and accepting the filing of campaign finance 

reports. 

Corporation Commission Commissioner In the 2000 election, ran for statewide office 

(Corporation Commission) as participating 

candidate in the public financing program. 

Office of the Auditor General Auditor Principal author of report issued by Arizona 

Auditor General, Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission Special Review (Jan. 11, 2002). 

Clean Elections Institute, Inc. Executive Director A nonprofit advocacy group “dedicated to the 

fair and impartial implementation of the 

Citizens Clean Elections Act.” 

Arizona Democratic Party Coordinated Campaign Director Provided party views on effects of the 

Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act. 

Arizona Republican Party Political Director 

Arizona Green Party Party activist Formerly served as a Commissioner of the 

Citizens Clean Elections Commission. 

Goldwater Institute Director of Urban Growth and Economic 

Development Studies 

Author of, Is Cleanliness Political Godliness? 

Arizona’s Clean Elections Law after Its First 

Year (Nov. 30, 2001). 

Arizona Education Association President Association membership is open to 

employees of all Arizona public schools, 

college and university employees, retired 

educators, and college students studying to 

be teachers. It is the state’s largest 

professional organization. 

Fennemore Craig (law firm) Government relations attorney Specializes in the areas of lobbyist regulation 

and campaign finance at both the federal and 

Arizona levels. Advises candidates, 

contributors, and political committees on 

complying with campaign finance reporting 

requirements. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 77 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Name of organization Title of individuals contacted Notes 

Arizona Chamber of Commerce Chamber Staff

• Senior Vice President, Public Affairs 

• Vice President, Marketing and 

Communications 

• Manager, Public Affairs 

Chamber Member Representatives

• Executive Director, Home Builders 

Association of Central Arizona 

• Swift Transportation Co., Inc. 

The Chamber represents Arizona businesses 

in interfacing with legislators and regulators 

at the state capital and with members of 

Arizona’s congressional delegation. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: These individuals held these positions at the time of our interviews. 

To obtain further perspectives on the effects of public financing, we 

surveyed by mail all candidates, including those who used public financing 

as well as those who did not, who ran in the 2000 primary and general 

elections in Maine and Arizona. Among other topics, the questionnaires 

asked for candidates’ opinions on various aspects of how public financing 

affected the 2000 primary and general elections in their states; their own 

decisions about whether or not to use public funding; participating 

candidates’ experiences with the public financing program; and their 

opinions about public financing of campaigns, in general, and in the 

2002 and future elections in their state. Overall, the two questionnaires 

were identical, with the exception of a few questions to account for 

differences between the states’ election laws. We pretested the 

questionnaires with both participating and nonparticipating candidates in 

each state and made relevant changes to the questions based upon these 

pretests. Copies of the Maine and Arizona questionnaires, along with the 

results to each question, are in appendixes IV and V, respectively. 

We mailed questionnaires to 379 candidates in Maine and received 

269 usable questionnaires; we mailed questionnaires to 237 candidates in 

Arizona and received 143 usable questionnaires. These completed 

questionnaires represented response rates of 72 percent for Maine and 

61 percent for Arizona.3

 We made extensive efforts to encourage 

candidates to complete and return the questionnaires, including advance 

telephone calls to candidates informing them about the upcoming survey, 

up to three follow-up telephone calls to nonrespondents, and up to two 

 3

Two candidates in Arizona and six candidates in Maine were removed from the 

denominator when calculating response rates after we learned that these persons were 

deceased at the time of the survey. 

Candidate Surveys 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 78 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

follow-up mailings of the questionnaires. We performed this work during 

July through December 2002. 

We conducted a response bias analysis to determine whether the 

candidates who returned completed questionnaires were substantially 

different from the candidates who were mailed questionnaires, in terms of 

whether they had been participating or nonparticipating candidates in the 

2000 elections. For each state, we found that both participating and 

nonparticipating candidates returned completed questionnaires in 

approximately the same proportions in which the candidates had 

comprised the initial mail-out groups. For the Maine survey, 36 percent 

of the initial mail-out group was participating candidates, compared with 

39 percent of the candidates who returned completed questionnaires. For 

Arizona, 24 percent of the initial mail-out group was participating 

candidates, and 27 percent who returned completed questionnaires were 

participating candidates. Therefore, we do not consider the results of our 

Maine and Arizona candidate surveys to have response bias on this 

characteristic. 

Because this was not a sample survey, but rather a census of all candidates 

who ran for office in 2000, there are no sampling errors. However, the 

practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, 

commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, measurement 

errors are introduced if difficulties exist in how a particular question is 

interpreted or in the sources of information available to respondents in 

answering a question. In addition, coding errors may occur if mistakes are 

entered into a database. We took extensive steps in the development of the 

questionnaires, the collection of data, and the editing and analysis of data 

to minimize total survey error. To reduce measurement error, we 

conducted two rounds of pretesting of the questionnaires with both 

participating and nonparticipating candidates to make sure questions and 

response categories were interpreted in a consistent manner. In addition, 

we edited all completed surveys for consistency and, if necessary, 

contacted respondents to clarify responses. All questionnaire responses 

were double key-entered into our database (that is, the entries were 

100 percent verified), and a random sample of the questionnaires was 

further verified for completeness and accuracy. In addition, all computer 

syntax was peer reviewed and verified by separate programmers to ensure 

that the syntax was written and executed correctly. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 79 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Regarding changes in interest group influence due to public financing of 

campaigns, we contracted with professional pollsters who conduct 

omnibus telephone surveys with representative samples of voting-age 

citizens specifically in Maine and Arizona. Generally, this polling effort 

was designed to determine the extent to which citizens in each state were 

aware of their state’s public financing program and to obtain their views 

about whether the program has decreased the influence of special interest 

groups, made legislators more accountable to voters, and increased 

confidence in government. The surveys consisted of two sets of questions 

that we developed, with some assistance from the polling organizations. 

As shown below, except for some minor wording differences customized 

for the respective state, the two sets of questions were the same for both 

Maine and Arizona.4

 Questions 2, 3, and 4 in each set were not asked of any 

individual who, in response to question 1, acknowledged knowing “nothing 

at all” about the applicable state’s clean election law or was unsure or 

declined to answer. We pretested the questions with members of the 

general public in each state and made relevant changes to the questions 

based upon these pretests. 

The questions used in the Maine survey were as follows: 

1. I would like to ask you about Maine’s clean election law. This law 

provides campaign money to candidates running for governor and for 

candidates to the state legislature. Would you say you know a lot, 

some, a little, or nothing at all about Arizona’s clean election law? 

2. Now, I would like to ask you about Maine legislators in general who 

ran their campaigns with public funds in the 2000 elections. Would you 

say that these sate legislators who received public funds have been 

much more, somewhat more, somewhat less, or much less accountable 

to voters than legislators who did not get public funds, or has it not 

made any difference? 

3. To what extent do you think Maine’s clean election law has decreased 

or increased the influence of special interest groups on legislators? 

Would you say the law has greatly decreased, somewhat decreased, 

 4

In designing the questions, we used the term “clean election” because this wording has 

been widely used in the media, was used in the ballot initiatives, and also is part of the title 

of the respective state’s law. Thus, in reference to voter awareness, the term “clean 

election” likely is more commonly recognized than an alternative term such as “public 

financing program.” 

Polls of Voting-Age 

Citizens 

Maine Survey Questions 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 80 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

has had no effect, has somewhat increased, or greatly increased the 

influence of special interest groups, or is it too soon to tell? 

4. To what extent has Maine’s clean election law increased or decreased 

your confidence state government? Would you say the law has greatly 

increased, somewhat increased, has had no effect, has somewhat 

decreased, or greatly decreased your confidence in state government, 

or is it too soon to tell? 

The questions used in the Arizona survey were as follows: 

1. I would like to ask you about Arizona’s clean election law. This law 

provides campaign money to candidates running for statewide office, 

such as the Corporation Commission or governor and for candidates to 

the state legislature. Would you say you know a lot, some, a little, or 

nothing at all about Arizona’s clean election law? 

2. Now, I would like to ask you about Arizona legislators in general who 

ran their campaigns with public funds in the 2000 elections. Would you 

say that these state legislators who received public funds have been 

much more, somewhat more, somewhat less, or much less accountable 

to voters than legislators who did not get public funds, or has it not 

made any difference? 

3. To what extent do you think Arizona’s clean election law has 

decreased or increased the influence of special interest groups on 

legislators? Would you say the law has greatly decreased, somewhat 

decreased, has had no effect, has somewhat increased, or greatly 

increased the influence of special interest groups, or is it too soon to 

tell? 

4. To what extent has Arizona’s clean election law increased or 

decreased your confidence state government? Would you say the law 

has greatly increased, somewhat increased, has had no effect, has 

somewhat decreased, or greatly decreased your confidence in state 

government, or is it too soon to tell? 

To conduct the Maine poll, we contracted with Market Decisions (South 

Portland, ME). During October 15-31, 2002, the firm completed telephone 

interviews with 400 randomly selected adults (age 18 or older) in Maine. 

The sample of telephone numbers called was based on a list of telephone 

prefixes (the first 3 digits in the 7-digit numbers) used throughout the 

state. The polling results are considered generalizable to households with 

telephones, given that every residential telephone number had an equal 

Arizona Survey Questions 

Contracted Polling 

Organizations 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 81 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

probability of selection. Up to 10 calls were made with households to 

obtain completed interviews. The 400 completed interviews represent a 

survey response rate of 30 percent. 

To conduct the Arizona poll, we contracted with Behavior Research 

Center, Inc. (Phoenix, AZ). During October 1-7, 2002, the firm completed 

telephone interviews with 713 heads of household in Arizona. To ensure a 

random selection of households proportionately allocated throughout the 

sample universe, the firm used a computer-generated, random digit dial 

telephone sample, which selected households based on residential 

telephone prefixes and included all unlisted and newly listed households. 

Telephone interviewing was conducted during approximately equal cross 

sections of daytime, evening, and weekend hours—a procedure designed 

to ensure that all households were equally represented regardless of work 

schedules. Up to 4 calls were made with households to obtain completed 

interviews. The 713 completed interviews represent a survey response rate 

of 35 percent. 

As indicated above, all surveys are subject to errors. Because random 

samples of each state’s population were interviewed in these omnibus 

surveys, the results are subject to sampling error, which is the difference 

between the results obtained from the samples and the results that would 

have been obtained by surveying the entire populations under 

consideration. Measurements of sampling errors are stated at a certain 

level of statistical confidence. The maximum sampling error for the Maine 

survey at the 95-percent level of statistical confidence is plus or minus 

8 percentage points, and the maximum for the Arizona survey is plus or 

minus 5 percentage points. Additionally, the results of these surveys may 

be subject to unknown nonresponse bias due to relatively low response 

rates. 

A few of the Maine and Arizona citizens who were interviewed may have 

been 18 years of age at the time of the interviews in October 2002—and, 

thus, would have been only 16 years of age (nonvoters) at the time of the 

elections in 2000. While the polling data do not permit an exact 

quantification of these young respondents, the numbers probably are quite 

small and would not affect the validity of the survey results. For the 

713 completed interviews in Arizona, for example, polling data show that 

54 respondents (7.6 percent) were in the age range of 18 to 24 years. 

We assessed the quality of electronic data provided to us by officials in 

Maine and Arizona by testing the data for internal consistency; validating 

Survey Error 

Data Quality 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 82 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

the data using other sources; and, to the extent possible, reviewing the 

associated documentation. Based on these tests, we determined that the 

data were sufficiently accurate for our purposes. 

As an additional quality-assurance measure, we asked officials of the state 

agencies responsible for administering the respective public financing 

program in the two study states to review a draft copy of our report for 

accuracy and clarity before its final issuance. Specifically, on April 16, 

2003, we provided a report draft to the Chair of Maine’s Commission on 

Governmental Ethics and Election Practices and the Chair of Arizona’s 

Citizens Clean Elections Commission. 

Commission Review of 

Draft Report 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 83 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Maine voters, by a margin of 56 percent to 44 percent, passed the Maine 

Clean Election Act (“Maine’s Act”) in November 1996. Arizona voters, by a 

margin of 51 percent to 49 percent, passed the Citizens Clean Elections 

Act (“Arizona’s Act”) in November 1998. These ballot initiatives 

established optional financing programs for candidates desiring to use 

public funds to finance their campaigns, as an alternative to traditional 

fundraising means. The Maine and Arizona programs are unique in being 

the first instances of state programs that offer full public funding—not just 

partial funding—of election campaigns for qualified candidates seeking 

state legislature seats and certain statewide offices. Regarding 

implementation, both states’ public financing programs became available 

for candidates beginning with elections in 2000. Generally, participating 

candidates—those candidates who agree to forego private fund raising and 

who otherwise qualify to take part in the respective state’s public 

financing program—receive a set amount of money for their primary and 

general election campaigns. Under Maine’s Act and Arizona’s Act, 

nonparticipating candidates—those candidates who choose to continue 

using traditional means for financing campaigns—are subject to limits on 

contributions and new reporting requirements. 

This appendix provides a brief overview of the public financing programs 

for election campaigns in Maine and Arizona. Detailed information is 

available on the Web sites of the state agencies responsible for 

administering the respective program—Maine’s Commission on 

Governmental Ethics and Election Practices (www.state.me.us/ethics) and 

Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Commission (www.ccec.state.az.us). 

Generally, proponents assert that the purposes of campaign finance 

reform are to increase voter choice and electoral competition, allow 

candidates to give more attention to voters and less to donors, and reduce 

the influence of special interests on elected officials. That is, from an 

overall perspective, proponents assert that public financing programs 

should enhance the confidence of citizens in government by increasing the 

integrity of the political process and the accountability of officials. 

As indicated, Maine’s Act and Arizona’s Act were passed by voters as 

ballot initiatives. Thus, unlike laws passed by state legislatures, these 

statutes have no accompanying legislative history that would document 

the progress of a particular proposal before the legislature. In reference to 

determining the purpose of statutes passed by this process, one court has 

noted that, “The search for legislative purpose or motive is always 

dangerous; it is even more difficult in the case of an initiative or 

referendum involving all the voters, where it is impossible to know what 

Appendix II: Overview of the Public 

Financing Programs for Election Campaigns 

in Maine and Arizona 

Purposes of the 

Public Financing 

Programs 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 84 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

the multitude read, heard or believed in deciding how to vote.”1

Nonetheless, in addition to the specific language of the statutes, available 

interpretive sources include various media accounts of the ballot 

initiatives, commentary materials prepared by organizations that 

sponsored the initiatives, and court decisions on various provisions of the 

statutes. 

The Maine Clean Election Act has no section that specifically details the 

purposes, goals, or objectives of the law. To get the initiative on the ballot, 

a coalition of interest groups, the Maine Voters for Clean Elections,2

collected about 65,000 signatures. At that time, the coalition and other 

proponents advertised that the public financing program would “take big 

money out of politics” by limiting what politicians spend on campaigns, 

reducing contributions from special interests and increasing enforcement 

of election laws. They said that the initiative, if passed, would decrease the 

influence of wealthy individuals, corporations and political action 

committees in politics, and would level the playing field so that 

challengers would have a chance against incumbents. Politicians would 

then spend more time focusing on the issues that affect all of their 

constituents rather than spend time on pursuing money for their 

campaigns. Further, proponents also advertised that the public financing 

program would allow candidates who do not have access to wealth the 

opportunity to compete on a more equal financial footing with 

traditionally funded candidates, restore citizen’s faith and confidence in 

government, and give new candidates a fighting chance against 

incumbents. According to Maine State officials and interest group 

representatives we interviewed, there was not any organized opposition to 

the initiative when it was on the ballot. 

Arizona’s Act does have a “findings and declarations” section that 

addresses intent. Specifically, the “findings” subsection of the Citizens 

Clean Elections Act, passed by voters in 1998, noted that the state’s 

current election-financing system 

 1

Daggett v. Webster, 81 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135 (D. Me. 2000). 

2

Including the American Association of Retired Persons (Maine Chapter), Maine A.F.L.-

C.I.O., League of Women Voters of Maine, Common Cause/Maine, Natural Resources 

Council of Maine, Maine People’s Alliance, Money and Politics Project, and Peace Action 

Maine. 

Purposes of Maine’s Public 

Financing Program 

Purposes of Arizona’s 

Public Financing Program 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 85 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

• allows elected officials to accept large campaign contributions from 

private interests over which they have governmental jurisdiction; 

• provides incumbents an unhealthy advantage over challengers; 

• hinders communication to voters by many qualified candidates; 

• effectively suppresses the voices and influence of the vast majority of 

Arizona citizens in favor of a small number of wealthy special interests; 

• undermines public confidence in the integrity of public officials; 

• costs average taxpayers millions of dollars in the form of subsidies and 

special privileges for campaign contributors; 

• drives up the cost of running for state office, discouraging otherwise 

qualified candidates who lack personal wealth or access to specialinterest funding; and 

• requires that elected officials spend too much time raising funds rather 

than representing the public. 

Further, the “declarations” subsection of Arizona’s 1998 Act stated that: 

“The people of Arizona declare our intent to create a clean elections system that will 

improve the integrity of Arizona state government by diminishing the influence of specialinterest money, will encourage citizen participation in the political process, and will 

promote freedom of speech under the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions. Campaigns will 

become more issue-oriented and less negative because there will be no need to challenge 

the sources of campaign money.” 

In Maine and Arizona, candidates who wish to receive public funds for 

campaigning must qualify by (1) agreeing to forego self-financing and all 

private contributions, except for a limited amount of “seed money” and 

(2) demonstrating citizen support by collecting a set number of 

$5 contributions from registered voters. For example, as table 18 shows, a 

candidate for Maine’s House of Representatives may raise $500 of seed 

money and must receive a $5 qualifying contribution from at least 

50 registered voters, and a candidate for Arizona’s House of 

Representatives may raise $2,500 of seed money and must receive at least 

200 qualifying contributions. 

Candidates Must 

Qualify to Receive 

Public Funding 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 86 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 18: Seed Money Limits and Number of Qualifying $5 Contributions 

 Seed money limitsa

State State legislature and applicable executive branch offices Total cap

Individual 

contribution limit

Number of $5 

contributions

Maine House of Representatives $500 $100 50

 Senate $1,500 $100 150

 Governor $50,000 $100 2,500

Arizona House of Representatives $2,500 $100 200

 Senate $2,500 $100 200

 Corporation Commission $10,000 $100 1,500

 Governor $40,000 $100 4,000

 Attorney General $20,000 $100 2,500

 Secretary of State $20,000 $100 2,500

 Treasurer $10,000 $100 1,500

 Superintendent of Public Instruction $10,000 $100 1,500

 Mine Inspector $5,000 $100 500

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

Note: In the initial year of implementation (2000), Maine’s public funding program covered candidates 

for legislative seats only, and Arizona’s program covered candidates for legislative seats and the 

Corporation Commission. Beginning in 2002, Maine’s program was extended to cover candidates for 

governor, and Arizona’s program was extended to cover candidates for governor and various other 

executive branch offices. 

a

To help with the qualifying process, candidates seeking to be certified to receive public funding may 

raise and spend limited amounts of seed money. In Arizona, these funds are called “early 

contributions,” and the base amounts are established in statute and adjusted for inflation every 2 

years. The adjusted amount of early contributions for Arizona’s 2002 election cycle is limited to $110 

per individual contributor. 

After being certified by the state as having met qualifying requirements, 

participating candidates receive initial distributions (predetermined 

amounts) of public funding and are also eligible for additional matching 

funds based on spending by or for privately funded opponents. For 

example, in Maine’s 2000 elections (see table 19): 

• Each participating candidate in a contested race for the state House of 

Representatives received an initial distribution of pubic funds in the 

amount of $1,141 for the primary election and an amount of $3,252 for 

the general election. Under Maine’s Act, these amounts were based on 

average expenditures in similar races in the two previous election 

cycles (1998 and 1996). 

• Also, under Maine’s Act, the maximum allowable matching funds 

available to a participating candidate were capped at double the initial 

distribution that the candidate received for his or her contested race. 

Amounts of Allowable 

Public Funding for 

Participating 

Candidates 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 87 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Matching funds are triggered when the participating candidate is 

outspent by a privately funded opponent. Further, matching funds can 

be based on independent expenditures that benefit an opponent’s 

campaign. Generally, independent expenditures are campaign 

expenditures made by individuals or groups without coordination with 

any candidate and are communications (such as political ads or 

mailings) that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 

identified candidate. 

In Arizona’s 2000 elections (see table 19), qualified candidates for the 

House of Representatives or Senate who were in contested party primary 

elections initially received $10,000. After the primary, successful major 

party candidates who were opposed in the general election then received 

an additional $15,000.3

 Independent candidates received 70 percent of the 

sum of the original primary and general election spending limits, and 

unopposed candidates received only the total of their $5 qualifying 

contributions as the spending limit for that election. Participating 

candidates for the state legislature could also use $500 of their personal 

monies for their campaigns, and participating candidates for statewide 

offices could use $1,000. 

Participating candidates also received matching funds when an opposing, 

nonparticipating candidate exceeded the primary or general election 

spending limits. Matching funds were also provided to participating 

candidates when independent expenditures were made on behalf of a 

nonparticipating candidate in the race. 

 3

The Secretary of State adjusts these base amounts, established in Arizona’s Act, for 

inflation every 2 years. 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 88 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 19: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 2000 

 Primary election public funds General election public funds 

State Office Type of race 

Initial 

distribution

Maximum 

allowable 

matching 

funds

Total 

public 

funding

Initial 

distribution 

Maximum 

allowable 

matching 

funds

Total 

public 

funding

Maine House of 

Representatives 

Contested 

$1,141 $2,282 $3,423 $3,252 $6,504 $9,756

 Uncontested $511 0 $511 0 0 0

 Senate Contested $4,334 $8,668 $13,002 $12,910 $25,820 $38,730

 Uncontested $1,785 0 $1,785 0 0 0

Arizona House of 

Representatives 

and Senate 

Contested 

$10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $15,000 $30,000 $45,000

 Uncontesteda 

 Corporation 

Commission 

Contested 

$40,000 $80,000 $120,000 $60,000 $120,000 $180,000

 Uncontesteda 

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

a

In Arizona, each participating candidate in an uncontested race received public funding in an amount 

equal to $5 times the number of qualifying signatures that the candidate obtained. 

In Maine, a total of about $865,000 in public funds was authorized in 

2000 for the 134 participating candidates who ran in the primary and/or 

general elections for state legislature. Candidates returned about 

$108,000 of unused money to the Maine Clean Election Fund. In Arizona, a 

total of $1.9 million in public funds was distributed in 2000 to the 

59 participating candidates—54 candidates for the state legislature and 

5 candidates for the Arizona Corporation Commission. 

Various revenue sources are used to support the public financing 

programs. As table 20 shows, appropriations were by far the largest 

funding source in Maine in 2000, whereas a surcharge on civil and criminal 

fines and penalties was the leading source in Arizona. As noted in table 20, 

the constitutionality of this funding provision in Arizona’s Act has been 

challenged in court but has been upheld. 

Revenue Sources for 

the Public Financing 

Programs 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 89 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 20: Revenue Sources and Amounts for Public Financing Programs in 2000 

State Revenue sources 

Annual revenue (in 

thousands of dollars) Percentage

Maine Appropriations: On or before January 1st of each year, the state treasurer is 

to transfer $2 million from the General Fund to a special, dedicated fund 

(the Maine Clean Election Fund). 

$2,000 70%

 Tax check-offs: Under a tax check-off program, a Maine resident can 

designate that $3 be paid to the Maine Clean Election Fund. A husband and 

wife filing jointly may each designate $3. 

523a18

 Qualifying contributions: The $5 qualifying contributions collected by 

participating candidates are deposited in the Maine Clean Election Fund. 

56 2

 Miscellaneous: Other income includes interest earned, penalties, and seed 

money collected by candidates and deposited in the Maine Clean Election 

Fund. 

277 10

Total $2,856 100%

Arizona Fines, forfeitures, and penalties: This source includes a 10-percent 

surcharge imposed on certain civil and criminal fines and penalties. b

Collections go in the Citizens Clean Elections Fund. 

 $4,665 68%

 Tax check-offs and donations: By marking an optional check-off box on their 

state income tax returns, Arizona taxpayers can make a $5 contribution to 

the Citizens Clean Elections Fund. A taxpayer that checks this box receives 

a $5 reduction ($10 if filing jointly) in the amount of tax. Also, taxpayers may 

redirect a specified amount of owed taxes—up to 20 percent or $500 

(ceiling adjusted periodically), whichever is greater—to the Citizens Clean 

Elections Fund and receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit. 

1,943 28

 Qualifying contributions: The $5 qualifying contributions collected by 

participating candidates are deposited in the Citizens Clean Elections Fund. 

136 2

 Filing and title certificate fees: This source includes all lobbyist fees.c 

Arizona’s Act imposed a $100 annual fee (amount adjusted periodically) on 

registered lobbyists who represent commercial or for-profit activities. 

104 2

Total $6,848 100%

Source: GAO analysis of state data. 

a

Revenue reflects tax check-off income for previous years, when taxpayers were contributing to the 

Maine Clean Election fund, but no elections were held. For the 1999 tax year, $266,907 had been 

deposited into the Maine Clean Election Fund through income tax check-offs. 

b

In June 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the surcharge provision of the Arizona Act was 

unconstitutional and that collections of the surcharge should cease. In July 2002, pending its review, 

the Arizona Supreme Court issued an order to stay enforcement of the lower court’s decision. Later 

that year, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held the surcharge provision 

to be constitutional. On January 9, 2003, the Institute for Justice appealed the Arizona Supreme 

Court decision on behalf of plaintiff May to the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the U.S. Supreme 

Court has decided to not hear the challenge to the Arizona law (see app. III). 

c

In December 2001, Arizona’s Maricopa County Superior Court ruled that the lobbyist fee was 

unconstitutional. Lavis v. Bayless, No. CV-2001-006078 (Arizona Superior Court, 2001). The 

collected money has been returned to lobbyists. 

Table 20 also indicates that in 2000, about 18 percent of Maine’s funding 

and about 28 percent of Arizona’s funding came from state income tax 

check-off donations and other voluntary donations. In Maine, $523,000 in 

funding came from state income tax check-off donations that had 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 90 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

accumulated from 2 tax years prior to the 2000 elections. For tax year 

1999, approximately 63,000 state income tax returns were filed with checkoff donations to the Maine Clean Election Fund, which represented about 

10 percent of the 599,000 total returns filed in the state. In Arizona, the 

$1.943 million in revenue included $1.829 million from state income tax 

check-off donations in 2000. These tax check-off donations came from 

approximately 246,000 of the 2.1 million state income tax returns filed, or 

about 12 percent of the returns filed through December 2000, for tax year 

1999. In perspective, about 11 percent of federal income tax returns had 

$3 check-off contributions to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund4

 in 

tax year 2000, which is used to finance qualified presidential candidates 

and national political parties. 

Both Maine’s Act and Arizona’s Act established commissions to implement 

the public financing program and enforce provisions of the Acts. In Maine, 

the responsibility for administering Maine’s Act, including management of 

the Maine Clean Election Fund, was given to Maine’s Commission on 

Governmental Ethics and Election Practices. The Commission consists of 

five members appointed by the Governor, subject to review by the joint 

standing committee of the state legislature having jurisdiction over legal 

affairs and confirmation by the state legislature. The Commission employs 

a director and staff to carry out the day-to-day operations of the program. 

In addition to financing election campaigns of candidates participating in 

the public financing program, the Maine Clean Election Fund also pays for 

administrative and enforcement costs of the Commission related to the 

Act. In 2000, the Commission’s total expenditures from the fund were 

$861,774, including $111,081 in administrative costs.5

 The administrative 

costs included staff payroll and other miscellaneous expenses. 

 4

Beginning in 1976, taxpayers have had the option of contributing to the Presidential 

Election Campaign Fund by checking off a box on their federal income tax return. Funding 

is provided to qualified presidential candidates for their primary campaigns and to major 

political parties for presidential nominating conventions, and grants to presidential 

nominees for their general election campaigns. In 1994, the check-off was increased from 

$1 to $3. 

5

State of Maine, Report of the Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices 

to the Joint Standing Committee on Legal and Veterans Affairs, Documenting, Evaluating 

and Making Recommendations Relating to the Administration, Implementation and 

Enforcement of the Maine Clean Election Act and Maine Clean Election Fund. Augusta, 

ME, 2001. 

Administration of the 

Public Financing 

Programs 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 91 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

As a part of the responsibility for implementing and enforcing Maine’s Act, 

the Commission is to investigate violations of the requirements for 

campaign reports and campaign financing activities of both participating 

and nonparticipating candidates. The Commission has authority to assess 

civil penalties against any person who violates any provision of the act. A 

summary report released by the Commission in August 2001 reported that 

enforcement of the act required minimal Commission activity during the 

2000 election year. 

In Arizona, the Citizens Clean Elections Commission was newly created by 

Arizona’s Act and consists of five members selected by the state’s highestranking officials from opposing parties. These state officials choose one 

new commissioner per year. No more than two commissioners may be 

from the same political party or county, and commissioners may not have 

run for or held office, nor been appointed to or elected for any office for 

the 5 years prior to being chosen as a commissioner. As established by 

Arizona’s Act, the Commission employs an executive director to facilitate 

administration of the program, including voter education and enforcement 

of the act’s provisions. The executive director is, in turn, responsible for 

determining additional staffing needs and hiring accordingly. Arizona’s Act 

caps Commission spending for a calendar year at $5 times the number of 

Arizona resident personal income tax returns filed the previous calendar 

year. Of that amount, the Commission may use up to 10 percent for 

administration and enforcement activities and up to 10 percent for voter 

education activities. The remainder of Commission spending goes to 

participating candidates’ campaign funds. For example, in calendar year 

2000, the Commission’s spending cap was $9,979,355—$5 times the 

1,995,871 personal income tax returns filed in calendar year 1999 (for tax 

year 1998). The Commission’s total revenue for calendar year 2000 was 

less than the prescribed spending cap at $6,847,843. In 2000, the 

Commission’s expenditures totaled $3,176,711—$668,562 for 

administration and enforcement, $590,725 for voter education, and 

$1,917,424 for campaign funds.6

The Commission’s responsibility for enforcing campaign finance laws 

established by Arizona’s Act covers contribution limits, spending limits, 

and reporting requirements that affect both participating and 

nonparticipating candidates. Cases of possible violations may be initiated 

 6

State of Arizona, Citizens Clean Elections Commission, Annual Report: January 1, 

2000—December 31, 2000. Phoenix, AZ, 2000, 38-40. 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 92 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

with the Commission in one of two ways: either by an external complaint 

or through information that comes to the Commission’s attention 

internally. The Commission may assess civil penalties after investigating 

compliance matters and finding probable cause of a violation unless the 

candidate comes into compliance within a set time frame or a settlement 

agreement is reached. For example, in 2000, the Commission reviewed 

19 externally generated complaints, 5 of which were forwarded to the 

office of the Secretary of State due to jurisdictional issues, while 9 cases 

were dismissed and 4 were dropped because the candidate came into 

compliance. The Commission reached a settlement agreement with the 

candidate in the remaining case. Of the 16 internally initiated compliance 

matters in 2000, the Commission found only 1 case with probable cause of 

a campaign finance violation. The candidate in that case came into 

compliance within the required time frame.7

Before the passage of Maine’s Act and Arizona’s Act, political campaigns in 

the two states were financed completely with private funds, subject to 

certain statutory limitations on contributions from individuals and others. 

There were no limitations placed on expenditures by candidates of their 

personal wealth. Under the new laws, this latter aspect of campaign 

financing remains true for candidates who choose not to participate in the 

respective state’s public financing program. That is, for their own races, 

nonparticipating candidates can still spend as much of their personal 

funds as they please. 

On the other hand, nonparticipating candidates are subject to new 

limitations on the amounts of contributions they can accept. In Maine, for 

example, a nonparticipating candidate for the state legislature may accept 

up to $250 per donor, and a nonparticipating gubernatorial candidate may 

accept up to $500 per donor. Previously, the candidates could have 

collected up to $1,000 from individuals and up to $5,000 from political 

committees and corporations. In Arizona, contributions from individuals 

and political committees are now limited to $270 per donor for 

nonparticipating candidates for the state legislature and $700 to 

nonparticipating candidates for applicable executive branch offices. 

Arizona’s new limitations represent a 20 percent reduction from the 

contribution ceilings that existed previously. 

 7

Id. 25. 

Reduced Contribution 

Limits and Additional 

Reporting 

Requirements for 

Nonparticipating 

Candidates 
Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing 

Programs for Election Campaigns in Maine 

and Arizona 

Page 93 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

In order to administer the public financing programs, nonparticipating 

candidates have additional reporting requirements. For example: 

• In Maine, a nonparticipating candidate must notify the Commission on 

Governmental Ethics and Election Practices when his or her receipts 

total 101 percent of the Commission’s initial allocation of pubic funds 

to a participating candidate. 

• In Arizona, a nonparticipating candidate must file original and 

supplemental campaign finance reports with the Secretary of State 

when the candidate makes expenditures that exceed 70 percent of the 

primary election spending limit or receives contributions (less the 

expenditures through the primary) that exceed 70 percent of the 

general election spending limit. 
Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to 

Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing 

Programs 

Page 94 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

The legal challenges to the public financing programs in Maine and 

Arizona raised many issues. The Maine Clean Election Act, passed in 

November 1996, took effect in the 2000 elections. Preceding the elections, 

elected officials, political action committees, and campaign contributors 

challenged the law in federal court on federal constitutional grounds. The 

litigation focused on First Amendment issues raised by what plaintiffs 

regarded as the impermissibly coercive nature of the act, limitations on 

campaign contributions, and the grouping of independent expenditures 

with a candidate’s expenditures. 

Arizona voters passed the Citizens Clean Elections Act in November 

1998, and it also took effect in the 2000 elections. An Arizona political 

action committee, an Arizona lobbyist, and Arizona voters challenged the 

act on state constitutional grounds. Furthermore, the challenges in 

Arizona included contesting the sources of funding, the validity of the title, 

and the process for selecting members that sit on the Citizens Clean 

Elections Commission. 

This appendix provides a summary of the legal challenges to the Maine 

Clean Election Act and Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act. 

In a March 2000 opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 

Circuit validated the Maine Clean Election Act. After consolidating 

appeals, the First Circuit upheld two lower court decisions and ruled that 

the First Amendment rights of candidates, contributors, and political 

action committees were not violated by the public finance scheme and 

contribution limits established in the Maine Clean Election Act. 

Since the Maine Clean Election Act was first approved by a voter initiative, 

it has been the subject of a great deal of litigation. Almost immediately 

after voters of Maine approved the Act, the first suits were brought against 

the state. Eventually, after a number of cases were dismissed on 

procedural grounds, the federal district court for Maine ruled on the 

constitutionality of the act. Table 21 summarizes the results of the legal 

challenges. Following table 21 is a more detailed synopsis of the court of 

appeals decision and the district court cases. 

Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges 

to Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing 

Programs 

Legal Challenges to 

the Maine Clean 

Election Act 
Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to 

Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing 

Programs 

Page 95 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 21: Maine Clean Election Act Litigation 

Case citation Synopsis of the legal challenge Decision of the court 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 

Daggett v. Commission on Governmental 

Ethics and Election Practices, 

205 F. 3d 445 

(1st Cir. 2000). 

The U.S. Court of Appeals consolidated the 

appeals from two lower court decisions. One 

set of appellants included past and current 

candidates, the Libertarian Party of Maine, 

and an individual campaign contributor. 

Their major complaint was that the statute 

was impermissibly coercive, thereby 

unconstitutionally burdening the First 

Amendment rights of candidates. The other 

set of appellants included an individual 

contributor and two political action 

committees. Their major complaint was that 

the provision for matching funds for 

independent expenditures was 

unconstitutional. Both sets of appellants also 

contested the constitutionality of the 

reduced contribution limits. 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 

Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the 

Act. The court held that: (1) Maine’s public 

financing scheme provided a roughly 

proportionate mix of benefits and 

detriments to candidates seeking public 

funding, such that it did not burden the 

First Amendment rights of candidates or 

contributors; (2) the independent 

expenditures requirement did not limit the 

freedom of speech and association of the 

independent contributors; and (3) the 

reduced contribution limits of $250 did not 

infringe on appellants’ First Amendment 

rights because the limits served an 

important government interest in avoiding 

corruption and were closely tailored to 

serve that interest. 

Source: GAO analysis of court decision. 

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Daggett v. Commission on 

Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F. 3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000), 

addressed three arguments. First, the court ruled that the $250 

contribution limits were supported by a “sufficiently important 

governmental interest to which the ceilings are closely tailored.” Daggett 

v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 

459. Relying on a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Nixon v. Shrink 

Missouri PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), the First Circuit held that there was 

sufficient evidentiary support of the threat of corruption or its appearance 

to implement the limits. As to the consequences, the First Circuit decided 

that the limits on contributions had a minimal effect on people who wish 

to support a candidate directly. 

The First Circuit also held that the matching funds provision for 

participating candidates does not violate the First Amendment rights of 

the nonparticipating candidates. Furthermore, the court agreed with the 

district judge that the reporting requirements imposed on privately 

financed candidates are not an undue burden and serve an important and 

narrowly tailored governmental interest. The court said that these sections 

of the act do not restrict the amount of money nonparticipating candidates 

can spend; rather, the sections level the playing field by providing 

matching funds for participating candidates. 
Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to 

Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing 

Programs 

Page 96 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Finally, the First Circuit held that the cumulative effect of the act was not 

impermissibly coercive. The court cited several examples of election laws 

in other states that were similar or more restrictive and not found 

coercive. The court concluded that neither the matching funds provision 

nor the labels associated with participating and nonparticipating 

candidates are such strong incentives that candidates are forced to accept 

public funding. 

In the first district court case, Daggett v. Webster, 74 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D. Me. 

1999), plaintiffs challenged the act on a number of issues, mainly focusing 

on the trigger provision—that is, when privately funded candidates raise 

funds above a certain amount, publicly funded candidates receive 

matching funds—and additional reporting requirements imposed on 

privately funded candidates. Of the seven claims raised by plaintiffs, all 

were rejected by the district court: 

• The court found the Maine Clean Election Act offers incentives, but the 

incentives are not overwhelming or of an order that can be said to 

create profound disparities. 

• The court held that the Maine Election Commission is not labeling 

publicly funded candidates as “clean”; the state cannot control what 

candidates choose to call themselves or their opponents. 

• The court stated there was nothing unfair and no profound disparity in 

providing publicly funded candidates matching funds equivalent to 

what their privately funded opponents raise. 

• The court held that triggers, tied to the amount privately funded 

candidates raise and not to the amount they spend, is a legitimate 

approach for the legislation to take. 

• The district court upheld the additional reporting requirements 

imposed on privately funded candidates who receive, spend, or 

obligate more than 1 percent over the amount distributed to their 

publicly funded opponents. 

• The court held that independent expenditures spent to support a 

candidate (including negative ads targeting the candidate’s opponent) 

must be reported by the candidate as money spent on his or her 

campaign. 

• Finally, the court ruled that funds spent on public funding for primary 

elections are relatively small, and separate allocations for primary 
Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to 

Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing 

Programs 

Page 97 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

elections are necessary to make the act’s public financing measure 

effective. 

The other district court case, Daggett v. Webster, 81 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D. 

Me. 2000), involved a challenge to the lowered contribution limits. 

Plaintiffs in that case challenged the $250 contribution limits for state 

legislative candidates and the $500 contribution limits for gubernatorial 

candidates. The court did not rule on the $500 limit on gubernatorial 

candidates because there was no gubernatorial race at the time. The 

district court did, however, uphold the $250 individual contribution limit 

to a state senate or house candidate. In reaching its decision, the court did 

not focus on the monetary limit but instead analyzed three constitutional 

interests at stake: contributors’ free speech, candidates’ free speech, and 

freedom of association. These constitutional interests were elucidated in 

the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 

The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the Citizens Clean Elections Act, but 

not before a number of provisions were severed by the courts because 

they were unconstitutional under the Arizona Constitution. Three separate 

cases made their way through the state judicial system before reaching the 

state’s highest court. In the first case, the court ruled that despite an 

oversight by the drafters, the title of the ballot initiative was constitutional. 

The Arizona Supreme Court ruled in the second case that the nomination 

and selection of commissioners to the Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission was unconstitutional in part; however, the court also ruled 

that those parts could be severed, allowing the Citizens Clean Elections 

Act to stand. Finally, the court held that funding for public campaigns 

from a surcharge on criminal and civil fines was constitutional. 

Before the initiative even got on the ballot of the general election, the act 

was challenged. The claims that were litigated in Arizona were different 

from those raised in Maine. Political action committees and individual 

citizens raised state constitutional challenges to the title of the act, and the 

process of appointing commissioners to the Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission, the sources of funding for the law. Tables 22 through 24 

provide a summary of the litigation. Following each table is a more 

detailed synopsis of the cases. 

Legal Challenges to 

Arizona’s Citizens 

Clean Elections Act 
Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to 

Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing 

Programs 

Page 98 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 22: Arizona Litigation – Title of Ballot Initiative 

Case citation Synopsis of the legal challenge Decision of the court 

Arizona Supreme Court 

Meyers v. Bayless, 

965 P. 2d 768 

(Ariz. 1998) 

The plaintiff, an Arizona voter, brought the action 

seeking the court to revoke the certification of the 

ballot initiative because it lacked a title. 

The Supreme Court of Arizona held that even though 

the initiative did not have a title, Article II did have a 

title and it was the only article in the initiative. That 

combination of factors was enough for the court to 

hold that the initiative substantially complied with the 

title requirement. 

Source: GAO analysis of court decision. 

Before the Arizona initiative for clean elections was placed on the ballot, 

an action was brought seeking the court to revoke the certification of the 

ballot initiative because it lacked a title. The lower court in Arizona held 

that the words, “Citizens Clean Elections Act,” which were not at the top 

of the measure but on the third line as the title of an article, met the title 

requirement. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The court held that for 

an initiative petition, the legal sufficiency standard requires substantial, 

not necessarily technical, compliance with the law. 

Table 23: Arizona Litigation – Nomination and Appointment Process to the Citizens Clean Elections Commission 

Case citation Synopsis of the legal challenge Decision of the court 

Arizona Supreme Court 

Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission v. Myers, 

196 Ariz. 516, 1 P.3d 706 (Ariz. 2000) 

Citizens Clean Elections Commission and 

Arizonans for Clean Elections appealed the 

Superior Court decision. They argued that 

the sections challenged were constitutional or 

at least severable from the rest of the act. On 

cross-petition, VotePac challenged the 

validity of the title of the act and asserted that 

the requirement of Supreme Court members 

to select Clean Elections Commissioners 

violated the Arizona Constitution. 

The Arizona Supreme Court heard this 

appeal on an expedited review process. The 

court held that: (1) the Commission on 

Appellate Court Appointments did not have 

the authority to nominate Clean Elections 

Commissioners; (2) the Commission on 

Appellate Court Appointments provisions 

could be severed from the act; (3) the Senate 

could concur with any removal decisions the 

Governor made of Clean Elections 

Commissioners; (4) the title of the act was still 

valid; (5) members of the Supreme Court 

could not appoint commissioners to the Clean 

Elections Commission; and (6) the section of 

the act requiring Arizona Supreme Court 

members to appoint Clean Elections 

Commissioners could be severed from the 

rest of the act. 

Source: GAO analysis of court decision. 

Prior to the 2000 elections, a registered Arizona political action committee 

and citizens of Arizona challenged the Citizens Clean Elections Act, 

seeking a declaration of the act’s invalidity. The Superior Court for 
Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to 

Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing 

Programs 

Page 99 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Maricopa County held that the act was invalid. See Votepac v. Bayless, CV 

99-11937 (Superior Court of Arizona, 2000). The Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission and the Arizonans for Clean Elections appealed the decision 

of the Superior Court to the Arizona Supreme Court in an expedited 

review process. 

The Arizona Supreme Court, in Citizens Clean Elections Commission v. 

Myers, 196 Ariz. 516, 1 P.3d 706 (Ariz. 2000), upheld the law, but required 

certain provisions—regarding how commissioners were nominated and 

appointed to the Citizens Clean Elections Commission—be severed for 

violating the Arizona Constitution. First, the Arizona Supreme Court held 

that the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments could not 

nominate Clean Elections Commissioners because it was beyond the 

scope of their constitutional authority under the state constitution. The 

court held that any exercise of legislative power is subject to the 

limitations imposed by the state constitution. In this case, the authority 

that the Citizens Clean Elections Act gave the Commission on Appellate 

Court Appointments to appoint Clean Elections Commissioners was 

beyond its scope. That section of the Act requiring the Commission on 

Appellate Court Appointments to nominate Clean Elections 

Commissioners was removed, and the governor was required to select 

Clean Elections Commissioners without the slate of candidates from the 

Commission on Appellate Court Appointments. 

The Arizona Supreme Court next examined the section of the Citizens 

Clean Elections Act requiring senatorial concurrence in the governor’s 

decision to remove any member of the Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission. The court disagreed with the trial court and held that there 

was no violation of separation of powers. Because the Citizens Clean 

Elections Commission is an independent agency, the requirement for 

senatorial concurrence does not hinder the governor’s ability to carry out 

his or her duties. 

The Arizona Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether it was 

unconstitutional under the state constitution for members of the Supreme 

Court of Arizona to make appointments to the Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the act violated the 

doctrine of separation of powers to the extent that it included members of 

the court as officials who could appoint members of the Commission. The 

court reasoned that the appointment process was unrelated to the court’s 

judicial power and that members of the court (an apolitical body) were 

called upon to make political decisions. The court held that the provision 
Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to 

Maine’s and Arizona’s Public Financing 

Programs 

Page 100 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

in question was severable from the rest of the Act and allowed the rest of 

the act to stand. 

Table 24: Arizona Litigation – Sources for Public Funding 

Case citation Synopsis of the legal challenge Decision of the court 

Arizona Supreme Court 

May v. McNally, 

203 Ariz. 425, 55 P.3d 768 

(Ariz. 2002) 

Secretary of State, State Treasurer, and Citizens 

Clean Elections Commission sought review of the 

Court of Appeals decision that struck down the 10-

percent surcharge provision in the Citizens Clean 

Elections Act. 

The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the Court 

of Appeals and held the surcharge funding 

provision to be constitutional. The high court 

reasoned: (1) the surcharge was a tax assessed 

against all citizens who pay civil and criminal fines; 

(2) there was no defined association, so 

germaneness is irrelevant; (3) the government 

could use public funds to finance political speech; 

and (4) funds were allocated in a viewpoint neutral 

way to safeguard First Amendment rights. 

Source: GAO analysis of court decision. 

The most recent challenge to the Citizens Clean Elections Act focused on 

whether two of the act’s sources of funding violated the First Amendment. 

The two sources that were challenged were an annual $100 fee from 

lobbyists who work for commercial or for-profit entities and a 10-percent 

surcharge imposed on all persons paying civil and criminal fines, such as 

parking fines. The lobbyist fees were found to be unconstitutional by the 

Superior Court; however, the court also found the provisions severable. 

See Lavis v. Bayless, CV 2001-006078 (Superior Court of Arizona, 2001). 

The 10-percent surcharge on civil and criminal fines was ultimately 

decided by the Arizona Supreme Court to be constitutional. 

The Arizona Supreme Court found that those paying the surcharge were 

not linked to any one viewpoint or message; instead, the surcharge funded 

all qualified candidates. Furthermore, the court found that the surcharge 

was not applied in an unconstitutional manner or for an unconstitutional 

purpose. 

The Institute for Justice, a public interest litigation organization, recently 

appealed the decision, on behalf of State Representative and plaintiff Steve 

May, to the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has 

decided to not hear the challenge to the Arizona law. 
Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 

Page 101 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 
Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 

Page 102 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 

Page 103 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 

Page 104 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 

Page 105 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 

Page 106 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 

Page 107 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Maine 2000 Elections 

Page 108 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 

Page 109 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 
Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 

Page 110 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 

Page 111 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 

Page 112 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 

Page 113 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 

Page 114 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 

Page 115 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office 

in the Arizona 2000 Elections 

Page 116 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 117 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Our survey by mail1 of all candidates for office in Maine’s and Arizona’s 

2000 elections contained an ending statement inviting respondents to 

provide any comments they believed were important about the effects of 

the respective state’s public financing program (see app. IV and V). We did 

not independently evaluate the merits of the respondents’ comments. 

However, we did group and list the comments by topic, as presented in the 

following two sections—the first for comments provided by Maine 

candidates and the second for comments provided by Arizona candidates. 

With some exceptions, such as responses that were irrelevant or unclear, 

substantially all of the comments are arrayed by topic in a table in the 

respective section. To ensure inclusiveness and avoid subjectivity in 

presenting the comments, we did not eliminate any candidate’s comments 

even though the comments perhaps were the same as (or very similar to) 

comments made by another candidate. Also, except for some minor 

editing for grammar or clarity, the comments are presented as worded by 

the responding candidates. 

As perhaps may be expected, many of the comments followed ideological 

lines. For example, although there were some exceptions, nonparticipating 

candidates generally commented that financing the campaigns of political 

candidates was an inappropriate use of tax dollars, whereas participating 

candidates usually endorsed public financing. Collectively, the widely 

divergent and sometimes virulent comments seem to indicate that 

reaching a consensus regarding the value of the public financing programs 

may be unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. 

We received written comments from 157 respondents to our survey of 

candidates for office in Maine’s 2000 elections. In reference to Maine’s 

public financing program, the 157 respondents consisted of 97 

nonparticipating candidates and 60 participating candidates. 

Table 25 presents the comments of the responding candidates. 

 1

Appendix I discusses the scope and methodology of our work regarding the survey 

questionnaires we mailed to candidates. This work—including pretesting of the 

questionnaires, initial distribution, and follow-up inquiries—was conducted during July 

through December 2002. We mailed the survey to the candidates in mid-August 2002, which 

was close in timing to the primary election date in each state. Maine’s primary election was 

June 11, 2002, and Arizona’s primary election was September 10, 2002. Although the survey 

was mailed to candidates who ran in Maine’s and Arizona’s 2000 elections, some of the 

comments provided by the candidates were related to events surrounding the 2002 

elections in each state. 

Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Comments Provided 

by Maine Candidates 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 118 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 25: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 2000 Elections 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Use of public funds The public financing program is a tax on the citizens of this state and is 

allowing a large amount of money to be spent by some individuals at 

taxpayers’ expense. 

Tax funding of campaigns is an immoral and unproductive welfare 

program for politicians and will not work. I advocate abolishing all 

contribution and spending limits and reporting requirements. Campaign 

finance laws protect incumbents and enhance the power of the press, 

while destroying the First Amendment rights of others. 

I am opposed to spending Maine’s hard-earned tax dollars on 

campaigns. If you are popular with your constituents and they believe 

in you and what you stand for, they will donate to your campaign. 

I totally disagree with using the state’s tax dollars and general fund to 

finance candidates. If clean elections was based on only the amount 

collected for the signatures, I may support it. Otherwise, it adds one 

more layer of state bureaucracy. 

No taxpayer should be forced to support a candidate financially. 

Political action committee (PAC) spending and union support (i.e., 

workers paid with no management accounting for cost) made the socalled “clean” election system a joke. GAO’s questionnaire is slanted 

towards the continuance of this outrageous program. 

My strongest objection to the program is that it forces taxpayers to fund 

candidates that they may not support. 

Many people complained to me that their money should not be used for 

everyone. They felt the candidate should raise his or her own money 

with a cap on the amount spent. 

Public funding is a bad way to finance campaigns. 

There are better uses of public money. If people would use it, 

accountability exists in the private funding system. 

Publicly funded elections fly directly in the face of freedom. 

Tax dollars should not be used for campaigns. 

Paying health insurance for our retired teachers should be done before 

we begin to subsidize names on ballots. Maine has the highest state 

and local taxes of any state in the nation, and our income tax hits its 

highest rate at approximately $14,000 per year. Our legislative districts 

are small; raising campaign contributions by canvassing door to door 

and attending PTA meetings is the norm. People know each other 

here. 

This is a good program and should 

be continued, although some 

changes are needed. 

This is a great program. It needs to 

be continued, with some tighteningup of loopholes. 

This is a terrific program, even if it is 

not perfect. 

My personal experience was that the 

public financing program was a valid 

attempt at campaign reform. 

While the public financing program is 

not perfect, it begins the process of 

returning power to the people. 

The program has enhanced 

democracy and will return power to 

voters in the long run. 

This program helps the electoral 

process and is good for democracy. 

Maine’s public financing program 

should be a pilot program for federal 

elections. 

The Maine Clean Election Act is the 

best thing that could ever happen to 

our government. It is a great example 

for national elections, and such 

reform should be greatly 

encouraged. 

I support the use of publicly funded 

elections. I think it is good for the 

people of Maine and, for that matter, 

any state. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 119 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

The money spent on this program could be spent on the needs of 

senior citizens, such as prescription drugs. 

Maine cannot afford to fund candidates at the expense of taxpayers. 

I am not a proponent of the public financing program. In difficult times, 

as we now have, I do not feel that taxpayers should be funding 

elections. 

Public financing is another drain on public funds. 

The public financing program is another sock-it-to-the-taxpayer form of 

taxation. In my opinion, voters were not aware of what they were voting 

for in 1996. The voters saw the words “clean elections” and thought it 

would solve the issue. The program infringes on the First Amendment 

guarantee of free speech. 

With $250 million or more in revenue shortfalls versus spending 

commitments, Maine should not be financing elections when there are 

insufficient funds to pay for day-to-day operations of government. 

Due to the present state deficit, the public funding program should be 

reduced or repealed. It is a luxury that the state can ill afford. It is hard 

for me to use taxpayers’ money when there are so many more 

important needs. 

Public financing is wonderful for first-time candidates because they 

have difficulty raising money. But, special interests will always find 

ways to promote their allies. Thus, all in all, tax money can be put to 

better use. 

I ran with traditional financing in 2000 and with public financing in 2002. 

Public funding has made it easier to run as a state representative; I 

have more time to go to the voters’ homes. But, I am not sure if they 

like candidates spending taxpayer money. 

Taxpayer funds should not be spent in this manner. Taxpayers have no 

real understanding of the process and the “games” that are played. 

There are lots of problems with this program. It should be repealed. 

Public financing has added millions of dollars to political campaigns 

without any other noticeable changes. We are spending public funds on 

something that is of no benefit to the taxpayers. Ask the person on the 

street if his or her legislator is a participant or not in the public financing 

program. The blank stare you get will answer your question. 

The current budget crisis will erode public support for taxpayer funding 

of politicians, as will the giving of $1 million in public funds to a Green 

Party candidate for governor. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 120 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Number of 

candidates and 

electoral 

competition 

The only reason more candidates will opt for public financing is that the 

law and its implementation are punitive towards traditionally funded 

candidates. 

This year (2002), there seem to be quite a few candidates, at least in 

my area, who have chosen to be clean election candidates. They did it 

only to avoid having to raise money. They did not talk to constituents to 

obtain the $5 contributions; friends did it for them. The law has made 

candidates more lazy, especially incumbents. 

More candidates are choosing public financing because it involves no 

fundraising efforts. It is a somewhat lazy approach of letting taxpayers 

do your work. 

If the goal of Maine’s public financing program was to elect people for 

office who would not normally be elected, I believe it was partly 

successful. Time will tell if the people got what they wanted. 

Maine’s public financing system has proven to be very successful. It 

especially helped to recruit female candidates. 

The public financing program has made it easier to find candidates in 

rural districts. 

The program may have encouraged some candidates to run, but it has 

not had much effect in my opinion. 

This may be a simplistic view, but I think the Maine Clean Election Act 

does make a difference. Although I withdrew my candidacy, I 

considered it much more seriously because I knew public funding 

would help me to run a decent campaign against a very strong 

incumbent. 

The program has encouraged massive fraud by having insincere 

“paper candidates” take the money and run half-hearted campaigns 

just to tie up the incumbent. Also, they use the money (for phone 

banks, graphic artists, overhead, etc.) to support other competitive 

campaigns. Further, because fundraising expenditures are not 

deducted, conventional candidates have a financial disadvantage. 

People voted for the Maine Clean Election Act because they thought 

dirty campaigning (e.g., personal attack ads) would stop. Yet, the 2000 

election was one of the dirtiest campaign scenes that I have witnessed 

in over 30 years. I got many calls asking, “How come so and so can 

say that about her opponent?” I explained that all Maine’s Act does is 

to ensure that tax dollars will pay for participating candidates’ 

campaigns. This is a very bad piece of legislation. 

Races will continue to get nastier because, by law, independent 

expenditures and issue advocacy spending cannot be coordinated with 

or attributed to candidates. 

The program gives a greater number 

of people a chance to run for office. 

I support Maine’s public financing 

program. We have been able to 

recruit more candidates of diverse 

backgrounds. 

I know my opponent could not have 

run without public funding, and I am 

pleased that he did run. 

Without public funding, I would not 

have been able to launch a 

campaign or run as a candidate. 

Absent the public financing program, 

I seriously doubt that I would have 

ever run for office. And, I am sure 

that many other candidates were 

similarly influenced by the program. 

I remain a committed supporter of 

clean elections. A greater and more 

varied population of candidates is 

now able to run. The requirements 

are high enough to exclude 

candidates who lack community 

support or credibility. The system is 

well run in Maine. 

Public financing is changing the 

nature and number of candidates 

and campaigns in Maine. In 

particular, third-party candidates are 

accessing funds to run viable 

campaigns. In general, my 

constituents seem to support the 

motivating principles that initiated this 

program but do not understand 

where the money is coming from. 

I have significant concerns when a 

third-party candidate, such as the 

Green Party’s gubernatorial 

candidate in the 2002 election, can 

get public funding even though he 

received a mere 5 percent of the 

votes in the previous election. It is a 

terrible waste to use public funds for 

an unelectable candidate’s 

propaganda. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 121 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

I am very concerned about how marginal third-party candidates will 

influence the outcome of close elections. I think we will have too many 

officials elected with less than 50 percent of the vote. We may need to 

have run-off elections. 

Public financing only clutters the field of candidates by putting radicals 

on the ballots—radicals who get support only from a few other radicals. 

If a candidate cannot garner enough support to run, he is not capable 

of performing the duties of office. The people know who should run, 

and they show it with contributions. Get rid of public financing! 

Soliciting contributions enlightens the voters about the political program 

of the potential candidate. Also, this traditional fundraising process 

shows the reluctance of voters to contribute or not contribute to the 

candidate’s program. 

Public financing is creating a Green Party spoiler in the governor’s race 

in the 2002 election. 

Candidates running for a higher or 

statewide office (e.g., governor) 

should have to demonstrate viability 

by first being elected to serve in a 

lower office. 

The only reservation I have is that 

public financing can be obtained by 

people who cannot win an election 

because they are too single-issue 

oriented or are not widely supported. 

They become spoilers, potentially 

causing candidates to be elected by 

a plurality rather than a majority. 

There are about 4,000 to 5,000 

voters in each House district. A 

candidate’s physical ability to 

campaign has at least as much to do 

with the outcome as money. It is 

possible to knock on every door in a 

district if necessary. 

Party loyalty and party organization 

are critical to helping a clean 

elections candidate. Such candidates 

must have a “campaign place” in 

order to be effective. 

Interest Group 

Influence 

The implication that publicly funded candidates are “clean” and 

traditional candidates are not is offensive to me. The hypothesis that 

Maine legislators are driven by whoever provides financial support to 

campaigns is bogus. This program is a solution looking for a problem. 

I resent the fact of being labeled a dirty candidate if I do not participate 

in the program. 

The “clean election” designation for those taking advantage of the 

public funding program implies that the traditional candidate may not be 

“clean.” This is unfortunate and should be changed. 

The use of “clean” is a poor choice of words as it denotes a negative 

for the other candidates. 

I think the public is being deluded into thinking that public financing 

takes big money out of elections and that the term “clean candidate” 

means something. I also think partisanship is even more involved in 

elections now than when individuals had to pay their own way or raise 

their own funds. 

Maine’s current law does not adequately limit the behind-the-scenes 

roles played by the most powerful players, that is, the parties and their 

most powerful lobby groups—business, labor, National Rifle 

Accepting public financing gives me 

the feeling that I truly represent the 

people and not a lobby. 

Running as a clean election 

candidate was a liberating 

experience that most people seemed 

to appreciate. 

The program has contributed to 

lessening the impact on and control 

of candidacies by special interests. 

However, term limits have increased 

the impact of lobbies in the halls and 

committee rooms. The final result 

regarding the influence of lobbies 

may be negligible, but more “regular” 

people are running for office. 

Public confidence in politics is crucial 

if democracy is to survive. Publicly 

financed campaigns help to increase 

that confidence by leveling the 

playing field and driving candidates 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 122 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Association, abortion rights, etc. They put out the most blatant negative 

ads and literature. Successful candidates know exactly to whom they 

are beholden, even if the candidates received no money directly from 

these groups. 

If the program’s purpose was to ensure some integrity in the election 

process, it is a huge failure. If they lack integrity, candidates and 

supporters will always find loopholes. 

I feel that the program has increased negative presentations by 

advocacy groups, and it could have the effect of weakening the twoparty system. Special interests rather than candidates will have the 

greatest voice. Without their consent, candidates could be endorsed by 

groups in ads that do not reflect the candidates’ views. 

I believe the program has helped restore the public’s faith in the 

integrity of candidates. Hopefully, many other states, and eventually 

Congress, will adopt public funding of elections. 

I did not accept funding from any group. I ran a low-key campaign and 

paid my own bills. In this way, when I walked through the door at 

Maine’s House of Representatives, I was my own person. I owed no 

one person or any group anything. 

The public funding program removes a certain contact with people for 

fundraising. Some view traditional candidates as being influenced by 

funding services; others view such candidates as being responsive. 

I have found that voters generally do not care whether you are running 

as a publicly funded candidate or not. Maine’s Act was passed as a 

knee-jerk reaction to a ballot irregularity. 

Until honest people are elected, you will not have clean elections. 

Maine’s law does the complete opposite of its intended purpose. 

back to grassroots campaigns that 

connect them directly with voters. 

There is no question that public 

financing requires constituent 

participation. Running a campaign is 

not about getting and raising money; 

it is about meeting and talking to the 

people and engaging them in the 

election process. 

I welcomed the ability to be 

independent from groups who try to 

exert influence on the basis of 

monetary support. 

To be elected to the state legislature 

and not feel beholden to anyone 

except my constituents is a liberating 

feeling. 

The most important effect of the 

public financing program has been to 

free legislatures from the influence of 

campaign contributors. 

The program has removed private 

fund raising. The issue is: How 

influential were the private check 

writers on the way legislators voted. 

It did not impact me, because I voted 

on the basis of whether legislation 

was good or bad for my constituents 

and the people of Maine. 

I like the idea of not having to answer 

to big companies after they give big 

bucks to your campaign. 

I felt a great deal of freedom after 

being elected because I had only my 

constituents to answer to. 

Make Maine’s law stronger and 

continue to reduce the role of 

lobbying groups. 

The program may lead to changing 

this country from an oligarchy of 

corporate and special interests to 

something approaching democracy. 

I probably would not be a traditionally
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 123 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

funded candidate because financial 

influence is too much of a precedent 

in state and national campaigns. 

It is time that the rich, both personal 

and companies, be stopped from 

running our country. With “clean 

elections,” the candidates’ time and 

energy will be spent on 

communicating and working with the 

people they represent. 

The general public is in great need of 

education regarding the benefits of 

publicly financed elections systems. 

The public believes that all politicians 

are bought and paid for by special 

interest groups, and the public is not 

all wrong. 

I wish PACs and special interests 

could be stopped from interfering 

with democracy. 

The way Maine’s law is now written, 

a publicly funded candidate must 

demonstrate a strong fund-raising 

ability and come up with more private 

donors than usually found in a 

traditional campaign. Where are 

likely donors found? Sources are the 

same as used by traditional 

candidates—groups with 

membership lists, such as political 

parties, unions, service 

organizations, non-profit and activist 

entities, and church groups, as well 

as people you work with. In short, 

special interests have not been 

removed from campaigns. 

Campaign 

spending: 

independent 

expenditures and 

issue advocacy 

spending 

Independent expenditures are a big problem for senate and statewide 

office races. 

Maine now has a soft money problem where none existed before. Our 

campaigns are now much more expensive, and the races have more 

dirty politics than ever. Political action committees (PACs) spend the 

same or more money now—in addition to the “clean funds,” doubling 

expenditures. The public can no longer trace the money being dumped 

into campaigns. Special interest groups and lobbyists are stronger here 

now more than ever because it is almost impossible to get elected 

without PAC expenditures. More issue advocacy and soft money move 

through the party organizations. This program was a bad move for 

Maine. 

I am very concerned that 

independent expenditures and issue 

advocacy will be the major source of 

information for the voters. Both of 

these types of communications come 

from somewhere other than the 

candidate, perhaps even serving to 

trump the candidate’s message due 

to unlimited funds. The increase in 

independent expenditure is an 

unintended consequence of public 

funding. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 124 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Maine’s public financing program has created a major problem with soft 

money—independent expenditures and issue advocacy—where none 

existed before. 

The public financing program has created a soft money problem in 

Maine, when no problem existed prior to the change. 

Independent expenditures are increasing. Every candidate under a true 

clean election system should receive exactly the same amount of 

funds, and independent expenditures should not be allowed under the 

law. 

I ran as a traditional candidate in 2000. I am running with public funds 

in 2002 because my opponent is also publicly financed. There are too 

many ways that independent expenditures can be made and just as 

many ways the incumbent can spend to inform his or her constituency. 

Public financing is not always really an equal playing field. Why not just 

limit the amount of money a candidate can raise? 

It is erroneous to believe that candidates are unaware of independent 

expenditures. Both Democratic and Republican party leaders use 

PACs to exploit the loophole. 

If public funds are used, PACs should be outlawed. 

The “clean” candidates are using “leadership PACs” to collect funds for 

other candidates. The parties are finding ways to get around limits. 

Labor unions and interest groups are just going on as usual. 

PAC money can be used by all except the candidate. It is much too 

easy to get around the regulations. 

In its infancy, the public funding program creates more of a hardship for 

the participating candidate, as the races most often are composed of 

one participating and one non-participating candidates. Traditional 

candidates have the ability to go to special interest groups and bury a 

publicly financed opponent under a volume of ads. 

The public financing program does not help the system because more 

independent expenditures are occurring, which thwarts the intent of the 

program. 

I have already seen an extensive shift to advocacy advertising. It is a 

real change in how elections are done. Total spending has really 

grown. 

Independent candidates, such as myself, are seriously disadvantaged 

in that there are no limits on issue advocacy spending and independent 

expenditures, since no one does these on our behalf. I did not chose 

public financing, but not because of spending limits. I won each of my 

races with increasing majorities and spent far less than $6,000. 

Campaigns do not have to be expensive. 

Issue advocacy spending is a 

loophole in the clean elections law. 

Under current policy, participating 

candidates can benefit from such 

spending without breaking the rules 

of the public financing program. It 

puts candidates who follow the 

program fairly at a disadvantage. We 

must not allow issue advocacy 

communications to mention the 

names of candidates or parties. 

Independent expenditures are the 

only trouble spot. I do not know how 

to solve it, except by requirement to 

file (maybe 6 weeks before the 

election) an “intent” to make 

expenditures on behalf of a 

candidate. It drove me crazy when a 

group in 2000 did a mailing on my 

behalf that misled voters on where I 

stood on the issue. I had no control 

over the mailing, which also resulted 

in freeing up money for my opponent 

to spend. 

There is no accountability for 

independent expenditures. A publicly 

financed candidate is at the mercy of 

last-minute independent 

expenditures for opponents and has 

no opportunity to respond in kind 

before the election. 

Candidates should not be allowed to 

create their own PACs. 

Leadership, particularly in the 

Democratic Party, continues to raise 

monies to share with candidates. 

There should be limits on 

independent expenditures and 

outside monies. I ran my campaign in 

one of Maine’s poorest counties; to 

ask individuals to finance large 

amounts for politics is obscene. 

To limit “hard” money from going 

“soft,” there must be restrictions 

(e.g., disclosure, disincentives, etc.) 

on independent expenditures. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 125 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

I think that if you are running as a clean candidate, none of the parties 

should spend money on the candidate. 

Campaign 

spending: overall 

amounts 

There is more money in Maine politics than ever before. The clean 

elections law has done more harm than good. 

Public financing of elections has increased the amount of money spent 

on campaigns in this state. I am sorry that I voted as a legislator for this 

program. 

Having a publicly financed opponent in 2000 drove my spending higher 

because I knew he had enough money for radio and TV; and, his party 

was running negative ads against some of our candidates. I bought 

several thousand dollars of radio ads that I had not planned to spend. I 

expect to spend less money in the 2002 election because my opponent 

did not qualify for public funds. 

I was unopposed in my 2000 campaign; the total cost was only about 

$1,900. Public financing reduces the fund-raising of traditionally 

financed candidates. Some constituents who support public financing 

no longer contribute to the campaigns of privately funded candidates, 

although the constituents still support the candidate and did contribute 

in the past. 

I found that candidates who were in the public financing program 

bragged about the fact that they spent more money than when they 

were not in program because it was not money they had to raise. 

All candidates should be allowed to receive and spend no more than 

$5,000 per campaign year to support their campaign—or an amount 

equal to that of their opponent, if less than $5,000. 

I limited my campaign expenditures to $5,000 and dedicated my efforts 

to the less-costly, door-to-door campaign. 

The provisions of the law that made corporate contributions illegal and 

reduced the maximum contributions from individuals were good. 

Allowing matching funds for little effort by a public financed candidate 

does not make sense. An example is the Green Party candidate in the 

2002 gubernatorial race. Consistently unable to get votes from Maine 

voters, he will probably get over $1 million of taxpayer money and may 

become a “spoiler.” 

I feel that the public financing 

program decreased the amount of 

money spent in my race. 

Publicly financed campaigns helped 

me to be more responsible with my 

finances. I made a conscious effort to 

be more thrifty so as not to deplete 

the public coffer. 

Maine’s public financing program has 

removed a lot of “big money” from 

legislative races. 

I take exception to the fact that 

candidates who participated in the 

public funding program were still able 

to be associated with PACs. 

If you are a “clean election 

candidate,” you should not be 

allowed to form a PAC for a 

leadership position. 

A candidate should be allowed to 

spend only the allotted amount of 

money—with no other financing, 

such as PACs. 

Unfortunately, pressure to raise 

money for the party caucuses will 

continue to affect voting within the 

parties at the state level. 

More funds should be available to 

challengers than to incumbents, who 

have the advantage of receiving 

extra press coverage and using their 

office newsletters and materials from 

previous elections. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 126 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Lots of public money goes to the participating candidates, who spend 

about four times the amounts they would spend if taxpayer funds were 

not being used. 

The public funds are too easily spent—overkill on signs and junk—a big 

waste. Many candidates who use public funds know it is a joke; but, it 

is easy money. 

The amount of money needed to finance a House of Representatives 

race in rural Maine is not the same as that needed for urban areas. If 

the Maine Clean Election Act is retained, the initial dollars to be 

distributed to a participating candidate should be recalculated based on 

the particular district’s record. Having an opponent who was publicly 

funded forced me to more than double my funding and expenditures in 

2002 compared to 2000. 

Because public funding amounts are based on average expenditures in 

previous cycles, the program pours money into non-competitive races 

and provides insufficient funds for competitive districts. 

Public funding is more important in Senate races than House races 

because of geography and the need for more campaign dollars. 

In early 2002, thousands of dollars were given out in public financing 

for a special election to fill a vacated legislative seat. These sums led to 

a spending spree for a seat to be filled for only a few weeks. 

Participation in the public financing program makes a candidate think 

before spending. The program is a step in the right direction and is 

good for cleaner elections. 

In 2000, inadequate funding was 

available for Senate races. As an 

incumbent, I had a huge advantage 

over my publicly funded opponent. In 

2002, I faced a traditionally funded 

opponent. Loopholes allowed him to 

raise money in an uncontested 

primary—money that never will be 

matched and gave him an unfair 

advantage. 

In 2000, I had no opposition in my 

race for the state legislature. 

However, because I am so 

passionate about public financing, I 

ran as a clean elections candidate. In 

2002, I am running again with public 

funds. I have a Republican opponent 

and feel that I have more than 

enough money to win again. 

Program scope All candidates should be on an equal playing field. Either all candidates 

or none should be publicly financed. 

The program is flawed because it is not mandatory and universal. 

Public financing should be for all candidates or none. As it stands now, 

the program is a farce. 

For this system to work, it must become a requirement across the 

board. I sincerely hope this will happen, because it then will accomplish 

what I would like to believe was the original purpose—to elect 

representatives unencumbered by obligation to select populations. 

The program should apply only to candidates for the state legislature 

and not to gubernatorial candidates. 

I believe that public financing should 

not be granted to incumbents. The 

program’s purpose should be to 

encourage newcomers and not to 

perpetuate career politicians. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 127 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Program 

administration 

The Maine Governmental Ethics and Election Practices Commission is 

run by the majority party. Thus, one party is “off the hook,” and the 

other party’s members are harassed. 

The reporting procedures are a burden and unreliable. 

Sections of Maine’s law regarding reporting are problematic. What 

happens when a non-participant goes over time frames and limits for 

outside expenditures? 

The reporting forms and information requirements are worse than those 

for tax purposes. 

The idea of publicly financed campaigns is good. It is my perception, 

however, that Maine’s program adds to the time spent on filling out and 

filing forms. One of my greatest fears is that I may make a mistake on a 

form, or fail to submit a report on time, and be held up to criticism as an 

incompetent or a criminal. The system should be simplified if it is to be 

effective. 

The requirement for $5 contributions should be dropped; people do not 

understand it. 

The use of money orders for the $5 contributions should be banned. 

Anyone can generate money orders to get credit for the required 

number of contributors. 

I do not believe the public in general knows a great deal about the 

public funding process, unless they know a particular candidate who is 

running in the program. 

I did not run with public funds because I did not want to deal with the 

requirements. But, even though I got no public money, I ended up 

having to deal with the program’s requirements anyway because my 

opponent participated. So, in the future, I think that I will run with public 

funds if my opponent does. 

Another bureaucracy will expand, more forms will be created, and the 

bureaucracy in general will begin to influence who runs for public office 

and how. Eventually, the state will be making more rules in how people 

should run. 

The possibility of abuse should be 

studied so as to avoid candidates 

taking advantage of the process. 

Greater clarity needs to be brought to 

the process. A candidate was able to 

spend $385 for a dinner for four 

people, while I was not allowed to 

purchase a copy machine that cost 

less. 

My local jurisdiction consistently 

violated my civil rights and made it 

almost impossible for me to comply 

with the new law in a timely fashion. 

To be useful, matching funds based 

on last-minute expenditures by a 

non-participating candidate should 

be sent out earlier than the last week 

of the campaign. Also, collection of 

the $5 contributions should be 

allowed in cash if the donees sign 

the appropriate form. 

There are lots of issues dealing with 

the timing of funds. My opponent 

“hid” his expenses until the last 

minute. So, my matching funds came 

too late to be helpful. 

Planned expenditures (with the 

knowledge of the candidate) timed 

just before the election must be 

controlled. The matching funds arrive 

so late they have to be returned 

because it would be a waste to run a 

responding ad for the election. 

When the $5 contributions are 

received, the routing numbers on the 

checks should remain private for 

their protection. Also, the law needs 

to be more specific about whether 

more than one check is needed for 

contributions from family members. 

Other than the last-minute 

expenditures of funds on behalf of 

Republican and Democratic 

candidates—expenditures made so 

late (although no doubt planned 

much earlier) that the matching funds 

could not be intelligently spent—I 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 128 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

believe that the public financing 

program worked well and was fairly 

implemented by the state officials. 

One loophole involves bank accounts 

opened by a candidate’s family 

members and used to promote the 

candidate. 

I ran against an incumbent who was 

able to send out a flyer at state 

expense describing her 

accomplishments as a state senator, 

and she had weekly articles in the 

press. None of this counted as 

campaign expenses. The limitations 

of Maine’s Act prevented me from 

countering this. I could afford only 

one flyer and just one or two small 

newspaper advertisements. Our 

press releases on issues were not 

considered newsworthy, while an 

incumbent senator’s activities were. 

GAO’s survey did not explore the 

effect that incumbency has on 

campaigning. 

There remain loopholes to be closed, 

such as last-minute expenditures that 

might incur a small “penalty” but 

would result in an election victory. 

Other At the outset, the system seemed complicated. But, once tried, the 

participants showed that it could be almost fun, politically speaking. 

Candidates had an additional chance for face-to-face contact with 

potential constituents, and the candidates boasted about how well they 

were able to do. 

I did not use public funding because I did not have time during the busy 

legislative session. 

The public program is ridiculous. Repeal this program or remove the 

holes left for money to still flow in. In its current form, the program is a 

sham. 

The name of the program should be changed to “Maine’s TaxpayerFunded Elections Law.” 

In the 2000 election, I came in on the deadline and was unable to 

qualify for public funding; the funds would have assisted me greatly. In 

the 2002 election, I did qualify and find that I can better use my time 

talking with and listening to people in the district. I support the Maine 

Clean Election Act. 

In Maine, the essential reality is that 

you are at a competitive 

disadvantage if you do not run as a 

participating candidate. 

My opponent and I both used public 

funds. We treated each other with 

respect, and we encouraged our 

supporters not to use dirty tricks. We 

cooperated in trying to show that a 

clean campaign was better for all, 

even though we disagreed 

remarkably on the issues. 

Term limits must be repealed. Limits 

are needed only on the number of 

years in committee chair and 

leadership positions. State agencies 

and lobbyists are becoming more 

and more powerful because of term 

limits. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 129 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

No one wants to run for office. The biggest problem is low pay and the 

amount of time spent in the state capital. You have to be retired or a 

secondary wage earner in order to take the time needed. 

I am pleased to be running as a publicly funded candidate in my 

second campaign (2002); it proved to be simpler to manage. 

More time is needed to evaluate the program. 

For every hour of effort that goes into drafting a law, three are spend 

trying to skirt it. 

In 2000, my publicly financed opponent found numerous ways to get 

around the regulations. It made a mockery of the intent of the law. The 

program gave her free assistance, which was worth a great deal 

financially. Whatever one person invents, another person will find a 

way to circumvent. 

Influential parties and organizations are already trying to sway public 

opinion against public financing. 

The law had no effect on number of votes cast. 

The program is a wasted effort.. 

In 2000, I decided to run for office 

because of term limits. Because I 

was new to politics, the Democratic 

chair thought I should go with public 

funding. It was right for me at the 

time. 

The state legislature wanted to make 

many changes in the public funding 

program after the first election cycle. 

Small tweaking is okay; but, in my 

opinion, there should be no real big 

changes until after one or two more 

election cycles. 

Source: Response to question 25 of GAO’s survey of candidates for office in Maine’s 2000 elections (see app. IV). 

Note: Each sentence (or paragraph) entry under a given topic in the table is a comment uniquely 

attributable to one candidate. That is, under each topic, each entry is a comment from a separate 

person. Some candidates provided comments that covered more than one topic. In these instances, 

the table presents the applicable portion of the comments under the appropriate topic. 

We received written comments from 86 respondents to our survey of 

candidates for office in Arizona’s 2000 elections. In reference to the state’s 

public financing program, the 86 respondents consisted of 66 

nonparticipating candidates and 20 participating candidates. 

Table 26 presents the comments of the responding candidates. 

Comments Provided 

by Arizona 

Candidates 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 130 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Table 26: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for Office in Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Use of public funds The public financing program should be judged unconstitutional. 

Arizona laws already restrict campaign fundraising and provide for 

full disclosure. The public funding program is an issue of the 

Democrats, was given a catchy name on the ballot, and is 

supported by the liberal media. The program’s purpose is to gain 

advantage over Republicans. 

The public was hoodwinked to approve this initiative (by a margin 

of less than 1 percent) with ads stating the initiative would “get dirty 

money out of politics.” 

The public financing program should be available for all city, state, 

and federal elections. 

Since the number of participating candidates increased significantly 

from 2000 to 2002, many candidates must feel that public financing 

is a good program. I surely do. In 2000, there was too much 

uncertainty about the law to use it in a competitive district. I spent 

only $7,000 and lost by 180 votes out of 12,000. My opponent 

spent $40,000 or nearly $200 for each of the 180 votes. 

Although it would have saved me time and money, I do not believe 

it is the government’s role to finance campaigns. Taxes are too 

high, and these dollars should be used on beneficial programs. 

Public financing is campaign welfare. 

The program wastes public funds, infringes on free speech rights, 

goes against the founding principles of our country, and increases 

fraud. 

Arizona is in dire financial need. These funds should be spent on 

existing programs now being cut or eliminated. Candidates, staff, 

and precinct committeemen start looking like beggars trying to 

achieve their quotas of $5 contributions. 

The program is a socialist scam. 

Public funding is a terrible program and will destroy the democratic 

elections process if continued. 

Most candidates, including me, have little faith in the ability of the 

new public financing program to work. 

The program is tyrannical, punitive, and anti-American. It is lazy 

man’s financing. 

All candidates should raise their own money. If you cannot raise 

money—i.e., you do not have support—you should not be given tax 

Public financing is a very good thing 

but definitely is not a panacea for our 

money-dominated political system. 

The program is costing taxpayers a 

lot of money that could be going to 

more worthwhile uses for the state. 

The program is an excellent example 

of campaign finance reform. All 

states should have it. 

Having run as a participating 

candidate, I am convinced of the 

value of public financing of elections. 

Candidates have more time to spend 

with voters, adequate funds are 

provided for message delivery, and 

participants must demonstrate that 

they possess the bona fides of a 

serious candidate. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 131 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

dollars. Yes, reform is needed, but funding everyone with public 

money is not the answer. 

The law is a disaster and is designed to benefit the state’s 

Democratic Party. 

Arizona’s law is a moral outrage, suppresses free speech, and 

violates political and civil rights. The public financing program fails 

in its objective to “take the money out of politics.” The program 

simply creates a new political game with new rules and with money 

still playing a key role. 

The public funding program is bad policy, forces people to support 

candidates they do not agree with, and is unconstitutional. 

The public funding program is unconstitutional. 

The program is the worst concept to be proposed for elections. The 

government should not be buying elected officials. 

Public funding is a terrible program that should be discontinued. It 

is a sham by liberals to obtain money to get elected. 

Because I believe in true freedom of speech not hampered or 

helped through government, I do not support public financing of 

private campaigns. Further, the implementation of Arizona’s Act 

has all but eliminated free, fair, and democratic elections in the 

state. 

Number of candidates 

and electoral 

competition 

There may be more candidates this year, but there is less debate 

about even fewer ideas. The hot issue in the Republican 

gubernatorial and Attorney General campaigns this year (2002), 

was cash versus accrual accounting and punctuality in campaign 

paper work. A vigorous campaign about education, taxes, and 

health care was lost because a government agency charged with 

regulating finance for traditional candidates could not decide what 

the rules were before the contest began and dictated the terms of 

the public dialogue by distracting the media and the public with 

press conferences, egregious fines, and threats to disqualify 

legitimate candidates from the ballot. Arizona gained candidates, 

but we lost debate on the issues that matter. 

Clean elections money allowed some good candidates to be able 

to run. 

I think it is a great way to get more people to run for office in 

Arizona. Had I known more, I would have run as a participating 

candidate in 2000. 

Why should taxpayers fund fringe candidates? What publicly 

funded candidate ran and won who would not have won with the 

traditional method of raising money? 

While I fully support the public 

financing program, the court 

challenges reduced its efficacy in 

both 2000 and 2002. 

The program increased the number 

of candidates running; most are not 

qualified. 

Public financing is the only way that 

concerned, qualified, working 

individuals can become directly 

involved in the electoral and 

governing process. It provides for a 

more direct form of participation in 

our republican form of government. 

Clean elections open the door to the 

American dream of running for office. 

Now, not just the rich and those “in 

bed” with lobbyists can run. Qualified 

people can run and strengthen our 

democracy. I can only hope more 

states adopt public financing to clean 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 132 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

It is very difficult to assess the Arizona system from the 2000 cycle. 

The system was in legal limbo for a significant time, and fewer 

candidates participated for that reason. The 2002 cycle has many 

more participating candidates and will be a more realistic test run. 

Hopefully, the system will fulfill its promises. 

There were no new people elected because of public funding. Term 

limits are the reason for new faces. 

The program is great. It increased the competition dramatically in 

2002, and the effect should be huge by 2004. 

Public funding is insufficient to offset a well-heeled opponent. 

Pubic financing has opened up the political process to individuals 

who, in the past, either could not self-finance their campaign or had 

little or no access to contributors. 

The program increases the number of unqualified candidates. 

The program helps to bring in more candidates. Some changes are 

needed in the law, but it should not be repealed. 

Under the program, some not very bright people are getting 

elected, not because of their views or abilities but because they 

can make a bigger splash with signs and advertising. The balance 

now is too far in favor of publicly financed candidates. 

Under the public funding program, fringe candidates with no 

support run and waste resources. 

“Clean elections” is a bad law that favors incumbents with 

established name recognition. 

Public funding helped many new candidates run in 2000, especially 

in Tucson. The program was a significant boost to the Pima County 

Green Party, which ran candidates in most races. Many of these 

candidates made respectable showings at the polls. The program 

is very positive and should be continued. 

Too many candidates are running (prompted by term limits, 

redistricting, and government funding), and confusing elections are 

resulting. Candidates lacking viability are being encouraged (rather 

than discouraged) from running. The traditional funding system is 

an excellent way to separate the wheat from the chaff early on, 

before the public is forced to confront a herd of candidates on the 

ballot. 

up politics. 

More candidates are able to run for 

office. 

I ran for statewide office in 2002. 

Without public funding, I would not 

have run. 

Since 2000 was the first election 

under the public financing program, 

participation was not as great as it is 

this year (2002). 

Interest Group 

Influence 

Special interests can hide behind the collection of the $5 qualifying 

contributions. Under normal campaign limits, a special interest 

could at best raise 10 to 20 percent of a traditional candidate’s 

money. With clean elections, a special interest can be responsible 

for collecting all of a participating candidate’s $5 qualifying

In 1996, I had to raise my own 

money. In 2000, it was wonderful not 

having to raise money and not 

having to jump through hoops to get 

endorsements to obtain money. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 133 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

contributions. In reality, under clean elections, special interest 

involvement can be hidden or cloaked from disclosure. 

In Arizona, the publicly funded candidates accepted seed money 

from special interests at the same rate that I did as a nonparticipating candidate. If anyone believes that I can be influenced 

by $270, then they do not want me. 

Special interest groups and lobbyists have had, do have, and will 

always have a significant influence on the process. 

A candidate should serve his or her constituency instead of special 

interest groups. 

The public funding program does help to reduce the impact of 

lobbyists. 

The program does remove a lot of special interest money from the 

process, which results in better public policy. 

Having candidates interface with $5 contributors to get funding is 

much better than obtaining money from special interest 

contributors. 

The worst thing I disliked was that spokespersons for the Citizens 

Clean Elections Commission constantly referred to traditional 

candidates as bad apples. However, I felt that my integrity and 

honesty were intact. 

Any candidate still needs groups of people for support, whether it is 

for financial support or the vote. So, a participating candidate can 

still be lobbied. The public funding program does not make a 

participating candidate any less biased. 

Well-organized candidates were able to raise the $5 qualifying 

contributions with the assistance of organizations, unions, and 

special interest groups. I would have had to do it all on my own, 

with individual contributions. That was not possible for me; I did not 

have a campaign organization to help. 

In 2000, I ran with traditional funding. But, in 2002, because of an 

extremely wealthy candidate in my race, I chose to try the public 

financing program. It has been a disaster, and I would never do it 

again. It was easier to obtain sufficient money through fundraisers 

than to collect the $5 contributions. Labor unions collected most of 

the $5 contributions for Democratic candidates; there was not 

much work done by the candidates. 

The cash nature of the $5 contributions makes bundling and illegal 

activity in collection significant and not trackable. 

Under the public funding program, lobbyists are able to continue 

To me, it was wonderful not having to 

go to individual committees to grovel 

for money. I felt more powerful and 

independent. It was a better feeling 

than when I ran in 1998. 

Public financing takes special 

interest money out of government. 

This approach is the only way that 

elections should be run, at both the 

state level and nationally. 

With public financing, my interaction 

with traditional lobbyists changed; 

they had to pursue me. Some PACs 

seemed to automatically oppose me, 

even though I might have supported 

their issues. These entities seemed 

to respect only those candidates 

whom they could support financially. 

Arizonans seem well aware that the 

link between special interest money 

and special interest laws is strong 

and want to change it. Arizona and 

Maine are leading the way in the 

nation. Let’s hope a federal clean 

elections law is passed. 

Lobbyists will have less influence on 

candidates and legislators. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 134 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

their influence by simply “volunteering” to collect $5 contributions 

for participating candidates. 

Public funding does not produce “clean” campaigns or any real 

fairness. Political influence of special interests remains 

undiminished. Influence is gained by arranging for qualifying 

contributions. 

Special interests continue to exert tremendous influence on both 

privately and publicly funded candidates. The only difference is that 

the influence on privately funded candidates is fully disclosed and 

reported, while the influence on “clean” candidates is not disclosed 

anywhere. 

Campaign spending Clean elections allowed many people to just waste and spend 

money to run. 

I object to the fact that a participating candidate can get public 

money to match or equal the amount of money provided by 

supporters of a traditional candidate. Clean elections is a bad law. 

In my first two elections, I spent about $18,000, whereas my 

opposition spent $42,000. So, money did not buy the election; the 

message did. 

The program is unfair to non-participating candidates. Participating 

candidates get more money than non-participating candidates, 

which raises the cost of campaigns from being kitchen-table 

campaigns to high-priced, complex campaigns. Some candidates 

spend money on non-campaign activities. The money should not 

go directly to candidates. 

I feel strongly that there should be spending limits on all 

candidates. 

Public financing has greatly increased the cost of campaigns. 

The program has fueled the campaign services industry, allowing 

more money to go to owners of printing shops and yard sign 

makers. Public financing had little effect on the outcome of 

elections in 2000. Voters may be disappointed to know that tax 

dollars had this end result. 

The 2002 election is the most costly I have ever witnessed. We 

received more full color mailings than has ever been the case. In 

the 2000 election, at least one candidate took public money, hired 

family, and never appeared anywhere. Incumbents with campaign 

money from previous years still have an advantage. The limitations 

on campaign contributions to non-participating candidates are 

arbitrary and unfair. 

Except for gubernatorial candidates, the amounts of public funding 

are significantly insufficient. 

The proliferation of campaign 

materials direct mailed in the 2002 

primary has become disgusting. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 135 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Rural candidates are disadvantaged because of the huge, 

disproportionate cost of travel. Public funds are not available in 

time to meet the logistics of traveling to a sign printer and then 

distributing signs over vast areas and multiple communities. 

The 2002 election cycle has pointed out some glaring problems 

with Arizona’s Act, including a possible inadequacy of funding and 

problems with interpretation of the law. 

It was disappointing to see how tax dollars were spent by the 

participating candidates—computers and other equipment kept for 

personal use after the election, travel expenses, dinners out, and 

parties. It was a disgrace. 

In the primary election, the program does not provide enough 

money for a new candidate to complete against an incumbent or to 

compete in a redistricted area. Also, late in campaigns, nonparticipating candidates have a great advantage in planning and 

controlling expenses. 

Public funding can be used as an unfair weapon. In one primary in 

2000, my publicly funded opponent obtained matching money and 

spent the entire amount on a smear campaign directed at me. The 

goal seemed not so much to win but to destroy my credibility in 

order to improve the chances of another competing candidate who 

had a similar political philosophy. Receiving six negative campaign 

flyers in the mail at one time—flyers that were publicly financed—

was objectionable. 

Participating candidates were allowed a higher level of spending 

than me. As soon as I raised more than they were allowed in the 

primary, they received more funds. I should have been allowed to 

raise and spend as much as they were allowed in the primary and 

general elections. 

Public funding sounds good in theory but fails miserably in terms of 

producing positive results. Campaigns are more expensive. 

Statewide candidates spend a great amount of time begging for $5 

contributions. A traditional candidate actually has much more time 

to meet constituents, talk to them about issues, and get to know 

their concerns. 

There is no level playing field. Those accepting taxpayer financing 

enjoy a tremendous advantage over those who raise money from 

friends and family in terms of actual cash available for 

campaigning, as well as advantages in reporting requirements, 

disclosure of campaign strategy, and the burden of horrendous 

IRS-style audits. My publicly funded opponent was given funds to 

communicate with voters to match money that I spent to pay taxes, 

fund official legislative business, and raise funds. A taxpayerfinanced candidate will generally enjoy a 25-percent cash 

advantage over a traditionally funded one. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 136 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Program scope I believe all candidates should get public funds and that the $5 

contributions requirement should be dropped. I dislike asking 

people for money, whether it’s the public or special interests. I’d 

rather pay my own way or have each candidate get an equal 

amount. I would not participate in the public funding program 

unless all candidates received the funds, without the $5 

contribution requirement. 

If you want a system for financially challenged candidates, 

establish a welfare program to provide seed money for individuals 

who can prove financial need. 

Program administration The Citizens Clean Elections Commission does not have clear 

rules; it is very easy to make mistakes in filings, which can result in 

severe sanctions or penalties. This is discouraging possible new 

candidates from considering the public financing route. The 

absolute power of the Commission is scary. 

The reporting is not fair and equal for both types of candidates. 

Traditional candidates have to report more often than candidates 

who use public money. Clean elections changed the rules many 

times during the campaign. 

A non-participating candidate has to go through all the ridiculous 

reporting requirements. A participating candidate does not need to 

use funds to raise money; but, a non-participating candidate does, 

and it gets counted towards what a participating candidate gets 

from the public. This is totally unfair. 

There are too many reports. 

The reporting obligations are significant and time consuming, but 

the system is well thought-out. 

Our system is draconian in its reporting requirements. The Citizens 

Clean Elections Commission struggles with interpretation of the law 

and is often challenged. The law places unfair limits on 

contributions to non-participants. In short, it is a terrible law and 

should be repealed. 

The Citizens Clean Elections Commission is just another 

government agency gone amuck. 

Even when running unopposed, non-participating candidates still 

have to do all the time-consuming reporting. 

The program puts unreasonable reporting demands on nonparticipating candidates, which detracts from the campaigning 

process. 

The Citizens Clean Elections Commission needs to be more 

professionally trained to give accurate answers. Information given 

out is often wrong or it changes without notification. Also, the 

Public funding needs to be available 

early in order for the recipient to plan 

his or her campaign advertising 

effectively. All printers and 

advertisers require payment in 

advance. 

The pamphlets (covering all 

candidates) distributed to every 

registered voter were very 

informative. Plus, the pamphlets 

included a vote-by-mail request form, 

which should help voter turnout. 

I complained to the Secretary of the 

State and the Attorney General about 

an opponent who inappropriately 

received additional financing. 

Nothing was done about it; I never 

even received an answer. 

The Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission tells you what you can 

say, whom you can say it to, when 

you can say it, and how you say it. 

This is a grotesque violation of our 

First Amendment rights. 

I went to all of the available training 

programs but still was fined at the 

end of my campaign for not properly 

closing my committee. The Secretary 

of State’s office took over a month to 

notify me, and the fine was $10 per 

day. Since I had spent all of my 

public money, the fine ($270) was 

mine to pay. My opponent tried to get 

the Commission to fine me for 

accepting an in-kind contribution of 

sign poles. To defend myself 

required much time and effort. 

Clearer rules would be helpful. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 137 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

Commission needs to be able to skim finance reports and act on 

violations. Enforcement is weak. 

Arizona’s Act places different standards on participating and 

nonparticipating candidates in direct violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment equal protection clause. Upon some perceived 

violation, an unelected board can remove a candidate’s name from 

the ballot without any recourse for the state’s citizens. 

A nonparticipating candidate has to go through all the ridiculous 

reporting requirements. Also, a participating candidate does not 

need to use funds to raise money, whereas the fund-raising 

expenditures made by a nonparticipating candidate are counted 

toward what a participating candidate gets in public funds. This is 

totally unfair. 

The Citizens Clean Elections Commission is the fourth branch of 

government and is accountable to no one. The Commission makes 

its own rules for all candidates. 

The Commission should have spent some time and money on 

public information ads. My district has many rural areas, and many 

people had not heard of the clean elections program. I spent most 

of my time trying to explain the law rather than discussing important 

education, health, and environment issues. Therefore, I was not 

able to get the qualifying signatures needed to obtain public 

funding. 

Under the public financing program, reporting is overly 

burdensome, and the Commission is not accountable to anyone. 

Before the program, Arizona already had a good system of limited 

contributions and open reporting requirements. 

As the rules change, candidates and their finance managers 

become confused about requirements. 

The additional requirements for both participating and nonparticipating candidates have become a political tool to bludgeon 

opponents with. 

The candidate debates and forums were not advertised sufficiently, 

and turnout was poor at best. 

Arizona’s law has served only to get candidates in trouble due to 

the capricious, ad hoc nature of the Citizens Clean Elections 

Commission and its unfair, confusing campaign finance rulings and 

procedures. 

The Commission has gotten politically involved and hurt several 

campaigns. 

Not all bugs were worked out during 

the first year (2000). Some 

candidates nearly lost their seats 

trying to do the process. Things 

tended to operate much better this 

year (2002). 

There should be stiffer penalties for 

participating and nonparticipating 

candidates who break the law. 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 138 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

To assure compliance with reporting requirements necessitated 

having a full-time person, which resulted in less time for campaign 

issues. 

The Commission’s red tape and subjective rulemaking are barriers 

to involvement. Constituents think the paperwork is ridiculous and a 

waste of time and would prefer to give me a $100 check rather than 

mess with a $5 contribution and paperwork. I stopped trying to 

qualify for public funds because I was taking 15 to 20 minutes to 

explain the program to voters rather than discussing issues. Also, 

the timeline for qualifying is absurd; funding can occur as late as 1 

week before the election, which penalizes a participating candidate.

The Commission has become an advocacy group that shoots from 

the hip publicly and has unclear rules and onerous obligations. The 

Commission has no accountability for its actions and is attempting 

to influence the outcomes of elections rather than simply reviewing 

the process. 

The current funding program uses processes that are very similar 

to the way the Soviet Union mismanaged its economy. 

Arizona’s Act requires traditional candidates to disclose to their 

opponents on a daily basis their every campaign activity during the 

heat of the campaign. This is information that the “clean” 

candidates keep secret until after the election. Think about filing 

your taxes every day, itemizing every expenditure, and making it 

available on the Internet for all to see. It’s practically the same for 

candidates who refuse government funds, but not for those who 

accept them. The cost of compliance is immense, and the 

advantage given your opponent is insurmountable. Also, this year 

(2002), the Commission decided to randomly audit 10 traditional 

candidates during the campaign, even though there were no 

allegations of impropriety. This served only as a means for the 

government to distract the candidates from their campaigns in 

order to give yet another advantage to the preferred “clean” 

candidates. Also, the Commission zealously audited every 

candidate against whom a “clean” candidate complained, 

regardless of whether the complaint had validity or not. This just 

another “service” the Commission provides to the candidates it 

prefers. 

The computer software was not compatible with a MAC. 

Other Most candidates, myself included, had little faith in the ability of the 

new public financing program to work. 

Public funding would be fine if our law did not punish people who 

fund privately. As it is now, the law is very unfair. 

Public funding, the Redistricting Commission, and term limits have 

“dumbed down” the legislature. 

Several publicly funded candidates with less than creditable 

backgrounds are now running for legislative seats. The public 

 
Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our 

Survey of Candidates for Office in Maine’s 

and Arizona’s 2000 Elections 

Page 139 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Topic Nonparticipating candidate comments Participating candidate comments 

funding program gives the candidates the power to run without 

much personal financial loss or scrutiny of past transgressions. 

I entered the 2000 campaign late in the process. I would have used 

public financing if my decision to run had not occurred 2 weeks 

before submittal of petitions. 

Individual contribution limits should be lowered from $5 to $1. 

The program has resulted in more public debate and media 

coverage. 

Public funding laws in Arizona need to be improved by making 

them less complex and more consistent internally. 

The grossly misnamed law (“clean elections”) violates the First 

Amendment. 

Source: Response to question 23 of GAO’s survey of candidates for office in Arizona’s 2000 elections (see app. V). 

Note: Each sentence (or paragraph) entry under a given topic in the table is a comment uniquely 

attributable to one candidate. That is, under each topic, each entry is a comment from a separate 

person. Some candidates provided comments that covered more than one topic. In these instances, 

the table presents the applicable portion of the comments under the appropriate topic. 
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

Page 140 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

Norman J. Rabkin, (202) 512-8777 

Danny R. Burton, (214) 777-5600 

In addition to the above, staff who made key contributions to this report 

were David P. Alexander, Leo M. Barbour, Lindy Coe-Juell, Glenn Dubin, 

Ann H. Finley, Marco F. Gomez, Nancy K. Kawahara, John W. Mingus, Jan 

B. Montgomery, Demian T. Moore, Terry L. Richardson, and Wendy 

Turenne. 

We gratefully acknowledge the time and cooperation of state agency 

officials, political party and interest group representatives, and other 

knowledgeable individuals in Maine and Arizona who assisted us in this 

study. Further, we thank the political candidates who responded to our 

survey questionnaires regarding the 2000 elections in Maine and Arizona. 

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Other 

Acknowledgments 
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Page 141 GAO-03-453 Public Funding of Political Campaigns 

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