Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed November 15, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D23-1018

Lower Tribunal No. 19-11545

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Michelle Saenz,

Appellant,

vs.

Roberto Sanchez, III,

Appellee.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, Veronica Diaz, Judge.

Reid Levin, PLLC and Reid Levin (Boca Raton), for appellant.

Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Fort Lauderdale), for 

appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and BOKOR, JJ. 

LOGUE, C.J.,

Michelle Saenz (the “Mother”) is appealing a non-final order, issued 

following a three-day evidentiary hearing, ordering that her eldest child, 
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B.M.S., continue attending military school, and that Roberto Sanchez III (the 

“Father”) continue to maintain 100% timesharing of the parties’ three minor 

children, with the Mother having no contact or communication with the minor 

children pending final trial of this matter. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. 

P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)(b); see, e.g., Mezei v. Tzynder, 307 So. 3d 83, 83 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2020) (reviewing non-final temporary order granting father overnight 

timesharing under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)(b)).

Florida law recognizes that pretrial, temporary child custody and 

timesharing determinations are subject to a different legal standard than final 

custody determinations. Riddle v. Riddle, 214 So. 3d 694, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2017). “Temporary relief orders in family law cases are among the areas 

where trial judges have the very broadest discretion, which appellate courts 

are very reluctant to interfere with except under the most compelling of 

circumstances.” Id. (internal citation omitted). This is generally because the 

relief granted is not final and the trial judge may revisit temporary relief 

matters in the final judgment. Id. “The goal of temporary relief hearings [ ] is 

to promote stability in the lives of children while the divorce is pending, not 

to decide the final outcome.” Hoff v. Hoff, 100 So. 3d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2012).
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The orders on appeal here reflect such pretrial, temporary child 

custody and timesharing determinations by the trial court during an ongoing 

divorce proceeding. Trial on the parties’ dissolution petitions is presumably 

underway, according to the information provided by the parties, thus a final 

determination on the issue of timesharing and child custody should be 

forthcoming. For present purposes, the question before the Court is whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in temporarily ordering that B.M.S. 

continue to attend military school and the Father continue to exercise 100% 

timesharing, with the Mother having no contact or communication with the 

minor children.

The trial court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing on May 8-10, 

2023. The Mother contends the trial court violated her due process rights 

and abused its discretion by placing the burden on her to show a substantial, 

material, unanticipated change in circumstances warranting modification of 

the Father’s 100% timesharing and the return of B.M.S from military school. 

A review of the record, however, demonstrates the inaccuracy of this 

argument. 

While the trial court does refer to a lack of evidence indicating any 

change in circumstances, this does not equate to applying the “extraordinary 

burden” of demonstrating “a substantial, material, and unanticipated change 
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in circumstances” warranting modification of a parenting plan and 

timesharing schedule. Alence v. Matheson, 351 So. 3d 1265, 1270 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2022); see also § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2022); Paskiewicz v. 

Paskiewicz, 967 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). This legal standard 

applies only to a motion for modification that is filed after the trial court has 

established a final timesharing plan, not a temporary child custody and 

timesharing determination as we have here.

A review of the evidentiary hearing transcripts as a whole 

demonstrates that the trial court here did apply the correct legal standard—

namely, the best interest of the three minor children. The trial court heard 

and considered evidence and testimony from the Mother regarding why 

military school was not in B.M.S.’s best interest, including evidence of 

alleged incidents that occurred at the military school, and why it was not in 

the best interest of the minor children to be denied timesharing with their 

mother, including evidence that the minor children’s grades and schooling 

were suffering. 

The trial court also heard and considered evidence from the Father 

regarding why it was in B.M.S.’s best interest to continue attending military 

school, including testimony regarding substantial improvements in B.M.S.’s 

behavior and attitude, and why it was in the minor children’s best interest to 
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continue to have no contact or timesharing with the Mother, including 

evidence that the minor children were actually receiving the education and 

schooling they needed and their behavior and attitude had significantly 

improved.

Finally, the trial court considered testimony from the minor children’s 

guardian ad litem, as well as a report, which also recommended B.M.S. 

continue attending military school and the minor children continue to have 

no timesharing or contact with the Mother and referenced the Mother’s 

psychological evaluation and the need for therapeutic intervention.

After considering this evidence, the trial court ruled that it was in the 

best interests of the children at the present time that B.M.S. remain in military 

school and that the Father continue to maintain 100% timesharing, with the 

Mother continuing to have no contact with the children, pending the final trial. 

This conclusion is supported by competent substantial evidence presented 

over the course of the three-day evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.