RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4780-12T1

 A-4946-12T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD 

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

B.O. and T.E.,

Defendants-Appellants.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF T.E.E.,

a minor.

__________________________________

Submitted November 18, 2014 – Decided

Before Judges Reisner, Koblitz and Higbee.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth 

County, Docket No. FN-13-198-12.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney

for appellant B.O. (Andaiye Al-Uqdah, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney

for appellant T.E. (Carol A. Weil, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

December 19, 2014

APPELLATE DIVISION

December 19, 2014
2 A-4780-12T1

Timothy P. Malone, Deputy Attorney General, 

on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor T.E.E. (Lisa M. 

Black, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KOBLITZ, J.A.D.

In this consolidated matter, both parents appeal from a 

February 14, 2013 order finding they abused or neglected their 

seven-week-old infant, T.E.E. (Timmy1), within the meaning of 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), by causing him to suffer brain injury 

through partial suffocation when they both took oxycodone and 

the mother, B.O. (Betty), slept with Timmy in the same bed.

2 The 

parents argue that the eyewitness presented by the Division was 

so incredible and the doctor so poorly informed that the 

Division did not prove the parents' failure to exercise a 

minimum degree of care by a preponderance of the evidence. The 

Law Guardian joins the Division in urging us to affirm. After 

carefully reviewing the record in light of the contentions

advanced on appeal, we affirm.

 

1 We use fictitious names for the parties for ease of reference 

and to preserve their confidentiality.

2 The order was rendered ripe for appeal as of right after the 

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) filed a 

complaint for guardianship and the judge entered a May 10, 2013

final order terminating this neglect litigation.
3 A-4780-12T1

Defendants did not testify, nor present any other evidence 

at the fact-finding hearing, nor did they attend every day of 

the four-day hearing. The Division presented the following 

facts. The Division received its first referral regarding 

defendants on the day after Timmy was born. The reporter 

alleged that in June and November 2011, during her pregnancy, 

Betty tested positive for marijuana. Betty told the Division 

she did not intentionally smoke marijuana after realizing she 

was pregnant, but may have tested positive because she was in a 

car where others were smoking it. She also said she had been 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder but was not receiving treatment. 

Both parents tested negative after Timmy was born, although T.E. 

(Ted) did not appear for a drug test at the end of January.

In January, on a routine home check, defendants informed 

the Division caseworker that they had taken Timmy to the 

hospital because he had a fever. The child's pediatrician 

expressed no concerns about Timmy's care. A week later, 

however, on February 10, 2012, the caseworker called Betty and 

discovered that defendants were waiting at the pediatric 

intensive care unit. Betty said that morning she found Timmy, 

then about seven weeks old, not breathing. Betty related that 

she had placed Timmy in his bassinet for a nap in the morning.
4 A-4780-12T1

When she checked on him later he had blue lips, a blanket 

covering his face, and was not breathing. 

Two Division caseworkers met the parents at the hospital 

where both parents provided a similar account of what happened. 

Neither parent mentioned the presence of any other adult. On 

February 21, however, a downstairs resident of the two-family 

house where defendants lived contacted the Division to say that 

Jay, who had been staying with defendants, told her that he saw 

Betty "get up off the baby" on the morning of Timmy's injury. 

She said defendants were drug-involved and were always "messed 

up and nodding out." Betty acknowledged having a houseguest 

named Jay, but said he was not there when Timmy was hurt. Both 

parents admitted using marijuana recently due to the stress from

Timmy's injury. Betty tested positive for marijuana and Ted

tested positive for marijuana, oxycodone and oxymorphone.

Two days later Jay told the police that he met the parents 

through Betty's downstairs relative, and had been living with 

the parents for four weeks as of February 10. According to the 

transcribed statement given to the police, Jay told them that on 

the evening of February 9, defendants purchased "oxycodone, 

weed, [X]anax and cocaine[.]" While he did not see them use any 

drugs that evening or notice any drugs in the house, Jay said he 

had overheard defendants ordering drugs on the phone. Jay 
5 A-4780-12T1

asserted that he could also "tell they were on something"

because they were "addicts." Jay told the police that the 

parents began to argue because Ted kept "nodding out" and was 

not helping Betty care for Timmy. Betty took the baby into her 

bedroom, and Ted slept in the living room. 

Jay stated to the police that at around 1:15 p.m. on 

February 10,

I knocked on the bedroom door three times 

and then [Betty] finally woke up and said 

who is it? I said it’s Jay and she said 

come in. I watched [Betty] roll off the 

baby. My eyes were focused on the baby. I 

saw his head was a dark bluish color and his 

lips were purple. I screamed at her to get 

off him, and to look at what she did and she 

picked him up by his diaper screaming and 

she ran into the living room . . . and she 

put him on the couch and woke [Ted] up. 

[Ted] started to give him compressions on 

his chest and blowing into his mouth. I 

didn’t want to be up there anymore so I went 

downstairs and I told everybody downstairs 

and somebody downstairs called 911 and then 

all the cops came and the ambulance came and 

went upstairs and gave him oxygen and then 

they took him to the hospital.

Dr. Steven Kairys, a child abuse specialist with thirty 

years of experience, who saw Timmy at the hospital every day, 

opined that this explanation of the deprivation of oxygen was 

"much more consistent as a plausible cause" for Timmy's 

neurological damage. Kairys wrote in his report:

Co-sleeping is now the major cause of Sudden 

Infant Death Syndrome [(SIDS)] and Near 
6 A-4780-12T1

Sudden Infant Death Syndrome [(NSIDS)] in 

this age child. Obviously, co-sleeping is 

an accidental cause of suffocation. 

However, it is quite concerning that the 

child was already an open DYFS[3] case because 

of marijuana smoking during pregnancy. More 

concerning is that the family fabricated a 

different story, rather than being truthful 

to the events that occurred.

Thus, there are clear concerns for child 

endangerment that resulted in the major 

morbidity to the child.

At trial, Jay gave a description of what he had observed on 

February 9 and 10 that differed somewhat from his earlier

account to the police. He testified that, after completing a 

drug rehabilitation program, he stayed with defendants from late 

December 2011 to February 10, 2012. During that time, he saw 

defendants sniff oxycodone every day and smoke marijuana on a 

regular basis. He maintained that he had to care for Timmy

several times:

When they were messed up, nodding out on the 

kitchen table, the baby screamed in the 

chair, I would change him. I would cover 

him up at night. I fell asleep a couple 

times in my hoodie and my jeans and I was 

freezing, and I'd wake up and the baby was 

screaming and he would be in a diaper and 

that's it, no blanket covering him. So I 

covered him up, gave him a bottle, put him 

back to sleep.

 

3 The Division of Youth and Family Services, the prior name for 

the Division.
7 A-4780-12T1

Jay saw defendants purchase drugs several times, and sometimes

he personally gave them oxycodone as "rent[.]"

In contrast to his police statement, at trial Jay testified 

that he saw defendants sniff oxycodone on February 9. He heard 

Ted agree to buy more oxycodone, after which Ted left for a 

period of time. Ted was nodding off, while Betty "was still 

functioning." Jay admitted that he lied when he told police 

that he saw Betty roll off Timmy, and testified that he saw 

Timmy on a mattress on the floor directly behind Betty when she 

sat up on the mattress to open the door to the bedroom.

Jay conceded on cross-examination that, on March 3, 2012, 

two weeks after Jay spoke to the police about Timmy, the police 

arrested him and charged him with burglary after Jay stole items 

from defendants' apartment. He later pled guilty to an amended 

charge of theft, and as of trial he was in jail serving a 

sentence for that offense as well as an unrelated charge of

heroin possession. Jay denied that his testimony was in any way 

motivated by the fact that defendants had reported him to the 

police. Jay said he still dreamed about the blue baby he saw, 

and that he wanted Timmy to go to a better home.

Kairys testified about the medical aspects of child abuse 

and neglect. Consistent with his February 28 evaluation, Kairys

opined that Timmy suffered brain damage because he was deprived 
8 A-4780-12T1

of blood and oxygen for a sustained period of at least six 

minutes. Timmy's tests had produced no evidence of brain trauma 

or shaken baby syndrome, and the tests ruled out the possibility 

that Timmy had stopped breathing because of a vascular failure, 

an infection, a seizure, or a disturbance in his metabolism. 

Kairys could not identify within a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty what caused Timmy to stop breathing.

Kairys acknowledged that Timmy had tested positive for

Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV), and that RSV could cause 

episodes of apnea, which is defined as not breathing for fifteen 

or twenty seconds. Based on his own experience and review of 

the literature, he did not believe that RSV had caused Timmy to 

stop breathing for six minutes, as there was no report of apnea 

or Timmy wheezing prior to February 10, and Kairys knew of no 

case of such severe oxygen deprivation due to RSV. In Kairys's 

view, Jay's allegation that Betty co-slept with Timmy while in 

an impaired state presented "the most plausible explanation for 

[Timmy’s] injuries." Kairys admitted that without Jay's 

statements, he would have deemed the cause of Timmy's 

respiratory failure to be unclear.

Kairys maintained that Betty’s purported discovery of Timmy

with a blanket over his head was not plausible because an infant 

of Timmy's age lacked the motor skills to pull a blanket over 
9 A-4780-12T1

his head. Kairys testified that even if Timmy's head had been 

covered there would have been a sufficient amount of air 

available to prevent suffocation. He discussed the other 

diagnoses that doctors considered, and admitted that he could 

not rule out the possibility that Timmy had suffered NSIDS. He 

noted that studies suggested a correlation between this 

condition and co-sleeping, and that the danger would increase if 

the co-sleeping parent was impaired, but stated that the cause 

of SIDS and NSIDS remained a mystery.

Kairys testified that Timmy "had a significant brain damage 

from the lack of oxygen[.]" Timmy had "cerebral palsy[,]" and 

"was going to have all sorts of major neurological changes[.]"

Betty raises the following issues on appeal:

I. THE FINDINGS OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT MUST BE 

REVERSED BECAUSE THEY WERE BASED ON 

UNRELIABLE, INCREDIBLE EVIDENCE SUPPLIED BY 

A SELF-ADMITTED LIAR AND BECAUSE DR. KAIRYS' 

REPORT AND TESTIMONY WERE BASED SOLELY UPON 

THE REPORT MADE TO DYFS.

II. THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD REVERSE 

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING BECAUSE HEARSAY 

STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS, WERE IMPROPERLY 

ADMITTED DURING FACT-FINDING AND DISCUSSED

AND RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN HIS 

RULING.

III. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S RULING SHOULD BE 

REVERSED AS THE JUDGE RELIED UPON DR. 

KAIRYS['S] REPORT, WHICH WAS CONCLUSORY, 

FAILED TO MAKE ANY CONCLUSIONS BASED OFF OF 

A REASONABLE DEGREE OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY OR 
10 A-4780-12T1

PROBABILITY WHICH VIOLATES DEFENDANT'S DUE 

PROCESS RIGHTS.

IV. THE JUDGE ERRED BY NOT ARTICULATING WITH 

PARTICULARITY THE FACTS UPON WHICH A 

DETERMINATION OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT IS MADE 

AND FAILED TO IDENTIFY ALL DOCUMENTS/

EXHIBITS RELIED UPON IN REACHING HIS 

DECISION.

V. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT 

CO-SLEEPING WITH A CHILD AMOUNTS TO GROSS 

NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESSNESS.

VI. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION 

WHEN HE ABDICATED HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO 

EVALUATE WHETHER HE SHOULD SEQUESTER A DYFS 

SOCIAL WORKER WHOSE PRESENCE IN THE 

COURTROOM DURING THE TESTIMONY OF ANOTHER 

DYFS WORKER WOULD PREJUDICE THE DEFENSE WHEN 

HER TESTIMONY WAS CRITICAL IN DETERMINING 

CREDIBILITY.

Ted raises these issues:

I. THE FINDING OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT AS TO 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE 

THE TRIAL COURT MISCHARACTERIZED THE

EVIDENCE AND ASSUMED FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE.

II. THE FINDING THAT THE CHILD IS ABUSED AND 

NEGLECTED AS DEFINED BY THE STATUTE MUST BE 

REVERSED BECAUSE THE DIVISION DID NOT PROVE 

THAT THE FATHER FAILED TO PROVIDE THE 

MINIMUM DEGREE OF CARE.

To prevail in a Title 9 proceeding, the Division must show 

by a preponderance of the competent and material evidence that 

the defendant abused or neglected the affected child. N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.46(b); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 

N.J. 17, 32 (2011). The Division need only show that it was 
11 A-4780-12T1

more likely than not that the defendant abused or neglected the 

child. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. 

Super. 593, 615 (App. Div. 2010). 

 Title 9 defines an "abused or neglected child" as a child 

less than eighteen years of age, whose parent or guardian:

(1) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon 

such child physical injury by other than 

accidental means which causes or creates a 

substantial risk of death, or serious or 

protracted disfigurement, or protracted 

impairment of physical or emotional health 

or protracted loss or impairment of the 

function of any bodily organ; [or] (2) 

creates or allows to be created a 

substantial or ongoing risk of physical 

injury to such child by other than 

accidental means which would be likely to 

cause death or serious or protracted 

disfigurement, or protracted loss or 

impairment of the function of any bodily 

organ . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) (emphasis added).]

The phrase "accidental means" in this provision refers to 

"the events leading up to the injury and not the resulting 

injury itself." G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 

174 (1999) (citation omitted). "Where an action is deliberate, 

and the actor can or should foresee that his conduct is likely 

to result in injury, as a matter of law, that injury is caused 

by 'other than accidental means.'" Id. at 175 (citations 

omitted). The parent's intent is irrelevant. Ibid. (citations 

omitted).
12 A-4780-12T1

The definition of an "abused or neglected child" also 

encompasses:

a child whose physical, mental, or emotional 

condition has been impaired or is in 

imminent danger of becoming impaired as the 

result of the failure of his parent or 

guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a 

minimum degree of care . . . by . . . acts 

of a . . . serious nature requiring the aid 

of the court[.]

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) (emphasis added).]

"Where an action is deliberate, and the actor can or should 

foresee that his conduct is likely to result in injury, as a 

matter of law, that injury is caused by other than accidental 

means." G.S., supra, 157 N.J. at 174 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

The requisite measure of neglect in Title 9 matters is 

higher than that of ordinary negligence. Id. at 178. By 

isolating acts that fail to adhere to a "minimum degree of 

care," the statute seeks only to capture conduct that is 

"grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily 

intentional." Ibid. (citation omitted); see also N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. J.L., 410 N.J. Super. 159, 167-68 (App. 

Div. 2009) (affirming that inattentive or merely negligent 

conduct does not constitute willful or wanton misconduct as 

required by Title 9). Under this intermediate standard, a 

parent is culpable if he or she acts "with the knowledge that 
13 A-4780-12T1

injury is likely to, or probably will, result" in serious 

injury, or acts with a reckless disregard for the consequences 

of his or her actions. G.S., supra, 157 N.J. at 178.

The trial judge held that co-sleeping with an infant when 

the parent is in an impaired state constitutes an act of gross 

negligence. The judge found Betty was neglectful by co-sleeping 

with her seven-week-old infant while under the influence of 

illegal drugs. The judge also found Ted neglectful by knowingly 

allowing this sleeping arrangement while Betty was impaired.

Defendants argue that because the medical expert's opinion, 

that Timmy was probably injured due to co-sleeping with Betty,

depends on facts set forth only by Jay, who is not credible, the 

Division did not prove its case. Defendants argue that Jay's 

testimony is so demonstrably incredible that we should reverse 

the trial judge's findings. In State v. Elders, where our 

Supreme Court reinstated the trial judge's decision to deny the 

defendant's motion to suppress after holding a plenary hearing,

Justice Albin wrote:

An appellate court should give deference to 

those findings of the trial judge which are 

substantially influenced by his opportunity 

to hear and see the witnesses and to have 

the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing 

court cannot enjoy. An appellate court 

should not disturb the trial court's 

findings merely because it might have 

reached a different conclusion were it the 

trial tribunal or because the trial court 
14 A-4780-12T1

decided all evidence or inference conflicts 

in favor of one side in a close case. A 

trial court's findings should be disturbed 

only if they are so clearly mistaken that 

the interests of justice demand intervention 

and correction. In those circumstances 

solely should an appellate court appraise 

the record as if it were deciding the matter 

at inception and make its own findings and 

conclusions.

[State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)

(citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).]

As demonstrated by defense counsel during crossexamination, Jay's testimony could have reasonably been rejected 

by the trial judge. Jay was in prison for stealing from 

defendants, which gave him a motive to lie in retaliation for 

their reporting him to the police. We note, however, that Jay 

first spoke to the police before the theft occurred. Jay also 

did not seek out the Division to cast blame on the parents, but 

was found after the downstairs neighbor reported Jay's comments 

to the Division. Jay gave differing versions of what happened 

to the downstairs neighbor, the police, the Division and finally 

under oath to the trial court. Jay's admission that he supplied 

defendants with drugs and smoked marijuana with them was not 

initially told to the police or the Division. His statement 

that he saw Betty "roll off" Timmy was recanted in court. 

The fact that Jay was living with defendants for an 

extended period of time and that defendants did not mention 
15 A-4780-12T1

Jay's existence when they reported the events adds credibility 

to Jay's testimony. The parents' version of events was not 

given under oath nor subjected to the rigors of crossexamination. In a criminal case, where the standard of proof is 

beyond a reasonable doubt, one could argue that "it is better 

that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." 

United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S. Ct. 1114, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1021

(1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When

the welfare of a defenseless baby is at stake, and the burden of 

proof is more probable than not, different considerations apply. 

A neglectful parent is a serious danger to an infant. We must 

be particularly vigilant not to improperly interfere with the 

credibility determinations of the trial judge where the danger 

to an innocent party of an incorrect determination is so severe. 

We owe great deference to the assessment of the trial judge, 

particularly in light of the expertise of the family court.

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998).

The trial judge explained why he found Jay credible, 

determining that Jay was genuinely concerned for Timmy's welfare 

and that inconsistencies in his version of events were 

understandable given his desire to hide his drug involvement 

from the police. Jay was not promised anything by the
16 A-4780-12T1

authorities for his testimony. The judge found that Jay was 

truthful in his courtroom testimony, although, overwhelmed by 

the sight of the injured baby, he had exaggerated initially when 

speaking to the police. The judge also believed Jay's testimony 

because it was consistent with Kairys's understanding of what 

probably caused the injury to Timmy.

Our trial system is built on the premise that fact-finders 

are able to view a witness, watch direct and cross-examination,

and decide whether the witness was truthful when making those

statements that are crucial to the decision-making. A factfinder is not required to reject the entire testimony of a 

witness who willfully lies about some facts. State v. Ernst, 32 

N.J. 567, 583-84 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 943, 81 S. Ct.

464, 5 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1961); see Model Jury Charge (Criminal), 

"False in One – False in All" (2013). A witness who gives a 

prior inconsistent statement may well be believed by the 

factfinder when he testifies in court. See Model Jury Charge 

(Criminal), "Prior Contradictory Statements of Witnesses (Not 

Defendant)" (1994). We therefore defer to the trial judge's 

finding that Jay was credible.

Ted's argument that he did nothing wrong because he did not 

sleep with Timmy is unpersuasive. A parent's failure to act in 

circumstances that demand action is the essence of neglect. See
17 A-4780-12T1

In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 351-53 (1999) 

(stating that a mother's failure to provide continuing care for 

her child or to take any measures to relieve her child's 

suffering satisfied the first prong of the statutory test); In 

re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 379-80 (1999) (finding 

harm where a father's failure to act "compounded the mother's 

neglect and contributed to the circumstances that" led to 

removal); In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 44 (1992) 

(finding that "[s]erious and lasting emotional or psychological 

harm to children as the result of the action or inaction of 

their biological parents can constitute injury sufficient to 

authorize the termination of parental rights") (citation 

omitted); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. 

Super. 418, 436 (App. Div. 2009) (stating that a mother harmed 

her children by permitting the father into the home in violation 

of court orders). If Jay's testimony is credited, Ted

participated in drug use with Betty and was aware that Betty 

slept with Timmy, thus failing to protect Timmy. 

Parents who use illegal drugs when caring for an infant 

expose that baby to many dangers due to their impaired judgment. 

See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super.

320, 331 (App. Div. 2011) (commenting that, unlike an infant, 

the twelve-year-old child was not vulnerable "to the slightest 
18 A-4780-12T1

parental misstep" when visiting in a Division-supervised setting 

with her father, who tested positive for drugs). Timmy was 

completely dependent on his parents to protect him from danger. 

Although a sober parent could also inadvertently smother a baby 

when co-sleeping, a parent who falls asleep after ingesting 

illegal drugs is less likely to exercise good judgment in

protecting the baby in bed.4 Just as a sober driver may have an 

automobile accident, an impaired driver is much more likely to 

do so.

The parents raise issues relating to the admission of 

unspecified hearsay statements embedded in Division records. 

Such evidence may not be admitted unless it satisfies an 

exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Long, 173 N.J. 138, 152 

(2002). Rule 5:12-4(d), however, specifically provides that the 

Division may "submit into evidence, pursuant to N.J.R.E.

803(c)(6) and 801(d), reports by staff personnel or professional 

consultants[,] [and that] [c]onclusions drawn from the facts 

stated therein shall be treated as prima facie evidence, subject 

to rebuttal." The trial judge in his oral opinion stated that 

 

4 To be clear, the trial judge did not find that co-sleeping 

constitutes child abuse or neglect, and neither do we. The 

issue presented in this case is co-sleeping with an infant while 

under the influence of illegal drugs.
19 A-4780-12T1

he was not considering inadmissible hearsay contained in the 

Division documents.

The Division's central fact witness, Jay, testified based 

on his personal knowledge. The Division's expert witness, 

Kairys, also testified based on his observations and review of 

the records. A trial court's evidentiary rulings will not be 

disturbed unless they constitute an abuse of discretion 

resulting in a manifest error or injustice. Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 

194 N.J. 6, 20 (2008). The trial judge did not abuse his 

discretion by admitting hearsay contained in the testimony and 

documents. Any other issues not addressed by us in this opinion 

are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.