General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

GENERAL COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE PLAN

(GCIP)

President’s Transmittal Letter to the People of the United States

Cabinet Principals’ Transmittal Letter to the President

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Page

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................1

Summary.................................................................................................4

ACTION PLAN

Introduction................................................................................................................ .13

Section A: National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination.......................................... .16

I. Purpose .................................................................................................. .16

II. The President’s Council on Counter-Narcotics......................................17

III. Counternarcotics Interagency Policy and Program Coordination................. .17

IV. Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) ............................ .18

V. Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX).............................. .20

Section B: National Centers........................................................................................ .24

Section C: Regional, State, and Local Cooperation....................................................... .31

Section D: Foreign Coordination................................................................................. .36

Section E: Analytic Personnel Development and Training ............................................ .41

Section F: Information Technology............................................................................. .46

Appendices

Appendix A Methodology Used to Develop the General Counterdrug

Intelligence Plan ....................................................................A-1

Appendix B White House Task Force Authorities........................................A-4

Appendix C Missions of Counterdrug Intelligence Centers

and Activities.........................................................................A-7

Appendix D Glossary of Terms............................................................... .A-15

Appendix E General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan Action Items.............. .A-21
Executive Summary

The General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) addresses issues identified by the

White House Task Force Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and

Activities. The Review was commissioned in September 1997 by the Attorney General,

the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director

of National Drug Control Policy, and was supported by the Secretaries of Defense,

Transportation, and State. The Review was mandated in the Treasury and General

Government Appropriations Act of 1998 and the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act.

The GCIP reflects the collective need to clarify and make systemic improvements to U.S.

drug intelligence and information programs. Its goal is to establish a drug intelligence

framework that supports operators in the field, improves Federal, state, and local

relationships, and responds to policymaker needs as they formulate counterdrug policy,

taskings, and resource decisions.

The GCIP provides a means for the law enforcement and intelligence communities to

resolve drug intelligence issues and to aid National Drug Control Program agencies in

satisfying performance measures of effectiveness. When implemented, the GCIP will

facilitate the appropriate and timely exchange of information between the intelligence

and drug law enforcement communities, taking care to respect law and regulation, but

will not change agency authorities or the laws governing interagency relationships.

The following summarizes the 73 GCIP action items. To the extent that these action

items delineated in the GCIP have resource implications, they must be weighed against

other priorities. Therefore, the action items with resource implications for future years

will need to be vetted through the normal budget process. Participating agencies will

need to identify funding options to accommodate the Plan’s objectives.

National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination: Two collaborative coordinating

structures, the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) and its supporting

staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX), are created. The

CDICG is composed of 13 representatives from Cabinet elements and law enforcement

agencies with drug intelligence responsibilities, is co-chaired by law enforcement and

intelligence officials, and receives policy guidance from the President’s Council on

Counter-Narcotics, as well as from the National Drug Control Strategy. The CDX will

be led by a senior law enforcement officer, will have a senior intelligence officer as its

deputy, and will have a full-time staff of experts detailed from participating departments

and agencies.

National Centers: The existing program priorities and mission statements for three of

the four national centers with counterdrug intelligence missions require further definition

to improve coordination and eliminate unnecessary duplication. Action items are

presented to make the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso Intelligence
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Center (EPIC), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) more effective

in their missions.

• The DCI Crime and Narcotics Center will remain the principal center for foreign

strategic counterdrug analysis and for coordinating Intelligence Community support

to U.S. foreign counterdrug activities;

• NDIC will become the principal center for domestic strategic counterdrug analysis in

support of policymakers and resource planners;

• EPIC will be strengthened as the principal center for operational and investigative

intelligence analysis of illicit drug movements in support of interdiction activities and

U.S. law enforcement; and,

• FinCEN will be strengthened as the principal center for strategic analysis of

narcotics-related financial crimes and for investigative support to law enforcement

concerning financial crimes.

Regional, State, and Local Cooperation: The GCIP promotes Federal, state, local, and

tribal law enforcement information sharing. It also leverages successes such as Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task

forces, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces

(OCDETFs), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), the High-Risk MoneyLaundering and Related Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCAs), and the Regional Information

Sharing System (RISS) to maximize interagency cooperation. Specific proposals include

a call for Federal law enforcement agencies and HIDTAs in major metropolitan areas to

bring counterdrug intelligence analysts together into collocated, consolidated intelligence

centers; to enhance interagency enforcement and information sharing; to streamline

production of area drug threat assessments; to consolidate drug seizure data; and, to better

exploit seized documents.

Foreign Coordination: The GCIP promotes a more robust international counterdrug

effort within U.S. Missions and between the United States and its counterdrug partners.

Included are proposals to improve leadership and coordination of counterdrug

components in U.S. Missions; improve counterdrug intelligence dissemination to host

nations; ensure adequate levels of U.S. Customs Service personnel overseas to enhance

intelligence on foreign commercial drug smuggling activities; ensure adequate numbers

of drug law enforcement analytic personnel overseas; increase attention to foreign drugrelated illicit finances; and, clarify legal and policy guidelines on law enforcement and

intelligence coordination.
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Analytic Personnel Development and Training: Specific measures will standardize

professional career development paths for Federal law enforcement intelligence analysts

and enhance the broader dissemination of sanitized intelligence from law enforcement

investigative reporting. In addition, actions are presented to standardize and improve

drug intelligence training and education.

Information Technology: An effective drug intelligence system requires a firm

information technology foundation to enable all drug intelligence analysts with the

appropriate clearances to readily obtain the information they need to do their jobs.

Accomplishing this requires: formation of an interagency group to guide and coordinate

automation upgrades and connectivity policies and initiatives; completion of a detailed

schedule for implementing specific architectural upgrades; and, improvement of the

technical capabilities and interactions among NDIC, EPIC, FinCEN, and law

enforcement at all levels.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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Summary

The Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities (the Review) was

commissioned in September 1997 by the Attorney General, the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI), the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of National Drug

Control Policy (hereafter termed Director of ONDCP) and supported by the Secretaries of

Defense, Transportation, and State. The Review responded to the requirement for a study

of the national counterdrug intelligence architecture that was mandated in the Treasury

and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, and a review of the National Drug

Intelligence Center (NDIC) that was mandated in the 1998 Intelligence Authorization

Act. The field review was conducted over a seven-month period by the White House

Task Force (WHTF), which comprised detailees from the Department of Justice, the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ONDCP, and the Departments of Defense,

Transportation, Treasury, and State. Issues identified in the WHTF Report were resolved

by representatives of the Cabinet Principals meeting as the Senior Working Group

(SWG) and later as the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG). This

General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) is the culmination of deliberations by the

SWG, the CDICG, and the Cabinet Principals to address issues identified in the Review.

Review Findings

The WHTF found that there is no single, all-encompassing national counterdrug

intelligence architecture.1 Instead, there are two loosely associated systems, one each for

the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The Intelligence Community has a

centralized intelligence-sharing system and interagency information-sharing structure; the

law enforcement community does not. Within the law enforcement community, each

agency has developed its own information-sharing and communication systems that serve

agency-specific needs. Terminology, practices, techniques, and expectations vary widely

within the law enforcement agencies and between the law enforcement and intelligence

communities.

Counterdrug investigative information and intelligence sharing—both among law

enforcement agencies and between law enforcement and Intelligence Community

components—has improved significantly over the past several years. There are

numerous exemplary interagency programs, joint operational and analytic endeavors, and

 

1

 Intelligence, as used in this document, is a generic term referring to information related to subjects of interest to a

government agency. When used to refer to either Intelligence Community or law enforcement community

intelligence, the context in which it is used is critical to its intended meaning, as each community uses the same word

to mean different things, often resulting in communications problems. Intelligence Community “intelligence” is

information resulting specifically from Intelligence Community collection actions and relating to the capabilities,

intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons (Executive Order 12333). Law enforcement

“intelligence,” also referred to as investigative information, is sensitive information that is part of a law enforcement

inquiry, matter, or case, usually developed as a byproduct of law enforcement investigative and interdiction efforts

and subject to being divulged, as required, to support the arrest and prosecution of the subject(s) of the investigation.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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critical data-sharing mechanisms in place that would have seemed unattainable to most

practitioners a decade ago. However, the Review found that while there were laudable

achievements, boundaries among various law enforcement and intelligence components

are largely bridged by carefully crafted legal interpretations and a mixture of ad hoc

interpersonal relationships and informal mechanisms.

This informal environment continues to result in gaps in analytic coverage, as well as

incomplete and inaccurate analysis and unnecessary duplication, single-agency

perceptions of critical drug threats or issues, and occasional mistrust and confusion in the

counterdrug community. At the operational level, some investigators and inspectors still

complain of a shortage of actionable intelligence; they believe that they receive

insufficient guidance and intelligence support from the national level. The WHTF noted

the common complaint was that no one has the charter to define the “lanes of authority”

for the different components and to monitor the components’ adherence to them.

Improving the Counterdrug Intelligence Architecture

This General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP, or the Plan) reflects the collective

agreement of the Director of ONDCP, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the

Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Secretary of Defense, the

Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs on the need to clarify and make systemic changes to U.S. drug

intelligence and information programs. The goal is to establish a drug intelligence

framework that both supports operators in the field and responds to the needs of

policymakers as they formulate counterdrug policy, generate tasking and requirements,

and make resource decisions.

The Director of ONDCP, acting on behalf of the President, continues to play the lead role

for the U.S. Government in formulating drug control policy and developing the National

Drug Control Strategy. The Director of ONDCP is responsible for providing oversight

and policy guidance to the respective departments and agencies that make up the Federal

counterdrug community. Under the new drug intelligence architecture, the Director of

ONDCP, as Executive Director of the President’s Council on Counter-Narcotics (PCCN),

will monitor progress in the implementation of the GCIP and promote resolution of drug

intelligence policy issues.

The GCIP, in turn, provides a means for the law enforcement community and the

Intelligence Community, responsive to the national drug policy prescribed by the

Director of ONDCP, to resolve drug intelligence issues and to aid National Drug Control

Program agencies in satisfying performance measures of effectiveness. The GCIP will

also strengthen the overall process to provide operators and investigators with timely,

relevant, and actionable drug-related information and intelligence necessary to disrupt

and dismantle illicit drug-trafficking infrastructures, organizations, and resources. It will

do these things by creating and implementing effective interfaces between domestic and
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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intelligence- and information-gathering organizations, as well as between the law

enforcement community and Intelligence Community agencies, consistent with law.

To fashion the vision for a more integrated, strategically-oriented counterdrug

intelligence architecture, the GCIP outlines a series of action items grouped into discrete

sections under six general topic areas:

• National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination

• National Centers

• Regional, State, and Local Cooperation

• Foreign Coordination

• Analytic Personnel Development and Training

• Information Technology

National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination

The central theme confronted in the WHTF Review was the need for clear, consistent

inter-community and interagency coordination of the counterdrug intelligence effort. A

concern most often echoed was, “No one is in charge.” The Review established that it

was neither possible nor appropriate for any one person or component to be “in charge”

in a monolithic coordinating body. The law enforcement and intelligence communities

each have very distinct and legitimate legal and operational authorities that must be

preserved in the joint management of counterdrug investigative and intelligence

activities.

What is possible and appropriate, however, is the establishment of a strengthened

interagency coordinating mechanism that fosters and facilitates both greater information

sharing and operational coordination between the law enforcement and intelligence

counterdrug communities. This mechanism recognizes and optimizes the capabilities,

equities, and authorities of all Federal departments and agencies engaged in the

counterdrug effort, and also strengthens the important counterdrug partnership among the

Federal, state, and local law enforcement communities.

The structure defined in this section of the GCIP forms the core of a new, three-tiered

mechanism designed to specifically meet the coordination need. The centerpiece of this

new collaborative coordinating structure is the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating

Group (CDICG), with its supporting staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive

Secretariat (CDX). The CDICG will draw its policy guidance and input from the

members of the President’s Council on Counter-Narcotics (PCCN), as well as from the

five goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy. The CDICG derives its

ability to resolve issues through the authorities and prerogatives of its respective

members.

• The PCCN shall have a Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Committee comprising

eight members: the Attorney General, the Director of ONDCP, the Director of
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Central Intelligence, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the

Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs.

• The CDICG comprises 13 representatives of the Cabinet members and agency

heads. The CDICG will provide a semiannual report of all cross-jurisdictional

counterdrug intelligence issues addressed and recommendations made (including

progress on all of the action items in this GCIP) to the PCCN.

• The CDX will be a full-time staff of experienced counterdrug intelligence specialists

detailed from all of the participating departments and core agencies in this Plan. Its

director will be a senior law enforcement officer; its deputy director will be a senior

Intelligence Community officer.

National Centers

One of the key charges by Congress for this Plan was the articulation of clear roles and

mission statements for the core components that comprise the interagency counterdrug

intelligence architecture. The review process validated the existing program priorities

and mission statements for all but three of these components: the National Drug

Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Financial

Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

The respective missions and roles of these three centers have been the source of much of

the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the current counterdrug intelligence system. It

is imperative that their respective missions, and that of the DCI Crime and Narcotics

Center (CNC), be complementary and comprehensive, rather than duplicative or

competitive. One intent of this GCIP is to clarify program priorities and mission

statements and strengthen each of these centers individually, while collectively

promoting a more integrated and coordinated intelligence support architecture for both

domestic and foreign counterdrug strategic planning and operational support.

Under the 18 action items advanced in this section of the Plan, the drug intelligence

responsibilities of these four primary national-level centers are further defined to improve

coordination and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

• CNC will remain the principal center for foreign strategic counterdrug analysis and

for coordinating Intelligence Community support to U.S. foreign counterdrug

activities;

• NDIC will become the principal center for domestic strategic counterdrug analysis in

support of policymakers and resource planners;

• EPIC will be strengthened as the principal center for operational and investigative

intelligence analysis of illicit drug movements in support of interdiction activities and

U.S. law enforcement; and,
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• FinCEN will be strengthened as the principal center for strategic analysis of

narcotics-related financial crimes and for investigative support to law enforcement

concerning financial crimes.2

.

Regional, State, and Local Cooperation

The overall success of national enforcement efforts to combat the availability and use of

illegal drugs in the United States depends in great measure on the effectiveness of state

and local law enforcement efforts. Federal drug law enforcement agencies rely heavily

on the input and participation of these state and local organizations in task forces and

multiagency investigations. The challenge is to leverage resources and existing

mechanisms such as Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) task forces, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, Organized Crime Drug

Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

(HIDTAs), and the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) to maximize

interagency cooperation at all levels. This will also include the High-Risk MoneyLaundering and Related Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCAs) as integral parts of the

National Money Laundering Strategy.

Some 17,000 Federal, regional, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and support

entities exist. Often agencies operate autonomously, frequently with overlapping

jurisdictions, and are supported by multiple authorities, procedures, and systems. Drug

investigators increasingly have joined together in local or regional task force programs

for coordination and support. Multicomponent task forces and HIDTAs, in particular,

have multiplied. While all serve to advance local or regional cooperation, they are

insufficiently coordinated on a larger scale. This often fosters jurisdictional and funding

competitiveness.

The regional or local intelligence centers associated with many of these multiagency

programs are intended to be strongly tactical, augmenting the development of individual

cases. However, they do not routinely generate meaningful systematic trend and pattern

analyses or further interregional information exchange. A typical, large U.S.

metropolitan area has the DEA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service, state, county, and city police forces,

and Federal, state, city, and county prosecutors carrying out drug investigations,

interdictions, and prosecutions in support of their respective missions and jurisdictions.

Many have their own intelligence capabilities and many participate in joint task forces.

Information is shared among agencies predominately through interpersonal

communication on a case-by-case basis. Accommodating the complexity of U.S. law

enforcement, in terms of the number of agencies and agent-level information-sharing

practices, is a central challenge of a common counterdrug intelligence-sharing system.

This section of the GCIP presents 13 action items to further enhance regional, state, and

local cooperative efforts. Specific proposals include a call for major metropolitan areas

 

2The terms strategic, investigative, and operational intelligence are defined in Appendix D-Glossary of Terms.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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to bring appropriate counterdrug intelligence analysts from DEA, FBI, HIDTAs, and

other components together into collocated intelligence centers, with a common set of core

functions and capabilities, in support of all counterdrug law enforcement within their

areas; to enhance interagency enforcement and information-sharing efforts; and, to

streamline several processes locally, such as area drug threat assessments, drug seizure

reporting, and seized document exploitation.

Foreign Coordination

This section of the Plan addresses the international dimension of the counterdrug

intelligence architecture. The 12 action items in this section further enhance the already

strong relationships among U.S. counterdrug components operating overseas. They will

promote a more robust counterdrug effort between the United States and its many allies

in the international counterdrug community. These action items include specific

proposals for improving leadership and coordination of counterdrug components of U.S.

Missions abroad; improving counterdrug intelligence dissemination to host nations;

enhancing intelligence on foreign commercial drug smuggling activities, including the

placement of U.S. Customs Service drug intelligence personnel overseas; ensuring

adequate drug law enforcement analytic personnel overseas; increasing attention to

foreign drug-related illicit finances; and, clarifying legal and policy guidelines on law

enforcement and intelligence coordination.

Analytic Personnel Development and Training

This section of the GCIP brings necessary attention to analytic personnel development

and training. The action items delineated in this section will strengthen the drug law

enforcement community’s intelligence structure through adequate staffing, while

concurrently enhancing the abilities of law enforcement intelligence analysts and other

law enforcement personnel. Overall, Federal components need to build upon their

current drug intelligence efforts, especially in areas of analysis, recruitment, training,

technology, support, and information sharing. At the same time, a clearer understanding

of the legitimate differences among philosophies and policies of law enforcement and

Intelligence Community agencies will enable them to perform as a true community and

deliver fully coordinated drug intelligence. The analyst function within law enforcement

agencies—designed primarily to support ongoing investigations and prosecutions—will

be more clearly defined, with a structured career path.

The 20 action items in this section include measures to ensure an adequate number of

Federal law enforcement drug intelligence analysts; to establish and standardize across

agencies professional development career paths for Federal law enforcement intelligence

analysts; to enhance the broader dissemination of sanitized intelligence from law

enforcement investigative reporting; and, to better coordinate counterdrug intelligence

training and education conducted under the various departmental training programs and

facilities, including:
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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(1) The Justice Training Center in Quantico, Virginia, within which DOJ is considering

establishing a national crime and drug intelligence academy.

(2) The Treasury Department’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, in Glynco,

Georgia.

(3) The Defense Department’s Joint Military Intelligence Training Center.

(4) The HIDTA Assistance Center.

(5) The Intelligence Community-chaired interagency Training for Intelligence and Law

Enforcement program.

Information Technology

Drug intelligence analysts must be supported by effective, secure, and powerful

information systems. The drug intelligence centers and activities require an architecture

that permits rapid access by authorized analysts to all relevant information sources; quick

information retrieval and sorting; secure information transfer among organizations; and

tools to manipulate and analyze the information. The existing array of information

technology and communications systems, particularly in the law enforcement

community, needs significant improvement in secure interconnectivity to adequately

support drug intelligence dissemination and information sharing.

The state of information systems architectures today is much improved over that of

August 1992, when the National Drug Control Information Resource Management Plan

was published under ONDCP auspices. The Intelligence Community has achieved

significant advancements that address many of the requirements for interagency

information sharing in the national security realm. The law enforcement community has

also completed numerous improvements in overall automation across the Federal, state,

and local levels. There are also several positive information-handling and -sharing

initiatives involving law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, military components,

and regional organizations.

Despite these successes, drug intelligence and law enforcement organizations’ systems

remain virtual “stovepipes.” The counterdrug community can maximize the efficiency of

the intelligence process by adopting a systems architecture that places the relevant

information into a series of interoperable and accessible information spaces, with respect

for need-to-know and proper authorization. The creation of shared information spaces

will make community-wide electronic access a reality, providing analysts the flexibility

to interact with and gather information from other organizations. It will also provide the

technical foundation for the proactive and secure dissemination of intelligence to

appropriate customers.

The architecture outlined in this Plan will provide a mechanism for appropriate state and

local personnel to interact electronically with one another and their Federal counterparts

in a secure environment. The goal is to enable all of the drug intelligence analysts with

the appropriate credentials to obtain all of the information they need to do their jobs.

There is no intent to enable, nor will the system permit, personnel without appropriate
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need-to-know and security clearances to access national security databases, or

Intelligence Community analysts to directly access domestic criminal investigative data.

Advances in communications technology have removed most of the technical barriers to

information sharing, while also improving methods of protecting information. Technical

security measures such as encryption, smart cards, public-private key infrastructures,

Internet protocol security standards, biometrics, and firewalls can be used to prevent

unauthorized access, allowing network administrators and security professionals to

enforce the standards of need-to-know and to ensure that the proper authorizations are in

effect. The technical means exist for the drug intelligence community to share

information securely, but the connecting hardware and software must be widely available

throughout participating agencies. Departmental and agency procedures will be reviewed

and revised to ensure they maximize secure information sharing.

This Plan envisions a future systems architecture that is both secure enough to support

information sharing and also easily accessible from across the counterdrug intelligence

and law enforcement communities. The goal is to ensure that all drug intelligence and

law enforcement personnel can obtain expeditiously the information they need. The Plan

promotes the use of existing networks and secure Web technology to connect the drug

intelligence community. The technical components include more robust, timely, and

accurate input to agency databases; adherence to strict security with audit trails; proactive

dissemination of non-case-specific law enforcement information to the broader drug

intelligence community; single-workstation access to multiple sources of law

enforcement information; and, adequate technical support, life-cycle enhancements,

training, user support, and analytic tools.

This section provides 10 specific action items that will create the basis for an effective

drug intelligence systems architecture. Included are the formation of an interagency

Systems Policy Review Group (SPRG) to help guide and coordinate component

automation upgrades and connectivity policies and initiatives; plans for the completion

within one year of a detailed schedule for implementing specific architectural upgrades;

and specific measures to improve the technical capabilities and interactions among the

core national level centers with drug intelligence responsibilities (NDIC, EPIC, and

FinCEN), and the HIDTA Intelligence Centers.

Recognition of Statutory and Component Authorities

The missions and functions of the agencies of the Intelligence Community and the U.S.

law enforcement agencies and their enabling legal authorities differ substantially. This

Plan recognizes that agencies of the Intelligence Community are obligated to protect

sensitive intelligence sources and methods from improper disclosure. Likewise, drug law

enforcement agencies are obligated to protect sensitive, undercover, and legally restricted

law enforcement sources, information, individuals, and techniques.
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The GCIP does not change fundamental agency authorities or the laws governing

interagency relationships. The agenda set forth in this Plan facilitates the appropriate and

timely exchange of information between the intelligence and drug law enforcement

communities, taking care to respect law and regulation. The Plan recognizes and respects

the legal authorities that govern: the collection and dissemination of information

pertaining to "U.S. persons;" the dissemination of certain legally-restricted law

enforcement information, such as taxpayer information, grand jury information, and

information derived from court authorized electronic surveillance; information disclosure

pursuant to the Privacy Act, as amended; and, information sharing that, if not properly

conducted, could "taint" domestic drug investigations and prosecutions with information

derived from sensitive intelligence sources and methods, resulting in the dilemma of

either dismissing the prosecution or compromising a sensitive source or method.

The functions and responsibilities of the counterdrug intelligence centers and

coordinating bodies addressed in this Plan do not supersede or modify the authorities of

Executive Department or Agency heads, nor confer statutory roles and responsibilities

upon them. The Plan recognizes the legitimate need of individual agencies to retain their

intelligence components.

To the extent that this Plan addresses authorities or functions of the DCI, including the

authority to establish requirements and priorities to govern the collection of national

intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community; the authority to approve

collection requirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection

priorities levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the

Secretary of Defense pursuant to direction of the President; the responsibility for

providing national intelligence; and the functions of the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center,

it is expository of already existing authorities and functions. Nothing contained herein

shall be construed to imply any grant of or change to the missions, functions, or

authorities of the DCI.

Resource Implications

To the extent that these 73 action items delineated in the GCIP have resource

implications, they must be weighed against other priorities. Currently, FY2000

departmental and agency resources are not programmed to accommodate such action

items. Therefore, the action items with resource implications for future years will need to

be vetted through the normal budget process. Participating agencies will need to identify

funding options to accommodate the Plan’s objectives.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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Introduction

The General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan3 (GCIP) establishes an all-encompassing

national counterdrug intelligence architecture. It advances an action agenda to improve

information sharing and resolve issues of mission clarity, systems connectivity,

interagency cooperation, and analyst professionalization. The GCIP fashions the vision

for a better-integrated, more effective counterdrug intelligence architecture—building on

notable successes of recent years. The GCIP is the blueprint to clarify and make

systematic U.S. counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement information programs to

better support the departments, agencies, centers, and activities involved in:

• Drug policy formulation and implementation;

• Federal, state, and local law enforcement drug investigations and prosecutions;

• Foreign and domestic drug interdiction; and,

• International drug control programs.

The GCIP is a collaborative interagency product. It builds on the findings of the White

House Task Force (WHTF) Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and

Activities. The GCIP establishes ways to provide policymakers, operators, and

investigators with timely, relevant, and actionable drug-related intelligence and

information necessary to disrupt and dismantle illicit drug trafficking infrastructures,

organizations, and resources. The Plan maximizes the opportunities for timely

information sharing, intelligence exchange, and operational coordination—fully within

all statutory limitations—among the various policymaking, military, law enforcement,

and Intelligence Community components that collectively make up the national

counterdrug intelligence architecture. The action items leverage the important progress

made on these fronts, and provide a framework that promotes additional and improved

counterdrug intelligence coordination and information flow at the Federal, state, and local

levels.

Authority

The GCIP was developed in response to the Treasury and General Government

Appropriations Act of 1998, which required the Director of National Drug Control

Policy (ONDCP) to:

“...submit to the appropriate congressional committees...a plan to improve

coordination, and eliminate unnecessary duplication, among the counterdrug

intelligence centers and counterdrug activities of the Federal Government...”

 

3Appendix A describes the process to produce the Plan.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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The Plan also responds to the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act, which required a

review of the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) mission. 4

Relationship to the National Drug Control Strategy

The goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy guide the GCIP.

Counterdrug intelligence supports individual organizations’ drug monitoring, and law

enforcement, intelligence, and other counterdrug missions under the National Drug

Control Strategy. The Strategy has five goals to reduce illegal drug use and its

consequences:

Goal 1: Educate and enable America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.

Goal 2: Increase the safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and

violence.

Goal 3: Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.

Goal 4: Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

GCIP Recognition of Statutory and Component Authorities

Counterdrug intelligence organizations employ a variety of techniques to collect

intelligence. Existing Federal statutes and executive orders authorize U.S. counterdrug

intelligence organizations to collect information regarding suspected illegal drug

activities of both U.S. and foreign persons and organizations both within and outside the

United States. Generally, law enforcement organizations such as the Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) collect both

domestic and foreign drug information, whereas national intelligence organizations such

as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are authorized to collect only foreign intelligence on

any drug-related activity outside the United States. In general, Executive Order 12333

(United States Intelligence Activities) limits agencies such as the CIA, NSA, and DIA

from collecting, retaining, and disseminating information concerning the activities of

U.S. persons.

The missions and functions of the agencies of the Intelligence Community and the U.S.

law enforcement agencies and their enabling legal authorities differ substantially. This

Plan recognizes that agencies of the Intelligence Community are obligated to protect

sensitive intelligence sources and methods from improper disclosure. Likewise, drug law

enforcement agencies are obligated to protect sensitive, undercover, and legally restricted

law enforcement sources, information, individuals, and techniques.

 

4Appendix B cites the relevant portions of the aforementioned Acts, and Appendix C contains the mission statements

for each of the national-level centers with counterdrug responsibilities and activities.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

15

This Plan does not change agency authorities or the laws governing interagency

relationships. The action agenda set forth in this Plan facilitates the appropriate and

timely exchange of information between the intelligence and drug law enforcement

communities, taking care to respect law and regulation. The actions recognize and

respect the legal authorities that govern: the collection and dissemination of information

pertaining to “U.S. persons;” the dissemination of certain legally-restricted law

enforcement information, such as taxpayer information, grand jury information, and

information derived from court-authorized electronic surveillance; and information

sharing that, if not properly conducted, could "taint" domestic drug investigations and

prosecutions with information derived from sensitive foreign intelligence sources and

methods, causing the dilemma of either dismissing the prosecution or compromising a

sensitive source or method.

The functions and responsibilities of the counterdrug intelligence centers and their

activities and coordinating bodies addressed in this Plan do not supersede or modify the

responsibilities or authorities of, nor confer statutory roles on, heads of Executive

Departments or Agencies.

Nothing contained in this Plan shall be construed to imply any grant of or change to the

missions, functions, or authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). To the

extent that this Plan addresses authorities or functions of the DCI, including the authority

to establish requirements and priorities to govern the collection of national intelligence by

elements of the Intelligence Community; the authority to approve collection

requirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities

levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of

Defense pursuant to direction of the President; the responsibility for providing national

intelligence; and the functions of the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, it is expository of

already existing authorities and functions.

Resource Implications

To the extent that these 73 action items delineated in the GCIP have resource

implications, they must be weighed against other priorities. Currently, FY2000

departmental and agency resources are not programmed to accommodate such action

items. Therefore, the action items with resource implications for future years will need to

be vetted through the normal budget process. Participating agencies will need to identify

funding options to accommodate the Plan’s objectives.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

16

Section A:

National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination

Introduction

The central theme confronted in the White House Task Force (WHTF) Review was the

need for clear, consistent intercommunity and interagency coordination of the

counterdrug intelligence effort. A concern most often echoed was, “No one is in charge.”

The Review established that it was neither possible nor appropriate for any one person or

component to be “in charge” in a monolithic coordinating body. The law enforcement

and intelligence communities each have very distinct and legitimate legal and operational

authorities that must be preserved in the joint management of counterdrug investigative

and intelligence activities.

What is possible and appropriate, however, is the establishment of a strengthened intercomponent coordinating mechanism that fosters and facilitates both greater information

sharing and operational coordination between the law enforcement and intelligence

counterdrug communities. This mechanism recognizes and optimizes the capabilities,

equities, and authorities of all Federal departments engaged in this effort, and also

strengthens the important counterdrug partnership among the Federal, state, and local law

enforcement communities.

The coordinating structure defined below forms the core of a three-tiered coordination

mechanism designed to specifically meet the above objectives. The centerpiece of this

collaborative coordinating structure is the new Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating

Group (CDICG), with its supporting staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive

Secretariat (CDX). The CDICG will draw its policy guidance from the President’s

Council on Counter-Narcotics and from the five goals and supporting objectives of the

National Drug Control Strategy and derives its ability to resolve issues through the

authorities and prerogatives of its respective members from the law enforcement and

intelligence communities.

National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination

I. PURPOSE. The coordinating structure for carrying out the functions and for

implementing the recommendations contained in this General Counterdrug Intelligence

Plan (GCIP) is set forth below. This structure is intended to maximize timely

information sharing, intelligence exchange, and operational coordination—fully within

statutory limitations—among the policymaking, military, law enforcement, and

Intelligence Community components that collectively make up our national counterdrug

intelligence architecture. The new architecture will build on the important progress that

has been made over the past decade, and provide a framework that promotes even further
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

17

counterdrug intelligence coordination and information flow, at the Federal, state, and

local levels, in the 21st Century.

II. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS.

The Council, originally established by Executive Order, was given statutory authorization

under section 709 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of

1998 (21 U.S.C. 1708). With the Director of ONDCP serving as Executive Director, this

cabinet-level Council advises and assists the President in providing direction and

oversight for the National Drug Control Strategy, and in ensuring coordination among

departments and agencies of the Federal Government concerning implementation of the

National Drug Control Strategy. Consistent with those responsibilities, the Council shall

serve as the preeminent body for providing oversight on all issues relating to drug

intelligence policy. There is established within the Council an eight-member body (the

Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of ONDCP, the

Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the

Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) known

as the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Committee, whose purpose is to provide a

focal point for all counterdrug intelligence policy issues within the PCCN. Other PCCN

members may attend meetings of this Executive Committee as appropriate to the issues

under consideration. Through existing counternarcotics fora noted in Section III, below,

and subordinate bodies prescribed in Sections IV and V, below, the Council will monitor

implementation of the GCIP, and, more particularly, it will oversee the development and

dissemination of law enforcement and intelligence requirements to meet the goals and

objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy.

III. COUNTERDRUG INTERAGENCY POLICY AND PROGRAM

COORDINATION.

The interdepartmental bodies listed below meet to identify and coordinate counterdrug

issues. Each focuses on a distinct area of the counterdrug arena, described below, and

may provide input into the CDICG or CDX, as appropriate. While the Counter-Narcotics

Interagency Working Group deals exclusively with policy guidance issues, the remaining

entities deal primarily with operational and programmatic issues.

A. The Counter-Narcotics Interagency Working Group (CN-IWG), chaired by

ONDCP, is the principal interagency, senior working-level forum for coordinating

policy guidance related to counterdrug issues. As described below, it is also a

principal forum for identifying counterdrug intelligence-related requirements and

taskings that may cross jurisdictional lines or involve multiple components within

the Federal law enforcement community and the Intelligence Community.

B. The Southern Frontiers Committee is chaired by the Attorney General and

provides operational focus and direction to law enforcement organizations
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

18

regarding operations along the Southwest Border and the Caribbean and the Gulf

of Mexico.

C. The Interdiction Committee (TIC), which is currently chaired by the

Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, provides advice to the U.S. Interdiction

Coordinator (USIC) in support of his role of overseeing the adequacy and

optimum use of Federal interdiction assets. Additionally, the TIC provides a

forum for coordination and optimization of border interdiction and promotes

seamless and effective integration of interdiction efforts in support of the National

Drug Control Strategy.

D. The J-3/USIC Quarterly Counterdrug Conference, which is co-chaired by the

Department of Defense Joint Staff Director for Operations and the U.S.

Interdiction Coordinator, promotes coordination between military counterdrug

support efforts and the needs of interdiction organizations.

E. The Committee on Narcotics Intelligence Issues (CNII) is chaired by the

Director, DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, and promotes counterdrug

coordination within the Intelligence Community.

Whenever these or other Federal counterdrug-related interagency committees and

working groups identify counterdrug intelligence-related issues, requirements, or taskings

that are cross- jurisdictional, 5 such matters may be referred to the CDICG, described in

Section IV, below, for attention and necessary action. Matters that cannot be resolved by

the CDICG will be referred to the Council.

IV. COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING GROUP.

A. ESTABLISHMENT. There is established under the Council an interagency

group known as the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group, or CDICG.

B. MEMBERSHIP.

1. COMPOSITION. The CDICG shall be composed of 13 members, of

whom:

a. 1 will be designated by the DCI;

b. 1 will be designated by the Attorney General;

c. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury;

d. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of Transportation;

e. 1 will be designated by the Director of ONDCP;

f. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of Defense;

g. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of State;

 

5As used here and elsewhere in the GCIP, the term "cross-jurisdictional" refers to counterdrug intelligence issues that

affect or involve both the law enforcement community and the Intelligence Community, or, within the law enforcement

community, that affect or involve more than one department, or that affect both the U.S. Government and state and/or

local officials.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

19

h. 1 will be designated by the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs;

i. 1 will be designated by the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration;

j. 1 will be designated by the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation;

k. 1 will be designated by the Commissioner of the United States

Customs Service;

l. 1 will be designated by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue

Service; and,

m. 1 will be designated by the Commandant of the United States Coast

Guard.

2. LEADERSHIP. The CDICG shall be led by co-chairs from the

Intelligence Community and from the Federal law enforcement community.

The Intelligence Community co-chair will be the member designated by the

DCI. The law enforcement co-chair will be designated from among other

members of the CDICG by mutual agreement of the Attorney General, the

Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Transportation. Co-chair

designations will be made in consultation with the Director of ONDCP.

3. OTHER ATTENDEES. With the concurrence of the co-chairs, individual

members may invite other officials, representing the major counterdrug

intelligence centers and components of the participating departments and

agencies, to attend meetings or participate in CDICG deliberations as

appropriate to the issues under consideration. In particular, the Deputy

Director for State and Local Affairs/ONDCP may attend meetings of the

CDICG to discuss counterdrug intelligence issues that concern state and local

officials. With the concurrence of the co-chairs, said Deputy Director may

invite no more than two state and/or local law enforcement representatives to

attend appropriate CDICG deliberations.

C. FUNCTIONS. The CDICG, in support of the Council or its individual

members, will, among other things:

1. Ensure coordination among departments and agencies of the Federal

Government responsible for conducting intelligence programs that support the

National Drug Control Strategy;

2. Receive policy guidance and taskings from the Council; additional issues

for CDICG consideration may be received from other fora as described in

Section III or may be raised by individual members of the CDICG. The

CDICG will refer to the Council those issues that it cannot resolve;
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

20

3. Receive and recommend to appropriate CDICG members domestic and

foreign drug intelligence taskings and requirements in support of national

counterdrug policymakers;

4. Provide a forum to resolve or refer for adjudication those crossjurisdictional counterdrug intelligence issues that cannot be resolved at a

lower level;

5. Study and advocate enhancements to promote the effectiveness and

efficiency of both foreign and domestic counterdrug programs and activities,

including the adequacy of intelligence services;

6. Commission national and regional drug threat assessments and studies as

requested by senior policymakers;

7. Promote improvements to counterdrug intelligence centers and activities to

strengthen mission focus, reduce functional overlap, and promote joint

analytic products;

8. Assume the functions heretofore performed by the National Drug

Intelligence Center (NDIC) Executive Advisory Board, the NDIC Intelligence

Priorities Board; and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Advisory Board;

9. Use the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX) (described

in Section V, below) to carry out the functions of the CDICG under this

section, and other taskings, as appropriate; and,

10. Submit a semiannual written report concerning drug intelligence issues

and recommendations to the Council.

D. AUTHORITY. The CDICG derives its ability to resolve issues through the

authorities and prerogatives of its respective members.

V. COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

A. ESTABLISHMENT. In order to improve the overall effectiveness of

counterdrug intelligence, there is established a full-time interagency staff known

as the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat, or CDX, which shall

operate directly under the CDICG.

B. CDX DIRECTOR AND CDX DEPUTY DIRECTOR.

1. CDX DIRECTOR. There shall be a CDX Director, who will be

responsible for carrying out the functions of the CDX. The CDX Director

shall be designated by mutual agreement among the Attorney General, the
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

21

Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation

with the Director of ONDCP, for a renewable term of two years. The CDX

Director will fill an SES position.

2. CDX DEPUTY DIRECTOR. There shall be a CDX Deputy Director, who

will assist the CDX Director in carrying out the functions of the CDX. The

CDX Deputy Director shall be designated by the DCI, in consultation with the

Director of ONDCP, for a renewable term of two years. The CDX Deputy

Director will fill an SES or SIS position.

C. CDX STAFF. The CDX staff shall be initially composed of approximately 30

personnel—selected by the CDX Director from departmental nominees—on twoto three-year details, and such additional detailees as needed to fill an executive

officer, legal advisor, and other administrative support positions. Within one

year, and annually thereafter, the CDICG will review CDX staffing to decide if

the CDX needs a mix of detailees and permanent appropriated staff positions. The

CDX staff shall be organized to address:

1. Foreign drug information and intelligence;

2. Domestic drug information and intelligence;

3. Information systems and technology; and,

4. Analyst career professionalization, education, and training.

D. FUNCTIONS. The CDX shall primarily provide staff support to the CDICG,

and shall act for the CDICG, as appropriate, in monitoring the implementation of

the GCIP; coordinating the implementation of multiagency, cross-jurisdictional

counterdrug intelligence taskings and requirements levied by or through the

CDICG; and promoting resolution of cross-jurisdictional counterdrug

intelligence-related issues. In so doing, the CDX shall, among other things:

1. Promote stronger information flow, information sharing, and fusion

relationships among Federal, state, and local agencies, between U.S. law

enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community, and with foreign

nations or international organizations;

2. Promote development of technology standards and interoperable

information systems, and monitor implementation of and report on

information technology and communications plans;

3. Promote improved drug intelligence career professionalization, education,

and training throughout the intelligence and law enforcement communities;

4. Receive cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence issues from multiple

sources, review and analyze the issues, and prepare appropriate staff studies

with recommendations for resolution;
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

22

5. Promote improved mechanisms for counterdrug intelligence exchange

with foreign nations and international organizations;

6. Attempt to resolve issues and disputes at the lowest practical

organizational level; and,

7. Draft reports and recommendations, as appropriate, including a

semiannual, written report addressing issues raised and recommendations

made over the past six months, to the CDICG for review and submission to

the Council.

Recommendations by the CDX shall take care to protect and preserve the safeguards

between U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community, shall be advisory and

non-binding, and may be formally and informally disputed by the applicable departments

or agencies.

E. ADMINISTRATION.

1. EVALUATIONS. The co-chairs of the CDICG shall evaluate the annual

performance of the CDX Director and CDX Deputy Director. Other CDX

personnel shall be evaluated within the CDX. Evaluations shall be provided

to the detailing agencies.

2. COOPERATION FROM OTHER AGENCIES. The CDX will receive

from each department and agency of the Executive Branch:

a. Access to the information it requires to fulfill its mission, with

applicable safeguards for protection of sources and methods;6

b. Cooperation in carrying out the functions of the CDX; and,

c. Such assistance, information, and advice as the CDX may request, to

the extent permitted by law.

3. SUPPORT AND PLACEMENT. CDX will be administratively supported

by the Department of Justice, housed in Justice-owned or -leased nonheadquarters space in the Washington metropolitan area, and funded by

ONDCP, as prescribed below. ONDCP will, through the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM), assist parent agencies in obtaining and maintaining temporary SES

and SIS billets for CDX.

F. FUNDING. The CDX shall be funded as a line item through the ONDCP

budget per fund availability. These funds shall be used to reimburse the Justice

Department for expenses associated with CDICG and CDX operating, travel,

administrative, supply, security, and support services, and those agencies that

provide administrative support detailees or services. Additionally, if any funds

 

6Disputes regarding CDX access to information should be referred to the head of the department or agency concerned

for resolution.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

23

remain after reimbursing the Justice Department, these funds will be used to

reimburse departments and agencies from which other detailees are assigned.

G. NOTE. The functions and responsibilities of the CDX will not derogate or

supersede the statutory roles, responsibilities, or authorities of participating

Executive Departments and Agencies.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

24

Section B:

National Centers

Introduction

Under the 18 action items advanced in this section of the Plan, the drug intelligence

responsibilities of these four primary national-level centers are further defined to improve

coordination and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

• The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) will

remain the principal center for foreign strategic counterdrug analysis and for

coordinating Intelligence Community support to U.S. foreign counterdrug activities;

• The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) will become the principal center for

domestic strategic counterdrug analysis in support of policymakers and resource

planners;

• The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) will be strengthened as the principal center

for operational and investigative intelligence analysis of illicit drug movements in

support of interdiction activities and U.S. law enforcement; and,

• The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) will be strengthened as the

principal center for strategic analysis of narcotics-related financial crimes and for

investigative support to law enforcement concerning financial crimes.

The DCI Crime and Narcotics Center

The DCI Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) will maintain its present mission focus and

program priorities. The counterdrug mission of CNC is to oversee the development,

coordination, and implementation of all counternarcotics activities within the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA). In close collaboration with all relevant law enforcement,

policymaking, and Department of Defense (DoD) counternarcotics elements, CNC is

responsible for the prioritization, responsiveness, and efficient use of counternarcotics

resources throughout the Intelligence Community, and for ensuring that intelligence

priorities are closely coordinated with those of U.S. law enforcement.

Through the melding of analytic, operational, and technical expertise from several

agencies, CNC provides a full range of multidisciplinary, current, and long-term

intelligence to support policymakers and all components of the U.S. counterdrug

community. The Center’s analytic program addresses all dimensions of the international

narcotics problem and provides intelligence to support the development and

implementation of U.S. counternarcotics policy. CNC provides actionable intelligence to

support a variety of operations to disrupt and dismantle major foreign drug organizations
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

25

and to detect, monitor, and interdict drug flows. CNC also assesses drug flows to the

United States and is responsible for estimating annual cultivation and production for all

major coca- and opium-producing countries worldwide and for cannabis crops in selected

foreign countries. The Center is also responsible for ensuring that all relevant

technologies are brought to bear in supporting analytic, collection, and operational efforts

throughout the counterdrug community.

B-1. Strategic Assessments: Beginning in calendar year 2000, CNC will take the lead

role in the interagency production of an annual International Drug Threat Assessment,

which will be designed to provide more comprehensive intelligence input to the

Administration’s annual designated nations counterdrug certification policy process and

to the formulation of the Administration’s annual National Drug Control Strategy. In

coordination with FinCEN and other appropriate agencies, CNC will also augment its

analytic efforts concerning the international aspects of narcotics-related money

laundering.

The National Drug Intelligence Center

B-2. Mission: The mission statement of the National Drug Intelligence Center shall be:

• To support national policy and law enforcement decisionmakers with timely strategic

domestic drug intelligence assessments, focusing on the production, trafficking, and

consumption trends and patterns of all illicit drugs inside U.S. national borders and

territories.

• To assist the Intelligence Community in guiding and prioritizing its counterdrug

effort by providing to the originating law enforcement agency, or with the permission

of the originating agency to a multiagency coordinating mechanism, foreign-related

investigative leads discovered in its domestic analyses.

• To produce an annual National Drug Threat Assessment, to produce or coordinate

interagency regional drug threat assessments, and to participate in other joint

counterdrug assessments involving the integration of foreign and domestic drug

information.

B-3. Subordination: NDIC will remain under the direct line authority of the Deputy

Attorney General, but the NDIC Executive Advisory Board (EAB) and the Intelligence

Priorities Board (IPB) will be abolished. In their place, the Counterdrug Intelligence

Coordinating Group (CDICG) shall provide counterdrug intelligence guidance and

direction to the Director, NDIC, to ensure that the Center’s taskings, activities, and

products are consistent with its mission and with the needs of the national interagency

counterdrug community.

B-4. Production: In support of the National Drug Control Strategy, NDIC will take the

lead role in the interagency production of an annual National Drug Threat Assessment.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

26

This domestic-focused assessment, and the foreign-focused assessment described in

Action Item B-1, above, will be designed and produced as a coordinated, two-volume

companion product as part of an annual interagency threat assessment process.

NDIC will use information from Federal, state, and local sources, as well as from

nationally representative and scientifically valid health and epidemiological sources, to

produce timely and relevant articles, bulletins, and research studies on drug trafficking

and consumption developments and trends within domestic regions, states, and major

cities. NDIC will also participate in or conduct appropriate national- and regional-level

colloquia and public issue roundtables. In collaboration with CNC and the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA), NDIC will also participate in other joint,

interagency assessments that require the integration of both foreign and domestic

strategic counterdrug intelligence analyses.

B-5. Special Projects: Beyond NDIC’s active and continuing participation in strategic

domestic analysis—for example on cocaine and heroin trafficking trends—NDIC will

maintain the capability to take on appropriate additional strategic domestic research and

analysis efforts that policymakers or individual counterdrug components may request

through the CDICG. This will include the following five topics, which will be

maintained as ongoing projects consistent with the Center’s mission:

(1) Expanded research and strategic analyses of domestic marijuana production,

trafficking, and consumption trends and patterns;

(2) Expanded research and strategic analyses of the production, trafficking, and

consumption of methamphetamine and other illicit synthetic drugs inside the United

States;

(3) Expanded research and strategic analyses of drug-related trafficking, homicides, and

other violent crimes associated with gang activity in the United States;

(4) The management of an on-line National Drug Intelligence Library for the benefit of

the Federal, state, and local counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement

communities, to be based on existing, commonly available networks like the AntiDrug Network (ADNET), Intelink, Law Enforcement On-line (LEO), and the

Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET) systems. This Plan

requires that all agencies provide their finished drug intelligence products to NDIC

for inclusion in its Library; and,

(5) The provision of on-site and video distance learning-based counterdrug analysis

education and training, in coordination with the Justice Training Center, to both

NDIC and external component analysts, including analysts in state and local law

enforcement components.

B-6. Access to and Protection of Information: The Intelligence Community will

provide NDIC analysts with full access to appropriate drug-related reporting and products
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

27

to maintain expertise, and to support their analyses of domestic trafficking, including the

important “seamless continuum” characteristic of foreign illegal drug organizations and

activities within the United States, with priority given to coordinated intercommunity

counterdrug processes.

Federal law enforcement agencies will ensure full NDIC access to all pertinent

intelligence and information relating to the NDIC strategic domestic drug intelligence

mission, including those specific NDIC assessment and research topics coordinated

through the CDICG.

7

 Initially, Federal law enforcement agencies will dedicate sufficient

personnel and database terminals at NDIC facilities to provide analysts with the most

current law enforcement information. Eventually, with the Global Justice Information

Network advances and implementation of the reports analyst concept8 (see Action Item

C-2), NDIC analysts shall have appropriate direct access to the agencies’ current law

enforcement drug information. The Director of NDIC shall maintain adequate training

and education and aggressive security programs to ensure a level of security

commensurate with the increased access to sensitive and classified information.

B-7. Document Exploitation: Over the next two years, NDIC will redirect its domestic

document exploitation (DOCEX) program, transitioning this capability to an additional

six regional DOCEX teams to be established at designated High Intensity Drug

Trafficking Area (HIDTA) or other regional intelligence center locations throughout the

country (see Action Item C-6). NDIC document exploitation and computer forensics

specialists will help train DOCEX analysts (in coordination with the Justice Training

Center) as they receive their equipment packages and are ready to take on these

functions. NDIC will continue to provide priority DOCEX support services until these

designated elements are capable of serving their regions. At that time, the CDICG will

evaluate the NDIC role as a continuing DOCEX regional and/or nationwide surge support

and training assistance provider.

The El Paso Intelligence Center

B-8. Mission: The mission statement of the El Paso Intelligence Center shall be:

To support United States law enforcement and interdiction components through the

timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence on illicit drug and alien movements, and

criminal organizations responsible for these illegal activities, within the United States, on

both sides of the U.S.- Mexico border, across the Caribbean, and from other points of

origin within the Western Hemisphere en route to the United States.

 

7

 Disputes regarding NDIC’s access to information from the Intelligence Community and Federal law enforcement

agencies should be referred to the head of the department or agency concerned for resolution.

8A description of the “reports analyst” implementation proposal is contained in Action Item E-18.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

28

This mission refocuses EPIC’s efforts on drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere

rather than worldwide to make EPIC more responsive to its customers’ needs and threats

impacting the United States.

B-9. Management and Program Coordination: EPIC will remain under the direct line

authority of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the interagency makeup of

EPIC will be continued, but the EPIC Advisory Board will be abolished. Direct

management responsibility for EPIC rests with the EPIC Director, who will collaborate

with senior law enforcement representatives at EPIC from the Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S.

Customs Service (USCS), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). A Principals Group

composed of intelligence chiefs of the DEA, FBI, USCS, INS, and Coast Guard has been

established to provide internal interagency management and coordination. The CDICG

will provide guidance to the EPIC Principals Group and the EPIC Director to ensure that

EPIC’s activities and products are consistent with its mission, are not duplicative of

taskings or reporting of other national centers (to include NDIC and FinCEN), and meet

national interagency counterdrug community requirements.

B-10. Program Priorities: EPIC’s activities will focus on operational and investigative

intelligence support to drug law enforcement, with emphasis on the Center’s existing toppriority operational programs like the 24-hour Watch function. Emphasis will also be

placed on domestic interdiction and training programs such as PIPELINE, CONVOY,

and JETWAY. EPIC’s Maritime Lookout Watch will continue to provide support to both

the Caribbean and Pacific areas, and receive reporting on all suspect vessel drug

trafficking worldwide that may affect the United States. Focusing on the Southwest

Border, the Southeast Border, the Caribbean, and contiguous seas and airspace, EPIC also

will provide regional analysis to identify drug trafficking trends and patterns associated

with those regions, and issue timely reports as appropriate. EPIC will ensure these

reports are coordinated with NDIC so that there is no duplication. The EPIC Director, in

coordination with other senior center managers, will review ongoing projects for

consistency with the EPIC mission statement.

B-11. Relationship with State and Local Law Enforcement: EPIC should strengthen

its relationship with state and local law enforcement components throughout the country,

including greater state and local participation. The Center will review and update its

agreements with each state to increase the number of state and local contacts permitted to

directly access and request EPIC services. EPIC will further improve the ease by which

state and local law enforcement can coordinate with the Center, to include information

technology applications to supplement current telephonic inquiries. As a major national

center in the new drug intelligence architecture, EPIC will serve as a clearinghouse and

will work with the HIDTA Intelligence Centers, gathering state and local law

enforcement drug intelligence requirements and providing drug intelligence and

information back to the HIDTA Intelligence Centers.

B-12. Development of a Nationwide System to Report Drug Seizures to EPIC: The

Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX), in cooperation with EPIC and its
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

29

various state points-of-contact, HIDTA Intelligence Centers, DEA, and RISSes, will

coordinate the development of a process to capture drug seizure data at the state and local

levels. The objective will then be to aggregate the data from the Federal-wide Drug

Seizure System (FDSS) and the state/local initiative into a common database reflecting

seizures nationwide. DEA administers the FDSS to account for drug seizures and avoid

multiple counting. The system is an effective accounting mechanism for Federal seizures

and a useful tool in the analysis of trafficking activity. State and local law enforcement

seizure reporting, however, is not similarly aggregated. The development of this new

process, working toward a common, aggregate database of seizures nationwide, will help

incorporate the substantial contributions of state and local drug law enforcement agencies

into the overall counterdrug effort—contributions that may now be lost,

underappreciated, and not analyzed for their intelligence potential.

B-13. EPIC Watch Program: EPIC management should take steps to reduce the

number of special agents assigned to the Watch Program, replacing them with

investigative assistants. Additionally, EPIC will increase the number of analysts assigned

to perform first-phase intelligence analysis on data generated by the Watch. EPIC will

also increase the number of incoming drug movement and seizure reports upon which

their analysts generate self-initiated tactical reports or supplemental commentary reports

back to the providing component and/or to other affected law enforcement or interdiction

components.

B-14. Hub for HIDTA Intelligence Centers: EPIC will centrally receive and share

drug movement-related information developed by the HIDTA Intelligence Centers and

ensure that the EPIC Watch and relevant database checks are a standard part of

appropriate HIDTA operational protocols.

B-15. JICC Program Review: The CDICG will commission an interagency review of

the Joint Information Coordination Centers (JICC) program (which is designed to

consolidate data on suspect individuals, aircraft, and marine vessels in designated

Caribbean and Latin American countries) and will report on the continued viability of the

JICC Program.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

B-16: Mission: The mission statement of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

shall be:

To support law enforcement investigative efforts and foster interagency and global

cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes; and to provide U.S.

policymakers with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide money-laundering

developments, trends, and patterns. FinCEN will work toward those ends through

information collection, analysis, and sharing, as well as technological assistance, and

innovative, cost-effective implementation of Treasury authorities.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

30

B-17. Strategic Intelligence: FinCEN has the potential to play a central role in the U.S.

drug control program. To that end, a near-term objective for FinCEN is to significantly

increase its strategic intelligence role without diminishing the quality of the critical case

support that it currently provides to law enforcement. Under this objective, FinCEN and

the Treasury Department will undertake initiatives devoted to broader, strategic-level

analyses of money laundering and other illicit business transactions related to the drug

trade.

B-18. Access to Intelligence Reporting: FinCEN will improve its mechanisms for the

receipt and exploitation of law enforcement-sensitive data and classified intelligence.

FinCEN analysts will more actively participate in interagency counterdrug programs and

provide financial analysis to support interagency assessments. FinCEN’s analysts will

exercise their unique expertise in routinely reviewing, analyzing, and producing

assessments based upon Intelligence Community reporting on known or suspected drugrelated financial transactions and activities.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

31

Section C:

Regional, State, and Local Cooperation

Introduction

The overall success of national enforcement efforts to combat the availability and use of

illegal drugs in the United States depends in great measure on the effectiveness of state

and local law enforcement efforts. The decentralized nature of law enforcement makes it

difficult to implement a comprehensive counterdrug intelligence system. Federal drug

law enforcement agencies rely heavily on the input and participation of state and local

organizations in task forces and multiagency investigations. The challenge is to leverage

resources and existing Federal, state, and local cooperative mechanisms such as Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task

forces, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), High Intensity

Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS),

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the High-Risk Money-Laundering and Related Financial Crimes

Areas (HIFCAs), and others, to maximize interagency and intercommunity effectiveness.

Some 17,000 Federal, regional, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and support

entities exist. Often agencies operate autonomously, frequently with overlapping

jurisdictions, and are supported by multiple authorities, procedures, and systems. Drug

investigators increasingly have joined together in local or regional task force programs

for coordination and support. Multicomponent task forces and HIDTAs, in particular,

have multiplied. All serve to advance local or regional cooperation, but require enhanced

national and multiregional coordination. This expanded coordination will improve

operational effectiveness and help reduce jurisdictional and funding competitiveness.

The regional or local intelligence centers associated with many of these programs are

intended to be strongly tactical, augmenting the development of individual cases.

However, they do not routinely generate meaningful systematic trend and pattern

analyses which would be useful for investigations conducted on a national or

international scale.

A typical, large U.S. metropolitan area has the DEA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service

Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S.

Customs Service, state, county, and city police forces, and Federal, state, city, and county

prosecutors carrying out drug investigations, interdictions, and prosecutions in support of

their respective missions and jurisdictions. Many have their own intelligence

capabilities, and many participate in joint task forces. Information is shared among

agencies predominately through interpersonal communication, on a case-by-case basis.

Accommodating the complexity of U.S. law enforcement, in terms of the number of

agencies and agent-level information-sharing practices, is a central challenge of a

common counterdrug intelligence-sharing system.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

32

This section of the GCIP presents 13 action items to further enhance regional, state, and

local cooperative efforts.

C-1. Consolidation of Drug Intelligence Resources: In major metropolitan areas,

Federal law enforcement agencies and the HIDTA Intelligence Centers, where they exist,

will take steps to consolidate, or at least collocate, core drug intelligence-gathering and -

reporting components, including information systems terminal access. Agencies will

retain, as they consider appropriate, their own intelligence units to serve their individual

requirements. Such units should endeavor to coordinate efforts and share information

with other drug intelligence organizations in their region. In geographic areas identified

by the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG), participating agencies,

with the support of the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX), will

review the feasibility and efficacy of consolidating or collocating the drug intelligence

functions of the various agencies.

C-2. Dedication of Intelligence Analysts to Produce Sanitized Reports: Law

enforcement information sharing can be markedly and actively enhanced by establishing

a capability to generate and disseminate sanitized reports of current law enforcement

investigative information to their counterpart law enforcement agencies at the Federal,

state, and local levels. Doing so necessitates the dedication of a cadre of intelligence

analysts in the Federal law enforcement agencies, especially DEA, FBI, and U.S.

Customs Service headquarters and field offices. Their primary mission is to ensure that

timely and high-value, but not case-sensitive, information is provided to those with a

need-to-know, while protecting sensitive, undercover, and legally-restricted law

enforcement sources, information, individuals, and techniques. The law enforcement

community needs a reporting capability comparable to the Intelligence Community’s

reports officer to “push out” valuable information from the law enforcement field offices

to their own headquarters elements. This information would be further disseminated to

the drug intelligence community, as appropriate, to augment their analyses and focus

collection tasking. Law enforcement should not generate these reports at the expense of

direct case support. FY 2000 resource levels are not programmed to accommodate these

initiatives. (See Action Item E-18 for training implications.)

C-3. Federal Participation in HIDTA Intelligence Centers: The mission of the High

Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program is to enhance and coordinate America’s drugcontrol efforts among Federal, state, and local agencies in order to eliminate or reduce

drug trafficking (including the production, manufacture, transportation, distribution, and

chronic use of illegal drugs and money laundering) and its harmful consequences in

critical areas of the United States.

The establishment of intelligence centers in each HIDTA is a recent Federally funded, yet

locally implemented, intelligence initiative. The participation of Federal, state, and local

drug law enforcement agencies in these centers will provide a local forum for interagency

information gathering and exchange. HIDTA Intelligence Centers must be fully

integrated into the local counterdrug law enforcement information architecture. Federal

agencies should participate actively in each HIDTA and its Intelligence Center.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

33

C-4. Development of Guidelines for HIDTA Intelligence Centers: The Office of

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), in coordination with the CDX and Federal,

state, and local agencies participating in the HIDTA Program, will develop

comprehensive intelligence-related policies and guidelines for HIDTA Intelligence

Centers.

C-5. Establishment of Core Functions and Services for HIDTA Intelligence

Centers: HIDTA Intelligence Centers differ in their level of development, due largely to

regional needs and local HIDTA Executive Committee decisions. To a lesser degree, the

Centers vary because of limited national oversight and guidance provided to the HIDTAs.

As the HIDTA Program continues to develop, ONDCP will provide program guidance

for a set of core services and functions for HIDTA Intelligence Centers:

(1) The mission of the HIDTA Intelligence Centers is to facilitate the timely exchange of

information among Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies participating in

the HIDTA area of responsibility. In part, this will be accomplished by encouraging

automated database access to, and initiating automated systems messaging

connectivity among, Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and law

enforcement national centers and their enforcement databases, to include the Global

Justice Information Network (Global);

(2) Establish event and case deconfliction systems using commercial or government offthe-shelf technology where the systems do not already exist;

(3) Develop drug threat assessments for HIDTA areas of responsibility (see Action Item

C-12, below);

(4) Conduct post-seizure analysis9 of major seizures related to HIDTA initiatives;

(5) Assist participating state and local enforcement agencies in reporting drug seizures to

EPIC for inclusion in the database supporting the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System;

(6) Participate in on-line intelligence reporting systems that can be used on a state,

regional, or national basis; and,

(7) Provide a photo-imaging network capability that would permit Federal, state, and

local jurisdictions to share arrest photographs and biographic data for arrestees in the

area. These efforts should comport with the National Crime Information Center 2000

and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System planned to provide

digital photo imaging capability.

C-6. Expansion of Document Exploitation (DOCEX) Capabilities: ONDCP will

support the establishment of six initial DOCEX teams at designated regional intelligence

centers. ONDCP—in coordination with the various HIDTA Executive Committees, and

 

9Post-seizure analysis would include immediate exploitation of data as well as follow-up exploitation for intelligence

purposes and comprehensive dissemination of analysis results.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

34

in consultation with the CDICG—will select six HIDTA Intelligence Centers to establish

a document exploitation capability. FY 2000 resources are not programmed for this new

initiative. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) document exploitation and

computer forensics specialists—in conjunction with the Justice Training Center—will

help train these DOCEX analysts. NDIC, as reflected in Action Item B-7, will continue

to provide priority DOCEX support services until these designated elements are capable

of serving their regions. At that time, the CDICG will evaluate the NDIC role as a

continuing DOCEX regional or nationwide surge support and training assistance

provider. ONDCP, in coordination with NDIC, DEA, FBI, and CDX, will develop

protocols for the use of these teams.

C-7. Management of HIDTA Intelligence Centers: ONDCP, in coordination with the

CDX and the Federal, state, and local agencies participating in the HIDTA Program, will

issue guidelines to ensure the HIDTA Intelligence Centers have dual Federal-state/local

management with a single line supervisor. The supervisor of the Intelligence Center will

be a sworn Federal, state, or local law enforcement officer or a law enforcement

intelligence analyst appointed by one of the managing agencies and approved by the

HIDTA Executive Committee. The supervisor must have appropriate Federal law

enforcement clearances.

C-8. HIDTA Intelligence Center Information Sharing and Access: Agencies

participating in HIDTA Intelligence Centers will provide Center personnel with on-site,

direct access to their agency’s pertinent databases, whenever possible and in accordance

with existing Federal and state regulations. HIDTA Intelligence Centers are less

effective where staff do not have access and connectivity to participating agency-specific

data systems such as DEA’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System

(NADDIS), FBI’s Automated Case Support System (ACS), or the Treasury Enforcement

Computer System (TECS). Center personnel should be cross-designated to grant direct

access to other participating agencies’ databases whenever possible. If direct access by

Center personnel to participating agencies’ databases is not possible, dedicated personnel

will be assigned to the Intelligence Center from the participating agency to ensure access

to its information.

C-9. Funding of Background Investigations for HIDTA Intelligence Center

Employees: ONDCP and the individual HIDTAs will budget for the requisite

background investigations for HIDTA Intelligence Center personnel. The lack of

background investigations for some HIDTA Intelligence Center employees has

sometimes prevented access to available information. The Federal agency jointly

managing the HIDTA Intelligence Center will be responsible for arranging for

background investigations for non-Federal Center personnel. Granting Federal law

enforcement clearances to HIDTA Intelligence Center personnel satisfies one prerequisite

for access to law enforcement databases, because the clearances granted by one agency

are recognized by the other agencies. The standards for granting clearances will not be

lowered.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

35

C-10. Eligibility of HIDTA Intelligence Center Personnel to Receive Law

Enforcement Information: EPIC will work with the individual states to revise its

Memoranda of Understanding to designate HIDTA Intelligence Center authorized

personnel as eligible to make inquiries to EPIC and receive law enforcement information,

provided that they satisfy the management guidelines of Action Item C-7, and have

appropriate background investigations per Action Item C-9. Similarly, the Bureau of

Justice Assistance will revise its guidelines to designate HIDTA Intelligence Centers as

eligible to join RISSes, have target input capability, and receive law enforcement

information.

C-11. Production of Regional Threat Assessments: Coordinated threat assessments

that aggregate and analyze intelligence on the drug problem within specific regions,

Federal jurisdictions, metropolitan areas, and cities are needed—and in many instances

are produced—by authorities at all levels. Examples include DEA annual and quarterly

drug threat and trend reports, Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force

(OCDETF) regional drug threat assessments, and HIDTA area drug threat assessments.

NDIC will produce the annual, domestic National Drug Threat Assessment by combining

and analyzing all information provided by Federal, state, and local law enforcement,

HIDTAs, and other sources. NDIC will also produce complementary drug threat

assessments for geographic regions.

C-12. Production of HIDTA Area Drug Threat Assessments: HIDTA Intelligence

Centers will produce consolidated and coordinated annual interagency drug threat

assessments for their areas. In addition to drawing upon Federal, state, and local law

enforcement and other sources within their areas, these HIDTA assessments will draw

upon the district crime and drug assessments prepared by the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and

regional drug threat assessments prepared by the OCDETF Regional Advisory Councils.

Copies of these threat assessments will be provided to NDIC. To ensure the appropriate

scope and depth of HIDTA threat assessments, ONDCP, with input from NDIC, the

Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the OCDETF program of the Department of

Justice, and others, will develop the format for the HIDTA area threat assessments.

C-13. Participation of Federal Agencies in the National Drug Pointer Index

(NDPIX) System: NDPIX is a fully automated pointer system developed by state and

local law enforcement, in conjunction with the DEA. NDPIX serves as a valuable

investigative coordination and criminal subject deconfliction mechanism and is

accessible through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. Federal

agencies, to include FBI, DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S.

Customs Service, and the U.S. Marshals Service, will plan full participation in NDPIX

within two years. NDPIX will be used in support of case/subject deconfliction. NDPIX

is a powerful investigative tool that will provide participating state, local, and Federal law

enforcement personnel with pointer information relative to active drug targets.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

36

Section D:

Foreign Coordination

Introduction

This section of the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) addresses the

international dimension of the counterdrug intelligence architecture. The action items in

this section further enhance the already strong relationships among U.S. counterdrug

components operating overseas. They will promote a more robust counterdrug effort

between the United States and its allies in the international counterdrug community. This

section addresses seven issue areas and advances 12 action items.

Improving counterdrug leadership and coordination in U.S. Missions

The quality and effectiveness of interaction and coordination among the various

components involved in counterdrug support vary widely in U.S. Missions abroad.

Where most effective, the U.S. Mission leadership clearly defines its oversight

responsibility, is well informed, attends to program details, and structures an environment

for interagency information sharing. Where it falters, it lacks structure and relies almost

solely on the personalities of the U.S. Mission members.

D-1. U.S. Mission Counterdrug Program Coordinator: The Senior Narcotics and

Law Enforcement Coordinator appointed by the Chief of Mission pursuant to the Foreign

Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-277) will ensure that U.S.

Mission components focus on common drug control matters.

D-2. Structured Information Exchange: The Coordinator will establish and oversee a

structured program of information exchange and program coordination among U.S.

Mission leaders, and will be assisted by the senior Drug Enforcement Administration

(DEA) supervisor in the U.S. Mission. Consistent with agencies’ authorities and

procedures, U.S. Mission members will continue to conduct drug intelligence activities

required by their agencies, in coordination with the U.S. Mission Coordinator. The

coordination function provides a systematic approach for meeting interagency and

intercommunity drug intelligence requirements. The Coordinator’s function is to

facilitate a team approach to these drug intelligence requirements.

D-3. U.S. Mission Orientation: Each U.S. Mission should also tailor its own in-house

orientation procedures for arriving counterdrug component employees, emphasizing:

(1) An overview of the local counterdrug program operating environment;

(2) Familiarization with post counterdrug component key personnel, responsibilities, and

program capabilities; and,

(3) Familiarization with intercomponent mechanisms and procedures in place for

information sharing and coordination.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

37

D-4. U.S. Mission Reviews: Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX)

staff officers will communicate with and visit U.S. Missions with a significant drugrelated responsibility, after obtaining the necessary country clearance from the Chief of

Mission. The CDX, in coordination with the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating

Group (CDICG) and appropriate headquarters components, will update the Missions on

changes in the counterdrug intelligence community, and assist the U.S. Missions by

reviewing the effectiveness of drug intelligence and information sharing, coordination,

and cooperation. The visiting team members will provide observations and

recommendations to the U.S. Mission members and the Chief of Mission. Visit results

will be included in the CDICG semiannual report.

D-5. Intercommunity Counterdrug Coordination Processes: The existing

intercommunity counterdrug coordination processes will continue to assist U.S. Missions

to identify, set priorities for, and coordinate their efforts against the most significant drug

traffickers and their drug trade business sectors in Latin America and in

Southeast/Southwest Asia. These processes provide a regular forum for multiple U.S.

Mission coordination efforts against designated targets through planning meetings and

regional U.S. Mission conferences.

Improving counterdrug intelligence dissemination to host nations

The United States is a signatory to a series of bilateral, multilateral, subregional, regional,

and global accords that create a strong backdrop for effective counterdrug measures. To

enhance the effectiveness of counterdrug activities in foreign countries, counterdrug

intelligence must be available to authorized host nation enforcement officials. Current

mechanisms for obtaining approval to release such intelligence are often cumbersome

and time-consuming.

D-6. Sharing Intelligence with Foreign Counterparts: The CDICG will coordinate the

development of a comprehensive interagency system, governed by adequate policy

direction, to facilitate the secure and timely sharing by U.S. Mission components of drug

intelligence and information with allies and counterdrug partner nations. This system

must ensure that host nation personnel follow policy guidelines and protocols and that

there is accountability for information provided. It also must be flexible enough to

account for the sensitivity of the information as well as the requirement for timeliness.

Agencies producing drug intelligence of use to host nations will ensure, consistent with

U.S. national security and foreign policy goals, that this intelligence is provided in a

“tearline” or “release to” format in original reporting, for timely release to specific

authorized foreign counterparts. In selected nations, the Department of Defense should

continue to maintain existing secure information transmission systems and determine

whether these systems are adequate for the originating agency of the U.S. Mission to be

able to provide time-critical information to authorized and designated host nation

counterparts.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

38

Enhancing intelligence on foreign commercial drug smuggling activities

Domestically, the U.S. Customs Service has broad authority to pursue investigations, to

seize contraband, and to order merchandise forfeited in support of its border mission.

However, for drug smuggling issues internationally, Customs’ legal authorities are

subordinated to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Under a 1984 DEA/U.S.

Customs Service Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), U.S. Customs Service has

relied on DEA for foreign-based drug law enforcement information.

The White House Task Force Review of the U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and

Activities identified the need to increase expertise in the foreign collection and

exploitation of intelligence addressing drug smuggling in commercial conveyances. The

Review recommended that multidiscipline teams consisting of U.S. Customs Service

investigators, inspectors, and intelligence analysts be forward-deployed on a permanent

basis to U.S. Missions. Their objective would be to collect commercial drug smuggling

intelligence in support of their interdiction mission at the U.S. border and share it with

the U.S. Mission, and other members of the counterdrug community.

D-7. U.S. Customs Service Drug Intelligence Personnel Overseas: Pursuant to the

recommendations of the White House Task Force, the DEA and U.S. Customs Service

executed a supplement to their 1984 MOU in August 1999. The new MOU recognizes

and addresses the need for U.S. Customs Service to actively participate in gathering

critical foreign drug intelligence as part of the national counterdrug effort, while

reaffirming DEA’s role as the U.S. Government’s single point-of-contact for drug law

enforcement issues overseas. Consistent with NSDD-38 and with host nation approval,

U.S. Customs Service will ensure adequate drug intelligence teams are in the Country

Offices under the auspices of the DEA Country Attaché. Consistent with Chief of

Mission authority, the U.S. Customs Service teams’ tasking will be determined by the

Intelligence Division, U.S. Customs Service headquarters, but will be communicated to

them and coordinated through the respective DEA Country Attachés.

U.S. Customs Service proposes a phased approach to its personnel deployments,

commencing with a small number of temporary assignments followed by permanent

placement of drug intelligence teams in selected Latin American and Asian countries.

Follow-on phases will include other countries and additional personnel as U.S. Customs

Service foreign response to the drug threat evolves.

Increasing drug intelligence law enforcement analytic capability overseas

U.S. Missions in major drug-producing and transit countries need counterdrug analytic

and planning support. FY 2000 resources are not programmed to provide a sufficient

number of trained law enforcement analysts.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

39

D-8. DEA Intelligence Analysts Overseas: Under this GCIP and consistent with

NSDD-38, the Department of Justice will ensure that the appropriate number of

permanent analyst positions are assigned to DEA country offices overseas.

Enhancing Department of Defense (DoD) foreign counterdrug intelligence support

DoD provides critical intelligence support for foreign counterdrug efforts at the national,

regional, and U.S. Mission levels. Much of the DoD direct counterdrug support to U.S.

Missions is coordinated under the various Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs)

maintained under DoD’s U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and Pacific

Command (PACOM). To further consolidate and improve these ongoing support efforts,

DoD merged the two JIATFs that had been operating separately under USSOUTHCOM:

JIATF-South at Howard AFB, Panama, was merged into JIATF-East at Key West,

Florida.

D-9. Coordination of the JIATFs: DoD coordinates and integrates the intelligence

responsibilities of PACOM’s JIATF-West in Alameda, California, with JIATF-East in

Key West, to more effectively support detection and monitoring and interdiction efforts

against illegal drug movements in the eastern Pacific Ocean that originate in or transit

Latin America. Because these Joint Interagency Task Forces are critical to U.S.

interdiction efforts, the CDICG will work with the appropriate Federal agencies to ensure

that these services meet counterdrug community needs.

D-10. Tactical Analysis Teams’ Staffing: DoD will streamline and improve the

staffing and management of its Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs), which are the focal

points of DoD counterdrug support for U.S. Missions throughout Latin America and the

Caribbean. The TATs fall under the operational oversight of DEA and support U.S.

Missions by providing on-site analytic assistance. Because TAT positions are filled on a

temporary duty basis, frequent turnover and varying levels of training, experience, and

skill of the personnel assigned to them adversely affect many TATs. To improve the

continuity and focus, DoD will work with the State Department and with the U.S.

Missions in these regions to designate TAT Chiefs’ billets, and certain Deputy Chiefs’

billets, as two-year (minimum) permanent positions. DoD will standardize its

prerequisite qualifications and en route training requirements for individuals selected for

all TAT positions.

Increasing attention to foreign drug-related illicit finances

To attack both the means and ends of criminal trafficking enterprises in the United States

and abroad, more intelligence is required on their financial operations and relationships.

Our counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement communities need more

comprehensive and in-depth strategic assessments of drug-related money laundering and

other financial crimes, both on the foreign and domestic scenes. This will require that the

contributing agencies develop additional expertise and undertake more intelligence
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

40

collection efforts. Both the Intelligence Community, with the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) as its lead counterdrug element,

and the law enforcement community, with the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes

Enforcement Network (FinCEN) as its lead element, are increasing efforts directed

against foreign drug-related money laundering and associated illicit business and

financial activities. Concurrently, CNC and FinCEN will coordinate with each other and

enhance both their information-sharing efforts and their support for enforcement efforts

against illicit drug-related financial activities.

D-11. Drug Money Laundering Assessments: Both CNC and FinCEN, in close

coordination with other components, will collaborate on the enhanced production of

finished intelligence assessments for national policymakers and senior law enforcement

officials on worldwide drug money laundering and illicit financial activities. These

assessments will address the amounts of money involved; the means by which they are

moved or laundered; the extent to which they flow abroad; the involvement of known or

suspected business and banking enterprises; and the recipients to which they are directed.

Clarifying legal and policy guidelines on law enforcement and intelligence

coordination

In many U.S. Missions abroad, staff officers still experience uncertainty about

interactions and information sharing between the two communities.

D-12. Legal Policy Guidelines and Procedures: Under this GCIP, the CDX will work

with the Department of Justice, State Department, the Intelligence Community, and

Federal law enforcement agencies to facilitate development and dissemination of

guidelines such as were recommended by the 1997 Joint Intelligence Community/Law

Enforcement Working Group (JICLE), and approved by the Deputy Attorney General

and Acting Director of Central Intelligence, for coordination of activities and sharing of

information within the counterdrug community. Further, counterdrug community

components will reduce the guidelines to procedures, as much as practical, for U.S.

Missions, domestic offices, and headquarters. The CDICG will periodically review the

application and effectiveness of the procedures.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

41

Section E:

Analytic Personnel Development and Training

Introduction

This section of the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) brings necessary

attention to analytic personnel development and training. The action items delineated

below will strengthen the drug law enforcement community’s intelligence structure and

enhance the abilities of law enforcement drug intelligence analysts and staff. At the same

time, better understanding of the legitimate differences in philosophies and policies of

Federal law enforcement and Intelligence Community agencies will enable them to

perform as a true community and to deliver fully coordinated drug intelligence. The

analyst function within law enforcement agencies—designed primarily to support

on-going investigations and prosecutions—will be more clearly defined, with a structured

career path.

This section, consisting of five issue areas and 20 action items, will advance Federal law

enforcement efforts to enhance their analytic capabilities in partnership with the

Intelligence Community and with the state and local law enforcement communities. This

Plan recognizes that Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have similar drug

intelligence analyst training and education needs. It highlights the need for an

interagency, agreed-upon, exportable core drug intelligence curriculum to serve those

needs. It proposes a leadership role for the Justice Training Center (JTC) to develop

those exportable courses. It recognizes that some introductory, intermediate, and special

advanced law enforcement intelligence analyst training courses might be more efficiently

delivered through a centralized academy, the requirements for which warrant thorough,

interagency review.

Developing staffing plans and establishing standardized hiring criteria

E-1. Federal Analytic Staff: For the FY 2002 budget, the Departments of Justice

(DOJ), Transportation, and Treasury should have in place a three-year staffing plan that

supports initiatives encompassed by the GCIP and actively recruits for existing vacancies.

This presupposes—and encourages—that agencies support current initiatives by actively

recruiting for existing vacancies and meeting obligations to detail staff to national

centers.

E-2. State and Local Support: The Department of Justice, in conjunction with Federal

law enforcement agencies and the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX),

will explore additional ways to deploy drug intelligence assistance—analytic and

technological—in support of state and local agencies. This should include a thorough

assessment to determine if existing programs such as the Community Oriented Policing

Services (COPS) and Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE) may be
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

42

leveraged. If DOJ finds this to be a viable course, appropriate statutes should be

modified to allow for an expansion of COPS/MORE into intelligence support.

E-3. Standardized Minimum Intelligence Analyst Hiring Criteria: To better ensure

recruitment of intelligence analysts with top skills and expertise, Federal law enforcement

agencies may require a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent combination of experience or

training, when supported by a valid job analysis.

Professionalizing of Federal law enforcement drug Intelligence Analysts

E-4. Establishment of Career Ladder for Federal Law Enforcement Intelligence

Analysts: Each Federal law enforcement agency should create uniform career ladders

for its drug intelligence analysts that include minimum selection criteria, basic,

intermediate, and advanced training opportunities, and standardized promotion

guidelines. The training opportunities should include not only those of the parent

enforcement agency, but also those offered by other law enforcement agencies, the

military, and the Intelligence Community. Specialized training should be provided for

intelligence analysts assigned overseas. Analysts will be given expanded opportunities

for advancement into management or specialized support areas. Supervisory intelligence

analyst positions will be created in the field as well as at headquarters to assure

professional analytic management of intelligence support to enforcement agents and to

provide greater analytic expertise and subject matter continuity in mentoring less

experienced analysts. Interagency assignments will be encouraged to enhance analysts’

knowledge of other agencies’ operations and systems, facilitate information sharing, and

establish an esprit de corps among fellow professionals.

E-5. Management and Leadership Training Programs: Each Federal law

enforcement agency will develop a one-year Career Management Training Program for

drug intelligence analysts with demonstrated management and leadership potential.

During this year, the analysts will serve a period of months in the agency’s key divisions

and will be required to complete at least one 4- to 8-week special assignment outside the

agency.

E-6. Leadership Program Opportunities: Federal law enforcement agencies will

arrange for select intelligence analysts at the GS-13 to -15 levels to compete for senior

management and leadership programs, such as those offered at Harvard’s JFK School of

Government, the National War College, the Joint Military Intelligence College, the

Foreign Service Institute, and Intelligence Community agencies.

E-7. Development of a Master’s Degree in Law Enforcement Intelligence: The JTC

will plan to contract with universities in the Washington, D.C., area and in two or three

other U.S. cities to design a certified Master’s Degree program in law enforcement

intelligence. This should be a one- to two-year program covering areas of criminal

justice, intelligence, foreign affairs, technology, and national security.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

43

E-8. Justice-Treasury Drug Intelligence Fellowship: The Attorney General and the

Secretary of the Treasury should consider sponsoring a Justice-Treasury Drug

Intelligence Fellowship, a one-year program for post-graduates and mid-career

professionals inside and outside government. Working closely with Federal enforcement

agencies, the Fellows will research leading drug intelligence issues of interest to the

Departments—for example, commercial and trade intelligence, money laundering,

technology, international cooperation, cyber-finance, and cyber-crime.

E-9. Expansion of Federal Law Enforcement Intelligence Programs: Federal law

enforcement agencies should continue to design their intelligence career programs to

place supervisory intelligence analysts in each field office. In the field and at

headquarters, the first-line supervision of intelligence analysts should be a Supervisory

Intelligence Research Specialist.

E-10. Expansion of Federal Law Enforcement Drug Intelligence Analyst Rotational

Tours: Within one year, Federal law enforcement agencies should develop a plan to

expand their numbers of drug analysts and Special Agents serving in rotational or

exchange tours at headquarters and field sites in other Federal law enforcement and

intelligence agencies, or in multicomponent national centers such as the National Drug

Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Financial

Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

E-11. Drug Intelligence Issue Experts: Federal law enforcement agencies should

designate certain non-supervisory GS-14 and GS-15 positions as key drug intelligence

issue experts. This is especially important for agencies such as the FBI and U.S. Customs

Service, which have jurisdiction for multiple violations, in order to avoid diverting drug

intelligence expertise to other mission areas. These analysts, because of their skill and

expertise, also should be used extensively in training and as mentors to junior analysts.

Training and education

E-12. National Training Center for Drug Intelligence: The JTC will become the

principal national center for Federal drug law enforcement intelligence training and

education. The JTC will not supplant the authorities of other Federal agencies and

departments involved in drug intelligence training and education. The DOJ is

considering, in close collaboration with NDIC and other appropriate centers, an

interagency process to develop national standards to further professionalize drug

intelligence analyst training and education. Other Federal training and education centers

should continue to offer drug intelligence analysts courses that are specific to their

Departments’ missions. The Intelligence Community, military, and state and local drug

law enforcement analysts will also benefit from JTC drug intelligence training and

education. For the JTC to be able to serve the interests of all agencies involved in the

counterdrug effort, staffing and resources must be identified.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

44

E-13. Standardized Training and Education: The JTC will develop a comprehensive

drug intelligence training and education curriculum for analysts and other personnel,

from entry- to supervisory-level, including management and leadership training, for

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The JTC should consider offering

drug intelligence education and training programs to Federal, state, and local law

enforcement analysts and other personnel. Law enforcement agencies with drug support

missions will include drug intelligence courses as part of their entry-level specialist

training curricula. Training for Special Agents should also include a module on the drug

intelligence and analytic services that intelligence analysts provide. The JTC will

develop innovative ideas concerning the fusion of law enforcement and Intelligence

Community training approaches and perspectives.

E-14. National Training Centers Coordination: JTC should work closely with other

Federal Training Centers, particularly NDIC and Treasury’s Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center (FLETC), located at Glynco, Georgia, to develop an interagencyapproved, exportable core drug intelligence curriculum for use by Federal, state, and

local law enforcement and analytic personnel. JTC should draw intelligence instructors

from all agencies with drug intelligence expertise, including intelligence, military, and

Federal, state, and local law enforcement. This should include the use of instructors and

expertise from FLETC and its Financial Fraud Institute, NDIC, and other national

centers. JTC will take advantage of various training sites around the country, with

particular emphasis placed on the use of long-distance, distributed learning, to include

video teleconference training.

E-l5. Interagency Task Force: The DOJ will create an interagency task force to

examine the requirements, concept, and justification for an academy for criminal and

drug intelligence at the JTC in Quantico, Virginia. It is imperative that such an

examination has senior executive support of the law enforcement, intelligence, and

military communities. DOJ, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of

Personnel Management (OPM), and the Defense, Transportation, and Treasury

Departments will support this task force effort.

E-16. Five-Year Plan: To ensure the requisite interagency support for this academy, if

recommended, the JTC will prepare a comprehensive five-year plan that addresses the

program’s interagency staffing requirements, curricula, funding, and plans to interface

with or engage various other national training centers.

E-17. Coordination of Training and Education Initiatives: The Counterdrug

Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) will work closely with each of the

participating departmental and agency training facilities that provide drug analysis

training and education courses in order to promote better coordination, standardization,

and consistency of drug analytic methodologies and operating procedures. Principal

coordination will be conducted with the JTC, NDIC, FLETC, the High Intensity Drug

Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Assistance Center, the Joint Military Intelligence Training

Center, and the interagency Training for Intelligence and Law Enforcement (TILE)
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

45

program, which seeks to promote coordination and cross-training opportunities for drug

specialists in law enforcement agencies and in the Intelligence Community.

Establishing a cadre of intelligence analysts to produce timely sanitized reports for the

counterdrug community

E-18. Resource and Training Requirements for “Reports Analyst” Function: To

enable Federal law enforcement agencies to produce sanitized reports of current

investigative information to share with other law enforcement components and the

Intelligence Community (see Action Item C-2) will require additional training. FY 2000

resources are not programmed to provide this cadre.

(1) Federal drug law enforcement agencies, particularly DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs

Service, will ensure adequate numbers of analysts are at both the headquarters and

field levels. Analytic staffing enhancements necessary to perform this function will

be identified in each agency’s staffing plans; and,

(2) The JTC will oversee the development of the needed training courses. Intelligence

personnel at both the headquarters and field levels will be trained to apply procedures

to extract and disseminate the information from one agency to another while

protecting sensitive undercover and legally restricted law enforcement sources,

information, and techniques.

Decreasing reliance on military intelligence analyst support

E-19. Analysts’ Job Focus: Professionalizing the intelligence analytic cadre at Federal

law enforcement agencies (see Action Items E-3 through E-8) requires that intelligence

analysts will no longer perform data-entry tasks and other nonanalytic-related tasks such

as technical or graphics support, but rather focus on the job for which they were hired—

research and analysis. FY 2000 support staffing levels do not permit this. Agencies

should establish staffing modules for the appropriate ratios of Special Agents, analysts,

and support personnel.

E-20. Decreased Reliance on the Military: Over the past decade, law enforcement

agencies have increasingly come to rely upon military detailees (National Guard, active

duty, and reservists) to provide analytic support to domestic and foreign activities. Law

enforcement reliance on military analytic support to domestic field offices can and should

be significantly reduced. Military support should then be required only in special cases,

because these law enforcement agencies will have strengthened their own cadre of

intelligence analyst and associated support capabilities. In the foreign arena, law

enforcement agencies will also seek to ensure adequate numbers of analysts are at U.S.

Missions in key drug-producing or transit countries, thereby decreasing their reliance on

the military analytic support overseas for other than highly specialized support.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

46

Section F:

Information Technology

Introduction

Drug intelligence analysts must be supported by effective, secure, and powerful

information systems. The drug intelligence centers and activities require an architecture

that permits rapid access by authorized analysts to all relevant information sources; quick

information retrieval and sorting; secure information transfer among organizations; and

tools to manipulate and analyze the information. Existing information technology and

communications systems in the law enforcement community require large-scale

improvements in secure interconnectivity. FY 2000 resource levels are not programmed

to accommodate these initiatives.

The state of systems architectures today is much improved over that of August 1992,

when the National Drug Control Information Resource Management Plan was published

under Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) auspices. The Intelligence

Community has achieved significant advancements that address many of the

requirements for interagency information sharing in the national security realm. For

example, secure Internet-type technology has been implemented in the Top Secret

environment. The law enforcement community has completed numerous improvements

in overall automation across the Federal, state, and local levels. Notable examples of

improved automation include DRUG-X, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA)

Firebird and Merlin systems, and the National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX). There are

also several positive information-handling and -sharing initiatives involving law

enforcement, the Intelligence Community, military components, and regional

organizations. Some examples are the Department of Defense-sponsored interagency

Anti-Drug Network (ADNET), and the Department of Justice-administered Regional

Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET).

Despite these successes, no single organization’s system can provide electronic access to

all of the drug law enforcement information that is available to support ongoing

investigations and analyses. The frequent inability of the various law enforcement and

Intelligence Community agencies to share the appropriate data in an expeditious manner,

or at all, is still a critical shortcoming.

The key concepts underlying the systems architecture plan defined in this section are the

following:

(1) No agency or level of government has all the drug intelligence available;

(2) Information sharing is critical to ensuring success—there must be a level of

information sharing across all political boundaries (including international,

national/Federal, regional, state, and local government entities) and within all
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

47

security levels (including Top Secret, Secret, Sensitive But Unclassified, and

purely Unclassified);

(3) Security is a mandatory precursor to information sharing;

(4) The legal and policy barriers to effective information sharing must be clearly

identified, and accommodated or eliminated, where appropriate, to enable technology

to help solve the intelligence problems;

(5) The technical capabilities required begin with electronic mail within and

among agencies and analysts, at a minimum, and progress through limited

database access and document publishing, and culminate with real-time

collaboration, eliminating geographic barriers by using audio, video, and

direct access to databases under strictly controlled circumstances; and,

(6) The key technical connections across the drug intelligence community to

provide for information exchange can be improved using current

technologies—no further research or development is necessary to implement

the initial architecture.

Traditionally, drug intelligence and law enforcement organizations at all levels have

developed information systems to meet their own specific requirements, resulting in a

proliferation of information systems that are essentially “stovepipes.” Major drug

intelligence centers, in particular the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), have

very limited access to law enforcement data. The counterdrug community can maximize

the efficiency of the intelligence process by adopting a systems architecture that places

the relevant information into a series of interoperable “accessible information spaces,”

with respect for need-to-know and proper authorization to access information. The

creation of shared information spaces will make community-wide electronic access a

reality, providing analysts the flexibility to interact with, and gather information from,

other organizations. It will also provide the technical foundation for the timely and

secure dissemination of intelligence to appropriate customers.

This systems architecture will provide a mechanism for appropriate state and local

personnel to interact electronically with one another and their Federal law enforcement

counterparts in a secure environment. The goal is to enable all of the drug intelligence

analysts with the appropriate credentials to obtain all of the information they need to do

their jobs. There is no intent to enable, nor will the system permit, personnel without

appropriate clearances to access national security databases, or Intelligence Community

analysts to directly access domestic criminal investigative data.

Advances in communications technology have removed most of the technical barriers to

information sharing, while also improving methods of protecting information. Technical

security measures such as encryption, smart cards, public-private key infrastructures,

Internet protocol security standards, biometrics, and firewalls can be used to prevent

unauthorized access, allowing network administrators and security professionals to
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

48

enforce the standards of need-to-know. The technical means exist for the drug

intelligence community to share information securely, but the connecting hardware and

software must be widely available throughout participating agencies. Departmental and

agency procedures should be reviewed to ensure that they facilitate secure information

sharing.

This Plan envisions a future systems architecture that is both secure enough to support

information sharing and easily accessible from across the drug intelligence community.

The goal is to ensure that all drug intelligence and law enforcement personnel can obtain

expeditiously all of the information they have been cleared to receive and need to know.

It promotes the use of existing networks and secure Web technology to connect the drug

intelligence community. The technical components include more robust, timely, and

accurate input into agency databases; adherence to strict security with audit trails;

proactive dissemination of non-case-specific law enforcement information to the broader

drug intelligence community; single-workstation access to multiple sources of law

enforcement and intelligence information; and funding for adequate technical support,

life-cycle enhancements, training, user support, and analytic tools.

This section provides 10 specific action items that will create the basis for an effective

drug intelligence systems architecture.

F-1. Establish a Systems Policy Review Group (SPRG): To ensure that broad systems

standards are developed to guide law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the

Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG) will establish an SPRG to advise

it and help the participating departments and agencies in accomplishing the six initial

goals:

(1) Develop common criteria and define architectural and data standards for drug

information-sharing systems focusing on the counterdrug Intelligence Community,

the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

(FinCEN), and NDIC;

(2) Ensure consistency with laws and policies concerning privacy and civil liberties.

Information sharing will follow the security, privacy, and technological standards

determined for the Global Justice Information Network (Global). The CDICG, based

on the recommendations of the SPRG, will consider the advantages of any new data

access and transfer initiatives, and the possible legal and policy reasons not to

undertake particular proposed initiatives;

(3) Facilitate electronic connectivity among Federal drug law enforcement personnel;

(4) Facilitate electronic connectivity among regional, state, and local drug law

enforcement personnel;

(5) Address the policy concerns limiting connectivity between Federal and regional,

state, and local personnel; and,
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

49

(6) Support agency initiatives to automate case files at an accelerated rate.

F-2. Use Existing Information to Create a Detailed Schedule for Implementing the

Drug Law Enforcement Intelligence Architecture : The SPRG, working with the

Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX) and other experts, will expedite

the development of an initial architecture plan and a detailed schedule for its

implementation. Concurrent with the SPRG architecture effort, the participating

Departments and agencies should begin to plan and budget for the technology

enhancements defined in the Action Items listed below. The development of the

architecture will take advantage of recent Justice Department studies, the plans for the

Intelligence Community Collaborative Operations Network, the creation of the Global

Justice Information Network (Global), the Defense Department’s Global Information

Grid, and other ongoing initiatives in this area.

The planning effort will also take advantage of the conceptual model for information

technology architecture (ITA) created under the auspices of the Chief Information Officer

(CIO) Council of the Federal Government. The Council has created a common set of

terminology and definitions that are appropriate for the drug intelligence information

technology architecture effort. The CDICG will ensure that the CIOs are cognizant of the

ongoing efforts of the SPRG.

At a minimum, the plan must take the following factors into consideration:

(1) Information requirements and capabilities—this includes determining which

organizations require the various types of information and identifying which

organizations have that information available;

(2) Barriers to information sharing—this includes identifying and seeking resolution to

impediments to secure information sharing at the international, Federal, regional,

state, and local levels; and,

(3) Candidates for interconnection at the same level of security:

(a) Top Secret—future efforts within the Intelligence Community to augment the

existing Intelink;

(b) Secret—FBINET, EPIC Internal System, and the NDIC internal network with the

ADNET (DEA Merlin already connects);

(c) Sensitive But Unclassified—Treasury Enforcement Communications System

(TECS), DEA Firebird, U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Information System

(LEIS), RISSNET, and certain systems on National Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System (NLETS);
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

50

(d) Unclassified—High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Information

Systems Network (ISN) and other secure and non-secure systems operating on the

Internet; and,

(e) Alternatives for connecting systems that operate at different security levels—the

Counternarcotics Command Management System (CNCMS) and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) currently operate systems with limited connectivity

between Unclassified and Secret systems. The technology, policies, and

procedures that enable this type of connectivity will be examined for broader

application.

F-3. Extend Secure Connectivity Among Federal Drug Intelligence Personnel: It is

critical that the drug intelligence personnel at all Federal law enforcement agencies and

centers have the ability to contact and collaborate securely with their counterparts, and

that capability should be available at their desktop workstations. The Federal law

enforcement community should significantly expand electronic connectivity among its

intelligence analysts. Each analyst must be provided with the appropriate hardware and

services (ranging from simple e-mail connectivity and Internet access to real-time,

multimedia collaboration) at the appropriate level of security (ranging from Unclassified

to Top Secret).

F-4. Accelerate Federal Law Enforcement Automation Initiatives: The Departments

of Justice and Treasury, and Federal law enforcement agencies, will accelerate, to the

extent possible, multiyear initiatives upon which they are already embarked that will

automate their future reporting and case file systems and convert their active case paper

files initiated within the past 10 years. Currently, within the Department of Justice, DEA,

FBI, and other components each have their own messaging, case file, and database

systems. In Treasury, the U.S. Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)-

Criminal Investigations, and other components have their own messaging, case file, and

database systems. The databases are mainly indices of individuals with references to

supporting case files. The indices also serve as pointers to, and case deconfliction

systems for, agents. Case and drug intelligence reporting remain paper intensive, with

much of the information located in hardcopy case files at agency field offices.

F-5. Expand Connectivity of NDPIX: All appropriate Federal law enforcement

agencies, to include DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Marshals, the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the

Border Patrol, plan to participate in the NDPIX system within two years. Expanded

connectivity and automation will also be used to accelerate the input of state-level data.

The architectural plan will address other requirements for NDPIX, such as a simultaneous

input capability for NDPIX and RISSNET.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

51

F-6. Provide Information Technology Support to NDIC: To the degree funds become

available:

(1) Provide secure Internet-type connectivity to other counterdrug centers at the

Unclassified level, as well as to CDX for administrative communications, and, in

coordination with the Justice Training Center, develop and deliver on-site and video

distance learning-based drug analysis education and training;

(2) Provide Secret connectivity from the analysts’ desktops to ADNET via secure

firewall;

(3) Improve access to multiple (and additional) databases via desktop PCs, including

direct access to participating agencies’ online databases and report transmission

systems;

(4) Provide electronic collaboration capability to NDIC and the Intelligence Community

for the purpose of better coordinating annual drug threat assessments and the

integration of foreign and domestic strategic drug intelligence analyses;

(5) Provide the necessary systems connectivity for NDIC to coordinate and manage an

online national drug intelligence library and make it available to the counterdrug

community; and,

(6) Provide a method and establish parameters by which to enter Document Exploitation

(DOCEX) information into NDIC and agency databases.

F-7. Provide Information Technology Support to EPIC: To the degree funds become

available:

(1) Provide secure Internet-type connectivity to other counterdrug centers, as well as to

CDX, at the Unclassified level for administrative communications;

(2) Provide Secret-level connectivity from EPIC analysts’ desktops to ADNET via a

secure firewall;

(3) Upgrade the EPIC Watch by augmenting the current telephonic inquiry system with a

system that allows posting of electronic database inquiries via RISSNET, NLETS,

and other appropriately secure systems;

(4) Provide technological connectivity to improve the ease by which state and local law

enforcement components can request EPIC services;

(5) Make the FinCEN-sponsored Suspicious Activity Reports System (SARS) database

available for searches by appropriate EPIC personnel;

(6) Develop a systematic process for state and local law enforcement agencies to collect

and report area drug seizure data to EPIC for national tabulation; and,

(7) Receive Federal U.S. District Court indictment information via the Justice

Consolidated Office Network (JCON) or other available means.

F-8. Provide Information Technology Support to FinCEN: To the degree funds

become available:

(1) Provide secure Internet-type connectivity to other counterdrug centers, including

CDX, at the Unclassified level for administrative communications;

(2) Provide secure collaboration capability to FinCEN, other Federal law enforcement

agencies, and the Intelligence Community for the purpose of producing interagency

illicit financial activities assessments; and,
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

52

(3) Provide FinCEN analysts with improved direct and timely access to Intelligence

Community reporting on known or suspected drug-related financial transactions;

F-9. Develop HIDTA Intelligence Centers Systems Standards: ONDCP and the

Departments of Justice and Treasury, in coordination with CDX and the Global initiative,

will develop minimum systems standards for HIDTA Intelligence Centers, including:

(1) Wide-area network connectivity between each HIDTA Intelligence Center and the

member agencies they serve, including analytic tools, e-mail, Web access, and

collaboration capabilities;

(2) The identification of, and adherence to, compatible systems standards across HIDTAs

to ensure information-sharing capability;

(3) The need for baseline systems in each HIDTA Intelligence Center (for example,

ADNET, NDPIX, and event and case deconfliction systems);

(4) Connectivity between each HIDTA Intelligence Center and its RISS;

(5) Enhanced electronic connectivity from HIDTA Intelligence Centers to Federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies and national centers;

(6) Methods for timely pointer information entry into NDPIX; and,

(7) A photo-imaging network capability that will permit Federal, state, and local

jurisdictions to share arrest photographs and biographic data for arrestees in the area.

These efforts should comport with the National Crime Information Center 2000 and

the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System planned to provide digital

photo imaging capability.

F-10. Improve Personnel Development and Training:

(1) Provide means for the Justice Training Center to collaborate with Treasury’s Federal

Law Enforcement Center, the HIDTA Assistance Center, the Joint Military

Intelligence Training Center, the interagency Training for Intelligence and Law

Enforcement Program, NDIC, and other national centers; and,

(2) Develop a long-distance learning network (with video teleconference training

capability) for the JTC.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

A-1

Appendix A:

Methodology Used to Develop the

General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan

In 1997, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury; the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and the Office of National Drug Control Policy

(ONDCP) collaborated to begin an interagency review of the counterdrug intelligence

architecture, for example, the roles, missions, and interagency relationships of the

departments and agencies with counterdrug intelligence programs and responsibilities.

The review was made in four phases:

Phase 1

In July 1997, a sub-Cabinet-level Interagency Committee initiated the Phase 1 inventory

of organizations involved in the counterdrug intelligence architecture, their general

functions and capabilities, and their interrelationships. The Phase 1 inventory, compiled

under the auspices of ONDCP, was used in the Phase 2 evaluative review.

Phase 2

In September 1997, the participating departments provided representatives to a review

team to evaluate and make recommendations to improve the counterdrug intelligence

architecture. In December 1997, the Director of ONDCP, the Attorney General, the

Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) designated the

12-person review team as the White House Task Force on the Coordination of

Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities. The Task Force Review primarily

focused on the drug-related information-sharing and intelligence components of the:

• National-level centers with counterdrug intelligence responsibilities, specifically,

the:

--National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)

--El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

--Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

--DCI Crime and Narcotics Center

• Major interagency counterdrug intelligence activities, including:

--Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East

--JIATF-West

--JIATF-South

--Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Operations Division (comprising

DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and U.S. Customs Service (USCS))
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

A-2

• Major agency counterdrug intelligence activities, including the counterdrug

intelligence activities of the:

--Defense Intelligence Agency

--Drug Enforcement Administration

--Federal Bureau of Investigation

--National Security Agency

--Office of Naval Intelligence

--United States Coast Guard

--United States Customs Service

• Major Federally-funded task force and partnership programs, specifically, the:

--Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force program

--High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program

--Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) program

The Task Force visited more than 250 elements in 10 countries, 19 states, the District of

Columbia, and Puerto Rico; 15 of 20 HIDTAs; the three JIATFs and Joint Task Force Six

(JTF-6); and four of six RISS Centers.

NDIC was a prime focus of the Task Force review.1 The entire Task Force visited NDIC

and EPIC to evaluate the roles of these centers in the counterdrug intelligence system and

their ability to accomplish their drug analysis missions.

Phase 3

The Task Force incorporated many departmental comments into its final report of

observations and recommendations. All comments were appended to the final report. On

23 July 1998, the Task Force submitted its final report to ONDCP and the Interagency

Committee. The Task Force was then disbanded. The Director of ONDCP distributed

the final report to the participating components to inform them about the process for

preparing this Plan.

 

1 The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998 specified that the National Drug

Intelligence Center (NDIC) be included in the plan to be submitted by the Director of ONDCP. In addition,

conference committee report language, accompanying Section 104(e) of the 1998 Intelligence

Authorization Act, stated that the Director’s counterdrug intelligence architecture review:

“...should describe current and proposed efforts to structure the NDIC to effectively

coordinate and consolidate strategic drug intelligence from national security and law

enforcement agencies. It should also describe what steps have been taken to ensure that

the relevant national security and law enforcement agencies are providing the NDIC with

access to data needed to accomplish this task.”
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

A-3

Phase 4

Using the Task Force report as a basis, an interagency working group was established to

formulate the required plan to improve coordination and eliminate unnecessary

duplication among the Federal counterdrug intelligence centers and activities. The Group

identified major issues from the Task Force report for interagency deliberation and

resolution, and prepared the draft General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) for

formal interagency coordination. Following interagency clearance, the GCIP was

submitted to the President for approval and transmittal to Congress.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

A-4

Appendix B:

White House Task Force Authorities

Section 639 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998

(P.L. 105-61, Coordination of Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities):

(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of the Act, the Director of the

Office of National Drug Control Policy shall submit to the appropriate congressional

committees, including the Committees on Appropriations, a plan to improve

coordination, and eliminate unnecessary duplication, among the counterdrug

intelligence centers and counterdrug activities of the Federal Government, including

the centers and activities of the following departments and agencies:

(A) The Department of Defense, including the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(B) The Department of the Treasury, including the United States Customs Service

and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

(C)The Central Intelligence Agency.

(D) The Coast Guard.

(E) The Department of Justice, including the National Drug Intelligence Center

(NDIC); the Drug Enforcement Administration, including the El Paso

Intelligence Center (EPIC); and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(2) The purpose of the plan under paragraph (1) is to maximize the effectiveness of

centers and activities referred to in that paragraph in achieving the objectives of the

national drug control strategy. In order to maximize such effectiveness, the plan

shall—

(A) articulate clear and specific mission statements for each counterdrug

intelligence center and activity, including the manner in which

responsibility for counterdrug intelligence activities will be allocated

among the counterdrug intelligence centers;

(B) specify the relationship between such centers;

(C)specify the means by which proper oversight of such centers will be assured;

(D)specify the means by which counterdrug intelligence will be forwarded

effectively to all levels of officials responsible for United States

counterdrug policy; and

(E) specify mechanisms to ensure that state and local law enforcement agencies

are apprised of counterdrug intelligence acquired by Federal law

enforcement agencies in a manner which—

(i) facilitates effective counterdrug activities by State and local law

enforcement agencies; and

(ii) provides such State and local law enforcement agencies with the

information relating to the safety of officials involved in their

counterdrug activities.
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(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section,

the term “appropriate congressional committees means the following:

(1) The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Judiciary, and the Select

Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) The Committee on International Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and

the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

1998 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT, Section 104(e) and

Accompanying Conference Committee Report Language

Sec. 104 (e) NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER -

(1) IN GENERAL - Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), the

amount of $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center.

Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation

purposes shall remain available until September 30, 1999, and funds provided for

procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2000.

(2) TRANSFER OF FUNDS - The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the

Attorney General of the United States funds available for the National Drug Intelligence

Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for

the activities of the Center.

(3) LIMITATION - Amounts available for the Center may not be used in contravention

of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.

403-3(d)(1)).

(4) AUTHORITY - Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General

shall retain full authority over the operations of the Center.

PERTINENT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT LANGUAGE:

Section 104 of the conference report authorizes appropriations for the Community

Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount authorized in subsection (a) to be

made available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). This subsection is

identical to subsection (e) in the House amendment. The Senate bill had no similar

provision. The Senate recedes. The managers agree that continued funding of the NDIC

from the NFIP deserves considerable study and many remain concerned that the balance

between law enforcement and national security equities in the NDIC's operations is
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skewed in favor of the law enforcement community. This is due, in part, to placement of

the NDIC within the Department of Justice.

The managers urge the President to carefully examine this problem and report to the

Committees before April 1, 1998. This examination should be undertaken and reported as

a part of the National Counter Narcotics Architecture Review currently being prepared by

the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The report should describe current and

proposed efforts to structure the NDIC to effectively coordinate and consolidate strategic

drug intelligence from national security and law enforcement agencies. It should also

describe what steps have been taken to ensure that the relevant national security and law

enforcement agencies are providing the NDIC with access to data needed to accomplish

this task. The managers agree that upon receipt of this report the intelligence committees

will reconsider whether it is appropriate to continue funding the NDIC as a part of the

National Foreign Intelligence Program.
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Appendix C:

Missions of Counterdrug Intelligence Centers and Activities

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC)

The mission of CNC is to oversee the development, coordination, and implementation of all

counternarcotics activities within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In close collaboration

with all relevant law enforcement, policymaking, and Department of Defense (DoD)

counternarcotics elements, CNC is responsible for the prioritization, responsiveness, and

efficient use of counternarcotics resources throughout the Intelligence Community, and for

ensuring that foreign intelligence priorities are closely coordinated with those of domestic law

enforcement.

Through the melding of analytic, operational, and technical expertise from several

agencies, CNC provides a full range of multidisciplinary, current, and long-term

intelligence to support policymakers and all components of the U.S. counterdrug

community. The Center’s analytic program addresses all dimensions of the international

narcotics problem and provides intelligence to support the development and

implementation of U.S. counternarcotics policy. CNC provides actionable intelligence to

support CIA, law enforcement, and DoD operations to disrupt and dismantle major

foreign drug organizations and to detect, monitor, and interdict drug flows. CNC also

assesses drug flows to the United States and is responsible for estimating annual

cultivation and production for all major coca- and opium-producing countries worldwide

and for cannabis crops in selected countries. The Center is also responsible for ensuring

that all relevant technologies are brought to bear in supporting counternarcotics analytic,

collection, and operational efforts throughout the counterdrug Intelligence Community.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Counterdrug Analysis

The mission of DIA’s Office for Counterdrug Analysis (TWD) is to manage and

coordinate DIA’s counterdrug intelligence support. The office oversees DoD

counterdrug intelligence production and dissemination activities. It provides

comprehensive DoD plans for analysis, production, and dissemination of drug

intelligence. TWD produces a broad range of products on drug issues worldwide,

primarily in support of DoD missions. It participates in developing Intelligence

Community estimates and products under the direction of the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI) and the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, and actively participates in

existing intercommunity counterdrug coordination processes. In conjunction with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), TWD sponsors the DOMINANT CHRONICLE

Project, providing translation, exploitation, and community dissemination of captured

foreign records relating to the illegal drug business.

TWD produces finished strategic intelligence on foreign trafficking organizations and

their vulnerabilities; develops trend and pattern analysis of air, maritime, and land

movements of drugs; and analyzes foreign military policies, involvement in trafficking,
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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corruption of high-level officials, and links between terrorism and the drug trade. TWD

serves as the executive agent for the production of the Office of National Drug Control

Policy (ONDCP)-sponsored Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement.

TWD provides a broad range of operational intelligence in support of the military

commander’s counterdrug missions, the detection and monitoring mission of the Joint

Interagency Task Forces, and the activities of Federal drug law enforcement agencies

overseas. TWD provides counterdrug intelligence support through appropriate channels

or established programs to host country military services. TWD provides intelligence

analyst support in response to approved U.S. Mission requirements, as well as provides

intelligence analyst support to Commander in Chief (CINC)-deployed analytic teams,

such as Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs).

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Intelligence Program

As the lead Federal agency for drug law enforcement, the DEA goal is to significantly

reduce the availability of illegal and diverted drugs in the United States. To achieve this

goal, DEA intelligence elements provide leadership strategies and comprehensive

programs to support drug law enforcement and intelligence efforts worldwide. These

programs consist of strategic, investigative, and tactical intelligence support, innovative

database enhancements, improved information-sharing and dissemination, and enhanced

interagency cooperation, to include expanded interaction with the Intelligence

Community, the U.S. military, and Federal, state, and local authorities. DEA’s

intelligence program utilizes drug intelligence from these agencies in addition to DEAacquired information and develops programs that allow the strengths and resources of

each agency to most effectively support U.S. counterdrug efforts. The DEA Intelligence

Division also has responsibility for the coordination and review of interagency drug

intelligence initiatives, as well as significant management, policy, and liaison functions.

The Intelligence Division will continue to:

• Produce reports on the major drug trafficking organizations, using information

obtained through the Special Operations Division and other sources; and,

• Produce strategic and investigative reports on foreign and domestic drug-related

issues.

Individual law enforcement agencies will continue to be responsible for coordinating

support to their investigations in both the domestic and foreign arenas.

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

Previous Mission Statement: The El Paso Intelligence Center is to provide a

comprehensive, accurate intelligence picture of illicit drug movement by land, sea, and

air throughout the world as it relates to the United States; to provide tactical intelligence

support through the exchange of time-sensitive information related to illicit drug
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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movement; and, to support other programs of interest to EPIC member agencies, such as

alien smuggling and weapons trafficking.

New Mission Statement: The El Paso Intelligence Center will support United States law

enforcement and interdiction components through the timely analysis and dissemination

of intelligence on illicit drug and alien movements, and criminal organizations

responsible for these illegal activities, within the United States, on both sides of the U.S.-

Mexico border, across the Caribbean, and from other points of origin within the Western

Hemisphere en route to the United States.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Intelligence Section (FBI)

The mission of the FBI Criminal Intelligence Section is to collect and analyze existing

information from within the FBI, as well as from other Federal law enforcement and

Intelligence Community agencies, and public sources. The goal of the criminal

intelligence capability is to provide evaluated intelligence in support of national criminal

investigations at all levels, Federal, state, and local. The FBI's intelligence capability is

not just reactive, but proactive as well. The FBI identifies national criminal threats

through Racketeering Enterprise Investigations, criminal informant coverage, liaison

contacts, and the analytic capabilities at FBI Headquarters and in the 57 Field Offices.

Consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy, timely and accurate information will

help the FBI to uncover trafficker and criminal organization vulnerabilities and

intentions, fill intelligence gaps, and fully support national investigations.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

Previous Mission Statement: The mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

is to support and strengthen domestic and international anti-money laundering efforts and

to foster interagency and global cooperation to that end through information collection,

analysis and sharing, technological assistance, and innovative and cost-effective

implementation of Treasury authorities.

New Mission Statement: The mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is

to support law enforcement investigative efforts and foster interagency and global

cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes; and to provide U.S.

policymakers with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide money-laundering

developments, trends, and patterns. FinCEN will work toward those ends through

information collection, analysis, and sharing, technological assistance, and innovative

and cost-effective implementation of Treasury authorities.
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High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)

The mission of the HIDTA program is to enhance and coordinate America’s drug control

efforts among Federal, state, and local agencies in order to eliminate or reduce drug

trafficking (including the production, manufacture, transportation, distribution, and

chronic use of illegal drugs and money laundering) and its harmful consequences in

critical areas of the United States.

Pursuant to the Anti-drug abuse Act of 1988 as amended, the HIDTAs, as designated by

ONDCP, are the most critical drug trafficking areas of the United States.* The Executive

Committee of each HIDTA is composed of representatives from local, state, and Federal

agencies. Each Executive Committee receives a charter from the Director of ONDCP to

reduce trafficking activities, particularly those that adversely affect other areas of the

country.

The mission of the HIDTA Intelligence Centers is to facilitate the timely exchange of

information from Federal, state, local, commercial, and HIDTA databases with HIDTA

initiatives and participating agencies. Strategic and tactical intelligence is disseminated

in support of drug distribution, money-laundering, firearms trafficking, and drug-related

violence investigations.

*These are the current HIDTAs:

Appalachia

Arizona

Atlanta

California

Central Florida

Central Valley, CA

Chicago

Gulf Coast

Hawaii

Houston

Lake County

Los Angeles

Midwest

Milwaukee

New England

New Mexico

New York

Northern California

North Texas

Northwest

Ohio

Oregon

Philadelphia/Camden

Puerto Rico/Virgin

Islands

Rocky Mountain

South Florida

South Texas

Southern Michigan

Southwest Border

Washington-Baltimore

West Texas
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Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East

(NOTE: The mission of JIATF-East was expanded in 1999 to include JIATF-South.)

JIATF-East is situated in Key West, FL, and functions as a subordinate of the U.S.

military’s Miami-based Southern Command. The JIATF-East area of responsibility

includes the Caribbean, together with its associated island nations, and the waters off

South and Central America (less Mexico’s Pacific coast). JIATF-East/J2 Intelligence

Directorate provides operational, all-source, 24-hour-per-day fused intelligence support

to: DoD TATs, in U.S. Missions; U.S. drug law enforcement agencies; DoD detection

and monitoring forces; and foreign military and drug law enforcement agencies operating

within the JIATF-East area of responsibility. The principal recipient of JIATF-East

intelligence is the JIATF-East Joint Operations Command Center, although most reports

are routinely provided to other agencies and departments for their use. The Joint

Operations Command Center is the only joint interagency counterdrug operations and

intelligence facility providing tactically actionable intelligence products to deployed

international or interagency counterdrug forces operating in the JIATF-East transit zone

area of responsibility.

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South

(NOTE: The mission of JIATF-South was absorbed in 1999 by JIATF-East.)

The mission of JIATF-South in 1998 was to execute U.S. national counterdrug policy by

supporting U.S. Federal agency and participating nation counterdrug efforts to deter,

degrade, and disrupt the production and transshipment of illegal drugs within and from

the JIATF-South area of responsibility. The JIATF-South J2 provided intelligence

support to the JIATF-South mission. The intelligence directorate was responsible for the

planning, collection management, analysis, intelligence fusion, and dissemination of allsource intelligence in support of regional and in-country counterdrug operations. It also

was responsible for 24-hour intelligence watch support to surveillance and

reconnaissance operations, and direction of all Tactical Analysis Teams assigned to U.S.

Embassies in Panama and South America.

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-West

JIATF-West is situated in Alameda, CA, and functions as a subordinate of the U.S.

military’s Honolulu, Hawaii-based Pacific Command. The JIATF-West area of

responsibility extends from the waters off Mexico’s Pacific coast to Southeast Asia and

parts of Southwest Asia. JIATF-West brings DoD forces to bear in support of law

enforcement agencies and U.S. Missions in Southeast and Southwest Asia in their efforts

to disrupt international drug trafficking and coordinates with JIATF-East on activities in

the eastern Pacific and near Mexico. JIATF-West operates a 24-hour-per-day all-source

intelligence analysis function for coordination of tactical and operational intelligence

support to U.S. Mission counterdrug operations in the Pacific area of responsibility.
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National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)

Previous Mission Statement: The mission of the National Drug Intelligence Center is to

coordinate and consolidate strategic organizational drug intelligence from national

security and law enforcement agencies in order to produce assessments and analyses

regarding the structure, membership, finances, communication, transportation, logistics,

and other activities of drug trafficking organizations.

New Mission Statement: The mission of the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)

is:

• To support national policy decision makers with timely strategic domestic drug

intelligence assessments, focusing on the production, consumption, and trafficking

trends and patterns of all illicit drugs inside U.S. national borders and territories.

• To help the Intelligence Community guide and prioritize its counterdrug effort, it will

provide to the originating law enforcement agency, or with the permission of the

originating agency, foreign-related investigative leads discovered in its domestic

analyses.

• To produce an annual National Drug Threat Assessment, to produce or coordinate

interagency regional drug threat assessments, and to participate in other joint

counterdrug assessments involving the integration of foreign and domestic drug

information.

Office of Naval Intelligence-212 (ONI-212)

ONI-212 provides unique maritime-focused analysis of drug trafficking entities and

conveyances in support of the National Drug Control Strategy. The division brings oneof-a-kind sources of information, databases, and analytic experience to bear on the

detection, monitoring, and interdiction of maritime drug trafficking. Beyond providing

access via the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET) to ONI maritime databases (SEALINK),

ONI provides support in the following:

• Finished intelligence and ad hoc support on foreign commercial maritime facilities,

conveyances, companies, and activities;

• Technical and operational-level intelligence reporting against non-commercial

maritime conveyances and organizations; and,

• Investigation and application of new maritime-related data sources for the

counterdrug community.

The majority of ONI tailored support is provided directly to law enforcement agencies’

field and regional intelligence offices and headquarters elements. Other significant

consumers include the Joint Interagency Task Forces, forces from the U.S. Navy, U.S.
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Coast Guard, cooperating foreign nations, Tactical Analysis Teams in Latin America, and

existing intercommunity counterdrug coordination processes.

Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Law Enforcement Program

The mission of the RISS is to enhance the ability of local, state, and Federal law

enforcement agencies (LEAs) to identify, target, and remove criminal conspirators, and to

support investigative and prosecution efforts which span multi-jurisdictional boundaries

involving narcotics trafficking, organized crime, criminal gangs, and violent crime.

Program Description: RISS is divided into six regions and comprises more than 5,000

local, state, and Federal LEAs. It is funded by DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance and

supplemented by annual membership fees.

Although RISS projects focus on the overall mission noted above, each project is allowed

to focus on its choice of multi-jurisdictional crimes to target and its range of services (for

example, data analysis, investigative support, equipment sharing, training, and technical

assistance) to offer. Each RISS contains a centralized database of criminal records and all

RISS members are connected by a secure, unclassified Wide Area Network.

• Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network

(MAGLOCLEN) - It includes Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey,

New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and two provinces in

Canada. MAGLOCLEN focuses on organized criminal activity, criminal gangs, and

violent crime.

• Mid-States Organized Crime Center (MOCIC) - It includes Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,

Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, and Wisconsin. MOCIC

focuses on narcotics trafficking, professional traveling criminals, organized crime,

criminal gangs, and violent crime.

• New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN) - It includes

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

NESPIN focuses on narcotics trafficking, organized crime, major criminal activity,

criminal gangs, and violent crime.

• Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC) - It includes Alabama,

Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South

Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Puerto Rico.

ROCIC focuses on narcotics violators, professional traveling criminals, organized

crime, criminal gangs, and violent crime.

• Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN) - It includes Arizona, Colorado,

Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and Canada. RMIN focuses

on narcotics violators, associated criminal activity, criminal gangs, and violent crime.
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

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• Western States Information Network (WSIN) - It includes Alaska, California,

Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. WSIN focuses on narcotics, narcotics trafficking,

and criminal organizations and activities.

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (CGICC)

The mission of the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center is to produce and

disseminate information derived from all sources to support Coast Guard planning and

operations in all agency mission areas in addition to counterdrug, and to ensure the

adequacy of Coast Guard intelligence support to other government agencies. CGICC

inserts Coast Guard requirements into the national collections systems processes and

validates national requirements for Coast Guard collection. CGICC is the Coast Guard

representative on interagency assessments and is the designated center for exploitation of

imagery to support maritime interdiction and detection and monitoring operations.

U.S. Customs Service, Intelligence Division

The Intelligence Division is the cornerstone of the new Customs Intelligence System.

The mission of the Customs Intelligence System is to unify and integrate the diverse but

interconnected intelligence components of the U.S. Customs Service. This system

includes managing the intelligence process in support of U.S. Customs Service policy,

core processes, and law enforcement. The fundamental goal of the Intelligence System is

the production and dissemination of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence. The

vision of the Intelligence System is to provide excellence in intelligence support in the

face of ever-expanding windows of opportunity for criminal organizations in a changing

world.
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Appendix D:

Glossary of Terms

ACS Automated Case Support System; provides access to all Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) databases.

ADNET AntiDrug Network; a secure information network connecting selected

military, law enforcement, and intelligence counterdrug components.

CDICG Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group.

CDX Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat.

CFR Code of Federal Regulations.

CIA Central Intelligence Agency.

CINC Commander in Chief; a Department of Defense (DoD) term for the

military officer in charge of one of the United States regional or strategic

military commands.

CIO Chief Information Officer.

CISP Criminal Intelligence Support Program; an FBI searchable database.

CNC Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Crime and Narcotics Center; the

element of the Central Intelligence Agency responsible for counterdrug

intelligence support.

CNCMS Counternarcotics Command Management System; a secure

USSOUTHCOM communications system.

CNII Committee on Narcotics Intelligence Issues; an Intelligence Community

committee.

CN-IWG Counter-Narcotics Interagency Working Group; an Office of National

Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) committee.

CONVOY An El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)-based domestic drug interdiction

training program.

COPS Community Oriented Policing Services; a Department of Justice (DOJ)-

funded activity.

CY Calendar year.
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DCI Director of Central Intelligence; the cabinet position occupied by the

Director, CIA, through which he exercises oversight and direction of the

Intelligence Community.

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration.

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency.

DOCEX Document Exploitation; the extraction of information from records

obtained during an investigation.

DoD Department of Defense.

DOJ Department of Justice.

EAB Executive Advisory Board; previously provided intelligence production

guidance to the National Drug Intelligence Center.

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center; a DEA-administered, multi-agency law

enforcement support activity; located in El Paso, Texas.

FDIN Federal Drug Interdiction Number; a unique number assigned to a drug

seizure.

FDSS Federal-wide Drug Seizure System; administered by DEA to monitor drug

seizures.

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; a component of the Department

of Treasury; located in Vienna, Virginia.

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; a component of the

Department of Treasury; located in Glynco, Georgia.

FY Fiscal year; the Federal fiscal year is 1 October through 30 September.

GCIP General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan.

GIG Global Information Grid.

Global Global Justice Information Network; a DOJ automation initiative.

GS Government Service.

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area; an ONDCP-designated area.
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HIFCA High-Risk Money-Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Area;

identified in the 1999 Money Laundering Strategy.

IC Intelligence Community; a term that includes: CIA, DIA, the National

Security Agency (NSA), the offices within DoD for the collection of

specialized national foreign intelligence, the Bureau of Intelligence and

Research of the Department of State, the intelligence elements of the

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the FBI, the Department of the

Treasury and the Department of Energy, and the Staff elements of the

Director of Central Intelligence.

ICON Intelligence Community Collaborative Operations Network; an

Intelligence Community automation initiative.

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice.

intelligence As used in this document, a generic term referring to information related

to subjects of interest to a government agency. When used to refer to

either Intelligence Community or law enforcement community

intelligence, the context in which it is used is critical to its intended

meaning, as each community uses the same word to mean different things,

often resulting in communications problems. Intelligence Community

“intelligence” is information resulting specifically from Intelligence

Community collection actions and relating to the capabilities, intentions,

and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons (Executive

Order 12333). Law enforcement “intelligence,” also referred to as

investigative information, is sensitive information that is part of a law

enforcement inquiry, matter, or case, usually developed as a byproduct of

law enforcement investigative and interdiction efforts and subject to being

divulged, as required, to support the arrest and prosecution of the

subject(s) of the investigation.

IPB Intelligence Priorities Board; previously provided intelligence production

prioritization to the National Drug Intelligence Center.

IPSEC Internet Protocol Security standards.

IRS Internal Revenue Service, Department of Treasury.

ISN Information Systems Network.

IT Information Technology.

ITA Information Technology Architecture.
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JCON Justice Consolidated Office Network; a DOJ-managed automation

initiative.

JETWAY An EPIC-based domestic drug interdiction training program.

JIATF-E Joint Interagency Task Force-East; a military and law enforcement

operational coordination activity in Key West, Florida.

JIATF-W Joint Interagency Task Force-West; a military and law enforcement

operational coordination activity in Alameda, California.

JICC Joint Information Coordination Center; an EPIC-based initiative designed

to consolidate information on suspect aircraft and maritime craft.

JICLE Joint Intelligence Community/Law Enforcement working group; legal

policy guidelines and procedures approved in 1997 by the DCI and the

Department of Justice regarding coordination between the intelligence and

law enforcement communities.

JTC Justice Training Center, Quantico, Virginia.

JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System; a DoD-managed

secure telecommunications network.

LEA Law Enforcement Agency.

LEIS Law Enforcement Intelligence System; an automated information system

operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.

MORE Making Officer Redeployment Effective; a DOJ-funded initiative.

MOU Memorandum of Understanding.

NADDIS Narcotics And Dangerous Drugs Information System; a DEA-maintained

automated data base.

NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center; a component of the Department of

Justice located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.

NDPIX National Drug Pointer Index; an interagency automated data base that

provides Federal, state, and local law enforcement officers with pointer

information relative to active drug targets.

NLETS National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System; a combined

Federal and state communications network.
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NSC National Security Council.

NSDD National Security Decision Directive.

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force.

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy.

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence.

Operational As used in this document, this is highly perishable raw or analyzed

information derived from any source that supports immediate interdiction

or law enforcement actions.

PACOM Pacific Command; a U.S. military regional headquarters based in

Honolulu, Hawaii, responsible for directing and coordinating U.S. military

activities in the Pacific in defense of the United States.

PCCN President’s Council on Counter-Narcotics.

PIPELINE An EPIC-based domestic drug interdiction training program.

RISS Regional Information Sharing System; a DOJ-funded system for sharing

criminal information.

RISSNET Regional Information Sharing System Network.

SARS Suspicious Activity Report System; a bank reporting system used to

identify potentially suspicious transactions.

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence.

SES Senior Executive Service.

SIS Senior Intelligence Service.

SPRG Systems Policy Review Group; reports to the CDICG.

Strategic As used in this document, information that permits users at the highest

levels of government to define a high-priority issue, identify and relate

broad but pivotal issues, and understand the most significant elements so

as to arrive at an informed decision.

Tactical As used in this document, highly perishable raw or analyzed information,

derived from any source, that supports immediate action.
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TAT Tactical Analysis Team; an intelligence activity located in some U.S.

Missions, staffed by DoD personnel and designed to support the Mission

staff.

TDY Temporary Duty.

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communication Systems; a U.S. Customs Serviceand Immigration and Naturalization Service-maintained automated

database.

TIC The Interdiction Committee; an ONDCP interagency advisory group.

TILE Training for Intelligence and Law Enforcement; promotes coordination

and cross-training opportunities for drug specialists in the intelligence and

law enforcement communities.

TWD Transnational Warfare Counterdrug Analysis Office; the element of the

Defense Intelligence Agency responsible for counterdrug intelligence

support.

USIC United States Interdiction Coordinator.

USSOUTH- Southern Command; a U.S. military regional headquarters based in

COM Miami, FL, and responsible for directing and coordinating U.S. military

activities in Central and South America and the Caribbean in defense of

the United States.

WAN Wide Area Network.

WHTF White House Task Force.
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Appendix E:

General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan

Action Items

 Page

Executive Summary 1

Summary 4

Introduction 13

Section A: National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination 16

Section B: National Centers 24

The DCI Crime and Narcotics Center

B-1. Strategic Assessments 25

The National Drug Intelligence Center

B-2. Mission 25

B-3. Subordination 25

B-4. Production 26

B-5. Special Projects 26

B-6. Access to and Protection of Information 27

B-7. Document Exploitation 27

The El Paso Intelligence Center

B-8. Mission 27

B-9. Management and Program Coordination 28

B-10. Program Priorities 28

B-11. Relationship with State and Local Law Enforcement 28

B-12. Development of a Nationwide System to Report Drug

Seizures to EPIC 28

B-13. EPIC Watch Program 29

B-14. Hub for HIDTA Intelligence Centers 29

B-15. JICC Program Review 29

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

B-16. Mission 29

B-17. Strategic Intelligence 30

B-18. Access to Intelligence Reporting 30

Section C: Regional, State, and Local Cooperation

C-l. Consolidation of Drug Intelligence Resources 32

C-2. Dedication of Intelligence Analysts to Produce Sanitized

Reports 32

C-3. Federal Participation in HIDTA Intelligence Centers 32

C-4. Development of Guidelines for HIDTA Intelligence

Centers 33

C-5. Establishment of Core Functions and Services for

HIDTA Intelligence Centers 33

C-6. Expansion of Document Exploitation Capabilities 33

C-7. Management of HIDTA Intelligence Centers 34

C-8. HIDTA Intelligence Center information Sharing and

Access 34
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C-9. Funding of Background Investigations for HIDTA

Intelligence Center Employees 34

C-10. Eligibility of HIDTA Intelligence Center Personnel

to Receive Law Enforcement Information 34

C-11. Production of Regional Threat Assessments 35

C-12. Production of HIDTA Area Drug Threat Assessments 35

C-13. Participation of Federal Agencies in the

 National Drug Pointer Index 35

Section D: Foreign Coordination

D-1. U.S. Mission Counterdrug Program Coordinator 36

D-2. Structured Information Exchange 36

D-3. U.S. Mission Orientation 36

D-4. U.S. Mission Reviews 37

D-5. Intercommunity Counterdrug Coordination Processes 37

D-6. Sharing Intelligence with Foreign Counterparts 37

D-7. U.S. Customs Service Drug Intelligence Personnel

 Overseas 38

D-8. DEA Intelligence Analysts Overseas 39

D-9. Coordination of the JIATFs 39

D-10. Tactical Analysis Teams’ Staffing 39

D-11. Drug Money Laundering Assessments 40

D-12. Legal Policy Guidelines and Procedures 40

Section E: Analytic Personnel Development and Training

E-1. Federal Analytic Staff 41

E-2. State and Local Support 41

E-3. Standardized Minimum Intelligence Analyst Hiring

Criteria 42

E-4. Establishment of Career Ladder for Federal Law

Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 42

E-5. Management and Leadership Training Programs 42

E-6. Leadership Program Opportunities 42

E-7. Development of a Master’s Degree in Law Enforcement

Intelligence 42

E-8. Justice-Treasury Drug Intelligence Fellowship 43

E-9. Expansion of Federal Law Enforcement Intelligence

Programs 43

E-10. Expansion of Federal Law Enforcement Drug

Intelligence Analyst Rotational Tours 43

E-11. Drug Intelligence Issue Experts 43

E-12. National Training Center for Drug Intelligence 43

E-13. Standardized Training and Education 44

E-14. National Training Centers Coordination 44

E-15. Interagency Task Force 44

E-16. Five-Year Plan 44

E-17. Coordination of Training and Education Initiatives 44

E-18. Resource and Training Requirements for “Reports
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) February 2000

A-23

 Analyst” Function 45

E-19. Analysts’ Job Focus 45

E-20. Decreased Reliance on the Military 45

Section F: Information Technology

F-1. Establish a Systems Policy Review Group 48

F-2. Use Existing Information to Create a Detailed Schedule

for Implementing the Drug Law Enforcement

Intelligence Architecture 49

F-3. Extend Secure Connectivity Among Federal Drug

Intelligence Personnel 50

F-4. Accelerate Federal Law Enforcement Automation

Initiatives 50

F-5. Expand Connectivity of NDPIX 50

F-6. Provide Information Technology Support to NDIC 51

F-7. Provide Information Technology Support to EPIC 51

F-8. Provide Information Technology Support to FinCEN 51

F-9. Develop HIDTA Intelligence Centers Systems 52

Standards

F-10. Improve Personnel Development 52
Access the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan online at

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/GCIP

For online information on Federal Departments and Agencies involved in drug policy, 

law enforcement, drug trafficking interdiction, and counterdrug intelligence issues, contact:

For general drug information online contact:

Drug Enforcement Administration

www.usdoj.gov/dea/

National Security Council

www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/nschome.html

Department of State

www.state.gov

United States Coast Guard

www.uscg.mil

Federal Bureau of Investigation

www.fbi.gov/

United States Customs Service

www.customs.treas.gov

Internal Revenue Service

www.ustreas.gov/irs/ci/

Department of Transportation

www.dot.gov

Department of Justice

www.usdoj.gov

Department of the Treasury

www.ustreas.gov

Office of National Drug Control Policy

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov

Drug Facts and Statistics

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/drugfact.html

The National Drug Control Strategy

www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/99ndcs/contents.html