UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5100

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

EDDIE WAYNE SNEAD, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, 

Senior District Judge. (5:09-cr-00281-H-1) 

Submitted: October 31, 2012 Decided: November 7, 2012

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion. 

Noah A. Clements, THE CLEMENTS FIRM, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, 

Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Eddie Wayne Snead appeals his conviction and 228-month 

sentence following his guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement 

to distribution of a quantity of cocaine, in violation of 

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). 

The Government argues that Snead’s appeal of his sentence is 

foreclosed by the waiver of appeal rights in his plea agreement 

and that the remainder of the appeal is without merit. 

We dismiss in part and affirm in part. 

A criminal defendant may waive the right to appeal if 

that waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. 

Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Generally, if 

the district court fully questions a defendant regarding the 

waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy performed 

in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the waiver is both valid 

and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 

(4th Cir. 2005). Whether a defendant validly waived his right 

to appeal is a question of law this court reviews de novo. 

United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). 

Where the Government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and there 

is no claim that it breached its obligations under the plea 

agreement, we will enforce the waiver if the record establishes 

that (1) the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to 
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waive the right to appeal; and (2) the issue being appealed is 

within the scope of the waiver. Id. at 168 & n.5. 

Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

conclude that Snead knowingly and voluntarily waived the right 

to appeal his 228-month sentence. Accordingly, we dismiss the 

portion of Snead’s appeal challenging his sentence under United 

States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241-47 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(en banc), and Congress’ sentencing policies. 

Next, we decline to reach the merits of Snead’s 

challenge to the hearing on his motion to suppress evidence 

because the claimed error was waived by virtue of his guilty 

plea. “When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all 

nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to 

entry of the plea.” United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644 

(4th Cir. 2004). A criminal defendant’s guilty plea “represents 

a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the 

criminal process.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 

(1973). “Thus, the defendant who has pled guilty has no 

non-jurisdictional ground upon which to attack that judgment 

except the inadequacy of the plea or the government’s power to 

bring any indictment at all.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 

F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Snead’s valid guilty plea thus waives his 

argument challenging the judgment of conviction on the basis of 
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a claimed constitutional error at the pre-guilty-plea hearing on 

his motion to suppress evidence. 

Snead also challenges the district court’s failure to 

order a competency hearing sua sponte. A district court is 

required to order a competency hearing sua sponte “if there is 

reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be 

suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 

incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the 

nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to 

assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006). 

In determining whether there is reasonable cause to order a 

competency hearing, a district court “must consider all evidence 

before it, including evidence of irrational behavior, the 

defendant’s demeanor . . . , and medical opinions concerning the 

defendant’s competence.” United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 

1290 (4th Cir. 1995). To prevail on a claim that the district 

court erred in failing to order a competency hearing, the 

defendant must establish that the court “ignored facts raising a 

bona fide doubt regarding his competency.” Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 

at 291 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

conclude that Snead fails to establish that the district court 

abused its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing 

sua sponte. See United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 742 
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(4th Cir. 2007) (stating the standard of review). Snead’s two 

indicators of his alleged need to be evaluated for mental 

competence — letters he supposedly wrote to the district court 

prior to the sentencing hearing and the nature of his allocution 

at that hearing — do not establish a bona fide doubt as to his 

competency. Snead fails to identify the letters at issue,

expound on their contents, or explain how the letters in any way 

bear on the issue of whether he was suffering at the sentencing 

hearing from a mental disease or defect that prevented him from 

understanding the nature and consequences of the hearing or in

assisting in his defense. Further, Snead also fails to connect 

his allocution with any reasonable basis for believing he lacked 

understanding of the sentencing proceeding or lacked the ability 

to assist in his defense. Accordingly, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency 

hearing sua sponte. 

Snead also argues that he was constructively denied 

counsel at the portion of the sentencing hearing dedicated to 

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Constructive denial of 

counsel “results from circumstances where the performance of 

counsel is so inadequate that, in effect, no assistance of 

counsel is provided at all.” Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 289 

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). After review 

of the record, we reject Snead’s argument, premised on United 
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States v. Joslin, 434 F.2d 526, 528-31 (D.C. Cir. 1970), that he 

was constructively denied counsel because trial counsel failed 

to deliver arguments in support of the motion and told the 

district court that he recommended against granting it. Unlike 

in Joslin, which, in any event, does not bind this court, Snead 

did not plausibly assert his innocence of the offense to which 

he had pled guilty. Further, Snead in no way suggests that his 

trial counsel plausibly could have argued that he had shown a 

fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. Cf.

United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) 

(listing six factors this court is to consider in determining 

whether defendant has carried his burden in showing a fair and 

just reason to withdraw his guilty plea). Further, Snead’s 

suggestion that he was constructively denied counsel because 

there may have been a “breakdown of communication” with trial 

counsel is wholly unexplained and lacks record support. 

Accordingly, Snead’s claim of the constructive denial of counsel 

is without merit. 

Finally, Snead claims that trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance in connection with the competency hearing 

conducted by the magistrate judge. Claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable on direct 

appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 

1997). Rather, to allow for adequate development of the record, 
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a defendant must bring his claims in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2012) motion. Id. An exception exists, however, where 

the record conclusively establishes ineffective assistance. 

United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). 

After review of the record, we find no conclusive evidence that 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and we therefore 

decline to consider this claim on direct appeal. 

In view of the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal in 

part and affirm the district court’s judgment in part. We deny 

Snead’s motion seeking leave to file a pro se supplemental 

brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED IN PART;

AFFIRMED IN PART