ARMY PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE AND JURISDICTIONS

Richard A. Lacquement, Jr.

October 2003
***** 

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ISBN 1-58487-145-8 

ii 
iii

FOREWORD

With the soldiers of the Army deployed to over 120 countries and 

executing a wide variety of missions, the Army as a profession is 

being stretched to its limits. Richard Lacquement takes note of these 

developments and calls for a clarifi cation of what exactly the Army 

“profession” entails. 

His mapping of the profession’s expert knowledge provides 

a framework to continue the debate on the jurisdictions of the 

Army profession. The recommendations he presents are radical 

and thought provoking. While there may not be a consensus on his 

conclusions, this monograph serves the important role of stimulating 

thought and debate on the Army profession.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RICHARD A. LACQUEMENT, JR., a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. 

Army, is a professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War 

College. He is a strategic plans and policy offi cer who has served 

in a variety of command and staff positions in both heavy and 

light fi eld artillery units. Lieutenant Colonel Lacquement’s artillery 

assignments included the 82nd Airborne Division, the 1st Armored 

Division (to include combat service in Operation DESERT STORM), 

the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 101st Airborne 

Division, (Air Assault). During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, he 

served as head of the Army G3’s War Plans Division’s Stability 

Operations Planning Cell and then returned to the 101st Airborne 

Division to assist with stability operations in Northern Iraq. 

Lieutenant Colonel Lacquement has also served as an Assistant 

Professor of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy 

where he taught courses in American politics, international relations 

theory, and international organizations. He is the author of Shaping 

American Military Capabilities After the Cold War (Praeger, 2003). (Praeger, 2003). 

Lieutenant Colonel Lacquement is a graduate of the U.S. Military 

Academy and holds master’s degrees from Princeton University and 

the Naval War College and a Ph.D. in International Relations from 

Princeton University.
v

SUMMARY

Changes in the international security environment and in 

technology challenge leaders to defi ne the Army’s role for the 

future. Effective strategic leadership of the Army profession will 

be an essential component of successful transformation. To serve 

American society effectively, strategic leaders of the profession must 

define, prioritize, and limit the expert knowledge of the profession, 

clarify the jurisdictions within which this knowledge applies, and 

then develop professionals to apply this knowledge. 

There are three main reasons to map and prioritize the Army’s 

professional expertise and jurisdictions:

• Facilitate choices about the use of constrained resources;

• Reestablish the Army’s collective professional identity; and,

• Move beyond the concept of “full spectrum dominance.”

This monograph provides a framework intended for use by the 

Army’s strategic leaders. But it also should be a point of departure 

for debate among all members of the profession. The most important 

purpose of this framework is to provide a mechanism for HOW 

TO THINK about Army expert knowledge and jurisdictions. This 

monograph offers some general recommendations derived from my 

application of the framework and its logic. These recommendations 

represent just one possible view. Ultimately, the strategic leaders of 

the Army will decide priorities and boundaries. 

Recommendations include:

• Eliminating of combat service support branches as basic 

branches for commissioned offi cer accession.

• Strengthening precommissioning standards for combat 

and combat support offi cers to include certifi ed military 

training and educational components.

• Establishing clearer qualitative standards for assignment, 

promotion, and retention of commissioned offi cers (in 

terms of physical capacity, psychological capacity, and 

demonstrated performance).

• Refocusing the offi cer career management and education 

system. 
vi

• Developing coherent intellectual justifi cations and defense 

of jurisdictions related to the leadership of Army soldiers 

in the organized application of coercive force (war, peace 

enforcement, peacekeeping). 

• Better articulating reasons for avoiding jurisdictions that 

do not require unique Army expertise (humanitarian 

assistance, disaster relief, homeland security). 
1

ARMY PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE AND JURISDICTION

Introduction.

Our nonnegotiable contract with the American people is to fi ght 

and win the nation’s wars. Every other task is subordinate to that 

commitment. To discharge our responsibilities to the Nation, 

we maintain several core competencies. These are the essential 

and enduring capabilities of our service. They encompass the 

full range of military operations across the spectrum of confl ict, 

from sustained land dominance in wartime to supporting 

civil authorities during natural disasters and consequence 

management.1

 Field Manual 1, The Army, June 14, 2001

This quote from Field Manual (FM) 1, the Army’s capstone 

manual, declares broad and compelling responsibilities for the 

Army. Aside from the priority for warfi ghting, however, it provides 

an undifferentiated and almost limitless range of operations for 

which the Army must prepare. This is a noble aspiration that refl ects 

the best “can-do” spirit of loyal service to the nation. It is, however, 

a problematic practical foundation that obscures signifi cant 

limitations and trade-offs required to concentrate the army’s fi nite 

resources—personnel, material, and funds—on the most important 

requirements. Changes in the international security environment 

and in technology challenge leaders to defi ne the Army’s role for 

the future. Effective strategic leadership of the Army profession will 

be an essential component of successful transformation. To serve 

American society effectively, strategic leaders of the profession must 

define, prioritize, and limit the expert knowledge of the profession,, 

clarify the jurisdictions within which this knowledge applies, and 

then develop the professionals to apply this knowledge. 

This framework is intended for use by the Army’s strategic 

leaders. It is also a framework for debate among all members of the 

profession. I hope it will generate an institutional exchange of ideas 

that can lead to renewed consensus on the Army’s professional 

essence. 
2

Problem.

The Army needs to redraw the map of its expert knowledge 

and then inform and reform its educational and developmental 

systems accordingly, resolving any debate over the appropriate 

expertise of America’s Army.2

The Army faces increasing jurisdictional competitions with new 

competitors. Thus its jurisdictional boundaries must be constantly 

negotiated and clarifi ed by offi cers comfortable at the bargaining 

table and skilled in dealing with professional colleagues on 

matters touching the profession’s civil-military and politicalmilitary boundaries.3

The Army is at a crossroads. Its traditions, recent successes, and 

capabilities are praiseworthy. Its appropriate focus for the future is 

uncertain. “Full Spectrum Dominance” is a great bumper sticker, 

but of limited practical utility. It glosses over too much. It lacks 

boundaries. It lacks priorities. 

In some ways, the tremendous success of the Army in recovering 

from Vietnam and better preparing for the Soviet challenge is 

impeding the current transformation. Clear focus on a specifi c 

foe, in a specifi c theater, provided a high degree of professional 

certainty for the Army. The “training revolution” of the 1970s led 

to a dramatic improvement of Army training for fi ghting the Soviet 

Union.4 Collective and individual training were predicated on a 

clear overarching mission. 

The current era is one of broader and less certain missions. 

Operation DESERT STORM drew heavily on the focused training 

for conventional warfare with the Soviets that characterized the 

Cold War. This mission fi t the Army’s preferred concept of war 

and was well-suited to its expertise developed in the latter stages 

of the Cold War. In contrast, numerous peace operations such as 

the missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo were not wellsuited to the training and organization of the Cold War confi gured 

Army. Although still too early to draw clear lessons from the war 

with Iraq, success in conventional combat and diffi culties in some 

aspects of unconventional warfare and post-confl ict stabilization 

indicate a persistent tension about appropriate Army missions. 

There have been debates and signifi cant dissonance among Army 
3

leaders between the expectations and requirements related to being 

prepared to “fi ght and win our nations wars,” and the numerous 

operational requirements for military operations other than war 

(MOOTW).5 Surveys of Army personnel and anecdotal evidence 

have identifi ed related tensions within the offi cer corps--particularly 

between senior offi cers and junior offi cers.6 Army leaders should not 

allow internal tensions concerning professional jurisdictions and 

expertise to continue.

Intellectual Foundations. 

This monograph builds on two concepts. The fi rst is the concept 

of the military profession provided in Samuel Huntington’s classic, 

The Soldier and the State.

7

 Second is the concept of professional 

adaptation and adjustment suggested by Andrew Abbott in The 

System of Professions.

8

 Huntington provides a commonly understood 

defi nition of the military profession. With some adjustments 

and refi nement, this monograph suggests a revised foundational 

defi nition of the Army profession. Abbott provides a framework 

for understanding how professions adapt and sustain themselves 

by defi ning and negotiating their roles with their clients while 

competing with other professions. 

Huntington’s defi nition of a profession is “a peculiar type 

of functional group with highly specialized characteristics.”9 To 

him, it is defi ned by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.10

With regard to the military profession, “The direction, operation 

and control of a human organization whose primary function is 

the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the offi cer.”11

The responsibility of a profession is to its client. “The military 

profession is monopolized by the state. The skill of the offi cer is the 

management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of 

his client, society.”12

The Army professional core is found among its offi cers. They 

are required to master a body of abstract professional knowledge 

and understand the moral, ethical, political, and social contexts 

within which military actions take place. They must be experts, fi rst 

and foremost, in the human dimensions--leadership, morale, and 

physical capacity—that underlie effective military operations.13
4

Refi ned to refl ect this quintessentially human endeavor, the 

core expertise of American offi cers can be restated as follows. The 

peculiar skill of the military offi cer is the development, operation, 

and leadership of a human organization, a profession, whose 

primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf 

of the American people; for the Army offi cer such development, 

operation, and leadership occurs incident to sustaining America’s 

dominance in land warfare. In abbreviated form, I will refer to this 

core expertise as “Leadership of Army soldiers in the organized 

application of coercive force.”14

Huntington also suggested that the most appropriate means 

to attain effective military subordination was to maintain a clear 

divide between the realms of civilian and military responsibility.15 A 

common critique of Huntington is that the clarity of this separation 

is easy to stipulate in theory but hard to realize in practice. As 

Clausewitz’s insight suggests, since war is merely an instrument of 

policy, it is diffi cult to separate the purely military from the purely 

political.16 To validate the importance of military advice, there 

should be standards to help determine appropriate boundaries. 

Defi ning professional expertise and jurisdictions more clearly will 

assist in making these distinctions. 

Andrew Abbott identifi es a key property of professions. 

Professions compete with each other to determine legitimate 

realms within which to apply their expertise.17 Abbott defi nes 

professions as “somewhat exclusive groups of individuals applying 

somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases.”18 Professions 

provide social goods to address important problems. “The tasks of 

professions are human problems amenable to expert service.”19 “The 

central phenomenon of professional life is thus the link between a 

profession and its work, a link [called] jurisdiction.”20 Professions 

compete for jurisdictions and may not always be able to claim 

complete control over all jurisdictions within which they compete. 

“Every profession aims for a heartland of work over which it has 

complete, legally established control.” However, since full control is 

not always possible, there are other possible settlements. In addition 

to full control, jurisdictional settlements can be divided (shared with 

another profession), intellectual (cognitive control of a jurisdiction 

while allowing practical work to be widely shared), advisory (over 
5

certain aspects of work within a jurisdiction), or subordinate (another 

profession controls the jurisdiction, but the fi rst profession may still 

do practical work within the jurisdiction).21

The central questions of this monograph are fundamental ones 

that Army leaders must address in defi ning the Army profession:

• What is the nature of Army expert knowledge? How should 

relevant expertise be prioritized?

• What are the jurisdictions within which this expertise may be 

legitimately applied? How should jurisdictions be prioritized? 

Which should be claimed and defended? Which should be 

avoided?

These are iterative questions that leaders of the profession must 

constantly address. The questions yield descriptive answers for the 

present and suggestive answers for the future. Strategic leaders of 

the Army profession must negotiate the answers with the civilian 

leaders who act as agents for American society. Hence, this is an 

important aspect of civil-military relations. 

Ultimately, civilian leaders decide the Army’s jurisdictions. 

But Army strategic leaders must represent the profession in this 

decisionmaking process. Civilian leaders’ decisions become part 

of the process that requires strategic leaders of the profession 

to reevaluate and modify conceptions of expert knowledge and 

jurisdiction. 

This monograph is explicitly focused on the profession as 

defi ned by the commissioned offi cer corps.22 This is not meant 

to slight warrant offi cers, noncommissioned offi cers, or junior 

enlisted soldiers. These highly-skilled workers are the experts in 

the numerous necessary tasks that allow the Army to succeed. But 

the nature of their responsibilities is fundamentally different from 

those of the Army’s commissioned offi cers. These soldiers and 

their tremendous skills are the instruments of Army success. The 

diagnoses, inferences, and treatments of societal problems for which 

these skills are appropriately applied are the responsibilities of the 

commissioned offi cers who are guardians of the profession’s and the 

institution’s essence. 

The framework provided is also applicable to offi cers of all 

components of the Total Army (active, reserve, and National Guard). 
6

With respect to the National Guard, the dynamic of jurisdictional 

defi nition and negotiation is complicated by the dual allegiance to 

national and state leaders. The negotiation may be more nuanced, 

but, the principles and logic are the same.

A New Framework.

The most important purpose of this monograph is to create 

a rigorous framework for HOW TO THINK about Army expert 

knowledge and jurisdictions. Three main reasons exist to map the 

Army’s professional expertise and jurisdictions:

1. Facilitate choices about the use of constrained resources. 

We are required to make choices about the best ways to allocate the 

resources we acquire. A more rigorous framework will allow leaders 

to better articulate the Army’s needs, in priority, on fi rm professional 

grounds. 

2. Reestablish the Army’s collective professional identity.

Institutional discourse on these issues can lead to consensus about 

the Army profession and the role it plays for society. It can also 

clarify individual self-concepts of our professionals.

3. Move beyond the concept of “full spectrum dominance.”

The spectrum of confl ict and range of military operations is vast. We 

already acknowledge that fi ghting and winning our nation’s wars 

is the highest priority. Taking this as the start point, we can identify 

other priorities at the nexus of established expertise and possible 

jurisdictions. We should be forthright in debating and negotiating 

these priorities. We owe society and the profession improved clarity 

as a step towards greater effectiveness. 

Defi ning the Army Profession’s Expert Knowledge.

Our unique contribution to national security is prompt, sustained 

land dominance across the range of military operations and 

spectrum of confl ict. The Army provides the land force dominance 

essential to shaping the international security environment.23

 FM 1, The Army, June 2001
7

Andrew Abbott’s valuable insight in the System of Professions is 

the dynamic competition among experts to command jurisdictions 

of practice legitimized by society. Professions succeed or fail to 

the degree that they provide expertise that clients need. Many 

professions compete in market, consumer-driven environments. 

The Army profession exists within a similar competitive realm; 

however, American society is the sole client of the Army. The Army’s 

legitimacy and effectiveness are measured entirely in relation to 

meeting American society’s demands for defense and security. 

The suggested map of the Army profession is an effort to portray 

what is unique about the Army and its expertise. It also suggests 

how such expertise is related to society. Four broad categories of 

expertise are required by the Army: 

1. Military-technical expertise. This is the Army’s core 

expertise. “How the profession prepares for and conducts land 

operations combining Army soldiers with organizations, doctrine, 

and technology.”24 This requires the mastery of violent means to 

accomplish policy ends. 

2. Human development expertise. “The Army’s management of 

its human resources . . .”25 and “creating, developing, and maintaining 

expert knowledge, and embedding that knowledge in members 

of the profession.”26 This expertise includes how to maximize the 

effectiveness of the Army’s people. This also includes professional 

development and understanding academic fi elds relevant to Army 

training and education.

3. Moral-Ethical expertise. This expertise concerns the nature 

of professional moral duties—to members of the institution and to 

society. “The nature of the profession is such that only moral soldiers 

can discharge their professional duties, and the Army’s strategic 

leaders are morally obligated to the client to maintain a profession of 

both competence and character.”27 This includes the understanding 

of how to apply coercive force ethically and the ethics that govern 

the appropriate relationship of military professionals to society 

(civil-military relations). 

4. Political-Social expertise. “The Army profession serves its 

collective client, the American people, through interactions with 

the citizenry’s elected and appointed leaders and the nation’s other 

government agencies.”28 Army leaders require expertise to manage 
8

interaction between the Army and the broader defense community 

(public, industry, government). This includes the critical task of 

representing the profession to society and advising society on the 

use of the profession’s expertise.29

Table 1 provides an institutional perspective on the relevant 

elements of the profession’s expert knowledge. They are identifi ed 

by their applicability to the Army’s core expertise in the leadership of 

Army soldiers in organized application of coercive force, especially 

sustained land warfare, on behalf of society. This is the heartland of 

the Army’s abstract, expert knowledge to which all other expertise 

relates. The fi ve columns assist in classifying and prioritizing areas 

of Army relevant expertise. 

Ia. Army lead: Army has lead, if not unique, expertise. The 

ability to succeed in sustained land warfare is the core, indisputable 

responsibility of the Army. The Army cannot delegate this 

responsibility. Expertise in these areas differs from other military 

services by the relationship to sustained land warfare. 

Ib. Military unique: These are areas of expertise that encompass 

the Army and at least one other military service. This relates the 

unique expertise of the Army to the other American military services 

(joint operations) and American allies (combined operations) on 

behalf of American society. 

II. Army-Specifi c application (societal availability): Areas of 

expert knowledge that have counterparts within the broader society, 

however,withintheArmy,the applicationofthis expertise requiresan

important and unique adaptation. For example, medicine is a body 

of expert knowledge required by society as a whole. The Army has 

a requirement for adaptation, specialization and regulation of this 

expertise to the demands of Army operations—especially combat. 

The adaptation requires additional training or schooling. Regulating 

ethical application of such expertise justifi es integrating individual 

experts in these areas directly into the Army. 

III. General Application (needed internally). These are areas 

where society and military applications are the same. The key 

distinction is that the Army has routine or frequently recurring need 

of this expertise and of the individuals who can apply this knowledge 

for the Army’s interests. When extensive familiarity with the Army’s 

operations, norms, and values is important to the appropriate 
9

Military

Technical 

Expert

Knowledge

Human 

Development

Expert

Knowledge

Moral-Ethical

Expert

Knowledge

Political

Social Expert

Knowledge

Other

Expertise Applicability 

and priority

Character of

expertise

How Acquired

Developmental

responsibility

Certification

Leadership of Human

organizations in 

application of 

coercive force

Combat

Combat support

Joint opns

Combined opns

Admin/Logistics

Engineering/Science

Info Technology

Leadership

Human Behavior

Physical Fitness

Education

Combat Medicine

Family Medicine

Social Work

Ethical Standards

Character 

development

Legal

Soldier spirituality

Advice on behalf of

and representation of

the Profession

Political negotiation

Diplomacy (attaché)

Resource Acquisition

& Management

Basic Research

Ia. Army

Lead

Ib. Military

unique

II. Army specific

application

III. General

application

(needed

internally)

IV. General

application

(needed

externally)

Core Core Core support Acquired Borrowed

Army

Exclusive Military Exclusive Army and Society

Contract

IN

Contract

OUT

Army Military

Society with

Army

component

Society with

Army quality

control

Society

Army Military Army Society Army & 

Society

X

(sustained

land

warfare)

X

(general

warfare)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X X

X

X

X

Table 1. Map of the Army Profession’s Expert Knowledge.
10

exercise of such expertise on the Army’s behalf, individual experts in 

these areas may be developed among members of the profession. To 

the degree that such familiarity is less crucial, experts can be hired 

from civilian society to apply the expertise on behalf of the Army. 

The exercise of expertise in these areas often involves a combination 

of Army professionals and civilian experts. The Army professionals 

in these areas provide the valuable capacity to lead, conduct liaison, 

and translate an area of general expertise to Army purposes. NonArmy experts in these areas are contracted into the organization.

IV. General Applications (needed externally). The last column 

refl ects areas of expertise in society that may be borrowed and 

applied by non-Army professionals as needs arise and without the 

more demanding social and ethical controls created by integrating 

such practitioners directly into the Army. If expertise is available to 

be borrowed, there is no need to integrate it internally. Such experts 

can be contracted out. 

Other relevant aspects of expertise include where the expertise is 

applied, where it should be acquired, and how it is applied.

Where applied? If practitioners in an area of expertise must be 

readily available within combat zones, the Army has good reasons 

to exercise horizontal integration to include such expertise within the 

organization. In these cases, the expectation of operating in a violent 

environment is a key consideration (e.g., medics, chaplains, drivers, 

pilots). If the expertise doesn’t need to be applied in a combat zone, 

there may be no need for it inside the Army. 

Where acquired? Who controls the life cycle of expertise 

development and educational advancement? For Army lead/

dominant expertise, the Army should be responsible for the entire 

life cycle of expertise development and application. For expertise 

created elsewhere in society, but with specifi c Army applications, 

the Army is responsible for developing the capacity for Armyspecifi c aspects. For expertise with general applications in society, 

the Army should leave training and development to others but must 

ensure quality control in application to Army purposes. 

How applied? Is there a particular ethical or moral element 

peculiar to its Army application? This implies an important 

component of ethical control that differs from society more generally. 

A good example would be application of information technology as 
11

a form of warfare (to hurt, kill or disable others through effects on 

societal infrastructure or other public goods). 

Defi ning the Expert Knowledge of Individual Professionals.

The quality, maturity, experience, and intellectual development of 

Army leaders and Soldiers become even more critical in handling 

the broader range of simultaneous missions in this complex 

[future] operational environment.30

 U.S. Army Objective Force White Paper 2001

The previous section provided a framework for understanding 

the areas of expert knowledge required by the Army at an 

institutional level. The combination of numerous professionals with 

diverse paths of development and integration provide the aggregate 

pool of expertise to serve the profession. The next step is to suggest 

a map of the expertise of individual Army professionals. 

Future challenges will place high demands on new offi cers. 

Offi cers of the 21st Century must be fl exible, principled, 

and self-learning. These offi cers will be challenged to lead 

American soldiers and make complex decisions in complicated 

environments with little or no time. They will be part Harvard 

professor, part professional athlete, part Ambassador, and all 

disciplined warfi ghter. It will take each one of these attributes to 

be successful on the 21st Century battlefi eld.31

This is a tall order for each offi cer. The Army as a profession needs 

the expertise of professors, athletes, ambassadors, and warfi ghters. 

The degree to which each professional must possess all this expertise 

is an important consideration. This section suggests a framework 

to understand the appropriate relationship of the profession’s 

general requirements and the manner in which individuals develop 

expertise to meet the profession’s specifi c demands. It suggests a 

framework for professional expertise appropriate to both generalists 

and specialists. It recognizes that members of the profession cannot 

all be masters of every area of expert knowledge required by the 

Army as an institution. 

The Army seeks to create generalists familiar familiar with many or all of with many or all of 
12

the major aspects of the profession’s expertise and the appropriate 

use of such expertise in complementary, synergistic combination. 

These generalists are the core from which we obtain the strategic 

leaders of the profession. Complementing these generalists are 

the specialists who master areas of knowledge that support the areas of knowledge that support the 

Army’s success in its core expertise. Specialists serve the profession 

through high level expertise in a particular fi eld akin to the Harvard 

professors, professional athletes, and ambassadors. 

The ambiguous nature of the operational environment requires 

Army leaders who are self-aware and adaptive. Self-aware leaders 

understand their operational environment, can assess their own 

capabilities, determine their own strengths and weaknesses, 

and actively learn to overcome their weaknesses. Adaptive 

leaders must fi rst be self-aware—then have the additional ability 

to recognize change in their operating environment, identify 

those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new 

environment.32

The schools and assignment process must be designed to nurture 

these traits over time so that it creates the foundation of professional 

expertise at higher levels. Familiarity with the higher level concepts 

among junior members of the profession also ensures that they 

understand the context of decisions and guidance.

The relative demand for education versus training should 

increase as offi cers rise in rank and experience. Mastery of specifi c 

skills and tasks should give way to broader theoretical and 

conceptual training. This is a means to greater fl exibility, versatility, 

psychological maturity, and mental agility. This also corresponds to 

the higher levels of uncertainty and greater opportunities for choice 

that accompany promotion and commensurately higher professional 

responsibilities.

Precommissioning must address all elements of the Army’s 

expertise and jurisdiction as candidly as possible with rising offi cers. 

All offi cers should have the same foundations of professional ethics, 

understanding of offi cership, and the intellectual seasoning of a 

broad but balanced technical-scientifi c and humanities education. 

Core military programs and supporting academic programs are 

designed to work in tandem. The academic program provides a 
13

broad context for expertise appropriate to the Army profession. 

The core military program reinforces these elements with Army 

or military specifi c academic courses, practical experience, 

and rigorous training. Success in this comprehensive program 

permits the profession to certify that its new members have an 

acceptable foundation for a career of principled service to the 

nation. The functional imperatives of the profession require that its 

commissioned leaders have the mental agility to recognize problems 

and draw on a complex body of knowledge to suggest appropriate 

diagnoses, inferences and treatments. 

This program should be standardized across all commissioning 

sources. Large portions of the military program are already 

standardized.33 The academic requirements to support Army 

professional expertise are less consistent. A bachelor’s degree 

generally is considered suffi cient to meet professional academic 

qualifi cation from Reserve Offi cer Training Corps (ROTC) 

programs. For Offi cer Candidate School (OCS), a bachelor’s degree 

is not required before commissioning, but must be attained before 

attending the Captain’s Career Course.34 For ROTC and OCS, the 

specifi c components of the academic program are largely at the 

individual’s discretion.35 Precommissioning academic requirements 

should be better standardized to meet Army professional needs. 

The body of relevant knowledge that affects the Army’s ability 

to function effectively has increased dramatically over time. Masters 

of particular fi elds require specialization and long-term experience. 

Table 2 illustrates specialties currently identifi ed by the Army as 

they relate to the categories of Army expertise.

Table 2 depicts several important concepts. First, all Army 

professionals enter through the box in the lower left hand corner. 

That is the area representing the operational force (combat and 

combat support). Ultimately, the operational force will generate 

the aptly named general offi cers who will lead the profession. 

Medical, legal, and religious experts are acquired from their 

appropriate professional education systems. Additional orientation 

or training occurs to integrate these non-Army professionals into the 

institution. 

The arrows with their origins in the lower left box represent the 

OPMS III mid-career specialization tracks that draw on offi cers who 

have a strong professional foundation in the operational force. 
14

Area of Expert Knowledge (by Functional Area or Specialty Branch)

Military - Technical Human Development Ethical - Moral Political - Social

Major / Lieutenant Colonel / Colonel Lieutenant / Captain

OPMS

Career Field

Designation

(non-OPCF

specialization)

24 Telecommunications

system engineering

30 Information

Operations

34 Strategic

Intelligence

40 Space Operations

49 Operations

Research Systems

analysis

52 Nuclear Operations

53 Information Systems

Mgmt

57 Simulations

Operations

90 Multifunctional

Logistics

Basic Combat and

Combat support

Branches — OPCF

Medical Doctors

Psychiatrists

Dentists

Chaplains Corps

Judge Advocate

General's Corps

(JAG-Lawyers)

None

Medical Corps

43 Human Resource

Mgmt

47 Academy Professor Chaplains Corps

Judge Advocate

General Corps

39 Psyops/Civil Affairs

45 Comptroller

46 Public Affairs

48 Foreign Area

Officers

50 Force Mgmt

59 Strategic plans and

Policy

Lateral Entry from Civilian Life

ROTC

USMA

OCS

Medical Schools Law School,

Seminary

Table 2. Nonoperations Career Field (OPCF) Specialization.

Table 2 depicts the idea that there are specialists in the civilian 

world whose expertise can serve the Army’s needs. Specialties 

that are not unique to the Army lend themselves to lateral entry. 

Examples include civilian professors within the Army School 

system, public affairs experts, comptrollers, and systems analysts. 

The argument for including Army professionals with signifi cant 

combat and combat support experience in these specialties rests 

heavily on the degree that such experience is necessary to integrate 

this knowledge to the Army’s requirements. 
15

Map of Professional Expertise: Practical Implications and 

Applications.

The priority expertise of the Army profession is the human 

dimension of leadership. The Army is most importantly about its 

people and their ability to apply their skills in a potentially violent 

environment to serve American society. The abstract knowledge 

of leadership, particularly for combat, must dominate the Army’s 

professional essence. 

Knowledge of technology, military doctrine, human development, 

professional ethics, and political-social context supports the 

quintessential focus on the leadership of human organizations to 

achieve appropriate military effects. 

The focus of the Army profession on the leadership of soldiers in 

the organized application of coercive force suggests a few important 

ways to rethink the structure and composition of the offi cer corps.

Elimination of Combat Service Support Branches for Offi cer 

Accession.

These branches have no peculiar or unique skill related to 

leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive 

force. Instead, these skills can be provided through functional area 

specialization and civilian contracts at higher level. Within tactical 

units, combat service support task execution can be allocated to 

Warrant Offi cers and NCOs. Service support elements should be 

integrated into existing combat and combat support units where 

the commissioned offi cers provide the most important professional 

skill--leadership. Command and staff assignments should be 

allocated to combat and combat support offi cers. The practical 

result is the elimination of fi nance, adjutant general, quartermaster, 

transportation, and ordnance as offi cer accession branches. 

Realignment of Precommissioning System.

Precommissioning programs should better distinguish between 

offi cer candidates for operational force basic branches and candidates 

for special branches (medical, legal, chaplain, etc.).36 Operational 
16

force offi cers should have the same educational foundations. This 

should include common core military programs and common core 

academic requirements. Eligibility for accession to combat and 

combat support branches should require Army certifi ed completion 

of the military core program and a baccalaureate degree that 

includes Army-specifi ed elements. Additionally, Army sponsored 

programs (USMA, OCS, and ROTC scholarships) should require 

accession to basic branches (combat and combat arms). Transfer to 

special branches (medical, legal, religious) should be permitted only 

after an initial service obligation in basic branches has been met.37

Establish Stronger Qualitative Standards for Promotion and 

Advancement.

Initial certifi cation of professional competence should be 

augmented with periodic professional certifi cation for advancement. 

This is an important element in making sure that qualitative 

professional standards dominate. Providing aggregate numbers 

of personnel should be a subordinate objective. We know and 

can establish appropriate qualifi cations for a particular rank and 

responsibility. 

Psychological development models have recognized that certain 

stages of development are better suited for particular positions.38 To 

identify the appropriate position of a particular individual at a point 

in their life is diffi cult but not impossible. The ability to measure 

and code a person’s stage of psychological maturity would require 

substantially different evaluation tools, but it can be done. 

Similarly, we know the physiological demands to which 

individuals will be subjected in various assignments. A minimal 

level of fi tness for all soldiers makes sense in the same way the 

various physical disabilities and mental defi ciencies are bars to 

entry. We know the routine as well as the extraordinary demands 

of particular situations. We can tailor physical fi tness tests better to 

refl ect the needs of particular specialties. This can provide objective 

standards that transcend charges of political correctness. 

There is nothing that prevents us from establishing specialty 

related standards in physical fi tness, mental acuity, and 

psychological development. Additionally, testing should be 
17

designed to accommodate personal improvement and development. 

Similar to programs to improve current general test (GT) scores, we 

should design a system for improvement and reevaluation. If the 

standards for entering a particular specialty are meaningful, they 

must also be subject to revalidation. The requirements for offi cers 

should be particularly stringent. 

Career Management and Education.

Army leaders must ensure that professional values—not 

bureaucratic imperatives—drive the military education and 

assignment system. The two key elements of this structure are the 

Army’s professional military education (PME) system and the closely 

related assignment patterns that shape individual professionals. 

Senior military leaders are not laterally appointed from other 

sectors of society. They must enter at the lower ranks of the 

profession and advance within the boundaries of profession’s 

assignment, education and promotion system. Through this process 

of professional development, the services establish and reinforce 

concepts of professionalism to meet the diverse and shifting 

challenges of an uncertain era. 

This requires a professional development system that produces 

individuals to meet current and short run challenges and who can 

also adapt to uncertain future challenges. Such a system must place 

less emphasis on narrow technical skills that are perishable and 

greater emphasis on qualities of enduring value (physical, spiritual, 

and ethical). The system must seek to develop individuals with the 

capacity to learn and grow professionally throughout a lifetime 

of service to the nation. In an era of rapidly changing technology, 

mastery of particular weapons and equipment may provide only 

fl eeting benefi t. More important is the intellectual agility of leaders 

to understand the dynamics of change and to be able to readily adapt 

new capabilities to enduring requirements and old capabilities to 

new requirements. 

Defi ning the Army’s Professional Jurisdictions.

The Army operates in jurisdictions ultimately legitimized by the 

demands of society, represented by its civilian leaders. In a passive 
18

formulation, the Army is simply a loyal servant of society and 

does what it is asked to do. Superfi cially accurate and normatively 

supportable, this formulation overlooks an important responsibility 

for the profession to participate in clarifying appropriate jurisdictions 

in negotiation with its societal clients. The Army’s professional 

expertise and capabilities are fi nite. The Army is capable of 

performing duties unrelated to its core expertise and core mission. 

The costs of doing so must be measured against its ability to perform 

duties effectively for which it is uniquely designed and for which 

society is solely reliant upon the Army. Army leaders must be able 

to reconcile the jurisdictions within which the profession operates 

with the expertise and capacity it possesses. Civilian leaders have 

the fi nal decision; nonetheless, Army leaders should be clear about 

the nature of the Army’s appropriate role in specifi c jurisdictions. 

Expertise is developed for application within particular 

jurisdictions. If jurisdictions are no longer relevant to the client’s 

needs, a profession with expertise in that area may no longer be 

useful. If expertise to address problems in a jurisdiction can be found 

elsewhere, competition may eliminate the need for a profession’s 

particular body of abstract knowledge and, hence, lead to the 

profession’s death. 

The uncertainty and challenges of the present era provide an 

impetus for professional competition. Other military services, other 

government agencies and private organizations compete with 

the Army to address American society’s security concerns. Many 

responsibilities associated with the Army have been challenged and 

claimed by others. Moreover, laudable service in missions that have 

little to do with the use of coercive force blur public understanding 

of the Army’s core roles, thus making it easier to challenge other 

roles. Strategic leaders of the Army profession must recognize this 

dynamic, competitive context as they defi ne the appropriate role of 

the Army. 

The other military services challenge the Army’s role to 

dominate land combat with claims for battlespace dominance that 

blur distinctions of air, sea, and land domains. Even regarding 

land warfare, the rapid expeditionary use of Marines challenges 

central claims of the Army’s relevance and importance. Contracting 

for training of Army offi cers (within the ROTC program) and 
19

the training of foreign armies represent further competition in 

jurisdictions previously run by the Army. In a variety of MOOTW 

missions, Army efforts compete with international governmental 

and nongovernmental organizations.

The core of the Army’s map of expert knowledge is the 

development, operation, and leadership of a human organization 

whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on 

behalf of the American people incident to dominance in land 

warfare. The jurisdictions within which this expertise apply are 

conventional war, unconventional war, military operations other 

than war, and homeland security. This section briefl y analyzes each 

jurisdiction using a framework based on Abbott’s description of 

possible jurisdictional claim settlements.39

The most important settlement claim is for full and complete 

control of jurisdictions (FULL). Next are those jurisdictions that 

the Army shares with other American military services and allies 

(DIVIDED). The other three forms of settlement (intellectual, 

advisory, or subordinate) refl ect lower priority jurisdictions relative 

to the profession’s expertise. In descending order of priority, 

INTELLECTUAL jurisdiction is with “the dominant profession 

retaining only cognitive control of the jurisdiction, while allowing 

practical jurisdiction to be shared more widely.”40 Another settlement 

is to “allow one profession an ADVISORY control over certain 

aspects of the work.”41 Last is the concept of SUBORDINATION. In 

this settlement another profession (or professions) retains primary 

responsibility. The Army may have skills that are applicable and 

can therefore assist, but concedes control to other professions or 

agencies.42

The most important reason to have an Army is to support national 

security, and, in particular, to defend against armed forces—

irregular, uniformed, foreign, or domestic—that threaten the 

security of the nation and it citizens. But the Army’s utility and value 

has also been understood in a much broader context. “Essentially, 

the Army as a profession emerged to embrace any tasks levied by 

the American people that necessitated the deployment of trained, 

disciplined, manpower under austere conditions on behalf of the 

nation.”43 This broader conception of the Army’s utility beyond 

war accounts for the extensive involvement of the Army in nation-
20

Jurisdiction Settlement Claim

Conventional War

Land War FULL

Joint Warfare DIVIDED

Combined Warfare DIVIDED

Unconventional War

Low intensity confl ict/guerrilla warfare DIVIDED

Nuclear War ADVISORY

Military Operations Other Than War

Peace Enforcement (ground forces) FULL

Peacekeeping DIVIDED

Humanitarian Assistance SUBORDINATE

Disaster Relief/assistance SUBORDINATE

Military-to-Military contacts (with

 foreign ground forces)

FULL

Homeland Security 

 WMD response (chem, bio, nuke protection) INTELLECTUAL

 Law enforcement support SUBORDINATE

Table 3. Jurisdictions and Army Settlement Claims.

building tasks at home and abroad. This includes exploration of the 

continent (Lewis and Clark), development of vast civil engineering 

works, occupation and pacifi cation of North American territories 

(to include confl icts with native Americans), as well as occupation 

and administration of territories abroad (such as Mexico, Cuba, the 

Philippines, Germany, and Japan). 

The most important jurisdiction of the military professions is war. 

The war jurisdictions are led, if not monopolized, by the military 

services. Leadership of people in the organized use of coercive force 

on behalf of the state is the special expertise of military professionals. 
21

The increasingly intertwined effects of military operations on land, 

in the air, at sea, in space, and, according to many, in cyberspace, 

preclude clear distinctions between the domains of combat within 

which the military services specialize. The overlap and interplay 

of capabilities optimizes for air, sea, and land operations permit 

application in the jurisdiction of other services, albeit it with varied 

degrees of effi ciency. This situation makes interservice competition 

possible. This competition is a messy but ultimately very successful 

mechanism for identifying, debating, and deciding issues concerning 

society as a whole. 

The Army profession competes with the maritime profession 

(Navy and Marines) and the aerospace profession (Air Force) with 

respect to a variety of national objectives amenable to the use of 

force. The Army is not always suffi cient or even necessary to address 

all challenges. The Army and other military professions offer a 

menu of capabilities from which American society can choose. The 

perception of a particular profession’s utility is a function of the 

manner in which problems are defi ned, diagnosed, and suggested 

for treatment. 

To take a conventional war example, it is not necessarily clear 

in advance what strategy will prove most effective in compelling 

an enemy to do our will. Will naval blockade be suffi cient? Will 

air power alone be suffi cient? Will it be necessary to seize and 

hold portions of territory? Typically, all means that can contribute 

to success will be applied. The issue is to determine an effective 

combination. More broadly, effective diplomacy (the expertise 

of Foreign Service professionals) can obviate the need for any 

military action. If there are a variety of effective combinations and 

permutations, assessment of relative risk and cost effectiveness will 

infl uence choices. 

The manner in which competing professions defi ne the issue will 

be important. For war and preparation for war, there is not likely to 

be one correct answer. 

Military science is not normally so exact as to rule out all but 

one school of thought on the question of how battles are to be 

fought and wars won. As a result, military planners frequently 

fi nd themselves uncertain or divided regarding the kinds of 
22

preparations necessary to support the foreign policy purposes of 

the nation. There is, moreover, the additional complication that 

some purposes might alternatively be met through nonmilitary 

means, that is, through economic or diplomatic arrangements, 

or through the allocation of American resources to advance the 

military power of other nations.44

Each American military service differs in its dominant concept of 

war and the best means to carry it out.45 In an uncharitable light, these 

service specifi c diagnoses and suggested treatments are grounded 

in organizational self-interest. This does not, however, mean that 

the professionals advancing such arguments are unpatriotic or 

unreasonable. They are all trying to achieve success for society. The 

services and their strategic leaders are responsible for articulating 

the appropriate ways that service capabilities best serve societal 

needs. This competition is a healthy one that identifi es alternatives 

for national leaders. The services sustain or create capabilities 

through a variety of methods. The government does not have infi nite 

resources and must therefore constantly reevaluate trade-offs both 

across and within a variety of jurisdictions. There is nothing selfevident or exclusive about the claims the Army advances concerning 

appropriate national strategy and appropriate resource allocation. 

Strategic leaders of the Army profession must clearly articulate the 

relevance of the Army’s expertise to appropriate jurisdictions. 

Society aspires to attain policy goals in the most effective manner 

at the least possible cost. The lack of objective criteria to determine 

the relative value of one course of action or combination of means 

versus another simply suggests that there is value to the advice of 

various professions’ leaders to clarify the relevance and application 

of their profession’s expertise. 

For MOOTW, the unique tasks for which the military is wellsuited are those that require the use or possible use of coercive 

force. The Army should retain full jurisdiction for such missions. 

The Army is confi gured and trained to deter or defeat threats from 

organized military forces. 

With regard to peacekeeping, the Army has the capacity to deter 

or defeat paramilitary, unconventional, or guerrilla forces. Although 

duties may include actions similar to domestic policing activities, 

the situations are ones that could escalate to armed clashes. Where 
23

traditional peacekeepers or police might be rapidly overwhelmed, 

combat-organized Army forces provide overmatch capabilities and 

the potential for escalation dominance. 

With regard to peacekeeping missions, military-to-military 

contacts, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and other 

nonwarfi ghting missions, there is a strong case for the employment 

of the readily available and robust capabilities of the Army to 

undertake missions that other agencies of the U.S. Government or 

private organizations are unable to accomplish. For some missions, 

such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the issue is not 

unique Army capabilities, but rather the speed with which the Army 

can respond and the ability to undertake such tasks in an austere, 

remote, or unsecure environment. In these situations, the valuable 

Army capacity is rapid response. The capacity to support such 

missions is an inherent part of the Army’s warfi ghting ability. The 

Army is prepared for the exigencies of war to include destruction of 

parts of the organization in combat. Hence, military units are capable 

of rapidly providing infrastructure and support mechanisms. 

Professionally, however, these are not unique Army jurisdictions. 

The Army can apply its skills subordinate to civilian governmental 

and nongovernmental experts. These other experts should assume 

long-term responsibility for these tasks as soon as possible. 

Defi ning Appropriate Jurisdictions: Practical Implications 

and Applications.

The Army is expected to operate effectively on behalf of national 

security objectives within many jurisdictions. The Army must place 

the greatest emphasis on those for which it should have full and 

complete control—those relevant to leadership of Army soldiers 

in the organized application of coercive force. In particular, this 

includes all aspects of sustained land warfare (conventional and 

unconventional) as well as peacekeeping and peace enforcement 

missions where the potential for coercive force—if not its actual 

use—is required. These are the Army’s highest priority missions. The 

Army must articulate its relevant dominance of these jurisdictions 

and must seek to sustain its professional expertise as the lead 

proponent for effective performance in them. 
24

All other jurisdictions are secondary. The common element of 

these is the fungible utility of Army capabilities. Professionally, 

the Army does not possess unique expertise in these areas. Other 

professions or agencies possess the expertise to lead or manage 

operations. The Army may possess expertise or capabilities that can 

be applied—but at a substantial opportunity cost. 

Note that the relative priority of professional jurisdiction is an 

important distinction. There are certainly many tasks that Army 

units or Army individuals will be well-suited to perform in 

secondary jurisdictions that create minimal, if any, opportunity 

costs for the individuals or units involved. A more appropriate 

way to conceptualize this would be to note that Army capabilities 

may be borrowed (or lent) for application in jurisdictions outside 

the Army profession. Professionally, the Army’s role is advisory or 

subordinate within these jurisdictions, and Army strategic leaders 

should seek to avoid accepting responsibility for them. Army leaders 

should, however, maintain the expertise to manage effective liaison 

with those individuals or professions that do control or lead these 

jurisdictions (political-social expertise). 

Another way to look at it is that turf battles to defi ne and 

control primary jurisdictions are not only warranted but required. 

For secondary jurisdictions, such battles should not be joined. 

If conscripted to accept such secondary jurisdictions (a distinct 

possibility for a profession also defi ned by loyal service to society) 

professional leaders should actively seek appropriate ways to hand 

off, or spin-off, the jurisdiction. If there is no way to do this, strategic 

leaders must explore adaptations to the profession that may involve 

segmenting a portion of the profession to handle the new jurisdiction 

while shielding the rest (e.g., the creation of specifi c constabulary 

forces for peacekeeping in benign environments).46

To fi x problems with lack of clarity concerning appropriate 

jurisdictions, Army leaders must work with both the civilian 

policy leaders and with the junior members of the profession. With 

regard to these junior members, the Army’s strategic leaders must 

articulate the multifaceted demands for Army professionals. The 

Army’s strategic leaders must actively advise civilian leaders on 

how to defi ne and clarify service jurisdictions. They cannot afford 

to be passive and merely accept civilian preferences. “Can-do” 
25

acquiescence is a laudable trait when tasks are clear or decisions 

already made. It does not require silence in shaping decisions. At 

the other extreme, it is also unacceptable for military leaders to insist 

on controlling the defi nition of jurisdictions. Strategic leaders must 

draw on their experience and their vision for the profession to advise 

and negotiate with civilian leaders. 

Ultimately, military leaders are beholden to civilian leaders’ 

decisions about the Army’s jurisdiction. On one hand, Army leaders 

must ensure that the profession’s leaders and soldiers are aware of 

the tasks society may require. Continued emphasis on the “fi ght and 

win the nation’s wars” mantra must be imbedded in a larger context 

of service to the nation on behalf of national security objectives. War 

is only one, albeit the most important, professional jurisdiction. On 

the other hand, strategic leaders of the Army must advise civilian 

leaders on appropriate defi nition of the Army’s jurisdictions and 

the prospective costs of shifting jurisdictions capriciously. This 

is necessary to help maintain a consistent core identity for the 

members of the profession and to sustain the institution’s reliable 

performance. Army strategic leaders play a critical role negotiating 

the profession’s identity at the nexus of its internally understood 

identity and its responsiveness to society’s demands. 

OBSTACLES TO CHANGE 

Arguing with Success.

A signifi cant challenge to making changes in the Army profession 

is the fact that there is little or no evidence of Army failure in the most 

important measures of Army effectiveness. This is certainly a good 

thing. In combat, the Army has performed very well since the end 

of the Vietnam War. The most dramatic examples of Army successes 

are Operation DESERT STORM, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 

and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In operations other than war, to 

include Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, the Army has also 

performed superbly. 

Past success does not guarantee future performance. As General 

Douglas MacArthur put it, “We must hold our minds alert . . . The 

next war will be won in the future, not in the past.”47 The Army 
26

should not be content to rest on its laurels. The fact that the Army has 

yet to fail in a manner that requires change is a weak excuse for not 

making changes that can avert failure. Adversaries constantly seek 

to nullify or counter our capabilities. Changes in the international 

environment and technology pose daunting challenges. The Army 

must continually validate its choices against a healthy respect 

for the shadow of the future. Choices now severely constrain 

future capabilities. This is true with regard to choices of weapon 

systems and equipment. It is also true with regard to the nature of 

recruitment, training, and development that will grow the strategic 

leaders of tomorrow’s Army from the junior members of today’s 

profession. 

Overcoming Transaction Costs.

Many of the changes suggested in this monograph create high 

costs in the short run. In particular, changes contemplated for the 

professional development system will be very diffi cult. Even the most 

clearly justifi ed changes must seek to mitigate problems generated 

by personnel turmoil, career anxiety, and social disruption. In the 

wake of the Cold War, one of the most commonly cited problems 

for the downsized force was uncertainty and anxiety about the 

organization’s future and the effect on its members’ lives. 

Army strategic leaders must be able to articulate the value of 

changes that warrant the short-term disruptions. The short-term 

costs to individuals must be justifi ed in terms of the profession’s 

long-term effectiveness. 

The Army personnel system is a successful one that has done 

much to render predictable the patterns of an Army career. Paths 

to future responsibility and success are relatively well-defi ned. 

Senior offi cers successful at treading these paths often reinforce the 

patterns of their careers in their guidance and endorsement of junior 

offi cers. Similarly, particular school and training requirements 

have been incorporated into the pattern of assignments to assist 

in the appropriate assembly of professional skills and experience. 

Certainly much recommends this system as an appropriate response 

to the demands of running a large organization effi ciently. But the 

most important rationale for the personnel system is its effectiveness 
27

in supporting fundamental national defense. Bureaucratic structures 

cannot be allowed to dictate the principles of military effectiveness. 

Recommendations for Further Study. 

Additional study is necessary to refi ne the map of the profession’s 

expert knowledge and that of individual professionals. More work 

is needed to create the professional development pathways for 

individuals. The principles that led me to suggest boundaries of 

the Army’s expert knowledge may suggest different conclusions to 

others. Ultimately, specifi c decisions needed to operationalize this 

approach are the responsibility of the profession’s strategic leaders. 

This framework can serve is a useful point of departure for 

examination of subelements of the Army profession. Additional 

study and application by leaders of the current Army branches 

and functional areas would be useful to help defi ne the expert 

knowledge of branches and the jurisdictions within which they 

should appropriately operate. The focus of this monograph is at the 

Army’s institutional level. Greater defi nition will help us to better 

see how these principles apply to the specialties that comprise the 

profession. The future of the Infantry profession, Armor profession, 

Field Artillery profession, and other areas of Army expert knowledge 

would be useful adjuncts to this monograph. 

Although it contains broad implications for other members of 

the organization (warrant offi cers, noncommissioned offi cers, junior 

enlisted soldiers and civilians), this monograph does not provide 

detailed analysis or recommendations for the transformation of 

these members’ roles. This is an area for fruitful additional study.48

A key aspect of such an analysis would include the manner in which 

warrant offi cer and noncommissioned offi cer specialization might 

incorporate tasks formerly expected of commissioned offi cers that 

no longer require the application of abstract professional knowledge. 

Restructured warrant and enlisted occupational specialties may 

prove an appropriate mechanism for assimilation of such skills. 

It may also be appropriate to restructure such tasks as part of the 

Army’s civilian work force. 
28

Conclusion.

Army leaders must nurture a strong, healthy relationship between 

the Army and the society it serves. To do this effectively, they must 

think strategically about the future of the profession. Strategic leaders 

need a clear understanding of the nature of the Army’s expertise and 

the jurisdictions within which it can be usefully applied. Strategic 

leaders of the profession must negotiate jurisdictions with society’s 

civilian leaders from the fi rmest possible foundation derived from 

what Clausewitz called “the grammar of war.”49 Military advice not 

derived from professional expertise compromises the legitimacy of 

advice in other contexts. 

Positions based on either an overly narrow or an overly broad 

conception of the military’s professional expertise could 

ultimately have negative consequences. The input of military 

offi cers could come to be seen either as irrelevant to the needs of 

the policy-maker, or as having dubious professional credibility.50

Strategic leaders imperil the Army institution if they lose sight of 

the professional foundations of their role and allow themselves to be 

drawn into policy and other debates that exceed their professional 

expertise and experience. It is a fi ne line between Clausewitz’s wise 

counsel for offi cers to be sensitive to the political context within 

which they operate and actually stepping in to try to determine 

appropriate policy goals. The framework presented here can help 

draw that line more clearly. 

The security challenges of the future are complex, demanding, 

and uncertain. The territory may be diffi cult to negotiate, but many 

sound guidelines are available to map a successful course. The 

Army needs strategic leadership to determine the required expert 

knowledge for specifi c professional jurisdictions and to develop the 

individuals to apply this professional expertise appropriately. The 

Army’s strategic leaders must also negotiate to bound and prioritize 

the profession’s jurisdictions and expertise with the civilian leaders 

representing society. These efforts will more resolutely set the Army 

on a successful axis of advance to meet the nation’s future security 

challenges.
29

ENDNOTES

1. FM 1, The Army, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 14, 2001, 

p. 32.

2. Don. M. Snider and Gayle Watkins. eds., The Future of the Army Profession,

New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2002, p. 538.

3. Ibid., p. 543.

4. For a description of the training revolution of the 1970s, see Rodler F. Morris, 

Scott W. Lackey, George J. Mordica II, and J. Patrick Hughes, Initial Impressions 

Report: Changing the Army, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center History 

Offi ce, Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1994. Available from http://call.army.mil/

products/exfor/specrpt/sprptoc.htm, Internet, accessed May 25, 2002. 

5. “Executive Summary,” American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century, 

A Report of the CSIS International Security Program, Washington DC: The Center 

for Strategic and International Studies Press, February 2000, pp. xxii-xxiii.

6. American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century, and Army Training and 

Leader Development Panel, Offi cer Study: Report to The Army, May 2001, available 

at http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf, Internet, accessed November 1, , Internet, accessed November 1, 

2001; Joe LeBoeuf, “Three Case Studies on the Army’s Internal Jurisdictions, Case 

No. 3: The 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel,” Chapter 22, in 

Snider and Watkins, Future of the Army Profession, p. 487. 

7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge: Harvard 

University Press, 1957. 

8. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert 

Labor, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

9. Huntington, p. 7.

10. Ibid., p. 8. 

11. Ibid., p. 11.

12. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

13. This is signifi cantly different than the expectation of warrant offi cers, 

noncommissioned offi cers, and junior enlisted soldiers. In Huntington’s 

formulation, the difference between offi cers and other members of the force is that 

offi cers must be experts in the management of violence whereas other members of 
30

the organization (warrant offi cers, NCOs, junior enlisted soldier) must be expert in 

the application of violent means. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 11.

14. I acknowledge the help of Don Snider in crafting this wording for the 

nature of the Army profession’s core expertise. E-mail communication with the 

author, May 29, 2002.

15. Huntington, p. 83.

16. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 

p. 87.

17. Abbott, The System of Professions, p. 318.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 35.

20. Ibid., p. 20.

21. Ibid., pp. 69-71. 

22. In this study, commissioned offi cers refers to offi cers in the rank of 2nd 

lieutenant and above and does not include commissioned warrant offi cers. 

23. FM 1, p. 21.

24. Snider and Watkins, The Future of the Army Profession, p. 101.

25. Ibid., p. 438.

26. Ibid., p. 355.

27. Ibid., p. 291.

28. Ibid., p. 197. 

29. Huntington, p. 72.

30. U.S. Army, Concepts for the Objective Force, U.S. Army White Paper, 

undated, p. 3.

31. William J. Lennox, Jr., “The Supe’s Letter: A Soldier of the 21st Century,” 

Assembly, Vol. LX, No. 4, March/April 2002, p. 8.
31

32. FM 1, p. 12.

33. For a detailed list of the common core tasks for the OES system at the 

company grade and precommissioning level, see http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/

cal/LETDD/COMMON1.htm, Internet, accessed May 30, 2002. 

34. This happens after approximately 3 years of commissioned service. 

Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, Paragraph 4-16b, p. 19.

35. The AR does require that ROTC scholarship candidates have an approved 

major. However, the list of approved majors is extremely comprehensive and 

appears to suggest very little restriction on acceptable academic programs. The 

only specifi c requirement listed in the AR is for one semester of language. 

36. The special branches are the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (legal), 

Chaplain Corps (religious), and Medical Corps. Medical corps includes the 

following six sub-elements: medical corps, dental corps, veterinary corps, Army 

Medical Specialists, Army Nurse Corps, and Medical Service Corps. DA Pam 600-

3, Paragraph 8-2c, p. 31. 

37. Service obligations are as follows. Military Academy graduates are 

obligated for 8 years of service, 5 of which, at a minimum, must be served on active 

duty. ROTC scholarship recipients incur an 8-year service obligation, of which 4 

must be on active duty and the remaining 4-6 years in the reserves or National 

Guard (ROTC information from U.S. Army Cadet Command Headquarters, 

available from http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/scholarships/green/obligation.asp, 

Internet, accessed May 30, 2002.) OCS commissioned offi cers have a 3-year active 

duty service obligation. Date from Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-

100: Offi cer Active Duty Service Obligations, May 4, 2001, p. 5.

38. Forsythe, et al., in Snider and Watkins. 

39. The detailed discussion of claim settlements can be found in Abbott, pp. 

69-79.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., emphasis by author. 

42. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

43. Leonard Wong and Douglas V Johnson II, “Serving the American People: 

A Historical View of the Army Profession,” in Snider and Watkins, eds., The Future 

of the Army Profession, New York: McGraw-Hill Primus Custom Publishers, 2002, 

p. 62. 
32

44. Warner R. Schilling, “The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950,” in 

Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets, 1-266, New York: Columbia University Press, 

1962, p. 13.

45. For an excellent treatment of these differences, see Carl H. Builder, The 

Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, Baltimore: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, A RAND Corporation Research Study, 1989, especially 

chapter 5, pp. 57-66.

46. An historical example of this may have been those portions of the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers responsible for domestic duties such as river/fl ood 

management.

47. General Douglas MacArthur, as quoted by Lennox, p. 8.

48. As part of the Army Training and Leader Development panels, follow-on 

efforts to the offi cer study address warrant offi cers, noncommissioned offi cers, 

and Army civilians. The implications of this study could be used to modify the 

results of these other panels.

49. Clausewitz, p. 605.

50. Suzanne Neilson, “Rules of the Game? The Weinberger Doctrine and 

the American Use of Force,” in Snider and Watkins, eds., The Future of the Army 

Profession, New York: McGraw-Hill Primus Custom Publishers, 2002, p. 219.