2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-30-2002

USA v. Williams

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 01-3351

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PRECEDENTIAL 

 Filed July 30, 2002 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 01-3351 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v. 

SHAWN P. WILLIAMS, 

 Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Western District of Pennsylvania 

D.C. No.: 99-cr-00195 

District Judge: Honorable Robert J. Cindrich 

Argued: June 14, 2002 

Before: ROTH, RENDELL, ROSENN, Circuit Judges 

(Filed July 30, 2002) 

 Christopher A. Feliciani (Argued) 

 Berk, Whitehead, Kerr, Feliciani 

 & Turin 

 115 North Main Street 

 Greensburg, PA 15601 

 Counsel for Appellant 

 Bonnie R. Schlueter (Argued) 

 Office of United States Attorney 

 633 United States Post Office 

 & Courthouse 

 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

 Counsel for Appellee 

 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 

The common law felony of arson was a crime "against 

another’s habitation, not against another’s property but 

against his life and safety at his place of abode." State v. 

Midgeley, 105 A.2d 844, 845 (NJ 1954). Historically, the 

states prosecuted the crime of arson not only under 

common law but also under statutes that expanded its 

reach. With the passage of the Anti-Arson Act of 1982, Pub. 

L. 97-298, 96 Stat. 1319 (1982), Congress stated clearly 

"that federal authorities will henceforth share responsibility 

with state officials to investigate and prosecute arson 

crimes." United States v. Gelb, 700 F.2d 875, 879 (2nd Cir. 

1983). Specifically, Congress enacted legislation making it a 
federal crime to maliciously damage or destroy by fire any 

building used in interstate commerce or in any activity 

affecting interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. S 844(i).1 The 

primary issue raised on this appeal, one of first impression 

in this circuit, is whether the arson of a vacant building 

available for rent but not actually leased at the time of the 

fire sufficiently affects interstate commerce as to constitute 

a federal crime. 

A jury in the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Pennsylvania convicted Shawn Williams of 

malicious destruction of property by fire in violation of 

S 844(i), and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341. 

The District Court sentenced Williams to 60 months’ 

imprisonment followed by 60 months of supervised release 

on both counts, to run concurrently. The defendant timely 

appealed the judgment of conviction and sentence. We 

affirm.2 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. 18 U.S.C. S 844(i) provides: "Whoever maliciously damages or destroys 

. . . by means of fire . . . any building . . . used in interstate . . . 

commerce or in any activity affecting interstate . .. commerce shall be 

imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years." 

2. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 

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I. 

In the early morning hours of September 23, 1998, a 

street sweeper smelled and saw smoke rising from the roof 

of the former state unemployment office on West Otterman 

Street (Otterman building) in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. 

Eventually, the fire department brought the fire under 

control and a fire investigator concluded that the fire had 

been intentionally set. 

Police officer Paul Cyak found four fuel containers in the 

vacant Otterman building. One of the containers was a blue 

kerosene-type can with a Sheetz convenience store label 

with code numbers on it. The can had been delivered to 

Sheetz in New Stanton, Pennsylvania, late in the evening of 

September 22, 1998, and it was purchased at 1:32 a.m. on 

the morning of the fire. The New Stanton Sheetz store was 

located between Williams’s home and the Otterman 

building. 

Officer Cyak learned that in April 1998, Williams and Nat 

Lamolinara, his ex-business partner, acquired the building 

for $111,000. Williams and Lamolinara made a down 

payment of $11,000; Lhormer Realty held the remainder of 

the mortgage. 

From April 1998 until the September 1998 arson, 

Williams displayed a large banner on the front of the 

building advertising its availability for rent. He also 

advertised the property for rent in a local newspaper. 
During that period, Lamolinara had on several occasions 

shown the building to potential tenants. Thomas, at 

Williams’s behest, had also shown the building to 

Primestar-Excalibur (Primestar), a satellite television 

company with headquarters in Virginia. 

On September 22, 1998, the evening before the Otterman 

building burned down, Primestar and Williams had 

negotiated the terms of an agreement to lease the building. 

Later that evening, Williams faxed the proposed lease to 

Louis Busato, Primestar’s Northeast Regional Sales 

Manager, who then forwarded the lease to corporate 

headquarters. Upon corporate approval of the lease, it 

would have taken effect on September 25, 1998. During the 

weeks leading up to the arson, Primestar had stopped 

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looking for other buildings because its "heart was set on 

this place." Busato planned on moving employees into the 

building within two to four days of signing the lease. 

Although the purchase price for the building was 

$111,000, it was insured by Lebanon Mutual Insurance 

Company (Lebanon Mutual) for its replacement value at 

approximately $500,000. Lebanon Mutual settled Williams’s 

claim, paying $336,000 to Williams and Lhormer Realty, 

holder of the mortgage. Lebanon Mutual also paid Williams 

another $64,000 for the cost of removing the debris from 

the land. 

In due course, the Government charged Williams with 

and convicted him of malicious destruction of property by 

fire in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 844(i), and mail fraud in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341. 

II. 

Williams raises three issues on appeal: (1) there was 

insufficient evidence to satisfy S 844(i)’s affecting interstate 

commerce element; (2) the District Court’s jury instruction 

was plain error; and (3) Congress’s failure to provide a 

"safety valve" for first time offenders underS 844(i) violates 

the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s 

Due Process Clause. We now turn to the first issue and 

begin our discussion of the interstate commerce element of 

the offense. 

A property’s use in an activity affecting interstate 

commerce is an essential element of the crime of arson 

under 18 U.S.C. S 844(i). United States v. McGuire, 178 F.3d 

203, 205 (3d Cir. 1999). Like all elements of criminal 

offenses, the Government must prove the jurisdictional 

element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Williams argues 

that there was insufficient evidence to establish a sufficient 

connection between the Otterman building and interstate 

commerce.3 Because the jury convicted Williams, we review 

_________________________________________________________________ 
3. Williams frames the question in terms of federal subject matter 

jurisdiction. The District Court, however, properly exercised jurisdiction. 

United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he 

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the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government 

and will sustain the verdict unless a rational juror could 

not have found that the Government proved the affecting 

interstate commerce element beyond a reasonable doubt. 

United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). 

Williams asserts that the destruction by fire of a vacant 

building is "clearly a local activity" that is not the concern 

of the federal government. He, therefore, argues that 

according to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), 

for such local activity to become a concern for the federal 

government, the activity must substantially affect 

commerce and that a property advertised for rent does not 

substantially affect commerce. 

The federal arson statute, although it does not regulate 

commercial or economic activity, regulates the damage and 

destruction of business property that has the requisite 

interstate nexus. Lopez "did not purport to overrule cases 

upholding application of the Commerce Clause power to 

wholly intrastate activities satisfying the requisite nexus to 

interstate commerce." United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 

1238, 1245 (1st Cir. 1996). And, as the United States 

Supreme Court noted in Lopez, the statute there did not 

contain a jurisdictional element that "would ensure, 

through case-by-case inquiry, that the [crime] in question 

affects interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at 561. Here, 

however, the statute contains such an element. 

Accordingly, our analysis is governed by the Supreme 

Court’s opinion in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 

(2000), which specifically addressed this aspect ofS 844(i). 

_________________________________________________________________ 

‘jurisdictional element’ is merely one element of the criminal activity . . . 

and whether it is demonstrated in an individual circumstance does not 

affect a court’s constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case.") 

(internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 

505, 509 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[W]e join the other circuits which have 

concluded that S 844(i) remains constitutionally viable after Lopez."). 

Williams argues instead that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the 

interstate commerce element of the offense. Gaydos, 108 F.3d at 509 

("[Defendant’s] best argument is that the evidence was insufficient to 

satisfy the interstate commerce nexus necessary to support her 

conviction under S 844(i)."). 

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In Jones, the Court addressed the question of whether 

arson of an "owner-occupied private residence" falls within 

S 844(i)’s ambit. The Court held that arson of such a 

dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution underS 844(i). 

Id. at 850-51. The Court noted that it had previously held 
in Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), that 

S 844(i) applies to buildings used as rental property. Id. at 

853; Russell, 471 U.S. at 862 ("By its terms . . . the statute 

only applies to property that is ‘used’ in an‘activity’ that 

affects commerce. The rental of real estate is 

unquestionably such an activity."); accord Gaydos, 108 

F.3d at 509 ("Russell established that renting real estate is 

an activity that affects interstate commerce for purposes of 

S 844(i)."). The dispositive factor in Russell was the owner’s 

"renting his apartment building to tenants at the time he 

attempted to destroy it by fire." Jones, 529 U.S. at 853 

(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, it followed that 

the building was being used in an activity affecting 

commerce within the meaning of S 844(i). Id. 

The Jones Court contrasted Russell’s facts with Jones’s. 

The Court focused on S 844(i)’s use of the phrase "used in 

interstate or foreign commerce," finding that the key word 

is "used." Id. at 854. The Court stated that Congress did 

not define S 844(i)’s crime as arson of a building whose 

damage might affect interstate commerce, but rather 

"require[d] that the damaged or destroyed property must 

itself have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting 

commerce." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

Thus, the proper inquiry is an analysis of the "function of 

the building itself, and then a determination of whether 

that function affects interstate commerce." Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). The Court ruled that the word"used" 

is "most sensibly read to mean active employment for 

commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or 

past connection to commerce." Id. at 855. It held that 

private, owner-occupied residences are not used in 

activities affecting interstate commerce and that arson of 

such buildings therefore does not fall under S 844(i)’s reach. 

Id. at 856-58. 

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In the instant case, Williams focuses on the Supreme 

Court’s discussion regarding the word "used" and argues 

that, because the Otterman building had not been leased at 

the time of the fire,4 it was not, under Jones, being actively 

employed for commercial purposes. We reject this 

argument. Gaydos is instructive. 

Gaydos involved a defendant who argued that the house 

she burned down was not rental property because at the 

time of the arson it was vacant, uninhabitable, and she had 

no intention of renting it again. 108 F.3d at 507. We agreed 

with the defendant, holding that the trial record did not 

support a finding that the house at issue remained in or 

was intended to return to the stream of commerce. Id. at 

510. We first noted that the record demonstrated that all 

tenants had vacated the house and that the house was 

uninhabitable at the time of the arson. Id. We then stated 

that there was no evidence that the defendant had any 

intent to improve the living conditions in the building. Id. 
Finally, we found no evidence rebutting the defendant’s 

contention that the house had "been permanently removed 

from the rental market and had no prospect of generating 

any future rental revenue." Id. at 510-11. 

Although ruling in favor of the defendant, in dicta we 

stated that a temporary cessation of activity at a business 

property does not place the property beyond the reach of 

S 844(i). Id. at 509 ("This argument has been accepted by 

every Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue."); 

accord United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th Cir. 

1995) (holding property vacant and not rented for three 

months but still available for rent did not lose its 

commercial character by virtue of the temporary cessation 

_________________________________________________________________ 

4. At oral argument Williams repeatedly referred to the Otterman 

building as "abandoned." "Abandoned property" is defined by Black’s 

Law Dictionary as "[p]roperty that the owner voluntarily surrenders, 

relinquishes, or disclaims." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (7th ed. 1999). 

Williams actively sought to lease the building in the months before the 

arson. He did not -- voluntarily or otherwise-- surrender, relinquish, or 

disclaim his interest in the building. Therefore, the Otterman building 

was not an abandoned building, but was an unoccupied building 

available for rent. 

 7 

 

of activity). We thus interpreted the collective case law as 

suggesting that 

 once the business nature of the property at issue is 

 established, courts will presume, absent indicia of an 

 intention to permanently remove the property from the 

 stream of commerce, that the requisite nexus between 

 the property and interstate commerce is satisfied, 

 notwithstanding temporary changes or modifications in 

 the use of the property. 

Gaydos, 108 F.3d at 510. In contrasting Gaydos’s holding 

with other cases, we stated that 

 in each of th[o]se cases, however, there was a clear 

 intention that the property at issue either remain in, or 

 return to, the stream of commerce. . . . [T]he trial 

 records in th[o]se cases demonstrate that the particular 

 properties were treated by their owners as if they had 

 never left the stream of commerce. 

Id. 

Here, in contrast to Gaydos, a reasonable trier of the 

facts could have concluded that Williams intended the 

building, at the very least, to return to the stream of 

commerce. He actively pursued such a course. Evan 

Thomas, the building’s former owner, testified that, from 

April 1998 until the September 1998 arson, there was a 

sign in front of the Otterman building advertising office 

space for lease. Lamolinara, Williams’s ex-business partner, 
testified that there was a banner advertising space for 

lease, and an advertisement for the same in a local 

newspaper. Lamolinara also testified that he had shown the 

building "several times . . . to potential tenants." Thomas 

testified that he had, at Williams’s behest, shown the 

building to Primestar. 

Furthermore, Louis Busato, Primestar’s Northeast 

regional manager, testified that he and Williams had 

negotiated terms to lease the Otterman building. Indeed, 

the proposed lease had been drafted by Williams and faxed 

over the evening before the building burned down. The 

arson occurred on September 23, 1998; the lease was 

supposed to commence on September 25, 1998. Busato 

 8 

 

planned to move employees into the building within two to 

four days of signing the lease because conditions were so 

cramped at their present location. Primestar had even 

stopped looking for a building because its "heart was set on 

this place." Thus, Primestar relied on its belief that it would 

soon occupy the Otterman building and terminated its 

search for other rental space. It can be reasonably assumed 

that Primestar, a Virginia corporation negotiating to lease 

Pennsylvania property, had its interstate commercial 

activities disrupted when it learned of the destruction of the 

Otterman building. A rational trier of the facts could find 

that this satisfied the requisite interstate commerce nexus. 

On the other hand, Williams asserts that United States v. 

Ryan, 227 F.3d 1058 (8th Cir. 2000), supports his position. 

Ryan involved the arson of a permanently closed fitness 

center. The Court held that an earlier panel’s conclusions 

that the Fitness Center was (1) about to be placed on the 

market for sale, and (2) had the potential for commercial reentrance, did not satisfy the interstate commerce element of 

S 844(i). Id. at 1063-64. The Court noted that the property 

"was not formally listed for sale or rent at the time of the 

fire." Id. at 1060. This case is completely different. 

In contrast with the building in Ryan, Williams’s 

Otterman building was available for rent at the time of the 

fire; the lease execution was in the process of 

consummation. Moreover, the conclusion that the interstate 

commerce element is satisfied is not based merely on 

predictions of the building entering commerce or its 

potential for commercial re-entrance, but rather is based on 

the Otterman building’s actual entrance on the market: it 

had been available for rent for the six months preceding the 

arson. Ryan, therefore, is not on point. 

Williams’s argument ultimately hinges on an overly-literal 

and narrow definition of the word "used." As the 

Government points out, "[t]he logical extension of this 

would be a holding that federal jurisdiction does not attach 

at night, because the business employees are at home 

sleeping, and no one is actually putting the building itself 

to active use in interstate commerce." The District Court 
wisely noted the sophistry of Williams’s argument when it 

inquired: "[S]uppose the tenant signed the lease but doesn’t 

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move into the building next week? Would we say then it’s 

not actively in interstate commerce?" As Gaydos suggests, 

"once the business nature of the property at issue is 

established, courts will presume, absent indicia of an 

intention to permanently remove the property from the 

stream of commerce, that the requisite [interstate 

commerce] nexus" exists. 108 F.3d at 510. Here, the 

evidence of Williams’s leasing activities established the 

business nature of the Otterman building before its arson. 

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

trier of the facts to conclude that the interstate commerce 

nexus had been satisfied. 

III. 

Williams further argues that the District Court erred in 

its jury instructions. Because Williams did not raise the 

objection at trial, we reverse only if we find plain error. 

United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2001). 

The plain error standard is satisfied when the District 

Court’s error is obvious or clear and is deemed to have 

affected the substantial rights of the party. Id. at 261. An 

error affects the substantial rights of a party if it is 

prejudicial. Id. 

Under plain error review, the defendant bears the burden 

of establishing that the error prejudiced the jury’s verdict. 

Id. Even if the defendant establishes plain error, Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides this Court with 

discretion whether to correct the error.5 Id. We are not 

required to correct the error. Id. Instead, we reverse when 

the defendant is actually innocent or where, regardless of 

the defendant’s innocence, the error "seriously affect[s] the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

Williams asserts that the District Court committed plain 

error by instructing the jury to determine whether the 

_________________________________________________________________ 

5. The rule provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights 

may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 

court." 

 10 

 

property was used in "an activity affecting interstate 

commerce" rather than modifying "commerce" with the 

word "substantial" to track Lopez’s language. The 

instructions, however, must be looked at as a whole in 

order to determine whether the jury was apprised of the 

issues and applicable law. Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Int’l Ass’n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 

1991). 

The District Court instructed the jury as follows: 

 The word "commerce" refers to all of the various 

 types of economic relationships which may exist 

 between parties, such as buying, selling, bartering or 

 renting. . . . . 

 The phrase "interstate commerce" means commerce 

 which affects more states than one. . . . It also includes 

 activities wholly within a given state, but which ha[ve] 

 a substantial effect on commerce between or among 

 the states. 

 The phrase "used in interstate commerce or used in 

 an activity affecting interstate commerce" means active 

 employment for commercial purposes, and not merely 

 a passive, a passing, or a past connection to 

 commerce. 

 The determination of whether property is used in 

 interstate commerce or in an activity affecting 

 interstate commerce, should focus on the function of 

 the property and whether that function affects 

 interstate commerce. 

 In this case, you must make a determination as to 

 the function of the [Otterman] building . . . at the time 

 of the fire, and then you must make a determination of 

 whether that function affected interstate commerce. 

The Court’s instructions tracked S 844(i)’s language. 

Section 844(i)’s language refers to destroying a building 

used "in any activity affecting interstate or foreign 

commerce." Thus, the statutory language lacks Lopez’s 

"substantial" modifier, and speaks only of an activity 

affecting -- not necessarily substantially affecting -- 

interstate commerce. Indeed, the District Court started this 

 11 

 

part of its instruction by quoting the statutory language by 

referring to "[t]he phrase ‘used in interstate commerce or 

used in an activity affecting interstate commerce.’ " 

Therefore, in the subsequent instructions, the Court spoke 

of the jury’s responsibility, pursuant to S 844(i)’s statutory 

language, to determine whether "property is used in 

interstate commerce or in an activity affecting interstate 

commerce." 

Post-Lopez case law from the Supreme Court also speaks 

in terms of "affecting commerce," and not"substantially 

affecting commerce." In Jones, the Court noted that 

Congress required that the destroyed property have been 

used in an activity affecting commerce before such arson is 

covered under S 844(i). 529 U.S. at 854. It framed the 

inquiry as one aimed at determining whether the function 
of the building "affects interstate commerce." Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). Even in the post-Lopez environment, 

the Supreme Court did not interpolate "substantial" into 

S 844(i)’s language. 

Furthermore, it is doubtful that lay jurors comprehend 

the distinction between activities that affect interstate 

commerce and activities that substantially affect interstate 

commerce. Because S 844(i)’s affecting interstate commerce 

provision is an element of the criminal offense, a defendant 

is entitled to a jury determination of whether the element 

has been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. 

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000). As a matter of law, 

however, arson of an unoccupied building available for rent 

is sufficient to satisfy S 844(i)’s jurisdictional element. 

Therefore, the significant factual question put to the jury 

was whether the building was available for rent at the time 

of the arson. On appeal, Williams does not dispute that the 

building was available for rent. 

A District Court’s instruction tracking the exact language 

of a statute is not plain error, or indeed error at all. 

Moreover, even if it were error, there is no evidence 

establishing Williams’s innocence. 

IV. 

Finally, Williams argues that S 844(i) violates the Fifth 

Amendment’s equal protection component because it does 

 12 

 

not provide him with access to 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f). Section 

3553(f) is a safety valve provision that permits"less 

culpable defendants in drug-related crimes who fully assist 

the Government to avoid the application of the mandatory 

minimum sentence." United States v. Pratt, 87 F.3d 811, 

812-13 (6th Cir. 1996). Williams’s argument is devoid of 

merit. 

We apply rational basis review to Williams’s 

constitutional challenge. United States v. Hawkins, 811 

F.2d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1987). We will uphold the legislation 

if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate Government 

purpose. Id. Legislation is irrational if it creates a 

classification wholly irrelevant to achieving its objective. Id. 

Section 3553(f) provides a safety valve for some drug 

offenders, so that they can avoid draconian mandatory 

minimum sentences. There are five factors that must be 

satisfied before a drug offender has access to the safety 

valve. Assuming arguendo that S 3553(f) applies to federal 

arson, two of the conditional factors make Williams 

ineligible for the provision. First, the defendant must not 

have used violence in connection with the offense. 18 

U.S.C. S 3553(f)(2). Arson is, however, an inherently violent 

act, and Williams therefore cannot satisfy that condition. 

Second, the defendant must have "truthfully provided to 

the Government all information and evidence the defendant 
has concerning the offense." 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f)(5). Williams 

has yet to admit his culpability and has not provided the 

Government with any information relating to the offense. 

Thus, he cannot satisfy that condition. Accordingly, even 

assuming Williams’s eligibility for the safety valve, he does 

not satisfy two of the five prerequisites. 

However, Congress plainly had a rational basis for not 

providing a safety valve for federal arson. As the District 

Court held, providing a safety valve for nonviolent first-time 

drug offenders has a rational relationship to the legitimate 

Government goal of providing exceptions to draconian 

mandatory minimum sentences for such individuals. On 

the other hand, held the Court, it is entirely rational that 

Congress would not create such an exception for arson, 

"which is an extremely dangerous and violent offense," and 

by definition is excluded from the safety valve. The Court 

 13 

 

cogently continued: "Arson is not a nonviolent offense. For 

that reason, it seems to the Court clear that Congress saw 

a rational distinction between drug offenses carried out in 

some nonviolent way and crimes which by their very nature 

involve violence." 

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), which 

Williams cites, is of no avail and indeed even cuts against 

him. Skinner involved an Oklahoma practice of sterilizing 

habitual criminals. Id. at 536-37. The Court noted that the 

equal protection clause does not prevent legislatures from 

recognizing degrees of evil, and legislating accordingly. Id. 

at 540. A state need not ignore experience that marks a 

class of offenders or offenses for special treatment. Id. The 

Court, however, distinguished Skinner’s facts: "We are 

dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic 

civil rights of man." Id. at 541. Therefore, the Court held 

that strict scrutiny applied and invalidated the law. Id. at 

541-42. 

Williams’s equal protection challenge, in contrast to 

Skinner, does not concern a basic civil right; it is not 

subject to strict scrutiny, but to a rational basis review. 

Congress rationally could have concluded that it did not 

want to provide a safety valve for first-time violent 

offenders. Indeed, as noted earlier, even first-time drug 

offenders are not eligible for the safety valve if the crime 

involved violence. Congress’s decision to deny a safety valve 

for first-time violent offenders rationally relates to its 

legitimate interest in providing such a safety valve for firsttime non-violent drug offenders. Accordingly, the District 

Court did not err in ruling that S 844(i)’s lack of a safety 

valve does not violate the equal protection component of the 

Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 

V. 

In summary, the Government produced sufficient 

evidence to satisfy the interstate commerce element and 
convict Williams of violating S 844(i). Furthermore, the 

District Court committed no reversible error in its jury 

instruction or in holding that S 844(i) does not violate Fifth 

 14 

 

Amendment equal protection. Accordingly, the District 

Court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

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