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67–123 PDF 2012

S. Hrg. 112–403 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 — 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

A REPORT FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION CHAIRMEN—MARCH 30, 2011 

IS INTELLIGENCE REFORM WORKING?—PART I—MAY 12, 2011 

IS INTELLIGENCE REFORM WORKING?—PART II—MAY 19, 2011 

NEXT STEPS FOR SECURING RAIL AND TRANSIT—JUNE 22, 2011 

PREVENTING TERRORIST TRAVEL—JULY 13, 2011 

IMPROVING EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS—JULY 27, 2011 

SUCCESSFUL REFORMS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD AT THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY—SEPTEMBER 7, 2011 

ARE WE SAFER?—SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

A STATUS REPORT ON INFORMATION SHARING—OCTOBER 12, 2011 

PROTECTING AGAINST BIOLOGICAL THREATS—OCTOBER 18, 2011 

THE NEXT WAVE IN AVIATION SECURITY—NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 — 2011 

S. Hrg. 112–403 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 — 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

A REPORT FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION CHAIRMEN—MARCH 30, 2011 

IS INTELLIGENCE REFORM WORKING?—PART I—MAY 12, 2011 

IS INTELLIGENCE REFORM WORKING?—PART II—MAY 19, 2011 

NEXT STEPS FOR SECURING RAIL AND TRANSIT—JUNE 22, 2011 

PREVENTING TERRORIST TRAVEL—JULY 13, 2011 

IMPROVING EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS—JULY 27, 2011 

SUCCESSFUL REFORMS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD AT THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY—SEPTEMBER 7, 2011 

ARE WE SAFER?—SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

A STATUS REPORT ON INFORMATION SHARING—OCTOBER 12, 2011 

PROTECTING AGAINST BIOLOGICAL THREATS—OCTOBER 18, 2011 

THE NEXT WAVE IN AVIATION SECURITY—NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada * 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas ** 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BETH M. GROSSMAN, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Associate Staff Director and Chief Counsel for 

Homeland Security Preparedness and Response 

GORDON N. LEDERMAN, Associate Staff Director and Chief Counsel for 

National Security and Investigations 

CHRISTIAN J. BECKNER, Associate Staff Director for 

Homeland Security Prevention and Protection 

TROY H. CRIBB, Senior Counsel 

JEFFREY D. RATNER, Counsel 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Senior Professional Staff Member 

SEAMUS A. HUGHES, Professional Staff Member 

AARON M. FIROVED, Professional Staff Member 

ELYSE F. GREENWALD, Professional Staff Member 

ALFRED CUMMING, Senior Investigator 

ROBERT H. BRADLEY, Staff Assistant 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

MOLLY A. WILKINSON, Minority General Counsel 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Minority Director of Homeland Security Policy 

LUKE P. BELLOCCHI, Minority Counsel 

ERIC B. HEIGHBERGER, Minority Professional Staff Member 

JARED F. GOLDEN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

HEATHER E. RAITI, Minority Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT K. LEMASTERS, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

* Senator Ensign resigned on May 3, 2011. 

** Senator Moran joined the Committee on 

May 11, 2011. 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 4 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 6 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 18 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 20 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 359 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 361 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Thomas H. Kean, Former Chairman of the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ......................................................... 6 

Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Former Vice Chairman of the National Commission 

on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States .................................................... 9 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Kean, Hon. Thomas H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 364 

Hamilton, Hon. Lee H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 364 

APPENDIX 

Letter to the President of the United States, dated April 8, 2011, submitted 

for the Record by Senator Lieberman ................................................................ 387 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton ............................................................................ 389 

THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 31 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 32 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 395 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 398 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Jane Harman, Former Representative from California and Chair of 

the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 

Assessment ........................................................................................................... 34 

Hon. Michael V. Hayden, Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

and Former Director of the National Security Agency ..................................... 37 

John C. Gannon, Former Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central 

Intelligence Agency .............................................................................................. 40 

Page

IV 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Gannon, John C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 40 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 406 

Harman, Hon. Jane: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 400 

Hayden, Hon. Michael V.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 37 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 403 

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 59 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 60 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 69 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 71 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 412 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 414 

WITNESS 

Hon. Dennis C. Blair, Former Director of National Intelligence: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 61 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 416 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 83 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 85 

Senator Paul ..................................................................................................... 101 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 104 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 111 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 436 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 438 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 440 

WITNESSES 

Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 87 

Hon. Peter J. Boynton, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Emergency 

Management and Homeland Security ................................................................ 90 

Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., President, Center for National Policy ......................... 93 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Boynton, Hon. Peter J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 90 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 450 

Flynn, Ph.D., Stephen E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 93 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 454 

Pistole, Hon. John S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 87 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 442 

APPENDIX 

Brian Michael Jenkins, Director, National Transportation Security Center 

of Excellence, Mineta Transportation Institute, document submitted for 

the Record by Senator Lieberman ...................................................................... 462 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Pistole ......................................................................................................... 467 

Page

V 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from—Continued 

Mr. Boynton ...................................................................................................... 485 

Mr. Flynn .......................................................................................................... 491 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 117 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 120 

Senator Paul ..................................................................................................... 136 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 141 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 493 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 496 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................................ 122 

Hon. Janice L. Jacobs, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. 

Department of State ............................................................................................ 124 

Hon. David F. Heyman, Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 127 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Beers, Hon. Rand: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 122 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 499 

Heyman, Hon. David F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 127 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 530 

Jacobs, Hon. Janice L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 124 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 506 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Beers and Mr. Heyman ............................................................................. 542 

Ms. Jacobs ......................................................................................................... 568 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 151 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 154 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 170 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 594 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 597 

WITNESSES 

Gregory Schaffer, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ...................... 157 

Michael D. Varney, Statewide Interoperability Coordinator, Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection ................................... 159 

Robert P. McAleer, Director, Maine Emergency Management Agency ............... 161 

Charles H. Ramsey, Police Commissioner, Philadelphia Police Department ..... 164 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

McAleer, Robert P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 161 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 616 

Ramsey, Charles H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 164 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 627 

Page

VI 

Schaffer, Gregory: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 157 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 599 

Varney, Michael D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 159 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 611 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Schaffer ...................................................................................................... 630 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 179 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 181 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 193 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 195 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 197 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 641 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 644 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ......................................................................................................................... 183 

Hon. Eugene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Cathleen A. Berrick, 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office ......................................................................................................... 185 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Dodaro, Hon. Eugene L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 185 

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 660 

Lute, Hon. Jane Holl: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 183 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 647 

APPENDIX 

Report to Congressional Requesters titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11,’’ submitted by Mr. Dodaro .......................... 689 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Ms. Lute ............................................................................................................ 894 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 207 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 208 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 224 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 227 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 230 

Senator Moran .................................................................................................. 232 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 233 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 236 

Senator Paul ..................................................................................................... 238 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 241 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 912 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 914 

Senator Moran .................................................................................................. 917 

Page

VII 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security . 211 

Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 

Department of Justice ......................................................................................... 214 

Hon. Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence .............................................................. 216 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Mueller III, Hon. Robert S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 214 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 943 

Napolitano, Hon. Janet A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 211 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 918 

Olsen, Hon. Matthew G.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 216 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 955 

APPENDIX 

Anti-Defamation League, letter dated September 14, 2011, with an attachment ...................................................................................................................... 966 

Margaret Huang, Executive Director, Rights Working Group, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 981 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, a U.S. Senator from the State of West Virginia, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 994 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Secretary Napolitano ........................................................................................ 996 

Mr. Mueller ....................................................................................................... 1045 

Mr. Olsen ........................................................................................................... 1053 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 253 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 255 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1061 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1063 

WITNESSES 

Hon. John E. McLaughlin, Distinguished Practitioner-In-Residence, Paul H. 

Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University . 257 

Hon. Thomas E. McNamara, Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International 

Affairs, George Washington University ............................................................. 260 

Cathy L. Lanier, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department, District 

of Columbia ........................................................................................................... 262 

Ronald E. Brooks, Director, Northern California Regional Intelligence Center 264 

Jeffrey H. Smith, Partner, Arnold and Porter ...................................................... 267 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Brooks, Ronald E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 264 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1085 

Lanier, Cathy L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 262 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1078 

McLaughlin, Hon. John E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 257 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1065 

McNamara, Hon. Thomas E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 260 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1073 

Smith, Jeffrey H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 267 

Page

VIII 

Smith, Jeffrey H.—Continued 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1107 

APPENDIX 

Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, prepared statement ................................... 1115 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. McLaughlin ................................................................................................ 1134 

Mr. McNamara ................................................................................................. 1136 

Ms. Lanier ......................................................................................................... 1137 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 1139 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 1142 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 281 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 284 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 300 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1144 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1147 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Tara J. O’Toole, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 286 

Hon. Alexander G. Garza, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and Chief 

Medical Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................. 289 

Hon. Nicole Lurie, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services ...................................................... 291 

Vahid Majidi, Ph.D., Assistant Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice ............. 294 

Thomas V. Inglesby, M.D., Director and Chief Executive Officer, Center for 

Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center ...................................... 307 

Robert P. Kadlec, M.D., Former Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Senior Director for Biological Defense Policy ..................... 310 

Jeffrey Levi, Ph.D., Executive Director, Trust for America’s Health .................. 312 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Garza, Hon. Alexander G.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 289 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1161 

Inglesby, M.D., Thomas V.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 307 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1196 

Kadlec, M.D., Robert P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 310 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1205 

Levi, Ph.D., Jeffrey: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 312 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1213 

Lurie, Hon. Nicole: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 291 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1167 

Majidi, Ph.D., Vahid: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 294 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1186 

O’Toole, Hon. Tara J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 286 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1150 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Dr. Garza ........................................................................................................... 1219 

Page

IX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from—Continued 

Dr. Lurie ............................................................................................................ 1220 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

Opening statements: 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 323 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 329 

Senator Paul ..................................................................................................... 330 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 335 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 336 

Senator Moran .................................................................................................. 351 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 353 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 356 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1224 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1226 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 1228 

WITNESSES 

Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 325 

Roger J. Dow, President and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Travel Association . 340 

Kenneth J. Dunlap, Global Director, Security and Travel Facilitation, International Air Transport Association .................................................................... 343 

Charles M. Barclay, President, American Association of Airport Executives .... 345 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Barclay, Charles M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 345 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1285 

Dow, Roger J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 340 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1235 

Dunlap, Kenneth J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 343 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1278 

Pistole, Hon. John S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 325 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1230 

APPENDIX 

‘‘A Better Way,’’ a report submitted by Mr. Dow, U.S. Travel Association ........ 1241 

Gregory Principato, President, Airports Council International-North America, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 1292 

Donald Lee Moak, President, Air Line Pilots Association International, letter 

submitted for the Record ..................................................................................... 1297 

Nicholas E. Calio, President and CEO, Air Transport Association, letter submitted for the Record ........................................................................................... 1301 

Marcus W. Flagg, President, Federal Flight Deck Officers Association, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 1303 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Pistole ......................................................................................................... 1311 

Mr. Dow ............................................................................................................. 1332 

Mr. Dunlap ........................................................................................................ 1337 

Mr. Barclay ....................................................................................................... 1342 

Page

X 

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

9/11—September 11, 2001 

9/11 Commission—National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 

AAAE—American Association of Airport Executives 

AIT—Advanced Imaging Technology 

AOR—area of responsibility 

APEC—Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

APIS—Advance Passenger Information System 

AQ—al-Qaeda 

AQAP—al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

ASAC—Aviation Security Advisory Committee 

ASP—Advanced Spectroscopic Portal 

ASPR—Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response 

ATA—Air Transport Association of America 

ATF—Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

ATR—Automated Target Recognition 

BARDA—Biomedical Advanced Research Development Authority 

BASE—Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement 

BIDP—Border Interoperability Demonstration Project 

BRIDGES—Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance Sensitivity 

BSL—biosafety level 

BTRA—Biothreat Risk Assessment 

CAARS—Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System 

CBP—U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCTV—closed caption television 

CDC—Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CEO—Chief Executive Officer 

CIA—Central Intelligence Agency 

CINCPAC—Commander in Chief Pacific Command 

CIO—Chief Information Officer 

CIS—Citizenship and Immigration Services 

CLASS—Closed Loop Artillery Simulation System 

CMS—Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 

CNN—Cable News Network 

COML—Communications Unit Leader 

COMT—Communications Technician 

CRS—Congressional Research Service 

CTAB—Counterterrorism Advisory Board 

CTC—Counterterrorism Center 

CUI—Controlled Unclassified Information 

CVE—Countering Violent Extremism 

DARPA—Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DCA—Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 

DCI—Director of Central Intelligence 

DCIA—Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

DEA—Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS—U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

DNA—deoxyribonucleic acid 

DNA—Defense Nuclear Agency 

DNDO—Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

DNI—Director of National Intelligence 

Page

XI 

DOD—U.S. Department of Defense 

DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice 

DOT—U.S. Department of Transportation 

DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

ECPC—Emergency Communications Preparedness Center 

EMS—emergency medical services 

EO—Executive Order 

EOC—Emergency Operations Center 

EPA—Environmental Protection Agency 

ESTA—Electronic System for Travel Authorization 

ER—emergency room 

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration 

FAMS—Federal Air Marshal Service 

FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCC—Federal Communications Commission 

FDA—Food and Drug Administration 

FEMA—Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FISA—Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

FOUO—For official use only 

FTA—Federal Transit Administration 

GAO—U.S. Government Accountability Office 

GETS—Government Emergency Telecommunications Service 

Haz-Mat—hazardous material 

HHS—U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

HIDTA—High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 

HIG—High-Value Interrogation Group 

HIV/AIDS—human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 

HSDN—Homeland Secure Data Network 

HVAC—heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

HVE—homegrown violent extremist 

I&A—Intelligence and Analysis 

IAFIS—Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 

IATA—International Air Transport Association 

IC—intelligence community 

ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization 

ICD—International Classification of Diseases 

ICE—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ID—identification 

IDENT—Automated Biometrics Identification System 

IECGP—Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program 

IED—improvised explosive device 

IG—Inspector General 

IMF—International Monetary Fund 

INA—Immigration and Nationality Act 

IPAWS—Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 

IRTPA—Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

ISE—Information Sharing Environment 

IT—information technology 

ITACG—Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 

IWN—Intergrated Wireless Network 

JTTF—Joint Terrorism Task Force 

JSOC—Joint Special Operations Command 

LAPD—Los Angeles Police Department 

Page

XII 

LTTE—Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

LWIN—Louisiana Wireless Information Network 

MCCA—Major Cities Chiefs Association 

MOU—memorandum of understanding 

MPD—Metropolitan Police Department 

MSCOMMNET—Maine State Communications Network 

MTA—Metropolitan Transportation Authority 

Navy SEALS—Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams 

NBAF—National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility 

NBIC—National Biosurveillance Integration Center 

NBIS—National Biosurveillance Integration System 

NCIC—National Crime Information Center 

NCR—National Capital Region 

NCS—National Communications System 

NCSWIC—National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators 

NCTC—National Counterterrorism Center 

NECP—National Emergency Communications Plan 

NGA—National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NICS—National Instant Criminal Background Check System 

NID—National Intelligence Director 

NIEM—National Information Exchange Model 

NIH—National Institutes of Health 

NIST—National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NIP—National Intelligence Program 

NPPD—National Protection and Programs Directorate 

NSA—National Security Agency 

NSC—National Security Council 

NSI—National SAR Initiative 

NSSE—National Special Security Event 

NYPD—New York Police Department 

ODNI—Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

OEC—Office of Emergency Communications 

OHA—Office of Health Affairs 

OIG—Office of the Inspector General 

OIP—Office of Infrastructure Protection 

OMB—Office of Management and Budget 

OPCON—Operations Control 

OPM—Office of Personnel Management 

PAG—Policy Advisory Group 

PAHPA—Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 

PATRIOT Act—Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 

PD-DNI—Principal Deputy, Director of National Intelligence 

PDB—President’s Daily Brief 

PERF—Police Executive Research Forum 

PETN—pentaerythritol tetranitrate 

PHEMCE—Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise 

PNR—passenger name record 

PSA—Public Safety Alliance 

PSA—public service announcement 

PSI—Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

R&D—Research and Development 

Page

XIII 

RF—radio frequency 

RFP—request for proposal 

RSO—Regional Security Office 

S&T—Science and Technology Directorate 

SAFECOM—Emergency communications program of DHS 

SAR—suspicious activity reporting 

SENTRI—Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection 

SEVIS—Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 

SIV—Special Immigrant Visa 

SPECTRUM Act—Strengthening Public-Safety and Enhancing Communications Through 

Reform, Utilization, and Modernization Act 

SPP—Screening Partnership Program 

SWIC—Statewide Interoperability Coordinator 

TACON—tactical control 

TASC—Transformation and Systems Consolidation 

TEKS—Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills 

TIC—Tactical Interoperable Communications 

TIP—Terrorist Interdiction Program 

TSA—Transportation Security Administration 

TTIC—Terrorist Threat Integration Center 

TTP—Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban) 

TWIC—Transportation Worker Identification Credential 

UASI—Urban Areas Security Initiative 

UPMC—University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 

UPS—United Parcel Service of America, Inc. 

US-CERT—U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

USCIS—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

USDA—U.S. Department of Agriculture 

USDI—Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

USA PATRIOT Act—Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 

US-VISIT—U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

VA—Department of Veterans Affairs 

VHF—very high frequency 

VIPR—Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response 

VRVK—visa revoked 

VSP—Visa Security Program 

VSU—Video Security Unit 

WHO—World Health Organization 

WIN—Wireless Interoperable Network 

WMD—weapons of mass destruction 

(1) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: A REPORT FROM THE 

9/11 COMMISSION CHAIRMEN 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011 

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Collins, and 

McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. Thank you all for being 

here. 

The attacks on America by Islamist terrorists on 9/11 took place 

almost a decade ago, but the memories of that day are still searing. 

The attacks ended thousands of lives, changed families forever, and 

forced our country into another worldwide war. 

We all remember that morning, and I know we will until the moment we leave Earth. The Nation watched on television as those 

extraordinary mighty twin towers of the World Trade Center collapsed into a pile of smoking rubble, taking so many innocent lives 

with them. 

American Airlines Flight 77 smashed into the Pentagon and set 

it ablaze. And in the fields near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, we saw 

the smoldering crash of United Flight 93, whose brave passengers 

had fought to retake the plane from the terrorists who had targeted Washington, DC—probably targeted this very place where we 

are, Capitol Hill—and by their heroism saved hundreds if not thousands of additional lives. 

But even as we mourned—and we did—we began to ask—and 

when I say ‘‘we,’’ I mean not just those of us privileged to serve 

here, but people throughout the country and particularly the families of those who were lost on 9/11—how those attacks could have 

happened and what could we do to make sure to the best of our 

ability that nothing like that ever happened again. And so we created the 9/11 Commission to investigate what did happen on 9/11. 

What were the flaws in our homeland security and what could we 

do to protect our Nation against another such attack from Islamist 

terrorists or anyone else who would want to carry out such a 

dreadful act? 

2 

Coming to the leadership of that Commission were two extraordinary Americans—gifted, able, and extremely patriotic—Governor 

Tom Kean and Congressman Lee Hamilton. We are really privileged to have them with us as our witnesses today. 

The Commission they led and its staff reviewed 2.5 million pages 

of documents, interviewed 1,200 individuals in 12 countries—including every relevant senior official of both the Clinton and Bush 

Administrations—and held 19 days of public hearings across the 

country with 160 witnesses testifying. 

The Commission’s recommendations were sweeping and they 

were definitive. They were not just general conclusions, but they 

were specific recommendations for both immediate actions we needed to take to defend ourselves against further attack, but also longterm actions we could take to blunt the terrorists’ message and dry 

up their recruitment. 

In response to the Commission’s recommendations, this Committee authored—and I am honored to see that not only Senator 

Collins is here but also Senator McCain, three of the four original 

sponsors of the legislation—the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 that adopted not all but most of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, including the creation of a 

Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center, which I thought, and I believe the Commission 

thought, were the two most substantial and significant recommendations for change it was making. 

That Act was the most sweeping reform of our government’s intelligence apparatus and, together with the adoption of the Homeland Security Act a couple years before, represented the most significant changes in our governmental framework since the end of 

World War II. 

This Committee was privileged to be deeply involved in drafting 

these and other pieces of counterterrorism legislation to implement 

the Commission’s recommendations and further strengthen our security against terrorism. 

But a lot of the hard work in identifying, recommending, and 

then adopting the specific reforms was done by the two gentlemen 

who are testifying before us today: Then the Chairman and Vice 

Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, now the co-chairmen of its successor, the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group. I thank Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton for being here 

today, for their hard work and dedication to public service throughout their lives, and for providing our Nation with a most compelling reminder of how much we can accomplish in public life when 

we put party labels aside and work together for the national good. 

Today, in the exercise of our Committee’s responsibility to constantly evaluate and investigate our homeland defenses, and also 

mindful of the approaching 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, 

we are beginning a series of oversight hearings on all that we attempted to accomplish after 9/11. Today we are very privileged to 

have Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton here to help us 

begin our review with their opinion of the state of America’s homeland security. We have already scheduled four more subject matter 

hearings for May, June, and July that will look, among other 

things, at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the efVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
3 

fectiveness of our aviation security reforms, what we have done to 

try to keep terrorists out of the United States, and how we are progressing on the goal that we all said we had to improve, which is 

emergency communications among law enforcement and associated 

personnel. 

I want to say how grateful I am for the prepared testimony that 

the two of you have submitted to the Committee, which will be included in full in the record. You have touched on some of the concerns that the Committee has and will deal with in coming hearings. One of the most significant is with regard to the Director of 

National Intelligence and how that office has done and whether it 

needs further support to help it achieve the goals that you had for 

it. Personally, I believe it is essential to have a strong Director of 

National Intelligence who can marshall the full capabilities of the 

intelligence community. 

I am encouraged by some of the recent changes that the current 

DNI, General James Clapper, has carried out toward further integration, but I must say I am also concerned about some of the continuing bureaucratic resistance from other components of the intelligence community, which, under our vision and I believe yours, 

were supposed to be under the supervision of the DNI. I know from 

your testimony that you both share some of those concerns, and I 

am interested in hearing your comments on those. 

I note with appreciation that you have also talked about the importance of moving more rapidly toward better interoperable communication systems and that one of your recommendations is that 

we set aside the so-called D Block of the broadband spectrum for 

funding those public safety improvements. Senator McCain and I 

sponsored legislation to accomplish that in the last session, and we 

are working to introduce a similar bill in this session. 

So to summarize an awful lot very briefly, I would say that since 

the 9/11 Commission reforms were adopted, we have seen a very 

significant improvement in our homeland security. We have had 

many victories in our battles with terrorists, many plots broken 

and attacks planned against America thwarted. We have also had 

some close calls such as the case of the Christmas Day bomber and 

the other case of the Times Square bomber. And we have had some 

tragic failures like the homegrown radical Islamist Major Nidal 

Hasan who murdered 13 Americans at Fort Hood. 

So we want to continue to learn from our successes and our failures, and that is the intention of this series of hearings that we 

are beginning today. 

May I say finally that we are very proud and grateful to be 

joined this morning by some family members of 9/11 victims who 

went on to become leading advocates for the creation of the 9/11 

Commission and the implementation of its recommendations and 

have continued to play a wonderful oversight role in that work. 

Mary Fetchet and Carie Lemack are two of the most likable pests 

we have around Capitol Hill. [Laughter.] 

Really, I would say lovable and committed. The Commission 

would not have been created without their advocacy. We would not 

have passed its legislative recommendations without their most effective lobbying. And its implementation would not be as good as 

all of us want it to be if they had not stayed on duty as they have. 

4 

So I cannot thank you enough. I know I speak for everybody on the 

Committee when I express my gratitude and admiration for your 

personal strength, your skill, and your continuing commitment to 

America’s homeland security. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This year, we will commemorate the worst attack ever on the 

United States. In doing so, we must ask ourselves, ‘‘Are we safer?’’ 

Or are we just safer from the tactics that terrorists already have 

tried? 

Is our intelligence community better at fitting together these 

complex puzzle pieces? Or have we just been lucky? Are we anticipating the next threat, such as a cyber attack or the use of poisons? Or are we just looking backward, reacting to previous plots? 

Undoubtedly, compared to where we were on September 10, 

2001, we have greatly improved the framework for information 

sharing among our intelligence and law enforcement agencies. But 

sometimes it has been an inept bomb maker or a faulty fuse that 

has spared American lives. 

Once again, the two extraordinary leaders of the landmark 9/11 

Commission, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Kean, are appearing before our 

Committee as we evaluate our progress in securing our Nation. In 

September of last year, their ‘‘Assessing the Terrorist Threat’’ report warned of an increasingly wide range of U.S.-based militants 

who do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile. 

The American melting pot, the report said, ‘‘has not provided a 

firewall against the radicalization and recruitment of American 

citizens and residents, though it has arguably lulled us into a sense 

of complacency that homegrown terrorism could not happen in the 

United States.’’ 

This report correctly called 2009 a watershed year in U.S.-based 

terrorist plots, with 43 American citizens or residents aligned with 

violent Islamist extremists charged or convicted of terrorist crimes 

in that year alone. 

This Committee first sounded the alarm about home-based terrorism 5 years ago and has held 15 hearings on this topic. We 

found that individuals within our country, in both our prison system and our communities, are being inspired by al-Qaeda’s violent 

ideology to plan and execute attacks, often acting as ‘‘lone wolves’’ 

without direct orders or ties to al-Qaeda. 

As Senator Lieberman has indicated, the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which we authored, did much to 

improve the management and performance of our intelligence, 

homeland security, and law enforcement agencies. This most 

sweeping reform of our Nation’s intelligence community since just 

after World War II would not have happened without the leadership of our witnesses and the advocacy of the families of the victims. The resulting increased collaboration and information sharing 

have helped our Nation prevent numerous attacks. 

There have been untold successes. In many cases, the intelligence community and law enforcement have quietly connected the 

5 

dots and thwarted plots. In other cases, alert citizens have reported 

suspicious behavior to the authorities just in time. 

Challenges still remain, however. We continue to see troubling 

examples of the pre-9/11 stovepiped mindset from some of our intelligence and law enforcement officers. For example, as documented 

in our Committee’s recent report on the Fort Hood attack, the 

Army and the FBI collectively had ample information to have detected Major Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism, 

but they failed to act on the many red flags signaling that he had 

become a potential threat. 

Major Hasan and others seem to find motivation and ideas online. Technology is transforming our culture, our economy, and our 

world in many beneficial ways. Yet we must also be alert to the 

fact that terrorists are seeking to exploit the Internet’s potential as 

well. We have recently witnessed that the Internet can serve as a 

platform for extremist propaganda on the one hand and peaceful 

revolution on the other. 

Other Commission recommendations have not yet come to fruition, and, of course, the most obvious example of that is Congress’ 

failure to reform itself. But there are others as well. We must make 

more progress, as the Chairman has indicated, in enhancing first 

responder communications. 

Gaps also remain at our borders and in our cargo inspection systems. As the news today indicates, the potential to plant an explosive somewhere within the millions of pieces of air cargo shipped 

around the world each day is a real vulnerability. 

It is also troubling that the Border Patrol does not have the ability to detect illegal activity across approximately three-quarters of 

the Northern Border. DHS must continue to work to find a balance 

that opens our border to our friends while closing it to those who 

would do us harm. 

Nevertheless, there have been real accomplishments: The biometric system for screening foreign nationals seeking to enter the 

United States, the creation of a consolidated terrorist watchlist, 

and the dedicated DHS and State and local law enforcement employees all deserve recognition. 

But even in these areas of progress, improvements are needed. 

Biometric screening must be expanded to include foreign nationals 

leaving the United States. Screening technology must be improved 

to keep up with changing threats and to ensure that the safest possible screening equipment is deployed. 

I hope that this year we can expand protection against lawsuits 

for citizens who report suspicious behavior indicating potential terrorist activity. We must also pass legislation to ensure that key 

U.S. intelligence officials are consulted following a foreign terrorist’s detention in the United States. That did not happen in the 

case of Abdulmutallab. 

And, finally, I continue to have deep concerns that this Administration refuses to acknowledge that violent Islamist extremism is 

the ideology that fuels such attacks. The Administration should 

have an overarching national strategy to counter this growing 

threat within our own country. 

Ten years ago, nearly 3,000 lives were lost on that terrible day. 

We cannot become complacent or let our guard down when every 

6 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton appears in the Appendix on 

page 364. 

single intelligence briefing that I have ever attended always warns 

that the enemy remains determined to attack our country. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins, 

for that excellent statement. Normally we limit opening statements 

to the Chairman and the Ranking Member on the Committee, but 

Senator McCain was, as you two know, the original sponsor of the 

legislation that created the 9/11 Commission, so, Senator McCain, 

I would invite you to make an opening statement if you would like. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. I would just briefly like to thank our witnesses. 

I think what they did was one of the reasons why this country has 

not been attacked since 9/11. They are two dedicated public servants, an example of bipartisanship, and I think it is very appropriate that on the 10-year anniversary, we get their continued 

input. Thank you again for your service to the country. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Before we go to the witnesses, I just want to briefly introduce 

Charles Dowd, Deputy Chief of the New York Police Department 

for Communications. He has been a very strong proponent of allocating the D Block to public safety, and we appreciate the fact that 

he is committed enough to this that he is here in the room today. 

Governor Kean, welcome, and we look forward to your testimony 

now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS H. KEAN,1 FORMER CHAIRMAN 

OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 

UPON THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Collins. We are very pleased to have the opportunity to be here 

with you once again today. Nobody has been more important than 

you all have been at the center of defending this country from the 

terrorist threat that we face. We are deeply grateful for your sustained support of our 9/11 Commission recommendations and your 

leadership in continuing to reform our national security institutions. Over the last decade, you have done much to ensure that we 

are taking the difficult steps necessary to confront this determined 

enemy and protect Americans, our allies, and, for that matter, people throughout the world. 

Today, we are appearing in our capacity as co-chairmen of the 

Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group. 

That is the successor organization to the 9/11 Commission. Drawing on a strong roster of national security professionals, we work 

as an independent, bipartisan group to monitor the implementation 

of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and to address other 

emerging national security issues. 

Let me begin by describing the changes in our government since 

9/11, the current threat, and perhaps updating you on some of our 

Commission’s recommendations. Lee Hamilton will then continue 

7 

assessing the status of the implementation of a number of these 

recommendations. 

So now nearly 10 years after the tragic 9/11 attacks and 7 years 

since we finished our report, it really is, as the Committee has decided, a very appropriate time to see just where we are in national 

security reform and how we are doing. 

The terrorist attacks, as everybody knows, had a profoundly dramatic impact on our government, on the private sector, and, for 

that matter, on our daily lives. The suddenness of that attack on 

American soil and the loss of so many lives I think made a lot of 

us feel vulnerable in our homes and caused us to question whether 

or not our government was properly organized to protect us from 

this kind of lethal threat. The economic damage resulting from the 

attacks was severe. Businesses in all sectors have adapted in one 

way or another to this new reality. 

Over the past 10 years, our government’s response to the challenge of transnational terrorism has been equally dramatic. We 

have created major new institutions—the Department of Homeland 

Security, Cyber Command, and in 2004, with the leadership of Senator Collins and Lieberman, Congress created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism 

Center to make sure we had a unity of effort in the intelligence 

community. 

Now, despite all this progress, some major 9/11 Commission recommendations still remain unfulfilled, and we would suggest today 

that these require urgent action because the threat from al-Qaeda, 

related terrorist groups, and individual adherents to violent 

Islamist extremism persists to this day. 

Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups continue to pose a serious 

threat to all of us. Al-Qaeda Central has been diminished, but its 

leadership, Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, as we know, are 

still at large. Although a devastating 9/11-type attack we believe is 

less likely, the threat is more complex and diverse than at any time 

in the last decade. Al-Qaeda and its allies continue to have the intent and the reach to kill dozens or even hundreds of Americans 

in a single attack. There is a high risk of attacks, but we believe 

that they will likely be smaller. 

A key change in recent years is the increasingly prominent role 

that a number of U.S. citizens and residents have taken in the 

leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups. 

Another development is the increasing diversification of the types 

of U.S.-based jihadist militants. Some are individuals inspired to 

engage in attacks on their own while others have been actively recruited by overseas terrorist groups. Indeed, these would-be 

jihadists do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or 

social profile. The operations they mount, or attempt, range from 

shootings, to car bombs, to suicide attacks, to in-flight bombings of 

passenger aircraft. 

We have seen a pattern of increasing terrorist recruitment of 

American citizens. In 2009, there were two actual terrorist attacks 

on our soil. You referenced the Fort Hood shooting, which claimed 

the lives of 13 people, and one U.S. military recruiter was killed, 

another wounded, in Little Rock, Arkansas. Many counterterrorism 

8 

experts talk about 2010 and name it the ‘‘year of the homegrown 

terrorist.’’ Self-radicalization is an alarming development. 

Our group issued a report, as you have mentioned, last fall on 

radicalization, and we are going to follow up this spring with a set 

of recommendations for dealing with this important and very sensitive problem. 

We also face new threats, like the discovery in October 2010 of 

explosives packed in toner cartridges, addressed to synagogues in 

Chicago, and shipped on FedEx and UPS cargo flights from Yemen. 

The cyber threat is also increasingly severe and poses a real danger to our critical infrastructure. Defending the United States 

against such attacks must be an urgent priority. 

So we would like to offer our assessment today of where the government is in implementing 9/11 Commission recommendations. 

On emergency preparedness, we have made some progress toward establishing a unity of command—in other words, one person 

responsible for coordinating efforts in a disaster. But having said 

that, our recommendations are still a long way from being fully implemented. We have found too many community leaders and first 

responders who have mentioned to us that many metropolitan 

areas still have not solved the problem of having a unified command structure. Moreover, it is unacceptable that the government 

still has not allocated the additional 10 megahertz of radio spectrum, the D Block that you mentioned, to public safety so that our 

first responders can communicate with each other in a disaster. 

Now, I recognize the efforts and the leadership that you have 

shown through your bill. I believe the President supports such a 

recommendation, and Congress needs to act. 

There have been improvements in transportation security, but 

technology still lags in screening passengers for weapons concealed 

in their bodies and for detecting explosives contained in bags. The 

GAO continues to find holes in virtually every single security layer 

that we establish. 

Border security remains a top national security priority as terrorists continue to exploit our border vulnerabilities to gain entry into 

the United States. Several attempted attacks over the past 2 years 

were perpetrated by terrorists who could have been detected by the 

U.S. immigration system. We require a more streamlined terrorist 

watchlisting capability and better sharing of information between 

intelligence agencies and immigration authorities. 

One area of progress is the deployment of the biometric entry 

system known as US-VISIT. We still lack, however, any comprehensive exit system. We do not know, in other words, when people leave the country. The Commission recommends that the government standardize secure identification and the Federal Government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and 

driver’s licenses. 

The REAL ID Act established these standards by statute. About 

one-third of the States have complied with this first-tier benchmark. The deadlines for compliance have been pushed back now 

twice. Delay in compliance creates real vulnerability and makes us 

less safe. We would ask that no further delays should be authorized. 

9 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton appears in the Appendix on 

page 364. 

Now I will ask my friend and partner, a man I admire as much 

as anybody in this country, Lee Hamilton, to continue. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON,1 FORMER VICE 

CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 

ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Kean. Good morning. 

I want to begin simply by endorsing what Mr. Kean has said 

with regard to the leadership not only of this Committee but specifically of the three Senators in front of me. I can remember coming to your offices shortly after the 9/11 Commission report was 

made. Mr. Kean and I spoke to each one of you. You were very 

courteous and receptive. But beyond that, you acted with genuine 

political leadership, and the country is very grateful to you. 

I think there are a lot of reasons why the 9/11 Commission had 

a favorable response, but two of them: First, the families who gave 

sustained, sophisticated support for our recommendations; second, 

specifically the political leadership embodied by the three of you 

was just really quite extraordinary. And Mr. Kean and I are very 

grateful to you for what you have done. And when the Chairman 

a moment ago outlined your continuing hearings and investigations, I was immensely pleased to hear that because I think having 

been on the inside and on the outside, you have powers that we do 

not have in terms of getting people before you to provide tough 

oversight, and that continuing effort by this Committee is just 

hugely important because, as we will say often this morning, so 

much more needs to be done. 

With respect to intelligence reform, the DNI has made progress 

in several areas: Increased information sharing, improved cooperation among agencies and of the analysis of intelligence, and sharpened collection priorities. Genuine progress, no doubt about it. Still, 

it is not clear to us that the DNI is the driving force for intelligence 

community integration that the Commission envisioned. 

Some ambiguity probably remains with respect to the DNI’s authority over budget and personnel, although that can be disputed, 

I guess. Strengthening the DNI’s position would advance the unity 

of intelligence effort that we think is still very much needed. 

I do not anticipate new legislation—you would know more about 

that than I on this subject—in the very near future. So we have 

to live with the statute that we have for an extended period of 

time. It may very well be that in the future some legislation could 

fortify the office. 

Repeated indication from the President that the DNI is the unequivocal leader of the intelligence community, I think, would be 

greatly helpful. 

The FBI has gone through dramatic change. I think it is moving 

in a positive direction, but in some sense incomplete. It has had, 

I believe, very strong leadership from Director Robert Mueller. It 

shifted resources to collect and analyze intelligence to prevent terrorism. That is an enormous cultural change, as you all know, 

10 

away from its former focus strictly on law enforcement. Its progress 

has been significant but uneven. 

The Fort Hood shootings highlight the lingering problems. Your 

report, which I have looked over quickly, has spelled that out, I 

think, in a very persuasive and compelling way. 

Analysts do not appear to be driving intelligence within the FBI, 

nor have they achieved status on a par with the special agents who 

traditionally rise to management of the Bureau. 

FBI headquarters components did not play a direct role in analyzing the threat posed by the person who later allegedly did the 

shootings. There were miscommunications, as Senator Collins has 

indicated in her opening statement, between the field offices, so the 

shift taking place within the FBI is still very much a work in 

progress. Congress needs to continue to help the FBI with its difficult transformation. 

The CIA has improved its intelligence analysis and removed barriers between its analysts and operations officers. Our sense is that 

there has been more talk than action with respect to improvement 

in the CIA’s human operations. 

Acquiring well-placed sources is very difficult business, particularly in closed societies and among close-knit terrorist cells. More 

money and more personnel do not necessarily result in better 

agents. 

While the CIA has attempted to recruit officers qualified in the 

languages of the greatest interest, that, too, is very hard. Part of 

the problem is that young people in our country, with some exceptions, of course, do not gain proficiency in foreign languages. Congress can help on that. 

The CIA then must continue to rebuild. It will require strong 

support from Congress and the Executive Branch. We want the 

Agency to take calculated risks to protect the country. Congressional oversight must be depoliticized so that when the Agency 

fails, as it occasionally will, it is not inappropriately blamed for 

taking the necessary risks. 

Improving information sharing across the Federal Government 

and with State and local authorities was a major recommendation. 

In some ways, I think the government is doing better. The Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces and Fusion Centers across the country have 

certainly improved information sharing. The National Counterterrorism Center has analysts and other officers from all agencies of 

the intelligence community working side by side and sharing information with their home organizations. 

There have been some failures, as has already been indicated. 

There is no question that WikiLeaks’ unauthorized publication of 

sensitive government documents has raised some genuine and real 

concerns. Those are legitimate. But the need to share information 

we think still remains highly important, and we should not backslide on that. 

Congress has to help the government strike the right balance between the need to protect unauthorized disclosures and the need to 

share information to defend ourselves against the threats we face. 

Among our major disappointments has been that the Administration has not empaneled the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 

11 

Board. This was a major recommendation very strongly supported 

by all the Commissioners. 

I am informed—I am not sure I am quite up to date on this— 

that the Administration has nominated two individuals for the 

panel. I know one of them personally. As far as we know, they have 

not yet been confirmed, and the panel certainly has not met. The 

Administration, I believe, needs to push this on a priority basis because that board has a lot to do, and I think this Committee can 

be helpful in pushing the Administration. 

We are equally disappointed that Congress has not reformed 

itself along the lines we recommended. We recommended that Congress create a Joint Committee on Intelligence or create House and 

Senate committees with combined authorizing and appropriation 

powers. Those recommendations may be a bridge too far. 

Last week, the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee 

announced a decision to include three members of the House Appropriations Committee to participate in House Intelligence Committee hearings and briefings. That appears to us to be a positive 

step, but obviously there is more to do. 

Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security is fractured. 

That massive Department will be better integrated if there is better integrated oversight. I know the concerns you have expressed 

about that. It is in our country’s security interest that Congress 

make committee reform a priority. 

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons must be a national priority. The Administration hosted a major nonproliferation summit 

last year and announced a new initiative to secure all nuclear materials by 2013. It plans to spend $14.2 billion over the next 5 years 

to secure nuclear and radiological materials. 

May I say outside my statement that because of other responsibilities I have dealing with nuclear power, I have recently had 

the occasion to listen to some highly qualified people within our 

government, and I believe the access to nuclear materials and the 

ability to use those materials and to explode them is much greater 

than people generally think. And so I hope the Congress will keep 

a hard, sharp focus on this question of nuclear proliferation. I know 

there are some suggestions to cut some of these important programs. Money is not everything here, but we must not weaken or 

underfund what President Bush and President Obama have both 

said is the highest priority security need. 

Now, at the outset of his Administration, President Obama 

issued Executive Orders that brought the United States into line 

with international norms for the treatment of detainees. That fulfilled part of our recommendation. We believe there is a conflict between the rule of law and holding detainees indefinitely without resolving their cases. Both Presidents Bush and Obama have really 

wrestled with this problem. It is a tough one. President Obama 

took a step forward by requiring periodic reviews of the status of 

detainees, but there is an awful lot more to do. The Congress and 

the Executive Branch simply have to agree on a statutory base to 

give us a comprehensive approach to dealing with the detainees. 

Congress and the Executive Branch need to agree on the rules 

of evidence and the procedures that should be applied in determining how to deal with these detainees. I do not think this is a 

12 

problem that can just simply go on and on and on. You need a statutory basis—and I do not suggest it is easy to reach it—on how to 

deal with these potentially very dangerous detainees. 

We had a number of foreign policy recommendations in the report. Events today in the Middle East and North Africa clearly indicate that the region is in a state of upheaval, and it is quite unclear to any of us how it will emerge. 

We addressed the role that U.S. foreign policy plays in counterterrorism, but we did it, to be honest about it, with considerable 

modesty. We believe that although the countries share a common 

religion, their people have many cultural, national, ethnic, and 

tribal differences, and therefore, we have to deal with them on a 

country-by-country basis. We want our country always to advance 

its core values, but a pragmatic approach for each country, one that 

supports an agenda of opportunity for the Islamic world, we think 

is necessary. 

So, to conclude, significant progress has been made since 9/11, 

and our country is undoubtedly more secure. Yet important 9/11 

Commission recommendations remain to be implemented, and over 

the next few years, a lot of heavy lifting still needs to be done. 

As Mr. Kean mentioned just a moment ago, the fact that we have 

not resolved this radio spectrum problem and have not resolved the 

unity of command is just really distressing to us. Those are two nobrainers with regard to the safety and security of the country. 

Some progress has been made in both areas, but not nearly 

enough. 

Congress has resisted reorganizing its own institutions, and 

streamlining congressional oversight of the intelligence community 

and the Department of Homeland Security would go far toward advancing unity of effort in the intelligence community and within 

DHS. 

Also the DNI needs a clear-eyed appraisal. I think it is functioning reasonably well. Likewise the FBI. We have concerns about 

each, and our goal really should be to strengthen both the DNI and 

the FBI. 

The terrorist threat will be with us far into the future, demanding that we be ever vigilant. Our national security departments require strong leadership and attentive management at every level to 

ensure that all parts are working well together and that there is 

innovation and imagination. Our agencies and their dedicated 

workforces have gone through much change, and we commend 

them for their achievements in protecting the American people. But 

there is a tendency toward inertia in all bureaucracies, and vigorous congressional oversight is just imperative to ensure that they 

remain vigilant and continue to pursue needed reforms. 

So our task is challenging and difficult. We constantly have to 

assess our vulnerabilities and anticipate new and evolving lines of 

attack. We have done a lot. We can look back with some satisfaction, but there is an awful lot more to do. 

We are very grateful to you for the opportunity to testify before 

this Committee, which has provided longstanding leadership on 

these issues, and we will do our best now to respond to your questions. 

13 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you both for those thoughtful 

opening statements. I think you really helped us get some perspective on where we have come in the last several years, certainly 

since 2004, when the 9/11 Commission Act was enacted. But you 

have also given us a clear statement of unfinished business and 

priorities for the future, and I appreciate that. 

Before I begin my questioning, I want to note the presence since 

we began of Abraham Scott, whose wife, Janice, died at the Pentagon on 9/11, and he is another one of those family members who 

have continued in the battle to do everything they can to make 

sure nothing like this happens again. 

I thought both of you summarized well where we have come and 

also noted that the steps we have taken to improve our homeland 

security, including those very significant steps that were part of 

your recommendations that we adopted, have strengthened our security, but that the nature of the threat has changed. We can never 

say never, but certainly our defenses against a sophisticated 9/11- 

type attack are way up and, therefore, the prospects of that happening are down, thank God. 

There is a high risk right now of smaller attacks than 9/11, particularly of attacks that come from within the country because that 

has become a focus of al-Qaeda and all the other international 

Islamist terrorist groups. 

I wanted to begin by asking you, Governor Kean, just to talk a 

little bit more about the inadequacy of unity of command at this 

point and what you think we can do about it. 

Mr. KEAN. Well, this was one of the real problems on 9/11. Who 

was in charge? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. KEAN. And so our recommendation very strongly to all communities has been there has to be one leader. Now, New York City 

made a lot of progress in that regard by putting everything under 

the police department. Some cities have followed that pattern and 

some have not, and so there are still a number of communities, 

some of them fairly sizable, where people tell us there is still that 

question. If something really happens, who is in charge? 

Businesses have made more progress. I think almost all major 

businesses I know now have somebody who is in charge if something happens. They know what they should do. They know where 

employees ought to go. All that is in place in a lot of major businesses. But in communities, not as yet, and we think it is a very 

serious problem and one that we have to address and make it, as 

best we can, a requirement that somebody be in charge. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I am really interested that you have 

focused on the local or metropolitan level, and I think we have to 

do some thinking about that to see whether we cannot create some 

requirement or incentive to bring about that unity of command at 

the local level, perhaps by making it a condition of some of the 

homeland security or other grants. 

Let me take you to the national level. I am reading from Section 

13.1 of the Commission’s report on Unity of Effort Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide, and this section of the report notes specifically that during the Commission’s hearings, members of the Commission often asked, ‘‘Who is the quarterback? The other players 

14 

are in their positions doing their jobs. But who is calling the play 

that assigns the roles to help them execute as a team?’’ 

To respond to this need, in my interpretation of the Commission’s report, you recommended creating a National Counterterrorism Center with the responsibility to develop counterterrorism 

plans that integrate all the instruments of national power, and 

that was, I think, one of the most significant recommendations and 

one of the most significant components of our legislation. 

So as you look back nationally now, are you satisfied there is 

clarity and unity of command at the national level and that we now 

have a quarterback? And is it the National Counterterrorism Center? 

Mr. KEAN. Well, it is the National Counterterrorism Center and, 

of course, the DNI. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. KEAN. In combination. They are the quarterback. Now, 

whether they are being implemented as the quarterback, whether 

or not they really have the power that you intended when you 

wrote the law and that we intended when we made recommendations, I do not know. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. KEAN. Because the signals sometimes are mixed. And we 

have to have unity of effort in that regard. We have to have the 

quarterback. And I would suggest that you would probe that area 

and find out whether or not the quarterback is in place and whether or not the quarterback has the powers that you intended him 

to have in the legislation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. There is no question that the National 

Counterterrorism Center has created unprecedented cooperation 

between components of our security and intelligence communities. 

In that sense, the dots are all on the same board now. One of the 

problems, I say in passing, that we have noted in some of our earlier hearings and it was a cause of some of the cases that we have 

studied that were not as we would want is that the problem now 

is there are so many dots on the same board that it is hard in real 

time to separate them out to connect the ones that ought to be connected, but they are not on separate boards anymore. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word about it? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, please. 

Mr. HAMILTON. You have two problems there. You have raised 

both of them. One is the scene of the disaster. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. And there it is kind of a no-brainer, too, for me 

anyway, that someone has to be in charge. Now, that creates difficult political problems because the governor wants to be in 

charge, the mayor wants to be in charge, county officials want to 

be in charge. And that is the reason it has not been resolved because the politicians are unwilling to address the question because 

it is a tough one to say who is in charge. 

Now, I do not know whether that barrier can be overcome or not, 

but in terms of saving lives, it is an easy question to answer. You 

have to have one person making decisions with regard to sanitation, public health, food, housing, and transportation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

15 

Mr. HAMILTON. They have to make thousands of decisions within 

a matter of a few hours, really, at these scenes. And if you have 

confusion of command at that locale, you lose additional lives. 

So that is why we think it is an important matter. I really do 

not know how well different metropolitan areas around the country 

have addressed this problem, but I am very uneasy about it, and 

I do not really think it has been solved in most areas. 

Now, the second problem relates to a unity of effort in the Administration, which is the broader question. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Who is the quarterback? I follow this reasonably 

carefully. I do not pretend to know everything about it. I do not 

know who the quarterback is. And I will give you my impression. 

My impression is that the number one official within the White 

House is John Brennan on these matters. That makes me a little 

uneasy—not because of him. He is an extremely dedicated, important, capable man. But he is right in the center of the policy world 

at the White House. He is not removed from it like I generally 

want intelligence officials to be. And so I am not sure whether he 

is the right person to do it. But if he is, then it seems to me there 

ought to be a very clear designation that he is in charge of homeland security and counterterrorism. 

Today, quite frankly, from where I sit, it looks to me like a number of different people are involved in it, including Mr. Brennan, 

including the Director of National Intelligence, including the DHS 

Secretary and several others. I do not know who the quarterback 

is, and I can identify the Commissioners who raised that question 

all the time in the meetings we had, Mr. Kean. 

Mr. KEAN. That is right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. My guess is those same Commissioners would be 

raising the same question today, who is the quarterback? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very helpful commentary, and I 

agree with you that we have the combination—and I am simplifying here—of the critical role of intelligence in counterterrorism 

and homeland security, but also then the other roles, which are different, of preparedness and prevention and response. And I agree 

with you, Mr. Hamilton, that the top person today in our government is John Brennan, the Deputy National Security Adviser for 

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. And, again, I have great 

respect for his ability, etc. Whether that is the right place for that 

role to be is an important question. 

Mr. HAMILTON. The President should have the right to organize 

his White House he wants to organize it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. And maybe the President is comfortable with 

this. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. HAMILTON. As an outsider here, who looks at it fairly carefully, it is not clear to me that the lines of authority are precise. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, and I think you have quite accurately identified the key players. It is the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the 

National Counterterrorism Center. And, of course, there are others—the FBI Director—— 

16 

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But more than anyone else, Mr. Brennan 

seems to us day to day to be coordinating that effort. There are different roles here, although you could pick one of those other players and make that person the coordinator. It might be the Secretary of Homeland Security who has both operating and intelligence authority. You have given us a good charge for our review 

during this year. 

My time is up. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me pick up on this very issue of who is in charge. To me, 

it was very clear when we passed the Reform Act in 2004 that we 

wanted the DNI to be in charge. That is why we created this new 

quarterback position. And yet I completely agree with Congressman Hamilton that in this particular Administration, the person 

who is in charge is Mr. Brennan at the White House. And putting 

aside his enormous capabilities, which we all agree to, the problem 

with that situation is there is no accountability to Congress. It is 

a member of the President’s staff, so we cannot call Mr. Brennan 

to testify before us. We cannot hold him accountable for decisions. 

And I think that is another very big problem. 

The other area of confusion of command, as Congressman Hamilton has said and Governor Kean well knows, is when a disaster 

strikes or there is a crisis situation. And we saw this with 

Abdulmutallab where there was tremendous confusion over who 

was in charge and who should make decisions. In that case, it 

ended up being the Attorney General who made the decision on 

how to treat Abdulmutallab without any consultation whatsoever 

with the DNI, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or any top intelligence official on whether or not Abdulmutallab should be questioned about 

whether there were further plots, and that was a lost intelligence 

opportunity. 

Are these problems that we can fix through legislation? Or are 

they problems that depend on an individual President setting up 

who is truly going to be in power? 

The reason I ask this question is when I go back and review the 

language creating the DNI, it is pretty strong language. Now, we 

tried to get it to be even stronger in the area of personnel, but in 

fact, the DNI has strong authority to set priorities for the intelligence community, to oversee the budget formulation, to make 

some personnel decisions. 

Is this really a case where we need to strengthen the law? Or 

is it a case where the President needs to empower the person we 

intended to be empowered? I would like to hear from both of you 

in either order on this question. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the latter—the President has to step in 

here. Now, any law, as we all know, can be strengthened. But as 

I suggested, this law is not going to be changed in the immediate 

future. It took you several years to get it on the statute books, so 

maybe in the future it will be clarified. But, Senator Collins, I basically agree with your comment that there is sufficient authority in 

present law. We envisioned, of course, that the DNI would be the 

17 

central powerful driver of the intelligence community. I do not 

think he has been. 

Now, I want to say here, too, you know I have known all of these 

men that have held that position. It is a very tough position. We 

have had very good men in that position. They really have been 

quite strong. But that line of authority is not as clear as it should 

be, and so I think given the circumstances that you now have, your 

second choice, that is, the President has to step in and make it 

very clear with regard to his authority in the intelligence community, over budget and over personnel and over transfer of funds 

within the budget. And so far as I can see, that really has not been 

done. 

Now, having said that, the DNI deals with some pretty powerful 

players—the Secretary of Defense, the CIA Director—and if they 

get a decision within the bureaucracy they do not like, they will go 

directly to the President. Fair enough. So the DNI may have authority and he may try to exercise it, but he has to exercise that 

authority with extraordinary skill and discretion. And these are all 

major players within the Administration, and so that power has to 

be very skillfully exercised. 

But I personally think the system is going to work a lot better 

if you have someone at the top of it who is the driving force, who 

is recognized as the center of power, who has the authority, and 

obviously has to have the support of the President, to do the things 

that need to be done to get unity of effort. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Governor Kean. 

Mr. KEAN. Yes, I remember when the bill was going through. It 

was weakened a bit in the House, and I remember talking to Mr. 

Hamilton about it at the time, and he said, ‘‘Do not worry because 

in the end it is the President. And if the President gives the DNI 

the authority, the DNI will be just the way you want it to be. If 

not, the law is not going to help.’’ And that is where we are. 

My own belief is the law says the DNI ought to be the top intelligence operative, I think it will work better that way, and that is 

probably how it ought to be. But if this President wants somebody 

else, then my only recommendation would be that he make that 

clear and that both publicly and within the Administration everybody knows where the lines of authority are, and if somebody else 

is going to be in full charge, let us say who that person is, and then 

everybody knows, because the worst thing of all is a vacuum or 

confusion or lines that are not clear. The President is the only one 

who can make those lines clear, and the President is the only one 

who could make it happen. 

Senator COLLINS. I agree that the President’s response is absolutely clear and needs to be clearer here, and that if the President 

does not empower the DNI, we can write all the language in the 

world, and the DNI is not going to truly be in charge. But I also 

remain very concerned about the lack of accountability to Congress 

and the public when it is a member of the President’s staff who is 

running the intelligence community. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I just want to support what you said. I think that 

is terribly important. 

Mr. KEAN. Very important. 

18 

Mr. HAMILTON. The person who is in charge, whoever it is, ought 

to be accountable to Congress at all times. That is just fundamental, it seems to me, to the way this place ought to operate. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. Of 

course, I agree with you, and it strikes me that ultimately the DNI 

has ample authority—not as much as any of us wanted, but ample 

authority in the current statute, but it really requires the President to make clear that the DNI is the person in charge of the intelligence community. 

We all expected that coming in as a new position to oversee existing agencies, which have a real life of their own and a constituency of their own, would be difficult. And it is interesting that General James Clapper—really to just amplify a bit on what I said in 

my opening statement—I think because of his background in the 

military and credibility at the Pentagon, has actually negotiated an 

agreement with Secretary Robert Gates, which will enable the DNI 

to have much more authority with regard to intelligence budgeting, 

appropriations, than was the case at the beginning of the office, 

and that is good. 

The question of who is on top overall in the counterterrorism effort is a complicated one because there is not only the intelligence 

community but all the others—the operators, the preventers, and 

the responders. But I, again, agree that it has to be somebody at 

the top—nothing negative about Mr. Brennan—who is accountable 

to Congress and the public. And we have to think about how to 

deal with that problem. 

Mr. KEAN. Yes, I think that is very important. When we first 

talked about the position, I think what we envisioned was a man 

or woman who would step into that position and stay 5 or 6 years 

and develop the position, strengthen it and all of that. We have 

had this rotating door, really, of very good people, but in and out. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. KEAN. And that has been one of the problems with the DNI, 

and hopefully we have one now who will stay for a while. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I hope. Thank you. Next in order of arrival, Senator Akaka and then Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I would like to welcome Governor Kean and 

Congressman Hamilton, and thank you for being here today. 

Although many of the information-sharing and intelligence shortfalls that the 9/11 Commission identified have been addressed, critical work remains to ensure that we have an agile and well-coordinated response to terrorist threats, and you have been discussing 

this. Supporting our Federal workers at DHS, the intelligence community, and other agencies who make daily sacrifices to keep us 

safe is essential to this effort. Additionally, we must never lose 

sight of the privacy and civil liberties implications of our efforts to 

protect the Nation. In particular, I agree with our witnesses’ comments that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board must 

be set up immediately. 

19 

Congressman Hamilton, as you know, I believe that GAO could 

assist our efforts to strengthen oversight of the intelligence community. In response to my question in 2007, you stated that GAO 

should have the same authorities within the intelligence community as it has in other agencies. Key principles of my Intelligence 

Community Audit Act were included in the Intelligence Authorization Act last year. Under this legislation, the Director of National 

Intelligence must issue a directive to facilitate GAO audits and 

evaluations of the intelligence community. 

What elements should be included in the DNI directive to promote effective oversight? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, I am not sure I understand the question. What elements should the DNI insist upon for oversight? 

Senator AKAKA. To include in the directive to promote effective 

oversight. 

Mr. HAMILTON. The DNI’s oversight of the intelligence community or congressional oversight? 

Senator AKAKA. Well, either one. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I am not sure I have the thrust of the question in mind, but I am deeply impressed that only you folks in the 

Congress can effectively oversee the intelligence community. The 

press does not know what is going on. Those of us outside Congress 

do not have the information that you have and your staffs have 

about what is going on. So unlike most other areas of our government, the only really effective independent oversight of the intelligence community can come from the Congress. 

Now, you have the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. I 

serve on that. But they are all appointed by the President, and 

they are not really an independent group. So in all of the recommendations we made, we thought that the strengthening and 

persistence of congressional oversight was just absolutely critical to 

the success of the implementation of the recommendations. 

Now, I know that there is a lot of internal oversight that takes 

place within each agency, and I think within the DNI’s office as 

well, and that can be important to oversee it. But that is not an 

independent oversight. That can only come from Congress. I support giving the GAO ample powers to review the intelligence community, and I agree with you, Senator Akaka, that GAO should 

have a key role. The DNI should issue directives to intelligence 

agencies requiring their cooperation with GAO. 

I do want to pick up on your observations about the Privacy and 

Civil Liberties Oversight Board because this has been a source of 

enormous frustration to Mr. Kean and to me. I just cannot figure 

it out. I do not know what President Bush and President Obama 

think. They just have not put an effective board in place, and I cannot understand why. 

Now, this is urgently needed because in homeland security and 

intelligence matters, you have greatly accelerated surveillance. All 

kinds of provisions are written into the law that expand the powers 

of the FBI and the intelligence agencies, understandably in most 

cases, I think, to check on what the American people are doing. 

And I think somebody needs to be out there to keep their eye on 

these folks in a very aggressive way because the security people 

20 

1The letter referenced by Chairman Lieberman appears in the Appendix on page 387. 

within an agency almost always win the arguments, and you need 

an independent source to really keep your eye on them. 

So we favored a strong, robust oversight of civil liberties and privacy with the power to issue subpoenas and a power to call people 

in front of them and keep a watchful eye because I think there has 

not been enough attention to the question of civil liberties and privacy in general with regard to homeland security. 

Mr. KEAN. I might just add that Mr. Hamilton is right. Nothing 

has frustrated me more, of almost all our recommendations, than 

the lack of progress on civil liberties and the board, and I do not 

know what problems the administrations have with the bill that 

you passed. But if there is a problem with it, if there is something 

wrong with the structure, if they think it is intrusive or something, 

then tell us and maybe you will change it. But to not appoint members and to be almost 2 years into an administration which has not 

even nominated enough members to make a quorum is frustrating 

and makes no sense to me and leaves a big hole in what we should 

be doing. 

So again, I do not understand it. I am frustrated by it. But if 

there is a problem, I wish they would tell us what the problem is. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for those observations. I really agree 

with you that we need to set that up immediately. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. Senator Collins 

and I were talking. We can address a letter to the White House to 

ask what is going on here because I do not think there is any policy 

or ideological opposition to the board. I suppose it is always possible that there are elements within the intelligence community 

that do not like the idea, but I actually have not heard that either. 

I think we will address a letter right away and see if we can get 

you a response.1

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Next is Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, we have gathered before us today two of my very 

favorite people in public life: Mr. Kean, a great governor of New 

Jersey, our neighbor across the Delaware River, and someone for 

whom we have huge respect in our State; and Mr. Hamilton with 

whom I was privileged to serve for 10 years. I was privileged to 

think of him as one of my mentors. And it is just great to see both 

of you still so active, vibrant, and contributing on so many different 

levels. 

About once a month I am asked what is wrong in Washington, 

and one of the things I always talk about is the lack of trust— 

sometimes a lack of trust between parties, sometimes a lack of 

trust between the Executive and Legislative branches, sometimes 

a lack of trust between Committee chairs and ranking members, 

and this Committee is an example of what you can get done when 

21 

you have a trusting relationship, with Senators Lieberman and 

Collins. 

Every month I talk about the trust that the two of you developed 

when you assumed your positions as the leaders of the 9/11 Commission and how you provided an example through that trust to 

the other members of the Commission and achieved extraordinary 

consensus and came to us and enabled us, with your leadership, to 

reflect and to follow that example. So I just wanted to lead off by 

saying that. 

I am fortunate to chair a subcommittee of this Committee. It has 

a long name, but it is called Federal Financial Management for 

short. We poke in almost every nook and cranny of the Federal 

Government to see if there are ways that we can get better results 

for less money. 

In this hearing room yesterday, we heard from, among others, 

the Department of Defense and GAO, and we were looking at the 

GAO report that came out yesterday that cited major weapon systems cost overruns for 2010 of $402 billion, up from $42 billion a 

decade earlier. In this room, we have had hearings in the last 

month on improper payments—not fraud, but just mistakes, overpayments for the most part. We have a new number for improper 

payments for last year—$125 billion—not counting the Department 

of Defense, and not counting the Medicare prescription drug program. 

We have had hearings on surplus property. We have thousands 

and thousands of pieces of surplus property we do not use, we need 

to get rid of, and they are just a burden on us, $300 billion, plus 

tax gap monies that are owed and not being collected. Those are 

the kinds of things we focus on in this room. 

With that spirit of trying to change the culture around here or 

at the Department of Defense or in the Legislative or Executive 

Branch throughout the Federal Government, to move from what I 

call a culture of spendthrift to a culture of thrift, would you join 

with us today maybe just to think about it and then to come back 

to us in writing? I know there are things we are doing, entitlement 

programs, we have had many hearings on those as well, and domestic discretionary spending programs and defense programs, 

things that we are doing where we can get a better result for less 

money or a better result for not a lot more money. With that spirit 

in mind, can you just think out loud with us for a minute or two 

here today about if there is some way that we can get a better result in this area of national security and homeland security without spending more money or even spending a little bit less? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, no, my impression, Senator, is in the area 

of homeland security and intelligence—I know this is not the Intelligence Committee—the whole question of cost effectiveness rarely 

arises. 

Senator CARPER. That is true. 

Mr. HAMILTON. We have been set on a course, for understandable 

reasons, since 9/11 to create enormous increases in intelligence 

budgets and a massive new Department, DHS, and everybody has 

hit the full-speed-ahead button. I do not have the specific figures, 

but you have had an enormous increase in the total amount of 

22 

money spent in intelligence just in the last few years, for reasons 

we all understand. 

So when you began your comments on cost effectiveness, getting 

better results for less money, my response was, ‘‘Bravo,’’ because I 

think you need a hard-headed business attitude, if you would, in 

this area, which has been totally absent for 10 years. There is probably a little exaggeration in what I have just said, but I think cost 

effectiveness here would be important and making these fellows 

come in who head these agencies and not only hold their feet to the 

fire with regard to homeland security and stopping terrorist attacks, but making sure this money is being wisely spent. It makes 

a lot of sense to me. So I think you perform an enormously important service as you push the whole business of cost effectiveness. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

Mr. KEAN. I think there is no question, whether it is public or 

private sector, if you ramp up as fast as we felt we had to ramp 

up after 9/11, you are going to have problems. You are going to 

overspend. You are going to waste some money. And I am sure that 

has been done. Spending on non-military intelligence, that number 

is now public. I guess the military intelligence spending is not public yet. I assume, combined, we are somewhere around $80 billion, 

I would guess. And that is a lot of money, and a lot of it ramped 

up in a great hurry. So I think what you are doing is very important. We need not only to do this well, we need to do it efficiently. 

Senator CARPER. If I could, I am just going to ask you two to 

think about this for a while and maybe respond on the record after 

you have given it some more thought. 

One last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Please. 

Senator CARPER. Going back to the early 1990s, we have seen a 

couple of countries come back and forth across our radar screen. 

They include Somalia and Yemen. Both countries have been in almost perpetual decline for, it seems like, a couple of decades. And 

as a result, we have seen two very different dangerous groups that 

are proving a clear and present danger to our country. They are alShabaab from Somalia and al-Qaeda from the Arabian Peninsula 

operating in Yemen. Both have been directly and indirectly responsible for the December 25th Christmas Day bombing attempt, the 

Fort Hood attacks, and Alabama and Minnesota terrorism cells. 

And it is clear that if these two countries implode, they will not 

only pose a more severe threat to us, but maybe to the rest of the 

world. 

Could either of you please describe your thoughts on the threat 

that these groups pose to the United States and if our Federal Government is doing enough to prevent these two specific terrorist 

groups from growing into a more powerful global entity? 

Mr. KEAN. You are right. It is interesting how this business has 

evolved. Years ago, we used to worry about urban areas and powerful countries and so on. Those were the threat. Now it is the 

ungoverned areas of the world. It is the wild areas. It is the areas 

where there does not seem to be any kind of legitimate authority 

where these organizations develop. And I think beyond even Yemen 

and Somalia, we do not know what is happening now in that area 

of the world in some other countries. We do not know what is going 

23 

to happen if and when Gaddafi falls and how tribal that will become. We do not know what is going to happen in some of these 

other areas that may or may not disintegrate into these kind of 

areas. 

So this has to continue to be our priority, and with the government of Yemen collapsing, it is going to be worse before it gets better. I know we are not doing enough—I know we are concentrating 

on it. I know the intelligence communities are working hard to 

learn what they can learn. We still do not have enough people, 

enough boots on the ground, the boots of intelligence people on the 

ground in those areas. We are depending on other intelligence 

agencies in that part of the world, which now may not be able to 

give us that information anymore because of what has gone on 

with their governments. 

So it is a continuing and very serious problem, and we have to 

be ready to address not only those two areas, but other areas that 

may develop. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Congressman Hamilton. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I think you have put your finger on maybe 

the most difficult problem with regard to protecting ourselves from 

threats from abroad. You have governments in these countries that 

really do not govern throughout the country. You have all kinds of 

tribal, ethnic differences. It is a very hard problem. 

I think we have to work as a Nation on developing the capabilities to deal with these countries, and I must say I am not quite 

sure how I would spell out those capabilities. Supporting the government is often done to try to ensure stability, but we have surely 

seen the limits of that in recent years. 

So I think we just have to develop the expertise for these countries and figure out on an ad hoc basis with each one of them what 

kind of capabilities exist within the country to counter the extremist groups. If you have a government that is reasonably stable, reasonably competent, then you have to work with that government 

for sure. And if you do not have a stable, competent government, 

then we may have to insert capabilities ourselves. You cannot generalize here too much. But the kind of plots we had that went with 

the FedEx and UPS packages that were sent into the United States 

that originated, I think, in Yemen indicate to us the challenges 

that we confront. You have to have a multi-layered approach, obviously, to deal with these threats, not just in-country but trying to 

stop it when it is in transport, whatever the threat may be. 

We described in our report the evolving nature of the threat, and 

this is, among other things, exactly what we meant, and it is a formidable challenge for us. 

Mr. KEAN. You cannot do it in a public hearing, but when you 

have your private hearings with members of the intelligence community, I would ask: Have our sources of information been compromised and how much? Where did we find out the information 

we have used to stop some plots? We received information from 

various governments. Was it the Egyptian government? And can 

we still depend on them for that information? 

Did we get information out of even Libya? Which, obviously, we 

cannot count on anymore. A lot of those people who were working 

with us probably are not working with us or do not have the ability 

24 

to work with us today, and if we are losing those sources of information, what are we going to do about it? 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you for those responses. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the Afghanistan experience should tell us 

not to ignore these countries as difficult as it may be. So if we have 

intelligence that in Yemen or in Somalia there are groups that are 

plotting against the United States or our allies in some way, then 

I think we have to get our brains together and figure out the best 

way to do it. And depending on the strength of the intelligence, you 

may want to use drones; you may want to use special operation 

forces. Your preference would be to have the local government deal 

with it. But if the local government does not deal with it, then we 

have to take a position that it is a threat to our national security 

and we have to deal with it. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you for those comments. 

Mr. Chairman, you have been very generous with the time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, not at all. 

Senator CARPER. I just want to say again to both of you, thanks 

so much for your continued leadership and for being an inspiration 

to us all. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Carper. Excellent questions. 

Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, I have a few more 

questions myself. 

We have talked about the evolving nature of the threat, and I 

know that we agree that one of the most significant developments 

in terms of the Islamist terrorist threat since 9/11 has been the 

homegrown radicalization and self-radicalization. It may have existed in some way before 9/11, but not really in an observable or 

consequential way, and we have seen it over and over again now 

in cases that have existed, including the two that you mentioned, 

Governor Kean, in 2009, in which successful terrorist attacks were 

carried out, both the Bledsoe case in Arkansas and the Hasan case 

at Fort Hood. Those were both homegrown, self-radicalization 

cases. In the case of Bledsoe, he did go to Yemen for a while. It 

is not totally clear who he connected with there, but he was 

radicalized here. 

By coincidence, just this morning I was informed by my staff that 

last night the most recent edition of a magazine called ‘‘Inspire,’’ 

the fifth edition, which is published by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, appeared. It is quite remarkable, very slick, printed in 

English, published in English, so aimed at an English-speaking audience, including here in America. Perhaps we should take this as 

some kind of compliment, if you will, that we have built up our perimeter defenses, you might say, to protect the homeland such that 

our foreign enemies are now trying to develop within our country 

people who can carry out terrorist attacks. 

Anyway, we have held a number of hearings and made some recommendations about this. It is a complicated problem because unlike 9/11, which we should have detected and stopped, very often 

these are people operating as so-called lone wolves. So I know that 

your National Security Preparedness Group has focused on this 

problem. I wanted first to thank you for that and say how much 

25 

I appreciate it. I know you have described the problem, and as you 

mentioned, there will be recommendations coming this spring. I 

just wanted to give you the opportunity to comment on this new, 

very significant threat element in our attempts to protect the 

homeland. I do not want you to pre-empt your recommendations, 

but is there anything you would like to say about what more you 

think the government ought to be doing to stop the problem. 

Mr. KEAN. Well, it is extraordinarily difficult because as you say, 

our defenses, based on our recommendations in many cases and on 

your work, have been to stop people like the 9/11 co-conspirators 

from coming in from other countries and doing us harm. Those defenses are not adequate when the dangers come from somebody 

who is an American citizen, with an American driver’s license, an 

American passport, and all of that. They are inspired, a lot of these 

people, from the Internet. 

One of the missing pieces that we never quite nailed down in the 

9/11 report was whether or not anybody in this country supported 

or helped the terrorists in any way, though we had a suspicion alAwlaki might have. And we mentioned in our report that we lacked 

the staff and the time to really dig into it further, but he was very 

suspicious, as were his contacts. Well, he is now gone, of course, 

and has become one of the people who is recruiting from overseas. 

So he has a definite connection to even the 9/11 hijackers. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. KEAN. So we think it is a terrible problem, a difficult problem, though we are not talking about a lot of people. We do not believe there is enormous radicalization taking place. It is a very 

small number of people. But these people, many of whom do not 

look like your traditional terrorists and have American passports, 

present the greatest danger right now, and we think there ought 

to be a real effort and a real dedication by our intelligence communities to implement a strategy to deal with it. And I am not sure 

that is in place as yet. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Obviously it is a lot better to stop terrorist attacks before they happen and prevent people from being injured. 

Our group is working on a radicalization report, which we hope will 

have some recommendations for you before too many weeks go by. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Two or three things come to mind. One is, this 

is a good illustration of how important it is to work with State and 

local officials. In my own experience in my State, I have seen communities that have reached out to the Islamic community and 

those that do not. Community leadership makes a difference here, 

and that community leadership knows their community better than 

anybody else, and I think it is very important for Federal officials— 

and I know it is not easy because there are so many communities 

in the country—to strengthen their State and local contacts in 

order to better prevent radicalization. 

Second, I think there has to be a clear outreach to the Islamic 

community leadership. I know there are some controversial aspects 

to this, but most of the Islamic leaders with whom I have had any 

contact want to help. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

26 

Mr. HAMILTON. And believe you me, they know their communities—not perfectly but pretty well. And so good liaison with those 

people is very important. 

We have a representative today from the NYPD, and he would 

know much more about this than I, but I am impressed with the 

way the NYPD has contacted various communities within the New 

York City region and has reached out to try to understand those 

communities better. 

Look, the people who cause you trouble are young men, for the 

most part, so they are the keys for you. Now, maybe not exclusively 

but for the most part. And the community leadership has to understand their own young people in a sense. And I think the NYPD 

has set an example of contacts that other metropolitan areas could 

follow. 

The other thing we talked about earlier, I guess, is the coordination of the effort within the Federal Government. If you ask the 

question today who is in charge of dealing with homeland 

radicalization in our government, I do not think I could answer 

that. Maybe someone from the government can, but it is not very 

clear to me who it is. But there ought to be somebody in charge. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree. We have asked that question, and 

the answer we received was that the Director of the National 

Counterterrorism Center is in charge. But that surprised us, frankly, and there is an attempt to try to organize this better and a recognition that this is a real problem. But we will benefit from your 

recommendations greatly, and I look forward to them. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, they need operational responsibility. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is the problem, and interestingly 

enough—and this now goes back a while, maybe 2 years ago, so it 

is somewhat dated—we had a hearing with some leaders of the 

Muslim-American community, and we asked, Is there any agency 

of the Federal Government that has done outreach to your community or which has done the most? And to me the surprising answer 

we received was, yes, the FBI through its State offices had been 

reaching out quite a lot and had some communication. 

But, Mr. Hamilton, the NYPD sets the standard here. This is not 

inexpensive. It is labor intensive. Maybe because they were so traumatized by 9/11, they have committed a lot of resources, and they 

have excellent communications with the Muslim-American community. I think the LAPD does a good job, too, but then there are 

some places in the country with significant Muslim-American communities where my impression is that the outreach and communication from local law enforcement is slim to none, and that is a 

dangerous situation. So we look forward to your recommendations 

on that. 

Senator Collins mentioned something at the beginning, and I am 

just going to do it quickly because I know we are both concerned 

about this, and this is to come back to your report. You did a great 

service by identifying the enemy here and saying, yes, it was alQaeda. But more broadly, it is an ideology, which is violent 

Islamist extremism. That is what inspired the attacks of 9/11 and 

has continued to inspire this myriad of attacks large and small 

since then. And I thought you made a substantial contribution 

when you said, ‘‘We are not fighting terrorism, some generic evil.’’ 

27 

We are fighting an ideology, if you will, a corruption of a theology. 

You also said, ‘‘Our strategy must match our means to two ends: 

Dismantling the al-Qaeda network and prevailing in the longer 

term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.’’ That 

is a direct quote from your report. Talk about frustration. We have 

been so frustrated that the Administration continues to resist identifying the ideology, preferring instead to say that we are in a conflict with violent extremism. Well, it is violent extremism, but it is 

a particular kind of extremism. 

In our report on the Fort Hood attack by Hasan, we pointed out 

that the Defense Department has even tried at one point to characterize the threat represented by the Fort Hood attack as workplace 

violence. But, of course, it was a lot more than that. 

So, I guess I understand what is going on here. Somebody thinks 

that if we use the term ‘‘Islamist extremism’’ it is offensive to Muslims. But I think it is quite the opposite because we are talking 

about, as you said, Mr. Kean, a very small group within a larger 

community, certainly here in America, of people who are followers 

of Islam, not Islamist extremism. 

Anyway, I invite a response to this continuing problem. 

Mr. KEAN. Well, we worked on that one. We worked on how to 

characterize it. We had debates on the Commission about it, and 

we did research. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. KEAN. For instance, some people suggested ‘‘jihadist.’’ Well, 

jihadist has some good connotations, too, in the Muslim world. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. KEAN. And so we rejected a lot of these terms. ‘‘Islamist’’ 

does not, and Islamist extremism is what it is. And I think words 

are important and language is important, and I think naming the 

enemy is important. And Islamist extremism is as good a term as 

we have been able to find for actually identifying what the problem 

is and who the people are. And I think everything from our research shows that the community itself accepts that term. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that answer. I have continued to use the term that you used because ‘‘Islamist’’ makes the 

point that a political ideology has exploited a religion. It is not 

Islam. 

Let me ask the last question. The Commission made a great series of recommendations. We were successful in almost every one 

of them of substance, certainly the major ones, in convincing and 

wrestling part of the bureaucracy to accept what you were recommending, but also our colleagues, except when it came to congressional oversight. And this was very disappointing. And then Senator Collins and I, who are very stubborn people, I will say, normally do not yield, but the reaction had been so overwhelming that 

we pulled back a bit. I think that Mary Fetchet and Carie Lemack 

are ready to take up this battle again, and I think it is worth trying to do it because the truth is the oversight in Congress is much 

too diffuse and overlapping, and the consequence of that is that we 

are taking much too much time of the executives, particularly in 

the Department of Homeland Security. So I wanted to ask you if 

you have any thoughts about how to go at this again and about 

whether there is a way in which we can prioritize this. We tried 

28 

to do a lot at the outset, and we got totally defeated. But just give 

me your thoughts about whether you think it still is a problem— 

I assume you do—and whether you have any tactical suggestions 

about how we might take this up again, knowing that these two 

irresistible forces are about to focus on this. 

Mr. KEAN. Mr. Hamilton mentioned why congressional oversight 

is so important and why it has to be effective because you are the 

only oversight there is, really, because the rest of us cannot know 

the information that you know when you are doing your oversight. 

And only you can say how effective it is. If Administration officials 

are really forthcoming in the way that they have to be when they 

talk to you, and if you really feel that you get every answer you 

want and that the oversight is effective, that is great. But we 

thought that it would be much more effective in a number of ways. 

Interestingly enough, we have asked every Director of Homeland 

Security we have met: What can we do for you, how can we help 

you? Their first response is, Can you do something about congressional oversight? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is important 

Mr. KEAN. Because I think it is between 80 and 90 committees 

now that they have some responsibility for, and they all say they 

are spending as much time testifying in some cases when they 

should be protecting us all. And preparing congressional testimony 

takes time, and it takes time testifying, and they are doing a lot 

of it. So that is extraordinarily important, and giving the Intelligence Committee some fiscal responsibility, so if the Administration is not paying attention, it will pay attention, is also, we think, 

very important. So we think it was a top priority when we recommended it. We think it is still a top priority, and anything that 

increases your ability to oversee these intelligence agencies and 

make them perform is a step toward protecting the country and we 

think a very important step. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Hamilton, do you have any thoughts 

about this? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me make two points. One, going back 

to your earlier question, how do you deal with Islamist extremism, 

your comments are well taken. ‘‘Know your enemy’’ is the first rule 

of fighting anybody, and I sometimes think we have a good bit of 

confusion on who the enemy is. 

On the positive side, I want to say that in the war of ideas, I 

think we have made some progress, and the progress is that alQaeda is having a hard time. They are identified as being a violent 

organization that kills a lot of their own people, and I think we are 

making some progress there. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. And it is important progress because they have 

not rallied the masses to their support. So that needs to be said, 

but your basic point is very much on target. 

The second point on the Congress—I think things happen in the 

Congress when the leadership does it, and they do not happen 

when the leadership does not. My perspective is a little more from 

the House, obviously, than from the Senate. And I wonder whether 

or not the key national security officials—the DHS Secretary, the 

intelligence officials, and so forth—have been able to sit down in 

29 

a congenial environment to discuss this problem with the leadership of both the minority and the majority parties. It is such an 

obvious thing that you weaken a department like the DHS when 

you have all the time that they have to spend—you have referred 

to—testifying. And so I think we need to focus our attention on the 

leadership of the bodies. They have to understand that this is a national security problem. They are not dealing here with a political 

problem and domestic consequences. They are dealing with trying 

to improve the national security of the United States, putting it on 

a firmer basis. I was told at one time that every single Senator sits 

on some committee dealing with homeland security oversight. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You are probably right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not know if that is exactly right or not, but 

it is pretty close to it, and if it is, it is an absolute absurdity. But 

that is not the problem. The problem is you are undermining the 

effectiveness of homeland security. So, Senator, I just do not know 

any way to get at it except impressing upon the leadership the necessity of doing this for the national security interests of the 

United States. And the leadership has enormous problems in both 

bodies, but if I may be so blunt, they tend to look at so many of 

these problems as an internal political problem they have to solve 

in order to maintain their position in the caucus leadership. I am 

not naive about that. But this is a different quality problem, I believe, and we have to get that across to both party leaderships. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very helpful and something for us 

to work on because the truth is the leaders have not made an attempt at this with everything else going on since the legislation 

was first considered in 2004, and the truth is they did not make 

much of an attempt at it then, really hardly any attempt, because 

they were working so hard at getting the rest of the legislation 

passed, that this was why take on this fight. And it is also true 

that the people who have the most interest in seeing this fixed, 

which is the leadership of the Homeland Security Department, in 

some sense the DNI, always have other priorities. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Sure. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It may be the immediate budget priority. 

It may be a legislative priority. But we have to work together to 

make another try at this, and I agree, it has to come from the leadership. I thank you for that. 

When you were talking both about the reaction of the Muslim 

community but also about al-Qaeda and the ideology, it struck me 

that we should at least note that in the last few months there has 

been this remarkable development in the Arab world, in the Islamic world that is directly relevant to what we are talking about. 

I know that people say, well, where are the moderate voices within 

the Muslim world? Well, the truth is that, though we have not, I 

think, seen it that way, what happened in Tunisia and Egypt is 

really a very loud outcry by—they are not just moderate. They are 

not focused on religion. There may be some who are focused on religion in the movements, but the leaders in both cases—I had the 

opportunity with Senator McCain to visit about a month ago both 

countries—are very focused on political freedom, economic opportunity, and essentially getting their countries into the modern 

world. And they view Islamist extremism as regressive. 

30 

Now, some of them are religious, of course, but that is quite different, as we were saying before, and in some sense—I know this 

is hopeful thinking, optimistic thinking—what is happening now I 

think is a profound repudiation of the ideology of Islamist extremism, much more widespread than any of us are capable of. So 

that is a final statement by me. 

I do not know if either of you want to comment on that. 

Mr. HAMILTON. You articulated it much better than I did, but I 

think that is a hugely important development. 

Mr. KEAN. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And I think it really cries out to us to do 

whatever we can to be supportive. 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. These are very proud movements. Ultimately, the people in Tunisia and Egypt, and hopefully in Libya 

soon, will determine their own destiny. But they may need some 

technical assistance and economic support. They are looking for investment from the United States. I think finally you will both get 

a kick out of hearing that when Senator McCain and I were in Tunisia, we met with a group of the leaders of the uprising there, and 

one of them said to us, ‘‘Senators, we want to ask you if you could 

help us to get one American who we would most like to come and 

speak to us here in Tunisia.’’ And I thought to myself, ‘‘Now, who 

is this going to be?’’ And the answer: Mark Zuckerberg. [Laughter.] 

Mr. KEAN. Really? Modernity. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, first off, he represented the new 

world of telecommunications, but in some sense, Facebook had provided them with what I might call the weapons in their peaceful 

revolution. It is quite remarkable. 

Mr. KEAN. Well, that is a wonderful story. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I am very hopeful. 

I cannot thank the two of you enough for everything you have 

done and your testimony. It has been very specifically helpful to 

focus our review that will go on for the rest of this year. We are 

going to keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days for additional questions and statements. 

Thank you again very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(31) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: IS INTELLIGENCE 

REFORM WORKING? PART I 

THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good 

afternoon and thanks to all of you, particularly our three witnesses, 

for being here. 

This is one in a series of hearings our Committee is doing this 

year as we approach the 10th anniversary of the attacks against 

America on September 11, 2001, and the purpose of these hearings 

is to examine how well the national security reforms implemented 

in the wake of 9/11 are working. 

This particular hearing, of course, is being held in the aftermath 

of a spectacularly successful collaboration between our intelligence 

and military agencies that resulted in locating and killing Osama 

bin Laden, the al-Qaeda leader who presided, of course, over the 

9/11 attacks on America. 

This success required intense and focused cooperation among key 

intelligence agencies and the Defense Department, as well as other 

related agencies throughout our government. 

Each organization, as we go back and are debriefed on this mission, brought its distinct assets and expertise to bear on the mission, which was to locate Osama bin Laden and then to capture or 

kill him. And when it comes to intelligence, sufficient material was 

brought together to reach informed conclusions with a level of confidence that enabled the President of the United States to make a 

tough call, but one that he felt the evidence enabled him to make 

decisively, that resulted in this remarkable success. 

I do not believe that all of this would have happened 10 years 

ago. In fact, in the 9/11 Commission report, the authors expressed 

frustration that, as they reviewed our government at that time, no 

one was actually in charge of the hunt for Osama bin Laden, which 

symbolized to the Commission the dysfunction and disunity that 

they concluded contributed to the 9/11 attacks in the first place. 

32 

In response to the 9/11 Commission’s criticisms, this Committee 

drafted and Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. There was then, and there is still 

today, another body of Congress called the House of Representatives, and there was another committee there that drafted similar 

legislation, headed at the time by one of our three witnesses, Congresswoman Harman. It results in the most sweeping intelligence 

reform since the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency after 

the Second World War. 

I think the most important reform in the 2004 Act was the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, with the 

aim of bringing together and coordinating the efforts of our 16 intelligence agencies and offices under one leader to make sure they 

work toward the single goal of collecting and analyzing intelligence 

to better protect our national security. So the purpose of the hearing today really is to take a look at how the ODNI is doing. 

I am going to include the rest of my statement in the record except to say that I feel particularly grateful that we have the witnesses that we have before us today, really three people who are 

particularly well prepared to assist us in answering the questions 

we are posing, which is how has the ODNI done and what improvements, if any, by statute or regulation are necessary. 

First, as I mentioned, former Representative Jane Harman was 

the Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence, where she worked closely with us, as I said, on the 

2004 Act. She later chaired the House Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, and has now gone on to be the head of 

the Wilson Center, at which she is already doing a great job. 

General Michael Hayden, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, former Director of the National Security Agency, 

and former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, really a great, if I may say so, national asset, always a help to this 

Committee in its deliberations. 

And John Gannon, former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production and really one of our Nation’s 

top experts on intelligence analysis. 

We thank all of you for coming today. We look forward to your 

testimony about where we are and where we need to go to ensure 

that our intelligence community consistently performs at the high 

levels, the kind of levels that we saw demonstrated in the hunt for 

and taking down of Osama bin Laden. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to follow the Chairman’s lead and also do only an abbreviated version of my opening statement. Let me begin by echoing his comments about the distinguished panel that we have before us today. I, too, am particularly delighted to see former Representative Jane Harman here with us. As the Chairman has indicated, she was one of the four authors of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and worked very closely with 

us through extraordinarily intensive negotiations that spanned sevVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
33 

eral months. General Hayden has given so much work and effort 

to his country, and he also was a key behind-the-scenes player as 

we drafted that bill. And, of course, as the Chairman has indicated, 

Mr. Gannon has had a stellar career in the intelligence community. 

I am confident that all three of our witnesses will help us do the 

evaluation that we are undertaking today. 

Last week’s welcome news that Osama bin Laden was killed 

demonstrates exactly the kind of successful collaboration of intelligence and operations that we envisioned in reforming our capabilities and restructuring the intelligence community in the wake 

of the attacks on our country in 2001. This certainly was a great 

victory for our intelligence efforts and a great blow to al-Qaeda. 

But the fact remains that al-Qaeda is not going away, and that 

is why it is time for Congress to closely examine and build upon 

the successes that have emanated from the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act, identify any shortcomings, and work to 

correct them and to build in further reforms. 

As the Chairman has indicated, our 2004 law created the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism 

Center to foster information sharing and collaboration among our 

security partners not only across the Federal Government but also 

at all levels of government. 

The DNI has made some concrete progress integrating the 16 

agencies in the intelligence community. I want to give just two examples of how that integration is taking place. They are not the 

kinds of examples that the public is generally aware of, but when 

you talk to those working in the intelligence community, these frequently come up. 

In 2008, the DNI rolled out the innovative ‘‘A–Space,’’ which is 

an intelligence analyst’s Facebook. But instead of being used for social networking, our intelligence experts are posting, sharing, and 

asking each other about topical issues. They can collaborate with 

colleagues across agencies and around the world, allowing them to 

share leads and resources more easily than ever. 

A second example is the National Counterterrorism Center’s creation of ‘‘pursuit teams’’ that map terrorist networks, track threats 

using information from across intelligence agencies to bridge the 

gaps between national and domestic intelligence and help to put 

the pieces of the intelligence puzzle together. 

These are just two examples of innovative ways that the stovepipes have been broken. I completely agree with the Chairman that 

I doubt that the kind of integrated operation that was successful 

in going after Osama bin Laden could have existed a decade ago. 

So I think that we have indeed made progress, and there are other 

examples as well. The arrests of Mr. Zazi and Mr. Headly are two 

other cases where the dots were connected. 

On the other hand, this Committee’s investigation and report on 

the Fort Hood shootings showed that we still have a ways to go in 

other areas, particularly in information sharing between the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other members of the intelligence 

community. We concluded that the Department of Defense and the 

FBI collectively had sufficient information to have detected Major 

Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism, but that the 

Department of Defense and the FBI failed to act effectively toVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
34 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Harman appears in the Appendix on page 400. 

gether on the many red flags signaling that he had become a potential threat. 

So the bottom line is that almost 10 years since the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and 7 years since our landmark legislation, 

our Nation is much safer, but we clearly are not yet safe. And that 

is why it is incumbent upon all of us to re-evaluate the law and 

to look at where we are and where we need to go. 

Finally, let me just end with one comment that continues to be 

of concern to me. When we drafted the Intelligence Reform Act, we 

described the DNI as the quarterback that the 9/11 Commission 

envisioned and that we intended. At our earlier oversight hearing, 

the two leaders of that Commission, Governor Kean and Representative Hamilton, made the point that some of the functions that we 

envisioned the DNI carrying out are, in fact, being done by John 

Brennan out at the White House. And that troubles me not due to 

any doubts about Mr. Brennan’s capabilities, but because that 

structure undermines the statutory role of the DNI. 

So a basic question that we must ask is whether changes to the 

law are required or whether it is simply a matter of more fidelity 

to the spirit and the letter of the 2004 law in order to realize the 

potential of the DNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Well said. 

Congresswoman Harman, it is great to have you here on the 

other side of the table. Welcome back. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE HARMAN,1 FORMER REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA AND CHAIR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not used to being 

on the other side of the table. You and I, Senator Collins, and Representative Pete Hoekstra were at the same table day and night as 

we crafted what is now called IRTPA, which I think is probably the 

worst acronym ever invented. 

Again, it is a pleasure to testify with a good friend before dear 

friends and dedicated former colleagues who serve on one of the 

most important and bipartisan committees in the Senate. I now 

work in a bipartisan institution and pinch myself every day to be 

so lucky and to succeed our former colleague, Lee Hamilton, at that 

job. I am passionate about the topic of your hearing; intelligence 

and intelligence reform were the focus of my 17 years—which is 

119 dog years—in the House of Representatives. I did not run an 

intelligence agency like Mike Hayden, and I was not a top analyst 

like John Gannon. But I did try to conduct, as you do, careful oversight over the intelligence function during my 8 years on the House 

Intelligence Committee and my 8 years on the House Homeland 

Security Committee. 

I agree with both of you that although 24, or perhaps more, heroic Navy SEALS deserve our Nation’s gratitude for the capture 

and kill of the world’s most wanted man last week, the information 

on which their mission was based derived, in most part, from the 

35 

integration of people and ‘‘ints’’ achieved by the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 

We now have proof—I think we had some proof before, but we 

now have big-time proof that IRTPA works—that, at its best, our 

intelligence community can achieve the seamlessness that its authors, including me, dreamed of. 

In fact, my view is that had we not passed IRTPA and had we 

continued to operate the intelligence community using the 1947 

business model set out in the National Security Act, we would 

probably not have been able to thwart a number of plots or take 

down Osama bin Laden. 

Let me focus briefly on three issues: First, both of you have addressed the performance of the Director of National Intelligence. By 

the way, I take credit for the name of DNI. Originally, it was supposed to be National Intelligence Director, which I thought sounded 

like a bug. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is interesting. I take credit for that, too. 

[Laughter.] 

We probably had the same thought. 

Senator COLLINS. And I am the one who actually did it. [Laughter.] 

Ms. HARMAN. It was a good start. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think we can all agree that Pete Hoekstra had nothing to do with it. [Laughter.] 

Ms. HARMAN. Moving along, second, let me talk about something 

Senator Collins mentioned, which is the role of domestic intelligence agencies and, third, some ongoing issues involving congressional oversight—of course, not involving the two of you. 

As for the DNI, I think the DNI continues to be a work in 

progress. Congress intended her or him to be a joint commander. 

A quarterback is a good analogy, but I recall our modeling this 

after the Goldwater-Nichols law that created the joint command 

across four military services, and it works very well, I believe, at 

DOD. So we envisioned a joint commander, not a huge bureaucracy 

by a joint commander across 16 intelligence agencies—far more 

than a coordinator, and a job that clearly required leadership 

skills. 

IRTPA is not perfect, but I believe it contains adequate authorities to give the DNI the necessary leverage she or he needs to get 

the job done. I have often said that the function is 50 percent law 

and 50 percent leadership. 

Congress intended, as I think both of you said, that the DNI 

serves as the principal intelligence adviser to the President. Those 

authorities were, I think, clarified and enhanced when the President, President Bush, issued Executive Order 12333, and that was 

the intention of Congress and clearly the intention of President 

Bush as well. This has never really happened. I believe that during 

the Bush Administration, Vice President Cheney was the principal 

intelligence adviser, and as Senator Collins said, during this Administration, John Brennan, the counterterrorism coordinator in 

the White House, is the principal intelligence adviser. In my view, 

neither President has adequately valued the DNI role, nor has either President made an adequate effort to support the mission. 

This is something I think Congress and those of us who agree with 

36 

Congress should push harder on. It is not to diminish the reputation and power of the people in the White House who have assumed the role, but we established a person who is confirmed by 

Congress and accountable to Congress to take that job, and I think 

we should push harder to make certain that person actually has 

the full job. 

Let me raise a few issues that I think are important that the 

DNI is addressing. 

First, DNI James Clapper has suggested—and I would urge that 

this happen—that the National Intelligence Program be taken out 

of the Defense Department and added to the DNI’s budget. I think 

that this will achieve more efficiency and promote more accountability. 

Second, I think the issue of right-sizing the DNI staff is being 

handled well, and we should move on to other topics. We should 

also, by the way, reduce the use of outside contractors. 

Third, when General David Petraeus moves to the CIA role, and 

CIA Director Leon Panetta becomes the Secretary of Defense, hopefully we will finally cement a good working relationship between 

the CIA Director and the Secretary of Defense. This was impossible 

in 2004 because the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld implacably opposed the law and the then-Chairman of the House Armed 

Services Committee, Duncan Hunter, also did. We had to work 

around them to achieve what we did, and I thought it was pretty 

darn good. 

And, finally DNI Clapper urges that we reduce the number of reports to Congress. I know how those reports get into statutes, and 

I know what they mean politically to the members who add them. 

But I think consolidating them will save time and resources and 

enhance the focus on the mission. 

I want to keep to my time, so let me just move to another subject, and that is, our domestic intelligence agencies. I think, as Senator Collins said, that there are ongoing problems with vertical intelligence sharing. This is going better, especially because you are 

doing some great oversight. I think that the Fort Hood massacre, 

as you said, could have perhaps been prevented if there had been 

better collaboration between DOD and the FBI, and the especially 

weak player is the intelligence and analysis function in the Department of Homeland Security. We need much more work, and I want 

to thank your staff and you for the work you did on helping to pass 

the reducing overclassification bill last year, which was signed into 

law by President Barack Obama in October. 

Finally, on congressional oversight, this Committee, your Committee, has far more jurisdiction than its House counterpart on 

which I served for 8 years. But I do not believe either committee 

in the Senate or House has adequate jurisdiction. We know why 

this happens. No one wants to give up any jurisdiction. But I actually think that reorganizing this function in the Congress would, 

one, carry out a strong recommendation of the 9/11 Commission; 

but also, two, give us a much better shot of providing the oversight 

necessary to be sure that the intelligence community will get the 

job done and help us protect our homeland. 

I agree with Senator Collins that while last week’s news is fabulous, it will not diminish the threats to our homeland, and it probVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
37 

1The prepared statement of General Hayden appears in the Appendix on page 403. 

ably will not diminish the potency of al-Qaeda, although that potency I believe will now move from Pakistan to other places like 

Yemen, where al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is emerging, in 

my view as the part of al-Qaeda that is doing the most work both 

to inspire and train people to attack us in the homeland. 

Let me finally conclude by saying that there is no way to make 

our homeland 100 percent safe. What we can do is minimize risk, 

and we are doing that. We need to constantly re-evaluate the 

threats against the United States and to prioritize our investments. 

We are not making a lot more brain cells. Those that we have have 

to be applied against the top threats, and surely we are in a resource crunch, and our resources must be carefully marshaled. 

Let me close by recognizing the heroically brave women and men 

of our intelligence community who put their lives on the line every 

day for our country—often in austere places around the world, living apart from their families. Surely CIA Director Panetta, DNI 

Clapper, President Obama, some Members of Congress, and others, 

should take a lot of credit for last week’s activities. But the true 

heroes were those in the field, not just the Navy SEALs but those 

in the field who put together the clues that led to the information, 

that tracked the couriers, that found the house, that found Osama 

bin Laden, and they deserve our heartfelt thanks. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Hear, hear. Thank you. And if I may, that 

gave the President a sufficient level of confidence in the information he had to order that the raid occur. Thank you for that excellent statement. 

General Hayden, it is great to welcome you back. Thank you for 

being here, and we look forward to your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL V. HAYDEN,1 FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND 

FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

General HAYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good to 

see all of you again. 

Let me begin by attempting to scope the problem. We sometimes 

look as if we are trying to repair a community that was totally dysfunctional, and what I want to describe is I think what the legislation attempted to do was to balance two things, both of which are 

virtues, and two things which any complex organization has to balance, and that is, simply the unity of effort for the whole and autonomy of action for the parts. And both of those are good things. 

Both need to be protected. And I think the macro judgment was 

that we were more than a brick shy of a load when it came to unity 

of effort for the whole, and that was the intent of the legislation. 

The real problem is, I think, what we are trying to do is to build 

what some of our younger analysts and case officers would describe 

as a networked organization, which very frequently looks and acts 

like it is leaderless or has many leaders. And, unfortunately, the 

only way we can get from here to there is to actually have very 

strong leadership in order to create this kind of organization. 

38 

And so what the Nation decided and what you sponsored and fostered in 2004 was another path to that balance, not the DCI path 

but the DNI path. 

I think those of us in the community were a bit nervous about 

that. We were quite busy at the time. We actually thought that the 

DCI had some real authorities and did provide a fair amount of 

glue. But even those of us who had our doubts recognized that if 

we needed more glue, if we needed more unity of effort, the then 

current model, the DCI, was probably going to be inadequate simply because the DCI had full-time day work as the Director of the 

CIA, and it would be very hard for anyone, almost superhuman, to 

reach above that role and both psychologically and physically play 

the role of coaching the entire community. 

But you had a real daunting challenge on your hands because 

whatever glue we had in 2004, whatever centripetal forces we were 

able to create in the community, came from the fact that the head 

of the community, the DCI, also headed the CIA, and that ‘‘C’’ still 

meant ‘‘central’’ and that he was in that core position inside the 

community. And, of course, the decision was made, whatever else 

the DNI was going to be, he was not even going to have his office 

at Langley let alone run the CIA. So you really had a difficult challenge to pull us out of this course, put us on another, and put 

enough bricks in his backpack that he had enough authority to get 

beyond what the old model had provided us. 

Beyond that, as existentially difficult as that was, this has actually been harder than it should have been. We were at war, and, 

therefore, it is kind of hard to restructure when your daily operations tempo is so important. But there is another, I think more 

subtle challenge because we are at war. Three or four of those really big organizations that you care a lot about, and most of whose 

first initials are ‘‘N,’’ are actually in the Department of Defense. As 

mentioned, I was the Director of NSA, and I would not say we were 

schizophrenic, but we did have a duality in our personality. We 

were the National Security Agency, but we were also directed to 

act as a combat support agency. 

In many ways, your law was trying to strengthen the national 

character, to bring folks, organizations under the Director of National Intelligence. It is inevitable that after 9 years of war, the 

combat support character of those organizations becomes more and 

more dominant. There is nothing wrong with that. That is actually 

a good thing. We would all agree, we would all foster it. But it is 

not quite a convergence with the course of action that you set out 

in terms of strengthening the DNI. 

There are other things that made this harder. We have had four 

DNIs in 6 years. That cannot help. We have had four DCIAs in 6 

years. That cannot help either. I think one of the most powerful 

phrases in your legislation was the role you gave to the DNI to recommend the DCIA to the President. I just told you we have had 

four and four. I can think of only one example where the DNI actually recommended the head of the CIA to the President of the 

United States, and that was John Negroponte recommending me to 

be DCIA instead of his Deputy, and we overlapped for only 6 

months after I took that job. That is actually pretty important. 

39 

And, finally—and I am fearful of being too self-referential here— 

my old job, the PD–DNI, the Principal Deputy, I think is really important because those two tasks you gave the DNI, senior intelligence adviser to the President and smooth functioning of the intelligence community, those are really hard. And that deputy function is really important. For over half the life of this legislation, 

that deputy position has been vacant. That has real impact on, I 

think as you said, Senator Collins, effecting the intent of the law 

rather than trying to change the legislation. 

Now, all that said, I think there has been some really good news 

with regard to the DNI. It exists and is accepted, and, frankly, in 

2005, when I was Principal Deputy, that was not a given throughout the community. 

The NCTC has already been mentioned as a signal success, and 

I think that is right, and there will probably be questions on it as 

we go further. 

Imagine, if you will, trying to create the NCTC, which fundamentally is characterized by the mingling of foreign intelligence with 

domestic law enforcement. Try to picture that if it reported not to 

the DNI, but if it reported to the DCI, who was also the head of 

CIA, and therefore, was your foreign espionage chief. American political culture would have rejected that like a foreign object. And 

so the DNI structure has actually enabled the success of the NCTC. 

The DNI has also kind of thrown his body from time to time in 

front of really big trains. I can recall Director Mike McConnell 

spending about 18 months on legislation with which you are all familiar—FISA reform. That could not have been done by any sitting 

Director of NSA. Only the DNI could have brought the gravitas of 

the community to that discussion. 

This again sounds a bit personal, but it is very real. Every day 

I was a DCIA, I thanked God there was a DNI. I had no idea how 

anybody could be a DCIA and also be head of the American intelligence community. You talked about the recent success and used 

the term ‘‘quarterback.’’ I think I am a little more comfortable with 

the term ‘‘coach’’ to describe the DNI. And I think it is clear—I was 

not on the inside, but from all the accounting, I think it is clear 

that Director Panetta was the quarterback for this effort. 

There is an echo of that—if you recall al-Kibar, the Syrian nuclear reactor in eastern Syria that was ultimately destroyed. When 

that came up, Director McConnell and I worked very closely, but 

he, in fact, empowered me to act on behalf of him because this was 

at the operational level. And I do not know that we want the DNI 

routinely playing at that level. 

There are other things the DNI has set in motion. Sharing in 

something that is called ICD File 502, which sounds like coded language to most folks in the room, but it is a process which allows 

over time the bureaucracies to more readily, more facilely share information. Joint duty is another thing that has been set in motion 

and that over time will change the culture of the community. Not 

possible without the current structure. 

There probably are some tinkerings in the law that someone 

might consider. I will not suggest any. I think that should come out 

of the sitting DNI. But some things that come to mind, if there is 

anything you need to do to get the National Intelligence Program 

40 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Gannon appears in the Appendix on page 406. 

more fully under the DNI and out of the DOD budget, if there is 

some legal impediment I am not aware of, that is probably a very 

good thing. 

We have already mentioned that we are cooperating pretty well 

east to west at the national level. But the new threat is going to 

require more cooperation north to south. And how better do we 

share between national, State, local, and tribal assets? I do not 

know that there are legal impediments, but if there are, I think 

that would be a great help. 

All that said, I think I agree with something that both of you 

suggested. We are going to succeed or fail more on intangibles than 

we are on the precise letter of the law, as important as that is. The 

three intangibles that most come to mind to me are: 

First, the personality of the DNI. That really matters, who that 

person is. 

Second is the relationship of the DNI with the DCIA. That has 

got to work. My shorthand is the DNI owes the DCIA room to run, 

and the DCIA owes the DNI total transparency. 

Then finally, as already suggested, whatever shortcomings there 

may be in the law, everything is fixed if the DNI is—and everyone 

knows him to be—the President’s senior intelligence adviser without question. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, General Hayden. That 

was great. 

Mr. Gannon, thanks again for being here and please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. GANNON,1 FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE AT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY 

Mr. GANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will also 

summarize the statement I provided for the record. 

In my view overall, the performance of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community has improved dramatically since 9/11. Analytic and 

operational tradecraft have advanced significantly. Performance in 

counterterrorism programs has reached the highest standard of 

professionalism and dedication. The application of technology has 

broadened, deepened, and accelerated. Interagency collaboration, 

especially in support of the warfighter, has improved markedly. 

And progress toward a more distributed model of intelligence support to users anywhere in the world is palpable and encouraging. 

The fusion of intelligence, the synergy of well-trained people and 

advanced technology, and the interagency teamwork in Afghanistan and Iraq are at their highest level ever—a level that seemed 

unattainable when I left government. 

The creation of the DNI has contributed significantly to this 

progress, but other leaders and individual agencies—with administration and congressional support—also have taken impressive 

steps on their own. The Department of Defense won congressional 

approval to establish in 2002, the position of Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence to improve management of its considerable 

intelligence assets and programs. Most significantly, in my view, 

41 

the Secretary of Defense elevated the authority and boosted the 

budget of the Joint Special Operations Command to provide in the 

field a strong coalescing leadership, a clear chain of command, and 

a powerful authority to coordinate focused requirements for intelligence collection and analysis. I would risk the outside judgment 

that the cooperation of CIA, including its Counterterrorism Center, 

with the JSOC has never been closer or more effective. While there 

is always room for improvement in the intelligence business, the 

strong, collaborative performance of our agencies ‘‘down range’’ 

today is unprecedented and a source of justifiable pride for the intelligence community. 

The domestic picture, in my view, is mixed. The key difference 

with ‘‘down range’’ is that there is no JSOC counterpart in the 

homeland to integrate intelligence processes and products. The FBI 

has built an impressive intelligence infrastructure and has shifted 

significant resources, once wholly devoted to law enforcement, to 

domestic intelligence collection and analysis. The National 

Counterterrorism Center has made significant progress in integrating foreign and domestic intelligence and analysis. The Department of Homeland Security, with its 22 constituent agencies sometimes taking initiative on their own, has made commendable 

strides in border security and some, but uneven, progress in sharing threat-based information and coordinating policy with State 

and local governments and the private sector. Overall, however, domestic agencies do not show the strong unity of effort that is evident in theaters of conflict abroad. Domestic intelligence and security is a much slower work in progress. 

The DNI should be seen as a leader with explicit responsibilities 

for clearly defined oversight of IC performance, for the development 

and application of interagency program standards, and for the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. We are not yet 

there, in my view. I believe, however, we can do much better. We 

should recall that the IRTPA was passed into law after decades of 

debate about the inability of successive DCIs to manage the intelligence community. The IC today is challenged by historic geopolitical change, a globally dispersed threat environment, and a 

technological revolution that is enabling even minor adversaries to 

hurt us as never before. The DNI has the potential to help agencies 

to achieve a unity of effort in this challenging environment. 

To be optimized, the DNI roles and responsibilities should be tied 

clearly to defensible IC strategic priorities and requirements. The 

DNI’s leadership must be authoritative with regard to these ICwide priorities but not intrusive in agency-specific matters. It must 

recognize the distributed and networked nature of intelligence support around the world today. And, most importantly, in my view, 

the incumbent must have the visible and sustained backing of both 

the White House and the Congress, and it is questionable whether 

the DNI has this now. This in my judgment has been a major obstacle to progress. 

The DNI may need additional authorities. I believe his management of the NIP, for example, would be strengthened if it were 

moved from the defense budget to the ODNI. In a period of tightening budgets, he will need clearer authorities and powerful top 

42 

cover to evaluate and prioritize key programs for growth, reduction, 

and elimination, a role he has a unique potential to perform. 

At this juncture, however, rather than simply add authorities, I 

believe it would be more useful in a period of IC leadership transition to take a step back and consider ways to get the intelligence 

community, White House, and congressional priorities aligned to 

enable and support the DNI on this hazardous mission. 

I would cite several priority areas in addition to the NIP management and cross-agency program evaluation on which the DNI is 

uniquely positioned to help improve IC performance and enhance 

U.S. national security: 

Balancing strategic versus tactical collection and analysis, which 

in my view has gone too far in the tactical direction. 

Equipping trained analysts for the Information Age, meaning 

giving them greater and full Internet access to social media and to 

outside experts, which I think is essential against the challenges 

we face today. 

Strengthening commitment to science and technology in an era 

when we are subject more than ever to technological surprise. 

Enhancing training and education for the intelligence profession—that is, with a curriculum that codifies and conveys the body 

of knowledge that defines the intelligence profession itself. 

Adapting security and counterintelligence to the 21st Century, 

pursing the benefit from innovation and avoiding the costs of doing 

it the old way. 

And continued promotion of information sharing across all the 

agencies, and improving intelligence community procurement strategies and policies as well as improving government contract management overall. 

I am glad to say that the DNI is working on all these important 

priorities, but in my judgment, he will need help to deliver the best 

results. And it should matter to all of us that he succeeds. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gannon. Your statement 

and the others prepared will be part of the record, and we appreciate the time and thought that you gave to your statements. 

We will do a 7-minute round of questions here. 

General Hayden, I think I want to start with you, picking up on 

one thing you said, reminding us that the DNI has two major functions: One is to be the senior intelligence adviser to the President, 

and the other is to be, whatever term we choose, coach, manager, 

leader, quarterback, of the intelligence community. 

You have been pretty close to the functioning of the DNI since 

it came into effect, and first I want to say that you are absolutely 

right. One of the shortcomings over the last period of time, which 

is not in the law but in its implementation, is that for too long the 

Principal Deputy position at the DNI has been vacant, and that 

really means that either we are putting these two functions in a 

very burdensome way on the DNI himself, or he is not going to be 

able to do the two. And either he is going to do both not as well 

as it should be done, or he is going to fail in one or not do as well 

as he should. 

How would you assess the function of the DNI as the senior intelligence adviser to the President in practice? You talked about 

43 

this a little before. The CIA is a big agency with a lot of history 

and a lot of assets, so that is the muscle they have. But from what 

you know, to the extent you can talk about it from the inside, has 

the DNI actually ended up being, since we created the position, the 

senior intelligence adviser to the President? 

General HAYDEN. I think it has gone back and forth. It is very 

much dependent upon the personality of the President and the personality of the DNI. 

The first thing is the DNI has to choose where he is going to 

shift his weight. Does he shift it downtown? I mean, that is, frankly, how to draw the picture. Or does he shift it back out at headquarters? 

There is an incredibly powerful gravitational pull downtown, and 

that is not out of pride from the DNI. That is out of the demand 

of the President and the National Security Council staff. 

My experience, to show you how difficult this was, I was generally always there—not in the morning briefings. That was generally a DNI show. But a lot of decisions get made at the Deputy’s 

level, the Principal’s level at the NSC, and I was almost always invited. And so I am there with Admiral McConnell. Literally, the 

President or Steve Hadley would say, ‘‘OK, the two Mikes, you go 

first.’’ And Mike McConnell would talk, and then if I had anything 

to add, I would add. But we were both there. 

Admiral McConnell was really disadvantaged. I am sitting on top 

the Nation’s premier analytical service. Admiral McConnell is up 

the road reading books. I am putting somebody in the back of the 

car with me explaining the details we are running down because 

I have the analytical staff to do that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

General HAYDEN. So there is a bit of a tension there, a bit of an 

anomaly. But you have to work through it. Remember that transparency and freedom of action between the two? The DCIA and the 

DNI have to be friends, and the DNI does not get to do job two, 

which is smooth functioning of the community, unless everyone believes he is the one responsible for job one. He gains power for the 

second task from his performance of the first. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree. Obviously we wanted the DNI to 

be the principal intelligence adviser to the President because the 

gathering of intelligence goes beyond the Central Intelligence Agency, even though it has the most personnel and the most assets in 

the community. 

Is the DNI’s presence at the daily intelligence brief to the President critically important to this fact? I mean, that is not in the 

statute. Well, it is, actually, generally in the statute. But there is 

latitude. 

General HAYDEN. First of all, Mr. Chairman, this depends on the 

personality of the President. All presidents deal with this in a different way. President Bush was very interactive, was face to face, 

it was that human contact. I think President Obama is a bit more 

cerebral and likes printed material and so on. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General HAYDEN. So you have to accommodate the character of 

the President. But I do think it is very important—let me be very 

precise—that the DNI be represented in those morning briefings, 

44 

either he or the Deputy. But on balance, I think it needs to be the 

DNI more often than not. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Congresswoman Harman or Mr. Gannon, 

do you want to get into that discussion about the interplay of the 

senior adviser to the President and coordinator of the intel community? Ms. Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. We have seen good stories and bad stories. There 

was a tension between DNI Dennis Blair and CIA Director Leon 

Panetta that wasted a lot of time about what you call people who 

are forward deployed in our embassies. I thought that was a stupid 

fight, I really did, and certainly nothing we imagined when we 

formed the law. 

It seems to me that, as I said in my testimony, the DNI role has 

never been adequately valued by either president during the time 

of the law, either President Bush or President Obama, and that is 

something we should push for. 

But, second, my term at the DNI is the joint commander. I think 

her or his job is to leverage the strengths of the other agencies. If 

you are a good CEO, you do not do all the work yourself. You help 

those underneath you understand the mission and perform their 

missions well, and then you pull it together, and that is what I see 

is the DNI role. 

Yes, I agree with General Hayden that being part of the President’s daily brief is important, but I do not think the DNI personally has to do it every time. Again, letting other people shine and 

have that face time, too, is the sign of a secure leader. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. You have said twice now that we 

ought to be pushing harder in the face of the fact that neither 

President who has had a DNI yet has used that DNI to the full 

extent that we hoped. Are you thinking additional statutory authority to the DNI? Or is it more trying to make the point to the 

President, if we could, that this is what we intended and this will 

serve him better? 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes, it is the latter. I think that to the extent that 

our law left any ambiguity—and, of course, as one of its authors, 

I thought it was quite swell—that was clarified by—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But not without ambiguity. 

Ms. HARMAN. In the face of implacable opposition by two key 

people in the government at the time, I thought we did extremely 

well. But Executive Order 12333, issued by President Bush and 

supported at the time by then-Candidate Obama, as I recall, was 

an attempt to make even clearer that we intended the DNI to be 

the principal actor in intelligence. 

I mean, you cannot make a President rely on somebody in the 

chair, but as General Hayden has said, you can try to help forge 

the right chemistry between the President and this person. And 

you could also explain as Congress that the person accountable to 

Congress for the failures or successes is the DNI, not the Vice 

President of the United States or the principal counterterrorism officer in the White House. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Gannon, do you want to get into this? 

Mr. GANNON. As the former Deputy Director of Intelligence who 

ran the PDB staff at CIA, I always regarded this daily access to 

the President of the United States as critical to the intelligence 

45 

mission and absolutely essential to the role of a senior intelligence 

adviser to the President. 

By the way, I will add—and I think Mr. Hayden knows this 

well—that it takes tremendous analytic resources to perform this 

role successfully. The substantive role that one plays in the PDB 

forum is very different from the management roles in the intelligence community. All DCIs struggled with this tension, and all of 

them ultimately failed at trying to perform the two functions. 

But I think the problem with the DNI construct now is that the 

DNI does not have adequate analytic resources to serve him in the 

substantive role. What it takes to produce that book every day is 

a tremendous investment of resources and expertise, and they have 

to be serving the person who actually provides the briefing or 

whose deputy provides the briefing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So is the answer to try to provide more 

analytical resources to the DNI? 

Mr. GANNON. That would be my answer to the question, yes. I 

think if the DNI is going to continue to serve in that substantive 

role, he needs to have more resources to do the job. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Because, otherwise, this will naturally 

move to the CIA because they have the analytical—— 

Mr. GANNON. I think there would be a very strong gravitational 

pull in that direction. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK, thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I am listening to this debate, it reminds me that in Washington there are really three levers of power. One is your relationship with the President, and we have talked about the fact—and 

I agree with Representative Harman—that neither President Bush 

nor President Obama has fully valued the DNI as the principal adviser to the President the way we intended in the law. The second 

is control over personnel, and I want to come back to that with an 

example. And the third is control over budget. 

Now, each of you, I believe, made a budget recommendation to 

us. When we wrote the 2004 law, there was a huge dispute over 

whether the intelligence community’s budget should remain with 

DOD and then be doled out, essentially, to the agencies or whether 

it should go through the DNI. And I think—but I want to clarify— 

that each of you are recommending more authority for the DNI in 

this area. So if I could first explore the budget issue and start with 

Representative Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes, moving the so-called NIP into the DNI’s orbit 

is an active recommendation made by the current DNI, Jim Clapper, and I think it would be very helpful. I have not thought about 

whether that requires a change in the statute. I am not sure of 

that. I do not think we know—or what the answer is now? We do 

not know. Imagine that. We do not know. 

But I am one, as I said, who thinks that this is 50 percent law, 

50 percent leadership, so I think we can accomplish a lot of what 

we are trying to achieve unless there is a bar in the statute by just 

getting, hopefully, this President to support DNI Clapper’s recommendation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I have been advised that we have actually 

been in discussion with the DNI about whether there is a need for 

46 

statutory action, and they are not sure. So they are coming back 

to us with an answer, and then we will reason together. 

Senator COLLINS. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, ma’am. You have some tension inside the 

law on the budget. 

Senator COLLINS. Yes. 

General HAYDEN. The verb you picked is great. ‘‘Determine’’ is 

what you decided. And then you have Section 1018, which says 

nothing in here infringes the prerogatives of the cabinet officers in 

which these organizations are located. I am not suggesting to go 

back in and use a wrench to change any of that, but to the degree 

you can in the process foster ‘‘the DNI determines,’’ I think that is 

a very positive thing. 

In terms of shifting the National Intelligence Program out of the 

DOD budget and into an independent account under the DNI, I 

think most people who look at that say it would actually strengthen his authorities in the execution year, which is not a bad thing. 

It may not do a whole lot in the planning or programming year. 

But in the execution year, which is where you kind of look around 

and say who is burning money at the rate they expected and who 

is not, and let me remind everybody, it was my money to begin 

with, that actually might be a very positive thing. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Gannon. 

Mr. GANNON. I agree with all that has been said. I think Jim 

Clapper has made a very persuasive case that I would have probably agreed with even before he made it. And I think in an era now 

of greater stress on the intelligence budget, I think it is important 

in real terms and also symbolically—that he have that budget control. 

Senator COLLINS. I was smiling as General Hayden was talking 

about the language because I remember how difficult it was and 

that we did want the DNI to be responsible for determining the 

budget. But in order to get the bill through, I think we did create 

a compromise or some lack of clarity in order to get the bill accomplished, which sometimes happens. So it will be interesting to see 

if we can perhaps clarify this. 

Let me turn to the personnel issue. As Representative Harman 

has mentioned, at the start of this current Administration, shortly 

after Leon Panetta was confirmed as the CIA Director, the DNI, 

Admiral Blair, issued a directive in which he claims the right to 

select an individual other than a CIA station chief to be the DNI’s 

representative in foreign governments. And this built upon similar 

but far less public efforts that were undertaken by previous DNIs 

Negroponte and McConnell as well. 

But this did blow up into a rather prominent public battle between the DNI and the CIA Director, and the unfortunate, in my 

view, outcome was the White House was forced to choose sides and 

sided with the CIA, which in many ways, in my view, undermined 

the DNI’s ability in the whole area of personnel. 

Who should be in charge of the personnel in the intelligence community in terms of allocating assets? Mr. Gannon, we will start 

with you. 

Mr. GANNON. First of all, I think that the particular case that 

you are citing was badly handled. The outcome need not have been 

47 

what it was. I believe that it could have been managed in a way 

that all parties to this conflict could have gone away with a much 

better feeling. But I think it ended up publicly undermining the 

DNI and doing a lot of damage to his effort to establish authority. 

I think that, because of the nature of the complicated and fastmoving global threat environment that our country now faces, the 

intelligence community needs to be able to move assets, including 

personnel, quickly and the DNI must have the authority to do this. 

I do not have the confidence to say how precisely this should be 

crafted into law, but I think the DNI is the appropriate leader to 

have this authority. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, ma’am. Admiral McConnell and I had that 

very issue for quite a while when we were in office and, unfortunately, just could not get it across the finish line. This is a very 

emotional issue for CIA, and I was doing my duty in terms of representing the Agency’s views, and very frequently my senior staff 

would say, ‘‘You need to take this to Mr. Hadley,’’ or someone else 

in the White House. And my response was, ‘‘Guys, we take this to 

the White House, we lose.’’ I mean, there is no way the White 

House cannot support the DNI in this kind of issue. 

Now, frankly, I think the DNI was wrong. I think it should be 

the station chief. I think our foreign partners expect it to be the 

station chief. But the DNI has a right to be wrong without being 

overruled in such a public, humiliating way by the White House. 

So I agree with Mr. Gannon. It was a very bad thing. 

In terms of moving personnel around in general, falling back a 

little bit on the military model, commanders talk to commanders. 

All right? Commanders do not command troops inside other people’s organizations. So I think the model we might want to think 

of is to make sure the DNI has the authority to demand capabilities of his component commands, and his component commands are 

NSA, NGA, CIA, but to leave those component commanders the 

freedom of movement to how they respond, how they create that 

capacity where the DNI wants it. But he fully should have the authority to demand capacity where he needs it. 

Senator COLLINS. That is a good distinction. Representative Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. I strongly support that last point and also agree 

with Mr. Hayden’s earlier point that the DNI should carefully pick 

her or his fights and hopefully pick the right fights. This was the 

wrong fight. 

All of this feeds the conversation we are having, we have been 

having from the start. I felt, again, given the implacable opposition 

by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and House Armed Services 

Chairman Duncan Hunter, that we did pretty well. We consulted 

closely with an unnamed source then in the Bush Administration 

to make sure we had adequate authorities for the DNI to build the 

budget, not just to execute the budget because moving money, providing money, is how you give somebody power. And I believe we 

had adequate authority there. That Section 1018 was modified or 

clarified later by Executive Order 12333, so I am pretty confident 

that the budget authorities are OK. 

48 

In terms of people, even people for the PDB, if I were the DNI, 

I would use assets that exist among the 16 intelligence agencies to 

help me do what is necessary there. There are excellent analysts 

at the CIA, as has been mentioned. John Gannon knows that extremely well. And they surely were very good at providing information leading up to the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden. So 

those assets can be used by the DNI. There is no prohibition 

against using them. They do not have to move to a different box. 

I think we should be done with moving boxes around, and we 

should insist that the DNI get the respect that person deserves and 

do the job by leveraging the assets of the agencies under her or his 

command. 

Senator COLLINS. Just one final comment, if you will indulge me. 

I also believe that if the intelligence community more fully adopts 

the joint model of the military where in order to advance your career you need joint service, that will help promote those kinds of 

exchanges and willingness to give up talented people as well. 

Ms. HARMAN. Senator Collins, that was in the law. 

Senator COLLINS. Oh, I know. 

Ms. HARMAN. Giving some points for joint service and trying to 

break down, as you said, the stovepipes and promote a need-toshare culture instead of a need-to-know culture. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

One of the other ways in which the law attempted to give the 

DNI authority in a way that would help him or her be a better 

manager or leader of the intelligence community was in the recommendation of personnel throughout the intelligence community. 

General Hayden, just as the beginning of a series of questions, 

you made, I think, a very good point, which is that, to the best of 

your knowledge, the only CIA Director who was actually recommended by the DNI was yourself. And in the other cases, I assume what you are saying is the name came from the President. 

And while the DNI may have formally put his name to the bottom 

of the letter recommending, that is the way it happened. 

General HAYDEN. That is my understanding, Senator, and, frankly, there is nothing wrong with that in an objective sense. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

General HAYDEN. But if you are going to establish that kind of 

relationship—if you have this ideal relationship between the DNI 

and the DCIA, starting off with the one owing nothing to the other 

for being in the position is not a disqualifier, but you are not getting out in front of the pack either. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It makes it harder. You are absolutely 

right. Probably none of us here thinks that General Clapper came 

up with the idea of General Petraeus being the head of the CIA. 

[Laughter.] 

Not that he is opposed to it. I have talked to him about it. I am 

sure he is happy with it. 

This discussion is another piece of evidence, this one that we 

have just had, of the way in which the law can express an aspiration that the Congress has regarding something, but it all depends 

ultimately on how the people in the positions implement it. 

49 

So acknowledging that piece of unaccustomed congressional humility, let me go on to ask you, one other idea that has been suggested to us as we take this look back at the DNI is that we ought 

to extend the authority of the DNI to approve—recommend and/or 

approve personnel throughout the intelligence community below 

the level of the head of the constituent agency, perhaps down to the 

second or third position in the agency. 

What do you all think about that? Let us start with Mr. Gannon. 

Mr. GANNON. I would think that is an idea whose time has not 

yet come. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. No, that did not have any particular charm for 

me either, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Representative Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. I think there are higher priorities, like urging the 

President to fully stand up the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, 

which is required under the law. I would go there before I would 

start an opportunity to pick new fights between the DNI and other 

agencies. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Am I right in interpreting the reaction of 

you to be that actually consistent with what we have just said 

about the DNI relationship to the DCIA, the head of the constituent agency ought to be able to choose his own second and third 

people? 

Mr. GANNON. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Just in terms of their ability to work together. 

Let us go back to this extraordinary experience we have just 

been through with the intelligence leading to the takedown of 

Osama bin Laden. The President designated the Director of the 

CIA, Director Panetta, under Title 50 to be in charge of this operation, even though in the end—and Leon Panetta both privately 

and publicly has gone out of his way to say that he then essentially 

delegated the final part of it to a Title 10 force, which was the Special Operating Command under Admiral William McRaven. 

I suppose the first question I want to ask is whether, consistent 

with what we have been focused on today—I know this is secondguessing on a spectacular success, but whether the President, consistent with the intention of the law we are talking about, really 

should have designated the DNI to be in charge of the hunt for 

Osama bin Laden as opposed to the DCIA. Ms. Harman, do you 

want to start that? We will just go down the row. 

Ms. HARMAN. In organization chart terms, I think the answer to 

that is yes. I think this was a highly risky operation, and there 

were at least plausible reasons to designate someone else. I am just 

guessing that the President has worked longer with Director Panetta than he has with DNI Clapper on a personal basis and figured he not only brought a lot of the assets to the table in terms 

of preparing the information on which the special ops team acted, 

but he also had a strong relationship with Congress and, therefore, 

that made him probably the best guy, especially in the event that 

something went wrong. And so I think this was a call based on personal chemistry more than on an organization chart, and I do not 

fault the President for making it, and the result was spectacular. 

50 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And it worked. 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. All that is true and I agree with it, but I do 

not think it is exclusive. I think it is structural. It is just not personality based. 

If you do it under Title 50, it is a covert action. Executive Order 

12333 says—the President can change this, but what it says right 

now is the only organization of the U.S. Government that conducts 

covert action is the Central Intelligence Agency. So I understand 

why that has gone in that direction. 

I think technically Director Panetta had what is called OPCON, 

which means he is ultimately responsible for it, but he gave Admiral McRaven and his troops TACON. It makes great sense. I cannot 

think of any other way of doing it. 

With regard to the DNI role in this—we actually had this discussion in the Bush Administration, and I know Congresswoman Harman has talked about needing more presidential oomph to the job. 

We actually got a fair amount from President Bush based on my 

recollection. We had a pretty serious debate about this role, and we 

went to the law, and the language in the law is that the DCIA reports to the DNI for all the activities of the Central Intelligence 

Agency. And that is the verb: ‘‘reports.’’ It is not ‘‘authority,’’ ‘‘direction,’’ or ‘‘control,’’ which are also English words that were available, but they were not chosen. 

The ultimate decision—and we had this discussion long before 

going to Abbottabad—is that the DNI has to have total transparency. But covert actions are so sensitive, so delicate, that the 

President—and I suspect this President—wants no one between 

him and the individual carrying out the covert action. And so in 

that sense the DNI is here to offer views as a member of the NSC 

and in an advisory role but not in that chain. We discussed this 

at great length. We really clearly did not want to make this two 

hops rather than one. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Discussing, in other words, this kind of 

action. 

General HAYDEN. That is correct. Title 50 covert action. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. And, again, because the CIA Director is in charge of the operators here. 

General HAYDEN. That is correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Mr. Gannon. 

Mr. GANNON. I have no problem with the way this transpired, 

and I do not think it really had any negative impact on the DNI’s 

authorities. 

As a professional intelligence officer, I always regarded covert action as only partially an intelligence activity. It is supported by the 

National Intelligence Program, so the DNI should play a consultative role. But I think the accountability for covert action belongs 

so acutely to the President that there should not be any layers between him and the CIA Director. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Again, if I may go over my time, I am 

going to ask you, Mr. Gannon, a somewhat related question. I was 

interested in your statement in your testimony that the intelligence 

community has moved to what you called a more distributed model 

51 

of providing intelligence support in which a large number of intelligence agencies and offices provide direct support to policymakers 

and also work closely with the military—in fact, with troops on the 

ground—and that there could be a conflict between that model and 

having a strong central leadership. And I just want to ask you to 

develop that a little bit more. 

Is there necessarily a conflict there? Isn’t there an argument that 

DNI should in any case be the leader ultimately responsible for 

building the distributed network and ensuring that it works properly and, of course, is ultimately accountable for its performance? 

Mr. GANNON. The direct answer to your question is I do not 

think there is necessarily a conflict. My point is that I think we do 

need to understand the evolution of the intelligence community to 

a more decentralized distributed model of intelligence support over 

the past several years. It is not going back. 

Back in the 1990s, when I was managing intelligence analysis 

there really was a preference for the national customer at CIA, and 

I could—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Meaning, just to clarify? 

Mr. GANNON. The national customer means the cabinet-level, 

Washington-based policymaker with the President, the White 

House, at the top and—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. As opposed to the—— 

Mr. GANNON. As opposed to the warfighter, the military establishment. So if I have a request for analytic support say at that 

time, from CINCPAC, I would probably respond with something 

like, ‘‘Well, if you could wait a few days, I will get a sanitized 

version of the product to you.’’ I saw in the 1990s the environment 

change and the customer in the field became more demanding, 

partly because of the digital revolution—we actually could provide 

products in real time; and, second, because diplomats and military 

commanders abroad demanded that we do so. Admiral Dennis 

Blair, for example, was at CINCPAC, and he would say, ‘‘Heck, no, 

I need it now. Look at the challenges that I face’’—this is the postCold War period. I have multiple threats in my AOR. I need to 

have real-time intelligence, and I need to have the best that you 

are giving to the President.’’ 

So what we saw then was a decentralization of intelligence support—CIA was less ‘‘central’’ and other agencies and sources of information played larger roles. 

In the prolonged Balkans conflict, we saw the demand was not 

only to get information out there in realtime, but to actually have 

intelligence capability in place in the field where folks there could 

levy intelligence requirements and get a timely, tailored response. 

That is what I was talking about with reference to the JSOC model 

in Afghanistan or about what Mike Hayden and I meant by the 

IC’s networked environment. So my point is that I think we can 

sort of lighten up about how much we want a DNI to control. The 

distributed or networked system is working very well, and a DNI 

should be nurturing at a strategic level, not trying to control it at 

a tactical level. He should be looking for gaps to close to better enable it, to better resource it, and to grow capabilities for the intelligence. But I do not think there is any way we are going to get 

52 

back to the old days when you had a centrally controlled system 

of intelligence support. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. And I hear you saying that we 

should not try to get back to that, but—— 

Mr. GANNON. No. It is just a question of—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. The world has gone beyond 

that. 

Mr. GANNON. I think you can have a very successful authoritative DNI who is not worried about central control. By the way, 

I do not actually see a Secretary of Defense who has to worry about 

a lot of what goes on beneath them. A lot of the success we have 

had in Afghanistan and Iraq is because we have developed a distributed system of intelligence support, and that means we should 

not have an intrusive central authority getting in the way. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is great. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have talked a lot about the DNI this afternoon. I want to get 

your assessment of the National Counterterrorism Center. I remember when President Bush, by Executive Order, created what 

was then called TTIC. It was the predecessor agency of NCTC, and 

I visited—I believe that Senator Lieberman was with me. I visited 

TTIC and I remember being struck by how young the analysts 

were and got the distinct impression that agencies sent over their 

least experienced analysts to the TTIC. By contrast, when we visited NCTC, the analysts seemed to be far more experienced, and 

there seemed to be competition to be assigned to the NCTC. Totally 

different. 

But that is my observation as a Senator. I would like to hear 

your views of NCTC. Has it been effective? Where does it need to 

go? And I will start with you, Mr. Gannon. 

Mr. GANNON. I think NCTC has been effective. I think it has 

grown from strength to strength. I think it is much better today 

than it was 2 or 3 years ago. I think it is doing a commendable 

job of integrating foreign and domestic intelligence and producing 

analysis for a much broader, really nationally based customer set. 

One issue which I think needs to be addressed by leadership— 

and I think it is a leadership issue—is the tension between NCTC 

and the CTC at CIA. I was actually around in 1986 when we created CTC. CTC and NCTC have different, equally valuable missions, and I do not think it is that difficult to appreciate. They need 

to support one another, but CTC is geared toward support for operations in the field, while NCTC has a mission to integrate foreign 

and domestic intelligence for the U.S. Government as a whole. It 

is not an intelligence collection or operations organization. Its primary role is analalytical. 

I think what has happened is that the CTC in the Washington 

domain is getting less recognition, less respect. I believe it deserves 

a tremendous amount of credit for what it has been able to do in 

providing analytic support to operations. I think the reputation it 

has in the field, if you talk to special operations people, for example, is very powerful. I do not think it has ever done better than 

it is doing now. So why would we want to see that organization in 

any way diminished because we have created a NCTC? I think you 

can have both of them and be glad for it. 

53 

The rap against the CTC has been that it provides analysis in 

support of operations; it provides less direct support to the Washington community. Now we have the NCTC that can do that and 

does it well. NCTC has the responsibility that CTC does not have 

to do the integration of foreign and domestic intelligence. There has 

to be appreciation in the White House and in the Congress that 

there are distinct missions here, that both these organizations do 

well and their people have to be given credit for what they do. And 

my perception is that CTC is not getting the credit in the Washington environment that I think it deserves. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Very briefly, I agree with everything that Mr. 

Gannon just said. I was asked this question in both the DNI role, 

Deputy, and head of CIA. What is the division of labor between the 

two? And one thought that is quickly tossed out but it is wrong is 

strategic and tactical. It is not. And what I am going to tell you 

now is not perfect. It is blurry. But I think as Mr. Gannon suggested, that is OK. It is a bit offense and defense. You turn to the 

NCTC first to deal with threats to the homeland and what needs 

to be done about it; hence, the more powerful blending of foreign 

and domestic intelligence and law enforcement. 

The CTC has its center of gravity on the offense. We are going 

after these people. We need to know where they are. And so I think 

we are blessed to have both. We are lucky to live in a Nation that 

has the resources that it can afford a little—I will call it ‘‘redundancy,’’ not duplication, or competitive analysis. But, fundamentally, they are different and they are focused on different things. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Representative Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center—yes, I 

know. 

Senator COLLINS. You remembered. 

Ms. HARMAN. I remembered. It was set up by President Bush I 

think out of frustration that the intelligence function of the Department of Homeland Security was taking so long to be established. 

And I think TTIC, which has now become the National Counterterrorism Center under our 2004 law, has served us extremely well. 

I understand this point, but I think our big threat now is attacks 

to our homeland, and the piece of this we need to nurture—and, 

in fact, it is doing well—is the NCTC. 

It is very ably led by Mike Leiter, who is a holdover from the 

Bush Administration, a very good call by President Obama to keep 

him there, and it along with something called the ITACG—it is a 

group of police and first responders who come to Washington for 

a year and work at the NCTC—is preparing good product for local 

law enforcement so they know what to look for and what to do. 

NCTC plays an indispensable role in that regard. 

The other point I would make is that after the Abdulmutallab 

plot was finally foiled—that was not a great moment for our intelligence community—Mike Leiter set up something called ‘‘pursuit 

teams.’’ He discovered that there was no one in the U.S. intelligence community who had sole responsibility for detecting and 

piecing together disparate threat information. Talk about offensedefense. That is an offense we absolutely need in order to protect 

54 

our homeland, and NCTC provides that. So I think we have room 

for both of these things. 

I think the weak actor in this picture is still the intelligence and 

analysis function at the Department of Homeland Security. In the 

Bush Administration, Charlie Allen had that job, and he was the 

legendary CIA Director of Operations who built, in my view, a kind 

of mini-CIA at DHS. I am not sure we needed it there, but I surely 

think we need more than what we now have there. In fact, it is 

kind of telling that Rand Beers, who is not the Director of I&A but 

is an Under Secretary of Homeland Security, has the portfolio for 

counterterrorism at the Department of Homeland Security, not the 

Director of Intelligence and Analysis. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Is there any recommendation that you would like to make to us 

as we look to revise, if necessary, the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act? 

Mr. Gannon. 

Mr. GANNON. Well, I think we are in a period of transition in the 

leadership in the intelligence community, and this would be a great 

time, I think, to take a step back and talk with people who have 

been or still are in the saddle. Robert Gates is leaving. There is nobody who has more knowledge and more desire to make things 

work. He knows both the intelligence and defense communities intimately. I think Jim Clapper is a man who works very hard to collaborate work with others. I cannot imagine having a better DNI 

for the times we are in. 

So I’d suggest that you bring some of the folks who are leaving, 

have left, or are still in office, to talk about how best to proceed 

from where we are. Mr. Hayden is an example. Let us admit that 

we have the need to make the DNI position work. Let us recognize 

that we have a terrific guy in Jim Clapper and a very capable set 

of leaders today across the intelligence community. They all can 

help to drive us forward in a constructive direction. 

Senator COLLINS. Good idea. Thank you. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. I would be receptive to whatever the DNI 

brought you when he needs changes in law to go where he has to 

go. I do not think they will be numerous, but when they come, I 

think you can bet he needs them to get from here to there. 

But to echo what has been said at the table before, it is a lot 

more dependent on the individuals and taking full advantage of the 

law, and those informal structures that get so much done in such 

a complex kind of organization. And so I would keep a close watch 

on that, and if you do end up with, for want of a better word, 

pathologies in terms of process or personalities, then there is not 

enough history and there is not enough structure to overcome that. 

And, therefore, that is a danger sign of which we need to be aware. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Representative Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. I think the law is a good law, and it is working, 

and the people in the top positions are excellent. And we had an 

enormous success last week, and we have had other substantial 

successes over the last several years. We are getting better and 

better at this, building on the record of three administrations. The 

pursuit of Osama bin Laden started under the Clinton Administration when he was indicted, and a unit at the CIA was set up to 

pursue him. We did not get very far with that. The then-National 

55 

Security Advisor’s hair was on fire, but, alas, we did not get the 

job done. And through the Bush Administration and now the 

Obama Administration, with success of congresses, we are doing 

better. So I would kind of say that is in good shape. 

A piece of the law that has never really been implemented is the 

formation of a robust Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. I know 

both of you have written letters. In my last job I wrote letters. Two 

people at the top have now been designated by this Administration, 

but I do not think the board is filled out, and I am quite sure it 

does not function. And why does this matter? It is not just to check 

a box so the civil liberties community, which is a robust community, and should be, is happy. It is to make certain that there is 

full vetting of policies that affect our U.S. Constitution and the implementation of the FISA amendments that we all worked so hard 

on and the implementation of the Patriot Act, and perhaps new 

policies to deal with something I know you are both worried about, 

which is our vulnerability to cyber attacks. 

We want a group of knowledgeable people to screen these things 

and then to persuade an anxious public that the policies are a good 

idea. I was told today that the Patriot Act extension may be in 

trouble on the Hill in both parties because people do not understand why we need it. I think they would understand that better 

if there were a bipartisan Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to explain this. 

And the final point is that our vulnerability in the near-term future is to our homeland, and that is why the NCTC matters, and 

that is why vertical information sharing matters. We have to think 

very carefully about the domestic intelligence space and how we 

are going to move forward and make sure that we do not trade off 

liberty for security. I do not think that is a zero sum game. I think 

we will either have both or we will have neither. And getting from 

here to there will depend on the watchdog that the three of us plus 

Pete Hoekstra insisted be in the 2004 law that has not yet been 

fully operational. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

Just one more item that I want to take up with you while we 

have you here. My impression from the testimony, at least of Representative Harman and Mr. Gannon—using a term, General Hayden, that you used, ‘‘unity of effort’’—is that we do not have the 

unity of effort regarding domestic intelligence that we have regarding foreign intelligence. 

I know, Representative Harman, you have been critical—or you 

said Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security is not where it should be. I agree. I think Secretary Janet 

Napolitano is working on that, and they are getting better. But I 

wanted to invite any of you—and we will start with Mr. Gannon 

because you made this point. What is the problem in terms of unity 

of effort? You were not criticizing the FBI. You were admiring the 

improvements they have made in their counterterrorism. But what 

do we need to do? And does the DNI need additional authority or, 

again, is this one of those areas, as you said before, that the DNI, 

looking across the community, maybe this is an area that the DNI 

56 

with the authority he has now ought to focus in on to make sure 

it works better? 

Mr. GANNON. I will make several points. I think you are dealing 

in the domestic arena with, frankly, new agencies, like the Department of Homeland Security. If you compare it to the Department 

of Defense or CIA, they have years of working on the foreign intelligence side and developing capabilities that are quite extraordinary. We do not have those capabilities domestically. 

On the FBI, I would actually have some criticism for where the 

Bureau is today. But I would also say that we underestimated the 

difficulty of transforming a law enforcement agency into an intelligence agency. If I had been at the CIA and they told me to transform it into a law enforcement agency, I would have been horrified. 

So I think we had to expect it was going to take some time. 

And then some of the constituent agencies of the Department of 

Homeland Security, they are doing their own thing, but they are 

also dealing with new missions. There is a lot of overlap in the perceived missions of domestic agencies. But I would also say that we 

have fragmented congressional jurisdiction that I think has been a 

real problem. There is not what I would call the ‘‘adult supervision’’ 

needed to encourage all these agencies to develop a common strategy, to establish clear roles and responsibilities, and then to measure their progress against the strategy. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The adult supervision from Congress. 

Mr. GANNON. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. You are not calling us childish, are 

you? No, I know what you mean. 

Mr. GANNON. I was not talking about you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I know. [Laughter.] 

This is the most significant failure that we had in working to 

adopt the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We were really pretty good at reforming the Executive Branch, but when it 

came to reforming Congress, it just did not work. 

Mr. GANNON. On the national side, you have the CIA with years 

of practice with counterterrorism to bring forces together. You have 

JSOC now in the field, which really has become a focal point for 

driving intelligence collection and anlayses. There is no comparable 

gravitational pull on the domestic agencies to work collaboratively. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right, and as you said in your testimony, 

there is nothing like that. 

Mr. GANNON. You do not have any counterpart on the domestic 

side, and a lot of what is being done, including with the FBI, is a 

work in progress. I do not see an agressive or effective approach 

on the part of the Congress to really put quality measurement on 

what is going on. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So what should be done about this? General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Well, first of all, let me just say I agree totally 

with everything that Mr. Gannon has just described. It is not bad 

people or lack of effort. This is very hard for us to do because we 

have not done it historically. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General HAYDEN. I recall your legislation sets up the FBI to be, 

in essence, a domestic intelligence service. 

57 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

General HAYDEN. And everyone says that is great in 2004, and 

in late 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey finally issues the 

FBI guidelines with regard to working the spaces between cases as 

a domestic intelligence service, and you saw how well that fit inside the popular political culture. It just unleashed a firestorm of 

criticism. So this is hard because we have not done it before and 

our political culture has a bit of a rejection for it. 

It brings us to the point that Congresswoman Harman brought 

up. You make people feel better if you have those mechanisms in 

place and working. You give a comfort level that this is being overseen as well. 

I guess to reinforce it, this is a very important if not the most 

important area of focus. The new flavor of threat—homegrown, low 

threshold, self-radicalized, individual—puts a lot more weight on 

domestic as opposed to foreign and a lot more weight on law enforcement derived as opposed to intelligence derived. And if we do 

not begin to perfect our processes and organizations there, something bad will happen, and we will overreact and perhaps make it 

even worse. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Well said. 

Go ahead, Representative Harman. I was going to ask you if you 

agree with what has been said and, if you do, whether this is a 

matter of trying to give new authority again to the DNI or just urging the DNI to focus in on domestic intelligence as one of the weaker links in our chain. 

Ms. HARMAN. I think the DNI has adequate authority. I think we 

need to have—and this is something you can do—a public debate 

about how to do this, not whether to do this. I think most people 

get it that the risk of homegrown terror is great. Maybe the harm 

from homegrown terror will not be as great as two towers in New 

York falling down and killing 3,000 people, but it is certainly possible—we all know this—that nuclear or radiological materials not 

only can be smuggled into this country, but certainly the radiological materials are already here and could be assembled into a 

dirty bomb, or several, and harm a lot of folks. 

But my point is that we need public buy-in. It is not just making 

people feel better, Mr. Hayden. At least that is my view. It is making them agree that our Constitution will be respected, and it must 

be; otherwise, the underpinnings of our country are gone, and we 

turn into something else, which I surely do not want us to do. 

We have not yet had a robust public debate about a comprehensive framework, new security framework in a post-9/11 world. We 

have done it episodically. We amended the Patriot Act, which I 

supported. We did FISA amendments. We did surely intelligence 

reform. But we have not thought through how all the pieces fit together, and I do not know that we would agree, and I do not know 

that this is the best time for Congress to do this since there is an 

excess amount of partisanship in Congress at the moment. But if 

ever there was a time to give this Committee adequate jurisdiction 

to hold that debate and do broader legislation, not just moving 

boxes around for the DNI but really thinking about in a new world 

with 21st Century threats how should Americans living our values 

deal with detention, interrogation, and investigation of Americans 

58 

on American soil; racial profiling or other activities that are anathema to some people; and how should we do this comprehensively. 

I think this is the time, and this is a huge service you could perform. I think the hearings you are holding right now are very helpful, and I am very happy to participate in one. 

But I would urge the Congress to play its role as a co-equal 

branch of government—Congress writes the laws—and to thoroughly assess what is the right way with public buy-in to fill this 

domestic intelligence space. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. That is an interesting place 

for us to come, but it does point to a kind of top of what needs to 

be done next, and it does relate, as you all have said, to the unique 

threat, which is to say we did not have homegrown domestic terrorism in our mind when we adopted the 2004 act. It now becomes 

a very significant part of the threat that we face, and we are trying 

to do this in ways that are different, as you all said. 

For instance, DHS is trying to interact with State and local law 

enforcement, literally hundreds of thousands of people. I mean, 

they are obviously interacting with the leadership, but it is potentially a mighty force of gatherers of intelligence if you can do this 

well. And we are still feeling our way. 

I do not have any more questions. Senator Collins, do you? 

Senator COLLINS. No. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I want to thank the three of you. It has 

been a very valuable session for us. You have really brought to 

bear the quite remarkable and long experience that you have all 

had, and we are going to continue these hearings and then step 

back and decide whether we think there is any legislation to propose in this session of Congress to better achieve the purposes for 

which the original legislation was adopted or whether this is a 

matter where we ought to just agree on a report or even—in part 

public and in part maybe just to meet with some of the key players 

and say we have taken a look at this, and here is what we really 

think based on our inquiry you ought to be focused on now. It does 

not require a new law, but it does require attention and coordination. 

With that, I thank you. The record of the hearing will stay open 

for 15 days for any additional questions and statements. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(59) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: IS INTELLIGENCE 

REFORM WORKING? PART II 

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:33 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Collins, and Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good 

afternoon. This is our second hearing on the topic ‘‘Ten Years After 

9/11: Is Intelligence Reform Working?’’ This is part of a continuing 

series of hearings that our Committee is convening this year on 

how well the security reforms enacted after 9/11 have protected our 

homeland, obviously with an eye on the 10th anniversary of 9/11 

coming up. 

During our hearing last week, we explored a variety of issues related to intelligence reform. This hearing is really going to focus on 

a single big question, but with a lot of sub-questions, and that is, 

does the Director of National Intelligence have the authority needed to lead our sprawling intelligence community as we want it to 

be led? 

We are very honored to have with us as our sole witness today 

the immediate past Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair. 

Admiral Blair is an extraordinarily talented and dedicated public 

servant who has had an exemplary career as a senior military commander and, of course, as a continuing consumer of intelligence before he overtook its production in one of Washington’s, I would say, 

most challenging jobs—the Director of National Intelligence. Therefore, he is uniquely qualified to help us answer the questions we 

have about how the DNI has performed, and his willingness to testify I think is in keeping with Admiral Blair’s lifetime of service to 

our country. So I thank you for being here today. 

This Committee created the DNI as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 at the recommendation 

of the 9/11 Commission, which concluded that basically no one was 

in charge of the U.S. intelligence community, and that this lack of 

leadership resulted in dysfunction and disunity that left us vulnerable to the attacks that occurred on 9/11. 

60 

1The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman appears in the Appendix on page 412. 

The nature of the threat has changed certainly from the postSecond World War period and the Cold War, and even since 9/11 

with the dispersion, in a way the metastasizing of the Islamist terrorist movement and also the development, for instance, of a very 

serious cyber threat to our security. 

In the midst of all that, our intention was that the DNI would 

bring the necessary unity of command and effort to our 16 intelligence agencies. 

So we come together today to ask: On a day-to-day basis, does 

the DNI have the authorities needed to lead the intelligence community effectively? Does the DNI have the ability to forge the unity 

of effort across the community and achieve the level of integration 

that is necessary to meet the range of security challenges that our 

Nation faces and the range of needs for intelligence that various 

people in our government have? 

These are the overarching questions that I hope we will have the 

opportunity to pose to Admiral Blair today. 

With that, I am going to put the rest of my opening statement 

in the record 1 and call on Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The operation that tracked and killed Osama bin Laden demonstrates the kind of successful collaboration between our intelligence and operational capacities that we envisioned when we reformed our intelligence community in the wake of the attacks on 

our country on 9/11. 

This was undoubtedly a great victory for our intelligence efforts 

and a great blow to al-Qaeda. But the fact remains that al-Qaeda 

and other terrorist threats are not going away. 

That is why it is time for Congress to examine and build upon 

the successes since the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was passed. That bill created the Director of National Intelligence. It is an opportune time to identify any shortcomings in 

that structure and work to correct them. 

I look forward to hearing from Admiral Blair about what worked 

during his tenure as DNI, what did not work, and what might be 

changed about the structure that we designed 7 years ago. 

I would note with great pride that Admiral Blair is a fellow 

Mainer—hailing from Kittery, Maine, the home of the Portsmouth 

Naval Shipyard. So either coming from a great Navy town or following five generations of naval officers perhaps preordained his 

career. We all hope that he has what we call a great Navy Day 

here as we hear from him about his experiences as the DNI as well 

as his recommendations now with the benefit of actual experience 

and 20/20 hindsight. 

Almost 10 years since September 11, 2001, and 7 years since our 

landmark legislation, we are safer as a Nation but not yet safe. 

Our intelligence community is stronger and more effective than 

ever before, but plenty of turf battles remain. During his tenure 

Admiral Blair was at the center of some unusually public disputes 

with the CIA. 

61 

1The prepared statement of Admiral Blair appears in the Appendix on page 416. 

To help address lingering deficiencies in the intelligence community, the DNI must be the ‘‘quarterback’’ that the 9/11 Commission 

envisioned and that we intended. At last week’s hearing, General 

Hayden preferred the term ‘‘coach.’’ I will be interested to hear 

whether or not Admiral Blair believes the DNI has been empowered to fill this critical role, regardless of what you call it. 

At the first hearing in this series, the leaders of the 9/11 Commission, Governor Thomas Kean and Representative Lee Hamilton, 

agreed that presidential adviser John Brennan is, in many respects, performing the role that we envisioned for the DNI when 

we authored the law; that troubles me, not due to any doubts about 

Mr. Brennan’s capabilities, but because that choice, that structure 

undermines the statutory role of the DNI. 

We must ask, therefore, the fundamental question: Are changes 

in the law required in order to realize the potential of the DNI? Or 

is this simply a matter of more fidelity to the 2004 law? 

Admiral Blair, thank you for being here today, and I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Admiral Blair, it is all yours. Thanks for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DENNIS C. BLAIR,1 FORMER DIRECTOR 

OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Admiral BLAIR. Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, thank you for 

inviting me here today. It is common to improve the effectiveness 

of government after some disaster or crisis, and, in fact, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 was born of 

9/11, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. But I think that reform in 

the wake of success also has a history. Those who led the great victory of World War II knew that there were major improvements to 

be made in the national security organizations, and when the parades were over, they passed bold legislation to make the country 

safer. 

So as we celebrate the brave, dogged, and brilliant work of those 

who found and attacked Osama bin Laden in his hideout, I believe 

that now is a similar time for bold laws to make this Nation’s intelligence enterprise even more effective than it is. 

And as I look to our future national security challenges and opportunities, I am absolutely convinced that we need an intelligence 

community that operates under authorities that are relevant to the 

future, not to the past, an intelligence community that is organized 

on a rational basis, and an intelligence community that is integrated under a strong and competent Director of National Intelligence. 

I left the Administration a year ago frustrated with the lack of 

support for a strong DNI, but I was reluctant to appear publicly 

before this Committee where my comments could perhaps be 

miscast as sour grapes from the loser in some petty bureaucratic 

squabble. But I believe that the imperative of an integrated, effective intelligence community should transcend policy and politics 

and personalities. The country needs and deserves legislation that 

will establish the best intelligence capability possible, independent 

62 

of officials and Administrations as they come and go. So let me use 

the rest of my introductory time to highlight the improvements 

that I believe are still needed. 

The objective is to make the structure of the intelligence community worthy of its people, whether in the CIA, NSA, NGA, FBI, 

DEA, DIA, the service intelligence organizations, along with the 

other seven intelligence elements of our government. These heroes, 

these people who are in those organizations, are every bit as dedicated, patriotic, and skilled as the members of the armed forces 

and first responders whose heroism inspires us and makes us 

proud. We owe them integrated leadership. So let me run down 

areas where I think we can do more. 

First, organization. Right now the Department of Defense and 

the intelligence community conduct operations together under separate authorities—Title 10 and Title 50. To be effective against 

dangerous, elusive, and quickly adversaries like al-Qaeda, drug 

cartels, outlaw States, a new title is needed authorizing joint interagency task forces that can bring to bear all the capabilities of both 

organizations under unified direction. We need a Title 60. 

Right now the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency, one 

of the most important of the agencies, is a kludge of one organization that collects human intelligence and conducts covert operations and another organization that provides all sorts of intelligence analysis, of which the greatest proportion is, in fact, provided by the NSA, a different agency. But the skills, procedures, 

competencies, and cultures of these two sub-organizations are very 

different, and their collocation yields little synergy and has major 

disadvantages. 

I recommend that the CIA be broken into an all-source analytical 

agency and a national clandestine service, each led by a career professional with a fixed term, each reporting separately to the Director of National Intelligence, and I recommend that some elements 

of the Defense Intelligence Agency performing all-source analysis 

on the one hand, human intelligence on the other hand, be added 

to those two new agencies. 

Moving to authorities, current legislation and constitutional 

precedents have little application to the Information Age, and the 

efforts that I observe to adopt them have been completely unsuccessful. The National Security Agency has the world’s best ability 

to provide protection for the country’s Internet domains, yet it is 

not securing the important dot-gov domain, which your computers 

use here in the Congress, and the vital infrastructure, the dot-com 

domain. 

An official responsible for cyber defense should be dual-hatted, 

reporting to both the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of NSA with the responsibility for bringing NSA’s capabilities to bear to protect these vital systems. 

Right now there is no legislation that clearly authorizes offensive 

cyber operations by the United States against enemies that use the 

Internet to threaten American lives and property. Extremist Web 

sites incite violence, provide practical bomb-making advice. International drug cartels use the Internet to arrange deliveries of 

drugs and to purchase weapons. Foreign outlaw nations are making cyber plans that threaten vital interests. Yet because often 

63 

these threats are carried out on American Internet servers or because there is a possibility of collateral damage from attack or because a hostile actor and illegal action has not yet occurred, the 

United States has no basis in current law for the sort of quick, effective action that we need against these threats. The country 

needs such legislation. It should include limitations related to the 

proportionality of what is being done, related to avoiding collateral 

damage. It needs oversight mechanisms in both the Executive and 

the Legislative Branches. But it must provide a basis for action 

commensurate with the threat. 

And, third, the authority of the DNI within the intelligence community. The intent of IRTPA was clear, and you have both stated 

it. I believe it was correct. The intelligence community needs a 

leader, an integrator not a coordinator. The intelligence community 

does not self-synchronize. Few organizations do. We learned that 

on 9/11. The White House has neither the staff nor the time to lead 

it, and it often approves misguided schemes, as this country has 

learned to its sorrow in past instances. 

The authority that the Congress intended for the DNI to exercise 

is not now intact. Currently, a portion of it has migrated back to 

the Director of CIA on the one hand and some to the National Security Council staff on the other hand. The result is a confusion of 

responsibilities, bureaucratic fiction, but, more important, potential 

gaps in intelligence that our adversaries can exploit. 

There are several legislative changes that I believe can strengthen the authority and the accountability of the DNI. 

First, personnel. In addition to naming or concurring with the 

appointments of the heads of the intelligence elements currently 

provided in IRTPA, the DNI should approve the appointments of 

second- and third-level officials within the intelligence elements. 

This authority will ensure that community-minded officers occupy 

the important posts where much of the real work of intelligence is 

done. 

Second, budget. The DNI’s budget authorities in practice are 

strong in future budget years but relatively weak in the current fiscal year. He or she should have the authority to initiate reprogramming of funding from agency budgets to urgent and emerging unexpected objectives, for example, network security against new 

threats, or simply to higher-priority objectives or simply to programs that are not making the progress they should. 

So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Senator 

Collins, the success against Osama bin Laden should not cause us 

to rest on our laurels. We are a long way from an integrated intelligence community smoothly interacting with the Department of 

Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, with integration 

being driven by a strong DNI and a competent staff, and I believe 

congressional action is indispensable to this goal. 

The reform of our intelligence community is an unfinished, vital 

piece of business. I find it reassuring that you see fit to keep this 

challenge alive and take seriously the progress we need to make, 

and I am happy to answer your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate what you said at the beginning, but honestly, no one listening 

to your statement or reading it could think you were here out of 

64 

some sort of personal pique. The fact is we asked you, and the second is, listening to your statement, it is totally substantive, and 

truly it is exactly why we asked you because you are part of a very 

small group of people who have actually been the DNI. So you have 

that perspective, and obviously you bring to it everything else you 

have done in your career. 

We are going to do 7-minute rounds of questions. 

Let me ask you this question to begin with. It touches somewhat 

on something Senator Collins said. In the testimony last week, I 

was fascinated that at different points our witnesses—who were 

Jane Harman, General Hayden, and John Gannon—suggested that 

it may be as critical to accepting the goal of the strength and legitimacy of the DNI for there to be adequate support from the President—and to a somewhat lesser extent Congress in a different 

way—as it is to add on to the statutory authorities of the DNI. And 

I wonder what you think about that. It may not be an either/or 

question, but give me your sense of how important the non-statutory recognition and authority given for the office is. 

Admiral BLAIR. Senator Lieberman, I would agree with that observation that active support from the White House and the Congress makes it a lot easier for a director to fill in the gaps of authority in legislation, and that would be a good thing. However, I 

do not think that is a reason for the Congress not to continue to 

strengthen the intelligence community integration in a way that I 

think IRTPA was designed to do because as I mentioned, Administrations and personalities come and go, but it seems to me it is the 

responsibility of the legislation to establish that structure right in 

accordance with what we have learned over time. 

I think what we have learned over time—and this is not the only 

time that the Congress has attempted to integrate related but not 

really cooperating agencies. The National Security legislation of 

1947 which brought the services together based on the results of 

World War II, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the creation of 

the Department of Homeland Security—these things are always 

difficult to bring in children who think they are happy into an orphanage. That does not always go easily. But it takes persistence, 

and it takes a dedication to believing that this is the right thing. 

And I think Congress has a role. 

Right now there are two models of an intelligence community 

that we have seen in the last 5 years. One is one in which the Director of National Intelligence is expected to be able to integrate 

the community and to be responsible for that; another in which 

that authority is sort of spread around among people, and the 

White House picks and chooses what it will use. 

I think right now we see the model going toward that second 

model, which the group that is in the Executive Branch now believes. I think the first model is more correct, and I think that is 

what the Congress intended, and we need to continue to push that. 

And I think that 5 years into the DNI we had that—well, we are 

actually 6 years now. We are making good progress, and we need 

to continue to ring that out. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Let me talk about some of the authorities that the DNI has and how they might be expanded, and 

65 

then later on I would like to come back to some of your very interesting suggestions. 

The 2004 legislation gave budget authority to the DNI, and that 

authority includes having the final say over the intelligence community budget that is presented to the President; also certain authorities called, as you know, budget allocation and apportionment 

authorities related to how the intelligence community spends its 

budget during the fiscal year. 

In your prepared testimony, you called for the DNI to have increased ‘‘comptrollership’’ authorities so that agencies under the 

DNI could not seek to circumvent the DNI on budget issues. I want 

to ask how strong the authorities that the DNI has had over the 

budget have been in practice, at least certainly during your period 

of time, and whether you think the DNI has fully utilized those authorities over both budget development for future fiscal years and 

resource transfers during a fiscal year. 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir, Senator Lieberman. I think there are 

two important background points. Firt, is the last 10 years have 

been a time of rising budgets for the intelligence community just 

as they have been for the Department of Defense. So the tough 

budget trade-offs have generally been taken care of by putting 

more money on them rather than by reprioritization. I think those 

times are coming to an end, and we will see budgets that are flat 

and perhaps even decreasing, and that will make this central ability to make trade-offs even more important. 

The second item was that just due to the number of tasks that 

faced the DNI early on, there was not a strong staff support structure for budget trade-offs. The equivalent of my experience was in 

the Department of Defense, the Program Analysis and Evaluation 

Office, the strong Comptroller at the Office of the Secretary of Defense had not been established. Those were coming into maturity 

while I was DNI, and I spent a great deal of time trying to 

strengthen them. 

So I found that I finally, toward the end of my time, had the 

tools to use the budget authorities, and let me give you two examples of the kind of things I am talking about, because they came 

up during my final months in the job. 

I came back from a trip to Afghanistan horrified by the lack of 

language ability that we had among our deployed officers in that 

country. I will not give you the numbers, but the number of Pashtu 

and Dari speakers was smaller than I thought was safe. 

As you know, language ability was in IRTPA from the beginning, 

and the agencies have been chugging along—it was time to say, ‘‘all 

right, now, and we are going to move the money in, we are going 

to make it happen.’’ That is the thing that I am talking about 

where well-meaning agencies were making their own priorities, 

that sort of allowed a national priority to drift down, and you needed to be able to punch it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Were you able to do that at that point 

with the authorities you have? 

Admiral BLAIR. At that point, we had the ‘‘Come to mother’’ conversation, and I was going to give them one more chance to do it 

themselves before I did it, and then I left. So that is where it stood. 

66 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But you felt that you had the authority 

to carry that out if you needed it. 

Admiral BLAIR. I was going to find out. [Laughter.] 

That would have been the first one. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, you were right, of course. 

Admiral BLAIR. And, I mean, the usual thing that I saw was 

what happened after the Detroit bombing in December 2009 by 

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. We had obvious problems in the 

search engines that were available to counterintelligence analyst 

that required banks of computers, different skills on different systems. And as you saw from the final reports, we missed some of 

those, and part of it was due to an analyst not being able to hit 

just one click to make a query and have the answer come back. It 

required a lot of skill, which busy people often do not have everything they need. What happened is we received more money to fix 

that problem, and my job was only to spread it out. 

Now, there were fairly decent battles on how to spread it out, 

and, each agency said, ‘‘I am the one who ought to get the lion’s 

share, and I do the work,’’ and so on. But those are different problems from going in and carving it out and putting it on the thing, 

which is what I was talking about in terms of real comptrollership 

in which I was used to the Secretary of Defense’s Comptroller being 

able to do routinely in the year of execution. So that is really what 

I am talking about in a sense. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. Well said. My time is up. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Blair, you were just talking about Abdulmutallab and 

some of the problems that were exposed by that intelligence failure. 

I am curious. Were you consulted by the Attorney General on the 

decision to charge Abdulmutallab as if he were a criminal suspect? 

Admiral BLAIR. I was not consulted on that particular decision, 

Senator Collins, nor do I think I would have had much to add. I 

think the key role that the Director of National Intelligence plays 

is during the questioning phase of a suspect once apprehended or 

arrested. How much do we lean on intelligence gathering and how 

much do we lean on gathering material for prosecution which involves sort of a different set of protocols? And the most famous one 

that everybody talks about is the reading of Miranda rights and 

the provision of a lawyer and so on. 

On Abdulmutallab, I was not consulted on that either. As you all 

know from the hearing that we held here, that set of decisions was 

made by the agents at the scene, and it was not really supervised, 

and we did not have the High-Value Interrogation Group stood up 

well enough to be able to take that. But I believe strongly that is 

the point at which the Director of National Intelligence or his representative should make an input, and the goal is to be able to do 

both so that the Attorney General can make a decision: Military 

tribunal, Federal court, or nothing. 

If you have to make a trade-off, that is when you need to say, 

we are drilling ahead to get intelligence information, and we are 

going to back off on perhaps gathering evidence. And I think that 

is what I should be involved in. 

67 

Senator COLLINS. I realize that we had gone through that issue 

before, but the reason that I brought it up again is I want to lay 

the predicate for my next question, which is: What is the role of 

the DNI when a terrorist suspect is apprehended? It seems to me 

that one of the first calls, if it is a surprise apprehension, should 

be to the DNI so that a search can be done immediately of all databases so that intelligence analysts and the HIG—which is now, I 

believe, set up—could be flown out to wherever they need to go. 

But I want to hear from you more what you see as the role. You 

were starting to get into that. I was not trying to relive who told 

what but, rather, for those who were not around when we explored 

that before, I wanted to lay the predicate. 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, ma’am. The theme you will see throughout 

all of my testimony and my thinking that I have become passionately to believe is that we need to be able to quickly bring together 

the skills of anybody in government and many from outside of government who can apply their skill to it. 

So let us say that we on a surprise apprehend a member of alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. We should be able to get the best 

intelligence Yemen analysts, the best counterterrorist analysts and 

at the same time the best FBI interrogators, the best people in the 

FBI who have been working terrorism. There should be a structured process that they have a quick conversation. The different equities and the different approaches are laid out on the table. We 

have a decisionmaking process so that a call can be made in terms 

of that balance. And then under tremendous time pressures—minutes, hours at the most—the people on the scene go ahead and proceed in accordance with that guidance. And you have to have practiced it some first. These people cannot meet each other the first 

time when it is a real situation. And it is really setting up those 

procedures that can do it. 

My experience is that we have such good people across the board 

in law enforcement and the intelligence community that with general guidance from the top they can do the job perfectly. But there 

are certain key questions, and you hit a real one, the balance between gathering evidence and gathering intelligence, that need to 

be made at the top when there is a conflict. And I think in the case 

of Abdulmutallab, I think we had all the evidence that this guy had 

a bomb, tried to blow it up, which is all we needed. We did not 

need a lot of self-incrimination in that category, and probably we 

should have leaned harder on intelligence throughout than we did, 

because we pretty much had a Federal conviction, I thought. 

So that is the kind of decision you need to make, and you need 

quick, practiced procedures to do it. 

Senator COLLINS. As I look at the DNI or, indeed, any position 

in Washington, there are really three levels of power: First is access to the President; second is authority over personnel; and third 

is control over the budget. And I would like to talk about those 

issues with you, starting with the personnel issue. 

Part of our concept was to try to have a Goldwater-Nichols-like 

joint approach to service in the intelligence community, and I am 

sure it took the military an awful long time to embrace that. But 

now, at least from my outside perspective, the military really has 

largely embraced jointness. 

68 

Where are we in the intelligence community as far as having 

that kind of joint approach where personnel is shared among agencies and where your ability to advance in your career in the intelligence community depends on joint service? 

Admiral BLAIR. Senator, I think your provisions of the IRTPA to 

that end were exactly right, and I think they are biting within the 

intelligence community. They are having effect. If I try to compare 

it to 5 years into the Goldwater-Nichols Act, I would say it is sort 

of comparable in terms of the effect it is having. And it will take 

more time, but two trends really encourage me. 

First is, as I talk to people, the younger they are, the more they 

get it. Half of the heroes in the intelligence community joined after 

9/11 for the right reasons, and they are naturally more prone to 

sharing. They do not carry all that baggage of bureaucratic prerogatives and all that we all grew up with, the past bureaucratic wars 

that we all thought were so important and which actually did not 

help the country much. And so as they age up and get into the jobs, 

I think the trends are good. 

The second one is that in the field—and you all have taken many 

visits out there. You walk into an intelligence center in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in just about any place in the world, you find people 

from NGA, NSA, CIA, and the armed forces in there working. If 

somebody has a piece of information, he is expected to contribute. 

So they are growing up in this atmosphere, and, again, as they 

bring that back stateside, all we have to do, I think, is provide 

them a modicum of structure so that you are not rewarded for bad 

behavior. You do not have to forget all that stuff you learned in the 

field. You ought to bring it back and use it, and it will take over. 

So I think we are headed in the right direction, but like you I 

am impatient at the scale. I mean, I thought we decided this. Let 

us get on with it. 

I think the next generation, the generation that is right on the 

cusp of leadership within the agencies is going to be quite more 

joint-minded, and if we can get the structures right, they will fall 

into it. What you have to realize is that you can be proud of your 

own agency, you can say, ‘‘I am a CIA person,’’ but you also need 

this pride in the team. You also need this pride in everybody doing 

well and you do well, too. And I think when you have not experienced it, you think the pride is a fixed amount. You know, if somebody else gets some, it subtracts some from what you have. And 

I think we found in the Armed Forces that both pride and effectiveness go up exponentially when you can sort of get over the hump 

of that jointness and working together. And I think we are headed 

that way, but the suggestion I made of putting special attention on 

second- and third-level people I think is of a piece with that and 

would just help it along. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I think your point about the 

generational change is absolutely right, and I think we are seeing 

that with the use of technology and networking and sharing of 

databases, too, because that is just what the next generation does 

naturally. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. The other thing 

I would add is that I hope that particularly since 9/11 people withVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
69 

in the intelligence community understand that they can come 

under great public, including congressional, criticism if in a look 

back it appears that one or another part of the community—including the military, but particularly the IC we are talking about—was 

not playing on the team, and as a result the team suffered, and 

therefore, they will suffer a kind of rebuke that perhaps they would 

not have at an earlier time. 

Senator Brown, it is all yours. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. I know the vote started, so I just 

have a couple of quick questions. 

General Hayden testified last week that the IC needs to find the 

critical balance between freedom of action for the parts and the 

unity of the effort for the whole. Is that balance achievable, do you 

think, given the current structure of the IC? And in what ways can 

the relationship between the DNI and the heads of the 16 intelligence agencies be improved or strengthened? 

Admiral BLAIR. Senator, freedom of action, and what was the 

other pole of that dilemma? 

Senator BROWN. The freedom of action for the parts and the 

unity of the effort as a whole. Is that balance achievable? 

Admiral BLAIR. I think it is very much achievable, and what you 

find is in the best organizations that achieve that balance, people 

come in as an expert in their own field, but they are more than just 

sitting there waiting to say, well, if you want a piece of human intelligence, I will gather that for you. If you want a piece of signals 

intelligence, I will gather it for you. They come in with an attitude 

of being able to contribute what they can do, and based on their 

much better understanding of what other people’s problems are 

and what the total mission is, how they can contribute in ways perhaps that are not traditional. And I have just seen that work time 

and time again. When you form these teams, you bring people into 

them with the attitude that everybody needs to contribute all they 

can and maybe more, and then magic happens in that interaction. 

I have seen it in terms of our teams in the intelligence community 

that can gather intelligence against very difficult targets by using 

our wondrous collection capabilities in new ways. I have seen it in 

action teams. I think one of the most poignant things I saw was 

I was off visiting one of our bases in a very dangerous part of the 

world, and a young CIA case officer told me a story that she had 

been on her way to a meeting in a restaurant with an asset to recruit. A complete other agency monitoring the situation had picked 

up a warning of danger. They had been able to get a phone call to 

her. She turned around, did not go to the restaurant, life saved, 

lesson learned. And it is that kind of teamwork in the field that 

I think becomes the norm when you create an atmosphere in which 

it is expected and it is valued. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. And I want to say thank you for 

your service, too, in your position. I wanted to just mention that 

first. 

I know General Hayden testified last week that the creation of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, undermined Congress’ attempt to strengthen the DNI because Secretary of Defense 

70 

Donald Rumsfeld delegated his authority, direction, and control of 

the major defense intelligence agencies to the USDI. Can you describe your relationship with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

and the USDI? And does the role of the USDI hinder the DNI’s 

ability to exert his authority over the counteroperations or future 

directions of the entire IC? 

Admiral BLAIR. That was not my experience, Senator Brown. I 

thought that General James Clapper as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and I, as DNI, worked very well together, 

and if he were sitting here, I am very confident he would say the 

same thing. 

I know Senator Lieberman was involved in some of the angst 

from the Department when IRTPA was written. I found it largely 

to have dissipated by the time that I had the honor of being DNI. 

I think there are two important reasons for this. First is the really important security challenges we face these days have so much 

of the military aspect mixed up with the non-military aspect—economic, social, others—that the idea that you can sort of hive off a 

military aspect of a problem and say, well, that is for the Pentagon, 

this other stuff is for CIA, INR, the civilian groups, is long gone. 

If you look at our big problems—Afghanistan, terrorism, Iraq— 

the military aspects and the non-military aspects are all together, 

and you have to use your intelligence capabilities, whether they be 

signals intelligence, which happens to be collocated in DOD, or 

geospatial intelligence, which is sort of a hybrid, to look at the 

whole question. So we are driving toward this unity by just the nature of the problem. 

Second, the officers or civilians in the case of Letitia Long, who 

is now the head of NGA, have grown up in this joint era that we 

were discussing earlier, and they understand the advantages of 

teamwork and the synergies that can come from that. I did not 

have any stronger teammates in community integration than Admiral Robert Murrett at NGA, General Keith Alexander at NSA, 

and General Ronald Burgess at DIA. That leadership was strong, 

and the USDI in my observation was part of the team, also. 

So I did not see that, and I know it was the historical fault line, 

but it seems to have been helped. And, of course, Secretary Gates 

having had some piece of my job previously had a good understanding, and that helps, too. 

Senator BROWN. Great. Well, thank you, sir. I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Brown. 

Incidentally, for the record, General Clapper has said exactly the 

same thing to me about how good a working relationship he had 

with you. These are interesting comparisons because this is a case 

where I think the personalities that were in these positions under 

Secretary Rumsfeld and perhaps the Secretary himself were part 

of the problem, if I can call it that, and as you said, correctly, Secretary Gates comes to his position, after having spent most of his 

public service in the intelligence community. But you must have 

known General Clapper before, so you had knowledge of each other 

and just a willingness to work together, and you did to the Nation’s 

benefit. 

71 

So it is interesting, as I have told you before, I think, Admiral, 

that during the legislative battles on the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, the toughest ones were with the 

Defense Department about the changes we were trying to bring 

about strengthening DNI. And yet in practice, the tensions between 

the DNI and the DOD have been much less than were reflected at 

the legislative negotiating table. Without being specific at this moment, I would say that it was the opposite for other components of 

the IC. 

So I really apologize for having to break the flow. The vote is 

going on on an important judicial nomination, so I am going to ask 

that we stand in recess, and I will be back as soon as I can to continue the questioning. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will reconvene again. 

Is that a new staff member? Oh, that is Senator Carper. [Laughter.] 

Senator Carper, I can proceed with a round of questions, or I can 

call on you first, if you would like. It is up to you. 

Senator CARPER. You are very kind. I would like to. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead because I have had one 

round. Again, I apologize, Admiral, for having to leave to vote. But 

I look forward to asking you some more questions. 

Senator Carper, thanks very much for being here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. I do have a question. Welcome, Admiral. I am a retired Navy captain, so I salute you, in more ways 

than one. 

I understand that today’s intelligence reform hearing is focusing 

on whether the intelligence community is operating better, and if 

this question has already been asked, I apologize, but I am going 

to ask it anyway. And if you could respond, I would be grateful. 

But since the passage of the intelligence reform legislation in 2004, 

after the successful operation against Osama bin Laden—and as a 

Navy veteran of 23 years, I salute our SEALs and everybody who 

was part of that operation. I said to my colleagues today at another 

meeting that while I think there is a sense of justice with respect 

to Osama bin Laden and hopefully some closure for a lot of the 

families who lost their loved ones on 9/11 and other attacks, the 

greater benefit is, I hope, going to be our ability to use the intelligence that we recovered to better protect folks here in this country and other countries as well who might also be at risk. 

But after the successful operation against Osama bin Laden and 

the thwarting of any number of terrorist attacks that were directed 

at our homeland and other places where we have interests during 

the last 9 years, I think that things are working better. I hope you 

do, too. I also believe we are in a safer place as a result of this reorganization that we put in place a number of years ago. 

Specifically, I was impressed with, I think, last week’s remarks 

by the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, on how 

intelligence information from the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound was almost immediately being shared throughout our intelligence community. I am not sure this would have happened as 

72 

quickly or as smoothly before the work that has been done since 

9/11. And while it is clear that institutional reorganizations are 

needed every now and then, without the President’s national security leadership working together as a team, I think restructuring 

our Federal Government is only going to work partially. 

Here is my question, and it really centers on the relationship between the President, Deputy National Security Adviser Denis 

McDonough, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism John Brennan, and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper—and whether the Director of National Intelligence will ever work as it was intended to with the first two 

positions being usually confidants in close physical proximity to the 

President than the rest of the Federal Government’s national security leadership. Would you just think about that for a moment and 

maybe share some thoughts with us on that? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir, Senator Carper. On the first observations you made, I agree completely. This was a very well done operation. What I think we need is to make that the norm, and I think 

it is understandable that we did well on that operation, the highest 

priority task that this Nation has had for the last 10 years in that 

area required deep personal involvement of the President, the highlevel Cabinet officers themselves, and so on. So it is no surprise to 

me that we did well on that. 

What I think we need to do is to get that same interaction and 

legislatively mandate that same interaction and teamwork in order 

to get everything done that the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security are involved in. And I think we have made strides, but I think we have 

a ways to go. 

On the question of the relationship between the DNI and the 

President versus his staff, this is what staff line relationships are 

all about. The President should get his advice from whoever he 

chooses to seek it from. He has staffers on his staff who are experts 

in defense, and I used to be on the national security staff as a commander in the Navy. Department of Homeland Security officers 

serve at the National Security Council staff. Outside experts are 

brought in. We all know how the advice of staff versus the responsibility of line officers should work, and I think that in the White 

House relationships with departments and with the intelligence 

community, just the same principles should apply. You should 

carry out your main actions and get the recommendations of those 

whom you appoint and whom the Senate confirms, and then you 

ought to use your staff to evaluate their recommendations and to 

check on how they are doing. And there will be tension between 

those two at times. You know, no good staff officer but thinks he 

can do a better job than this guy who has the job—until he occupies that job and wisdom occurs. So these tensions are natural, but 

I think the formal structure should be that those responsible officials at the right level should be carrying out the job and be held 

responsible for it. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one 

more question? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, sir. 

73 

I chair a subcommittee of this Committee that focuses on Federal 

financial management and a host of other areas. But one of the 

things that we try to do in the subcommittee, as the Chairman 

knows, is we try to look into every nook and cranny of the Federal 

Government and ask this question: Is it possible to get better results for less money, or is it possible to get better results for the 

same amount of money? We try to do that throughout the government. I sort of describe it as a culture change from a culture of 

spendthrift to more of a culture of thrift. It is a little bit like trying 

to turn an aircraft carrier. But we know if we try long enough and 

hard enough, we can turn aircraft carriers. So we can maybe even 

change the culture here. 

This Committee is really a great Committee to be on. Governmental affairs used to be almost our sole focus, and how to make 

the government work to get better results for less money. And now 

we have this other hat that we wear in homeland security, which 

is terribly important, but we have not forgotten what our bread 

and butter used to be. 

But a couple of weeks ago, I was returning from South Asia 

where I had been to, among other places, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 

and India, reviewing our regional counterterrorism strategy in 

Pakistan. One of the glaring success stories that was brought to my 

attention was how our intelligence community analysts and military specialists, both men and women, and special operations men 

and women, were sitting side by side each other and analyzing intelligence information. And I was very impressed with the cohesion 

that I saw on the ground. 

My question to you is simply that today whether this new approach is part of a broader counterterrorism strategy in the region? 

And then, second, are there lessons learned from your experiences 

that you can share with us that you would like to see our military 

and intelligence communities implement tactically? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, Senator. I think what you saw is just as 

good as you said it was, and I think it is a result of 10 years of 

the same set of mid-level leaders in the intelligence agencies and 

in the Department of Defense, primarily special forces working together against al-Qaeda and its subordinates. These extraordinary 

leaders in all of these agencies and services have learned to cooperate at the local level. 

I would say they do that right now with the tolerance of the leadership, in some cases with the active support of the leadership, but 

there is not a structure that they can fall into naturally or that 

new people will fall into naturally when the urgency and the passion that 9/11 caused passes. 

So I recommended in my prepared testimony for this Committee 

that we form joint interagency task forces. Let us pick a place like 

Yemen where both military counterterrorism capabilities and intelligence community counterterrorism capabilities can be brought to 

bear. I would recommend forming a joint interagency task force. 

The boss of it could be, for example, a military officer and the deputy be an intelligence community professional or vice versa. I do 

not really much care, but they need to be qualified for the job and 

have experience and all of the tools. And then instead of this extraordinary cooperation which now occurs, you can have a unified 

74 

effort in which the task force commander, after he has submitted 

a plan, has the authorities and can choose to use intelligence assets 

one way or military assets, and put them together, because what 

we found in our joint task forces in the Armed Forces is that you 

come up with new ideas when you put people together in one space 

with one mission, with a set of core competencies that are pretty 

extraordinary. They find different ways to do it. ‘‘Oh, that is what 

you need? That is easy. We can help you out with that. Why don’t 

we try this?’’ 

That sort of synergy comes much better by putting them together 

under one boss than it does by sitting there in their individual 

stovepipes, and with all the best will in the world and if the right 

people happen to be there, you can work out some of this stuff. But 

it is not institutionalized. The incentives are not right. The rewards 

are not right. There is a certain danger in cooperating. And so I 

vote for counterterrorism joint interagency task forces pointed at 

the key areas where we still face al-Qaeda and its affiliates. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much for your responses and for 

that analysis. Thanks so much. Thanks for joining us today. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

Admiral Blair, let me approach the topic we have been talking 

about by sharing this analysis of our 2004 legislation, which is that 

it gave the DNI two major responsibilities: One was to be the leader of the intelligence community, and the second was to be the senior adviser on intelligence matters to the President. And I wanted 

to ask you both from what you know of your predecessors’ and successors’ experience and your own, one, just in terms of responsibility whether that is too much to ask of one person. Maybe I 

should leave it at that. But the second is a bit inconsistent with 

the first, in some ways following Senator Carper’s question. Is it 

necessary for the DNI to be the senior intelligence adviser to the 

President in order for the DNI to have the credibility to be the 

leader of the intelligence community? Two different questions related to that same dual responsibility. 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir. I think that the DNI can and should 

have both those responsibilities. I do not think the DNI can have 

the additional responsibility of directing the CIA. I mean, that was 

the hand that we dealt the DCI, as you will recall. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral BLAIR. And integrating the community and advising the 

President, and I think it was extremely wise to cut those two off. 

But I also think that it is essential that leading the community and 

advising the President be combined in one person so that the advice can be realistic in terms of what it is the community can do, 

one; and, two, so that the Director, seeing the sorts of information 

the President needs, can turn around and say, ‘‘Listen, we have got 

to work harder on Problem X. I see this one coming. It is important 

to the President. We are not there yet. Do it.’’ 

Sometimes people forget that the intelligence successes of today 

are due to a lot of work done over the last several years, really 

hard work of collection, integration, spending money in the right 

place, language capabilities, and personnel assignments. And unless you are the person who ensures that all of that happens well 

75 

and direct some of it if it is not being done very well, you are not 

in a position really to tell the President how good the stuff that you 

are telling him is; otherwise, you are just taking some report from 

some analyst and parroting it to him, and you might as well have 

the analyst tell him directly. 

So I think this combination of being the one who has the responsibility for making the intelligence good and then passing it to the 

President is important. I found it was often as important to tell the 

President what we did not know and why we did not know it than 

telling him what we knew because making high-level decisions 

under conditions of uncertainty is what we really pay the President 

for. Sometimes I would tell the President, ‘‘If I were perfect in intelligence, your job would not be very difficult. You would just ask 

me what is going to happen and choose the obvious course of action.’’ 

But it is that interaction of what the big intelligence machine 

can actually do, the burn that you need to do better so that when 

the President turns to you in a year and says, ‘‘What is the situation with nuclear weapons in Country X?’’ You have a good answer. 

That is essential to the DNI. So I do not think those two responsibilities can split up. 

And, finally, the DNI should have the political sense of what is 

important to the President over the long term. President Grant 

knew that he had to win a battle before the Emancipation Proclamation could come out, and so he won one. I mean, I fully accept 

that ultimately the will of the people expressed through their elections has to drive what we do. So you need to be close to the political sense in that sense, but not so close that you simply make all 

the mistakes that overpoliticized leaders of very difficult national 

security enterprises can make. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. That was a good statement. You 

have to be mindful of the political realities that the President is 

facing, but also obviously tell the President the truth, as you see 

it. 

One of those little questions that always comes up: How important to the DNI’s strength and credibility is it that the DNI himself 

be there at the daily intelligence briefing for the President? 

Admiral BLAIR. The approach I took—and it felt right for me and 

this President—was that I was responsible that the intelligence— 

the daily briefing of the President was correct, but I did not have 

to be the one to brief it every day. So I think it is the former responsibility that is the more important. And then I think that the 

President—a DNI needs to attend enough of those sessions so that 

he gets a sense from the President and his inner circle as to are 

the right questions being answered and so on, and he needs to do 

that, I think, on a fairly frequent basis. I would always receive a 

memo from the person who gave the briefing, here is what happened, here is what the President asked and so on. I mean, that 

is natural. But it is not quite the same as being there and seeing, 

we are just not hitting the mark on this one so we need to work 

on it better. 

So I think you need to be there for some of the time but not wear 

out your welcome. 

76 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Last week, incidentally, at the hearing everybody agreed, including those who had had most of their experience at the CIA, that the DCI was an unsustainable position, it 

was too much, and that, therefore, creating the DNI made sense. 

I want to say in passing that General Michael Hayden said something interesting, which was that he thought that he was probably 

the only Director of the CIA who was nominated since we have had 

a DNI who was actually recommended by the DNI, and he thought 

that was not good. He was recommended because he knew Admiral 

Mike McConnell or Admiral McConnell chose him, but that the others had come up, as would naturally happen, through the White 

House. I do not know—unless you want to comment, but I was 

really saying that more to share it with you as an interesting historical observation. 

Admiral BLAIR. I just have one comment on that, if I could, Senator Lieberman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Admiral BLAIR. I strongly believe that the Director of the CIA, 

whether it be the CIA as we now know it or the CIA as I recommended it, with an analytical piece and a clandestine piece, 

should be a CIA professional that has come up through the ranks. 

I think the record shows that those who have done that have been 

some of the Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency that we 

think the most highly of their records. 

I think now that we have a DNI position, that is the position 

that you should put someone who should have some intelligence 

knowledge but does not necessarily have to have lived and 

breathed it all his or her life. But I think part of the confusion in 

roles that we now have is when you appoint two people to these 

two jobs, both of whom are sort of considered independently rather 

than one being a professional. We get some of the jostling that we 

have seen in recent times, and I think the political direction can 

be sent through the DNI, and we ought to have professional 

DCIAs. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think that is a big insight, and what it 

requires is a President having different visions of both roles and 

really recognizing that the DNI is the President’s main personal intelligence adviser, and also in the President’s interest, the leader 

of the community. 

General Hayden did not dwell on it, but when he made his statement, he included the incoming head of the CIA because there is 

no one in the world who thinks that General Clapper came up with 

the recommendation of General David Petraeus to head the agency—not that he is opposed to it, but your point is well taken. 

I want to ask you just to dig down a little bit deeper on it, and 

then I want to ask you about the split in the Agency that you recommend. 

Talk a little more about what the advantages are of having a career person at the head of either the CIA as it is now or a CIA in 

two parts. 

Admiral BLAIR. I think the main advantage, Mr. Chairman, is 

that you have someone who knows the organization. If you choose 

the right person, as you should, that person will have instant credibility and a following. I think with agencies whose jobs are specialVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
77 

ized and difficult, you just cannot walk in and do them with a general purpose background, that the best leaders move their organizations a step further, to be more skilled, more unified, and able 

to do new things. And I think that is really best done by somebody 

who knows the organization. 

I am also influenced by what I saw at the CIA in that there are 

marvelous people there. I saw any one of four people in that Agency who I, had I had the chance, would have recommended to be the 

Director. You had four good chances, and you could have flipped a 

coin among them. So there are good people there who can do it. 

And if you have a DNI who is running the political top cover for 

them, then you can have your Director of the CIA being a professional just the way a uniformed military officer or a police chief is. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

Admiral BLAIR. I mean, that is what they do. And so I would say 

that is part of it. 

And, finally, as I said, as I looked back over the history of Directors of Central Intelligence, although there has been some brilliant 

work done by outside officers coming in, if you had to handicap the 

odds, those who were remembered as having done the best at a 

higher percentage rate are those who have the background. So that 

is really what I think the advantages are. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Now go in a little bit deeper than you did 

in your opening statement about why separate the CIA into an 

analytic section or agency and a clandestine agency. 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, Senator. Starting off with trying to clean the 

slate and letting us look at those two different functions, they are 

really quite different approaches. An analyst is skeptical, questioning, uses the academic skills and all. A case officer or an officer 

involved in covert operations has got to be positive, extemporaneous, flexible doing the job. So you have oil and water here in 

terms of the sort of people who do it. 

Until I guess about the early 1990s, of course, they were originally divided out at Langley. This tower was the analyst tower and 

this tower was the operators’ tower. When they were thrown together and mixed up, there were some advantages. I think the 

main advantages were for the clandestine service, the operators, 

because it gave them a closer sense of what was required, and they 

could direct their efforts more to that. It taught them to become a 

little more reflective in what they were doing, not just where is the 

job, let us go do it, where is the door, I want to run through it. So 

there were certain advantages to that. And I would leave an analytical cadre in the national clandestine service in order to perform 

that function. 

But also over time the operator ethic prevailed at the Agency. 

Being the sort of active can-do people they are, they were the ones 

who pretty much set the tone for the Agency. And I think it, detracted somewhat from the analytical ability and made it difficult 

analytically at some times, especially when the analysis was not 

supporting the program that the action side was working on. 

In addition, if you look at where the intelligence comes from 

now—I do not have the figures right with me. They may well be 

classified. But the bulk of information comes from signals intelligence gathered by the NSA. So it is not that you have the allVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
78 

source analyst next to the place where most of the intelligence is 

coming from. So I do not see any disadvantage to having this allsource analytical shop separate and then the clandestine service 

would be the specialists in human intelligence. They would feed it 

in. Signals intelligence comes in. Geospatial-intelligence comes in. 

In the same way, as you will recall, when the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency was formed, intelligence analysts 

were taken out of the CIA, put together with the same skills from 

the Defense Mapping Service, and they were the functional experts 

on geospatial intelligence, and they now help the CIA just the way 

they help others. So it is sort of an analogous thing of having the 

functional division of the collectors fairly pure and the analysts together. 

Now, the danger in that thing is that people get back in their 

stovepipes and they do not cooperate, and that is where I think the 

DNI putting these mission management teams together with representation from all of these agencies is the norm. 

Just a final point. I think you will find that the United States 

is completely unusual in having this particular collection of skills. 

If you look in other countries—and it is not that we should be 

bound by other countries, but it is just sort of an interesting check 

of how it happened. It is more a product of our history than it is 

a product of how it is generally done around the world. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I had not thought about this. There is a 

separation between the operators and the analysts in most of the 

foreign intelligence. 

Admiral BLAIR. Correct. In most foreign intelligence, they are 

separate. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I must say that I had followed these 

things from a distance, but when I came here as a Senator and 

started understanding what the CIA was about, I was surprised at 

how many people I would interact with in briefings who I would 

call basically researchers. It was valuable research. They were becoming expert in a particular country. But most—not all, but a lot 

of what they were doing was from open sources, and that is necessary. That is actually very important, but not what I think the 

public feels is the CIA. The public thinks of it as the operators and 

the clandestine workers. Those are two very interesting suggestions. 

Let me talk to you about another one that I think is interesting, 

and it does relate to the Osama bin Laden case, which is, as you 

indicated briefly in your opening statement, we have Title 10, 

which covers traditional military operations authorized by the 

President; then you have Title 50 covering intelligence and covert 

authorities. As you and I have discussed and is known, in the case 

of the Osama bin Laden search, the President gave the authority 

to the Director of the CIA, which was interesting, under Title 50— 

and Director Leon Panetta has been very open and enthusiastic 

about this. He called on the Joint Special Operations Command, 

Admiral William McRaven, operating under Title 10. So you make 

a very interesting and I think relevant suggestion here that we effectively need, as you said, a Title 60 for what you called joint integrated teskforces. 

79 

So let me ask you to develop that a bit. I presume it comes from 

the fact that, as you said during these questions and answers, a 

lot of what intelligence operators are doing today is inherently 

joint, but these actions particularly are. So what would be the benefit of a Title 60? 

Admiral BLAIR. Sir, let me illustrate it first by a well-known bad 

example since I think that is always instructive. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Admiral BLAIR. If you recall, when we went into Afghanistan late 

in 2001 and CIA agents famously rode in rickety old Russian airplanes with bags of money between their legs, and when they got 

out, they started reaching their old contacts, paying them money, 

turning the Northern Alliance. Meanwhile, Secretary Rumsfeld was 

famously impatient that the special forces were not there yet. They 

were slow, they were getting in place ready to jump, and never 

again will DOD be second getting into one of these situations. 

There was explicit competition between those two groups to get in 

and do the same job. And then, tragically, when a number of CIA 

agents were killed with a group of Afghans who had been taken 

prisoner and the CIA officials were outnumbered and beaten to 

death, the military back-up for that was not readily available. And 

yet it is one country, one President, one Congress, one set of authorities. 

What we need to do is put the best capabilities of the Defense 

Department that applied to this problem together with the capabilities that the CIA can bring, integrating a staff so that you have 

knowledgeable direction, and then using everything, whether you 

are utilizing all of the skills that the CIA has developed in terms 

of working with foreign intelligence services—the CIA has a lot 

more budget flexibility than DOD does. In those situations I think 

it is very useful. But yet having the huge back-up logistics, planning capability, and fire power that the Department of Defense can 

bring to bear is also important. 

What I want for the country is let us do them both. Let us not 

have the President have to make a decision. Do I give this one to 

the CIA or do I give this one to the Department of Defense? 

Now, the other thing that has happened is that the definition of 

covert action under Title 50 has really changed since the Cold War 

when it was invented. It was basically to make actions deniable so 

that we could take lethal action against the Soviet Union and areas 

around the world. We could officially deny it. We would not risk escalation to World War III. If there was ever an operation which 

was less intended to be deniable than the raid 2 weeks ago on 

Osama bin Laden, I have no idea what it was. That does not pass, 

I do not think, anybody’s traditional understanding of what a covert action is. We were going to do it. There were going to be soldiers involved. There were going to be sailors involved. The CIA 

was going to be involved. Five thousand people were probably involved in that operation from the very beginning, and we were 

going to do it. Why? Because it was a job that was not being done 

by a country that we could call on to do it, and we felt we had to 

do it ourselves. 

That is really the nature, I think, of the challenge we face now 

with al-Qaeda and its affiliates, drug cartels, outlaw operations of 

80 

various kinds, even some outlaw countries. It is not the state 

boundaries Cold War that we invented plausible deniability to take 

care of. 

In addition, a lot of these campaigns go on for a long time, like 

our current campaign in Afghanistan, and, again, if there is a more 

publicized CIA action than drones in Pakistan, I do not know what 

that is. The CIA officers call reporters and tell them about what 

happened on a routine basis. So I think these definitions are getting in our way, not helping us. 

What they do set up is sort of a competition for who is in charge 

rather than a mechanism so that both sides can bring it to bear. 

So I am for doing it. 

Now, there are some very weighty questions involved. Title 10 is 

part of what entitles soldiers to protection under the Geneva Convention and under Status of Forces Agreements. So Title 60 would 

have to be designed in a way that, yes, this is still a military action, these are still soldiers, if they are captured, so on and so on. 

Now, again, that provides some protection, but had one of the 

helicopters gone down in North Waziristan and the Haqqani tribe 

picked up some of our SEAL Team 6 people there, I doubt if they 

would have been much motivated by the Geneva Convention, and 

that is generally how it is in these situations. 

Similarly, who does this group report to and to whom is it accountable in Congress? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I was thinking about that. In Title 

50, there is a requirement for quite limited notification to Congress 

of covert action. Obviously, under Title 10, special operators are operating all the time with no notification for Congress. So how 

would you balance that? 

Admiral BLAIR. Within Title 60 I would say that both Intelligence Committees and Armed Services Committees need to be notified. There was one instance of a somewhat similar operation that 

I was involved in when I was in DNI, and we formed a joint briefing team. We went up and we talked to the leadership, both 

Houses, both parties, about a very sensitive operation that involved 

military and intelligence community actions. And, the world did 

not come to an end. They asked good, tough questions. We were 

able to answer them. I think we can do the notification part of it 

well. 

So I think we need ways to draw those capabilities together for 

the country. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Who would be in charge of one of the joint 

task forces? 

Admiral BLAIR. I would look at it and say that you know this is 

a mixed set of skills here. On balance, is it 51 percent intelligence 

and 49 percent military, or is it the other way around? And I would 

choose the lead commander on that basis. But the deputy I would 

make from the other discipline so that you have the two top people 

bring both sets of skills to bear. And also I would make sure that 

those two top people had qualifications and experience with operating with the other agencies, similar to the way we do it with joint 

commanders. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

81 

Admiral BLAIR. But I would mix them, and I would have the 

staff mixed so that you had all the skills available to spark that 

synergy and to keep from doing something stupid in either the intelligence or the military realm. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Would the DNI be always involved in one 

of these joint task forces? 

Admiral BLAIR. I would say that his involvement would be comparable to that of the Secretary of Defense: Final approval for the 

plan, approval of the commander, and concurrence with the deputy. 

And then if you are a good DNI, just like if you are a good Secretary of Defense, if you have chosen good people, given them good 

direction, approved a good plan, you let them roll. 

I hand it to the current leadership for what I understood of what 

happened during those hours of the raid. They sat there and let the 

people who were right there make the decisions, and that is the 

way it ought to run. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Those are very interesting ideas. I 

think I have, within the rules of the Geneva Convention, interrogated you enough today. Admiral, you have been extremely helpful, 

and Senator Collins and I talked about it briefly on the floor. You 

have given us some ideas. I am not quite sure what we are going 

to do from here. We may recommend some additional legislation if 

it makes sense; I think some of these really do require it. In other 

cases, we may issue a report and make recommendations to the 

President or to the DNI. But if you are willing, I reserve the right 

to reach out and just call you on the phone or ask you to come in 

and talk about the direction in which we are going, because the 

combination of your experiences in service of the country is really 

quite unique and very helpful. Also, you have had the independence now out of office to make some of the suggestions that people 

in office sometimes do not make. So this is what I have to look forward to after January 2013. 

Admiral BLAIR. I hope we can call on your wisdom after you 

leave that chair, too, Senator Lieberman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. You always can do it, whatever wisdom there is there. I thank you. I thank your wife for 

being here with you. I even thank my friend for decades, Arthur 

House, and your friend and counselor, for being here. 

We will keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days for any 

additional questions or statements, but, again, with great thanks 

to you for what you have contributed today. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(83) 

SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING, 

DO SOMETHING: NEXT STEPS FOR 

SECURING RAIL AND TRANSIT 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Landrieu, Collins, and 

Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. The hearing will come to 

order. Thanks very much to our witnesses for being here, and 

thanks for coming a bit earlier than we had planned to start the 

hearing. Senator Collins and I may be called to the Senate floor at 

11 a.m. when a bill from our Committee is pending. 

Mr. Pistole, you will be happy to hear that this is a bill to reform 

the process by which nominations are made and considered by the 

Senate. 

Today, we have come together to discuss the security of our rail 

and transit systems and strategies for the future to improve the defense of these systems, which are historically open and, therefore, 

in the post-9/11 world, vulnerable. 

This hearing is being held as part of a continuing series of hearings and investigations our Committee has committed to do as we 

approach the 10th commemoration of the attacks against America 

on 9/11. But in this particular case, this hearing was also catalyzed 

by the reports from the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in 

Abbottabad, Pakistan, which yielded documents indicating that 

Osama bin Laden continued to urge members of al-Qaeda to attack 

the rail sector of the United States, particularly on or about the 

10th anniversary of September 11, 2001. Apparently, one of those 

documents included a plan to derail a train. Some of the analysts 

that we have talked to have concluded that the most likely form 

of such an attack would be multiple operatives acting independently against separate targets as part of a coordinated attack on 

the same system and, of course, usually at peak travel times. There 

has also been some reference to Osama bin Laden suggesting that 

84 

1The document referenced by Chairman Lieberman appears in the Appendix on page 462. 

these kinds of attacks might most dramatically occur on rail lines 

over valleys or bridges. 

In other words, this again made real the threat to our rail and 

transit systems, which we have lived with since 9/11 and, of course, 

we have seen carried out in other places like Mumbai—the first attack—Madrid, London, Moscow, and, of course, plans which were 

thwarted to attack rail systems right here in Washington, DC, and 

in New York City. 

In fact, the Mineta Transportation Institute 1 issued a report that 

concluded that since September 11, 2001, worldwide—this is a 

stunning number—1,800 attacks have been carried out on surface 

transportation, mostly buses and trains, obviously not all of them 

major, causing over 3,900 deaths. Compare that to the 75 attacks 

carried out on airplanes and at airports that have caused about 160 

deaths—157 to be exact. 

The other fact here is that 14 million people use mass transit 

systems in America every day. In Connecticut, the Metro-North 

New Haven Line is one of the busiest rail lines in our country. 

Speed, reliability, and convenience are obviously hallmarks of mass 

transit, and we support mass transit as part of broader societal 

goals. But with so many passengers at so many stations along so 

many paths, those systems are very difficult to secure. 

We certainly have not gone unsecured, and since 9/11, we have 

increased the presence of surveillance cameras, explosives-detecting 

dogs, roving security teams, and, of course, a greater public awareness. Secretary Janet Napolitano has energetically promoted—and 

Mr. Pistole also—the ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ public education campaign because the security of our rail system really does 

hinge in large part on the awareness and actions of an observant 

citizenry. 

But a decade after 9/11, as one of our witnesses, Dr. Steve Flynn, 

correctly suggests, we need to move beyond ‘‘See Something, Say 

Something,’’ to ‘‘Do Something.’’ 

Rail and transit security has been traditionally the primary responsibility of State and local law enforcement. However, the 

Transportation Security Administration has begun to play a critically important role. TSA has been working with State and local 

governments to improve rail and transit security. It now has 25 

mobile security teams, known as Visible Intermodal Prevention and 

Response teams—one of the best acronyms that I think our government has—that it sends into the field. The President’s fiscal year 

2012 budget requests 12 more such teams. 

TSA also has over 300 security inspectors working with local 

transit officials to assess the security of trains, platforms, and rail 

yards. But there is more that TSA, State and local governments, 

and transit agencies can and, I think, must do. Let me just mention a few. 

First, TSA really needs to fulfill a 2007 legislative requirement 

to develop uniform standards for rail and transit training programs 

for background checks for front-line employees and for transit 

agencies’ security plans. 

85 

Second, the Department of Homeland Security should step up its 

efforts to develop creative, non-intrusive transit security solutions, 

especially to detect improvised explosive devices, which history has 

shown are the weapons of choice for disrupting rail and transit systems. The Department of Homeland Security has a Science and 

Technology Directorate explicitly to achieve this, but specific R&D 

for rail and transit security innovations, in my opinion, has been 

much too limited. 

Third, TSA has to improve its intelligence sharing with State 

and local officials—it has come a long way, but it needs to come 

further—and also the private sector, to provide information that is 

both current and useful to them, that is, simplified and easier to 

manage. 

Fourth, all of the stakeholders in transit security need to be conducting more exercises to accustom rail and transit officials with 

the unique requirements of disaster prevention and response involving mass transit, particularly trains. So I hope that TSA and 

FEMA will continue to expand these exercises and that local and 

State authorities will become more proactive and ensure that employees at every level are involved. 

And fifth, we have to continue to work with passengers to make 

them full partners in securing our rail and transit systems, and 

that includes educating them about the risks, how to report suspicious activities, and how to respond should an attack occur. 

We have the Department of Homeland Security’s Transit Security Grant Program through which approximately $1.8 billion in 

rail and transit security grant funds have been distributed since 

2006. These funds are critically important to our State and local 

authorities, and that is why I feel that the House action to zero out 

these funds is just plain bad policy, and I hope we will be able to 

overturn that legislation here in the Senate. 

I do want to stress that our law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies have successfully thwarted plots against rail and transit 

systems, and we should not, in talking about what more we can do, 

pass over that without acknowledging really remarkable work. The 

2009 plot by Najibullah Zazi to explode bombs in the New York 

subway system was disrupted by brilliant intelligence and law enforcement work. A threat to the D.C. Metro system just last year 

was similarly uncovered and stopped before anyone was hurt. 

So these are some of the subjects I want to take up with our witnesses. We really have the best in the field before us in the three 

witnesses, and I thank them for their commitment to strengthening 

the security of our rails and mass transit and for being with us 

today. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, it is a pleasure to welcome back to our Committee 

Administrator Pistole. It has been about a year since his confirmation, and I very much appreciate his commitment to strengthening 

the safety and security of our transportation infrastructure and our 

travelers. 

86 

I am also pleased to welcome Commissioner Boynton here from 

Connecticut to lend his perspective from the State level and, of 

course, Stephen Flynn, who has testified before this Committee 

many times and provided us with his insights. 

As the Chairman has pointed out, today’s hearing on rail and 

transit security is timely. Only a few days after our U.S. Navy 

SEALs raided Osama bin Laden’s compound, the Department of 

Homeland Security and the FBI released an alert about rail security. The information was dated from early last year and was not 

connected to any particular city or rail line. Nevertheless, it demonstrated and reminded us that mass transit remains a terrorist 

target. 

The fact is, soon after 9/11, terrorists began targeting mass transit systems. In March 2004, 10 bombs exploded on four commuter 

trains heading into central Madrid. The attacks left 191 people 

dead and 1,800 people wounded in what is regarded as the worst 

Islamist terrorist attack in European history. 

The United States has been subject to rail plots as well. Since 

2004, our government has thwarted five terrorist plots against our 

Nation’s transit and rail systems. Metro and subway stations in 

New York City, here in Washington, DC, and train tunnels between New York and New Jersey were the intended targets. 

While improvements have been made since 9/11, the challenge of 

securing rail and mass transit systems is enormous. As the Congressional Research Service reported in February, passenger rail 

systems, particularly subways, carry about five times as many passengers each day as the airlines over many thousands of miles of 

track, serving hundreds of stations that are designed for easy access by passengers. The vast network and sheer volume of riders 

make it impractical to conduct airline-type screening. Security at 

airports is the responsibility of the Federal Government, but security at subway, bus, and rail stations is largely under the jurisdiction of mass transit providers in partnership with State and local 

governments. 

It is vitally important, however, that the Federal Government act 

in concert with these local partners, helping to ensure that transit 

providers and local officials have the equipment and the training 

to plan for and to respond to terrorist threats while ensuring that 

taxpayer dollars are spent efficiently. I would note that the same 

CRS study says that much of the training is directed at response 

rather than prevention. 

In addition, Federal agencies must partner with State and local 

law enforcement to develop a process to identify and report suspicious activity and share that information nationally so that it can 

be analyzed to identify broader trends. 

The GAO recently reported that transit administrators and public transportation professionals currently receive security information from a variety of sources. Nearly 80 percent of the respondents 

used five mechanisms or more to receive security information. The 

GAO identified at least 21 mechanisms through which agencies can 

receive security-related information. The GAO noted that those 

interviews yielded a common desire that the information should be 

streamlined to reduce the volume of overlapping information that 

public transit agencies receive. 

87 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix on page 442. 

As we work to improve and streamline information sharing, we 

need to remember that an alert citizenry remains our first line of 

defense against terrorist attacks, whether at transportation hubs 

or city parks or airports or in Times Square. A good example is 

how an alert street vendor, noticing smoke coming from a vehicle 

in Times Square, reported it to local law enforcement and thus 

helped to disrupt an attempted bombing. If not for this concerned 

citizen, the consequences could have been deadly. 

In 2007, Senator Lieberman and I co-authored a law that made 

it easier for alert citizens to report suspicious activity in the transportation sector indicating potential terrorist behavior without facing the threat of frivolous lawsuits. This year, we have reintroduced our See Something, Say Something bill to expand those protections to reports of such behavior in all sectors. 

The world is a safer place without Osama bin Laden, but we are 

not yet safe. We are better prepared for terrorist attacks across all 

modes of transportation, but the fact remains that future attacks, 

at least attempted attacks, are certain. The enemy continues to innovate and probe our defenses. 

Administrator Pistole and I recently spoke at a forum conducted 

by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce about these challenges. One of 

our greatest assets is the spirit of innovation and flexibility that is 

fostered when we partner with the private sector, State and local 

governments, and local law enforcement officials. We are able to 

benefit from their eyes, ears, and ideas. 

I thank our witnesses for being here, and I look forward to the 

discussion today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

I thank Senator Paul and Senator Carper for being here. We will 

go now to Administrator Pistole. John Pistole has spent 28 years 

in the service of our government. We talk a lot about service in the 

military, but people like Administrator Pistole have served our 

country with great effect—we appreciate it—most of that with the 

FBI and now with the TSA. So we look forward to your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE,1 ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Chairman Lieberman, and Senators Collins, Carper, and Paul. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today with the distinguished co-witnesses to discuss the efforts of TSA in partnership with not only DHS and 

FEMA, of course, but our industry partners and those who are in 

the best position to provide the best possible mass transit and passenger rail security. 

Chairman Lieberman, I would just comment on your five goals 

for improvement that you noted in your opening statement, and I 

agree with each one of those, noting that we have made some significant improvement in those areas, but we need to do more. And 

so I appreciate your highlighting those. 

As has been mentioned, last month the President announced the 

U.S. operation that resulted in Osama bin Laden’s death, and that 

88 

effort marked a historic counterterrorism success for not only the 

United States, but for the world. And I would add to that the recently announced deaths of Ilyas Kashmiri, the leader of an alQaeda operational wing out of Pakistan for Western attacks, including Europe and the United States, and Harun Fazul, the leader 

of al-Qaeda in East Africa and, of course, the leader of the 1998 

East Africa bombings and much of al-Qaeda’s work in the Horn of 

Africa there. 

Our efforts to combat terrorism go well beyond those individuals, 

as Senator Collins mentioned, and that is why we remain focused 

on trying to do what we can do in terms of enhancing the efforts 

of others along with our own critical mission of protecting the traveling public and our transportation systems. 

TSA will continue to evaluate screening measures based on the 

latest intelligence, and we will continue to share information with 

stakeholders to enable them to enhance protective measures and 

surge resources as appropriate. 

As we know, mass transit systems and passenger railroads are 

a critical part of the transportation network TSA works to protect 

as passengers rely on them for over 10 billion trips annually. They 

also remain a target for terrorist groups and have been the subject 

of numerous attempted plots in the United States, two of which 

were mentioned earlier, as well as a number of successful attacks 

overseas, which have also been noted. 

Passengers serve as important partners for securing these systems, and we are encouraging Americans to alert local law enforcement if they see something that is potentially dangerous through 

the nationwide expansion of the ‘‘If you see something, say something’’ campaign, a clear and effective means to raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism, but also crime and other threats, 

and emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to 

the proper law enforcement authorities. 

Our partnerships with industry and local and regional stakeholders are a critical component of TSA’s security efforts for mass 

transit and passenger rail. DHS’s comprehensive Transit Security 

Grant Program is currently the primary vehicle for providing funding assistance for security enhancements to eligible transit agencies, supporting State and local government initiatives to improve 

security. TSA works with FEMA to fund projects that most effectively mitigate risk at the highest risk systems. In other words, 

how do we best buy down risk? 

These projects address operational deterrence activities, the remediation of critical infrastructure in transit, and other assets critical to surface transportation security. In 2010, DHS awarded nearly $274 million to the transit and passenger rail industry, bringing 

the total to over $1.6 billion awarded since 2006. 

In addition to grant funding, TSA supports the security of mass 

transit and passenger rail systems by deploying those VIPR teams 

that Chairman Lieberman mentioned to augment the local security 

efforts. We do have 25 dedicated teams in operation, and we are 

seeking to expand that to an additional 12 teams in our request for 

the 2012 budget. 

Now, the VIPR teams work alongside local law enforcement officers and are typically comprised of personnel with expertise in inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
89 

spection, behavior detection, security screening, and law enforcement for random, unpredictable deployments throughout the transportation sector to deter potential terrorist attacks. 

VIPR teams enhance TSA’s ability to surge resources quickly 

anywhere in the country. TSA conducted over 8,000 VIPR operations in the past 12 months, including over 4,200 operations in 

mass transit venues across the country. In addition, TSA performs 

baseline and collaborative risk assessments for mass transit and 

passenger rail, engaging State and local partners in three critical 

areas: One, how to reduce vulnerabilities; two, assess risk; and, 

three, improve security efforts. 

These assessments are conducted with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit and passenger rail systems in terms of passenger 

volume, which collectively account for over 80 percent of the more 

than 35 million trips taken on mass transit each weekday. Among 

these assessments is the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement, a comprehensive security assessment program designed to evaluate 17 security and emergency management action 

items that form the foundation of an effective security program. 

Through the BASE program, TSA reviews security-related proposals jointly developed by TSA, the Department of Transportation’s Federal Transit Administration, and private sector partners from mass transit and passenger rail systems. The assessment 

results provide critical data about security priorities, the development of security enhancement programs, and the allocation of resources—a critical aspect, obviously—and a compilation of the most 

effective security practices for mass transit and passenger rail 

agencies. Over 115 mass transit and passenger rail agencies have 

participated in the BASE program and used their assessments to 

help make their systems even safer and more secure for their passengers, employees, and infrastructure. 

TSA also provides timely, relevant intelligence and security information to industry officials and State and local partners, and we 

are working with our partners to develop a unified, comprehensive 

intelligence and security information-sharing platform for that 

mode. 

In closing, I would like to stress again that collaboration is critical for the success of mass transit and passenger rail security operations, noting that no one single agency can do it all. TSA will 

continue to collaborate with law enforcement, industry, State, local, 

and tribal officials, first responders, and Federal partners to foster 

regional security coordination and enhanced deterrence for response capabilities. 

With that, Chairman Lieberman and Senator Collins, I would 

pause for questions and other statements. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much for that opening statement. 

We will next go to Peter Boynton, Commissioner of the relatively 

new Connecticut Department of Emergency Management and 

Homeland Security. I am really delighted that you could be here 

today. We look forward to hearing from you about the State and 

local perspective on securing mass transit, particularly in our 

State, which, as I said in my opening statement, has such heavy 

90 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Boynton appears in the Appendix on page 450. 

rail traffic. Thanks for being here, Commissioner, and we welcome 

your statement now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. PETER J. BOYNTON,1 COMMISSIONER, 

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BOYNTON. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, 

and Senator Paul. I appreciate the invitation to come here today. 

I am here to offer a State perspective, as you said, Mr. Chairman, 

and I also come with some other background. I was the TSA Federal Security Director for a couple years at Bradley International 

Airport in Connecticut, the second largest airport in New England, 

and I was also the Coast Guard Captain of the Port in New Haven, 

Connecticut. So I hope that does not mean that I cannot hold a job. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No. It really reveals to everyone that 

there is a heavy Coast Guard tilt on this panel. 

Mr. BOYNTON. Yes, sir. I am afraid you have broken our cover. 

[Laughter.] 

I would like to begin by thanking the terrific partnership that we 

have in the State of Connecticut, and it is an example of what I 

think you and Senator Collins already indicated is a lot of work already done and achieved. And this includes MTA and Amtrak police who work with us in Connecticut, TSA in Connecticut, the 

Coast Guard, Connecticut State Police, Connecticut DOT, all the 

first responders who are there on that rail line every single day. 

DHS has done a terrific amount of work to support the Connecticut 

Intelligence Center, a State-run entity that we really rely on DHS 

to support, and, of course, all the public who participate in our See 

Something, Say Something campaign that we rolled out last summer. 

Connecticut does have a mass transit rail system, but it also has 

a number of other mass transit forms. We have two ferries that go 

to Long Island. They are two of the 14 largest passenger/auto ferries in the country. They are the only two that are privately operated. We have a number of bus systems throughout the State. We 

have a number of rail systems—the Northeast Rail Corridor, a rail 

corridor from New Haven up through Springfield. But the one I 

would like to focus on is the Metro-North New Haven Line. 

This system carries 127,000 passengers every day, 289 trains 

every day, and even so, it is not among the largest. But what I 

think is very notable about that the Metro-North New Haven Line 

is its connection with New York City. It is part of the much larger 

New York City metropolitan system. And every one of those Connecticut riders go right to the heart of New York City—Grand Central Station from New Haven and other points on the line. In 2010, 

there were over 37 million passenger trips from Connecticut into 

New York City. 

My point here is that the interconnected nature of mass transit 

means that the security of the New York City system is dependent 

in part on the security of the Connecticut-based part of the transit 

system, and that is not unique to Connecticut. We see that with 

91 

communities that surround urban areas with transit links all 

around the country. 

From the State perspective, however, what we are seeing is Federal funding increasingly being shifted into the large urban areas. 

This is not only happening with transit security, but also with 

UASI grants and shifts in port security. The focus on security for 

cities makes sense for a lot of reasons, but shrinking funding for 

those surrounding communities with transit links into those urban 

areas may have the unintended consequence of pushing the risk 

out to those surrounding areas. And Connecticut has real experience with this. The 9/11 terrorists and the attempted bomber in 

Times Square both spent time in Connecticut. 

So our view is that the challenge is to modify some of the current 

Federal Transit Security Grant Program criteria to include more 

proportionate funding for those communities outside of the major 

urban areas but with transit links into those major urban areas. 

We may be a relatively small transit system, but because we are 

part of the larger one, their security depends on our security. 

We need additional funding to continue to complete some of the 

basic security enhancements that have already begun, and these 

are basic things: Fencing, lighting, communications, cameras. A 

specific example is that under the new criteria for the Transit Security Grant Program, Connecticut is unlikely to continue to receive transit security grant funding this year except in Category 1 

for public awareness, which is very important. We need more of 

that money, and we will use that money well. But we are unlikely 

to qualify under the new criteria to complete some of those enhancements that we have already done. And, again, it makes sense 

to focus on the urban areas, but we are part of the urban areas, 

and there is a potential vulnerability by pushing that risk out to 

us. 

In addition to modifying the grant criteria, there may be some 

utility to using the model used in the Port Security Grant Program 

whereby the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port convenes a 

group of users to help evaluate and prioritize the grant submissions. Potentially, the analogous person to do that might be the 

TSA Federal Security Director, pulling together users of the transit 

system to help us do an evaluation of those grant proposals. We 

have produced something like that in Connecticut that I will talk 

about a little bit later. 

I would also like to note that, at least from our perspective, balancing the grant criteria for some proportional funding for the surrounding communities—and we are really talking about small dollars—is linked to the evolving terrorist threat. On the one hand, 

the Federal partners have helped us understand how this threat is 

evolving. The diversification of the threat is essentially requiring 

more involvement from the local community level. But, on the 

other hand—and this would be the Federal hand with the money— 

it seems in some respects to be going in a different direction, and 

that is, increasingly focusing funds within the city limits of large 

urban areas. And those of us who are connected with mass transit 

really have a need not just for our own State and our own population, but as a partner with that urban area to help them stay 

safe as well. 

92 

In addition to balancing the grant funding to achieve transit security, another way is to enhance information sharing, and this 

was the point I mentioned earlier. In Connecticut, we have convened a Transit Security Committee. We have representatives from 

every mode of transportation: Rail, bus, trucking, highway, aviation, maritime, even pipelines, all working together. 

We have all heard of the danger of people operating in silos. One 

of our local partners just a couple weeks ago gave me a new term 

to use, and the term was ‘‘cylinder of expertise.’’ We all have cylinders of expertise, and those are not bad things, but the difficulty 

is pulling them together with horizontal integration, and this pulling people together does not happen without effort. We have to 

take people out of their comfort zones and get them to work together, and we have had great success through that committee. 

Another example of pulling people together from within their cylinders of expertise are the VIPR operations that Administrator Pistole mentioned. In Connecticut, I just have to give thanks to our 

TSA partners. In 2009, we had 34 VIPRs. By the end of this year, 

we expect to have increased that seven-fold. These VIPRs do not 

happen without the leadership of a TSA Federal Security Director 

coming out of the comfort zone and working with other Federal, 

State, and local partners to make it happen, and it is a big success 

in Connecticut. I would like to see more support on that. 

Another example of pulling people out of their silos of expertise 

or cylinders of expertise is the intelligence fusion center. In addition to the traditional partners—State police, DHS, FBI—we also 

have a full-time TSA intelligence analyst, and I do not know how 

many of the 72 fusion centers have a full-time TSA analyst. We do 

in Connecticut. I hope by mentioning that I have not put that in 

jeopardy because we want that person to stay. That is his primary 

work location, and it gives us tremendous information exchange, 

not just with the State. We have full-time municipal police detectives whose primary job location is in our fusion center. That allows us to marry them with the great work of TSA pulling information into our fusion center. 

Last, and probably most importantly, is engaging the public. We 

have a very substantial See Something, Say Something campaign 

that has been running for 2 years in many different media routes. 

But I certainly agree the next step is to go beyond seeing and saying to doing something. And I think we have a great example in 

the area of emergency medical response, and that is, publicly available defibrillators. If we talked 30 years ago about allowing members of the public to operate a defibrillator, I think we would react 

in horror. But today we do that. We have come that distance. And 

I think we can do the same in the area of security by engaging the 

public not only to see and say but also to do, and that is a great 

principle of resiliency. It is an example of adapting if we can get 

to that next step of helping people do something. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here, and I look 

forward to answering questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Commissioner 

Boynton. That was very helpful. 

Finally, we will go to Steve Flynn, a former Coast Guard Commander and now President of the Center for National Policy. He 

93 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Flynn appears in the Appendix on page 454. 

has been a really terrific resource for this Committee over the 

years, and we welcome you back with gratitude for your testimony 

today. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN E. FLYNN, PH.D.,1 PRESIDENT, 

CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY 

Mr. FLYNN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, 

Senator Landrieu, and Senator Paul. It is an honor to be here 

today. What I would like to do is to offer a bit of an analytical perspective about the threat, why I think this hearing is so important, 

and then speak to a few don’ts I would suggest about how we approach this issue, and then some ideas about the do’s, where we 

go from here. 

I would offer up at the outset that we really are still at the starting line, and as with so much in Washington, we can always evaluate priority by what we spend, and the numbers are pretty clear 

on this one. We spend on average $9 for every passenger who flies, 

and the estimate for the amount of money that we spend on transit 

is a penny or a little less. So that kind of tells us where we are 

in terms of what we have been willing to invest in. 

Now, this is not to say that we should replicate the model that 

we are doing in aviation and do a very expensive effort with regard 

to transit. The heart of my testimony here today is to say, in fact, 

this is an opportunity, since we are still at the starting line, to essentially recalibrate the approach. 

I want to specifically speak to the threat and why I think that 

we really need to step up our focus on this area, and it is not simply because, as was laid out at the very outset of your opening 

statement, Mr. Chairman, we know Osama bin Laden had been 

plotting and thinking about the transit system. We have the very 

explicit examples from around the world of attacks since 9/11 on 

those systems. But the threat is evolving. I think there is a convergence of views on this and something that I have been part of being 

able to track as a result of my being a member of the National Security Preparedness Group led by former 9/11 Commission Chairmen Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton. 

Essentially what we are seeing is a fundamental evolution in the 

terrorist threat with increasingly a homegrown quality, but also 

with a focus on smaller-scale attacks. And this is driven in part because the capacity to take on large-scale attacks has clearly been 

hampered. But this has also been because there has been a bit of 

an ‘‘a-ha’’ moment for al-Qaeda and its affiliates, which is, they realize you really do not need big, spectacular attacks to get big results. You can get a big bang, particularly in terms of disruption, 

by doing relatively small-scale things that basically lead to a reaction or in many cases an overreaction that is very costly and very 

disruptive for the society you are targeting. 

And so with that we end up with what Commissioner Ray Kelly 

of the NYPD has called a ‘‘let a thousands flowers bloom’’ kind of 

strategy where the recruitment threshold is much lower and you 

are willing to essentially allow lone wolves or an individual with 

a few allies to go off and cause mischief. 

94 

Now, that is the broad backdrop against which to evaluate the 

state of transit security. We have both the homegrown dimension 

to it and the fact that we are looking at one and two operatives 

and not looking for necessarily massive, catastrophic scale attacks 

but things of the ilk that are really disruptive, potentially can 

achieve mass loss of life, and are very visible sort of attacks. Mass 

transit and not surprisingly rail freight as well become very attractive to satisfying these two criteria. They are open systems spread 

across vast geography that are also accessible to the public and 

that are very time sensitive. Therefore, the ability for a relatively 

small operation to get into the system is minimal. The goal is to 

disrupt the system so you do not need massive kinds of things. A 

derailment or taking out commuters in a single car, if that leads 

to a shutting down of the system for a period of time or to Washington then coming up on the fly with lots of new requirements to 

reassure the public, can be very expensive and disruptive. 

So what I would suggest is that while we do not have right now 

immediate intelligence that I am aware of to say that something 

is unfolding in our cities, we do have enough in terms of general 

intelligence to say that this is a sector that is being targeted, we 

have instances of it being targeted in the past, and we need to 

focus on it to a much greater degree. 

So now on to my don’ts. What do we not want to do as we tackle 

this problem? I essentially would advance here that overall we 

need to move away from essentially a law enforcement-centric, 

screening-centric approach to tackling this issue because of both 

the difficulty of doing so and also because there is an opportunity 

to take a much different model. 

So my first don’t is, we should always avoid in any homeland security endeavor, I would argue—and certainly in the case of rail 

and transit security—alienating the very public that security officials are obligated to protect. This is actually something David 

Petraeus has figured out in Iraq. Its key is, you need the cooperation and collaboration of the people that you are protecting, and 

you want to make sure that they see themselves as part of the solution and that they understand the risk and they are playing the 

collaborative role. We have a tremendous ability within the transportation system to essentially coerce people to comply. You want 

access to the system, subject yourself to A, B, C. But it is not necessarily the way you win hearts and minds. And given that we 

have limited resources to be able to bring about something of that 

scale in the transit system, we should not head down that path. 

The second don’t is, avoid promising more than you can deliver. 

This is something that I think is fundamental to governance overall. We do not want to set expectations beyond what we can deliver, 

and therefore, it is very important to acknowledge there is risk and 

there are limits to what government can do to eliminate risk when 

we have an open system that is time sensitive and spread over a 

wide geographic space—there will be limits to what we can do to 

prevent acts of terror. And I think the President and the Secretary 

of Homeland Security should be applauded when they talk about 

risk as something that cannot be eliminated. This is an important 

message Americans need to hear. 

95 

Now, we also need to avoid the excessive secrecy impulse because 

if the overwhelming majority of the people we need to talk to, particularly those on the front lines of running trains, are not in the 

clearance system, then we are keeping them out of the loop. We 

really need to work much harder, pushing beyond the envelope of 

the very good things that have been done around information sharing, and encourage Federal players, law enforcement, State and 

local and security officials to get more information out to citizens, 

the owners and operators, and the designers of transit systems so 

that they can start to be a part of the solution set. 

So the last piece here is, we need to be very careful not to overreact. When essentially something goes wrong and Americans and 

elected officials overreact, we are only motivating the very threat 

that we are trying to prevent. 

So the way forward. Essentially, the overarching message I 

would like to convey—and I was happy to hear it in the testimony 

provided by both Administrator Pistole and Commissioner Boynton—is that many of these thoughts are clearly in the mix, but we 

need to put them on steroids. We essentially really need to move 

away from relying almost exclusively on Federal screening and law 

enforcement to an effort that basically says for mass transit—particularly, rail, freight, and so forth—we really need to have the 

public engaged, empowered, and focused on the issue of resilience 

of the system as a key security imperative. 

The reason for this is pretty straightforward. The size and diversity of the system means that we have a lot of passengers and a 

lot to protect so we need everyone involved. But also I think I want 

to really highlight the extent to which particularly in transit there 

is an extraordinary opportunity. If we think about the nature of 

transit—and I spend a lot of time on the Metro-North Line coming 

into New York particularly—most transit passengers often end up 

on the same train at the same time, and many times even in the 

same seat. They end up knowing the rhythm of that system pretty 

darn well. 

I can tell the story of the Metro-North Line. One of the unofficial 

rules is, you do not use cell phones before 8:30 in the morning. 

Somebody who is not aware of this rule and actually starts chatting it up at about 7 a.m. on the train to New York will die of a 

death glare of 40 other passengers aboard the train. People immediately know the anomaly. In this case, it is not enforceable, but 

it can feel that you are definitely isolated. 

The fact is, folks on that train are aware of their environment. 

They know the rhythm of the environment. They are vested in that 

environment. And they are folks that are clearly security assets. It 

is a little different from aviation. I fly a lot, but it is different airports, different airplanes. I do not have that same feeling for normal and abnormal. Passengers are very much a part of the solution. Of course, conductors, who in many cases know the same 

faces—they may not know all the names. In some cases they do because some of their passengers are daily commuters. Then there 

are the people in the stations. We need to expand our security effort to those who own, who operate, and who are vested in the system. These are the passengers and the workers for the transit auVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
96 

thorities. How the Federal Government brings them in is absolutely essential to going forward. 

So what does that mean? We really need to move the public education effort from ‘‘see something, say something so that law enforcement can take care of it’’ to one that gives them much more 

granular detail about what they should be looking for, what they 

should be doing, and how they can help. And what I want to highlight particularly would be the opportunity perhaps to reach out to 

the major employers who have lots of employees dependent on the 

transit system and who could convene training that could happen 

at their workplace to engage those commuters, not as they run for 

the train, but when they are not in a rush, to sit down and talk 

a little bit more about transit security. This kind of outreach would 

certainly be very helpful. 

The final thing I want to also mention here is a program in 

Logan Airport in Boston. It is a program called Logan Watch. Like 

an airport, the transit system is more than just the trains and the 

passengers on the trains. We have train stations. We have shoeshine boys and newspaper dealers and so forth, and they should be 

involved because—again, like we saw with Shahzad—they understand the rhythm of their work environment. Getting them involved is a very important way to go forward. 

Logan Watch is a system by which everybody who works in that 

terminal is given some training—and the goal should be annual 

training—so that they understand the environment they are in and 

they can be a help. 

I have run out of time, so I just want to conclude by saying that 

a focus on resilience, which I have been long advancing, is not an 

exercise in resignation and pessimism. Focusing on our ability to 

respond and recover to incidents is a way to deter the incident from 

happening, and so the extent to which we can plus-up more investment in response and recovery, exercises and so forth, for incidents 

should they happen, both accidental and man-made, the more I 

think you are going to have a safer system. It does not look like 

a soft target, going back to what I was saying about the threat. It 

is, in fact, something that makes sense pragmatically to do, but it 

also has real value in terms of our goal of hopefully mitigating the 

risk to the mass transit system. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Flynn. That was very interesting testimony. I am not a regular commuter on the Metro-North 

Line, but when I do get on the train to go to New York, you are 

absolutely right that there is a sociology of train travel. There are 

people there every morning and every afternoon. They know each 

other. There is a certain extent to which they socialize. There is a 

certain extent, as you indicated with the cell phone incident, to 

which they hardly talk to each other at certain hours because they 

are reading their papers or their memos for the day. Anyway, that 

was very practical and insightful testimony. 

Let us do a 7-minute question round to start. Administrator Pistole, let me begin with you and ask you to focus in, to the extent 

that you can in open session, on what, if anything, TSA did after 

the evidence came out of the Osama bin Laden compound in Pakistan that Osama bin Laden was urging al-Qaeda to think specifiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
97 

cally about an attack on a rail system in the United States on or 

around September 11, 2011. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Mr. Chairman, we started off on Monday morning, 

May 2, following the President’s announcement Sunday night, with 

a conference call to all the key stakeholders and industry as part 

of a group that is known as the Policy Advisory Group to say that 

this has happened, just be aware of possible retaliatory action that 

may be taken either spontaneously by somebody who is a Osama 

bin Laden or al-Qaeda sympathizer or that may have always been 

a triggering mechanism if Zawahiri, No. 2 in al-Qaeda, moved up 

to No. 1. So we did that call just for awareness. 

It was then 21⁄2 days later, late Wednesday/Thursday, before the 

media document exploitation from the compound about that specific threat from February 2010 that noted the rail attack on the 

10th anniversary. As soon as we received that information and the 

declassified portion of that information from the intelligence community, we reconvened that group and then did an intelligence dissemination to all the stakeholders and the industry to say, here is 

specific information. Now it is over a year old, but it cites an upcoming event, the 10th anniversary of 9/11, and so be aware that, 

because of the death, that may again trigger some activity to move 

up from the 10th anniversary. 

So there are other things, but those are some of the highlights. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So is it fair to say that we raised our 

guard in response to that information from Osama bin Laden? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. Actually, in terms of other activity, we also did 

several things in terms of operational deterrence. For example, the 

industry on its own, with information from us, obviously, conducted 

what is known as a Rail Safety Day, and that involved over a thousand law enforcement and security officials from across the country, major transit agencies, that stepped up patrols, either uniform 

patrols, K–9 patrols, and additional information awareness that 

given the Osama bin Laden death there may be something going 

on. So that was done, I believe, on Thursday or Friday of that 

week, and so that was something that was done based on prior 

funding from DHS and TSA, but really done unilaterally. So there 

are other steps that were taken. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. How about the suggestion that 

there might be an attempt to essentially disable some track over 

a valley or a bridge? Do we have a way or are transit systems raising their surveillance on tracks to prevent that kind of episode 

from happening? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, and we believe, Mr. Chairman, that this is 

consistent with Osama bin Laden’s idea of trying to cause not only 

the greatest number of casualties, but as has also been mentioned, 

the greatest economic impact, plus if you could get a train to derail 

into a valley, just the psychological aspects of that. 

As part of that, the transit agencies, Amtrak in particular, 

stepped up their patrols of the rails to look at perimeter fencing 

where appropriate and especially to look at the critical areas over 

bridges and areas that also may be seen as more vulnerable—obviously to look at CCTV where appropriate, especially at stations. 

The concern is not only the derailment but also the possible attack 

like we saw at the Moscow airport where somebody could go into 

98 

a crowded station, in this case a train station, whether Union Station, 30th Street Station, Penn Station, with explosives in suitcases 

or bags, and then do a bombing in that regard. So it is not just limited to the intelligence we have. There has been stepped-up vigilance across the board. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is important to hear. The bottom 

line—and I am saying it to anybody who is listening—is that there 

is a lot more going on to protect mass transit systems than is visible. It is very visible in aviation transportation, of course, but less 

so with rail and buses. 

Commissioner Boynton, give us the response from a State perspective to the intelligence from the Osama bin Laden compound 

and, if you can, how you work with TSA, the Metro-North Line, 

and Amtrak in Connecticut. 

Mr. BOYNTON. Mr. Chairman, we used our intelligence fusion 

center—it is a State-run entity, one of 72 around the country—to 

disseminate that intelligence bulletin, and we did that in two ways: 

First, for those who have security clearances, we provided a classified briefing. We have tripled the number of people in Connecticut, like police chiefs, with those clearances, and we are adding more. 

And, second, with the unclassified part, our fusion center has an 

existing network to send that out quickly to every police department, and in this case, since it was not law enforcement sensitive, 

also to all first responders. And I should not say ‘‘police department,’’ but all police partners, so that includes not only municipal 

police, State agencies with police forces, but also Amtrak and MTA 

within Connecticut. 

I do want to add that part of our reaction from that intelligence 

took place a year ago and prior to that, that we have been doing 

things, in my view, that help us now, but we did not start now. 

And one example of that is getting that TSA intelligence analyst 

into our fusion center as a primary work site. What that allowed 

us to do is have someone already in place in that fusion center who 

we then could ask to focus on surface transportation, focus on rail, 

and we have already had two cases since then of potential rail tampering, of potential rail gate tampering in neighboring areas. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BOYNTON. But through the collaboration between fusion centers, because we have the luxury of someone who focuses on that— 

but that is something that was in place 2 years ago, which helped 

us now. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So was there an event that led to that occurrence 2 years ago, or was it an administrative decision at some 

level, TSA or State? 

Mr. BOYNTON. It was an administrative decision between the 

Federal Security Director for TSA at Bradley Airport and the Commissioner of Homeland Security. It was the previous TSA Federal 

Security Director that—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What was his name? 

Mr. BOYNTON. I think that was Commissioner Boynton. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. My time is up. [Laughter.] 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

99 

Mr. Pistole, I want to start with something that Dr. Flynn raised 

in his testimony. He said that the first rule is to avoid alienating 

the very public that security officials are obligated to protect. As 

you know, there has been some criticism of TSA over the years, 

most recently about the selection of a small child to be patted 

down, but also people have raised questions about why a very elderly woman had to go through such scrutiny. 

Is TSA considering any actions that would focus more on a risk 

analysis using intelligence to select individuals for secondary 

screening? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator, and I agree with that point in 

terms of not alienating the public that we are trying to protect. The 

challenge, as we know, comes in the practical application of that. 

And to your point, we in TSA since last fall, actually before the 

Thanksgiving issues arose, have been looking at a risk-based security initiative to do exactly what you have described, to try to identify those that we know something more about, whether they are 

frequent flyers, whether they hold top secret security clearances, 

whether they, based on the intelligence we know, do not fit in a 

category such as the very young or perhaps the very old, who we 

could expedite their screening at airport checkpoints. That would 

then allow us to spend more time with those that we do not know 

very much about other than what is in Secure Flight, the three 

data fields, name, date of birth, and gender, which allows us to 

compare to the terrorist watchlist. We obviously want to spend the 

most time on those who would be selectees, but then in the next 

category, I would say we want to spend as much time as possible 

on those that we do not know much about and then the least 

amount of time, frankly, using a risk-based approach, to say this 

person has traveled 100,000 miles in the last year, she has done 

that for the last 20 years, what is the possibility of her being a terrorist? It is very small, so let us treat her in that regard. 

So it incorporates some of the aspects of what is known as trusted travelers, known traveler programs, and some other aspects of 

that. So we have had a fair amount of discussions with industry 

about that. There is a great deal of interest, whether you talk 

about a checkpoint of the future that one association is promoting. 

There are a lot of technology aspects to it, but a lot can be done 

right now with enhanced behavior detection and information that 

passengers are willing to share with us. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I support TSA’s and DHS’s expansion of the See Something, Say Something campaign, and indeed, 

mass transit systems have been using this for many years. New 

York City subways, for example, have had it for nearly a decade. 

I mentioned in my opening statement that Senator Lieberman 

and I authored the law to give immunity to individuals who make 

such reports, as long as they make them to the proper authorities 

and act in good faith. This was in response to an infamous case involving US Airways when passengers did just that, and then the 

airline, its crew, and some of the passengers got sued. 

Does TSA or do you personally support extending the law so that 

it is not just confined to the transportation sector? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Senator, I think it makes sense. We want to encourage people to provide information without concern about liabilVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
100 

ity from something that would come about. That being said, I know 

the lawyers at DHS are looking at all of that and are going to provide a formal response, but, yes, I think it makes sense. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Commissioner, you have so much experience at the State level, 

and one comment that you made that really resonated with me is 

when you said that their security, the security of big cities, depends on our security, that you are feeding people into those lines. 

It resonates with me because two of the hijackers on 9/11 started 

their journey of death and destruction from Portland, Maine, and 

I think that is often forgotten when some of our colleagues argue 

that all of the homeland security money should go to just large 

urban areas. My colleague from Kentucky just had the case where 

two suspicious individuals in Bowling Green, Kentucky, were arrested. So I think that we need to understand in this country that 

security is everyone’s business, that terrorists hide and train and 

plan in rural areas and not just in the areas that they are apt to 

strike. So thank you for making that important point. 

I want to ask you about the training exercises. Like the Chairman, I have been a huge proponent of having more exercises that 

involve Federal, State, county, and local officials because if disaster 

strikes, you do not want people meeting each other for the first 

time and exchanging business cards in the middle of it, which is 

what happened with Hurricane Katrina, and that is why we restructured FEMA to have regional offices and have pushed and 

funded these training sessions. 

I want to know from you, however, whether we are striking the 

right balance. CRS tells us that the transit security measures, including training, tend to emphasize managing the consequences of 

an attack. In other words, they are focused on response. And I 

agree with Dr. Flynn that response and resiliency are important. 

But to me, our focus should be on trying to detect, deter, and prevent the attack in the first place. 

So how do you rate the effectiveness of the training sessions? Are 

we striking the right balance between teaching prevention techniques versus consequence management? 

Mr. BOYNTON. Senator, I can tell you that we have had a number 

of exercises in Connecticut—Norwalk, Old Saybrook, and two other 

locations—and another one where we sent from Bridgeport about 

40 people to the TEKS Program down in Texas, a terrific program 

where they do very well simulated exercises. And the unusual 

thing about this was that it included fire, police, emergency management, emergency medical—all four disciplines, including the 

chiefs from each of those departments—carving out essentially a 

week of time and moving 30 people down to Texas to do this. So 

it was a fully integrated training exercise. That was just within the 

last couple months that we did that, and the key thing there was 

the fully integrated part of it. 

In the case of the exercise in Old Saybrook, which is on the 

northeast corridor, that included taking a rail car off on a siding 

and then simulating a shooting event, all phases of the response 

right to the point of actually taking passengers out through the 

windows. Normally something like that is simulated because you 

might hurt somebody in the exercise. They actually went to that 

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level of actually moving people out of the windows. So really terrific exercises, but I would agree with you that the focus is on response, and I think perhaps as part of this not just see something 

and say something but do something, that really could be a great 

trigger for us to then move into training and exercising not just 

first responders but some members of the public to help us with 

what specifically are we asking you to look for and how exactly are 

we asking you to report it, and then what do you do. And it is not 

that we have not done that. We have very robust See Something, 

Say Something campaigns, but I think we could use more in that 

area. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you 

Mr. FLYNN. Senator, could I add just one thing to that? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. FLYNN. One of the reasons why I place such emphasis on response and recovery is that it helps to get people vested in couldn’t 

we do more to prevent something in the first place. In other words, 

when you get citizens involved in response and recovery, they become much more vested in how they could be helpful in prevention 

efforts. So exercises are so important because, as a practical matter, we are not going to eliminate every threat, which could lead 

us to overreact. But exercises also very much support prevention 

and protection efforts as well. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Flynn, and thanks, Senator 

Collins. Senator Paul, you are next. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL 

Senator PAUL. Thank you, and thanks to the panel for coming 

today. 

I wanted to follow up on Senator Collins’ question to Mr. Pistole. 

Currently, the invasive patdown searches are random and not 

based on risk assessment? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, actually they are based on intelligence that we 

know specifically from Christmas Day, Abdulmutallab, and the way 

he concealed that device. There are some random patdowns, if that 

is what you are referring to, but it is based on the intelligence. 

Senator PAUL. So I guess this little girl would be part of the random patdown? This is the little girl from Bowling Green, Kentucky, 

one of my constituents. They are still quite unhappy with you, and 

I and a lot of other Americans think you have gone overboard and 

are missing the boat on terrorism because you are doing these 

invasive searches on 6-year-old girls. 

The same week that this happened, I received a call from another neighbor of mine in Bowling Green. A little boy had a broken 

foot and crutches. They did not want to go through all the screening, so they took the crutches off and the cast, and he wanted to 

hobble through on his broken foot, and his Dad was helping him. 

TSA said, ‘‘Back away. Back away.’’ Then he had to go through the 

special search because he previously had a cast on even though the 

cast went through the belt. When the Dad comes close, they say, 

‘‘Back away. Back away. If you do not back away, you will not fly.’’ 

This kind of gets back to this whole idea of what are we willing 

to do, what are we willing to give up as a country. 

102 

In your interview with ABC News, you said, ‘‘I see flying as a 

privilege.’’ Well, there are those of us who see it otherwise, the Supreme Court included, and Saenz v. Roe, in 1999, says that although the word travel is not found in the text of the Constitution, 

the constitutional right to travel from one State to another is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. 

Justice Potter Stewart went on to say in Shapiro v. Thompson 

that the right to travel is so important that it is assertable against 

private interference as well as governmental action, a virtually unconditional personal right guaranteed by the Constitution to us all. 

Now, this is not to say we do not believe in safety procedures, 

but I think I feel less safe because you are doing these invasive 

exams on a 6-year-old. It makes me think that you are clueless 

since you think she is going to attack our country and that you are 

not doing your research on the people who would attack our country. It absolutely must involve a risk assessment of those who are 

traveling. The fact that she is being patted down—I do not feel 

comfortable really with your response that, ‘‘We are no longer doing 

it. We may be doing some risk assessment. We are still doing random patdowns.’’ I think you ought to get rid of the random 

patdowns. The American public is unhappy with them. They are 

unhappy with the invasiveness of them. The Internet is full of 

jokes about the invasiveness of your patdown searches. And we 

ought to really just consider whether this is what we are willing 

to do. 

While we are doing ‘‘random patdowns,’’ there are examples 

where we have had letdowns. When Faisal Shahzad got on the 

plane, the alleged Times Square bomber, he was on the watchlist. 

Everybody said, ‘‘It was the airline that let us down.’’ Well, he had 

to go through TSA screening. It was not a long time, but there 

were 10 hours, and we ought to be able to react. His name was on 

the watchlist, and he went right through TSA. 

Is the TSA looking at flight manifests? Are you doing background 

research of people getting off and on planes? Are we targeting who 

we are looking at based on who might attack us? I really get the 

idea that because our approach is so politically correct, it has to be 

so universal that 6-year-olds and 90-year-olds and people in wheelchairs are agressively screened. You probably saw in the newspaper the other day the young man who is mentally handicapped 

who had a plastic hammer. Because you are telling your agents to 

do this, they took away something the boy had had for 29 years. 

If you have ever dealt with a child with autism, there are certain 

things that comfort them and keep them calm, and to do that really just shows that no one is thinking. They are given this rote, automaton message to crack down, pat people down, and do this. 

Catching terrorists should be about police work. Most of these people are caught by police work. The hijackers who came here were 

overstaying their welcome. They were on student visas, but they 

were not going to school. We need to be doing better police work 

and less of the universal giving up of our freedoms. 

I would like you to comment a little bit about the right to travel 

as a privilege and then a little bit about the idea of the universality 

of insult that we are being given versus targeting this toward people who might attack us. Thank you. 

103 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. You have raised a number of 

important issues. Let me try to take them in order. 

In terms of the patdown of the 6-year-old, that, of course, is 

something that is done based on intelligence that is gathered from 

around the world, not as to a specific individual, but if there is an 

anomaly detected or for some reason the resolution cannot be done 

other than through a patdown, that is what is done. Unfortunately, 

we know that terrorists have used children under 12 years old as 

suicide bombers in other locations—not in aviation, but there have 

been two 10-year-olds used. We also know that two grandparents— 

one grandmother and one grandfather, 64 years old in both situations—have chosen to be suicide bombers. So it is informed by the 

intelligence. 

I agree with you that we need to be smarter in how we go about 

doing things. We need to use more common sense. When TSA was 

stood up nearly 10 years ago, it was given a mission: Do not let 

this happen again. And the men and women of TSA have taken 

that very seriously. Secretary Napolitano and I are working on a 

risk-based security initiative to say, yes, let us take what we know, 

some of the passenger manifest information, especially those who 

are willing to share information with us, so we can make better 

judgments, better informed decisions as to this particular person, 

what risk do they pose? And so how can we expedite their screening if they are not seen as a risk? 

So we are doing a number of things. I would be glad to provide 

some more detailed briefings to you in a closed setting on that. 

Senator PAUL. Right. And just one follow up on that. I mean, 10 

years is a long time. It has been a decade now. We do not have 

a frequent flyer program. We do not have a trusted traveler program. I do not want this to be against the TSA. I know most of 

the agents, and I think they are good people. But at the same time, 

they are wasting their time. All these Congressmen and Senators 

go back and forth, but to be fair, TSA agents have to search all of 

them. They know us by name a lot of times, and we are getting 

the same patdown search as everybody else to be fair. But so are 

the frequent travelers. My brother-in-law is on two or three planes 

a week. He is an Air Force graduate. He is clearly not a terrorist. 

And so they are wasting time on all these people. But I really think 

as far as the privacy issue, there were the beginnings of this, let 

us turn it over to a private company. We should have a frequent 

flyer program that you can voluntarily participate in. Let us get it 

done. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Paul. 

I want to just clarify about the 6-year-old. Based on the evidence 

that children have been used by terrorists, did that 6-year-old set 

something off in the screening that led to the patdown? Or was it 

a random patdown? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, if I recall correctly on that particular one, the 

child moved during the screening so they were not able to get a 

clear reading. And so what we have done, just for your awareness, 

we have changed the policy to say that there will be repeated efforts made to resolve that without a patdown. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

104 

Mr. PISTOLE. Although it is premature, I will be announcing 

something in the not-too-distant future about a change in policy as 

it relates to children and under. 

One of the challenges, as you know, is that we not provide a road 

map to terrorists saying here is exactly the criteria. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. And so if this category is exempt from most screening, then how will terrorists exploit that and game the system. So 

that is our challenge and that dynamic between security and privacy we try to tread. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Senator Landrieu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, thank you so much for holding this hearing. I think it is extremely timely and extremely important. 

As you know, I am the Chair now of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and Senator Coats and I are in 

the process of writing our bill for this year, and this is a very important subject and very timely because, unfortunately—which is 

why I wanted to come this morning, to call to your attention since 

you and Senator Collins have worked so hard on the reorganization, the development and creation of the Department of Homeland 

Security, and have put so much effort into it—the homeland security bill that has been sent over by the House of Representatives 

cuts the exact grants that support rail and transit security and 

emergency response by over 60 percent. So I do not know how we 

accomplish the security objectives that are the subject of this morning’s hearing with a 60-percent reduction in the grants—transit security, port security, training and preparation. This cannot be done 

on the cheap, and it has to be well resourced and well focused. So 

I wanted to bring that to your attention. 

In addition, I want to also strongly object to the 35-percent cut 

in Science and Technology because, clearly, this is an area where 

we need more science, not less, and better technology, not mediocre 

or the same technology. We have to stay ahead of the terrorists, 

not behind them, and I think cutting a research and development 

budget borders on reckless, and we have received a bill from the 

House that comes 44 percent below the President’s request for this 

year and 35 percent below where we were in fiscal year 2011. 

Let me give you a specific example. The VIPR teams were described this morning as being highly effective, and the President 

included in his budget funding for 12 additional VIPR teams. Those 

have been eliminated in the House homeland security spending 

bill. So I want to submit for the record the rest of my statement 

in writing, but Senator Coats and I have quite a challenge to put 

a budget together that supports some of these efforts and the obvious and evident evolving threat, particularly since based on the information that we received from the capture of the documents from 

the Osama bin Laden compound, we now have not a direct but a 

105 

1The pepared statement submitted for the record by Senator Landrieu appears in the Appendix on page 440. 

pretty good idea of where some of this was headed. So I want to 

just include that in the record.1

I do want to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Collins 

and the Senator from Kentucky. I think some of these patdowns of 

children—and I have expressed this to you before—are so contrary 

to what we are trying to accomplish, and I surely hope that TSA 

can be responsive and smarter about what we are doing. 

The travel industry is very important to Louisiana—and to many 

places, but our State has a tremendous business and industry built 

on travel. We have been hearing a great deal from the industry 

about the difficulty, the loss of jobs, the loss of income, the missed 

opportunities to get travelers into our country because it is, frankly, getting so difficult to get here, people are choosing to go elsewhere. We want terrorists to go elsewhere. We do not want business people and tourists to go elsewhere. We want them to come 

to Connecticut and go to Maine and come to Louisiana and go to 

New York. 

So what is your timeline for a trusted traveler program? Is there 

something that this Committee or the Appropriations Committee 

could help you with? Specifically, what is your timeline for some 

sort of trusted traveler program? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, first, Senator and Madam Chair from the Appropriations Subcommittee, let me thank you for your supportive 

comments on the budget. Those items that you highlighted are key 

aspects of what we are trying to do in TSA and the Department 

of Homeland Security to protect the traveling public. So thank you 

for your strong support of that. 

We are doing a number of things, and let me just briefly outline 

what we have done thus far in terms of doing a program with the 

pilots, those in charge of the aircraft, to say, look, they are the 

most trusted people out there. They are in charge of the aircraft. 

If they have a small knife or some prohibited item on them, frankly, that is not what is going to bring down the aircraft. So we have 

worked with the airlines and the Pilots Association to say, yes, let 

us go through identity-based screening with them. 

We have also changed the policy for the World War II veterans 

who come into Washington, DC, to visit the World War II Memorial 

on charter flights. You know, the youngest of these—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. We have had the most honor air flights of 

any State, and I am so happy to hear that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So the youngest is 84, and two-thirds are in wheelchairs, and even though our officers are very respectful, talking 

about giving them a massage rather than a patdown, it is something that I felt was not needed, not common sense, and so we 

changed that policy several months ago. 

Also, we are looking at children, looking at the elderly, and recognizing there are challenges there. And then to your point on the 

trusted traveler, we hope to be piloting some initiatives this fall to 

see how it would work. We are working with the airlines, U.S. carriers initially, to say for those willing to share information about 

106 

themselves, what can we glean from that that would help us make 

informed judgments? 

Senator LANDRIEU. But do you have a timeline for the trusted 

traveler business flyers, not the pilots, not the Honor Guard, 

but—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. So for the trusted travelers, whether we call 

them trusted traveler, known traveler, as I mentioned, we hope to 

start a trial this fall in select airports and airlines, U.S. carriers 

again. 

Senator LANDRIEU. With the idea that if it goes well, we could 

implement it within 12 months or 24 months or—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would hope we would see some significant 

changes in 2012. I do want to make sure to manage expectations 

with the traveling public. It is a complex issue, and so I want to 

basically underpromise and overdeliver, but we will be doing some 

things that some passengers will see as early as this fall. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I would hope that as you give pilots some access, you would consider also the flight attendants who work these 

long shifts and sometimes spend so much extra time in the airport 

that it just causes the morale of this whole industry to be at a level 

that I do not think is appropriate. 

So I want to associate myself again with the remarks of Senator 

Paul and Senator Collins on this issue, and I thank the Chairman 

for his courtesy. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Landrieu. I 

appreciate your work on the Appropriations Committee, and I forget whether you were here, but I was talking about—what is the 

gracious adjective? I was about to say ‘‘foolish’’—how foolish it is 

at this moment to cut the budget of the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. These are really 

investments in our future security. We all know we are under economic stress and we need to do things we would not normally do 

to balance the budget. But thanks for that and thanks for fighting 

for the other funding that you are fighting for, which I am confident will certainly lead to a higher level of support for homeland 

security than exists in the House budget. 

We will do a second round of questions. Dr. Flynn, I missed talking with you on the first round. You are a very interesting and 

thought-provoking thinker on these subjects. You said a couple of 

things in your opening statement about both moving beyond 

screening, if you will, in these kinds of security matters and avoiding alienating the public that we are trying to protect. I want to 

ask you to talk a little bit more about that, particularly about moving beyond screening. I have assumed that we are doing screening 

of airline passengers because we cannot figure out, frankly, a more 

effective way to make sure that somebody does not go on a plane 

with the intention of doing harm, of carrying out a terrorist attack. 

And sometimes people have been before this Committee and asked 

a reasonable question, which is: We know it would be inconvenient 

to do airline-type screening on rail travel, but would we not feel 

more secure if we knew that everybody had been through some 

kind of detector to get on a train, particularly knowing that trains 

have been a target of terrorists? 

107 

I want to invite you to speak in a little more detail, to explain 

what you meant about moving beyond screening, and also perhaps 

to get into this question of what are the alternatives to screening. 

Are they as effective? And particularly with regard to rail, are 

there other things we could do, including more screening? 

Mr. FLYNN. Well, Senator, thank you very much. I want to say 

first that, no matter what, screening is always in a portfolio of 

tools, but really per this conversation that preceded your question, 

one of the things that I am concerned about, the broad message 

that I think we need to take away from mass transit security, is 

you really need to make the public a partner in the process. And 

the face of homeland security for the overwhelming majority of 

Americans is what they experience at airports. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FLYNN. And to the extent that they do not understand what 

is happening is being based on sound judgment, assessment of risk, 

and so forth, they are not likely to be cooperative. And so that is 

why I think we really need to speed up efforts to figure out how 

we do a risk-based screening approach, less intrusive for some portion of the population, and so forth. That is going to be very important, I think, for the broader effort. 

But, the essential problem of relying heavily on a screening approach is that it largely assumes that everybody who enters the 

system poses a threat unless they can be discerned by a security 

official that they are not. And that is not manageable within the 

mass transit systems for them to work in most urban areas because it is such a time-sensitive, open system. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FLYNN. As a practical matter, people know that they are taking risk on any system. There are safety risks, of course, associated 

with it, whether it is risk of personal safety in a busy station, people taking hazardous objects on trains, and so forth. They have to 

balance that with the function that they are trying to do, which is 

to get from A to B through that system. 

The extent to which we get the public to be seen as both helping 

on the prevention side, aware of the environment, and everybody 

from the T-shirt vendors, as we saw in Times Square, the shoeshine boys, and others to be on the lookout for what we know are 

core elements of carrying out an attack—surveillance. Typically, 

nobody just shows up for the very first time to do something bad. 

They want to check out the place first because they need to be successful. There are typically dry runs that have to happen before 

somebody launches an attack. 

All that creates opportunity for detection that this is somebody 

who is really up to no good, but also creates a deterrent for that 

person to come into that space because he is aware there is that 

operational kind of awareness and there is that engagement by the 

people who are present at the front lines literally, the passengers, 

the transit operators, the folks who are working around the station. 

So the extent to which we emphasize screening at the cost of 

those engagement efforts, I think what you will end up with is 

alienation without perhaps the benefit that these other strategies 

would provide. And, again, we know in the case of aviation there 

is a portion of the public, the frequent-flyer public and people of 

108 

certain backgrounds, that we should be able to mitigate how much 

screening we subject them to, it should be a no-brainer. 

We also need to give more discretionary judgment capabilities to 

screeners to make the calls versus to work in a real mechanical 

way. But, fundamentally, it is about getting the public more involved, and if they sense that this is solely the job of external 

screeners to do this and they do not have an obligation except to 

submit to the screening, then we are not going to get the kind of 

buy-in that I think we need about how to manage the risk going 

forward. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That helps me understand. So you are not 

saying end screening. You are saying it has to be part of a total 

approach, and it ought not to be seen as basically giving the public 

a pass. 

Mr. FLYNN. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think Dr. Flynn’s insight about the people who essentially work and live in train stations is an interesting 

one, and I just wonder whether that is part of our normal routine. 

In other words, are train stations and transit systems training the 

news stand operators, the people at the coffee stands, the shoeshine people, etc.? Because they really do see a lot, and therefore, 

they can say a lot and do a lot. 

Mr. PISTOLE. There has been a limited amount of that done, but 

we would like to expand that, as Dr. Flynn mentions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I think there is a great force multiplier available 

to which we can avail ourselves. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. There is. I know that in air travel, of 

course, we do not just have the screeners, but we have people who 

are experts in evaluating the behavior of people boarding the 

planes. Since the consensus seems to be that because of the openness, the speed of the trains, etc., that we cannot and should not 

apply a screening model from aviation to trains, should we be using 

more behavior experts to evaluate people as they move onto trains 

or subways? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a good idea that we 

have been able to do on a limited basis. One of the key aspects of 

the VIPR teams that we use with random and unpredictable aspects is to not only have this uniform presence because we know 

that terrorists are deterred by uniformed law enforcement officers, 

K–9, and CCTV, unless they are a suicide bomber then they do not 

care about the CCTV. But those three things are important layers 

of security all informed by intelligence. But when it comes to behavior detection, one of the best opportunities we have is when 

there is a VIPR team, let us say a dozen uniformed officers, K–9, 

walking through a train station, to have a plainclothes behavior detection officer to see people responding to that. I would have loved 

to have been in Schiphol Airport on Christmas Eve 2009 to see 

Abdulmutallab walking with his underwear bomb toward screening 

and to have a K–9 uniformed officer walking toward him, then with 

a plainclothes behavior detection person observing how does he respond to that officer and that K–9. I doubt that he would have had 

the audacity to walk right by that person, the K–9, for fear of detection. 

109 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So that is what is key: How can we deploy behavior 

detection in a smart, efficient way? We are not currently budgeted 

to do that across the board, but that is how we try to be force multipliers to State, local, and Amtrak. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very smart. That combination I think 

would be very effective. Thanks. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pistole and Commissioner Boynton, I listened to the exchange with Senator Landrieu, and I, too, am concerned about the 

deep cuts in some of the homeland security grant programs. One 

challenge that we face, however, is that there has been a low rate 

of obligation of the money in the area of mass transit. And, indeed, 

there was one audit that was done by FEMA—and I realize these 

are FEMA grants, so if you cannot fully respond, I understand. But 

back in fiscal year 2006, something like 90 percent of the money 

for mass transit and rail security measures remained unobligated. 

Mr. Pistole, are we doing better in getting those funds out? And, 

Commissioner Boynton, from the local level or from the State level, 

can you give us any insights on why it takes so long for that money 

to actually be expended for the purposes of improving security? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. Let me start off by saying, yes, 

we are doing better, but we are still not where we should be in 

terms of the whole process. It is something that I think has frustrated everybody involved. You have correctly identified that TSA 

is responsible for identifying with FEMA and DHS and the industry where the highest risks are and for awarding the funds, and 

then the actual drawdown of those funds and the use of those 

funds are up to, obviously, industry and FEMA how that works. 

Some of the issues, I think, going back to 2006, were with multiyear projects that were, if you want to say, not shovel-ready, if it 

came to actually critical infrastructure enhancements and things, 

whether it is strengthening tunnels or bridges and things like that. 

And so I think there has been additional focus on operational deterrence things, such as training where even though there is still 

delayed rulemaking that is out there, over 90 percent of the people 

in the critical high-risk transit areas have been trained. So even 

though the rulemaking is still pending, we have gone ahead and 

provided the substance of what was to be covered by the rulemaking. So we are not letting the bureaucracy, if you will, get in 

the way of the substance of what, in this case, the 9/11 Commission 

Act required. I will defer to Commissioner Boynton on the other 

parts. 

Senator COLLINS. Commissioner Boynton. 

Mr. BOYNTON. I think I can give a couple examples. In one case, 

we have a capital improvement project on the Metro-North Line 

where we want to put fiberoptic cable along the entire line to connect all of the CCTV cameras. We have cameras at a number of 

stations, different places along the line, in the rail yards. Right 

now most of those cameras—not all of them but most of them—are 

localized. And given the governance of the rail system, that can be 

problematic, and let me just give one example. 

There are towns along the rail line where there are multiple stations in the same town, and each one of those stations is managed 

110 

differently by different entities, some with participation by the municipality, even within the same municipality, some without. So 

tying these cameras together is very important to us. We are unable to compete, given the size of our transit system, to fully fund 

the project at any point in time. So the best we have been able to 

do—since 2006, we have just over 1.5 percent of the national total 

of transit security grants—is to save the money to get the project 

done. We think we have saved about half. In the meantime, we are 

moving ahead with the design phases of the project with additional 

cameras. We are holding the money on purpose because we cannot 

afford the project in any 1 year because we are not able to compete 

at that level. And I am actually not being critical. The needs of the 

much larger transit systems in the large urban areas are overwhelming. I want them to have more money than we have, but 

part of the reason we are holding that money is on purpose. And 

then there is a second reason, and it is not just the transit grants. 

It is many of the other grants in our grant portfolio. Many of these 

grants have 3-year performance periods. Those are the rules we 

were given. In all of our grant planning with, in our case, 169 municipalities, two tribal nations, dozens of State agencies, we were 

told, ‘‘You have a 3-year performance period for these grants.’’ We 

have statewide homeland security strategies, 10 goals, 80 objectives, 403 measurable criteria, all laid out. We have 3 years to 

spend this wisely. It is coming as a little bit of a surprise to us now 

that we are being challenged: Why have you not spent this money? 

We have not spent it because we were told we had 3 years to spend 

it, and we are using that time wisely. 

Senator COLLINS. Dr. Flynn, do you have anything to add to this? 

I know it is more the other two witnesses’ purview. 

Mr. FLYNN. Sure. What I continue to hear about is the difficulty 

often of chasing these very small numbers of dollars, so I guess I 

would just reinforce the concern of Senator Landrieu that some 

folks basically saw there was maybe a pot of gold that you would 

have in Washington to advance homeland security at the State and 

local level and through critical infrastructure. I often characterize 

it as a ‘‘thimble of gold.’’ And what happens here is these decisions 

are being made in a kind of triage fashion. At its core we have to 

look at these as systems. 

I think one of the important points that Commissioner Boynton 

made here today is about how the riders who are coming from Connecticut as far away as New Haven, 90 miles, are going to the belly 

of the beast, Grand Central Station in Manhattan. And assessments about where we apply resources and how we roll them out, 

that is going to take time. It is not something you can just throw 

together. You have to have the collaborative mechanisms. And I 

want to reinforce the idea of using the area security committee 

model we have in the maritime world as potentially a process for 

managing grants in the other transportation sectors. It is very important, and we often lose sight of this. In the case of Connecticut, 

trains connect passengers to ferries. It is trains, buses, and trucks, 

and it is all there together. And connections by trains to airports, 

such as Newark Airport. 

We have not really been looking at the system and the integrated 

nature of that system, leaving State and local officials to fight for 

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scraps, and the scraps are not being used as well as they should 

be used. 

Senator COLLINS. What worries me—and, Commissioner, I am 

going to use your examples—is many of our colleagues look and see 

unobligated funds, or funds that have been obligated, but it is 2 

years later and they have not been spent, and they make two conclusions: The program is overfunded, that money was never needed 

in the first place, we can slash that from the budget; or they conclude that it is being poorly managed and is not really needed, and 

thus, they reach the same conclusion that it can be slashed from 

the budget. 

The desire around here to sweep up unobligated or unspent 

funds is enormous, given the budget constraints, and the irony is 

that it penalizes projects and good planning and communities that 

are actually spending the way you would want them to spend. They 

are formulating a careful plan so that they do not waste the money. 

And I think this is going to be a real battle for us. I hear it all 

the time from our colleagues, ‘‘Well, the money is not needed because it has not been spent,’’ when, in fact, the careful planning 

that is going on, which takes time, ensures that the money is spent 

wisely and not wasted. But it is an uphill battle, I will tell you. 

Finally, Administrator Pistole, I want to commend you for keeping your commitment made a year ago to come up with a Surface 

Transportation Security Priority Assessment. For the record, I 

would like you to give us an update on the 20 recommendations 

that you made as far as what the timeline is for implementing 

those recommendations and how it is going. But I do commend you 

for completing the project. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

I would just indicate to the witnesses, in the characteristically 

unpredictable way the U.S. Senate works, we are not taking up a 

bill on the Senate floor at 11 a.m., so we have a little more time. 

Senator Carper, thanks very much for being ready to take the 

gavel if Senator Collins and I had to leave, and thank you for being 

here now to ask your questions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. I apologize for being in and out. We 

have a Finance Committee hearing going on just one floor below, 

and we are focusing on improper payments or overpayments of 

about $17 billion a year on unemployment insurance. So that is important. This is important, too, and I tried to go back and forth as 

best I could. 

I just want to mention that for about 8 or 9 years, Senator Biden 

and I used to ride the train together, a lot of days back and forth, 

and before that with Mike Castle, our Congressman. And I still 

ride the train almost daily now with Senator Chris Coons and with 

Congressman John Carney. I call us ‘‘The Three Amigos.’’ We love 

to be able to live at home and take the train to work. 

Every morning the train is packed with passengers. In fact, I sat 

in the quiet car this morning. Every seat was filled. And I think 

Amtrak has set a record again this year. I think last year it was 

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1The photo referenced by Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix on page 449. 

about 28 million. This year they are, I think, approaching 30 million people. And I am delighted that so many fellow Americans 

have decided to take the train along with the rest of us. 

However, I am also concerned about the threat that those 30 million passengers face, as well as others who ride the rails with local 

transit services. I just want to ask how the Department of Homeland Security is coordinating with Amtrak to improve train safety. 

Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. We work very closely with Amtrak. Chief O’Connor and I speak frequently about security precautions that they take unilaterally and best practices that we recommend from either here in the United States or from around the 

world. We have provided Amtrak nearly $100 million—$97 million 

since 2006—for specific security enhancements to Amtrak to protect those 28 to 30 million people who are traveling every year, and 

there are a number of aspects to that, both on training of Amtrak 

officers and rail personnel to look for anomalous activity, obviously 

the See Something, Say Something campaign for the general public, the ridership especially, and enhanced K–9 patrols 

Senator CARPER. Do people ever say anything? When I am at 

Union Station and the station back home, I hear these announcements all the time. You hear them in airports, too. But do people 

ever say anything? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, in fact, I have asked that question because we 

are investing in that, and the answer is yes, in some places more 

than others. One example I have is in Boston from the MBTA 

where from 2010 to 2011 they have seen over a 100-percent increase in people reporting things. Now, they have taken some interesting initiatives, including one of which I happen to have a 

photo of a 16-foot or 12-foot backpack that they put out in some 

of their stops, and Chief Paul MacMillan is standing by that backpack, and the caption is: ‘‘It is never this obvious.’’ So it is not 

going to be a bomb that just looks like something huge like that.1

Senator CARPER. The folks in the audience cannot see that. That 

is a big backpack. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is a big backpack, right. 

Senator CARPER. I would certainly say something if somebody 

came carrying one of those on their back. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, so the idea is it is not as obvious as that, so 

let us be alert, let us be attuned to what is around us, and I think 

the partnership, which was mentioned on the panel this morning, 

is the key criteria. So we can do all the security enhancements, we 

can do all those things, but I think it really will come down to an 

alert individual, perhaps a police officer, or perhaps a K–9, who 

sees something and takes action to disrupt a possible plot. 

The best opportunity we have is like what we saw with 

Najabullah Zazi where we were informed by intelligence well before 

he got to New York City with the backpacks. That is the best possible opportunity we had. Or, for example, the Yemen cargo plot 

with the toner cartridges, intelligence that helps inform our judgments. If it gets through all those layers of intelligence and somebody is actually getting on a train in Wilmington or Newcastle or 

113 

wherever, and we know nothing about them, then it really comes 

down to somebody seeing something and taking some action with 

local law enforcement or Amtrak. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Mr. Boynton, as a State partner, you have, I think, an interesting perspective on the interaction between Federal, State, and 

local security officials. Many of the public transportation systems 

that service Connecticut also travel through other States, such as 

Amtrak and the Metro-North railroads. These interconnected systems require coordination among multiple public safety agencies, 

as you know. Are we doing an especially good job of functioning 

well together? And how can that be improved? 

Mr. BOYNTON. Senator, we have a couple forums, and I like to 

tell people that what we do is we provide a table and ask people 

to come to the table. We have created a transit security committee 

with representatives from every mode—trucking, bus, maritime, 

aviation, pipeline, highway, rail, all of them. And what we found 

was, all of the rail people know each other. Same with the bus people. We think they may never have been in the room together before, however. 

Senator CARPER. How do they get along? 

Mr. BOYNTON. Well, it is clear that they are all out of their comfort zone, actually. We have all heard about people operating in 

silos, and one of those partners, just in the last few weeks, used 

a term I had not heard, which was ‘‘cylinders of expertise.’’ They 

are all very good at what they do. It requires effort to bring them 

to the table, and the first time we met, we saved $60,000 in the 

first 10 minutes. The rail people were talking about a See Something, Say Something campaign, and the bus people said, ‘‘We are 

working on a campaign. Can we use yours?’’ And the answer was 

yes. They saved $60,000 in about 2 minutes. They both worked for 

State government. They both worked in the same department of 

State government. But they were all within their comfort zones, so 

this collaboration that the Administrator speaks about, it is absolutely key. This is one way we do it. The other way we do it is with 

our fusion center. We have a full-time TSA analyst whose primary 

work site is in that fusion center. 

I find examples like that to not necessarily be the norm. I find 

that the agencies we work with do a lot of great work, building capacity and building expertise, but trying to get people at the same 

table and to stay there as primary work sites while not exactly 

hard to do, takes a special focused effort. And once you do it, you 

cannot stop. It has to be sort of continual to keep people at the 

table because, by definition, it is out of their comfort zone. They are 

not with their parent agency. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, could I ask 

one other question? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Senator CARPER. I understand, Dr. Flynn, that in your written 

testimony you provide compelling evidence of the deficiency of rail 

and transit security. I think you may have mentioned in your written testimony that roughly $9 is spent for safety on every airline 

passenger, and we spend about one penny per rail and transit pasVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
114 

senger. How can we use limited resources to improve the Federal 

Government’s existing transit and rail security programs? 

Mr. FLYNN. Well, Senator, thank you very much for the question. 

The case I tried to make in my testimony and advance is that there 

actually are some relatively modest things versus very expensive 

things that we can be doing, some around, just as we are covering 

here today, the focus on public education efforts. I mean, if you ask 

a law enforcement agency to develop the message of See Something, Say Something, it is going to come out a little differently 

than maybe talking to some folks out in Hollywood who will come 

up with a different idea. 

The big backpack I think is a wonderful illustration of reaching 

out to real talent pools that exist, but that takes some resources 

to be able to go out and say: ‘‘Here is a message we are trying to 

convey. Can you help us with this message? Because you know 

what people will listen to and pay attention to.’’ So that is an investment that raises awareness that hopefully makes sure that we 

can prevent things by taking advantage of all those eyes, the 28- 

30 million on Amtrak trains. We are not going to get all of them, 

but we could get more than relying on a lot more dogs or a lot 

more—and, again, not either/or but a huge multiplier by taking 

that transit public who is with the rhythm of that train and knows 

the train station and gets them involved there. 

The other, it takes funds to be conveners, and I guess I would 

push a little bit. I think what Connecticut has done is a model, but 

it still is largely intra Connecticut—as opposed to efforts that reach 

beyond the State. It is very difficult often to get the States to play 

well with each other, something that I know you have some experience with here, because everyone is fighting for so few resources. 

And so to the extent to which these area security committees, regional committees, and so forth really bring key players together, 

they can build on what is a superb State initiative, but make sure 

there is something like that going on in the surrounding area so 

people can recognize that See Something, Say Something for the 

buses that Connecticut is doing could be done also in Delaware. 

The challenge is that you cannot get to homeland security without really dealing with the horizontal, and the horizontal is dealing 

with the citizens, the private sector, the community, State, and 

locals. But we are still coming at it vertically and/or episodically, 

like spitballs on a map, a few major urban areas, let us try to fix 

some of those. And this lack of a holistic approach I think is a serious problem. I am very worried about the budget climate reversing 

the few embryonic steps that we have made to achieve the horizontal, engage the public a bit more, draw them on board. And if 

we lose ground on the science and technology front and so forth, 

it will take us years to get back to where we want to go. And God 

forbid we have the next major event and people see that we essentially stopped working on the problem and stopped making modest 

investments. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Boynton. 

Mr. BOYNTON. Senator, could I just comment on one point there? 

Senator CARPER. Sure. 

Mr. BOYNTON. The difficulty of communicating between the 

States, I have seen over the last year, 18 months a really encourVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
115 

aging increased ability for the fusion centers to talk among each 

other. These are all 72 fusion centers, State or locally led, with the 

Federal participants but an increasingly good dialogue between 

these fusion centers, and that helps us with the regional approach 

and across-State approach. 

Senator CARPER. All right. I am glad to hear the kind of communications you all have started up in Connecticut. That is the kind 

of stuff that we do in Delaware. I am proud of it. Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

Thanks to the three witnesses. I think you have been very helpful. I am reassured from this hearing that there has been a response to the evidence that came out of Osama bin Laden’s compound about potential attacks on mass transit systems in the 

United States on or around September 11 of this year. I appreciate 

the continuing work that is being done. We are up against an 

enemy that is not smarter than we are, but is certainly more inhumane and ruthless than we are. To say the obvious, with regard 

to the discussion with Senator Paul about patting down a child, unfortunately there is an evidentiary basis for doing that, which is 

that some of these terrorist groups have used children and have 

been willing to risk or take their lives as a result, and they have 

used grandmothers and grandfathers to do the same. 

So when you are up against this kind of enemy and we are attempting to maintain freedom of movement in our country and the 

openness of our country, it is not easy. So I share the sentiment 

that has been expressed across the panel, which is that we have 

to be very careful as we cut budgets that we do not take big risks 

with our security because in the end that really is the first responsibility of our government. 

I thank each of you for what you are contributing to homeland 

security. We are going to leave the record of the hearing open for 

an additional 15 days for additional questions and statements. 

With that and the Committee’s gratitude, I hereby adjourn the 

hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(117) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PREVENTING 

TERRORIST TRAVEL 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, Brown, and Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Normally 

I am a few minutes late and Senator Collins is on time. Today she 

surprised me, but she is in the hallway, so I will take the—there 

you are. I was just saying you are normally the more punctual 

one—it is not really an odd couple relationship we have—so I waited a moment or two. 

Senator COLLINS. I apologize. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Not at all. 

I want to welcome everyone to this hearing, which is the fifth in 

a series of hearings that our Committee is holding this year to review the state of our Nation’s terrorist defenses as we approach the 

10th anniversary of the attacks against America on September 11, 

2001. 

Denying foreign terrorists the ability to travel to our country to 

attack us, as they did on 9/11, obviously is a continuing homeland 

security priority, and that is what we are focusing on today. 

As you look back over the 10 years and think of all that we have 

done to meet the challenge of preventing terrorists from coming 

into the country, you have to say that, thanks to a lot of people, 

we have done very well at it. There has not been another major attack from outside. And yet there have been attempted attacks in 

which people have certainly shown they are still trying to enter the 

country, or succeeded in doing so, such as the cases of the shoe 

bomber, the Christmas Day bomber, and the Times Square bomber. 

All plotted outside the United States with help from al-Qaeda and 

other Islamist terrorist groups, and all involved travel into the 

United States. 

In the years since September 11, 2001, legislation authored by 

this Committee has created a number of programs and systems 

meant to enhance our government’s ability to identify and stop terrorists among the millions and millions of people who travel to the 

118 

United States and who we want to welcome each year. The terrorists, obviously, we want to prevent from entering our country. 

The Homeland Security Act, which created the Department of 

Homeland Security, gave the new Department the authority to set 

visa policy and deploy Visa Security Units to overseas consular 

posts, working with the State Department to provide an added 

layer of security in the issuing of visas. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 

which was the original 9/11 Commission recommendations implementation legislation, called for a biometric entry and exit system 

for travelers into and out of the United States, and also required 

enhanced travel documents. It required consular officials to conduct 

personal interviews with all visa applicants. 

The 2004 Act also directed the President to negotiate agreements 

with other nations to share information on lost or stolen travel documents. And perhaps most important, it required that domestic 

and international airline passengers be screened against terrorist 

watchlists. 

Then the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, in a way the 9/11 Commission Act 2, created the 

Electronic System for Travel Authorization, a program that allows 

the Department of Homeland Security to screen travelers from socalled visa waiver countries against our intelligence and law enforcement databases before they board an airplane bound for the 

United States. 

These programs are all critical new components of our post-9/11 

efforts to deny terrorists entry into the United States. And I would 

say, looking back, for the most part they have been successful. But 

as is documented in a series of reports from the Government Accountability Office, we clearly still have work to do. 

First, some good news: GAO reports that the Electronic System 

for Travel Authorization has been well implemented on our end 

and is helping to address gaps in the Visa Waiver Program. 

In the same report, however, GAO says that only half of the visa 

waiver countries have signed the biometric law enforcement information-sharing agreements required for participation in the program, and none—not one—of these agreements has actually been 

implemented. So I would say today, looking back and forward, we 

really have to get them all signed and implemented as quickly as 

possible. 

The implementation of the US–VISIT entry system has really 

been one of the biggest success stories of our post-9/11 efforts. It 

ensures that almost all non-U.S. citizens coming to the United 

States have their fingerprints registered and checked against all of 

our intelligence, immigration, and law enforcement databases prior 

to being admitted to the United States. That is a very significant 

filter, if you will, set up to stop terrorists from coming into the 

United States. 

Unfortunately, implementation of an exit system has been one of 

our biggest failures. GAO recently reported to this Committee that 

US–VISIT’s current biographic system has a backlog of over 1.6 

million records of potential overstays that have not been reviewed. 

In other words, these are people who have entered America legally 

but overstayed the time during which they were legally authorized 

119 

to be in this country, and they become a very significant percentage 

of the millions of so-called illegal immigrants or undocumented 

aliens who are in our country. And this backlog is growing every 

day. 

Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, in testimony before our Committee a few months ago, reiterated their call for a biometric exit system, and I would like to hear 

from our witnesses today about the current plans at DHS for getting this done because this really is a problem, knowing when people who come in legally are still here illegally. 

I also continue to be concerned with the slow implementation of 

the Visa Security Program. Although the Department of Homeland 

Security and the State Department have identified 57 high-risk 

consular posts abroad, only 14 of them have criminal investigators 

to provide an added layer of security to the visa-issuing process. 

The attempted Christmas Day bomber attack highlighted the importance of having adequate security measures in place at our consular posts, as you remember from that fact situation. But despite 

pledges by the Department of Homeland Security and the State Department to continue expanding this really important security program, the President’s budget included no additional funding for 

this program for fiscal year 2012. Even in these obviously tight 

budgetary times, this is disappointing. 

GAO released another report yesterday that found a lack of coordination and focus in our government’s efforts to help our foreign 

partners develop their own terrorist travel programs, and that is 

something I am sure we will want to talk about today. 

Finally, many of us on this Committee, particularly Senator 

Paul, who is here today, are concerned about security gaps in the 

Iraqi refugee program that allowed two Iraqi nationals, who turned 

out to be terrorists—one whose fingerprints were on an unexploded 

improvised explosive device that the FBI had in its possession from 

our troops in the field since 2005, so one of the two Iraqis arrested 

in Kentucky for planning terrorist acts actually had his fingerprints on this unexploded IED that was in the possession of the 

U.S. Government for over 5 years and was not processed in the system. Therefore, when this individual had his fingerprints done 

when he entered as part of the US–VISIT program, it was not correlated against this very implicating fingerprint that was in our 

possession, and so he was allowed to enter the country and then 

plot to send weapons back to their fellow terrorists in Iraq to use 

to attack American troops there. 

We really need to know how these two were allowed to enter our 

country and why those fingerprints from 2005 have not been entered into our system. Senator Paul has focused the attention of 

this Committee on this matter, and I am sure he will have questions for the witnesses about it. 

In sum, looking back, I think we can say with some satisfaction 

that we have made progress in the past 10 years toward making 

the entry by terrorists into the United States much more difficult 

than it was on 9/11/01. But we have also had some very unsettling 

experiences that show they can still penetrate the defenses that we 

have set up. And, of course, we know that they are adapting their 

mode of operating to our increased security measures. 

120 

Just last week, we saw published reports that al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula is apparently at least considering if not carrying 

out the surgical implantation of explosives inside the body of an individual, which would be undetectable by most of our screening devices, but I will say clearly not undetectable by all of our defenses. 

Given these threats and their development, we have to continue to 

focus on this area of our homeland security, and that is our intention today. I thank the witnesses for being here. They are all perfectly positioned to report to us and answer our questions, and I 

look forward, after their testimony, to that part of the hearing. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Limiting the travel of terrorists is a key way to protect our country. As the 9/11 Commission put it, ‘‘Targeting travel is at least as 

powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money.’’ 

According to the 9/11 Commission’s report on terrorist travel, as 

many as 15 of the 19 hijackers might have been intercepted by border authorities if procedures had been in place to share intelligence 

data. At the time, however, threat information-sharing systems and 

policies were largely absent, and the hijackers’ past terrorist associations were not readily available to American officials who could 

have acted. 

Today, as the Chairman has pointed out, we have a more rigorous system at high-risk consulates to help identify those who 

should not receive visas, but we need to upgrade the Visa Security 

Program so that it can operate more effectively and in more highrisk posts. 

This program deploys Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

agents to our high-risk embassies and consulates overseas to help 

identify suspected terrorists and criminals before visas are issued. 

The problem is that the United States has these offices at only 14 

of the 57 high-risk posts. 

It is also troubling that the GAO has found ongoing turf battles 

between ICE and the State Department’s diplomatic security at 

some posts. VSP must implement effective procedures to help DHS 

and the State Department resolve questions about who should and 

who should not receive a visa to come to our country. All of those 

involved in the visa process at these high-risk locations must be 

rowing in the same direction for this program to reach its full potential. 

There are other serious challenges and gaps in our security. As 

the Chairman mentioned, recently we learned that terrorists intent 

on attacking America have shown an interest in having explosive 

devices surgically implanted in their bodies. Yet a young man was 

able to fly cross-country from New York to Los Angeles without a 

valid government ID and with an expired boarding pass that was 

not even in his name. 

At the other extreme, it troubles many Americans to see TSA 

putting the very young and the very elderly through intrusive and, 

in most cases, what appear to be unnecessary patdowns. If we continue to give extra screening to individuals who pose no threat yet 

others who should arouse suspicion can bypass checkpoints without 

121 

being questioned, our systems clearly are still not properly calibrated. 

As Senator Paul will undoubtedly discuss today, and as Republican Leader McConnell and our Chairman have all highlighted, we 

also need to scrutinize the criteria for granting asylum. In May, 

two Iraqi refugees living in Kentucky were indicted on Federal terrorism charges. That they were permitted to come to this country 

on humanitarian grounds is shocking. How could this happen when 

there was sufficient evidence of the terrorist attacks in which they 

were involved to indict them? What is being done to close this serious vulnerability? Is the Administration re-analyzing the backgrounds of other refugees granted asylum under what appears to 

be a flawed process? 

On the other hand, the New York Times today reports on cases 

of apparently worthy applicants who are not receiving asylum. 

Clearly, our system needs to be adjusted to ensure vetting and 

careful scrutiny so that those who are in danger of their lives because they have truly been allies of the American forces can receive 

asylum, but those who have been involved in attacking our troops 

or working with the Taliban or al-Qaeda do not receive asylum. 

Even with improvements in our own safeguards, the United 

States cannot go it alone. Our intelligence reform legislation, which 

became law in 2004, directed the National Counterterrorism Center 

to establish a strategy to combat terrorist travel, and part of that 

strategy, an essential pillar, was helping to enhance the capacity 

of other nations to combat terrorist travel. 

A new GAO report provides an update on our progress. While the 

United States has many programs to help our partner nations improve their visa issuance and screening protocols, the GAO has 

found that too often these programs lack coordination. The GAO 

also found redundancies. In one case, the GAO discovered that 

DHS and the State Department were both planning to hold training on fraudulent travel documents for the same Pakistani agency 

during the same month without knowing of each other’s plans. 

These programs, in my judgment, also do not focus sufficiently 

on corruption in the passport issuance process overseas, which, according to the GAO, is a significant obstacle in our efforts to keep 

terrorists from traveling. 

There is, as the Chairman has mentioned, encouraging news as 

well as problems. DHS, for example, reports that nearly 450 suspected terrorists that were identified on a watchlist were blocked 

from boarding overseas flights bound for the United States in fiscal 

years 2010 and so far in 2011. The Customs and Border Protection 

is now matching passenger manifests with terrorist watchlists and 

not just with the no-fly list. It is vital to review these lists before 

departure and not once the plane is airborne. 

Terrorists clearly are going to constantly probe our defenses and 

constantly innovate. Therefore, we must never cease our efforts to 

keep terrorists from acquiring the documents and the means to 

travel to our shores. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Unfortunately, I just heard off the wire, just to show us how 

timely all this is, that at least three bombs went off in different 

122 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Beers appears in the Appendix on page 499. 

public places in Mumbai today, and this is just the first report. 

They are reporting many injuries. No indication of responsibility 

yet. 

We have a vote around 10:40 and we will have to break at that 

point, but let us see if we can get at least some of the initial testimony in. I again thank the witnesses for being here. 

We will start with Rand Beers, who is Under Secretary, National 

Protection and Programs Directorate, at the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. RAND BEERS,1 UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Senator Paul. I am pleased to be here before this Committee which has 

been so important in the efforts to protect the homeland. 

Our goal here in this area is to push information to the front 

lines, as Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman both indicated, as 

quickly as possible to prevent known and suspected terrorists from 

traveling to the United States. Today, I am testifying in two capacities—first as the Under Secretary for the National Protection and 

Programs, a position to which I was appointed by President Obama 

and confirmed by this body in June 2009, and am thereby responsible for the US–VISIT Program. I am also testifying today as the 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department, a role Secretary Janet Napolitano assigned to me following the December 25, 

2009, bombing attempt on Northwest Flight 253. So what I will do 

is address what the Department is doing to better coordinate and 

prevent terrorist travel, describe the specifics of US–VISIT activities being done in this area, and also discuss my role as the 

Counterterrorism Coordinator. 

DHS collects and screens information on who is entering the 

country or boarding an aircraft in order to identify possible links 

to terrorist activity. In this regard, the Department has made considerable progress since 9/11 to implement measures to identify 

and stop terrorist travel in five general areas: 

First, unifying immigration and border management systems so 

that we can have the capability to access efficiently and effectively 

biometric- and biographic-based information across the entire 

homeland security spectrum. 

Second, enhancing capabilities for more effectively identifying 

fraudulent documents and impostors and implementing measures 

to confirm document authenticity and validity. 

Third, establishing a system of interoperability and information 

sharing that allows Federal partners across the government to 

share that information in order to do a better job identifying those 

persons of interest and concentrating on them. 

Fourth, streamlining the visa overstay review process to establish reliable data on individuals who have violated the terms of 

their authorized admission. 

And, fifth, establishing and maintaining strategic partnerships 

with an increasing number of international partners, sharing apVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
123 

propriate information, providing technical assistance, and developing commonality in biometric standards and best practices while 

investigating and testing emerging multimodal biometric technologies. 

With respect to US–VISIT, let me just identify a few of the 

things that I think we have been doing. It is a broad program with 

important applications ranging from screening foreign travelers to 

immigration adjudication to law enforcement. 

Interoperability and information sharing between agencies and 

international partners continues to yield significant results, as 

demonstrated by three success stories that I want to briefly mention. 

The first occurred in February of this year. Australia sent us a 

batch of fingerprints as part of our High Value Data Sharing program. Within that batch we had a match on an individual about 

whom we had some terrorist information. We provided that information to the Australian government, and they denied that individual asylum, as they were contemplating. 

Second, in November of last year, we assisted in a case of a 

Turkish man who was attempting to gain employment at a nuclear 

power plant. We were able to identify that he was using a false 

document with a false identity in an attempt to demonstrate his 

legal status in this country. He was obviously denied employment, 

but he was subsequently arrested for overstay and placed in Federal custody. 

The third, which is not so distant from what you just reported, 

Senator Lieberman, was in October 2009, when the Canadians 

asked us to help them look at a boatload of undocumented males 

who were arriving off the coast of British Columbia. We helped 

them go through that with biometric information that they collected and identifying two of the individuals on that not only as 

suspected LTTE, Tamil Tiger terrorists, but also individuals who 

had sought visa and asylum status with us and were denied. Obviously, those individuals were detained. 

So I think that represents the kind of thing that biometrics allow 

us to do, as you have so fervently supported on a number of occasions. 

With respect to the role of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 

what has happened within the Department is, following the December 25, 2009, failed attempt to bomb Northwest Flight 253, the Secretary assigned me an additional responsibility for coordinating 

counterterrorism activities from the Department across its directorates, components, and offices related to detection, prevention, response to, and recovery from acts of terrorism. 

In November of last year, she authorized the stand-up of a 

Counterterrorism Advisory Board to further improve coordination 

with the Coordinator acting as the Chair and the Under Secretary 

of Intelligence and Analysis and the Assistant Secretary for Policy 

to my left to act as the Vice Chairs. We have also organized under 

that a task force working group that supports this effort, so that 

what we are basically doing with respect to support for our mission 

one counterterrorism activity is use the Coordinator position, the 

Counterterrorism Advisory Board, and the task force to bring together intelligence, operational matters, policymaking elements 

124 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobs appears in the Appendix on page 506. 

within the headquarters and the components so that we can field 

a cohesive and coordinated operational response to any threats that 

should arise or in some cases try to anticipate those threats. 

Let me just give you one example of the kind of work that we 

have done. Following the death of Osama bin Laden, we began an 

even more dedicated review of intelligence. The CTAB was meeting 

on an almost daily basis for several weeks after that. We still meet 

roughly twice a week to look at these things. In each meeting, we 

look at new threat information. So in one case, we were looking at 

one particular threat and instituted a series of new measures that 

were put in place, taking the information that our intelligence and 

analysis office gave us, developing the countermeasures, creating 

the outreach to the various sectors who were affected by that particular piece of information, implementing those counterterrorism 

matters, informing State and local governments as well as other 

partners in our efforts, and basically coming up with a major effort 

to counter this particular threat. In addition to that, there was obviously a public affairs component. 

This represents a much more coordinated response on the part 

of the Department than we have heretofore been able to produce 

and I think demonstrates the value. 

In this particular case, we also considered whether we ought to 

raise the threat level and decided that the information was not sufficiently imminent and actionable so we chose not to do that. But 

that has nothing to do with the fact that we instituted security 

measures and had a public outreach program to ensure that we 

were adequately positioned, without having to raise the alert level, 

to respond to this particular threat. 

In conclusion, we are working hard to address these complex 

challenges, and I stand ready to answer the questions from this 

Committee. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Under Secretary Beers. That was 

a good beginning for us and a good report. 

Next we are going to have Janice Jacobs, who is the Assistant 

Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs at the Department of State. 

Welcome back. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANICE L. JACOBS,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman and 

Senator Collins. It is an honor to appear before you again to tell 

you how the Department of State has increased security of the visa 

process in response to the December, 25, 2009, attempted terrorist 

act. In my previous appearances before this Committee, I testified 

about the Department’s multilayered approach to visa security, 

what I had called ‘‘the five pillars of visa security’’: Technological 

advances, biometric innovations, personal interviews, data sharing, 

and training. I want to assure you that these pillars are even more 

relevant today. Today, after a full year of implementing corrective 

actions taken after December 25, 2009, I believe that our visa processing has reached new levels of security. 

125 

The title of this hearing has a special meaning for the men and 

women of the Department of State. We have no higher priority 

than the safety of our fellow citizens and the protection of our borders. In this statement I would like briefly to highlight key steps 

we took to respond to the President’s directive to address weaknesses in the systems and procedures we use to protect the United 

States. 

We improved our Visas Viper Program and related processes by 

directing all chiefs of mission to ensure that the Visas Viper Program was working effectively at their posts and instructing consular officers to include complete information about all U.S. visas 

in Viper cables. 

We issued new instructions to officers on visa revocation procedures and reinforced standing guidance on their discretionary authority to deny visas under Section 214(b) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, with specific reference to cases that raise security 

and other serious concerns. 

We constantly refine and update the technology that supports 

our visa process. Before any visa is issued, the applicants fingerprints are screened against DHS’s automatic biometric identification system called IDENT and against the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. 

We use facial recognition technology to screen visa applicants 

against a watchlist of photos obtained from the Terrorist Screening 

Center as well as visa applicant photos contained in the Consolidated Consular Database. 

We improved the capability of consular systems to match visa 

records against new and emerging derogatory information to support visa revocation in appropriate cases. 

We employ sophisticated name-searching algorithms to ensure 

matches to derogatory information contained in the 39 million 

records pertaining to 27 million individuals found in the Consular 

Lookout and Support System. This layered biometric and biographic identity verification ensures the security of the U.S. visa 

by nearly eliminating the possibility of visa fraud through counterfeit or photo-substituted visas or through the use of valid visas by 

impostors. 

We are continuing to match new threat information against our 

visa records. We have revoked over 1,000 visas since December 

2009. As soon as a visa is revoked, a VRVK entry code is added 

to CLASS and shared in near real time with the DHS lookout systems used for border screening. CBP uses these VRVK records to 

advise airlines that certain passengers should not be boarded on 

flights bound for the United States. 

We have completed the worldwide rollout of the online DS–160 

non-immigrant visa application form, and we are currently piloting 

the online DS–260 immigrant visa application form. These forms 

provide consular and fraud prevention officers as well as our intelligence and law enforcement partners the opportunity to analyze 

data in advance of the visa interview. 

Consular officers are trained to take all necessary steps to protect the United States and its citizens during the course of making 

visa decisions. Each consular officer completes our basic consular 

course, which has a strong emphasis on border security and fraud 

126 

prevention, and includes in-depth interviewing and name-checking 

technique training. Officers receive continuing education in all of 

these disciplines throughout their careers. 

Consular officers receive extensive training on the Security Advisory Opinion process, which requires them to suspend visa processing pending interagency review of any case with possible terrorism ineligibilities. We work closely with DHS to ensure that no 

known terrorist receives a visa or is admitted into our country. 

ICE special agents assigned to Visa Security Units provide timely and on-site vetting of visa applications and other law enforcement support to our consular officers. Over the past 7 years, the 

Department and DHS have increased resources significantly, improved procedures, and upgraded systems devoted to supporting 

the visa function. 

DHS receives all of the information collected by the Department 

during the visa process and has broad access to our entire visa 

database. We make our visa information available to other agencies 

and specifically designed our systems to facilitate comprehensive 

data sharing. In May 2011, almost 22,000 officers from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Commerce submitted nearly 2 million visa record queries. 

On a regular basis, we engage our foreign partners bilaterally, 

regionally, and on a multilateral basis to address the issue of terrorist travel. We have entered into arrangements for the sharing 

of visa information with foreign governments consistent with the 

data protection requirements of Section 222(f) of the INA. 

With our partners at the Terrorist Screening Center, we negotiate Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 agreements overseas. We are a close partner with DHS in advance passenger information and passenger name record discussions overseas. 

Anne Witkowsky, our Deputy Coordinator for Homeland Security 

and Multilateral Affairs in the Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, is here with me today to answer any questions 

you may have on building foreign partner antiterrorism capacity or 

the State Department’s role in the overall U.S. Government terrorist travel strategy. 

Let me also address the Committee’s interest in the process that 

brings Iraqi nationals working on behalf of the U.S. Government 

in Iraq to this country as recipients of special immigrant visas or 

as refugees. 

As of mid-June a total of 7,063 Iraqis have been issued special 

immigrant visas under one of the two pertinent SIV programs. 

Kelly Gauger of the Refugee Affairs Office within the Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration is here to answer questions 

about the State Department’s role in U.S. refugee security screening. 

Distinguished Members of the Committee, I believe that a layered approach to border security screening in which each agency 

applies its particular strengths and expertise best serves our border security agenda while furthering traditional U.S. interests in 

legitimate travel, trade promotion, and the exchange of ideas. The 

United States must meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security. 

Thank you and I am ready to answer your questions. 

127 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman appears in the Appendix on page 530. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Assistant Secretary Jacobs. 

The Senate is in a quorum call, which means that hopefully we 

can hear the opening statement of David Heyman, who is the Assistant Secretary in charge of the Office of Policy at DHS. Thank 

you. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID F. HEYMAN,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HEYMAN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Senator Paul, 

this hearing, preventing terrorists from traveling to or remaining 

undetected in the United States, remains a top priority at the Department. 

Ten years ago, screening of passengers coming to the United 

States was limited to the Department of State visa process, if applicable, and the inspection of a person by an immigration officer 

at the port of entry, plus whatever processes were applied at foreign airports or by foreign governments. If you were a terrorist 

seeking to come to the United States, you would, for all intents and 

purposes, apply for a visa, purchase a ticket, and board an aircraft 

to America. There would be very limited checks to see if you were 

known or suspected of terrorist activities other than the visa process, limited checks to see if you may be a security risk based upon 

your behavior, no checks to see if you were traveling under a lost 

or stolen passport, limited checks on you or your baggage for explosives, and little to no security on board the aircraft during the 

flight, as well as limited checks to see even if you are admissible 

to the United States. That was 10 years ago. 

Similarly, at that time provision of advance passenger information was voluntary, and even when provided by air carriers, it frequently contained inaccurate or incomplete information. There was 

no biometric collection for visa applicants beyond photographs nor 

for aliens seeking admission to the United States, and there was 

very limited pre-departure screening of passengers seeking to fly to 

the United States. 

Today, a decade later, in response to both 9/11 and evolving 

threats, and with the help and support of this Congress, we have 

significantly adapted and enhanced our ability to detect and interdict travel threats at the earliest opportunity. The systems we have 

put in place over the past decade are multilayered and multinational, from the intelligence we gather on known and suspected 

terrorists even before someone decides to travel to the United 

States to visa and travel authorization processes, travel document 

security, pre-flight screening against criminal and terrorist databases, checkpoint screening prior to boarding, pre-departure screening for admissibility to the United States, in-flight security, and additional screening at ports of entry. We have put in place multiple 

layers of security across the spectrum of travel—before departure, 

during travel, and upon arrival. 

Additionally, we have put in place or are in the process of piloting recurrent vetting programs to check and recheck the status and 

potential risks of all visa holders and immigrants after they arrive 

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into the United States. Today, all air and sea passengers intending 

to travel to the United States must have valid visas or, if traveling 

under the Visa Waiver Program, must now obtain in advance of 

travel electronic travel authorization. 

Since 2009, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and 

in support of key 9/11 Commission recommendations, all travelers 

coming across our land borders are required to establish identity 

and citizenship. Furthermore, while issuing visas is the responsibility of the Department of State, as you have mentioned, at certain embassies and consulates DHS administers a Visa Security 

Program through ICE where we assist the State Department in 

identifying visa applicants who may present a security threat. 

Prior to 9/11, there was no centralized system or method to 

screen airline passengers. Over the past 10 years, the U.S. Government has stood up the Terrorist Screening Center administered by 

the FBI and established a consolidated terrorist screening database 

or watchlist to determine who may be authorized to travel to the 

United States, who may board a plane, and who may require further screening. 

Additionally, fulfilling another key 9/11 Commission recommendation, DHS and the TSA have strengthened security through 

full implementation of the Secure Flight Program. Under the Secure Flight Program, DHS now pre-screens 100 percent of passengers on flights flying to, from, or within the United States 

against the no-fly and selectee portions of the known and suspected 

terrorist watchlist. Through the Secure Flight Program, TSA now 

vets over 2 million passengers daily. 

We have expanded our trusted traveler programs from approximately 80,000 members when DHS was created to well over a million people today, and by expanding these programs, these passengers, who provide biometric identification and pass rigorous recurrent security checks, we are now better able to focus resources 

and attention on those who may pose a greater risk. 

DHS also uses passenger name record data which is the information that travelers provide airlines when they book a flight. This 

information, along with the APIS and the Immigration Advisory 

Program, allows us to assess a passenger’s level of risk prior to departure, and when necessary, flag them for further inspection or 

even prevent them from boarding. 

Following the attempted attack of December 25, 2009, DHS implemented additional enhancements in coordination with other departments. These include a number of items which I have complete 

in my testimony, but let me just list a couple now. 

The U.S. Government reformed the criteria and nomination processes for the terrorist watchlist and enhanced its information-sharing capabilities. 

We updated the Secure Flight Program to use all terrorist 

watchlist records containing a full name and a full date of birth. 

Travelers are then required for enhanced physical screening prior 

to boarding. 

Beginning in 2010, DHS began a new initiative with the Department of State where CBP currently vets approved visa applications 

so that as new information is discovered, DHS and the Department 

129 

of State are able to proactively identify these individuals and address them. 

Also, beginning earlier this year, DHS began piloting a new recurrent vetting process for those applying for immigration benefits. 

As new derogatory information surfaces, we double-check those 

who have approved immigration status against this information. 

In addition, prior to December 25, 2009, CBP conducted inbound 

passenger targeting using APIS and PNR data provided by the airlines but could not easily prevent high-risk travelers from boarding 

flights to the United States unless they were traveling from foreign 

locations where we had our Immigration Advisory Program or preclearance presence. As of December 25, CBP re-engineered its inbound targeting operations to identify high-risk travelers who are 

likely to be inadmissible and recommend to carriers at all airports, 

all last points of departures, that those individuals not be permitted to board a commercial aircraft. 

DHS has also strengthened the presence and capacity of law enforcement to prevent terrorist attacks on aviation to include our 

Federal air marshals and FAMS coverage. 

And, finally, I think the lesson of Abdulmutallab, or one of them, 

is that if you have access to one airport anywhere in the world, you 

have access to the entire international aviation system, and so to 

prevent terrorist travel, we must work closely with our international partners. We did just that following December 25, 2012. 

In the weeks and months that followed that event, DHS worked 

with the International Civil Aviation Organization, and on a bilateral basis, to advance an unprecedented initiative and to strengthen aviation security. Those efforts culminated at the ICAO Triennial Assembly in October 2010 where the assembly adopted the 

Declaration on Aviation Security, which forges a new foundation 

for aviation security to better protect the entire global aviation system. The extraordinary global collaboration demonstrated by nearly 

190 countries during that assembly has helped to bring about an 

aviation security framework that will help make air travel safer 

and more secure. 

All of this is not to say that there will not be new threats or that 

the security architecture is a finished product. To the contrary, this 

effort will require continuous improvement. Terrorist screening is 

a multiagency effort that relies on good data, good intelligence and 

information, automated capabilities to ensure identification of highrisk activities and individuals. We must continue to understand the 

threat, terrorist tactics, and stay ahead of it. This requires strong 

interagency and international partnerships, something that we are 

deeply committed to. 

As a result of all of these efforts over the last decade, it is now 

part of our regular daily experience to identify potential incoming 

threats and deny them boarding, deny them admission, and at a 

minimum require them to go through enhanced screening. CBP 

through its National Targeting Center generates nearly 200 targets 

a day of where they have to research whether they should be 

boarded or not. They have identified 2,600 passengers that would 

likely have been found inadmissible upon arrival and passed that 

on to air carriers. 

130 

TSA now vets over 14 million passengers weekly; approximately 

25 individuals per month are denied boarding on aircraft through 

the Secure Flight Program. 

Let me conclude by saying that this Nation I think has taken significant steps to counter and prevent terrorist travel since 9/11. 

This has been accomplished as a result of a historic partnership between Federal agencies, between Federal, State, and local partners, 

between multiple Congresses, and three successive Administrations, and with our international partners. It entails a multilayered, multifaceted, and multinational effort that weaves together intelligence, information sharing, security and law enforcement programs from across DHS, the interagency, and across multiple partners around the world. Together they reflect one of the 

Nation’s most pressing priorities: To ensure the safe, secure, and 

efficient movement of literally millions of people traveling to, from, 

and around the United States on a daily basis, while thwarting the 

few would-be terrorists to who seek to do us harm. 

This concludes my testimony. I have a written statement for the 

record, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Assistant Secretary Heyman. 

Your statement and that of the other witnesses will be included in 

full in the record. 

I appreciate your testimony. It was actually quite revealing to 

hear the description before and after 9/11 of what you have to go 

through to get into the country. We know in this Committee pretty 

well what has happened since 9/11, but it was important to be reminded about how easy it was to get into the United States prior 

to 9/11 if you intended to do us harm. And I think hearing all we 

have done since then ought to give people in our country some increased sense of security when they go about their daily lives but 

also, of course, when they travel. But obviously we are never going 

to achieve everything we want by way of security and also retain 

the freedom of movement that is part of what defines us as Americans. So when we come back, I am sure we will be asking the three 

of you about some things that we think should be done better. 

Let us close on this good note and thank you for all you have 

done to bring us to the point we are at. I am glad we could get the 

three of you in. We will come back as soon as we can from the two 

votes. 

The hearing is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come back to order. 

Thank you very much for your patience while we were voting. We 

will do 7-minute rounds of questions. 

Let me begin with a question for you, Assistant Secretary Jacobs. 

A recent GAO report, which was a review of the Visa Security Program, raised some questions about how it was working. One of the 

most troubling parts of the report to me was that GAO found disagreements between consular officers and Immigration and Custom 

Enforcement agents, at some posts around the world concerning 

how close an association with terrorism was needed before someone 

could be denied a visa to come into the United States. I would 

guess that most Americans would share the opinion I have, which 

is that travel to the United States is a privilege not a right and 

131 

that any association with terrorism should be enough to keep a foreign national from getting a visa to come into the United States. 

So I wanted to ask you to respond to that finding by the GAO 

and tell the Committee exactly what the policy of the State Department is now. What kind of association with terrorism would be considered significant enough to bar someone from being issued a 

visa? And then, Mr. Beers or Mr. Heyman, if you have anything 

to add from the perspective of DHS, being the Department in 

which ICE is located, I would welcome that testimony as well. Ms. 

Jacobs. 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Senator. Basically let me start off by 

saying that I think that we have very good cooperation between the 

VSUs and the consular sections, wherever the Visa Security Program is in place. And it is true from time to time that looking at 

the exact same information, two individuals might come to different conclusions. 

We have found, though, in every single case—first of all, those 

are few and far between. In most every instance there is agreement. But when there is a disagreement, normally it is worked out 

at post where people will sit down and really look at the information and try to decide whether, in fact, it makes someone either ineligible for a visa or inadmissible to the United States. 

If for some reason they cannot reach agreement there, then the 

case is referred back to headquarters where people in Consular Affairs and people at DHS will take a look at it. And then it is always 

resolved there. 

When we signed the MOU with DHS back in 2003 on our shared 

roles and responsibilities on visas, we actually put in place there 

a very formal mechanism if there was a dispute or a disagreement 

that could not be resolved at those levels where the Secretaries 

would get involved, and then we would resolve it that way. That 

has never happened. It has never had to happen. As I said, most 

of these are taken care of right at post. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So what is the State Department policy 

now on this question? And do the disputes go to the weight of the 

evidence when there are disputes? I understand you have said that 

the disputes between State and Homeland Security are rare, but is 

there a State Department policy? 

Ms. JACOBS. The policy really is simply to apply the existing provisions of law, and so if there is information suggesting that someone might have some kind of connection to terrorism, the ICE officer might look at it and come to one conclusion, whereas the consular officer may look at it and believe that it is not sufficient to 

find the person ineligible for a visa. But in any case, we will always 

give security the priority when we are adjudicating visas, and if 

there is any question or doubt, the burden of proof is on the applicant. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Ms. JACOBS. The law is written in a way that puts the burden 

of proof on the applicant. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is important. 

Ms. JACOBS. And so we would in almost all instances wind up denying the visa. 

132 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you have anything you want to add to 

that, Mr. Beers or Mr. Heyman? It is not necessary. 

Mr. BEERS. No, sir. I think that is a fair rendition of our ability 

to cooperate with one another. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Let me go in the time I have remaining in this round to this question of the US-VISIT exit system. 

This is a source of concern. I know it is no small task, but this is 

not only a question that leads to an enormous number of so-called 

illegal immigrants who do not come in illegally but then stay here 

illegally, but also in some cases obviously related to terrorist activity. My recollection is that three of the 9/11 terrorists were here because they had overstayed legal visas, and, of course, if you think 

about it, it is one of the remaining ways somebody who has a nefarious intent to come in as a tourist or a student and then overstay 

and attack the United States. 

So this backlog of 1.6 million people, give us your report on why 

we are behind on that and what we are doing now to catch up. 

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity to answer this 

question because we have been working hard on dealing with that 

issue over the last several weeks, and I think I am in a position 

to say that we will have cleared the backlog later this week or 

early next week. But let me tell you what we have done—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is significant. 

Mr. BEERS. So that you actually understand what we have done. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. BEERS. We have taken the 1.6 million, and we have run it 

against two databases: One which said, Did this individual leave 

the United States after they went into an overstay status? Or did 

this individual change to a different visa or a different benefit? And 

we have basically eliminated 50 percent of the people in the 1.6 

million. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Just so I understand, that is very interesting it is that high a percentage. So they either left—— 

Mr. BEERS. But in an overstay status. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. So we had some record of that. And 

then second is that they had changed their status? 

Mr. BEERS. They applied for a different visa, or they came in and 

applied for a different benefit status. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, and in the current state of recordkeeping we did not know that. 

Mr. BEERS. What we had not done is when they went into overstay status, if they were not in the priority category that we were 

looking at before we ran this broad check, we did not look at them. 

And what we decided we had to do in response both to our own 

concerns and your concerns is we needed to get through all of 

them. 

So what we have done is those people have left—those who were 

in an overstay status and left will be caught if they try to come in 

again, because having been in an overstay status, that is a basis 

for denying them a visa or a basis of refusing entry to a visa waiver person who seeks to come in again. 

With respect to the remaining 50 percent, what we are doing at 

this point in time is running them against CBP’s travel history to 

see whether or not they would have hit any of our targeting rules 

133 

and been the basis for having an additional interrogation. In some 

cases, sir, this is information that came in after they entered the 

United States. 

The second thing we are doing is we are sharing the database 

with the intelligence community through NCTC to see if there is 

any additional derogatory information. As we are able to transfer 

this information to ICE, we can allow ICE to be able to look at not 

just the original way in which we had sorted the data, but across 

all of the people who have come into the United States or are in 

an overstay status so that they can then prioritize those particular 

individuals that they want to go after in the first instance. 

Obviously, we do not want anybody to overstay in this country, 

and as you well know, we have limited resources, and ICE will, 

therefore, prioritize who they are going after. But this will give us 

a much better picture. 

When we have finished with this process, sir, we want to come 

up and brief the Committee on the results of this. So I am telling 

you is what the process looks like. What I want to come back to 

tell you or have staff come back and tell you is what that process 

yielded: What did we learn? What are we doing about it? And how 

will we do this better? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am interested in this—and I think it is 

significant. I would like to ask you to come back and brief Senator 

Collins and me and anybody else on the Committee who wants to 

be there. Do you have a sense of how soon you will be ready to do 

that? 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, I am expecting to review the data either later 

this week or early next week. As soon as I have heard the report, 

we will put things together and get back to you. I do not want to 

promise next week. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, that is fine. That gives us a general 

sense. 

Mr. BEERS. Let me say we will get back to you before the August 

recess, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Fine. My time is really over, so maybe I 

will come back to this. Now that you have worked to try to clear 

up the backlog, how do we get to the end state we want to get to, 

including particularly a comprehensive, functioning biometric exit 

system? But in deference to my colleagues, I am going to hold that 

one and call on Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to leave the majority of the questions about the Kentucky 

case to my colleague from Kentucky, but I do want to ask one general overview question. Assistant Secretary Jacobs, it is my understanding that since 2007, the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, 

which was the program under which these two alleged terrorists 

were settled in Kentucky, has approved more than 84,000 Iraqi nationals for resettlement, and 58,810 Iraqi refugees have actually arrived in the United States. 

What is being done to ensure that there are not other cases like 

those two alleged terrorists in Kentucky among those 58,000 that 

are already here in addition to the 30,000 additional ones that have 

been approved for resettlement? 

134 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Senator. For the Refugee Admissions 

Program, actually we have shared responsibilities with the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department does play 

a role before people arrive in the United States, and then once they 

are here, they are under the purview of the Department of Homeland Security. 

I can tell you just generally that over the past few months we 

have put in place more stringent screening requirements for both 

refugees and for special immigrant visa applicants who want to 

come to the United States, and we can probably give you more details about exactly what that screening consists of in a classified 

briefing. But please know that has happened and certainly anyone 

who is currently outside of the United States wanting to come here 

is undergoing that new level of scrutiny. 

I don’t know if one of my DHS colleagues wants to talk about the 

actual screening of people once they have arrived here. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, I am concerned about people being approved to come, but I am concerned about the 58,000 already here. 

Is there a review being done of those who are here to make sure 

that there are not other cases of individuals who should not have 

been admitted? Assistant Secretary Heyman. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. The answer to your question is yes, Senator. 

Several months ago we began a pilot project to enhance our screening both abroad before individuals come here as part of the Refugee 

and Asylee Program, but also looking retrospectively. The Iraqi 

program in particular started back in 2007, and so we have had 

vetting in place since then to include looking at holdings from other 

agencies. And so what we are doing now is to look again in a recurrent fashion or in an enhanced re-check fashion, and we are piloting that effort right now to see the technical capability of doing 

that and also what we are finding. That will be concluded at the 

end of this month, and we can get back to you and let you know 

what results we found. 

Senator COLLINS. The Chairman and I are working on a DHS reauthorization bill, as Assistant Secretary Beers knows because he 

is smiling as I say that. Whether in approval or in horror, I am 

not sure. But when I was reading the most recent GAO report that 

I requested, which was released today, GAO found a lot of 

redundancies, examples of travel offices at the Department of State 

being unaware of training programs at the Department of Homeland Security. And it seems as though there are several offices that 

are involved in terrorist travel: The US–VISIT program, the 

Screening Coordination Office, and the Visa Waiver Program. 

I have concerns based on GAO’s findings about duplication, a 

lack of communication, and coordination. As we are looking at the 

reauthorization bill, I would like all of you to comment on whether 

there should be a single office that deals with terrorist travel and 

all of these programs, with the exception of TSA, which is clearly 

a different kind of screening program. Assistant Secretary Beers. 

Mr. BEERS. Let me start. We have TSA, we have CBP, we have 

USCIS, all of whom are front-line activities that deal directly with 

terrorist travel, and we have ICE on top of that, which has an enforcement function. 

135 

What we have tried to do with respect to this kind of an issue 

is exactly why the position of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 

was established, to try to ask the question that you are asking and 

ensure in short order that the deficiencies that might be occurring 

in fact are corrected and that we have this kind of coordination. 

With respect to the issue that you asked and with respect to the 

GAO report, Assistant Secretary Jacobs and I have also talked 

about the coordination that needs to happen between our Department and her Department. Now, obviously, some of that should 

have happened in the embassy when the country team was aware 

that there were two different agencies coming in roughly the same 

time frame to talk to the same people. That should not happen. 

There is no question about that. 

So we have certainly agreed that we are going to do a better job 

across agencies to do that, but we have to do the same thing within 

the Department on training. 

The Secretary has asked us specifically to look at these kinds of 

overseas positions and overseas travel, so Assistant Secretary 

Heyman, who is responsible for the Office of International Affairs, 

also has a very important role to play in that, and he may want 

to add something on that. 

Senator COLLINS. Assistant Secretary Heyman, should there be 

a consolidation of some of these programs within one office? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So, Under Secretary Beers rightly points out that 

almost every part of the Department has some role to play in 

screening or addressing travel screening as it pertains to individuals coming into this country. I would add also the U.S. Coast 

Guard in the maritime domain as well. And so that is why we established the Screening Coordination Office from a policy perspective to make sure that from a policy perspective we have the right 

framework and coordination across the Department. 

The role of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is to make sure 

operationally that these entities are all working together and there 

is no duplication or that there are no gaps. And so I think the combination of a Screening Coordination Office to make sure that our 

policies across the Department are uniform, consistent, and appropriate and a Counterterrorism Coordinator looking at the symphony of these parts moving is being conducted in a harmonious 

way, if I get the metaphor right, I think that is an approach that 

I think is quite useful. We have seen it effective in the short time 

that the process has been operational. 

Senator COLLINS. Assistant Secretary Jacobs, if you could quickly 

comment since obviously we have heard how DHS is coordinating 

with the Department, but the fact is the State Department plays 

a considerable role. 

Ms. JACOBS. Yes, Senator, that is right. We do. We have our Office of Counterterrorism where we have a number of regional and 

other programs that they oversee. Some of that is capacity building, some of it is training. 

I think the areas where we sometimes run into duplication, because we have similar missions, is on fraud training, and that particular example pointed out in the GAO report, as Under Secretary 

Beers pointed out, really should not have happened because it is 

136 

incumbent upon the country team at a post to know who is coming 

in and to prevent that kind of duplication from taking place. 

I think that within the U.S. Government as a whole, again, our 

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism plays a significant 

role in the overseas programs. I think that we can probably do a 

better job working with our DHS colleagues in the specific areas 

where we seem to have similar missions such as, again, fighting 

fraud, helping foreign officials identify fraudulent documents. We 

have expertise, both of us, in that area, and perhaps we can even 

go together and do this kind of training, which would be even more 

effective. So I am certainly willing to sit down and talk to my DHS 

colleagues about how we might do a better job with that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL 

Senator PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins, 

for putting these hearings together, and I thank the panel for coming. 

I think the most serious threats to our country from terrorism 

probably come from travel visas, refugee visas, and student visas. 

Now, some might argue with that, but 16 of the 19 hijackers were 

here on student visas, were not policed well, and had overstayed 

their welcome. I am still concerned we may not have figured out 

nor done a good enough job on these problems. 

I believe we continue to have security breaches, and I think there 

are two possibilities. We could say, well, there are so many people 

visiting that we will have these breaches; it is inevitable we will 

have a certain amount. Or you could say that maybe we are inundated with information and it is our philosophy that is mistaken. 

Perhaps it is that our philosophy is that everyone is potentially 

a terrorist and everyone has an equal chance of being a terrorist. 

I think if you take that philosophy, you inundate yourself with information, so much information that you will never get through it. 

Nobody can talk to each other because you are wallowing in electronic and paper information, and you cannot determine who the 

people are, which would really require good police work. 

We had the head of the TSA here last week. After we showed 

him the outrage—and he has to be reading the newspaper—over 

patting down these children, he said TSA was changing its procedure. But then he sends me a rather curt note and says, ‘‘well, an 

8-year-old had a bomb in Afghanistan.’’ 

The problem is there is a logical error there—an 8-year-old in Afghanistan had a bomb. What does that have to do with an 8-yearold or a 6-year-old in Bowling Green? Absolutely nothing. Now, 

they are the same age, but that is not a risk factor, and age is not 

a risk factor. It is where this girl lived, how she grew up. It is sort 

of like telling me that if an 8-year-old in Afghanistan sacrifices a 

goat, we now have to be worried about kids sacrificing goats at 8 

in America. They have nothing to do with each other, but that is 

the logic. But it is this universal approach that everyone is the 

same and everyone is an equal threat. But I think it makes us less 

safe, but it makes us more insulted. 

137 

This morning, in the airport in Nashville, a 41-year-old mother 

was arrested because she did not want TSA agents putting their 

hands inside the pants of her 6-year-old girl. They say they are 

going to change, but they are not changing. They continue to pat 

down 6-year-old girls. The real threat is from people who are coming here internationally. 

So here we get to the situation in Bowling Green. I compliment 

the FBI and our local law enforcement for doing a good job, but I 

think this person was only caught because an informant tipped 

them off, and then we finally started looking, and eventually we 

looked through a database that we had not been looking through. 

Chairman Lieberman remarks that this is from the FBI database. Why wasn’t this going on? Why does it take an informant to 

find somebody for us for us to do our job? Do we need to replace 

people who are not doing their job? It sounds like no one thought 

this through since we had to be tipped off by an informant, and 

then we are left saying: ‘‘Oh, my goodness, we let a terrorist in.’’ 

But it gets back to the universal versus the specific. Why can’t 

we search everybody? Why don’t we know everybody’s background? 

Because we have let 60,000 Iraqis in here in the last 3 years. It 

is a policy question. Why do you admit 60,000 people? 

Now, here is the point: People will argue, well, it is dangerous 

over there. Well, we have 50,000 of our young men and women putting their lives on the line every day. Some of our relatives, some 

of my relatives, are over there putting their lives on the line for 

the Iraqis. Do you think maybe they ought to stay even if it is a 

dangerous place? It has been dangerous since the 900 A.D. Karbala 

massacre—not the recent massacre. They have hated each other for 

a millennium. It is not safe. But should we be admitting 50,000 

people over here to our country? 

And then to add insult to injury, one of the alleged attackers who 

lived in government housing—most of them do. We are encouraging 

them to be on welfare. We have a whole cottage industry set up 

to get them in government housing, and on food stamps. It is insulting to us that we are doing this, but it would take a policy 

change. I do not fault you for missing the needle in the haystack. 

You have to make the haystack smaller. We need to admit fewer 

people. There is no reason we should be admitting 60,000 people, 

and we need to address that policy. 

I am almost out of breath. Why don’t we start with that question, 

Mr. Heyman, and tell me: Why do we need 60,000? Are we going 

to keep admitting 18,000 a year? Can we possibly know who these 

people are? 

And just one other example of how we cannot. Even in the military over there—we have an attack almost every 6 months where 

we admit someone into the Iraqi military or the Afghan military, 

and then they attack our soldiers on base. It is hard to know who 

your friends are and who your foes are because they will lie to you 

on the admission statement. 

But I would appreciate your comments, Assistant Secretary 

Heyman. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Senator, and I might add this is the 

first hearing I have been at where there are two individuals with 

138 

the first name of Rand, and I am not sure I will ever experience 

that again. [Laughter.] 

Senator, the decision, I think, after the war in Iraq to admit 

Iraqis who had helped United States and coalition forces in that 

endeavor, whether as interpreters, informants, or otherwise, was a 

decision that was taken back in, I think, 2006 or 2007. It continues 

to be the policy of this government that those individuals who also 

may be at risk of retribution or those individuals who supported 

the United States in such ways, they and their families would be 

given an opportunity to come here. 

Senator PAUL. Let me interject. Here is the difference, though. 

In Vietnam, the war ended and a totalitarian regime took over, and 

I have many friends who came here from South Vietnam who 

fought with us. I do not have any problem with that. We should 

reward people who fought with us, we fought with them. But it is 

not a totalitarian regime. We have a democracy over there. We are 

supposed to be proud of that government. It is not perfectly safe 

over there, but there is no reason to continue this policy, and the 

policy should change. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Let me get also to the really, I think, strong point 

you made about a universal policy of terrorists behind every person 

versus a possibility of using more discriminating tactics and approach, which is what we attempt to do. We have adopted a riskbased approach to security. I believe John Pistole, the head of TSA, 

testified to some of the things we have been trying to do as recently 

as a month or so ago, which is to expand the list of those who are, 

in fact, trusted to us or known to us, the trusted travelers who do 

not require the kind of screening that those who might pose a 

threat to us do. And so in terms of moving forward with that, I 

know that Administrator Pistole has already brought in the pilots 

and pilots association into that trusted program—— 

Senator PAUL. But I do not think he is doing any less patdowns. 

He said he was going to change his policy on patdowns. Every day 

there are more complaints. It is insulting our privacy. Our parents 

do not like it. Our kids do not like it. It needs to change. Our approach should not be: Because there was an 8-year-old with a bomb 

in Afghanistan, all 8-year-olds in America are a threat to our country. It is not true, it is a waste of time, and you are not going after 

the people who could attack us. We have a guy who gets on a plane 

with 11 different boarding passes, he gets on with his student ID 

from Michigan and a boarding pass with the wrong name on it. 

TSA does not catch him, but they are insulting all of the little children in our country, and it needs to stop. They need to change the 

policy. They do not need to come here and tell us their policy is 

changing and continue to do the same thing, and that is what he 

told me in his letter. He is going to continue patting them down 

because he found an 8-year-old with a bomb in Afghanistan. 

I know it is not all your fault, but I have to let off some steam. 

Mr. HEYMAN. I appreciate that, and actually also just let me at 

least recognize that 2 million individuals go through TSA’s screening every day. Our TSA front-line officials have to make those 

kinds of difficult judgments, not always successfully in the cases 

that you have brought forward, but they do process 2 million peoVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00154 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
139 

ple a day, and I think they do it at a very high professional rate. 

Thanks. 

Senator PAUL. Can I have just a couple more minutes? I have a 

couple other questions. 

The 59,000 refugees that Senator Collins brought up, you say you 

are going to screen them. Right now how many of the 59,000 have 

been re-screened? And will every individual, all 59,000, be rescreened? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I do not have the numbers. I can get back to you 

on the specifics of that. 

Mr. BEERS. The number we will re-screen is all of them. 

Senator PAUL. You will screen all 59,000. 

Mr. BEERS. All have been re-screened at least once. This is not 

going to be a one-time-only screening process because, as you are 

well aware, information becomes available, even if it is historical, 

that does not become available until a time later. So this is a program that we have instituted which is both backward-looking and 

forward-looking. We have been through the backlog. It is a large 

number, as you quite correctly said, and it was not an easy process 

because it required some database adjustments and interactions 

that we had not even tried before. 

So I can tell you, as a result of that, we have had some important 

new insights into how we need to have our databases fit together 

and be integrated with one another. 

Senator PAUL. With the student visa program, we admit 40,000 

people from the Middle East, 20,000 from Saudi Arabia; 16 of the 

19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia; 16 of the 19 I think were also 

overstaying their student visas. 

Are the student visa people initially going through the better 

process now that would hopefully catch people who have fingerprints in there? Are they going through the same kind of screening 

before they come here? 

Mr. HEYMAN. All of our visa applicants go through a number of 

screening processes that I described, including matches against the 

known or suspected terrorist watchlist, targeting against unknown 

behavioral patterns, criminal databases, as well as additional visa 

violations. 

Senator PAUL. And supposedly the better screening, not the 

screening we did 2 years ago that did not work, we now have enhanced, and they are doing—— 

Mr. HEYMAN. We have had extensive improvements in screening 

and in our watchlisting process as recently as in the past 2 years, 

but also over the last several years. 

Senator PAUL. Are they re-screened again? If they enroll in 

school, do we know they are still in school after 3 months? Does 

someone go through all 40,000 and find out if they are attending 

classes? Not enrolled. Attending classes. 

Ms. JACOBS. All of the foreign students who come here participate in the SEVIS program, which is basically a program that monitors their attendance at school when they first enroll. Any switch 

in schools is registered in that system. Consular officers overseas 

have access to that system, and let me just add that before they 

even get their student visa, as a visa applicant they go through a 

number of security checks, including being run through our lookout 

140 

system, which has about 39 million records, 70 percent of which 

come from other agencies, many of those law enforcement and intelligence agencies. So there is a thorough screening before they 

come, and once they get here they have to maintain status. If they 

are not registered in this system that I described, SEVIS, then 

their names are turned over to ICE. 

Senator PAUL. So attendance is being recorded by whom? By the 

school and then sent back? That is how the system works? 

Ms. JACOBS. The school, yes, has the responsibility for—— 

Senator PAUL. If they overstay their welcome, if they overstay 

their student visa, are we systematically going through—like Senator Lieberman talked about with the exit program, do we have an 

exit program on all student visas? 

Mr. BEERS. It is one of all of the visas that we look at, yes. If 

they go into overstay status, it is noted, and now we have this vetting system that will focus on anybody who is an overstay to ensure that we know as much as possible about it. 

What we will end up having to do now is, as this number of 

unreviewed overstays goes to zero, we will then have to continue 

to do recurrent vetting to make sure that the individuals who were 

placed in an overstay status, who then leave after we have reviewed their files initially, we come back and make sure that we 

know that they have actually left the country so that we can inform ICE that is not a person who is an overstay status. 

Senator PAUL. And one quick final question on the Bowling 

Green alleged terrorists. If their fingerprints were in an FBI database, why weren’t they checked? 

Mr. BEERS. We did not have access to that database, sir. 

Senator PAUL. I am not sure I understand that. 

Mr. BEERS. We get a lot of fingerprints from a lot of different 

sources, including the FBI. We did not have access to that fingerprint in the US–VISIT system, which is the way that we then are 

able to make the identification. That person, had that information 

been available, would have immediately come up on the FBI’s 

radar screen independent of the informant coming forward. 

Senator PAUL. That is a real problem. I mean, we got lucky because of the informant, but I guess that is the real problem, and 

I do not understand. See, I do not know all the names of your 

watchlists, but I have heard of the FBI. I would think that would 

be a pretty prominent watchlist or database fingerprints where you 

would be integrating your information. 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, you need to ask the FBI to explain where that 

particular fingerprint was. 

Senator PAUL. I am going to ask them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Paul. We will ask the 

FBI that. I gather they are far behind—but there is no excuse for 

that—on inputting fingerprints of this kind. But I do not understand why it would be 5 or 6 years. 

No need to regret your agitation or letting off steam here. We 

share your agitation, and your right to let off steam is fully protected here in this Committee, and that right has been exploited 

by many Members of the Committee over time, one of which is our 

next distinguished colleague from Massachusetts. [Laughter.] 

141 

Senator Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Assistant Secretary Jacobs, due to the recent political turmoil in 

Yemen, the State Department has withdrawn most of the staff 

from the embassy in Sana’a. However, before this occurred, earlier 

in the year, the OIG found that in 2009 and 2010 the embassy in 

Sana’a was, in fact, critically understaffed, and fraud prevention, 

as you know, is critical to preventing terrorists from getting visas 

to come to the United States, and probably one of the most important places that we need to ensure we have necessary resources to 

fulfill this critical function is in Yemen, especially now, where 

AQAP is actively plotting to conduct attacks on the United States. 

Yet according to the State Department’s OIG, the embassy is in 

critical need of staffing, in the Fraud Prevention Unit, especially. 

So how can we effectuate counterterrorism policies if the necessary resources are not being supplied? 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Senator. It is absolutely true that our 

embassy in Sana’a, in Yemen, traditionally has been a place where 

it has been hard to fill positions. It is a difficult place and sometimes difficult to get people to those positions that exist. 

The State Department has made it a priority to make sure, 

though, that with these critical countries like Yemen we are getting not just the staffing filling a position, but filling the position 

with the right people, and that is a top priority for the State Department. The truth is we are on ordered departure right now in 

Sana’a, so a number of the people who were at the embassy have 

had to leave, but that does not mean that we in any way have cut 

back in our consular section on fraud prevention or really screening 

the applicants. 

We understand very well the high risks that exist in Yemen and 

the fact that applicants there have to undergo very extensive scrutiny. 

I have made it a personal quest, after visiting Sana’a almost 2 

years ago, to make sure that the consular section in that embassy 

is not just properly staffed but has the right people in it. I have 

sent a number of my very best officers to temporarily head the consular section. We now have a permanent person who just arrived, 

someone who is one of our best officers, who is going to be running 

our operation there. 

I have sent in a number of temporary officers to reduce backlogs, 

to look especially at fraud and what we are doing to prevent that. 

We have help from our diplomatic security colleagues. We have 

an assistant RSO investigator who helps us with our fraud investigations in Sana’a. We have a Visa Security Unit there. A lot of 

different people with the very same concerns, with the same mission, and that is, to keep out people who might be coming here to 

do us harm. 

Senator BROWN. But even though you are doing that, it is still 

understaffed. 

Ms. JACOBS. The consular section is not understaffed. 

Senator BROWN. It is not. How many people do you actually have 

working in that section? 

142 

Ms. JACOBS. I will get back to you with the exact number. 

Senator BROWN. Yes, if you could, let me know how many people 

are working there, where the shortfall is, if any, and how many efforts do you process monthly because if there is a breakdown and 

there is something that we need to do to help get that up. I mean, 

it is no secret that Yemen is in the forefront of terrorist activity, 

and to think that we may be, because of lack of resources, allowing 

people to sneak through the cracks is problematic and very troubling. So I would rather be proactive, and then if there is something that the Chairman, in his amazing leadership, and Senator 

Collins can do to provide the resources to fill that void, that would 

be helpful. 

Assistant Secretary Heyman, thank you, sir. Is it my understanding that there is a backlog of over—and this may have been 

asked, and I apologize. I actually just had a briefing on Yemen, so 

I was a little delayed. But is there a backlog of over 1.6 million potential visa overstays? I think that is what Mr. Beers was hinting 

at. Is that number accurate? 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, that is my bailiwick. 

Senator BROWN. Oh, I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. BEERS. That is quite all right. There was a backlog of 1.6 

million. Over the last several weeks, we have worked at a very 

high level of activity to deal with this. 

Senator BROWN. So what is the number now, do you think? 

Mr. BEERS. The number is less than half of that number in that 

the people who were included in that 1.6 million, over half of them 

have already left the country. They were in an overstay status 

when they left the country, but they left the country after they 

passed into the overstay status, and we had not determined that. 

There is a much smaller number who have changed status; that 

is, they have applied for a different visa or in some cases they may 

have had an application for refugee status or something along 

those lines. 

The remaining people—just to assure you, anybody who left after 

they were an overstay will not be admitted again because we have 

their biometric data, and if they apply for a visa, they will be denied a visa because they overstayed on an earlier visa. And if they 

come through the Visa Waiver Program, we have their biometric 

data in that way, and we will see who they are when they seek to 

get off the plane and pass through immigration. They will not be 

admitted. They will be returned to the country from which they 

came. So that is the first half. 

Then the second half—— 

Senator BROWN. Let me just stay on that first half. Is it true that 

it is 180 days after their visa expires that they are considered having overstayed their visa? 

Mr. BEERS. We know when they overstay on the day that they 

have overstayed. 

Senator BROWN. Yes, but we are a non-visa waiver country and 

we do not consider them really overstayed until 180 days. Isn’t that 

right? 

Mr. BEERS. Well, because that is the terms of the Visa Waiver 

Program entry. 

143 

Senator BROWN. And why is it so long? It just does not make 

sense to me. I know when I go to other countries, we have to go 

through hoops to get into the country and then leave the country. 

I am a U.S. Senator. 

Mr. BEERS. Ms. Jacobs, do you want to describe what the different classes are? 

Senator BROWN. No, I do not need a lesson on classes. I am trying to pick up where Mr. Beers was zeroing in on. We have all 

these people here that are overstaying, and it does not seem like 

we are really zeroing in to either get them reclassified, helping 

them out if they want a different type of visa. What are the efforts? 

Am I missing something? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Let me just say one thing that Mr. Beers did not 

get to say, which is that the number of 1.6 million will be down 

to zero in the next week or so, and we have committed to come 

back to brief you on that. 

Senator BROWN. That is fair. See, I asked you the right question. 

Mr. BEERS. No, I was going to get there. [Laughter.] 

Senator BROWN. He is much quicker. 

Mr. BEERS. The other half are now going through two databases 

to determine, first, whether or not there is any derogatory information that was available before or after they came into this country; 

and, second, whether or not they would be subject to the targeting 

rules that the Customs and Border Protection organization runs 

against people who are in this country. That will reduce the number from the remaining half to a smaller number who will be classified as persons of interest. The entire remaining number will be 

turned over to ICE with a notation as to who are the most prominent numbers, and as Mr. Heyman said, I am expecting a report 

of the completion of this process tomorrow. We will get back to the 

Committee as quickly as possible, at Senator Lieberman’s request. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Brown. We will have 

a few more questions each and then let all of you go back to work. 

Let me pick up where Senator Brown ended and where I ended 

on my first round. So we understand now what the Department 

has done to work through this backlog that existed of overstays, 

but let us talk now about what is the ideal state we are looking 

forward to in terms of an exit system, as I mentioned, so we do not 

develop another backlog and so we have a much more contemporaneous understanding of where people are after they come into the 

country, or at least did they leave when they were supposed to 

leave when their legal right to be here ended. 

And as I mentioned in my opening statement, Mr. Kean and Mr. 

Hamilton, when they testified before us, again called for a comprehensive biometric exit system. And then GAO recently reported 

that the current biographic system continues to be full of problems. 

So take a minute, because this really is important to the Committee, and tell us what the biographic system is, how it works, 

and whether you agree that we should be working toward a comprehensive biometric system, how that would work, and what you 

need to get there as quickly as possible. 

Mr. BEERS. Mr. Heyman, do you want to start with the enhanced 

biographic that you have been working on? 

144 

Mr. HEYMAN. One of the challenges that we have had with 

overstays historically is that the biographic information is not easy 

for us to reconcile in terms of who is here and who is not here. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So what does ‘‘biographic’’ mean? 

Mr. HEYMAN. ‘‘Biographic’’ means the name, date of birth, the 

textual information that we gather on departure of an individual. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So we recorded it when they came in? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We got it when they came in, from the passport information. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. HEYMAN. And we get it when you leave. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. HEYMAN. And so we actually have real-time biographic exit, 

but the question is, over the last several years, we have been trying 

to improve the ability and the integrity of that data so that we can 

actually be sure that when we think somebody has left, they have 

left, or when we think they have overstayed, they have overstayed. 

And we have not had that until recently. 

Over the last several months, Mr. Beers’ folks have been doing 

deep dives into the data on a pilot basis to see if we cannot get better integrity and be able to do a better job of actually knowing realtime when people have left using the biographic analysis. And the 

answer is we think we can. And the result of that is that once we 

complete the backlog and we can do real-time biographic, that will 

help us in the near term—in fact, we are doing that now—be able 

to accurately assess overstays on a more real-time basis. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So that makes sense in that when you 

come into the country, not only do you give the biometric data by 

putting your fingerprint down, but there is passport information, so 

that is in the record. And when you leave the country, that is in 

the record, and presumably that is not a complicated data entry 

matter to find out who has not left after the date at which their 

visa expired, right? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So what you are saying is you think you 

can do better at working that biographic system. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Are you still thinking about going over to 

a biometric system? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, we have not stopped thinking about this. As you 

know, we have run some pilot programs and some cost estimates. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BEERS. The last cost estimate we had, the lowest cost estimate we have ever had, was $3 billion over 10 years. We are still 

looking for a more cost-effective solution to close the gap between 

the enhanced biographic that we are currently working with and 

the validity of the biometric exit. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Is biometric, just for the record, largely a 

fingerprint or—— 

Mr. BEERS. Although we can come up with another solution, but 

that is what we have spent our time looking at. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

145 

Mr. BEERS. That is what the $3 billion estimate was associated 

with. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you conclude that it is more effective 

to have a biometric than a biographic system? 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, I have said before, before this Committee, that 

in the end that is the highest fidelity system that we would have. 

The question that we are faced with is whether or not the highest 

fidelity system is sufficiently cost-effective in the current budgetary 

environment, and that is why we have asked S&T to look hard and 

see if they can come up with perhaps even a new way to approach 

this problem. We do not have the results of that yet. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is important. So that is the first 

step, and it is a significant step. But let us say whether it is enhanced biographic or biometric, either way you are going to know, 

am I right, which of the people who have come into the country on 

a visa have overstayed the visa? 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And then what do we do? 

Mr. BEERS. That is where the visa backlog and the going-forward 

system is going to identify in near real time after they pass into 

the overstay status whether or not—as a result of the interrogation 

of the databases—they are persons of high interest because of some 

derogatory information or behavioral activities which I can talk to 

you more about in a classified setting. This information says that 

we ought to really pay more attention to this particular person, 

which is not to say that the other names will not go to ICE, but 

then ICE will have to decide with respect to whom. This goes back 

to Senator Paul’s concern about focusing on the high-risk persons 

first, who the people that we would put in the high-risk category 

are in order to do that. 

But the thing I want to tell you is that does not stop the recurrent vetting that we will have to continue to do to ensure that, as 

I said earlier, if more information comes in at a later point in time, 

even though it is historical information, we want to get that information to the investigator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So this is a question really for ICE, but 

maybe you know. This is a very labor intensive, but I presume in 

the ideal system that on the day somebody’s name popped up as 

their visa has expired and they should have left the country and 

we do not have a biographic or a biometric indication that they 

have, that somebody would begin to look for them, presumably at 

their last known address or whatever. But I assume that is not 

happening now? Leave aside for a moment they are screening— 

which is a very good move, of course, to try to set a kind of priority 

based on activities or suspicions. But right now what does ICE do 

about all those people who overstay their visas? 

Mr. BEERS. Let me focus on the persons of interest because that 

will give you a sense of what they can do. They can look, as you 

quite correctly said, at the last known address. They would look to 

see what other evidence there is in any databases that they might 

be able to access that would provide some further information 

about where that person was or what that person was doing. So 

they would look, for example, at if they got a driver’s license. They 

would look for whether or not the person had a phone. They would 

146 

look for whether or not the person had a credit card and other 

kinds of indicators that are publicly available information which 

would help establish location so that they could zero in on that person. So the front end of that is preparing the case, and then the 

back end of that is for the ICE investigator to go out and actually 

try to find the person. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. To the best of your knowledge, is ICE 

able to do those kinds of checks on everybody who overstays their 

visa? 

Mr. BEERS. Certainly not on everybody who overstays their visa, 

no, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So we have to get to a point where a person who comes in on a tourist or student visa, or any other kind 

of limited-time visa, worries that the odds are that they are going 

to be apprehended. I fear that right now the odds are that they can 

probably avoid detection, whether they are here for evil reasons or, 

as most of them probably are, just here to work and make a living. 

Either case is a violation of our law. 

My time is up. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Assistant Secretary Heyman, there is some good news in your 

testimony on the issue of applying new data to these holders now, 

and I believe your written testimony says that to date, for this fiscal year, DHS has revoked 782 visas using this process of using the 

kinds of new information that Under Secretary Beers has referred 

to to revoke visas. And this brings to mind the Abdulmutallab case 

where there was a lack of understanding that the Christmas Day 

bomber even had a U.S. visa. 

Assistant Secretary Jacobs, this is an issue that we talked about 

extensively in April of last year when you testified, and we talked 

about the misspelling of Abdulmutallab’s name by embassy officials 

which resulted, at least initially, in the failure to realize that he 

held a U.S. visa. 

Now, your testimony today says, ‘‘For visa applications, we employ strong, sophisticated name-searching algorithms to ensure 

matches between names . . . and any derogatory information. 

. . .’’ And then you go on to say something which puzzles me. You 

said, ‘‘This robust searching capability, which takes into account 

variations in spelling, has been central to our procedures since 

[the] lookout system checks were mandated following the 1993 

World Trade Center bombing.’’ So I am trying to reconcile your testimony today when you say that we have had the capacity to check 

for variations in spelling since we instituted these procedures many 

years ago following the 1993 bombing and what happened in the 

Abdulmutallab case. 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Senator. Actually, we are dealing with 

two different databases and so that explains the difference. What 

we created after the original attack on the World Trade Center was 

our lookout system, or what we call CLASS, where we develop 

many algorithms that allow us to search for names using what we 

call ‘‘fuzzy logic,’’ which basically means you can misspell a name, 

if there are differences in how, for example, an Arabic name is 

transliterated. Our CLASS system for many years has had these 

sophisticated abilities or algorithms so that no matter what you 

147 

put in, it would bring up several different results so that you could 

look through to see if it applied to the applicant. 

That search capability was not available in our Consular Consolidated Database when the name was put in for Mr. Abdulmutallab, 

and so one of the changes that we made after the attack Christmas 

2009 was to make the same fuzzy logic search capability available 

in our Consular Consolidated Database, and we tell everyone now 

when they are searching for names or any other information that 

they have to use what we call our person finder search, which involves this fuzzy logic. 

So today if that name was misspelled and put into the Consular 

Consolidated Database, it would, in fact, have hit on this name and 

several others that came close. 

Senator COLLINS. But earlier today you and Under Secretary 

Beers indicated that there are still some problems with databases 

and their capacity to interrelate. So give me your assessment—it 

seems like we have all these databases, and the FBI example of the 

fingerprints is a perfect example. That just seems like such a logical place to look. So what is your assessment of the compatibility 

of all of these databases that are critical to our ability to protect 

against terrorists traveling to this country and overstaying visas or 

all of the other problems that could cause us to have someone in 

our midst who could do harm? 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you. That is a very good question. I would 

say that one of the issues that we focused on after 9/11, in addition 

to the need for Federal agencies to do a better job of data sharing, 

we also looked at all of the stand-alone systems that each of us use 

and tried to figure out how can they speak to each other. 

When DHS was creating US–VISIT—frankly, I think US-VISIT 

is one of the best examples of how agencies can partner together 

because one of the first things we did was to make sure that our 

visa information was made available to the inspectors at the ports 

of entry through US–VISIT. When people come in, they are able to 

pull up on their screen the information from our visa database. 

They are able to look at the fingerprints that we collect. It is interoperable. It works extremely well. 

That goes for the FBI as well. We had some issues in the very 

beginning, but we have worked through those, so that all of our 

visa applicants are checked against a DHS fingerprint database 

and the FBI database. 

It is true that there are some agencies who did not participate 

in this exercise that we all underwent early on after 9/11. The Department of Defense, for example, has still some stand-alone systems where certain information resides. Now, DOD does or is supposed to share any information on known or suspected terrorists. 

That should come into these other systems that do talk to each 

other. But to the extent that there are other people in those standalone databases that are not automatically checked against, something might be missed. 

What we are doing now in the case of Iraqi refugees and SIV applicants, for example, is we check all of these existing systems, but 

in addition, we are now doing separate checks against DOD systems. And DOD is working very hard to make their system interoperable with our systems. 

148 

So there is still some work to be done, that is absolutely true, 

but I think certainly between the State Department, DHS, and 

FBI, it really is a good-news story. 

Mr. BEERS. Could I add something, Senator? 

Senator COLLINS. Yes, Under Secretary Beers. 

Mr. BEERS. We would have interviewed the individual in question when—— 

Senator COLLINS. When he got here. 

Mr. BEERS [continued]. He got here, based on the information 

that was available. Given the new system that we had, it is quite 

possible that he would have been denied boarding overseas. But we 

did not have that system in place until after this event. Had that 

person’s visa been revoked, he would have been denied boarding. 

That is a system that we have worked out between ourselves in 

terms of how to do that because just because the State Department 

revokes a visa does not mean they have any way of telling the person that the visa has been revoked. They would have to find the 

person and tell him that, and the person would still have the visa 

in the passport. So that is another improvement that we have had 

since then by being able to keep people off the planes rather than 

having to wait until they get here before we get a chance to talk 

to them. 

Senator COLLINS. That is absolutely critical, but another aspect 

of the Abdulmutallab case that was most disturbing to me was that 

the derogatory information about Abdulmutallab from his father to 

our embassy officials did not trigger the revocation of his visa and, 

thus, block him from boarding the plane in the first place. And I 

know improvements have been made so that supposedly that would 

not happen today, but that still is so troubling to me that he was 

not listed on the watchlist and preferably on the No Fly List, but 

also that his visa was not revoked. That was a pretty gaping hole. 

If I could just ask one more very quick question, it is about the 

Visa Security Program, which we have talked about many times. 

We have talked about it over and over in our April hearing in 2010 

and again today in both of our opening statements, and we have 

talked about how DHS and the State Department have identified 

57 posts as high risk. But I want to go to a subcategory of the highrisk posts, and that is, the GAO tells us that 20 are characterized 

as the highest-risk posts. So why aren’t we covering at least those 

20? We have 19 posts covered now, but 5 of those are not in the 

highest-risk posts. 

I understand that there are limited resources, but I do not understand why we would not assign DHS officers to the highest-risk 

posts first. 

Mr. HEYMAN. So the process for deciding how to get a visa security officer to a post includes a joint risk assessment between the 

State Department and the Department of Homeland Security. We 

do this on an annual basis, and that is where that ranking comes 

up. So we have a sense of priority, not necessarily need per se, but 

it is a priority ranking. 

Last year, as you know, we had additional funding for visa security officers, and we expanded the program to the extent we could. 

When we consult with the State Department either because of an 

interest on our part to enhance the visa security and to provide 

149 

Visa Security Units or when the State Department talks to us, that 

has to be jointly done, and it has to also be done with the posts. 

The ambassador has the final say of who can come to post and 

whether there is even space available. 

So some of the things that we go through are: (A) what is the 

priority; (B) what are the resources available; and, (C) whether 

there is even space available. We continue to review that. Last 

year, I think quite effectively, in the 19 posts we had about 815,000 

applicants for visas of which 105,000 required further review and 

1,300 we recommended be refused. And so there is quite a big 

tempo on that, and we, as I said, will continue to review that both 

in terms of resource availability and priorities. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, thank you for that response. It still troubles me very much if an ambassador is blocking the implementation of this critical program in any of the posts that have been 

ranked the highest risk. Security ought to be No. 1. 

Mr. HEYMAN. In the past year there have not been any blockings 

of that nature that I am aware of, but that is one of the considerations that goes into it, whether a post has space available. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Ms. JACOBS. Senator, if I may just add very quickly just two 

things. One is that for the existing VSUs and any future ones, we 

did sign an MOU with ICE earlier this year that really defines 

very well the roles and responsibilities of the visa security officer, 

the consular officer, and then if we have someone from diplomatic 

security helping in the consular section. And so we are very 

pleased about that. It is something that Assistant Secretary John 

Morton and I worked on together, so we know that for the current 

ones and any ones in the future that those roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. 

And I would also like to add that, in addition to the reviews that 

are done by ICE overseas in these Visa Security Units, in fact, ICE 

here in Washington has access to all of the same visa information 

that is available to the ICE officers in the field. This comes through 

our Consular Consolidated Database. And it is true that every day 

they are reviewing that information right here in Washington, and 

if they see cases of concern, they notify the post. And these are 

posts where we do not even have VSUs. So they are able, in fact, 

to do that review back here and have input into cases. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, either the program is needed or it is not 

needed. If you can do it remotely, then maybe we should be questioning the whole program. But if the program is needed, it does 

not make sense to me that only 9 of the 20 highest-risk posts have 

DHS officials stationed there to review visas. That just does not 

make sense to me. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. I agree with 

you. Senator Paul. 

Senator PAUL. Thank you. 

On the underwear bomber, not only does it perplex me we did 

not take his visa away, why didn’t we send the Nigerian police over 

to his house? His dad is there reporting him. Why wasn’t someone 

looking for him? I mean, it is really doing police work. That is what 

I think more of this has to be about, good police work, rather than 

150 

focusing on just database searches and all that. And we have to 

take away visas. But when someone’s dad comes and says they are 

a threat, the police should have gone over to the guy’s dorm or his 

house or tried to find him somewhere in Nigeria. I am not aware 

that there was an active effort looking for this man before he came 

over here. 

But I wanted to get back to the FBI list and the idea with the 

Bowling Green terrorists and the fingerprint on the bomb. You said 

we need to ask the FBI, when they came in in 2007, or 2009, there 

was no FBI database or something called the Terrorist Screening 

Database? That did not exist in 2007 and you did not have access 

to that? 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, we had access to that. This particular file, this 

particular print, was not in any of the databases that the FBI had 

to which we have access. 

Senator PAUL. That makes it clear. So the problem really was not 

that you did not have access to lists. They did not put the information on the list. I know nobody wants to talk about it. They just 

want to say it is better. But there was a problem then. There obviously was a problem because we let somebody in with fingerprints 

on a bomb. It really sounds like the problem mostly originates in 

the FBI, that they did not put this information into the correct 

database, because you do not now have new access to a new database. They are just doing a better job, supposedly, getting the information into the database? Am I correct? 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator PAUL. Were either of these two Bowling Green terrorists 

on any kind of watchlist? 

Mr. BEERS. At the time that they were put into the asylum system, no. 

Senator PAUL. So that would have all occurred after the whole 

investigation started? 

Mr. BEERS. Unless the information had been available before, 

and then they would have been on a watchlist. 

Senator PAUL. All right. That is all I have. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Paul. 

Thanks to the three witnesses, Under Secretary Beers, Assistant 

Secretary Jacobs, and Assistant Secretary Heyman. Frankly, 

thanks up front for all that you and your predecessors have done 

to create this quite remarkable and, I think, largely effective system we have for preventing terrorists from traveling into the 

United States to attack us. And I guess I would say thanks for the 

work that we are going to continue to do together to try to close 

the gaps that continue to exist. It has been a very informative 

hearing, and I thank you very much for your participation. 

We will keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days for additional questions and statements. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(151) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: IMPROVING 

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning, and I welcome the witnesses particularly and urge you to feel comfortable and take your 

seats. It is good to have you here. 

This is another in a series of hearings that Senator Collins and 

I and our Committee have been doing as we approach the 10th anniversary of 9/11 to essentially evaluate what lessons we learned 

from that tragic day and what we have done to act on those lessons. One of the revelations of that day was the enormous gaps in 

our emergency communications capabilities. The fact is that on 

9/11, a lot of first responders could not coordinate their rescue efforts because they could not talk to each other. 

As one New York City fire chief told the 9/11 Commission, ‘‘People watching on TV certainly had more knowledge of what was 

happening a hundred floors above us than we did in the lobby [of 

the World Trade Center].’’ And that proved fatal because many 

firefighters inside the Twin Towers did not hear the call to evacuate. 

In its report, the 9/11 Commission said, ‘‘The inability to communicate was a critical problem at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, 

and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, crash sites, where multiple 

agencies and multiple jurisdictions responded. The occurrence of 

this at three very different sites is strong evidence that compatible 

and adequate communications among public safety organizations at 

the local, State, and Federal levels remains an important problem.’’ 

As a result, the 9/11 Commission recommended the Federal Government take the lead in helping State and local governments establish interoperable communications systems. 

A year after the Commission issued its report, Hurricane Katrina 

slammed into the Gulf Coast, and we saw there the relevance of 

the critique of the 9/11 Commission not just to man-made disasters, such as a terrorist attack, but to natural disasters as well. BeVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
152 

cause on the Gulf Coast, as a result of Hurricane Katrina, the lack 

of interoperable communications was compounded by an inability of 

many communications systems to operate at all under those circumstances. 

Phone lines, cell towers, and electrical systems were destroyed by 

the storm, knocking many communications systems offline and 

making it impossible at times for many first responders and government officials on the Gulf Coast to talk to each other. 

Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi memorably said, ‘‘My 

head of the National Guard might as well have been a Civil War 

general . . . because he could only find out what [was] going on by 

sending somebody.’’ 

Today at this hearing, we are going to assess what progress we 

have made and what gaps remain in making public safety communications more interoperable and more operable in a crisis. 

In assessing what has happened since 9/11, it is important to remember, I think, that planning and funding decisions for emergency communications traditionally have been splintered across 

over 55,000 public safety organizations across our country that operate on many different bands of radio spectrum. 

But as we look back almost 10 years now, I would say that significant progress has been made in bringing these varied organizations together. 

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

of 2007, which was the second wave of legislation from the 9/11 

Commission report, which, again, I am proud to say originated in 

our Committee, created the Office of Emergency Communications 

within the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate with 

State and local governments in addressing the many challenges 

that come with trying to create interoperable communications systems. 

With assistance from the OEC, each State and territory has now 

created a communications interoperability plan and has appointed 

a State interoperability coordinator, and I am pleased to say that 

these officials meet face to face twice a year and are in ongoing 

communication about how to improve interoperability. 

That is very significant because not so many years ago, it was 

not always clear who the point person in each State was when it 

came to interoperability or if there actually was such a point person. 

In 2008, OEC issued the National Emergency Communications 

Plan to establish clear goals for improving interoperability, and to 

ensure that the plan is more than just a piece of paper, OEC has 

been testing to see if its goals are being met. In 2010, OEC tested 

60 urban areas to see if they could demonstrate that they could 

rapidly establish communications among agencies from all levels of 

government in the event of an emergency. I am pleased to say that 

all 60 urban areas met the goals set by OEC. They are now working with the States to test the capabilities of the more than 3,000 

counties across the country. 

Investments in many State and local communications systems, 

which have been significant, supplemented by over $4 billion in 

grant funds from the Department of Homeland Security, have significantly enhanced voice communications and interoperability of 

153 

voice communications over what they were a few years ago. In this 

regard, it is comforting to report that one of the greatest success 

stories actually comes from Louisiana, which has used State 

money, DHS grants, and stimulus dollars to build a single, statewide radio communications system that provides daily voice communications to more than 60,000 Federal, State, and local users. 

This system, incidentally, proved its worth during the evacuation 

of almost 2 million people before Hurricane Gustav in August 2008 

and again after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill when the system 

was the backbone for establishing interoperable communications 

among the various first responders in the Gulf States. So that is 

real progress. 

But despite such progress in voice communications, we still have 

failed to fulfill the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to set 

aside a portion of the radio spectrum and dedicate it to create a 

coast-to-coast, interoperable, emergency digital communications 

network for first responders. We have the opportunity to do that 

right now, and I think we need to seize it. 

Currently, public safety agencies transmit on narrow slices of 

non-contiguous spectrum that cannot handle the kinds of large 

chunks of data available to the average smartphone user. 

Turning over a large contiguous slice of the broadband spectrum, 

which is known as the D Block, to public safety would give our first 

responders a 21st Century communications system with equipment 

that could share information with any other department anywhere 

in the Nation. Right now, as one of my staff members put it, one 

of my more eloquent and colorful staff members, the average firefighter or first responder does not have the capability that the average teenager with a smartphone has, and that really is unacceptable. 

If we close this gap, as an example, firefighters could get digital 

building diagrams from the local building department as they approach a burning building so they know the floor plan and exits before they go in. 

Paramedics could send a patient’s vital signs to the emergency 

room so doctors and nurses would know what they were dealing 

with before the patient arrived. 

A police officer at the scene of a crime could take electronic fingerprints and immediately compare them to Federal, State, and 

local databases. Or the officer who gets a partial read of a license 

plate could immediately tap into a database to help determine who 

owns the car and whether they have outstanding warrants against 

them. 

Senator McCain and I have sponsored legislation to set aside the 

D Block for first responders, and we are committed now to working 

with Senators Rockefeller and Hutchison, Chairman and Ranking 

Member of the Commerce Committee, who have reported similar D 

Block legislation out of their Committee. 

But I will note that Senator Reid, to bring what we are talking 

about that began 10 years ago right down to today, in his proposal 

to end this debt ceiling crisis that approaches, that we are in the 

middle of—and D–Day is next Tuesday, apparently—has included 

auction money from the spectrum as contributing to diminishing 

the deficit, but has allocated $7 billion of that for these purposes. 

154 

For reasons that are not clear to me yet—and we have to talk to 

him and his staff—that is $4 billion less than the RockefellerHutchison bill and Senator McCain and my bill, and we want to 

see what is going on there. But all the authorizing language is now 

in Senator Reid’s debt ceiling proposal, so perhaps one of the witnesses is either clairvoyant or has been tapping phones and emails 

and can predict better than Senator Collins and I can what actually will happen here in the next 3 or 4 days on the debt ceiling. 

But here all of a sudden—and we do not know whether this is in 

Speaker Boehner’s proposal or not because we have not seen the 

language—we have the possibility of actually achieving this as a 

resolution of this larger crisis in the next week, and that would be 

great. 

In this 10th year after 9/11, adopting this legislation I think is 

one of the best things to do to show that we have learned the lessons from 9/11. The bottom line is, our first responders need a nationwide network giving them the most modern broadband capabilities. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, as you were talking about the debt crisis, I could 

not help but think that it would be good if something positive came 

out of this debacle that we find ourselves in. 

Good morning to all of our witnesses. Mr. Chairman, I am not 

sure that you realize that we not only have a witness from the 

State of Maine with us, but that the Connecticut witness hails from 

Milo, Maine. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I would like to say I knew that. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Varney, this does not put your credibility in doubt with me 

at all. [Laughter.] 

It only enhances your credibility. 

Senator COLLINS. I was just going to say, be careful there. This 

is a big plus and now gives me great confidence in what Connecticut is doing as well as what Maine is doing. 

The effectiveness of emergency communications has emerged as 

a concern due to the failures that occurred in the wake of the 9/ 

11 attacks and the Hurricane Katrina disaster. As both of these catastrophes demonstrated, the lack of reliable communications before, during, and after a disaster can cost lives, worsen damage, 

and slow response operations. 

Not only did the 9/11 attacks represent a ‘‘failure of imagination,’’ as the 9/11 Commission found, they also revealed the inadequacy of communications equipment, technology, and systems. 

The 9/11 Commission report cited many problems with communications among firefighters on September 11, 2001, and found that the 

technical failure of the fire department’s radios was a ‘‘contributing 

factor’’ to the loss of firefighter lives, albeit not the primary cause. 

Incredibly, when Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, we saw exactly the same kinds of problems that we had witnessed 4 years 

earlier in the 9/11 attacks. Emergency personnel had incompatible 

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nications problems arose when towers and electronic equipment 

were destroyed, 911 centers were rendered inoperable, and the 

FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Systems were overwhelmed. 

A FEMA official who was in New Orleans after Hurricane 

Katrina estimated that the lack of effective communication at the 

Superdome reduced FEMA’s effectiveness by 90 percent. 

This Committee conducted an in-depth investigation into the 

failed response to Hurricane Katrina and detailed the various communication failures associated with that storm. Although there are 

numerous examples, one of the most notable assessments that 

sticks in my mind is the one that the Chairman has already cited, 

and that was from Governor Haley Barbour when he said that it 

was as if he were back in the Civil War because he had to send 

messengers to communicate. He noted that he did have helicopters 

instead of horses, so it was a little faster, but the same concept. 

When seconds and minutes are important, communications systems must be both operable and interoperable so that first responders can talk to each other and coordinate their operations. We 

never again want to see individuals on rooftops pleading for help 

that may be delayed because of an inability of responders to communicate. We must be especially sensitive to the ability to communicate with the most vulnerable in our population, such as children, the elderly, the homebound, and those with special needs. 

As the 10th anniversary of 9/11 approaches, how first responders 

communicate with one another and how Americans receive emergency information remain challenges. 

Public safety officials clearly should have access to state-of-theart, interoperable communications equipment to use during emergencies. But we must also be sure that resources are invested carefully and that an effective and efficient structure is established to 

manage emergency communications. That, too, was a problem after 

Hurricane Katrina. There was not a command-and-control structure in place that could be implemented even if the equipment had 

been there and had operated. And that is why plans and systems 

must be tested during State, regional, and national level exercises. 

Today, the Committee will examine the progress made during 

the past decade and explore what more needs to be done. After 

Hurricane Katrina, Congress created the Office of Emergency Communications within DHS, which developed a National Emergency 

Communications Plan, stood up Regional Working Groups, and established goals to measure progress. 

The Chairman and I also created an Interoperability Emergency 

Communications Grant Program to support State plans. This program has supplemented other Federal, State, and local investments. According to CRS, as much as $13 billion in Federal funding has been spent on emergency communications during the past 

9 years. 

What exactly do we have to show for these investments? Are we 

making sufficient progress? Is the money being well spent so that 

we are better prepared for the next major disaster? 

I know from my experience in my home State of Maine that a 

great deal has been done to increase the ability of first responders 

to communicate with each other. Notably—and I want to ask our 

witness, the head of the Maine Emergency Management Agency, 

156 

about this today—our State has been working with Canada to ensure that first responders across our more than 600-mile international border can communicate with each other in an emergency. 

When you look at the border of Maine with Canada, there are communities on both sides, and they often have assistance packs to 

allow for help when there is an emergency, but they have to be 

able to communicate as well. 

The investments, training, new equipment, and planning clearly 

have produced some successes. For example, in recent testimony, 

the FEMA Administrator testified that interoperable communications were effectively used after the Joplin, Missouri, tornado and 

that the success of State and local responders reduced the burden 

on the Federal Government. 

Another issue is the importance of effective communication with 

the public before, during, and after an incident. This is an issue 

that has been of great interest to the Chairman and me. We have 

talked about who would be the most credible spokesperson, who 

should get information out to the public, particularly if there were 

a nuclear disaster and the instruction might well be to shelter in 

place, not to flee. Much like the communication among first responders, the communication between officials and the public is vitally important and can save lives. I will soon introduce legislation, 

on which I look forward to working with the Chairman, to 

strengthen the Nation’s public alert and warning system. 

But, again, today I want to thank all of our witnesses for being 

here and especially to welcome our two witnesses from the great 

State of Maine. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

Before we get to the first witness, apparently there is a public 

safety meeting of some kind in Washington, and we are honored to 

have, in addition to our witnesses, a number of first responder officials. I am going to call out some names that I have, and I apologize if I have missed anybody, but I thank you for your service and 

for being here: 

Chief Harlin McEwen, who is Chairman of the International Association of Chiefs of Police Communications and Technology Committee; Sheriff Paul Fitzgerald, President of the National Sheriffs 

Association, and Sheriff of Story County in Iowa; Chief Gregg Riddle, incoming President of the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials International; Chief Al Gillespie, North Las 

Vegas Fire Department, incoming President of the International 

Association of Fire Chiefs; Chief Gregory Frederick, President of 

the Metropolitan Fire Chiefs Association, from the Louisville Fire 

Department; Chief Charles ‘‘Chuck’’ Dowd, Deputy Chief for Communications of the NYPD, we welcome you back. You have become 

not quite a regular but a frequent visitor here—and Kevin 

McGinnis, State Trauma Coordinator and Chief of Mobile Health 

Services from—— 

Senator COLLINS. From the great State of Maine. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Oh, yes. [Laughter.] 

We have an ongoing routine. Anyway, we are honored to have all 

of you here. 

Our first witness at the table is Greg Schaffer, who is the Acting 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Schaffer appears in the Appendix on page 599. 

torate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Thanks for 

being here, and please proceed with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF GREGORY SCHAFFER,1 ACTING DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. SCHAFFER. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure 

to be here today to talk about the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to support emergency communications and the emerging capabilities of our State, local, tribal, and Federal resources in 

that space. 

Today’s hearing is just the latest in this Committee’s consistently 

strong support for first responder emergency communication needs, 

a tradition that includes the passage of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and the statutory creation of the 

Office of Emergency Communications. 

There are three offices within the National Protection and Programs Directorate that directly support emergency management 

and interoperable emergency communications capabilities: 

The Office of Emergency Communications, which really helps 

create the foundation for first responders and public safety officials 

at all levels of government to talk to each other during an emergency. 

The National Communications System works in times of disaster 

to ensure that there is priority communication capability for Federal, State, local, and other officials, as well as creating the ability, 

along with FEMA, to restore those communications when they are 

disrupted by a man-made or natural disaster. 

The third office, the Office of Infrastructure Protection, works 

across all sectors of critical infrastructure to ensure that owners 

and operators of our most critical infrastructures have the ability 

to restore capabilities and that they are provided with capabilities 

to communicate with the Federal Government during a time of disaster. 

I am happy to elaborate in all of these areas and answer your 

questions, but I would like to focus on some success stories, as has 

been noted. 

There has been significant progress made in the area of emergency communications through investments in planning, governance, training, interagency coordination, and technology support. 

As a result of those efforts and work in that area, we do have a 

better situation than we have had in the past, but there is still certainly more progress to be made. 

One example is the April 20, 2010, Deepwater Horizon drilling 

rig explosion, which released enormous amounts of oil, as we know, 

in the Gulf of Mexico. As noted, the Louisiana Wireless Information 

Network was used as a major backbone for communications for 

emergency responders after that incident. Indeed, within 24 hours, 

the LWIN mobile tower capability was launched to Mobile, Alabama, and voice communications were established between area 

158 

commands in Robert, Louisiana, and two unified command groups 

in Houma, Louisiana, and Mobile, Alabama. Within 48 hours, technicians were working with the Louisiana Department of Public 

Safety to connect the statewide radio system in Mississippi as well 

as the Orange Beach Fire Department radio system in Alabama to 

LWIN through various motor bridge devices that allowed for effective communications all the way from the Texas-Louisiana border 

to the Florida Panhandle. 

Louisiana also issued over 200 portable radios from their State’s 

cache of 600 to allow the U.S. Coast Guard to immediately establish voice interoperability, and then within a week, radio systems 

in Austin, Houston, and Harrison Counties in Texas were added to 

the system through interoperable RF subsystem interfaces, which 

extended the network, which was now called Gulf WIN, all the way 

to central Texas. 

This rapid connectivity of multiple systems was possible due to 

the integration of communications unit leaders at all levels of government, and Louisiana, Mississippi, and Orange Beach granted 

access to individual radio IDs in all of these systems, which essentially allowed the use of one handset to talk through all of the networks. 

That network is still in operation today, and as we come into 

hurricane season, it is good to know that we have a capability that 

really connects the entire region. 

As a second example, as was noted by the Chairman, Joplin, Missouri, experienced an F–5 tornado that, while tragic, did display 

new capabilities or enhanced capabilities of our communications 

networks. The investments in standards and in grant funding for 

interoperable communications equipment and training really did 

yield measurable improved results of our communications capabilities. The city of Joplin’s 10-channel trunked radio system experienced heavy use, but it continued to operate throughout the incident response, and the establishment of an incident command capability reduced the confusion that can occur after an event of this 

kind. 

Indeed, in the very week before this event occurred, there was 

a training by DHS, a national-level exercise, with many of the responders participating and being brought up to speed on the way 

to respond in a mock earthquake scenario. So these examples really 

show that we have made critical strides in strengthening the overall security and national preparedness of the communications systems over the last decade. 

The public safety community, while enhancing their capabilities 

on the mission-critical voice side, they do not have all of the capabilities that they need from a data capability perspective. The 

availability of new technologies in the Long Term Evolution 

space—4G mobile capabilities to allow them to use data as mission 

critical as we do with voice capabilities today—is something that 

we believe must be realized for the community to bring greater 

operability, interoperability, and capability across the board. 

In order to realize that vision, the Administration is fully committed to working with Congress to ensure the passage of legislation that meets the critical needs of the public safety community 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Varney appears in the Appendix on page 611. 

gress has been working across several committees, multiple jurisdictions, including Chairman Lieberman, Chairman Rockefeller, 

and Senator McCain, we believe is a sign that we can indeed get 

this accomplished. 

We will continue to work with you to achieve this goal. We thank 

you very much for the opportunity to testify this morning, and we 

look forward to ensuring that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 

of 2001, we are taking enormous strides to make sure that emergency communications capabilities continue to advance. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Schaffer. That was a good 

beginning. 

Next we go to the frequently mentioned Michael Varney. Senator 

Collins, you will be interested to hear that Mr. Varney brought 

with him from Maine not only enormous capability but a tremendous work ethic. He is here today as the Statewide Interoperability 

Coordinator from Connecticut, but he is also the Director of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications at the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, the Vice Chairman of the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators, and the 

Chief of the Ellington, Connecticut, Volunteer Fire Department. 

Thank you for all your public service. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL D. VARNEY,1 STATEWIDE INTEROPERABILITY COORDINATOR, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT 

OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION 

Mr. VARNEY. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Lieberman, Senator 

Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I would like 

to thank you for allowing me the opportunity to provide testimony 

on this important topic. 

As the Senator indicated, I am the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator for the State of Connecticut in addition to serving as the 

Vice Chairman of the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators. 

Being a local first responder and serving in the capacity as a fire 

chief, I can truly appreciate the efforts put toward solving the nationwide interoperability problems and have seen their positive impact directly in the field. 

Close to 10 years ago since the attacks of September 11, 2001, 

a priority for States has been improving emergency responder communications capabilities. Public safety responders need the ability 

to have the most accurate, reliable information and to be able to 

communicate directly and instantaneously with their assisting and 

supporting responders. 

Interoperability of public safety communications takes significant 

coordination to solve and is being addressed by the creation and 

use of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators. In each State and 

territory, there is a designated SWIC responsible for a variety of 

critical planning and coordinating functions, guided by the initiatives outlined in the National Emergency Communications Plan 

and the Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans, all of 

which were not coordinated through a specific designated office 

prior to 2001. 

160 

In Connecticut, our Statewide Public Safety Interoperable Communications Committee has representatives from each planning region within our State—law enforcement, emergency medical services, fire departments, and key State and Federal response agencies. The abilities and relationships that are leveraged by this 

group have been very successful in our efforts to improve interoperability of public safety communications within the State of Connecticut. 

Each of the Nation’s Urban Areas Security Initiative sites developed a Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan. Connecticut 

used this framework to continue to create TIC Plans for all of the 

additional regions in our State. This effort was possible because of 

the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program. 

Since the TIC Plans have been developed, they have been used in 

the field by local practitioners to successfully plan for and respond 

to events and emergencies that involve multiple disciplines and jurisdictions. 

In early June when tornados struck southern Massachusetts, the 

Connecticut fire service was requested and responded with significant assets, which were coordinated quickly and efficiently between 

the two States due to prior planning and exercises made possible 

through the IECGP-funded TIC Plan process. 

SWICs serve as members of the National Council of Statewide 

Interoperability Coordinators, which was established in 2010 to assist State and Territory interoperability coordinators with promoting the critical importance of interoperable communications 

and the sharing of best practices. As a SWIC, I have received excellent support and engagement by the DHS Office of Emergency 

Communications. Their technical support and coordination activities have proven invaluable to our efforts in Connecticut. Their outreach activities through SAFECOM and the NCSWIC have listened 

to our concerns and priorities and adapted their programs to make 

them relevant. 

As I mentioned earlier, the IECGP funds such as those used to 

create TIC Plans in Connecticut have been critical to the SWICs 

to provide funding that ensures that federally funded projects align 

to strategic plans and to implement and report on the NECP goals, 

allowing DHS to measure progress in emergency communications 

capabilities nationwide. 

In a recent survey of SWICs conducted in June, we found that 

over one-third of the SWIC positions were funded in whole or in 

part by this grant program. The elimination of this funding and reduction of related homeland security grant programs will have a direct impact on the sustainment of the many programs put in place 

to increase interoperable communications. 

We support the commitment to develop and deploy a nationwide 

interoperable wireless network for public safety that the Administration has put forward in the President’s Wireless Innovation and 

Infrastructure Initiative. Many of our issues are captured within 

the Rockefeller-Hutchinson bill, and we are very appreciative of 

Senators Lieberman and McCain’s leadership and the Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in their work to reallocate the D Block for public safety use. This leadership will ensure successful completion of this very important milestone. 

161 

1The prepared statement of Mr. McAleer appears in the Appendix on page 616. 

While maintaining their traditional land mobile radio systems, 

our public safety agencies are increasingly using commercial 

broadband systems to support their missions. We have been relying 

on off-the-shelf broadband systems using laptop computers in vehicles and communication devices such as BlackBerrys and smartphones for remote data communications. Although the present commercial broadband devices have some functions that go beyond 

public safety communications devices, they lack the ruggedness, reliability, and direct device-to-device connectivity of traditional public safety radio systems. In other words, the commercial networks 

do not provide the public safety control, mission criticality, and capacity needed for their mission. 

The Statewide Interoperability Coordinators believe that the creation and support of a wireless broadband network for public safety 

is critical for interoperability and to allow first responders to communicate and do their jobs as safely and efficiently as possible. We 

appreciate your ongoing support to make this nationwide network 

a reality, and the NCSWIC is very appreciative of the initiatives 

supported by the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and 

Commerce Committees to create a national public safety broadband 

wireless network. 

As Senator Lieberman indicated in his comments earlier, right 

now my son and daughter have more broadband capability than my 

firefighters do while responding to emergencies every day. This is 

a unique time to solve this problem and create a nationwide public 

safety wireless broadband network. We look forward to working 

with you and your Senate colleagues to pass this law to meet public safety’s needs for interoperable communications, a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report. 

In conclusion, I again would like to thank the ongoing tremendous support and activity by your Committee to increase interoperable communications throughout the United States. The Federal 

investment to support interoperable communications over the past 

few years will continue to show its value in saving lives and protecting property while our Nation’s first responders work together 

to respond to emergencies and disasters in our homeland. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I would be 

pleased to answer your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Varney, for that 

excellent statement. 

Now we will go to Robert McAleer, who is the Director of the 

Maine Emergency Management Agency and who, as far as I know, 

was not born in Connecticut. [Laughter.] 

Mr. MCALEER. No, sir. New Jersey. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT P. MCALEER,1 DIRECTOR, MAINE 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

Mr. MCALEER. Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins, Members of 

the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to come before you this morning. My 

162 

name is Robert McAleer, and I am the director of the Maine Emergency Management Agency. 

I would like to address the issue of communications interoperability as it relates to the State of Maine and, in particular, some 

of the accomplishments we have achieved since 2001, our work that 

is currently in progress, and existing gaps that need to be addressed. 

By New England standards, Maine is a large State, roughly 

equivalent to the rest of the New England States combined. It is 

mostly a rural State with vast areas of very limited population and 

some very rugged terrain. Maine is also not a wealthy State. These 

factors have made improving interoperability a challenge. 

Maine, however, has been fortunate to receive a significant 

amount of Federal funding, for which we are very grateful, to support our efforts. We estimate that approximately $9.5 million or 25 

percent of our Homeland Security, Public Safety Interoperable 

Communications, and Interoperable Emergency Communications 

Grants funds have been dedicated to improving communications 

just since 2007. We have used that funding to leverage whatever 

local funding municipalities have generated to make notable improvements. 

One advantage that we have had throughout this process is that 

the vast majority of our first responders use VHF radios that transmit and receive on similar frequencies. 

Because of the overwhelming similarity in equipment statewide, 

our challenge has been to replace old or worn-out equipment and 

to acquire new equipment where there was none or to replace 

equipment that simply was inadequate to meet our current needs. 

In addition to acquiring a large number of modern radios for our 

first responders, we have completed a significant number of major 

projects. An attachment to my testimony contains a detailed compilation of the projects since 2003, examples of which are as follows: $107,000 to upgrade communications systems throughout 

Sagadahoc County and complete their narrowband transition; 

about $200,000 to upgrade the communications infrastructure for 

the Hancock County Sheriff’s Office; $500,000 for the bulk purchase of narrowband-compliant fire pagers; and $350,000 to support a countywide microwave communications project in Cumberland County. The State has also acquired four large mobile command vehicles that have state-of-the-art radio, cell phone, internet, 

and satellite capabilities for use in incident coordination. In multiple instances, these vehicles have served as dispatch centers 

when fixed facilities were out of service. We have also provided 

support for communications vehicles in over half of our counties. 

The State has established radio caches at crossing sites along the 

U.S.-Canada Border for use by first responders moving across the 

border to ensure adequate interoperable equipment is available. 

Each county now has portable repeater antennas that can be deployed to remote areas where coverage may be minimal or to boost 

signals that may otherwise be blocked. 

We have been able to move our EOC from a facility that was 

generally inadequate to a new facility and provide the new EOC 

with equipment that meets virtually all of our communications 

needs. Our court system and law enforcement agencies now have 

163 

access to a data broker system that enables almost instant access 

to the various types of critical information. 

The majority of our law enforcement and even some fire departments now have mobile display terminals in their vehicles, which 

in many cases provide a better communications capability than 

standard radios. 

We realize that interoperability is not just a matter of acquiring 

equipment. In many instances, process and training also bring 

gains. Along those lines, we have established a Memorandum of 

Understanding with the owners of six statewide frequencies to 

allow incident commanders to request dedicated use of those frequencies to establish and coordinate communications at an incident. 

We have also dedicated a significant amount of time to communications unit leader training. This training helps us ensure that 

there is sufficient expertise available at a large event to ensure 

that the correct agencies are speaking on the correct channels. 

We have worked with our counties to ensure that they have upto-date detailed countywide communications plans to identify all of 

their communications assets, to ensure that their procedures are 

adequate, and to identify any gaps. 

Our border with Canada has presented a unique challenge. To 

meet that challenge, we have been conducting a series of cross-border communications working sessions with our local, State, and 

Federal partners on both sides of the border. These sessions are 

helping us better understand our differences and plan for how we 

can overcome those differences when needed. 

In addition to these workshops, Maine, with the support of our 

Canadian partners, applied for and received a Border Interoperability Demonstration Pilot grant. Out of 21 applicants nationwide, 

Maine was one of only seven awardees. We are using the almost 

$4 million provided by this grant to significantly reduce communications gaps along the border and establish a single common frequency that will be available for use by first responders from both 

sides of the border. 

Finally, the State of Maine is investing $50 million of State funding to essentially rebuild and expand the infrastructure backbone 

of the State’s communication system. When this project, MSCOMMNET, is completed, the State will have a series of 42 interconnected transmission towers that will replace infrastructure that 

has reached or passed its useful life expectancy, provide enhanced 

coverage, and increase redundancy. Of note is that part of the 

tower build-out is a joint effort between the State and our Customs 

and Border Patrol partners. We believe this may be the first such 

partnership in the Nation. Included with this project is the replacement of virtually all State-owned portable and mobile radios. 

In general, Maine is in a relatively healthy position with regard 

to interoperability. Through the concerted efforts of many people 

and the judicious use of available resources, we have been able to 

accomplish a great deal. And we have witnessed those accomplishments coming into play during real world events. There is, however, more work that needs to be done. 

First and foremost in our view is the requirement to meet the 

FCC narrowbanding mandate. While the initial estimates of the 

164 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Ramsey appears in the Appendix on page 627. 

cost to meet this requirement were staggering, we have dedicated 

a major portion of available Federal funding to the requirement as 

well as a concerted effort to encourage local communities to recognize their own responsibility to invest in the solution. Because we 

will be able to reallocate many of the State radios that are being 

replaced as part of MSCOMMNET, we believe that our first responders will be ready on January 1, 2013. We remain concerned, 

however, about communities that are not meeting the National Incident Management System compliancy requirements because we 

cannot assist them with Federal funds. 

We believe firmly that during an emergency situation if we do 

not have solid communications, then we will have no coordination. 

We will only have chaos. For that reason, building a solid communications capability has been a priority for the State for a number 

of years. Further strengthening of that capability and sustaining 

what we now have will be priorities moving forward. 

That concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions you might have. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much for that good report. 

Finally, we have Charles Ramsey whom we knew here for a long 

time as Chief. We welcome back now Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department and President of the Major Cities Chiefs 

Association. 

Commissioner, it is an honor to have you here. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES H. RAMSEY,1 POLICE 

COMMISSIONER, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 

Mr. RAMSEY. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and all invited speakers and guests. Thank 

you for this opportunity to discuss a critical issue affecting all public safety and law enforcement organizations across our country 

and our ability to serve the public. Having had 42 years in law enforcement, I have witnessed many important changes in emergency 

communications across police departments in three cities: first in 

Chicago for 30 years, then as Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department here in Washington, DC, for 9 years, and now as Police 

Commissioner in Philadelphia for the past 31⁄2 years. I also have 

the privilege of serving as the President of the Major Cities Chiefs 

Association and the Police Executive Research Forum, both of 

which are members of the Public Safety Alliance. 

The PSA is a coalition of the leading national public safety associations that represent every law enforcement, fire, EMS, emergency management agency, and first responder organization in the 

country. I am here on behalf of first responders across this country 

to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator McCain for sponsoring 

S. 1040, the Broadband for First Responders Act of 2011. And we 

hope that you will also continue to work closely with Senator 

Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison of the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation and sponsors of S. 911, the 

SPECTRUM Act, which was recently voted out of Committee for 

consideration by the Senate. 

165 

These bills fulfill an absolutely critical need. They allocate the D 

Block to public safety, provide the necessary funding to build out 

and expand the nationwide broadband network, and establish a 

governance structure in cooperation with State and local authorities. 

Since September 11, 2001, like many other jurisdictions around 

the Nation, the Philadelphia region worked diligently to ensure 

adequate local, State, and Federal coordination for emergency communications. We established an Interoperable Communications 

Committee within our Southeast Pennsylvania Regional Task 

Force. Representatives from the five counties in the Philadelphia 

UASI, as well as seven additional regional counties from New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, comprise this task force. I would also 

like to take the time to thank Committee Member Senator Tom 

Carper for his assistance in strengthening homeland security in 

our region. 

Let us be very clear in our mission: A terrorist attack or a major 

catastrophic event knows no municipal, State, or Federal boundary. 

Emergency preparedness spans across lines and demands that law 

enforcement and public safety organizations across the country 

plan and coordinate their responses. 

And as you mentioned in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, 

we have an extremely valuable opportunity in front of us to meet 

our needs in emergency communications. Seamless interoperability 

can only be achieved through a dedicated public safety nationwide 

broadband network. The allocation of the D Block for public safety 

organizations, with adequate capacity, control, and funding, is the 

only proposal that will meet the challenges and demands that we 

confront. As President of MCCA and PERF, I am here to support 

this solution, which serves law enforcement and public safety organizations and, most importantly, helps to protect the American people in the best way possible. 

Commercial networks are not designed to serve our public safety 

needs. Past experiences with major national disasters have demonstrated that these networks are not interchangeable with dedicated public safety networks. There are fundamental differences in 

the architecture that go to the heart of public safety communications. The Public Safety Alliance will strongly oppose any legislation or resolution that supports auctioning the D block. Public safety becomes both less public and less safe if we auction any part of 

the D Block to the highest commercial bidder. 

We need the up-front funding to jump-start the investment and 

build out of the network and to attract and encourage commercial 

interest and competition. We will partner with the private sector 

to leverage and make maximum use of the existing infrastructure, 

while managing operations locally through a national governance 

structure. 

This Committee, the House Homeland Security Committee, the 

House Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee have all held numerous hearings over the past 2 years on the proposed public safety spectrum and the nationwide broadband network. Congress has 

asked many good questions, and hopefully you now have the information you need to make an informed recommendation. 

166 

Our first responders, who put their lives on the line every day, 

must have the resources that they need to do their jobs more efficiently and effectively, armed with real-time data, video, and other 

critical information. We can only accomplish this goal if we have 

the latest in mobile broadband technology that is fully interoperable on a local, State, and Federal level. The ability to share mission-critical information nationwide to coordinate and plan our response to emergencies depends on having this capability. 

I would like to thank all the Members of the Committee for your 

continued time and commitment to finding a solution that will 

meet the communications needs of our first responders and will 

best serve the American people. What Congress decides now will 

dictate the future of our emergency response capabilities. Ten years 

after 9/11, we urge you to make the decision that will finally establish a dedicated nationwide public safety broadband network. 

I am happy to answer any questions that you may have, sir. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Commissioner. Very helpful, 

very good testimony. 

We will now do 7-minute question rounds for each of us. 

Mr. Schaffer, let me begin with some of the monetary implications of what we are talking about since we are all focused at every 

level of government on the cost of government, and let me suggest 

a point of view to you and ask you to react to it. 

Currently, because public safety agencies operate on so many 

systems, equipment costs can be quite high since there is not much 

economy of scale for manufacturers. For example, I gather that a 

handheld set for a police or fire officer can cost around $5,000. 

So I wonder whether an advantage of building a D Block network 

might be that it would create that economy of scale that would 

drive down costs, which, of course, would be very helpful to Federal, State, and local governments. What do you think? 

Mr. SCHAFFER. Senator, thank you. That is certainly one of the 

hopes of this proposal, that, in fact, by aggregating and getting 

public safety together on a single standardized set of equipment 

based on the commercial standard that is being deployed by virtually all of the commercial carriers, we create an opportunity for 

an economy of scale level that has never been seen before for the 

public safety community. 

We would love to see a situation where handsets cost a couple 

hundred dollars rather than several thousands dollars as they do 

today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And you think that is an achievable goal? 

Mr. SCHAFFER. Based on the interactions that we had with the 

manufacturing entities over the last year, the economies of scale 

are much better with a national network of this sort where you 

have millions of potential customers buying from the same pool 

rather than a city or a small entity. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me give the other witnesses the opportunity to comment on that from your own experience. Obviously, 

all of us would like to see the cost of the equipment go down, but 

is there anything that you want to reflect based on your own experience in acquisition on this question? Mr. McAleer. 

167 

Mr. MCALEER. We are paying significantly less for our radios up 

in Maine. However, I think that is probably because of the nature 

of the radio that we are talking about here. These may be P25-compliant radios, whereas the radios that we are buying at this point 

just to meet the narrow banding requirement are not P25. We realize that there are certain issues there, but that is the best that we 

can do. So our radios are from $300 to $500, and we have found 

that even at the county level, when there is bulk buying, prices do 

go down. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Let me ask, beginning with Commissioner Ramsey, if you could elaborate a bit, again, from your 

own on-the-ground experience, on the kinds of uses you would 

make of broadband technologies if the D Block is allocated to public 

safety. 

Mr. RAMSEY. Thank you for that question, Senator. I was listening to some of the testimony earlier, and the issue of the oil spill 

came up and how we were able to put together a network that 

would allow for some interoperability. And that is a good bridge, 

but it is not a permanent solution because as a police chief, I have 

to use a network every single day for a variety of reasons, not just 

an emergency that may come up on occasion. So not only do we 

have the need for voice interoperability, but we also have computers in all of our cars. We need to be able to get information out 

to those cars. We need to be able to get information from those 

cars. We need video. We have video in our vehicles. We have video 

in our city that needs to be monitored. You mentioned during your 

opening statements fire departments rolling to the scene that need 

blueprints for buildings. Well, if we have an active shooter in a 

building, we will need those same blueprints for our SWAT team. 

If they have video inside that building, we will need to tap into 

that in real time so we can see exactly what is going on: Where 

are the hostages? Where are the shooters? All those kinds of things 

need to be able to take place. 

Aside from that, more and more we are using video conferencing 

with our courts, with our prosecutors to save time in moving prisoners from one point to another. There are just so many different 

uses, and the way in which technology is evolving so rapidly, who 

knows what we will need 10 years from now? So we have to have 

the capability to expand and to grow as our needs grow. 

I have been around a long time. Call boxes were still in use when 

I started my career, and the radios were still in police cars. So, it 

is just unimaginable to me what could possibly take place over the 

next four decades in law enforcement. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is true. 

Mr. RAMSEY. So we need a solution now that is not only going 

to meet our current needs, but our future needs as well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well said. 

Mr. McAleer, do you want to add anything from your own perspective about other possible uses of the D Block if it is allocated 

to public safety? 

Mr. MCALEER. Sir, that would go to a level of technical information that I am not comfortable dealing with. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Varney. 

168 

Mr. VARNEY. In addition to what was said earlier by you and all 

of the witnesses, access to facility information, chemical data and 

processes, utility services, HVAC systems within the building 

would be able to be accessed by the responding units to try to mitigate incidents, in addition to the access to inside-building cameras 

and surveillance systems, which certainly would add to the safety 

and enhancement of operations. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very interesting. Right now you 

cannot do any of that easily. 

Mr. VARNEY. No. Certainly not easily. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is an interesting thing. You might 

be able to access into an inside-the-building camera system. 

Mr. VARNEY. Certainly all of those things could be put in place 

with access to a broadband system such as that. 

One of the other important things we would want to do in the 

future as the next generation 911 systems are built throughout the 

United States, we would want to be able to get the information 

that is sent from the public in the form of data, video, or pictures 

when they report incidents to the responders while they are en 

route, which gives them a greater situational awareness of what 

they are getting into. More data make better decisions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a very interesting point because 

we are now all accustomed to viewers sending video into TV stations, for instance, from the scene of a natural disaster or a crime 

scene. And that capability to pick those up is not there at this 

point. 

Do you want to add something, Mr. Schaffer? 

Mr. SCHAFFER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I think it is also important to recognize that there will be uses that we cannot even imagine today. Five years ago, no one could have imagined what we 

have in smartphone technology and a very large universe of applications that have been developed in a very short period of time for 

the commercial sector. I think once this capability is available to 

our public safety community, we will see the opportunity for a 

whole range of new capabilities that we cannot imagine or articulate today. We have great examples of what the art of the possible 

is now, but what will come when they have access to the spectrum 

and capability will be even beyond what we might be able to articulate now. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Absolutely right. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Schaffer, in your testimony, you detailed much of the 

progress that we have been able to make, and that is encouraging. 

You also said there is a great deal more work to be done. 

It is disappointing to me, therefore, that the President in his 

budget chose to terminate the funding for the Interoperability 

Emergency Communications Grant program. That was a program 

that is near and dear to our hearts because it was our initiative 

and was included in the 2007 homeland security law. 

Given that we all agree that more work needs to be done and 

given what you have heard today about the use that the money has 

been put to and how it has made a big difference in the State of 

Maine, for example, why would the President choose to terminate 

169 

that program? It is a pretty modest program in the scheme of 

things, but it has been really helpful to States. 

Mr. SCHAFFER. Yes, Senator. I think that the opportunity to have 

money flow into emergency communications capabilities is certainly 

still there through a number of grant programs and the focus 

through, for example, the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center of developing grant guidance that applies across 40 different grant programs that steers those grant dollars in the direction of the kind of interoperable communications capabilities that 

you and the Chairman have supported in the past. 

So I think the focus has been on general grant opportunities and 

making sure that all of those grants across the entire range of opportunities are being directed in a way that is consistent and that 

can advance the ball with respect to what we are doing in land mobile radio today. 

Senator COLLINS. I agree with the goal of having more consolidation of grant programs, but the fact is, if you do not have a targeted stream of funding that is aimed at improving interoperability 

and sustainability of emergency equipment, you are not going to 

reach the goal that we all agree is necessary. So that is something 

that I know the Chairman and I have already communicated to the 

Appropriations Committee on, but it is something that I really 

think is short-sighted given that every first responder group always 

says that interoperability and sustainability of equipment is such 

an important goal. And it cuts across every State, every kind of 

first responder. They all need that to be effective. 

So I hope that is something we can continue to work with the 

Department on. I do not mean to put you as much on the spot as 

if Secretary Napolitano were here, but I did want to mention my 

concern about the termination of that program. It has not been in 

operation for very long, and to terminate it before we reach the 

goal—someday we will be able to terminate it—seems to me to be 

premature. 

Mr. McAleer, I want to ask you more about the program that you 

have with Canada. I think this is fascinating and far-sighted. Having grown up 20 minutes from the Canadian border in northern 

Maine, I am so aware of the fact that there are mutual aid packs 

where our firefighters on the Maine side of the border assist Canadian firefighters and vice versa. We have a wonderful Federal program called Operation Stonegarden where our law enforcement 

works with Border Patrol officials, which has been a force multiplier as well. And when you come from a border State, whether it 

is the Northern border or the Southern border, you cannot ignore 

the fact that you are going to need your partners on the other side 

of the border. 

So tell us a little more about what the goals are of the grant programs that you are participating in right now. 

Mr. MCALEER. The primary cross-border grant program that we 

are dealing with is the Border Interoperability Demonstration 

Project Program, and that is a program that was sponsored by the 

Federal Government that we won the grant for and is helping us 

increase our cross-border communications with both our New 

Brunswick partners and our partners in Quebec. And our grant apVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00185 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
170 

plication was supported very strongly by partners in Canada at the 

local and provincial levels. So they are very much in favor of this. 

Currently, both New Brunswick and Maine use VHF channels, 

and so we are able, when necessary, to use common channels. 

What we are trying to do is formalize that process so that those 

channels are loaded up on both sides—we have Canadian channels 

loaded in our radios, and our channels loaded in their radios—because as it is right now, we have worked with the Border Patrol, 

and the first responder communities come across very quickly, and 

there is no stopping them. When they get there, they need to be 

able to communicate. In those instances where we do not have the 

channels in the radios, we have those radio caches. We have about 

12 caches at sites along the border already that we established 

with State Homeland Security Grant funds, and we are looking to 

increase that with the BIDP funds, and then increase our transmission capability in four of our counties to cover some of those 

vast gaps that we have out there in the wilderness. 

Senator COLLINS. Several years ago, before you assumed your 

current position, there actually was a problem with the Maine 

State troopers having interference from the New Hampshire State 

troopers when they were using the same channels in Southern 

Maine, and I recall helping to secure some funding to sort that out. 

Is that still a problem, are you aware? 

Mr. MCALEER. I have not heard of that problem recently, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. I think that has been fixed, but that, too, 

shows that you can have interference even between two bordering 

states that can interfere with the ability to respond. 

Mr. MCALEER. Absolutely. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Brown, timely appearance. If you would like to proceed 

with questions now, we would welcome them. If not, of course, I 

could fill a few moments. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. You are going to filibuster a little bit? No, I am 

all set. I was at another hearing. We are having a Veterans Committee hearing upstairs, so I apologize. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, not at all. Thanks for coming by. 

Senator BROWN. I have been getting periodic updates. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is all yours. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

Mr. Schaffer, in Commissioner Ramsey’s testimony, he notes that 

disasters do not stop at State borders, and witness testimony has 

highlighted efforts at the State level, such as the Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans. Considering that a disaster in 

the New England region and the Northeast corridor in general 

could include multiple jurisdictions, what is DHS doing to ensure 

regional coordination across State lines? And, obviously, we have 

had some pretty interesting weather in Massachusetts. As recently 

as yesterday, another tornado hit. So I think it is a timely question. 

Mr. SCHAFFER. Yes, Senator, no question, it has been a very active season from a weather perspective, and, of course, the hurriVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00186 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
171 

cane season is just getting started now, so we are certainly focused 

on these issues. 

There are several things the Department has been doing to ensure regional interoperability and coordination. Of course, the National Emergency Communications Plan is the foundation for much 

of that work. The development of Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans, the appointment of Statewide Interoperability 

Coordinators who have banded together in many regions to form 

regional coordination groups to work these issues, all are moving 

us in the direction of better capability to be able to cooperate across 

multiple jurisdictions. The development of standards like the P25 

standard are advantages as well. If we are all buying to the same 

standard, we have a better opportunity to have our equipment 

work. But we are still in a situation where it does end up being 

a project when people arrive on the scene to get all of those radios 

tuned to the right frequencies, to the right interoperability channels, and have them operate the way we like, which is why the Administration believes that the development of a national public 

safety broadband network based on the same technology across the 

board will improve things even further. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

Mr. Varney, I certainly want to thank the State of Connecticut 

for its help in Massachusetts, and I noted that when the tornado 

struck, Connecticut Fire Services were there to quickly coordinate. 

What made the coordination possible from a State and local perspective? 

Mr. VARNEY. It comes from years of work across the border coordinating efforts. 

Senator BROWN. Do you have something in writing, or is it just 

a custom and courtesy thing? 

Mr. VARNEY. I think it works from relationships that start initially, but then it becomes more formalized over time. In Connecticut, what we have done to work with our bordering States is 

we put together a system where whenever an interoperability system or sub-channels is activated for an event in-State or near a 

State border, all of our area States are notified immediately of 

that, which creates coordination and alleviates the issue of interference when multiple people are trying to use the same interoperable channels. And through the years, we have worked closely on 

the borders with our fellow SWICs in the regional States, in our 

regional interoperable committees, as Mr. Schaffer indicated, so 

that we talk and formalize those issues where we know we are 

going to cross borders that happen on a regular mutual aid basis, 

and when things escalate to a larger basis, we can quickly coordinate those assets because we know the types of information that 

would be needed and the types of equipment that would need to be 

moved across the border. 

Senator BROWN. So if there was a larger catastrophe, God forbid, 

what do you think the greatest challenge would be in handling a 

more widespread disaster? 

Mr. VARNEY. The greatest challenge is that coordination effort. 

As was mentioned earlier today, the way that public safety is working in Connecticut and New England is a patchwork of many different frequencies and many different systems, so in order for us 

172 

to handle a large-scale event in any of the States, we have to bring 

in some pretty technical pieces of equipment and expertise through 

the COML and COMT trained personnel to patch these systems together, where if we had a nationwide single system that was standards-based and completely interoperable from the beginning, it 

would speed up that effort and make it less complicated for those 

problems to be solved. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

Commissioner Ramsey, although Connecticut is right next door 

to New York City, Philadelphia is within a couple hours of it and 

within 3 hours of Washington, DC. It is conceivable that—and God 

forbid a disaster happens—a terrorist strike or something could impact your city or vice versa. Do you feel confident that proper coordinating frameworks are in place to ensure seamless communications within the region? 

Mr. RAMSEY. It is better than it has been within the region. We 

have done a lot in that particular area, but again, it is not a permanent solution like a nationwide public safety broadband network 

would be. We are right across the river from New Jersey, not very 

far from Delaware or Maryland. So we actually could be involved 

in something where multiple States would be involved in the same 

event. There we would have some problems in terms of interoperability of our systems. We could probably patch the voice communications, but transmission of data would be different, and that 

would be something that would present even more of a problem. 

So I think that a lot of regions across the country have come together to work out solutions for their communications problems as 

a region, but major disasters that require going beyond that region 

is where we are going to have a problem. And if there were a terrorist event for example, when you look at how they tend to take 

place in other parts of the world, usually it is multiple locations hit 

simultaneously. So now you have a much wider problem than you 

had before. It is not just a regional problem. It is much broader 

than that. 

We need to be able to have lines of communication, and in an 

earlier question that Senator Lieberman asked, one of the other 

things that would be operating on D Block would be our fusion centers. We have fusion centers around the country, but you now have 

to fuse the fusion centers because it is going to be necessary for 

New York to communicate and get information from Los Angeles 

or someplace else in a very timely and secure fashion, either Federal, State, or local. 

So, we have done a lot in terms of trying to patch it up the best 

we can, but nothing that comes close to a permanent solution. 

Senator BROWN. And one final question, Mr. McAleer. You came 

from a 30-year career—congratulations—in the Marine Corps. 

What lessons did you take from your time commanding operational 

elements in the Marines to your job now in regard to dealing with 

the communication issues before you? 

Mr. MCALEER. Well, the one thing you learn right away with 

communications systems is, if you do not work with them, they will 

not work when you need them. So we try to drill with our communications as much as we possibly can. For instance, with our radio 

network that we have with our counties, we exercise three times 

173 

a week, and it is amazing how even with exercising that many 

times, we have radios that are down, towers that are down. If we 

were not doing that kind of work, that would come as a surprise 

to us when the time came. 

We also look at redundancy. Where do we have gaps and where 

do we have single coverage and where do we have redundancy? Because it is also my experience that when you are under stress situations and radios are being used hard, those systems tend to go 

down as well. So you have to have backup systems. 

So I think probably the two main things that we have learned 

are that you have to exercise it and you have to have redundancy, 

or it will not be there when you need it. 

Senator BROWN. Good advice, sir. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, thank you, Senator Brown. Thanks 

for coming by. I appreciate it. 

Just a few more questions. Mr. Schaffer, I want to focus in a little bit on the Federal Government interoperability. As you know, 

several years ago the Department of Homeland Security and the 

Department of Justice embarked on a joint project with the wonderful name of Integrated Wireless Network, which was shortened 

to the acronym IWN, which could be stated ‘‘I win.’’ Unfortunately, 

IWN fizzled as a governmentwide effort. I gather the Department 

of Justice has continued to pursue the project, along with the 

Treasury Department and the U.S. Park Police, and has recently 

built out a system to provide interoperability to the agencies mentioned within the National Capital Region. 

However, DOJ got a very small amount of money in the continuing budget resolution, so I think it is probably going to make 

it hard for them to maintain their legacy radio systems let alone 

continue or expand IWN. 

Meanwhile, DHS component agencies like Customs and Border 

Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement have continued to make their own investments in tactical radio systems. 

So I wanted to ask you whether we are doing enough on interoperability of communications within the Federal system. In other 

words, can CBP and FBI talk to each other? Or I suppose in a more 

immediate sense, in terms of DHS, can the different components of 

DHS talk to each other over these systems? 

Mr. SCHAFFER. Thank you, Senator. The components can talk to 

each other as a general proposition, but it is a project as it is with 

these jurisdictions. They have to use these interoperable channels, 

and they have to program those radios in order to be able to interoperate. 

We are making several steps in the direction of ensuring better 

interoperability with the existing technologies today in a variety of 

ways. At DHS, we have a committee called the One DHS Emergency Communications Committee, which for the first time is coordinating across all of the components of DHS and looking at how 

we coordinate our activity in terms of our investment in communications technology. And that has developed into a strategy for our 

tactical communications across the Department with some pilot 

projects that are looking at doing things in a coordinated way. 

174 

At the same time, the Emergency Communications Preparedness 

Center is trying to coordinate across a number of departments and 

agencies, including DOJ, DHS, and several others that have significant roles in emergency communications, to think about how to coordinate their activity in areas like new broadband technology and 

developing joint requirements across Federal departments and 

agencies that can then be used in coordination with the public safety community as a national public safety broadband network is developed. 

So there are several initiatives underway to try to further coordinate among the entities in the Federal Government, writ large, and 

specifically within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So the availability of the D Block would 

also help components of the Federal Government communicate better with each other? Is that what I am hearing you say? 

Mr. SCHAFFER. I think that is absolutely true. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you one other question. We 

had discussed the Office of Emergency Communications and that 

it has been measuring progress at the local level in meeting the 

goals of the National Emergency Communications Plan. I wanted 

to ask you whether you plan on issuing any type of report card or 

public statement measuring the results, which thus far seem to be 

pretty good. 

Mr. SCHAFFER. The results are good, Senator. As mentioned, the 

Goal 1 work showed that all 60 of the large urban areas were able 

to establish emergency communications within an hour, as was the 

intent with Goal 1 for planned events. We are in the process of 

working toward Goal 2, which is a much broader effort, 3,000 counties as opposed to 60 large urban areas. That will consist of getting 

reporting from the counties. We do not have the resources to go out 

and examine each county as we did with the cities. But we will get 

reporting from the counties, both in terms of their ability to stand 

up communications for events and a broad view of their capabilities 

from an emergency communications standpoint. 

We try to balance the collection of that data and the development 

of reports in this space. Because there is voluntary reporting coming to the Department, we try to be careful about having a report 

card that may make it harder for cooperative efforts to get that information flowing to us. But we do aggregate the data and try to 

give some indication of where we are and whether progress is being 

made. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very good. I appreciate it. 

Mr. Varney, you mentioned the response to the June tornadoes 

in Massachusetts as an example of improved coordination between 

governments, and Senator Brown mentioned it as well. I wanted to 

ask you to just give us a little more detail on how the response benefited from the planning and exercises that you have conducted in 

recent years. 

Mr. VARNEY. It is one of those things that you plan and you put 

together an exercise for something you hope will never happen, but 

it just so happens that in our north-central Connecticut region, our 

emergency planning region, several years earlier, to validate their 

tactical interoperable communications plan, the scenario was such 

that a tornado went south to north through a very close area of the 

175 

State, which actually affected some correctional facilities in the notional exercise and went into Massachusetts. So as part of the validation of that effort that we put together to collect the data, to 

identify the systems and personnel that would respond to an event, 

bring everyone together to walk through a tabletop exercise, all 

funded through IECGP funds with technical support and assistance 

from OEC, we were able to bring people from northern Connecticut 

and that area of Massachusetts together as part of this exercise to 

share equipment and to talk about those resources, only to have 

several years later a very similar event happen in a very close 

proximity. Although it was not in Connecticut, we were able to leverage all of those relationships and expertise that we were able 

to put together several years earlier to quickly respond to and enhance the efforts to support their request. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a great example of the benefit of 

planning. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have talked a lot today about the importance of communications among first responders. However, I do not want to slight the 

importance of warning the public prior to a disaster striking. 

Maine has had, like many other States, an extraordinary run of 

violent weather this year. In northern Maine, there have been four 

tornadoes. I never remember that happening in my lifetime. And 

we have seen violent storms throughout our country. 

So getting information to the public before disaster strikes helps 

to save lives, reduce property damage, and prepare people for what 

is coming. Early warning can truly make a huge difference. 

I noted when I was home that the warning I received of the violent weather was across my TV screen, and I happened to have the 

television on, and it was the old-fashioned emergency alert system 

that we have had for as long as I can remember. And I could not 

help but think that most people probably did not have their television on, but they probably had their mobile phone nearby. They 

probably were on a computer on Facebook, or there are so many 

different ways to communicate today. 

So I would like to hear your assessment on the importance of 

having a system that embraces today’s technologies because we 

need to recognize that people get their information in different 

ways nowadays. We will start with Commissioner Ramsey. 

Mr. RAMSEY. Well, that is a very good point, Senator. In our department, we text-message a lot of information out to the public 

now about crime issues. We are taking advantage of Twitter. We 

take advantage of Facebook. We have what we call reverse 911 

where we are able to use telephone calls to certain specific areas 

of the city, if there is a burglary pattern or a con game that is prevalent in a particular area, and we can reach people and warn them 

and let them know. So from a police perspective, we use the technologies that are available to get information out to the public the 

best we can, recognizing the way things have changed—my son, for 

example, would rather text me than have me call. If I call him, he 

says, ‘‘Dad, why did you call? How come you just did not text me?’’ 

So, that is the world we are in now. And so to reach a population, 

I think you have to do all the above. It is not one in lieu of the 

other. You have to do them all because different groups of people 

176 

use different ways to communicate, and we have to be able to 

adapt very quickly to that and get information out as quickly as 

we can. 

With regard to a point you made in your opening statement, I 

believe that one of the shortcomings in preparedness in this country is our preparing the communities on a consistent basis on what 

to do in the event of an emergency. As first responders, we can 

have the best plans in the world. If there are traffic jams and we 

cannot get to where we need to get too, it does not matter how good 

your plan was, you cannot get there to deal with the situation because if you have panic among the public—and a lot of that comes 

from just not quite knowing what to do—then that is a problem. 

And if the FCC set aside 1 hour a month for PSAs for different jurisdictions to do 30-second or 1-minute PSAs over and over again— 

and I do not mean airing it at 3 o’clock in the morning on the Psychic Network and all that—I mean in prime time, constantly reminding people of certain things that they need to do, then I think 

we will have a better prepared public, which makes us even more 

effective if we can rely on the public to do certain things in the 

event of an emergency. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Great response. Mr. McAleer. 

Mr. MCALEER. Senator, I believe that we can to a certain degree 

dictate when and what we will transmit to the public, and I say 

‘‘to a certain degree’’ because if we do not put out the right information at the right time, there are so many other sources of information out there that the public will go to those sources, and then 

we in emergency management tend to become irrelevant. 

The thing that I think we cannot do is dictate how we put that 

information out. We have to remember that our citizens are our 

customers. We have to be able to communicate with them in the 

ways that they communicate. It is much like a guy owning a shop. 

If you walk in and I try to sell you a T-bone steak and you are a 

vegetarian, it could be the best T-bone steak in the world, but it 

is irrelevant. So we need to be very careful about that. 

I think this applies both before events and during the response 

to events so that we become the center of information for the public. The challenge becomes, how do we afford to pay for that because the technology is out there that can do it, but as you get 

more technologically advanced, it costs more money. 

On the other side, if we with our systems are chasing the emerging technology that is out there, we might always be in a race. So 

if we could develop some sort of industry standard so that there 

was a talk-back means or a talk-forward means as these new social 

medias are coming online, that would help us a great deal, I believe. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Varney. 

Mr. VARNEY. In Connecticut, of course, we maintain and we 

leverage the emergency alert system when it is needed. But in Connecticut, we have also invested significant State funds to put in a 

system for our local municipalities and dispatch centers to use, 

similar to a reverse 911 type of system, to alert citizens for any 

type of incident that a municipality believes that they need to be 

alerted to, and we make that available to all of the local municipalities. 

177 

So if somebody wants to sign up to have messages sent to them 

via text on their BlackBerry or they want it sent on traditional 

voice mail to their phone, they can opt in to do that, and we will 

send it in the mode that they have asked for. That is in addition 

to having all of the land-line phones into the system. In case of 

emergency, a message has to go out to have people shelter in place, 

as was mentioned before, or to evacuate. Those systems are in 

place in Connecticut, and I would think that as IPAWS and the 

alerting systems mature in the future, they would all become integrated. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Schaffer. 

Mr. SCHAFFER. Yes, Senator, indeed, the Integrated Public Alert 

and Warning System really is designed to take advantage of some 

of the new technological capabilities of the smartphones and other 

devices that almost everyone carries today. We need to be able to 

alert people who are in a specific geographic area, not just people 

who sign up and give their zip code, because they may be traveling 

to another area on a given day and there may be people who are 

visiting Washington, DC—we have tourists right now from all over 

the country and all over the world. So this system is designed to 

give warnings to people who are proximate to a cell tower, who are 

nearby, as opposed to people who have signed up or people who live 

in a certain place. And that is an effort not of NPPD, my organization within DHS, but FEMA working with the FCC. That solution 

should come into initial operating capability within this year, 2011, 

and have expanded capabilities going out for Federal, State, and 

local officials being able to send those kinds of alerts and warnings 

to broadcasters through a variety of digital communications paths 

sometime in 2012. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins, and I thank 

you, all four of you, for your testimony today and obviously for 

what you do every day. 

The bottom line is, I think you validated our preliminary conclusion before the hearing that we have made a lot of progress in the 

area of interoperability of communications among first responders 

since 9/11 and the operability, the robustness of our communications systems. We obviously have some gaps yet to fill, and if this 

D Block legislation can pass soon, that would be a giant leap forward in assisting you to do what we ask you to do for all of our 

communities and States every day. 

So thanks very much. You have really helped to inform the Committee and also, I think, given some testimony that should give the 

public an increased sense of confidence and security in an age 

when, because of the unpredictability of the weather, not to mention extremist and terrorists groups, this kind of capability is very 

significant. 

I had not thought to mention the terrible tragedy in Norway, and 

we are just beginning to understand what happened, but part of it 

was that—this goes back to what Senator Collins quoted earlier 

from the 9/11 Commission—part of the cause of 9/11 was a failure 

of imagination by which the Commission meant that we failed to 

imagine that anybody could try to do to us what the attackers did 

on 9/11. And, of course, I think this is exactly what people in NorVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00193 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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way are going through because of their shock that anybody would 

try to do what that individual apparently did, and therefore, their 

relative lack of preparedness to respond to that. 

Anyway, we are in much better shape than we were 10 years 

ago, thanks to you and a lot of other people. We thank you for that. 

Senator Collins, do you want to add anything? 

Senator COLLINS. I just want to thank our witnesses. I think this 

was a very helpful update on an issue that we have been working 

on together for many years, so thank you for the work that you are 

all doing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. The record of the hearing will 

be held open for 15 days for any additional statements or questions. And with that I thank you again and adjourn the hearing. 

Mr. RAMSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(179) 

DEFENDING THE NATION SINCE 9/11: 

SUCCESSFUL REFORMS AND CHALLENGES 

AHEAD AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, Collins, and 

Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. The hearing will come to 

order. Thanks to our witnesses for being here. 

In 4 days, we will commemorate the 10th anniversary of the attacks of 9/11 and mourn anew the nearly 3,000 lives that were lost 

that day at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and on Flight 

93, which, as we all know, of course, crashed into a field in 

Shanksville, Pennsylvania. 

But we have already quite appropriately begun and will continue, I am sure, a look back at September 11, 2001, to both understand with the clarity of hindsight what that day meant in American history and to evaluate what our government particularly and 

our people have done since that time. 

There is no question that, although I think we knew it then, we 

can certainly look back and say now that we understand that on 

that day, we were drawn into a war which is increasingly global. 

We hesitate to use the term ‘‘world war,’’ but this is a war that is 

being fought by violent Islamist extremists against most of the rest 

of the world, including most of the Muslim world. That day’s brutal 

attack, in my own opinion, in the clarity of hindsight, began that 

war, although, in fact, Osama Bin Laden had declared war in 1998 

in statements he had made, and they had been attacking us for 

some period of time before that, including the World Trade Center 

in 1993. 

But it really began that day, and in the days and months following 9/11/01, we in government set out with an urgent determination to reform the systems that had failed us. I think the more 

we knew about how September 11 happened, particularly informed 

180 

by the work of the 9/11 Commission headed by Tom Kean and Lee 

Hamilton, we learned a lot more. I came to the conclusion, although one will never be able to know with certainty, that 9/11 was 

probably preventable. As I look back and I think of all we have 

done to respond to our failures on that day, I think that if another 

group of terrorists attempted a similar attack on the United States 

today, we would prevent it, and that, of course, gives me great comfort and a sense of great gratitude for all that has been done by 

so many people in our State and local governments to work together to make sure we are better secured here at home than we 

were on 9/11/01. 

We put into place measures that reorganized and reformed our 

government to prevent another terrorist attack on the United 

States. I know that there are some on this 10th anniversary lookback that are saying that we overreacted to 9/11, that it was, in 

fact, not just a substantive overreaction, but an expensive overreaction. Well, I do not agree. The most extraordinary bottom-line 

reality today is that as we look back over the last 10 years, as we 

all know, thank God and thanks to everybody who has worked so 

hard, there has not been another mass casualty terrorist attack on 

the United States by violent Islamists since 9/11/01. I do not think 

anybody would have predicted that on 9/12/01. 

But we can say that today not because our enemies stopped trying. They have tried over and over and over again. But fortunately, 

our defenses, our intelligence, all the things that we have done, 

really have made us more secure. And, frankly, a couple of times, 

just to remind us that we continue to have work to do, we were 

just plain lucky, as in the two glaring cases of the Detroit bomber 

on Christmas Day on the airplane and the Times Square bomber, 

both of whose weapons, explosives, just did not go off. If they had, 

I think we would be looking back with a different sense of these 

past 10 years. 

But overall, there is no question in my mind, we have been 

spared another catastrophic terrorist attack like the one on 9/11 

not just as a matter of luck or coincidence but because of a lot of 

things a lot of people did. I am very proud of the role Members of 

this Committee across party lines played back then and continue 

to play in creating these new organizations and supporting them. 

The first, of course, was the cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, which we created to lead our efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, and I believe DHS has significantly contributed to our increased national safety. I am grateful that the report that the Government Accountability Office has 

issued today to our Committee as we move toward September 11, 

2011, essentially agrees with that, and it is a positive report on the 

work of the Department of Homeland Security. It points to some 

work yet to be done, and then I think we would all agree with that, 

including people at the Department. 

But the fact is that 10 years ago, no single agency and no single 

official was designated to lead the Federal Government’s efforts to 

prevent terrorism or, for that matter, to adequately marshal the resources of the Federal Government to respond to natural disasters, 

not just terrorist disasters. Today, there is clarity about who is in 

charge, and that is the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

181 

1The prepared statement of Chairman Lieberman appears in the Appendix on page 641. 

2The GAO report titled, ‘‘Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11,’’ appears in the Appendix on page 689. 

Security, and whose efforts that Secretary should be coordinating 

to prepare, respond to, and recover from disasters. That has made 

a tremendous difference. 

I am going to put the rest of my statement in the record because 

I want to hear the witnesses.1

I simply want to thank Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute from 

DHS who is with us today, and Gene Dodaro, the Comptroller General of the United States, both to hear DHS’s own evaluation of 

these past 10 years and the Comptroller General’s on behalf of 

GAO. 

And I repeat, I am heartened that the report that GAO is issuing 

today 2 concludes that, overall, the Department of Homeland Security has implemented most of its key missions and achieved most 

of its important goals, creating a foundation that will allow the Department to continue to move aggressively toward its full potential. 

So we appreciate that very much and look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me thank 

you for holding today’s hearing to review the first 8 years of the 

Department of Homeland Security, whose vital mission is to protect 

our Nation and our people. 

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George Bush 

established the White House Office of Homeland Security and soon 

concluded that the Nation needed a more unified homeland security structure. We envisioned a department that would secure our 

borders, improve the security of transportation and critical infrastructure, meld homeland security intelligence from multiple 

sources, and work with first responders and law enforcement to 

deter, detect, prepare for, and respond to terrorist plots. 

The law establishing the Department of Homeland Security was 

enacted in November 2002. Twenty-two entities and approximately 

180,000 employees were merged into DHS. Not only was the new 

Department’s mission a challenge, but so was simply unifying its 

email systems. Over the past 8 years, the GAO has repeatedly 

placed the Department on its High-Risk List. The GAO has issued 

approximately 1,500 recommendations and DHS has adopted only 

about half of them, although others are in progress. This July, 

DHS issued a self-administered report card noting considerable 

progress in achieving the goals set out nearly a decade ago to 

strengthen our security. 

When it comes to our homeland security, however, we are only 

as strong as our weakest link. This week, as the Chairman has indicated, we will commemorate the worst attack ever on the United 

States. In doing so, we must ask ourselves some fundamental questions. Are we safer, or are we just safer from the tactics terrorists 

have already tried? 

I think the answer is yes to both questions. We are far safer than 

we were on September 10, 2001. But terrorists continue to probe 

our vulnerabilities and attempt to exploit gaps in our security. We 

182 

also face increasing threats from homegrown terrorists already 

within our borders. 

Today, the GAO concludes that more than 8 years after its creation and 10 years after September 11, DHS has indeed made significant strides in protecting our Nation, but has yet to reach its 

full potential. The examples are many. TSA has strengthened airline passenger pre-screening, yet a young man recently was able to 

fly cross-country without a valid government ID and with an expired boarding pass that was not even issued in his name. At the 

other extreme, it bothers many Americans to see TSA screeners 

putting the very young and the very elderly through intrusive and 

in many cases unnecessary pat-downs. 

Although DHS has bolstered the security of U.S. borders and 

identification documents, two Iraqi refugees associated with alQaeda were recently arrested in Kentucky. How a known bombmaker whose fingerprints we have had on file for some time was 

able to enter our country on humanitarian grounds remains an unanswered and extremely troubling question. Are there other Iraqi 

nationals granted asylum who were involved in attacking our 

troops? The fact is, we do not know. We still await clear answers 

from the Administration, which must do more to ensure that all 

relevant databases are used so that we do not let terrorists and 

criminals into our country, much less grant them asylum. 

I am pleased that the GAO found that our chemical facilities and 

seaports are safer, both priorities of mine and of this Committee. 

The GAO indicates that DHS should make improvements in how 

it shares and manages cyber threat information. This is the key 

goal of comprehensive cyber security legislation that Chairman 

Lieberman, Senator Carper, and I have co-authored. The Department has also had its fair share and then some of management 

problems. Failures in expensive procurements have cost taxpayers 

billions of dollars and delayed much-needed technology. 

Now, merging 22 agencies and nearly 180,000 employees is always going to be a challenge. If DHS is to become a truly unified 

Department, its employees in headquarters should not remain 

spread over 70 buildings and 40 sites. The lack of a consolidated 

headquarters inhibits communication, coordination, and cooperation among DHS components, and I know the Administration is 

working hard to consolidate the headquarters. 

I also believe that there are efficiencies that can be gained by 

consolidating offices at the regional level, a recommendation made 

by former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge. We should 

take a look at consolidating field office locations to reduce costs and 

improve coordination. 

As this Committee will soon consider a reauthorization of the Department, it is important to discuss what experts inside and outside of DHS believe has and has not worked. We must even answer 

the fundamental question of whether or not we are safer because 

of the creation of DHS. 

As has been noted often, the terrorists only have to get it right 

once. DHS and its partners have to be right every single time or 

we will suffer the devastating consequences of a terrorist attack. 

We are much safer than we were 10 years ago, but we must be tenacious in anticipating the changing tactics of terrorists. As the 

183 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Lute appears in the Appendix on page 647. 

successful decade-long search for Osama bin Laden proved, America’s resolve is a powerful weapon against those who would seek to 

destroy our way of life. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to review GAO’s report with the Comptroller General today and look forward to hearing from Deputy Secretary Lute on how DHS can better fulfill its 

mission. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much for that statement, 

Senator Collins. Deputy Secretary Lute, welcome back. How long 

have you been at the Department now? 

Ms. LUTE. Over 21⁄2 years. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. So for 21⁄2 years you have been on 

the scene, and the previous years, you were an informed observer. 

Ms. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE HOLL LUTE,1 DEPUTY SECRETARY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee, for this 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department’s 

progress in keeping our Nation safe from the range of threats that 

we face. 

Mr. Chairman, you have my full written statement. I request it 

be entered into the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection. 

Ms. LUTE. And I would like to highlight some of that statement 

here this morning. But first, Mr. Chairman, I would like to strike 

a note of remembrance of the lives and memory of those who were 

lost on 9/11/2001. I was in New York City that day. I will never 

forget it. None of us will ever forget where we were, how we felt, 

and how we came together as a Nation, determined in our resolve 

to never let that happen again, determined in the conviction, in the 

core belief that this country can protect itself. And nowhere has 

that commitment been stronger than in this Committee, Mr. Chairman, with you and certainly you, Senator Collins, and the other 

Members of the Committee, and your steadfast support for the efforts that we have been taking in homeland security. 

I would like to thank our many partners in our effort to ensure 

the safety and security and resilience of our Nation. DHS plays a 

central role in that effort, but we rely on strong partnerships 

throughout all levels of government, law enforcement, private industry, and with the public. We view homeland security as a whole 

community enterprise and we are fortunate to have strong partners 

to help us meet our mission. 

As I mentioned, Congress is an essential partner. Particularly 

this Committee has played an extraordinary role in creating and 

equipping DHS and the other institutions with the authorities and 

resources necessary to carry out programs to secure our country. 

You have carried forward the bipartisan spirit that marked the 

days after 9/11, and you have always held us accountable to maintain that spirit and achieve our missions. 

184 

In the spirit of accountability, we are also very thankful for the 

hard work of our partners in GAO, and I say that sincerely. Along 

with DHS’s Office of the Inspector General, GAO has audited and 

reported on the work of the Department and their work has helped 

inform us as we mature and grow as an organization. 

As we approach this important anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, 

we are thankful, too, Mr. Chairman, for the commitment of the 

American people. Since 9/11, countless Americans have stepped up, 

whether in our military in Afghanistan, Iraq, or in other posts 

overseas; in our Federal agencies, including the Department of 

Homeland Security; and in our States, cities, tribal communities, 

and elsewhere, as first responders, law enforcement officials, reservists, and engaged citizens. 

I take great pride, Mr. Chairman, as you know, in my service in 

the U.S. Army for the first half of my adult life. But I am equally 

proud of my service as a member of the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Great progress has been made at the Department and around 

the country since the Department was created in 2003. Today, we 

are a more capable Nation and a stronger Nation. We can detect 

threats sooner with better information and make adjustments more 

quickly based on real-time intelligence. Today, we know more about 

those who seek to enter our country, the levels of risk they might 

pose, and what is needed to prevent potential threats from reaching our shores. Our borders are stronger, enhanced by more personnel, technology, and infrastructure, as well as with stronger 

partnerships with States, cities, border communities, and our international partners around the world, especially in Canada and Mexico. 

Our immigration laws, while in need of reform, are being enforced according to common sense priorities that we have set, 

which are to identify and remove criminals and those who are a 

threat to the American people. At the same time, we have strengthened our processes and systems for providing legal immigration 

benefits and services while ensuring the security and integrity of 

our immigration system. 

We have also created a framework for ensuring our cyber systems, networks, and our critical infrastructure where none previously existed. As part of this effort, we enhanced our ability to 

protect Federal Government networks through better detection, reporting, and countermeasures. We have engaged cyber users at all 

levels, public and private, in our shared protection, and we have 

broadened our partnership with the private sector to protect our 

critical infrastructure and established a new regulatory framework 

to protect high-risk chemical facilities. 

We have built a more ready and resilient Nation that is able to 

confront major disasters and emergencies in our States, cities, and 

communities. We have helped front-line responders become more 

equipped, better trained, and more unified under a new national 

response framework and incident command system, as you have 

noted. We have improved emergency communications and we have 

provided capacity building grants to support our Nation’s first responders. 

185 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Dodaro appears in the Appendix on page 660. 

The response and ongoing recovery effort from Hurricane Irene 

is just the most recent testament to the robust capabilities that you 

have helped us build. 

We have continued to integrate the Department of Homeland Security by advancing the work that began more than 8 years ago to 

refashion our homeland security enterprise and engaged a full set 

of partners in the protection of our Nation. 

And finally, the Department’s commitment to civil rights, the 

values of liberty, fairness, and equality under the law are embodied 

in all of the Department’s programs and activities. 

While we have been making much progress, Mr. Chairman, we 

know we must continue to improve. As the threat against us continues to evolve, so do we. Today, then, is an important opportunity 

to talk about some of our progress, which GAO notes in its report, 

and also to address some of the areas where there is more work 

to be done. I look forward to discussing this with you today so that 

we may build upon the foundation of security in place to address 

our future challenges, and with this Committee’s partnership and 

support, continue to protect our Nation, our citizens, our freedom, 

and our way of life. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Deputy Secretary Lute. 

Now, we will hear from Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General of the 

United States, and I note for the record that Mr. Dodaro is accompanied by Cathleen Berrick, who is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at GAO. Good morning, and please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. EUGENE L. DODARO,1 COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY CATHLEEN A. 

BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE 

ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. DODARO. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and 

Senator Akaka. I am very pleased to be here today to discuss 

GAO’s report on the various homeland security issues and progress 

made as well as remaining issues and challenges since the 9/11 

event. 

Our report reflects a summary of the work that we have done 

over the last decade. It also reflects the constructive approach we 

have tried to take in making recommendations to offer improvements and suggestions to the Department. We are pleased with the 

Department’s response, although many things, as Senator Collins 

mentioned, are still in progress and need to be implemented. But, 

generally, I think we have had a good dialogue and it has enhanced 

their operations. 

The bottom line of our report, as everybody has noted in their 

opening comments, is that a lot of progress has been made since 

9/11. That has clearly been demonstrated. But there is work remaining to address gaps and weaknesses that will enable DHS to 

reach its full potential. 

Now, on the progress side of the ledger, we have Secure Flight 

in place, a system that checks incoming passengers against terVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00201 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
186 

rorist watch lists. We have screening workforces deployed at 460 

commercial airports across the country. 

We have a biometric entry system now in place to be able to 

check those people entering our borders over time. We have also established and put more resources, as Deputy Secretary Lute mentioned, at the ports and along the borders, putting resources, equipment, and infrastructure in place over time. 

There is also the Border Visa Security Program that has been 

put in place to have DHS work along with the State Department 

in screening visa applications at certain locations overseas. And we 

also have put in place an electronic authorization program for 

those entering under the Visa Waiver Program. 

There has also been a range of plans and assessments that have 

been done on maritime security, surface transportation, such as 

rail and mass transit, that have laid an important foundation for 

assessments of risk. 

I am also pleased that cyber security has been given increased 

emphasis in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and as 

the Deputy Secretary pointed out, FEMA has issued a national response framework and associated documents with that to address 

emergency preparedness. 

Now, on the work remaining side, there are a number of significant issues and I would like to highlight a few this morning. There 

needs to be continuous improvement in the processes and technologies used in screening operations at airports, including coming 

up with a plan to ensure that the equipment for screening checked 

baggage meets the current requirements for detecting explosive devices. 

While we have a very effective entry system, we still do not have 

an exit system in place, and I know that this is a very difficult 

task, but the overstays issue is significant. The estimates are between four and five million people in the United States are 

overstays. Of course, as we know, five of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 

had overstay issues. This is something that is a big challenge but 

needs to be addressed going forward. 

We also think that the Visa Security Program can be expanded 

so that DHS is working with the State Department at more critical 

high-risk locations, whether DHS staff are deployed abroad in 

countries or working remotely from here in the United States. That 

program has a lot of potential for being strengthened. 

There also needs to be a practical approach to screening cargo 

and containers before they come to the United States. DHS has 

some important programs underway. Of course, there is the 100 

percent screening requirement, but there are questions about its 

feasibility. We need a practical approach to address that issue. 

Also, Senator Collins, as you mentioned, in the cyber security 

area, we have noted that there is a need for more timely and 

actionable alerts to the private sector and others so they can take 

action over time. 

Also, we believe FEMA needs to continue to work to develop 

some metrics and a methodology to address jurisdictions’ preparedness. I think the roles have been articulated, but there is really not 

a clear assessment of preparedness levels of various jurisdictions 

yet. 

187 

There is also a need to effectively implement the global nuclear 

detection architecture and to strengthen abilities to detect biological agents. 

Now, underpinning a lot of these issues is the ability of DHS to 

continue to work with its partners, and as Deputy Secretary Lute 

mentioned, DHS has established those relationships. These partnerships need to continue to develop and mature and I think they 

need in some cases to meet the expectations of those partners, as 

well. One area is in cyber security, as I mentioned. But there is 

also a fundamental need to continue to evolve and improve the Department’s management processes. The core of why DHS is on our 

High-Risk List is the need to develop those management infrastructure processes, in the acquisition area in particular, and also 

the development and testing of technologies before they are deployed, as well as in the financial management area. 

I am very pleased. I have had meetings with Deputy Secretary 

Lute. I have talked to Secretary Napolitano and their team. I know 

they are committed to addressing these high-risk issues. They have 

developed a number of plans. We have an ongoing, constructive 

dialogue to try to be as specific as possible and make recommendations to strengthen these management areas. We look forward to 

continuing that dialogue as they make improvements going forward. 

Finally, I would note that another theme that we have identified 

is the need for continued risk-based approaches to these areas and 

also figuring out what works well from what the Department has 

been doing and what is not working so well. We have had an ongoing dialogue, encouraged by this Committee, on performance measures to judge DHS’s performance, and the Department has developed a number of measures and they are preparing a plan to be 

released shortly to talk about those issues. 

But I think it is terribly important as we enter this period of 

budget austerity and dealing with our deficit and debt issues to 

really work hard to make sure that we are making the right investments and using risk-based approaches or expanding things that 

are working well and we are operating as efficiently as possible, because as all of us know, the resources will not be as abundant, likely, in the coming years as they have been to date. 

That concludes my opening statement. Ms. Berrick and I would 

be happy to answer questions that you have about the GAO work. 

Thank you very much for your time and attention this morning. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Those were two good statements to set the groundwork. We will do 7-minute rounds of questions. 

Let me begin with your last point, Mr. Dodaro, and the whole 

question of management is not too fascinating, really, as it is to 

discuss individual programs’ successes and failures. But just to put 

it in context, what we really tried to do in creating the Department 

of Homeland Security was to take a lot of agencies and departments of our Federal Government that touched on homeland security and disaster response and bring them together with the aim 

of making a whole greater than the sum of the parts, to make sure 

the dots were all connected, etc. And I think that was a worthy 

goal and we have achieved a lot on that. 

188 

But in doing that, we created a very large Department, over 

200,000 Federal employees from more than 22 agencies, and therefore, created a very large management challenge. The Comptroller 

General mentions two things particularly, and that is contract 

oversight and new technologies. But to the extent that you can, let 

me ask you both to comment on the overall management, which is 

to say what kind of progress have we made in the 8 years of the 

Department’s history to really blend these 22 agencies together, not 

that they were ever all intended to become homogenized, but they 

were intended to work together. As someone—I think it was the 

previous Secretary, maybe it was the current one—said, the aim at 

DHS is to make sure that every one of the component agencies is 

speaking the same language in their own dialect, their own accent—not speaking ethnically but speaking in terms of their agency. 

So, Mr. Dodaro, how do you evaluate that part of the management record of DHS? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, I think, clearly, the intent of having a lot of 

synergies with that collection of agencies in place has been evolving 

and taking place. We pointed out in the past, for example, there 

were difficulties in coordination among many of those agencies, 

particularly in the law enforcement area, when they were separate 

entities, and they had some management problems when they were 

merged into DHS. So that was one of the reasons that we put them 

on the High-Risk List when they were formed. 

So I think that there has been some progress in this area. The 

framework for that progress has been in a lot of cases that the 

plans have been developed require the coordination that are laying 

out and clearly defining roles and responsibilities. This is a really 

important issue, not just within the Department but across the 

Federal Government because there are so many players involved. 

And if you look at many of our recommendations, they go to clarifying roles and responsibilities—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. DODARO [continuing]. Writing them down, having written 

procedures, and working through communication vehicles to work 

both within the Department and across departments. 

So I would say it is a work in progress, but there have been definite improvements. Attention to this area is constantly needed because of the changing threats and the changing capabilities. And 

after Deputy Secretary Lute responds, I will ask if Ms. Berrick has 

anything else. I am sure she will add. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Mr. DODARO. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Deputy Secretary Lute. 

Ms. LUTE. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks, Mr. Dodaro, for 

that. I would say the first thing, Mr. Chairman, that we have been 

able to reflect is the common narrative that now exists across these 

22 agencies—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. LUTE [continuing]. And over the life of the Department. Everyone has heard of homeland security and people were not always 

sure what it meant. We are now very sure what it means, in part 

inspired and helped by the work of this Committee. It means the 

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effort to build a safe, secure, resilient place where the American 

way of life can thrive. 

What does it take to do that? It requires that we prevent terrorism, that we secure our borders, that we enforce our immigration laws, that we ensure our cyber security, and that we build national resilience. Everyone in homeland security can find themselves in these missions and in this purpose. So in the first instance, narrating out the story that was originally intended these 

years ago when the Department was first conceived and formed 

and having all of the agencies relate the work that they have been 

doing, that they continue to do in the context of those missions and 

that overarching vision. 

What we have had to do over the course of time, again, building 

on the work of those who have gone before us, is continue to operate. DHS is overwhelmingly an operating agency, every single day. 

The ‘‘building the plane while flying it’’ metaphor is apt here, and 

in fact, GAO points that out in its report. It is a huge challenge. 

And so the question for us as a Department is how do we add 

value in this overarching structure in the day-to-day management 

of those operations? And we have done everything, as Mr. Dodaro 

mentioned, from improved planning across the range of threats 

that we face, improving our information, gathering and sharing 

across the enterprise, and equipping the entire enterprise with the 

information that it needs. Working on that front, we need to be developing the ability to do risk assessments that address threats, 

vulnerabilities, and consequences, to mobilize the assets of the Department across agencies when operations require it, as we often 

do in disaster response, and to work increasingly on those crosscutting areas, whether it is aviation planning for acquisition, establishing a single point and resource to use for the entire Department 

across the range of vetting needs that we have, and other areas 

like this, acquisition improvement and strengthening, which this 

Committee knows well the work that we have undertaken under 

the Under Secretary of Management. 

So in the three key areas that this Committee has a right to expect the Department can perform in, can we execute our missions, 

can we run ourselves, and can we account for the resources that 

have been entrusted to us? In each of these areas, as the GAO report makes clear and the numerous IG reports, as well, the Department has made progress. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Ms. Berrick, do you want to 

add anything? 

Ms. BERRICK. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say in the 

area of management, the most progress has absolutely been in the 

establishment of plans. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. BERRICK. For example, if you look at acquisition management, DHS has a pretty rigorous policy in place that governs oversight of acquisition programs. It is very similar in the information 

technology area. And, in fact, DHS has efforts underway to improve 

that. 

I think there are three primary areas where they need to focus. 

One is making sure that they have the resources in place to implement those plans. If you look across the range of DHS’s plans and 

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their management areas, they cite available resources as a No. 1 

constraint to implementing them. 

I think the second area they should focus on is having oversight 

mechanisms in place to make sure that they are executing those 

plans as designed. We have identified a number of these areas, and 

I will just take acquisition management as an example. A number 

of times DHS has routinely not followed its acquisition guidance. 

They have not had executive level oversight over major acquisition 

programs, and have not developed cost estimates in accordance 

with their own guidance. So they need to have those oversight 

mechanisms. 

And then, finally, I would say it is demonstrating progress and 

delivering mission capabilities that they can sustain over time. 

This is where we are getting at these major acquisition programs, 

making sure that they can field these programs that meet cost, 

schedule, and performance expectations and have an infrastructure 

to continue to be able to do that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks for that answer. I will make two 

comments briefly in response. The first is on the resources. I think 

that is a very important point for management, and particularly 

since we are in the middle of it right now as we go through the 

process of trying to get back toward some kind of fiscal balance in 

our Federal Government and we are squeezing and squeezing. It is 

a real temptation to take money out of the management accounts 

of a Department like DHS because the management accounts have 

inherent advocates for them. Hopefully, we are. In other words, the 

programs of the Department all have constituencies. The management really does not in that sense. And the danger is that you will 

gut the management and, of course, the end result will be that the 

programs will not be run very well. So I think that is up to us, but 

that is something we have to do. 

Senator Collins and I had this conversation once we were some 

months into the Obama Administration. We were observing together that there was a kind of market test of the coherence of the 

new Department of Homeland Security because at the beginning of 

a new Administration, which was the first new Administration 

since the Department had been created, that would have been the 

moment for constituent agencies within the Department to have 

tried a break-out legislatively or with the new Administration. 

There was only a little bit of a flurry, not widespread and very 

short-lived, about FEMA coming out of the Department. 

So I think that said that both the first two Secretaries and now 

Secretary Napolitano and yourself have created a coherence to the 

Department in a fairly short time, at least to the extent that nobody tried to get out. And I do not mean just because they could 

not stand being in the Department, I mean because a lot of them 

have big constituencies of their own and a certain amount of political muscle around here. But none of them, either through the Administration or to Congress, tried to break away. And I think it 

says that for them, the Department is working as an entity, maybe 

helping them do their job better. 

And maybe one thing that happened after 9/11 is that the kind 

of turf protection that went on before was impossible to defend 

after an attack like 9/11, and I think perhaps there is an attitude 

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now that we had better work together, because, God forbid, something happens, we do not want the press or the Congress to come 

at us and say, ‘‘you were just being parochial, not sharing information, or not cooperating with another agency of the Federal Government and that is why this attack occurred.’’ 

So, anyway, that is a long story to say that though we have not 

reached the ultimate destination here, as GAO reminds us, we 

have come a long way in the right direction. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dodaro, the GAO has studied DHS extensively, report after 

report, recommendation after recommendation. So I want to ask 

you a fundamental question, a question that we are going to be 

asked as we seek to reauthorize the Department this year, and 

that is: Has it worked? Has it made us safer as a Nation? Was it 

a good idea to bring all 22 agencies together in terms of improving 

our security? What is GAO’s assessment and answer to that very 

fundamental question? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, I think we are definitely better prepared as 

a Nation to address these issues, and to the extent that we are better prepared, we are safer in that regard, although we need to be 

vigilant, we need to be alert, and we need to evolve to changes. 

I think in terms of bringing the 22 agencies together, there are 

a lot of different organizational models that could have been used. 

That was one that was chosen. Our focus has been on making sure 

that model worked as effectively and efficiently as possible. There 

were synergies to be gained and they are beginning to gel and develop over time, and so the benefits of putting those agencies together are becoming clear, I think. 

With regard to the progress, I would say that the Department, 

in our view, and this is reflected in our report, has made considerable progress in the mission areas. The management areas that underpin some of the developments really need additional work to be 

implemented properly to help the missions, whether it is developing and acquiring new technology or looking at cost effectiveness 

issues and measures over time. 

So I think I have addressed all parts of your questions, Senator 

Collins. Those are very good questions. But that is our response. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Deputy Secretary Lute, I want to turn to the management challenges that both the Comptroller General and Ms. Berrick have 

mentioned today, particularly in the area of procurement. I mentioned in my opening statement that there have been a string of 

procurement failures. It spans both Administrations. It has cost the 

taxpayers literally billions of dollars. And equally troubling, it has 

delayed the deployment of much-needed technology and equipment. 

Here is just a partial list. TSA determined that the explosive 

trace detectors, the puffer machines that we saw for a while at the 

airport, did not work in a real world environment. They worked 

fine in the lab but not at the airports. There was the Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portal, which DNDO moved to deploy before proper 

testing and evaluation had been completed. 

There have been two major consolidated financial data system 

failures. With the Emerge II System, $52 million was spent before 

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solidation Project was abandoned this year, in May, after multiple 

protests, a GAO ruling against DHS, and a lot of money spent. 

This one, in particular, is very frustrating to me because Senator 

McCaskill and I repeatedly wrote to Secretary Napolitano. We received written personal assurances that the TASC initiative was 

critical, and it was on track. We were assured of the soundness of 

the program’s lifecycle cost estimates. And, yet, it is abandoned. 

The SBInet program was cancelled by the Administration after 

programmatic failures. Even the Coast Guard, one of my favorite 

agencies and one that is very well run, had extraordinary problems 

for a while with its Deepwater Program because of a failed lead 

system integrator relationship with the government. In July of this 

year, the DHS IG issued a report that found that the Department 

had not leveraged its collective buying power across the Department and thus was paying literally billions more than it needed to. 

That is not a great record in the area of procurement. So my 

question to you is what is the Department doing to better define 

requirements up front, which is one of the major problems, to ensure real world testing and evaluation, and to ensure that we do 

not have these string of failures continue into the future? 

Ms. LUTE. Senator, as you know, and I have testified before this 

Committee before on certain acquisitions, this has been an area 

where we have been working diligently to improve our record and 

our practice. We have cancelled non-performing programs, that is 

true, and we have had other challenges in our procurement process, but we have addressed them by looking comprehensively at the 

acquisition process and tailoring a program. We have been planning within that a process that meets the needs of the Department, 

which largely, although not exclusively, resides in the acquisition 

of services and important technologies to facilitate our operations 

at the border and at airports and across the Homeland Security enterprise. 

We have worked in three key areas in the area of procurement. 

First, on requirements. Let me use, for example, aviation requirements. I now chair a committee composed of members across the 

Department, principally with CBP and with the Coast Guard, to 

look at our aviation assets and our aviation fleet, leading toward 

the reestablishment of a Joint Requirements Board so that we can 

sensibly prioritize what we need in terms of air fleets and seek the 

air solutions that are not only the most economical, but the most 

effective operationally, first and foremost. 

We have improved the process of cost estimates that has often 

bedeviled procurements at every stage, not only the acquisition of 

items in particular, but the sustainability costs which are intrinsic 

to understanding the life cycle of those acquisitions, as well. 

And we have taken a number of steps to strengthen our procurement workforce—you are very familiar with these—including establishing a Department-wide Acquisition Training Program under 

our head of procurement and enhancing our internship program. 

We recently had 60 graduates of that program and we are training 

more. We also are establishing an Acquisition Corps for our senior 

personnel so that they understand their responsibilities in the acquisition process. 

193 

Importantly in this regard, and something I also know that you 

have great interest in, is the intersection of the operators with the 

procurers. It makes absolutely no sense to go down a long, tortured 

path of procurement without having an operator’s sensibility introduced every step of the way. Do we know what we need? Are we 

considering alternatives for what operationally works? And then 

are we testing it in an operational environment? All these are 

areas where we have made strong improvements and will continue 

to do so. 

Senator COLLINS. Is this an area, Mr. Dodaro, where the Department has to show more progress and control before GAO will remove the Department from its High-Risk List? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Akaka, 

good morning. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing updating us on the progress in implementing the Department of Homeland Security. This is especially 

significant as we reflect on the last 10 years since the terrible 

events that led to the Department’s creation. 

The Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

which I chair, has held several hearings on efforts to reform and 

improve management of DHS which is vital to executing its mission. The Department has made a great deal of progress, but as we 

have heard from GAO, the important work is not yet finished. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing and I will have 

a few questions. 

Ms. Lute, and I would like to ask Mr. Dodaro as well—as you 

know, the entire Federal Government, including DHS, has experienced and will continue to face budget reductions. This has caused 

delays in consolidating DHS’s headquarters and forced reductions 

in the Management Directorate. Please discuss the challenges DHS 

faces in effectively executing its mission to protect the Nation in 

this budget environment. 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Senator. We are all facing those challenges. We have articulated, though, that within the budget guidelines as articulated by the President, the priority for us, of course, 

are the five mission areas that we see as essential to homeland security. 

Preventing another terrorist attack, such as we saw on 9/11, that 

is job one for us. We do it every day. We will continue to prioritize 

that within our budgetary guidelines. 

Securing our borders, again, we have achieved significant 

progress in securing our border and we will continue to emphasize 

that. 

Enforcing our immigration laws, conveying immigration benefits 

appropriately, as well. 

Building our cyber capacity is essential. Developing cyber security for the Nation and building the Nation’s resilience, as well, to 

face all risks and hazards. 

194 

We will continue to prioritize these. We will also continue to 

prioritize the integration of the Department and the management 

of the Department. There are some that—no one on this Committee, I am proud to say—has ever suggested that, somehow, the 

management is separate and apart from the line or the programmatic functions. We are one Department. The entire Department is operational and we will continue to prioritize our ability to 

execute our missions to run ourselves and to account for the resources that we are given. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Dodaro, I would like to hear you on this, as well. This GAO 

report is based on observations over the past several years at DHS, 

but in the last year, the Department’s budgetary outlook has dramatically changed. Based on your work, are you concerned that 

budgetary challenges will reverse any of the recent management 

progress at DHS? 

Mr. DODARO. I think it largely depends on how DHS can implement its mission in the most cost effective manner, and I would 

point out several areas are critical to that. One is in the acquisition 

area. It is about 40 percent of the Department’s budget, and so it 

is very important that the acquisitions be carried out according to 

their plans. As Ms. Lute outlined, they have a lot of efforts underway to try to improve acquisition management. I think it is very 

important. In the IT area, for example, right now, there are 46 

projects at a little over $3 billion that are in need of significant 

management attention, according to their IT Dashboard. 

Second, I think they need to use the assessments that they have 

done on a risk-based approach to make sure that they are integrated into their plans more. They are beginning to do that more 

and more, but in order to be cost effective, you have to use your 

risk assessments more effectively. 

Third, as I pointed out in my opening statement, the performance measures, what is working, what is not working, is really critical if you are going to target your resources on areas that are in 

need of greater improvement or to make sure that you are financing things that are producing the right types of results. 

And last, their financial management systems are still in need 

of reform, and if you are going to operate in a cost effective manner, you need good accounting. You need good cost management 

processes. 

So I think all those things can help them deal in a more cost effective manner and it will be critical in this period of budgetary 

challenges. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Ms. Lute, DHS has committed to empowering the agriculture 

mission of CBP with the leadership structure and authorities at all 

levels necessary for success. I am concerned that unless we fully 

accomplish this important goal, our efforts to safeguard American 

agriculture will continue to fall short. 

In my home State of Hawaii, invasive species have the potential 

to cause economic and environmental catastrophe there. I plan to 

introduce a bill to reinforce DHS’s efforts to strengthen agricultural 

inspection. 

195 

Will you commit to work with Congress to make sure CBP is 

fully empowered and held accountable for effective agriculture inspection? 

Ms. LUTE. I will, Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Lute, last year, the Department released its High-Risk Management Strategy, which I think is an important step for DHS to 

come off the High-Risk List. However, GAO reports that this plan 

has not been fully implemented. What more needs to be done to implement the High-Risk Strategy and are there any barriers preventing implementation? 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Senator. We have made getting ourselves 

off the High-Risk List a priority for us from a management point 

of view and I am very pleased to say we have been working very 

closely with Mr. Dodaro, Ms. Berrick, and the team to identify 

what we actually need to do. GAO has given us a detailed view on 

what it takes to get off the High-Risk List and we have responded 

with an equally detailed plan for executing those steps and we 

have been working very closely together. 

So, I think we are on track. We have issued one report on our 

progress in June of this year. We will issue another in December 

of this year. And we are going to continue to march along this 

track until we succeed. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator 

Pryor, good morning. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Thanks for having this hearing today 

and I appreciate all of our witnesses being here. 

Let me start, if I may, with you, Deputy Secretary Lute. According to the GAO, one reason DHS has missed opportunities to optimize performance across its missions is a lack of reliable performance information or assessment of existing information. That concerns me. How has DHS tried to address this problem and what 

is the Department doing to try to fix that? 

Ms. LUTE. It concerns me, as well, Senator, and we have made 

identifying common sense metrics of progress a priority for us. We 

have been working, as I mentioned, with GAO across a range of 

areas to improve our business intelligence processes so that we can 

have a fact-based understanding of how we are executing and the 

effect that our operations are having, and this is across the mission 

areas and across the components within DHS, including very pragmatic metrics for understanding the effectiveness of our emergency 

response in FEMA, CBP, ICE, CIS, and TSA, as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Since you mentioned different parts of your mission there, let me ask about FEMA. What are you doing to improve 

financial management practices at FEMA? 

Ms. LUTE. Administrator Fugate is very committed to this, as am 

I, and we are looking across the range of operations that FEMA engages with, both on the preparedness side and on the response 

side. And I chair, for example, a Department-wide task force to 

look at the Administration of grants, for example, to streamline our 

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processes, improve accountability, and, frankly, improve the overall 

performance of the grant program, as well. But across FEMA, the 

commitment to management is the commitment that we have in 

the Department for responsive, timely, effective accountability for 

the resources that have been given to us in the context of effective 

delivery of effective operations. 

Senator PRYOR. And Mr. Dodaro, is GAO comfortable with the 

progress FEMA is making on its financial management? 

Mr. DODARO. We remain concerned about financial management. 

We look across the Federal Government and there are only four 

agencies right now that are not able to obtain a clean opinion on 

their consolidated financial statements, and DHS and DOD are two 

of the largest ones on that list of four. There have been a couple 

efforts to try to get an integrated financial management system in 

place. Most of the problems are in the Coast Guard area and property accountability at TSA. 

So I think the Department is trying to get a good plan together 

in that area. We are going to be evaluating that to see if they make 

the necessary improvements. But it is one of the critical areas and 

reasons for why they are on our High-Risk List and so we are going 

to continue to give them advice on how to move forward and fix the 

problems. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask this. DHS is a relatively new department. It seemed to me when it was started a few years ago, that 

it would have a chance at a clean slate to set all the operations up 

the way they should be done and not inherit a lot of issues and 

challenges from the other agencies and offices that existed before 

that they brought under the umbrella. Was DHS not set up the 

right way? What is the origin of this problem? 

Mr. DODARO. The origin is—I will ask Ms. Berrick to elaborate 

on this, if she would like—basically, they inherited the 22 agencies. 

A lot of them had their own definitions and requirements and systems and methods, and so while it presented an opportunity to 

start fresh, it also presented a challenge because the Department 

did inherit a lot of the problems and concerns. 

Now, we had mentioned early on and our report reflects that 

they made more progress in the mission areas than in the management area, and we were concerned about management from day 

one. We put them on the High-Risk List the day they started operations in 2003 and we have always advocated for more management oversight, and eventually the Under Secretary for Management position was created and that position is now filled. 

And so I think, Senator, there was an opportunity. In the early 

days, there was not enough focus on taking advantage of the opportunity, but they also inherited a lot of problems and a lot of challenges and so they are working their way through those still. 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. Berrick, do you have a comment? 

Ms. BERRICK. Sure. Thank you, Senator. In addition to inheriting 

legacy problems from the different components, just by the nature 

that these are disparate systems among the components that are 

not integrated together is a challenge in and of itself because the 

systems cannot speak to each other, and at the Department level, 

senior leadership does not have the ready access to financial information that they otherwise would have with an integrated finanVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00212 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
197 

cial management system. So I think it is both inheriting some existing problems and also just the fact that these are disparate systems that do not work well together. 

Senator PRYOR. And are they actively trying to address those and 

fix those problems? 

Ms. BERRICK. They are trying to do that through the development of an integrated financial management system. They have 

had a couple of attempts that have not been successful so far, but 

they are working toward that as their goal. 

Senator PRYOR. How much money does it cost to try to integrate 

a financial system? 

Ms. BERRICK. About $52 billion has been devoted thus far. 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. Lute. 

Ms. LUTE. Senator, the only thing I would add is that is only one 

component of this. The Department also have made steady progress 

toward the goal of a clean audit, which is anyone’s aspiration. We 

have gone from over 18 reportable conditions down to six, and we 

are on track to make even further progress this year and look to 

do so. 

Senator PRYOR. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I 

have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Pryor. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses, welcome. It is good to see all of you. 

I had three questions. The first one dealt with a clean audit. The 

second one dealt with a clean audit. And the third one dealt with 

a clean audit. So it sounds like we have mined that field pretty 

well, plowed that field pretty well. 

Let me just ask for the Comptroller General Dodaro, are you encouraged by the progress that is being reported by Deputy Secretary Lute? Should we be encouraged? 

Mr. DODARO. Yes. I think, basically, the Department is committed to trying to make progress in this area. As Ms. Lute mentioned, the number of material weaknesses are coming down, but 

they still have some challenges. Now, they have set some aggressive targets, I believe, to getting an opinion on a consolidated balance sheet for 2011 and to try to get an unqualified opinion or 

clean opinion by 2014. Those are aggressive targets and those will 

be the benchmarks as to whether they are successful or not. But 

they are focused on it. What they really need to continue to focus 

on is improving their underlying systems, and recover from a couple of efforts that have not resulted in success. 

Senator CARPER. And if they are successful in that, it will leave 

one department as an outlier in this, is that correct? 

Mr. DODARO. One major department would be the Department of 

Defense. 

Senator CARPER. I guess as an aside to our colleagues, I had a 

chance to meet, I think in the early part of August, with Secretary 

Leon Panetta, who indicated that the idea of waiting until 2017 to 

reach that goal of audited financials and then maybe hearing from 

some of those folks that said they were not probably going to be 

able to make that goal. What he said to me in our conversation— 

198 

he may have said the same thing to you—is ‘‘I would like to beat 

that goal’’ rather than have to slide further. Sometimes it is good 

to have somebody who was the former Budget Committee Chairman and OMB Director. I mean, he has done it all. But he brings 

a real commitment to these issues which is very much welcome. 

Yesterday, Mr. Dodaro, we had another hearing, as you may 

know—some of your folks were here—and the issue was the path 

forward on the Postal Service and how do we help them get back 

on track. I described the situation as dire but not without hope, 

and I thought we had a very good hearing. 

One of the questions that is before us, and I know it is not the 

subject of this hearing, but I want to ask while you are here, there 

is reason to believe that the Postal Service has overpaid its obligation into the Civil Service Retirement System to the tune of $50 

billion, maybe as much as $75 billion over time, and overpaid the 

amount that they owe to the Federal Employee Retirement System 

by maybe $7 billion or so. We had yesterday one of the witnesses 

from Segal and Company Auditing, a very nationally renowned 

company, along with the Hay Group, they have done independent 

audits to determine what is the validity of the overpayment, has 

there really been an overpayment. The IG at the Postal Service alleges, and both Segal Company and Hay Group have said, yes, we 

think there has been an overpayment, anywhere from at least $50 

billion to as much as $75 billion. 

The Administration is not buying that yet, so we had some discussion there. The head of OPM was here yesterday to talk about 

that. We asked the witness from GAO if GAO would be willing to 

come in and take a look at the work that has been done by the two 

independent auditors to find out if they are valid. We need that 

kind of direction. If you will, a good housekeeping stamp of approval from GAO, I think, would be very helpful as we try to move 

and help the Postal Service to dig out of the hole that they are in 

and return to profitability. So if that is something that you all 

could help us with, we would be most grateful. 

Mr. DODARO. Definitely, Senator. We will be able to do that. We 

have a Chief Actuary at GAO, as well, that will be integral to figuring out that status. I understand the tasking and the work. 

We will deliver that. And as you know, the Postal Service is also 

on our High-Risk List because of the financial condition situation. 

So we would be happy to do that. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thanks very much. 

Since my first three questions have already been addressed, I 

will turn to the fourth, and that was cyber security, and it is an 

issue that the Chairman, Senator Collins, and I have had a whole 

lot of interest in, and with the help of our staff, I think have done 

some good work. It is hard to get anything passed around here, but 

the Administration, I think, has done good work on this front. 

But over the last 10 years, Deputy Secretary Lute, as you know, 

we have witnessed an evolving terrorist threat that has required 

your Department and other agencies to constantly be thinking 

about tomorrow’s threat. I like to say as an old Naval flight officer, 

we are pretty good at re-fighting the last war. We are not always 

very good at looking over the horizon and preparing to fight the 

next war. But in my view, the next war could very well likely be 

199 

on the cyber security front. But nowhere is this more evident than 

in the world of cyber security, where threats can change almost 

daily, almost weekly without a whole lot of notice. 

GAO has noted much of the good work that your Department has 

undertaken in this area. GAO has also stated that Homeland Security needs to better secure Internet connections at Federal agencies 

and more thoroughly share cyber security information with the private sector. 

Madam Secretary, I understand that the Department of Homeland Security has a program called Einstein that is helping Federal 

agencies detect and prevent cyber intrusion. I would ask you, if you 

will, just to discuss the steps that the Department of Homeland Security is taking to integrate programs like Einstein across the government and what additional authorities, resources, or staffing you 

need to be more effective. My colleagues here know I like to quote 

Albert Einstein from time to time, who once said, among other 

things, ‘‘that in adversity lies opportunity.’’ We have plenty of adversity in the world and there is hopefully some opportunity, as 

well. Maybe this program Einstein can be part of that. But would 

you proceed. 

Ms. LUTE. Thanks very much, Senator. There certainly is opportunity here. This is an area where I have been spending a lot of 

my time lately, as we have in the Department. We have culled it 

out as one of the five essential missions of Homeland Security, 

which is ensuring our cyber security. 

What we can all agree is that the status quo in cyber security 

is not acceptable. There are intrusions. There are threats that we 

have to address. Cyberspace is an environment right now where offense wins and we have to change that. And our vision is one of 

distributed security, where we have smart machines and smart 

users that are supported by intelligent networks that identify 

threats, hopefully before they occur, that prevent them, and that 

cultivate a community and a sensibility of cyber hygiene pervasive 

throughout the United States and, indeed, throughout the Internet, 

because we are so interconnected. 

Einstein specifically is a program that we have, as you know, 

which is designed to prevent intrusions. We are 84 percent deployed in terms of Einstein II capabilities right now. But the Federal agencies and offices have a number of things that they have 

to do, as well, to bring their traffic behind Einstein to ensure that 

they are taking advantage of the deployment of this technology, 

and we are working with them. In fact, I attended a meeting of the 

President’s Management Council that consists of all the department deputies as the chief operating officers of the departments 

and spoke to them about what they can do to ensure that their 

agencies are taking the steps necessary to organize their traffic behind the Einstein protections. 

But there are other things to do, as well. What is on your networks? How is information traveling? Who is using your networks? 

Do they have appropriate levels of access and controls? There is a 

whole pyramid of efforts—that is perhaps one way to think of it— 

on top of which sits Einstein. It is only a part of the puzzle necessary to ensure our cyber security. 

200 

We are also working very closely with the Department of Defense 

and with industry. And our, again, vision is to have an environment of distributed security that utilizes all of the assets of this 

country in protecting ourselves in cyberspace. 

Senator CARPER. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, the last part of 

my question was what additional resources or staffing do you need, 

what additional authorities do you need in the Department to enable you to be even more effective on this front? 

Ms. LUTE. The President’s budget that was submitted, Senator, 

reflects specifics in a number of those areas. We can address this 

in a stand-alone, if you would like. We have also been working with 

OMB and there has been a legislative proposal sent to the Hill regarding ways to strengthen our ability to fulfill our cyber security 

mission. 

Senator CARPER. Well, thanks very much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

We will do a second round, up to 7 minutes apiece, and thanks 

for hanging in there with us. 

I wanted to ask you about a particular part of the Department 

that the Committee was anxious in the creation of the Department 

to put in, and that is the science and technology section. Our hope 

had been—a lot of us on this Committee happened to be on the 

Armed Services Committee—that we could develop within and for 

homeland security something like DARPA in the Department of 

Defense. Over the time of the Department overall, it has appeared 

to me that the science and technology section has been below what 

our hopes were. My impression is that it is doing better now, and 

I wonder if either of you would like to comment on that. 

Ms. LUTE. I think I would say at the outset, Senator, that science 

and technology is a key part of the Department. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. LUTE. Our ability to innovate, to make use of end-to-end solutions, not just a particular piece of technology, is a task that we 

have given to S&T. It has very able leadership with Under Secretary Tara O’Toole, who has integrated into every aspect of our 

mission performance, working directly with components to ensure 

that we have a systems approach and are making best use of technology within the context of an overall systems solution. 

We also have a very robust cooperation with the other departments, notably the Department of Defense, looking to learn from 

them on such things as tunnel technology, unmanned sensors, etc., 

and S&T is critical and important to this and remains a priority 

for us at the leadership of the Department, certainly for the Secretary. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Comptroller General Dodaro or Ms. 

Berrick, have you had any overview of S&T and what is your sense 

of it now? 

Ms. BERRICK. Yes, we do, and I would agree with your characterization that the Department has been slower in making progress 

in the S&T area. However, I would also agree with the Deputy Secretary that there is a framework in place right now, I think, for 

the Directorate to be successful. They have put in place additional 

policies. They have created additional units within S&T to support 

201 

efforts like test and evaluation throughout the Department that I 

think will strengthen the foundation of that Directorate office and 

enable some successes. 

Of the two areas that I would mention related to S&T that I 

think need continued focus, one is resources. For example, when we 

did work looking at the test and evaluation function of S&T, we 

found that they were low in terms of resources and it inhibited the 

outreach that they could perform with the components in supporting their testing efforts. 

And I think the second area that requires focus in S&T is coordination within the Department. We found that sometimes S&T 

would be pursuing technologies without effectively coordinating 

with the end users of those technologies to make sure that what 

they were developing was meeting needs. And a quick example of 

that is the CAARS program that was being designed to detect 

shielded nuclear material in cargo and vehicles. DHS ultimately 

decided to stop that program after learning that S&T was working 

on developing a system that was not going to fit within primary inspection lanes. So I think that is an example of the internal coordination. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Another one is the so-called virtual 

fence, is it not? My impression is that there was not much interaction with Customs and Border Protection in the development of 

that. 

Ms. BERRICK. We did cite that as a concern that CBP’s input on 

how it was working operationally and challenges that they were 

facing, were not always fully considered, at least in decisions that 

were made related to the program. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think that is one we all want to keep 

an eye on because it has tremendous potential both to avoid the 

kind of problems that Mr. Dodaro cited in terms of new technologies being introduced. 

And the second, of course, is more affirmative, which is, as we 

have seen with DARPA, the ability to leverage Federal money with 

private innovation and entrepreneurship to create new technologies 

that will more effectively protect our homeland and also, hopefully, 

as in DARPA’s case, have remarkable spin-offs into commercial applications that will create a lot of economic activity. 

Let me ask you, Madam Deputy Secretary, about something a little different, which is the increasing concern that I know the Department and all of us who care about homeland security have had 

in recent years about homegrown terrorism, self-radicalized people, 

particularly so-called lone wolves. And I know that the Administration, through Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan, put out a 

report recently. Senator Collins and I, frankly, were overall—forgive me if I am overstating it—disappointed by the report. We have 

our continuing concern about the reluctance, refusal of the Administration to use the term ‘‘violent Islamist extremism,’’ or something like that, as opposed to ‘‘violent extremism.’’ But I want to 

focus on a different aspect of it. 

We also did not see in the report a clear allocation or designation 

of authority. In other words, who is in charge? And a lot of different departments should be involved in interacting affirmatively 

with the Muslim American community to gain their assistance in 

202 

education and noticing the potential lone wolf behavior, coordinating a lot of the law enforcement education, etc. I know the National Counterterrorism Center, interestingly, has been doing some 

of that. I cannot say, since that originated in this Committee, too, 

that we had that kind of function in mind. 

The White House, I suppose, has a natural overview which might 

suggest that it should oversee the response or the prevention of 

homegrown terrorism, but it has so much that is in the White 

House now, I wonder whether this is not something that DHS 

should begin to play a more active role in and I just wanted to give 

you an opportunity, as now we look back at this decade but forward 

to the next decade and seeing homegrown terrorism rising as a 

threat, what you think about DHS’s record here and what it might 

do in the years ahead. 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We certainly have been 

playing a very active role. The President’s policy that was announced emphasizes three things. First, we need to understand 

more about what generates this threat and how it promulgates 

within communities. 

Second, we need to engage communities more, break down barriers that isolate them and engage and understand them, create 

pathways of dialogue and understanding and outreach. 

And third, and equally as important if not more so, is strengthen 

the hand of law enforcement to be able to stop violent extremism 

in its tracks. Law enforcement prevent crimes all the time quite effectively and we need to equip them with the information and the 

tools that they need to address this nature of crime, as well. 

And so the Department works very closely with the Department 

of Justice, FBI, NCTC, the White House, and other agencies. We 

meet regularly on this. We meet as a small group. I meet with my 

counterparts on exactly this question, about how in each of these 

areas, in terms of understanding the threat, sharing information, 

breaking down barriers that isolate communities, and strengthening the hand of law enforcement, what we are doing every day 

to address this trend. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. To me, those are the right goals. So who 

would you say is in charge now of that effort on behalf of the Federal Government? 

Ms. LUTE. Certainly under the leadership of the President and 

the White House, this is coming together, but the work is distributed, as so much of the work is in homeland security. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, that I understand, but again, there 

has to be somebody who is in charge to keep driving it. So would 

you say it is in the National Security Council? 

Ms. LUTE. I would say that it is. It is a working system. Again, 

I meet with my counterparts in the Department of Justice, the FBI, 

and NCTC regularly on this subject and there is an enormous 

amount of work going on in each of those strains. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will come back to that. I thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to reemphasize what the Chairman just said. The 

strategy produced by the White House does not clearly assign the 

responsibility to an individual who we can hold accountable, whose 

203 

progress we can measure. And I still do not hear that from you. 

You keep talking about, well, we work together. There are all these 

agencies involved. That is not adequate. We need to have a leader 

of this effort and I hope you will relay that we are continuing to 

push on that, as well. 

I want to switch to some other issues in my remaining time. The 

recent hurricanes and natural disasters in this country have reminded us of the importance of ensuring that people are notified 

as quickly as possible when a natural disaster is looming. Early 

warning can make a huge difference in saving lives and property 

and that is why I have been working hard on a bill that would 

strengthen the Nation’s public alert and warning system. 

I would like to ask your assessment, and GAO may have something to add on this, as well, as far as where are we in using smart 

technology so that we are not just relying on the crawl on a television screen, the emergency alert that comes across, since many 

people are not going to have televisions on, but instead we are 

using phones, we are using social networking sites, and we are 

using tools that are more likely to reach more people. Deputy Secretary Lute first. 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Senator. The public alert and warning system now currently reaches about 78 percent of the population. We 

have a number of initiatives in play particularly aimed at making 

progress this year, rolling out the Commercial Mobile Alert System, 

for example, in New York and Washington, DC, and having the 

first ever national-level test of the Emergency Alert System, as 

well. So we are absolutely committed to making use of modern 

technology, social media, to give people accurate and timely information, because we know that in a crisis particularly, information 

is a commodity and it is essential to having informed individuals 

and capable communities. 

Senator COLLINS. Does GAO have anything to add to that? 

Mr. DODARO. We have not looked at this issue, Senator Collins. 

It is certainly an important issue and I know we are dealing with 

it ourselves and communicating our own results of our reports, and 

so it is very important in emergencies. So we would be happy to 

take a look at this in the future. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Deputy Secretary Lute, I want to 

talk to you about an issue that is related to the homegrown terrorism threat and that is the insider threat. Certainly, the Major 

Nidal Malik Hasan case was an example of the insider threat. In 

a report that was released by GAO earlier this year, GAO took a 

look at the Transportation Worker Identification Credential program that is used for access to our seaports, and its findings were 

disturbing in terms of protecting us from the insider threat. 

First, GAO found that TSA’s background checking process is not 

even designed to detect fraud. In other words, GAO found that it 

would be easier to obtain a TWIC card with fraudulent documents 

than a driver’s license. That is very disturbing. 

Second, GAO criticized the process as not providing an ongoing 

check. In other words, once a worker receives a TWIC card, he or 

she has that TWIC card for an indefinite time, even if there is subsequent information or a conviction or something that would cause 

the TWIC card to be revoked, one would hope. 

204 

What steps has DHS taken to remedy these critical flaws in the 

TWIC program? 

Ms. LUTE. Senator, we share the concern about the insider threat 

and know that it is one that we have to stay constantly vigilant, 

and this involves not only those of us in the Federal Government, 

but also, for example, in our critical infrastructure having programs in place in the private sector so that we know who is working in these facilities and that they are trustworthy for the responsibilities that they have been given. TWIC now covers about two 

million workers and we have run a number of pilots to ensure that 

we can strengthen the system with respect to not only the technology, but the reliability of the system end to end. 

In this regard, the ongoing checks is something that we are looking at department-wide, because, as we have learned, for example, 

in the case of Abdulmutallab, the 12/25 bombing attempt, that we 

have to have an ongoing check of visa holders, for example, and of 

other credential holders. And I chair an interdepartmental examination of a common vetting platform to bring together all of our 

vetting capabilities and, again, to deploy them in real time to give 

accurate, full checks, and also working with the agencies to ensure 

that we have the requirements fully in hand to prevent fraud and 

other abuses. 

Senator COLLINS. In that regard, that reminds me of the Bowling 

Green, Kentucky, case where two suspects have been arrested, one 

of whom’s fingerprints allegedly were in a database that should 

have been checked before the individual was granted asylum and 

admitted to this country. The Chairman and I have written you a 

letter with a number of detailed questions since the information 

that was provided at the hearing where we explored this issue 

proved to be inaccurate. When do you anticipate that the Department will complete its review of how in the world this could have 

happened, that an individual whose fingerprints were on IEDs 

used to attack our soldiers in Iraq was granted asylum and allowed 

to be a resident of this country? 

Ms. LUTE. We expect that shortly, Senator. But importantly, we 

have taken a number of steps to ensure that cannot happen again. 

We have expanded our engagement of databases, working also 

closely with DOD to take advantage of the databases of individuals 

that they hold. And again, this is part of our common vetting examination to strengthen the system overall. 

Senator COLLINS. Finally, I want to ask you about the Department’s progress in dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear threats. This is an issue that we have held several 

hearings on in the past, that GAO has also examined. And what 

GAO found echoed the conclusions of our investigations and that 

is that there was poor cooperation between DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services in assessing the CBRN risk. 

In particular, it is of great concern that, under the BioWatch program, a threat agent may not be identified until more than a day 

after its release. What is being done to improve coordination between DHS and HHS in this area, and also when do you anticipate 

that the next generation, a more sensitive BioWatch system, will 

be deployed? 

205 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Senator. Again, here, we think that we 

make progress continually with the other agencies in this regard. 

NBIC, for example, does effectively integrate the information for 

early warning and response on possible attacks or pandemics in the 

biosphere, as well. 

As you know, the work that we have done, for example, on the 

global nuclear detection architecture is generating work on an implementation plan to further develop our cooperation with other 

agencies in identifying threats to the homeland and responsibilities 

for early action to defeat those threats. 

So specifically to answer your question, this is a priority for the 

Department, one that we are making continual progress toward, 

and we believe that it will substantially reduce the response time 

inherent in the detection of a dangerous pathogen and alerting appropriate responses. 

Senator COLLINS. But when? What is the time table? 

Ms. LUTE. I can get back with you, Senator, on the specifics of 

that, but this is a program that we have in place and it is a priority for the Department. 

Senator COLLINS. If the Chairman would indulge me—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Senator COLLINS [continuing]. Just one final question on the 

Kentucky case, which really deserves it. Can you assure us today 

that the Department has reviewed the files of every Iraqi national 

who was admitted under that program to ensure that there was 

proper vetting, including matching fingerprints with databases in 

possession of the Department of Defense? 

Ms. LUTE. It is my understanding that every person admitted 

under the program has been vetted, Senator. I will confirm that it 

complies with the question as you have asked it. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

I just want to ask one more brief question. It is about the St. 

Elizabeths campus project. The last time I looked at the statistics, 

the Department, and we talked about its management and coordination, was spread through 70 buildings and 40 sites in the National Capital Region, and, of course, that is what motivated the 

plan to coordinate and collect as many of those as we could on the 

St. Elizabeths campus. If I am not mistaken, the next step would 

be to bring the 10 operations centers of the Department together 

there. 

So we are in tough budgetary times. The President delayed some 

of the projects in his budget. The Senate Appropriations Homeland 

Security Subommittee, I think, has appropriated a third of what 

the President asked for and the House has cut all the money out 

for St. Elizabeths. How bad will that be for the improved management of the Department? I would ask you, Deputy Secretary Lute. 

And then I do not know whether you have done this or it is even 

possible, but Mr. Dodaro or Ms. Berrick, is it possible to make a 

judgment about the cost effectiveness of not building—I do not 

know whether it is possible to evaluate what costs the Department 

being spread out adds to its budget, but go ahead, Deputy Secretary Lute. 

206 

Ms. LUTE. Senator, as you know, we believe it is important and 

there is a wisdom in consolidating the Department to reduce the 

transaction time in engagements, but also to facilitate coordination, 

dialogue, information sharing, as well. We remain committed to 

that view that this is an important step in the development and 

evolution of the Department. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Anything to add, Mr. Dodaro? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, there certainly would be challenges in trying 

to come up with the exact quantification that you are calling for. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I understand. 

Mr. DODARO. One of the things that we could do is look at the 

Department’s business case for the consolidation and offer our 

thoughts on that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I would welcome that, if you could. 

Mr. DODARO. Sure. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks to the three of you for 

being here. 

Overall, obviously, we have certain almost parental or possessive 

interest in this Department because we were privileged to be there 

to help in its creation, so we would like to think it has helped. I 

do think both the record and the independent evaluations over the 

years and the summary that you have offered here as we approach 

the 10th commemoration of 9/11 says that the Department of 

Homeland Security has made a difference. And again, it is not an 

accident that we have not had a major attack on us succeed. Do 

we have more work to do? Of course, we do. 

I would also say, and one of you mentioned this, that a different 

kind of country after 9/11 would have become much more like a police state. I suppose there are people who feel that at different 

times, somebody’s civil liberties were compromised. I think, overall, 

really, our record is remarkable. I say that also that in a country 

as big, open, and free as we are—and we want to remain always 

as open and free as we are—we are never going to achieve 100 percent security. 

But we have come a lot more toward that goal, and we should 

always aspire to the goal, than we were on 9/11, and it is thanks 

to the leadership of the Department over these two Administrations and the literally hundreds of thousands of men and women 

who have worked for the Department, working with colleagues in 

other departments, the Department of Defense, intelligence, NCTC, 

etc. So it is in a spirit of gratitude and confidence that both GAO 

and this Committee will continue to push you to get as close to 100 

percent secure as we possibly can. 

Senator Collins, do you want to add anything? 

Senator COLLINS. No, thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much. We will keep the 

record open for 15 days for any additional questions and answers. 

Again, thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(207) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: ARE WE SAFER? 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, Collins, Brown, McCain, Johnson, Paul, and Moran. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Good morning and welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses: Secretary Napolitano, Director Mueller, and the new Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew Olsen. 

This past weekend in ceremonies and vigils across the Nation, 

we stopped to remember the nearly 3,000 people who were killed 

10 years ago in the attacks of September 11, 2001, and to appreciate the acts of heroism and service by countless Americans on 

that day and every day since to protect our homeland and defeat 

the violent Islamist extremists who attacked us on 9/11 and drew 

us into the war that we are in. 

The ninth anniversary of 9/11 last year did not get, obviously, 

the same degree of attention and neither will the 11th anniversary 

next year, and in some sense, that is why we are here this morning. This annual status of the threat against our homeland hearing 

with the heads of these three critically important agencies has become a tradition of our Committee. Senator Collins and I wanted 

very much to hold it after 9/11 to look back a little bit but really 

to look forward and to make the point that our work in protecting 

the homeland goes on. 

Even though we had fresh warnings that alerted us over the past 

few days, over this weekend of commemoration, of a specific, credible, although unconfirmed, terrorist plot against the United 

States, there is already evidence that in a quite natural reaction, 

the American people are beginning to forget how real the threat of 

Islamist extremism continues to be. 

There was a Gallup Poll taken last year that showed terrorism 

ranked at the bottom of six voter concerns—understandably probably because of the intensity of the economic concerns that we have 

today—behind the economy, jobs, government corruption, Federal 

spending, and health care. 

208 

And in a very different way last week, a study was published by 

the Cato Institute calling for the abolition of the Department of 

Homeland Security, which essentially would return us to where we 

were pre-9/11. 

In some ways, I think we may be the victims of the success that 

has been achieved in protecting the homeland since there has obviously not been another mass casualty terrorist attack on American 

soil since 9/11—something, a reality, nobody would have predicted 

on that day. 

Some have taken this lack of another large-scale attack as further evidence, to them anyway, that the U.S. Government exaggerated the danger posed by Islamist extremism and overreacted in 

the wake of 9/11. I believe this is a profoundly mistaken and ultimately irresponsible conclusion. We have weakened our enemies, 

and we have protected our homeland, but our enemies are not vanquished, and that is why our vigilance must be constant and not 

limited to the understandable public attention given to a particular 

anniversary. 

As the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, it is our responsibility to make sure our national 

focus is not distracted from the threat. 

For our witnesses and the tens of thousands of people who work 

with them, it is their constant responsibility 24–7, 365 days a year, 

to protect our homeland. So we welcome them to this annual threat 

hearing and thank them for the service and for all that their respective agencies have had to do with the fact that we have not 

had another major terrorist attack against our homeland in the 

past 10 years. 

But the violent Islamist extremist ideology that motivated the attacks of 9/11 remains a potent force, though weakened throughout 

the world, and increasingly, of course, seems to have an effect in 

the radicalization of homegrown terrorists, including lone wolves. 

Today, we have asked our three witnesses to help us answer at 

least three big questions. One is to take a quick look back, to the 

extent they want, at what the U.S. Government and their agencies 

have done since 9/11. Two, of course, the focus of this hearing is 

to discuss the current threat, the status of the threat of Islamist 

terrorism to our homeland. And then the third is to discuss what 

our government currently is doing to counter that threat. 

So for me, the question today is not are we safer than we were 

on 9/11. I think it is self-evidently clear that we are safer. The 

question is what are we doing and what should we be doing to 

make sure that this safety continues to be what it is and be greater 

in the face of the threat that we continue to face. 

The 10-year anniversary of 9/11 has passed. The media and public attention will naturally fade. But this Congress and future Congresses, and this Administration and future Administrations, must 

stay focused on the threat and its ever-evolving tactics until the 

ideology is truly vanquished and gone. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

209 

The State of Maine became forever linked to the attacks of September 11, 2001, when two of the hijackers, including the ring 

leader, Mohamed Atta, boarded an early morning flight to Boston 

at the Portland International Jetport. From Logan Airport, they set 

in motion the worst terrorist attack in our Nation’s history by seizing control of American Airlines Flight 11. 

That evening, Members of Congress gathered together on the 

steps of the Capitol to express unity. A day that had begun in 

shock and anger ended with unity and resolve. We resolved to ensure that our country had the tools to detect and deter future plots 

as well as to identify those who would do us harm. 

When Chairman Lieberman and I authored the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, our goal was to create 

a strong leader to coordinate the 17 separate agencies of the intelligence community and to change their culture from ‘‘need to know’’ 

to ‘‘need to share’’ so that next time the dots would be connected 

in time to stop an attack. 

The operation that killed Osama bin Laden represented the kind 

of successful collaboration of intelligence and operations that we 

envisioned. Information is now being shared more effectively, both 

across the Federal Government and among Federal agencies and 

their State, local, and tribal partners. 

Just last week, DHS and the FBI announced a ‘‘specific, credible 

but unconfirmed threat’’ related to the 9/11 anniversary. The Administration is taking this threat seriously, and appropriately so. 

It has shared information and intelligence with State and local law 

enforcement officials in the targeted locations and with others 

across the country. 

Thankfully, there was not an incident over the weekend, but we 

must consider whether this particular threat has truly passed or 

whether the terrorists have just gone to ground. We must evaluate 

for how long should we remain on heightened alert. 

This threat demonstrates yet again that the terrorists have not 

abandoned their quest to harm our country and our people. They 

continue to probe for vulnerabilities. 

Much has changed in the past decade. We have vastly improved 

the sharing of information across agencies at the Federal level and 

with State and local emergency and law enforcement professionals. 

America’s chemical facilities and seaports were especially vulnerable a decade ago, and we took important steps to safeguard them. 

In the case of last week’s terrorist threat, the decision to publicize 

the threat put millions of eyes and ears on the lookout for suspicious behavior on the eve of the September 11 commemoration. 

Senator Lieberman and I continue to work to expand our ‘‘See 

Something, Say Something’’ law. The legislation that we have introduced would provide further protection against lawsuits for citizens who report suspicious activity indicating potential terrorist 

threats. 

When it comes to our homeland security, however, we truly are 

only as strong as our weakest link. As we saw in 2009 with the 

Christmas Day bomber and Major Hasan’s attack later on Fort 

Hood, when information is not shared and when warning signals 

are ignored or overlooked, our security is placed at risk. 

210 

The TSA has strengthened airline passenger screening. Nevertheless, a young man was recently able to fly cross-country without 

a valid government-issued ID and with an expired boarding pass 

that did not even bear his name. 

Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security has bolstered 

the security of America’s borders and identification documents, yet 

two Iraqi refugees with ties to al-Qaeda were arrested in Kentucky 

for allegedly helping to carry out attacks against our troops. How 

a known bombmaker, whose fingerprints we have had for years, 

was able to enter our country on humanitarian grounds remains an 

unanswered and troubling question. It appears, however, that this 

case may reflect the kind of lack of imagination that the 9/11 Commission found to be a persistent failure. While the FBI’s analysis 

of IEDs collected in Iraq and Afghanistan has undoubtedly helped 

U.S. warfighters, the forensic information being collected from 

these devices should also be used to screen those trying to enter 

our country, and we must ensure that the FBI has the resources 

necessary to do that job. 

We must ask this question: Are there other Iraqi nationals granted asylum who were involved in attacking our troops? I know that 

the Administration is reviewing the files of more than 51,000 Iraqis 

admitted under this refugee program, but it is deeply troubling 

that we are still awaiting clear answers from the Administration. 

Homegrown terrorism is another challenge and evolving threat. 

This Committee first sounded the alarm about home-based terrorism 5 years ago and has held more than a dozen hearings on 

this topic. 

Over the past 2 years, 31 arrests have been made in homegrown 

plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents—an enormous increase compared to the previous 7 years dating back to 

2001. Yet, the Administration’s strategy for countering violent 

Islamist extremism is insufficient to meet the threat. 

We shall never forget those whom we lost on September 11, 

2001. As has been noted often, the terrorists only have to get it 

right once. We have to be right every time or suffer the consequences of an attack. We are surely much safer than we were a 

decade ago, but we must be relentless in anticipating the changing 

tactics of terrorists. As the successful decade-long search for Osama 

bin Laden proved, America’s resolve is our most powerful weapon 

against those who seek to destroy our way of life. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Secretary Napolitano is our first witness on the panel. Before she 

testifies, last Friday morning, the Department of Homeland Security held a departmental commemoration of 9/11, and I was able 

to attend on the plaza outside the Reagan Building here in downtown Washington. And the Department showed a video that had 

been made by people within the Department about its history, particularly on that day. I thought it was very impressive—for me, 

moving—and I asked the Secretary if she would bring it today. 

So I am sorry not everybody in the room can see. Maybe you can 

see that screen over there. But at this point, whoever is in charge 

of the machine, please turn on the video. It is only about 2 or 3 

minutes long. 

211 

1The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano appears in the Appendix on page 918. 

[Video played.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I thought that was great. I hope my colleagues on the Committee agree. Really, it is such a powerful statement of unity. I thought it was wonderful to include Secretaries 

Ridge and Chertoff in it, and all the component division heads. 

There was a real sense of unity and resolve. So I appreciate it very 

much. 

And with that, please proceed, Secretary Napolitano, with your 

testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANET A. NAPOLITANO,1 SECRETARY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to keep our Nation safe against ever-evolving threats. 

This weekend, our Nation observed the 10th anniversary of 9/11 

and honored the nearly 3,000 innocent victims as well as their 

friends, their colleagues, and their families. We saluted the many 

first responders and law enforcement officials who responded with 

such courage and conviction on that tragic day and in the days that 

followed. 

While these past few days remind us that we must remain vigilant and prepared as threats against our country remain, the recent anniversary of 9/11 is also a time to consider the progress that 

we have made. As Chairman Lieberman noted, America is a 

stronger and more secure Nation today. We bounced back from the 

worst attack on our soil and have made progress on every front to 

better protect ourselves. We have used our experience to become 

more resilient, not only to terrorist attacks but to threats and disasters of all kinds. 

Following 9/11, the Federal Government, including many Members on this Committee, especially Senators Lieberman and Collins, 

moved quickly to develop a security framework to protect the country from large-scale attacks directed from abroad while enhancing 

Federal, State, local, and tribal capabilities to prepare for, respond 

to, and recover from attacks and disasters here at home. 

A key element of this new security framework included the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and over the past 

10 years, DHS and its many partners across the Federal Government, across public and private sectors, have strengthened the 

homeland security enterprise to better mitigate and defend against 

ever-present and ever-evolving threats. 

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the progress we have made is 

to apply today’s security architecture to what existed when the terrorist attacks of 9/11 occurred. 

The 9/11 plot, like many terrorist plots, began overseas, which 

means our security layers must begin there as well. With respect 

to intelligence, planning for 9/11 began several years before the actual attacks. Osama Bin Laden summoned operatives to Afghanistan to discuss using commercial aircraft as weapons. Since then, 

we have strengthened the depth and breadth of our intelligence enVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00227 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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terprise to get the best information possible wherever the operational planning may occur. 

With respect to visa security, all of the 9/11 hijackers applied for 

visas overseas. Today, the DHS Visa Security Program deploys 

trained special agents to high-risk posts around the world to conduct targeted in-depth reviews of visa applicants before they reach 

the United States. We have additional layers of security in place 

through the Department of State’s visa checks and pre-departure 

screening measures. And not only has DHS now reviewed a historic 

backlog of overstay leads for national security and public safety 

concerns, but this process has helped put an enhanced biographic 

exit system on the fast track. 

With respect to international information sharing, the hijackers 

began preparing for the attack while living abroad. Today, 18 countries have joined the United States in agreeing to share information about potential terrorists and criminals through a series of 

Preventing and Combating Serious Crime Agreements, and more 

are underway. 

After 9/11, the Federal Government discovered that information 

existed about the hijackers well before and after they came to the 

United States, but this information had not been coordinated, 

shared, and analyzed. Since 9/11, the Federal Government, along 

with its State, local, tribal, and private-sector partners, has made 

significant improvements to enhance information sharing and analysis. 

With respect to targeting, the Federal Government, and DHS in 

particular, has become more effective at analyzing travel-related 

data to better understand and anticipate the travel patterns of 

known or suspected terrorists. This analysis has been essential in 

identifying, targeting, and interdicting known and suspected terrorists, and prompting additional screening, before these individuals 

travel to the United States. 

We have established 72 fusion centers, which serve as focal 

points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among the Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, 

and private-sector partners. Today, the intelligence community is 

able to identify the common threads that can tie a seemingly minor 

crime to the larger threat picture, and all but a few of the fusion 

centers are now connected to the HSDN, which is a secret level, 

real-time data system sharing data across our country. 

Once the 9/11 hijackers made it to the United States, they still 

required access to aircraft. With respect to flight schools, prior to 

9/11, the hijackers enrolled in flight schools and conducted crosscountry surveillance flights. Today, the TSA screens all foreign students seeking flight training against terrorist, criminal history, and 

immigration databases. 

With respect to passenger screening, 10 years ago, the 9/11 hijackers were able to purchase tickets and board planes carrying 

weapons. Today, through the Secure Flight Program, DHS prescreens 100 percent of the 14 million passengers flying weekly to, 

from, and within the United States against government watch lists. 

And Senator Collins, I think I can elaborate, that would have, if 

it had been deployed, prevented the situation you referred to with 

the boarding pass. 

213 

Moreover, Transportation Security Officers at more than 450 airports now screen all checked and carry-on baggage for explosives, 

weapons, and other threats using cutting-edge technologies. 

And with respect to behavior detection, even though some of the 

9/11 hijackers were randomly selected for additional screening and 

aroused the suspicion of gate agents, they still made it onto a 

plane. TSA’s Behavior Detection Officers today work to identify potentially high-risk passengers who exhibit behaviors that indicate 

they may be a threat to aviation security and refer them for additional screening. 

The last line of defense against threats to aviation security is on 

the plane itself. With respect to airplane security, today, all commercial aircraft have hardened cockpit doors and Federal Air Marshals are deployed across the aviation system based on risk. 

And with respect to emergency communications, limitations in 

communication and interoperability among air traffic control operators, military personnel, and first responders hindered the response 

on 9/11. Our Nation has since made significant investments in 

training and technical assistance to improve emergency communication capabilities. 

Each of these layers combined creates a stronger security architecture that did not exist on 9/11 and that has helped keep our Nation, our transportation system, and the American people safe over 

the past 10 years. 

We would not be where we are today without the direct involvement and support of the Congress and particularly this Committee. 

I want to thank you for your support, your guidance, and your continued oversight. 

We continue to engage the broader homeland security enterprise 

in our Nation’s protection. We have made great progress, but more 

remains to be done. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Secretary Napolitano. That 

was an excellent statement. I particularly appreciate the pre-9/11 

comparison to today because it documents in a very tangible way 

the progress we have made and it backs up a conclusion that I 

have come to over the years, and it is a painful one, which is that 

9/11/01 could have been prevented and should have been prevented 

and that if it was tried today, it would be prevented, and that is 

a very important thing to be able to say. 

Director Mueller, thanks for being here. Talk about change, 

though as compared to the Department of Homeland Security, 

which did not exist on 9/11, the FBI obviously is a venerable American institution, but it has gone through a dramatic transformation 

in the last 10 years under your leadership to become our domestic 

counterterrorism agency and really a first-rate one at that, and I 

appreciate it. Also, we thank you for agreeing to stay on for 2 more 

years. I suppose I should also thank your saintly wife for allowing 

you to stay on. 

Mr. MUELLER. Most appropriate, yes. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So please proceed with your testimony. 

214 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears in the Appendix on page 943. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III,1 DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir, and good morning, Mr. Chairman, 

Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. I thank you for 

the opportunity to appear here today before you. 

As has been pointed out, since September 11, the threat from terrorism has evolved in ways that present new challenges for the FBI 

and our partners. Today, the threat environment is far more complex and diverse than ever before. 

And in response, the FBI has undergone unprecedented transformation over the past 10 years, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman. We have developed new intelligence capabilities necessary to 

address terrorist and criminal threats. We have created the administrative and technological structure to meet our mission as a national security agency. And we have made these changes while continuing to safeguard American civil liberties. 

Let me begin by focusing on the most serious threats we face and 

then discuss how the FBI has changed since September 11 to 

counter these threats. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its leader, Anwar alAwlaki, have shown a commitment not only to attack the United 

States but also to inspire acts of terrorism from overseas. For the 

past 2 years, AQAP has undertaken a task directly targeting the 

homeland. We saw this with a failed attempt to send package 

bombs to the United States on cargo planes and in the attempted 

bombing on Christmas Day the year before. And in online media, 

al-Awlaki and other AQAP leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to this type of attack. 

They also continue to emphasize lone actor operations in the 

West and have sought to radicalize individuals over the Internet to 

carry out attacks here and in Europe. And despite the recent 

counterterrorism successes abroad, and there have been many, core 

al-Qaeda also remains committed to high profile attacks directed at 

the West. We saw this with the 2009 plot by Najibullah Zazi, a plot 

to attack the New York subway, and we confirmed this from the 

materials seized from the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound 

last spring. 

And as you know, we continue to track the current threat 

streams from al-Qaeda, threat streams that became public last 

week. 

Other groups in the Fatah region of Pakistan, such as TTP, have 

similarly shown an intent to target the United States. We saw this 

when TTP claimed responsibility for the Times Square attempted 

bombing. 

And we remain concerned that all these groups encourage 

radicalized Westerners, particularly U.S. citizens, to travel to the 

Fatah and East Africa for training with the potential to return to 

the United States to conduct attacks, and of course, the threat from 

homegrown violent extremists is among our most serious terrorism 

threats today. 

215 

Individuals may be radicalized over the Internet even if they do 

not receive direct guidance or training from a terrorist group. 

These individuals may have diverse backgrounds and life experiences as well as differing motives. Increasingly, they may be acting 

alone, and for these reasons, homegrown violent extremists are 

harder to detect and to disrupt. And the FBI, along with our partners—NCTC, the Department of Homeland Security and the other 

law enforcement and intelligence communities—are focused on 

these threats more than perhaps 8 to 10 years ago. 

And of course, the FBI remains concerned about the domestic 

terrorist threat as well. Economic and political issues could motivate white supremacists or militia extremists to violence. As you 

know, domestic terrorists can often operate as lone offenders or in 

small cells, which are difficult to detect. 

Overall, the threat environment has evolved significantly since 

September 11 and is more complex and diverse than ever before, 

and this requires the Bureau and our partners to change and adapt 

constantly to address these threats. 

As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the FBI has undergone unprecedented change in the years since September 11. Today, the 

FBI is a stronger organization as a result, and we continue to focus 

on national security threats as our highest priority. 

After September 11, the Bureau shifted 2,000 agents from criminal investigations to national security matters. Over the years that 

followed, we centralized management of counterterrorism and intelligence operations at headquarters to avoid the stovepiping of information. 

Structurally, we created the National Security Branch in 2005 to 

consolidate and integrate the Bureau’s overall national security 

mission and gave senior executives the authority to accelerate the 

integration of intelligence into our national security operations. 

We established the Directorate of Intelligence at headquarters to 

manage our intelligence programs nationwide. We created Field Intelligence Groups in each of our field offices to prioritize intelligence collection in each of those field offices, and we hired and 

trained thousands of new intelligence analysts and agents to enhance our intelligence capabilities. 

Following September 11, the FBI greatly increased the number 

of Joint Terrorism Task Forces operating around the Nation. We 

now have more than 100 of those task forces. These task forces 

bring together the expertise from our Federal, State, and local 

partners, and this cooperative effort has led to numerous successes 

in disrupting terrorist plots and threats since September 11. 

After September 11, the FBI also recognized the need to recruit, 

hire, and train the intelligence analyst cadre necessary to meet the 

requirements of our national security mission. In 2001, the Bureau 

had approximately 1,000 intelligence analysts and fewer than 30 

supervisory analysts. Today, the Bureau has tripled the number of 

intelligence analysts to more than 3,000, and we have more than 

270 supervisory analysts. 

Let me, as an aside, also emphasize the FBI’s role in countering 

cyber attacks—one of the most significant and complex threats facing the Nation. With our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, the Bureau is positioned to investigate and disrupt cyber inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00231 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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1The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen appears in the Appendix on page 955. 

trusions, and our need to counter cyber attacks cuts across all of 

our programs, including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and 

the criminal programs. 

Beginning in 2007, we worked with our partners to establish the 

National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, which now includes 

20 Federal and intelligence community agencies. Through these 

partnerships, the Bureau has identified, investigated, and prosecuted an unprecedented number of intrusion cases, and these intrusions have impacted our military, other government agencies, 

the financial and telecommunications sectors, and other critical infrastructure. Addressing this cyber threat will be among the FBI’s 

highest priorities now and in the years to come. 

Let me conclude by thanking the Committee for your continued 

support of the men and women of the FBI and support for our mission as it has evolved. This has been essential to our transformation and our ability to meet today’s diverse threats. 

Again, as the Secretary said, I would be happy to answer any 

questions that you might have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Director Mueller. 

We look forward to the question period with you. 

Matthew Olsen, welcome. Obviously, the National Counterterrorism Center is also one of the most significant new entities created in our government, to put it simplistically, to make sure the 

dots are connected, but obviously, it does much more than that. 

This is your first appearance before us since your confirmation, and 

we welcome you. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MATTHEW G. OLSEN,1 DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE 

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you very much, sir. Chairman Lieberman, 

Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee, good morning. As 

I begin, let me thank you for taking the time to meet with me during my confirmation. I appreciate your counsel and support. I am 

honored that my first hearing as the Director of the National 

Counterterrorism Center is before the Committee that authored the 

legislation creating NCTC. 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the evolution of the terrorist threat and our collective efforts to address that threat. I am 

also very pleased to be joining Secretary Napolitano and Director 

Mueller this morning, and it is appropriate that we continue to reflect on the day that our Nation suffered the worst terrorist attack 

in our history. 

After a few weeks as the Director of NCTC, I can report that the 

Center is a national asset. It is comprised of dedicated and talented 

intelligence professionals representing a wide array of perspectives 

and experiences. 

I am also proud to lead the Center, continuing the work of others—Andrew Liepman, Mike Leiter, Scott Redd, and John Brennan—and my testimony today reflects the thoughtful and rigorous 

analysis of the expert workforce at NCTC. 

217 

Today’s hearing asks the question, ‘‘Ten years after 9/11: Are we 

safer?’’ Chairman Lieberman, as you said, the bottom line is we are 

safer than we were 10 years ago, but al-Qaeda and its allies and 

its affiliates continue to pose a significant threat. 

Thanks to the skill and the hard work of thousands of men and 

women in the intelligence, homeland security, diplomatic, and law 

enforcement communities, as well as our men in uniform, we have 

made significant progress in the fight against terrorism. With the 

support and guidance of this Committee and Congress, we have 

built an enduring counterterrorism framework—the framework 

that includes the establishment of DHS, the transformation of the 

FBI, and the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Our Nation has placed relentless pressure on al-Qaeda’s leadership, denied the group safe haven and resources, and as a result, 

core al-Qaeda is weakened. But a decade after the September 11 

attacks, we remain at war with al-Qaeda. It is a resilient and 

adaptive adversary, and we continue to face an evolving threat, as 

Director Mueller mentioned, from its affiliates and adherents. 

In the balance of my remarks, I will briefly describe that terrorist threat and then discuss a bit about the role of NCTC and 

some of the challenges we face. 

First, al-Qaeda’s core capability to conduct attacks has been significantly diminished. Again, Chairman Lieberman, in your words, 

it is weakened but not vanquished. The group remains the ideological leader of the global extremist movement. It continues to influence others through propaganda. Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has 

advanced several unsuccessful smaller-scale Western plots in the 

past 2 years, and these plots highlight its ability to continue attack 

preparations while under sustained counterterrorism pressure. 

And just this past week, we acted in response to unconfirmed intelligence of a possible threat that the group was planning an attack in the United States. We, thus, remain concerned that alQaeda may be plotting to strike against the United States at home 

or overseas. 

Further, since al-Qaeda’s relocation to Pakistan, it has encouraged its militant allies to expand their operational agendas to include U.S. and Western targets, both within the region and overseas. For example, Faisal Shahzad’s attempted bombing in Times 

Square, as Director Mueller mentioned, is a stark reminder that alQaeda’s allies, such as the Pakistani Taliban, continue to threaten 

U.S. interests in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region. 

Second, 10 years after 9/11, we face a much more diverse and diffuse threat from groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. These affiliates 

have increased the scope of their operations, seeking to strike some 

U.S. and Western targets both inside and outside of their respective regions. 

The single most capable affiliate is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. AQAP’s recent gains and Yemen’s governing challenges increase our concerns about the group’s capability to conduct attacks. 

Further, the group’s propaganda efforts are designed to inspire 

like-minded Western extremists to conduct attacks in their home 

countries. 

AQAP’s two attempted attacks against the homeland—the attempted airliner attack in December 2009 and its attempt to down 

218 

two U.S.-bound cargo planes in 2010—show that the group is a determined and capable enemy that is able to adjust its tactics. 

Third, a key element of the evolution of the terrorist threat since 

9/11 is the advent of homegrown violent extremists, as you mentioned, Senator Collins. These individuals are inspired by alQaeda’s global extremist agenda. Over the past 3 years, we have 

seen an increase in violent extremist English content online. This 

has fostered greater cohesion among homegrown violent extremists. 

Plots disrupted during the past year appear to be unrelated operationally but may share a common cause, rallying independent extremists to attack the homeland. 

A key feature of this trend has been the development of a narrative that addresses the unique concerns of U.S.-based extremists. 

This narrative includes a blend of al-Qaeda inspiration, perceived 

victimization, and a glorification of homeland plotting. HVEs who 

independently plan attacks with no direction inside the United 

States or overseas are difficult to detect and disrupt and could advance plotting with little or no warning. 

Now turning to the role of NCTC, as the terrorist threat has 

evolved over the past decade, so has the government’s ability to 

counter that threat. NCTC has proven to be a vital element of the 

government-wide effort to counter terrorism. 

First, as you know, NCTC has unique responsibility to examine 

all international terrorism issues, spanning geographic boundaries 

so that we can analyze intelligence regardless of whether it is collected inside or outside the United States. NCTC has access to the 

full catalog of reporting, both foreign and domestic, on terrorism 

issues. 

Last year, NCTC created the Pursuit Group to develop tactical 

leads and pursue terrorism threats. Pursuit Group analysts look 

for connections among less obvious details to help ensure that terrorist threats are fully examined. 

NCTC continues to implement important reforms in the watchlisting process. This includes better processing and sharing of 

watchlisting information. Our watchlisting experts work closely 

with NCTC’s Pursuit Group, with the FBI, and with the Department of Homeland Security to expedite the sharing of information 

and to build more complete terrorist identities. 

NCTC also conducts strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities. In this role, NCTC looks beyond individual department and agency missions toward the development of a single 

unified counterterrorism effort across the Federal Government. We 

develop plans to help translate high level strategies and policy direction into coordinated activities. 

Finally, as this Committee is well aware, the Center continues 

to be the home to the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group. This group is led by DHS in partnership with FBI, 

and it brings together Federal and non-Federal intelligence, law 

enforcement, and first responder communities to bridge the intelligence information gap between traditional intelligence agencies 

on the one hand and State, local, tribal, and private-sector partners 

on the other. 

I would like to close today by identifying NCTC’s most important 

resource, and that is our people. As NCTC redoubles its effort to 

219 

meet the terrorist threat, our progress depends on maintaining and 

developing our talented and diverse workforce. We bring together 

professionals from across the government to focus on a single mission—counterterrorism—and we must strive to work collaboratively, to share information, and to integrate our efforts. 

Finally, all of our activities must be consistent with our core values and the protection of privacy and civil liberties. In everything 

we do, NCTC must retain the trust of the American people as it 

fulfills its critically important responsibilities. 

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. As you 

know, perfection is no more possible in counterterrorism than it is 

in any other endeavor, and we will always strive to improve. Your 

leadership, support, and direction have been invaluable in helping 

us move forward to carry out our mission and to work with resolve 

and with unity to protect the Nation. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Director Olsen. Thank you 

very much. 

We will go to the questions now. We will start with the first 

round of 7 minutes for each Senator. 

Let me begin by going to the threat stream that alerted everyone 

in government and the Nation last week as we approached the 

10th anniversary weekend. It was described as specific, credible, 

but unconfirmed or uncorroborated. 

Let me ask you first what is the status of our review of that 

threat now. Do we consider it to be an ongoing threat, Secretary 

Napolitano or Director Mueller? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Chairman Lieberman, yes, we consider it 

an ongoing threat, and we continue to monitor that threat. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, the threat has not been resolved, and until 

it is resolved, it is an outstanding threat that we are following up 

on. Even though September 11 has now passed, we do not believe 

that necessarily means that we should back down. Consequently, 

we, the Department of Homeland Security, NCTC, and the intelligence agencies are pursuing that as hard and heavily as we have 

over the last several days and will continue to do so until it is resolved. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So it remains, if I hear you correctly, 

unconfirmed, but again, the intelligence stream was specific and 

credible enough that you are not prepared to dismiss it. 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Olsen, do you want to add anything 

to that? 

Mr. OLSEN. I share the views of Director Mueller and Secretary 

Napolitano. We are not prepared to say that it has been resolved, 

and we are continuing to work to analyze it and share information 

about it. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would like to add one thing if I might, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Mr. MUELLER. Since we first had word of that threat, we have 

conducted hundreds of interviews; we have been pursuing a number of leads. Consequently, as a result of that, we now have been 

220 

able to eliminate some aspects where we thought that we ought to 

be looking in order to determine whether it was indeed a valid 

threat, but there is still work to be done. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is reassuring from my perspective. 

I know there were plans already in place—Federal, State and 

local—to be prepared to defend against another terrorist attack on 

the 10th anniversary weekend and particularly with regard to 

homegrown radicals, or lone wolves, and others as well, but I was 

impressed by the extent to which so many of the assets that our 

government has now in regard to homeland security and counterterrorism were brought into action on this threat that we really, I 

think, would not have been able to do 10 years ago. 

One of the things that the 9/11 Commission said was that when 

they asked the question, who is in charge of counterterrorism or a 

particular response to the terrorist threat, they did not have an answer. So from my perspective, it looked like you were all really 

working together very well, but I am interested in knowing who 

was in charge because at some point somebody has to be overseeing 

all this. 

So who would you say was in charge? 

Mr. MUELLER. You have on the one hand the intelligence agencies. You have the domestic agencies—operational, DHS, FBI, and 

the like—all of whom have been through this before any number 

of times. And the relationships and the organization comes together very quickly, given our history. 

But I would say it is the White House and the Office of the National Security Advisor that makes certain that everything has 

been taken care of generally through the NCTC as the operational 

arm or the support arm. 

But there is no question about the source of the leadership and 

the coordination, and I think that is why we have been, over the 

years, effective in terms of coming together, sharing information, 

understanding our differing roles, and complementing each other to 

make certain that the job gets done to resolve the particular 

threats. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very interesting. So the Deputy 

National Security Advisor, Mr. Brennan, is in charge of counterterrorism, homeland security, acting on behalf of the President, who 

obviously is in charge, and coordinating all our assets, but the 

NCTC plays an operational role on his behalf, a support role. 

Do you want comment on that, Mr. Olsen? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes, sir. I would say that, as you put it, John Brennan played a coordinating role on behalf of the President in the 

last few days in response to this threat. 

And our role at NCTC is to be the place where information all 

comes together because some of the information is coming from 

CIA, some information is coming from FBI, and lots of information 

is coming from DHS. We play a central clearinghouse role where 

we take all of that information, analyze it, and then share back out 

what we are seeing from an analytical standpoint. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Secretary Napolitano, do you want to add 

to that? Does this sound right to you? 

221 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is right, and it is an amazing coordination thing that I have seen, and I do not think it would have 

been able to be accomplished 10 years ago. 

It is ultimately coordinated out of the White House. We all understand how we fit together. Sometimes it is difficult to articulate. 

You kind of know it when you see it. But it does seem to increase 

our ability not only to share information among ourselves, but to 

share information with the country and receive information back. 

And that also is a difference between now and 10 years ago. 

Ten years ago, I was the Attorney General of Arizona, and it was 

very difficult to get information as to what was going on with the 

attacks and what decisions were going to be made with respect to 

air safety, airports, borders, and all the rest. Now that sort of dislocation does not occur. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that. 

My time is running out, but I want to ask you, Secretary 

Napolitano, one additional question. Probably the most visible part 

of the change in homeland security since 9/11 for most Americans 

has been the presence of TSA at the airports, and I think they have 

done a great job. As you know, it is an annoyance to people, but 

they put up with it. 

In testimony before this Committee, Mr. Pistole has indicated 

that the Department really would like to move away from a onesize-fits-all approach to a more risk-based aviation security strategy. I wanted to ask you what the Department is doing to implement such a risk-based strategy and whether there are moves that 

will be made soon in that regard. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. I was fortunate to take Director 

Mueller’s No. 2 and to bring him over to TSA. So thank you very 

much. I owe you a draft choice to be named later, I think. 

But with the respect to TSA, we are moving to a more risk-based 

approach to screening passengers and trying to streamline procedures for those passengers who are low risk, which enhances our 

ability to focus on passengers who we either do not know or who 

are assessed a high risk. 

We are piloting several programs to achieve these goals right 

now. One of them is the expansion of global entry, which is essentially a program that facilitates international travel. It is really a 

prescreening of a passenger, and we just got our millionth passenger a couple weeks ago. That really facilitates crossing borders. 

We also have been piloting programs to deal with children under 

the age of 12 with respect to not only taking off their shoes but also 

pat-down procedures, and we hope over the coming weeks and 

months to be able to begin rolling that out. It does require additional training of all of the thousands of TSA officers, and that is 

also underway. 

We are, obviously, looking at some of the other procedures that 

passengers need to make in order to streamline their process 

through the lines. There will always be some unpredictability built 

into the system, and there will always be random checks, even for 

groups that we are looking at differently, such as children under 

the age of 12. But I think the traveling public will begin to see 

some of these changes in the coming months. 

222 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is good to hear. So that, in the foreseeable future, if I hear you correctly, we may be moving to a system where children under 12 would not normally be subject to patdowns and the like. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. There will be additional training for 

a different pat-down procedure for them and also, again, allowing 

them to leave their shoes on. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent. That is good news. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, I want to go back to the Bowling Green case, 

which was very troubling to many of us on this Committee. As I 

look at the overall statistics, DHS interviewed more than 101,000 

Iraqi refugee applicants and approved more than 84,000 for resettlement in this country. This is an approval rate that exceeds 80 

percent. I was surprised at the scope of this program; 58,810 Iraqi 

refugees have been resettled and are living here. 

Now I know from previous DHS testimony and from my conversations with the Director that there is a review of those who are 

here to make sure that we have not missed fingerprints or other 

data or intelligence that would indicate that a mistake was made 

in granting them the right to resettle in this country. But that 

leaves 25,625 who have been approved for resettlement but have 

not yet been resettled in this country. 

Is there a hold on that population until they can be more stringently vetted to ensure that we are not letting into this country 

people who would do us harm? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Let me, if I might, answer your question 

in two parts. 

First part, with respect to the 58,000 Iraqi refugees who were resettled pursuant to the original resettlement program, they have 

now all been revetted against all of the DHS and NCTC databases 

and the Department of Defense’s biometric databases. So that work 

has now been done and focused. 

Senator COLLINS. That is completed? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is completed. 

Moving forward, no one will be resettled without going through 

the same sort of vetting procedure. Now I do not know whether 

that equates to a hold, as you say, but I can say that having done 

the already resettled population, moving forward, they will all be 

reviewed against those kinds of databases. 

Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller, it is reassuring to hear that 

those 58,000 individuals have been vetted against the existing 

databases. But in fact, due to a lack of resources and the fact that 

it is not easy to vet, match, and lift latent fingerprints, do you not 

have a considerable backlog of fingerprints that have yet to be 

uploaded into these databases? 

Mr. MUELLER. As I think we discussed, there is prioritization in 

terms of the explosive devices that we look at, and with that 

prioritization, there is a substantial grouping of devices that have 

not been looked at. We have taken the precautions of assuring that 

we maintain the capability of looking at it down the road, in other 

words, assuring that if there are fingerprints, they can be recaptured down the road. But as you pointed out before, it is a question 

of resources, and we do have to prioritize. 

223 

If we get an indication of a name of a person who there is some 

question about, we can do that more thorough review by going into 

this third tier to determine whether that person’s fingerprints appear on any IEDs, but it requires a triggering of information in 

order to go into that backlog. 

And it is not just a small grouping, as I think you understand. 

It is substantial. And so regardless what additional resources we 

are given, and with more resources we can do more, nonetheless, 

there would be ultimately a grouping that we just cannot upload 

for a variety of reasons. 

Senator COLLINS. What concerns me is in the case of one of the 

individuals arrested in Bowling Green, his fingerprints were in 

those lower priority IED parts, correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Correct, and as I think you understand, we had 

to go back and identify where he was and do the additional research. And we will do that and have done it. We will continue to 

do that. 

Senator COLLINS. But that depends on your getting a lead or the 

name of an individual where you can try to map out where that 

individual was as opposed to DHS being able to run the fingerprints against the complete database, correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, they can run the fingerprints against the 

complete database, but that database will not have that information—— 

Senator COLLINS. That is my point. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. From the third tier that has not been 

uploaded because of the amounts of devices we have and the necessity to prioritize. 

Senator COLLINS. And that third tier, again, happened to be 

where the fingerprints of the individual from Kentucky were located. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator COLLINS. Madam Secretary, I want to talk to you about 

fusion centers. I have been a supporter of fusion centers. I have visited two of them—one in a large urban area, one in a rural State. 

And I have seen the information sharing that they do, and I have 

been impressed. 

But my enthusiasm is not shared by everyone. There are individuals on both sides of the aisle who argue that the fusion centers 

are duplicative of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Why do we 

need them when we already have this multi-agency task force, particularly in a time of budget constraints? 

Senator Warner sent you a letter in June on that issue. Senator 

Coburn’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is looking at 

the effectiveness of fusion centers. And I know that DHS has conducted a study to identify baseline capabilities that every fusion 

center should have. 

Tell me why we need fusion centers. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Senator. I can speak both as 

a former U.S. Attorney General and a governor as to the utility of 

the fusion centers. 

They do not duplicate the JTTFs. They really complement the 

JTTFs. They are portals of entry where we can share information— 

224 

and as I mentioned in my opening comments, for all but three, we 

are now connected at the secret level—and get information back. 

As Director Olsen and Director Mueller mentioned, one phenomenon that we are dealing with now is the growth of homegrown 

terrorists and the so-called lone actor or lone wolf. We need more 

eyes on the ground than the Federal Government itself can supply. 

The training and ability to share information about tactics and 

techniques, early trips that should be looked for can be very helpful. 

And it is not just sharing information, Senator, that is important 

with respect to the fusion centers. It is sharing and expanding analytical capability to different levels of government. 

So we now have the 72 fusion centers. We have moved our own 

analysts into the fusion centers so that they can help not only with 

the gathering and receipt of information but with the analysis of 

information, which is helpful. 

If you look at Zazi, Faisal Shahzad, and Paulin-Ramirez, who 

was connected with Jihad Jane, in all of those cases, you would see 

fusion center activity that was very helpful. 

And indeed, these past 3 days, with the ongoing threat that has 

been described to you, fusion centers are active in that as well. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

For the information of my colleagues, Senators will be called in 

order of arrival as follows: Senators Brown, Carper, Johnson, 

Pryor, Moran, and McCain. 

Senator Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Olsen, several of the recent attempted terrorist attacks 

against the United States have been carried out by, or inspired by, 

AQAP. How would you assess their threat to the homeland? 

Would you put them at the top of the list of threats by terrorist 

organizations? 

And then as a follow-up, is Yemen on its way to becoming another Afghanistan, i.e., a safe haven for AQAP to plot attacks, and 

do we have a sufficient strategy in place for Yemen? 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you, Senator. 

The response to your first question is that AQAP is certainly 

among our biggest concerns from a counterterrorism perspective. It 

has shown itself to have both the intent and capability of carrying 

out attacks against the United States in the homeland. I mentioned 

the two examples of that—the Abdulmutallab attack of Christmas 

Day 2009 and then the cargo plane attack in the fall of 2010. 

Beyond the actual attempted attacks, one of the biggest concerns 

we have about AQAP is its propaganda effort. Anwar al-Awlaki, an 

English speaker, dual U.S. citizen, has through Inspire Magazine 

sought to inspire potentially radicalized Westerners. The actual 

issues of Inspire Magazine have included step-by-step bombmaking 

instructions. 

Senator BROWN. Yes, and it is interesting. That was my next 

question. How do they actually get away with that? I mean, how 

225 

do they get away with putting bombmaking instructions in a magazine, which is disseminated widely, if you can just tell me? 

Mr. OLSEN. Well, that information is put out through an online 

magazine over the Internet, and it is actually information that 

is—— 

Senator BROWN. We have no control over anything like that? 

Mr. OLSEN. Well, some of that information is not necessarily 

unique to AQAP. In other words, one of the biggest concerns about 

the nature of the information is it is quite basic. It is easy to follow. It does not require someone to be particularly sophisticated to 

follow those instructions. 

So in answer to your question, yes, AQAP is at the top of our list 

or one of the biggest concerns we have. 

With regard to whether Yemen is a safe haven, we are very concerned about the ability of the Yemeni government at this point to 

sustain any strong counterterrorism efforts, given the governance 

challenges that it faces. So AQAP has had the opportunity to recruit inside Yemen and to plan and plot inside Yemen. We have 

put extreme pressure on AQ senior leadership. It has been more 

difficult for us to put that same pressure on AQAP leaders in 

Yemen. 

Senator BROWN. On the Inspire Magazine, in particular? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, let me start by saying we are not without 

tools to address it. But the fact of the matter is that once you 

upload something on the Internet, it is exceptionally difficult to try 

to eradicate it. In fact, I would say impossible. 

So while we have tools, the likelihood, the possibility of eradicating Inspire from the Internet, understanding it is not just the 

United States but every country around the world, is virtually impossible. And to the extent that we have some capabilities to address that is something we probably ought to talk about in closed 

session. 

Senator BROWN. Madam Secretary, in your testimony, and I have 

heard you address this many other times, you talk about our Nation’s borders and protecting us from illegal entry, especially in Arizona where you are from. I know it is of great concern to Senator 

McCain and a lot of the other Members from border States. And 

quite frankly, I could not agree with you more. 

In Massachusetts alone, there are several tragic cases of Bay 

State residents being killed by persons in this country illegally, and 

then they either flee or are never heard from, but it really has to 

stop. 

The Secure Communities program is something I believe—I do 

not want to misstate—you are in favor of, you have worked toward, 

and you would like to see implemented. 

How do you deal with States, for example, my State, where you 

have a governor or others who do not support it? Is there a way 

to convince them, cajole them, or incentivize them to get with the 

program, so to speak? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, Senator Brown, I do support Secure 

Communities. I think it is a key tool in our immigration enforcement efforts to identify those in the country illegally who are also 

committing other crimes, are fugitives from existing warrants, are 

multiple illegal entrants, are security concerns. In other words, we 

226 

have to be able to find them, and going to the jails and prisons of 

the country is a logical first place to start. 

Senator BROWN. How do you do your job if you do not have the 

cooperation from the individual States or people in charge? How do 

you do it? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, there was some initial misinformation about Secure Communities, but the plain fact of the matter is, 

it is an interoperability agreement between DHS and the FBI so 

that when someone is booked and his fingerprints are run through 

the FBI, there is also a connection over to run them against our 

immigration databases so that ICE can flag an arrestee before he 

is released back into the community. 

It does not require the specific agreement of a State or locality 

in order to deploy Secure Communities. Now it is helpful when we 

have cooperation, and so I am using my powers of persuasion to 

speak with the governors or mayors or other officials who have 

been troubled by the program. 

Senator BROWN. Yes. It just does not really make sense. We are 

all Americans first, and when we tackle a problem together, we 

usually prevail. So I am encouraging others that I know back home 

in Massachusetts and throughout the country to remember we are 

Americans first and to work together on these very real terrorist 

threats and concerns. 

If someone is arrested and they are here illegally and they are 

killing people, whether it is through accident or just through basic 

murder and mayhem, we should be able to get them out and do it 

with the cooperation of all government entities. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Secure Communities was begun under 

my predecessor. We have actually deployed it now throughout the 

country. I think we have it in 1,200 sites, and we will have it in 

every jurisdiction by fiscal year 2013. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, can I just ask you a question? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Of course. 

Senator BROWN. Mr. Mueller also pointed out that there are folks 

who are American citizens, and they are going over there, they are 

being trained, and they are using their knowledge when they come 

back. 

What is the status of the Terrorist Expatriation Act that you and 

I and Senator Collins and others filed? Are we going to refile it? 

Is it something that he would support? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I would be happy to refile that bill 

with you because I think it continues to be a problem. 

Senator BROWN. Great. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Brown. 

I will just mention very briefly in terms of what do you do about 

extremist material like Inspire Magazine or the other things on the 

Internet, and what Director Mueller said, and other witnesses too, 

is that there are certain limits on the Federal Government, but 

what we have discovered in going over this, Senator Brown, is that 

with some of the major sites—like Google owns YouTube and 

Blogger, and Facebook is a separate operation, obviously—if individual citizens complain to them about a particular site having vioVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00242 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
227 

lent material on it, they all have standards. They actually have 

people whose job it is to review complaints like that. 

And on many occasions—let me say that I have at least one staff 

member who exercises his individual citizen rights when he is not 

in the office to complain about this material—Google, YouTube, 

Blogger, Facebook, they take down those jihadist Web sites. It is 

quite remarkable. 

Now of course—it is the glory and the problem of the Internet— 

they can pop up somewhere else, and then you have to go at it all 

over again. But there is that ability by individual citizens. 

Senator BROWN. Well, as the President encourages people to call 

us, I would encourage our citizens, if they feel compelled and 

moved, to contact those entities to do just that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, and it is pretty easy to do if you go 

on those Web sites. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

To our witnesses, welcome. Secretary Napolitano, nice to see you. 

Director Mueller, thanks so much for your willingness to sign on 

for a longer tour of duty. We are grateful for that. And Mr. Olsen, 

it is nice to see you as well. 

My colleagues have heard me tell this story before, but it is 

worth repeating, and I am going to take this questioning in a little 

different direction. 

About 2 months ago, we had a hearing in the Finance Committee. The subject of the hearing was deficit reduction, and one 

of the witnesses was Alan Blinder who used to be Vice Chairman 

of the Federal Reserve when Alan Greenspan was Chairman. And 

he said in his testimony, unless we are serious about doing something about health care costs in this country—Medicare, Medicaid, 

and addressing health care costs—we are not going to really get a 

handle on the deficit. 

So anyway, all the witnesses finished their testimony. We were 

doing the question period, like this, and it came to me, and I said, 

Mr. Blinder, you said earlier if we do not do anything about health 

care costs—that is the 800-pound gorilla in the room—then we are 

really just playing around the edges. 

And he said, that is right. 

And I said, well, what would be your advice? What should we do? 

He teaches now at Princeton. But he said, I am not a health 

economist, but here is my advice: I would urge you to find out what 

works. Do more of that. 

That is all he said: Find out what works. Do more of that. 

And I said, I guess the corollary to that would be find out what 

does not work and do less of that. 

I think the same is true across government as we deal with the 

budget deficit. We are happy that the deficit is down. It is only 

going to be $1.3 trillion, I think, by the end of the year, but the 

red ink is as far as we can see. In everything that we do, we have 

to look at it through a prism that says is there a way to get a better result for less money, or a better result for the same amount 

of money. 

228 

And I would just ask of you today to talk with us about some of 

the things that we are doing that are working, where we need to 

invest a little more money, and maybe some things where we are 

spending money, frankly, that does not add a whole lot to our security. 

Madam Secretary, would you go first? Here is somebody who has 

had to live with balanced budgets in governing your State. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Right. 

Senator CARPER. You did a pretty good job, as I recall. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. Yes, we did have to balance 

the budget every year. 

First of all, I would resist the notion that some redundancy is 

wasteful. In the areas with which we deal, some redundancy is 

helpful because there is always the possibility that someone or 

something will get through one of the many layers of security that 

we have in place. So you have to evaluate redundancy differently 

in this arena, I think, than in some others. 

Second, we always have to plan for some human error in the universe with which I deal, which is who or what can get into the 

country, and how do we know who or what is in the country. 

So one of the major improvements that we have been able to accomplish over the last several years is to merge more and more 

databases that are very robust so that we can look at abnormal 

travel patterns and the like and to share that information. That is 

the kind of information we can share with the FBI, with the NCTC, 

when we are pulling the thread of a threat. 

So that is an improvement that we want to continue to make 

more robust and link up, again, as I said before, with the FBI, 

NCTC, and other agencies around town. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would look at it from two perspectives. First is 

internally. Every one of us are looking at where we can make savings—— 

Senator CARPER. Good. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Whether it be contractors or cutting 

down in a variety of ways that we are going to have to continue 

to do for the foreseeable future. 

More importantly for us is prioritization, and real prioritization. 

Not everything can be a priority. And for us, it is programs that 

we have, the particular crimes and threats that we see out there, 

and prioritizing our efforts to address those threats and assure that 

as we do that there is a metric for success as opposed to just arrests, indictments, and the like. 

Senator CARPER. We are pretty good at measuring process. We 

are not all that good in government in measuring outcomes. 

Mr. MUELLER. And results. So that is from that perspective. 

More generally, within the Federal Government, and particularly 

in our line of work, the ability for information technology to provide 

us not only the information we need, but to sort through that information and bring out that which we really need is something that 

we are all undergoing. It is part of having a federated search capability so that you can do searches across a variety of databases, 

both internally and externally. 

229 

And by doing that and developing that information technology 

capability, we will save a tremendous amount of money, but more 

particularly, we share the information across our agencies and 

have the ability for our analysts to do the kind of federated search 

that does not require them to go into one database, make a search, 

come out, and do another one. That is one of the keys in my mind 

to both information sharing of the future but also doing it in a financially responsible way. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. Mr. Olsen, do you want to 

add anything? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes. First, let me just say that we are, like the rest 

of the intelligence community, looking for ways to be more efficient 

in how we are using our resources, but I would make two points. 

The first follows up on Director Mueller’s point, and that is, at 

NCTC we are seeking to create what we have called a counterterrorism data layer, which is to take in all of the data that we can 

from DHS, FBI, and other agencies to be able to take advantage 

of advances in information technology, to be able to search across 

that data, exactly as Director Mueller said. 

The actual advances in technology make that a way to actually 

save money, instead of doing searches manually where you log into 

one system and then log into a separate system, having all that information available so you can search across a variety of databases 

and make those connections that you would not otherwise be able 

to make. 

The other initiative that I would identify, which I think has no 

real resource expenditure, is we have set up, as I mentioned in my 

opening statement, Pursuit Groups, which are analysts looking at 

the tactical level for connections that might not be obvious and 

then taking that information, those connections, and handing those 

off particularly to the FBI and to DHS as leads to follow up on. 

That is an area where we are focusing particularly in the aftermath of the Christmas Day attack in 2009. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Let me just conclude by recalling the 

words, as we begin a new football season, of Vince Lombardi who 

used to say, ‘‘If you are not keeping score, you are just practicing.’’ 

Another way to say that is, what we measure, we manage, and 

the idea of looking throughout the Federal Government to see what 

is working well, how can we invest more money there, and what 

is not, let us invest a little bit less money there. 

Secretary Napolitano, there are two departments in the Federal 

Government that I think are operating without audited financials. 

One of them is the Department of Defense. Secretary Panetta said 

to me that he is going to try to get there by 2017; he is going to 

push his people as hard as he can. And I think that is great, and 

we want to help him. 

Your new Department is making good progress, and I understand this is something you have put a priority on, and I urge you 

to keep doing that. 

Senator McCain and I have been pushing an idea that you had 

as a tool as governor, a line item veto. I had this tool as governor. 

We think the President ought to have that tool and just try it for 

4 years, a 4-year test drive, fully constitutional. I think everybody 

sitting in this room except maybe for one person has co-sponsored 

230 

that, and we have about 40 co-sponsors, and we are going to push 

that. 

And I call it a 4-year test drive of line item veto authority, and 

I think that could be part of the solution, not all of it, but in a day 

that we are looking for silver bullets, it is not a bad silver BB. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Carper. Senator 

Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I really do want to thank you all for your service, 

and I mean that in all sincerity. You do incredibly important work, 

and I certainly appreciate the work and effort that you put into 

your jobs. 

I remember watching the debate over whether you should even 

set up this Department. I think it was a very legitimate debate. 

I come from a background in manufacturing where you are always looking for continuous improvement. So my questions really 

are from that basis. So I do not want anybody taking offense. 

Getting ready for this hearing, ‘‘Are We Safer,’’ one of the questions I really asked was, are we as safe as we could be based on 

how much resource we are actually putting toward the problem 

here within the Department. 

So the first thing I was trying to determine is how much money 

is really wrapped up in the bureaucracy and the overhead of the 

Department of Homeland Security, and I looked for the 22 agencies 

that were consolidated. Their budget in 2002 was about $20 billion 

as best I can come up with. Now we are spending about $56 billion, 

almost a three-time increase. 

Do you know, I mean, do you have in your mind or in your budgeting process, how much really is the Department of Homeland Security bureaucracy versus how much is the expense based on the 

mission and putting real assets in place? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. It is a difficult question to answer because one of the key criticisms of the Department when it was 

stood up was that it did not have enough administration so that 

things like procurement, acquisitions, and planning were not adequately performed. That is, as Senator Carper mentioned, one of 

the reasons why there was not an audit capability of the Department. We are making great progress on that score. 

So you can call that bureaucracy. You can call it management. 

But the idea is to have as little management as possible to get the 

maximum out of a very large, complicated department. 

So I can go through component by component and say, when the 

Department was created, we had 7,000 border patrol agents. Now 

we have 21,000 border patrol agents, and they are in the field. 

I can go through and say, when we started the Department, the 

TSA really did not even exist, and that has almost had to be built 

from scratch, with the accompanying personnel, training, and technology. 

And I would be happy to sit with you and go through that and 

see where we are. 

231 

We are trying to keep the administrative arm as thin as possible, 

given what we are asked to manage and how we are asked to manage it. But the goal is, as I said earlier, Senator, to do that with 

as thin a layer of management as possible to enable and empower 

those in the field to do their jobs. 

Senator JOHNSON. One thing I would appreciate, if you could go 

back and take a look at the head count of the agencies that were 

consolidated as a basis. Then I could work it up in terms of now 

you have 230,000 employees in the Department; 63 are in the TSA. 

I know in earlier testimony, Director Mueller, we were concerned 

about how many FBI agents were really devoted to the task. I just 

want to ask your opinion. I do not want to put you on the spot 

here. But do you have frustrations in terms of the resources that 

are devoted to your activities versus what resources are necessarily 

spent in just department overhead? 

Mr. MUELLER. I had one of those consultants come in several 

years ago to look at our structure. We are very a flat-line structure. 

We have 56 field offices that really do the work around the country. 

And persons from the business community were saying that because they all report to one individual basically, you have a real 

problem in terms of coverage. 

They say, well, you are very thin in terms of management, but 

you are a very matrixed organization. And so, you do not go 

through the hierarchy. If somebody is doing counterterrorism in the 

field, they will call the counterterrorism person back at headquarters. 

And traditionally, we want more agents on the street, out in the 

various communities, doing the investigation. What we find from 

counterterrorism is that I cannot assign the responsibility for protecting the country to a particular office, and we have to integrate 

the information and manage the cases, not just domestically, but 

in concert with the CIA, NSA, and others that are looking at the 

cases internationally, which has required us to build up a capability at headquarters that we did not have before. 

That is frustrating. Everybody in my organization would like to 

be in the field, but in order to be effective, we have had to build 

a capability to coordinate our actions. 

Traditionally, bank robberies or white collar crimes will be in a 

particular division. In the cyber arena, you can affect persons in all 

50 States. You do not know where they are. 

In order to address the cyber intrusions, for instance, it takes a 

headquarters-managed oversight in order to do it. That is working 

day in and day out with DHS, NSA, CIA, and the other compartments. 

We try to stay as flat as we can be, but given the threats, we 

have had to develop new organizational structures to address them. 

Senator JOHNSON. In hindsight, in terms of coordinating that information, would possibly a more efficient model have been utilizing the counterterrorism center for that liaison, for that coordination effort? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the counterterrorism center is an analytical 

agent. What we provide is the immediate response to a lead any 

place in the country. If you have a threat such as we had last 

week, we have agents following up on aspects of that lead in every 

232 

one of the States in the country. And it is the combination of the 

analytical capability along with the operational ability to pursue 

that lead, interview people, do wires where appropriate and court 

orders, to do surveillances around the country, to do the forensics 

work that provides the intelligence, which is absolutely essential to 

bring to bear. 

NCTC has none of those capabilities. It is an analytical entity. 

Senator JOHNSON. Obviously, one of the tasks of the Department 

is response to a terrorism attack. Now you could take a look at the 

earthquake here in D.C. as somewhat of a dress rehearsal. I was 

not here, but I was told that cell phones would not work for hours. 

It was a mess getting out of town. There was not a real good evacuation plan. 

Have you taken a look at that instance and evaluated how prepared were we and did the Department perform the way you would 

have expected it to? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, yes, we look at all those instances. 

When you have a disaster that occurs, the private cell phone capability is often overwhelmed in the first instance. Everybody is trying to call out. 

A key question I asked was: Well, what about the responders? 

Were they able to be in touch with each other and to have effective 

interoperability? And as far as I know, the answer is yes. 

Now the second question relates to the evacuation of the Capital 

Region. We have had that issue with snowstorms. We had it with 

this recent earthquake. 

We have been working. There is a National Capital Region group 

that involves Virginia, Maryland, the District, and our Department, 

working with the Office of Personnel Management, quite frankly, 

in terms of how do you effect an orderly evacuation of the District. 

You do not have enough road coverage to do it very well, and that 

is the plain fact of it. But it can be done better, and that group is 

in ongoing sessions looking at how they can at least improve evacuation procedures, particularly if the Federal Government is going 

to go into shutdown. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Senator 

Moran. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MORAN 

Senator MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I would like to express my appreciation to our three witnesses for 

their presence here today, but more importantly, for their efforts 

to make Americans more safe and secure. I express gratitude on 

behalf of all Kansans for what you do. 

Madam Secretary, let me focus on an issue that has received 

some attention but in my view less than what we normally talk 

about in safety and security. We are often talking about transportation—airports, railroads, those kinds of things. 

There has been this genuine concern. In fact, the Graham-Talent 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission talked about agro-bioscience, the threat that comes from animal disease. Unfortunately, 

they gave us an F in their report on our preparation for that occurrence. 

233 

In my view, a real threat exists in our ability to deter, detect, 

and quarantine the introduction of any kind of disease into our 

food supply. 

We have a hearing this afternoon on this topic in which one of 

your officials from your Department will testify, but I would like 

to know your perspective 10 years later after 9/11. I think in fact 

slightly before 9/11, the President of Kansas State University, Jon 

Wefald, testified in front of an emerging threats hearing here in 

Washington, DC, about this issue. It was not something that a lot 

of us thought about. 

I would like to have you bring me up to date on where you think 

we are in regard to that threat. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think that threat is one of the many 

evolving threats that we continue to confront. One of the challenges, Senator, that we have been working on these last few years 

is to actually improve and replace our laboratory and diagnostic capability because one of the problems with these kinds of threats is 

exactly that. It is diagnostic, it is quarantine, and decisions need 

to be made on a very rapid basis if one of the sources of our food 

supply is beginning to be infected. 

We have been working with Kansas on the NBAF. One of, quite 

frankly, the concerns I have is that in the fiscal year 2012 budget— 

somebody will correct me if I am wrong, I am sure—I think the Department asked for $150 million for fiscal year 2012. The House 

mark was $75 million. The Senate mark was zero. I hope that can 

be explored, and perhaps in the conference between the House and 

the Senate, we can rectify that. 

That facility is, I think, necessary for really the next generation, 

not just for now but also for the future. And we need to always be 

thinking not only what is happening now but what we could be 

confronting, indeed, 10 years from now. 

Senator MORAN. I certainly appreciate your comments in regard 

to the scientific aspect of this. In addition, is there any sense across 

the country of how we are now prepared, or better prepared, or less 

prepared to respond to the introduction of some contaminate? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I would say overall we are better prepared. It obviously involves more departments other than just 

DHS, but there has been a lot of cross-departmental work. Some 

exercises have been done. Also, importantly, Customs and Border 

Protection, with respect to inspecting what can come into the country, has done a lot of work in this arena. 

Senator MORAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank 

you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Moran. You are next, 

Senator McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for their service, and Director Mueller, 

thank you very much for your willingness to continue to serve. 

Madam Secretary, are you aware of the Government Accountability Office report of September 12, 2011, addressed to Chairman 

Levin and me on the subject ‘‘Observations on the Costs and BeneVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00249 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
234 

fits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border’’? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I am not sure I am familiar with that 

particular report, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I would refer it to you for your reading. 

In the report it says, agency officials identified a number of 

broad issues and concerns surrounding expansion of DOD assistance in securing the Southwest border. Specifically, DOD officials 

expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy 

for Southwest border security and the resulting challenges to identify and plan a DOD role. 

Are you aware of the Department of Defense concerns about the 

absence of a comprehensive strategy for Southwest border security? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. As I said, I do not know that report, but 

I have spoken both with Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta 

about the fact that we do have a comprehensive border strategy, 

what it is and what roles DOD can play to assist us there. 

Senator MCCAIN. So you disagree with the DOD officials’ expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy for 

Southwest border security. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Vehemently. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I would be glad to hear about your strategy because I have failed to see one yet, nor have those residents 

of my State. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we have been trying to find a 

date to brief you over the last several months, and we just have 

not been able to arrive at one. But I am more than happy to come 

in and sit down with you again and go through what is happening. 

Senator MCCAIN. Madam Secretary, I would be glad to receive 

that briefing. We have had one meeting, which was highly unsatisfactory, and you might want to broadcast your strategy to the residents of the Southwest who also, certainly the governors and Senators, agree that there is no comprehensive strategy, along with 

the DOD officials who expressed concern. 

I am sure you are familiar, Madam Secretary, with Operation 

Fast and Furious. Given the high level of information sharing between the departments, were you made aware of the operation 

while it was underway? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. No. 

Senator MCCAIN. Let me be very clear for the record. You were 

unfamiliar with Operation Fast and Furious while the operation 

was underway. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is accurate. 

Senator MCCAIN. While weapons were transported from the 

Southwest and the State of Arizona to Mexico, obviously, as we 

know, with serious flaws in the operation, you were not aware of 

it. 

When was the first time you or someone within DHS was made 

aware of the operation? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I would have to go back and 

check, but it was, I think, around the time of the death of our 

agent in Southern Arizona. 

Senator MCCAIN. And what action did you take at that time, 

once you were informed? 

235 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, first of all, we want to make sure 

that the investigation into the cause of the death and prosecution 

was pursued vigorously, and that was being done. I did meet with 

the FBI agent in charge in Arizona at the time, and I was told that 

DOJ was referring the entire matter to the Inspector General. So 

we have reserved judgment until that report comes out. 

Senator MCCAIN. When were you made aware that guns, which 

were allowed to walk during Operation Fast and Furious, were 

used in the murder of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Sometime thereafter. I do not know a 

specific date, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Maybe you could supply that for the record. We 

would be interested. 

Have you come to any conclusions, Director Mueller, as to who 

was responsible for this operation? You are doing the investigation, 

right? 

Mr. MUELLER. Senator, we are doing the investigation of the killing of the Border Patrol Agent, and that has been pursued. There 

have been submissions made in court pursuant to that investigation. 

The investigation with regard to the approval of the operation 

itself is being conducted by the Inspector General’s Office of the 

Department of Justice. 

Senator MCCAIN. And have you reached any conclusion so far? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not privy to what the Inspector General’s investigation has shown at this juncture. 

I was concerned as I would be in terms of the extent to which 

there was FBI involvement, and I have reached the conclusion to 

believe that there was not FBI involvement in that particular operation. 

Senator MCCAIN. So your conclusion is, who was involved? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I mean, the fact of the matter is it is ATF, 

which was the principal agency involved. 

If you are asking about who was involved beyond ATF and the 

agents on the ground, or the others in the supervisory line, that is 

being investigated by the Inspector General’s Office, and I am not 

privy to their findings to date. 

Senator MCCAIN. So we leave it all to the Inspector General’s Office as to their conclusions. You, as Director, do not have any role. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we do not have a role in that particular aspect of the investigation. We have a very important role in bringing 

to justice those persons responsible for the death of the agent. 

Senator MCCAIN. But you are awaiting an Inspector General’s report. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. No. 

Mr. MUELLER. Not on that. We are pursuing that investigation 

as to who is responsible, what weapons were used in the killing of 

the Border Patrol Agent, and we are working with the prosecutor 

to make that—— 

Senator MCCAIN. And what conclusions have you arrived at? 

Mr. MUELLER. I believe that there are submissions made in court 

in support of—I would have to get back to you on where it is in 

terms of charging somebody. 

236 

Senator MCCAIN. It would be nice for you to get back to me, but 

we have a dead Border Patrol Agent. We have a situation which 

at least for a period of time was out of control. It has been now 

a number of weeks since this happened. And you would be glad to 

get back to me? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I do not know the specifics of what charges 

have been brought in Arizona with regard to that particular shooting. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, can you share with us what information 

you have? 

Mr. MUELLER. We have information relating to individuals who 

were there. We have individuals identified as a result of interviews 

we have conducted. We have done the forensics of the scenes. We 

have identified the weapons. We are pursuing the weapons. 

Senator MCCAIN. And when will all of that information be made 

privy to the American people? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, it is an ongoing criminal investigation. My 

expectation is that much of that information will be made available 

in the criminal proceedings that are brought against the individuals responsible for that killing. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Next is Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

I join all Americans across the world in mourning the loss of the 

thousands who died as a result of the terrorist attacks a decade 

ago. As we commemorate this solemn anniversary, we must acknowledge the tremendous progress over the past decade to secure 

our Nation against terrorist attacks. 

I want to commend both Administrations’ resolve and successful 

strategy to prevent another attack. We must also commend the 

men and women who serve bravely in the military, as well as the 

Federal, State, and local workers in homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence, and other fields who have made essential 

contributions to combating the terrorist threat. 

This anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on how the attacks 

still affect our lives today. We must remain vigilant so that privacy 

and civil liberties are not sacrificed in the name of security. As we 

reaffirm that we will never forget those who died 10 years ago, let 

us resolve to continue to take steps to ensure that such a tragedy 

will never happen again and to strengthen the principles upon 

which our Nation was founded. 

The former Chairman of the 9/11 Commission just released a report listing nine of their recommendations that remain unfinished, 

including the absence of a functioning Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Oversight Board. In April, I joined Senators Lieberman and Collins 

in a letter to the President, asking that he nominate a full slate 

of members so the board could operate. 

And I would like to ask these questions to the panel, and if any 

of you can comment, fine. Otherwise, if you can provide it for the 

record, that will be fine, too. 

237 

What is the status of the board being formed and how are 

counterterrorism efforts reviewed—and this is the important part— 

for privacy and civil liberty concerns, given that the board is dormant? 

Madam Secretary. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator Akaka, I do not know the status 

of the board itself. I can say that at the Department, we have a 

presidentially appointed Privacy Officer who runs a Privacy Office. 

They are integrated into all of our program planning, particularly 

with respect to information sharing and how that is done—making 

sure, for example, that when we enter into MOUs with the NCTC 

on the exchange of information, we include within those limitations 

on uses and users, audit, training and also that we, with respect 

to U.S. persons, put some special limitations on time of retention 

of certain types of records so that those kinds of privacy concerns 

we think about before we move forward. They are important to protect. 

Mr. MUELLER. Senator, we have three ways. 

The first is, we have attorney general guidelines—we have had 

them for a number of years—that guide our investigative activities. 

Second, we do also have an individual responsible for overseeing 

our particular initiatives from the perspective of impact on privacy 

and civil liberties. 

And third, again, when we have some form of initiative that is 

being undertaken, we have a panel review of that initiative, which 

has a person certainly from our legal counsel’s office but also from 

the Department of Justice that oversees that particular undertaking as being reviewed by the panel. 

Mr. OLSEN. Senator, I do not know the status of the board, but 

I would say that at NCTC, we really have what I would consider 

to be three layers of oversight that consider our activities from a 

civil liberties and privacy perspective. 

First, internally, we have a Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer 

assigned to NCTC. The sole purpose of his role is to review our activities from that perspective. We also have attorneys within the 

General Counsel’s Office of the DNI who conduct somewhat the 

same activities with respect to our work. 

Second, all of our handling of U.S. person information is done 

pursuant to attorney general guidelines as Director Mueller made 

reference to. As well, when we handle information that was obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the FISA 

Court has a role in overseeing that activity. 

And then finally, I would mention that we are subject to very robust congressional oversight through the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Secretary Napolitano, as you know, the Asia-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation leaders’ meetings will be held in Honolulu, Hawaii, in 

November. This high profile event has raised concerns that Hawaii 

could be a target of a terrorist attack. Local residents have also expressed concerns about the Island of Oahu being locked down as 

a result of security measures. 

238 

How are the U.S. Secret Service-led security plans progressing 

and how will they inform the public about areas to avoid and businesses impacted by security measures? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Senator. The meeting you 

reference has been designated a National Special Security Event, 

a meeting for which the Secret Service will provide lead organizational responsibilities, but we will work very closely and are integrated with officials in Hawaii and local law enforcement. They are 

an integral part of planning and execution in any NSSE event. 

As the event gets closer, there will be a public relations plan, for 

lack of a better phrase, to make the public aware of what areas will 

be closed down and the like. 

One thing I would say to reassure the residents of Oahu is when 

we do these NSSEs, we are very conscious of the fact that people 

actually live in these cities and they still need to get to work and 

school, and so forth. For example, next week, we will have the U.N. 

General Assembly convene, and we will have many national leaders in New York City, and still New York City will work and people 

will be able, and have been able, to get to where they need to go 

for the most part. 

So we are very sensitive to that. We acknowledge that. I just use 

the General Assembly as an example of an event that is perhaps 

even more complex than the one in Oahu to say that we have some 

experience here and we will deploy our best efforts in Hawaii. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. Senator Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL 

Senator PAUL. Thank you, and thank you to the panel for coming 

today and these presentations. 

Secretary Napolitano, we have admitted about 70,000 Iraqis over 

the past 3 years. Two of which I think Senator Collins brought up 

earlier were arrested recently in Bowling Green on accusations of 

conspiring to be involved with terrorism. 

I can kind of understand that after we lost the war in Vietnam, 

the communists took over and people who sided with us or fought 

with us would be executed. But my understanding is we won the 

war in Iraq, and we are admitting 70,000 Iraqis when we won the 

war and there is a democracy over there. 

What reason do we have to be admitting so many, and is the policy of the Administration to continue to admit so many, and is it 

not a danger to our country and overwhelming us with numbers of 

folks who have to be screened and apparently sometimes are not 

screened properly? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, Senator, as I explained earlier, we 

have now gone back and rescreened the Iraqi population who were 

admitted as refugees against all of the DHS databases, the NCTC 

databases, and the Department of Defense biometric databases, 

and for any future refugees, we will continue to do the same. 

And then, if there are particular hits or particular concerns on 

individuals, we refer them sometimes to the FBI to do further investigation or checking. 

239 

Senator PAUL. Does the Administration have a position though 

on admitting so many people and continuing to admit so many people from Iraq? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, the refugee program was begun 

under the prior Administration, Senator, and many of the individuals who have been rechecked were admitted then. 

With respect to the current time, if people qualify for refugee status under the law, they will be permitted to come in, but they will 

be vetted. 

Senator PAUL. I understand the number though is determined by 

the Administration. Your Administration determines the number, 

and if you decided you wanted to have 3,000 next year, my understanding is under the law you could. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. My understanding, Senator, is that is 

being done primarily by the State Department and a number of 

considerations are taken into account. 

Senator PAUL. The argument is that it is unsafe in Iraq, but I 

think it is sort of an insult to our soldiers who are over there to 

say that it is unsafe. Our soldiers are still there protecting their 

country, but it is so unsafe that Iraqis get to leave and come over 

here. 

I guess really to add insult to injury is not only do we bring them 

over here, but both of these people who are accused of terrorism 

in our country were living in government housing and on food 

stamps. 

Now in the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, we said that if you come 

here legally through immigration, you would not qualify for welfare. I think we should change that. 

Does the Administration have a position on refugee status and 

whether or not they should be coming here and immediately put 

on welfare? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I cannot answer that question 

right now. I will get back to you. 

Senator PAUL. Bowling Green seems to have been in the news— 

Bowling Green, Kentucky, where I am from. We had a little girl 

from Bowling Green, who was on Good Morning America, who had 

a TSA agent do an invasive search inside of her clothing, inside of 

her pants. We had an 8-month-old who had his diaper inspected. 

Then we had a 95-year-old who had his diaper taken off and inspected and stayed, I presume, for hours waiting to get through the 

TSA. 

Earlier this year, TSA Administrator Pistole said that we need 

to do these invasive searches, and he said that we may slow down 

or we may not do them as much. 

But then he sent me a letter and said that we absolutely have 

to because an 8-year-old in Kandahar exploded a bomb. 

To me, I think that shows a bit of naivete to think that somehow 

there is a similarity between an 8-year-old in Kandahar and an 8- 

year-old in Bowling Green, Kentucky. I mean, the only similarity 

is their age, and I would not consider age to be a risk factor. If anything, age might argue against a risk. But to say that she is the 

same age as someone who exploded a bomb in Kandahar—I mean, 

we have to bring some sense to what we are doing in this country. 

After 10 years, why do we not have a frequent flyer program? 

240 

A big bulk of those traveling are traveling two to three times a 

week, and yet, we treat everybody equally as a terror suspect. In 

doing so, we take away time that could be spent on those who 

would be. 

I would have a frequent flyer program. I would have it in a 

month, and I would take half of the TSA agents, and I would have 

them looking at the manifests of those flying from foreign countries. I would want to know who is on every flight. 

I do not know how far in advance we are doing this, or if we are 

doing it, I would like to know a month in advance. 

I would make strict rules on those flying internationally. I think 

that is the biggest risk. 

With those 70,000 people coming from Iraq, we say that we are 

going to vet them, but we missed fingerprints that they had on an 

IED. Even if we do things perfectly, the haystack is too big. 

Think of our army. We have people about once every couple of 

months in Iraq or Afghanistan who we admit into the Army to help 

us. They are supposedly our allies, and they turn around and shoot 

us. It is hard to vet these people. 

This was an extraordinary circumstance that we had a fingerprint and we missed it, but most of the time they could be completely lying to us as they go through the vetting process. We bring 

them here, put them on government welfare, and then they are 

here to attack us. 

We have enough problems in our country. We have a lot of poverty in our country. We do not need to be admitting the world’s 

poverty problems, and I think the Administration needs to take a 

position to lessen the numbers of people coming in from Iraq. 

You need to take a position and move forward on a frequent flyer 

program, and we need to not just be told there is some day going 

to be risk assessment. We need to start doing risk assessment and 

paying attention to the people who could attack us, and not wasting and diverting our time and resources and insulting the dignity 

of those who are traveling. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will simply say 

with respect to the movement to a risk-assessed based strategy in 

the TSA, that is exactly what we are doing. And as I said earlier 

in the hearing, we will be rolling out slowly because you have to 

train agents as you do this. We move almost 1.8 million passengers 

a day, and we always have to have a certain amount of randomness 

and unpredictability in the system because the minute you say an 

entire group is exempt from screening, they can be exploited as a 

possibility. 

But your point about travelers who are low risk is something 

that we accept. We are moving to expand the global entry, which 

is for international travelers. We just passed our 1 millionth traveler. We are moving to expand that. 

We are moving to loosen restrictions on children under the age 

of 12 and also to amend the pat-down procedures that are used. 

So these improvements are underway, but I would caution, Senator, that when you say do it in a month, we need to move on a 

deliberate pace but a careful pace. Our adversaries are very determined, and they are very determined with respect to the aviation 

system. We want to make sure that we do it right. 

241 

Senator PAUL. One quick follow-up to that. Really, I agree with 

you. It is probably not that smart to say absolutely that we are 

never going to search anyone under 12 years old. But for goodness 

sake, could we not make a difference between an 8-year-old from 

Bowling Green and an 8-year-old from Kandahar? 

I do not mind if someone is coming from Pakistan or Afghanistan 

next week, that you spend a little more time, but we need to understand and use more common sense with what we do. And it really 

would, in practical purpose, mean that probably 99 percent of kids 

under 12 would not be patted down, and that would be a lot better 

for most of us who are insulted by what they are doing now. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Paul. Thank you. Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Sorry that 

I could not be here for most of this because I was chairing, as you 

know and Senator Collins knows, the Armed Services Committee 

hearing on the confirmation of Ash Carter. 

Let me welcome you all. I join my colleagues in doing that. 

Director Olsen, let me start with you. I think you note in your 

prepared testimony that the homegrown violent extremist activity 

remains elevated with U.S.-based extremists taking inspiration and 

instruction from al-Qaeda’s global efforts in a wide range of its 

English language propaganda. Part of that propaganda was a recent online video released by an American-born confirmed al-Qaeda 

operative in which he urges al-Qaeda followers and sympathizers 

to exploit U.S. gun laws and to purchase firearms. 

Now, under current gun laws, individuals are allowed to purchase a firearm without an FBI background check if they are buying from a private seller, such as those at gun shows. Does that 

loophole make it easier, in your judgment, for homegrown extremists to purchase firearms for use in a terror attack? 

Mr. OLSEN. Senator, I have not looked at the gun laws and after 

4 weeks in my position would be reluctant to comment on that. 

Senator LEVIN. Will you comment on that and get us a report? 

Mr. OLSEN. Yes, sir. 

MR. OLSEN’S RESPONSE TO SENATOR LEVIN’S QUESTION 

Response: As Senator Levin points out, individuals who purchase firearms from 

federally licensed firearms dealers are subject to background checks. Individuals 

who purchase firearms from private sellers are not subject to FBI background 

checks. Federal law makes it unlawful for certain categories of persons, such as convicted felons, to transport, possess, or receive any firearm or ammunition. See 18 

U.S.C. § 922. It is my understanding that the FBI uses the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) to determine whether individuals seeking to 

purchase firearms from federally licensed firearms dealers are eligible to make such 

purchases. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. And with that FBI background check of individuals purchasing a firearm from private individuals, in your judgment, would that help reduce the threat to us from U.S.-based violent extremists? 

242 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to put it like this: A background 

check is important in identifying those persons who have some reason for being in the databases, and enhanced coverage of the purchase of weapons would give us a greater ability to identify persons 

who should not have weapons and prevent them from getting 

weapons. 

Senator LEVIN. That would include the purchase from private 

sellers such as at gun shows? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Fifty States now form nearly 2 million new corporations each 

year without knowing who really owns them. The failure to collect 

ownership information—the actual owners, so-called beneficial 

owners—invites wrongdoers to misuse U.S. companies for terrorism, money-laundering, tax evasion, and other crimes. It is a 

subject this Committee has been examining now for some years. 

In August, Senator Grassley and I introduced S. 1483, the Incorporation and Transparency in Law Enforcement Assistance Act 

that would require disclosure of beneficial ownership information 

in the company formation process. 

At that time, the Treasury Department was very supportive and 

announced the following: ‘‘The bill would substantially advance the 

Administration’s fundamental interest in ensuring the availability 

of meaningful beneficial ownership information about companies 

created in the United States.’’ 

And they went on: ‘‘Such legislation is critical to the Administration’s objective of protecting the global financial system and strategic markets from abuse.’’ 

So we want to first of all thank the Treasury Department for 

that support, and we are wondering, Secretary Napolitano, whether 

or not the Department of Homeland Security takes the same supportive position that we need to know for law enforcement purposes, just for law enforcement purposes, who the beneficial owners 

of the corporations are in order to prevent terrorists and other 

malfeasers from misusing shell corporations to launder money or 

for other nefarious purposes. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, we support it. 

Senator LEVIN. I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can take 

up this bill again. I know you have had it on the agenda a couple 

times, and it has, for various reasons, been on and off our markup. 

But I think it is important that we have the testimony from law 

enforcement here this morning that we need to do what other countries do, by the way. We go after these tax havens for allowing 

their jurisdictions to be used to avoid taxes from being paid, but 

one of the things they do at least is they get the beneficial owners 

of corporations on record so that they know who actually owns the 

shell corporations, at least in many cases. 

And I would hope that, again, we would be able to take that up, 

and the support of the Treasury Department and the Department 

of Homeland Security is very helpful. I just wanted to get that on 

the record for us. 

On the Northern border, the GAO in February reported that 

there are serious security threats to the Northern border and that 

the risk of terrorist activity is high. It said that DHS reports—now 

243 

this is the GAO saying that the DHS reports—that the terrorist 

threat on the Northern border is higher than on the Southern border, given the large, expansive area with limited law enforcement 

coverage. That was on page one of that report. 

However, even with that high risk of terrorist and other illegal 

activity on the border, the Border Patrol reports that ‘‘only 32 of 

nearly 4,000 Northern border miles in fiscal year 2010 had reached 

an acceptable level of security.’’ 

I am wondering if you would tell us here today or for the record, 

Secretary Napolitano, whether that number of Northern border 

miles has increased. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I believe it has, and as we have discussed 

in other contexts, that use of the phase operational control is a 

term of art. 

We have a Northern border strategy. It had to be cleared by 

OMB. It now has been completed, but we want to update it with 

the full fiscal year’s statistics prior to publishing. It will be published shortly. 

The other change I think that is very significant is what is called 

the Beyond the Border strategy that we now have with Canada, 

which is a law enforcement information sharing perimeter-oriented 

strategy that really did not exist 2 years ago when I think a lot 

of that report was probably researched. That is going to be of enormous importance because it takes pressure off of the physical U.S.- 

Canadian border and allows us to expand the border outward. 

Senator LEVIN. If you could, in your own words, get us the number of miles of border that have an acceptable level of security. I 

do not mean now. Get it to us for the record, if you would. 

Very quickly, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, 

but I just have one more question and then I have a thank you. 

The Urban Areas Security Initiative has a very complex funding 

allocation formula, and one of the questions is whether or not a location is on an international waterway. For reasons which are totally incomprehensible, Detroit is not listed as being on an international waterway when it is. The Detroit River is an international 

waterway between the United States and Canada, and not only 

that, it has more commerce crossing that river at Detroit than any 

other place probably in the world, much less in the country, in 

terms of commerce crossing that bridge particularly in Detroit. 

Will you take a look at that, Madam Secretary, that issue of 

whether or not Detroit is on an international waterway? Find out 

for us why the City of Detroit is not listed because it makes a difference in terms of allocation of resources. So will you take a look 

at that? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I will drill down on that for you, 

Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Finally, a thank you. Two days ago we remembered 9/11. And following 9/11, there was a small group of people 

in Detroit representing the Arab-American community and representing law enforcement that came together and formed a group 

called BRIDGES. 

And there has been a really strong connection between the law 

enforcement community under the leadership of the U.S. Attorney 

in Detroit, but including also elements of the Homeland Security 

244 

Department, so that the communication is far better. The trust is 

far better. They work shoulder to shoulder now against violence 

and hatred. It is an important group because if you have the support of community, whatever community it is, working with law enforcement, it is a great source of American security. 

And that kind of support in the Arab-American community, in 

the Muslim-American community is reflected in that group where 

law enforcement—Federal law enforcement and State and local law 

enforcement—are represented for frequent meetings. They also memorialized their anniversary the other day with their annual dinner. 

And it is a very reassuring thing to see law enforcement in our 

communities, period, whatever the community is, working so closely together. That is where security is really enhanced. It is not just 

the typical law enforcement security, which is important—protecting borders and doing other things—but it is also having the 

support of the people in our neighborhoods, in our communities 

working shoulder to shoulder with law enforcement. 

I just want to commend you both. The FBI is actively involved 

in that. The Justice Department, U.S. Attorney, and also your elements of DHS are very much involved. And it was kind of heartwarming to see that, and we all feel a lot more secure when that 

is true. Thank you. 

Thank you. I am sorry I went over. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, thank you. I join you in that thank 

you. The Bureau actually was out there right after 9/11, and that 

probably surprised a lot of people, in outreaching to the MuslimAmerican community, and it continues to do that. We appreciate 

that. 

Senator Collins and I would like to ask just one or two more 

questions. You are a very steadfast, resilient group, and I am sure 

that you have faced worse challenges than the two of us, and just 

for a few minutes more. 

I want to ask you a wrap-up question. We have had a lot of good 

testimony, good discussion. Of course, I feel very positively about 

what we have accomplished over the last 10 years. Looking to the 

next year, let me know what your top one or two priorities are of 

what is not done to your satisfaction yet in terms of your Department, your Bureau, and your Center. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, our Department has so 

many elements to it, but I think over the next year, we will continue to improve and expand information sharing and analytic capability with the FBI, NCTC, and other agencies within the Department and outside the Capital Area to the rest of the country. 

I believe that cybersecurity will be an increasing area of focus for 

us as we deal with, as Director Mueller said, really that emergent 

threat in the cyber world. 

I think we will see over the next year a movement toward a more 

risk-based screening process for passengers, particularly in the air 

environment. 

And last, we want to move toward, we call it—and you heard it 

in the video that you began the hearing with—one DHS. We are 

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volved with putting 22 agencies together, and I think we will see 

even more progress in the year ahead. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. All right. You have a busy year ahead of 

you. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. First would be the federated searches capability, 

both internally and externally, so that while we have to keep, for 

a variety of reasons, different database structures, there has to be 

the ability to pull information very easily from those databases. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Give us a little background for people listening. 

Mr. MUELLER. If we have information off a FISA intercept, there 

are minimization procedures, or procedures about to whom that information can be disseminated—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Which requires us to keep it in a separate database. But what you want to do is give the analysts the 

ability to understand if there is anything in that database on a particular individual, email address, or the like. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER. While for a variety of reasons we have to keep 

separate databases, whether it be from security or from statutory 

direction, there has to be the ability to do the federated searches 

across those databases, both internally as well as externally, which 

is where NCTC is putting a great deal of its effort. 

So we all have to get our own houses in order in order to be the 

platform for the government as a whole to be able to do this kind 

of search capability. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you need statutory changes to do that? 

Mr. MUELLER. It would be difficult, if you take the FISA statute, 

for instance. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. We have just gone through the update of the PATRIOT Act, and I am not certain it is something that would easily 

get through. So while conceivably you could do it, it is unlikely to 

happen very shortly, and consequently, we have to utilize technology. 

Second, as pointed out earlier, is the cyber arena. Adjusting our 

organizations to address the cyber threat in new ways that will 

make us more effective as a united entity is going to be a huge 

issue. 

Third, is the necessity for assuring that new mechanisms of communication that are being developed daily by the new entrepreneurial information technology capabilities by various companies— 

I do not want to necessarily name them here—but it is not just the 

communications carriers that carry communications now. It is 

Google, Facebook, all of them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER. And the necessity of assuring that in response to 

a court order giving us the right to obtain those communications, 

there is the capability of those persons or those entities to respond 

to those court orders is something that I will be addressing. We 

cannot afford, as we say, to go dark. 

The last thing I would say very quickly is with enhanced information technology comes additional administrative burdens. One of 

246 

the challenges we have is to make certain that our agents or people 

are spending their time on the substance—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. And removing some of the administrative burdens and obstacles to getting out there and doing the 

work that we want to pay them to do. That, for us, is an issue that 

we continuously fight. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So it is a substantive list. On that third 

one, about gaining access to information from the unconventional, 

the new communications media, that might require legislation? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think it will. I think you may see some suggestion with regard to legislation. And I would say most of the companies are very patriotic and working on capabilities, but we have to 

make certain that they have the capability to respond to the court 

orders. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right, because a lot of times those recipients of court orders want the statute to make clear their obligations. 

Mr. MUELLER. True. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Olsen. 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Picking up on the theme of information sharing, it is similar at 

NCTC. As you both know very well, the founding principle of 

NCTC was to break down the silos of information and provide a 

place where information from the CIA, DHS, the FBI, and NSA 

could be brought together. We have made significant progress in 

doing that, largely through bringing people together in one place 

from each of those organizations. 

I think the next step in that process is to have that information. 

We have much of it but to continue to gather that information, ingest it, have it available at NCTC where we then can do exactly 

what Director Mueller talked about at NCTC—search across databases, not have an analyst go to one database, go to another database, and go to a third, but be able to find the connections that are 

so elusive by being able to search seamlessly across all those databases. So that is one, and that is a significant priority for us. 

Second, I mentioned the Pursuit Group. I think that there is a 

lot of potential there. This was something started in 2010 to fill a 

gap by looking for less obvious connections among pieces of information, among people, and then to be able to tip those leads off to 

the operational entities that can follow up, whether that is CIA, 

FBI, or DHS. I think there is a lot of potential there, and I am 

going to continue to focus on that. 

And third is an area I know that is of significance to both of you, 

and that is countering violent extremism. This is an area where 

NCTC has played a vital role, and I think we will play an increasingly important role in the next year in particular as we do a couple of things, but the one I will highlight right now is to develop 

the implementation plan for the Administration’s new framework, 

a strategy for countering violent extremism. 

We have done a number of things on the intelligence side and on 

the operational planning side to prepare law enforcement to understand the radicalization process, to help communities understand 

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munities, but there is a significant amount of work to do in this 

area, and I think NCTC is going to play an important role. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We agree. As you may know, Senator Collins and I just sent a letter to Mr. Brennan, expressing disappointment with a lot of that report, and a lot of the disappointment had 

to do with the lack of detail, a lack of clarity, at least as we read 

it, about who was in charge but also what is going to happen. 

Insofar as you are going to put some flesh on the bones, or whatever the metaphor is, clarify that urgently, that would be very important. 

I thank all three of you. It is interesting how much cyber comes 

up. And also, these remarkable instruments of data analysis retention, which have helped us enormously, just were in play in the 

last week with the latest threat stream. But we can yet do better 

at that, as you have all said. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Olsen, let me take up where you just left off because I was 

going to talk to you about who is the lead for countering violent 

extremism. 

I know that the White House is the lead for policy and put out 

what is in our view a disappointingly sketchy strategy. But is the 

NCTC going to be the operational lead for implementation? 

Mr. OLSEN. We will not be the lead for the operational implementation. The National Security Staff and the National Security 

Council at the White House has the lead for developing the policy. 

And we at NCTC play a role and will be front and center in developing the implementation plan, putting the flesh on the bones for 

that broad policy, but the agencies and departments with specific 

authorities and responsibilities in each area will be responsible for 

operationally implementing that plan. 

I think the overall picture, as I understand it, is centralized policy development but decentralized operational implementation because there is a number of agencies and departments that have a 

particular expertise or role or set of authorities that they can take 

advantage of. 

Senator COLLINS. I share the concern of the Chairman that we 

do not have one person who is accountable to Congress, who is in 

charge of the strategy. I mean one of the problems of running it 

out of the White House is the individuals on the President’s staff 

are not accountable to Congress. So for us to exercise oversight in 

this extremely important area becomes impossible. 

I am going to push with the Chairman to continue to argue that 

we need one person accountable to Congress who is clearly in 

charge of the strategy for CVE and for homegrown terrorism. I am 

glad that NCTC is involved, but it sounds like everybody has a 

piece of it. I understand why that can be desirable, but there has 

to be one person in charge. 

Let me, because I know we are wrapping up, switch to two other 

issues I want to touch on before we adjourn. I, too, am pleased to 

hear the priority placed on cyber security. When I look at the 

threats that we face that I feel we are least prepared for, cyber attacks, homegrown terrorism, and chemical/biological weapons top 

my list. 

248 

I read just recently a very interesting piece that General Michael 

Hayden wrote in which he argued that government is being too secretive about cyber security vulnerabilities, which, in turn, prevents the private sector from sufficiently addressing the threat and 

how to address it. 

He says, ‘‘Let me be clear: This stuff is overprotected. It is far 

easier to learn about physical threats from U.S. Government agencies than to learn about cyber threats.’’ 

And that is one reason the Chairman and I, along with Senator 

Carper, have introduced a bill. It mirrors many of the recommendations of the Department of Homeland Security and the Administration to require the government to share actionable cyber information with the private sector. 

I would like to ask the Secretary and you, Director Mueller, what 

you see as the biggest impediments to the timely sharing of cyber 

threat information and also cyber breaches with the private sector 

and with other agencies. I will start with you, Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. On the one hand, there is some reluctance of the 

business community to share breach information with the government. That, I think, is going to be addressed, and we would want 

that to go to DHS and the FBI, so we can act very quickly on it. 

It is interesting to see General Hayden articulating this particular view. He probably could answer the other side of it, and if 

he were here 2 years ago, he would have been answering the other 

side of it. 

Senator COLLINS. That is true. I appreciated the irony also. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, there is a very substantial imperative that to 

the extent possible, we share the information that will allow the 

private industry to protect itself from cyber intrusions to the extent 

that it does not disclose capabilities that we need elsewhere. 

It is not only a criminal case for an intrusion in the United 

States, it is also often a national security risk, which we have to 

treat as a national security risk, and there are capabilities out 

there that you do not want to be disclosed because you would lose 

that capability. 

And so, it is sometimes a difficult balancing act to make certain 

we push out as much information as we can, and we should. But 

there are some good reasons often that you cannot give as much 

detail as you would like, but you can give a generalized warning. 

But there are some equities on the other side that we cannot go 

into here. I do believe—and I think the Secretary can probably address it—we are making great strides in trying to make available 

information that 2 or 3 years ago we would not have been able to 

do and are currently doing. 

Senator COLLINS. Madam Secretary, do you have anything to 

add? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, first of all, I hope the legislation 

moves forward. I think it is a good piece of legislation and necessary to establish authorities and jurisdiction, and the like. So we 

will work with you in that endeavor. 

We need to keep focused on building out our information sharing 

capabilities at DHS through the US-CERT, through the NCIC facility and others. We have worked with the DOD on our ability to use 

some of the assets of the NSA under appropriate circumstances. 

249 

But the whole cyber arena, from a DHS perspective, is going to 

be a growth area. The information sharing with the private sector, 

particularly critical infrastructure aspects of the private sector, will 

be key for us, and then as Director Mueller said, getting information back in a timely fashion. And all of this needs to move very 

quickly. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Finally, I want to touch on the decision to make public the threat of last weekend. 

The Sergeant at Arms sent out an email message to, I believe, 

all employees of the Senate as well as to all Senators in which he 

talks about the announcement and says that the announcement 

was ‘‘well intentioned, perhaps helpful, but not very well coordinated.’’ This obviously worries me because the Sergeant at Arms is 

a key player when it comes to protecting the Washington, DC, area. 

We followed up with the Sergeant at Arms. First, let me say that 

he said that coordination is 100 percent better than it used to be, 

that the FBI’s local office had worked very closely with them. 

But here is what he said happened. First, he was told—as we 

were, I might add—that the information was classified and closely 

held, and as he said, that is pretty typical and an understanding 

approach. 

But then he said that the decision to go public caught them off 

guard. They were out of the loop, and essentially, it sounds like 

they learned about it on television. What is your response to this 

critique? 

And again, so that I am not taking this out of context, he did 

praise the local FBI office, he did say that coordination is 100 percent better than it used to be, but he said the decision to go public 

took them by surprise. And that, it seems to me, should not have 

happened, given what a key player the Sergeant at Arms is since 

he controls the Capitol Police. Madam Secretary. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. It is kind of difficult to respond out of 

context. The decision was made to share the threat because it was 

credible and specific and to share it out through joint bulletins. 

There was a Joint Intelligence Bulletin with the FBI, to share it 

out through law enforcement, particularly in the affected areas, 

which were Washington, DC, and New York, which were the targets of the threat stream. 

There was not a public elevation of the threat because the information was already getting out and actions were already being 

taken in response so that when he says he did not know it was 

going public, if he means there was some kind of public press release, there was not. There was information that was shared 

through law enforcement channels, as it should have been, for law 

enforcement to be more aware of what the threat was and what to 

watch for. 

So whether or not he received that information, I do not know, 

but the information was put out through law enforcement channels. 

Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. We take the position from September 11. To the 

extent that we have threat information and imminent threat information that is specific to a particular jurisdiction—New York, 

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250 

sons responsible for securing those communities should have the 

information. And we find a way to get it to them, whether it be a 

bulletin or through the Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

Inevitably, that opens the circle of persons who have information 

on that threat. 

Inevitably, the person responsible, whether it be in New York or 

Washington, DC, the police chief or otherwise, says, I have to respond to this threat. And so, you will have actions taken in each 

of the jurisdictions that are affected that raise the public’s consciousness. 

And often, as a result of the raised public consciousness, there 

has to be an explanation of why you are doing car stops or why you 

have more people on the street. 

And it is that cycle where the information comes out without a 

conscious decision at one particular point in time—we are going to 

go public. The reports come in. The questions come in. And the decision is made that you have to give as much information as you 

can to put it in particular context. 

If it has happened once, it has happened 50 times since September 11. 

And if I get one criticism from State and local law enforcement 

officials, it is always: Director, why do I have to hear about it on 

CNN? 

And the fact of the matter is the combination of wanting to inform people who are immediately affected by it with the understanding, as you open the circle, it is going to get on CNN probably 

sooner rather than later. It is a fact of life. 

Senator COLLINS. It is, and I do not disagree in any way with the 

decision to go public because I think you want more people on the 

alert. I think you want the average citizen watching for suspicious 

activity. But it does trouble me if a person such as the Sergeant 

at Arms, in such a key position, did not know that there was going 

to be a decision made to go public. 

So I would be happy to share the email that he sent to all of us 

with you. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would like to see it, and we will be talking. 

Senator COLLINS. And he does an excellent job. 

Mr. MUELLER. He is terrific. He is terrific and a great partner 

with us. 

Senator COLLINS. Let me just be clear on that, which is why I 

brought up his concern. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

And of course, he was previously the Chief before he became the 

Sergeant. So he has the background. 

So it is interesting. I do not want to keep you any longer really, 

but there was not a decision really made, for instance in the White 

House, to go public with this information. There was a decision 

made, for all the factors you indicate, to disseminate part of the information that you had on the threat to State and local law enforcement at a for-official-use-only level, not classified. But the presumption is, based on experience, that once you do that, people are 

going to start talking and it is going to find its way to the media. 

So have I got it right? 

251 

1The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller appears in the Appendix on page 994. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, and the person, the recipient, the police chief, 

or others responsible for public security in that community, has to 

take steps. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. If you take steps to respond to that threat, the 

question is going to be asked, why are you taking these steps? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER. So it is a response to questions that inevitably 

build up as you go forward and the local communities or the Federal community take the steps necessary to address the threat. 

Senator COLLINS. But, Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Senator COLLINS. Was there not a press statement actually put 

out by the Department of Homeland Security? When we were 

briefed by John Brennan, he told us that DHS was going to be the 

lead on the public announcement. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, but that was later on in the sequence. That was not at the immediate time that we put out the 

FOUO document, as I recall. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good enough. Incidentally, I think Senator Collins already said this. We discussed this. We both felt that 

this was a case where the balance of public interest and safety was 

in putting this information out, not everything, but that there had 

been a specific, credible, unconfirmed threat. 

Before we close, Senator Rockefeller has filed a statement with 

the Committee, which I want to include, without objection, in the 

record, in which he discusses the importance of allocating the Dblock to first responders, and I agree with him totally.1

I want to thank all of you again. It is just very impressive what 

you and all the people who work with you have done over the last 

10 years. 

We are at a time of national pessimism, and a lot of it is understandable because of the economy. But it just seems to me if people 

in the country will think back to 9/11 and think what we have done 

since. We stood up two new organizations here, and the third, the 

FBI, was dramatically transformed. The benefit is an enormously 

improved homeland security. 

I do not think there is another country in the world that could 

have done it as well as we did. Frankly, without being too explicit, 

there are other countries in the world, close friends of ours, who 

probably should have done a lot of what we did and have not yet. 

But in any case, really, I think we all have reason to be grateful 

to you and, again, everybody who works with you on our behalf. So 

I thank you. 

It has been a very informative and encouraging hearing. And the 

work is not over, as we all know, and I look forward to continuing 

to work with you all. 

The record of the hearing will be held open for 15 days for any 

additional questions or statements. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at approximately 12:38 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(253) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: A STATUS REPORT 

ON INFORMATION SHARING 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:34 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Good morning and welcome to all of our witnesses, who I thank 

very much for coming here today to help us review the status of 

information sharing among law enforcement intelligence communities at all levels of government in the United States and to determine what, if anything, we still should be doing to achieve yet 

better information integration and, therefore, a higher level of 

homeland security. 

Just yesterday, we witnessed the stunning outcome of brilliant 

information sharing when the Department of Justice announced it 

had uncovered a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the 

United States here in the United States. The case began apparently with the Drug Enforcement Administration in Texas and 

Mexico before it was handed off to the FBI, and eventually to the 

Attorney General’s Office, I presume, though it has not been explicitly said. The components of the intelligence community were also 

involved at various points. The system really worked brilliantly 

and the men and women in the field did exactly what they were 

supposed to do, and as a result, we are all safer, including the 

Saudi ambassador. 

This has not always been the case, which is why we are holding 

this hearing. This is the ninth in a year-long series of hearings, 

this year being the 10th anniversary, so to speak, of 9/11, in which 

we are assessing progress made on key government functions that 

the 9/11 Commission recommended we overhaul. Information sharing was a particularly important matter to the Commission because 

it concluded, as we all remember, that the attacks of 9/11 might 

have been prevented had our intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies shared intelligence they had gathered and had in their 

possession separately to create an overall picture of what was to 

come on 9/11. Agencies were mired in what the Commission deVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00269 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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scribed as a ‘‘need to know’’ culture for sharing information, whereas the Commission said what we should be aspiring to is a ‘‘need 

to share’’ rule. 

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, with the focus on this problem, Congress moved to strengthen information sharing among 

critical Federal agencies in the Patriot Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Once the 9/11 Commission released its 

report and its recommendations, we worked on a bipartisan basis 

coming out of this Committee to enact the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which tackled the problem in a 

comprehensive way, particularly by establishing the National 

Counterterrorism Center to analyze and share information to and 

from all agencies to better protect our homeland and by requiring 

the President to appoint a Program Manager in the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence to coordinate information sharing 

across the Federal Government. 

In my opinion, there is little question that our government now 

operates on a need to share basis much more than it did 10 years 

ago. As barriers of information have been taken down over the last 

decade, the quality, and, in fact, the quantity of information have 

improved and grown significantly. I think we have also integrated 

important new partners into the information sharing stream, and 

in that I mean particularly State and local agencies and the private 

sector, as well. 

The results of these efforts are visible in game changing military 

and counterterrorism successes that have really protected our security. Shared information, for instance, between the intelligence 

community and the military led to the strikes that killed Osama 

bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. Information sharing among Federal, State, and local agencies has played a critical role in recent 

arrests of homegrown terrorists, some of these really quite remarkable cases of information sharing and creativity, innovation, just 

plain hard work, including particularly Najibullah Zazi, the alQaeda trained operative who was plotting to bomb the New York 

City subway in 2009, and then the arrest in Seattle in June of this 

year of two homegrown Islamist extremists who were planning to 

attack a military recruiting station there. 

Unfortunately, we have seen missteps, as well. Even when government officials and agencies have shared information, failure to 

share enough information, combined with human error and technological limitations, for instance, prevented the detection of Umar 

Farouk Abdulmutallab before he boarded a plane Christmas Day 

2009 and tried to detonate explosives. 

This Committee’s January report of the murders at Fort Hood 

exposed more serious and ultimately deadly failure of the Departments of Defense and the FBI to share information about the growing radicalization of the alleged killer, Major Nidal Hasan, despite 

what our Committee investigation found were multiple red flags 

about his behavior. 

There are other new factors that further complicate efforts to 

share information. For instance, the WikiLeaks disclosures exposed 

the risks of what might be called over-sharing without necessary 

safeguards. New communications technologies have made it more 

difficult to ensure that critical information is retained for approVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00270 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
255 

priate use by law enforcement. And, of course, we have to ensure 

that information is shared in a way that adequately protects the 

privacy and civil liberties of our citizens. 

Last week, President Obama issued an Executive Order that acknowledged that effective information sharing is critical to both national and homeland security, of course, but that in the aftermath 

of WikiLeaks, information must be shared in a secure manner. I 

think the Executive Order strikes a sensible balance between protecting information from unauthorized disclosure and coordinating 

information sharing across all levels of government. Now, we need 

to make sure the Executive Order is implemented fully and expeditiously. 

So, bottom line as we meet today on this subject, I think we have 

come a long way since the failures of information sharing that 

helped to enable the attacks of 9/11, but obviously we have to continue to build on that progress if we are to maintain our security. 

That is what we hope this hearing this morning will help us do and 

why we are so grateful to have a truly excellent panel of witnesses 

before us. Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am very impressed with the caliber of the panel before us, so as you were delivering your opening statement, I was trying to cut mine down so 

that we could get to them, since you said many of the same points. 

Certainly, the results of information sharing and collaboration 

within the intelligence community and the law enforcement community have been evident in the operations that located, tracked, 

and killed Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki in the recent 

months, and just yesterday in the disruption of a plot by elements 

of Iran’s government which plotted to kill the Saudi ambassador to 

the United States right here in Washington. This appears to be yet 

another victory for cooperation across departmental boundaries. 

When the Chairman and I were working on the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, we understood that it would be challenging to 

change the culture in the intelligence and law enforcement communities from ‘‘need to know’’ to ‘‘need to share.’’ It is gratifying, 

therefore, that many intelligence and law enforcement professionals have embraced this change. In a recent op-ed, the Director 

of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, observed that the intelligence community now starts ‘‘from the imperative of responsibility to share in order to collaborate with and better support its 

intelligence consumers from the White House to the foxhole.’’ 

U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald put it more colorfully when he 

told an audience last month that intelligence and law enforcement 

operators now ask themselves, if it is found out that I have information that I did not share with someone, how am I going to justify to myself that I sat on it? He could have added, how will that 

failure to share be justified to congressional overseers, or far worse, 

to the victims of a successful attack. 

I believe that the influx of new analysts that have joined the intelligence community after 9/11 has had a very beneficial impact on 

information sharing because this new generation of intelligence officers is much more comfortable sharing information. It is their life. 

256 

Social media and collaborative information technology have been a 

daily part of their lives and it is much more natural for them to 

share in the workplace, as well. 

Notwithstanding, the many recent successes and the thwarted 

plots for which the intelligence and law enforcement communities 

deserve great credit, the GAO continues to rank terrorism-related 

information sharing as a high-risk area. As this Committee saw in 

the Fort Hood attacks and the attempted airplane bombing on 

Christmas Day 2009, when information is not shared, our Nation’s 

security is placed at risk. 

The Bowling Green, Kentucky, case is another recent example of 

information apparently not being shared and remains very troubling to me. It is unsettling that a suspected bomb maker whose 

fingerprints we had for many years was able to enter our country 

on humanitarian grounds. I have raised this issue repeatedly with 

the Department of Homeland Security as well as with the FBI. 

Both have told this Committee that the 58,000 individuals who 

have been resettled in the United States have been vetted now 

against existing databases, but what we found is the problem is 

that information has not been uploaded into those databases because of resource constraints. So if you are vetting people against 

databases that do not have all the information, you are obviously 

going to miss people who may want to do us harm. 

But in some respects, that case demonstrates an evolution of information sharing. Originally, this information—these fingerprints 

that were collected from IEDs—was collected with the warfighter 

in mind, not with the idea of sharing them with Immigration or 

State Department officials to vet those who were seeking asylum. 

That teaches us that it is increasingly important for agencies to 

think creatively about other potential uses of information that we 

collect and how best to prioritize, analyze, and act upon that information. 

Our investigation of the Fort Hood shootings demonstrated that 

the Department of Defense and the FBI collectively had ample information that Major Hasan had radicalized to the point where he 

was a serious threat, but they failed to act effectively on the many 

red flags. 

The Chairman mentioned the WikiLeaks breach. That demonstrated that we also need to improve the security of our data 

from internal threats. But in doing so, we have to be vigilant that 

we do not recreate the old stovepipes in order to guard against the 

internal threat. But it is baffling to me that the individual involved 

in the WikiLeaks case had easy access to such a wide variety of 

highly classified information. Just last week, the President signed 

a new Executive Order on responsible information sharing prompted in part by the WikiLeaks situation. This hearing will help us 

assess the President’s new Executive Order. 

As we explore the issue of information sharing, we must also ensure that our Homeland Security partners like local and State law 

enforcement and fusion centers are receiving and sharing information that is useful and that adds value, and it needs to be a twoway street. Last year, this Committee passed a law that was written by former Congresswoman Jane Harman to try to guard 

against over-classification, and I will be interested to ask our State 

257 

1The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin appears in the Appendix on page 1065. 

and local representatives whether you have seen any benefits from 

that new law yet. 

The public should be able to share its information, too. After all, 

the Times Square bombing was averted by an alert sidewalk vendor, and that is one reason that Senator Lieberman and I have introduced our ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ bill, which would 

broaden the protections from lawsuits from citizens who in good 

faith report suspicious activity. 

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not express my concern over 

this Administration’s inexplicable failure to fully appoint and staff 

the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board that we created as 

part of our 2004 Act. I am truly baffled by the Administration’s 

slowness in this regard because it is an important check as we seek 

to expand information sharing. 

From the most sophisticated intelligence collection methods to 

the police officer on the street to the observant sidewalk vendor, information sharing is clearly key to keeping our fellow citizens safe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

I thank the panel not only for being here, but for the work and 

thought that you put into the statements that you have prepared 

for this morning. The full text of all your statements will be printed in the record as if read, and we will now go to your testimony 

before the Committee. 

First is John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and, for an interim period, Acting Director. 

He is currently a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins. In 2010, Director McLaughlin 

led an internal review for the Director of National Intelligence and 

Admiral Dennis Blair of the intelligence community’s role with respect to the Christmas Day and Fort Hood attacks. We appreciate 

both your past service and the fact that you are here this morning 

and welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN E. MCLAUGHLIN,1 DISTINGUISHED 

PRACTITIONER-IN-RESIDENCE, PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF 

ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman and Senator 

Collins. Great to see you both again. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. The requirement to share information has 

been around since time immemorial, but the key thing about our 

time is that we are long past the moment when you can rely on 

a single individual or a single brain to sort through the complex 

problems that we deal with. In fact, today’s world requires an unprecedented level of cooperation among people with varied expertise, supported by information systems that make that easier, and 

legal systems and procedures that take all of that complexity into 

account. 

In formulating my thoughts on this, I am relying on two things, 

the experience Senator Lieberman referred to when I was Deputy 

258 

Director and Acting Director in the period after 9/11, and also the 

work I did for Admiral Blair in 2010. 

So let me begin with three positive trends, and I think both of 

you have alluded to some of these. First, the desire and willingness 

to share information is dramatically greater than it was at the time 

of 9/11. There are still some who resist, but the momentum is 

clearly in the other direction. 

Second, the capabilities for sharing information have grown notably within agencies. Many are world class, but they do not operate 

as effectively across agency lines yet. The notable exception to this 

might be the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Third, there is an improved policy foundation for access to and 

sharing of data, and I am referring to Intelligence Community Directive 501, which allows officers to discover what relevant data exists, request access to it, and have such requests professionally and 

fairly adjudicated. Implementation of this is moving along, though 

not yet complete. 

But there are at least three countervailing negative trends, and 

again, I think you hinted at these. First, the volume of data keeps 

going up with no end in sight. These days, it is not uncommon at 

all for an analyst to see his or her daily take of messages go from 

hundreds to thousands overnight, ensuring that those who would 

do us harm do not really have to work that hard to hide. They are 

sometimes just lost in the noise. 

Second, the breakdown in security discipline in our own government works against sharing of information, and you both alluded 

to this. Leaks, authorized and unauthorized, reinforce arguments 

made by those who stress the risks of sharing and pose obstacles 

to doing so. 

And third, despite the progress represented by Intelligence Community Directive 501, broader policy procedure and law have been 

a little slow to keep pace with the challenge. 

So given that complicated picture, what is the way forward? 

Above all, we need finally to break through the barriers that have 

for years kept us from bringing the most advanced information 

technology to bear on the problem. Information technology can 

prompt humans to look in the right places, consider pieces of data 

that might otherwise be missed, expose relationships that are buried in all the noise that the avalanche of data represents. What 

stands in the way? There are three major issues. 

First, there is in the national security community limited visibility into data that is distributed across multiple agency systems 

housed in different agencies. 

Second, existing search capabilities do not allow for exploitation 

of existing data. 

And third, I am not sure there is a common and widely shared 

vision among national security specialists on the end state they 

want to achieve here. 

There are a number of things that deserve attention in the near 

and medium term. In the near term, it is important to strengthen 

online instruction for national security specialists on what data exists. Sometimes, they do not know. 

In the medium term, we should work to improve search capabilities and training in how to use them. 

259 

And in the longer term, and once basic capabilities are improved, 

we need more software capable of exposing the underlying relationships in large bodies of data. 

Faced with challenges like this, one key need is a common standard across the intelligence community for access to data, essentially, the virtual equivalent of a community badge that now allows 

officers to move physically from agency to agency. This would 

mean, for example, that when someone logs on in one agency, other 

agencies whose data that person is seeking would confidently know 

who this person is and what they are authorized to access. It is 

easier to say than do, but it is achievable over time. 

Another broad problem likely to complicate our efforts, especially 

the need to identify people involved in terrorism, is that so many 

of them are turning out to be Americans. Names like al-Awlaki, 

Najibullah Zazi, David Headley, Faisal Shazad, and just yesterday, 

Manssor Arbabsiar, are familiar ones in this room. This is a problem with at least three dimensions. 

First, I suspect there is still an inconsistent understanding of the 

laws and regulations that govern the acquisition and sharing of 

data that touches Americans—these are complicated laws. 

Second, there is an understandable concern not to violate the 

laws protecting our citizens’ privacy, and this can inspire a subtle 

kind of risk aversion in dealing with such data. We saw this in 

some cases I have looked at. 

Third, terrorists, in my personal view, have figured all this out. 

Faisal Shazad, the unsuccessful Times Square bomber, got his citizenship here within the year before he attempted to carry out that 

act. This tells me that these people know that complicates our task 

in detecting them. 

Finally, I would just say that any misgivings we have about 

counterterrorism stand out, and I think you both alluded to this because they are so at odds with the broad pattern of success we 

have experienced since 9/11. Our law enforcement, intelligence, and 

military officers have really delivered. As always, intelligence successes are rarely apparent, not only because we cannot talk about 

them, but because they are often woven kind of invisibly into the 

fabric of successful policy. 

Those are my opening thoughts on this. I thank you for the opportunity. There is a fuller statement in the record, but these are 

the basic points I wanted to make. Thanks. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. Those were excellent opening thoughts. 

Ambassador Ted McNamara served as Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment from 2006 to 2009, where he 

had lead responsibility for coordinating the Federal Government efforts with respect to information sharing. It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the Committee and we look forward to your testimony now. 

260 

1The prepared statement of Mr. McNamara appears in the Appendix on page 1073. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS E. MCNAMARA,1 ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 

much. Let me start by saying that during my 31⁄2 years as a Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, I had the 

pleasure to work very closely with Members of this Committee and 

the staff and I received nothing but encouragement, constructive 

criticism, and strong bipartisan support, and for that, I want to 

thank the Committee, especially the Chairman and Senator Collins. The two of you are unsung heroes of what we got done downtown. 

I think what you probably would like to see from me is the view 

from the trenches. I will try and do that. 

Two years ago, in my final appearance before the Committee as 

the Program Manager, I stated that we had built a strong foundation for the ISE, but that a fully functional and mature ISE was 

still in the future. I am delighted to observe that 2 years later, we 

have gone well beyond that point. 

A truly mature and functioning ISE can only exist when we have 

fully standardized and harmonized rules, procedures, and operating 

systems to manage the ISE. To get from the start point to that 

fully mature system, we now know, as we were not fully aware of 

back in 2005, is a long, complex, and difficult process. Today, 10 

years after 9/11 and 5 years after I sent the required Program 

Manager’s first implementation plan to the Congress, we are well 

beyond the foundation, but we are not near the finish. 

What I find most encouraging in the last 2 years is that the pace 

and breadth of the change are stronger, more widespread, and exist 

among all stakeholders. Concepts and programs that were hardfought struggles in those first years are conventional wisdom now. 

I will give as one example, the Controlled Unclassified Information 

program. It was met with widespread skepticism and open opposition in 2006 when we set the goals for building it. Today, there is 

not a single agency I know of that opposes the CUI or believes that 

the old way was better. From my perspective, that is a huge 

progress. 

At the macro level, my observation is that the ISE is alive, well, 

and growing stronger. We spent a lot of time getting buy-in from 

the stakeholders. I would equate what happened with the proverbial supertanker that takes so much time initially to start turning, 

but once it turns, the turning is quite forceful. The problem for the 

manager, or in this analogy the captain, is to make sure the turn 

winds up on course. I think that we are on course. We still have, 

however, incomplete standardization and harmonization. They are 

central problems, still, today. 

We also have another problem which I did not face, and that is 

as the ISE grows, it begins to bump into other programs and priorities which are out of step with it and which have major conflicting 

priorities. A growing ISE interferes with other big rice bowls. I 

would say that the incomplete standardization and harmonization, 

261 

and the bumping into other priorities are two of the major causes 

of the WikiLeaks problem. There are a couple of others. 

What happens, and what happened in the past, I believe, has 

been a transformation of attitudes. We have all seen the absolute 

necessity now of managing information in the new information age 

in a way that responds to the need of that new age. Let me list 

just a couple of things that I think were important to what we have 

done: A national network of fusion centers, the Controlled Unclassified Information that I have already mentioned, Suspicious Activity 

Reporting, National Information Exchange Model, and what I am 

particularly proud of, the privacy and civil liberties protections. All 

of those are accomplished, they are functioning programs. 

Let me list a few things that I believe are high priorities, which 

still remain. Although all of them have started down a path, they 

have a much longer way to go. First of all is monitoring and auditing. We are not monitoring and auditing the system with the technology that is available and in the manner in which we need to do 

it, which is another reason for the WikiLeaks. 

Second is discovery and authorized use. It is beginning in the 

various communities, those stakeholders that I mentioned earlier, 

but it is not yet a unified and standardized system. 

Interoperability across networks—again, it has begun, but there 

is a long way to go. The technology is there; we just have to spend 

the time and the resources to get it implemented. 

And finally, we need to expand the mandate, something I said in 

my last address to this Committee and to other congressional committees. It is time to expand the mandate of the Program Manager. 

It is not possible to set up an Information Sharing Environment 

only for terrorism information. It will not work. 

I will close by summing up what I think can be the future of the 

ISE. We have built the foundation. Two years ago I borrowed the 

Churchillian phrase that we were not at the beginning of the end, 

but we were at the end of the beginning. I think we have gone beyond that now. I would estimate that we are about halfway there. 

Quite a bit of progress. 

It took us 5 years to get to this point. Fortunately, because of the 

changed attitudes, because of the increased pace and breadth of the 

changes that are going on, I do not think we need another 5 years 

to get to our goal of a fully functioning and fully mature ISE. 

And with that, I will close my remarks. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Ambassador. That is 

very encouraging. Thanks for the part that you played in the 

progress that we have made in this area. 

Chief Cathy Lanier is, of course, the Chief of Police of the D.C. 

Metropolitan Police Department. As such, she has been a leading 

advocate for the importance of effective information sharing with 

State and local law enforcement and has had direct experience on 

the effectiveness of information sharing regarding various terrorist 

threats in Washington, DC. 

Chief, thanks for taking the time to be here. Good morning. 

262 

1The prepared statement of Chief Lanier appears in the Appendix on page 1078. 

TESTIMONY OF CATHY L. LANIER,1 CHIEF OF POLICE, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

Chief LANIER. Thank you for having me here. Good morning, 

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee, 

staff, and guests. Thank you for the opportunity to present this 

statement on the status of information sharing among Federal and 

local partners. 

Of course, I am the Chief of Police here in Washington, DC, of 

the Metropolitan Police Department. I would like to remind everybody, that is the primary law enforcement agency here in Washington, DC. As the chief of police of a major city police department, 

I am very pleased to be able to brief you on the significant progress 

that has been made in the Federal and local information sharing 

and how that has improved our ability to safeguard the public. 

In my testimony, I will elaborate on why it is even more important now, 10 years later, to recognize the vital role of law enforcement in our homeland security efforts. With threats to the Nation 

constantly evolving, local law enforcement officers who are on the 

street every day are uniquely positioned to detect and prevent terrorist incidents. 

There are more than 700,000 law enforcement members across 

the Nation that know and are well connected to the communities 

that they serve, placing them in the best position to detect and investigate criminal activity that might be connected to terrorism or 

violent extremism. Clearly, information sharing with local police is 

essential to countering the threats that we face going forward. 

The success of local law enforcement in fulfilling our role hinges 

on the cooperation and support of our Federal partners. Ten years 

after the September 11 attack on the United States, the partnership between Federal and local authorities is very robust and continues to improve. The 10-year anniversary of 9/11 presented an 

excellent case study to illustrate how the infrastructure and relationships that we have built operates in a critical situation. 

Important groundwork for the anniversary preparations was established in 2010. With a significant increase in American residents aligned with violent Islamist extremists who are arrested or 

convicted in 2009, the Department of Homeland Security launched 

a broad working group on countering violent extremism. From the 

outset, the working group included local law enforcement. Following that effort, the Department of Homeland Security and the 

FBI committed to a partnership with the Metropolitan Police Department to go out and engage and educate our partners in the private sector and the community. Beginning in 2010, we jointly 

briefed literally thousands of government and private sector partners around the National Capital Region on recognizing and reporting suspicious activity as well as responding to potential terrorist 

incidents. Those briefings certainly paid off, as you will see, when 

we entered the high-threat period of the 9/11 10-year anniversary. 

Let us fast forward to last month. Early on the morning of September 8, 2011, I received virtually simultaneously calls from both 

my own official on the Joint Terrorism Task Force and my counterpart at the Department of Homeland Security urging me to attend 

263 

a classified briefing on an emerging threat to Washington, DC, and 

New York. Within an hour, both the FBI and DHS provided me 

with unfettered access to the actual cable outlining the threat. I 

continued to receive up-to-the-minute briefings from the FBI over 

the next several days. This was critical, as I continually had to 

make staffing and deployment decisions on a shift by shift basis. 

This shows that not only have we built strong relationships in the 

region, but more importantly, the institutional structures that we 

have created are ensuring the flow of information. 

What perhaps was even more important was the quality of the 

information that was made available to me. The details in the 

briefings were far greater than we had received in the past and enabled me to focus our officers very specifically on threats. 

Equally important, within 24 hours, the intelligence community 

collectively decided that the public needed to be informed of this 

credible threat, a significant departure from previous experience. 

This decision helped law enforcement in several ways. For one, 

many of the actions of local law enforcement, as you know, are 

much more visible than that of our Federal partners, and in many 

cases, they are intended to be. In other words, our community 

members notice when we take steps in relation to heightened 

threats. They see us on the street, they see us around critical infrastructure, and they know something unusual is happening. Although this may only be a local concern, announcing the threat 

helps local authorities explain, and sometimes justify, our actions 

to the public. Local partners really appreciate that support. 

More importantly, making this potential threat public helped us 

focus our community on reporting the types of suspicious activity 

that may help us detect and deter those who may be interested in 

carrying out this threat. Obviously, when we can effectively harness and direct the attentions of the public, we can get much more 

useful information to help us counter that threat. 

In this case, just after the announcement to the public, our calls 

for suspicious activities jumped significantly. Most importantly, 

this announcement calls many of our private sector partners that 

we had educated in the joint briefings much earlier to start reporting suspicious activity that warranted further investigation. 

For example, on September 10, the Metropolitan Police Department was contacted by the general manager of a local hotel who 

advised that six males from various Middle Eastern countries had 

checked into the hotel between September 8 and 10. The last to arrive paid cash for the room, asked for a specific view of a notable 

landmark. All six placed ‘‘Do Not Disturb’’ signs or placards on 

their doors. 

A manager at another hotel contacted the MPD on September 11 

to report that cleaning personnel had found suspicious items left in 

a hotel room. The occupant had departed early without checking 

out and leaving cash for the room. In this instance, the activity was 

linked to suspicious financial transactions that had been reported 

to the MPD earlier in the week. The MPD and the FBI determined 

that the case did not have an actual nexus to terrorism. However, 

it was linked to criminal activity. 

Although neither instance was related to the 9/11 threat or to 

terrorism at all, the hotel managers in both cases took the right 

264 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks appears in the Appendix on page 1085. 

steps in calling the police to report these indicators. As you can see, 

providing some of the information to the public helps our efforts in 

the long run. It is a recognized principle in policing that sometimes 

you need to give a little information to get information. 

With the information about the threat on the anniversary of 

9/11 and the visible government mobilization to it, the public is reminded of the importance of sharing information about suspicious 

activities. It also reinforces the significance of our ‘‘See Something, 

Say Something’’ campaign, which has been strongly supported by 

Federal and local partners. 

Fortunately, our experience here in the District of Columbia during the threats of 9/11 highlighted several areas where information 

sharing has improved. However, in recognizing that my experience 

here in Washington, DC, does not represent all police chiefs, I did 

reach out to the major city chiefs and former Chief of the MPD, 

Commissioner Charles Ramsey, who is now the current Commissioner in Philadelphia, to see what other chiefs around the country 

are seeing. What we are seeing across the major cities is that there 

has been significant progress since 9/11. One person simply and 

aptly described the fusion centers and the FBI’s field intelligence 

group as game changers for local police departments. We would not 

be able to prepare for and work together to prevent significant 

threats facing our communities without this sea change in government cooperation. In addition, these cornerstones of Federal-local 

information sharing, we continue to work on new links between 

levels of government and the private sector. 

In the interest of time, I will stop there and you have my full 

statement on record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Chief. That was great. Just a 

quick question. Is your main point of contact with the Federal Government, the Department of Homeland Security? 

Chief LANIER. Typically, most of my information comes in 

through the FBI. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Chief LANIER. We have heavy participation on the JTTF and I 

have daily conversations and twice-a-week briefings from the 

JTTF. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Thank you. 

Our next witness is Ron Brooks, another important part of this 

newly established framework for information sharing and homeland security, the Director of the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, which is the fusion center for the San Francisco 

Bay area. Mr. Brooks is also the Chairman of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, which is a State and local advisory 

group to the Federal Government on information sharing issues, so 

he is uniquely qualified to testify today. 

Thank you for coming across the country to be with us. 

TESTIMONY OF RONALD E. BROOKS,1 DIRECTOR, NORTHERN 

CALIFORNIA REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER 

Mr. BROOKS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. I appreciate your continued attention to this important issue and for 

265 

inviting the National Fusion Center Association to provide our 

views. 

Mr. Chairman, we are light years ahead of where we were

on 9/11. In fact, we have moved really beyond information sharing 

to create a true homeland security enterprise. Providing for the 

common defense is a Federal constitutional responsibility, and in 

post-9/11 America, the national network of fusion centers plays a 

pivotal role in helping the Federal Government achieve that important goal. 

Fusion centers are much more than information sharing hubs. 

They embody a process, the fusion process, that has fundamentally 

changed how information is gathered, transformed into actionable 

intelligence, and shared over both classified and unclassified networks. They are about putting national threat information in a 

local context for action by leveraging the 840,000 law enforcement 

officers on the ground to support the national security mission. 

Without fusion centers, there is no mechanism that allows us to do 

this across all 50 States. 

Last month, less than 24 hours after high-level national intelligence indicated a 9/11-inspired threat, detailed information was 

sent through DHS and FBI to the fusion centers and was put in 

the hands of local law enforcement. Fusion center analysts across 

the Nation worked around the clock alongside FBI and DHS personnel to review suspicious activity reports and leads associated 

with the New York and Washington, DC, threats and to share actionable intelligence with decision makers at all levels. 

This is much more than information sharing. It is deep collaboration, and it is essential to effective homeland security and it is impossible to do without the National Network of Fusion Centers. In 

addition to information sharing, fusion centers give us complex 

analytic capabilities. Fusion centers have the ability to catalog critical infrastructure, leverage a large network of trained terrorism liaison officers to report suspicious activity, overlay that SAR data 

on critical infrastructure and layer in national threat information. 

The result is high quality actionable intelligence. 

None of this was possible on 9/11. Even at the Federal level, 

agencies do not have the manpower, local knowledge, or trusted 

partnerships to handle such an effort, yet it is happening every day 

at fusion centers and that adds tremendous value to the Federal 

Homeland Security Enterprise. 

Last October, an advisory was distributed by the New York Police Department concerning a suspicious truck whose driver reportedly diverted its route toward Times Square in exchange for 

$10,000. After DHS informed several fusion centers in the region, 

analysts at the Rhode Island Fusion Center discovered that the 

owner of the truck was a California native and coordinated with 

my fusion center to conduct background checks. Within 2 hours of 

the initial advisory, information from those two fusion centers was 

used to coordinate with the Connecticut Fusion Center, which enabled the State Police to locate and stop the truck before it reached 

New York. If not for the National Network of Fusion Centers, the 

dedicated personnel from DHS and the FBI, we could not have 

moved from alarming SAR to a threat resolution within just hours. 

266 

Not only do fusion centers enable the Federal counterterrorism 

mission, the all crimes approach generates value in communities 

every day. This past July, an alert from the Oklahoma Fusion Center referenced a suspect wanted in connection with a double homicide who was trying to escape to Canada. The North Dakota Fusion 

Center analyzed the suspect’s vehicle and information and connected with the Arkansas Fusion Center, which quickly provided a 

photo of the suspect. The fusion center released the information in 

an alert to law enforcement, who apprehended the suspect that 

same day. Again, fusion centers were essential to a quick resolution. 

The National SAR Initiative is being implemented across the National Network to gather and analyze tips and leads for analysis 

of suspicious activity that might be linked to terrorism. Fusion centers are linchpins in the implementation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. Without fusion centers, we 

would not have a portal for the SAR process or a system that provides SAR-related front-line officer and analyst training. We would 

not have a way to share or request information among the JTTFs, 

DHS, and local public safety partners. We would not have the ability to vet SARs through a national standard that protects civil 

rights and civil liberties according to the ISE-compliant privacy 

policies that are now enforced in every fusion center. 

The value of fusion centers is clear, but that value is at serious 

risk. Urban Areas Security and State Homeland Security Grant 

programs, the primary DHS programs that support fusion centers, 

have been slashed. Each fusion center is operated by State and 

local governments. Some centers rely heavily on Federal funding 

while others rely on funding from their own States. In all cases, 

State and local agencies make major contributions of full-time personnel that are not reflected in that budget data. 

After 9/11, much of the Federal assistance to State and local 

partners supported enhancements to response capabilities. It is 

time to reinvest in enhancements to prevention capabilities in a 

more focused way, and that includes supporting fusion centers. Unless Congress and DHS take measures to focus State and local assistance on fostering prevention capabilities, the forward progress 

that we have made on information sharing and SAR reporting 

could be reversed. 

Mr. Chairman, we have learned some tough lessons. It is easy to 

focus on mistakes when they are made, and unfortunately, we 

probably will not stop 100 percent of the threats to this Nation. 

But the grassroots development of this decentralized national network of fusion centers, really, that distributed and decentralized 

system that was called for in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, is a tremendous accomplishment. It is generating value every day and has become a true national homeland 

security asset. 

On behalf of the National Fusion Center Association, we commend your leadership and the leadership of this Committee and 

ask for your continued support, and I have submitted my full remarks to the Committee. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Captain Brooks. I am a strong 

supporter of the fusion centers. I appreciate the case you made for 

267 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the Appendix on page 1107. 

them, as it were, and I have one or two questions in that regard 

when we get to that point. 

Finally, Jeff Smith is a partner at the law firm of Arnold and 

Porter, former CIA General Counsel, a familiar and trusted source 

of counsel for this Committee and me personally. Mr. Smith is testifying on behalf today of the Markle Task Force for National Security, which released a series of reports over the last decade that 

played a really seminal role in shaping the policy debate on information sharing. 

So, counselor, we welcome you back. 

TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY H. SMITH,1 PARTNER, ARNOLD AND 

PORTER 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Senator Carper, for holding this hearing and for your leadership on 

this critical issue. I appear this morning on behalf of the Markle 

Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. My prepared statement is jointly submitted with Zoe ̈ Baird Budinger, the 

President of the Markle Foundation. 

I want to begin, as my colleagues have, by commending this 

Committee and your staff for the significant time and energy you 

have devoted to making information sharing a top national priority. 

The work of your Committee has helped make this Nation safer. 

Since 2002, the Markle Task Force has worked hard to provide 

policy makers, including this Committee, with recommendations to 

help accelerate our government’s use of information technology to 

better understand the threats we face, to make better decisions, 

and at the same time protect our national and vital civil liberties. 

I am pleased to say that many of our recommendations have been 

accepted. 

As a result of all of these efforts, substantial change has occurred 

throughout government. Information sharing has become more 

widespread. That said, progress has been too slow in some places 

and has lacked adequate guidance or oversight in others. Information sharing is like the blocking and tackling in football. It is not 

as sexy as a 60-yard pass to a wide receiver, but at the end of the 

day, it wins games. 

Ten years ago, there was a failure to adapt to a network world. 

Our law enforcement and intelligence communities were driven by 

the ‘‘need to know’’ culture that stovepiped information. This was 

in part because of the so-called wall between law enforcement and 

intelligence. This failure to connect the dots has become famous 

since 9/11, but that phrase oversimplified a fundamental problem, 

not only with the sharing of information, but with the way in 

which departments and agencies worked together. 

Where are we today? Washington can work, as demonstrated by 

the changes that we have talked about and this panel has talked 

about. We have had three dramatic successes: The attack that led 

to the death of Osama bin Laden; Najibullah Zazi was arrested on 

September 29, 2009, in connection with an al-Qaeda plot to bomb 

the New York City subway system; and on May 1, 2010, because 

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268 

fully apprehended after his attempt to detonate a car bomb in 

Times Square. He was arrested 53 hours and 20 minutes after he 

left Broadway, largely as a result of better sharing and cooperation 

with State and locals. 

But we still fall short. The task is enormous. Where should we 

be going? 

The Markle Foundation Task Force has four critical steps that 

we recommend. One is strong leadership from the highest levels of 

government is required to sustain the progress since 9/11. There is 

a risk that this virtual reorganization of the government will be 

eroded as a result of bureaucratic turf battles and fears about information security. 

Two, the adoption of discoverability and authorized use must be 

expanded. It is possible for relevant data to be discovered in an 

automated manner that allows both human users and data itself 

to find relevant information. This is often referred to as data finding data. The concept of authorized use is being adopted, but it 

must be expanded. An important Intelligence Community Directive, ICD 501, was issued in 2009 that represents a substantial 

step toward enhanced discoverability and authorized use. Ambassador McNamara talked about that and the importance of that 

needs to continue to be pressed. 

Three, privacy and security protections must be increased simultaneously. WikiLeaks is not an argument for less information sharing. Doing that would compromise our national security. As we improve our capabilities to better share information, we should simultaneously deploy better policies and technologies to control its access and use. I am pleased with the new Executive Order the President signed on Friday. It was a significant step in the right direction and I look forward to discussing it with the Committee. 

I also share Senator Collins’ concern about the failure to appoint 

persons to the Privacy and Oversight Board. It is a frustration, and 

I am happy to talk about that. 

Developing this trust is critical so that the American people will 

trust that the government will protect its civil liberties. It is important so that government officials will share information with one 

another, confident that it can be kept confidential. 

The fourth point is one that a couple of people have made, including Ambassador McNamara. Information sharing is a tool that 

can help make the entire government more efficient. The trusting 

sharing of information in government decisionmaking is not a 

unique attempt to counter terrorism. Successful information sharing is a model that can be used across many areas of government 

to improve the effective functioning of government. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I look forward to 

your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much for that testimony and 

for your work with the Markle Task Force. 

We will do 7-minute rounds of questions. 

Ambassador McNamara, let me pick up where Mr. Smith ended. 

I wonder if you could just say a bit more about why you think it 

would be valuable to expand the authorities of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment and how you would 

do it. 

269 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Well, let me go back to the very first year I was 

on the job. It was apparent that we were not going to be able to, 

for example, create a Controlled Unclassified Information system, 

which only handled terrorism information. No agency managed 

their data in that manner. So when we sat down to do CUI, we created CUI for all controlled unclassified information. 

I only had the authority to mandate it to the agencies for terrorism. Fortunately, terrorism was a high enough priority that they 

had to pay attention to me. But, in fact, only a very small portion 

of CUI information, I would say a single-digit percentage, is terrorism information. Most CUI, and it goes all the way down to 

State and local authorities, is unrelated to terrorism. Yet the system works for all of it. We had to build it that way or it would have 

failed. 

Another example is the Suspicious Activity Reporting. When I 

picked that up off the ground, and turned it into—I should not say 

‘‘I,’’ I should say ‘‘we,’’ because there was an awful lot of partners 

that were helping us. We had to do it for terrorism information. 

But as I have said so many times, if you take the Suspicious Activity Reporting mechanisms and you unplug the database that says 

‘‘terrorism information’’ and plug in one that says ‘‘serial killers,’’ 

or unplug that and plug one in that says ‘‘drug violence,’’ or unplug 

that, you name it, it works for all suspicious activities. In fact, we 

constructed that knowing that if it only worked for terrorism information, it was not going to last. It would be too small and disappear. 

Another example is the fusion centers. There is only one fusion 

center in the United States that handles only terrorism information 

and that is the National Counterterrorism Center. The others all 

handle all crimes and all hazards. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So how far would you expand the—— 

Mr. MCNAMARA. I would like to see that an Information Executive be created, probably in the Office of the President, as a manager, not a crisis manager, as I was, in the Program Manager position. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Not doing just a program, but managing information the way a Chief Information Officer does it, across the 

board, with complete authorities. You have to give that individual 

some budget clout. I had virtually no budget clout—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MCNAMARA [continuing]. So I had to appeal for agencies to 

do it. And the person needs to work very closely with OMB and 

with the agencies as an overseer, not a doer. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is helpful. Is your preference that 

this be done by executive action, or do you think it requires legislation? 

Mr. MCNAMARA. It does not require legislation, as far as I am 

concerned. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. I say good because—— 

Mr. MCNAMARA. But it may require some congressional push to 

get the executive action. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, we are glad to do that. We generally 

categorize that as oversight. 

270 

Director McLaughlin, in your testimony, you note the growth in 

the number of Americans participating in terrorism, which has 

been a focus of our Committee, and that reality creates a set of 

challenges for the intelligence community given rules in place related to the acquisition and sharing of data that touches U.S. citizens, and I am quoting from your testimony. We have strong rules 

in place to protect such U.S. persons’ information within the intelligence community, but you note that this can lead, and I agree, 

to, and I quote again from your testimony, ‘‘a subtle kind of risk 

aversion in dealing with such data.’’ 

So talk to us in a little more detail about that. What kind of risk 

aversion are you worried about, and do you think the intelligence 

community needs to clarify the framework that it is operating 

under now for dealing with information regarding U.S. persons? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I do, Senator. This comes directly out of the 

study we did for DNI Blair in 2010. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. We talked to people in a dozen agencies and 

carried out about 70 interviews, and one of the things that came 

out of that, because in both the Christmas bombing and in the Fort 

Hood shootings you had the involvement of an American citizen at 

some level—that was Anwar al-Awlaki having inspired the Christmas bomber and having played a role in his communications with 

Major Hasan—what we discovered was that as you went agency to 

agency, you got different interpretations of what was allowed and 

not allowed when you encountered U.S. persons’ data. And people, 

frankly, were very careful, particularly at the National Security 

Agency, where this is most likely to occur, and this results, in part, 

from some of the controversies involved with their collection programs and so forth that you are familiar with. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. This is the risk aversion—— 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. This is the risk aversion part of it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In other words, to avoid the risk, they 

may not be going some places we would actually want them to go 

in terms of—— 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, the way I would put it is that we certainly were not pushing them to violate anyone’s privacy. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. What we came away believing, and I had a 

civil liberties attorney on my task force, was that in many cases, 

intelligence agencies were not going to the limit of what the law 

allowed them. In other words, they wanted to err on the side of not 

ever crossing that line. And some, frankly, confessed worrying 

about punishment of some sort if they did cross that line. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. And without going into the classified details 

of that study, I think we came to the conclusion that this was one 

of two big reasons why we did not anticipate or detect Abdulmutallab’s intentions here—because as a former intelligence officer, 

I know how these things can get kind of oversimplified, but I came 

away reluctantly convinced that had we been more aggressive on 

this particular score and had we also had information technology 

that helped the human brain connect things up—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

271 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN [continuing]. We would have found this guy 

and we would have known pretty much what he was intending to 

do. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is a very important conclusion. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Another part of this, if I could just add this 

final point—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN [continuing]. Is that sometimes, and this, I 

have to be a little careful with because there is some sensitive stuff 

involved, but sometimes foreign partners encounter information 

about American citizens and they are often confused about what do 

we do with that because it is sensitive. So that is another area that 

needs to be clarified. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do you know whether any changes have 

been made as a result of your report? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I know the recommendations were taken seriously and I have been told by people at the White House that they 

are working on this. I checked within the last 24 hours and I think 

people are sensitive to the question, but I would say that it probably is something that still needs to be worked on, primarily by 

someone like the DNI and the Department of Justice convening 

people throughout the intelligence community who have the job of 

interpreting these regulations to the workforce and making sure, as 

a first step, that they are all on the same page, that everyone is 

getting the same message. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very helpful and I promise you 

that we will take this on in the Committee as another kind of oversight responsibility because of the rising significance of terrorism 

committed by American citizens or legal residents of one kind or 

another. My time is up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to continue with Director McLaughlin exactly along 

the lines of what you just started because we have now talked a 

little bit about the Abdulmutallab case, and by the way, I am informed that he pled guilty today. But our Committee also looked 

at the Major Hasan case and the information sharing or lack thereof in that case, and it was fascinating to talk to the members of 

the Joint Terrorism Task Forces both in Washington and in San 

Diego and to learn that they chose not to share all the information 

that they had due to the requirements for FBI approval for sharing 

under the JTTF guidelines and the Memorandum of Understanding. And thus, you had a situation, without going into classified information, but let me say it was widely reported, of contacts 

with al-Awlaki that were not passed on to the Army, because even 

though there was a member of the Department of Defense represented on the JTTF, because it could not be passed on without 

explicit approval by the FBI. 

Did your committee, in looking at these cases, take a look at 

whether those guidelines and Memoranda of Understanding that 

applied to the JTTF’s information sharing with the home agencies 

need revision, as well? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. We did. We were a little limited in what we 

could do on the Fort Hood case because there were some ongoing 

legal questions that inhibited our ability to interview everyone who 

272 

was involved, but we did speak with enough members of both San 

Diego and Washington to come to similar conclusions, and the 

main conclusion we came to was that no single person had looked 

at all of the information. Some of it had been seen in San Diego. 

Some of it had been seen in Washington. And there were some follow-up issues that you are probably familiar with that were not as 

aggressively pursued as should have been. 

The main thing I was concerned about was if someone has done 

something about this, and I got assurances from both the FBI and 

the Department of Defense that they now have a way when something like this occurs to pass information that was not—the kind 

of information that was not passed in the Major Hasan case—to 

counterparts in law enforcement, or vice-versa, from law enforcement to counterparts in the Defense Department. 

I think I came away as pretty much assured that they have figured that out. Now, that is always fighting the last war, so you always have to ask, are there other realms, other circumstances in 

which that same issue might arise, and I think we need to keep 

our eye on that across the board. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Ambassador, we have just talked about policy obstacles in the 

form of restrictions through guidelines or Memoranda of Understanding that may restrict information sharing. From your perspective, how much of this is a policy problem versus a technical problem? I remember the first hearing that we held after the Abdulmutallab case, and the deputy from the National Counterterrorism 

Center told us, much to my amazement, that they lacked the technology to do the kind of federated searches that were needed, 

which amazed me because all of us who go on Google know that 

if you type in a name and it is not quite right, you get the question, 

‘‘Did you mean X?’’ and any of us who have ordered on Amazon 

have seen how information of, you might like this, that is similar. 

So it seems like the technology is out there to be used. 

What is your assessment? Is this a technology problem? Is it a 

policy problem? Is it still a cultural problem? A leadership problem? 

Mr. MCNAMARA. That is an excellent question. First of all, it is 

not a technology problem, strictly speaking, if you mean by technology the availability of the technology. That is there. 

The policy problem is that the policy does not allow the technology to work or to be employed because of policy restrictions. 

Then, the attitudinal problem (‘‘in the trenches’’ problem) comes 

when, even though you change the policy, the work habits and the 

ingrained methodologies of those working do not change. 

So, I have not seen, in all of the years I have been involved in 

this, a true technological problem. In addition to these problems 

you have the resource problem. So if NCTC says that it does not 

have the technology to do the integration of the data, it is not because integration technology does not exist, which can be either 

taken off the shelf or modified and used. It is because policies do 

not allow them to use that technology, or resources are such that 

they cannot afford to put it in until later. 

To move out from the Federal Government, I found, and I cede 

to both Ms. Lanier and Mr. Brooks as to whether or not my vision 

273 

of this is still accurate, but I believe it is. There are ingrained habits that persist. I am not going to pick on the FBI or DEA or law 

enforcement, but if you think about the need to integrate the activities of the fusion centers with other fusion center-like activities 

out there, such as JTTFs and HIDTAs, there is no reason why 

those organizations should not be collocated. As Mr. Brooks referred to, he was having what he called ‘‘deep collaboration.’’ But 

that only comes with collocation and with some form of integration 

of activities. 

I looked at the statistics. There is fewer than one full-time FBI 

agent, on average, at fusion centers around the United States. That 

is liaison. That is not full collaboration. Now, I know in the large 

cities—possibly here in Washington, DC, New York, and other 

places—that is not the case. It is a much closer collaboration. But 

the habits, the ingrained habits, when not changed by the policy, 

the resources, or not changed by the leadership, results in situations where the information does not get shared. I know of no tech 

problem that stands in the way. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. We will do 

one more round of questions. 

Chief, I was interested when you said that your main point of 

contact with the Federal Government is the FBI. From our perspective, there is nothing wrong with that, of course. I will say that 

when we created the Department of Homeland Security, and particularly creating within it the Intelligence and Analysis Section 

and watching it evolve, one of our hopes, and I think Secretary 

Napolitano’s hopes now, for I&A was that it would play a very important role, unique role in the intelligence community in both 

transferring and receiving intelligence from State and local law enforcement. 

In fact, DHS and FBI have been working very well together, but 

I want to ask you this. One of our visions here, and it was not just 

ours alone, was that we have hundreds of thousands of State and 

local law enforcers, etc., across the country, that they, if properly 

informed, alerted, or involved, would become hundreds of thousands of additional eyes and ears in our effort to protect the homeland, particularly from terrorist attack. And, of course, if that was 

true anywhere because of the centrality of Washington, DC, it 

would be here. 

So my question is whether you think, as the Chief of Police here 

in Washington, DC, enough has been done to encourage information sharing from your force, up as opposed to from the Federal 

Government down? 

Chief LANIER. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think you have testified in very encouraging ways to the way in which there has been cooperation and 

more sharing from the Federal Government down, but how about 

from the local level up? 

Chief LANIER. That is actually a very good point, and particularly 

with the threat that we see evolving now of so many American citizens and people living in the United States becoming part of this 

threat because people call the police and report all kinds of strange 

274 

behavior by neighbors or people in the communities and they call 

us with that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Chief LANIER. So the way that works, and I want to back up and 

clarify a little bit—I have a large contingency of officers assigned 

to the JTTF and I receive twice-a-week briefings from them, and 

they have full access to cases they are working here in the NCR— 

which are most important to me—or anything relevant to Washington, DC. So that is why I say that, primarily, the information 

I get on the counterterrorism side comes from the FBI. 

However, when there are threats or different things that are 

going on, DHS does a very good job, and I&A, in putting out those 

intelligence bulletins. They have an analyst in my fusion center 

who works with all of our other analysts that continually produce 

products for us and for us to share with our forces to do what you 

described, updating our local police officers to know what to report. 

In terms of two-way information, we started the SAR Initiative 

that was talked about by Mr. McNamara 3 years ago and has now 

evolved so that we have a way to receive suspicious activity reporting through text messages, 911 calls, email, and we just launched 

iWatch, which is a community public reporting tool, so people can 

report suspicious activity. We also have engaged with Trap Wire, 

so when those SARs or those suspicious activities come in, they 

come into the fusion center, enter into the system that we have, 

Trap Wire. They are first reviewed by analysts in the fusion center. 

Then there is an analytical software that also analyzes those suspicious activity reportings and there is a decision made there 

whether it should be bumped up into eGuardian, which is shared 

space—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Chief LANIER [continuing]. So we can connect the dots with suspicious activity reporting around sensitive sites or critical infrastructure around the country. But also, it bumps it up to the Federal level so that it goes in that shared eGuardian space. I mean, 

that is significant progress. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, that is good to hear because Senator 

Collins mentioned earlier the bill that we put in encouraging the 

See Something, Say Something approach, which is really an important idea, talking about expanding our forces. Then you are involving everybody. But the natural place that a citizen who sees something and wants to say something will call is the local police department. They are not going to know, generally speaking, how to 

get to the JTTF or the fusion center. Maybe they will call the FBI, 

but I doubt it. They will probably dial one of the easy codes that 

they can dial to get to a dispatcher. 

So your dispatchers are trained as you described, just to take 

that suspicious activity report and send it through the chain of 

analysis and verification, and then ultimately it will go up to the 

Federal Government, I assume, if it is a—— 

Chief LANIER. If there is a counterterrorism nexus, it will go into 

the shared space. If there is a criminal nexus, it will go in for investigation externally to the law enforcement community. So there 

is pretty extensive vetting before it is pushed into shared space, 

but it does—if there is a potential connection to counterterrorism, 

275 

it goes into shared space, usually within a short period of time, a 

couple hours. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Give me a status report, I suppose, on 

this question. At various times, we have talked about the fact that 

if a local police officer stops somebody and is suspicious of them 

and checks them, goes to the laptop that a lot of them now carry 

in their cars and checks the name on databases, we know that they 

will naturally plug through the criminal information database, but 

it is routine now that they also will plug into terrorism watch lists? 

Chief LANIER. That is correct. We get hits back all the time—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Chief LANIER [continuing]. Of all three levels on the terror watch 

list, and notifications are made. The officers are very familiar with 

it. And in fact, if there is a connection or a hit, there are instructions for the dispatcher and the officer in the computer as to who 

to call and how to make that call. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. That is great. 

Captain Brooks, let me ask you this. You talked about it a little 

bit. In this time of budgetary stress, there are some people, and we 

have already heard voices who are going to say—and I want to give 

you an opportunity on the record to respond to this—well, do we 

need both JTTFs and fusion centers? We really cannot afford them 

both, so maybe we should either cut back on or even eliminate the 

fusion centers. I want to give you an opportunity to respond to that 

kind of offensive. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, and that is a great question. It is one 

that comes up all the time. JTTFs are an investigative body. They 

are the FBI, and in partnership with their local law enforcement 

counterparts, that is the FBI’s ability to investigate terror in this 

country. 

Fusion centers play a much different role. They are not only the 

information sharing hub. The fusion centers are the place where 

we build a cadre of terrorism liaison officers, where we train not 

only the 840,000 cops around the country, but more than a million 

firefighters around the country and the EMS workers and our private sector partners on indicators and warnings and the seven 

signs of terror. That is where we have the ability to catalog our 

critical infrastructure, and as Chief Lanier talked about, then be 

able to analyze incoming suspicious activity reports against the national threat picture and against what we know about our critical 

infrastructure. It is the ability to share, as you saw in a couple of 

the examples I gave, between the whole network of fusion centers 

and then with the FBI. 

Our HIDTA, our fusion center, and our threat squad, our JTTF 

are one entity. We are collocated together. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Interesting. Is that typical or atypical? 

Mr. BROOKS. Is it not typical, but there are a lot of people that 

have looked at our model. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BROOKS. And so we have the ability to sit eyeball to eyeball, 

our analysts with the JTTF agents and investigators, as SAR information is coming in. But as often happens, as Chief Lanier mentioned, many times, that SAR information has no nexus to terrorism. It is about drug dealing or gang activity or firearms trafVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00291 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
276 

ficking, mortgage fraud. I mean, it could be about a variety of 

things. And so the all crimes approach, as Ambassador McNamara 

talked about, gives us the ability to take that information and funnel it to the right place, and we know, sir, oftentimes, activity that 

at first blush appears to be criminal in nature—the Torrance gas 

station robberies, the smuggling of the cigarettes in North Carolina—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BROOKS [continuing]. The sale of pseudoephedrine in California—that money is funneling back, or that is a precursor to a 

terrorist act. We cannot really separate crime and terror. We have 

to knock that wall down. If we are really going to be effective, we 

have to make sure that we understand that the sharing of information makes communities safe. Our end state is to prevent terrorism, but in my own community, right across the bay from San 

Francisco where I work, the City of Oakland, they have had 740 

shootings to date. That is a city of 400,000. That is terror right 

there in our own community, and that kind of terror is one that 

is experienced in big cities and in small towns across the country. 

And so I really think when people are concerned about the 

money spent on fusion centers, we are in tough budget times and 

we certainly get that. But fusion centers are uniquely situated to 

do things that JTTFs or no other program can. They can bring together disparate resources. In my center, I have emergency managers, firefighters, EMS workers, public health workers, cops, and 

analysts, Federal, State, and local, and private sector, and we can 

bring all of that data together. We can share information on terror, 

crime, or other threats. We can make sure that the JTTF gets the 

information they need, but that the DEA and the ATF and the 

local law enforcement gets the information they need, as well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks for that excellent answer. Senator 

Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Captain, I, too, want to thank you for a terrific answer to that 

question. The Chairman and I have been fighting off efforts by 

some of our colleagues to do away with fusion centers. There is this 

argument that they are redundant with the Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces or that they are ineffective or they are really not playing 

much of a role, and your answer distinguishing among the various 

roles was just what we need to counter it. We may send you to see 

a couple of our colleagues to better educate them about the differences, but thank you because that is exactly the question I was 

going to ask, as well. 

Chief, I want to ask you a question about over-classification of 

information. We passed a law last year. It started out on the House 

side, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, with Representative 

Jane Harman who introduced the Reducing Over-Classification 

Act. The House bill only applied to the Department of Homeland 

Security. It was intended to prevent the unnecessary classification 

of information at a higher level than was warranted. Once it 

passed the House, Senator Lieberman and I, in my view, improved 

the bill by expanding it beyond the Department of Homeland Security to cover all Executive Branch agencies, and it became law a 

year ago this month. 

277 

One of the concepts is to encourage greater use of tear-lines so 

a lower level of classification of a report that is highly classified 

can be disseminated more widely. Has it made any difference in 

the past year? 

Chief LANIER. Actually, I followed that through and was glad to 

see it pass, and I have seen a significant difference. The example 

I gave of the information I was provided during this last threat, 

and, in fact, the information I was provided during the threat that 

was uncovered yesterday, or at least the arrest that was revealed 

yesterday, is a significant difference. 

Back in 2004, when preparing for the fall IMF conference here 

in the District—this is where you have 8,000 world delegates that 

come here for the IMF-World Bank conference—there was some 

specific information that was recovered from a computer in Pakistan about surveillance that had been done on the sites, and I was 

given a briefing that contained little to no information that would 

help me to put adequate security in place based on what information I had. I was briefed initially 2 months before the event. I was 

planning the event. I was putting the security plans in place. And 

it took weeks of arguing to get access to the information. And when 

I did finally get access to the information, which was completely 

over-classified, it changed my entire security plan. There were details in there that were critical to how I planned my security and 

I would have never known it if I relied on what I was briefed. 

I do not see that anymore. I actually in this past threat, during 

the anniversary, was amazed at how open both the FBI and DHS 

were with sharing the information, and then, also, in the process 

as the days went on about including me in briefings as the deliberative process went on about what would be released and how it 

would be released and what updates on the investigation. 

So I have seen a significant change here in Washington, DC, and 

from talking to Chuck Ramsey and major city chiefs, I think, at 

least in major cities, they are seeing a big difference across the 

country. 

Senator COLLINS. That is great to hear. 

Chief LANIER. Thank you for that. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, thank you for the feedback. It is nice to 

know that it has made the kind of difference that we were looking 

for, so thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith, my final question is for you and it has to do with the 

issue I referenced in my opening remarks, and that is the strange 

failure of the Administration to appoint a full complement of people 

to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Obviously, this 

board has gone through sort of a difficult time with members resigning in the previous Administration, and I continue to believe 

that as we expand information sharing, which I think is absolutely 

critical, that this board is an important check on the process, just 

to make sure people are considering the privacy implications. So 

what do you think is the problem? 

Mr. SMITH. I agree completely with you, Senator, about the importance of the board. I cannot speak, obviously, for the White 

House. I do not know exactly why they have had such a problem. 

To some extent, the confused and unfortunate history of the board 

may factor into that. 

278 

I think two other factors may be involved, and this is speculation 

on my part. One is that, by statute, the members and the chairman 

serve a 6-year statutory term. That is a long time to ask somebody 

to serve—— 

Senator COLLINS. Good point. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Particularly the chairman, and I understand they want the chairman to be full-time. 

A second concern may be whether it is adequately funded. I do 

not know what the current plans for funding are, but I did recently 

happen to look at the statute and it is pretty modestly funded for 

an extraordinarily broad set of responsibilities. So perhaps the 

Committee should look at some aspects of this. 

I mean, it would be presumptuous to suggest what you might do, 

but asking the White House why they have not filled it, I do not 

believe it is inattention. I do think they want to do it, but there 

may be some structural problems that perhaps the Committee 

could look at. 

When you contrast that, by the way, with the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board—— 

Senator COLLINS. Right. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Which is not subject to Senate confirmation, reports directly to the President, has extraordinarily highpowered people on it, and has an awful lot of influence within the 

Executive Branch, that may be, frankly, a better model than the 

one that is currently in statute. 

Senator COLLINS. That is a great idea and I think we should look 

at revamping it. We have written to the Administration repeatedly 

on this issue without any notable effect, but I think a 6-year term 

is too long and probably we should be looking at a 3-year term. I 

personally opposed the move to a full-time chairman. I do not think 

that is necessary, and I think that makes it difficult to get someone. We might want to have a full-time executive director, but not 

a full-time chairman. 

Ambassador McNamara. 

Mr. MCNAMARA. Just a brief interjection. I strongly recommended to the former Administration and to this Administration 

before I left government that I, as Program Manager, really wanted 

that privacy board to be alive, well, working, and cooperating with 

me. It is a necessary place, I feel, for the Program Manager to go 

to bounce ideas off, to get an independent view. Sometimes you get 

so wrapped up in the problem that you forget that there are other 

aspects that have to be taken into account. 

I was very disappointed that the good initiative, within 6 

months, in fact, had deteriorated, and for all practical purposes, 

was moribund. 

Senator COLLINS. Exactly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think 

this was an excellent hearing because of the extraordinary witnesses that we have, not to suggest that it would not have been 

a good hearing without them. [Laughter.] 

But I very much appreciate the expertise that you assembled. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. I agree with you 

totally. It has been very productive. I am going to end up coming 

away with a good feeling that we have made significant progress 

in information sharing over the last decade. I think it was you, 

279 

Ambassador McNamara, who said that we had built a foundation 

but we are not finished with what we have to do. In that regard, 

you have given us, I think, some very timely information and counsel and some suggestions that I promise you the Committee will 

follow up on to continue to improve the already improved situation. 

Chief LANIER. Can I just add one thing I wanted to get on the 

record before we close? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Chief, you have the full First Amendment 

rights. [Laughter.] 

Chief LANIER. Thank you. One of the things that is in my testimony, but I did not get a chance to get to it, is still a problem with 

information sharing, is the D-Block. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Chief LANIER. During the earthquake that happened here in 

Washington, as you know, just a few weeks ago, literally, there was 

no phone service for anyone. I was on the street. I was with two 

other police chiefs in downtown Washington. None of our cell services worked. Using the GETS Card is great. You can get the GETS 

emergency service up. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Chief LANIER. It takes time. I do not think we should have that 

situation 10 years after 9/11, where you cannot make a phone call 

when there is a disaster that is unfolding. So any help you could 

give us on the D-Block would be really important for us. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks for bringing that up and relating 

it to this. You cannot share information if you cannot get information. We both are strong supporters of the D-Block auction and the 

commitment of the D-Block to public safety. There is growing support for it. There still is opposition to the auction from people who 

would have to pay, but I think we have the majority and we have 

to find a vehicle to get this through. It almost, believe it or not, 

got into one of the versions of the debt ceiling extension over the 

summer. I hope and believe that there will be an attempt to put 

it into the report of the Joint Special Committee, the so-called 

supercommittee created by the Budget Control Act. So I am more 

optimistic than not that we are going to find a way in this session 

to both have the auction, raise the money, commit the D-Block to 

public safety, give you some funding to implement that, and then 

also have some money left over to go toward deficit reduction. 

Chief LANIER. Thank you very much. It is very important. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much for your lifetime of 

service and for your testimony this morning. 

We are going to leave the record open for 15 days for any additional questions or statements that Members may have. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(281) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND THE ANTHRAX 

ATTACKS: PROTECTING AGAINST 

BIOLOGICAL THREATS 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Collins, Brown, and Moran. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. The hearing will come to 

order. Thanks to our really excellent panel of witnesses for coming 

today to discuss this topic, which is our Nation’s record over the 

past decade in improving our defenses against a biological attack 

or a pandemic. 

Today’s hearing is part of our ‘‘Ten Years after 9/11’’ series assessing the status of a number of government homeland security 

operations that were singled out as inadequate or dysfunctional by 

the 9/11 Commission. The impetus for our review today, as everyone will remember, actually came a week after the 9/11 attacks, 

long before there ever was a 9/11 Commission, when our already 

traumatized Nation was shaken anew by the mailing of anthrax 

spores to five news media organizations and two U.S. Senators. 

All told, five people died from anthrax inhalation. Two were postal workers. And one close to my home was a 94-year-old woman 

from Connecticut. Twenty-two others were sickened, and thousands—including a lot of Members of Congress and our staffs—took 

a course of powerful antibiotics to ward off possible infection. 

We remember those days well around here because one of the letters was sent to Senator Daschle’s office in the Hart Building, 

where my office was and is located. The building was evacuated 

and closed for months while HazMat teams scoured the area. We 

were fortunate that no additional anthrax was found and that no 

attacks, of course, have occurred since. But that is unlikely to remain the case. 

Three years ago, the Graham-Talent Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 

concluded that a biological weapon was more likely than any other 

weapon of mass destruction to be used in an attack against our 

282 

country that causes mass casualties. The Commission predicted 

that such an attack would probably occur somewhere in the world 

within the 5 years after its report, which was 3 years ago, and concluded then that the Federal Government was not prepared to respond adequately. 

Just last week, the Bipartisan WMD Research Center, which was 

a follow-on to that Graham-Talent WMD Commission, reported 

that the threat of a bioterror attack remains as strong as ever. We 

have no specific credible evidence, I want to make clear, that terrorists are now plotting such a specific attack. But they certainly 

have made it clear in words and action that they aspire to do so, 

and technological advances, I am afraid, are making it easier, faster, and cheaper to carry out such an attack. 

So our question today is: Has the Federal Government developed 

the tools we need to respond effectively to a bioterror attack or naturally occurring pandemic disease, to develop and disseminate vaccines and antibiotics, and to respond to the medical consequences 

that would result from such a biological disaster? 

Over the past several years and past decade, we have spent billions of dollars on biodefense research; on strengthening first responder capabilities; and on developing new vaccines, biosurveillance systems, and forensic science techniques. Really we have 

done a lot more than, I would say, the average American knows we 

have done to protect their security. 

These investments, in my opinion, have made us a Nation far 

more prepared to deal with a biological disaster than we ever have 

been. Just yesterday, for example, I noticed in the news that the 

Connecticut Children’s Hospital, which is located in Hartford, conducted an exercise to test if it could immunize its employees within 

a 24-hour period in the event of a virus outbreak or a bioterror attack. This is typical of preparedness at the local level which is 

going on all over the country and is absolutely key. Communities 

across the country have significantly improved their disaster planning since 2001. 

But it is also clear from the reports that have been issued that 

we are not prepared for a catastrophic biological incident. We are 

much better prepared for a smaller WMD biological attack although there, too, are gaps remaining in our capabilities, which I 

would like to talk about during this hearing. 

Since 9/11, Congress has created a remarkable number of new offices to deal with this bioterror threat, so we have not sat back. 

The Biomedical Advanced Research Development Authority, established at the Department of Health and Human Services to fund 

WMD medical countermeasures—that is what products and programs do we have to address the questions: What do you do if 

there is an outbreak? How do you stop it and protect people? It has 

helped greatly increase our preparedness by delivering medical 

countermeasures to the National Strategic Stockpile, which now 

contains millions of doses of smallpox and anthrax vaccines; postexposure therapeutics for anthrax, smallpox, and botulism; and 

some basic radiation treatments. As a result, our ability to treat 

victims with medical countermeasures has improved dramatically 

since 2001. 

283 

At the Department of Homeland Security, the National Bioforensics Analysis Center studies new bioforensic methods and 

identifies the DNA of biological agents so that criminal investigators can pinpoint their source. 

The Obama Administration is also tightening security at laboratories that use the most dangerous pathogens and those most likely 

to be capable of being weaponized. I am pleased to note that legislation, which this Committee produced in October 2009, has helped 

to facilitate this Administration action. 

The government has also deployed—and, again, I mention this 

for the benefit and hopefully the greater sense of security of the 

public—a network of aerosol sensors called BioWatch in cities 

around the country that is designed to detect anthrax and other biological agents. New technology is on the horizon that would shorten the amount of time that it takes these sensors to detect a biothreat. 

These are significant advances, in my opinion, in our biodefense, 

but they do not tell the whole story. Last week, the Bipartisan 

WMD Research Center concluded: ‘‘Although [government] efforts 

have yielded considerable progress over the past decade, the Nation 

does not yet have adequate bioresponse capability to meet fundamental expectations during a large-scale biological event.’’ And I 

stress ‘‘biologial event.’’ 

We still, as far as I can determine, lack a strategy for dispensing 

vaccines and antibiotics in a mass crisis. We do not have the ability 

to track the spread of disease in realtime through a community or 

quickly reclaim contaminated areas to get people back to their 

homes and critical infrastructure up and running again. 

And 10 years after the anthrax attacks of 2001, as far as I can 

tell, we still do not have a modern anthrax vaccine that is more 

effective than the one developed in the 1950s. Medical countermeasures for other chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

threats have also not yet been developed. 

Tight budgets now have led to an understaffed medical surge 

force to respond to a biological attack in communities around the 

country. In fact, right now discussions are underway in Congress 

to eliminate funding for programs that coordinate the overall medical response to a bioattack, such as the Metropolitan Medical Response System, and for centers that train public officials in emergency response. 

So the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 

Health and Human Services, and the FBI, working together and in 

coordination with State and local governments and the private sector, have an enormous responsibility to continue to work to increase our capability to protect the public from biological attacks. 

This Committee has been working with those Federal agencies to 

make sure that they can fulfill that responsibility, and we will continue to work with them in that direction to make sure they can 

do so in a way that is ever more effective. 

So, bottom line, as I look back over 10 years, we have come a 

long way. Perhaps we will never be as fully protected as we would 

like to be, but we still have a ways to go. I would like to focus with 

the witnesses on both elements of that story. What have we done 

since 2001? And what are the most pressing unmet needs that we 

284 

have? So I look forward to the thoughts of this excellent panel of 

expert witnesses today. 

Senator Collins, I really appreciate you coming. I know you are 

involved in the appropriations bill on the floor, and you are probably not going to be able to be with us very long. But thanks for 

coming by for an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It has been a decade since the anthrax attacks that left 5 people 

dead and 17 sickened. It has been just 2 weeks since the operation 

in Yemen killed Anwar al-Awlaki, who reportedly sought poisons, 

including cyanide and ricin, to attack the United States. 

The new leader of al-Qaeda has a medical background, which 

raises concerns that he may have an even greater interest in pursuing chemical and biological terrorism. 

Since 2001, more than $65 billion in Federal funds have been invested in biodefense, but progress has been difficult to quantify. 

With the growth of new technologies and online road maps, terrorist groups may soon be able to threaten nation states with biological weapons. And some countries, like Syria, have never ratified 

the Biological Weapons Convention. 

As the Chairman mentioned, former Senators Graham and Talent issued a report in 2008 on the prevention of WMD proliferation 

and terrorism. They predicted the use of a weapon of mass destruction, most likely a biological weapon, in a terrorist attack by the 

year 2013. Just last week, they issued a report card grading improvements in detection and diagnosis capabilities, medical countermeasures availabilities, and communications. 

Their report card is troubling. While it does show progress in 

some areas, they found stagnation on medical management and on 

the development, approval, and dispensing of medical countermeasures. The Members of this Committee have only to think of 

our extensive investigation into the difficult time the Administration had in distributing the flu vaccine to respond to the naturally 

occurring H1N1 outbreak. 

The Administration received F’s from the Commission in areas 

such as the attribution of even small-scale events and the environmental cleanup of large-scale incidents. That is not acceptable. 

To safeguard our citizens against bioterrorism, we must have the 

ability to respond effectively after an attack has occurred. But this 

is no easy matter. We do not yet have adequate bioresponse capabilities to meet fundamental expectations during a large-scale attack. The WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act that Senator 

Lieberman and I introduced in 2009 would have required the establishment of a detailed plan for preventing and responding to 

such an attack. 

A biological attack is especially worrisome because we likely 

would not immediately know that we had been attacked. That is 

why I remain concerned about the effectiveness of the BioWatch 

Program. Secretary Janet Napolitano has touted this nationwide 

environmental monitoring system designed to detect the intentional release of aerosolized biological agents. But according to the 

285 

GAO, a threat agent may not be identified until more than a day 

after its release. 

While the next generation of BioWatch technology could bring 

this down to just 4 hours, we are not yet certain that this technology will be viable. 

In addition to the technological upgrades, better coordination between DHS and HHS is necessary to enhance our ability to identify 

a threat agent quickly and to increase the speed and reliability of 

attribution so that we can help prevent follow-on attacks. 

Ultimately, our best hope of detecting and containing an attack 

is the low-tech, unglamorous, but critically important system of intelligence combined with a robust public health surveillance network. This still remains the most effective system, and we must be 

careful not to look for technological magic bullets to relieve us of 

the duty to maintain and strengthen our public health surveillance 

infrastructure. 

The Graham-Talent Commission also found serious flaws in the 

security of biological labs in this country. A GAO report in 2009, 

which I requested, reported alarming deficiencies in basic perimeter security at facilities that house the world’s most dangerous 

pathogens, like the Ebola and smallpox viruses. GAO also found 

that laboratory regulation ‘‘for the most part relies on self-policing.’’ 

I was pleased to hear the Chairman say that the Administration 

has taken some steps to improve security at these labs. I look forward to hearing what those are. 

While security controls must be improved within our own country, global security problems are even more daunting. I mentioned 

Syria earlier, but the crossroads of terrorism and proliferation, biology, and technology, in volatile countries such as Pakistan are also 

troublesome. 

A multitude of Federal agencies—DHS, EPA, HHS, CDC, USDA, 

and the FBI, among others—all have some responsibilities for bioterrorism. I will tell you, it concerns me that so many different 

Federal entities could be scrambling to respond during and after an 

attack. And that is, of course, in addition to State and local health 

officials and first responders that are a critical part of the system 

as well. 

Yet the Executive Branch does not have one agency or one official that is the clearly designated leader on all elements of biodefense, especially the coordination and dissemination to both law 

enforcement and public health stakeholders of critical information. 

This appears to me to be a major gap in our prevention and response capability. If we cannot tell our health providers what to 

look for when there is a potential threat, we cannot properly trigger the public health surveillance system that is our best hope for 

early detection, containment, and response. 

We need a leader who can direct the response and eliminate 

overlap or redundancy. This official should also have the ability to 

coordinate across Federal agencies and harness the assets and expertise of State and local governments, first responders, and the 

private sector. 

Although, as the Chairman has indicated, I am going to have to 

leave early from this hearing to manage a bill on the floor, I can 

286 

1The prepared statement of Dr. O’Toole appears in the Appendix on page 1150. 

assure the witnesses that I will follow with great interest your testimony, and I look forward to reading the questions and answers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins, and if you are 

not able to return, as I presume you will not because you are managing the bill, I am going to make sure to ask the witnesses to respond particularly to your last couple of questions about coordination among the many Federal agencies involved here. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Our first witness is Dr. Tara O’Toole. Dr. O’Toole was before us 

in an earlier incarnation as a noted biodefense expert and founder, 

in fact, of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh 

Medical Center. It is a pleasure to welcome you back as the Under 

Secretary for Science and Technology in the Department of Homeland Security and to welcome your testimony at this time. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. TARA J. O’TOOLE,1 UNDER SECRETARY 

FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and 

Senator Moran. As you have both already eloquently stated, there 

really has been a lot of significant cumulative progress in many of 

the areas of this complex landscape of biodefense over the past decade, and I will highlight some of the S&T Directorate’s contributions in understanding the threat, detection and characterization, 

response, recovery and decontamination, bioforensics, and last but 

not least, defense against agro-bioterrorism, which is very important even though we have not experienced such an event before. 

Senator Collins, as you both noted, at the Federal level biodefense is an intensely interagency activity. I think the subject represents such irreducible complexity that at some level there is no 

help for learning how to coordinate across multiple Federal agencies and, indeed, as you said, State and local governments, the private sector of health care, and public health. 

In particular, in austere budget environments I think collaboration among the Federal agencies is going to become even more imperative as we try to conserve resources and make sure our priorities are correct. 

What you see before you today is the beginning of an actual community of biodefense experts in the government, which we certainly 

did not have, at least not as robustly as we do today, in 2001. I 

would caution you, however, that some of the budget cuts being 

contemplated will do great damage to that community, and if people do not see career paths in biosecurity, then this complex melange of technical subjects may suffer, and so will the Federal Government’s expertise in this area in time to come. 

And, finally, I just want to commend this Committee for your 

continuing interest in this topic. This Committee is really one of 

the only places in Congress that the entire landscape of biodefense 

is overseen and examined, so this, I think, is a very important 

hearing. 

287 

First of all, what is different since 2001? We have a much better 

understanding of the risks associated with specific biothreat agents 

under particular scenarios. Part of this understanding comes from 

S&T’s Biothreat Risk Assessment, which is done biannually. We 

have done three of these major probablistic risk assessments, 

which are strategic assessments, models, which identify and 

prioritize the relative risk, as I say, of different agents and serve 

as the starting point for biodefense priorities and investment decisions. 

The BTRA, as it is known, also identifies knowledge gaps that 

are then pursued by the National Biothreat Center at Fort Detrick 

and provides a systematic, science-based framework for asking 

‘‘what if ’’ questions. What if it was a lot easier to get hold of this 

agent? What would that do to the risk? And so forth. 

Every other year when we are not doing this elaborate risk assessment, we conduct what are called tailored assessments which 

focus on more detailed evaluation and hypothesis testing. For example, what is the impact on producing agents given a range of 

judgments from the intelligence community about how easy that 

might be to accomplish? 

We are also in S&T pursuing detailed and empirical risk studies 

on the effects of releasing a biological agent or a chemical agent in 

metro systems. We have done this in Boston and in Washington, 

using both biological and chemical simulants to understand what 

would happen to these structures under attack and how to recover 

them quickly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What kind of metro systems are you referring to? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. The Massachusett Bay Transportation Authority in 

Boston and the Washington Metro, the oldest and the newest. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Actual metro transportation. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Exactly. Subways, as we call them in Boston. 

In the category of detection and characterization, as you noted, 

in 2001, once it was recognized that letters containing anthrax had 

been mailed to media outlets and Congress, there was an avalanche of reports of suspicious powders causing thousands of first 

responder requests and a tsunami of samples being sent to State 

labs for analysis. The response was very disorganized, confused. It 

engendered a lot of alarming speculation and repeated calls and responses that ranged from building evacuations, to stripping people 

who had been in the buildings and washing them down, and to 

closing buildings for years at a time. 

I think the reaction would be much different today. S&T has led 

an interagency working group with the same alphabet—CDC, FBI, 

HHS, and NIST—to create the Standard Field Protocol for Rapid 

Resolution of Suspicious Powders. This guidance basically walks 

first responders through how to deal with a visible powder they 

suspect of being a bioagent, protecting themselves and also yielding 

a sampling strategy that would stand up to reliable testing and 

prosecution if necessary. These are also much more effective and 

efficient procedures. They are already being used by the FBI in 

several States, and they are now being incorporated into first responder training curricula. 

288 

We are also in S&T evaluating the ability of commercially available technology which would rapidly test powders in the field to be 

reliable. These technologies were available in 2001 and were not 

reliable. There were a lot of false positives which caused a lot of 

mayhem. 

Because S&T and others have developed reliable standards for 

doing assays of microbiological agents, we can now effectively 

evaluate these commercial options and tell first responders what 

works and what does not. 

As Senator Collins says, the Lab Response Network is critically 

important to our biodefense. This is a State-sponsored network of 

public health labs which are the ones that carry out the assays 

that would come to them via the first responders. They, too, are 

much more organized and capable than they were in 2001. They, 

too, are using standardized assays developed by S&T and the interagency, and we are working on technologies that would allow them 

to surge more effectively if they were suddenly, again, to encounter 

large swaths of tests. 

I will point out, however, that the robustness of this important 

leg of our response is also in peril. Since 2008, we have lost about 

50,000 public health staff in the State and local public health agencies due to economic pressures. 

I will mention a final technology in detection and characterization category that S&T is working on. This is an outcome of our 

work on metro studies. We called it ‘‘Detect to Protect.’’ We are concerned that we need to be able to respond faster to detection, so 

we are looking at a two-tiered system, first, of very fast detectors 

that would automatically trigger low-impact action, such as turning 

off HVAC systems, and at the same time would trigger a slower 

but more reliable detector that would then confirm whether or not 

this was a true positive. 

We are also working on many other things, including advanced 

diagnostics. We have done a lot of work in recovery and decontamination. We do have initial guidance out there for how we 

would do that rapidly. I would point out that decontamination is 

really an issue mostly with anthrax, which is especially hearty. It 

may not be an issue with other bioagents, at least not in the long 

term. And DHS along with other agencies, in particular DTRA, are 

now conducting the aerosolization studies at Dugway Proving 

Ground to find out exactly whether or not and to what extent anthrax would come back up into the air and pose a risk to health 

after an attack. 

We have made great progress in bioforensics, which is one aspect 

of attribution. I think this is an area where the WMD report card 

was a little bit harsh. I would be happy to talk about that. But 

NBAF at Fort Detrick is an enormous national capability that we 

are very proud of. 

And, finally, agrodefense is also moving forward thanks to great 

work at the Plum Island Disease Center off the coast of Long Island. We are very close and, in fact, are doing field trials of a new 

foot-and-mouth disease vaccine, which would allow us to distinguish animals who were infected from a disease versus those who 

were vaccinated. And DHS is very committed to building the National BioAgro Facility in Manhattan, Kansas, a BSL-4 facility 

289 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Garza appears in the Appendix on page 1161. 

which Secretary Napolitano and I believe is essential for U.S. 

agrodefense. That is problematic in the fiscal year 2012 budget, 

and I would be pleased to take questions on that during the question period. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Secretary O’Toole, for that excellent beginning. I cannot control myself from asking whether there 

is a benign form of the foot-and-mouth vaccine that you will have 

available to Members of Congress. [Laughter.] 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Given the budget, Senator, we would be—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I apologize, really. But thank you for 

laughing quietly. 

Our next witness is Hon. Alexander Garza, Assistant Secretary 

for Health Affairs and the Chief Medical Officer of the Department 

of Homeland Security. Dr. Garza prior to coming to this position 

was involved in many aspects of practice, including serving in the 

U.S. military in battlefield circumstances with great honor and effect. He heads the biodefense strategy and planning effort at 

Homeland Security and runs operational components such as the 

biological surveillance system I mentioned, BioWatch. So we are 

very glad to have you back, and please proceed with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ALEXANDER G. GARZA,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS AND CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. GARZA. Thank you, sir. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank 

you for inviting me to testify before you today. Secretary 

Napolitano, in submitting the 2011 Progress Report, highlighted a 

number of activities that DHS has instituted to prepare for and 

protect against biological attacks. The Office of Health Affairs 

works on several of these efforts, so I welcome the opportunity to 

discuss these with you. 

I am pleased as well to testify with my counterparts here from 

the FBI, HHS ASPR, and the Science and Technology Directorate. 

As was mentioned before, biodefense requires a multidimensional 

approach if we are to protect the American people, and we very 

much value the partnerships with these and other Federal agencies. 

The Committee is also very familiar with OHA’s role and responsibilities. We are the principal medical and health authority for 

DHS, including acts of terrorism, and are the legislative coordinator for biodefense within the Department. These are responsibilities that I take very seriously as our mission is imperative to the 

overall mission of homeland security. 

As has been mentioned already, the risk of a biological agent 

being used as a weapon against the United States is both real and 

concerning. Just last week, the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center released its 2011 bioresponse report card stating 

that the threat of biological attack was real and growing. 

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Furthermore, rapid advances in biotechnology have lowered the 

potential barriers once thought to inhibit would-be bioterrorists. 

The Amerithrax incident of 10 years ago, although significant, was 

a small-scale attack with limited casualties. It nonetheless showed 

that one does not necessarily need a weapon of mass destruction 

but only a weapon of mass disruption to effect severe consequences, 

and our adversaries have learned from this model. 

The Department has made great strides in protecting and preparing the Nation to respond to biological attacks since this incident. We have improved our ability to detect biological agents, 

mitigate their effects, speed our recovery, and, most importantly, to 

save lives. I will discuss our initiatives that are instrumental to 

biodefense for the Nation, including BioWatch, biosurveillance, and 

our planning and exercise efforts. 

One of DHS’s most significant contributions in biodefense is in 

early detection. The prompt identification of a bioattack accelerates 

the detect, decide, deliver, and dispense sequence. Put another 

way, it buys time, and time saves lives. 

Now in its ninth year, OHA’s BioWatch program is a federally 

managed, locally operated nationwide environmental surveillance 

system designed to detect biological agents. BioWatch is strategically deployed to more than 30 high-risk metropolitan areas and at 

national special security events such as the upcoming APEC summit. 

However, BioWatch is much more than a machine. BioWatch has 

evolved to become a robust network of Federal, State, and local individuals that together form the nexus of decisionmakers in the 

event of a biological attack. 

In 2010, DHS began testing and evaluating the next generation 

of biodetection systems, which we call Generation-3, or Gen-3. The 

Gen-3 program’s goals are to decrease the time to detection from 

4 to 6 hours, increase our population coverage, and provide greater 

cost-effectiveness all without losing any accuracy. We are currently 

in the process of a rigorous and well-controlled testing and evaluation program validating this technology. 

Early detection through BioWatch is but one element of an overall biosurveillance and situational awareness system. OHA also 

manages the National Biosurveillance Integration System, a consortium of Federal partners established to detect and monitor biological events of national concern. 

DHS has developed and continues to refine an integrated, multidisciplinary, common biosurveillance capability to provide the Federal Government, State, and local partners with information and 

assessments of potential and unfolding biological events. 

Furthermore, understanding that all events are local, we work 

directly with State and local public health, emergency management, and emergency medical services leaders to develop response 

capabilities for health security threats, including biological threats. 

For example, we are expanding local public health participation 

in the national network of fusion centers, and OHA together with 

FEMA conducted a series of anthrax response exercises in each of 

the 10 FEMA regions. These exercises were designed to help coordinate roles, responsibilities, and critical response actions following a wide-area anthrax attack. 

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1The prepared statement of Dr. Lurie appears in the Appendix on page 1167. 

Last, OHA coordinates routinely with our Federal partners, including those at this hearing, on various medical countermeasure 

issues. These efforts include the interagency development of a Federal rapid response capacity and the DHS effort to stockpile medical countermeasures for our personnel, which my office has led. 

As demonstrated by these multiple examples, DHS has made 

substantial investments and improvements since the 2001 anthrax 

attack, and we are much better prepared than we were a decade 

ago. There still, however, remains much work to do in biodefense 

going forward. 

I thank you for your time and look forward to answering whatever questions you may have. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Dr. Garza, for that excellent 

testimony. 

Next we have Dr. Nicole Lurie, who we are again glad to welcome back—we have four doctors on this panel, and it is reassuring. She is the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the Department of Health and Human Services. Dr. 

Lurie heads the biodefense strategy and planning efforts at HHS 

and in that regard oversees efforts to develop vaccines and therapeutics under the Project BioShield in BARDA. So thank you for 

your work, and we look forward to your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. NICOLE LURIE,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Dr. LURIE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, 

and Senator Moran, as you heard, I am Dr. Nicole Lurie. I am the 

Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, and I am 

pleased to talk with you about our Nation’s public health preparedness for a biological event. 

As we all know, 10 years ago, on the heels of the World Trade 

Center attacks, we all dealt with the anthrax letters, which we 

have talked about this morning. While we were ill prepared at the 

time to face those attacks, today I am pleased to tell you that our 

public health preparedness has made steady and really significant 

progress. With each emergency, from hurricanes and tornadoes to 

a pandemic and an oil spill, we have continually improved in our 

planning and our operations. We now have strategies in place to 

coordinate our efforts and have built truly all-hazards capabilities 

from the local to the Federal level to ensure that our responses are 

flexible and can save lives. 

One area of progress is in the medical countermeasures enterprise, beginning with surveillance running all the way through to 

dispensing and evaluating a countermeasure. Yet I will be the first 

one to tell you that, despite the gains, progress has not been fast 

enough. 

In December 2009, Secretary Sebelius requested a review of the 

medical countermeasures enterprise to ensure that the Nation really has a forward-looking, 21st Century system. We have made 

many improvements in response to that review, including strengthVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00307 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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ening surveillance, laboratories, and countermeasure distribution 

plans. 

Critical to the success of the whole Public Health Emergency 

Medical Countermeasure Enterprise is an integrated approach with 

a formal governance structure. And you should know that this includes all of the components of HHS plus DHS, VA, DOD, USDA. 

So it is truly an interagency effort. And that all parts now of HHS, 

CDC, FDA, NIH, and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority work together with companies from the outset 

of a contract rather than at the end of the pipeline. 

In this arena, active partnerships with industry have become 

really critical, and we have created new opportunities to communicate our priorities and help companies, especially new ones, learn 

how to work more effectively with us. 

We have also strengthened our internal processes, making the 

government an easier partner to work with, and I am pleased to 

report, for example, that we have decreased the time it takes to announce, review, and award new contracts for our broad agency announcements by almost 25 percent in the last year, to under 6 

months. 

The medical countermeasure review also prioritizes regulatory 

science at FDA and proposes innovative partnerships with industry 

to support promising new companies and ideas. 

Thanks to the BioShield special reserve fund, we have procured 

and stockpiled more critical life-saving countermeasures than at 

any time in our Nation’s history, including for smallpox, anthrax, 

botulism, and radiological and nuclear threats, as you mentioned. 

Through work in BARDA, we now have a pipeline of new products, 

including over 80 candidate products that, if successful, have the 

potential to transition to the stockpile. And we continue to make 

progress in preparedness for the next influenza pandemic. 

Through a long-term partnership with Novartis, for example, the 

first U.S. cell-based influenza manufacturing plant will become 

operational in the next couple of weeks. This plant will expand significantly our domestic surge capacity for a pandemic vaccine and 

could also make vaccines for other novel emerging pathogens in an 

emergency. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Just tell us a little more about that, because our Committee was so focused on that during the H1N1 

hearings we held. Tell us where it is going to be. This will be the 

first inside the United States now. 

Dr. LURIE. This is the first cell-based facility inside the United 

States. It is in Holly Springs, North Carolina, and it has been a 

long-term partnership with Novartis. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. LURIE. Then, in addition, we are reviewing applications now 

for the Centers for Advanced Development and Manufacturing 

called for in the Secretary’s medical countermeasure review which 

will provide core services to companies and then additional surge 

manufacturing capacity. I do not know where those will be yet because that is still in process. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is really good to hear. I remember during the outbreak that we were very concerned that we were 

dependent on foreign manufacturers, and they would naturally feel 

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pressure to give first to their local populations, and quite understandably. So that is very significant. I am glad to hear that. 

Dr. LURIE. Yes. Thanks. I think the progress has really been remarkable, and I congratulate both Congress for funding and our 

team and our partners for really pulling it off. 

Yet, as we all know from the WMD Terrorism Research Center 

report card, while we have made important progress—and that is 

some of it—our preparedness is not yet sufficient. In particular, 

they noted that the medical countermeasures enterprise lacks sufficient and sustained funding. The reauthorization of the Pandemic 

and All-Hazards Preparedness Act is one opportunity to provide 

some new authorities and resources called for in that report. 

On the response side, we are using new technologies, including 

electronic medical records to match demand with need, geographic 

information systems to identify the needs of affected populations 

and available resources, and social media to communicate and observe developing health trends. 

We have also made impressive strides in our Nation, in our core 

State, and local public health capabilities. So there was a time in 

the not too distant past, in fact, when you and I had a chance to 

speak, when getting Internet access for a local health department 

was a challenge, and blast fax was a breakthrough technology. We 

can all laugh about it now. It was not very long ago. 

Two-thousand-eleven has seen a number of natural disasters 

that were ably managed by our State and local partners with limited or no Federal assistance, and we have heard repeatedly from 

them that this would not have been possible 10 years ago. 

Two critical tools that underpin State and local response are the 

Hospital Preparedness Program and the Public Health Emergency 

Preparedness Program, which are being aligned for greater efficiency. However, without continued support and funding for our 

public health and medical systems, the infrastructure will degrade. 

In fact, as you heard from Dr. O’Toole, we are seeing this already 

in this loss of almost 50,000 jobs. My fear is that as State and local 

capacity diminishes, we will see an increase once again in the call 

for Federal assistance, but, furthermore, this really puts our Nation’s response capability and community recovery at risk. Sustaining our community-based response capabilities has to remain a 

top priority. 

Ultimately, all of our investments and efforts have the same 

goal: Building a resilient Nation and saving lives when a disaster 

does occur. We have made great strides in the last decade. I am 

very proud of what we have accomplished in the last 21⁄2 years, but 

in truth, we have miles to go before we sleep. 

Thank you for the opportunity, and I am happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Dr. Lurie. 

Last on this panel is Dr. Vahid Majidi, who is the Assistant Director at the FBI in charge of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. It says a lot that Dr. Majidi, who has a very distinguished background as a chemist and worked at the National Laboratories, now finds himself at the FBI where he is responsible for 

investigating suspected cases of WMD terrorism and proliferation. 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Majidi appears in the Appendix on page 1186. 

So I am very glad you are here, and please proceed with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF VAHID MAJIDI, PH.D.,1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. MAJIDI. Thank you, sir. Good morning. It is my pleasure to 

discuss what the FBI has done over the last 10 years and what we 

are doing to protect the United States against bioterrorism threats. 

The FBI’s number one priority is to protect the United States 

from terrorist attacks, and within that priority, the use of weapons 

of mass destruction is simply unacceptable to us. In fact, to clearly 

demonstrate our commitment and to ensure that we rigorously address WMD issues, the FBI established a Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate in 2006. The Directorate consolidates WMD 

investigations and prevention efforts, creating a unique combination of law enforcement authorities, intelligence and analysis capabilities, and technical subject matter expertise focused on chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive matters. My Directorate’s primary mission is prevention of WMD terrorism and proliferation. 

The FBI has the responsibility to investigate WMD threats, and 

often we have to use our strong response capabilities to collect evidence in contaminated areas, disarm hazardous devices, and provide command and control support for critical incidents. 

Threats are identified through products from the U.S. intelligence community, which includes FBI’s collections efforts, and 

leads are provided through the local law enforcement community as 

well. Domestic and international terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda 

and its affiliates, have shown unwavering interest in using biological agents and toxins. It is not unusual for these groups to openly 

seek scientists to join their ranks and support their cause. 

The FBI addresses bioterrorism threats by identifying points of 

vulnerability for biological agents acquisitions, weapons development, and ultimately the execution phase. This systematic approach allows for resources prioritization in light of potential gaps 

in our biosecurity program. We have a well-defined framework to 

design and implement countermeasures focusing on our outreach 

and indicators. 

There are challenges mounting an effective response to an act of 

bioterrorism. These events may go undetected for a long period of 

time until victims seek medical treatment or other key evidences 

are discovered. As such, the FBI and CDC developed the Joint 

Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations. This is an interactive 

training program to improve public health and law enforcement efforts to jointly identify and investigate intentional or naturally occurring threats. 

As you mentioned earlier, a recent bioresponse report card published by the Bipartisan WMD Research Center provides an overall 

negative view of U.S. Government accomplishments in bioterror 

readiness. Nonetheless, they do highlight that CDC and FBI have 

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lic health and law enforcement that will significantly improve cooperation during investigations. 

I must emphasize that FBI’s program in combating bioterrorism 

is based on prevention concepts, which is much more expansive 

than leading-edge investigative protocols, advanced traditional 

forensics, and microbial forensics familiar to all. Amongst the pantheon of activities centered on WMD issues, the FBI is keenly focused on safeguarding biological organisms and the security of individuals with access to these materials. We developed the Biological 

Sciences and Academic Biosecurity Workshop Initiative to build 

partnerships between the FBI and academic research communities. 

This initiative improves situational awareness for all participants 

and develops a mechanism to report suspicious activities to prevent 

emerging national security threats. 

As you are aware, the FBI is a Federal partner in the Select 

Agent Program with HHS and USDA, and this program is designed 

to safeguard entities that store or conduct research with biological 

select agents and toxins. The FBI supports this program by properly vetting individuals prior to access against any of the 10 

prohibitors defined in the USA PATRIOT Act and 18 U.S.C. 175(b). 

The FBI has at least one highly trained special agent in each of 

our 56 field offices who manages and addresses WMD threats and 

events. These special agents are known as WMD coordinators. The 

FBI laboratory has developed an extensive protocol and strong national relationship with U.S. Government components, including 

DHS’s National Bioforensic Analysis Center, to deal with WMD 

evidence. Biologically contaminated evidence is evaluated by the 

Laboratory Response Network established by FBI, CDC, and associated public health laboratories. 

Additionally, the FBI created the Hazardous Evidence Analysis 

Team, a cadre of highly trained forensic examiners who are capable 

of safely performing traditional forensic analysis on contaminated 

evidence in our partner laboratories. 

Advancements in science and technology have led to significant 

progress in synthetic biology. The FBI has established a synthetic 

biology initiative, a proactive approach to mitigate current and 

over-the-horizon risks posed by exploitation of advancements in 

this arena. In a partnership with private industry, we have implemented the Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA. This framework codifies a notification 

process for DNA sequence providers to contact their local WMD coordinator, which I mentioned earlier, when encountering alarming 

orders. 

Moreover, growing public interest in biological science has led to 

the development of an amateur biology movement. In this community, science and biotechnology is pursued at home or shared meeting places. The FBI has developed a partnership with the amateur 

biology community to garner collaborations in preventing, detecting, and responding to potentially nefarious incidents. In short, the 

FBI is dedicated to protecting our Nation and will continue to collaborate with the U.S. Government and scientific community to 

proactively address new biological threats on the horizon. 

Since the establishment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, the FBI has successfully managed hundreds of cases inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00311 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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volving biological substances and suspicious powders, leading to 

numerous convictions and lengthy sentences. 

Thank you for your time. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Doctor. 

We will do 7-minute rounds of questions. Senator Moran is here, 

and Senator Brown said he would try to come back from another 

committee hearing. 

Dr. O’Toole, let me begin with you, and thank you for the work 

that Science and Technology has done. I want to ask you to talk 

to us a little more about the strategic risk assessments that you 

have carried out, and tell us in a little more detail what they show. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. These risk assessments are models. They are computer models based upon the best scientific data and the judgments 

of professionals—including intelligence community professionals 

and law enforcement experts—that we can find. ‘‘All models are 

run, some are useful’’ is the rule of thumb, and the same goes for 

BTRA. 

I would be happy to tell you how the agents themselves rank and 

what scenarios we are most worried about in a classified session. 

I cannot talk about that now. But what the models produce is information of that sort: What agents really could create a mass casualty situation and under what conditions. 

It allows you to say, well, if I change this variable, so, for example, if I made it impossible to get a bioagent such as smallpox, then 

that scenario goes away or is greatly mitigated. 

What happens if you could have medical countermeasures 

against a certain agent under reasonable expectations of distribution and efficacy and so forth? How many lives would you save? 

So you can ask questions of these models and probe them, and 

then take the uncertainties that you uncover and actually investigate those in laboratories, which we do, and back, in Frederick, 

Maryland. 

They act in practice as the starting point for decisions about 

which biothreat agents do we need to be most worried about. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is the important point. This is a 

unique function that you are carrying out. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And the results of these strategic risk assessments are then shared across the board in our government, 

and presumably State, local government, and the private sector, in 

terms of how the attacks are most likely to come and, therefore, I 

presume, how we should work to develop countermeasures. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. The last is particularly important. The bioagents of greatest concerns are then further studied in detail. We 

validate the original assumptions. We make sure we have up-todate intelligence. And then the results of that second analysis are 

forwarded to HHS, where they consider them in their own framework in terms of public health impacts. 

First of all, the design of the Biological Terrorism Risk Assessment is an interagency process, and the results are disseminated 

through the interagency and find their way into an array of activities, from what kind of exercise are we going to pursue in terms 

297 

of decontamination to what countermeasures are we going to pursue to a myriad of other things. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me go back to the baseline. I obviously respect and support your conclusion that you do not want to 

describe this in detail in a public setting. But I take it, generally 

speaking, that the result of the strategic risk assessment is that 

you continue to consider the threat of a bioterrorist attack to be 

real. In other words, there is a second look here around the tenth 

anniversary of 9/11 where some people are beginning to say that 

in general, not just in terms of bioterrorism, we have overreacted 

over the last 10 years. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Can I address that directly? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is what I would like you to do. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. The biothreat is real, as Dr. Majidi said. We know 

our adversaries are pursuing biological weapons. The potency and 

the accessibility of these weapons, as you said, will increase as the 

bioscience revolution proceeds. 

Just as an example of how fast we are learning how to manipulate biological organisms, in the 1990s it took a decade and $1 billion to decode the human genome. We could now do that for $1,000 

in about a week. And that is only one technique. 

At the same time, this progress is happening globally. It is not 

owned by the U.S. Government or any government. It is being pursued avidly by huge amounts of capital in biopharma, biofuels, and 

all kinds of places, including amateur biologists and kids who are 

interested in extracting DNA for fun, similar to the computer revolution that began the IT industry. So this is going to proceed apace, 

and the appeal of asymmetric weapons is not going to go away either among terrorist groups or among sovereign states, I would 

suggest. This threat is not going to go away. It is going to grow. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Dr. Majidi, you agree with that, I assume. For instance, the Graham-Talent Commission, as you probably know, said that they considered a biological attack to be the 

most likely of the various forms of weapons of mass destruction attack because of the relative ease of developing biological agents and 

moving them into the country. Do you agree? 

Mr. MAJIDI. Yes, that is correct, sir. In fact, if you look at a historical perspective as well as the current case trend, biological 

cases tend to be the largest portion of our WMD cases that we investigate. Many of them tend to be hoaxes, but, nonetheless, the 

cases that have real material involved in them tend to be biologically centered. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I mean, I can tell you that we have 

a warning system now in the Capitol, usually on our BlackBerrys 

or cell phones, and there is actually a remarkable number of occasions where the Capitol Police are called to investigate some kind 

of substance that they do not identify. I think every one of them 

since 2001 has turned out to be benign, but that is not always 

going to be the case. 

I think it is clear from your testimony that—Dr. Garza or Dr. 

Lurie, do you want to add anything about the reality of the threat? 

Dr. GARZA. I would concur with both of my partners up here. Dr. 

O’Toole hit on this earlier. There is such a thing as the curve on 

how quickly biotechnology is growing, and as I mentioned in my 

298 

opening statement, this is very concerning. And she made the analogy to computer technology. There is a law in computing called 

Moore’s law where you increase the capacity of your capacitor and 

the price decreases. Well, the curve for biotechnology is much 

steeper than Moore’s law, and so that barrier that a would-be bioterrorist would have in being able to develop a biological weapon 

is becoming much easier than it was in the past. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Lurie. 

Dr. LURIE. Nothing really to add. I would say that for some years 

I participated as a judge in a contest for high school students who 

did epidemiology projects. What they did was remarkable and, in 

fact, sometimes much more sophisticated than many of the other 

modelers I know. 

I think if we were to have such a kind of contest now in the amateur biology sphere, we would be pretty terrified with what they 

would come up with. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is sufficient warning in itself. 

I want to go back very briefly, Dr. O’Toole. Obviously, intelligence in the war we are in with the terrorists is more critical 

than it has ever been in any other war because of the nature of 

the enemy not striking in any conventional way and also not hesitating—in fact, focusing on civilian populations. So I take it that 

the intelligence community is fully and directly involved certainly 

in the strategic risk assessments that your Directorate is doing. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes, they are, more and more actually, and the intelligence community itself is rethinking its own approach to the 

biothreat and putting new emphasis on collection techniques and 

so forth. 

I would urge all Members of Congress to get a classified briefing 

on the biothreat from the intelligence community. I think that 

would be very helpful to biosecurity. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is a good idea, and I am going to ask 

Senator Collins, but it might be good for our Committee to begin 

that and do that in a classified setting. 

Let me ask you one more question, and then I am going to yield 

to Senator Akaka, who I welcome here this morning, and this picks 

up in a way from Senator Collins’ last statement in her opening 

statement, which is here are four different agencies—well, three 

with two from DHS—represented and a lot of other agencies clearly 

involved. Who is in charge? In other words, who is coordinating the 

efforts of the various departments of the Federal Government involved in both trying to prevent and respond to a biodisaster? Let 

me begin with that. Dr. O’Toole, do you want to start? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, I would have to ask, in charge of what? I understand the longing for a strong leader, somebody who can take 

decisive action in a crisis, and there is an argument for that. I do 

think that biosecurity is so complex and involves equities from so 

many agencies that a coordinator in the White House may be of 

some use, but I think the question is to some extent a red herring. 

In a catastrophic attack, the President is going to be in charge 

in about 30 seconds. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is what I was going to ask. Who is 

in charge in a crisis? Is there somebody within the White House 

299 

who will take the key role in coordinating your effort and advising 

the President—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes, I mean, I think that would be within the National Security staff, either John Brennan or his Deputy, Heidi 

Avery. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. But we would all have roles to play very intensely. 

The interagency approach brings strengths as well as liabilities, 

and as we saw in 2001 and during the flu pandemic, you need a 

lot of very detailed, specialized knowledge to have an informed, coherent response to these kinds of events. And we are going to have 

more and more of them in this society, like Deepwater, like 

Fukushima. We are not going to be able to predict in advance exactly what constellation of experts we need. We need to have an 

agile capacity to assemble and reassemble and restructure the capacities of the U.S. Government as needed. That is what we have 

to learn how to do, and we have to get very efficient at that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Maybe I will turn to you, Dr. Lurie. What 

assurance can we give the public, particularly at this time of tremendous budgetary stress, that there is not a redundancy that is 

necessary, in other words, that there is not an overlap of public investment because of the many agencies involved in the whole field 

of preparing for, preventing, and responding to bioterrorism? 

Dr. LURIE. Thank you for that. This is an area where I actually 

feel quite comfortable. I think the governance structure for the 

countermeasures enterprise is very robust. As I testified, it includes high-level membership from across the interagency. So Dr. 

O’Toole and Dr. Garza both sit on the PHEMCE steering committee, as do others. We have pretty full visibility into what people 

are working on and developing, whether it is in different HHS components, whether it is in DOD, whether it is in DHS. 

The good part is that we all share expertise and problem-solve 

around it. We look and say, well, if you are doing X, I need to do 

Y instead. Or for example, in the case of FDA, how can FDA be 

at the table earlier with a DOD issue? 

So the coordination I think has really grown tremendously over 

the past couple years and is quite robust. So going back to your 

first question to Dr. O’Toole, we learn from DHS and get information from DHS about which agents are the threat agents. We do 

our own public health assessment of how those are likely to make 

people sick and how many people are likely to either get sick or 

die. We look at the kinds of products that we need to make to counteract those. And with that, we work across the whole interagency, 

so we want to know how would a product be used before we even 

go ahead and make it. Does that make sense? Is it usable? Is it 

needed? How would it be deployed in the field, for example? 

In this space, I actually feel quite comfortable that we have 

worked very hard to wring redundancy out of the system. In our 

Centers for Advanced Development, for example, DOD has sat at 

the table with us, helped put the RFP together, will help provide 

core funding for it. Again, tremendous opportunities exist for coordination and collaboration that we have taken full advantage of. 

I want to go back to your question for a minute also to Dr. 

O’Toole about this, the sort of ‘‘who is in charge’’ piece, because I 

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think, as she said, this capabilities-based piece is really important, 

and we have now a number of structures for governance and coordination across all of us. But I should also point out that at the 

end of the day, with each of the emergencies that we have faced, 

whether it was pandemic, whether it was Deepwater, whether it 

was the effects of the Fukushima crisis, we all sat together in the 

situation room, led by National Security Council staff, and worked 

it out, worked through plans and operational responses. And because we work so closely together now day to day on all of these 

other issues, that has actually been really easy. It is not like you 

have needed to corral people to sit them down at the table and 

make them talk to each other. We do that all the time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am going to leave it at that now, but I 

think your answer, both of your answers, says that you are working together regularly and that the person in charge is in the National Security Council, probably Mr. Brennan or his Deputy, 

which makes as much sense as anything else. OK. It makes sense, 

in other words. 

Senator Akaka, thanks for being here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I want to add my welcome to our 

witnesses here today. 

I have long been concerned about biological attacks, especially 

against our food and agriculture systems. The difficulty in tracking 

the source of the recent E. coli outbreak in Germany and France 

reinforces my concerns. 

A bioterror attack committed anywhere in the world could easily 

spread to the United States. We must detect an attack early and 

limit its impact, which is why we need to continue to strengthen 

domestic and overseas surveillance capabilities. 

Dr. Majidi, last month I held a hearing on how the United States 

would respond to an attack on our food and agriculture systems, 

and an issue that was raised at the hearing was the lack of indicators of emerging threats to food and agriculture within the intelligence community. 

How are the Bureau’s intelligence activities targeting biological 

threats and, in particular, biological threats to U.S. food and agriculture? 

Mr. MAJIDI. Sir, like most of the intelligence community, what 

we have is that annual gap review and ultimately production of 

what we call an intelligence requirement. That is based on what 

we feel has the highest risk associated with it and the information 

that we need to know more about that particular item. 

What we do is to disseminate that particular gap through the intelligence requirement to our field offices. We share our concern 

with our brethren in the intelligence community, and in many instances we work collectively together to push those gaps out for additional collection. 

The issue of agroterrorism and biological attacks has been on the 

forefront of many of our activities, and these gaps have already 

been disseminated, and we are still requiring additional information on many of the items. 

301 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Lurie and Dr. Garza, as you know well, effective global disease surveillance can provide early warning to the 

public health community of emerging infectious diseases in other 

countries that could potentially threaten the United States. Would 

you please comment on what steps your departments have taken 

to make sure our Nation is aware of possible threats overseas? 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, thank you for that question, Senator. In terms 

of biosurveillance, in particular the global reach of biosurveillance, 

most of the work that we have done within the Office of Health Affairs has been through our National Biosurveillance Integration 

Center, and in that capacity we work with many of our Federal 

partners, many of whom are seated here today, including the FDA, 

USDA, HHS, and others. DOD actually has a fairly substantial 

global reach in biosurveillance due to their deployment activities. 

And so we work with them to bring that information together into 

one place where we can take a look at the data to make sure that 

there are no signals coming out that would impart something of 

concern to the United States. 

I think we work very well with our partners at HHS, DOD, and 

others to make sure that we are not missing anything and to make 

sure that we are covering the different aspects of biosurveillance. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Lurie. 

Dr. LURIE. I will maybe add that CDC, in particular, has a very 

robust global disease detection program, is one of the WHO coordinating centers for influenza, and has subject matter experts virtually all over the world helping build capacity in countries to do 

surveillance, working on reporting, having the relationships that 

give you the earlier heads up that something is coming. They also 

have greatly strengthened laboratory capacity in that regard. 

In addition, we work through a number of organizations. The 

Global Health Security Initiative, which is a constellation of a 

number of developed countries, is actually meeting here next week. 

We do a lot of work and coordination with them around surveillance, preparedness, and response. 

Similarly, the international health regulations promulgated by 

the WHO are regulations that we support, that we work through, 

and a lot of our efforts to strengthen detection and surveillance in 

countries around the world are also in support of these international health regulations. 

And, finally, just because you arrived here late and did not have 

an opportunity to hear more discussion about this, we also have to 

remember that novel infectious diseases certainly know no borders 

and can arise anywhere in the world, and we saw with H1N1 that 

they arose in this hemisphere. We talked earlier about the fact that 

we have lost almost 50,000 jobs in local and State public health 

around this country, many in the surveillance area. So we have to 

be really careful to have our guard up and surveillance networks 

up in every community and all over the world. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Dr. Garza, Customs and Border Protection is primarily associated with its mission to prevent terrorists, drugs, and unauthorized 

individuals from entering the United States. Too often the agency’s 

important mission of protecting American agriculture from the accidental or deliberate introduction of diseases or pests is overlooked. 

302 

I have introduced legislation that would elevate the agriculture 

mission in CBP to match the significance of the biological threats 

approaching our borders. 

Do you believe that enhancing agricultural inspection operations 

will improve our Nation’s biodefenses? 

Dr. GARZA. Well, I cannot speak for CBP, but I certainly feel that 

you are correct, that if there is an increase in the inspection capacity, that will increase our preparedness for biodefense for the Nation. 

There are many aspects of biodefense that I think get overlooked 

somehow in their one-off effects on how they provide added deterrence or added protection, even outside of the biodefense world. 

The technologies and the information that we get from these different activities absolutely improve different sectors of both the 

U.S. Government, but also in our homeland security posture. So I 

absolutely think that if we improve that posture, it will pay dividends for the biothreat. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another 

question? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Senator AKAKA. An important potential source of information is 

animal health professionals. They are the first line of response to 

outbreaks in animal populations. These outbreaks, whether deliberate or natural, often pose a direct threat to human health. 

How are your departments working with veterinarians and the 

animal health community to ensure early and rapid detection of 

disease outbreaks? Dr. O’Toole. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Senator, S&T operates the Plum Island Animal 

Disease Center off the coast of Long Island, and among other 

things, we regularly train veterinarians in the recognition and diagnosis of foreign animal diseases that hopefully they do not see 

in their regular practice. 

In addition, Plum Island is working on developing diagnostic 

tests for these more exotic diseases that are not endemic to our 

shores, including pen-side tests that we could use to rapidly screen 

a lot of animals in the field. 

I think your concern about agroterrorism and agriculture security is well founded. Agrodefense really is the stepchild of biosecurity. I would argue that the country is underinvesting in agricultural defense, and we need to make sure that we have a strategic 

plan going forward. 

I will repeat, I think we should build the National BioAgro Facility in Kansas. If we do not have such a facility, we will not be economically competitive in this field, we will not maintain scientific 

eminence in this field, and we will not have the capacity to diagnose or respond to a foreign animal disease should one occur either 

through natural causes or through a deliberate attack. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Garza. 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, Senator, I think that is an excellent question. I 

completely agree with what Dr. O’Toole has just stated. Within my 

office we do have our food, agriculature, and veterinarian branch, 

which is led by a group of veterinarians, and they do a couple of 

things within Homeland Security. 

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First, they lead a homeland security working group which spans 

across the different components on all of these food, agriculture, 

and veterinarian issues. 

In addition, we have brought Customs and Border Protection into 

our information cycle, our National Biosurveillance Integration 

System cycle, so that we can share this information on the effects 

on animals and plants and things like this. 

CBP is currently performing risk-based inspections, and I know 

from reading newspaper articles in the last week about some of the 

challenges that they have had. I know that you have been an advocate for improving that service, and I certainly applaud that. But 

it is something that the Department of Homeland Security takes 

very seriously. We work with many of our Federal partners, with 

our Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and with many other 

people in the private sector to try and improve that sort of capability. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Lurie. 

Dr. LURIE. Thanks. Your question is important for a whole host 

of reasons, including, as we have just talked about, agroterrorism, 

but also because so many—in fact, the preponderance of new 

emerging diseases in humans, as you probably know, come one way 

or another from animals. And so our vigilance in this area is particularly important. 

I think many of our Federal agencies, certainly my office, CDC, 

and FDA, our Strategic Information Office, etc., all employ a number of animal health professionals both to help with the situational 

awareness sets of issues and to look at areas where there are 

synergies. Not only are there tremendous synergies in surveillance, 

such as some of the things Dr. O’Toole talked about, but also 

synergies in the countermeasure development area where many of 

the same techniques, platforms, and mechanisms for making countermeasures, for making vaccines, for example, in humans and animals are shared. We need to, and do, really work hard to exploit 

those kinds of defense synergies as well. 

In addition to the surveillance areas, there is that whole countermeasure development sphere that is just so important. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Majidi. 

Mr. MAJIDI. Thank you. Our activities are actually multifold in 

this area. One, the FBI really accomplishes all of its tasks through 

its field offices. Every year, we have a large symposium called 

International Symposium on Agroterrorism where we bring some of 

the largest manufacturers to this symposium, as well as our local 

field office WMD coordinators, to make sure that there is sufficient 

interactions between folks who work in the field as well as the 

major producers. 

We work with USDA to make sure of their awareness of potential outbreaks as well as working with cattle ranchers and farmers 

across the United States as a point of interaction. Much of our 

work is done through our partner agencies, but we want to make 

sure that our involvement is clearly beneficial to both parties there. 

And, last, our WMD coordinators in the field offices are really responsible for one-on-one contact with all those points of interest, 

and that is as part of their requirements, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

304 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. Thank you very 

much for your questions. 

Let me just ask a couple more questions because we have another panel we want to get on to. I want to get a reaction from each 

of you quickly to the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center 

report, which was generally positive about progress in this area of 

biodefense, but essentially said that we are not prepared to handle 

a large biodisaster, whether it is an attack or a naturally occurring 

disaster. Since I have been calling on Dr. O’Toole first all the time, 

Dr. Majidi, give us a quick response whether you think there is any 

truth to that. 

Mr. MAJIDI. Well, sir, I am not necessarily sure what is the definition of a large-scale biodisaster because in my book, while five individuals were killed by the Bacillus anthracis attack, the response 

that was required to deal with that so-called small scale was quite 

tremendous from a U.S. Government perspective. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is true. That was the anthrax attack 

you are talking about. 

Mr. MAJIDI. Exactly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MAJIDI. So the financial effects as well as the resources by 

every government organization was quite substantial in that case. 

From that perspective, while the scale is perceived as large or 

small, the overall consequence management is significant in totality. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So are we prepared? 

Mr. MAJIDI. Sir, I do not think we will ever be prepared for a 

pandemic on an incredibly large scale. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. A pandemic or a large-scale attack. 

Mr. MAJIDI. Exactly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I think the point you are making is 

that though the anthrax attacks of 2001 were in a comparative 

sense relatively small, they caused enormous dislocation and, of 

course, psychological fear throughout our country. 

Mr. MAJIDI. Absolutely. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And that is quite different from the kind 

of metro, in terms of subways, modeling that you have done. 

Dr. Lurie, what do you think of what the Bipartisan Center said? 

Dr. LURIE. Well, one area in which they recognized tremendous 

progress actually was in the area of communications. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. LURIE. And I want to highlight that communicating with the 

public and bringing the public along and having them have confidence in what the government is doing to help mitigate the effects 

of such an attack is absolutely critical. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. How communication is during a crisis? 

Dr. LURIE. Communications during a crisis I think have gotten 

orders of magnitude better. We have a lot of planning, pre-prepared 

work, and mechanisms for communication. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very important. That is one of the 

things that this Committee, I think, has learned most about response to a WMD attack, including even a nuclear attack, that the 

ability to communicate with people and to tell them what to do— 

which may be counterintuitive. The reflex may be to get out of your 

305 

house or office and run, which may be exactly the worse thing to 

do. So we are much better prepared to communicate to the public 

in a crisis, aren’t we? 

Dr. LURIE. Right. Absolutely. And so the good news first. 

I think their observations particularly about the major largescale attacks are what have made us focus. One, in the medical 

countermeasures area on shifting to this nimble, flexible capacity 

to make countermeasures quickly against something we have never 

seen before—would that we could all work at ‘‘Contagion’’ speed in 

getting a vaccine—and to have that surge manufacturing capacity. 

We talked about Holly Springs being the start of that, but to be 

able to make countermeasures very quickly in terms of an emergency, and a huge amount of work going on that sphere. And then 

we have been placing a lot of emphasis on the distribution and administration of those medical countermeasures, being sure that we 

have a much faster capability to do that, and that we are able to 

support with additional personnel communities that need additional personnel support and may be overwhelmed. 

I think we have made progress there. We are not all the way 

there, and particularly because each community is a little bit different. Again, it is those capabilities and the nimble adaptable 

plans that have to be put in place. 

And, finally, I would be remiss again if I did not point out that 

our ability to respond on the countermeasure side and have the 

countermeasures on time is very much tied to our ability to detect 

early and that early warning, early detection, surveillance components that all of our departments are working on so hard. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Garza, how about ready for a relatively small incident, not ready for a major biological attack? 

Dr. GARZA. Right. I agree with everything that has been said so 

far, but I especially agree with Dr. Majidi where it is not going to 

take a large event to cause a lot of disruption in society. We saw 

examples of this in the past during the 2001 attacks, but also as 

recently as Fukushima where the country was basically depleted of 

potassium iodine within a week. And so if you use that as a model 

for what would happen at a deliberate biological attack, you can 

understand the sort of rush to countermeasures that would happen 

not just within the area that was affected, but I think nationwide. 

So I think that is something that we really need to consider, and 

that is where the communication strategy plays a large part on 

how we would deal with this. 

Second, I am, I guess, somewhat pleased that nothing went down 

in the report, so at least we are not sliding back. I think we have 

improved a lot on different issues such as surveillance and detection. And so I am pleased with that. 

One of the things, though, that has been mentioned up here a 

couple of times is the capacity of the health care industry to be able 

to withstand a large-scale attack, I think, is very troubling. I can 

just tell you from being an emergency room physician, I have trouble handling the emergency department every day just on a regular 

workload. And so if we take the Minnesota case from a couple of 

months ago, a person who had a case of inhalational anthrax, and 

the amount of resources that it took to keep that one person alive, 

including intensive care, multiple different physicians, and mulVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00321 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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tiple different medications, and if you multiply that by the effects 

of a large-scale attack, the health care industry is going to be overwhelmed very quickly. Unfortunate, the paradigm for the health 

care industry is just-in-time care, and so there is very little surge 

capacity capability. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That obviously in a difficult time in our 

economy, but nonetheless that is high on the list of things we need 

to try to do better at, that surge capacity. Dr. O’Toole. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, no, we are not ready for a global catastrophe 

involving a deadly pathogen, whatever its origin. President Obama 

implicitly acknowledged this last month when he called for an 

international effort in the surveillance and management of infectious disease, whatever the origin of the plague. 

But in government, one is forced to focus on actionable priorities, 

and if I had a magic wand, I would wish for three things—although 

Dr. Garza’s wish for fewer vulnerabilities and more surge capacity 

all across the board in terms of the response communities is a good 

start. We know that communication is improved, and we also know 

from past experience that the community’s expectations of what 

they ought to be doing, of what might happen, are very important. 

There is recent research that shows just having a single person assigned to outreach with the community can make a big difference 

in terms of resilience and response. We ought to fund those people 

and make sure every State and local health department has somebody whose job is to do that. That could have a big impact. We talk 

about it, but we mostly wave our hands at resilience thus far. 

I also think that having rapid, even point-of-care diagnostic tests 

that say you are infected, you are not, in an outbreak of disease, 

particularly at scale, is going to be critically important. The technology for this exists. There is wondrous technology that might be 

just within reach that would be even better. We have got to build 

these diagnostic tests. 

And, finally, I would just offer a caution on the interagency process and the complexity of biodefense. I do believe that we have 

made very significant incremental progress over the past decade, 

but the interagency process is inherently slow and cautious. That 

might be the right approach when we do not know what we are 

doing and we do not want to make major missteps and we want 

to carefully husband limited resources. On the other hand, I think 

this is an area where the threat is growing, where the consequences are potentially so dire that the United States of America 

ought to make a few big bets and think about in what areas could 

we invest where a leap ahead would make a huge difference. Having a way to rapidly make medicines and vaccines, to surge, to do 

that cheaply and with fidelity, would change the world. We ought 

to think about that. 

Creating a biosurveillance system instead of talking about it, 

which would start with electronic links between public health and 

hospitals, would make a big difference. NBAF would make a big 

difference. If we leave it to the interagency and biodefense is continuously peanut-buttered across all of these very hard-working 

agencies, we are not going to make any leap-aheads, and that worries me. 

307 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Inglesby appears in the Appendix on page 1196. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is a good challenging note to 

end this on. 

Do you have any more questions for this panel, Senator Akaka? 

Senator AKAKA. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks for your service, thanks for your 

testimony. Just putting it all together, really we have come a long 

way, but as Dr. Majidi said, in this case even a relatively small biological incident can have enormous effects. And when you put that 

together with what we all acknowledge is all the evidence we have 

of the work that our enemies—and then the people who, as we 

found out in the anthrax case, apparently a researcher uses these 

pathogens for hostile purposes, this is really something to be concerned about. As we look at the list of priorities and, as you know, 

in a big, open, free country such as ours—and we want most especially to stay that way—it is very hard to protect against all attacks. But if you started to list the probabilities with consequences, 

I would say that this is an area—that is, biodefense—that really 

comes right to the top of certainly my priority list. So in that sense 

I thank you for what you are doing, and we will continue to look 

forward to working with you to get more and more secure. Thank 

you for being here. 

We will call the second panel now: Dr. Thomas Inglesby, Dr. Robert Kadlec, and Dr. Jeff Levi. This means we have a total of five 

M.D.’s and two Ph.D.’s testifying today. Thanks to the three of you 

for being here and for your patience as we listened to the first 

panel. 

Our first witness today is Dr. Thomas Inglesby, who is Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Center for Biosecurity at the 

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. He was one of the center’s 

founding members, served as its Deputy Director and Chief Operating Officer. Whatever happened to the first director? 

Dr. INGLESBY. She rose in the world a bit. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And I know you were recently named 

chair of the Board of Scientific Counselors to CDC’s Office of Public 

Health Preparedness and Response. Thanks for being here, and we 

welcome your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS V. INGLESBY, M.D.,1 DIRECTOR AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER FOR BIOSECURITY, 

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER 

Dr. INGLESBY. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the chance to speak to you today about U.S. biopreparedness 10 years after the anthrax attacks. My name is Tom 

Inglesby. I am the director of the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, 

and as you requested, I will focus my testimony on medical countermeasure development, biosurveillance, and other issues raised 

in our recent center report, ‘‘Crossroads in Biosecurity.’’ 

The potential biological threats to the United States are serious. 

We could face a new flu pandemic that spreads like H1N1, but kills 

like H5N1, or a novel virus that jumps from animals to humans 

and spreads across the world quickly, or another biological weapon. 

308 

The anthrax letters of 2001, as shocking as they were, were a 

very small case of the use of biological weapons. Attacks in the future could affect extraordinary numbers of people. 

In 2009, President Obama’s National Security Council said: ‘‘The 

effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent within an unprotected population could place at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The unmitigated consequences of such an event 

could overwhelm our public health capabilities, potentially causing 

an untold number of deaths.’’ 

One of the most important components of our defense against biological threats is the development of medical countermeasures. 

DHS has issued 12 Material Threat Determinations for top biological threats to the American public. Countermeasures for just three 

of those—anthrax, smallpox, and botulism—have so far received 

the majority of funding in advanced development and procurement. 

Here are my suggestions for making more progress in the future 

on countermeasure development. 

First, BARDA should convey its specific priorities, predicted 

budget requirements, and timelines for delivering them. Right now 

it is not clear, or at least it is not clear from the outside, what the 

top priority products are, how long it will take to develop them, or 

how much it will cost. And for each priority product that is to be 

developed, it should be made clear to what extent its development 

requires more basic science versus more advanced development, 

and the funding for this work should be allocating accordingly. If 

specific regulatory problems are the problem, then funding should 

be directed to FDA to resolve them. 

When decisions are made to purchase a particular countermeasure in the National Stockpile, an explanation should be provided, to the extent possible in the public, that explains the choice 

and the quantity and the way it will be used in crisis. 

BARDA’s recent Strategic Plan places a priority on broad spectrum antimicrobials and multi-use platforms. In the long term, we 

absolutely do need to develop multi-use platforms and broad spectrum products. But we also need to make sure expectations are not 

unduly raised in the short term. There are few experts who think 

a shift like this is likely in the short term. So in the short term, 

we need very applied, very directed advanced development of products that address the greatest material threats to the country. And 

we should certainly stretch our biosecurity resources in the smartest possible ways, for example, by extending the shelf life of products already in the stockpile, wherever possible, and by investigating the feasibility of shortening the course of antibiotics for 

various diseases that we might be exposed to, and by completing 

dose-sparing studies that could help us vaccinate more people while 

decreasing costs. 

In the realm of countermeasures, there are serious funding 

issues. There has not been enough advanced development funding 

as compared to basic science funding in the Federal budget for this 

mission, and BARDA has received a small fraction of what a private company would have required to make the same number of 

products. It is also our understanding that the BioShield fund will 

be depleted this year, and without a BioShield fund, we will not get 

new products procured. 

309 

And, finally, FDA was funded properly to deal with medical 

countermeasures for the first time this last year, but that program’s budget was reduced from $170 million to $19 million in the 

Senate and to zero in the House. Its work would be significantly 

set back if the FDA got that budget allocation. 

Biosurveillance is also another critical area of U.S. biopreparedness, and there have been gains but much work remains to be 

done. In many places biosurveillance is still too slow to discover or 

keep up with fast-moving epidemics. A few recommendations to improve it: 

First, a small portion of the $18 billion that is now going into the 

electronic health record incentive program should be moved to public health in order to allow them to be able to process and analyze 

information related to outbreaks. 

We also need to improve electronic laboratory reporting. All 

notifiable diseases should be automatically reported from the lab to 

health departments and continue to be transmitted throughout the 

course of an outbreak, and that does not happen now, although all 

in public health agree it is a top priority. 

In addition, as Dr. O’Toole said, we should place higher priority 

on rapid diagnostics. Right now we are investing heavily in the 

basic science side of diagnostics, but it trails off as we get to commercialization and development, and we could change that and 

make a big difference. 

And, finally, I want to emphasize how important public health 

preparedness is to U.S. biosecurity. Prior to 2001, many health departments lacked even the most basic expertise and infrastructure, 

and after 2001, incredible things have happened in the public 

health arena. New Federal funding has built a lab network, funded 

epidemiologists around the country, developed 24/7 response capacity, and much more. But recent declines in public health funding 

have directly, and very directly, threatened public health gains 

around the country. Federal funding for public health preparedness 

programs has declined by 27 percent since 2005 with a cut of more 

than $100 million since fiscal year 2010 alone. 

If the proposed cuts take place in this year’s CDC preparedness 

budget and preparedness efforts around the country will suffer. For 

example, the cuts would diminish or eliminate CDC’s ability to prepare for nuclear or radiological terrorism, CDC’s diagnostic program for emerging infectious diseases, their chemical laboratory 

and response programs, the Laboratory Response Network, and all 

of the academic centers for public health around the country, which 

is the only CDC external funding for preparedness research. I 

think this would be a real loss for the country, and I really would 

urge Congress to consider reversing the funding cuts that are 

planned. 

So, in conclusion, the country has made real strides in preparedness over the last 10 years. I have detailed them in my written testimony—some of them, I should say—but a lot of work remains to 

be done. I hope the Committee and its colleagues working on the 

reauthorization of the PAHPA bill now in the Senate and the 

House will ensure we continue to make progress in the time ahead. 

Thank you. 

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1The prepared statement of Dr. Kadlec appears in the Appendix on page 1205. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Dr. Inglesby. That 

was very direct, in some cases provocative, and some interesting 

ideas. I appreciate it. 

Dr. Robert Kadlec was a career military officer physician in the 

U.S. Air Force—we thank you for your service—and also served in 

a number of senior positions at the White House, Senate, and Department of Defense, and now is a biodefense consultant to industry and government agencies. His most recent government position 

was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Biological Defense Policy on the Homeland Security Council. 

We are grateful that you are here and welcome your testimony 

now. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT P. KADLEC, M.D.,1 FORMER SPECIAL 

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE POLICY 

Dr. KADLEC. Chairman Lieberman, thank you. I am evidence of 

a red herring, I guess is the way to start off my comments today. 

I would like to thank Members of the Committee, as well as staff, 

and it is really a privilege to testify before you today. 

One issue to put in historical context is that the efforts to prepare our country for bioterrorism predated 9/11. And, in fact, the 

progress that we have to date is really a testimony to three consecutive presidential administrations and several congresses in 

tandem. The Executive and Legislative Branches established bipartisan policies, passing vital authorizing legislation, and appropriating funds over the last dozen years. And, sir, I would note 

your leadership in this area. During my tenure on the Hill, working with Chuck Ludlam, your BioShield II legislation served as 

being, if you will, the father of the PAHPA legislation that ultimately passed. 

So it really has been an achievement of bipartisanship over that 

period of time, and in many ways Congress has led the way to ensure improvements in State and local emergency service and public 

health preparedness, in research, development, and procurement of 

medical countermeasures, and improved hospital and first responder preparedness. 

Despite the progress, I think as has already been discussed, we 

are far from being entirely prepared. I think the point in the question you made earlier, sir, about the difference between a small and 

large attack, I think, is worthy of noting the difficulty discerning 

the difference between wide-scale disruption and wide-scale devastation. And, quite frankly, one of the leaders that you did not have 

here today, Dr. Peggy Hamburg, the current Director of the FDA, 

really identified the dilemma back in 2005, that if the spores of one 

anthrax envelope had been put in the air shaft of the World Trade 

Center, there would have been a far larger number of casualties 

that died in those towers as they fell. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is right. I remember when she said 

that. That was chilling. 

Dr. KADLEC. And so when you look at today’s environment, and 

particularly the remarks of the former National Counterterrorism 

311 

Center Director Michael Leiter, where he expressed his concern 

about the risk from chemical and biological terrorism, particularly 

after he left his position as Director in July 2011, where he said, 

‘‘The potential threat from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is 

very real. The most likely . . . are simple forms of chemical or biological weapons attacks (rather than a nuclear attack).’’ 

I am reminded daily, looking in the papers, as I look at the casualty list of young Americans who have died in either Iraq or Afghanistan, to understand that we continue to be at war with these 

individuals and groups who are intent on using these weapons. 

And I think it is worthy to note, sir, and you have already commented on the Graham and Talent report, that we have a long way 

to go but have covered a lot of ground in terms of some of our specific capabilities. But I am going to identify two major obstacles 

and one critical missing ingredient leading to improved preparedness. The beauty about them is, quite frankly, they do not cost a 

lot of money. 

The first obstacle we have to overcome is our understanding of 

the difference between bioterrorism, biowarfare, and natural disease pandemics. Quite frankly, Mother Nature is not a thinking 

enemy intent on inflicting grievous harm to our country, killing our 

citizens, undermining our government, or destroying our way of 

life. Mother Nature does not develop highly virulent organisms 

that are resistant to our current stockpiles of antibiotics or disseminate them in high doses to result in more rapid onset and a more 

virulent clinical course of disease than seen in nature. 

Mother Nature does not target our military forces to undermine 

our capability, or our civilian population, undermining our willingness to protect our national interest. And certainly Mother Nature 

does not use biological agents to achieve the lethal equivalence of 

nuclear weapons. 

The second obstacle confronting us is embracing the greater role 

for the Federal Government that is inherent in our Constitution in 

responding to the risk particularly from deliberate biological 

threats. While all disasters are local, a biological attack is just 

that—an attack on our Nation—and our Federal Government needs 

to commit to a greater role in supporting and assisting State and 

local authorities. 

And, finally, I firmly believe that the missing critical ingredient, 

the secret sauce, to continued progress and future success is leadership. It was the finding of the 2010 National Biodefense Science 

Board report to the Secretary of HHS, as well as one of the three 

principal recommendations of the Graham and Talent report card. 

Without strong leadership that emanates from the White House, 

that is propagated through the Federal departments to State and 

local authorities, no amount of money will make us sufficiently prepared. We saw some of the leaders that sat on the first panel here 

today. 

The White House has already demonstrated such leadership with 

its commitment against the threat from nuclear proliferation and 

cyber attacks, but biological weapons can kill more than cyber attacks and are easier to develop, as you noted, sir, than nuclear 

weapons. Without the President’s visible concern and commitment, 

the best efforts of many capable people of his Administration will 

312 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Levi appears in the Appendix on page 1213. 

be wanting. White House involvement is essential to ensure that 

departments and agencies live up to their interagency obligations 

under the National Response Framework and emergency support 

functions. 

Just to highlight two in particular, the role of the Department 

of Defense and the role of the Department of Veterans Affairs in 

the response to surge capacity, for example, the involvement and 

contribution of those two agencies have not been entirely optimized. 

Visible leadership is not only a requisite for the Executive 

Branch, but as you know, sir, Congress has a vital leadership role 

as well. Congress can and has effectively advanced preparedness 

through legislative initiatives, oversight, and appropriations, and I 

understand, sir, your Committee is considering legislation to complement the bill created by your colleagues in the House. And I 

also understand there are efforts in the Health, Education, Labor, 

and Pensions Committee to reauthorize the Pandemic All-Hazards 

Act to complement the bill passed out of the House Energy and 

Commerce Committee. Hopefully, Congress will act to pass one or, 

ideally, both bills before the end of this session. 

Finally, I offer one last observation and thought. The grades 

issued by Senators Graham and Talent are useful to assess where 

we stand, but they are, frankly, abstract to the grim reality they 

represent. As a military physician who served in two conflicts, 

Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, I know too well that in war, 

grades do not matter. Combat is a pass-fail test. Simply stated, accepting getting a D or F grade means many Americans may die 

needlessly in the event of an attack. This is not only unacceptable, 

but as public servants, we would be derelict in our duty if we did 

not do everything in our power to prepare our country and protect 

our citizens from this risk. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Dr. Kadlec. That was excellent and also raised some good questions, which we will come back 

to. 

Dr. Jeffrey Levi is Executive Director of the Trust for America’s 

Health. 

In January of this year, President Obama appointed Dr. Levi to 

the Advisory Group on Prevention, Health Promotion, and Integrative and Public Health. In April, he was appointed chair of that 

group. He is also a professor of health policy at the George Washington University’s School of Public Health, where his research is 

focused on HIV/AIDS, Medicaid, and integrating public health with 

the health care delivery system. 

That is an impressive resume, and thanks for being here today. 

TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY LEVI, PH.D.,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH 

Mr. LEVI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am grateful for the 

opportunity to testify before the Committee on the progress and 

challenges we face on the 10th anniversary of the terrorist attacks 

on our Nation. 

313 

I am going to focus on public health’s role, which is crucial, in 

emergency preparedness and response. Health departments perform the surveillance that detects the first cases in an outbreak. 

Laboratories test the samples. Epidemiologists conduct the investigation and pinpoint the source. And public health workers coordinate the medical response, advise and communicate to the public, 

and distribute vaccines or drugs that help save lives. 

The anthrax attacks were a great wakeup call to the need for 

greater investment in public health preparedness, and over the last 

decade we have made dramatic progress in meeting this responsibility. But, unfortunately, it seems that we have hit the snooze button because that progress is greatly threatened by recent funding 

cutbacks at the Federal, State, and local level, and we could face 

the sad irony that if another attack were to occur today, we may 

be better prepared than we were 10 years ago, but possibly not as 

well prepared as 3 years ago. 

Last month, Trust for America’s Health and the Robert Wood 

Johnson Foundation released a new report, ‘‘Remembering 9/11 

and Anthrax: Public Health’s Vital Role in National Defense.’’ In 

developing this report, we learned that the public health system 

mounted an extraordinary response to these events despite limited 

familiarity with bioterrorism and decades of underfunding that left 

it with a deficit in technology, workforce, and training. 

For example, in 2001, there was not a clear public health response system in place for handling unexpected emergencies; thus, 

much of the response was developed on the fly. 

There was little to no experience in countermeasures research 

and development, and CDC and health departments faced a crushing demand for information and recommendations that had not 

been prepared in advance. 

Despite these challenges, public health rose to the occasion. The 

Laboratory Response Network, which is now an integral piece of 

the BioWatch program, tested 350,000 environmental samples and 

clinical specimens over an extended period. CDC provided national 

surveillance, laboratory diagnostic support, treatment recommendations, and advice on post-exposure prophylaxis. And public health 

helped to calm a Nation by putting science first in risk communications. 

Since fiscal year 2003, Congress has invested over $12 billion in 

State and local public health preparedness, hospital preparedness, 

and State and local pandemic capacity. This outlay has led to tremendous progress in our ability to prepare for and respond to an 

emergency. Now we recognize that bioterrorism and emergency 

preparedness are integral to the role of public health and that public health is integral to disaster preparedness and response. We 

have fully developed rapid response capabilities so that health impacts are considered and mitigated from day one of an emergency. 

Unfortunately, these improvements cannot be maintained with 

one-time investments. Training of our public health workforce must 

be ongoing; vaccines and antivirals in the Strategic National Stockpile are expiring; technology is quickly becoming outdated; and 

health departments need predictable funding to operate laboratories, respond to emergencies, and investigate outbreaks. And yet 

Federal support for public health preparedness has been cut by 37 

314 

percent since fiscal year 2005. Moreover, the cuts at the Federal 

level have been matched or exceeded at the State and local level. 

As a result, I worry deeply, as do my colleagues on the front line 

of public health agencies, that our capacity to respond to a new 

emergency will be severely diminished in the near future. 

These budget cuts are not just about money to purchase supplies 

and equipment. They are about the people who are essential to an 

effective public health response. Were a major public health emergency to occur today, even compared to the demands of the pandemic H1N1 just 2 years ago, there might not be enough workers 

to effectively respond. Forty-four thousand State and local public 

health positions were lost since 2008. We simply cannot quickly 

hire and train a 21st Century public health emergency workforce 

after an attack occurs. 

There is one silver lining here. Since the creation of the Preven- tion and Public Health Fund, we have put over $60 million in 

epidemiologial and lab capacity across the country at the State and 

local level, but that funding is also at risk, and if we lose that 

money as well, we will be in even worse shape. 

We also need to fundamentally rethink how we do surveillance 

for both emergencies and routine public health issues. Our disease 

surveillance system has been built one disease or crisis at a time, 

resulting in archaic and static silos of information. The particular 

challenge in the field of preparedness is that we do not necessarily 

know in advance what we will need to know. And, thus, the most 

comprehensive approach to data collection is needed. 

We must also harness the opportunities afforded by the Nation’s 

transition to health IT systems with electronic health records at 

their core, and I think you heard from previous witnesses the degree to which public health needs to be at the table in the design 

and development and implementation of these processes, or else 

they will not help us in the area of preparedness. 

Our report found that the United States often takes a band-aid 

approach to public health preparedness. As new emergencies and 

concerns emerge and attention shifts, resources are diverted from 

one pressing priority to another, leaving other ongoing areas 

unaddressed. I am encouraged to see this Committee is taking 

these threats seriously, and I thank you again for the opportunity 

to be here today and look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Dr. Levi, very much. I was really 

struck by one line from your testimony, which is the effect of funding cuts: ‘‘. . . the sad irony is that if another anthrax attack were 

to occur today, we may be better prepared than 10 years ago—but 

possibly not as well as 3 years ago.’’ And this is part of the effect 

of the budget deficit crisis we have gotten ourselves into. We have 

to be very mindful of it. 

I want to ask you at the beginning what you think of, to me, an 

interesting idea that Dr. Kadlec mentioned, which is, at least in 

part, to try to ameliorate this problem with regard the need for a 

public health surge in response to a biodisaster or a bioattack by 

being prepared to utilize personnel from the Department of Defense 

and/or the VA. 

Mr. LEVI. I think Dr. Kadlec was referring to health care personnel, and that is certainly—— 

315 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. That was my assumption. 

Mr. LEVI. Right, and that certainly is appropriate, and I think 

there are plans on the table, and how well they have been exercised is another question. But I think all of those agencies are committed to doing that kind of collaborative work. 

That is once we have identified what is going on, but my concern 

with personnel is that the day-to-day public health capacities of detecting, identifying a pathogen, communicating with the public, disseminating countermeasures, those kinds of things that are a core 

public health function. We have lost 44,000 workers. We have lost 

people who are trained. It requires special expertise, and it requires expertise that is exercised over and over again so we keep 

improving. That capacity is dramatically diminished compared to 3 

or 4 years ago, and if the budget cuts that seem to be on the table 

now go forward, it will even be worse. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I wish I could be encouraging about that. 

In the short run, it is very hard to be. Hopefully we will get the 

economy going again. But, of course, particularly in the stress that 

we are under now in terms of our budget, this should force us to 

make priority judgments, and by any number of standards this is 

a priority for us. To me it is part of the constitutional responsibility 

to provide for the common defense, really. 

Dr. Inglesby, you pointed out something that I think there is not 

enough awareness of. It is a fact that over the last 10 years, the 

Federal Government has made significant progress, building on 

progress before, and developing medical countermeasures such as 

vaccines and therapeutics to anthrax, smallpox, and botulinum. 

But as you point out, those are just 3 of the 12 agents that the Department of Homeland Security identifies as representing a material threat to our country, and that does not even include the 

emerging threats of someone manipulating substances, for instance, in a laboratory. 

Dr. INGLESBY. Right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So I wanted to ask you, first off, if you accept the rationale behind the listing of these 12 and whether you 

think the prioritization of the medical countermeasures, that is, on 

behalf of the Federal Government, is clear enough. 

Dr. INGLESBY. I do think the material threat determination process is very rigorous. As an outsider, I have seen a couple of the 

processes play through, and I have been very impressed with the 

rigor and the science. The details of the specific ordering right now 

I think is not public, so I cannot comment on that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. INGLESBY. But, in general, I think that it is a very rigorous 

process, and it is like what is done in other parts of the government. You set requirements and then the government reacts accordingly, and you set requirements as scientifically and rigorously 

as possible. 

So I think it is the right place to start with, actual requirements 

that there is wide agreement on in the government, and then to 

work backwards from that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. In the medical countermeasure review that Health and Human Services released last year, they 

pointed out a number of things that they are going to do to improve 

316 

the development of medical countermeasures such as including particularly the one that Dr. Lurie talked about, creating government 

manufacturing centers, partnering with the private sector and strategic investment firms, as well as moving to products that address 

multiple threats and, finally, to streamline FDA regulation. 

Give us your reaction to those recommendations, and how would 

you prioritize those? Which do you think offer us the most hope of 

making more rapid progress? 

Dr. INGLESBY. Well, starting with the last first, I think there is 

total agreement in and out of the government that FDA needed 

more resources and a lot more heft behind its program, and it has 

gotten it in the past year. So I think that was a really important 

development. 

I think there was also a part of that review that said there 

should be more integration between the various parts of government, NIH, BARDA, FDA, and CDC. I think that is very important. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. INGLESBY. When we have a requirement on the table, have 

we sorted out exactly what is required in the realm of basic 

science? Does that relate to advanced development? Does it relate 

to what is going to go in the stockpile, its regulatory problems? I 

think that is a very important facet of the strategy. 

As regards the Centers for Innovation and Advanced Development, I certainly believe in the principles behind that program, and 

we were supportive of that for a number of years as it was being 

discussed. In principle, it is a way to engage large pharmaceutical 

companies, which would be great for the country. It is actually 

probably crucial in the years ahead to get the talent of large 

pharmaceutial companies. And, in principle, it was a way to consolidate the costs and reduce the costs and concentrate expertise. 

And, in principle, I think it was a way to foster innovation. 

I do not know how it will play out. I have to say, in terms of 

making my conflicts available to your Committee, our mother institution was a potential competitor for that program and has decided 

not to compete. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. INGLESBY. But I hope that it succeeds. I certainly favor its 

original principles, and we will have to see how it ends. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Kadlec, let me bring you into this because you mentioned Chuck Ludlam who used to work with me. He 

is really creative, and he had an idea which I thought was a great 

idea. What do we do to get the big pharmaceutical companies into 

this field? Because it is not a naturally attractive market. So, Mr. 

Ludlam had the idea—and I put it forward; I think Senator Orrin 

Hatch was with me on that one—to say to big pharmaceutical companies, if you develop a medical countermeasure that HHS determines has some promise or passes a threshold, then go ahead with 

it, and we will give you the right to choose one of the array of 

drugs you have and extend the patent for 2 years. 

Well, it was as if we had sounded the trumpet for battle, and the 

generic drug manufacturers came marching with great force over 

the Hill and killed that idea. 

317 

I am not saying it is the only idea out there, but it was, I think, 

a creative attempt to deal with this problem. I wonder with the 

passage of years whether you have any other thoughts about how 

to make sure that we develop medical countermeasures, beginning 

with those nine other agents that the Department has said we 

have to worry about. 

Dr. KADLEC. Well, sir, I certainly was around during the time of 

the wild card and certainly do remember. I think I have a few 

trample marks on me from the generics. [Laughter.] 

But the issue is really about the role of big pharmaceutical companies here, and their interest and appetite to be involved seems 

to involve two areas. One is the issue of risk and, quite frankly, 

the other one is the issue of profit. Obviously, the ‘‘wild card’’ option certainly was an incentive on the profit side, and there has 

been much, I think, to address the risk side subject such as the 

Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, which had to 

do with liability. So in some ways, that barrier has been lowered. 

The other part of risk is technological risk and, if you will, where 

I think the government is trying, and appropriately so, to establish 

that there are opportunities for big and small pharmaceutical companies to get involved in places where co-development of new technologies. Platform technologies that could be used for biodefense 

that have direct commercial relevance and applicability and the assurance that the FDA would consider these as not only commercial 

but also national security-viable technology approaches is certainly 

another incentive. The question is whether that is enough, and, 

quite frankly, I think we still face the challenges with big pharmaceutical companies where they still view the profit incentives to be 

somewhat limited. 

I do not know if we will ever get over that hurdle, but I do believe that in some ways engaging them in terms of opportunities 

where they can expand their technology set, where they can defer 

the risk of development particularly of platform technologies goes 

a long way. And there may be other sweeteners involved subject to 

some of the orphan drug status that could be given particularly to 

biodefense countermeasures. But it is a very difficult balance to entice them to the table. 

Now, the ‘‘wild card’’ option here in another sense is the evolution or natural evolution of the big pharmaceutical company 

blockbusters where they seem to be kind of going away, where they 

are looking for smaller products. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is true. 

Dr. KADLEC. And so in some ways there may be a new landscape 

to engage them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Interesting. Yes, good idea. 

Dr. KADLEC. So I would say do not give up the ‘‘wild card’’ option 

just yet. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But the reality is that if we were attacked 

by one of those nine other biological agents, we do not really have 

medical countermeasures for those now, do we? 

Dr. KADLEC. That is correct. I think the answer is that the pipeline has been focused deliberately on some of the highest threats— 

anthrax, smallpox. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, sure. Right. 

318 

Dr. KADLEC. But, yes, the sequencing of other things that are 

less notable—tularemia, for example, and other threats on that 

list—have not probably been given the appropriate recognition or 

resources. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Did you want to add something, Dr. 

Inglesby. 

Dr. INGLESBY. I was just going to agree with what you just said, 

yes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That ought to get our attention, and some 

of those—am I right?—are not that complicated to make, to bring 

together. 

Dr. INGLESBY. Well, I think any drug or vaccine is complicated—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, I mean the threat. 

Dr. INGLESBY. Sorry, the threat. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. INGLESBY. Yes, I mean, the things on the list—all of those 

agents are available in the world to acquire. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. INGLESBY. And many of them are causing outbreaks in the 

world in any given month. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Garza was kind enough to stay, so 

there is always a danger inherent in that, but I am going to quote 

something from your testimony—Dr. O’Toole is here, too—and ask 

the witnesses for a response. 

Dr. Garza indicated in his testimony that, following some kinds 

of biological attacks, ideally we would need to detect and start 

mass dispensing treatments in as little as 1 to 2 days. And I wanted to ask you—and I really should have asked Dr. Garza, too— 

whether, to the best of your knowledge, there is any city, for instance, that is able to meet this expectation for a wide-area attack 

for even just one of the biological threats we face. Dr. Levi, do you 

know? 

Mr. LEVI. I cannot answer that question with specificity, but I 

think it speaks to the incredible importance of not losing more of 

our public health workforce, because you cannot create this kind of 

pop-up capacity. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Good. Anybody else? 

Dr. KADLEC. Sir, I would just comment I think that there is still 

a lot of doubt and concern about it. I know during my tenure in 

the White House in late 2008 we had serious concerns. Just to note 

that President Obama signed an Executive Order in December 

2009 mobilizing Federal assets to help assist in the dispensing effort, particularly the role of the U.S. Postal Service, the Department of Defense, as well as trying to use other Federal employees 

and other agencies to also assist. 

Quite frankly, there are two challenges here. One is, if you will, 

the tyranny of time that is created by, one, the natural 

epidemiologies of diseases and the potential effect of high dose exposures that basically change the normal incubation period, resulting in some of these diseases to appear much faster. 

The second issue is what will be the public demand and outcry. 

You can vividly imagine the CNN moment when this becomes first 

realized, an attack has happened, either through a BioWatch detecVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00334 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
319 

tion or the first case. There will be an incredible demand on the 

system for these antibiotics and other protective measures. 

So the sooner the better, and, quite frankly, it is clear that we 

are probably not fast enough yet. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Dr. Garza, we allow audience participation here. Do you want to respond to the question, which is: Is 

there any city or metropolitan area able to meet that standard that 

you raised? 

Dr. GARZA. I think, Senator, that is an excellent question. There 

has been tremendous work that has been done in the past couple 

of years, both with the CDC as well as the Federal interagency, in 

trying to develop that capacity. Dr. Kadlec is entirely correct on 

those challenges to getting the medical countermeasures out to the 

population. But we view it as multidisciplined approach, so you 

have, for instance, the postal model; we are trying to engage more 

to get the private sector involved. As part of the Executive Order, 

the President directed his Administration to develop ways of dispensing countermeasures to mission-essential people. So it is a 

multi-dimensional approach to this problem. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. While I have you there, because we are 

focused on the Postal Service, unfortunately, in other ways, take a 

minute and tell us where we are in the exploration of using this 

remarkable national network of the Postal Service to help in terms 

of biodefense. 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, sir. To my knowledge—and HHS ASPR runs 

most of the programs to do this—the program that has been developed and is the most widely known is the one in Minneapolis. If 

I believe correctly, I believe there are three or four other cities that 

are exploring the options or have developed plans to use the postal 

option. But, again, I would emphasize that it is one part of a multilayered approach, albeit an important one, but it has to be thought 

of as a multilayered approach. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And there, just to be specific, we are looking at the postal men and women delivering vaccines, for instance, 

or distributing vaccines. 

Dr. GARZA. They would be distributing medical countermeasures, 

so antibiotics. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am sorry. Antibiotics, right. 

Dr. GARZA. Yes, sir. So they would be delivering antibiotics to the 

population’s homes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think that is important to continue to 

explore. 

Dr. KADLEC. Just to put a finer point on that, because there are 

three cities that are in line to basically follow Minneapolis: San 

Diego, Boston, and Philadelphia. Those cities have received grants 

from HHS through the Cities Readiness Initiative to do so. So it 

is, again, as Dr. Garza has said, part of a multipronged approach, 

but the postal option really represents a first strike capability, 

which can in 12 hours to basically delover a limited supply of antibiotics to every residence within designated zip codes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So obviously the Postal Service is in real 

financial trouble, but part of what we are trying to do—it happened 

to come under the jurisdiction of this Committee—with the Postmaster General is to look at ways we can capitalize on the unique 

320 

national network they have. As you probably know, for instance, 

FedEx and UPS use the U.S. Postal Service for the last mile of delivery in a lot of cases where it does not make financial sense for 

those very successful companies to do so. And in the same way, 

this is an existing network which, as you say, can deliver antibiotics in a crisis very quickly. 

Dr. Inglesby, you made a really interesting suggestion, and I 

want to ask you to develop it a bit. It begins with the fact that in 

the so-called stimulus act, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, there was appropriated $18 billion for the improvement and modernization of health recordkeeping, a general 

description. So you are suggesting today—and, again, I presume 

this is all about priorities—that some part of that ought to be reallocated to this particular problem. So talk in a little more detail 

about what you have in mind. 

Dr. INGLESBY. So right now, if there is an outbreak in Washington, DC, the health department, who is going to be asked to figure out what is going on, has to actually walk over or phone somebody to try and go through the medical records one by one on 

paper. And this new program holds out the hope that you could 

connect health departments and clinical outpatient offices or inpatient in the hospital in an electronic way where people from their 

desks in the health department could try and actually go in and 

understand what is happening in a hospital or in a clinic automatically and analyze it and try and figure out if there are patterns 

going on in the hospital of this new outbreak. 

The $18 billion is set up to provide incentives to the hospitals 

and to the doctors to develop electronic health records, and there 

is a series of criteria that are laid out in order to get that money. 

If we changed, even modified a few of those criteria a little bit to 

say they have to be able to be read by public health departments 

in a crisis, then we could use a little bit of that money to help solve 

a very big divide between public health and clinical medicine. 

We had a meeting about this recently in our center, and the public health officials who see all this happening are upset about it because there has not been a dollar provided. They see that these 

electronic health records are being created, but public health is basically on the sidelines. They do not have any money to build their 

own IT systems to receive it. They do not have any incentive to 

connect nor any database management capacity. So a little bit of 

money could go a long way. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent idea. 

Mr. LEVI. If I could add to that, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. LEVI. I think it is important to think about the money that 

is being invested for electronic health records in the context of 

health reform—it is certainly a critical piece—and that the system 

we are designing is responsive to public health needs as well. But 

I think I would also add that we do have a receipt question as well, 

which is whether existing infrastructure in a lot of health departments even with those requirements would be able to receive and 

properly analyze the date. And I think that is a standard-setting 

and a training issue for public health agencies. 

321 

And I think I would add that we spend, just in the core work of 

CDC and the money they send out to the States, a lot of money 

on public health surveillance. That whole system needs to be redesigned, and with the redesign of that system, we may actually find 

the capacity and the resources to do a lot of the things that are 

needed on the preparedness side as well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Those are very constructive suggestions, 

and we will see if the Committee cannot move them into the system. 

Dr. Kadlec, a final question. In your testimony you put a lot of 

emphasis on leadership, and, of course, I agree with you. It is always a critical component, sometimes overlooked because we get focused on details of what you want to do and forget the leadership. 

So is there a criticism there? Do you think we lack effective leadership in this biodefense area right now? 

Dr. KADLEC. Well, I would just put it in—use a football analogy—we have a lot of great assistant coaches. You saw many of 

them. Some are still here. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. KADLEC. Where is the head coach? And where is the head 

coach basically making this a cause celebre—not to make a rhetorical statement around this, but as I did in my tenure at the White 

House. Someone needs to be the advocate and educate around this 

issue, particularly at the political level where there is little familiarity with it. I think there are many in the current White House 

who are experts on the nuclear issues. Certainly the pressing 

issues around cyber warfare and cyber attacks on our country and 

our economy have driven it in a different way. 

The risk of bioterrorism and biowarfare is one area that, quite 

frankly, needs similar kinds of leadership. I think Dr. O’Toole identified some of the leaders there now. That is very important. But, 

literally, you have to have someone 24/7 whose only job is this. I 

am convinced, having lived it and breathed it for a period of time, 

where you can basically go into those meetings and fight toe to toe 

with OMB to ensure that they do not necessarily decrement your 

program because they just do not understand the national security 

component to it. 

A quick example. In the recent budget alignments where OMB 

went through the exercise to basically significantly decrement a variety of different accounts, clearly homeland security and national 

security were treated differently. But health programs were not, 

and, quite frankly, the biodefense program, particularly within 

OMB, is buried in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 

And so in some ways it takes a greater haircut than maybe some 

of the other programs would because just simply the recognition is 

not there that this small amount of money, even though it is not, 

about $7 billion, is like any other billion dollars that are devoted 

to health and other related programs. And I think that is the challenge that you have, and unless you have someone at that level to 

advocate and to educate—and, literally, I had to bring people sometimes kicking and screaming to the White House and interagency 

meetings, to ensure that they understood the equities for the country and national security. 

322 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you are talking about not somebody, 

for instance, in the Department of Homeland Security but somebody in the White House, presumably in the National Security 

Council, who would be designated as the person in charge of biodefense. 

Dr. KADLEC. I think that is necessary but not sufficient, to get 

to Dr. O’Toole’s point. I mean, I think the fact that if you have the 

right constellation of leaders across the interagency, that is also 

critical. But it also helps to have someone at the White House level 

where particularly for some of these intractable problems, subject 

to the integration of our biodefense medical countermeasure portfolio, or the issue of basically leveraging Department of Defense or 

VA to make their medical capabilities available in case of surge, or 

security for medical countermeasure distribution by the Postal 

Service, those are things that sometimes are best done at a level 

above that. But you need all of it. You just cannot have some of 

it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think we have taken enough of your 

time, and I am going to go on to another meeting. This has been 

a very constructive hearing. The first panel was excellent. You 

built on the first panel with some very good suggestions that I 

think will guide the Committee as to where we can try to be supportive here. I appreciate your testimony and all the work that you 

do in this area very much. 

We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days 

for any additional questions or statements for the record. 

With that, I thank you again, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(323) 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE NEXT WAVE IN 

AVIATION SECURITY 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, Landrieu, 

Collins, Paul, and Moran. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS [presiding]. Good morning. The hearing will 

come to order. 

Senator Lieberman, the Committee’s Chairman, has been unavoidably delayed. He will be joining us shortly, but he has asked 

me to proceed to convene the hearing and delivery my opening 

statement. In fact, he suggested that I give a very lengthy opening 

statement in order to allow him to proceed with his before we call 

on our first witness. [Laughter.] 

Nevertheless, we will proceed as normal. 

By targeting our airplanes, al-Qaeda succeeded in killing nearly 

3,000 people a decade ago. Aviation security is clearly critical to 

homeland security. We Americans have demonstrated our willingness to endure enhanced security measures at our airports if those 

measures appear to be reasonable and related to real risks. But 

travelers become frustrated when security measures inconvenience 

them, apparently without cause, or when they appear to be focused 

on those who pose little or no threat. 

Next month, it will be 10 years since the shoe bomber failed to 

take down his flight from Paris bound for Miami, yet we still take 

our shoes off. In 2006, British and American intelligence thwarted 

an effort to conceal explosives in liquid bottles. We still cannot 

carry on a regular-sized tube of toothpaste onto an airplane. The 

Christmas Day bomber hid explosives in his underwear and media 

reports indicate that terrorists have shown interest in having explosive devices surgically implanted in their bodies. These threats 

have led to more intrusive pat-down searches, and one wonders 

what more will be required of airline passengers in the future. 

We see TSA putting the very young and the very old through intrusive and, in most cases, unnecessary screenings. At the same 

time, it troubles many Americans to learn that a young man was 

324 

able to fly cross-country without a valid government ID and with 

an expired boarding pass that was not even issued in his name. If 

we continue to give extra screening to individuals who appear to 

pose no threat, yet others who should arouse suspicion can get past 

checkpoints without being questioned, our systems still are not as 

finely calibrated as they need to be. 

Since our June hearing, the Administration has implemented a 

risk analysis to improve the screening process, a welcome change. 

This effort should provide a more effective and efficient use of the 

government’s limited screening resources. I am encouraged, for example, that this new risk-based approach is designed to permit 

TSA to learn more about travelers through information they choose 

to provide. Some of the changes will also respond to several of our 

most common airport screening complaints. Secretary Janet 

Napolitano said in September that frequent flyers who opt in to a 

known traveler program will often be able to keep their shoes on 

and their laptops in their bags. TSA, to its credit, and Administrator John Pistole deserves credit for this, also has changed the 

screening procedures for children under 12, a common sense decision that was overdue. 

Nonetheless, questions remain regarding how some security procedures affect Americans’ privacy, their health, and whether or not 

the procedures are as effective as they should be. In August, TSA 

began installing new software in passenger screening machines designed to enhance traveler privacy. Using a generic outline of passengers, Automated Target Recognition, detects items that could 

pose a potential threat. I first saw this less-invasive technology in 

Amsterdam in 2010 and I repeatedly raised this issue with Administrator Pistole and Secretary Napolitano. This technology was implemented at Schiphol Airport in the wake of the Christmas Day 

bomber who was able to go through that airport with his explosives 

undetected. 

I would parenthetically note that I assumed that this was some 

cutting-edge technology that had been developed in Germany. I 

asked where it had been developed and was told in Massachusetts. 

So, clearly, there are opportunities within our own country to take 

advantage of new technology. 

I urged consideration of this software, which better respects travelers’ privacy, eliminates the need for a separate screener in a 

booth, relies less on human judgment, and eliminates the inconsistencies associated with human reviewers. I am very pleased that 

TSA is rolling out and testing this technology. 

While the ATR technology is currently being used with so-called 

Millimeter Wave Machines which use radio frequency energy to 

generate images, I would note that other Advanced Imaging Technology, screening machines use backscatter X-ray radiation that 

have continued to raise health concerns. This is an issue that I 

hear about from my colleagues all the time because most of us 

travel every single week. I also hear about it from pregnant passengers who are concerned about the exposure to the babies that 

they are carrying. DHS, in my view, should independently evaluate 

the health effects of that technology and establish a goal of using 

radiation-free screening technology. 

325 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix on page 1230. 

Let me underscore my appreciation of the fact that no single 

screening technology can ensure our safety. There is no magic bullet. There is no perfect system. And that is why a layered system 

of security is so essential, involving watch lists, intelligence, and all 

the tools at our disposal. 

The fact is that we face a determined, innovative foe, and no machines can substitute for good intelligence, well-trained screeners, 

and an observant public. The passenger screening process has received both attention and sometimes anger from the traveling public. It became clear last year, however, from the printer cartridge 

plot, that cargo security is also a threat that terrorists are investigating. That is why Senator Lieberman and I intend to introduce 

an air cargo screening security bill later this year. Our successes 

in risk-based screening of maritime cargo should provide a road 

map for risk-based screening of air cargo, and that is what our legislation is intended to do. 

And, of course, just in the past 24 hours, we have learned of gaps 

in our security related to certain catering operations at Atlanta’s 

main airport. Those are very serious concerns because, obviously, 

the catering personnel have direct access to materials that are put 

on airplanes, and I am sure that is an issue that we will be talking 

about this morning. 

Our government’s first priority is to protect against terrorism 

and the public will accept a certain level of intrusion and inconvenience at our airports, as long as we are convinced that it is enhancing our safety. But DHS should continue to expand the use of riskbased approaches to screening with technology and techniques that 

are safer, more effective, and that minimize privacy and health 

concerns. 

Now, at this point, I would usually say, ‘‘Thank you, Mr. Chairman,’’ but in this case I would be thanking myself. 

We are going to move to our first witness today. We are very 

pleased to have with us John Pistole. He is the Administrator of 

the Transportation Security Administration within the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

Mr. Pistole, we welcome you back to the Committee. I, for one, 

want to commend you for your hard work and for being very open 

to our suggestions and to the recommendations of the public as you 

seek to protect the traveling public. Please proceed with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE,1 ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Senator Collins, and thank you for 

the Committee for your support of our Risk-Based Security Initiative in terms of how we try to work to provide the most effective 

security in the most efficient way. 

So when I last appeared before this Committee, as you noted, our 

plans to deploy aspects of this Risk-Based Security Initiative were 

still being formulated. I am pleased to report that we have begun 

actually implementing several aspects of risk-based security in 

326 

some airports and testing other aspects in other airports around 

the country, again, with the goal of providing the most effective security in the most efficient way. 

As this initiative progresses, we must ensure that each step 

strengthens security as intelligence informs us of terrorists’ ongoing interests in attacking aviation, and as noted, because most air 

travelers present little risk of committing an act of terrorism, the 

goal is to focus on those who present the greatest risk. Anecdotally, 

we still find four to five guns at airport security checkpoints every 

day. Yesterday, we found six, including one at Chairman Lieberman’s Bradley Airport in Hartford, Connecticut, a loaded gun with 

seven rounds in it in a checked bag that was going to try to get 

through. 

Our success in discovering other non-metallic items is significantly enhanced through the use of Advanced Imaging Technology, 

as you noted, because these machines give us the best opportunity 

to find non-metallic threats such as we saw on Christmas Day 2009 

and have successfully detected items as small as a coin or even a 

small individual piece of gum that is wrapped. AIT, of course, is 

not perfect, as you know, and we continue working closely with 

manufacturers to improve its detection capability, but again noting 

that it does give us the best available opportunity from a technology perspective of detecting those Christmas Day-type bombs. 

Additionally, as part of Risk-Based Security Initiative, we recently deployed TSA Pre-Check, a voluntary passenger pre-screening initiative with a small known traveler population in four U.S. 

airports, placing more focus on pre-screening individuals who volunteer information about themselves prior to flying. Because we 

know more about them, TSA Pre-Check travelers may move more 

swiftly through the standard screening process and be able to divest fewer items, such as leaving their shoes, belt, and a light jacket on along with keeping their laptop in their briefcase and keep 

their liquids, aerosols, and gels in their carry-on bag. Of course, we 

will always incorporate random and unpredictable security measures throughout the airport. At no point is a traveler guaranteed 

expedited screening. 

Initial feedback for TSA Pre-Check has been very favorable, with 

approximately 40,000 travelers having gone through this expedited 

screening process so far. Our first two partner airlines, American 

and Delta, have successfully demonstrated the required technical 

capabilities and we are working with other airlines and other airports to expand the program as they become operationally ready 

and as more and more people sign up through Customs and Border 

Protection’s hugely successful Global Entry Program. 

Efforts to expand identity-based screening are also evident in a 

new crew member screening system which helps positively verify 

the identity and employment status of airline pilots. Under this 

program being tested at seven airports currently, tens of thousands 

of airline pilots have processed through this expedited screening, 

again, all with very positive feedback. 

We are also evaluating an expanded Behavior Detection Initiative that began this fall at Boston Logan Airport and now Detroit 

Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. In this new initiative, behavioral analysis techniques are used by specially trained officers to 

327 

determine if a traveler should be referred for additional screening. 

This additional interaction used by security agencies worldwide enables officers to better confirm or dispel suspicious behavior and 

anomalies. Preliminary analysis from Boston shows an increase in 

detecting high-risk passengers, but additional data is required, 

both to understand if that trend is statistically significant and to 

measure it against our return on investment. 

In August, we implemented, as you noted, a new screening procedure for children 12 and under, allowing them to leave their shoes 

on and go through a less intrusive security screening, recognizing 

that intelligence indicates that these travelers pose little risk to 

aviation security, although, of course, it can be used by those who 

might want to cause harm. These changes give our officers more 

options to resolve any alarms that may occur during the screening 

process. The results from this nationwide enhancement to screening show a sharp reduction, although not elimination, of the need 

for a physical pat-down for children and families have responded 

very favorably to these changes. 

Combined with TSA Pre-Check and known crew member screening, these new processes help us free up resources to focus on higher-risk travelers. In essence, risk-based security helps us strengthen security by reducing the size of the haystack in which a terrorist 

might be hiding. I am dedicated to further identifying additional 

groups as part of the High-Risk Security Initiative and I look forward to updating this Committee as these efforts progress. 

So in closing, innovation, partnerships, and a commitment to the 

pursuit of excellence, these are the watchwords of TSA as we move 

into 2012. 

Thank you, Senator Collins and Members of the Committee, for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Pistole. 

As we have seen over the years, terrorists continue to look for 

gaps in our aviation security procedures and that is why I was particularly disturbed to read of a local TV report in Atlanta, Georgia, 

where lax airline catering security procedures were identified 

through an investigative report and an undercover video. And specifically, press reports indicate that the video showed catering employees piggybacking through security checkpoints. There were unsealed catering carts, which obviously would allow explosives or 

weapons to be concealed among the food in those carts, that were 

in the staging area before they were being loaded onto the plane. 

What is TSA doing in response to this report? Have we identified 

yet another vulnerability, or do you believe this is an isolated incident? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator, and clearly, this is something 

that we take seriously and is a concern under the umbrella of the 

insider threats. So those who have some type of special access, either through their work, employment, and their backgrounds, allow 

them access in a way that the general public does not have is 

something that we focus on. We set standards for catering companies and airports around the country, that they have to meet these 

standards. We inspect to those standards. So when we get a report 

328 

such as this, that there has been some type of breach or vulnerability identified, we move very quickly. 

So in this instance—this was brought to our attention in the last 

month—we immediately sent a team to Atlanta to work with the 

airport but also the catering company to assess what vulnerabilities there may be. We are continuing to follow up on that in 

terms of an investigation as to what actually happened, and that 

is ongoing. The bottom line is you will have all the facts as to what 

may have happened and what other vulnerabilities may need to be 

addressed, but we are moving forward in concert with the catering 

company and the airport on that. 

Senator COLLINS. Could you explain to the Committee what kind 

of vetting TSA does of airport employees and others who have access to airplanes but are not passengers? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. There is a series of background checks and a 

fairly robust system in place to assess whether anybody who wants 

access to either the sterile area of the airport or even the vendors 

who work in the non-sterile area, and so one of the first checks, obviously, to do is to make sure they are not on some type of terrorist 

watch list. So that is the first step, obviously. A criminal background check is also done, and then we do vetting that is recurrent 

for all those, especially those who have that additional access to 

the sterile area. 

We work closely with the companies and the airports for all 450 

airports around the country to determine from a risk mitigation 

perspective, do they see any vulnerabilities in their employees, and 

then based on what the U.S. Government knows, both within TSA 

and obviously FBI background checks and the U.S. intelligence 

community, are there those who may pose a problem. 

The challenge comes, frankly, from the clean skins, those who 

have no criminal background. They have not come up on a terrorist 

watch list in any way. So that is the challenge that we are presented. And so we also include random and unpredictable security 

checks both for the catering companies, for example, and for the 

employees. So we will do random surprise checks, if you will, on 

an unpredictable basis so terrorists cannot game that system. But 

it is clearly something that we focus on. 

Senator COLLINS. I would like to now switch to the issue of cargo 

security in the final time that I have left, now that our Chairman, 

the true Chairman, has joined us. As you may recall, at a hearing 

that we held in November of last year, I asked you the question 

that if our government had not received the intelligence tip about 

explosives hidden in air cargo that was shipped to Yemen, would 

our current security systems have detected those package bombs, 

and you very candidly replied that, in your professional opinion, we 

have not. Could you bring us up to date on what has been done 

since that time so that we have better screening in place for cargo? 

We are always going to need intelligence information. That is absolutely critical and it is part of the layered approach to security. But 

it does worry me that if not for the intelligence tip, these explosives 

would have made it to their destination, most likely. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. A great deal has been done, 

both by the U.S. Government, foreign governments, foreign carriers, cargo carriers, and the International Civil Aviation OrganizaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00344 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
329 

tion, along with the National Maritime Organization, the World 

Customs Organization, and the Universal Postal Union, all those 

groups working together. As you may recall, I was in Sana’a, 

Yemen, 5 days after this took place to work with the Yemeni authorities, but the day that the intelligence came in, I immediately 

issued a Security Directive Emergency Amendment that put a 

ground stop on any cargo coming out of Yemen, of course, as a first 

step. 

What we have done, I believe, very collaboratively is work with 

industry to assess from a very pragmatic standpoint, what can you 

do today, what can you do in the short term, mid-term, and long 

term in working with us? I mean, we can issue regulations day in, 

day out. The question is, what can they practically do that does not 

put a halt to the global supply chain, which was significantly impacted when I issued those Security Directive Emergency Amendments? 

So what we have done is work with industry to establish standards well beyond—much more rigorous than ours that addresses 

risk mitigation from a business perspective in addition to the government’s perspective. And so, as you know, 100 percent of all 

cargo coming in on passenger planes from overseas is now 

screened. All high-risk cargo is screened. And we are working with 

industry as to the other portions that as we divide, and we work 

very closely with Customs and Border Protection, their Advance 

Targeting System, to say there are categories of known shippers 

and known shipments. For those that are in the unknown category, 

we need to apply additional scrutiny, and have that applied before 

it comes to the United States. 

So that is what we are working through with carriers around the 

world, frankly. There are 20 countries that account for 80 percent 

of all the cargo coming into the U.S. We are working with countries 

on national cargo security programs. We have already recognized 

several of those and look to recognize another handful of those here 

in the not-too-distant future. So a number of steps have been 

taken. 

Senator COLLINS. That is good to hear. GAO, as you know, has 

been critical that there are still problems with screening palletized 

cargo and that is a scenario that we are going to need to work on. 

I want to turn the hearing back over to the Chairman, but tell 

the Chairman that Mr. Pistole brought out in his public testimony 

that the TSA is still capturing four to five guns per day as part of 

its screening of carry-on luggage and passengers, and he mentioned 

that just yesterday, the total was six, and one of those guns was 

at Bradley International Airport, and it was a fully-loaded gun. 

So I think that is a very good reminder to us that there still is 

a need for screening. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [presiding.] Thanks, Senator Collins. First, 

apologies to you, Mr. Pistole. I had to be on the floor when it convened at 9:30, and thanks to Senator Collins. I was just thinking 

about who is the chairman. I said it has been a real pleasure to 

work with Senator Collins here, regardless of who was in the majority or minority, and I said before that all that would change in 

330 

this session would be the titles we had, so I appreciate her holding 

the gavel and bringing the hearing to order. 

And I agree with what she just said. I know that a lot of people 

are taking their shoes off, taking their coats off, going through the 

lines who say, well, this is a nuisance, for what? But when you tell 

us and the American people that an average of four or five weapons 

are found every day at airports around the country, it reminds us 

why. 

Incidentally, I hasten to say that a traveler can carry a weapon 

in a checked bag so long as it is declared and checked, but these 

are people who are boarding the plane with a weapon in their luggage, four or five every day. So thanks for what you and your folks 

are doing. 

The rule of our Committee is that the first Senator to arrive goes 

first, and I think the Chairman ought to apply that rule to himself, 

so I am going to call on Senator Paul, and then I will come after 

him. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL 

Senator PAUL. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Pistole. Does 

the TSA examine flight manifests? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator PAUL. So when people come through, you have already 

looked at whoever is flying that day? Someone has looked at that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. It is under our Secure Flight Program. 

Senator PAUL. So there are specific searches then targeted toward someone you have looked at on the flight manifest and determined if they may need extra scrutiny? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. That is the whole basis of our watch list; it is 

predicated on knowing who is coming. These are individuals coming to the United States, or flying from the United States. So I 

start every day with an intelligence briefing that looks out 72 

hours in advance to say, who are those individuals who are known 

as selectees on terrorist watch lists, where there is some derogatory 

information about them, or clearly the no-flys who may want to fly 

but will not be allowed to fly, either from the last point of departure to the United States or in the United States. 

Senator PAUL. I was just thinking more of people who have been 

to Yemen three times and Somalia twice and they are not on your 

watch list, but you might want to spend a little more time with 

them. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator PAUL. That kind of screening is occurring, also? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, and I would be glad to go into some more detail in a closed setting, Senator, in terms of some of the work that 

we do with the intelligence community. 

Senator PAUL. I would just like to know that it is occurring in 

general terms. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator PAUL. If you fly from Islamabad into Kennedy Airport 

and then you are going to fly on to Chicago, do you go back through 

any screening or are you just relying on what happened in 

Islamabad? 

Mr. PISTOLE. No. You go back through additional screening here. 

331 

Senator PAUL. You do go back? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. 

Senator PAUL. So you go back out of the secure area when you 

have an international flight, and then you come back through the 

TSA screening? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. If you are talking about transiting from one 

point in the United States to another? 

Senator PAUL. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, clearly, the enabling legislation requires us to 

screen every passenger here in the United States. 

Senator PAUL. And with regard to setting up a frequent traveler 

program, you say there are a couple of airports we are doing it in 

now? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Four right now, Senator, right. 

Senator PAUL. And what is the plan for expanding that program? 

Mr. PISTOLE. We are working very closely with both the airlines 

and the airports. I have met with and talked to two airline CEOs 

in the last 2 weeks who are very interested, and so right now, we 

are doing it with American and Delta and we are in four of their 

key airports. So the goal is to, as quickly that we can do it in an 

efficient way, expand that with airlines and other airports, and so, 

clearly, there will be some more airports added in the next several 

months, but more so as we get into 2012. 

Senator PAUL. Right. Nashville Airport is not one of those, is it, 

because I have noticed there are pilots going through a separate 

line now. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. As part of the Known Crew Member Program—— 

Senator PAUL. That is a separate program—— 

Mr. PISTOLE [continuing]. That is a separate part of the RiskBased Security Initiative, separate from and apart from passengers. We have the pilots who, of course, are the most trusted 

persons on there. Actually, we are doing that at seven airports, but 

as I mentioned, we have had over—well, it is approximately 80,000 

pilots have gone through on this expedited screening process. 

Senator PAUL. But it is going to be on an airport-by-airport basis, 

is how it works? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, it is, simply because of the checkpoint configuration layout and if there is an area for either a dedicated lane or 

near the exit lane or something that we can configure for it. But 

it is in close association with the Pilots Association and ATA, who 

are doing all this—at no taxpayer expense, I would add. 

Senator PAUL. I would just encourage that we continue to expand 

this, that it is long overdue—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator PAUL [continuing]. And that the smaller we make the 

haystack of what we are looking in, the easier your job is to find 

people—— 

Mr. PISTOLE. Agreed. 

Senator PAUL [continuing]. And that involves more of making 

priority and targeting folks who are more risk to us. And anything 

we can do to have fewer pat-downs of 6-year-old girls—in fact, I do 

not really think there is any reason why we should be doing that— 

we need to get to that point. With an adult, when an adult goes 

332 

through and the image is blurred, can the adult request to go back 

through again? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Our policy has not been that. That is what we 

changed with children, simply because—— 

Senator PAUL. I would change it with adults, too. Ninety-ninepoint-nine percent of us are not terrorists. Let us go back through 

the machine rather than get a pat-down. You will get rid of a lot 

of the anger an animosity toward the TSA and toward what you 

are doing and give us a little more dignity when we travel. Just 

let us go back through the screener again. People do not want to 

have a pat-down. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. I will take that back, Senator. 

Senator PAUL. We are made to feel like criminals and we do not 

want to be made to feel like criminals when we fly on a plane. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Obviously, the only down side is it slows down the 

line and then people—you obviously want to keep moving along, 

and so it is a—— 

Senator PAUL. I am not sure it slows it down that much just to 

send them back through, particularly if they give them a choice, 

they can do a pat-down or a walk back through. But I think what 

happens is when you ask any questions, you are treated like you 

are guilty of some crime and you are treated roughly and it is, like, 

do anything, ask any questions, and we will pat you down more, 

or we will be more invasive. That is sort of what you get sometimes 

as you go through the airport. But I think we need to try to continue to do what we can to isolate and target who could attack us 

and to try to make it easier on those who are not going to attack 

us, which is recognizably 99.99 percent of us are not terrorists. So 

we need to figure out how to get them through in an expedited 

fashion and in the most dignified way. Thank you. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. That is exactly what this 

whole Risk-Based Security Initiative is designed to do, so thank 

you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Paul. 

Thank you, Administrator Pistole, for all the good work that you 

are doing. I am so struck by the example of the four to five weapons a day that are seized in the lines and I think it is very important, to the extent that you are able without jeopardizing security 

to regularly announce to the public, generally speaking, what you 

are finding because there is a level of impatience. I think people 

have resigned themselves to it, but the average person going 

through the line—I speak for myself—does not see somebody get 

stopped with a weapon and it is very important to remind people 

why we ask them to go through this, which is for their own security. 

I know you mentioned in your opening statement the ability of 

the whole body imaging machines to actually find a Nicorette in 

somebody’s back pocket. I know from having talked to you there 

have been occasions when you found things concealed on a person 

which would not show up in a metallic scanner that could be very 

dangerous to the other people on the plane. So I do not know if you 

want to respond at all to that—— 

333 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. It is a good reminder. We do post some things on our TSA Web site and we have 

a fairly active blog that people interact with us on. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE. One of the keys is not providing too much detail so 

the terrorists can go to school on what are the detection capabilities and not, but clearly, just the fact that we are getting four to 

five guns every day indicates that there are people who are not focused on the security protocols. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good enough. Thank you. 

Yesterday, as you probably know, ProPublica, an independent 

news reporting organization, in conjunction with Public Broadcasting, published an investigative report on backscatter machines, 

one that has become acceptable to use in airports, but the article 

summarizes health concerns raised by experts over the past 15 

years about these machines. I wanted to give you an opportunity, 

because I know this has been in the news the last 24 hours, if you 

choose to respond to these concerns at this time. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did see the article 

yesterday and it does contain a lot of information. I am not sure 

all of it is accurate from the standpoint of documenting all the different perspectives. Clearly, it is an issue that we have looked at 

and continue to look at and work with safety and health officials 

to ensure that these backscatter invasive technology machines are 

as absolutely safe as can be, and all the independent studies that 

we have had done indicate that they are well below any of the minimum dosages recommended. 

I take Senator Collins’s recommendation to heart, to have DHS 

do an independent study, and we will take that up and do that because of these lingering concerns about any additional exposure. Of 

course, what the scientific studies that we have seen indicate is 

that it is about the same amount of radiation as approximately 3 

minutes of flight at elevation, just naturally occurring radiation. It 

is one-one-thousandth of a time, for example, of a chest X-ray. But 

that being said, I am concerned that there is a perception that they 

are not as safe as could be, and since we are using different technology, that would be millimeter wave, that does not have that 

same perspective, I will take that back and we will conduct another—an independent study to address that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Let me ask you about another matter that has been in the news. 

I am sure you know that over the weekend, during the Winter 

Storm Alfred, there was a nightmarish series of events at Bradley 

Airport. To make a long story short, I and others have been asking 

questions of Jet Blue, the FAA, and Bradley Airport. The reality 

was that a lot of planes could not land where they were heading. 

They were running out of fuel and they were being diverted to 

three airports, one of which was Bradley Airport, which became 

very crowded and all the gates were full. They were making judgments about keeping the runways open. 

In the worst cases, I am sure, passengers on that Jet Blue plane 

stayed 7 hours, no water, no food, no bathrooms working, really a 

nightmare. And finally, Jet Blue was able to get a bus to go out 

334 

to take the passengers off, and the airline may well be subject to 

considerable fines as a result of all that. 

That is not directly in TSA’s area of responsibility, but I did 

want to ask whether you might have contingency plans, or should, 

for dealing with an unexpected influx of passengers and maintaining security at an airport when flights are unexpectedly diverted 

from another airport to that airport. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Chairman. We do, within TSA, have 

contingency plans. Obviously, with a little bit more head’s up, for 

example, if there is a hurricane, something like that coming in, we 

have a National Deployment Force that we can actually move individuals on an expedited basis, within hours, to an affected area 

that may need additional security regimen, either for the passengers, pilots, crew, or the workers. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. So we do have that capability and we use that. We 

used that in Hurricane Irene. But it is something that was started 

going back to Hurricane Katrina, which actually is where it 

stemmed from. So, yes, we do have that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That may preface an answer to my next 

question. It happened that one of the diverted flights to Bradley 

Airport was an international flight, and it raised an interesting 

question and I want to ask Customs and Border Protection about 

it. If the passengers on that international flight were forced to stay 

on the plane so long that it was just humanely impossible and they 

had to be taken off the plane and brought into the Bradley Airport, 

which of course, has a sizeable contingent of TSA personnel— 

whether there is any way TSA and CBP can work together in those 

unusual circumstances to process passengers more quickly so that 

they are not forced to stay on the plane for an enormous amount 

of time simply because they happen to be on an international 

flight? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I know there are some provisions. I do not know 

the details, so I would have to look into that and get back with you 

and the Committee on that. For example, if it is a situation where 

international travelers are trying to get out of the country—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE [continuing]. They have already been processed. If 

it is a matter of them then being reprocessed, and because their 

flight is not going to depart, there are some options, but they are, 

frankly, somewhat limited if there is not a good CBP presence 

there. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. I mean, Bradley Airport is an international airport, but all of the scheduled international arrivals currently originate from countries with CBP pre-clearance stations, so 

there may not be adequate clearance to handle some unexpected 

international arrivals—it may be a rare circumstance. On the other 

hand, we have had some extreme weather lately, so I just ask you 

to think about that. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I will follow up with Commissioner Alan Bersin on 

that and to see what the options may be. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. Thanks. My time is up. Senator 

Akaka. 

335 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on ‘‘The Next Wave in Aviation Security.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, because Hawaii is located 2,500 miles from the 

mainland, we have, of course, unique transportation needs. Hawaii 

residents and our many visitors rely heavily on air transportation 

when traveling between islands and also to the mainland or even 

abroad. Although protecting the public is our primary goal, we 

must ensure that security procedures and technologies safeguard 

privacy rights and are not so burdensome that they discourage air 

travel. 

I applaud the Federal employees who have worked tirelessly to 

secure our commercial aviation system since September 11, 2001. 

As we approach the busy holiday travel season, I hope this hearing 

will allow us to review whether the workforce has the tools they 

need to meet today’s security challenges. 

Administrator Pistole, your testimony mentioned that TSA is in 

the first phase of the expedited passenger screening pilot. I understand that Honolulu Airport and Hawaiian Airlines are being considered for the second phase of the pilot. In Hawaii, many people 

who take frequent short flights between islands could benefit from 

the expedited security procedures. How are the decisions being 

made about which additional airports and airlines will be selected 

for the second phase of the pilot, and when will those selections be 

announced? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Well, thank you, Senator Akaka, and thank you for 

your support for Federal employees. Clearly, the goal is to move 

out as quickly and efficiently as possible. There are a number of 

variables that we are working through and those include things 

such as the airlines’ capability, their information technology systems. Because the way this expedited traveler, if you want, TSA 

Pre-Check works is that we take information that is embedded on 

the bar code of the boarding pass, which the airlines, of course, 

produce, and so it shows up in that bar code as the person is a 

known or trusted traveler, if you will. Several airlines are going 

through mergers right now and they are waiting until those systems are merged as opposed to having disparate systems that do 

not talk and then trying to merge those into a new one. So those 

will be after the first of the year. So that is one criteria. Is the airline ready, capable, and all that. 

The second is the airports themselves, and the configuration of 

the checkpoint is a key aspect. One of the goals of this is to have 

a dedicated lane for those known, trusted frequent travelers, such 

as in Global Entry or these elite tiers and others that we will look 

at down the road, so they can go to a dedicated lane, they can be 

identified through that bar code on the boarding pass, and then we 

can have a separate screening lane for them where they keep a 

light jacket on, they keep a belt on, they keep their shoes on, they 

keep their laptop in their briefcase, keep their liquids and aerosol 

gels in their carry-on bags, and again, keeping random and unpredictable checks as part of that. 

So to directly answer the question, there are a number of airports and airlines that we are working with to try to get to that 

point, so I want to manage expectations as best I can to say there 

336 

have been no decisions made. I am waiting on a presentation for 

that second round, if you will. I will say that I met with the CEO 

of one of the major airlines going through a merger here the week 

before last and they are committed to doing it in the first quarter 

of 2012, and so we will use one of the very largest airports in the 

country as the basis for that airline, that merged airline, probably 

in the February-March time frame. So as soon as we get some additional information, I will get back with you on that. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you so much. 

Administrator Pistole, I applaud TSA’s increased use of Automated Target Recognition software, so that whole-body scanners no 

longer generate sensitive images of passengers’ bodies. However, I 

am concerned that the backscatter machines, which are not currently compatible with the ATR, are still used in many airports, including some in Hawaii. Does TSA plan to implement the privacyenhancing ATR feature for all whole-body scanners, and what is 

the time line for doing so? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, Senator. In fact, we just were approved to acquire 300 more additional AIT machines and all of those will have 

that Automatic Target Recognition. So no new acquisitions will be 

without that privacy feature built in. We should know sometime 

this month from the manufacturer of the backscatter whether their 

technology upgrades, if you will, are successful in terms of the depiction through the ATR rather than through the traditional 

means. But any new acquisition will have that privacy filter of the 

ATR as part of that. 

Senator AKAKA. As you know, the APEC summit will be held in 

Honolulu, Hawaii, next week. The high-profile event will feature 

President Obama and his fellow APEC leaders from the Asian region. I recently met with the security steering committee and 

toured the command center and event sites. I was very impressed 

by the planning. Would you please discuss TSA’s role in securing 

the safe travel of the 20,000 dignitaries and guests flying to Hawaii. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. Obviously, the U.S. Secret 

Service, the Diplomatic Security Service, and the State Department 

have the lead as far as the dignitaries themselves and their entourage. It is our responsibility, honestly, to ensure that everybody 

traveling to the summit, other passengers, other attendees, and 

things, have been thoroughly screened, whether they are coming 

from the mainland or from those last points of departure to the 

United States that have to meet our standards. So that is our responsibility, and then, of course, on the departure, all those people 

will go through the TSA security screening. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Akaka. Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Pistole, for being here. 

Let me start by asking about a March 2010 DHS Inspector General report entitled, ‘‘Transportation Security Administration’s Acquisition of Support Services Contracts.’’ 

337 

It is DHS IG Report 10–72. The DHS IG made some recommendations in the report, and I am curious about whether your 

agency has made the changes and is now complying with the 

recommendations in that report. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Senator, I think I am going to have to be refreshed 

on the specifics of that particular report—— 

Senator PRYOR. The three main recommendations that I am concerned about are: First, a review of inherently governmental functions as part of contract administration. Second, to establish evaluation factors and a review process for requirements identified in 

the statements of work. And third, assign dedicated, trained, and 

certified contracting officers, technical representatives to manage 

and oversee the contract administration function. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that refresher. So 

we have taken a number of steps as it relates to support services 

and contractors, and working within the framework of the Department of Homeland Security overall, we have conducted a review of 

all of our contractor services and, frankly, eliminated a number of 

positions. A number of other positions that were deemed inherently 

governmental services were converted to Federal employees. So the 

idea is to achieve greater efficiencies in our use of contractor dollars and services. 

As to the specifics of the acquisition, I think we identified some 

areas of improvement, or that were identified, some areas of improvement that we have implemented. I would have to get back to 

you on some of the specifics. 

Senator PRYOR. When you talk about efficiencies, does that mean 

savings? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Savings, yes. 

Senator PRYOR. And do you have a dollar figure on how much 

you are able to save? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I do not offhand. I will be glad to get back with you 

on that. I would also say that as a part of an internal initiative 

that I started 6 months ago to look at efficiencies that we could 

achieve within the agency beyond any IG, GAO recommendation—— 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Mr. PISTOLE [continuing]. We have come up with a number of opportunities to create efficiencies, savings, and cost avoidance and 

things that are all important to us and still provide the same critical security services. It is largely a headquarter-focused efficiency 

review, so, for example, I have put a freeze on hiring in most positions. I have required additional information about anybody who is 

at a mid- or senior-level supervisor position to make sure that they 

have requisite subordinates that they are supervising, merging 

some IT functions, and doing some other things internally. 

Additionally, from the field perspective, I recently implemented 

a decision to change our overall structure, where we had 12 area 

directors that oversaw the work of the 120 Federal Security Directors for the 450 airports, and I reduced that from 12 down to six 

Regional Directors to create some additional efficiencies in that regard. 

338 

Senator PRYOR. That is good. I would like to get more on that 

in terms of how much you think you can save and how those efficiencies will work. That would be great. 

And the next question would be whether, in the past, TSA has 

invested in technology that did not yield the predicted results, such 

as puffer machines. So I am curious about what criteria you all use 

as you are evaluating technology, and then how you measure 

whether the technology is going to achieve the anticipated goals 

that you are trying to achieve. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, thank you, Senator. The first criteria is what 

does intelligence tell us about how the terrorists are trying to hurt 

us, and so with that as a starting point, then we work with industry to say, what detection capabilities do you have currently and 

what are you working on that either others are incentivizing worldwide because if somebody comes up with a gold standard, it is a 

very important and valuable commodity. So we use those two criteria and then always push industry to improve the detection capabilities. 

For example, on the AIT, we are working very closely with industry. The GAO and IG both have reports coming out about some of 

the detection capabilities, and there is a distinction between what 

is the capability of the machine vice what may be seen as performance testing. So covert testing versus performance testing, and so 

we always try to make that distinction. 

But it has to be intelligence-driven, risk-based, and then to make 

sure that it is properly tested and validated, not only in the lab, 

as happened with those puffer machines, but then in the airport 

environment itself, which did not happen. And so after the puffer 

machine issue, we actually created a Transportation Security Integration Facility, which I know some staffers and some Members of 

Congress have visited. It is just on the South side of the Reagan 

Airport in Virginia. I would like to invite all Members and staffers 

to come out and tour where we test each new piece of technology 

in an airport environment to make sure that it works not only 

properly, but rigorously and all those standards that—not just in 

the lab setting. 

Senator PRYOR. It sounds like a lot of that has to do with training and to making sure the officers are properly trained on the machines. 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is a good point. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask you another question that relates to 

training. You are expanding your Behavior Detection Pilot Program 

and I would like to know more about that. It seems common sense, 

that behavior obviously would be a strong indicator, but does it accommodate cultural differences, language barriers, and physical 

and mental disabilities? How do you balance those needs, compared 

to trying to single out erroneous folks, who for whatever reason 

TSA is picking up erroneously? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Right. So, clearly, training is a key aspect of this 

expanded Behavior Detection Initiative that we are trying, and it 

is a proof of concept that we are doing in Boston and Detroit right 

now, and I want to get the data from those two airports before I 

make any decision whether to expand it or not. But we have, of 

course, our core Behavior Detection Officers that we have been 

339 

using for several years now and we have taken those individuals 

who showed the most aptitude and give them additional training 

based on some form behavior detection models, and those individuals then engage in just a simple question and answer with passengers in these two airports to make some assessments and judgments as to whether that person poses any additional risk. 

Now, in Boston, we have had over 150,000 people go through 

and, just again, answer these basic questions, and we have had 

probably a dozen or so people who were referred to law enforcement because of their response and it turned out some of these individuals had outstanding warrants for them. Some were illegal 

immigrants. So they are not necessarily TSA security issues, but 

there was something about the person that we needed to resolve 

why are they acting nervously or strangely or whatever. 

So as I get that additional information, I will look forward to reporting back to the Committee and say, here is what we are finding 

and here is what I think would be the best thing to do moving forward, recognizing that it is simply one layer of security, that I do 

not want to have a single point of failure in any of our layers. If 

this helps us identify that one putative terrorist, then I would like 

to use that. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Pryor. 

The late, great Ted Kennedy—I watched him in the Armed Services Committee and we have a rule, first come, first called on, so 

he would arrive a minute or two before the hearing convened. The 

Chairman would gavel it down, and then he would disappear. And, 

like, 30 seconds before it came his turn, he would reappear. So he 

was maximizing his time. 

Administrator Pistole, I thank you. We have a second panel and 

I think it is probably best that we go on. You are doing a great job. 

I think you certainly convinced me that all the effort we are making continues on a daily basis to be necessary, and I cannot stress 

enough, and I know I speak for Senator Collins, your people are 

finding four to five weapons every day, not in checked bags where 

they are legal, but people going on the plane. And just think about 

what could be done to the other passengers. So what the TSA officers are doing is for the protection of the general public. 

Obviously, we want you—and I know you want—to do your mission in the most cost effective way that you possibly can and in the 

most technologically progressive and imaginative way that you can. 

But we thank you for what you are doing. It has, just point blank, 

made the American people safer than we would otherwise be. 

Some of us may have questions for you that we will submit 

which we did not get a chance to ask you today and ask for your 

answers. Thank you very much. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Have a good day. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will call the second panel, which is 

Roger Dow, President and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. Travel Association; Kenneth Dunlap, Global Director of Security and 

Travel Facilitation at the International Air Transport Association; 

340 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Dow appears in the Appendix on page 1235. 

and Charles M. Barclay, President of the American Association of 

Airport Executives. 

Thank you all, gentlemen, for being here. We look forward to 

your testimony. Each of you has unique experience and perspective 

to add to this discussion. As you just heard me say, I am grateful 

for the work that TSA does, but as somebody said in another capacity, this is a journey without a destination point. In other words, 

we are just going to have to keep getting better and better and better as time goes on. 

So let us begin with Mr. Dow. 

TESTIMONY OF ROGER J. DOW,1 PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, U.S. TRAVEL ASSOCIATION 

Mr. DOW. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member 

Collins, and Senator Moran, thank you very much for this opportunity to testify. 

Senator Lieberman, first of all, we want to thank you for your 

dedication as you are about to retire. You have pursued bipartisan 

support for aviation security and we are going to miss you. 

So thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. DOW. U.S. Travel is a nonprofit organization that represents 

every sector of the $1.8 trillion travel industry, which employs one 

in nine Americans. Our mission is simple: To increase travel to and 

within the United States. 

As you all know, travel is a very powerful engine for increasing 

economic growth and improving our economy and jobs. Just in Connecticut, 62,000 Americans work in the industry, and travel generates $8.8 billion in revenue and $1.4 billion in taxes. In Maine, 

30,000 citizens work in our industry, and travel generates $2.7 billion in revenue and $334 million in taxes. But in every city and 

State, travelers support the salaries of policemen, firemen, and 

teachers, all around America. And I think it is also important to 

point out that travel attracts private sector investment, whether it 

be airports, hotels, convention centers, or attractions, that really 

help the communities build. 

When we talk about aviation security, we often talk in terms of 

terrorism, personal privacy, and technology, and less attention gets 

paid to the economic damage that is inflicted by the current inefficiency in our passenger screening process. For the travel community, which supports urban and rural communities, inefficient 

screening really causes staggering costs to the economy, hampering 

job creation, hampering growth, and the data suggests the problem 

is actually getting worse. 

A 2008 survey of air travelers showed that of the people that 

take more than one flight a year, 28 percent said they avoided a 

flight because of the door-to-door hassle of getting through the airport and delays, etc. That resulted in 41 million flights not taken, 

or $26 billion in lost spending to our U.S. economy and $4 billion 

in lost taxes. 

You compare that $26 billion loss with a 2010 survey that was 

conducted by Consumer Research and asked travelers, if you knew 

341 

1The report referenced by Mr. Dow appears in the Appendix on page 1241. 

that you had a predictable screening system, would you take more 

flights. Respondents said they would take two or three more flights 

per year, which is $85 billion in revenue and would support 

900,000 jobs. 

The costs of TSA’s budget are ballooning at a time when we are 

trying to find fiscally responsible ways of cutting costs in government. For example, in 2004, 618 million people went through an 

airport. In 2010, it was 623 million, a scant one percent improvement of the numbers, but yet during the same time period, TSA’s 

budget increased 68 percent. This trend cannot continue or security 

screening is going to fall in on itself on sheer costs and manpower. 

The FAA is predicting that in 10 years we will have a billion travelers. So just think if the costs keep raising at that rate, what 

would happen. 

Beyond the empirical numbers, there is other evidence. You all, 

as Senator Collins said, travel every single week. You see the inefficiencies and the need for reform in the security system and it 

could really stimulate economic growth. Our current system, while 

it reduces threats and ensures passengers’ safety, has also been inefficient and there is a huge hassle factor. 

We brought together in 2009, a blue ribbon panel of bipartisan 

aviation security experts and travel industry experts. It was 

chaired by former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, former 

Congressman Jim Turner, and Sam Gilliland of Sabre. The goal of 

the panel was to review the present process and recommend some 

reforms in creating a more efficient and secure and travel-focused 

system. They had over 20 meetings and we issued the report called 

‘‘A Better Way,’’ 1 and you have a copy of it, which presents a comprehensive review of what could be done. 

The report lays out a checklist with 14 recommendations so the 

Congress and TSA could really have a road map for creating a secure and efficient system. I am going to focus on three of those recommendations in my remarks. First, we must create a risk-based 

trusted travel program, which Administrator Pistole spoke about. 

Second, we must take steps to decrease the number of carry-on 

bags. And third, TSA must reconstitute the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. 

Let us go to the first one. The blue ribbon panel said they wanted Congress and TSA to create a risk-based system, and the need 

for that is very clear. The current one-size-fits-all screening really 

does not meet the needs of the traveling public. Currently, travelers have no choice in how the system works. We have to have security, of course, but in our view, a trusted traveler program would 

allow travelers to opt in voluntarily and provide background information to qualify for a predictable expedited screening system as 

long as they meet certain criteria that are established for these 

low-risk passengers, which would be just about everybody in this 

room, if you think about it. 

The blue ribbon panel recommended three elements of a trusted 

traveler program. First, a trusted traveler program must be secure 

and accessible program that encourages reverification and encourages a large number of enrollees, not just a small number. Having 

342 

a dedicated screening lane for trusted travelers, as Administrator 

Pistole said, is important. And a confirmation process ensures that 

these enrollees are able to use those lanes is also important. And 

third, the program should have a screening process that provides 

efficiency, security benefits, and an acceptable level of predictivity. 

We strongly believe that those three elements can take place. 

Not long after our release, our team met with Administrator Pistole’s team to review these recommendations and get their feedback. At that meeting, we learned of several initiatives that are underway at TSA to create a risk-based, intelligence-based system. 

For example, Administrator Pistole and TSA are creating the PreCheck program. I applaud him for his vision, his leadership, and 

undertaking an effort to launch Pre-Check, which is an important 

first step. Pre-Check is one of the critical reforms that is very important. I also applaud all of you for taking an interest in this area 

and hope that we can work with you to begin to oversee the implementation of a process that is efficient, yet still provides great security. 

As the Administrator mentioned, they recently started Pre-Check 

and it is going forward with putting passengers in that program 

who qualify through their airline or through the CBP program, 

Global Entry. Pre-Check allows people to share information from 

their frequent traveler program, whether it is Delta or American 

Airlines, that qualifies them for expidited screening. 

What we basically would like to see for this to succeed would be 

for Pre-Check to allow more people to get into the program, allows 

people to take their information from multiple airlines, not just two 

airlines, and also use other methods of enrollment, such as commercial data, criminal history, and the private registered traveler 

programs that other people are administrating. 

The second area of improvement is to have dedicated security 

lanes. We have talked about that. And also, as Administrator Pistole said, have random security, which is very important, but if you 

are randomly pulled out, you should still be expedited and have 

predictability. 

The next key area of reform we want to assess is to have passengers be able to check one bag at no additional cost. Now, we are 

not saying at no cost to the passenger. The airline should be able 

to put in their standard fee for their airline ticket a cost for that 

bag. But if we could reduce the number of bags, we would reduce 

those guns that you talked about. We would reduce the hassle and 

the ability to quickly go through the checkpoint. The New York 

Times said 59 million more bags came through TSA checkpoints in 

the past year. TSA estimates an increse of 87 million carry-on bags 

in the past year and 29 million more bags next year. So if we could 

get one bag per passenger, people would check them and it would 

improve the system greatly. 

And the last thing I would like to highlight today is the reinstatement of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. This has 

been in place for two decades with the FAA and TSA, but it really 

brought in a broad base of people to advise the government. But 

unfortunately, as we have seen, since 2006, the ASAC has not met. 

Therefore, you cut off valuable input from the private sector, from 

the travel community, etc. In July 2011, the TSA Administrator anVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00358 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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1The prepared statement of Mr. Dunlap appears in the Appendix on page 1278. 

nounced they are going to reconvene that committee and we think 

that is great and we would hope that we would have the travel 

community involved so we can have the input of the travelers because we do not believe that having great security and great customer service and an efficient system are mutually exclusive. You 

can have both. 

So we are asking your support to allow us to work with you to 

have a system that is secure, has trusted travelers, has a way that 

we can reduce the number of bags going through the system, and 

that we reinstate the broad spectrum of people providing advice to 

TSA. 

Thanks for what you do. We appreciate your support. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Dow, for an excellent opening statement and for your kind words. 

Mr. DOW. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Next will be Kenneth Dunlap on behalf of 

the International Air Transport Association. 

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH J. DUNLAP,1 GLOBAL DIRECTOR, SECURITY AND TRAVEL FACILITATION, INTERNATIONAL AIR 

TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION 

Mr. DUNLAP. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you very much for this 

opportunity to testify at this hearing. 

The International Air Transport Association, appreciates the 

leadership of the Senate in addressing this critical issue. It is our 

hope that today’s hearing accelerates the much needed dialogue on 

the future of passenger screening post-9/11 in the United States. 

IATA and our 230 U.S. and foreign member airlines have a vision of future passenger screening that is based on a paradigm 

shift in the principles behind checkpoint operations. We believe 

next-generation checkpoints must focus on looking for bad people 

and not just bad things, and I would ask that you consider for a 

moment our vision of an effective airport checkpoint. Security is enhanced with higher probabilities of detection. Babies and children 

with names similar to adults on the no-fly list pass through screening uneventfully. Harmless objects, such as toenail scissors and 

nail clippers, do not trigger alarms. 

In this scenario, the airport security checkpoint is no longer a 

stand-alone line of defense against terrorism but rather part of an 

integrated system that uses risk-based analysis as well as advanced screening technology to improve security and the travel experience for the passenger. We call this vision, the checkpoint of 

the future, and many of the key components are available today. 

But let me stress, this is a vision, this is not the vision of moving 

forward, and we certainly want to encourage a dialogue on what 

the next future checkpoint should look like. 

I think the obvious question is, why develop a future checkpoint? 

First, as we have heard, aviation remains a target, and this was 

demonstrated by the December 2009 attempted bombing of a 

Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit. 

344 

Second, air travel is forecast to continue growing and today’s 

checkpoints are showing their age. IATA expects an additional 90 

million passengers will travel within North America between now 

and 2014, and 659 million new passengers will travel in the entire 

world. Our long-range projections are that by 2050, as many as 16 

billion people will fly annually. But the evidence shows that the 

throughput of today’s checkpoints is decreasing. Our systems just 

cannot handle the traffic. At some places across the globe, we have 

seen a drop in throughput by as much as 50 percent in the last 2 

years. 

And third, the aviation security system needs to maintain the 

confidence of the traveling public, and unfortunately, the signs of 

discontent are growing. Passengers are becoming increasingly vocal 

about the inconvenience of security measures and the threats to 

their personal privacy. But let me stop and let me be clear about 

one thing. We have good systems and the flying public is safe. But 

we also need a confident public that trusts the authorities. If you 

have good systems combined with distrustful passengers, you create a toxic combination and a less secure system. 

So what lessons have we learned in the past decade concerning 

passenger screening? First, dropping new technology into an old 

checkpoint just will not work. That is akin to placing a new radio 

in an old car and saying you have a new car. Essentially, you just 

still have that same old car. 

Second, object finding has served us well, but it does not represent the future. If we have learned anything in the last decade, 

it is that a passenger with toenail clippers is not automatically a 

threat to aviation. Alternatively, if you find toenail clippers, you 

have not necessarily found a terrorist. 

And third, one-size-fits-all screening has outlived its usefulness. 

Over 2.8 billion passengers are screened per year and we cannot 

continue at this pace without using risk-based screening measures. 

IATA strongly supports Secretary Napolitano and Administrator 

Pistole’s calls for risk-based screening. 

So IATA has been working for the last year and a half on developing a more efficient, more effective and relevant passenger 

screening checkpoint, and let me just spend the last few minutes 

remaining discussing the core principles and explain how we propose turning these into a checkpoint. 

The checkpoint of the future concept described here relies on two 

basic concepts. The first is the introduction of risk-based screening, 

using data from travel documents and airline tickets that is already being used by the U.S. Government and other governments 

for customs and immigration purposes. And let me just stop again 

and emphasize, this does not involve profiling of passengers of any 

kind. We are simply proposing that rather than using this data 

only at the end of a journey for purposes of border control and immigration, we should use it at the beginning of the journey for security purposes. 

And the second concept is the use of advanced screening technology to enable a seamless journey through screening lanes without removing items of clothing or unpacking luggage. So, you might 

ask, what does this look like at an airport? Well, for a passenger 

arriving at an airport checkpoint, the passenger will biometrically 

345 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Barclay appears in the Appendix on page 1285. 

identify himself or herself and have a brief encounter with a behavior analyst. The passenger is assigned to a lane based on the results of their electronic pre-screening or random selection. The passenger proceeds through the lane and is screened while in motion. 

Passengers who voluntarily opt into a known traveler program and 

agree to provide additional information about themselves would 

proceed through a known traveler lane. Those about whom little is 

known or those randomly selected would go through an enhanced 

security lane. But let me emphasize, all passengers are screened to 

a baseline, and in this concept, no one—no one—gets a free pass. 

So where are we and what have we done? IATA has developed 

a high-level blueprint and a road map. We are working with likeminded associations, manufacturers, academics, and airlines to refine this concept, and this certainly needs to be a global effort. To 

date, ICAO has endorsed the need for a global effort to study a future checkpoint. Interpol and 12 States have signed statements of 

principle that we are headed in the right direction. 

Now, we certainly expect that in 7 to 10 years, all the necessary 

components for a walk-through screening process will be available, 

but we can repurpose and reintegrate existing technology into an 

intermediate checkpoint. That is possible within the next 2 to 3 

years. And this reworked checkpoint uses existing hardware and 

combines several essential elements of the checkpoint of the future, 

including passenger data already being used by governments, behavior analysis, and the creation of new screening lanes. 

IATA is committed to making air travel safe, secure, and more 

enjoyable, and in summary, we believe the foundation of the checkpoint of the future should be based on the lessons learned since 

9/11 and the next generation checkpoint should use passenger data, 

use behavior detection, screen passengers based on risk, provide for 

an uninterrupted journey from curb to aircraft door, and preserve 

our investment in our existing checkpoints. We will not settle for 

anything less than a revolution in the way our passengers are 

treated at the airports. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Dunlap. That was really fascinating. You have helped us to, no pun intended, look over the horizon here, at least in terms of security at the airports, so I have 

some questions I will ask you when we get to that. 

Finally, Charles Barclay on behalf of the American Association 

of Airport Executives. Thanks very much for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES M. BARCLAY,1 PRESIDENT, 

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES 

Mr. BARCLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and 

Members. It is always a privilege to be here. I am just going to 

take a very brief time and make two general points from our testimony. 

The first is that Airport Executives strongly support risk-based 

security. We congratulate Administrator Pistole and his team for 

bringing that concept forward. It is something that is essential for 

the future, as you have heard. 

346 

We support Pre-Check and encourage its expansion. Airports are 

eager to, as well as airlines, be sponsors of that program in local 

areas. We would ask the Committee to encourage TSA to move as 

quickly as they can from the pilot programs into further deployment of Pre-Check. 

The rationale behind risk-based security, we think, is pretty simple. You have to look for dangerous people, not just dangerous 

things, in the future. We have to identify the vast, vast majority 

of people traveling who are not a threat to the system so we can 

focus our limited resources on the people we do not get to vet in 

advance. And then, finally, the resources and facilities. If we continue the current system of treating everyone the same, they are 

going to be simply overwhelmed by passenger growth. So we have 

to make changes and modernize. 

Risk-based security is not a compromise in our point of view. 

When you think about the philosophy, a dangerous person with 

nothing on them that we vet for, that we screen for, is a danger 

to the system while a person with no bad intent with lots of dangerous things on them is not a threat to the system. So we need 

a future security system that implements that understanding. 

My second general point is that airports are unique partners of 

TSA. They are all branches of local government, local or State creatures. They all have local police powers and they all have branches, 

divisions, or special units that have people with precisely the same 

incentives as the agents of Federal law enforcement. 

My point for emphasizing that is that we have today a division 

of responsibilities. Local governments, airports, and local law enforcement are responsible for things like perimeter security, the 

front line of employee vetting and credentialing, incident response, 

and other areas that we mentioned in our testimony. We strongly 

believe those things should stay with local law enforcement. The 

TSA should not take over those areas because you do have a partnership between Federal law enforcement and local law enforcement. We need both of them to avoid focusing on each other. You 

do not want the good guys spending lots of time and energy watching each other as a regulator and a regulated entity. 

You want them both pointed outwards looking for bad guys, and 

we think that is a key element of having a partnership on security 

between local law enforcement and TSA, as opposed to having the 

agency take over more areas. TSA has its hands full with vetting 

and screening both passengers and cargo, and we want to see them 

do that well. It keeps our commerce moving. It keeps our system 

moving. We look forward in a future system to being partners with 

TSA and hope to carry out that mission as well as we can. Both 

groups will make mistakes. We will both have to learn from those 

mistakes and get better as time goes on. But local law enforcement 

and airports are there to be of assistance, and there is no higher 

priority in their view than the safety of the local citizens they work 

for. 

So thank you and I would be glad to answer any questions I can 

from our testimony. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Barclay. Very interesting testimony. 

347 

All of you, and Administrator Pistole, as well, used the term 

‘‘risk-based security.’’ Does everybody agree that what we are saying is that risk-based tends to focus on looking for dangerous people as opposed to dangerous things, which is the focus of the current system, right? But I presume that none of you would say that 

we should stop looking for dangerous things, is that correct? 

Mr. DOW. Yes. I think, personally, that we have to look for dangerous things, but there are ways to do that. If you take trusted 

travelers and they go through a machine that detects explosives, 

that is fine. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. DOW. But the question is how do you make the system much 

more efficient so you can focus on the dangerous people and the 

dangerous things. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. I mean, this is a real challenge, because let us just go to the point of Administrator Pistole’s testimony that both Senator Collins and I responded to. So you have 

an average of four to five guns found in baggage that people are 

sending through the line to carry on, not check. And I presume 

most of those are not terrorists. They are, for one reason or another, people who wanted to carry the gun on with them, maybe 

because it was their sense of how they protect their own security. 

But, presumably, if you did not have that kind of screening for dangerous things, somebody who was, in fact, a terrorist would be able 

to carry a weapon on. 

So what I am getting at is, and I know it is hard to do everything, and I support moving toward risk-based, which looks for the 

dangerous people, but we are not at a point where we can ignore 

looking for dangerous things, are we? Mr. Dunlap. 

Mr. DUNLAP. Mr. Chairman, I think that the presumption is everybody does, in fact, get screened—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. DUNLAP [continuing]. So those guns will be found. But in the 

new paradigm, some people will get screened more, and that if you 

have the opportunity to do things like enhanced security lanes, you 

can screen a population of people a little bit more thoroughly. 

So if we start with the presumption that there is a baseline, then 

to address your point, those bad objects are going to be found, as 

well, but they will not be the entirety of the focus of the checkpoint 

screening experience, because, again, if you spend your resources 

on looking for toenail clippers and scissors—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. DUNLAP [continuing]. You are not spending enough time 

looking for IED components. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, that is a good approach. In other 

words, the risk-based is in some sense on top of a more efficient 

application of the existing system. I mean, I noticed in the vision 

of the future you have that even the known travelers who have 

been pre-checked, etc., they go through a metal detector in that 

walk-through, that particular tunnel. 

Go back a little bit, because it is intriguing to look at your vision 

of the future here. I know you quoted some numbers, but how close 

are we to that? It looks pretty attractive. I mean, you have three 

348 

1The slide referenced by Mr. Dunlap appears in the Appendix on page 1284. 

lines that people walk through. Presumably, that is it. How close 

are we technologically to that? 

Mr. DUNLAP. So, Senator, if you take a look at the intermediate 

checkpoint that was the last slide depicted—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. DUNLAP [continuing]. We are within 2 to 3 years of that.1

Everything that we need to deploy a more effective security system 

and a more efficient security system using existing equipment is 

there today. So we think within about 2 years, we can have that 

deployed to any airport, and it will use passenger data, which we 

have today, behavior detection, here today, screening passengers 

based on risk, we can do it today. And then if you push the future 

out and you look at the tunnels of technology that we are developing, the one thing that we need is explosives detection that is 

performed while the person is in motion. That is probably 7 to 10 

years on the horizon—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. DUNLAP [continuing]. And we certainly cannot do that today. 

But what we are encouraged is that the manufacturers we are 

working with are telling us that vision is far closer than what we 

realize. So, obviously, technology grows exponentially and we think 

if we have a plan that preserves the current capital investment in 

our checkpoints, rearranges a little bit better, that when the time 

comes for the TSA to make a decision, what will we spend money 

on next, that all the technology and all the pieces for that tunnels 

of technology and checkpoint of the future will be there. So we 

think it is realistic. It is science fact, not science fiction, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Is there a lot of work going on in the private sector to develop these new technologies? This is a very significant global market, so I would think that people would be investing in it. Are they? 

Mr. DUNLAP. Absolutely. We know from our experience with the 

manufacturers that all these advance technologies are currently 

under study. But the problem that we have right now globally is 

that every regulator has different technology standards. So something certified in the United States might not be accepted in the 

European Community. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. DUNLAP. It may not be accepted in Australia. So there is a 

good effort, and I would like to pay a lot of credit to TSA for 

working with like-minded countries to come up with the global 

standards. So if we have global standards of detection, that will accelerate and incentivize the manufacturers to invest in the technologies that we need. And then also, I think, having a common vision, what does the future look like, that can also incentivize dollars to be directed into a more predictable vision and a more compact vision of what we need to have in our airports. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Barclay, let me ask you this question. As you know, TSA’s 

Pre-Check pilot program has led to a separate line for trusted travelers. At this point, the line is managed by either Delta or AmerVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:49 Sep 11, 2012 Jkt 067123 PO 00000 Frm 00364 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\67123.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
349 

ican Airlines. Do you think this format will be successful if it expands to incorporate more passengers and airlines or should TSA 

be looking for another administrative means to expedite the screening of people? 

Mr. BARCLAY. You have totally different facilities in each of the 

450 airports, so airports have been concerned about continuing to 

have the ability to manage queues and lines. If you have been 

through Denver, they have a great big hall and the airport actually 

needs to manage those queues and lines because of the nature of 

the facilities. And that is going to be true at other airports, particularly as passenger levels grow. So we are going to need to have a 

partnership to figure it out as to how do we make a lane available. 

Our members strongly support the idea of Pre-Check. We are going 

to do our best with facilities, but there is going to be queue management and airports are going to have to be central to that. 

Mr. DOW. Mr. Chairman, if I can add one comment—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead, Mr. Dow. 

Mr. DOW [continuing]. I believe that just having an airline frequency program is not enough. Through the registered traveler programs that are out there, the data, the criminal records, all that, 

we can build a much broader base, and that is what we are saying 

must be done. We need to get a lot of travelers, folks like us that 

are trusted and able to get out of the system, because if you have 

a long line, that is what produces the problem. When you are trying to push people through during the peak times, that is when you 

have problems. So if you eliminate that, you have a much better 

chance of finding that needle in the haystack. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good point. Thanks. My time is up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dunlap, I am very intrigued by your proposal for the security 

screening based on risk and I do think that we need to move toward a more risk-based system and TSA is doing that, to Administrator Pistole’s credit. I am, however, somewhat worried about the 

proposal and it is for this reason. If there is anything we know 

about al-Qaeda, it is that its members have demonstrated extraordinary patience over the years. So I am wondering, if we move to 

this system, what would prevent an al-Qaeda operative, perhaps 

someone like the Times Square would-be bomber, who was an 

American citizen, from traveling a lot, registering for the known 

traveler program, passing the background check, which he would 

have from everything we know, and just biding his time. And then, 

if he is only going through a lane that X-rays his carry-on bag and 

has him go through a metal detector, he could be lining his arms 

and legs with PETN, which would not show up. 

And that is my worry. We know the patience. I mean, think of 

the number of years that elapsed between the first attack on the 

World Trade Center and the second. And we know the careful planning. So what is your response to that? 

Mr. DUNLAP. Senator, we are acutely aware of the patience of our 

adversary and that is why we believe that, regardless of the concept, every passenger needs to be screened. They need to be 

screened for explosives. They need to be screened for weapons, as 

well. 

350 

So we establish a fairly high baseline within our concept to make 

sure that no one gets a free pass. Everyone is going to get screened. 

You know, one of the interesting things about the proposal, 

whether you look at the lanes or you look at the tunnels, all of that 

incorporates processes that have been demonstrated to work already. So we have a known traveler lane. We have the Pre-Check 

plan that the TSA is piloting right now, which is an analog. We 

have Global Entry, which is an analog, and you can go through 

SENTRI and NEXUS programs, as well. So there is a demonstrated history that those type of programs work. 

On the other hand, if you take a look at the high-security lane, 

that occurs in every airport in the world right now. In the U.S., you 

may see a glass booth, and within that glass booth, you will have 

a passenger getting swabbed down or have some other extraordinary security measure being taken to them. So our concept, it 

may look a little bit far forward, but that is what happens when 

you try to integrate things that are happening today in one place. 

But certainly, we do not want anybody to get a free pass and we 

do not want anybody to walk through not getting screened. Everybody needs that when they get on an airplane. 

Senator COLLINS. But although the known traveler gets screened, 

assuming I am reading your passport correctly, the baggage is 

screened through the X-ray machine and the passenger goes 

through a metal detector, but there would not be the kind of 

screening that is done with an AIT or an ATR, where you would 

see non-metallic explosives concealed on the body. Is that correct? 

Mr. DUNLAP. Well, if you look at our concept over the next 7 

years, it is to, in fact, develop walk-through explosive screening, 

walk-through imaging, so that can be done without a person having 

to spend 45 seconds of their time with their hands in a position like 

this getting screened and then going through the resolution process. 

If you take a look at what we are proposing in 2 to 3 years, we 

are just talking about taking existing equipment, reordering it, and 

making it a little bit more efficient, because in the end, the efficiencies to be gained are by not having shout-outs in the airport 

checkpoint saying, take this bag, take this passenger and move 

them aside, because that slows down the lane. 

So I think—and I confidently believe in this—is that we can establish a high enough baseline to ensure security, but also to do 

something, and that is to take the level of detection that we have 

right now, whatever that number is that the Committee has, and 

we can raise it even higher because we can direct our screening resources on those people that we know less about, least about, or 

those who appear on watch lists or another type of security list 

that the TSA has. 

Mr. DOW. Senator Collins, if I could add one point—— 

Senator COLLINS. Yes, Mr. Dow. 

Mr. DOW. One of the things that all security people tell us that 

deters this long-range planning is randomness, and when you have 

a randomness in the system, which Administrator Pistole adds, 

that enables us to thwart that in a very big way. So we are exploring, again, being able to go through this and having randomness, 

but when you have the random trusted traveler go through, just 

351 

make sure you are able to get them through that secondary and 

third screening very efficiently. So the randomness is very critical. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Barclay, my last question is for you. Earlier this year, Administrator Pistole decided not to approve an expansion of the 

Screening Partnership Program, which allows private screeners to 

operate at 16 airports. What is your assessment of that decision? 

Mr. BARCLAY. Well, our members support a viable and voluntary 

SPP program, so we would like to see revisiting that decision revisited. Most of the airports are not in the program. It is only 16 out 

of 450. There are a few others interested. But having it out there 

as an option is something that our members support. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. Senator Moran. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MORAN 

Senator MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Dow, you indicated that peak times is when there are problems. I just wanted you to tell me what the problems are. Are we 

talking about that it is more likely that someone who is a security 

risk will make it through security, or are the problems more related to the traveling public? 

Mr. DOW. No, the problem actually is both. One, when you have 

an unpredictable system, you take the efficiency and the productivity of the American workforce away because you have to go 

through DCA an hour and a half in advance. But if you knew it 

would take 15 minutes, you would get there 40 minutes in advance. 

But what happens during the peak time periods is the crowds get 

big, and you can see the urgency among the TSA sciences of how 

do we handle the crowd and move the lines. So if you are a bad 

person, you probably would want to go during one of those peak 

times. So we are saying, let us not have those large lines and create the incentive to try and get people through fast because it just 

does not work. Let us get an efficient system at all hours. 

Senator MORAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Dunlap, are there countries that we need to have concerns 

about the standards when passengers are screened and security 

procedures occur that are traveling around the globe, but particularly to the United States? How uniform are the standards by 

which the travelers are having to comply? 

Mr. DUNLAP. Well, let me start with what I think is a very positive story that needs to be discussed. Globally, the level of security 

across the board has been increased immeasurably because of the 

investments of organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization and their efforts to raise aviation standards. But 

individually, countries have looked at the United States, have 

looked at other regulators, and have increased their own levels. So 

in terms of are we much safer globally than what we were immediately after 9/11? Unequivocally, yes, Senator. 

And what I would say is if there are countries that are of worry, 

the best source of who they are and who their names would be 

would be with the intelligence community, and we trust that the 

men and women of the TSA have identified those countries and 

352 

have put in place procedures to deal with those additional threats 

that they might have. I would not be the intelligence specialist that 

would be able to name those countries. 

Senator MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Dunlap. 

And Mr. Barclay, I want to follow up on Chairman Lieberman’s 

question that he raised with you about American and Delta, and 

I think your answer was, airports would like to have a lot of authority on those decisions, how we manage that program. You all 

have worked out the public-private partnership in regard to airport 

employees and their passage through security. Has that worked 

well, and is that what you were referring to when you were answering Senator Lieberman’s question? 

Mr. BARCLAY. No. They are really separate, but related to the extent that airports are experienced and do know how to do employee 

vetting. They would like to be sponsors of local Pre-Check programs so that Dulles Airport could have a program where in addition to the airline signing up people through frequent flyer programs, the airports could have an opportunity to have passengers 

show up, do the vetting necessary, and help people get enrolled 

who are not part of the frequent flyer programs. So airports have 

experience in how to get that information into TSA and we have 

eager members. After 9/11, you may remember that there was a 

privately-run registered traveler program that was sponsored by 

airports, and over 20 airports signed up for that and enrolled over 

a quarter of a million people. So airports would like to be part of 

Pre-Check. 

The item that you mentioned on the clearinghouse is one that before 9/11, only about 10 percent of employees had to get criminal 

history record checks from the FBI and it was a nightmare. It was 

taking over 50 days to get a background check through the process 

because they were going through OPM. OPM was not set up to deal 

with entities outside of the Federal Government. They were losing 

accounting records. 

Pre-9/11, we had research that the Bankers Association was 

doing criminal history record checks for banking employees. They 

had a clearinghouse to make those checks work smoothly for their 

industry. 

That is what we set up in cooperation with FAA at the time and 

the airports. We have since vetted eight million backgrounds. It 

has not cost the Federal Government a penny, compared to the 

TWIC program, which has cost hundreds of millions and has vetted 

two million backgrounds. We have reduced that 50 days to minutes, which is what is important to an industry that is 24/7, needs 

to get employees vetted and out on the front lines as quickly as 

possible, to do that in a safe fashion. And it has really been a 

model of a public-private partnership that has worked very well. 

The reason that AAAE got involved in that originally was that 

FAA ran security back then and Jane Garvey, who was the Administrator, selected us to do that because it was a co-op model. The 

customers of the clearinghouse are also the owners of the clearinghouse. Airport executives run the clearinghouse, make the decisions about its charges and operations, and they are also the customers on the other end. So that was the reason that we got into 

that program to begin with. 

353 

Senator MORAN. And that program has worked well? 

Mr. BARCLAY. Very well. 

Senator MORAN. And TSA is satisfied? 

Mr. BARCLAY. They are, and they have moved in the last year to 

introduce competition so airports will have a choice of other vendors that can also provide those clearinghouse services, and we 

want to compliment TSA because they have moved on that carefully to make sure you did not undo a program that was working 

while you introduced more competition to it. So aviation workers, 

unlike truckers or port authority workers, who only have one program to go through and it is federally controlled, aviation workers 

are going to continue to have a variety, three options to go through, 

and they are in a program that costs about a third for the employee 

of what it costs a Haz-Mat trucker to get their vet done or a port 

worker to get their vet done. So it is a very efficient system and 

one that we would like to see TSA certainly continue. 

Senator MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Barclay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Moran. 

Senator Landrieu, good morning. Thanks for being here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU 

Senator LANDRIEU. Good morning. Thank you all. I think this is 

a very important hearing and I just wanted to highlight for the 

Committee’s attention five items that are in the Homeland Security 

appropriations bill that will help expedite some of these initiatives. 

We added in the Senate bill, Mr. Chairman, $10 million for TSA 

to begin to implement the trusted traveler program. It is in the 

Senate bill, not, unfortunately, in the House bill. A requirement for 

TSA to improve its response to passenger complaints, along with 

GAO review of existing procedures, is in the Senate bill, not in the 

House bill. Report language directing TSA to improve training to 

address passengers with physical or mental disabilities like autism, 

is not in the House bill but in the Senate bill. Eleven million dollars above the 2011 level to add 175 new Behavior Detection Officers, again, it is in the Senate bill, not the House bill. And there 

is a requirement that the fiscal year 2013 budget request documents resource allocation on the basis of risk, which is very important. 

There may be others, but this is just a short list that I had my 

staff put together because the authorization, which happens in this 

Committee, is extremely important, but if it is not funded, it does 

not get done. And so I want to just thank Mr. Dow and Mr. Dunlap 

particularly for the input that your organizations have given us 

both in this Committee and in our appropriations process. I believe 

that your associations can really help us lead the way to the future, 

where we can have a very secure system but also a system that is 

much less intrusive than the one we have now so we can reduce 

the inconvenience and the frustration that is associated with traveling today. 

And just for the record, Mr. Chairman, a 2010 survey by Consensus Research concluded that American travelers would take two 

to three additional flights each year if the hassles of security 

screening were eliminated. That would translate into an additional 

354 

$85 billion in consumer spending and 900,000 jobs created in the 

United States. 

So this is an area of interest to us all from a variety of perspectives. It is for security and the safety of our Nation to prevent important attacks. But for the State that I represent that is in large 

measure dependent on the traveling public—we are an international destination, and we, like many communities, rely on those 

international travelers to sustain our economy—it is just imperative that we quickly develop the checkpoint of the future. 

So I want to thank you all and I look forward to working with 

you. 

My first question is on checked baggage, because I intend, Mr. 

Chairman and Ranking Member Collins, to file a bill to require the 

airlines, for every ticket purchased to allow one checked bag for 

free. If the airlines want to write it into their ticket costs, that is 

fine. But this is pushing so many bags into, as you all testified, 

carry-on luggage. 

I understand that the cost, and if my staff will find this document, when Secretary Napolitano testified before our Committee, 

she testified that their internal study indicated that it cost TSA 

about $260 million more because of the baggage, Mr. Chairman, 

not being checked and being carried on. Is that your understanding? Do you have independent data? I will start with you, Mr. 

Dunlap and Mr. Dow. 

Mr. DUNLAP. Well, Senator, that is certainly a very interesting 

question. What we do is we look at global trends. If you take a look 

globally at what is happening to checkpoints, the fact that they are 

slowing down, the fact that you are getting passengers more inconvenienced, that is happening regardless of whether or not the local 

business model there includes some sort of a la carte pricing, which 

is always being blamed for driving more bags into the checkpoints. 

If you take a look at what is happening over time, IATA as far 

back as August 2005 sounded the alarm that our checkpoints were 

slowing down. So as you recall, in 2005, a la carte pricing or any 

kind of other pricing models that were discussed, they really did 

not exist in any major business models at all. 

And then I think the last thing that you need to consider is what 

has been happening at security checkpoints over the last several 

years. Shoes have been coming off. Computers have been coming 

out. Liquids are being set aside. And now you have the body scanners where passengers have to take absolutely everything out of 

their pockets. 

So I think, in all deference to the DHS report, I think that there 

are many other factors that are responsible for what is happening 

at the checkpoints rather than whatever or not the passenger puts 

the bag in the cabin or puts the bag into the belly of the aircraft. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Dow. 

Mr. DOW. Yes, Senator. You made two very important points. 

One was on the checked bags. Our research says that if people 

knew they could check a bag, if it was included in the price of their 

ticket, two-thirds would do so, and your point is right. You cannot 

dictate pricing to an airline, but we certainly can dictate that they 

should include that in the price of an airline ticket and it would 

help. 

355 

The second point you made, I thought was outstanding, is on customer service. TSA has to measure not only security, but customer 

satisfaction and efficiency, not on an average but at peak times, 

and have those measurements so we can look at them and know 

that we are satisfying the customers while improving security. So 

we agree. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And Mr. Chairman, I really am very focused 

on this issue because I think it is increasing the public’s anxiety 

and dissatisfaction with government generally. But Mr. Chairman, 

and I know it is not the purview of this Committee but rather the 

Commerce Committee, but if we do not do something, the airlines 

are going to sell a ticket to a flyer and you are not going to get 

a seat, you are going to stand on the airplane and then have to pay 

extra for the cushion, and I have about had it, OK? You do not get 

anything to eat. You get virtually nothing to drink. At least they 

give you water and a Coke or a 7-Up. Everything else costs. 

So I think the American people deserve, when they purchase a 

ticket from an airline, they get one bag that they can check and 

a carry-on item in that ticket price and they absolutely get a seat 

and a glass of water. I mean, that should be the minimum Federal 

requirement, and I am going to push very hard to see that it gets 

done. 

But in addition, let me just ask one final question to the airlines. 

Mr. Barclay, I flew in from Israel last week and got to the Newark 

Airport and was unable to use my cell phone from the time I exited 

the plane until I got, I guess, outside the building. Is that a rule 

of each individual airport or is that a TSA rule or where did that 

rule come from and are you aware of it? 

Mr. BARCLAY. I will check on that and get back to you with the 

folks at Newark Airport. I presume it was just a cell usage problem 

that they—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. No, absolutely not. It was a restriction. 

Mr. BARCLAY. Oh, you were told you could not—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. No one could use a cell phone from the time 

they got off the plane until they got their luggage through Customs 

and then out into the daylight, which, to me, when you are trying 

to manage business travel, the first thing people want to do when 

they have been traveling 13 hours on an international flight is 

check in with the office, see what they missed, etc. I wish, Mr. Dow 

and Mr. Dunlap, you would look at this. I do not know what the 

security requirement is for not being able to use cell phones. And, 

by the way, Mr. Chairman, we waited an hour and 10 minutes for 

our luggage after a 13-hour flight. And so the airports are going to 

be hearing from me about this baggage handling issue, as well, because it is very disappointing. 

So as much as we can make the travel experience safe and convenient, it has to do with both the way people board their flight 

and the way they de-plane, and the exit portion is getting worse, 

just as the entrance portion is, so we have a long way to go. 

I know I have exceeded my time. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARCLAY. Senator, if I could just briefly, I am told that is a 

CBP rule that you are not allowed to use cell phones in the arrival 

area. So you could go back to them on that. 

356 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will take that up. I was going to tell 

you that if we are on the same flight together, I will give you my 

seat. I will not make you stand. 

Mr. BARCLAY. You are going to stand? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. [Laughter.] 

Senator LANDRIEU. You can stand up and hold on to the lavatory—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, and the cushion. 

Mr. DOW. Senator Landrieu, I want to also thank you and the 

Appropriations Committee for what you are doing to help improve 

the visa process, because it starts when people start planning to 

come here, and the work you are putting forward there is going to 

make a huge difference in our economy. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Landrieu. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. To our witnesses, thanks so much for joining us 

today. 

Senators Lieberman, Collins, Brown, and myself have a press 

conference in about 5 minutes on the U.S. Postal Service, so I am 

going to be very brief. In fact, I am going to pose a couple of questions and ask you to respond to them for the record. 

The first question, Mr. Dunlap, is for you. I was intrigued by 

your discussion and images of the checkpoint of the future. The 

concept seems simple enough, and that is risk-based screening 

driven by information that we already collect from passengers, the 

use of advance screening technology, and separate lanes for different types of passengers. This kind of checkpoint, I think, could 

save travelers countless hours and ultimately increase the travel 

industry and our local economies. 

Given the financial challenges that we face as a Nation, what 

would the checkpoint of the future likely cost taxpayers and are 

there programs and technologies in place right now that can be 

seamlessly integrated into your vision? That is a question for the 

record. 

And maybe one more question for the record. This would be for 

all of our witnesses. In your testimonies, you discussed how the 

current one-size-fits-all screening process at America’s airports 

does not meet the needs of our traveling public, and I think you 

also noted that we need to move to a system that detects dangerous 

people instead of dangerous things. And as you know, this Committee has continually challenged government officials to work 

smarter with Federal dollars and to find efficiencies in our government programs without compromising security. Our credo is how to 

get better results for either less money or the same amount of 

money without sacrificing security. 

To this end, I understand that TSA has delivered a pilot to help 

expedite the flow of trusted travelers—you have had some discussion of that here today—but there is still much room for growth 

and improvement. Could you all discuss on the record for me the 

challenges that TSA faces as it looks to expand that pilot and how 

industry can help find solutions to these issues? 

357 

And I will have one more question, and I am not going to mention it today, but will submit another question or two for the 

record, as well, and if you could respond to those promptly, I would 

be most grateful. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Carper, I appreciate that very 

much. 

I thank Mr. Dow, Mr. Dunlap, and Mr. Barclay. Your testimony 

has been very helpful. 

We have come a long way. I mean, we are in a new age, and it 

is no fun, but as we have all said, the enemy is out there. The 

enemy is persistent and they continue to be attracted to air travel 

as a way to attack us and hurt us. We are trying very hard to protect the American people when they travel because the worst thing 

of all for airline business would be obviously if people felt unsafe. 

But I think, increasingly, under Administrator Pistole, we are 

both trying to leverage new technologies but also move into, on top 

of the basics, a more risk-based approach, and that is exactly what 

I think all three of you are asking. 

Your statements are in the record in full. We are going to keep 

the record of this hearing open for another 15 days for any additional questions or statements on either side of the bench here. 

But I thank you very much for what you do every day and for 

the thought and effort that you put into your testimony this morning. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(359) 

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1003 


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1016 


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1021 


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1022 


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1023 


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1024 


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1027 


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1028 


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1038 


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1080 


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1081 


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1085 


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1091 


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1093 


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1094 


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1095 


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1096 


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1097 


67123.731
1098 


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1099 


67123.733
1100 


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1101 


67123.735
1102 


67123.736
1103 


67123.737
1104 


67123.738
1105 


67123.739
1106 


67123.740
1107 


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1108 


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1109 


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1110 


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1111 


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1112 


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1113 


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1114 


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1115 


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1116 


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1117 


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1119 


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1120 


67123.764
1121 


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1122 


67123.766
1123 


67123.767
1124 


67123.768
1125 


67123.769
1126 


67123.770
1127 


67123.771
1128 


67123.772
1129 


67123.773
1130 


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1131 


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1132 


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1133 


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1134 


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1135 


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1136 


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1140 


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1152 


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1154 


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1155 


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1172 


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1177 


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1191 


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1192 


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1193 


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1194 


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1195 


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1196 


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1197 


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1198 


67123.832
1199 


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1200 


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1201 


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1202 


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1203 


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1204 


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1205 


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1206 


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1220 


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1221 


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1222 


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1224 


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1225 


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1226 


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1227 


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1228 


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1229 


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1231 


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1232 


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1233 


67123.867
1234 


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1235 


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1236 


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1237 


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1239 


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1240 


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1241 


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1273 


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1299 


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1301 


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1302 


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1340 


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1342 


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1344 


67123.978
1345 


67123.979
1346 

Æ 


67123.980