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UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN: 

CURRENT ISSUES IN RECONSTRUCTION 

(PART II) 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 a.m., Room 2172, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of 

the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

I have convened the Committee on International Relations for a 

hearing on United States Policy in Afghanistan: Current Issues in 

Reconstruction. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to receive testimony from the 

Administration about the coordination and implementation of 

United States policy in Afghanistan. This past June, at the initial 

hearing on this topic, the Committee heard testimony about the 

concerns from former policymakers, academicians and the NGO 

community regarding the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. 

At that hearing, the overriding issues presented to the Members 

of this Committee were the increasing lack of security in the region 

and the inability of the central government to implement fully its 

rule throughout Afghanistan. A number of witnesses voiced concerns about what appears to be a lack of coordination among the 

United States agencies operating in Afghanistan, and the ramifications this has had on the reconstruction of the country. Undoubtedly, Afghanistan is doing far better now than it was under the 

misrule of the Taliban. However, violence is increasing and has 

been hard to quell with deadly clashes in northern Afghanistan last 

week in which dozens of people were killed, including innocent civilians. In addition, the south and southeast of Afghanistan continue to be a stronghold for resurgent Taliban forces. 

Serious questions need to be addressed and answered: Should we 

be comfortable with a military victory? How can we assist in building a nation that is viable, independent and capable of running its 

own affairs and securing its own borders? 

The fact remains that a stable Afghanistan will require cooperation and a strong effort by the Afghans and a unified United States 

policy. In the end, the responsibility lies with the Afghan people to 

ensure that security, rule of law and, most of all, stability take root 

in their nation. 
154

Through the passage of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 

2002, Congress sought to establish the foundation for the United 

States to assist the Afghans in achieving this goal. However, security challenges have made it difficult to deliver an efficient and effective reconstruction process. 

For example, this past month, four Afghan employees who 

worked for an international aid organization, the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, had just completed installing 

water pumps in the south when they were captured and murdered 

in cold blood. The organization these employees work for had been 

operating in Afghanistan for 18 years and was perceived by the Afghan people as neutral. The forces working against freedom and 

progress in Afghanistan have now turned against those who have 

been assisting Afghans for generations. 

If the efforts toward a secure environment which will permit the 

installation of a basic infrastructure are not successful, one must 

ask how it is possible to ensure free and fair elections in less than 

1 year’s time. According to the United Nation’s assistance mission 

in Afghanistan, the registration process for elections will begin this 

December. 

We expect that our policies will be supportive of this laudable 

goal and that security challenges will be overcome so the Loya 

Jirga process can proceed and the authority of the central government will be strengthened in order to allow free and fair elections 

to take place. 

As Peter Thomsen, the former special envoy to Afghanistan, stated in our previous hearing:

‘‘Continuing implementation of the Bonn process will thus 

mainly depend on enhanced security accompanied by the successful extension of the Kabul government’s authority into Afghanistan’s region.’’

I welcome NATO’s commitment in principle to expand the International Security Assistance Force. The adoption of United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 1510, which widens the mandate of the 

International Security Assistance Force outside of Kabul is a positive step. 

Today, we will be hearing from Administration about the operations of executive agencies working in Afghanistan and what they 

are doing to ensure that their programs are consistent with the 

provisions in the Afghan Freedom Support Act of 2002. 

We have a distinguished panel representing the Administration 

today, and I warmly welcome you to the Committee. I look forward 

to hearing from you about these important issues of concern and 

the recently announced Accelerating Success initiative in Afghanistan. We hope that this supplemental funding of over $1 billion will 

support the Afghan government in meeting the benchmarks in the 

Bonn process by giving it the assistance Afghans need to determine 

freely their own political future. 

I now recognize with pleasure the Ranking Democratic Member, 

Mr. Tom Lantos, so he may make his opening statement. 

Mr. Lantos. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]
155

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTER- NATIONAL RELATIONS

The Committee will come to order. I have convened the Committee on International Relations for a hearing on United States Policy in Afghanistan: Current 

Issues in Reconstruction. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to receive testimony from the Administration 

about the coordination and implementation of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. This past 

June, at the initial hearing on this topic, the Committee heard testimony about the 

concerns from former policy-makers, academicians, and the NGO community regarding the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. 

At that hearing, the overriding issues presented to the Members of this Committee were the increasing lack of security in the region and the inability of the central government to implement fully its rule throughout Afghanistan. A number of 

witnesses voiced concerns about what appears to be a lack of coordination among 

United States agencies operating in Afghanistan, and the ramifications this has had 

on the reconstruction of the country. 

Undoubtedly, Afghanistan is doing far better now than it was under the misrule 

of the Taliban. However, violence is increasing and has been hard to quell with 

deadly clashes in northern Afghanistan last week in which dozens of people were 

killed, including innocent civilians. In addition, the south and southeast of Afghanistan continue to be a stronghold for resurgent Taliban forces. 

Serious questions need to be addressed and answered. Should we be comfortable 

with a military victory? How can we assist in building a nation that is viable, independent, and capable of running its own affairs and securing its own borders? 

The fact remains that a stable Afghanistan will require cooperation and a strong 

effort by the Afghans and a unified United States policy. In the end, the responsibility lies with the Afghan people to ensure that security, rule of law and, most of 

all, stability take root in their nation. 

Through the passage of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, Congress 

sought to establish the foundation for the United States to assist the Afghans in 

achieving this goal. However, security challenges have made it difficult to deliver 

an efficient and effective reconstruction process. 

For example, this past month, four Afghan employees who worked for an international aid organization, the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, had 

just completed installing water pumps in the south when they were captured and 

murdered in cold blood. The organization these employees worked for had been operating in Afghanistan for eighteen years and was perceived by the Afghan people as 

neutral. 

The forces working against freedom and progress in Afghanistan have now turned 

against those who have been assisting Afghans for generations. 

If the efforts toward a secure environment which will permit the installation of 

a basic infrastructure are not successful, then one must ask how it is possible to 

ensure free and fair elections in less than one year’s time. According to the United 

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the registration process for elections 

will begin this December. 

We expect that our policies will be supportive of this laudable goal, and that security challenges will be over-come so the Loya Jirga process can proceed and the authority of the central government will be strengthened in order to allow free and 

fair elections to take place. 

As Peter Tomsen, the former Special Envoy to Afghanistan, stated in our previous 

hearing, ‘‘Continuing implementation of the Bonn process will thus mainly depend 

on enhanced security accompanied by the successful extension of the Kabul government’s authority into Afghanistan’s region.’’

I welcome NATO’s commitment in principle to expand the International Security 

Assistance Force. The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510, 

which widens the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force outside 

of Kabul, is a positive step. 

Today, we will be hearing from the Administration about the operations of executive agencies working in Afghanistan and what they are doing to ensure that their 

programs are consistent with the provisions in the Afghanistan Freedom Support 

Act of 2002. 

We have a distinguished panel representing the Administration today, and I 

warmly welcome you to the Committee. I look forward to hearing from you about 

these important issues of concern and the recently announced Accelerating Success 

initiative in Afghanistan. We hope that this supplemental funding of over $1 billion 

will support the Afghan government in meeting the benchmarks in the Bonn process 
156

by giving it the assistance Afghans need to determine freely their own political future. 

I will now recognize my colleague, Ranking Democratic Member Tom Lantos, so 

that he may make his opening statement. 

Without objection, any Member may place his or her opening statement in the 

record of today’s proceedings. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

commend you for holding this hearing. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States-led military campaign in Afghanistan liberated the Afghan people from the horrific despotism 

of the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden. For the first time in over 2 

decades Afghanistan has a chance of becoming eventually a democratic state responsive to the needs of all of its people. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the United States-led effort to 

transform Afghanistan is in serious jeopardy. United States and 

international assistance to Afghanistan has been and continues to 

be insufficient to meet Afghanistan’s needs. Financial pledges and 

delivery of long-term aid by international donors are woefully inadequate. There are serious doubts that the current draft constitution 

will have adequate public support and will promote democracy, 

gender equality and protection of basic human rights. National 

elections in June will require a massive effort to register and educate voters and to ensure a free and fair electoral process, but that 

process has barely begun. The creation of an Afghan Army is seriously behind schedule. Police training lags, and the process of disarming the warlords’ militias is only just beginning. 

There are simply not enough United States and International 

forces in Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, to secure the country and lay 

an effective foundation upon which democratic institutions could be 

built. The United States-led Coalition and Afghan militia forces 

have been fighting with Taliban guerillas in southeastern Afghanistan for many months, killing scores but missing many more who 

scurry back into Pakistan to regroup and to attack again somewhere else. 

But there are some faint signs of hope. Just this week, consistent 

with the direction in the Afghan Freedom Support Act and an 

amendment passed by the House earlier this year, the United Nations Security Council authorized the expansion of the 4,500 member International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, beyond the capital of Kabul. Parenthetically I might indicate, Mr. Chairman, that 

you and I have been calling for this for many, many months. 

Thanks principally to German efforts, the International Security 

Assistance Force will be increased slightly and permit a limited deployment outside of Kabul. This is a start, but it is nowhere nearly 

enough. 

I am also gratified that Administration has finally recognized 

what this Committee has been saying for over a year, that a more 

robust approach to Afghanistan is required. 

The additional funds in the supplemental for fiscal year 2004 is 

a good step, but a single step will certainly not complete this long 

journey. We must recognize that Afghanistan’s security cannot wait 

for the evolution of a national army and police force. This is why 

you, Mr. Chairman, and I included a provision in the House-passed 

foreign relations authorization bill requiring the President to provide more security for reconstruction, to protect the highways, to 
157

terminate and deter acts of banditry, illegal checkpoints, human 

rights abuses and all pervasive intimidation, particularly intimidation of women, to take immediate steps to support the disarmament of Afghan militias and irregulars. 

NATO members in particular must do more. NATO at least must 

double the International Security Assistance Force. It must increase its mobility and expand its mandate to provide greater security along major highways. Today I am calling on the President to 

take steps to secure greater commitments from our NATO allies to 

contribute troops to Afghanistan. 

Let me suggest again, as I have earlier, that just as we have 

been calling for NATO to assume a significant role in Afghanistan, 

soon we will be calling on NATO to assume a significant role in 

Iraq. Coalition forces cannot continue to permit drug lords and traffickers to operate freely. The hundreds of millions of dollars of drug 

money is creating an infrastructure of corruption and crime which 

will undermine all of our efforts at security and political reform. 

These huge drug profits are funding the Taliban and al-Qaeda attacks on United States and Afghan forces and officials, and they 

are providing the warlords ever larger resources to establish themselves beyond the reach of any central government or system of 

law. 

Mr. Chairman, I also call upon the President to direct our forces 

to seek out and destroy the drug trade and labs in Afghanistan. 

The drug lords and their supporters must know that the United 

States will come after them with force. We and the Kabul government must find more effective means to persuade poor farmers not 

to grow opium. If we do not stop the explosive growth of the drug 

trade in Afghanistan, then that country will again become a 

narcoterrorist state, and we will have failed in our mission. 

Mr. Chairman, in Afghanistan, as in Iraq, we must do what is 

necessary to bring true freedom and security to this long-suffering 

nation. Our credibility and our security as a nation depends on 

that. We do not have the luxury of failure. 

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

It is the custom and the preference of the Chair to invite opening 

statements from any other Members to be made a part of the 

record at this point, but I am told that some Members have a compelling need to, for some reason, to deliver an opening statement; 

and we will accommodate them, being assured——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am one of them, as you, who felt compelled to 

make a statement. 

Chairman HYDE. I was advised of that some time ago, so we are 

ready for you, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Just wanted to make you aware, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman will be recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am pleased that the Committee is turning its 

attention this morning to Afghanistan because I believe that the 

Administration’s attention to that war-ravaged nation has wandered. 
158

For over a year now, Mr. Lantos and I and, quite frankly, many 

others on this Committee have been talking about the need to provide a secure environment in Afghanistan as a precondition to the 

success of anything else we, the international community or Afghans themselves try to do. At first we were told by the Bush Administration that the security situation in Afghanistan had stabilized and that ISAF in Kabul was sufficient. Then, even though 

it was painfully obvious that the security situation had not stabilized, the Administration continued resisting the expansion of 

ISAF beyond Kabul but suggested that if other nations wanted to 

expand ISAF the United States would not object, knowing full well 

that without American leadership ISAF would not expand. 

Instead of that, the Administration proposed Provincial Reconstruction Teams, a novel concept that has yet to prove itself. But 

even this step has been limited in its reach. PRTs operate only in 

four provinces, although there are plans to expand them. 

Finally, NATO assumed command of ISAF, and the calls by the 

Afghan government officials have been heeded. 

Earlier this week, the United Nations Security Council approved 

the expansion of ISAF’s mission outside of Kabul, not a moment too 

soon either. Violence against Afghans, against aid workers and 

against us has been increasing as the Taliban regroup and with the 

help from supporters in Pakistan continue to fight from across the 

Afghan-Pakistan border. 

In order for us to prosecute the ongoing war against the Taliban, 

we continue to rely on local Afghan militias. While this may be a 

necessity in the near term, it undermines our longer term goal of 

consolidating the central government and makes it more difficult to 

put in place the next important piece of the security puzzle disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia fighters. 

The process has only just begun. The United Nations and the Afghan government signed an agreement on DDR only last week. In 

the supplemental that the House is debating today, there are $60 

million for DDR efforts. But if we don’t accelerate this process the 

environment necessary to conduct anything that even looks like 

free and fair elections in Afghanistan will not exist. 

As Human Rights Watch pointed out in its report last summer, 

political intimidation by locally armed groups is commonplace. But 

the crucial question about our DDR efforts is, when a local warlord 

refuses to give up his guns, who forces him to do so? Are we relying 

on the nascent Afghan national army, or will the United States 

military be the ultimate force behind DDR? It is against that backdrop that Afghans face some of their most important political challenges. 

The Bonn Agreement calls for a constitutional Loya Jirga this 

year, followed by elections next year. Well, the constitutional Loya 

Jirga has been postponed until December; and there is talk about 

postponing the elections until next fall and perhaps even limiting 

them to presidential elections only. While we should only proceed 

with these things when the Afghans are ready, we should also recognize that delay serves the purpose of those who would thwart the 

process entirely. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this important hearing, together with the leadership of Mr. Lantos; and I look forward to 
159

hearing from our witnesses today and hope they can address the 

issues that we have raised. I do thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

Are there any more opening statements to be delivered? Very 

well. 

Our first witness, Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., is the Afghanistan Coordinator in the U.S. Department of State. For 9 

months he served as the Special Representative for Donor Assistance to Afghanistan. Ambassador Taylor previously served as Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia in the U.S. Department of State, and he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1969. 

Peter W. Rodman is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He is a principal advisor to the Secretary 

of Defense on the formulation and coordination of international security strategy and policy. Mr. Rodman was most recently Director 

of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center between 1995 

and 2001, and he is an alumnus of Harvard Law School. 

James Kunder is the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Asia and the Near East at the United States Agency for 

International Development. He was previously Director for Relief 

and Reconstruction in Kabul, Afghanistan; and he, too, received his 

degree from Harvard University. 

We are pleased to have you three appear before the Committee 

today. We will hear first from Ambassador Taylor, then Assistant 

Secretary Rodman and, finally, Deputy Administrator Kunder. 

Ambassador Taylor, would you proceed with a 5-minute summary of your statement, and the full statement will be made a part 

of the record. Ambassador Taylor. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, JR., 

COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be 

here. We appreciate the opportunity. 

Chairman HYDE. Would you help with the microphone? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I have a green light that indicates that it is working. Is it working? Very good. Is that better? 

Chairman HYDE. Not really. You must have a dead mike. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I will try this one. This sounds better. 

Chairman HYDE. That is better. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here. 

This is an opportunity, as you say, to focus attention on Afghanistan that may not have been there for some time, and this is a 

good opportunity to resume that discussion and to give you a sense 

of where we are and where we intend to be over the next several 

months. 

Afghanistan remains a desperately poor country. It has tattered 

infrastructure, as you know. The security environment in the south 

and the east in particular is deteriorating. 

There is an unacceptable level of poppy cultivation that we have 

talked about, and the central government has difficulty in making 
160

itself felt all across the country. There are areas where it is clearly 

in charge, but there are areas where it is clearly not. 

Increased violence against international security and development personnel, against innocent Afghans is also cause for concern. 

The security situation all along the border with Pakistan has clearly worsened recently. It is particularly worrisome that the Taliban 

units appear larger and better organized. 

Deterioration has led some humanitarian organizations to curtail 

aid programs, jeopardizing development goals in these affected 

areas. The central government continues to have difficulty extending its authority and providing services due to financial and other 

constraints. 

Too many regions remain under the sway of local strongmen that 

we have talked about here already today, supported by private armies that only have—sometimes have limited loyalty to the central 

government. These men terrorize local Afghans, extort money from 

businesses, steal from the government and fight one another. The 

fighting in Mazar-e-Sharif last week is only the most recent example. 

Poppy production and narcotics trafficking have continued within 

Afghanistan since Operation Enduring Freedom began in late 2001. 

We estimate that some 30,000 hectares were under cultivation last 

year, and the crop this year will very likely be even larger. 

Mr. Chairman, that is the sobering story. But there is a more 

hopeful story also coming out of Afghanistan. 

Women are more free to work and go to school. Gradually, as 

they appear in public, women are replacing their burqas with 

scarves. A variety of media and press outlets have emerged, representing a range of political and social viewpoints. Numerous 

radio stations are up and running. 

Politically, Afghanistan is now governed by a legitimate leader 

selected by Afghans themselves in a peaceful representative process. That in itself is unprecedented in Afghan history. 

The Karzai government is finalizing a draft constitution that 

should be released to the public within days and adopted by a constitutional Loya Jirga late this year, as several people have mentioned already. By most accounts, the constitution will protect 

human rights, will establish its separation of powers and institutionalize democracy. The elections are planned for next summer. 

President Karzai has taken strong steps recently to extend his 

government’s reach across the country. He has replaced seven governors, including the powerful governor of Kandajar. He stripped 

military command from the governor of Herat. He has demanded 

that governors remit customs and other revenues that they collect 

to the central government, and he sent his finance minister to each 

of the major provinces to enforce this demand. President Karzai 

has recently reformed the Ministry of Defense. 

Meanwhile, the Coalition is deploying small military teams 

around the country to enhance security, extend the reach of the 

central government and help with reconstruction. These Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams, established in Gardez, Bamiyan, Kunduz, 

and Mazar-e-Sharif have been well received by the local population 

and have begun to prove themselves to the skeptical NGO community. The United Kingdom and New Zealand are leading two of the 
161

PRTs, and the Germans are preparing to take over a PRT in 

Kunduz. The United States is preparing to dispatch similar teams 

to other areas, including Kandajar, Jalalabad, Parwan, Herat and 

Ghazni in the next 21⁄2 months. The British PRT in Mazar played 

an important role in calming the tensions between two competing 

commanders in that region last week. 

In August, NATO took over the International Security Assistance 

Force in Kabul. NATO has given its preliminary approval for an 

expansion of the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul, and the U.N. Security Council, as several people have already mentioned, has just approved the resolution allowing the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul 

to the provinces of Afghanistan. 

Led by the United States, the international community is training and equipping the new Afghan National Army. By next summer, Mr. Chairman, this effort will give President Karzai the single 

largest, best-trained military formation in that country. 

Later this month, a pilot disarmament program will start in 

Kunduz, to be followed shortly by similar efforts in Gardez, Mazare-Sharif and Kabul. 

On the economic front, the major cities of Afghanistan are experiencing new growth. The shops are full of goods, and the streets are 

bustling. Legal economic growth last year was 30 percent. It is estimated to be 20 percent this year. 

Afghanistan is expected to have the best harvest in 25 years, 

with more stable northern areas producing a significant surplus. 

Let me take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to point out the 

good work that USAID is performing in country—and my colleague 

Jim Kunder will describe this in more detail—but in particular the 

construction of the road from Kabul to Kandajar. By the end of December, Afghans will be able to drive from their capital to the second largest city in 5 hours, a trip that just last spring took 15 

hours. The political and psychological benefits of this achievement 

should not be overlooked. Not only does this road connect the predominantly Pashtun Kandajar to the capital, it runs through the 

volatile Pashtun belt of the country, demonstrating that reconstruction and economic development is not just for the north. 

The act of war, Mr. Chairman, that took place on our soil 2 years 

ago that took us back to Afghanistan reminds us of another important measure of success. Afghanistan no longer harbors terrorists 

that threaten the United States or the world. 

Those are the two stories of Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, one sobering, the other is optimistic, and both are true. 

Failure is not an option, as Mr. Lantos has indicated, but, unfortunately, it is still possible. That is why the President announced 

a new initiative to accelerate progress in Afghanistan. My full 

statement has many of the details. Let me give you the highlights. 

It consists of new funds, new people and new focus. 

As part of the supplemental appropriation that you are debating 

right now, the President is asking for $799 million in additional 

funding for the accelerating success in Afghanistan. Together with 

the $390 million that is being reprogrammed from existing DOD 

and State Department sources, almost $1.2 billion will be committed between now and next June. Almost half of this package 

will be devoted to security: Accelerating the training and deploying 
162

of the Afghan National Army, building a new police force, encouraging disarmament and demobilization of militias and protecting 

Afghanistan’s leaders. About 30 percent of the package will be for 

reconstruction assistance, including roads, schools, health facilities, 

small projects and initiatives to provide the framework for private 

sector growth. A third element of this package, accounting for 

about 20 percent of the total, will be for funding democracy and 

governance programs, including support for the constitutional Loya 

Jirga and the elections for next summer. 

In addition to new funds, Mr. Chairman, the President is sending 

new people to Kabul. The Embassy will be strengthened by a group 

of senior advisors to the Ambassador who will help accelerate the 

reconstruction efforts. The Embassy staff and security detail will be 

increased. USAID is sending new people to manage its programs. 

All of these new people will require additional space, as anyone 

has who visited Kabul recently can attest. The government of Afghanistan is allowing us to build a temporary facility right across 

the street from the existing compound to house these new people. 

Finally, new focus. To enhance the unity of effort that you have 

called for both in your statements and in legislation in Afghanistan, the military headquarters previously located an hour north of 

Kabul is moving to Kabul so the military and civilian authorities 

can be colocated. The Combined Forces Commander’s office will be 

right down the hall from the Ambassadors. 

Mr. Chairman, there is no question that the challenges are 

daunting and much remains to be done. But it is equally true that 

we have much to build on, and we have the Afghan people on our 

side and on the side of their many friends in the international community. 

After Mr. Rodman and Mr. Kunder speak, Mr. Chairman, I will 

be glad to answer your questions; and, again, I am glad to be here. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, JR., COORDINATOR

FOR AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today before the Committee. I welcome this chance to review where we are in Afghanistan and where we 

are going. 

There are, in fact, two stories to be told about Afghanistan: one is sobering, the 

other hopeful. Let me begin with the sobering one. 

AFGHANISTAN: HALF-EMPTY

By late 2001, when U.S. forces helped drive Al Qaeda and the Taliban from 

power, Afghanistan had suffered more than two decades of devastating conflict. Its 

physical infrastructure was destroyed and its human and social infrastructure lay 

in ruins. An estimated twenty percent of the population lived as refugees in Pakistan and Iran. About 200,000 Afghans had been disabled by mines. National roads, 

some built by the United States in the 1950s, were barely usable. Irrigation systems, ravaged by conflict and lack of maintenance, and agricultural production, once 

the foundation of the economy, had collapsed. Livestock herds had been depleted 

and legitimate industries had ceased functioning, replaced by an economy based on 

narcotics and terror. 

The Taliban government had essentially stopped providing health care, education 

and other services to the Afghan people, leading to a dramatic decline in social indicators, particularly affecting women and girls. The enrollment rate in primary education had dropped to only 38 percent for boys and barely 3 percent for girls. Infant 

mortality was estimated to be among the highest in the world, with malnutrition 
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affecting over 50 percent of children under the age of five. Average life expectancy 

was a little over 40 years. The IMF estimated that Afghanistan’s per capita income 

was between $150 and $180, among the lowest in the world. 

That was the country inherited by President Karzai and his team following the 

Bonn Conference almost two years ago. 

Mr. Chairman, I wish I could report this morning that a night-to-day change has 

taken place. But in fact many of the problems persist. I will be frank. Afghanistan 

remains a desperately poor country, with tattered infrastructure, a deteriorating security environment in the south and east, an unacceptable level of poppy cultivation 

and a central government whose authority is resisted in the some of the provinces. 

Increased violence against international security and development personnel and 

against innocent Afghans is also a cause for real concern. The security situation all 

along the border with Pakistan has clearly worsened recently. It is particularly worrisome that Taliban units appear larger and better organized. The deterioration has 

led some humanitarian organizations to curtail important aid programs, jeopardizing key development goals in affected areas. 

The central government continues to have difficulty extending its authority and 

providing services due to financial and other constraints. Too many regions remain 

under the sway of local strongmen supported by private armies that have sometimes 

only limited loyalty to the central government; these men terrorize the local Afghans, extort money from businesses, steal from the government and fight one another. The fighting in Mazar-e Sharif last week is only the most recent example. 

Poppy production and narcotics trafficking have continued within Afghanistan 

since Operation Enduring Freedom began in late 2001. We estimate that some 

30,000 hectares were under cultivation last year and that the crop this year may 

be even larger. 

That is the sobering, genuinely worrying story about Afghanistan. 

AFGHANISTAN: HALF-FULL

But there is another, more hopeful story: a story of a country that has taken significant strides forward in less than two years. 

Women are more free to work and to go to school. Increasingly, as they appear 

in public, women are replacing their burqas with scarves. A variety of media and 

press outlets have emerged, representing a range of political and social viewpoints. 

Numerous radio stations are up and running. 

Politically, Afghanistan is now governed by a legitimate leader, selected by Afghans themselves in a peaceful, representative process. That in itself is unprecedented in Afghan history. 

Since the inauguration of his government 16 months ago, President Karzai and 

his government have been actively implementing the Bonn Agreement. They have 

established judicial and human rights commissions to try to protect the rights of minorities and women. They have established a Constitutional Commission that is now 

finalizing a draft Constitution that should be released to the public within days and 

adopted by a Constitutional Loya Jirga later this year. By most accounts the constitution will protect human rights, establish a separation of powers and institutionalize democracy. 

The Afghan Government is steadily strengthening the institutional capacity of its 

ministries. It has put a systematic budget process in place and overseen the 

issuance of a new currency one year ago. 

The Government has also established an electoral commission that is now working with the UN and international donors to prepare for nation-wide elections next 

summer. 

President Karzai has taken strong steps recently to extend his government’s reach 

across the country. He has replaced seven governors, including the powerful governor of Kandahar. He stripped military command from the governor of Herat. He 

demanded that governors remit the customs and other revenues that they collect to 

the central government, and he sent his Finance Minister to each of the major provinces to enforce this demand. President Karzai has recently reformed the Ministry 

of Defense. 

Meanwhile, the Coalition is deploying small military teams around the country to 

enhance security, extend the reach of the central government and help with reconstruction. These Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), established in Gardez, 

Bamiyan, Kunduz, and Mazar-e Sharif, have been well received by the local population and have begun to prove themselves to the skeptical NGO community. The 

U.K. and New Zealand are leading two of the PRTs, and the Germans are preparing 

to take over the PRT in Konduz. The United States is preparing to dispatch similar 

teams to other areas, including Kandahar, Jalalabad, Parwan, Herat and Ghazni in 
164

the next two and a half months. The British PRT in Mazar played an important 

role in calming the tensions between two competing commanders in the region last 

week. 

In August, NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, 

the alliance’s first major deployment outside Europe. NATO has given its preliminary approval for an expansion of the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul, which could further extend security through PRTs or another ISAF mechanism. In New York, the 

UN Security Council has just agreed on a UNSC resolution approving the expansion 

of ISAF beyond Kabul to the provinces of Afghanistan. The international community 

and the United Nations are working very well together in Afghanistan. 

Led by the United States, the international community is training and equipping 

the new Afghan National Army. By next summer, this effort will give President 

Karzai the single largest, best-trained military force in the country. 

Later this month, a pilot disarmament program will start in Konduz, to be followed shortly by similar efforts in Gardez, Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul. 

On the economic front, the major cities of Afghanistan are experiencing new 

growth. Shops are full of goods; streets are bustling. Legal economic growth last 

year was 30 percent; it is estimated to be 20% this year. 

Afghanistan is expected to have the best harvest in 25 years, with the more stable 

northern areas producing a significant surplus. 

I will leave it to my colleague Jim Kunder to describe the progress that USAID 

has made in rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure and providing health, education 

and other services. Let me take this opportunity to point out the good work USAID 

is doing in general, but in particular the construction of the road from Kabul to 

Kandahar. By the end of December, Afghans will be able to drive from their capital 

to the second largest city in five hours, a trip that just last spring took 15 hours. 

The political and psychological benefits of this achievement should not be overlooked: not only does this road connect the predominantly-Pashtun Kandahar to the 

capital, it runs through the volatile Pashtun belt of the country, demonstrating that 

reconstruction and economic development is not just for the north. 

The American and international presence in Afghanistan is welcomed by most Afghans. The concern most Afghans express is that we not leave too soon, before the 

job is done. We did that before. 

Last month we marked the act of war that took place on American soil two years 

ago, and this is the point to stress: Afghanistan no longer harbors terrorists. It is 

no longer a threat to the United States and the world. On the contrary, it is a country whose leaders and people are committed to a new future as responsible members 

of the world community. 

These are the two stories of Afghanistan. One sobering and daunting; the other 

encouraging—and both are true. 

The Afghan people have accomplished a great deal—and Congress, the American 

people and the international community can take pride in what we have done to 

assist them—but the gains to date remain tenuous, and much remains to be done. 

Failure is not an option in Afghanistan, but it is still possible. 

CONSOLIDATING AND ACCELERATING PROGRESS

That is why the President announced a new initiative to accelerate progress in 

Afghanistan. Let me outline the key components of this initiative. It consists of new 

funds, new people and new focus. 

As part of the Supplemental Appropriation, the President is asking for $799 million in additional funding for accelerating success in Afghanistan. This sum will be 

augmented by $390 million that is being reprogrammed from existing DoD and 

State Department resources, for a total of almost $1.2 billion to be committed between now and next June. This will be on top of regularly appropriated funds, which 

have totaled over $900 million annually in 2002 and 2003. 

This new assistance will be used to address the three major challenges we confront in Afghanistan: the need, first and foremost, to improve security; the need, secondly, to accelerate reconstruction; and finally, the need to support liberal democracy as Afghanistan writes a constitution and prepares for elections next year. 

The most significant challenge today is security, especially in the south and east 

along the border with Pakistan, where the Taliban still has support. Continued insecurity risks slowing down the essential development efforts now underway, undermines the credibility of the central government and threatens prospects for free and 

fair elections next year. Therefore, almost half of this package will be devoted to 

security: to accelerate the training and deploying of the Afghan National Army, to 

build a new police force, to encourage disarmament and demobilization of militias, 

and to protect Afghanistan’s leaders. 
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Developing the Afghan government’s own capacity to address security threats is 

in Afghanistan’s interests and ours. Afghan National Army units are already participating in operations against the Taliban. Strengthening Afghan security institutions is the single most important step we can take in extending the reach and authority of the central government. Afghanistan’s legitimate leaders must have the 

capacity to fill the security vacuum now being filled by local militia leaders and 

their forces.

• The support for the ANA will help establish and equip the essential core of 

a multi-ethnic national army, with approximately 10,500 soldiers trained by 

next summer.

• Assistance to the police will enable training of 18,000 additional national police by mid-2004 and their deployment throughout the country. It will also 

provide training, equipment and infrastructure for 4,000 members of a new 

Afghan Border Police, a 12,000-strong force that will help the Afghan government combat drug trafficking and infiltration of terrorists. Finally, it will 

fund a new 2,600-person highway patrol to protect commerce and travelers 

on Afghanistan’s roads and end the unapproved tolling stations that are financing private militias.

• Hand in hand with these programs to build the central government’s security 

capabilities, we will provide additional funds for programs to disarm and demobilize members of Afghan militias and reintegrate them into society.

• We will also increase funding for measures to provide physical security to Afghanistan’s President, which is critical to the stability and progress of that 

country.

About 30 percent of the $1.189 billion package will be for reconstruction assistance, including roads, schools, health facilities, small projects and initiatives to provide the framework for private sector growth. These infrastructure projects will also 

have a broader impact, especially roads that will link together the major cities of 

Afghanistan, drawing the country together economically and politically.

• A top priority for the new funds will be accelerated work on roads, including 

the road linking Kandahar and Herat, as well as over 600 miles of secondary 

roads that farmers use to bring their crops to market.

• Funds will also be used to build or rehabilitate 150 schools—with the target 

of raising enrollment to 85 percent—and to build 60 additional health clinics 

that could reach an additional 3 million Afghans.

• Other areas that will receive additional funding include community-level 

projects implemented by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as well as industrial parks, power generation projects and other initiatives to improve the 

physical and institutional infrastructure for private sector growth.

The third element of this package, accounting for about 20 percent of the total, 

will be funding for democracy and governance programs, including support for the 

Constitutional Loya Jirga and elections, which will give Afghans from every corner 

of the country a voice and stake in the country as a whole, and help strengthen Afghanistan’s identity as a nation. Some of our planned governance funding will be 

used to help the government pay salaries; that too will strengthen the authority of 

central institutions. We will provide technical experts to ministries and will enhance 

the capabilities of the U.S. embassy to support the Karzai government. 

We expect that strengthened security institutions, including the border police, will 

help address the scourge of narcotics trafficking. Improved roads will help farmers 

produce legitimate, perishable crops that can be competitive in faraway markets, instead of cultivating poppy. Roads will also strengthen the central government’s ability to respond to reports of poppy cultivation. Other reconstruction and development 

programs will offer alternative livelihoods. But I would stress that our most effective 

strategy in combating narcotics will be to strengthen the central government’s authority throughout Afghanistan. 

In addition to new funds, the President is sending new people to Kabul. The embassy will be strengthened by a group of senior advisors to the Ambassador who will 

help accelerate the reconstruction efforts. The embassy staff and security detail will 

be increased. USAID is sending new people to manage its programs. These new people will require additional space, as anyone who has visited Embassy Kabul will attest. The Government of Afghanistan is allowing us to build a temporary facility 

right across the street from the existing compound to house these new people. 

Finally, new focus. To enhance unity of effort in Afghanistan the military headquarters, previously located an hour north of Kabul, is moving to Kabul so the mili-
166

tary and civilian authorities can be co-located. The Combined Forces Commander’s 

office will be right down the hall from the Ambassador’s. 

A HOPEFUL FUTURE

Mr. Chairman, we are at a defining moment in Afghanistan. Our success in consolidating and building on the progress to date will have lasting implications for Afghans and Americans alike. 

This three-pronged strategy, focusing on security, reconstruction and democracy 

is our best opportunity to ensure success. 

There is no question that the challenges are daunting and that much remains to 

be done. But it is equally true that we have much to build on, and we have the 

Afghan people on our side and on the side of their many friends in the international 

community. Afghans are eager to turn a new page in their troubled history. 

In February, President Bush and President Karzai reaffirmed

their common vision for an Afghanistan that is prosperous, democratic, at 

peace, contributing to regional stability, market friendly, and respectful of 

human rights.

With Congress’s support, I am confident that we will realize that vision. 

After Mr. Kunder speaks, we would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank 

you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rodman. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. RODMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of 

the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to come here and 

speak about our policy in Afghanistan, the challenges that we all 

acknowledge are very serious and also about the progress that we 

do think is being made. 

I think some perspective is in order. I am not going to read my 

prepared statement, just highlight a few points, however, if I may. 

Twenty-five years ago, before Afghanistan’s recent nightmare 

began, Afghanistan was already one of the poorest, most-isolated 

countries in the world—and then the nightmare really began. Then 

you had the Communist coup, Soviet invasion, a war of liberation 

against the Soviet occupation; and when that was defeated then 

you had 10 years of Taliban rule. So Afghanistan has been through 

25 years of nightmare on top of the difficulties it already faced to 

start with. 

We have had 2 years since the liberation of Afghanistan. In historical perspective, that is not a long time. We shouldn’t lose sight 

of the fact that, first of all, the war that liberated Afghanistan was 

a great success that we can all be proud of and that, secondly, 

those 2 years have seen progress. Those 2 years have seen the beginning of our help and the international community’s support for 

the Afghan people as they try to rebuild their institutions, try to 

build new institutions, try to build a more modern economy and so 

forth. So I think it is the classic ‘‘is the glass half full or half 

empty,’’ and we should approach the President’s supplemental 

budget request with the attitude that something good is happening. 

We are beginning to help this country get on its feet. We should 

invest in the success that we have already achieved and should not 

lose hope. Because I don’t think the people of Afghanistan have lost 

hope. 

I am here to focus obviously on issues of security. It is clear that 

the Afghans face at least two different kinds of challenges to secu-
167

rity. One is the continuing war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 

As Ambassador Taylor mentioned, we see the Taliban and al-Qaeda 

attempting to regroup, attempting to launch new offensives; and 

that is a serious issue. 

The other security challenge is the kind of instability which accompanies President Karzai’s attempt to assert national authority 

over the country. That process obviously is not complete. There are 

these independent centers of power, the militias, the warlords; and 

I think there is a consensus among most Afghans to transcend 

that, to build a unitary government that extends its authority 

across the country. 

So these two challenges exist, but it is our assessment that neither of these challenges is a threat to the consolidation that is 

going on. Neither of these challenges poses a significant threat to 

the progress that is being made. We think we can handle both of 

these challenges. 

First of all, it is absolutely correct that the Taliban attempted in 

recent months to organize themselves in larger units and to take 

us on. Well, they badly miscalculated. They suffered an enormous 

defeat. Now it is also true that they are probably going to come 

back at us again. It is very likely that they will attempt a fall offensive. But whether they attempt it and whether they succeed are 

two different things, and we and the Afghans and the Coalition believe that we are ready for this. We will not be surprised. If we defeat this offensive, then it is the enemy, not we, who will face some 

very hard strategic choices. So we believe we can manage that. 

The other issue, as I said, is the instability in the country that 

comes from the lack of national authority extended over the country. That is an issue on which we have been talking with President 

Karzai for many, many months. 

We believe we have a strategy in support of his strategy. It includes the elements that Ambassador Taylor mentioned—the Afghan National Army and police, the effort we are making to build 

national institutions. 

Part of the strategy is the political strategy that President 

Karzai has devised. It began, as Ambassador Taylor mentioned, 

with getting customs revenues to flow into the center. It begins 

with replacing provincial governors, replacing them with governors 

who are responsive to national authority. We believe that process 

is under way and moving forward. 

The strategy also includes the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 

the PRTs. This is a concept that we came up with a year ago. We 

think it has been very successful. These are military/political teams 

that we were able to put together very rapidly. We have four of 

them already deployed, another four of them to come in the next 

few months. This has proved to be a very useful instrument for 

supporting reconstruction efforts, for contributing to security to 

some degree and also helping to extend the authority of the central 

government around the country. 

A fourth element of the strategy is engaging international partners. We have already discussed the Germans taking over one of 

these PRTs, which we were delighted to have. We also have the 

British and the New Zealanders involved in PRTs. The Germans 

have requested that their PRT be under ISAF aegis, and we sup-
168

port that. So we and our NATO allies are involved in not only the 

ISAF activity but thinking about how around the country, outside 

of Kabul, the PRTs and ISAF can do the job that we all want them 

to do. 

But I will conclude as I began, just referring to the challenges 

that we all know are serious. We have no illusions about how difficult it will be to turn this country rapidly into a modern country. 

After a quarter century of what they have been through, we think 

we are on the right track. 

We are also delighted that our policy in Afghanistan is a bipartisan policy. It is great to have the debate being only about: How 

can we do more? Are we doing enough? That is a good debate to 

have. Because there is, obviously, a national consensus in this 

country to stay the course, to help finish what we began and give 

the Afghan people a fair chance to get on their own feet and run 

their own successful country. The President’s supplemental request 

is an opportunity, we believe, for this country to demonstrate that 

commitment and reaffirm it. 

I might just add a point. Our military operations in Afghanistan 

cost about $11 billion a year. And our view is that if this country 

can make an additional commitment now of a significant nature at 

a significant level, which we believe the $1.2 billion amounts to, it 

is worth it. If that amount of money now can shorten the period 

of our involvement there by even 1 year, then we will have saved 

money. We have done the right thing. We have done the smart 

thing, rather than drag this out over a long period. 

We think this is the time for this country to make a significant 

new commitment to accelerate the progress that is being made. 

Our involvement in Afghanistan, as I said, is something we as 

Americans should be very proud of. We did it for our own security; 

we didn’t do it out of pure altruism. And the same is true of the 

efforts we want to make now to ensure that Afghanistan becomes 

a successful, viable, modern state, never again to be a safe haven 

for terrorists. So we think our partnership with the Afghan people 

is a success and potentially a greater success. But we certainly 

agree that we, the Administration and the Congress have much 

more to do together to complete what we have begun. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Rodman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, I am pleased to have this opportunity to 

testify before the Committee about our policy and our progress in Afghanistan. 

The Afghan people have been through a terrible ordeal, over the last quarter-century. Their country was one of the poorest and least developed in the world, even 

before the ordeal began. But then came Communist misrule, a Soviet invasion, a 

war of liberation against the Soviet occupation, and then the Taliban. An entire generation of war and tyranny left the country’s institutions, economy, and social structure in shambles. 

In the two years since Operation Enduring Freedom helped Afghans liberate their 

country, we see a nation rebuilding, we also see large-scale international support 

for that rebuilding;

• The Bonn Agreement filled thc political vacuum by bringing Afghan political 

forces together in a process to build first an interim government, then a tran-
169

sitional government, and soon an elected, permanent constitutional government.

• Famine was averted in 2001; tons of hybrid feed were distributed. A new currency was introduced; International Monetary Fund arrears were cleared. 

International development assistance is flowing in. A national ring road is 

being built to promote not only economic growth and regional trade but national unity.

• Two million refugees have returned home,

• New security institutions are being built—Ministries of Defense and interior, 

a National Army, national police, and border and highway police.

This is, overall, a remarkable story. We acknowledge the continuing problems; no 

one can doubt how serious some of them are. But how could these problems be unexpected in a country that has been, through such an ordeal? Recognizing these challenges, the United States is redoubling its effort to accelerate the pace of the 

progress being made. This effort is reflected in the President’s Emergency Supplemental Appropriation request for more than $900 million for Afghanistan and in renewed efforts to galvanize international support. 

THE SECURITY SITUATION

Let me focus on the security situation. 

The Afghan people face two sources of insecurity. The first are the operations of 

the enemy—the Taliban, al Qaeda, and spoilers like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The second is the degree of instability occasioned by rivalries among local commanders (or 

’warlords’’) not yet fully responsive to the authority of the central government. 

We take seriously both of these challenges. The Coalition is working with the government of President Karzai to address them. We think that neither challenge is 

a threat to the consolidation of the political process laid down in Bonn, or to the 

progress being made. 

We have seen the Taliban step up their military activities in recent months. After 

operating in only small units, the Taliban have attempted to graduate to larger-unit 

attacks, sometimes with more than 100 fighters. The net result so far, however, has 

been that CJTF–180—and Afghan forces—have disrupted enemy operations and inflicted serious casualties on the enemy. 

Operations Warrior Sweep (since early August) and Mountain Viper (since early 

September) have driven the enemy out of sanctuary it sought in the south and 

southeast; it resulted in the capture of over 800 weapons, grenades, mortars, and 

rockets, and over 50,000 lbs. of ammunition. As many as 200 Taliban and other 

enemy fighters were killed 

We anticipate that the challenge from the enemy will continue. They may attempt 

a fall offensive of some kind. But the Coalition and the Afghan government are 

ready. The enemy will certainty test us, but we expect that this offensive will fail. 

At that point, the enemy—not we—will face hard strategic decisions. 

We are greatly encouraged by Pakistan’s recent military operation—Operation al 

Miwan—against the Taliban in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (E.ATA). 

Pakistan’s cooperation is crucial. 

The second Security concern, as I mentioned, is the instability that remains as 

the central government gradually extends its authority over the country. We are 

working with President Karzai and the international community in four principal 

areas to deal with this challenge. 

The first is the development of effective, national, and professional security institutions, particularly the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the national police and 

border and highway police. 

This Committee is familiar—with our program to build and train the ANA. In 

September the Afghan government appointed the leadership of and activated the 

Central Corps in Kabul. Eleven ANA battalions have now graduated from the Kabul 

Military Training Center, and a twelfth is in training. Next year, we hope to accelerate the rate of training from 6,000 a year to 10,000. Of the eleven graduated battalions, we have 4,000 soldiers either deployed with Coalition forces or completing 

more advanced or specialized training. 

ANA battalions have ably conducted presence patrols and combat operations. The 

reaction of the Afghan public to ANA presence patrols has been uniformly positive. 

As one local leader said, ‘‘Wherever the ANA goes, stability breaks out.’’ The ANA 

has also performed well in combat. 
170

The two greatest challenges are attrition—a problem that is very real but that 

has recently diminished—and a large gap between the high demand for thc ANA 

for a variety of missions and the limited supply so far of ANA units. 

In parallel with the building of a truly national army, we have also worked to 

help President Karzai and Defense Minister Fahim reform the Ministry of Defense, 

so that all Afghans will see it as a genuinely national institution. In September, 

President Karzai announced new appointments for the 22 top positions, introducing 

greater political and ethnic balance. This reform process, We expect, will continue. 

The Ministry of Interior controls the National Police and the Border Police. The 

Department of Defense hopes to be able to support our State Department colleagues 

in assisting these efforts as well. 

Second: At bottom, the warlord problem is a political problem. Since last spring, our 

government has worked with President Karzai in support of his political strategy 

to extend his national authority. We believe he has a well-thought-out strategy, 

and we have made clear the U.S. Government’s backing of his reform efforts: 

• Last May, with our support, the central government concluded an agreement 

requiring provincial governors who controlled customs posts to turn over revenues to the Ministry of Finance. Virtually nothing had been received before 

that agreement. Since then, more than $90 million has been turned over, putting the central government ahead of its revenue projections for this year.

• In 2003, President Karzai and the Ministry of Interior have replaced about 

one-third of Afghanistan’s provincial governors and about one-half of its provincial police chiefs—all in a concerted effort to improve governance outside 

of Kabul and to extend the authority of the national government.

• In August, President Karzai simultaneously transferred the governor of 

Kandahar, Gul Agha Shirzai, to a ministry in Kabul; changed the governors 

of Zabol and Wardak provinces; and replaced lsmail Khan as corps commander in Herat.

• This move was a significant assertion of authority by President Karzai. At the 

time, the United States made an important public declaration that it endorsed President Karzai’s reforms to assert the legitimate authority of the 

central government and to improve provincial governance.

• In addition, more recently, we have supported the efforts of President 

Karzai’s commission, led by Minister of Interior Jalali, to find a solution to 

the frequent military clashes in Mazar-e-Sharif between Generals Dostam 

and Atta. Special Presidential Envoy Dr. Khalilzad engaged himself in support of this process on his recent visit, and our Provincial Reconstruction 

Team (PRT) in the area also played a role in defusing tensions. 

The third dimension of our accelerated effort is the further deployment of these Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 

The PRTs, as we anticipated a year ago when their concept was devised, are a 

flexible instrument for achieving several purposes, including: to facilitate reconstruction efforts around the country; to contribute to the facilitation of security 

where needed; to bolster the presence and authority of the central government; and 

to provide another vehicle for internationalizing the overall effort. 

PRTs typically comprise 60–100 military and civilian personnel representing several agencies in the U.S. Government. Their composition is meant to be flexible, 

adapting to the particular needs of a region; they include a civilian led reconstruction team, engineers, security and military observer teams, linguists, and interpreters, and a medical team. The PRTs work with Afghan government ministries, 

local officials, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to facilitate 

their efforts. 

Four PRTs, as you know, are already deployed, and four more should be deployed 

in the next few mouths. The U.K., New Zealand, and now Germany are taking over 

some of these teams. 

Our fourth line of activity is support for international partners, including on security 

issues where they have the lead. We will work with the UN Assistance Mission 

to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and with Japan on disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration (DDR) of militia forces. We support U.K-led program against narcotics. We are supporting German efforts in police training and Italian efforts 

in judicial reform. 

In addition, we welcome the fact that NATO has taken over command of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, and that Germany (as 

noted) has proposed to take over the PRT in Konduz. 
171

The Germans, as you know, have proposed that their PRT in Konduz come under 

ISAF. We have agreed to this idea and are working out the details. We are open, 

as well, to expanding ISAFs mandate more broadly—as the new UN Security Council Resolution 1510 earlier this week now permits. ISAF’s role does expand, some 

of the issues we will need to pay attention to are:

• That the new arrangements ensure deconfliction between ISAF and OEF and 

do not impede OEF operations;

• That all these activities support the political strategy of President Karzai that 

the U.S. is supporting; and

• That the new arrangements be backed by real commitments of forces from 

NATO partners. 

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with an example of how these diverse strands 

of policy can come together to help win the war against the Taliban. 

In 2002, Paktia province in the east was considered one of the areas with the 

highest levels of enemy activity. Since then, the United States deployed a PRT near 

Gardez, the capital, and supported civil affairs and reconstruction activity. President Karzai replaced the governor, police chief, and sidelined local commanders who 

had been abusing the people. New national police were deployed, and we sent in 

the Afghan National Army on presence patrols. PRT activities—sometimes in concert with ANA deployments—have reinforced stability and won the confidence of the 

local population. Together, these reforms and deployments have transformed the security situation. 

As we continue our efforts to improve security and to support reconstruction, the 

lesson of Paktia province should inform the work of all of the departments and 

agencies of the U.S. Government. PRT team members, through their patrolling and 

interactions with local Afghan elders and officials, have enhanced security. The 

PRTs are also extending the reach of the Afghan central government, which now 

has a representative al each PRT location. And quick-impact projects like the building of schools and clinics, or the drilling of wells, have helped PRTs to develop close 

relationships with Afghan communities. Our challenge is to expand the geographical 

impact of these activities, both by increasing the number of PRTs and extending 

their reach through satellite locations. 

While the State Department and USAID are the lead agencies for Afghan reconstruction, DoD has also gladly supported them. DoD—primarily through civil affairs 

teams (300 civil affairs personnel deployed) and PRTs—is supporting the rebuilding 

of over 300 schools and 50 medical facilities, installing over 600 wells, and hiring 

over 30,000 Afghans countrywide. 

I will conclude as I began, acknowledging the seriousness of the challenges that 

we and the Afghans face in rebuilding a country devastated by a quarter century 

of war. But we have a strategy, and we are accelerating our effort. 

Our goals in Afghanistan clearly have bipartisan support. The President’s Emergency Supplemental request is an opportunity for this nation to reaffirm and 

strengthen its commitment. That appropriation can make a significant difference. 

Our nation’s role in liberating the Afghan people is a success story. All Americans 

can be proud of what we and our Coalition partners helped accomplish. We did it 

for our own security, not simply out of altruism, and that is equally true today of 

our effort to ensure that Afghanistan becomes a successful modern state and never 

again a safe haven for terrorists. 

Our partnership with the Afghan people continues to grow and strengthen. The 

Administration and the Congress have much to do together to complete what we 

have begun. 

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Kunder. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES KUNDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, sir. 

When I arrived in Kabul in January of last year, one of my first 

visits was to the Ministry of Education. Because the Taliban had 

used textbooks as a tool of intimidation and ethnic divisiveness, we 
172

wanted to redo the textbooks. That was one of the first visits, and 

I say in my statement that could be a metaphor for the condition 

of Afghanistan a year ago. I walked into a building with broken 

windows. The Minister of Education, who was a ex-pat who had 

just arrived from California, was huddled over a kerosene heater, 

had no telephones, no computers, no staff list, and hadn’t paid his 

staff in some time. 

Now when I was last in Afghanistan in August and went back 

to that same ministry, the building had been redone with United 

States taxpayer support. We built a daycare center so that the 

women employees of the ministry can get back to work and have 

someone to take care of their children. We got textbooks distributed, more than 25 million, that emphasize the good things about 

Afghanistan instead of ethnic divisiveness across the country. 

Now, as both Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Rodman have said, it 

is a cup half full. It is not a cup full all the way yet, and there 

are still a lot of problems. In fact, so many children have wanted 

to go back to school in Afghanistan in the post-Taliban period that, 

frankly, we can’t keep up with the school construction and can’t 

keep up with the teacher training. So we have got a lot more work 

to rebuild a country that was devastated by 23 years of war. But 

from the reconstruction point of view I would agree with both Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Rodman that we have made an enormous 

amount of success in the last 18 months. 

I also want to emphasize that while there has been a fair amount 

of criticism about or focus on the problems of the Afghan government, the Afghans have been darn good partners for the United 

States Government, by and large, in the rebuilding of their country. The ministries have taken their job seriously. The Afghan people have worked hard. 

We like to point out that in 1 year after the fall of the Taliban 

agricultural production went up 82 percent. That is not by U.S. 

Government statistics. It is by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization’s statistics. Once freed from the Taliban yoke, once some 

demining took place in the countryside and with a little good rain 

from the Almighty, 82 percent increase in agriculture production in 

1 year, an almost astonishing result. So the Afghans deserve a lot 

of credit as well. 

I will not go into a lot of details on the more than 760 projects 

in Afghanistan that the U.S. taxpayers are funding, because we 

provided all that material, although I will be glad to answer questions. I would like to address a couple of issues that I know are 

of deep concern to the Committee. 

One is the issue of coordination. From the USAID perspective, 

the coordination among U.S. Government agencies on the ground 

has been excellent. We have relied extensively on our military colleagues to get out to parts of the country where we haven’t been 

able to get to ourselves because of the security concerns. The 

United States military has worked extensively with us on getting 

that highway built that Ambassador Taylor referred to from Kabul 

to Kandajar. We have embedded USAID technical experts into the 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams out in the provincial capitals so 

that the diplomatic security and reconstruction parts of the U.S. 
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Government are working well together. So from my perspective 

that has been a success, not a failure. 

Also on the security side, to address that issue directly, we still 

have serious security concerns in Afghanistan. So far, in pushing 

the main highway from Kabul to Kandajar, we have had more than 

a dozen Afghans working with us on the highway killed and more 

than 20 wounded. It is by the grace of God that I am not here reporting to you that some Americans were killed, because we had 

a shooting incident within the last 3 days where one of our U.S. 

contractors had his forehead grazed by a bullet. 

But, all in all, we understand these security risks. The folks we 

have got out there are professionals and, from my perspective, the 

security risks, as serious as they are, have not significantly impeded the reconstruction effort in most parts of the country. We are 

moving forward with the reconstruction of schools. We are moving 

forward with the reconstruction of health clinics. We are moving 

forward with our agricultural products, projects to help undercut 

the poppy production in the country side; and we are moving forward with our infrastructure reconstruction projects. 

I just spoke with our NGO colleagues recently, and I know they 

testified before this Committee about the security concerns in the 

countryside. They are real. I am not here to give you some sense 

of false bravado. We take them seriously. But the reconstruction 

projects are going forward, and as far as we are concerned we are 

going to ram that highway right down the Taliban’s throat. We are 

going to show that there can be success in Afghanistan, and we are 

going to help win that battle against terrorism in that way. 

In closing, I would like to say that we very much appreciate the 

Afghan Freedom Support Act. I reread it before this hearing, and 

I feel confident that we have complied with both the letter and the 

spirit of the Afghan Freedom Support Act. We take it as a serious 

piece of guidance. We believe we are in compliance with it. 

Some parts of the Afghan Freedom Support Act that we have not 

yet fully implemented, like the call for a venture capital fund, we 

are looking at it seriously. We probably will implement something 

like that in the coming year. We are working on the preconditions 

to get to the point where we could implement it. 

So I would concur with Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Rodman that 

the cup is half full. An awful lot of progress has been done in the 

last year, as much a result of the Afghans’ hard work as the foreigners. There is a lot of work to be done, but I think we will get 

the job done. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Kunder. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES KUNDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP- MENT

Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the U.S. Agency for International Development, I 

want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the reconstruction situation in Afghanistan. I also want to thank the Committee for the leadership and support it has provided for those U.S. government personnel working in Afghanistan, 

through hearings like these today that focus attention on Afghanistan and especially 

for taking the lead with the Afghan Freedom Support Act. The Act provides a useful 

framework for reconstruction efforts, as well as a welcome foundation for USAID’s 

efforts. 
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Administrator Andrew Natsios dispatched me to Kabul in January, 2002, to reopen the USAID Mission there shortly after the fall of the Taliban regime. Since 

that time, I have been managing the USAID reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, 

either from Kabul or Washington. I returned to Kabul in August of this year to 

serve as Acting Mission Director, providing an opportunity to assess first-hand the 

progress we have made over the past eighteen months. 

First, in order to establish a baseline for analysis of the reconstruction effort, I 

believe it bears repeating that Afghanistan provides one of the most complex reconstruction challenges the U.S. government has encountered anywhere. Afghanistan 

was one of the poorest places on the face of the earth before the Soviet incursion 

precipitated more than two decades of conflict and destruction. Although solid data 

remains hard to come by, Afghanistan remains at or near the bottom of every socioeconomic indicator used to measure human and economic progress. In fact, the country’s overall human misery index is among the highest in the world. As just one 

grim reminder of the harshness of this long-suffering land, one of four Afghan children dies before the age of five. 

While many analyses of Afghanistan describe the infrastructure damage caused 

by the long conflict there, I would like to draw the Committee’s attention to Afghanistan’s institutional devastation, which matches the physical damage in its severity. When our USAID team arrived in Kabul in January last year, we found a 

nation without a viable security apparatus, without courts, without functioning ministries; in short, a place where all the basic trappings of a nation-state had been 

obliterated. Compounding these reconstruction challenges, Afghanistan possesses 

some of the harshest climatic conditions and most difficult terrain on earth, far too 

much of it laced with unmarked landmines, numbering in the millions. 

USAID’s first objective in Afghanistan was to prevent a major humanitarian crisis. Programs were put in place immediately to ensure sufficient supplies of food 

and shelter, especially for returning refugees and displaced persons, and to prevent 

the outbreak of hunger and epidemic diseases. Despite the challenges noted above, 

the massive humanitarian relief program launched in cooperation with our U.S. government, UN, NGO and other international colleagues worked effectively, preventing a widely feared and predicted relief crisis. As an example of the scale of the 

humanitarian effort undertaken since September 11, 2001, more than 400,000 metric tons of Food for Peace commodities has been delivered to Afghanistan. 

Now we are putting in place the building blocks of a reconstructed Afghanistan, 

an Afghanistan that is—to quote President Bush—‘‘prosperous, democratic, at 

peace, contributing to regional stability, market friendly, and respectful of human 

rights.’’

Six building blocks serve as the focus of our efforts:

1. Reconstructing the devastated economy: Since 85% of Afghans participate 

in the agricultural sector, USAID’s emphasis has been on spurring agricultural 

recovery and rural reconstruction. Since highways are the commercial lifelines in 

Afghanistan, we have invested heavily in rebuilding key road links and the 

bridges destroyed in the conflicts of the past twenty-three years.

2. Creating the conditions for private investment: Given Afghanistan’s commercial traditions and recognizing that foreign aid cannot alone provide longterm economic growth, USAID programs focus on currency and banking reform, 

investment law reform, sound budgeting procedures by the Afghan government 

and related ‘‘economic governance’’ initiatives. These mechanisms are necessary 

to induce the direct private investment that can fuel economic recovery in the 

long-term.

3. Providing a ‘‘peace dividend’’ that will improve the lives of average Afghans: Because the level of health care is abysmal in Afghanistan, and because—in a nation with 80% illiteracy—there are not enough schools for all the 

children who try to attend, we are investing in basic health clinics and primary 

education so that more Afghans will sense some hope for their future and their 

children’s future.

4. Reconstituting the basic organs of governance: We have helped rebuild the 

Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and 

other institutions wiped out during the conflict and Taliban oppression. We are 

funding 136 Afghan expatriate advisors in various Ministries, paying the salaries 

of 879 Afghans who staff these Ministries, repairing buildings and record-keeping 

systems and retraining competent managers and teachers.

5. Buttressing the peace process: Keeping on track the ‘‘Bonn Agreement’’ that 

forged the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan has required support for the 

nationwide Loya Jirgas, or grand counsels, for elections, judicial reforms and 
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human rights institutions, and especially for the writing of a new constitution for 

Afghanistan.

6. Contributing to a vibrant civil society: As an alternative to the Taliban’s emphasis on isolation and close-mindedness, USAID programs support a free media; 

training for professional journalists; assistance to private organizations of 

women, professionals and reformers; and other initiatives intended to spur free, 

open debate about the future of Afghanistan.

Although I do not minimize the very significant obstacles to reconstruction that 

remain in Afghanistan, our assessment is that significant progress has taken place 

in each of these key reconstruction building blocks between 2002 and 2003. 

In economic recovery, for example, the Rome-based Food and Agriculture Organization reported an 82 percent increase between 2001 and 2002 in production of 

wheat—Afghanistan’s staple grain—since the fall of the Taliban, with a further increase in production of 69 percent between 2002 and 2003. We are pushing forward 

with road construction, aiming to complete the first level paving of the major Kabulto-Kandahar highway by the end of 2003. In support of private sector investment, a new Afghani, the national currency, has been placed in circulation, the Afghan central bank has been placed on a sound footing, a new banking law has been 

written, and the investment code is on the verge of promulgation. 

To improve the lives of average Afghans, USAID alone has completed 760 

projects, small and large, in the countryside. I have appended, for the Committee’s 

review, a complete list of USAID reconstruction projects, which are under way or 

completed in 31 of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces. The generosity of the U.S. people has 

provided 25 million textbooks for Afghan children. We have repaired or rebuilt 121 

health clinics and facilities and will rebuild or construct 400 more over the next 

three years. We have also repaired or rebuilt 203 schools and will build or rebuild 

another 1,000 by 2006. 

Much work remains to establish or reconstitute government functions, but 

many ministries have been repaired, an orderly national budget process is in place, 

and a USG-funded and installed voice and data telecommunications system now 

permits Kabul-based officials to communicate regularly with their provincial counterparts, in some cases, for the first time in Afghanistan’s history. The Bonn 

Agreement Peace Process has been kept on track, with a successful Emergency 

Loya Jirga completed last year, functioning Judicial and Human Rights Commissions in place, programs underway to begin demobilizing factional fighters in the 

countryside, and a vigorous, and hotly debated, constitutional drafting process underway. Finally, a post-Taliban rebirth of Civil Society is under way in Afghanistan, with numerous radio stations up and running, a journalists training center 

funded with U.S. assistance in operation in Kabul, and a functioning Ministry of 

Women’s Affairs establishing women’s centers—with strong Congressional encouragement—across the nation. 

As these reconstruction efforts continue, we are working not only with the U.S. 

military and our civilian counterparts within and outside the U.S. government, but 

with the Afghans themselves. USAID programs are consciously designed to build Afghan capacity, and to pave the way for the Afghan government and people to secure 

their own destiny. For example, we are working with President Karzai’s government 

to increase Afghan capacity to collect and manage customs revenues, a major source 

of government income. Currently, much of the Afghan government’s operating costs 

are funded by foreign aid contributions, and we are working in the customs arena 

to build the capacity of the government to meet its own recurring costs. Similarly, 

in the health care field, we worked with the Ministry of Public Health to support 

the first national survey of health facilities, so that the government could establish 

its own priorities for rural health care delivery, led by the Afghans themselves. 

Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware of the many concerns about security in Afghanistan, and reports of an increase in security incidents in recent months. The security 

situation per se is not within USAID’s purview, but I do want to comment on the 

effect of security incidents on the reconstruction effort. Overall, without minimizing 

the security threat—and with profound regret for the lives, Afghan and foreign, that 

have been lost in recent attacks—we have every intention of maintaining the pace 

of our reconstruction efforts at the very least. We do not believe that the current 

rate of security incidents, including incidents targeting relief and reconstruction organizations, will significantly slow the reconstruction efforts. On the contrary, we 

will redouble our efforts out of awareness that our reconstruction efforts are a potent weapon in the fight against terrorism. 

The reality is that Taliban remnants and other enemies of freedom recognize full 

well that paved highways, schools where girls learn to read, caring NGO workers, 

fair elections, and free radio stations will destroy them. That is why they launch 
176

scattered, but deadly, forays against these harbingers of progress. We have increased and will increase security measures to deter attacks, but frankly—given Afghanistan’s levels of poverty and isolation, the legacy of twenty-three years of war, 

and the fear our work engenders among the enemies of freedom—I do not believe 

the current level of insecurity should slow our progress. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, much reconstruction work remains to be accomplished in Afghanistan, but much has been undertaken and the pace of reconstruction is accelerating. USAID appreciates the strong support of this Committee in 

those reconstruction efforts. I am prepared to elaborate on any of the points made 

in this testimony, or to answer your questions. 

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. I have just received a communication from I 

guess the Financial Times, but I will just read you—all three of 

you the first paragraph: 

Hamid Karzai has lost his original allies and is increasingly isolated, according to the Afghan newspaper Payam-e Mojahed. I hope 

I didn’t mangle that too much. The paper said, discord among his 

top ministers and commanders is holding up the development of 

the country. Payam-e Mojahed, which has links with the Northern 

Alliance factions, said it would be in the USA’s interests not to insist on Karzai remaining in power but to cooperate with Afghans 

in finding a new leader. And then the text of the long editorial 

here. 

Now we understand factionalism among democracies and free 

countries, and we understand that Afghanistan is on the brink of 

becoming a free country and enjoys a free press. But this is a disturbing comment, if it has any substance, and I would like each of 

you to—or any of you to comment on this. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, let me take a first stab at that. 

This government in Kabul is a coalition government. It is a government that was put together just after the war. It is a government that then went through a period of time before it came to a 

Loya Jirga that elected President Karzai. He has people in his cabinet from all different sides of the country, all different ethnic 

groups, all different parts of the country geographically. Are there 

disputes within the government? Yes indeed. Are there concerns 

that this is going to spill into military? No. 

What we are seeing right now in Kabul, in Afghanistan is real 

politics. As you would expect, we are in an election year in Afghanistan. There is going to be an election there next summer, at least 

on the presidential side, and probably on both, on the parliament 

as well. That pressure for elective success is there, just like it is 

in this country. So I am not surprised to hear about squabbles 

within the cabinet, and I don’t deny that they take place. They are 

certainly there. 

I do suggest, though, that it is not a threat to this government. 

It is not a threat to President Karzai. He remains the single most 

popular politician in the country. He has announced that he is 

going to run for re-election. There has been one or two suggestions 

that there might be somebody running against him but not from 

very credible kinds of concerns, of a concern of a real competitor. 

We will see how this goes. 

What we are after is a moderate government that can control the 

countryside, that will never again allow that country to be the 

home of terrorists; and we want to see the disputes take place on 

the political side, not on the military side. 
177

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. That will suffice. We 

will save the—Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to commend all three of our distinguished witnesses for 

very informative and helpful testimony. I have several questions, 

and I would like to throw them out, and whoever wants to answer 

them is fine with me. 

The first relates to—let me preface my comments by saying that 

there are probably no two people in this country who want us to 

succeed in Afghanistan more than the Chairman and I. So our 

questions and our probing is intentioned to elicit responses which 

will be helpful to the process. 

First, I want to talk about the role of NATO, present and potential, in Afghanistan. I am convinced that, while Afghanistan desperately needs NATO, NATO desperately needs Afghanistan. We 

now have a gigantic, successful, powerful, vast military alliance 

which basically lost its raison d’etre with the collapse of the Soviet 

Union; and it is self-evident that if NATO is to survive, as I hope 

it does and as I believe it must, it must find its mission out of area. 

I find it extremely disturbing that even though NATO has now 

taken over the responsibility, at least initially in Kabul and now 

in a minimal way outside of Kabul, the effort appears to be so utterly puny in terms of NATO’s capability. One cannot help but be 

reminded of the guns of Singapore during the Second World War 

aiming at the sea when the enemy came from land and the guns 

of Singapore were never fired. This vast NATO military apparatus 

in Europe today serves very little useful purpose except a marginal 

one in the Balkans. 

Now I am wondering if any of you could enlighten us as to why 

we have been unsuccessful in getting a dramatically more significant NATO presence in Afghanistan. My understanding is that several countries—Norway, Belgium, Spain, perhaps others—have indicated willingness to participate. I don’t understand why the very 

sizeable Turkish contingent which was in Afghanistan for a while, 

has now been reduced, I understand, dramatically. I would like to 

get the figures from you why the Turkish contingent has not been 

persuaded to stay. Because, clearly, all of our goals fundamentally 

depend on the establishment of a pattern of security; and NATO 

is the perfect instrument to provide security. 

I am also wondering, at a time when we are more than prepared 

to bear financial responsibility for non-NATO forces in Iraq and we 

have made major efforts along these lines, my staff is told that any 

foreign military units that might be deployed in Afghanistan must 

be completely self-sustaining. If that is the policy, I think it is a 

self-defeating and counterproductive policy, because it would be extremely helpful to achieve our goals in Afghanistan to have countries which cannot afford to maintain troops but are ready to do so. 

So I would—my first question really deals with this broad issue 

of security. This is a huge country. The force even with the current 

slight increase in the German contingent is negligible compared to 

the need; and, as you have indicated, while we rhetorically say failure is not an option, in point of fact, failure is very much of an option. 
178

Now to avoid that option, to preclude that option from becoming 

a reality, what is the Administration doing to bring NATO in in a 

dramatically more significant way? Because, clearly, the political 

obstacles which historically have been present vis-a-vis Iraq seem 

not to be present vis-a-vis Afghanistan. 

Mr. RODMAN. You have raised an number of very serious questions, Congressman. Let me attempt to touch on a few of them. 

NATO is now in Afghanistan. That is one of the new developments this summer. We consider that a positive thing for a number 

of reasons, including definitely the reasons you mentioned. It is a 

good thing for NATO as well as a good thing for ISAF and for the 

responsibility that the international community had undertaken 

under the ISAF mandate. 

One of the disappointing things is that if you look at the troops 

that NATO countries have, the number of usable forces they have 

for expeditionary uses is surprisingly small. These are countries 

that have small forces, many of which are already extended in 

other places, other peacekeeping missions in Africa or elsewhere. 

So one of the issues now is, precisely as we consider the expansion 

of ISAF around the country, as we seek to internationalize PRTs, 

NATO has made some very important decisions in the last few 

days in fact to study these things and to undertake these things. 

But one of our worries is that NATO may not be able to identify 

forces to carry out whatever ambitious new things they undertake. 

So that is a problem. 

What I can say in mitigation is that we strongly supported 

NATO’s taking over the ISAF responsibility. We welcome the idea 

of expanding ISAF’s mandate and thereby concomitantly NATO’s 

mandate around the country. One of the constraints will be whether NATO countries other than ourselves have additional forces of 

any significant numbers. 

ISAF, in our view, has been successful. The countries that have 

led it—the British, the Turks, the Germans and Dutch—have done 

their force generation exercise each time and have, you know, managed to staff ISAF; and we hope they will be able to do it. If ISAF 

expands, then they will have to undertake that. 

Why the Turks drew down I am not sure what the right answer 

is. Various countries, when they were in the lead of ISAF, had a 

large presence, including the British; and when they handed off the 

lead to someone else, they reduced their own contribution. But, as 

I said, the new country that was in the lead was able to generate 

forces to keep ISAF at the adequate level for its previous mission. 

Mr. LANTOS. Well, the previous mission was a singularly inadequate mission because the previous mission was Kabul, and this 

is a big country. I mean, it is like saying, you know, you have adequate security in New York City but not outside in the rest of the 

country. To an outside observer, this notion that 5,000 NATO 

troops are adequate to provide security in a country the size of Afghanistan is absurd. Turkey has a standing army of about a half 

a million. I would like to know if any of you know how many Turkish troops are in Afghanistan as we speak. 

Mr. RODMAN. I could get you that number. I don’t have it. 

Mr. LANTOS. It is probably several hundred, not more than that. 

So it is not unreasonable for those of us—and I am sure this in-
179

cludes the three of you—who want to see the mission succeed to 

ask the obvious questions. 

There is a huge NATO military alliance. It has no basic function 

in Europe today. There are tremendous functions elsewhere. What 

is the Administration doing as the principal member of NATO to 

aggressively generate NATO forces so that these two critical assignments, Afghanistan and Iraq, will prove to be successful? 

Mr. RODMAN. What I can say is, now we are engaging. Now that 

NATO took over ISAF, and the issue of ISAF expansion is on the 

table, you see Lord Robertson and the NATO Council in the last 

few days undertaking to take on a much bigger responsibility in 

the country. 

In fact, I should try to answer the point that was made earlier, 

that we have stood in the way of this, which is not the case. We 

are very pleased that NATO is undertaking this, with our full support, and this is the opportunity before us to make the countries 

put up their forces to live up to the ambitious thing that they are 

now speaking about doing. 

Mr. LANTOS. If I may have one more quick question, Mr. Chairman. What is the role of Iran in Afghanistan at the moment? 

Mr. RODMAN. Let me start on that one, and Ambassador Taylor 

may have something to add. In a nutshell, Iran is creating options 

for itself, I would say. They have some of the regional leaders in 

the West that are close to them. And they are keeping an eye on 

American forces. They, I think, do not wish us well. 

But at least in the military dimension, I think we are able to 

handle the challenges we face. Iran’s challenge is a political one, 

that Iran seeks to have influence in the country, as other neighbors 

do. And our job is to strengthen the institutions of Afghanistan so 

that it is, among other things, able to resist undue influence from 

neighboring countries. 

Mr. LANTOS. Would you like to add something, Ambassador? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Just briefly, Mr. Lantos. Yes, we see different parts 

of the Iranian influence. On the one hand, they have a responsible 

Embassy in Kabul. They are providing some reconstruction assistance. Mr. Kunder talked about his road. Well, the Iranians are 

building a road from Iran into Iraq. 

But there is the other side as well, exactly as Mr. Rodman said. 

There is a concern that their influence in the western part of Afghanistan is not altogether benign, that they will provide support 

to some of what we call the warlords in this discussion, which is 

not helpful, does not support the central government. 

On the other hand, they clearly want to have a stable Afghanistan, as all of the neighbors should want. That is what we are trying to do. That is what we are after in terms of our support for the 

government of Afghanistan. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

Let me go to a question that I have, and I have brought it up 

before. I and others on this Committee have been enthusiastic 

about this PRT concept for some time, and I have had the opportunity to see them in operation in Afghanistan and see the response that the people of Afghanistan are giving to these PRT 
180

teams. There are 60, 100 soldiers in a team, whose aim it is to facilitate the reconstruction and improve the security. 

I think the important side benefit is the amount of appreciation 

generated in the towns for what the U.S. is doing. We still have 

only four teams deployed. We still have only four. I am pleased to 

hear your testimony about your plans to expand into Kandahar, 

Jalalabad and Herat. These are critical areas. 

But when we look at the supplemental, we are envisioning here 

at least a dozen provinces. So can you give me a quick answer in 

terms of—is that what you envision, maybe a dozen teams being 

deployed here as a result of this legislation? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Royce, let me just make a couple of points on 

the funds that we are asking for in the supplemental and then Mr. 

Rodman may want to talk. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think it is 50 million for this purpose. 

Mr. TAYLOR. It is. You have indicated that there are several functions that these PRTs perform. One is, just by being out there, as 

you say, you have seen these. And the benefits to the people on the 

ground, the villagers, they see those provincial reconstruction team 

conveys go through their village is dramatic. 

One of the things these teams do when they go through the villages is identify projects that need to be done. Whether it be 

schools or clinics or wells in conjunction with Mr. Kunder’s AID colleagues, they are identifying reconstruction projects. 

Mr. ROYCE. You have got the New Zealanders and the British 

and the German teams working? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The New Zealanders are doing it in Bamiyan, and 

the British are doing it in Mazar, that is correct. 

What we are looking for in our supplemental request, is additional funds that will allow USAID and the State Department and 

the military, to do more of these reconstruction projects. These 

funds are separate from the operations, the funds that actually pay 

for the troops that are in the PRTs that pay for the military equipment that the PRTs use. That comes out of the actually 11 billion, 

that is also part of that request. 

Now, Peter, I don’t know if you want to talk about the question 

about the plans for the next steps. 

Mr. RODMAN. First of all, what Ambassador Taylor said is correct. There is 50 million or so that we hope to see in the supplemental that would go to PRT projects. As for additional PRTs, this 

is something that we would certainly be interested in. We and 

President Karzai had worked out the original schedule and the priorities and locations; we sought his advice, and that of the Minister 

of Interior and his colleagues, where he thought these PRTs would 

be most useful. I am not aware of discussions to identify additional 

positions. 

Mr. ROYCE. But, Mr. Rodman, getting back to my precise question. I am clearly trying to get an answer to the question: Will they 

be operating in a dozen provinces as we envisioned in this supplemental? And are we going to have more than four additional 

teams? I assume the answer to that must be, yes. So far we only 

have four teams. 

Mr. TAYLOR. You are right. 

Mr. RODMAN. We will have eight by the end of this year. 
181

Mr. TAYLOR. There is consideration for a ninth in Ghazni. There 

is also a consideration, to get at your exact point—the question is 

how can these eight or nine teams have a broader effect than just 

the single province that they are in? 

The first point is the PRT in Gardez, for example, is responsible 

for five provinces, and it sends its patrols out to five different provinces. That is a large territory. 

An idea that we are looking at is having satellite PRTs, if you 

will, out from the main PRT in Gardez out into Khost, down into 

other parts of Patika and in Paktya. So that is the idea that we 

are looking at. 

We share your enthusiasm for this concept. It is an excellent concept. It has an opportunity to make a real contribution. 

Mr. ROYCE. I have one last question. You mentioned President 

Karzai’s attempt to bring provisional governors, including Ismail 

Khan, who is the Governor of Herat, to obey the nation’s laws, to 

send regional revenue to the capital and so forth. How have they 

reacted? Have those dictates now been enforced, or are they being 

ignored? 

Mr. TAYLOR. They are being enforced. It took some time. There 

are actually two parts of this that I can talk about. One is the revenues. Back in May, President Karzai said you Governors need to 

send the revenues that you collect from import tariffs into the center. 

Then, as I mentioned in my statement, he sent out Dr. Ghani, 

his Finance Minister, to pick up—and Dr. Ghani came from Herat 

with $20 million. That was a stock, that was from the bank account 

out there. More importantly, he set up a procedure, a process, that 

would regularly send in the revenues into the center. 

Mr. ROYCE. That revenue stream right now is——

Mr. TAYLOR. That revenue stream continues. It does. 

The second thing that he said is, you Governors can’t have both 

a Governor’s title and a military title. That took a while. But then, 

as we have indicated, just in August, President Karzai enforced 

that one with respect, specifically with respect to Governor Ismail 

Khan out in Herat, took away the military role, his military command, and sent another commander out there. So that he is doing 

as well. 

And finally, he has replaced other Governors, a total of about 

seven, but the most recent out—Gul Agha Shirzai—out of 

Kandahar, has brought him up into Kabul, and put a trusted minister, Minister Pashtun, into the governorship down there. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am out of time. 

Chairman HYDE. [presiding.] Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have two 

bottom-line, what-do-we-do questions. And the first one goes to the 

DDR process that I expressed concerns about during my opening 

statement. I am interested in how just—a quick overview in a couple of sentences, if you can, how this process works, and from 

whom might we expect the most difficulty. 

And the bottom-line question is, how do we handle the situation 

where there is a local warlord who will not turn over his guns? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Ackerman, in a couple of sentences, the DDR 

process, as you have indicated, starts on the 25th of this month. 
182

It starts in Konduz. No coincidence that it is going to one of the 

places where we have a PRT. It is going to be a pilot program in 

Konduz. It will be followed by another pilot in Mazar and in 

Gardez, also no coincidence, that are places of two other of our 

PRTs. And as I said, a voluntary program that has been set up by 

the U.N., funded to a large degree by the Japanese, but with contributions from us——

Mr. ACKERMAN. How does it work? 

Mr. TAYLOR. It works as follows. The U.N. will have a compound, 

and into this compound will come soldiers with weapons. They 

need to do two things. They need to have a weapon that works and 

they need to be on the rolls. They need to be on the rolls of a military organization. 

Because we are trying to dismantle military organizations in—

let’s say we are talking about Konduz in this first pilot. If they 

meet those two criteria, then they will be given an option of some 

funds and training and equipment to be able to go start a business. 

Or if they can meet the physical and literacy requirements, they 

will have the option of going into the Afghan National Army. A limited number will go into the Army because the requirements are 

very strict. 

But that will be a pilot program to gain some experience over the 

next months. Then it will be broadened up. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And what happens when a warlord won’t give up 

his guns? 

Mr. TAYLOR. There——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do you have enough bait in this trap to draw in 

all the mice? 

Mr. TAYLOR. In the first phase, we have bait in the trap, exactly 

what you are saying. We have incentives for the soldiers to come 

in. There may well be problems down the line. There may well be 

problems. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I will start again with the question, what happens when you get down the line? What happens when a guy is a 

warlord and he doesn’t turn over the guns? 

Mr. TAYLOR. There are several——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is there a plan? 

Mr. TAYLOR. There is a plan. And the plan is, number one, to 

rely on Afghan forces. And we are not doing this everywhere at the 

same time. We are focused on a pilot at the beginning, and then 

one at a time they will move around. 

So there are police, there is the Afghan National Army. There 

are backups to these forces that will be there. The PRT—I mentioned that the PRTs, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, are in 

each of these places where our pilot DDR programs are starting. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me cut to the chase. We are going to play 

no role in helping disarm them? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We are playing a major role. The international community is playing a major role in terms of setting up this system. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. No, no, no. You are missing the point. I don’t 

want to keep missing it. If you don’t want to answer, that is fine; 

just tell me, I will go somewhere else. 
183

But the question is, when they don’t show up, do we go and—

do we go and take away their guns, rather than just, you know—

prayer is not a plan. Hope is not a plan. 

Do we go in with U.S. people, with U.S. uniforms, under U.S. 

command, and do we take away the guns? 

Mr. RODMAN. Let me relieve you for a minute. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is this a tough question? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sure. 

Mr. RODMAN. Let me add a point——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I guess we don’t have a plan. 

Mr. RODMAN. Let me try. President Karzai has been very astute 

up until now, sir, in preparing——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I have a second question. I just don’t want to run 

the clock on it. Do we have a plan or—do U.S. forces go in and take 

away the guns? 

Mr. RODMAN. The plan is to prepare the ground politically before 

we undertake a step to go after——

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have heard all of that three times, five times. 

After we prepare the ground, after we talk to everybody, after we 

do everything, if they don’t turn over the guns, do we take away 

the guns? 

I will go to the next question. Obviously we don’t have a plan. 

Drug interdiction. Can you tell us what our efforts are in drug 

interdiction? Are we getting rid of all of the stuff? Are we going in 

and taking it away? We have a lot of money in this budget to take 

it away or whatever it is that we are supposed to do? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Ackerman, you are right. Let me try to answer 

your question very directly. You are exactly right. We have a lot 

of money in this request. We have a lot of money in our regular 

request to deal with this problem of drugs. Drugs are a long-term 

problem. And it is something that needs short-term work that will 

eventually pay off in the long term. 

What needs to be done are three things. You need to have enforcement, you need to have alternative livelihood, and you need to 

have social procedure not to grow opium poppies. And we are pushing on all three of those. 

Last year the British, who are in the lead as you know, on the 

counternarcotics work in all of Afghanistan, we are supporting 

them. Last year they went in and tried to eradicate some fields, 

tried to knock down some poppy fields. 

This program, run by outsiders did not work. President Karzai 

has recognized that that didn’t work, and he has directed his Governors to go through their processes with their forces to eradicate 

fields. That has worked to some degree, not a great degree. It 

needs to be improved. It can be improved and made a success if 

there are alternative livelihoods and if there is enforcement both 

on police, which is a major portion of our request, as well as a judicial system that will focus on this problem. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. President Karzai pressured the British to back 

off of their pilot interdiction effort. Did we step in, or are we relying on President Karzai? And if we are relying on him rather than 

our efforts with all of this money that you are getting to do this, 

how successful are his efforts and why is it that we are not step-
184

ping up to the plate on this as we help in other places and spray 

those fields? 

Mr. TAYLOR. President Karzai asked the British to modify their 

program, and the British have done that. The British, however, 

stay in the lead. The British are not backing off. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The British have abandoned the program, as I 

understand it. 

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir. They have not abandoned the program. 

They are very much in the lead. They are constantly in touch with 

all of their allies, ourselves and others, to continue to focus on 

counternarcotics. So they have not backed down from that commitment, which they continue to do. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The commitment, but not the effort. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Bereuter. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony. I have a 

number of things I want to cover. I will just make a couple of observations at first, especially for the first one, Mr. Rodman. 

With respect to the PRTs that the Germans will be providing, 

one is good news. It is a very large commitment I understand. I 

have had members of the German Bundestag who say it is going 

to the wrong place in Afghanistan. This is a safe area in relative 

terms. I will just bring that to your attention. I don’t expect you 

to comment on it. 

I heard about the 82 percent increases in agriculture production 

in 1 year, Mr. Kunder, but of course it is from what base? I was 

concerned from the beginning that we needed to replace seed stock, 

which was all gone; we needed to replace the breeding stock; and 

we needed to use the food for work program to restore those relatively primitive but important irrigation systems. I hope work has 

been proceeding on that. 

I do know that with respect to opium production, much larger 

crops now than when the Taliban was in control. It is helping to 

destabilize countries further in middle and central Asia. It is, I suspect, arming some of these drug lords. And perhaps some of the socalled warlords are also involved in production, but not all, I think. 

You are setting up a different kind of force in Afghanistan by 

permitting these huge profits to come to these new drug lords or 

reconstituted drug lords. We are not doing well with respect to the 

opium production, and I had hoped that we would be in there very 

early to help farmers have another alternative instead of growing 

poppies. 

I want to come now to Mr. Kunder in particular and to USAID. 

I don’t usually bring up parochial matters, and this one is not in 

my district. When the Soviets took over Afghanistan, in effect, people were surprised to find the biggest center of expertise on Afghanistan was at the University of Nebraska-Omaha. The center 

was participating and, indeed, has been in a lot of programs up to 

this point. 

I think, though, the relationships between USAID and that program have deteriorated dramatically. I know that the head of it is 

a Democrat. I think that shouldn’t be a factor, if it is. Four-fifths 

of the delegation from Nebraska are Republicans. The State has a 
185

predominant party; that is, the Republican party. I hope that partisanship is not a part of cutting off the University of NebraskaOmaha. 

Mr. KUNDER. Not a factor at all, sir. 

Mr. BEREUTER. We have textbooks produced, surprisingly, with 

USAID funds, by UNICEF. I don’t know that we expected that 

USAID would send the money to a U.N.-affiliated organization, despite its reputation, and then they produce textbooks that read 

from front to back and have to be replaced. When you have that 

lack of understanding among the people at UNICEF in terms of 

cultural linguistic understanding—that they don’t know you have 

to have the books that read from the back to the front to go to 

school children, that shows me that was a bad choice to send the 

contract to UNICEF. 

I would like to know for the record, Mr. Kunder, if you would 

provide me the number of employees at Creative Associates that 

are former USAID or State Department personnel. 

Mr. KUNDER. We certainly will. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

I would like to say to my colleagues, and to you gentlemen, that 

I think that we are underfunding our operation in Afghanistan. I 

am very pleased that some adjustments have been made in the reconstruction funds for Iraq by Chairman Kolbe and his bipartisan 

effort in the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Appropriations. 

Some of those very ill-advised items on that lists funds being 

sent to Afghanistan operations instead. I think that is a move in 

the right direction. One, we don’t have to support things that are 

ill advised in that list of reconstruction, but the other was we need 

more funds. 

Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield? We have three 

votes pending: A 15-minute vote, a 5-minute vote, and a 5-minute 

vote on House Resolution 198, concerning debt relief by Russia and 

France. There is a previous question and another vote. So what is 

the disposition of the Committee? Do you want to come back? 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Yes. 

Chairman HYDE. Do you want to come back? 

Mr. BEREUTER. Fine. 

Chairman HYDE. I hate to impose on you. It will be a little bit 

of a wait, but what you are telling us is very important, and so we 

will be back. So we will stand in recess until after the last vote. 

And we will come back as quickly as we can. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I yield back my time, in any case. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. We will stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. I want you 

gentlemen to know that you are here by popular demand, but I 

don’t know where our demand has gone. But we do have one very 

demanding Member, and that is Mr. Menendez whose turn it is to 

interrogate you. So, Mr. Menendez. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

testimony of all of our witnesses. 

Ambassador Rodman, I am concerned about how you characterize the situation in Afghanistan, And I am concerned, because 
186

I think it may be much too much optimistic, as you testified before 

the Committee. You say that the Afghan people face two sources 

of insecurity in your testimony, the operations of the enemy—the 

Taliban, al-Qaeda and spoilers—and as well as the second—the degree of instability caused by the rivalries among warlords. 

Then you go on to say, while we take these challenges seriously, 

neither is a threat to the consolidation of the political process. I 

find that—to make that statement so bluntly, that neither is a 

threat to the consolidation of the political process somewhat flies 

in the face of what I got a sense in the first part of Ambassador 

Taylor’s comments, what I get in the sense of the PRTs not having 

the manpower, when you consider both force protection and patrol 

as part of their total composition, not having the manpower to do 

it. 

I have real problems in seeing that optimistic view when Pakistan does just enough to keep us at bay, but certainly not enough 

for us to be able to win this at the end of the day, when they permit so many of the Taliban fighters in their part of the porous region with Afghanistan. 

And we don’t seem to push them hard enough on that issue, and 

they increasingly allow those Taliban fighters who are ultimately 

shooting at our people, shooting at our people, and maybe they 

have told them now, start shooting at the Afghans so that the pressure gets off. But the reality is, is that that is a huge problem. 

And then I look at Mr. Kunder’s remarks. And while maybe 

there are significant parts in which there is enough security for the 

ability to do reconstruction work and development work, the reality 

is the one area that Karzai needs the most, which is in the 

Pashtun area, that there is no sense of security there whatsoever. 

That is his biggest challenge. 

And then, finally, I look at the what Congressional Research 

Service tells us, that the preliminary assessments that were presented by the UNDP, the World Bank, and the Asian Development 

Bank with reference to reconstruction costs were estimated in Afghanistan to be between $15 billion over the next decade, and then 

that the U.N. and the Afghan Government have reportedly said 

that same $15 billion will be needed over 5 years, over less than 

half—about half of the time that was the originally estimated. Yet, 

only international donor countries have committed nearly 4 billion 

of that, but only 1.7 has been distributed. 

So I look at all of that and I say to myself, as someone who supported that effort originally—because I sit on the west bank of the 

Hudson River and we lost several hundred of our citizens, and I 

clearly believe that Afghanistan was the place, the nexus for the 

terrorism—that we have lost our eyes on the prize here. 

We went to Iraq. And instead of continuing to do the job and cement the elements of what we seeded in Afghanistan, we now have 

a set of circumstances that is far less rosy than you projected. 

So could you speak to the concerns that I have raised on the reality of the PRTs don’t really have the manpower, the realities that 

Pakistan continues to harbor the Taliban in significant ways, and 

that is costing us in terms of lives and in terms of security; the reality that in the Pashtun area we don’t have the security that is 

necessary, which is the key to redevelopment, the key to strength-
187

ening Karzai and a central government? And how can you be, you 

know, somewhat overly optimistic to say these challenges pose no 

threat at the end of the day to the central government? 

Mr. RODMAN. Sir, let me start. When I said neither of these challenges is a threat, I meant neither one of these challenges is going 

to derail what is happening. Maybe I could have been clearer. I 

think both of these challenges are manageable and being managed. 

The Taliban and al-Qaeda would like very much to disrupt everything, but I think they will fail. 

The second issue was the warlord problem. That problem is being 

managed politically. I think it was Mr. Royce who mentioned a 

newspaper article, I think one explanation for that article was that 

some Northern Alliance people are nervous that President Karzai 

is, in fact, asserting his authority more forcefully than before. So 

I think both of these issues are being managed. When I said they 

were not a threat, I don’t think they seriously threaten to undermine what is going on and the progress that is taking place. 

I am sure it will be a good idea to have more PRTs, to expand 

their role. That is also underway. We think the PRTs are a success. 

It is an idea that we had; we were able to field these teams fairly 

quickly. There are four more teams coming on board, maybe five. 

So we think this is a useful device, a valuable device, that serves 

a number of good purposes. We think the German involvement signals a greater international interest in taking on some of the PRTs, 

which is a good sign in itself. 

So it goes back to what we were discussing before. Is the glass 

half empty or half full? We see progress being made. We think the 

direction of events is clear. And there are lots of people trying to 

frustrate it, but we think we are the ones advancing, and the people trying to frustrate it, we think they in turn will be frustrated. 

That is our assessment. It is a judgment call. Maybe it is part 

of our job to be optimistic so that we keep moving and certainly not 

despair at the problems. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may quickly follow up. Pakistan, you didn’t address that. The Taliban, al-Qaeda fighters, we 

know that they are using their borders. We seem to accept them 

doing what is just enough, but clearly not enough, and not enough 

certainly within their capacity. 

So I don’t understand how it is that we expect to not have a longterm conflict under which we are constantly attacked by a porous 

border, that we have a ‘‘ally’’ who is not doing what they need to 

do to engage, and therefore consistently becomes a huge wound 

that will not heal. 

Mr. RODMAN. You earlier used the word ‘‘increasingly.’’ Pakistan 

was ‘‘increasingly’’ not cooperating, or consistently. And I don’t 

think that is the case. I think Pakistan is responding to the pressure we have been putting on them to respond. 

There are a number of difficulties in controlling that border 

which have nothing to do with the good faith of Pakistan. The terrain is horrendous. The population, such as it is, is sympathetic to 

some of these terrorists. 

These are areas that, you know, have never been governed from 

the capital, even from British times. 
188

Mr. MENENDEZ. So you believe that the Pakistani Government——

Mr. RODMAN. We credit the good faith of the Pakistan leadership, 

particularly the President. There are obviously elements in the 

Pakistan Government who are still maybe sympathetic to the old 

policy of 2 years ago. So there may be elements that are sympathetic to the bad guys. But we credit the Pakistan Government, the 

military. We have had the Chairman of their Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Committee here this week. 

We talk to the Pakistan military all of the time. They say they 

understand their interest the same way that we understand ours: 

The destabilization of Afghanistan is a threat to them. So they tell 

us they understand the necessity to get more control over the border. And in the past week, we saw a very effective operation 

against Taliban in Waziristan. We think that is a good sign. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Do you believe, Mr. Secretary, that they are 

doing everything that they could within their power to do, yes or 

no? 

Mr. RODMAN. It is hard to assess given the inherent difficulty of 

doing it. We credit their good faith. And they have done a number 

of things that are very valuable to us—catching some al-Qaeda 

leaders, and the operation recently which was the most successful 

operation of that kind. 

Mr. TAYLOR. If I can just add to what Mr. Rodman says, because 

I agree with that. Secretary Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State 

Armitage was just in Islamabad. He was in Kabul and Kandahar 

but also in Islamabad this last week. 

And he had the conversation, exactly as Mr. Rodman said, which 

we have had before with the officials in Islamabad about cooperation with the United States, cooperation with the Afghans. And 

there are some institutions that have those three components: Afghan, Pakistan, and the United States. 

But Secretary Armitage came away from these discussions convinced that the Pakistanis are now on the right track, they are 

going in the right direction. This operation that Mr. Rodman just 

mentioned last week where the Pakistanis had people killed, they 

went into areas where no Pakistan, or indeed British, going back 

into the 1800s military forces, have ever been. 

So they are now, according to Secretary Armitage, on the right 

track. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I might have one last question. 

Mr. Kunder, how about the shortfall in the goal that is established by everyone as what is necessary for Afghan reconstruction 

and the internal donors’ shortfall in terms of both that which they 

have committed and that which they have actually dispensed within the context of what they have committed. Lastly, how about that 

part about the Pashtun area, where there isn’t security, and where 

you need some of the greatest redevelopment and buy-in in order 

for the central government to be able to sustain themselves? 

Mr. KUNDER. These are all fair questions, sir. The brief answer 

is, first of all to establish a baseline, there was a very preliminary 

World Bank assessment mission that was done early last year. I 

was there on the ground when they showed up. That was the one 

that gives you the 10 to $15 billion reconstruction estimates over 
189

a decade. Then there was the Tokyo pledge number where the donors got together in Tokyo and came up with that approximately 

$4 billion, which was some countries pledged for 1 year, some countries pledged for 3 years, but it was a much shorter time frame. 

At that conference the U.S. pledged 873 million. We have far ex- ceeded that, already having spent, $960-some million in Afghanistan on reconstruction alone, nonsecurity issues. 

So I think part of the discussion is there are different bases, different time lines. But in general to your point, I take your point 

is that we could use more reconstruction resources in Afghanistan. 

I think the President’s request for the additional billion dollars, 

which I believe the Congress will be supportive of, is in fact a recognition that we have found that we can use more reconstruction 

dollars in Afghanistan. 

We have also gone to our—repeatedly through he Department of 

State—to the other donors and said, we need you to ratchet up 

what you pledged in Tokyo as well. That has yielded only partial 

results so far. 

So can we use more dollars? Yes, sir. Are we asking for more dollars? Yes. 

I also believe that this is going to be a long-term reconstruction 

project that is not going to be finished in the next couple of years. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Bereuter. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further 

questions. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Well, I want to thank our three witnesses. You have been excellent. You have been instructive, illuminating, and long suffering. Thank you. 

The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(191)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICK SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2002 (AFSA)

Mr. Chairman, though other issues such as Iraq or the Mid-East Peace Process 

may have captured most of our attention over the last several months, it is important for us to pick up the discussion that we began in June of this year, assessing 

the effectiveness of United Nations efforts in Afghanistan and exploring what can 

be done better. 

The U.N. has left much to be desired in their management of rebuilding and reorganization of government in Bosnia. In Afghanistan, security continues to suffer in 

areas outside of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or Afghan National 

Army (ANA) patrols. With NATO’s assumption of command in August and the contribution of significant numbers of German and Canadian troops, there is renewed 

interest by Afghani and United Nations officials in expanding the ISAF to cities outside of Kabul. Germany has agreed to send 450 additional troops to expand the 

ISAF to Konduz, but further expansion could require anywhere between 2,000 and 

10,000 additional troops. The force currently consists of about 5,500 international 

troops. Expansion of this international force would be of great benefit, but it remains to be seen whether the U.N. and international community can deliver the 

number of troops that they advocate. 

Meanwhile, efforts to train recruits for the Afghan National Army continue to 

move forward with the help of the British and French. The central government can 

currently call upon 5,500 Afghani soldiers and 9,000 more should graduate from 

training around the time of next year’s elections. Still, the targeted troop strength 

of 70,000 men is several years off. Concurrent with these efforts, the Japanese and 

United Nations are attempting to reduce the number of unemployed or regionally 

controlled militiamen. These efforts have been delayed by regional concerns over the 

predominantly Tajik composition of the Ministry of Defense, but hopefully recent reforms and reassignment of senior defense positions will reinvigorate these efforts. 

Finally, the American security presence in Afghanistan is still predominant with 

9,000 American troops in the area including Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs) of 60–100 troops each deployed to protect reconstruction workers and create 

safe-havens for political and infrastructure building projects. 

While these international, Afghan, and American efforts to improve security continue, the critical political building process continues to proceed. The loya jirga (traditional Afghan assembly) tasked with drafting a national constitution expects to 

unveil its product publicly by the end of this month. We are still optimistic that 

elections will take place sometime after June of next year. I understand the Administration is considering 120 U.S. officials to Afghanistan to advise Afghani counterparts on running the various ministries of the national government more efficiently. 

On the floor today, we are also including $1.2 billion in the Emergency Supplemental to bolster American reconstruction efforts in the country. 

Still, we hear reports of Afghanis becoming frustrated with the pace of reconstruction. There is no doubt in my mind that the situation for the majority of Afghanis 

has improved tremendously since December of 2001 when the Taliban was toppled 

from power. Still, we have to ask whether their lives are continuing to improve and 

whether their country is continuing to proceed toward stability at an adequate pace? 

I thank the witnesses for coming today to share their insight on how we can improve the process and possibly speed up the pace of reconstruction efforts. Is there 

a way to improve security outside of the initiatives that are already underway? How 
192

significant are reports of Afghanis returning to poppy cultivation and other illicit 

activities? Is the reliance on international humanitarian aid creating a culture of 

dependence among ordinary Afghanis? Is the pace of efforts to rebuild roads, water 

systems, and other infrastructure enabling Afghanis to return to agricultural and 

other constructive pursuits or are we failing to empower the population to provide 

for themselves in a timely manner? 

I look forward to hearing the witnesses thoughts on these issues and I thank the 

Speaker for yielding me this time. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Chairman Hyde, I would like to thank you for convening this hearing today on 

such an important issue. 

As we all know, prompted by the horrific attacks of September 11th, the U.S.-led 

war in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, and by mid-November the Taliban 

had lost control of most of the country. Despite this defeat, however, Taliban groups 

reportedly continue to operate in Afghanistan, mostly in the southeast, targeting 

U.S. and Afghan forces and creating continuing insecurity. 

I would like to commend the United Nations Security Council for passing a resolution to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) outside of Kabul. 

The 33-nation force under NATO command may soon expand to several major cities. 

I have seen firsthand the suffering of the Afghan people while visiting Kabul and 

refugee camps in Pakistan in early 2002. Afghans who continue to face threats due 

to a lack of security and food shortages as a result of twenty-two years of war desperately need our help. 

The unveiling of the draft constitution for public discussion is expected to go forward by late October 2003, and it is imperative that this new constitution protect 

all ethnic and religious minorities in order for the government to be seen as legitimate. 

I am concerned, however, by the lag in reconstruction due to pressing humanitarian issues. 

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mostly based in Kabul, have large overhead costs to due security needs, and most Afghans are not seeing a significant 

change in their living conditions. For this change to happen, the United States 

should support, promote, and encourage NGOs that are currently working outside 

of the capital city. 

Reconstruction needs to move forward aggressively in order to help stabilize the 

central government by bringing credibility and credit to them for key projects. This 

will also help undermine the power of warlords who remain in control of much of 

the country and stop the spread of pro-Taliban elements. 

Most importantly, certain sectors need to be developed immediately—electricity, 

water sources, roads (both large and secondary in addition to market roads to help 

increase economic activity and commerce), and security. 

We must also reallocate our resources to maximize their efficiency. For example, 

the U.S. military would be better used in large-scale reconstruction projects, such 

as roads, versus building schools. NGOs already on the ground are capable of building schools, but cannot undertake large-scale projects. 

Tangible reconstruction successes are vital in order to meet the U.S. objective of 

a stable and democratic Afghanistan, and the Afghan objective of a government with 

recognized legitimacy throughout the nation. 

As the Congress moves forward with the FY04 Supplemental, we must keep this 

in mind. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity today to hear testimony from the Mr. 

William B. Taylor, Jr., Mr. Peter W. Rodman, and Mr. James Kunder.

Æ