### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs M

arch 18, 1999
CALVIN EASLEY v. JAMES BRITT
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 97-2368-II Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor

No. M1998-00971-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 16, 2001

This appeal involves a

dispute between a

pris oner and the Tennessee Department of Correction stemming from a

disciplinary proceeding. After he was reclassified to a higher security status and transferred to another institution, the prisoner filed a petition fo

r writ of common-la

w certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County claiming that the disciplinary board and the warden had acted arbitrar

ily and capriciou

sly by finding him

guilty of the disciplinary offense of escape. The trial court dismis sed the petitio n, and the prisone

r perfected an

appeal to this cour

t. While this appeal was pending, the p risoner was rele

ased from prison t

hereby render

ing this appea l moot. Accordingly, we vacate the June 12, 1998 order and remand the case

to the trial court with directions to dismiss it on the grounds of mootness. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated and Remanded

W ILLIAM C. K OCH , J R ., J., delivered th e opinion of the co

urt, in which B EN H. C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S., and W ILLIAM B. C AIN , J., joined. Calvin Easley, Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor Genera

l; and Sohnia W. Hong, Assistant A

ttorney Genera

l, for the appelle

e James Britt.
OPINION

I.

Calvin Easley was convicted of ro bbery an d sentenced to the custody of the Tennessee Department

of Correction for twenty years. On April 2, 1997, he was incarce rated at the Nash

ville Community Service Ce

nter (“NCSC”) an

d was participati

ng inthe work release program. He left the facility at the ap

pointed time that da

y; however, he fa

iled to return at the appointed time. Mr. Easley returned to the facility approximately nine hours late.-2-

The Department cha

rged Mr. Easley w

ith the disciplinar

y offense of escape. A

disciplinary boardconvened

at the NCSC conducted a hearing and on April 10, 1997, found Mr. Easley guilty of the d isciplinary offense of escape. Based on the board’s recommendations, the warden of the NCSC removed Mr. Easley from the w ork release pro

gram. The Department also reclassified Mr. Easley from minimum securi ty to medium security status. Because the NCSC was a minimum security facility, the Department also transferred Mr. Easley to the South Centra l Corre ctional Facility in Clifton.

Mr. Easley exhausted

his administrative appeals regarding the discipline he received, and on July 15, 1997, he filed a pro se petition for writ of common-law certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, alleging that the disciplinary board had acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it foundhim guilty of escape. On June 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed Mr. Easley’s petition after finding that the record contained material evidence supporting the disciplinary board’s decision that Mr. Easley was gui

lty of the disciplina

ry offense of es

cape. Mr. Easle

y appealed to this c

ourt.
After both parties filed their briefs, the clerk of the court received a change of

address notice from Mr. Easley indicating that he was living at an addressin Nashville that di d not correspond w

ith t he addre ss of any of the Department’s facilities. Because neither Mr. Easley nor the Attorney General had

provided this court with information regarding Mr. Easley’s current status, this court ascertained

that Mr. Easley had actually been released from prison on September 21, 1999, having served his sentence. We take notice of the change in Mr. Easley’s status as a post-judgment fa

ct in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 14.

II.

When Mr. Easley filed this appeal, his purpose was to convince this c ourt that we should vacate the trial court’s

dismissal of his

petition for common

-law writ of cer

tiorari and that w

e should sendthe case back to

the trial court to determine whether the disciplinary board had acted arbitrar

ily andcapriciously. The ultimate relief he sought was to cle

ar his disciplinar

y record so

that he could return to his minimum securit y classification a

nd could be place

d back in the work release program at the NCSC for the remainder of his sentence. Mr. Ea

sley’s release

calls the justicia

bility of this case into question.

The courts, being ca

reful stewards o

f their power, ha

ve developed var

ious justiciability principles to serve as guidelines for determining whether providing judicial relief in a particular cas

e is warranted. To b

e justiciable , a case must i nvolve presently existing rights, live issues that are within a court’s power to resolve, and parties who have a legally cognizable interest in the resolution of these issues. A case is not justiciabl e i f it does not involve a genuine, existin

g controversy requiring the adjudication of presently existing rights. State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. , 18 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Te

nn. 2000); State ex rel. Lewis v. State , 208 Tenn. 534, 537, 347 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1961); Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay , 984 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

The requirements for litigation to continue are essentially the same as the requirements for litiga tion to be gin. Charter Lakeside Behavioral Health Sys. v. Tennessee Health Facilities1 The courts have reco gnized several ex ceptions to the m ootness doctrine. Exercisin g their discre tion, McIntyre

v. Traughber , 884 S.W .2d at 137 ; Dockery v. D ockery , 559 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), they have declined to dismiss cases wh en the issue involves importa nt public in terests, whe n the issue is important t o the adminis

trati on of justi ce, andwhen a n issue is cap able of rep etition but w ill evade jud icial review

. State ex rel Angli n v. Mitchell , 596 S.W.2d 779, 78 2 (Tenn . 1980); New R iviera Arts Theatre v . State , 219 Tenn. 652, 658, 412 S.W.2d 8 90, 893 (1967); LaRo uche v. C rowell , 709 S.W .2d 585 , 587-88 (Tenn. C t. App. 19 85).
-3- Comm’n , M1998-00985-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 72342, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application fi led) . Thus, cases must remain justiciable throughout the entire
course of the litigation, including the appe al. State v. Ely , 48 S.W.3d 710, 716 n.3 (Tenn. 2001); Cashion v. Robertson , 955 S.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Tenn . Ct . App. 1997). A moot case is one that has lost its justiciability be

cause it no longer

presents a

present, live controversy. McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631, 637, 188 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1945); County of Shelby v. McWherter , 936 S.W.2d 923, 931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); McIntyre v. Traughber , 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Ten n. C t. App. 1994). Thus, a case will be considered moot if it no longer serve s as a means to provide some sort of judicial relief to

the prevailing party. Knott v. Stewart County , 185 Tenn. 623, 626, 207 S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1948); Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay , 984 S.W.2d at 616; Massengill v. Mass engill , 36 Tenn. App. 385, 388-89, 255 S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (1952).

Determ in ing whether a case or an issue has become moot is a question of law. Charter Lakeside Behavioral Health Sys. v. Tennessee Health Facilities Comm’n , 2001 WL 72342, at *5 ; Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging Co. , No. M1999-00943-COA-R3-CV, 1999 WL 1040544, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1999) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 applicat ion filed). Thus, unless the case fits within one of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine, 1 the courts will ordinarily vacate the judgme

nt and remand the c

ase to the tria

l court with directions that it be dismissed. Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay , 984 S.W.2d at 617; M cIn tyre v. Traughber , 884 S.W.2d at 138.

The relief that Mr. Easley seeks – reclassification to minimum security status – can no longer have any practical effect on his present rights and privileges now that he is back in free society. There is no relief that th

e courtscan grant Mr. Easley if he were to prevail in this case. Accordingly, we find that the iss

ues Mr. Easley ra

ises on this appeal

are moot.
III.

In accordance with our finding that this ap peal became moot as a result of Mr. Easley’s release from custody, we vacate the June 12, 1998 order and remand the case with directions that Mr. Easley’s petition be dismisse d on the grounds of m

ootness. We tax the costs of this appeal to Calvin Easley for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

___________________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE