United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Science, 

Technology, and Space, Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

United States Senate 

For Release on Delivery 


Expected at 2:00 p.m., EST 


Wednesday, October 29, 2003 NASA


Shuttle Fleet’s Safe Return 

to Flight Is Key to Space 

Station Progress 

Statement of Allen Li, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

GAO-04-201T 

Highlights of GAO-04-201T, 


a testimony before the Subcommittee on 


Science, Technology, and Space,


Committee on Commerce, Science, and 


Transportation, U.S. Senate 


Since its inception, the 

International Space Station has 

experienced numerous problems 

that have resulted in significant 

cost growth and assembly schedule 

slippages. Following the Columbia 

accident and the subsequent 

grounding of the shuttle fleet in 

February 2003, concerns about the 

future of the space station 

escalated, as the fleet has been key 

to the station’s assembly and 

operations. 

In August 2003, the Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board drew 

a causal link between aggressive 

space station goals—supported by 

the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s (NASA) current 

culture—and the accident. 

Specifically, the Board reported 

that, in addition to technical 

failures, Columbia’s safety was 

compromised in part by internal 

pressures to meet an ambitious 

launch schedule to achieve certain 

space station milestones. 

This testimony discusses the 

implications of the shuttle fleet’s 

grounding on the space station’s 

schedule and cost, and on the 

program’s partner funding and 

agreements—findings we reported 

on in September 2003. The 

testimony also proposes a 

framework for providing NASA and 

the Congress with a means to bring 

about and assess needed cultural 

changes across the agency. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-201T. 

To view the full product, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact Allen Li 

at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. 

October 29, 2003 

NASA 

Shuttle Fleet's Safe Return to Flight Is 

Key to Space Station Progress 

Since the grounding of the shuttle fleet last February, the space station has 

been in a survival mode. Due to the limited payload capacity of the Russian 

launch vehicles—which the program must now rely on to transport crew and 

supplies to and from the station—on-orbit assembly is at a standstill and onboard research has been limited. Moreover, certain safety concerns on 

board the station cannot be corrected until the shuttle fleet returns to flight. 

For example, NASA has had to delay plans to fly additional shielding to 

protect the on-orbit Russian Service Module from space debris—a risk that 

increases each year the shielding is not installed. 

To date, NASA has not fully estimated the increased costs and future budget 

impact incurred due to the grounding of the space shuttle fleet. However, it 

projects that additional costs of maintaining the space station while the 

shuttle fleet is grounded will reach almost $100 million for fiscal years 2003 

and 2004. It has also identified a number of factors that will affect costs— 

including the need to extend contracts to complete development and 

assembly of the station. Delays in completing the assembly of the station— 

which will be at least 2 years—are likely to incur significant additional 

program costs. At the same time, partner funding is uncertain, which may 

result in NASA paying a larger share of certain program costs. 

Although the full impact of the shuttle fleet’s grounding on the space station 

is still unknown, it is clear that the station’s future is dependent on the 

shuttle fleet’s return to flight. NASA must carefully weigh this future against 

the risks inherent in its current culture. As we reported early this year, 

NASA’s organization and culture has repeatedly undermined the agency’s 

ability to achieve its mission. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

similarly found that NASA’s history and culture have been detrimental to the 

shuttle fleet’s safety and that needed improvements at NASA go beyond 

technical enhancements and procedural modifications. The cultural change 

required for NASA to consider the numerous technical and administrative 

recommendations made by the Board could be the agency’s greatest 

challenge to date. 

In an effort to . help NASA as it undergoes this change—and the Congress as 

it assesses NASA’s future corrective actions—we have provided a 

framework for establishing appropriate operating principles and values and 

program direction, securing and maintaining a sufficient and skilled 

workforce, establishing proper performance targets, and ensuring adequate 

monitoring. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges facing the 

International Space Station in the wake of the Columbia accident. The 

grounding of the shuttle fleet this past February escalated concerns about 

the future of the space station—which, since its inception, has 

experienced numerous problems that have resulted in significant cost 

growth and assembly schedule slippages. The shuttle fleet has been key to 

the station’s assembly and operations, and without it, the program must 

rely on Russian launch vehicles to transport crew and supplies to and from 

the station. As requested, my testimony today will discuss the implications 

of the shuttle fleet’s grounding on the space station’s schedule and cost 

and on the program’s partner funding and agreements—findings we 

reported on to the full Committee in September 2003.1 

You asked how the Congress can assess the cultural changes that the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is considering as 

the agency proceeds with its efforts to safely return the shuttle fleet to 

flight. As you know, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board reported 

in August 2003 that in addition to technical failures, Columbia’s safety was 

compromised in part by the shuttle program’s fluctuating priorities and 

arbitrary schedule pressures to achieve certain space station milestones.2 

The Board characterized NASA’s emphasis on maintaining the launch 

schedule to support construction of the station as a “line in the sand” and 

found evidence that structural inspection requirements for the shuttle 

were reduced and other requirements were deferred in order to meet an 

ambitious schedule. NASA’s recent revision to its return to flight plan 

recognizes that to ensure safety in all its programs, a cultural change is 

needed across the agency. Today, I am proposing a framework intended to 

provide NASA and the Congress with a means to assess cultural change in 

the context of NASA’s overall mission. 

In summary, the grounding of the shuttle fleet last February has basically 

put the space station in a survival mode. Due to the limited payload 

capacity of the Russian launch vehicles, on-orbit assembly is at a standstill 

and on-board research has been limited. Moreover, certain safety concerns 

on board the station cannot be corrected until the shuttle fleet returns to 

1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Station: Impact of the Grounding of the Shuttle 

Fleet, GAO-03-1107 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.12, 2003). 

2

 Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2003). 

Page 1 GAO-04-201T 
flight. NASA estimates that additional costs of maintaining the space 

station while the shuttle fleet is grounded will reach almost $100 million 

for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. However, significant additional program 

costs are likely to be incurred because completing assembly of the station 

will be delayed by at least 2 years. At the same time, partner funding is 

uncertain—which may result in NASA paying a larger share of certain 

program costs—and partner agreement on the final station configuration 

has been delayed by approximately one year. 

While the space station’s future is clearly dependent on the shuttle fleet’s 

return to flight, NASA must carefully weigh this future against the risks 

inherent in its current culture. As we reported in January 2003, NASA’s 

management challenges and risks reflect a deeper need for broad cultural 

change to eliminate organizational stovepipes and hierarchy, which have 

repeatedly undermined the agency’s ability to achieve its mission.3

 The 

Columbia Accident Investigation Board similarly found in its August 2003 

report that NASA’s history and culture resulted in organizational practices 

that have been detrimental to the shuttle fleet’s safety. The cultural sea 

change required for NASA to consider the numerous technical and 

administrative recommendations made by the Board could be the agency’s 

greatest challenge to date. In an effort to help NASA as it undergoes a 

cultural change—and the Congress as it assesses NASA’s future corrective 

actions—we have provided a framework for establishing appropriate 

operating principles and values and program direction, securing and 

maintaining a sufficient and skilled workforce, establishing proper 

performance targets, and ensuring adequate monitoring. 

Background 	 In 1998, NASA and its international partners—Canada, Europe, Japan, and 

Russia—began on-orbit assembly of the International Space Station, 

envisioned as a permanently orbiting laboratory for conducting materials 

and life sciences research and earth observations under nearly weightless 

conditions. The International Space Station program has three key goals: 

(1) maintain a permanent human presence in space, (2) conduct worldclass research in space, and (3) enhance international cooperation and 

U.S. leadership through international development and operations of the 

3

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-03-114 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 2003). 

Page 2 GAO-04-201T 
space station. Each of the partners is to provide hardware and crew, and 

each is expected to share operating costs and use of the station.4 

Since October 2000, the space station has been permanently occupied by 

two or three crewmembers, who maintain and operate the station and 

conduct hands-on scientific research. The space station is composed of 

numerous modules, including solar arrays for generating electricity, 

remote manipulator systems, and research facilities. The station is being 

designed as a laboratory in space for conducting experiments in near-zero 

gravity. Life sciences research on how humans adapt to long durations in 

space, biomedical research, and materials-processing research on new 

materials or processes are under way or planned. In addition, the station 

will be used for various earth science and observation activities. Figure 1 

shows the International Space Station on orbit. 

4

 In 1996, NASA and the Russian Aviation and Space Agency signed a “balance protocol” 

listing the services that each side would provide to the other during assembly and 

operations. 

Page 3 GAO-04-201T 
Figure 1: International Space Station On Orbit 

Since fiscal year 1985, the Congress has appropriated a total of about 

$32 billion for the program. When the station’s current design was 

approved in 1993, NASA estimated that its cost would be $17.4 billion.5

 By 

1998, that estimate had increased to $26.4 billion. In January 2001, NASA 

announced that an additional $4 billion in funding over a 5-year period 

would be required to complete the station’s assembly and sustain its 

operations. By May 2001, that estimated cost growth increased to 

$4.8 billion. In an effort to control space station costs, the administration 

announced in its February 2001 Budget Blueprint that it would cancel or 

defer some hardware and limit construction of the space station at a stage 

the administration calls “core complete.” 

In November 2001, the International Space Station Management and Cost 

Evaluation Task Force—appointed by the NASA Administrator—made a 

number of recommendations to get costs under control. NASA 

implemented most of the recommendations, and the task force reported in 

December 2002 that significant progress had been made in nearly all 

5

 All amounts are stated in current-year dollars. 

Page 4 GAO-04-201T 
Grounding of the 

Shuttle Fleet Will 

Result in Additional 

Schedule Delays and 

Cost 

aspects of the program, including establishing a new management 

structure and strategy, program planning and performance monitoring 

processes, and metrics. NASA was postured to see results of this progress 

and to verify the sufficiency of its fiscal year 2003 budget to provide for the 

core complete version of the station when the Columbia accident 

occurred. 

With the shuttle fleet grounded, NASA is heavily dependent on its 

international partners—especially Russia—for operations and logistics 

support for the space station. However, due to the limited payload 

capacity of the Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly has been halted. 

The program’s priority has shifted from station construction and research 

to maintenance and safety, but these areas have also presented significant 

challenges and could further delay assembly of the core complete 

configuration. While NASA maintains that its fiscal year 2004 budget will 

remain unchanged, the schedule delays that have resulted from the 

grounding of the shuttle fleet will come at a cost. 

Program’s Priority Has 

Shifted From Station 

Construction and Research 

to Maintenance and Safety 

The space shuttle fleet has been the primary means to launch key 

hardware to the station because of its larger payload capacity. With the 

shuttle fleet grounded, current space station operations are solely 

dependent on the Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles. Because the 

payload capacity of the Soyuz and Progress vehicles are significantly less 

than that of the U.S. shuttle fleet,6 operations are generally limited to 

rotating crew and transporting food, potable water,7

 and other items to the 

station. The Russian vehicles are also used for logistics support. 

On-orbit assembly of the station has effectively ceased. Prior to the 

Columbia accident, NASA had planned to assemble the core complete 

configuration of the station by February 2004. NASA officials estimate that 

assembly delays will be at least a “month for month” slip from the previous 

schedule, depending on the frequency of flights when the shuttles resume 

operations. Assuming a return to flight around fall 2004, the core complete 

configuration would not be assembled before early 2006. 

6

 At about 36,000 pounds, the shuttle’s payload capacity is roughly 7 times that of Russia’s 

Progress vehicle and almost 35 times the payload capacity of its Soyuz vehicle. 

7

 Potable water is a constraint to sustaining station operations. For example, crewmembers 

currently have a limit of two liters of water per day per crewmember. 

Page 5 GAO-04-201T 
While the space station crew’s primary responsibility is to perform routine 

maintenance, the two crewmembers on board will conduct some research, 

according to an interim space station research plan developed by NASA. 

However, due to the grounding of the shuttle fleet and the station’s 

reliance on the Russian vehicles, this research will be curtailed. For 

example: 

• 	 Outfitting of U.S. research facilities halted: Currently, 7 of the 20 planned 

research facilities are on orbit. With the fleet grounded, three major 

research facilities—which, according to NASA, complete the outfitting of 

the U.S. laboratory—could not be launched in March of this year, as 

planned.8

 At this time, it remains unknown when the full configuration of 

the 20 research facilities will be on board the station. 

• 	 Existing hardware failures: Because new and additional hardware cannot 

be transported, NASA has to rely more heavily on existing on-orbit science 

facilities—facilities that have already experienced some failures. For 

example, the refrigerator-freezers on board the station, which serve as the 

main cold storage units, have failed several times, according to NASA 

officials. A larger cold temperature facility was one of three facilities that 

had been planned for launch in March 2003. 

• 	 Limited science material: Currently, there are very limited allocations for 

science materials to be transported to or from the space station by the 

Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles.9

 According to NASA officials, they 

plan to send about 93 kilograms (just over 200 pounds) of science material 

to the station on the next Progress vehicle scheduled for launch in January 

2004. However, returning samples from investigations will be delayed until 

the shuttle fleet returns to flight because of the Soyuz’s limited storage 

capacity. 

NASA also cannot resolve known safety concerns on board the station 

while the shuttle fleet is grounded. For example, NASA has had to delay 

plans to fly additional shielding to protect the on-orbit Russian Service 

Module from space debris—a risk that increases each year the shielding is 

not installed. NASA is studying alternatives for launching and installing the 

debris protection panels earlier than currently planned. In addition, a 

failed on-orbit gyro—one of four that maintains the station’s orbital 

8

 The research facilities that were packed in a logistics module awaiting launch had to be 

removed from the flight module and serviced. 

9

 Currently, science material is flown on a space and weight available basis. For example, if 

food or other life support items were not depleted between flights, science material might 

be transported. 

Page 6 GAO-04-201T 
stability and control—remains on board because the shuttle flight that was 

to carry a replacement gyro to the station and return the failed unit for 

detailed analysis was planned for March of this year—1 month after the 

grounding of the shuttle fleet. 

Cost Implications Have Yet 

to Be Determined, but 

Increases Are Likely 

Uncertainty of the 

Shuttle’s Return-toFlight Date Delays 

Partner Agreements 

To date, NASA has not fully estimated the potential increased costs and 

future budget impact incurred due to the grounding of the space shuttle 

fleet. However, it has identified a number of factors that will likely result 

in increased costs—including the need to extend contracts to complete 

development and assembly of the station. 

NASA has requested $1.71 billion for fiscal year 2004 for the space station. 

The request is based, in part, on near completion of the hardware 

development for the U.S. core configuration and the transition to on-orbit 

operations. Soon after the Columbia accident, NASA stated that it would 

maintain budget requests at current levels until the shuttle returns to 

flight. NASA estimates the impact to the station program from the 

Columbia accident to be $22 million in fiscal year 2003 and up to 

$72 million in fiscal year 2004. NASA maintains that an assessment of total 

impact cannot be accomplished prior to the fiscal year 2006 budget 

submission in February 2005. 

However, the considerable uncertainty about when the shuttle will return 

to flight, what the payload capability will be, and how many flights can be 

achieved each year greatly impact the total cost to the station program. 

NASA anticipates that by keeping a crew on board the station while the 

shuttle fleet is grounded and the continued development of space station 

hardware will incur additional costs. For example, NASA officials told us 

there are approximately 80,000 pounds of hardware at Kennedy Space 

Station ready for integration to the space station and another 106,000 

pounds there being processed. 

While long-term plans are not well defined at this time, alternative funding 

may be needed to sustain the station—let alone achieve the station’s 

intended goals. International agreements governing the space station 

partnership specify that the space agencies of the United States, Canada, 

Europe, and Japan are responsible for funding the operations and 

maintenance of the elements that each contributes, the research activities 

each conducts, and a share of common operating costs. Under current 

planning, NASA will fund the entire cost of common supplies and ground 

operations, then be reimbursed by the other partners for their shares. 

Page 7 GAO-04-201T 
Proposed Framework 

for Guiding and 

Assessing Cultural 

Change 

Depending on contributions made by the partners while the shuttle fleet is 

grounded, the share that each partner contributes to the common 

operations costs may have to be adjusted and could result in NASA’s 

paying a larger share of those costs. For example, the European 

Automated Transfer Vehicle is scheduled to begin flying in September 

2004. If that vehicle takes on a larger role in supporting the station than 

currently planned, the European share of common operations costs could 

be reduced with the other partners paying more. 

At the same time, NASA and its partners must develop a plan for 

assembling the partners’ modules and reaching agreement on the final 

station configuration. Prior to the Columbia accident, options for the final 

on-orbit configuration were being studied, and a decision was planned for 

December 2003. NASA officials told us the process has been delayed, and 

NASA and its partners agreed on a program action plan in October 2003 

that will ultimately lead to an agreement on the final on-orbit configuration 

in December 2004. 

Clearly, the space station’s future is dependent on the shuttle fleet’s safe 

return to flight. In the past, we have reported on challenges facing NASA’s 

shuttle program—especially in maintaining an adequate shuttle 

workforce.10 In January 2003, we reported that NASA needed to shift its 

overall orientation from processes to results, organizational stovepipes to 

matrixes, management hierarchy and control to flatter structures and 

employee empowerment, and reactive behavior to proactive approaches. 

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s report and 

recommendations similarly indicate that needed improvements to the 

shuttle program go beyond technical enhancements and procedural 

modifications. Specifically, the Board found that despite several schedule 

slippages and rapidly diminishing schedule margins, NASA remained 

committed to 10 shuttle launches in less than 16 months to achieve the 

space station’s core complete status by February 2004—a target date set in 

mid 2001. According to the Board, this schedule-driven environment 

influenced managers’ decisions about the potential risks to the shuttle if a 

piece of foam struck the orbiter—an event that had occurred during an 

October 2002 shuttle flight and one that was ultimately identified as the 

technical cause behind Columbia’s breakup. The Board concluded that 

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade 

Challenges Require Continued Attention, GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 15, 2000). 

Page 8 GAO-04-201T 
cultural issues—including lapses in leadership and communication, a 

dogged “can do” attitude, and reliance on past successes—were critical 

factors that contributed to the accident. 

In its September 8, 2003, response to the Board’s findings,11 NASA stated 

that it would pursue an in-depth assessment to identify and define areas 

where the agency’s culture can be improved and take aggressive action.” 

NASA indicated that it would take actions to achieve several goals: 

• 	 Create a culture that values effective communication and remove barriers 

to the expression of dissenting views. 

• 	 Increase its focus on the human element of change management and 

organizational development. 

• 	 Ensure that existing procedures are complete, accurate, fully understood, 

and followed. 

• 	 Create a robust system that institutionalizes checks and balances to 

ensure the maintenance of the agency’s technical and safety standards. 

Most recently, on October 15, 2003, NASA indicated that the agency is also 

assessing if cultural change is needed agency-wide. However, the agency 

offered no further details beyond its previous commitments. 

As NASA works to change its culture, and as the Congress assesses the 

adequacy of NASA’s corrective actions, applying a framework could prove 

beneficial. Such a framework should recognize NASA’s operating 

principles and values, describe the direction of NASA’s programs, focus 

attention on securing and maintaining skills for its employees, provide 

safety targets, show key results, and acknowledge the importance of 

internal and external review. The following framework—similar in 

concept to GAO’s framework for ensuring the quality of its work—is 

anchored in four main areas: leadership, human capital, program 

performance, and monitoring and review. 

11 See NASA, NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Station Return to Flight and Beyond 

(Oct., 2003). 

Page 9 GAO-04-201T 
Figure 2: Framework for Quality 

• 	 Leadership: The leadership anchor encompasses the agency’s core 

values, including safety as NASA’s highest priority; and the expectations 

that top management sets, such as stressing the importance of character, 

integrity, and support of safety assurance measures. This anchor also 

stresses the need to encourage staff to raise safety concerns, regardless of 

the staff member’s formal organizational relationships or job 

responsibilities. Strategic planning and stakeholder consultation have 

importance only if championed by NASA’s leadership. The leadership 

anchor helps address the question “What do we do?” 

• 	 Human Capital: Securing and assigning skilled staff, understanding shortand long-term skill deficiencies, establishing and maintaining skills, as well 

as assessing individual employee performance are major components of a 

comprehensive human capital anchor. NASA’s efforts at developing a 

strategic human capital plan and legislative proposals related to human 

capital would be included in this anchor. The human capital anchor helps 

address the question “Who will do it?” 

Page 10 GAO-04-201T 
• 	 Program Performance: While the primary focus of program performance 

is often related to mission-related activities, such as flight processing and 

major modifications, effective program performance also measures results 

achieved, oversight of contractors, infrastructure maintenance, and sound 

financial management to provide decision makers with accurate 

information with which to make resource tradeoffs and long-term 

investments. The program performance anchor helps address the question 

“How do we translate what we do into processes and procedures—that is, 

how do we operationalize our work?” 

• 	 Monitoring and Review: The oversight and enforcement of safety is a 

shared responsibility between program officials, Associate Administrators, 

the NASA Administrator, and independent groups such as non-advocate 

reviews and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. The monitoring and 

review anchor helps address the question “How is this reinforced?” 

We believe this framework can serve to identify the priorities agency 

leadership must communicate, the human capital activities needed to 

ensure that expected employee performance is achieved, the safety 

processes and procedures that need to be operationalized as part of 

program performance, and the scope of enforcement responsibilities. As 

such, use of this framework can help the Congress monitor the corrective 

actions NASA will undertake to strengthen the agency’s culture. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 

answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may 

have. 

Contact and Acknowledgments 

For future information, please contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or 

lia@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

include Jerry Herley, James Beard, Rick Cederholm, and Karen Sloan. 

(120304) Page 11 GAO-04-201T 
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