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78–204PDF 2002

U.S. AND EUROPE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 13, 2002

Serial No. 107–74

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

VALERIE VAN BUREN, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

KELLY MCDONALD, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............................................. 3

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 2

The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones: Prepared statement ..................................... 8

APPENDIX 

Follow-up questions submitted by the House Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on International Relations, to the Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones, 

and responses ....................................................................................................... 27

(1)

U.S. AND EUROPE: THE BUSH 

ADMINISTRATION AND TRANSATLANTIC 

RELATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:07 p.m. In Room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. We will call to order the European Subcommittee. 

Since its inception last year, the Subcommittee has held five 

hearings in which we received expert opinion regarding U.S. interests in Europe and advice on how U.S. policy should address the 

various issues in the transatlantic relationship. 

Today, this Subcommittee on Europe will hear from the Assistant 

Secretary of State for Europe who will discuss the Bush Administration’s policy approach toward Europe and the status to the 

transatlantic relationship. 

Can we turn that down just a little bit? 

It is appropriate that we focus on the transatlantic alliance because the relationship between the United States and all of Europe 

by any measure is the most important relationship we have. Nowhere are the interests in the United States more fully advanced 

than through our European partnership, our relations with Russia 

and our goals in the Balkans, the Caucasus and in the eastern 

Mediterranean. 

The creation of this Subcommittee sent a clear and important 

signal to our allies and friends across the Atlantic that, in the Congress, Europe remains our highest priority. 

Since September 11th, our partnership with Europe has become 

even more vital as we seek common strategies and solutions for the 

plague of global terrorism. 

Europe’s response to the terrorist attack on the U.S., from London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Sofia, Vilnius, Athens, Ankara and all 

points in between was both gratifying and appreciated. Since then, 

the cooperation, whether in military matters or police activities, 

has been nothing less than excellent. 

Nevertheless, despite the cooperation and good relations, there 

are problems and challenges. All relationships have their rough 

moments, and the transatlantic alliance is no different. Recent European criticisms of the Administration’s policy approaches have 

2

resurrected comments that the relationship is strained, fraying or 

even falling apart. 

As I have said before, our policy interests and objectives may not 

always be in perfect harmony with those of our European allies. 

We do have differences on arms control, proliferation, the environment, the Middle East and trade issues. As sovereign nations, we 

understand that there will always be differences. As friends, we 

deal with them, even if at times we do not handle them as well as 

we could. 

Yet, in the overall relationship, these are not the kinds of differences which should lead some to suggest that the alliance is 

breaking apart. 

Today’s hearing is intended to assess the Bush Administration’s 

views on the overall transatlantic relationship and to address what 

the Administration believes are our most pressing opportunities 

and challenges within Europe. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EUROPE

Since its inception last year, the Subcommittee has held five hearings in which 

we received expert opinion regarding U.S. interests in Europe and advice on how 

U.S. policy should address the various issues in the transatlantic relationship. 

Today, the Subcommittee on Europe will hear from the Assistant Secretary of 

State for Europe who will discuss the Bush Administration’s policy approach to Europe and the status of the transatlantic relationship. 

It is appropriate that we focus on the transatlantic alliance because the relationship between the United States and all of Europe is by any measure the most important relationship we have. 

No where are the interests of the United States more fully advanced than through 

our European partnerships, our relations with Russia and our goals in the Balkans, 

the Caucasus and in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

The creation of this Subcommittee sent a clear and important signal to our allies 

and friends across the Atlantic that in the Congress, Europe remains our highest 

priority. 

Since September 11 our partnership with Europe has become even more vital as 

we seek common strategies and solutions for the plague of global terrorism. 

Europe’s response to the terrorist attack on the U.S., from London, Paris, Berlin, 

Moscow, Sofia, Vilnius, Athens, Ankara and all points in between was both gratifying and appreciated. Since then the cooperation, whether in military matters or 

police activities, has been nothing less than excellent. 

Nevertheless, despite the cooperation and good relations, there are problems and 

challenges? All relationships have their rough moments and the trans-Atlantic alliance is no different. Recent European criticisms of the Administration’s policy approaches have resurrected comments that the relationship is ‘‘strained’’, ‘‘fraying’’ or 

even ‘‘falling apart’’. 

As I have said before our policy interests and objectives may not always be in perfect harmony with those of our European friends. 

We do have differences on arms control, proliferation, the environment, the Middle East and trade issues. As sovereign nations, we understand that there will be 

differences. As friends we deal with them, even if at times we do not handle them 

as well as we could. 

Yet, in the overall relationship, these are not the kinds of differences which 

should lead some to suggest that the alliance is breaking apart. 

Today’s hearing is intended to assess the Bush Administration’s views on the 

overall transatlantic relationship and to address what the Administration believes 

are our most pressing opportunities and challenges within Europe. 

I look forward to the testimony of the Assistant Secretary.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the Assistant Secretary; and before we go to the Assistant Secretary, I 

3

would like to recognize my good friend and colleague from Nebraska, Doug Bereuter. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will forego an opening statement but just commend you for holding this 

hearing. I think there is a lot for us to learn and to consider with 

respect to the relationship of the United States with our European 

allies in other countries of Europe, and I look forward to the Secretary’s comments today and a chance to ask her questions. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska. 

With that, we will turn the microphone over to our good friend, 

Secretary Elizabeth Jones. Madam Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am very 

pleased to be here today. I welcome the exchange that I hope we 

will have after I go through my testimony. 

I have a lengthier testimony that I would like to ask your permission to submit for the record, but I will go through quite a bit 

of it orally if I may. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection, your testimony will be made a 

part of the record in its entirety. 

Ms. JONES. Thank you. 

As I said, I am very much delighted to be here to address these 

issues. 

President Bush said last August in Warsaw that the Administration seeks a Europe whole, free and at peace. This is even more 

vital now after September 11th, where the imperative for closer coordination has opened up what we consider to be new opportunities 

in achieving our goals in Europe and Eurasia. Most importantly, 

we are cooperating more broadly to combat terrorism. This happens 

in very many categories at very many levels. We are pursuing a 

deeper relationship with Russia. We are advancing throughout the 

region respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 

free market economies. 

And I might say that the visit yesterday and today of President 

Karimov of Uzbekistan, which is not exactly in the purview of this 

Committee but is a part of our responsibilities, and is very important in this respect. 

To speak about the issue that you raised in particular, Mr. 

Chairman, we know who our friends are when the chips are down 

and when we need help, and I would argue that, by this measure, 

we certainly have friends in Europe. Following September 11th, 

our European partners offered really critical assistance in military 

deployments to Afghanistan. They cracked down on terrorist activities in their territory. European and American soldiers are working 

side by side in Afghanistan; and very regrettably just last week 

German and Danish troops suffered fatalities while trying to disarm abandoned ordnance in Kabul. We think that Europe and the 

United States are partners in every sense. 

But as you noted, Mr. Chairman, recently some of our European 

partners have expressed concerns about what they consider to be 

a return of U.S. unilateralism. They wonder—some of them wonder 

4

about our long-term goals in the war on terrorism and our intentions regarding pariah states such as Iraq. We take these concerns 

very seriously, but we think we should put them in perspective. 

The Europeans, of course, speak as our coalition partners. They 

are vulnerable to the same dangers that we are. One of my European colleagues put this most succinctly and most poignantly to me 

last week in a conversation that we had, that September 11th, he 

said, was an attack on all of us. That is why we want to be involved in the solution. 

As Secretary Powell says constantly, however, the U.S. will continue to engage vigorously with our European partners. He is on 

the phone daily, many, many times a day, with his European counterparts, as are many of the rest of us. Our policies haven’t 

changed. We absolutely remain in close touch and continue to look 

for ways to increase our engagement, our consultations, our discussions, our dialogue with our European colleagues. 

One of the ways that we are working to do this is to reinvigorate 

our partnership with the European Union. Counterterrorism there 

is also front and center. In December, Secretary Powell signed an 

agreement with EUROPOL. We are aiming next for an agreement 

on judicial cooperation. There is potential for progress on nonproliferation, intelligence sharing, asset freezes and uprooting terrorist networks. We are taking joint action terrorist organizations. 

And I wanted to emphasize this, because this is new in the U.S.-

European relationship, the amount of contact, cooperation and exchanges that go on between the justice and home affairs ministries 

in our Department of Justice and FBI and law enforcement agencies. 

NATO remains, of course, the cornerstone of transatlantic security. After September 11th, our allies invoked the Article 5 collective defense commitment for the first time in history. They have 

provided invaluable support to the anti-terrorist effort. This includes force deployments, intelligence sharing and extensive law 

enforcement assistance. Allies recognize that we must intensify this 

cooperation to address threats of terrorism and weapons of mass 

destruction. That is among our goals for the Prague Summit coming up in November. 

The 9–11 attacks and the continuation of terrorist threats have 

underscored the need for NATO to improve its ability to meet new 

challenges to our common security. The allies recognized this 

threat in the 1991 Strategic Concept, and they reinforced it at the 

Washington Summit in 1999. When President Bush meets with the 

allied leaders in Prague, NATO is expected to approve a program 

of action to enhance its ability to deal with these threats. It is vital 

that our European allies, who have not followed through on all the 

commitments made in NATO’s defense capabilities initiative, 

refocus and reprioritize their efforts to address the growing capabilities gap within NATO. Thus, the development of new capabilities is one of our priorities for the Prague Summit next November. 

In addition to new challenges, another goal for Prague is new 

members to the alliance. There has been a great deal of focus on 

this particular aspect of the Prague Summit. An interagency team, 

American interagency team, recently visited each of the nine countries participating in the Membership Action Plan for frank and deVerDate Feb 1 2002 09:11 May 21, 2002 Jkt 078948 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031302\78204 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
5

tailed discussions of their progress toward these goals. As we approach these historic decisions on new NATO members, we look 

forward to a close dialogue with the Congress. Our goal is to forge 

a united U.S. approach to enlargement and a solid consensus within the alliance. 

Our third goal for Prague is to advance new relationships. Foremost among these is a constructive NATO-Russia relationship. 

NATO’s continued outreach to Partnership for Peace member 

states has overcome entrenched hostility and historical divisions. 

Through its unique partnerships, NATO remains the only institution that can unite the continent in security cooperation. It remains 

the indispensable nexus to broaden and deepen Euro-Atlantic security, democracy, free markets and the rule of law. 

As NATO further evolves, we will work to strengthen alliance 

links for those partners who are not ready or do not seek NATO 

membership. Many of our partners, such as the Nordic countries 

and Ireland, have contributed significantly to NATO’s efforts in the 

Balkans. They have reached out to the states of the former Soviet 

Union. We will continue to work closely with these partners to improve interoperability and capabilities of all NATO’s partners. 

We continue to support a European Security and Defense Policy 

that strengthens NATO while increasing the EU’s ability to act 

where NATO as a whole is not engaged. At the same time, the 

broader value of close NATO–EU cooperation is nowhere more evident than in southeast Europe, where NATO and the EU have 

worked closely to prevent instability, overcome violence and begin 

to build a lasting peace. The Macedonia peace settlement is a 

model of our collective ability to draw on the unique strengths of 

these organizations in a common effort. 

NATO and its partners in SFOR and KFOR still have a role to 

play, as does the German-led NATO Task Force Fox in Macedonia. 

Our vision is that the U.S. and the international community deal 

with this region normally—without troops on the ground and 

through trade and investment rather than aid. We are mindful 

that we came into this region to gather with our allies, and we 

should go out together. 

But our engagement in southeast Europe is changing, as it 

should. We continue to support economic reform and regional trade 

development, supported by a Southeast Europe Trade Preferences 

Act. We are encouraging further integration of the region with Europe. We promote rule of law, cooperation with the International 

Criminal Tribunal and ethnic tolerance. 

Our European partners and us have been able to reduce force 

levels in Bosnia and Kosovo. We anticipate that NATO military authorities will recommend further reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. 

The EU will take over the UN’s police mission in Bosnia at the end 

of the year. The international community recently agreed to a blueprint for streamlining and downsizing its presence in Bosnia. The 

creation of a government in Kosovo will allow the transfer of many 

responsibilities from the international community to local democratically elected authorities. 

In Macedonia, the close and continuing cooperation between the 

EU, NATO and the OSCE is a model for transatlantic cooperation 

6

and crisis management. Task Force Fox is small. It is of limited 

duration and made up almost entirely of Europeans. 

I want to particularly emphasize the role of the OSCE as a vital 

element of our engagement with Europe. It is the pre-eminent multilateral institution for upholding democracy, human rights and the 

rule of law. It undertakes early warning measures, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. OSCE also implements valuable programs to counter corruption and trafficking and strengthen 

the rule of law through police training and judicial reform. Its 

broad membership allows it to operate throughout Europe and Eurasia. 

The OSCE has said it will begin to play a role in the war against 

terrorism. It can encourage European and Eurasian countries to 

adhere to the principles of UN Resolution 1373. It will continue to 

be central to the development of pluralistic societies in the Balkans, including solidifying the framework agreement in Macedonia. 

Implementation of CFE commitments will be an ongoing OSCE 

oversight responsibility. The organization can offer opportunities 

for cooperative engagement with Russia and the European Union. 

The OSCE plays a critical role in our effort to promote democracy, human rights and rule of law throughout Eurasia. It is working to restore territorial integrity in Moldova. In Belarus, we work 

with the OSCE and our European partners to urge the Lukashenko 

regime to adopt OSCE standards of behavior and come out of its 

self-imposed isolation. Unfortunately, the regime shows no inclination to do so thus far. 

In Moldova, we work through the OSCE and with key players to 

resolve the separatist conflict in Transnistria and reincorporate 

that region into Moldova. Ukrainian involvement is important on 

this issue and in the region generally. Ukraine’s influence is a potential force for regional stability and European integration. 

Ukrainian success in political and economic reform will fulfill that 

country’s political aspirations and will inspire other post-Soviet 

states to follow the same path. 

In the Caucasus, we are working with Armenia and Azerbaijan 

to resolve their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. We seek a comprehensive settlement through the Minsk Group peace process. 

Georgian sovereignty is important to the Administration. We are 

proposing a program to develop Georgia’s internal capacity to deal 

with terrorism now and in the future. We are also working very 

hard to support the development of democracy and human rights 

in the Caucasus. 

With Russia, our bilateral cooperation is unprecedented. Counterterrorism collaboration is central to this effort, but it is not the 

sole focus. The U.S. and Russia are cooperating more closely in intelligence sharing, nuclear weapons reduction and resolution of 

Eurasian regional conflicts. We are working together on the fight 

against HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, organized crime 

and narcotics trafficking. We hope to expand the economic and 

commercial component of the relationship. 

While we broaden this new cooperation with the Russians, we 

have not forgotten the difficult issues. We continue to press our 

concerns over issues such as the conduct of Russian forces in 

Chechnya and threats to media freedom in Russia as a whole. 

7

Russia’s cooperation with us and our allies in the war against 

terrorism also reflects the opportunity to bring Russia closer to 

NATO. We are working with our allies on arrangements for a 

NATO-Russia body that would focus on concrete, practical projects 

of mutual benefit. Russia would participate in this NATO-Russia 

Council, which would focus on issues with potential for cooperative 

initiatives, as an equal. The deepening of the Russian-NATO relationship will not be allowed to undercut NATO’s ability to decide 

and act on its own. Russia would not get a veto over the ability of 

NATO’s 19 allies to act on their own. The NAC, North Atlantic 

Council, will continue to meet and make decisions as it always has. 

The mechanisms and substance of such arrangements are still 

being worked out. I pledge to keep the Committee apprised of 

progress. Moreover, I want to reiterate President Bush’s and Lord 

Robertson’s pledges not to give Russia a veto over NATO operations. This is not a back door to membership but rather an opportunity for Russia to develop a new relationship with NATO that 

would advance not only our interests but also its own. 

In the spirit of new U.S.-Russia cooperation, we believe it is time 

to move beyond the Cold War. Russia has made significant 

progress on religious freedom and emigration. Therefore, the President is pursuing the removal of Russia and eight other Eurasian 

countries from the application of Jackson-Vanik legislation. We 

hope the Congress will pass legislation to ‘‘graduate’’ Russia from 

Jackson-Vanik before the President visits Moscow this spring. The 

President and Secretary Powell appreciate the support of many 

Members of this Committee in this endeavor. 

Success in addressing transnational problems is more important 

than ever in pursuing America’s transatlantic agenda. Stable countries able to withstand terrorist and other threats are based on respect for the rule of law, human rights, religious freedom and open 

media. Stable countries have vibrant civil societies. They are committed to the principles of free market economies. The Administration’s attention to these values with our European and Eurasian 

friends is even more critical as we pursue the war on terrorism 

with our coalition partners. Enhanced defense and security cooperation and intelligence sharing must be buttressed by societies 

committed to democratic principles such as those in the Final Act 

in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moreover, we are continuing efforts with our transatlantic partners to 

address problems with respect to no borders such as HIV/AIDS, 

narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation and trafficking in 

women and children. 

Public diplomacy is critical to the promotion of our policies in Europe and Eurasia. Training programs and exchanges offer an accurate portrayal of American views, values and tradition. These people-to-people ties will help bind the nations of Europe and Eurasia 

with the United States, thereby enhancing the transatlantic relationship and, therefore, American security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome your questions and comments. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones follows:]

8

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am delighted to be here today to review with you the Administration’s goals for U.S.-European relations, including 

Russia and the Caucasus. 

President Bush said last August in Warsaw that the Administration seeks a Europe ‘‘whole, free, and at peace.’’ This is even more vital to America’s national security in the aftermath of September 11th. The imperative for closer coordination has 

opened up new opportunities to achieve our goals in Europe and Eurasia. We are 

cooperating more broadly to combat terrorism. We are pursuing a deeper relationship with Russia. We are advancing throughout the region respect for democracy, 

the rule of law, human rights, and free market economies. 

We know who our friends are when the chips are down and we need help. By this 

measure, we have friends in Europe. Following September 11th our European partners offered critical assistance in military deployments to Afghanistan. They 

cracked down on terrorist activities in their territory. European and U.S. soldiers 

are working side-by-side in Afghanistan. Last week, German and Danish troops suffered fatalities while trying to disarm abandoned ordnance in Kabul. Europe and 

the U.S. are partners in every sense. 

Recently, a few European leaders have expressed concerns about U.S. 

‘‘unilateralism.’’ Some wonder about our long-term goals in the War on Terrorism 

and our intentions regarding pariah states such as Iraq. We take these concerns seriously. But we must put them in perspective. Europeans speak as our coalition 

partners. They are vulnerable to the same dangers that we are. As one European 

explained it: ‘‘September 11th was an attack on all of us. We want to be involved 

in the solution.’’ As Secretary Powell says constantly, the U.S. will continue to engage vigorously with our European partners. Our policies have not changed. We will 

remain in close touch. U.S.-European relations remain steadfast. 

We are reinvigorating our partnership with the European Union. Counter-terrorism is front and center. In December Secretary Powell signed an agreement with 

EUROPOL. We are aiming next for an agreement on judicial cooperation. There is 

potential for progress on non-proliferation, intelligence sharing, asset freezes, and 

uprooting terrorist networks. We are taking joint action against terrorist organizations. 

The U.S. and EU economies are increasingly integrated. Trade and reciprocal foreign investment rise each year, doubling since 1990. The U.S. supports a fair, open 

international trading system. We worked with the EU on a successful launch of the 

new WTO Round at Doha. We pursue vigorously the resolution of U.S.-EU trade disputes. We will continue to promote U.S. business and economic interests in resolving outstanding disagreements, not just on steel, but on Foreign Sales Corporation 

tax, biotechnology and beef hormones. Europeans have reacted strongly to the President’s decision to impose temporary safeguards on steel. We will work with our European friends and other steel producing countries to address the heart of this problem: excess global capacity in steel production. Our goal is that transatlantic trade 

solidify all aspects of our relationship, including security. 

Our European friends and allies share our concern about the need to accord recognition to surviving Holocaust victims within their lifetimes. In the past eight 

months, the German foundation ‘‘Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future’’ distributed more than $1.1 billion to 600,000 former slave and forced laborers as provided under the July 17, 2000 agreements. The payment of insurance claims is a 

difficult issue. We will continue to work with the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims and other involved parties to resolve outstanding procedural problem. We are engaged on property restitution. In this regard, the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research is an important focus. The foundation’s board of trustees is working on criteria for projects 

of the Future Fund. The interest on the endowment will be used to combat racism 

and hatred. 

NATO remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security. In the aftermath of September 11th, Allies invoked NATO’s Article 5 collective defense commitment for the 

first time in history. Our Allies have provided invaluable support to the anti-terrorist effort. This includes force deployments, intelligence sharing, and extensive 

law enforcement assistance. Allies recognize that we must intensify this cooperation 

to address the threats of terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction. That is 

among our goals for the Prague Summit next November. 

The September 11th attacks and continued terrorist threats have underscored the 

need for NATO to improve its ability to meet new challenges to our common secuVerDate Feb 1 2002 09:11 May 21, 2002 Jkt 078948 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031302\78204 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
9

rity. Allies recognized this threat in the 1991 Strategic Concept. They reinforced it 

at the Washington Summit in 1999. When President Bush meets with Allied Leaders in Prague, NATO is expected to approve a program of action to enhance its ability to deal with these threats. It is vital that our European Allies, who have not 

followed through on all the commitments made in NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative, refocus and reprioritize their efforts to address the growing capabilities gap 

within NATO. Thus, the development of new capabilities is one of our priorities for 

the Prague Summit next November. 

A second key goal for Prague is the addition of new members to the Alliance. Continued NATO enlargement will reinforce the strength and cohesion of states committed to our values. It will bolster our own defense. We are looking closely at values issues among aspirant countries. We will evaluate candidates on their ability 

to further NATO’s principles and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 

area. An inter-agency team recently visited each of the nine countries participating 

in the Membership Action Plan for frank discussions of their progress toward these 

goals. As we approach these historic decisions, we look forward to a close dialogue 

with the Congress. Our goal is to forge a united U.S. approach to enlargement and 

a solid consensus within the Alliance. 

We also hope to advance new relationships at the Prague Summit. Foremost 

among these is a constructive NATO-Russia relationship, which I will address later. 

NATO’s continued outreach to Partnership for Peace member states has overcome 

entrenched hostility and historical divisions. Through its unique Partnerships, 

NATO remains the only institution that can unite the continent in security cooperation. NATO remains the indispensable nexus for broadening and deepening EuroAtlantic security, democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. At Prague, we intend to continue building closer links with Russia, Ukraine, and all of NATO’s Part- ners. As NATO further evolves, we will work to strengthen Alliance links between those 

Partners who are not yet ready or do not seek NATO membership. Many of our 

Partners, such as the Nordic countries and Ireland, have contributed significantly 

to NATO’s efforts in the Balkans. They have reached out to the states of the former 

Soviet Union. We will continue to work closely with these Partners to improve interoperability and capabilities of all NATO’s Partners. 

Most recently, our Central Asian and Caucasus Partners have stepped forward to 

play critical roles in the anti-terrorist effort. We intend to energize all elements of 

the Partnership for Peace at NATO to engage Central Asian and Caucasus Partners. 

Working with our Allies and more advanced Partners, we hope to increase, coordinate and target assistance to the Central Asian and Caucasus states. We believe 

PfP programs should address issues that have the greatest appeal to these countries. These include terrorism, border security, and civil emergency planning. We 

will continue to support the development of democracy and market economic institutions to help ensure the viability of our security partnerships with these countries. 

We look to the OSCE to play an increasing role in this regard. 

We continue to support a European Security and Defense Policy that strengthens 

NATO while increasing the EU’s ability to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged. At the same time, the broader value of close NATO–EU cooperation is nowhere more evident than in Southeast Europe, where NATO and the EU have 

worked closely to prevent instability, overcome violence and begin to build a lasting 

peace. The Macedonia peace settlement is a model of our collective ability to draw 

on the unique strengths of these organizations in a common effort. 

Key to a Europe ‘‘whole, free and at peace’’ is a more stable, democratic and prosperous Southeast Europe. Despite the region’s great strides since the Dayton Peace 

Accords, governments still have much to do. Working in partnership with the U.S. 

and the Europeans, these nations must complete reform efforts and establish an environment conducive to prosperity. Corruption, insufficient border controls and weak 

export control regimes contribute to trafficking throughout the region—in arms, 

drugs and people. Work in these areas also contributes to our global 

counterterrorism efforts. 

NATO and its partners in SFOR and KFOR still have a role to play, as does the 

German-led NATO ‘‘Task Force Fox’’ in Macedonia. Our vision is that the U.S. and 

the international community deal with this region ‘‘normally’’—without troops on 

the ground and through trade and investment rather than aid. We are mindful that 

we came into this region together with our Allies and we should go out together. 

Our engagement with Southeast Europe is changing. We continue to support economic reform and regional trade development, supported by a Southeast Europe 

Trade Preferences Act (SETPA). We are encouraging further integration of the region with Europe. We promote rule of law, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal, and ethnic tolerance. With success, our European partners and we 

10

have been able to reduce force levels in Bosnia. We anticipate that NATO Military 

Authorities will recommend further reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The EU will 

take over the UN’s police mission in Bosnia at the end of the year. The international 

community recently agreed to a blueprint for streamlining and downsizing its presence in Bosnia. The creation of a government in Kosovo will allow the transfer of 

many responsibilities from the international community to local democratically 

elected authorities. In Macedonia, the close and continuing cooperation between the 

EU, NATO and the OSCE is a model for transatlantic cooperation in crisis management. Task Force Fox is small. It is of limited duration and made up almost entirely 

of Europeans. 

A critical element of achieving the President’s vision of a Europe ‘‘whole, free and 

at peace’’ is the resolution of regional and ethnic conflicts in Europe and neighboring 

Eurasia. We are pleased by progress in the Cyprus talks. We will encourage the 

leaders on the island to achieve a final settlement in the coming months. The Good 

Friday Accord is being implemented in Northern Ireland. We will work to solidify 

the role of the police force there. Cooperation among all factions is crucial. In Northern Europe, we will continue to work with our Nordic Allies and friends and our 

Baltic and other regional partners, including Russia. It is vital that we reinforce ten 

years of progress in a region of shared values. Opportunities for economic progress 

good neighborly relations and democratic institution building are beginning to outweigh the challenges. 

OSCE remains a vital element in our engagement with Europe. It is the pre-eminent multilateral institution for upholding democracy, human rights and the rule 

of law. It undertakes early warning measures, conflict prevention, and post-conflict 

rehabilitation. OSCE also implements valuable programs to counter corruption and 

trafficking, and strengthen the rule of law through police training and judicial reform. Its broad membership allows it to operate throughout Europe and Eurasia. 

The OSCE has said it will begin to play a role in the war against terrorism. The 

OSCE can encourage European and Eurasian countries to adhere to the principles 

of UN Resolution 1373. It will continue to be central to development of pluralistic 

societies in the Balkans, including solidifying the Framework Agreement in Macedonia. Implementation of CFE commitments will be an ongoing OSCE oversight responsibility. The organization can offer opportunities for cooperative engagement 

with Russia and the European Union. 

The OSCE plays a critical role in our effort to promote democracy, human rights 

and rule of law throughout Eurasia. It is working to restore territorial integrity in 

Moldova. In Belarus, we work with the OSCE and our European partners to urge 

the Lukashenko regime to adopt OSCE standards of behavior and come out of its 

self-imposed isolation. Unfortunately, the regime shows no inclination to do so thus 

far. In Moldova, we work through the OSCE and with key players to resolve the 

separatist conflict in Transnistria and reincorporate that region into Moldova. 

Ukrainian involvement is important on this issue and in the region generally. 

Ukraine’s influence is a potential force for regional stability and European integration. Ukrainian success in political and economic reform will fulfill that country’s 

European aspirations and will inspire other post-Soviet states to follow the same 

path. 

In the Caucasus, we are working with Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve their 

conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. We seek a comprehensive settlement through the 

Minsk Group peace process. Georgian sovereignty is important to the Administration. We are proposing a program to develop Georgia’s internal capacity to deal with 

terrorism now and in the future. We also are working to support the development 

of democracy and human rights in the Caucasus. 

Bilateral U.S.-Russia cooperation is unprecedented. Counterterrorism collaboration is central to this effort, although not the sole focus. The U.S. and Russia are 

cooperating more closely in intelligence sharing, nuclear weapons reduction, and 

resolution of Eurasian regional conflicts. We are working together in the fight 

against HIV–AIDS and other infectious diseases, organized crime and narcotics trafficking. We hope to expand the economic and commercial component of the relationship. While we broaden this new cooperation with the Russians, we have not forgotten the difficult issues. We continue to press our concerns over issues such as the 

conduct of Russian forces in Chechnya and threats to media freedom in Russia as 

a whole. 

Russia’s cooperation with us and our Allies in the war on terrorism also reflects 

the opportunity to bring Russia closer to NATO. We are working with our Allies on 

arrangements for a new NATO-Russia body that would focus on concrete, practical 

projects of mutual benefit. Russia would participate in this ‘‘NATO-Russia Council’’—which would focus on issues with potential for cooperative initiatives—as an 

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cut NATO’s ability to decide and act on its own. Russia would not get a veto over 

the ability of NATO’s 19 Allies to act on their own. The NAC will continue to meet 

and make decisions as it always has. The mechanisms and substance of such arrangements are still being worked out. I pledge to keep the Committee apprised of 

progress. Moreover, I want to reiterate President Bush’s and Lord Robertson’s 

pledges not to give Russia a veto over NATO operations. This is not a backdoor to 

membership. This is an opportunity for Russia to develop a new relationship with 

NATO that would advance not only our interests but also its. 

In the spirit of new U.S.-Russia cooperation, we believe it is time to move beyond 

the Cold War. Russia has made significant progress on religious freedom and emigration. Therefore, the President is pursuing the removal of Russia and eight other 

Eurasian countries from the application of Jackson-Vanik legislation. We hope that 

Congress will pass legislation to ‘‘graduate’’ Russia from Jackson-Vanik before the 

President visits Moscow this spring. The President and Secretary Powell appreciate 

the support of many Members of this committee in this endeavor. 

Success in addressing transnational problems is more important than ever in pursuing America’s transatlantic agenda. Stable countries able to withstand terrorist 

and other threats are based on respect for the rule of law, human rights, religious 

freedom, and open media. Stable countries have vibrant civil societies. They are 

committed to the principles of free market economies. The Administration’s attention of these values with our European and Eurasian friends is even more critical 

as we pursue the War on Terrorism with our coalition partners. Enhanced defense 

and security cooperation and intelligence sharing must be buttressed by societies 

committed to democratic principles such as those in the Final Act in the Conference 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moreover, we are continuing efforts with 

our transatlantic partners to address problems that respect no borders, e.g., HIV/

AIDS and infectious disease, narcotics trafficking and environmental degradation. 

Critical to the promotion of our policies in Europe and Eurasia is the use of Public 

Diplomacy. Training programs and exchanges offer an accurate portrayal of American views, values and traditions. Such people-to-people ties will help bind the nations of Europe and Eurasia with the United States, thereby enhancing the transatlantic relationship and American security. 

Now I will be pleased to address your questions.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I have just a couple of questions, and then I will 

defer to my colleagues. I know that they have several questions, as 

this hearing has a great interest to many folks on the Hill and 

across the country. 

My first question is: Do you believe that the Bush Administration feels that they have provided a sufficient level of consultation 

with the Europeans? 

Ms. JONES. Mr. Chairman, that is an extremely important question. It is a question that we focus on on a daily, hourly basis. Secretary Powell is on the phone and in meetings with European and 

other international colleagues on a daily basis. 

What, of course, would be even better would be to be able to have 

face-to-face meetings with all of these people on a daily basis. We 

haven’t quite accomplished that, just because travel takes so long. 

But the President, the Secretary, others in the Cabinet are very, 

very aware of the importance of a constant dialogue with our European allies and a constant need to be certain that, even though we 

think we are being clear about what we mean and we think that 

we have consulted, that the result of what we think is something 

that the Europeans are comfortable with. 

So we are engaged right now in strategies to enhance and upgrade the kinds of consultations we have with the Europeans because we believe so fundamentally that our goals are identical, and 

it is simply a question of making sure that the rationale that we 

bring to accomplishing those goals is as clear to them as it is to 

us. 

12

Mr. GALLEGLY. Well, you are certainly sensitive then to the subjectivity of that word ‘‘sufficient.’’ Is that basically what you are 

saying? 

Ms. JONES. That is absolutely right. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Are the Europeans justified in complaining that 

the U.S. cannot continue to call on its allies to share the burdens 

unless the U.S. is prepared to share in the decision-making as 

well? Are they justified—you know, some are saying this very vocally. 

Ms. JONES. Some are, but I think a lot of the public concern 

about that is behind us. We are really extremely pleased with the 

level of dialogue, the level of consultation and the extensiveness of 

the discussion. 

For example, in Operation Enduring Freedom, there are many, 

many European military units involved in Operation Enduring 

Freedom. There are many, many involved in the international security assistance force in Kabul, led by the British. And the opportunity for discussion, consultation, joint decision-making is constantly there, whether at Tampa with all of the representatives 

who are at CENTCOM, the foreign representatives who are at 

CENTCOM and participate in the planning; whether it is the local 

commanders working with our troops in Uzbekistan, who move into 

Afghanistan; whether it be at ISAF. I am impressed with the number of opportunities there are for discussion, consultation and involvement on the part of the Europeans and what is going on on 

the ground on the military side. 

One of the things that I like to emphasize is the breadth of our 

cooperation. Although the focus tends to be only on the military—

the focus in public tends to be so much on the military, it is a bit 

more dramatic. There is a tremendous amount of consultation, coordination, discussion that goes on, as I mentioned, in law enforcement channels, in intelligence channels, among the Treasury Department, the treasury ministries and finance ministries on all of 

the other aspects of the war against terrorism, many of which are 

addressed in UN Resolution 1373. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. On another issue regarding Russia, in a December policy memo Mr. Dimitri Galinski Vassiliev of the Institute of 

World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Science wrote a rather scathing assessment of the U.S./Russian relations. He wrote, and I will quote,

‘‘Over the past year, Russian president Putin initiated a 

stream of diplomatic overtures to probably the most unresponsive and self-centered of the U.S. administrations since the 

Roosevelt era.’’

Citing Russia’s outreach to NATO, the closing of Russian military bases in Vietnam and Cuba, accepting a U.S. military presence in Central Asia, conciliatory positions on the ABM Treaty and 

the possible NATO expansion into the Baltics and the perception 

that Putin had gotten nothing concrete in return, Galinski concluded,

‘‘The balance sheet of a year of this foreign policy is plainly 

negative and demeaning for Russia.’’

13

How would you respond to this assessment? And, can the Bush 

Administration offer President Putin anything substantial that he 

can use to continue to put a positive spin on the policy of reaching 

out to the West and especially the U.S.? 

Ms. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I would respond in two ways. 

First, I think it is a very positive measure of the level of civic 

society, free media, freedom of speech that he can make those 

kinds of statements, number one. 

Number two, I think he is quite wrong, for the following reasons: 

First of all, President Putin, I believe, does not agree with him; and 

most importantly, let me go through some of the evidence of why 

I believe he is wrong and why I believe President Putin would 

agree that he is wrong. 

President Putin, after September 11th—on September 11th in 

his discussion with the President and in subsequent discussions 

with the President made very clear—and it developed through their 

dialogue—the importance that they attach to focusing on joint 

goals. Russia’s goals and U.S. goals, indeed the international community’s goals, are really quite the same, and it took 9–11 to focus 

all of our attention, not just the Russians, not just ours, on the importance of going after the transnational threats, the importance of 

attacking terrorism, the importance of going after narcotics trafficking, of the ability of criminals to walk across borders so flagrantly. 

The benefit that Russia has obtained in working so closely with 

the United States, I would say, is a benefit that has also accrued 

to our European allies and to the United States. All of us are better 

off because we are able to work so much more closely together to 

counter these transnational threats. 

Intelligence exchange, for instance, with Russia is remarkable 

now, I am told by my colleagues who are very involved in that. We 

are creating new channels in law enforcement and changing law 

enforcement information so we can jointly go after common threats. 

The attitude that President Putin brings to NATO expansion is 

basically the following, and it is the same attitude we bring to it: 

It is a good thing for the world, it is a good thing for Europe, it 

is a good thing for Russia that there should be greater security cohesion, cooperation in Europe. There is no threat whatsoever to 

Russia from NATO, and therefore there will not be a threat to Russia from an expanded NATO. 

If you look at some of the evidence—at some of the experience, 

I should say, that, for example, Poland would put forward, the relationship between Poland and Russia has improved since Poland 

joined NATO for a variety of reasons, not necessarily because it 

joined NATO. But certainly, that is a fact that I think Russians 

and Poles and certainly NATO would not argue with. 

In terms of the U.S. presence, shall we say, military presence in 

Central Asia and President Putin’s attitude toward that, in the 

very detailed discussions we have had with him at the Presidential 

level but also Deputy Secretary Armitage has had with Deputy 

Foreign Minister Trubnikov in the U.S.-Russia-Afghan working 

group, the focus there has been on the importance of closing down 

the transnational threats coming out of Afghanistan and making 

14

certain that those threats are not allowed access to Russia through 

Central Asia. 

So the kind of work that we are doing in Central Asia, whether 

it be with the use of some of the Central Asian bases but, more importantly, in going after some of the social, political and economic 

issues that are a threat to the stability of these countries, that is 

all in Russia’s interest. Just as it is in Russia’s interest, we argue, 

for the kind of work that we propose to do with the Georgians in 

developing and pursuing a train-and-equip program to help ensure 

that terrorists that are a threat to Russia do not gain a position 

in Georgia. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. 

I would like to recognize the presence of my good friend, the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Hilliard. 

Mr. Hilliard, would you like to make an opening statement, or 

would you like me to move on to Mr. Bereuter and—that would be 

your preference? 

Okay. Mr. Bereuter, the gentleman from Nebraska. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your oral and your 

written testimony. 

I think that the part of the world for which you have responsibility is the one which perhaps offers us the most complexity, and 

it is certainly one of the three most important relationships we 

have. I count it with European countries in general as one and 

Japan as another and China as still another. These are the relationships that are going to be crucial to our country in this century. 

The political geography, the multilateral organization geography, 

the architecture of the continent has become quite complex, and it 

grows in its complexity. I think that many Americans have a hard 

time following that, and certainly many Members of Congress 

would as well. I think also Europeans oftentimes have a very incomplete understanding of attitudes and issues that are important 

in this country. 

I had been speaking for some time in formal and informal settings about a growing gap in understanding between Europe and 

the United States or Europe and North America, including the Canadians, with us. Then it seems to me that the long slide in credibility and understanding was interrupted by the events of September 11th, and we have had incredible demonstrations in so 

many ways, including the implication of Article 5 under the Rome 

Treaty of NATO which reassured us about their commitment to 

this international war against terrorism and their support for the 

United States. 

I think perhaps Europeans, in meeting with them lately, do not 

understand the degree of resolve and unity that exists in this country to conduct effectively a war against terror wherever it exists. 

Perhaps that is understandable because we were struck most directly, had the greatest number of casualties. But also, I think it 

may be because European countries, at least some of them—Spain 

and Britain and Turkey come to mind—have had a long and continuing experience with terrorism in their own countries. So they 

have not become complacent about it. But it is not as much a sharp 

change in attitude as the American public, because we thought, apVerDate Feb 1 2002 09:11 May 21, 2002 Jkt 078948 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031302\78204 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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parently, in large part we were invulnerable to attacks on our 

homeland. 

That was never the proper message to take, but the American 

audience now understands that. 

There is so much I appreciate about your testimony. I want to 

commend the Administration for its initiative in Georgia, for example. I think you explained very well why it is in our interest, it is 

in Georgian interest, it is in the Russian interest that we are involved in that way. It would appear to me, in that neighborhood, 

this is an opportunity for Russia and the United States to try to 

bring themselves together for a peace settlement involving Azerbaijan and Armenia, where strife has festered too long over 

Nagorno-Karabakh and other parts of that region. 

I do think also the time has come when you will find a positive 

attitude about the repeal of Jackson-Vanik. I made an effort some 

years ago and ran into a buzz saw, but the American Jewish community, I am told now, at least significant organizations, recognize 

that we need to move on from that, because the elements that it 

was to address, particularly immigration, no longer exists as they 

did with the Soviet Union. I think you could expect a positive and 

a bipartisan reception to an initiative, or perhaps one will emerge 

on the Hill, and that the Administration can support it. 

The thing that I note most often—which I think is an irritant to 

our relationship, which is gradually reemerging, I am sorry to 

say—is the attitudes and almost anti-American attitudes of some 

of the largest of the media outlets in Europe and one cause of these 

attitudes is the tremendous gap in our military capabilities. It is 

a gap that is huge, and it is growing. 

Every time the Defense and Security Committee of the NATO 

Parliamentary Assembly comes here annually for their examination of what our Defense Department and other related agencies 

are doing, they come away depressed with how far they are lagging. With the President’s new budget emphasizing research and 

development, it has every appearance that that gap will widen. 

And so Americans, as hopefully constructively critical friends on 

the sideline; wonder if we are going to make any progress on DCI 

in Europe, wonder if in fact the development of the ESDP within 

the European Union is going to mean increased defensive capabilities. Is it going to mean that they are going to be able to more constructively participate in peacekeeping and other Petersburg tasks 

or not. Or whether it simply detracts from trying to close the capabilities gap? 

Mr. Chairman, I can stop there and wait if for a second round, 

because I haven’t gotten to any questions. I would simply like to 

share with my colleagues. I will just stop at that point and consider 

this an intermission. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Fine. I appreciate the gentleman’s consideration. 

Mr. Hilliard, did you have anything? 

Mr. HILLIARD. Yes, I do have some questions. 

Madam Secretary, last week I met with several members of a 

delegation from Europe. It was really a delegation discussing our 

economic relationship, but they asked several questions that were 

generally political in nature. One of the ones was regarding their 

general feeling that Washington does not consult with the EuroVerDate Feb 1 2002 09:11 May 21, 2002 Jkt 078948 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031302\78204 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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pean allies in the relationship of the war on terrorism, the Middle 

East—and especially the Middle East and the American position 

there and missile defense. This was their perception. This was 

what they are feeling, and I have been reading also in various 

newspaper accounts of a similar problems developing. Are you familiar with it? Do you think that there is any truth to it? 

Ms. JONES. The question of how much we consult, as we talked 

about a little bit ago, is really a central issue between us and the 

Europeans. 

In connection with the Middle East, let us take that one, Secretary Powell is on the phone with his European colleagues and especially with the EU High Representative Solana several times a 

day. 

Mr. HILLIARD. What about representatives from France and Germany? Because they were the two most vocal ones. 

Ms. JONES. He is on the phone with them as well as with Foreign 

Minister Vedrine and Foreign Minister Fischer on a regular basis. 

But I think the crux of the issue is we believe a conversation is 

a consultation. It doesn’t always result in agreement, and there are 

times in our conversations with the Europeans—sometimes consultation is code for ‘‘you have to do it our way’’—we aren’t necessarily always going to be able to do it somebody else’s way, especially on the Middle East. And let me tell you why, very briefly, 

even though that is not really my area. 

The focus of the President and Secretary Powell, especially in the 

Middle East, is, as you know, to try to get the security situation 

under control, to be able to move on to Tenet, to be able to move 

on to Mitchell. Some of our European allies would like us to kind 

of skip that part and go right into the political, but we know from 

the interlocutors that are there, Sharon and Arafat, that this is not 

possible. They can’t move on to the political without addressing the 

security. 

So as much as the Europeans have a perfectly good idea, it is actually not an idea that would work because none of us can force 

the sides to do something that they don’t wish to do. So that is just 

going to be a constant debate, discussion between us and the Europeans on the Middle East. 

Now, as a matter of fact, right now we are very hopeful that we 

are on a track that is closer, if not identical, with what the Europeans have in mind, with General Zinni having gone back out. I 

am not briefed on what the latest in his efforts, but his goal is to 

work very hard with the Palestinian side and the Israeli side to try 

to get to a stable security situation so that we can move on. 

Mr. HILLIARD. Let me make sure I understand what you are saying. Are you saying that really this is more or less information 

sharing on what Washington proposes to do? Or that there is a sufficient give and take conversation where what we would like to do 

is discussed, and their ideas are heard and taken into consideration, and based on that we either go forward or make changes or 

do nothing? 

Ms. JONES. Yes, that is right. 

Let me give you a couple of examples of situations in which 

we——

Mr. HILLIARD. Which one is right? 

17

Ms. JONES. That we listen to our—any allies, not just the Europeans, but in this case the Europeans, listen to what they have to 

say and as much as possible take into consideration what their 

views are, what their attitudes are. 

But I can’t sit here and tell you that we are always going to shift 

to do whatever anybody else wants us to do. That isn’t going to 

happen. But we do listen, and we try to take into consideration. 

So, for instance, all of the work that was done last summer and 

through the fall in Macedonia was very much done in full concert, 

consultation with the European Union and with NATO, with their 

representatives. They were in the lead on negotiating the framework agreement in Macedonia. It was an extremely successful negotiation as a result, and it is a partnership that we consider a 

model on how we could proceed in other instances in which the EU 

and NATO and the U.S. have such a strong view. 

I would argue that the same thing is the case, although I know 

less about it, in Zimbabwe, consultations we had with the EU on 

elections there and how to talk about it, how to think about it. The 

same thing on Montenegro, how to—what sort of attitude we 

should have about a referendum there is very much in keeping— our position was very much a result of very deep consultations with 

the European Union. 

There are times, though, to get back to the first part of your— or the first option, shall we say, of your question, when people, 

when Europeans, others, believe we have not given them enough 

information about what we have in mind, but that is many times 

simply the result of an assumption that a statement means that we 

have changed a policy which we in fact haven’t changed. 

So, for instance, the concern about the President’s State of the 

Union address in which he described our concerns about the development of weapons of mass destruction and Iraq and Iran and 

North Korea, was—there was an assumption that behind that 

statement was a radical change in policy, and there was not. So at 

that point the Europeans say, you haven’t consulted with us 

enough. And we say, there wasn’t anything to consult. You know 

what our views are. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection, we will have Mr. Hilliard 

make one more question. 

Mr. HILLIARD. Yes. Let me make sure I understand what you are 

saying. Is it any concern of this Administration about the possibility of our allies not really feeling a part of what we are doing? 

Ms. JONES. It is a huge concern. I mean, that is why we spend 

so much time talking with them, mostly quietly, finding opportunities for meetings, so that we can get at what their concerns are, 

as soon as we know that there is a concern. 

I mean, it is genuinely something I spend every day, many hours 

of the day working on, talking, calling up my European colleagues, 

either in Washington or in capitols to say, okay, press reports are 

saying this and this. Let me explain to you what that is all about. 

Or such and such is going to happen. Here is what is behind it. 

Or such and such—we are thinking about such and such. What do 

you think? 

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Smith. 

18

Mr. SMITH. Expanding on, a little bit, on some of your comments 

on the Administration’s decision to have some protection on steel 

and with the strains in our trade relations with Europe, what is 

the chances that the problem is going to expand and spread in 

terms of our trade relations and with the European economic situation if that continues to decline? What is the possibility of looking 

at other areas with similar protections for this country? 

Ms. JONES. I am sorry? I didn’t understand the last part of your 

question. 

Mr. SMITH. With the decision—Administration’s decision on putting some protection for steel, with looking at the declining economic situation in Europe, what are the chances of other protections on other commodities or programs being implemented to add 

additional tariff embargoes? 

Ms. JONES. On our part? 

Mr. SMITH. On our part. 

Ms. JONES. Right. On steel, the President’s decision is as you 

have seen it. We are very hopeful that the European Union will 

talk with us at length about what it is that they may intend to do 

rather than take precipitous action. 

I can’t honestly tell you if there are further measures that we 

may take on—that would affect the Europeans on trade issues. I 

am just not up enough on trade matters in that kind of detail to 

be able to tell you that. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you about the emphasis that is being 

given on the Common Agricultural Policy with the EU, and they 

are meeting again—I mean, 50 percent of their budget, we are told, 

goes into the effort of the Common Agricultural Policy. What is 

going to happen in their next parliamentary meeting, and how is 

that problem going to be resolved? 

Ms. JONES. Congressman, I am going to have to get back to you 

on that. I don’t know the answer to that question. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, next question. As far as the WTO negotiations 

to further limit trade subsidies for—especially for agricultural 

products I am interested in, but all products, can you give me any 

insight in that area? 

Ms. JONES. I am sorry. I can’t. 

Mr. SMITH. I am running out of questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. JONES. I am very sorry. Clearly, I don’t know enough about 

the trade issues, and I apologize——

Mr. SMITH. What about the ramifications of steel with Russia? 

My understanding is, is—well, it was interesting to me that—to 

discover that half of our poultry exports go to Russia, and they are 

already finding some bad parts of our poultry exports. Is that—is 

Russia backing off of putting some kind of an embargo on some of 

their imports of our products? 

Ms. JONES. There is a very serious discussion under way just this 

week on the new Russian ban on importation of chicken legs. There 

were discussions—there have been discussions every day this week 

between a delegation from the Department of Agriculture and the 

Ministry of Agriculture, and just today the Deputy Minister of Agriculture told our Ambassador that he has directed that there be 

a speedy resolution to this dispute. We are very, very hopeful that 

19

there will be a speedy resolution, because we think that the Russian concerns are groundless, that they are—— Mr. SMITH. Well, they are groundless, but it is certainly going to 

hurt them in the reduction of steel exports to this country, and so 

their reaction has to be somewhat—they are contemplating something in—I am not sure the word is retaliation but in reaction to 

the protection tariffs that are going on steel. 

Ms. JONES. I am not convinced that one is the reaction to the 

other, because there is an issue of domestic chicken production as 

well and market share, so it may not be as tightly connected as one 

might assume. 

Mr. SMITH. You have mentioned the Kyoto Protocol. How is Europe reacting to the Administration’s alternative to going with that 

protocol to be more aggressive in our initiation to look to reduce 

pollution, especially carbon? 

Ms. JONES. Frankly, it is mixed reaction to our response. What 

we are very much hopeful of is that the Europeans and various 

other allies will work in parallel with this, that they will accept the 

line that we wish to pursue and work cooperatively with us to reduce the pollutants. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman from Michigan. 

We are joined with our good friend from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Delahunt. 

Bill, do you—one of the problems that we are running on to, we 

had a commitment for this room until 2 o’clock, and I know Mr. Bereuter has some more questions. I have one quick question, but it 

is certainly your time, Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I will try to be brief. 

Madam Secretary, you have been, I am sure, aware of the arrest 

of three Irish nationals in Colombia back in——

Ms. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. August? What information do you 

have regarding their activities in Colombia? 

Ms. JONES. I am not sure I recall it well enough to provide the 

detail that you would like. Congressman, may I provide that answer to you later? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure. 

Recently, we have heard public statements by officials, both in 

Russia and in France, regarding their concern about action against 

Iraq. Can you give us some feedback in terms of our consultations 

with our allies in regards to the expressed concern by the President 

relative to Iraq? 

Ms. JONES. We in fact have engaged in very detailed conversations with members of the security council in Iraq, because the 

focus continues to be on getting agreement on the goods review list 

that is required by the end of May in order for there to be an 

agreement on getting inspectors back into Iraq. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. There seems to be the interpretation, I believe, 

in Europe that the United States is seriously considering some possible military action. 

Ms. JONES. Right and—— Mr. DELAHUNT. What is the feedback you have been getting on 

that? 

20

Ms. JONES. Well, the feedback is worry that—again, as I—and 

the way I addressed Congressman Hilliard’s question is an assumption that there must be something more behind a statement that 

worries them than there in fact is, and that is why I answered your 

question that way. The focus continues to be on getting inspectors 

back in, on getting the goods review list agreed so that that can 

happen. 

That said, the President remains extremely worried about the 

states that are developing weapons of mass destruction, the possibility of their being used against the neighbors or falling into the 

wrong hands and used against us. There is no question that that 

remains a concern, but it is not a new concern. And that is the discussion that we have with various of our European colleagues, is 

you haven’t—this is not the first time you have heard this from us. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, they must have heard it in different terms 

because, and I am not trying to castigate or criticize the rhetoric, 

somehow the rhetoric has escalated the level of concern. We are 

reading about it. We are hearing about it. There has, I think, developed a sense among some of our allies that a military attack is 

imminent. What you are suggesting today, that this is a policy that 

has been in existence, and the focus is on the United Nations, and 

we are not on the verge of military action. 

Ms. JONES. The focus is on the United Nations. Our conditions 

about weapons of mass destruction have been there for a long time 

and the possibility of their getting into the wrong hands, into terrorist hands. But as the President says repeatedly as well, and his 

Cabinet members, is as we see it there is a need to go after additional threats, terrorist threats, we will do that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can I just have one final question? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Sure. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, and I know that you are Under Secretary for Europe and Eurasia, but since we are on the issue of 

weapons of mass destruction, let me speak specifically of one-third 

of the Axis of Evil, North Korea. By the end of the Clinton Administration, it would appear, according to newspaper reports, that 

substantial progress had been made in terms of an agreement 

which I believe diffused the situation. We needed, obviously, an appropriate verification mechanism, and I think that was left on the 

table. Have any efforts been made, that you are aware of, to pursue 

how to pick up that particular initiative, whether it be public statements or working through third nations or through any kinds of 

communication? 

Ms. JONES. I think it would be unwise for me to try to guess at 

what the right answer is. I don’t know it well enough, Congressman, to be able to address North Korea. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Bill. 

One quick question for me, and then we have Mr. Hilliard and 

then Mr. Bereuter. 

It appears that we finally have a government in Kosovo which 

can begin addressing more of the complicated problems in the area, 

even though the final status of Kosovo is not under consideration. 

When does the Bush Administration believe it will be appropriate 

to begin discussing the final status of Kosovo? 

21

Ms. JONES. We believe that that discussion should take place 

after there is a government in place, after the international community has turned over the political reins to the government. We 

think it is premature to do so now. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Mr. Hilliard. 

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much. 

Madam Secretary, in one of your responses to me you talked 

about the consultation between America and Europe on the 

Zimbabwe matter. Some time ago there was an agreement made— it was tri-party—between Zimbabwe, England and the United 

States. The United States and England agreed to pay certain sums 

of money to farmers who own a substantial portion of land in 

Zimbabwe. England pays part of the money, and some of the land 

was redeemed for it on behalf of the country. The United States 

never paid it, and there were considerable requests for the money 

to be paid and for an agreement to be fulfilled. It never was. 

About 3 years ago, the President of the country then started taking land from farmers, white farmers or farmers who are from, basically, Britain that own the property, and now it has escalated to 

a violent confrontation. Does the United States and England plan 

to hold to their agreement, or is it just going to sit back and see 

what happens? 

Ms. JONES. May I get you an answer on that? I don’t know the 

answer myself. 

Mr. HILLIARD. Yes. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Bereuter. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand we are 

in close time limits here. 

Three points about the reason for the gaps growing, and I think 

one is that the European Union has made major progress toward 

integration and the countries have given up major elements of 

their sovereignty. They don’t like to put it in those terms, but that 

is really what is happening. And they may, therefore, have a very 

different attitude about giving up elements to multilateral institutions than Americans do. 

Ms. JONES. That is right. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The second point related to that I think is the 

fact that Europeans and other countries as well are disturbed 

about our failure to agree to a variety of international treaties or 

other types of agreements. But I think, while there are some cases 

to be made on their behalf from time to time overwhelmingly, we 

have to recognize that somebody has to be pragmatic, somebody 

has to pick out the reasonable position, somebody has to occasionally say the emperor has no clothes. 

President Clinton and President Bush can’t do much to sell a 

Kyoto Treaty that was rejected almost unanimously in the Senate, 

at least in its current form. 

Two points that you might have a response to. One is mostly a 

warning, and that is that I think that if you can believe press reports—and that is all I can cite here—there are some substantial 

amount of weapons flowing to Albanian Kosovars and to Albanian 

ethnics in Macedonia for continuing to fight there. So I would hope 

22

that we can watch that very closely, assure that the Slavic majority 

in Macedonia lives up to the promises to integrate fully the Albanians but be worried that the German-led peacekeeping force may 

need to have immediate help from the United States. Anything you 

would like to say about that would be welcome. 

The second point is on Russia. I agree with you that the relationship is improving and it is deepening and we need to make the 

points in this country and help President Putin make the points 

that it is improving and that there are benefits flowing to Russia, 

but just in the last few days press accounts say that a classified 

nuclear use document was leaked. I can’t imagine any American 

that wants the best for our country would leak that, but apparently 

it has, and allegedly it says that one of the countries for which preemptive use of nuclear weapons might be considered would be Russia. 

I think that is particularly damaging to our relationship right 

now; and with the defense minister here in the city at the moment 

this would be a time for clarification and, if possible, a reconsideration of that policy, if in fact it has been accurately characterized 

in the media. 

Would you like to say anything about the prospects for peace this 

spring in Macedonia or about this document? 

Ms. JONES. Absolutely. Your focus on the flow of weapons in and 

around Macedonia is very well taken. It is something that we focused on considerably for the past year or more; and it is something that, more importantly, KFOR focuses on in terms of doing 

everything it can to stop the cross-border traffic. 

We also have some very productive, very good conversations with 

the Albanian government and some border control programming in 

place in order to help the Albanian government stem the flow of 

weapons and other material that would not be conducive to furthering peace in Macedonia. 

On Russia and the nuclear posture review, I think that the comments that Secretary Powell has made over the past couple of days 

are very apt in that regard. 

The first is to say that this is a planning document. It is not a 

policy document. It doesn’t—it is not a targeting document, so it 

doesn’t say that—it doesn’t list which countries are being targeted. 

None are being targeted right now. 

The most important aspect of the whole relationship that we 

have with Russia on nuclear weapons is the focus that we have on 

reducing substantially and significantly, dramatically the number 

of nuclear weapons that we would have in inventory and that Russia would have in its inventory. 

You are right. The Russian Minister of Defense is here now, 

Sergei Ivanov. I have every confidence that in his meetings in the 

White House with Secretary Rumsfeld and tomorrow with Secretary Powell that this issue will be addressed. It will be addressed 

thoroughly, and it will be addressed to his satisfaction. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. 

We have been joined by the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 

Cooksey. We were about to wrap up the hearing, but did you did 

you have anything that you would like to add? 

23

Mr. COOKSEY. Just a couple of comments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We are delighted to have you here. I know that at times the relationship with the Europeans has been testy. I think you should remind the Europeans that this is a different Administration, that it 

is an Administration that really is interested in international relations. This is an Administration that has people who have real 

depth. It is an Administration that has character and courage. 

And, you know, I love Europe. There are certain parts—I would 

like to go there, but at times they seem to lack courage on certain 

issues. I won’t touch on their character. But I do have a couple of 

questions. 

Some critics of Europe have demanded that the Europeans drop 

their pointless rhetoric about the U.S. unilateralism and making 

constructive proposals for countering global threats and challenges. 

Do you think this is the position of the Bush Administration, or 

what is the position? 

Ms. JONES. The position of the Bush Administration is that we 

are really very gratified by the level of cooperation and support 

that we have from our European friends and allies. What I would 

like to do is not lose sight of how much support and solidarity we 

have had from them, starting with September 12th with the invocation of Article 5 in NATO. But the number of European military 

units that participate in Operation Enduring Freedom and in the 

security force in Kabul is really very dramatic. They participate 

with us in Central Asia as well. 

I would like to—I think what is unfortunate is that a few public 

statements seem to overtake all of the much more extensive but 

much quieter kinds of discussions and cooperation that goes on between us and the Europeans, whether it be in law enforcement, in 

financial transactions, in discussions with the European Union, et 

cetera. That said, we take very seriously the worries of our European allies that they maybe don’t hear enough from us, and we are 

trying to—it is hard to expand the number of contacts. We are trying to expand the kinds of—or are giving them greater opportunity 

to air their views as well. 

Because it would be very difficult for me, if not impossible, to 

suggest, for example, that Secretary Powell get on the phone more 

often with his European colleagues. He is on the phone so much, 

he would do nothing else if he were to do—if he were to consult 

with the Europeans—to the extent that they would like to be on 

the phone with him. It is just a matter of the number of hours in 

the day. 

But what I do in my own conversations is encourage my colleagues to have their ministers raise questions that bother them 

privately with the Secretary in their conversations and use the 

phone calls as a way to get into some of the issues that are of concern to them, rather than use them as a quick, what do we do 

today on X, Y, Z issues? 

Mr. COOKSEY. You know, the French have been critical of us at 

times, more critical more often than supportive, I think, but do you 

think their public rhetoric and their criticism on things like capital 

punishment, our Mideast policy, the treatment of the people in 

Guantanamo Bay, Kyoto Treaty, missile defense—do you think that 

24

that is their true position, or are they doing it for the public, for 

an audience that they are appealing to? Are they making political 

statements to promote their own political careers, or do they have 

the courage to—or the convictions that they really mean what they 

are saying? 

Ms. JONES. Well, on several of the issues you mentioned, for example, Guantanamo Bay, there were some concerns raised right 

initially with the initial photographs, but those concerns have all 

gone away since our French colleagues have had access to their nationality prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and have seen the lengths 

to which the camp commander has gone to be sensitive to cultural 

and religious issues for the prisoners. 

In terms of some of the other issues, for example, there are something like over 5,000 French troops participating in various aspects 

of Operation Enduring Freedom. That, to me, means a lot more 

than a press statement here or there. 

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, I don’t know how to do this, but I think that 

the Administration or the State Department should subtly, or 

maybe not even subtly, remind them that there was a period two 

or three centuries ago when the center of influence in the world 

was in Europe. And they did some things well, and they did some 

things that were not so good. 

I used to work in Africa a lot, and they mismanaged a lot of their 

colonies in Africa. I think they mismanaged the colony that we now 

live in, and thank goodness for crazy King George, and then we got 

rid of him. But they should be reminded that the center of influence and power, military and economic, is in this country. We want 

to be their friends, but we can just—I think that a lot of people 

have a limit as to how much criticism we will take from them. 

But you are the diplomat. You are the one who can diplomatically tell them. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. That was very diplomatic. You would be a great 

Ambassador. 

Mr. COOKSEY. They have not called me to join the diplomatic——

Mr. GALLEGLY. Unusually diplomatic for the gentleman. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You can be the first Ambassador to Cuba, John. 

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. We are joined by our colleague, the gentleman 

from New York, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. Engel, before you came in, we had said we were going to— had a commitment to wrap up at 2 o’clock. So I know you have one 

quick question you would like to ask, and with the indulgence of 

the Committee I would yield to the gentleman from New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Secretary Jones, good to see you again. 

Ms. JONES. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. As you know, as we have discussed in the past, I 

chair the Albanian Issues Caucus, very concerned with what is 

happening in the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo. Scores of Albanians are still being held prisoner by Serbia in the wake of the 

Kosovo conflict. And although groups of prisoners have periodically 

been released, many are still being held. 

Now it is my understanding that, by March 31st, the end of this 

month, unless the President, under a provision inserted in the law 

25

by Senator McConnell, certifies that Serbia is cooperating with the 

international tribunal on Yugoslavia at implementing policies respecting minority rights and the rule of law, that no humanitarian 

or democracy assistance can be supplied to Serbia. And I will summarize. 

The International Crisis Group has concluded in a recent report 

that there is still a myriad of Serbian violations. There is no civilian control over the Yugoslav army. There is organized crime. 

Yugoslavia continues to work against Dayton by funding the Bosnian-Serb army. They continue to finance and maintain illegal parallel police administrative structures in the north of Kosovo, contrary to UN Resolution 1244; and they still hold at least 78 Albanian political prisoners from Kosovo. 

So I just want to say that I don’t believe that the President 

should certify that Serbia has satisfied this condition if the prisoners have not been returned to Kosovo, and I would like to know 

what the Administration’s position on the certification is and its relationship to the prisoners. I agree with Senator McConnell that 

this provision is important and that the Serbs have not implemented it and therefore the aid should not go to them. 

Ms. JONES. On the question of certification, we are pushing very 

hard for increased cooperation, additional cooperation with the 

International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. We agree that it has 

been insufficient but are very hopeful that cooperation will—the 

level of cooperation will be increased to allow certification. 

On the question of the prisoners, we are working very hard since 

the triumph of the DOS coalition to push for the authorities to release, and have finally succeeded in pushing for the release, of 

1,800 ethnic Albanian prisoners from Serbian jails. The numbers 

that you—our numbers are maybe slightly different from the ones 

that you have, but they are in the same ballpark, and what we are 

working on now is to encourage—to continue to encourage the turning over of a large number of files by the Serbs and are hoping to 

discuss this issue in Belgrade with Dr. Chovich on March 14th and 

are hoping for some progress at that time. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay, and in light of the Chairman’s admonition, I 

won’t pursue, but I really think that the law, as inserted by Senator McConnell, I don’t think that the President should certify that 

Serbia satisfied the conditions if the prisoners are not returned. I 

think that is very, very important. 

I thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

I would add, without objection we, the Committee, would like to 

present some additional questions for the record that could be answered. And, I would invite my colleagues on both sides, if they 

have any, to direct them to the Assistant Secretary, and her questions and answers will be made an official part of this hearing. 

Ms. JONES. We will do so. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Assistant Secretary, I want to thank you again 

not only for being here today but your ongoing accessibility to the 

Subcommittee, your input is invaluable, and the relationship we 

have been establishing is one that I am very pleased with. Thank 

you very much. 

26

The Subcommittee will stand adjourned. 

Ms. JONES. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 2:21 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(27)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TO THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND RESPONSES

Question: 

Jessica Matthews of Carnegie, writing in Foreign Policy magazine last year, stated 

that U.S. policymakers were so blinded by Europe’s shortfalls in the security realm 

that they consistently underestimated the historic developments the EU has undertaken in the economic and political spheres. 

Do you share this assessment? 

Do you believe the U.S. Mission to the EU in Brussels is adequately staffed and 

prepared to deal with the fundamental changes taking place in Europe? 

Answer: 

U.S. policymakers have been acutely aware of the historic changes taking within 

the economic and political spheres of the European Union (EU) and its member 

states. We have expanded the scope and subject matter of our consultations with 

the EU in step with the expansion of the EU’s own mandates and activities. European integration accelerated in the late 1980’s when the European Community 

launched its single market initiative of free movement in goods, people, services and 

capital. In 1990, we initiated regular summit and ministerial meetings and formalized sub-cabinet economic consultations. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 added a second pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy, to the EU’s longstanding first pillar of economic and trade activities. This treaty also provided for establishing the 

EURO as an eventual common currency among EU member states. In 1995, we 

launched the New Transatlantic Agenda, a broad and multi-level system of consultations which encompass trade and development, global issues such as terrorism, 

transnational crime, narcotics and HIV/AIDS, regional foreign policy challenges 

around the globe, and the encouragement of people-to-people dialogue. 

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1998 added Justice and Home Affairs, including law enforcement, as a third pillar of EU activity. The U.S. quickly sought to open discussion and explore ways to cooperate. We have markedly accelerated our engagement 

on this third pillar since the events of September 11, 2001. The Amsterdam Treaty 

also authorized the naming of an EU High Representative for Common Foreign and 

Security Policy. Senior Department officials, including the Secretary, have several 

contacts per week with the EU’s High Representative, currently Javier Solana, as 

well as the foreign minister of the country holding the EU Presidency and the Commission. 

The U.S. Mission to the EU in Brussels is staffed by 53 direct hire U.S. officers 

who represent a dozen U.S. agencies. The Mission is about 50 percent larger than 

it was ten years ago. The staff includes a sizable economic section and representatives of USTR, Commerce and the Department of Agriculture, who are devoted to 

advancing U.S. commercial and economic interests. The political section has added 

additional officers and agencies as the scope of our relations with the EU has expanded. I believe that the Mission is adequately staffed at present. As the role of 

the European Union evolves, we will continue to review staffing to ensure adequate 

resources and the right mix of personnel to protect and advance U.S. interests. 

Question: 

Jessica Matthews of Carnegie, writing in Foreign Policy magazine last year, suggested that one way to improve relations with Europe was to recognize that NATO 

28

is no longer the most relevant European institution. America’s European experts, who 

are NATOists rather than Europeanists, should be replaced with a generation that 

no longer sees Europe through that narrow lens. Do you believe this assessment accurately describes the situation at the Department of State. 

Answer: 

The Department of State recognizes and welcomes the increasing cohesion and 

growing significance of European institutions, most prominently the European 

Union (EU). Relations with the EU are important, most evidently on trade issues, 

but increasingly on political and security issues as well. The State Department devotes considerable resources to working as closely and cooperatively as possible with 

the EU. 

NATO remains, however, the pre-eminent transatlantic institution with membership spanning North America and Europe, essential to global security and stability. 

Over the past decade, NATO has engaged in a continuous process of adaptation, adjusting successfully to new security challenges. This process of transformation continues. NATO is at the vanguard of the effort to make Europe whole and free. Three 

former Warsaw Pact members joined the Alliance in 1999. Additional prospective 

members will be invited to join NATO this year. NATO’s Partnership for Peace has 

brought 26 European and Eurasian countries into cooperative and productive relations with NATO. NATO will forge a promising new relationship with Russia to advance the cause of peace and cooperation in Europe and beyond. September 11 both 

reinforced the NATO’s indispensability, but also underscored the need for NATO to 

develop new capabilities to address the problems of global terrorism. 

Question: 

The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy accounts for 50% of the EU budget and is 

a major stumbling block to EU Expansion. How productive will the upcoming ‘‘EU 

Convention’’ be in addressing the issue of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy? 

Answer: 

• The EU Convention has only just commenced and its potential scope is broad, 

focusing on institutional and decision-making issues.

• In the context of Agenda 2000, the mid term review in 2003, and reform of 

the Common Agricultural Policy before 2006, we would hope that Europe 

would work toward substantively reducing trade distorting domestic support 

issues.

• In January the European Commission put forward its proposal to phase in 

direct agricultural subsidies for new EU members. This proposal must be approved by EU member states before negotiations can commence with candidate countries; this is not expected to begin until later this year.

• We want the EU to participate in a positive way in the WTO agricultural negotiations where we are seeking additional disciplines on trade-distorting domestic support as well as meaningful market access. 

Question: 

What are the prospects for a WTO agreement to further reduce agricultural export 

subsidies? Can such an agreement be used to leverage the EU to compromise on a 

negotiated compensation for the WTO Foreign Sales Corporation Tax ruling? 

Answer: 

• Our views are clear, WTO members should work toward eliminating export 

subsidies, improve market access, and increase disciplines on trade-distorting 

domestic support payments.

• The negotiations may be difficult, not only with respect to agriculture, and 

countries will have to engage in and evaluate a comprehensive package of 

trade arrangements.

• Both the U.S. and the EU have made plain that the FSC/ETI dispute should 

not be linked to disagreements elsewhere and this issue is not on the agenda 

of the new WTO round. Of course, we will defend our interests and intend 

to comply in such a way as to ensure a level tax field for American business. 

Question: 

In 1997, the U.S. launched the Northern Europe Initiative (NEI) to promote stability, trade, and investment among 11 nations or parts of these nations in the Baltic 

Sea region. What is the Bush Administration’s current view on the NEI? Are you actively supporting regional cooperation in that area? 

29

Answer: 

• This Administration fully supports the Northern Europe Initiative (NEI), 

which remains an integral part of our overall strategy in Europe. NEI’s objective is to help integrate the Baltic states, Russia, and Poland into the new 

Europe and to further strengthen our relations with our Nordic partners and 

Germany through cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.

• NEI has provided the framework for a variety of regional programs implemented by U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and NGO’s. 

Our resources and engagement are used to address concrete problems in the 

region—like HIV/AIDS, TB, pollution, corruption, and trafficking in persons. 

At the same time, our programs help forge links across this important region 

that contribute to stability and prosperity. 

Question: 

Ukraine will hold elections for parliament in a little over two weeks. Is the Bush 

Administration following these elections? How does the Administration view these 

elections in terms of importance to our relationship with Ukraine? 

Answer: 

These elections will be a gauge of Ukraine’s commitment to democracy. We are 

providing approximately $4 million in election-related assistance to Ukraine. We are 

supporting efforts by the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy and other NGOs to train 

tens of thousands of local election observers and to educate and mobilize Ukrainian 

voters. 

We have used high-level contacts over the last two months to underscore that this 

election presents Ukraine with a key opportunity to improve relations with the U.S. 

by showing it is back on a democratic path. Senior USG officials, including Under 

Secretary of State Dobriansky, have emphasized to President Kuchma and other 

leading Ukrainian figures the need to ensure that the election campaign as well as 

election day itself are free and fair. This entails addressing the abuse of administrative resources and other disparities cited by both domestic and international election 

observers. 

Question: 

What is the Bush Administration’s policy toward promoting nuclear safety in 

Ukraine and Russia? Are we funding the Nunn-Lugar program at its optimum? 

Answer: 

• We are committed to addressing the problem of high-risk Soviet-designed reactors in operation.

• Our policy goal is closure of the least safe reactors, improvement in the safety 

of operation of existing reactors and strengthening nuclear regulators.

• The President has consistently stressed that preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, weapons technology, expertise and other weapons is 

our highest priority.

• Total security-related assistance for the Eurasian states for FY 2002, including supplemental funding, is just over $ 1 billion for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (‘‘Nunn-Lugar’’) program and the Departments of State and Energy nonproliferation programs.

• The FY 2003 Budget request at over $ 900 million for these programs continues to reflect the high priority we place on such non-proliferation assistance efforts.

• The administration is currently seeking a legislative change to gain waiver 

authority in the supplemental funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction and 

Title V of the Freedom Support Act to address concerns about Russian compliance with the chemical and biological weapons conventions.

• While seeking waiver authority, we will continue to work intensively at senior 

levels with Russia to resolve our concerns with its arms control behavior. 

Question: 

Does the Bush Administration support restoring normal trade relations with Yugoslavia? Are there any restrictions on this effort? 

Answer: 

The Bush Administration fully supports the overall goal of restoring normal trade 

relations (NTR) with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as part of the effort 

30

to reintegrate the FRY into the economic mainstream. At the same time, there is 

one legislative restriction that must be addressed prior to extending NTR to the 

FRY. Enacted in 1992, P.L. 102–420 withdrew most-favored-nation status (now 

known as NTR) from goods that are the product of Serbia and Montenegro. The law 

was designed to force the Milosevic government to cease its armed conflict and its 

policy of ethnic cleansing against various groups in the Balkans. It specifically 

sought to compel Milosevic to respect the borders of the republics of the former 

Yugoslavia and to cease its support of military forces in Bosnia. The law provides 

for the restoration of NTR upon a certification that Serbia and Montenegro have, 

inter alia, ceased all support of Serbian forces inside of Bosnia. The President has 

delegated to the Secretary of State the authority to make this certification. 

It has been impossible to certify up to this point because the law specifically provides for a finding that ‘‘all’’ FRY support for Serbian forces within Bosnia has been 

stopped, regardless of whether such support may now be provided in a manner that 

is consistent with the Dayton Accords. It is important to note, however, that the 

FRY Government has announced that as of March 1 it would no longer provide support to the VRS. We are in the process of evaluating this development. 

In addition, we believe that today’s reality in Yugoslavia is much different than 

that which prevailed at the time the legislation was written. In particular, armed 

conflict and ethnic cleansing have now ceased, Milosevic was extradited to the 

Hague, the Yugoslav government has full diplomatic relations with its neighbors, 

and the reformers in Belgrade are attempting to solidify democratic and economic 

progress, a process we are supporting fully. 

Question: 

Does the Bush Administration support European Union’s interest in taking over 

the international policing role in Bosnia and the military’s Amber Fox operation in 

Macedonia? 

Answer: 

BOSNIA: The U.S. supports the decision of the European Union (EU) to sponsor 

an international police mission in Bosnia as a follow-on to the UN’s International 

Police Task Force (IPTF) which will complete its core mandate in December 2002. 

The EU Police Mission (EUPM) will focus on advising and mentoring the mid-tosenior levels of Bosnian police leadership, and raising the level of professionalism 

and accountability of Bosnian police forces. At the same time, the EUPM will be 

complemented by a comprehensive program to restructure and improve the Bosnian 

judicial system. 

MACEDONIA: The European Council announced in the conclusions from its 

March 15–16 Barcelona summit ‘‘the EU’s availability to take responsibility, following elections in FYROM and at the request of its government’’ for a follow-on 

to NATO’s Task Force Fox ‘‘on the understanding that the permanent arrangements 

on EU-NATO cooperation (‘‘Berlin-plus’’) would be in place by then.’’ Elections in 

Macedonia will probably take place in mid-September 2002. If a follow-on to Task 

Force Fox is necessary, the U.S. is open to the possibility of an EU-led force under 

the circumstances stated in the European Council’s Barcelona conclusions. 

Question: 

The U.S. waived section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act for FY 02 in order to 

provide assistance to Azerbaijan to combat terrorism. What kind of assistance has 

actually been provided? Will the Bush Administration ask for another waiver for FY 

03 or is the Administration seeking to end section 907? 

Answer: 

Assistance provided to Azerbaijan to date under the waiver follows: 

An Assistant U.S. Attorney has been authorized to travel to Azerbaijan the first 

week in April to provide assistance and guidance to the Government of Azerbaijan 

in the drafting of anti-terrorism legislation. A group of Azerbaijani officials attended 

a conference on ‘‘The Role of the Public Prosecutor in a Democracy’’ in February. 

Another such group attended a conference on international money laundering in 

March. Both these conferences took place at the International Law Enforcement 

Academy in Budapest, sponsored by the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Assistance 

and Training of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

On March 11, 2002, the USDA authorized the granting of $10 million in export 

guarantees under the GSM–102 and Supplier Credit Guarantee Program, through 

the International Bank of Azerbaijan. 

The budget for security assistance to Azerbaijan in FY02 is $10.5 million. This 

includes: FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) Export Control and Related Border Security 

and other nonproliferation assistance programs ($3.1 million); Nonproliferation AntiVerDate Feb 1 2002 09:11 May 21, 2002 Jkt 078948 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\031302\78204 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
31

terrorism, Demining and Related Activities (NADR); and DoD resources. The security budget also includes a grant of $4 million each for Azerbaijan and Armenia for 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $400,000 each of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. The Administration is in the process of removing 

both countries from the ITAR list so they may receive this FMF and IMET programming. The Defense Department will have its first-ever Bilateral Working Group 

(BWG) with Azerbaijan in Baku March 27–28. The BWG will discuss the programming of U.S. security assistance to Azerbaijan and lay out the menu for defense cooperation for the rest of the year. 

In the law enforcement area, a team led by the State Department’s Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and including FBI, DEA, Justice and 

Treasury elements conducted a technical assessment in Azerbaijan from February 

5–8, 2002. The team recommended assistance in areas including forensics, counternarcotics training and police academy development, financial crime and money laundering, training and equipment for the maintenance of criminal records training and 

equipment for the maintenance of databases on fraudulent passports and counterfeit 

currency, and training on countering organized crime. The U.S. Embassy in Baku 

is drafting a Letter of Agreement which details the conditions under which this assistance will be provided to the GOAJ. Once all parties have signed, assistance programs will begin one to two months later. 

On January 28–30, the Justice Department performed a separate assessment of 

the criminal justice system in Azerbaijan to assist in determining what type of law 

enforcement and rule of law programs could be provided. The assessment recommended the USG consider programs that: 1) focus on the judiciary; 2) assist in 

the implementation of the new criminal and criminal procedure codes through the 

conduct of training programs for judges, lawyers, prosecutors and police; and 3) reform the training of police to increase professionalism. The assessment also recommended the inclusion of GOAJ officials in regional and ILEA programs to expose 

them to the reforms and practices of their neighbors. 

The Treasury Department’s technical assistance, tax, budget and debt assessment 

teams visited Azerbaijan in February. Treasury is considering assistance that could 

provide technical expertise on: 1) assistance in financial intelligence to monitor the 

banking sector, thereby improving GOAJ capacity to track financial flows supporting terrorist activities; 2) Government Debt Issuance and Management; 3) modernization and anti-corruption measures in the taxation system; and 4) modernizing 

the budget. process for the GOAJ. The Office of the Assistance Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia and the U.S. Embassy in Baku are working with Treasury to 

prioritize these various program concepts, and will ensure coordination between 

Treasury and USAID in the banking sector. 

The Administration believes that U.S. interests will require the continuation in 

FY 2003 of the types of assistance covered by the waiver of section 907. 

The Administration continues to oppose section 907 in principle. 

Question: 

The United States is about to provide military assistance to Armenia. Yet Armenian military forces continue to occupy a large segment of Azerbaijani territory. Does 

the United States condone Armenian military occupation of Azerbaijani territory? 

Can you assure this Committee that no U.S. military assistance will be used to train 

Armenian military units currently inside Azerbaijani territory or Armenia units 

scheduled to go to Azerbaijan? 

Answer: 

The United States supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. As a co-Chair 

of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States is actively committed to facilitating 

a comprehensive, mutually acceptable settlement to the conflict between Armenia 

and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. 

With the waiver of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, the United States 

will be able to increase engagement with Armenia on a variety of fronts, including 

military, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and law-enforcement cooperation. We 

believe our increased cooperation in these areas will lead to enhanced stability in 

the region. 

We plan to expand bilateral military cooperation with Armenia. This plan will not 

include training and equipping Armenian military units inside Azerbaijan nor be 

conducted in a manner that could destabilize the region. The U.S. Government also 

has no plans to conduct a Train and Equip program in Armenia. 

The Armenian Defense Minister visited Washington March 20–21 for the first 

U.S.-Armenia bilateral defense consultations with DOD. During his visit, the United 

States and Armenia signed a joint statement of cooperation that would focus U.S. 

32

assistance in three areas: professional military education, developing an enhanced 

and interoperable communications system, and expanding Armenia’s peacekeeping 

capabilities. 

Our assistance will be an expansion of our on-going efforts to promote stability 

in the region. We have emphasized to both Armenia and Azerbaijan that new assistance cannot be used to destabilize the uneasy cease-fire between them, and that we 

will use it to promote peace between the two countries. 

Question: 

As you know, the Greek Orthodox theological school in Halki, Turkey was closed 

in 1971 by Turkish authorities thus depriving the Ecumenical Patriarchate of any 

adequate means to educate its clergy in Turkey. Can you update the Committee on 

any attempts by the U.S. Government to help convince the Government of Turkey to 

reopen the theological school of Halki and to allow the Patriarchate to carry out its 

religious mission in Turkey? 

Answer: 

This Administration and the Department of State are committed to promoting 

freedom and tolerance for all religions abroad. We recognize that reopening Halki 

Theological School, and thereby ensuring the education of future generations of Orthodox clergy, is of great importance to millions of Orthodox Christians around the 

world, including in the U.S. Both President Bush and Secretary Powell told Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew during his visit to Washington on March 5 that the 

U.S. supports the reopening of Halki Seminary. We have repeatedly raised this 

issue with the Turks. Secretary Powell spoke with Turkish Foreign Minister Cem 

about the Seminary last December during his visit to Turkey. U.S. Ambassador to 

Turkey Pearson has been actively engaged in trying to find a solution to the impasse as will the new Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom. We 

believe that a solution can be found, and we will continue work toward that goal.

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