NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

FRANCISCO GALLEGOS-LOPEZ, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50420

D.C. No. 3:17-cr-001438-BEN-2

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Honorable Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2018**

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Francisco Gallegos-Lopez appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the above-Guidelines 41-month sentence imposed following his guiltyplea conviction for harboring an alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)

and (v)(II). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, and

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 19 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-50420

vacate and remand in part.

Gallegos-Lopez contends that the district court procedurally erred by first 

determining and imposing the sentence, and then calculating the correct Guidelines

range. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013) (“[D]istrict 

courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them 

throughout the sentencing process.”) (internal quotations omitted). We review the 

district court’s sentencing procedure for plain error because Gallegos-Lopez failed 

to preserve the issue properly at the sentencing hearing. United States v. ValenciaBarragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). On this record, we conclude that 

there is none. Gallegos-Lopez informed the court at the start of the hearing that the 

parties agreed upon the Guidelines range, and the court noted both that it had 

reviewed the sentencing memoranda and that there were no objections to the 

presentence report. Further, the court’s discussion of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors throughout the hearing demonstrates that it was considering 

whether and why to vary from the agreed-upon Guidelines range. Thus, despite 

the district court’s failure to calculate the Guidelines range at the outset of the 

hearing, the record reflects that it was aware of the range and had the correct range 

in mind throughout the proceeding.

To the extent Gallegos-Lopez also challenges the substantive reasonableness 

of his sentence, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. See
3 17-50420

United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2009). The record reflects a 

rational and meaningful consideration of the section 3553(a) factors, and the 

totality of the circumstances support the sentence. See Autery, 555 F.3d at 878. 

Contrary to Gallegos-Lopez’s contention, the district court did not err when 

it refused to recommend Gallegos-Lopez serve his sentence at a prison with a 

“drop-out” facility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (recommendations by sentencing 

court to BOP are non-binding). However, we agree with Gallegos-Lopez, and the 

government concedes, that the case should be remanded because the court added

three non-standard conditions of supervised release to the sentence after the 

sentencing hearing without notice to Gallegos-Lopez. See United States v. Napier, 

463 F.3d 1040, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2006). We thus remand and instruct the district 

court to strike conditions 4, 7, and 8 from the written judgment. See United States 

v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1993) (where there is a direct conflict 

between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment, remedy is remand to 

the district court to make the written judgment consistent with the oral 

pronouncement). 

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.