Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

December 2003 MILITARY 

TRANSFORMATION 

The Army and OSD 

Met Legislative 

Requirements for First 

Stryker Brigade 

Design Evaluation, but 

Issues Remain for 

Future Brigades 

GAO-04-188 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-188.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-188, a report to 

congressional committees 

December 2003

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 

The Army and OSD Met Legislative 

Requirements for First Stryker Brigade 

Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for 

Future Brigades 

The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met the 

legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense 

Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan for conducting an 

operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; obtained the plan’s 

approval from the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation; and from April through May 2003, the brigade deployed to the 

evaluation sites and conducted combat missions across the full spectrum of 

potential threats—from major theater of war to security and stability 

operations. In September 2003, OSD certified to Congress that the brigade 

design is both operationally effective and suitable. The Army has deployed 

the first Stryker brigade to Iraq. 

The Army developed an evaluation plan and established a control cell that 

used independent evaluators to monitor and collect data on the brigade’s 

performance. The cell compiled and analyzed the data and submitted a 

report to the I Corps commander, who declared the design as operationally 

effective and operationally suitable. The commander noted that performance 

difficulties were due to an accelerated fielding schedule and inadequate 

training time. The U.S. Forces Command endorsed the report. 

GAO determined, based on its observations and analyses, that the brigade’s 

performance showed strengths and weaknesses. The brigade could perform 

as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities. The 

brigade’s strengths were its ability to conduct combat missions, including 

deployment using different transportation modes and the ability to use the 

Stryker vehicle’s speed and agility. The weaknesses related to staff planning, 

digital system usage, sustainment, and executing company-level combat 

missions. Contractors were also used ineffectively. GAO concluded that the 

primary cause of the weaknesses was insufficient training proficiency. 

The Army is implementing a plan to mitigate most operational evaluation 

issues. The Army concluded that the issues were largely training related, 

although some were related to design or equipment. The brigade, in 

preparation for deployment to Iraq, conducted additional training to address 

the issues the Army and GAO identified. The brigade’s training performance 

indicates that these issues are being mitigated. The Army is addressing the 

training and equipment issues for the first Stryker brigade; however, it has 

deferred some critical issues that have implications for future brigades. 

The Army continues to transform 

units, known as Stryker brigades, 

into lighter, rapidly deployable, 

and more capable forces. 

Because Stryker brigades are an 

entirely new design, the fiscal 

year 2002 National Defense 

Authorization Act required the 

Army to conduct an evaluation of 

the design, to include deployment 

of the brigade and execution of 

combat missions across the full 

spectrum of potential threats. The 

act also required the Secretary of 

Defense to certify that the 

evaluation results indicate the 

design is both operationally 

effective and suitable. 

As one in a series of reviews of 

Army transformation, GAO 

monitored the evaluation to 

assess (1) whether the Army and 

the Secretary of Defense met 

legislative requirements, (2) how 

the Army evaluated both the 

operational effectiveness and 

suitability of the brigade’s design, 

(3) what the brigade’s 

performance was during the 

evaluation, and (4) how the Army 

plans to mitigate issues identified 

during the evaluation.

GAO recommends that OSD 

direct the Army to complete all 

mitigation efforts and apply, as 

applicable, adjustments made to 

the brigade design to future 

Stryker brigades. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, OSD 

concurred with the 

recommendations.
Page i GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the 

Stryker Brigade 6

Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter 

Experts to Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade’s 

Design 8

Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses 

during the Operational Evaluation 11

Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational 

Evaluation Issues, but Deferred Issues Have Implications for 

Future Brigades 32

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 35

Agency Comments 35

Appendix I Provisions from Public Law 107-107 Concerning 

Limitations on Army Transformation Actions 38 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 40 

Appendix III Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and 

Operational Capabilities by Critical Tasks 42 

Appendix IV Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical 

Tasks 43 

Appendix V Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities 

Compared to Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks 44 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Appendix VI Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and 

Key Operational Capabilities 46 

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Defense 49 

Related GAO Products 51 

Figures 

Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the 

Southern California Logistics Airfield 13

Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training 

Center 14

Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles, 

Louisiana 15

Figure 4: Road March 16

Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip 17

Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at 

Geronimo Forward Landing Strip 18

Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded Terrain at the Joint 

Readiness Training Center 20

Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon 21

Figure 9: Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center 26

Figure 10: Alternate Supply Point at the National Training Center 28

Abbreviations 

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

December 12, 2003 

Congressional Committees 

During fiscal year 2003, the Army continued to transform its force to one 

that is lighter, more rapidly deployable, and able to effectively operate in 

various environments and across the full spectrum of threats from smallscale contingencies to a major theater of war. Two of six planned Stryker 

Brigade Combat Teams are currently undergoing the Army’s initial 

transformation efforts—one brigade, which has been deployed to Iraq, and 

another brigade, which is co-located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The 

brigades are an entirely new organizational design, and questions have 

arisen regarding their combat effectiveness. In the fiscal year 2002 

National Defense Authorization Act,1

 Congress required 

• the Secretary of the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of the 

brigade that includes deployment of the brigade to the evaluation site 

and brigade execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of 

potential threats and operational scenarios; 

• the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of 

Defense to approve the operational evaluation plan; and 

• the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on the 

operational evaluation. 

The statute further limited deployment of the brigade and procurement of 

vehicles beyond the third brigade until 30 days after the Secretary of 

Defense submits the report and certifies that the results of the operational 

evaluation indicate that the design for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team is 

operationally effective2

 and operationally suitable.3 (See appendix I for the 

 1

 Section 113, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P. L. 107-107 (Dec. 

28, 2001). 

2

 Operational effectiveness is determined by the brigade’s ability to successfully 

accomplish full spectrum missions as well as, or better than, current forces. This requires 

the capability to achieve decisive action through close combat, centered primarily on 

dismounted infantry assault. 

3

 Operational suitability is determined if the brigade’s design supports the tasking of the 

brigade to the type of missions and environments that the brigade’s concept document 

indicates is appropriate for it. This requires organizing and equipping the force to provide 

high strategic, operational, and tactical mobility. 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

statutory provisions concerning these limitations on Army transformation 

actions.) 

On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored 

and assessed the Army’s efforts to conduct an operational evaluation of 

the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team — the Third Brigade of the Second 

Infantry Division — as required by the fiscal year 2002 National Defense 

Authorization Act. Our objectives were to assess (1) whether the Army and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met legislative requirements, 

(2) how the Army evaluated both the operational effectiveness and the 

operational suitability of the brigade’s design, (3) what the brigade’s 

performance was during the operational evaluation, and (4) how the Army 

plans to mitigate issues identified during the operational evaluation. 

In our assessment of the Army’s Stryker brigade operational evaluation, 

we reviewed the Army’s operational evaluation plan and its associated 

execution plan, and we observed the exercises held at the National 

Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training 

Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We observed the deployment of the Stryker 

brigade, as well as execution of certain combat missions. Upon 

completion of the operational evaluation and the Army’s compilation of its 

data sources, we reviewed and analyzed the Army’s database that 

consisted primarily of evaluator comments to assess the brigade’s 

performance. (See appendix II for the full text of the scope and 

methodology.) We are providing this report, another in a planned series 

related to Army transformation, to you because of your committees’ 

oversight responsibility. Related GAO products concerning transformation 

are listed at the end of this report. 

The Army and OSD met the legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 

National Defense Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan and 

conducted an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; it 

obtained the plan’s approval from the Department of Defense Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation;4

 and OSD submitted a report to Congress 

and certified the results of the operational evaluation. The Army 

conducted a deployment to the operational evaluation site from Fort 

 4

 The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal advisor to the Secretary 

of Defense concerning operational testing, including assessments of operational 

effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the items tested. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Lewis, Washington, to the National Training Center and onto the Joint 

Readiness Training Center; these deployments incorporated various 

methods, including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. The Army’s 

operational evaluation, held from April 1, 2003, through May 28, 2003, 

included the conduct of combat missions across the full spectrum of 

potential threats, to include scenarios in a major theater war environment 

as well as security and stability operations. Finally, on September 17, 2003, 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense certified that the operational evaluation’s 

results indicated that the initial Stryker brigade’s design is operationally 

effective and operationally suitable. 

The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational 

parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. The 

organizational parameters and operational characteristics were the 

essential elements in assessing both the operational effectiveness and the 

operational suitability of the first Stryker brigade’s design. In doing so, the 

Army established a control cell that developed a data collection plan, 

analyzed the results, and wrote an operational evaluation report. The 

Army used independent evaluators trained in Stryker brigade doctrine to 

monitor and observe the brigade’s performance. The evaluators provided 

subjective commentary as to how the brigade performed in accordance 

with key organizational parameters and key operational characteristics. 

The data were compiled and analyzed, and a report was submitted to the I 

Corps commander. The I Corps commander assessed the report’s findings 

and determined that the brigade’s design is operationally both effective 

and suitable, but noted that the brigade had experienced difficulties in 

demonstrating some of the key operational capabilities. The difficulties 

were primarily attributed to an accelerated fielding schedule and a lack of 

adequate training time. The Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command, 

endorsed the report’s findings. 

Based on our observation of events and analysis of the data collected in 

accordance with the Army’s plan, the brigade demonstrated that it could 

perform as designed, but it did not consistently demonstrate its 

capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths were 

illustrated by the brigade’s ability to deploy using different transportation 

systems and the individual unit’s ability to take advantage of the speed, 

agility, and maneuverability of the Stryker vehicle. With regard to 

weaknesses, the brigade had difficulties in (1) mastering staff operations, 

which reduced the ability of the brigade to use all of its assets as intended; 

(2) using its digital systems, which resulted in inconsistent and incomplete 

maintenance of a common operating picture; (3) conducting supply 

operations, which challenged the brigade to sustain itself; and (4) 
Page 4 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

executing company-level combat missions, which reduced its overall 

combat power. Additionally, contractors were used ineffectively because 

units used them improperly or did not provide the support necessary to 

ensure their effective use in providing maintenance support to the brigade. 

Our analysis of the data concluded that insufficient training proficiency 

was the primary cause of these weaknesses, thus inhibiting the brigade 

from achieving a full demonstration of its capabilities. 

The Army has developed a plan that when fully implemented will mitigate 

most issues identified in the operational evaluation, and the plan 

addresses the weaknesses we identified from our analysis of the 

evaluation results. However, the plan does not fully address design and 

equipment issues that have implications for future brigades. The Army’s 

immediate focus in implementing the plan was to resolve issues relating to 

training and equipment that affected the brigade’s ability to deploy to Iraq 

and defer the remaining issues for future consideration, some of which 

have implications for the future brigades. To mitigate the training issues 

and to prepare for deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and 

implemented training events, including a command post exercise to train 

the staff and a brigade field training exercise that emphasized platoon and 

company unit operations. Observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness 

Training Center observed the brigade’s performance during these events, 

provided feedback, and conducted informal after-action reviews focusing 

on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the training, the 

brigade commander and senior Army officials responsible for Stryker 

brigade transformation told us that they had no reservations regarding the 

brigade’s proficiency or ability to deploy and conduct combat operations 

in Iraq. However, one design issue that has not been completely addressed 

that has implications for the current and future brigades involves the 

current vehicle of the reconnaissance squadron operations officer— it is 

not as mobile or as survivable as the Stryker vehicle used by the 

reconnaissance squadron commander. The mitigation plan includes a 

short-term solution for the initial brigade of shifting a Stryker from 

elsewhere for the operations officer but no long-term solution. Regarding 

equipment, one equipment issue involved the fact that not all Stryker 

vehicles have the digital system called Force XXI Battle Command Brigade 

and Below (FBCB2). This system increases a commander’s ability to 

position troops and conduct combat operations. The issue is that only onehalf of the Stryker vehicles in each infantry platoon currently have the 

FBCB2 system. The mitigation plan calls for procuring a sufficient number 

of FBCB2 systems for the initial Stryker brigade, but the plan does not 

address if FBCB2s will be procured to equip all Stryker vehicles in the 

future brigades. All identified issues — training, design, and equipment — 
Page 5 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

and the related mitigation efforts provide valuable lessons learned for 

future brigades. 

We are recommending that, to assist the Stryker brigade’s transformation 

efforts, the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to 

develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues not 

addressed prior to deploying the brigade and apply, as applicable, 

adjustments made to the training, equipment, and design of the brigade to 

future Stryker brigades. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the department concurred with 

our recommendations. 

The Army continues to transform its forces toward its goal to be more 

strategically responsive and to dominate across the full spectrum of 

military operations — from small-scale contingencies to a major theater 

war. The transformation efforts, which began in 1999, attempted to 

balance lethality, mobility, and survivability with the capabilities required 

for responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a reduced in-theater 

footprint. The Army chose an armored wheeled vehicle, designated as the 

Stryker, as its primary combat platform and began to transform six 

existing brigades to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Third Brigade of 

the Second Infantry Division was selected as the initial Stryker Brigade 

Combat Team. 

According to the Army, the core qualities of the new brigade design are 

high mobility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; an ability to 

achieve decisive action through the use of dismounted infantry that is 

supported by organic direct and indirect fire platforms; and an enhanced 

situational understanding of the battlefield. As an early-entry force, the 

brigade is expected to have sufficient built-in combat power to conduct 

immediate combat operations upon arrival in theater if required. Also, the 

brigade was designed to accept additional forces that can expand the core 

tasks and functions that already reside within the brigade or that execute 

tasks that do not reside within the brigade (e.g., adding armor, field 

artillery, air defense, additional engineers, or aviation). The brigade was 

also designed to adopt a new training regimen that allows a faster 

deployment to any type of contingency; in contrast, current Army units 

receive an alert for a mission, train for the mission-specific requirements, 

and then deploy. 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Congress has supported the Army’s transformation efforts, but since the 

Stryker brigade is an entirely new design, members of the Senate and 

House Committees on Armed Services agreed that the Army must conduct 

an evaluation that indicated that the brigade’s design is operationally 

effective and operationally suitable. The requirement for an operational 

evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2002 National Defense 

Authorization Act. For the evaluation, the Army modified an existing 

training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, 

Louisiana, and added a data collection apparatus, a deployment schedule, 

and an additional training event at the National Training Center at Fort 

Irwin, California. The Army uses training exercises at the Joint Readiness 

Training Center and the National Training Center to increase the combat 

proficiency of its units and to identify training deficiencies that need to be 

addressed. The training exercises are conducted under stressful 

conditions against an opposing force emulating combat scenarios 

anticipated in war. By Army regulation, training deficiencies identified 

during the rotations and subsequent retraining are not indicators of unit 

failure. The Army conducted the evaluation from April through May 2003. 

The Army and OSD met the requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National 

Defense Authorization Act to, respectively, plan and conduct an 

operational evaluation of the Stryker brigade and certify the evaluation 

results. The Army met the requirements by (1) obtaining approval of the 

evaluation plan by the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test 

and Evaluation, (2) deploying the brigade to the evaluation site, and (3) 

conducting combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. 

The act also made additional vehicle procurement and brigade deployment 

contingent upon a certification that the brigade’s design is operationally 

effective and operationally suitable. OSD has provided the certification to 

Congress. 

The Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

approved the Army’s operational evaluation plan on March 28, 2003. The 

Army’s primary objective was to comply with the legislation by assessing 

the initial Stryker brigade’s design for operational effectiveness and 

operational suitability according to the unit’s organizational and 

operational concept and its current modified table of organization and 

The Army and OSD 

Met the Requirements 

of the Act to Assess 

the Stryker Brigade 
Page 7 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

equipment. A secondary objective was to conduct a readiness assessment5

of the unit’s ability to conduct combat operations according to Army 

doctrine. 

The Army deployed to the operational evaluation site when it conducted a 

multimodal movement from Fort Lewis to the National Training Center, 

Fort Irwin, and onto the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. 

The operational evaluation was held from April 1, 2003, through May 28, 

2003. To accomplish these strategic and operational moves, the Army used 

various methods, including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. Due to 

current world military operations and the limited number of available 

aircraft, the Army was restricted from moving the entire brigade combat 

team by air. 

During the operational evaluation, the brigade conducted combat missions 

across the full spectrum of potential threats. The evaluation’s scope 

included the brigade field training exercise at the National Training Center 

and a certification exercise during a Joint Readiness Training Center 

rotation. The evaluation was constructed so that the brigade conducted a 

series of combat missions against an opposing force in both major theater 

of war and small-scale contingency environments. For example, the 

scenario at the National Training Center was optimized for the higher end 

of combat where the brigade conducted operations against mechanized 

forces. At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the brigade’s mission was 

optimized for small-scale contingencies where the brigade conducted 

operations in noncontiguous areas and in complex urban terrain. 

Throughout the operational evaluation’s events, the brigade was 

augmented with aviation, military police, and armor. 

On August 19, 2003, the Acting Secretary of the Army forwarded a 

memorandum requesting that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress 

the operational evaluation report prepared by the Army following the 

evaluation and certify that the results of the evaluation indicate that the 

Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division’s design is operationally effective 

and operationally suitable. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on 

September 17, 2003, certified to Congress that the results of the 

operational evaluation indicated the design for the initial Stryker brigade 

 5

 The readiness assessment was based on the evaluation of the mission training plan and 

the associated critical tasks. These tasks were evaluated as Go/No Go based on defined 

standards. 
Page 8 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The Army has 

deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq. 

The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational 

parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. The 

Army also established an Operational Evaluation Control Cell (Control 

Cell) to coordinate the assessment activities and used subject matter 

experts and observers as independent evaluators to assess the operational 

effectiveness and suitability of the brigade. 

According to the Army, the key organizational parameters and operational 

capabilities were the essential elements in assessing the brigade’s design 

for operational effectiveness and operational suitability. The mission 

training plans provided the tasks, conditions, and standards to assess 

operational readiness as defined by the key operational capabilities. The 

eight key organizational parameters are 

• achieve balance between capabilities for strategic responsiveness and 

requirements for battle-space dominance, 

• balanced full spectrum utility,6

• reduced sustainment requirements, 

• minimize the brigade’s personnel and logistical footprint, 

• commonality of vehicular platforms, 

• reach-back, 

• embedded unit-based capabilities, and 

• internetted combined arms to company-team level. 

The nine key operational capabilities are 

• mobility, 

• dismounted assault and the close fight, 

• enhanced situational understanding and information superiority, 

• holistic force protection and survivability, 

• lethality, 

• force effectiveness, 

• reach/reach-back, 

• joint/multinational/interagency interoperability, and 

• full spectrum flexibility and augmentation. 

 6

 This refers to the brigade’s capability in the full spectrum of combat. See appendix III. 

Army Evaluated Key 

Operational Aspects 

and Used Subject 

Matter Experts to 

Assess Effectiveness 

and Suitability of the 

Brigade’s Design 
Page 9 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

The key organizational parameters and operational capabilities are defined 

by the brigade’s organizational and operational concept document of June 

2000.7

The evaluation linked these key characteristics to the brigade’s six critical 

training requirements and then to the brigade’s mission training plans. 

Army planners had determined that for an effective operational evaluation, 

the events must focus on 10 specific brigade level tasks extracted from the 

brigade mission training plans. Appendixes III, IV, and V illustrate the 

evaluation’s integration of key organizational parameters and operational 

capabilities, mission training plans, and critical training requirements. (See 

appendix VI for the definition of key organizational parameters and 

operational capabilities.) 

The Army established a Control Cell to manage the activities needed to 

conduct the evaluation. Participants included individuals from the I Corps 

staff, the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command’s Brigade Coordination 

Cell, the Army Test and Evaluation Command,8

 and a team of contractors. 

The Control Cell developed an execution plan and provided it to the 

Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for 

review. 

During development of the operational evaluation execution plan, the 

Department of the Army provided additional guidance to Forces 

Command and directed that the evaluation also assess the ability of the 

Stryker brigade to receive logistical support from echelon above brigade 

support elements. Initially, the Army had planned to informally assess this 

capability. However, after we recommended to the Secretary of Defense9

that external logistics support be an element of the evaluation, the Army 

included this in its execution plan. To address these concerns, the Control 

Cell’s execution plan included an evaluation of the echelon above brigade 

 7

 The organizational and operational concept document provides a detailed framework for 

the definition of fundamental operational precepts, capabilities, and organizational 

constructs. The concept document is the basis for the development of mission training 

plans, training strategies and support packages, evaluation plans, and field manuals. 

8

 The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army’s independent operational test 

activity and is responsible for overall management of the Army test and evaluation 

programs. 

9

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External 

Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of 

the Army’s Operational Evaluation Plan, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003). 
Page 10 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

support elements, including the logistics concepts such as contractor 

support, reach-back, and configured loads. Real-world events limited the 

number of assets available to allow for continuous aerial resupply, so the 

Control Cell compensated by using limited aerial resupply and, when 

aircraft were not available, used notional aerial resupply that included the 

use of time delays to replicate transport time. For both types of resupply, 

the echelon above brigade elements would distribute supplies in 

configured loads to the Stryker brigade for disbursement. 

Prior to the conduct of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell 

instructed and certified subject matter experts10 from proponent schools 

and observer-controllers from the training centers as primary data 

collectors. The instruction familiarized the data collectors on the Stryker 

brigade organization, capabilities and doctrine, and the combat training 

centers’ rules of engagement and safety guidelines. Officials from the 

Army’s Test and Evaluation Command provided instruction on data 

collection procedures and use of data collection tools such as personal 

digital assistants. Additionally, the Control Cell formed a team composed 

of members of the Training and Doctrine Command’s Brigade 

Coordination Cell that also collected data throughout the operational 

evaluation. 

Data collected for the operational evaluation included observations and 

comments from subject matter experts, observer-controllers, and team 

members from the Brigade Coordination Cell. These observations and 

comments occurred while the data collectors observed the brigade’s 

performance during the various combat missions. Additional data sources 

included after-action reviews, surveys, and key personnel interviews. The 

Army’s Operational Test Command also retrieved digital instrumentation 

data. All of these data sources were retrieved every 24 hours and validated 

by officials of the Army’s Operational Test Command and the Control Cell. 

The Control Cell established a review group to authenticate the data and 

develop initial insights based on observations that emerged as the events 

progressed. 

Upon completion of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell analyzed 

all the data sources and submitted a report of its findings to the I Corps 

 10 Subject matter experts are usually commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers 

who have extensive experience with the studied equipment, recent unit experience, and a 

background as a trainer or in training development. 
Page 11 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

commander. The I Corps commander concluded that the brigade had met 

or adequately met each of the requirements associated with the key 

organizational parameters and key operational capabilities. The Army 

defined “adequately met” as the brigade’s design was operationally 

effective and operationally suitable but had some deficiencies, or issues. 

The report was submitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces 

Command, who endorsed the report’s findings. Although the I Corps 

commander assessed the brigade’s design as operationally both effective 

and suitable, the operational evaluation report noted that the Stryker 

brigade experienced difficulties in demonstrating some of the key 

operational capabilities, which were primarily attributed to an accelerated 

fielding schedule and a lack of adequate training time. 

Based on our observations of the brigade’s performance at the two combat 

training centers and our analysis of data collected during the evaluation, 

the brigade performed as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its 

capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. In certain areas, 

the Stryker brigade demonstrated its strengths, including both the ability 

to conduct strategic and operational deployments and to maneuver about 

the battlefield using the Stryker vehicle. The operational evaluation also 

demonstrated weaknesses in the areas of staff planning, usage of digital 

systems, sustainment of the brigade, and established company-level 

combat procedures. Civilian contractors were also used ineffectively to 

support the units. Our analysis indicated that the Stryker brigade’s training 

proficiency was the primary cause of these weaknesses. 

Our observations and analysis of the data indicated that the Stryker 

brigade demonstrated the ability to conduct strategic and tactical 

deployments using different transportation systems such as rail, ground, 

and various sea vessels and aircraft. Upon arrival at each destination, the 

brigade showed the ability to reassemble into a combat configuration in a 

timely manner. Once reconfigured, units of the Stryker brigade also 

demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate combat operations. It 

should be noted, however, that while the tactical deployment of the 

Stryker vehicle by C-130 aircraft was demonstrated, the Army has yet to 

demonstrate under various environmental conditions, such as air 

temperature and airfield altitude, just how far Stryker vehicles can be 

tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft. 

Stryker Brigade 

Demonstrated Both 

Strengths and 

Weaknesses during 

the Operational 

Evaluation 

Stryker Brigade 

Demonstrated That It Is 

Deployable 
Page 12 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

The brigade used commercial air, rail, and ground transportation to move 

personnel and equipment from Fort Lewis to Fort Irwin. While at the 

National Training Center, we observed the brigade conduct a tactical 

movement by moving a Stryker infantry company with its personnel, 

supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft from Southern 

California Logistics Airfield to an austere desert airfield on Fort Irwin 

about 70 miles away. (Figure 1 shows a Stryker vehicle being loaded at the 

Southern California Logistics Airfield, and figure 2 shows the Stryker 

exiting from a C-130 aircraft at the National Training Center.) Upon 

landing, the infantry company unloaded the vehicles from the aircraft, 

reconfigured them for combat missions, and moved onward to a staging 

area. All Stryker variants could reconfigure into combat capable modes 

within their designated time standard, except the medical variant. Based 

on our observation of the event, we agree with the Army that the 

insufficient crew size was the reason why the medical variant, with its 

extra external boxes, could not be reconfigured within the time standard. 

However, if the brigade had trained to reconfigure the Stryker variants, 

this situation would have been apparent and should not have occurred. 
Page 13 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern California Logistics Airfield 
Page 14 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training Center 

The Stryker brigade demonstrated strategic movement when it deployed 

brigade elements by rail, sealift, and C-17 aircraft from the National 

Training Center to a staging area located at Chennault Industrial Airpark, 

located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Two battalion equipment sets moved 

by Fast Sealift Ship from San Diego, California, to Lake Charles Seaport, 

while a third battalion’s equipment, including all current Stryker variants, 

moved by C-17 aircraft from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to a staging area at the 

England Air Park in Alexandria, Louisiana. (Figure 3 shows a Stryker being 

unloaded from a Fast Sealift Ship.) Elements of the Stryker brigade that 

unloaded at the Lake Charles Seaport moved to the Chennault Industrial 

Airpark and then conducted a road march to the Joint Readiness Training 

Center to begin combat operations. We observed the staging area as the 
Page 15 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

brigade assembled and prepared for its road movement to the training 

center. Figure 4 shows the road march to the training center. 

Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles, Louisiana 
Page 16 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Figure 4: Road March 

Tactical deployment was demonstrated when C-17 aircraft transported an 

infantry company from Lake Charles to Geronimo forward landing strip, 

an austere dirt airfield at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The C-17 

aircraft landed at the forward landing strip, and the infantry company 

demonstrated the ability to quickly unload its vehicles and personnel by 

moving to the tactical assembly area in about 10 minutes. (Figure 5 shows 

a C-17 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) A Stryker infantry 

company also demonstrated the ability to travel into combat operations in 
Page 17 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

a C-130 aircraft. (Figure 6 shows the loading of an infantry company and 

its vehicles onto C-130 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) The 

Stryker infantry company—consisting of 21 Strykers and 5 other trucks 

and trailers; 188 soldiers; and 3 days of food, water, ammunition, and fuel 

to support the company—traveled from Geronimo to Essler airfield using 

7 C-130s flying 25 sorties over a distance of about 100 miles. Upon landing 

at the Essler airfield, the company moved to a tactical assembly area and 

onward to conduct a combat operation. 

Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip 
Page 18 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip 

The Stryker vehicle demonstrated speed, agility, and extensive 

maneuverability during the execution of the brigade’s combat missions 

during the operational evaluation. Because of its maneuverability, the 

Stryker vehicle allowed individual units to react and move around the 

battlefield much more quickly than light and mechanized infantry units, 

allowing individual units to accomplish tasks in minutes compared to 

Stryker Brigade 

Demonstrated Its Ability to 

Quickly Maneuver about 

the Battlefield 
Page 19 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

hours. When used properly, the Stryker vehicle enabled the brigade to 

outmaneuver and overpower opposing forces. The performance of the 

Stryker brigade at both training centers indicated that with its vehicles, it 

could move faster as compared to both conventional and/or nonmotorized 

infantry as well as infantry units equipped with the Bradley fighting 

vehicle. 

At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Stryker vehicle performed well 

in urban areas and in wooded terrain. (Figure 7 shows the Stryker 

maneuvering in wooded terrain.) The speed of the vehicle enabled the 

infantry companies to quickly arrive in urban areas, giving them the ability 

to surprise the enemy and overcome urban objectives. The attack on the 

“town” of Shugart-Gordon illustrated that the Stryker was able to move 

quickly using a route that included very restrictive terrain. (Figure 8 shows 

the town of Shugart-Gordon.) The Stryker easily moved through the rough 

terrain and made it to the objective, giving the company commander the 

ability to rapidly transport soldiers during the assault. The speed of the 

Stryker allowed one particular company to arrive at the objective early 

and surprise the enemy. In another instance, the capabilities of the vehicle 

allowed Stryker units to rapidly pursue and decisively engage 

unconventional forces that were more mobile than U.S. Army light infantry 

units. The Stryker vehicles’ speed allowed the infantry units to fix and 

destroy the enemy, despite the enemy’s efforts to leave the battlefield. 
Page 20 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded Terrain at the Joint Readiness Training Center 
Page 21 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon 

At the National Training Center, the Stryker vehicle demonstrated its 

ability to accelerate quickly and maneuver over the desert terrain to 

deliver infantry personnel to their objective. Our analysis shows that the 

Stryker vehicle moved more quickly and much quieter than the opposing 

forces’ vehicles, giving the brigade a substantial tactical advantage over 

the enemy. When operating in extremely rugged and steep terrain, the 

Stryker did lose some of its mobility advantage and had difficulty in 

maneuvering as quickly as the opposing forces’ vehicles. Despite the loss 
Page 22 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

of this advantage, the Stryker vehicle was nonetheless mobile enough to 

allow a company to quickly reposition and destroy a platoon of guerrilla 

forces running through rough terrain. The Stryker’s speed enabled the 

infantry unit to quickly move into its attack position after changes in the 

battlefield. Because of this speed, the vehicle potentially provides a 

commander more time to react since less time is spent moving from one 

location to another. 

On the basis of our analysis of the data, as a collective organization, the 

brigade staff11 was unable to consistently perform in accordance with 

Army doctrine, hindering the ability of the Stryker brigade to first fully see 

and then understand the battle space. Staff processes, both the integration 

of the entire staff and those internal to specific sections, affected the 

ability of the brigade to produce and execute synchronized plans. The 

Stryker brigade did display the ability to integrate and collect information, 

but not consistently. The observer-controllers generally identified training 

time as the primary cause for the weaknesses. 

Army doctrine prescribes a manner in which staffs should develop battle 

plans. This military decision-making process requires incorporation of all 

staff elements in a collective effort to synchronize all of the brigade’s 

assets. Although the brigade staff gained experience and improved by 

going through the process over the course of the evaluation, they did not 

consistently integrate all of the staff sections and key subsections, 

including information operations, fire support, and intelligence. Because 

all of these assets were not incorporated into the planning process, the 

brigade had difficulty in using its capabilities according to doctrine. 

The Stryker brigade displayed the ability to integrate information from 

multiple sources. However, managing the flow of the information and 

disseminating it throughout the brigade was difficult. For example, the 

brigade Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron 

provided more information than the brigade staff could process. Because 

the staff’s proficiency level to manage the information was low, the ability 

to analyze and present a common operational picture was reduced. 

 11 Brigade and battalion staffs are generally organized into sections. These sections are 

numbered S-1 through S-6 and represent functions such as personnel, intelligence, 

operations, logistics, civil affairs, and signal operations. 

Brigade’s Staff 

Performance Was 

Inconsistent 
Page 23 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

The staff’s performance affected all units within the brigade. Commanders 

were not given well-developed planning products, including an accurate 

initial picture of the enemy and the enemy’s anticipated actions, as well as 

tools that enabled the application of all of the brigade’s organic combat 

capability. Although they were still able to conduct combat missions, the 

brigade did not perform to the best of its capabilities. 

Synchronization of the brigade’s intelligence collection effort was 

inconsistent. Unlike traditional Army units, the Stryker brigade has a very 

robust intelligence collection capability that includes unique tools such as 

unmanned aerial vehicles; nonlethal effects capabilities such as civil 

affairs, psychological operations, and legal personnel; and a 

Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron. Because 

the efforts were not synchronized, intelligence collection assets were not 

consistently used in an efficient manner, resulting in areas not being 

observed or other areas receiving redundant coverage. Also, the 

reconnaissance squadron sometimes operated independently of the 

brigade’s guidance, resulting in a failure to obtain needed information. 

The operational evaluation demonstrated that the brigade had not 

mastered the use of its digital systems. The proper use and employment of 

the various digital systems increase the commanders’ ability to position 

troops and conduct combat operations. However, our analysis shows that 

a combination of either not using established procedures or not having 

established procedures, as well as a lack of familiarity with the systems, 

prevented full exploitation of the systems’ capabilities. 

During the evaluation, a lack of familiarity with the systems and a lack of 

standardized procedures contributed to the brigade’s inability to fully 

maximize the capabilities of its digital systems. Brigade leaders and staff 

struggled with acquiring data and interpreting it in a timely manner. If the 

staff had properly used the various digital systems, the commanders’ 

ability to position troops and conduct combat operations would have been 

increased. 

Digital systems were not available for all elements of the brigade, 

including augmenting units. Not all staff sections and subsections 

Using the Digital Systems 

Proved Difficult for the 

Brigade 
Page 24 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

possessed the FBCB2 system,12 hindering staff planning operations. At the 

platoon level, only the platoon leader and platoon sergeant Stryker 

vehicles are equipped with the FBCB2 system. Further, when infantry 

personnel dismount, they have no direct digital connectivity to the FBCB2 

system. As a result, the non-FBCB2-equipped Stryker vehicles and 

dismounted infantry did not possess the same level of situational 

awareness that Stryker vehicles equipped with the FBCB2 system did. 

Additionally, augmenting units such as armor and aviation did not arrive 

with the FBCB2 system, so the brigade attached a liaison element 

equipped with the system. Because the augmenting units did not have the 

system, the Stryker brigade had to provide analog control measures so that 

the augmenting unit would know the brigade’s plan. 

The FBCB2 system was not consistently updated to provide a current view 

of the battle space. Although the FBCB2 system automatically tracks the 

location of vehicles equipped with the system, enemy positions and the 

location of friendly dismounted infantry must be entered manually. While 

this capability exists, updating this information was not consistently done. 

The brigade did not consistently use predesignated formats in the FBCB2 

system, affecting the information flow into other systems. To 

communicate with the Army Battle Command System, the FBCB2 system 

has a predesignated message format. Units found these formats 

cumbersome and opted instead to use either analog means or the free-text 

feature in the system. Not using the predesignated format made updating 

the other systems inefficient, because operators had to transfer 

information from the free text into the Army Battle Command System. 

Additionally, because free text did not automatically update the 

information in the other systems, the view of the battle space was 

inaccurate. 

Not using the information available in the FBCB2 system was also an 

issue. For example, there were several instances where individual Stryker 

vehicles and an entire Stryker unit conducted movement through a 

minefield that had been entered into the system. These movements either 

delayed combat operations or resulted in casualties. Another example was 

movement of unit vehicles down a route that was congested. The system 

 12 FBCB2 is a digitized system that uses sophisticated information technology that allows 

Stryker brigade personnel to achieve superior battlefield information enabling them to 

engage the enemy long before coming into contact. 
Page 25 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

provided the unit information that the route was congested; yet the driver 

ignored the information and moved down the route. 

During the evaluation, the brigade experienced difficulties in conducting 

supply operations because components within the brigade did not or were 

unable to follow the established procedures. Support to the Stryker 

brigade is distribution based, meaning that instead of keeping supplies on 

hand, the brigade is designed to receive a near-continuous flow of 

anticipated supplies through the supply chain. The areas of the supply 

chain assessed were the organic sustainment provided by the brigade 

support battalion and the external logistics support provided by the 

echelon above brigade. Because these two support areas are linked, 

supply requests from the brigade impact the ability of the echelon above 

brigade elements to provide the necessary anticipatory logistics. 

Conversely, incorrect supplies sent from the echelon above brigade 

elements to the brigade affected the ability of the brigade to distribute 

supplies to its units. When units made proper requests, the process 

worked correctly. However, the inability to make proper requests affected 

the ability of the entire supply chain to provide support to the brigade. 

Difficulties in maintaining a flow of supplies began at the individual unit 

level and affected the entire logistics flow. We determined through our 

analysis of the observer-controller comments that units had difficulty 

adapting to the just-in-time system. Commanders were uncomfortable 

maintaining supplies below 50 percent of their full operational 

requirement and, during those situations, often placed emergency resupply 

requests to the brigade support battalion. Units also had difficulty using 

the digital systems to request resupply because they lacked familiarity 

with the systems, connectivity issues impeded performance, or reporting 

formats did not adequately address their logistics needs. While the units 

were able, at times, to adopt work-around solutions, the effect was a 

disruption of the intended flow of supplies. 

The brigade support battalion struggled to perform its dual function of 

acting as a conduit for its requests and the distribution point for supplies 

between the echelon above brigade support structure and the brigade. One 

difficulty faced by the support battalion was the need to reconfigure 

supplies received from the echelon above brigade support structure. Unit 

supply requests did not adequately reflect its needs; therefore, the 

anticipatory loads sent from the echelon above brigade support structure 

did not contain the correct supplies in the correct amounts and 

configurations. As a result, the brigade support battalion had to 

Sustaining the Brigade Was 

Challenging 
Page 26 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

reconfigure the supplies it had available as well as those that it had 

received. Supply distribution occurred as available, as opposed to a set 

schedule, resulting in the support battalion having insufficient 

transportation assets to deliver all needed supplies in a timely manner. 

Figure 9 shows the brigade support battalion at the National Training 

Center. 

Figure 9: Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center 
Page 27 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

The brigade also had difficulty providing supplies to units when the 

support battalion was moving to a new location. The evaluation showed 

that when stationary, the support battalion successfully established 

alternate supply points for brigade units. (Figure 10 shows an example of 

an alternate supply point at the National Training Center.) However, when 

the support battalion moved, the brigade did not adequately provide for 

alternate distribution points. Had this issue been addressed, the brigade 

would have had the ability to adequately supply its units during the 

support battalion’s relocation. 
Page 28 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Figure 10: Alternate Supply Point at the National Training Center 

Although Stryker companies were able to exercise and achieve some 

degree of success conducting combat operations at both training centers, 

many of their capabilities were not consistently used. Areas of concern 

included tracking dismounted infantry, performance of antitank systems, 

and challenges linking fire support elements to the artillery battalion. Our 

analysis of the data showed that limited training time and a lack of 

standard operating procedures contributed to the companies’ inability to 

Stryker Companies Had 

Problems Executing 

Combat Missions 
Page 29 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

consistently use their combat capabilities. Placing more emphasis on the 

planning and rehearsal of operations, as well as developing and practicing 

internal tactics, techniques, and procedures, could mitigate these 

deficiencies. 

Tracking dismounted infantry was an area of concern. Dismounted 

infantry squads do not carry digital systems, so units can only maintain 

awareness of dismounted infantry locations by entering reports from 

analog systems into digital systems. Uncertainty about the location of 

dismounts hindered the ability of companies to use their mortars, reducing 

the overall application of their combat power. Despite the inability to 

track dismounts noted in observer-controller comments, one unit at the 

National Training Center was able to rapidly update the location of 

dismounts into the digital systems by using a process it had developed, 

indicating that this issue can be corrected. 

Performance of antitank systems had mixed results. At the National 

Training Center, observer-controller comments were overwhelmingly 

supportive of the Javelin system, noting how it provided the dismounted 

infantry the capability to destroy armored forces. However, at the same 

time, observer-controllers at both training centers expressed concerns that 

the brigade antitank company and the organic mobile gun system platoon, 

consisting of a substitute Stryker antitank system, were not positioned 

properly to optimize their capability. The cause for this was attributed to a 

lack of situational understanding. 

Fire support elements, the link between infantry units and the field 

artillery battalion, also faced challenges in requesting and delivering 

brigade-level indirect fires. At both training centers, brigade units were not 

using their digital capabilities. Instead of using the digitized artillery 

command, control, and communication system, fire supporters were using 

radios and plain text messages on the FBCB2 system to call for fires, 

which required soldiers at the receiving end of the request to enter the 

information manually and increased the time to deliver fires. Observercontrollers at both training centers identified contributing factors such as 

a lack of a detailed digital standard operating procedure for fire supporters 

and the lack of familiarity and experience with the digitized artillery 

command and control system. 
Page 30 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Although in most instances contractor contributions were positive, our 

analysis identified instances where the contractors were used ineffectively 

because units used them improperly or did not provide the support 

necessary to ensure their effective use. 

Unit personnel perform regularly scheduled routine maintenance on their 

vehicles and equipment systems according to Army standardized 

maintenance manuals and unit operating procedures. However, the 

Stryker brigade requires a significant use of contractors to maintain and 

repair the unit’s newest systems, such as the Stryker vehicles and their 

remote weapon systems, and the digitized FBCB2 system. Use of 

contractors to maintain and repair the Army’s newest systems is not 

unique to the Stryker brigade. For example, we previously reported that 

the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Iraq with around 60 contractors to 

support the division’s digitized equipment.13 Within the Stryker brigade, 

contractors are placed in combat repair teams and generally co-located 

with the individual battalions and in sections within the brigade support 

battalion with the primary mission of maintaining specific systems 

according to the support contract awarded. The brigade is to provide the 

contractors with necessary support, including rations, water, and 

equipment items such as night vision goggles and protective clothing. 

During the evaluation, contractors assigned to the battalion combat repair 

teams responded quickly to maintenance issues. These personnel were 

commended for their ability to quickly fix damaged Stryker vehicles and 

for reducing the amount of time a vehicle was unavailable to the unit for 

combat operations. As a result of the contractors’ responsiveness, some 

units relaxed their emphasis on unit-level maintenance and became overly 

dependent on the contractors. In analyzing the data, we found instances 

where contractors were used ineffectively. For example, we found that 

some units bypassed standard Army maintenance procedures and 

requested contractor support to conduct maintenance that should have 

been conducted by the unit’s organic maintenance personnel. 

We also noted that transporting the contractors to support the 

reconnaissance squadron proved difficult because the squadron was 

spread across the battlefield and was responsible for the largest 

 13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services 

to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695

(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003). 

Contractors Were Not 

Always Used Effectively 
Page 31 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

operational area. The brigade placed contractors in combat repair teams 

that were, in turn, attached to the individual battalions. The battalions are 

responsible for the contractors’ security, logistics, and transportation. The 

location of the combat repair teams on the battlefield determines the 

ability of the contractors to get quickly to where they are needed. 

Also, contractors could not be used in some instances because the brigade 

did not provide the contractors with night vision goggles, impeding their 

ability to move to units during periods of limited visibility. Additionally, 

protective clothing and equipment for the contractors were not provided, 

which precluded the contractors from performing their responsibilities 

after chemical attacks. The mitigation plan addresses those issues relating 

to not using contractors effectively. 

Our analysis of the data collected during the operational evaluation 

indicated that the brigade’s training proficiency was insufficient to fully 

demonstrate the brigade’s entire capabilities across the full spectrum of 

combat missions. The comments from the observer-controllers and 

subject matter experts confirmed this conclusion because their comments 

generally identified training as a major contributor to the identified 

weaknesses. Moreover, the Army’s final operational evaluation report 

identified training as a limitation of the operational evaluation. The 

brigade had never trained as a brigade-sized unit until it reached the 

National Training Center and only three of six battalions had undergone an 

external evaluation prior to the rotation. According to the Army, the 

Stryker brigade needed 15 weeks of unit training after receiving its last 

vehicles and this did not occur. In fact, the brigade was still receiving 

Stryker variants at the end of the National Training Center exercise. 

In May 2002,14 we reported that Fort Lewis training officials would have 

preferred a full 6 months to train after receiving most of the new Stryker 

vehicles. This also did not occur. Most brigades in the Army begin training 

for their deployment to a combat training center, such as the National 

Training Center, 4 to 6 months ahead of time. We also reported that the 

need to train Stryker brigade soldiers in digital systems was posing a 

challenge because the brigade’s design requires digitization to maintain the 

 14 U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to 

Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams, GAO-02-442 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2002). 

Insufficient Training 

Proficiency Primary 

Reason for Operational 

Evaluation Weaknesses 
Page 32 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

critical situational awareness capability. These systems use sophisticated 

technology that allows the soldiers to achieve superior battlefield 

information enabling them to engage the enemy long before coming into 

contact. Our analysis of the operational evaluation concludes that 1 year 

later, the brigade still had not mastered the use of its digital systems. 

The Army is implementing a risk management plan to mitigate most issues 

identified in the operational evaluation, which generally correspond with 

the weaknesses we identified. The Army concluded that the issues were 

largely training related, but it also identified a few as design or equipment 

related. Although the Army developed, and is implementing, a plan that 

will mitigate most of the identified issues, the Army’s immediate focus was 

to resolve those training and equipment issues that affected the brigade’s 

ability to deploy to Iraq. It deferred for future consideration the remaining 

issues and decisions that have implications for the future brigades. 

Based on its analysis of the operational evaluation report, the Army first 

developed a matrix that assigned a risk level to issues and determined 

whether issues would preclude the Stryker brigade from a scheduled 

deployment or could be addressed in the future. It then developed a 

mitigation plan to address all issues identified. 

To mitigate the identified training issues and to prepare for the brigade’s 

deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and implemented an 8-week 

modular predeployment training event that included a command post 

exercise to train the staff and a brigade field training exercise that 

emphasized platoon and company operations. The training addressed four 

general issues identified from the operational evaluation: 

• Army Battle Command System interoperability and connectivity, 

• staff operations and synchronization, 

• application of doctrine in unit operations, and 

• subordinate unit specific training. 

Furthermore, the command post and field training post exercises were to 

ensure that the brigade 

• was proficient in stability and support operation tasks as specified by 

the combatant commander, 

• validated the interoperability of newly fielded systems and equipment, 

• validated the integration of newly assigned soldiers and leaders and 

attached units such as the assigned aviation task force, 

Army Risk 

Management Plan Will 

Mitigate Most 

Operational 

Evaluation Issues, but 

Deferred Issues Have 

Implications for 

Future Brigades 
Page 33 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

• exercised the staff planning and battle command process using the 

digital and communications systems to refine the staff planning 

process, 

• exercised distributed logistics in a complex environment, and 

• exercised force protection and accountability of contractors on the 

battlefield. 

To help the brigade achieve the training objectives, U.S. Forces Command 

provided observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training Center to 

provide feedback and conduct informal after-action reviews focused on 

lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. A senior training center 

official stated that 40 to 50 percent of the observer-controllers had 

participated in the operational evaluation segment held at the Joint 

Readiness Training Center. During the command post exercise, the 

observer-controllers viewed the planning and execution of the brigade and 

battalion staffs, and during the field training exercise, they viewed the 

conduct of assigned company-level combat missions. 

After completing the training, the brigade commander assessed the 

brigade as fully trained to perform its combat tasks. The brigade 

commander concluded the brigade was 

• completely retrained on those issues identified from the operational 

evaluation with a focus on applicability to planned missions in Iraq and 

• fully prepared to deploy. 

After the training events were completed, we discussed the brigade’s level 

of training and readiness with the brigade commander and senior Army 

officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation. All reported no 

reservations regarding the proficiency of the brigade and its ability to 

deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. One senior training official 

opined that the Stryker brigade is as well trained as any unit he has 

observed and that the unit can operate in any threat environment. 

Moreover, the issues the Army identified in its risk management matrix 

and exercised during its predeployment training addressed the 

weaknesses we identified in our observations and analysis of the 

operational evaluation. The brigade’s performance indicates that the 

issues and weaknesses are being mitigated. 

However, the Army is not fully addressing the potential brigade design and 

the brigade equipment issues identified from the operational evaluation, 

which were not included in the predeployment training, although the 

issues have implications for future brigades. According to the Army staff, 
Page 34 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

the issues that were nondeployment related are still under consideration. 

One identified design issue that has both deployment and long-term 

implications was associated with the mobility and survivability of the 

reconnaissance squadron operations officer. Currently, this staff officer’s 

mobile command post is a High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle. The 

operational evaluation concluded that the operations officer could not 

sustain the mobility pace of the reconnaissance commander and the 

commander’s Stryker vehicle. The evaluation also concluded that the 

threat requires armored protection for this key individual. The short-term 

solution is to consider providing a Stryker vehicle to the operations officer 

from brigade maintenance spares or other sources, such as another unit in 

the brigade. The mitigation plan includes no long-term solution, including 

purchasing additional Strykers. This issue is being considered through 

normal Army processes to determine a long-term solution that may affect 

requirements for future brigades. 

An equipment issue that is not addressed in the mitigation plan, but has 

implications for future brigades, is that not all Stryker vehicles are 

equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. Only two 

of the four Stryker vehicles in each platoon are currently equipped with 

the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The operational 

evaluation concluded that all infantry platoon Stryker vehicles need to be 

equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The Army 

had previously recognized the need because the brigade’s modified table 

of organization and equipment currently authorizes the equipment. 

However, the Army’s mitigation plan calls for procuring sufficient sets for 

only the initial Stryker brigade; it does not address plans for the follow-on 

brigades. 

The operational evaluation provided the Army its first opportunity to 

exercise and evaluate the capabilities of the Stryker brigade as a whole. By 

completing the evaluation and certifying the design, the Army and OSD 

met the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 

year 2002. However, as the results of the operational evaluation illustrated, 

issues with the brigade’s training, design, and equipment exist. The 

training issues arose because operating with a new unit design requires 

time to develop skills, which the accelerated fielding schedule did not 

allow. In preparation for deployment to Iraq, the Army mitigated most of 

these training issues, but it deferred resolution of some design and 

equipment issues and their respective decisions for future consideration. It 

is important that all issues be resolved, including those that affect future 

brigades, such as provision of Stryker vehicles for reconnaissance 

Conclusions 
Page 35 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

squadron operations officers and procurement of FBCB2 systems and 

other digitized equipment for the infantry platoons’ Stryker vehicles. 

Passing on lessons learned from the operational evaluation provides the 

Army the opportunity to ease the transformation process for future 

Stryker brigades by ensuring that the units have the proper training and all 

necessary equipment. As we have stated previously, taking action now to 

address such issues and passing on the remedies learned could enhance 

the chances that future brigade formations will be accomplished smoothly. 

To assist the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams’ transformation efforts, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army 

to 

• develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues not 

addressed prior to deploying the brigade and 

• apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the training, design, and 

equipment of the brigade to future Stryker brigades. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions the Army is 

taking in implementing them. 

In responding to our recommendation that the Army develop a plan to 

complete mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to 

deploying the brigade, the department stated that the Army has developed 

and is executing plans for the various issues identified in the operational 

evaluation and that once the armor installation is completed in NovemberDecember 2003 in Kuwait, the Army will have completed all of the 

mitigation efforts identified in our report. 

With regard to our recommendation that adjustments made to the training, 

design, and equipment of the first brigade are applied, as applicable, to 

future brigades, the department concurred that adjustments were 

necessary and would be applied to future Stryker brigades. The 

department stated the Army had created a Third Brigade, Second Infantry 

Division deployment team, comprised of representatives from across the 

Army, and that its scope included material requirements for the First 

Brigade, Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division (the Army’s next Stryker brigade) 

and future Stryker brigades. Regarding proposed changes to the Stryker 

brigade’s structure, the Army is reviewing possible design changes through 

its Documentation Assistance and Review Team to determine the 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 
Page 36 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

appropriate solution. The department states that the Army will use this 

same process regarding issues identified from Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

The department also commented that the Army designated Fort Lewis, 

Washington, as the Army’s Center of Excellence responsible for concept 

development, lessons learned, and the source for technical and tactical 

expertise for future Stryker brigades and to assist the Army in distributing 

lessons learned from the Stryker brigades. 

Appendix VII contains the full text of the department’s comments. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Acting Secretary of the Army, and the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512-

8365. Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Leo B. 

Sullivan, Robert Ackley, Timothy A. Burke, M. Jane Hunt, and Jim Melton. 

William M. Solis 

Director 

Defense Capabilities 

 and Management
Page 37 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John W. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107-

107 Concerning Limitations on Army 

Transformation Actions 

Page 38 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Public Law 107-107-Dec. 28, 2001 

SEC. 113. LIMITATIONS ON ACQUISITION OF INTERIM 

ARMORED VEHICLES AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERIM 

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS. 

(h) OPERATIONAL EVALUATION – (1) The Secretary of the Army shall 

conduct an operational evaluation of the initial interim brigade combat 

team. The evaluation shall include deployment of the team to the 

evaluation site and team execution of combat missions across the full 

spectrum of potential threats and operational scenarios. 

(2) The operational evaluation under paragraph (1) may not be conducted 

until the plan for such evaluation is approved by the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense. 

(i) LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OF INTERIM ARMORED 

VEHICLES AND DEPLOYMENT OF IBCTs. – (1) The actions described in 

paragraph (2) may not be taken until the date that is 30 days after the date 

on which the Secretary of Defense – 

(A) submits to Congress a report on the operational evaluation carried out 

under subsection (h); and 

(B) certifies to Congress that the results of that operational evaluation 

indicate that the design for the interim brigade combat team is 

operationally effective and operationally suitable. 

(2) The limitation in paragraph (1) applies to the following actions: 

(A) Procurement of interim armored vehicles in addition to those 

necessary for equipping the first three interim brigade combat teams. 

(B) Deployment of any interim brigade combat team outside the United 

States. 

(3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability of paragraph (1) 

to a deployment described in paragraph (2)(B) if the Secretary – 

(A) determines that the deployment is in the national security interests of 

the United States; and 

Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107-

107 Concerning Limitations on Army 

Transformation Actions 
Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107-

107 Concerning Limitations on Army 

Transformation Actions 

Page 39 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

(B) submits to Congress, in writing, a notification of the waiver together 

with a discussion of the reasons for the waiver. 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 40 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

To determine whether the Army’s conduct of the Stryker brigade’s 

operational evaluation met the legislative requirements, we focused our 

efforts on understanding the operational evaluation plan and its 

implementation. We obtained and analyzed the Army’s operational 

evaluation plan and its associated execution plan. We interviewed officials 

and analysts involved in both the design and evaluation of the plan from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the Secretary of the Army; 

Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army Forces Command; Army 

Training and Doctrine Command; Army Test and Evaluation Command; 

and I Corps, Fort Lewis. We held discussions with the Commanders of the 

Operations Groups at the National Training Center and the Joint 

Readiness Training Center to discuss their perspective regarding the 

operational evaluation. 

To determine how the Army conducted the operational evaluation, we 

used information from the Army’s operational evaluation plan and 

execution plan and monitored the conduct of the operational evaluation. 

We reviewed the training procedures and attended the training sessions 

for the data collectors and subject matter experts administering the 

training events at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness 

Training Center. We also reviewed the data collection, transfer, and 

validation processes. We attended nightly briefings that were provided to 

the I Corps leadership from officials of each of the two training centers. 

We observed various training activities such as an attack at the National 

Training Center and the tactical movements by ground and air 

deployments at the Joint Readiness Training Center, as well as other 

events such as the commander’s combined arms rehearsal prior to the 

brigade moving to the training site at the Joint Readiness Training Center. 

To assess the brigade’s performance during the operational evaluation, we 

evaluated information from the Army’s data collectors and from our visits 

to the two training centers to observe training events. For the deployment 

portion of the evaluation, we observed various deployment events 

including the loading and unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-130 aircraft 

at the National Training Center; the brigade staging area at Lake Charles, 

Louisiana; and the unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-17 aircraft at the 

Joint Readiness Training Center. We also observed the loading of a Stryker 

company’s personnel, vehicles, and supplies into C-130 aircraft as the 

personnel conducted intratheater movement to a different training area at 

the Joint Readiness Training Center. Because of their doctrinal expertise 

and the fact that they provide feedback to all Army units that go through 

the training centers, we monitored transmissions and attended meetings 

held by observer-controllers and operations officials at both training 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 41 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

centers. During these meetings, discussions were held regarding the 

performance of the brigade and any difficulties the brigade was 

experiencing. To gain perspective on the Army’s analytical process, we 

attended and participated in scheduled insight meetings that discussed the 

training events and observations that occurred over the previous 24 hours. 

We also discussed the evaluation events with officials from the Army’s 

Test and Evaluation Command, as well as representatives from the 

Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and 

the Institute for Defense Analysis. 

We obtained and analyzed the database that the Army used to draw its 

conclusions. Using the database, we determined that the most direct 

commentary on the Stryker brigade’s performance of its individual key 

operating capabilities came from observer-controller comments. We 

reviewed the comments as grouped by the individual operational 

capabilities and, after identifying the most salient issues, developed seven 

themes that incorporated all nine of the key operating capabilities. These 

themes are ability of the Stryker brigade to deploy, mobility of the Stryker 

vehicle, brigade and battalion staff performance, use of digital systems, 

employment of the new sustainment concept, execution of combat 

missions, and contractor support. 

Regarding the Army’s actions to mitigate the identified operational 

evaluation training deficiencies, we reviewed the training methodology 

developed to overcome the deficiencies and held a discussion with senior 

Army officials regarding the brigade’s operational readiness. We did not 

observe the activities conducted during the command post exercise or the 

field training exercise. However, we discussed the results of the exercises 

with senior Army officials. 

Our review was performed from October 2002 to October 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. 
Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational 

Parameters and Operational Capabilities by 

Critical Tasks 

Page 42 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Deploy/

Redeploy 

by Air 

Conduct 

Battle 

Command 

Conduct Simultaneous 

Distributed Offense & 

Defensive Operations 

Area 

Presence 

Sustain the 

Brigade 

Protect 

the Force

Key Organizational Parameters 

Balance between Strategic 

Responsiveness and Battle Space 

Dominance 

X X X X X X 

Balanced Full Spectrum Utility X X X X X X 

Reduced Sustainment Requirements X X X X X 

Minimize Personnel and Logistical 

Footprint 

X X X X X 

Commonality of Vehicular Capabilities X X X X X 

Reach-back X X X X X X 

Embedded Unit-based Capabilities X X X X X X 

Internetted Combined Arms to Company 

Team Level 

 X X X X X 

 

Key Operational Capabilities 

Mobility X X X X X X 

Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight X X X X X 

Enhanced Situational Understanding 

and Information Superiority 

X X X X X X 

Holistic Force Protection and 

Survivability 

X X X X X 

Lethality X X X X X 

Force Effectiveness X X X X X 

Reach-back X X X X X X 

Joint/Multinational/Interagency/Interoperability X X X X X X 

Full Spectrum Flexibility and 

Augmentation 

X X X X X 

Source: U.S. Army. 

X = annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Critical Training Task List (CTTL). 

Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational 

Parameters and Operational Capabilities by 

Critical Tasks 
Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks 

Compared to Critical Tasks 

Page 43 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Mission Training Plan Tasks 

Deploy/

Redeploy 

by Air 

Conduct 

Battle 

Command 

Conduct Simultaneous 

Distributed Offense & 

Defensive Operations 

Area 

Presence 

Sustain the 

Brigade 

Protect 

the Force

Establish a Digital Command Post X X X X X X 

Conduct Urban Operations X X X X X 

Conduct a Tactical Road March X X X X X 

Conduct an Attack X X X X X 

Conduct a Defense X X X X X 

Conduct Area Security Operations X X X X X 

Plan Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Operations 

 X X X X X 

Conduct Command and Control of 

Operations 

X X X X X X 

Sustain the Force X X X X X X 

Conduct Strategic Deployment X X X X 

Source: U.S. Army. 

X = annotates central tasks represented by the 10 essential mission training plan tasks. 

Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks 

Compared to Critical Tasks 
Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and 

Capabilities Compared to Essential Mission 

Training Plan Tasks 

Page 44 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

 1 2 3 4 

Key Organizational Parameters 

Establish a Digital 

Command Post 

Conduct Urban 

Operations 

Conduct a 

Tactical Road 

March 

Conduct an 

Attack 

Balance Between Strategic Responsiveness and 

Battlespace Dominance 

X 

Balanced Full Spectrum Utility X X X 

Reduced Sustainment Requirements X X 

Minimize Personnel and Logistical Footprint 

Commonality of Vehicular Platforms 

Reach-back X X 

Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities X X X X 

Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level X X X 

 

Key Operational Capabilities 

Mobility X X X 

Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight X X 

Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information 

Superiority 

X X X X 

Holistic Force Protection and Survivability X X X 

Lethality X X 

Force Effectiveness X X X 

Reach-back X X X 

Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability X X 

Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation X X X 

Source: U.S. Army. 

X= annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Mission Training Plan Essential task. 

Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and 

Capabilities Compared to Essential Mission 

Training Plan Tasks 
Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and 

Capabilities Compared to Essential Mission 

Training Plan Tasks 

Page 45 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

5 6 7 8 9 10 

Conduct a 

Defense 

Conduct Area 

Security Operations 

Plan Intelligence, 

Survey, and 

Reconnaissance 

Operations 

Conduct 

Command and 

Control Operations

Sustain 

the Force 

Conduct Strategic 

Deployment 

 X 

X X X X 

 X X 

 X 

 X 

 X X 

X X X 

X X 

 

X X X X 

 X 

X X X X 

X X X X 

X X X 

X X X X X 

X X X X 

 X 

X X X X X 
Appendix VI: Definitions of Key 

Organizational Parameters and Key 

Operational Capabilities 

Page 46 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

The Stryker brigade’s organizational and operational concept document 

defines the unit’s essential organizational characteristics, or parameters, 

that the brigade was evaluated against. The document also defines the 

unit’s essential operational characteristics, or capabilities, that the brigade 

was evaluated against. 

The eight key organizational parameters are defined below. 

• Achieve Balance Between Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness 

and Requirements for Battle-Space Dominance: The organization must 

balance deployability, sustainability, and its in-theater personnel 

footprint against its combat requirement for lethality, mobility, and 

survivability. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team must approach the 

deployability standards of a light brigade while arriving with the punch 

and staying power approaching that of a mechanized formation. 

• Balanced Full Spectrum Utility: The Stryker brigade is deliberately 

optimized for early entry small-scale contingencies, but it also is 

required to be prepared to participate as a “guarantor combat force” in 

stability and support operations to permit peacekeeping and stability 

forces to carry out their missions in a secure environment. Similarly, 

the Stryker brigade must be prepared to fight as a component within a 

division or corps structure in a major theater of war. 

• Reduced Sustainment Requirements: The Stryker brigade must have 

sustainment requirements well below that of a heavy force. 

• Minimize Brigade’s Personnel and Logistical Footprint: There is an 

imperative for expanding the combat elements and reducing the 

support capabilities. Strategic deployability and demand reduction 

must be enhanced, while maintaining a robust combat capability. 

• Commonality of Vehicular Platforms: A common platform for combat, 

combat support, and combat service support echelons enables 

deployability, demand reduction, and sustainment efficiency. Common 

platforms must also be highly mobile and capable of intratheater 

deployment by C-130 aircraft. 

• Reach-back: To enable the Stryker brigade to maintain a deployable 

structure with a minimized logistics footprint, it must be able to reachback and access those functions that can be accomplished by higherechelon or out-of-theater organizations. It is both an organizational and 

operational principle. 

Appendix VI: Definitions of Key 

Organizational Parameters and Key 

Operational Capabilities 
Appendix VI: Definitions of Key 

Organizational Parameters and Key 

Operational Capabilities 

Page 47 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

• Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities: Military intelligence, signal, 

engineer, antitank, artillery, and combat service support elements have 

been tailored specifically to the unique requirements of the unit’s 

mission set. For the Stryker brigade, analysis demonstrates that 

mission capabilities are best enhanced if they are embedded within the 

unit’s organic organization. Attaching divisional elements to a Stryker 

brigade unnecessarily enlarges the brigade’s deployment requirements 

and theater footprint and introduces different vehicle types and 

equipment sets into the structure, violating the principle of 

commonality and increasing sustainment and infrastructure 

requirements. 

• Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level: An operational 

analysis for the Stryker brigade indicates that, within the environment 

of complex/urban terrain, force effectiveness is best enhanced and the 

requirement for responsive mutual support is best satisfied through 

internetted combined arms to company-team level, i.e., to a degree 

beyond traditional practice. 

The nine key operational capabilities are defined below. 

• Mobility: 

• Strategic – Organized, equipped, and configured to support a goal of 

deploying the brigade in 96 hours from first wheels up. (Ninety-six 

hours was originally a requirement.) 

• Operational – Capable of intratheater lift by ground/sea or by U.S. 

Air Force family of tactical aircraft. (Concept document specifies 

C-130 aircraft.) 

• Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight: Achieves tactical decision by 

means of combined arms at the company/team level focused on 

dismounted assault, supported by direct fires, and on the integration of 

mortars, artillery, mobility support, and joint fires/effects. 

• Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information Superiority: 

This is the fundamental force enabler across all Stryker brigade 

battlefield operating systems and the foundation of risk mitigation with 

respect to brigade vulnerabilities, particularly the lack of armor 

protection. 

• Holistic Force Protection and Survivability: Overall, the Stryker 

brigade must meet force protection challenges through the holistic 

application of a variety of capabilities, including early warning; 

situational understanding; avoidance of surprise; deception; rapid 
Appendix VI: Definitions of Key 

Organizational Parameters and Key 

Operational Capabilities 

Page 48 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

mobility; signature control; nontemplateable operations; avoidances of 

enemy fires; mutual support; use of cover and concealment; and 

implementation of innovative tactic, techniques, and procedures. 

• Lethality: The Stryker brigade possesses a robust array of direct and 

indirect fire systems to shape the battle space and achieve decision in 

the close fight inherent within complex and urban terrain, greater than 

current light brigades. 

• Force Effectiveness: Although the Stryker brigade must have the 

capability to achieve/maintain information superiority, it will not 

always enjoy combat platform superiority. The Stryker brigade will 

offset the platform limitations of its medium-weight platforms through 

the holistic integration of all other capabilities, particularly the 

internetted actions of the combined arms company teams. 

• Reach/Reach-back: The capability of the Stryker brigade to exploit a 

multitude of nonorganic resources to accomplish its assigned missions. 

The Stryker brigade executes reach-back on a routine, deliberate basis 

as a combat power and sustainment multiplier in five primary areas: 

fires and effects, intelligence and information, planning and analysis, 

force protection, and sustainment. 

• Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability: The Stryker brigade 

will benefit from exploiting the knowledge and capabilities residing 

within multinational forces; U.S. interagency organizations operating in 

the theater; and other international, local, nongovernmental, and 

private organizations involved in the crisis, conflict, or instability. 

• Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation: The Stryker brigade will 

have the requisite capabilities to achieve decision in conjunction with 

the joint fight in low-end contingencies such as current operations in 

the Balkans. If conditions escalate, requiring additional capabilities that 

do not reside within the Stryker brigade, it will receive augmentation. 

The Stryker brigade may participate in major theater of war operations 

as a subordinate element within a division. Again, adjustments to the 

task organization, including augmentation, will be required in a major 

theater of war environment. 
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 49 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 50 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 
Related GAO Products 

Page 51 GAO-04-188 Military Transformation 

Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for 

Army Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 

Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily 

Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003. 

Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should 

Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army’s 

Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 

2003. 

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation 

of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2002. 

Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for 

Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. 

Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2001. 

Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems 

Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001. 

Related GAO Products 

(350347) 
The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of 

Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities 

and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal 

government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; 

evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents 

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site 

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail 

this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to e-mail 

alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading. 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A 

check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. 

GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a 

single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Public Affairs