U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

78–205PDF 2002

THE AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT

OF 2002

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 14, 2002

Serial No. 107–80

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

HILLEL WEINBERG, Counsel 

PETER D.R. SMITH, Professional Staff Member 

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development .......................................................................................... 17

The Honorable Alan P. Larson, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and 

Agricultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................. 22

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement and Afghanistan Trip Report ............... 12

The Honorable Andrew S. Natsios: Prepared statement ...................................... 19

The Honorable Alan P. Larson: Prepared statement ............................................ 24

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 49

The Honorable Cynthia A. McKinney, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Georgia: Prepared statement ......................................................... 49

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 50

(1)

THE AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT 

OF 2002

THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry Hyde (Chairman 

of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

Thank you for joining me to day at the meeting of the Committee. The purpose of today’s hearing is to understand not only 

the current situation in Afghanistan, but also to hear from the Administration its current approach for managing the intricacies of 

U.S. assistance for Afghanistan in the months and surely in the 

years ahead. 

The United States has an essential role to play in Afghanistan’s 

recovery from its darkest period, misruled by the Taliban, and concurrent occupation of that country by the foreign terrorists who 

have reaped grave harm on American interests at home and 

abroad. 

Our success or failure in establishing peace in Afghanistan may 

have profound implications for the U.S. national security in the 

years ahead. 

We on the Committee recognize the importance of a strong American commitment to peace in Afghanistan. We also recognize that 

this commitment necessarily involves and will require over the 

next several years the expertise and support of many parts of our 

government, including components of our Federal Government that 

lacked previous experience working together in Washington or in 

the field. 

Today, I would like to begin to understand how the Administration is organized to deal with present assistance challenges in Afghanistan, what are the Administration’s objectives in Afghanistan, 

and whether the Administration has a coherent strategy and structure in place necessary to achieving those objectives. 

Severe drought and refugee crises will continue to affect the people of Afghanistan, at least through 2003. But there are other 

equally important priorities as well that are necessary for a secure 

and again prosperous Afghanistan. 

Among them, we must be enable an indigenous Afghan force to 

police and protect the safety and dignity of Afghan people. We 

must help create durable institutions of government that are representative and accountable to the people. And we must continue 

2

to fight terrorism and drugs, two evils in particular that if not controlled will continue to plague South Asia and the world. 

It is not an overstatement to say that the work we accomplish 

over the next 2 or 3 years in Afghanistan will have a direct impact 

on U.S. national security. The Taliban held Afghanistan hostage 

and played host to foreign forces who were bent on destroying liberty and freedom, the liberty and freedom of the Afghans as well 

as that of the rest of the civilized world. Unspeakable atrocities occurred daily during this dark reign in Afghanistan’s history, atrocities against women and girls, against religious minorities, and 

those who resisted the Taliban’s warped and twisted vision of 

Islam, and against the cultural and artistic antecedents of Afghanistan. 

Only 6 short months have elapsed since September 11, and during this time President Bush has provided leadership and resolve. 

America and its allies have nearly eliminated every remaining foreign terrorist, having long since destroyed their ill-witted Taliban 

host. But the balance of our work remains ahead. 

On January 29, this Committee hosted in this room the Chairman of the Interim Government of Afghanistan, Hamad Karzai. 

That same evening he was a featured guest in the gallery during 

the President’s State of the Union Address. As you all know, the 

new interim government is in place and Afghan leaders have 

agreed to a road map for recovery of institutions of representative 

government. 

An international force is assisting in the maintenance of security 

in Kabul, and U.S. and allied Afghan forces are working side by 

side to eliminate remaining pockets of resistance. Reconstruction 

work is beginning with the U.S. providing assistance to Afghanistan’s crumbled educational system and alleviating suffering by 

furnishing food, agricultural inputs, clean water, and medical assistance to those in need. 

Following successful donor conferences in Washington, Brussels 

and Tokyo, the international community pledged unanimously to 

assist Afghanistan in again being a productive and peaceful nation 

in South Asia, and it is united in seeking to prevent Afghanistan 

from becoming a source of future instability and terror. 

Yet despite the Kabul-based international security assistance 

force and separate coalition military successes to date, elsewhere in 

Afghanistan much of that country remains clouded in insecurity. 

Threats loom around the corner. Experts predict that this spring 

will see the largest poppy crop in recent history. Meanwhile 

drought in Afghanistan continues into its fourth year, and for millions of refugees in Pakistan and Iran life is difficult and dangerous, even too dangerous now to return to Afghanistan. 

The factors that have historically created discord and disunity—

ethnic differences, economic disparity, religion, language and geography—need to be addressed, not by imposing the rule of one party 

but by modernization of Afghanistan’s structures informed by the 

traditional process of a just, compromised and devolved power that 

characterized Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion. 

Even prior to the September 11 attacks, the United States and 

other donors were assisting the Afghan people displaced within AfVerDate Feb 1 2002 16:37 Jun 12, 2002 Jkt 078205 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031402\78205 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

ghanistan and as refugees in neighboring countries with emergency 

humanitarian and refugee assistance. 

Through the Herculean efforts of the United States and other donors, through the good offices of the United Nation and the nongovernmental community, and through the determination of the Afghan people themselves, wide-scale famine was averted, but the 

food security situation remains precarious throughout the country. 

Afghanistan will not be food secure for the foreseeable future, and 

will require not only traditional food aid from the U.S. and other 

donors, but technical assistance and large-scale civil works to rehabilitate its water management and agricultural systems for the day 

when the rains return. 

One of the obvious problems in addressing this subject of the 

plethora of agencies and operations within the United States Government, each responsible for a portion of the overall program. The 

number and variety of these offices and agencies involved highlights one of the unsolved problems we must address—the lack of 

a central coordinating authority to provide direction to these agencies. 

The last thing we need is in-fighting or confusion among various 

agencies, especially for an issue as important and urgent as this 

one. 

I look forward to hearing from our two witnesses today: Administrator Andrew Natsios, and Under Secretary Alan Larson on the 

challenges ahead. I suspect, however, that the range of Afghanistan’s needs extends beyond the economic, business and agricultural scope of Under Secretary Larson’s portfolio, and also beyond 

the economic development and humanitarian assistance mandate of 

Administrator Natsios. 

The draft legislation we are considering establishes a significant, 

4-year flexible fund for the purpose of dealing with the special situation we find in Afghanistan. It is our intention to free the Administration from the need to find funding in one of the many baskets 

into which our foreign assistance program is divided. 

We welcome the observations of the Administration on this draft 

bill. I am prepared to work with the Administration and my colleagues to try to address any concerns they may have. 

I now yield to the Ranking Member of the Committee on International Relations, Mr. Tom Lantos, for his comments. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Thank you for joining me at today’s meeting of the Committee on International 

Relations. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to understand not only the current situation in 

Afghanistan, but also to hear from the Administration its current approach for managing the intricacies of U.S. assistance for Afghanistan in the months and years 

ahead. 

The United States has an essential role to play in Afghanistan’s recovery from its 

darkest period—misrule by the Taliban and concurrent occupation of that country 

by foreign terrorists who have wreaked grave harm on American interests at home 

and abroad. Our success or failure in establishing peace in Afghanistan may have 

profound implications for U.S. national security in the years ahead. 

We on the Committee recognize the importance of a strong American commitment 

to peace in Afghanistan. We also recognize that this commitment necessarily inVerDate Feb 1 2002 16:37 Jun 12, 2002 Jkt 078205 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\031402\78205 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
4

volves—and will require over the next several years—the expertise and support of 

many parts of our Government—including components of our federal government 

that lack previous experience working together in Washington or in the field. Today, 

I would like to begin to understand:

• How the Administration is organized to deal with present assistance challenges in Afghanistan;

• What are the Administration’s objectives in Afghanistan; and

• Whether the Administration has a coherent strategy and structure in place 

necessary to achieving those objectives.

Severe drought and refugee crises will continue to affect the people of Afghanistan 

at least through 2003. But there are other equally important priorities as well that 

are necessary for a secure and again-prosperous Afghanistan. Among them:

• We must enable an indigenous Afghan force to police and protect the safety 

and dignity of Afghan people;

• We must help create durable institutions of government that are representative and accountable to the people; and

• We must continue to fight terrorism and drugs—two evils in particular that 

if not controlled will continue to plague South Asia and the world.

It is not an overstatement to say that the work we accomplish over the next two 

or three years in Afghanistan will have a direct impact on U.S. national security. 

The Taliban held Afghanistan hostage and played host to foreign forces who were 

bent on destroying liberty and freedom—the liberty and freedom of the Afghans as 

well as that of theoutside rest of the civilized world. Unspeakable atrocities occurred 

daily during this dark reign in Afghanistan’s history. Atrocities against women and 

girls, against religious minorities and those who resisted the Taliban’s warped and 

twisted vision of Islam, and against the cultural and artistic antecedents of Afghanistan. 

Only six short months have elapsed since September 11th, and during this time, 

President Bush has provided leadership and resolve. America and its allies have 

nearly eliminated every remaining foreign terrorist, having long since destroyed 

their ill-witted Taliban hosts. But the balance of our work remains ahead. 

On January 29, this Committee hosted, in this room, the leaderChairman of the 

interim government of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. That same evening, he was a 

featured guest in the Gallery during the President’s State of the Union address. As 

you all know, the new interim government is in place, and Afghan leaders have 

agreed to a roadmap for recovery of institutions of representative government. An 

international force is assisting in the maintenance of security in Kabul, and U.S. 

and allied Afghan forces are working side-by-side to eliminate remaining pockets of 

resistance. Reconstruction work is beginning, with the U.S. providing assistance to 

Afghanistan’s crumbled educational system and alleviating suffering by furnishing 

food, agricultural inputs, clean water and medical assistance to those in need. 

Following successful donor conferences in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo, the 

international community pledged unanimously to assist Afghanistan in again being 

a productive and peaceful nation in South Asia, and it is united in seeking to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a source of future instability and terror. 

Yet despite the Kabul-based Iinternational sSecurity aAssistance fForce and separate coalition military successes to date elsewhere in Afghanistan, much of that 

country remains clouded in insecurity. Threats loom around the corner—experts 

predict that this Spring will see the largest poppy crop in recent history. Meanwhile, 

drought in Afghanistan continues into its fourth year. And for millions of refugees 

in Pakistan and Iran, life is difficult and dangerous, even too dangerous now to return to Afghanistan. 

The factors that have historically created discord and disunity in Afghanistan—

ethnic differences, economic disparity, religion, language, and geography—need to 

be addressed not by imposing the rule of one party but by a modernization of Afghanistan’s structures informed by the traditional processes of adjustment, compromise and devolved power that characterized Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion. 

Even prior to the September 11th attacks, the United States and other donors 

were assisting the Afghan people—displaced within Afghanistan and as refugees in 

neighboring countries—with emergency humanitarian and refugee assistance. 

Through the Herculean efforts of the United States and other donors, through the 

good offices of the United Nations and the nongovernmental community, and 

through the determination of the Afghan people themselves, wide-scale famine was 

averted. But the food security situation remains precarious throughout the country. 

5

Afghanistan will not be food secure for the foreseeable future, and will require not 

only traditional food aid from the U.S. and other donors, but also technical assistance and large-scale civil works to rehabilitate its water management and agricultural systems for the day when the rains return. 

One of the obvious problems in addressing this subject is the plethora of agencies 

and operations within the United States government, each responsible for a portion 

of the overall program. The number and variety of these offices and agencies involved highlights one of the unsolved problems we must address—the lack of a central coordinating authority to provide direction to these agencies. The last thing we 

need is infighting or confusion among various agencies, especially for an issue as 

important and urgent as this one. 

I look forward to hearing from our two witnesses today—Administrator Andrew 

Natsios and Under Secretary Alan Larson—on the challenges ahead. I suspect, however, that the range of Afghanistan’s needs extends beyond the economic, business 

and agricultural scope of Under Secretary Larson’s portfolio, and also beyond the 

economic development and humanitarian assistance mandate of Administrator 

Natsios. 

The bill before us establishes a significant, four-year, flexible fund for the purpose 

of dealing with the special situation we find in Afghanistan. It is our intention to 

free the Administration from the need to find funding in one of the many baskets 

into which our foreign assistance program is divided. 

We welcome the observations of the Administration on this draft bill. I am prepared to work with the Administration and my colleagues to try to address any concerns they may have.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first 

thank you for calling today’s hearing on reconstructing Afghanistan 

and for your leadership in putting forward legislation to help the 

Afghan society recover. 

We are indeed fortunate at this particular junction in our nation’s history to have your judgment and perspective as Chair of 

this Committee. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have recently concluded a visit to China, Japan, Germany, and France for the purpose of making it clear to the various governments and the media 

in those countries that the United States and Congress of the 

United States stands united behind the President’s war against 

international terrorism. And I am convinced that we will be able 

to develop a united front with respect to aiding Afghanistan. 

As we move on to the next steps in the war on terrorism, which 

we have to, it would be inexcusable if we failed to finish the job 

we have begun, bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, and 

ending the use of that long-suffering nation as a base for international terrorism. We will not win the war in Afghanistan, Mr. 

Chairman, until we have won the peace. 

As we meet today, warlords remain powerful in Afghanistan, 

women and children are starving, and some families sell their 

young to get a few days worth of food. It will take years, not 

months, for the international community to help Afghanistan’s new 

leaders solve the horrendous problems they face. 

For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I was pleased to join our distinguished colleague, Mr. Ackerman, and other Members of this Committee in introducing legislation last December to authorize a comprehensive reconstruction plan for Afghanistan. 

H.R. 3427 would authorize $1.4 billion in assistance over 4 years 

to improve the security situation in Afghanistan, upgrade the delivery of humanitarian services, lay the groundwork for Afghanistan’s 

economic reconstruction, promote the participation of women in AfVerDate Feb 1 2002 16:37 Jun 12, 2002 Jkt 078205 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031402\78205 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

ghan’s society, and tackle the many critical human rights issues 

the country is plagued with. 

While it certainly would not do all that is needed, it is an appropriate response from the United States, particularly given the costs 

we have already borne to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban. 

Certainly more is required of others in Europe, in Asia, and from 

the wealthy oil countries of the world. 

Our legislation also tied our assistance to continuing the groundwork begun in Bonn for democracy and good government in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, we are in the process of working 

with your staff closely to be able to agree on a legislative proposal 

which takes the best aspects of both of our bills, and I am confident 

we will reach that accommodation in the next few days. 

As we draft this legislation, we must keep several principles in 

mind. 

First, we must deal with the humanitarian and economic situation in Afghanistan immediately. If the people of Afghanistan have 

no hope, they will once again be dominated by warlords, drug traffickers and terrorists. 

Second, we must help provide security in Afghanistan both by 

helping the government to establish a military force to defend itself 

and by providing support for the interim peacekeeping force. Only 

the establishment of security will enable Afghanistan to eliminate 

terrorists and drug trafficking, and to reduce the interference in 

Afghanistan’s affairs of its neighbors. And security, obviously, must 

reach way beyond Kabul. The present situation where the peacekeeping forces are in the Kabul area only is clearly unacceptable, 

and must be changed at as rapid a pace as possible. 

Third, Mr. Chairman, we must help the people and government 

of Afghanistan to rebuild their societies by restoring or establishing 

the health, the education and agricultural sectors to empower civil 

society and promote democracy. 

To achieve these objectives the United States and others must be 

willing to commit significant funds over the next decade for Afghanistan. We must insist that the Japanese, the Europeans, 

wealthy Arabs and Muslim nations continue to use their resources, 

and we ourselves must be willing to commit more than a billion 

dollars in reconstruction aid over the next several years. 

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is proof positive of the need for the 

United States to remain actively engaged throughout the developing world with foreign aid, technology and education. Fifty years 

from now I hope that historians looking at the impact of September 

11 on U.S. foreign policy will be able to say that fundamental reevaluation of our funding priorities and that a new Marshall Plan 

for the developing world was the result. 

Hopefully, Mr. Chairman, historians will be able to cite the Afghanistan reconstruction legislation that will be considered by this 

Committee as soon as next week as the first example of America’s 

new vision of the world and of our responsibilities. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

We will entertain opening statements with the admonition that 

I hope you will be as brief as possible because we would like to get 

7

to our witnesses, but I would like to afford the opportunity to the 

Members to make an opening statement. And for any of you so considerate as to want your remarks to be included in the record in 

lieu of presenting them, it is so ordered. 

Meanwhile, Mr. Gilman is recognized. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will abide by your 

admonition. 

I want to thank you for holding this important hearing on the 

Afghan Freedom Support Act. I also want to welcome our distinguished witnesses here today, Administrator Natsios and Under 

Secretary Larson. 

Afghanistan and the Afghan people are at a critical crossroads in 

their survival. Afghanistan has been torn apart by the deadly manipulative interference of its neighbors and its warring groups, 

tribes, drug lords. Drought and fighting has caused a humanitarian 

crisis, has left millions of Afghans with little hope and too much 

despair. 

The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act before us today attempts 

to help Afghan people and to help themselves. This measure offers 

a mix of security, of development, of humanitarian and anti-narcotics assistance that will help the Administration in its efforts to 

build a stable Afghanistan and a better future for the Afghan people. 

Mr. Chairman, in just a few days the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, will be returning to Afghanistan to help bring together a Loya Jirga, a grand assembly. The King’s return and the 

Loya Jirga are significant events for this Committee, both of which 

we can be proud of. 

Prior to September 11, in this Committee room we passed several 

resolutions supporting the Loya Jirga and the King. We brought together in this Committee room all the major Afghan factions to assist in this effort. For many years Representative Rohrabacher has 

been at the forefront of that effort, and we commend him for his 

vision and tenacity. 

This measure, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, will help 

to bring all of the good work to fruition, and I look forward to hearing our distinguished witnesses today with regard to this proposal. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. 

Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Last week I returned from Afghanistan, and words cannot describe the destruction I saw in Kabul. Most buildings there are rubble, with the rest severely damaged. 

I commend this Committee’s efforts to shape how we go about 

helping Afghanistan rebuild. This is very much in our national interest, and I just wanted to say that despite the destruction I saw 

there I did come away with hope for the future. 

Our delegation visited a hospital, a hospital where the Taliban 

had taken the incubators and had forbid the treatment of women. 

And outside that hospital little children would put their hands over 

their hearts, kids on the street, and say thank you. We visited a 

couple of orphanages, and in one of these orphanages a little girl 

7 years old told me that she wanted to be a doctor when she comVerDate Feb 1 2002 16:37 Jun 12, 2002 Jkt 078205 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031402\78205 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
8

pleted her education, and that is why she was studying so hard, 

so that she could help her people. Her parents had both been killed 

by the Taliban. And the teacher showed me scars. The teachers, 

men and women, had been tortured by the Taliban for the sin of 

teaching these orphans, young boys and girls, or trying to teach 

them under that environment. So I understand how difficult this 

process of rebuilding that society is going to be. 

I would like to report that Radio Free Afghanistan, which is a 

product of this Committee, is now up and running, and Chairman 

Karzai told us how these broadcasts mean so much to his country, 

because when he travels around to remote pockets of that country 

for the first time people know who he is because of the radio. He 

said tens of thousand of people mob him, whether it is a Shiite 

area or other area, and he said,

‘‘They know that I am leading the country, not the local warlord, and that is a big difference and they know that because 

of the radio.’’

And so I do want to point out, Mr. Chairman, that although 

Radio Free Afghanistan is only authorized through fiscal year 

2002, we need keep these broadcasts going so that accurate information gets to the people of Afghanistan, because this is a long 

struggle ahead for Chairman Karzai and for the people there. They 

need information. And as he said, it is going to take some time to 

disabuse people of what they heard from Taliban radio for so many 

years. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for 

scheduling this hearing and for offering a proposal for reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan. 

As was noted, Mr. Lantos and I offered a similar proposal last 

December, and I believe there is a great deal of commonality between the two of them, which would indicate that we are heading 

in the same direction. 

It is important for the Congress to speak on the question of reconstruction because there are too many in the region who believe, 

as we have heard from Chairman Karzai last month, that the 

United States will abandon Afghanistan again when this war is 

over. 

An authorization bill that lays out the policy of the United States 

and articulates our long-term commitment to the region will go far 

in convincing the people of Afghanistan that we are there in peace 

as well as in war. 

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I think there are several issues 

that such a bill should address. Chief among them is the security 

situation on the ground. No level of assistance will be effective if 

aid workers cannot reach those in need. 

As I believe we will hear from Administrator Natsios, the current 

security situation is unsuitable for rapid or sustainable change. I 

know that the Administration has pledged to help establish an Afghan army, and an Afghan police force, and I know that we believe 

that ultimately Afghans should provide their own security. But we 

9

have had mixed results at best with such efforts. Haiti is the example that springs to mind, and this is really a long-term solution. 

There is an immediate need to deal with the situation in the 

near term, which is why we should support the expansion of the 

multinational force to bridge the gap between now and the time 

that Afghanistan national army or police force is ready to assume 

the role. 

I do not believe that the security issue should be left to local 

commanders and warlords, which brings me to my next point. 

There has been a great deal of discussion regarding the form of 

government the new Afghan nation should have, whether it should 

have a strong central government or whether it should be decentralized. I thought this was a question that the Bonn process set 

out to resolve. This is why there will be a Loya Jirga, a new constitution, and finally an election so that Afghans, men and women 

may choose. 

While I sympathize with those who argue that we cannot impose 

a strong central government on Afghanistan and that attempts to 

do so in the past have failed, we cannot simply allow authority to 

accrue to those local commanders who seem to be the most powerful. 

Channeling our assistance through entities with ‘‘practical authority’’ is a recipe for plunging Afghanistan back into the conflict 

from which it has so recently emerged. It is also an invitation for 

Afghan’s neighbors to decide who is the ‘‘practical authority,’’ try 

to choose favorites and to again interfere in Afghan politics. 

We have already seen media reports of such a relationship in 

Herat between Ismail Khan and the government of Iran. Some balance must be found that allows a central government to project its 

authority sufficiently to conduct foreign and defense policy, and allows legitimate local leaders to run their own domestic affairs. 

As we move forward with development assistance the question of 

narcotics must be addressed. There is currently a large, as you 

point out, even record crop of poppy about to be harvested in Afghanistan. This is a serious problem. But Afghanistan has a number of serious problems, and they all need to be addressed at once. 

I think it would be a mistake to closely link our assistance to Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics efforts, and an even bigger mistake to 

channel our assistance through those whomever we perceive to be 

in charge locally. That will simply empower the local commanders 

and give them the resources to challenge the government in Kabul. 

Chairman Karzai has pledged his support on poppy eradication 

and signed a decree banning its growth. We should work with him 

with UNDCP and with the Europeans, in whose markets most Afghan heroin winds up to deal with this problem, but it should not 

be the sole focus of our assistance efforts. 

The last thing, Mr. Chairman, I want to address is the military 

assistance program in the proposal. I think that a new program to 

provide military assistance without restrictions to any country except those designated as terrorist states and with only 5 days notice to Congress addresses a problem that does not exist. 

I agree that military assistance should be provided to Afghanistan to create a national standing army and a police force, and to 

support the multinational forces there. But other than the need to 

10

address some reimbursement and contracting issues, which the Department of Defense has raised, I do not see the requirement for 

us to cede to the President new unfettered authority to provide 

military assistance on a global basis. He does not seem to have any 

problem, for example, in the Philippines or in Georgia. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working with you 

and with Mr. Lantos and others on this legislation and to hearing 

today’s witnesses in the fervent hope that they might actually comment on the legislation pending before us. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Recently, several of us met with former King Zahir Shah. I think 

it is extremely important that a successful Loya Jirga be established and that the former King’s leadership is very important. I 

would suggest that if we cannot address the selfish quest for power 

by the tribal leaders and local warlords, then our efforts and the 

world’s efforts at humanitarian assistance, reconstruction assistance, promoting long-term economic development assistance and 

our efforts to counter the narcotic trade is going to in the long run 

be too little or no avail. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will just say I am pleased that you have called this very important hearing, and in order to hear the witnesses I will forego making a statement for the record. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for holding this important hearing on how we can further assist the people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their nation. 

On January 2 of this year, Congressman Frank Wolfe, Congressman Tony Hall, and I traveled to Afghanistan. We were greeted 

with warm, friendly smiles wherever we went from meetings with 

the interim administration officials to hospitals, to schools, to orphanages. 

There is a hope in Afghanistan that the country will be different 

and new opportunities in life will emerge out of the terrible suffering that the Afghan people have endured. 

Despite the clear hope, the trip was very sobering. The best children’s hospital in the nation, in Kabul, lacked basic medicines and 

medical equipment to treat the children. In fact, two children and 

their mothers shared a bed—a little bunk bed—and many of the 

children in the malnutrition ward that we visited, they said onein-three died each night. No hospital employees had been paid for 

6 months, and yet the doctors and nurses worked valiantly to save 

the lives of the children in their care. 

We visited a girls high school that had just reopened 1 week earlier after being shut down for 5 years. The concrete building was 

full of holes—bullet holes from the Soviet times. One room had no 

roof, and no rooms had glass in the windows. The girls sat on blankets on the concrete or dirt floor because there were no desks, no 

chairs, and no textbooks. Yet, the students were so motivated to 

learn that they had raised money from their meager earnings to 

11

buy plastic to cover the window holes, and pay daily for the kerosene to have some heat to keep out the biting cold. The girls 

greeted us with big smiles and chants of welcome. They were delighted, they said, to be back in school. Teachers needed to be rehired. Eighty percent of the teachers were women. The government 

needs assistance with providing basic supplies such as paper and 

pens and chalk and books. 

We visited an orphanage, 900 children in their care, and there 

are tens of thousands of orphans. Many of the children were obviously suffering from malnutrition and trauma from the violence in 

the war and the loss of their families. But they gave us huge 

smiles. They recited, they sang for us, and they welcomed us. 

There is an almost overwhelming humanitarian crisis that continues today for food, medicine, and shelter, and yet they have 

hope, hope that the American people will cement their friendship 

with the Afghan people by remaining engaged in their country 

through various avenues. They repeated this over and over: Do not 

abandon us like you did after the Russians. 

The United States and the international community must continue to support Chairman Karzai and the administration in 

Kabul, as well as the administration’s clarifying to the various region of Afghanistan that Federal authority rests in Kabul. In addition, it is vital that the international community ensure that the 

Bonn Agreement is fully implemented and culminates with the 

Loya Jirga to be held on June 22 of this year. 

Humanitarian aid must continue. The UN world food program, 

the United States and the other NGOs serving the people there are 

doing a great job, but the need remains high. U.S. assistance must 

be deliberate. Security is the primary need, and was mentioned in 

every meeting and every site visit we had. Unless there is security, 

no amount of effort will ensure that the new government leaders 

can implement the very necessary changes in the country. The 

economy must be developed, primarily through developing the agricultural sector of society. 

Prior to 1979 and the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was self-sufficient. It even exported agricultural products to neighboring countries. Studies show that before 1979, 80 percent of the society was 

in farming. The skills are there, but the opportunity needs to be 

developed. Unfortunately, the 4-year drought in the country has 

drastically affected the output of farms, the ability of animal herders to keep animals alive. 

Irrigation assistance and drought assistance need to be constructed and provided as soon as possible, and development of the 

agricultural sector with alternative crops is a necessary avenue in 

fighting against narcotic production. Development of the education 

system is a primary need. An overwhelming portion of the population has been affected by the lack of access to education. 

So it is vital that our nation continue to give support to the Afghan people, to the administration led by Chairman Karzai. 

And I would like to submit my statement and trip report for the 

record, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:]

12

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on legislation detailing how we can further assist the people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their nation. 

In January of this year, Congressman Frank Wolf, Congressman Tony Hall, and 

I traveled to Afghanistan. We were greeted with warm, friendly smiles wherever we 

went, from meetings with Interim Administration officials to hospitals, schools and 

orphanages. There is a hope in Afghanistan that the country will be different and 

new opportunities and life will emerge out of the terrible suffering the Afghan people have endured. 

Despite the clear hope, the trip was very sobering. The best children’s hospital 

in the nation, the Indira Ghandi Pediatric Hospital, lacked basic medicines and 

medical equipment to treat the children, in fact, two children and their mothers 

shared each bed, one of three children in the malnutrition ward died each night, 

and no hospital employees have been paid for six months. Yet, the doctors and 

nurses worked valiantly to save the lives of the children in their care. 

We visited a girls school, the Dorkhanai High School, that had re-opened one 

week earlier after being shut down for over five years. The concrete building was 

full of bullet holes from the Soviet invasion, one room had no roof, and no rooms 

had glass in the windows. The girls sat on blankets on the concrete or dirt floor 

as there were no desks or chairs. Yet, the students were so motivated to learn, they 

raised the money from the meager earnings of their families to buy thick plastic to 

cover the window holes and pay for kerosene heat to keep out some of the biting 

cold in the schoolrooms. The girls greeted us with big smiles and chants of ‘‘Welcome, welcome.’’ They were delighted to be back in school. Teachers need to be rehired (80% of the teachers were women), and the government needs assistance with 

providing basic supplies such as paper, pens, chalk and books. 

The Allauddin Center Orphanage has 900 children in their care—800 boys and 

100 girls. The children, many obviously suffering from malnutrition and trauma 

from the violence of the war and the loss of their loved ones, gave us huge smiles 

and recited and sang for us. 

There is an almost overwhelming humanitarian crisis that continues today. Food, 

medicine and shelter are lacking for much of the country’s population. Yet, there 

is hope—hope that the American people will cement their friendship with the Afghan people by remaining engaged in their country through various avenues. 

The United States and the international community must continue to support 

Chairman Karzai and the Interim Administration in Kabul as well as the Administration’s clarifying to the various regions of Afghanistan that federal authority rests 

in Kabul. In addition, it is vital that the international community ensure that the 

Bonn Agreement is fully implemented and culminated in the Loya Jirga to be held 

on June 22, 2002. 

Humanitarian Aid must continue. The UN World Food Programme and US and 

other NGOs serving the people there are doing a great job. But the need remains 

high. 

U.S. assistance must be deliberate. Security is the primary need, and was mentioned in every meeting and site visit we had. Unless there is security, no amount 

of effort will ensure that the new government leaders can implement the very necessary changes in the country. Second, the economy must be developed, primarily 

through developing the agricultural sector of society. Prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was self-sufficient and even exported agricultural products to 

neighboring countries. Studies show that before 1979, 80% of the society was in 

farming. The skills are there, but the opportunity needs to be developed. Unfortunately, the four-year drought in the country has drastically affected the output of 

farms and the ability of animal herders to keep animals alive. Irrigation systems 

and drought assistance need to be constructed and provided as soon as possible. In 

addition, development of the agricultural sector with alternative crops is a proactive 

avenue of fighting against narcotics production. 

Development of the education system is one of the primary needs. An overwhelming portion of the population has been affected by lack of access to education. 

As reflected in our visit to the girls’ school, the people have a desire to pursue an 

education as they view this as the primary avenue for bettering their lives 

It is vital that our nation continue to give support to the Afghan people and to 

the Interim Administration led by Chairman Hamid Karzai. 

I would like to submit my Trip Report for the Record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

13

AFGHANISTAN TRIP REPORT—JANUARY 2002

Mr. Speaker, I recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan with Congressman 

Frank Wolf (VA) and Congressman Tony Hall (OH). We were greeted with warm, 

friendly smiles wherever we went, from meetings with Interim Administration officials to hospitals, schools and orphanages. There is a hope in Afghanistan that the 

country will be different and new opportunities and life will emerge out of the terrible suffering the Afghan people have endured. 

The visit was a highlight, but it was also sobering. The best children’s hospital 

in the nation, the Indira Ghandi Pediatric Hospital, lacked basic medicines to treat 

the children, two children and their mothers shared each bed, one of three children 

in the malnutrition ward died each night, there is a lack of basic medical equipment, and no hospital employees have been paid for six months. Yet, the doctors 

and nurses worked valiantly to save the lives of the children in their care. 

We visited a girls school, the Dorkhanai High School, that had re-opened one 

week earlier after being shut down for over five years. The concrete building was 

full of bullet holes from the Soviet invasion, one room had no roof, and no rooms 

had glass in the windows. The girls sat on blankets on the concrete or dirt floor 

as there were no desks or chairs. Yet, the students were so motivated to learn they 

raised the money from the meager earnings of their families to buy thick plastic to 

cover the window holes and pay for kerosene heat to keep out some of the biting 

cold in the schoolrooms. The girls greeted us with big smiles and chants of ‘‘Welcome, welcome.’’ They were delighted to be back in school. Teachers need to be rehired (80% of the teachers were women), and the government needs assistance with 

providing basic supplies such as paper, pens, chalk and books. 

The Allauddin Center Orphanage has 900 children in their care—800 boys and 

100 girls. The children, many obviously suffering from malnutrition and trauma 

from the violence of the war and the loss of their loved ones, gave us huge smiles 

and recited and sang for us. A delegation of firefighters from New York City had 

visited recently and donated enough food for the children for the next three months, 

but after that, it will again be a struggle to feed these young children. The firefighters also provided warm blankets for these children who, in the winter due to 

lack of adequate heating facilities, sleep three to a bed with three rooms of children 

crowding into one room—this way they can all be in rooms in which there are heat sources. We also visited a women’s bakery with the United Nations World Food Program 

Women’s Bakery Project that has been vital in helping women, particularly widows, 

support and feed their families. During our visit, we learned that one woman had 

been a doctor at the hospital, but she left to work at the bakery so that she could 

earn money to actually support her family. 

There is an almost overwhelming humanitarian crisis that continues today. Food, 

medicine and shelter are lacking for much of the country’s population. Yet, there 

is hope—hope that the American people will cement their friendship with the Afghan people by remaining engaged in their country through various avenues. Government aid to Afghanistan is vital, but people to people diplomacy, sister relationships between schools and hospitals in the U.S. partnering with schools and hospitals in Afghanistan, will be invaluable in helping to rebuild the nation and the 

historic friendship between our nations. 

Our meetings with government officials also gave us hope. The Chairman of the 

Interim Administration, H.E. Hamid Karzai, is an impressive, capable, straightforward man who has the capacity to lead his country to establish a coalition that 

will last through the historic transitions the nation is experiencing. The Loya Jirga 

(Grand Assembly) in June will mark a key transition for the people of Afghanistan 

and Hamid Karzai appears to be the one who can lead the people through that transition. 

In response to our visit, there are several key points that must be addressed as 

our nation, government and people remain engaged with the people of Afghanistan:

1. The United States and the international community must continue to support Chairman Karzai and the Interim Administration in Kabul as well as 

the Administration’s clarifying to the various regions of Afghanistan that 

federal authority rests in Kabul. In addition, it is vital that the international 

community ensure that the Bonn Agreement is fully implemented and culminated in the Loya Jirga to held on June 22, 2002. The Loya Jirga is the 

traditionally accepted Afghan method of solving problems and reaching consensus. We must continue our support for the new government, otherwise 

lack of stability could create the opportunity for another pre-September 11 

environment of factional fighting, violence and upheaval, and a central power 

vaccum that would have severe implications for our national security.

14

2. Humanitarian Aid must continue. The UN World Food Programme and US 

and other NGOs serving the people there are doing a great job. But the need 

remains high. The UN estimated that they would be feeding 8 million people 

within Afghanistan, not to mention refugees in neighboring countries, in the 

next three months to help avert an even greater crisis. Food aid is needed, 

as is medical and educational assistance. People to people diplomacy can be 

conducted through Chairman Karzai’s office in Kabul.

3. U.S. assistance must be deliberate. Security is the primary need, mentioned 

in every meeting and site visit we had. Unless there is security, no amount 

of effort will ensure that the new government leaders can implement the 

very necessary changes in the country. Second, the economy must be developed, primarily through developing the agricultural sector of society. Prior to 

the 1979 Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was self-sufficient and even exported 

agricultural products to neighboring countries. Studies show that before 

1979, 80% of the society was in farming. The skills are there, but the opportunity needs to be developed. Unfortunately, the four-year drought in the 

country has drastically affected the output of farms and the ability of animal 

herders to keep animals alive. Irrigation systems and drought assistance 

need to be constructed and provided as soon as possible. In addition, development of the agricultural sector with alternative crops is a proactive avenue 

of fighting against narcotics production. Third, development of the education 

system is one of the primary needs. An overwhelming portion of the population has been affected by lack of access to education. As reflected in our 

visit to the girls’ school, the people have a desire to pursue an education as 

they view this as the primary avenue for bettering their lives. Studies from 

around the world support this: the development of educational systems 

changes nations. The Afghan people may lack the basic materials for education, but not the desire to learn.

Mr. Speaker, there are tremendous needs in Afghanistan, but there also is a tremendous amount of hope and an expectation that this time will be different. I look 

forward to visiting Afghanistan in the future and seeing these hopes and expectations lived out. As Chairman Hamid Karzai said during our meeting together, 

‘‘Think of the help as help to our children. The families will do well if the children 

do well.’’ As we look forward to the hopes and expectations of a new Afghanistan, 

I will be working with the generous people of Pennsylvania and others across this 

nation to extend a hand of friendship, partnership and care through practical 

projects that will help build up the Afghan people.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Lantos, for calling this hearing. 

I would like to reenforce the importance of health programs, as 

Mr. Pitts mentioned, and development strategies. In addition to the 

other tragedies, the people of Afghanistan are also threatened by 

the global killer, tuberculosis. Afghanistan ranks near the top of 

countries most ravaged by TB due to decades of war and restrictions by the Taliban, and the 401 foreign development assistance 

efforts to control TB have been severely limited. Few statistics on 

TB situation are available. Reports from various non-governmental 

organizations working in Afghanistan prior to September 11 note 

that TB control efforts then were reaching only 15 percent of the 

Afghani population, primarily around Kabul. 

The World Health Organization estimates that from 2001 to 2004 

approximately $3 million will be needed per year to control TB in 

Afghanistan. We must address the TB epidemic if we are to help 

Afghanistan rebuild. 

Studies suggest that on average 3 to 4 months of work time are 

lost as a result of TB. This results in average lost potential earnings of 20 to 30 percent of annual household income. For the families of those who die from the disease the situation is obviously 

worse. For those families there is a further loss of roughly, in the 

15

average, 15 years of income because of the premature death often 

of the breadwinner who died from tuberculosis. 

Increased U.S. support is urgently needed for TB control programs in Afghanistan, and for treating Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This should include both increased U.S. bilateral aid for TB 

as well as U.S. resources for the global TB drug facility to be able 

to provide low cost TB programs, not just to Afghanistan but to 

Pakistan and to other nations. 

Drugs to treat TB cost in the developing world only about $10, 

and treating TB is one of the most effective ways to extend the life 

of a person with AIDS from just a few weeks to at least a year, 

often as long as 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 years. 

The drugs and the program support for TB are inexpensive. We 

just need to make sure they are part of America’s aid package for 

Afghanistan and a centerpiece for international health efforts. 

The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget request proposes, amazingly enough, to cut funding for infectious disease account in the 

Child Survival Act, especially TB and malaria, by nearly a third, 

to a level of 110 million in fiscal year 2003, from 155 million to 110 

million. It is absolutely the wrong time to cut funding programs in 

global health. At the same time, the President wants to cut taxes, 

mostly for the most privileged people in this society, and then failing the world’s poorest people, and that is outrageous. 

If our goal is to help stabilize Afghanistan, we must help that nation overcome diseases like TB that kills its primary breadwinners 

and orphans its children. We must adopt a comprehensive development strategy and funding to combat global illnesses must be a 

part of that strategy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. No comment, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mrs. Davis? Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to echo Mr. Lantos’ comments on the importance of 

burden sharing, and echo the comments of Mr. Royce, who along 

with Mr. Berman has shown such leadership regarding Radio Free 

Afghanistan. We ought to be expanding as well as reauthorizing 

that project, and trying also in our broadcasts in the Farsi and 

Baluchi languages to reach Iran with the truth about world affairs. 

Aid is the right thing to do for the world’s poorest and most 

downtrodden people. Here though it is also important for our own 

national security, first as to narcotics which, while overshadowed 

perhaps in the press today, continues to ravage our streets, but we 

should not use the fact that poppies are being grown in Afghanistan as a reason to do less for Afghanistan. It is actually a reason 

to do more. We should do everything necessary to help that country 

get back on its feet, plus do everything necessary to make sure that 

farmers can get a high price for their legitimate crops such that 

along with poppy eradication efforts they decide that it is both reasonable and in their own interest to cultivate other crops. 

It is also important for our national security because world public opinion is an important part of our national security, and this 

battle against terrorism is not a clash of civilizations, but rather 

16

the United States has been a generous and courageous ally of Islamic peoples. 

In war, we have been courageous and we have saved the 

Bosniaks, the Kosavars, the Kuwaitis, and now the Afghans. And 

now we can demonstrate that in peace we are also good allies of 

Islamic peoples. In doing so, we not only meet our moral responsibilities as a well-to-do-nation, and as the world’s only superpower, 

but we also enhance our own security in ways perhaps far more 

significant than some expensive programs put forward as national 

defense programs. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Blumenauer. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate 

the Committee leadership that you and Mr. Lantos have developed 

in terms of looking at the big picture. 

I think you are right on the money in terms of asking about the 

level of assistance, and as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, the mix 

of assistance that is provided. 

I am concerned about some of the areas where we do not have 

the right mix of actions. Now, it is not to say that I have not been 

hanging on every single word of the opening statements, but I have 

had a chance to glance at the two statements that we are about 

to receive, and there is virtually nothing that is stated about what 

we are going to do in terms of urban redevelopment. 

We are approaching the point in the next couple of years where 

the majority of the world’s population for the first time in human 

history is in the cities. We have a vast expanse, not just in Afghanistan, which is one of the greatest examples and one of the most 

urgent and pressing, but we have a vast expanse from Cairo to Manila, and many, many cities in between that are cauldrons of unrest, where there is significant, unnecessary loss of human life. 

My colleague, Mr. Brown, referenced the health needs in terms 

of tuberculosis. We have the equivalent of four World Trade Center 

tragedies every day from needless deaths caused by water-borne 

diseases, and it is within our power to do something about it with 

our urban program, which we have discussed in this Committee 

with Secretary Powell in the past. For the urban aid program that 

we have, we spend the equivalent of three cruise missiles. 

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that as we go back and forth in 

terms of seeking information from our witnesses, I hope we can 

focus on what we are going to do to rebuild and stabilize these 

troubled urban areas in Afghanistan, throughout the Middle East, 

and in the developing world, which are going to take on two and 

a half billion more residents in the next 25 years. 

And I appreciate the leadership, Mr. Chairman, of you and Mr. 

Lantos in looking at the big picture, and I hope our Committee can 

focus on this one element where a little bit of investment can go 

a long way. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I am going to pass, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Schiff. 

We welcome first today Andrew S. Natsios, who was sworn in as 

Administrator of the United States Agency for International DevelVerDate Feb 1 2002 16:37 Jun 12, 2002 Jkt 078205 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031402\78205 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
17

opment in May 2001. USAID is the Government agency that administers economic and humanitarian assistance worldwide. 

Administrator Natsios has served the agency for many years 

prior to becoming Administrator, first as Director of the Office of 

Foreign Disaster Assistance, and then as Assistant Administrator 

for the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance. 

We look forward to hearing your statement today, Mr. Administrator. 

Our second witness will be Alan P. Larson, who is Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs at 

the Department of State. He assumed his duties in November 1999, 

and continues to serve as the senior economic official, advising the 

secretary on international economic policy and leading the work of 

the department on issues ranging from trade, aviation to bilateral 

relations with America’s economic partners. 

Ambassador Larson has been a career public servant with the 

Department of State, serving at a high level in a number of endeavors involving economic and business affairs and international 

energy, energy policy, and resources. 

We welcome both of our witnesses today. We ask that you summarize your statements to try to hold them within the 5-minute 

frame. Your full statements will be made a part of the record. 

And although my letter of invitation suggested you speak to the 

draft bill that you received last Friday evening, your statements do 

not address that. I understand you are prepared to discuss that 

orally today, and so we invite your comments, Ambassador Natsios. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANDREW S. NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you, Chairman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, 

Members of the Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity 

to appear before you today. 

Afghanistan has been a major priority for our agency and for the 

Administration for many months, even before the terrorist attack. 

As the Chairman indicated, it was in the spring of 2001 that we 

began action to deal with the problems of Afghanistan. 

I would like to thank the Committee for the outstanding support 

it has shown for us thus far, for the cooperation that we are certain 

we can count on in the future. 

On Monday, President Bush hosted a White House ceremony to 

mark the 6-month anniversary of the September 11th attacks. And 

he noted tremendous difficulties at hand. Faced with the difficult 

challenges ahead he averted mass starvation, began clearing 

land—mine fills and building roads and improving health care. 

USAID has had a major role in all of this. Today we are not only 

supplying emergency food assistance and other humanitarian relief, but we are also investing $167 million in recovery reconstruction made available for this fiscal year. 

We are also putting Afghans back to work rebuilding roads and 

irrigation systems, building schools and hospitals in immunizing 

children, providing seeds for the next crop. 

We are now printing 9.7 million textbooks. I have some here. I 

am certainly willing to pass them out. We will have four million 

18

of these textbooks printed by next week for the opening of school. 

The first shipment of these books will arrive in the regional capitals beginning on Friday of this week. We will print four million 

now, and the rest will be printed for later distribution. 

We are also retraining women teachers. A large portion of the 

workforce in the schools are women. This is one way for the reintroduction of women in a systematic fashion back into leadership 

positions in Afghan society. 

Another one of our quick impact projects has been for the refurbishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs run by Dr. Sima 

Samar, who is the Vice Chairman of the interim authority. 

We have four major priorities. The first is humanitarian assistance and assisting the return of refugees and internally displaced 

peoples; secondly, the reestablishment of food security; third, creating the conditions for stability, providing alternatives to conflict, 

terrorism and drug trafficking; and fourth, to assist the Afghan interim authority which is critical for political stability in the country. 

The drought, which is now in its 4th year, has put severe stress 

on the entire society. In fact, no Afghan I have met, and I have 

been there twice now in the last 4 months, has any memory of a 

drought lasting this long. Many people in the villages say they do 

not know what they will do next. 

With one more year of a drought of this magnitude, whole areas 

of the country will be completely uninhabitable because there will 

be no water left, even in the deep wells. 

The livestock production base has been almost entirely destroyed 

in large parts of the country. It is a nomadic culture, a rural culture. Eighty percent of the people in Afghanistan live in rural 

areas. This means unless the situation changes dramatically we 

will have to continue the emergency food aid and humanitarian 

programs for the foreseeable future. 

First, our first priority is to move people back to their villages, 

if it is possible, if there is enough water, so that we can bring people back from the camps. In the long-term, camps are not a desirable thing to have, whether for refugees or internally displaced 

people. 

Our second objective is to focus on food security. Food security 

is three things: It is production of sufficient food through the agricultural system for people to eat; it is the production of enough jobs 

in the economy so people have enough money to buy food in the 

markets if they cannot grow it themselves; and people must have 

good health in order to absorb the food. If for example they have 

tuberculosis, you can feed them all you want, they will not get better if they are malnourished. TB and malnutrition are intimately 

related to each other. In fact, that is why they call it consumption. 

And so you have to restore health in order to get food security restored. 

The third objective is in the area of counteracting conflict, terrorism and drug trafficking. We have six focuses in this. One is 

crop substitution. We will be doing a $3 million crop substitution 

program beginning next week, in the Helmand Valley in the south, 

which is one of the principal poppy growing areas. 

19

Second, we will begin physical infrastructure to create jobs to 

draw people away from poppy production. 

Third, we need access to credit so people can grow legitimate 

crops. We need to get the kids back in the schools, off the streets, 

particularly girl children who have been basically isolated in Afghan society for 5 years now. We need to rebuild local institutions 

to help regain legitimate local elders and village authorities and 

move away from the warlords. 

And, finally, we need food assistance as a salary supplement for 

Afghan civil servants, especially for teachers, and we have agreed 

to do that. We will be providing a salary supplement in the form 

of food aid to provide assistance in the form of a salary to Afghan 

civil servants. 

Our fourth and final goal is to support the interim authority, because if the interim authority fails and there is political instability, 

the rest of our effort will fail. We must have security and political 

stability in order to reconstruction the country. 

Peace is a prerequisite for progress. We must reintroduce women 

back into the mainstream of society. They were there before 

Taliban. They have a long tradition of women’s leadership in many 

areas of the country long before Taliban came on the scene. 

Afghanistan has to be reconstructed by the Afghans. We can help 

them do that. We can support them in doing that, but they have 

to take the leadership or this will not work. We need to build on 

Afghan capabilities, and finally, we need to address the needs of 

those who have not had access to schools and training in order to 

get a workforce of trained and skilled people to govern the country. 

As Secretary Powell said of Afghanistan earlier this year, President Bush, the Congress and the American people recognize fully 

that rebuilding that war-torn country will require additional resources and that our support will be multi-year effort. 

We have opened a USAID mission in January. It will remain 

open for some time, for years. We do not open missions for 6 

months or a year or 2. We are there for the long term. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Natsios follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANDREW S. NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Chairman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, Members of the Committee: I am very 

pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today and have the chance to 

discuss what the U.S. Agency for International Development is doing with respect 

to Afghanistan. 

As you can well imagine, Afghanistan has been a major priority for our agency 

and for the Administration for many months, and it is likely to continue that way 

for a long time to come. I would like to thank this Committee, therefore, for the 

outstanding support it has shown us thus far and for the cooperation that I am certain we can count on in the future. 

Afghanistan presents one of the most difficult humanitarian and development 

challenges USAID has ever faced. The Afghans are a remarkably resilient people, 

but the stress of the past 22 years has taken a tremendous toll on people’s lives. 

About half the country lives in absolute poverty. Average life expectancy is 46 years. 

Malnutrition is widespread. The child mortality rate is among the highest in the 

world. About a third of the Afghan people are still dependent on external food aid. 

Individual security is uncertain. Unemployment is running at about 50 percent, and 

70 percent of the people are illiterate. Virtually all the country’s institutions and 

much of its infrastructure have been destroyed. 

20

Most of this was apparent when I became USAID Administrator last spring and 

cited Afghanistan as one of the three countries in the world with the greatest humanitarian needs. By then, three years of drought, more than two decades of war, 

and the Taliban’s appalling misrule had raised the specter of impending famine. Already the world’s leading supplier of emergency food assistance to the Afghan people, we stepped up our efforts as the summer progressed. 

The events of September 11 only added to the challenge—and redoubled our determination to help the Afghan people. Throughout the fall, and in the midst of the 

campaign to remove the Taliban, we continued to work with the World Food Program, and other international and local NGOs, to deliver food and humanitarian assistance. Despite the difficulties and the approach of winter, by December we had 

surpassed our goals and delivered several hundred thousand metric tons of food, an 

unprecedented amount given the circumstances. Although pockets of hunger remain, 

the widespread famine we feared has not occurred. 

Altogether, the U.S. Government spent more than $183 million on humanitarian 

assistance to Afghanistan in FY 2001. We have already surpassed that in the first 

six months of this fiscal year, with overall U.S. Government assistance totaling 

more than $239 million thus far. Of that, $83.9 million has come from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, $75 million from our Food for Peace program, 

and $14.2 million from our Office of Transition Initiatives. 

On Monday, President Bush hosted a White House ceremony to mark the sixmonth anniversary of the September 11th attacks. At it he noted both the tremendous difficulties Afghanistan has posed, and the success our assistance has helped 

make possible. ‘‘Afghanistan,’’ he said, ‘‘has many difficult challenges ahead—and 

yet, we’ve averted mass starvation, begun clearing mine fields, rebuilding roads and 

improving health care.’’

USAID has played a major role in all this. Today, we are not only supplying emergency food assistance but also investing $167 million in recovery and reconstruction 

assistance made available this fiscal year. We are also putting Afghans back to work 

rebuilding roads and irrigation systems, repairing schools and hospitals, immunizing children, and providing seed so that farmers can plant their crops this spring. 

We are also printing 9.7 million textbooks, four million of which will be ready for 

the opening of Afghanistan’s schools nine days from now. We are re-training women 

teachers so that they can return to their classrooms now that the Taliban has been 

removed. Another of our quick-impact programs has paid for the refurbishment of 

the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. That the work was completed for International 

Women’s Day—March 8—has served, I think, as both a symbol and a concrete demonstration of our commitment to Afghan women. 

By funding a series of quick-impact programs and designing USAID’s Afghan 

strategy so that our emergency assistance contributes directly to our longer-term development goals, we are gaining months of precious time. 

Our near-term priorities are clear. For the present, we have four specific goals in 

support of the war against terrorists of global reach and the U.S. policy of assisting 

Afghanistan:

• Providing humanitarian assistance and assisting returned refugees and internally displaced persons;

• Re-establishing food security;

• Creating conditions for stability, providing alternatives to conflict, terrorism 

and drug trafficking; and

• Assisting the Afghan Interim Authority.

Let me explain in more detail. Unfortunately, the drought that has plagued Afghanistan for four years is still under way. That means that unless the situation 

changes dramatically—and soon—we must continue our major emergency food aid 

and humanitarian assistance programs. 

Stability and recovery in Afghanistan will be difficult until people can return to 

their homes and resume normal lives. So along with providing emergency humanitarian assistance, assisting refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) to resettle where conditions allow is our first goal. Life in these camps is seldom safe or 

healthy, despite the efforts of the international community to provide for them. As 

we have seen in many countries, the poverty and powerlessness of the people who 

live in these camps make them tempting targets for many kinds of lawless groups. 

Second, we must focus our attention on re-establishing food security as quickly as 

possible. This means ensuring that food production is increased, that people have 

the family income to buy food, and that they are sufficiently healthy to benefit from 

it. 

21

In order to do this, we will emphasize Afghanistan’s agriculture and infrastructure. Our immediate focus is on critical inputs: seeds, tools, and fertilizer for this 

spring’s planting season. We also need to rebuild irrigation systems and rural feeder 

roads, plant new trees and orchards, extend farmers credit, and create viable alternatives to poppy cultivation. 

Much of this we have already begun to do. Since September we have launched 

many small cash-for-work, food-for-work, and seed-for-work projects. 

In order for people to be able to purchase food—instead of receiving it as a handout—we need to help restore Afghanistan’s economy. To do this we will emphasize 

local reconstruction programs that generate jobs. 

This, too, we have already begun. Since December, we have funded several different food-for-work programs that employ Afghans throughout the country on water 

supply, irrigation, road repair and seed distribution projects. Altogether we now 

have nine food-for-work projects under way, at a cost of approximately $2.3 million. 

Most of those who die in famines or near famine situations succumb not to starvation, but disease. While, as has been noted above, wide-scale famine has been averted, there are plenty of Afghans who are undernourished and vulnerable to disease. 

Our goal, therefore, is to ensure that children, in particular, receive enough food and 

vitamins, and that they get immunized and treated for various diarrheal diseases 

and respiratory infections. We are also looking to provide pre- and post-natal care 

for mothers, build community wells and latrines, and improve overall hygiene and 

sanitation practices. 

Again, we did not wait for peace to begin our development relief. Since December, 

we have supported a wide range of basic health activities. This includes training, 

providing vaccines and vitamins to children, and establishing emergency obstetric 

care centers. 

Our third goal is to create conditions for stability and provide alternatives to conflict, terrorism and drug trafficking. 

To do this, we plan to emphasize several elements in our programs in addition 

to rehabilitating the agricultural sector:

• crop substitution to reduce poppy growing;

• physical infrastructure rehabilitation;

• access to credit;

• education, especially for girls;

• establishing and strengthening local institutions for accountable government; 

and

• food assistance as salary supplements for Afghan civil servants, especially 

teachers.

Reopening schools, supplying textbooks and training teachers can make an important contribution to Afghanistan’s stability. For the first time in years, girls will 

have the opportunity to attend school and obtain the education they deserve. This 

is true for many boys, as well. Attending school helps restore a sense of normalcy 

to children’s lives; it gets them off the streets and back into established routines, 

enhancing security in the process. Further, as two-thirds of Afghanistan’s teachers 

have traditionally been women, reopening the schools will return thousands of these 

women to the workforce, with all the economic benefits that this entails for themselves and their families. 

Similarly, restoring Afghanistan’s agricultural sector has multiple benefits. Historically, 80 percent of the population depends on farming and grazing. Revitalizing 

this sector not only will reduce dependency on international food assistance, but 

give employment to former combatants, help stabilize the security environment, and 

spur the economy. 

Our fourth goal is improving the governing capacity of Afghanistan’s Interim Authority and its successors. In the short term, this means providing support to the 

Interim Authority and the Transitional Government expected to be in place later 

this year. Over time, it will entail many different programs and areas of emphasis. 

Among these are good governance and rule of law; re-establishing functioning markets and improving the investment climate, especially in agriculture; private sector 

development; agricultural research and training programs; basic education; and improving the health sector. 

We have few illusions that rebuilding Afghanistan will be a quick or easy job. 

Still, we can greatly improve our chances for success if we recognize and abide by 

the following ideas and principles:

• Peace is a prerequisite for progress. The pace of reconstruction naturally depends on the extent to which the country’s factions, regions, and ethnic 

22

groups cooperate. Under the current security conditions, no one should expect 

our efforts to produce rapid and tangible change or to continue indefinitely 

if civil war or chaos break out.

• The role of women in the recovery and reconstruction effort will be critical. 

Before the Taliban, Afghan women occupied important positions in the country’s economic, social and cultural affairs, and we will support their efforts 

to do so again.

• Afghan ownership is essential. To ensure success and sustainability, our programs must have the support of the Afghan people and build on their traditions and practices. At the same time, they must take ethnic balance into consideration.

• Build upon existing Afghan capability. Afghans have a strong tradition of selfreliance. Programming should reinforce their traditions of community responsibility, support local NGOs, use Afghan technical experts, and encourage the 

return of Afghan expatriates to the country.

• Encourage the return of refugees and IDPs.

• Address the needs of those who have not had access to school and training. 

A generation of young Afghans have grown up in an atmosphere of violence 

and conflict. Many who took up arms lost the opportunity to attend school or 

receive training. As a result, many lack skills that are transferable to civilian 

life. Addressing the needs of these individuals will be an important priority.

At the Tokyo donor’s conference this January, Secretary of State Powell pledged $297 million on behalf of the U.S. Government to help the Afghan people. Of that, 

USAID is managing $167 million in Fiscal Year 2002. We have programmed this 

as follows: $77 million in humanitarian food assistance; $22 million in other emergency supplies; $38 million for agricultural and rural economic development; $9.7 

million in health care; $6.5 million for education; and $13.5 million for good governance and political stabilization programs. Another $2.7 million will fund the War 

Victims Fund, polio eradication and other programs. Altogether, we have already obligated $104 million of this $167 million. 

As Secretary Powell said of Afghanistan earlier this year: ‘‘President Bush, the 

Congress, and the American people recognize fully that rebuilding that war-torn 

country will require additional resources and that our support will be a multi-year 

effort.’’ We expect this. We are aware that our goals for Afghanistan are ambitious and 

that even under better circumstances it would be hard to guarantee success. But 

however difficult the reconstruction of the country proves to be, there is one thing 

I can guarantee you, Mr. Chairman: we at USAID are committed to doing our very 

best for Afghanistan. 

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALAN P. LARSON, UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. LARSON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for organizing this hearing on a 

matter that we all consider to be an important national priority, 

the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 

It is clear from the statements Committee Members have made 

this morning that the Committee and the Administration share a 

determination that we can and we must get this right. We cannot 

allow Afghanistan to slip back to what it had become in the past, 

a crucible for terrorists and a haven for drug traffickers. 

I have outlined in my written statement many of the issues that 

the Administration believes will be critical to our success, as well 

as the steps that we are taking to achieve our objectives. As I outlined in my written testimony, this is going to be an immensely difficult task. It is going to require that we pull together our work on 

a number of different strands, and simultaneously address security, 

political, humanitarian, reconstruction and recovery needs of this 

country. 

23

It is also going to require that we have close internal coordination at home, as well as close international collaboration with 

major donors and international institutions, including the UN system, the World Bank and other multilateral development banks. 

I can report that while the task is immense, the response of the 

international community today demonstrates a strong shared sense 

of commitment: A commitment to support a broadly representative 

government in Kabul; a commitment to using our resources to 

strengthen the interim authority so that a once-failed state can become a viable nation and a stable partner; a commitment to creating a society that offers opportunities for all of its citizens, including its women and children; and a commitment to supporting 

the declared and explicit objective of the Afghan interim authority 

that Afghanistan should not become a center for terrorism or drug 

trafficking. 

On the burden sharing issue that has been raised already, I 

would just like to highlight that at the Tokyo Donors Conference 

we were able to elicit $1.8 billion in pledges for the first year of 

this effort, and $4.2 billion of pledges for assistance in the years 

to come. 

We have many tasks ahead of us, and I have touched on those 

in my testimony. One of the most important and one that many 

Members have addressed already this morning is the pressing need 

of security. We do need to eradicate the remnants of the Taliban 

and al-Qaeda. We need to ensure that ISAF has the ability to carry 

out its mission, and we need to help Afghanistan develop a professional multi-ethnic army. We also need to be helping in the construction of a strong professional police force. 

We also must tend to immediate issues on the civilian side. We 

have to help build the capacity of the Afghan interim authority and 

of its successors to function effectively as a government. This includes some very basic issues like having places to work, as well 

as critical issues like developing and sticking with an operating 

budget for the country. 

We are addressing many of these issues through our bilateral assistance programs which Administrator Natsios has just outlined. 

I want to reenforce his emphasis on the need for quick tangible improvements through quick hitting projects. 

Mr. Chairman, the Administration and the Congress do share 

the same goals, objectives and priorities in our support for Afghanistan, and it is in this spirit that we are reviewing very intensively 

and very seriously the legislation that you and your colleagues 

have put forward. It is obvious to me that we agree on the need 

to address the humanitarian crisis, to build a representative government, to enhance the role of women, to fight narcotics production and trafficking, to support reconstruction particularly in the 

agricultural sector, the education sector and the health sector, and 

this is exactly what we are trying to do. 

At the same time, I think we are all aware of the fact that the 

situation in Afghanistan is extremely fluid, and it is in that spirit 

that I say that any earmarks or ceilings or floors or measures that 

would restrict the authority of the President and Secretary of State 

to respond to fast-breaking developments would be a source of conVerDate Feb 1 2002 16:37 Jun 12, 2002 Jkt 078205 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031402\78205 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
24

cern because they could make our response to this fast changing 

situation less effective. 

Mr. Chairman, we recognize also that this is a task that is going 

to require the best efforts of the United States and of all of our 

partners. We are pleased that we have forged a strong cooperation 

with the European Union, Japan and Saudi Arabia, who served 

with us a Co-Chairs of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering 

Group, as well as with other donors throughout the world. We welcome the very strong role of the United Nations in this effort, as 

well as the World Bank and other international organizations. And 

we have been very impressed with the strong positions that Chairman Karzai has taken on reconstruction issues. Working with the 

Congress, we intend to maintain this strong coalition in support of 

reconstruction in Afghanistan. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Larson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALAN P. LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR

ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my privilege to appear before you to discuss our assistance efforts in Afghanistan. 

Many members of Congress have visited Afghanistan in recent months and have 

seen first hand the country’s daunting challenges: a fledgling, fragile, and fractious 

government, surrounded by independent warlords, in a country prostrate after more 

than two decades of war. 

The long years of conflict destroyed Afghanistan’s physical and political infrastructure, shattered its institutions, and wrecked its socio-economic fabric. Many, if 

not most, of the talented and educated left. What little industry the country had 

was mostly destroyed. The little it exported was mostly narcotics. Many parts of the 

countryside are heavily mined. This devastation was brought about by conflict but 

exacerbated by a severe and prolonged drought, now in its fourth year. 

The Taliban intensified the anguish of Afghans. They pursued policies that victimized their own people, especially women and girls and ethnic minorities. They made 

no effort to provide health, education, and other social services. Instead, they devoted their resources to waging war on the Afghan people, and exporting instability 

to their neighbors. They welcomed terrorists and provided them with safe haven and 

support with tragic results. 

As a result of the economic and political devastation of the country, Afghanistan 

is among the least developed countries in the world by any criteria. Average life expectancy in Afghanistan has been reduced to 46 years; according to the World 

Health Organization, the infant mortality rate at birth is 152 per 1,000 births; the 

mortality rate for children under 5 is 257 per 1,000. 

It is not surprising that such an environment became the crucible in which terrorists found safe haven and drug traffickers flourished. 

With the downfall of the Taliban, the challenge the United States and the international community face is to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a threat 

to its own people, its neighbors, or to civilized society. We want to see an Afghanistan that is a responsible member of the world community and never again a hub 

for terrorists and drug traffickers that threaten our security. We would like to see 

an Afghanistan in which its people are able to express their voice within a representative political system and the government respects human rights, especially 

of the most vulnerable—women and minorities. 

The Administration is working with its partners in the international community 

to help Afghanistan make this transition from a failed state to a stable one. Such 

an approach requires that we address simultaneously and weave together all 

strands of public policy that make for a stable society—political, military, security, 

economic, reconstruction, and humanitarian. Lack of progress on any one of these 

elements will make it harder to achieve our objectives on the others. We would like 

the international community to help Afghanistan fashion a virtuous circle in which 

political stability leads to a secure environment, which allows economic activity and 

reconstruction to flourish, which creates income and employment, which alleviates 

the humanitarian crisis of the people, which creates a constituency for greater political stability. 

25

Mr. Chairman, we believe the Congress and the Administration share the same 

goals, objectives, and priorities on support for Afghanistan. The Congress and the 

Administration agree on the need to address the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan 

and to support programs that build representative institutions, enhance the role of 

women in society, fight narcotics production and trafficking, build AIA capacity, and 

support reconstruction, especially in the agriculture, education, and health sectors. 

This is exactly what we are trying to do. 

DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION

The ouster of the Taliban and the establishment through the Bonn Agreement of 

a broad-based interim government has created an opportunity to break with Afghanistan’s recent history. It will not be an easy task and there will be disappointments along the way. The situation remains fragile and volatile. There have been 

clashes in the North and Southeast; there are reports of anti-Pashtun violence in 

the North; the Afghanistan Interim Authority must still establish its authority in 

many parts of the country; the recent killing of the Minister of Aviation at Kabul 

International Airport was of particular concern. 

Nevertheless, the domestic political situation is moving in the right direction. The 

AIA and the UN have begun a process which will lead towards a constitutional government that respects all ethnic and religious minorities, that values its women and 

girls, and that does not harbor terrorists and drug traffickers. 

The Loya Jirga is set for late May or early June. A 21-member organizing committee, which includes 3 women, was announced last month. The committee has 

begun public meetings to establish the procedures for the Loya Jirga. The USG supports this process fully. We are in discussions with Afghan leaders and the UN on 

how to ensure broad participation of all ethnic groups, geographic regions, religions, 

and women. We are ready to assist the AIA and the UN in any way we can, including with logistical help for participants. 

ISAF

For recovery and reconstruction to proceed rapidly, it is essential that the immediate security environment be enhanced. ISAF, under UK lead, is fully operational 

with 4,400 troops on the ground from 18 countries. Joint patrols with Afghan police 

are proceeding well. Streets in Kabul are free of armed groups, but crime at night 

remains a problem. 

A robust and credible international military presence in Kabul has been key to 

stability of the Karzai government. Continued ISAF presence is required during the 

run-up to the Loya Jirga and through the end of the year. 

Although an ISAF fund has been established by the UN, no donor has contributed 

to date, and ISAF is currently self-financing. It is conceivable, however, that at 

some point we would be asked to contribute to this fund to support ISAF operations. 

AFGHAN MILITARY

The development of a credible Afghan army is the key to long-run security in Afghanistan, and, as such, an important component of Afghanistan’s future stability 

and economic recovery. It is, therefore, a high USG priority. A CENTCOM assessment team visited Kabul last month and is now in the process of preparing its report and making recommendations. President Bush has pledged U.S. support for the 

development of Afghanistan’s security forces. We are encouraging the international 

community to assist with the large amount of resources needed for demobilization, 

training, and professionalization of the military. We have stressed to the AIA that 

it needs to focus on a modest force configuration, with a broad-based ethnic mix. 

ISAF is currently training a battalion to provide static security for the government 

in Kabul. CENTCOM is poised to begin training additional battalions. 

Regular and reliable payment of Afghan military salaries—both to those currently 

under arms and to those that will form a new national army—is important. Failure 

to provide for regular military salary payments would enhance the threat of civil 

disorder and endanger efforts to build a new Afghan national army. 

The AIA has a limited capacity to pay military salaries due to donor funding constraints and a lack of internal resources. To ensure the AIA has the ability to establish an effective new Afghan army, an appropriate, reliable way must be found to 

pay the salaries of military personnel of that army. 

POLICE

Ensuring the domestic stability needed for long-term recovery requires as well a 

professional police force. The AIA has indicated its intention to develop a national 

26

police force, and Germany has agreed to take the lead on organizing international 

police assistance to the Afghan authorities. The United States recently sent a team 

to Kabul to assess the state of the police and examine from the US perspective what 

assistance we can best provide in coordination with the Germans and other donors. 

RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION

The administration views reconstruction of Afghanistan as a continuation of our 

campaign against terrorism. Our military campaign is succeeding. These successes 

can be fully consolidated only if the international community, working with Afghan 

authorities, supports a recovery and reconstruction plan that stabilizes Afghanistan 

and help prevent it from again becoming a haven for terrorists and drug traffickers. 

Our commitment to assist the people of Afghanistan has been long-standing and 

firm. Even before September 11, we were by far the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to Afghans; in FY 2001, we provided $183 million in aid. Thus far 

in FY 2002 we have given $240 million. The U.S. channels the majority of its humanitarian assistance through U.N. agencies, such as the World Food Program and 

the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. We also work directly with several large 

non-governmental organizations. 

Our first priority has been the stabilization of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, famine in Afghanistan has been averted, in 

large part due to the heavy infusion of U.S. food aid. 

While we will continue to provide humanitarian assistance, we have begun to implement recovery and reconstruction programs with a focus on quick impact, employment-generating projects. Our reconstruction focus in Afghanistan will be on agriculture and rural development, demining, education, and health care. 

THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT

The United States took the lead in focusing the international community’s attention on Afghanistan’s reconstruction needs. We knew we could not and should not 

do this alone and immediately set about finding partners. 

As co-host with Japan of the November 2001 Senior-Level Afghanistan Reconstruction Conference in Washington, we kicked off the planning effort for Afghanistan’s recovery by inviting the major donor countries. At that time, the EU and 

Saudi Arabia agreed to join us as co-chairs of a Steering Group that would help coordinate international engagement in Afghanistan. Together, in a series of almost 

daily conference calls linking officials in Washington, Riyadh, Tokyo, Brussels, and 

later Madrid (once Spain assumed the EU Presidency), as well as during a planning 

meeting in Brussels in December, we worked out plans for the January Afghanistan 

Conference on Reconstruction Assistance in Tokyo. We also encouraged the World 

Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the Asian Development Bank 

to prepare an urgent needs assessment. 

This exhaustive preparation was critical. We were gratified at the success of the 

Tokyo conference, in large part due to excellent cooperation and coordination among 

the co-chairs. The $1.8 billion in first year pledges exceeded our expectations. It exceeded needs assessment estimates of the UNDP, World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. Multi-year pledges totaled $4.5 billion. 

In Tokyo, the United States pledged $297 million for the first year of the reconstruction effort. This pledge represents previously appropriated and authorized 

funds. We intend to continue to make substantial contributions in future years. 

The international community also formalized an organizational plan for implementing Afghanistan’s reconstruction. The conference established a Steering Group 

consisting of the 62 countries that met in Tokyo, with the United States, Japan, the 

European Union, and Saudi Arabia as co-chairs to provide policy guidance for the 

reconstruction effort. An Implementation Group, with the AIA as Chair and the 

World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Afghan Support Group, and the United Nations Development Program as co-chairs, 

was to coordinate the implementation of reconstruction on the ground. The Afghan 

Support Group remained responsible for coordination of humanitarian assistance. 

We continue to collaborate closely with our Steering Group co-chairs to monitor 

the reconstruction response and to develop ideas to address problems, including 

through regular conference calls involving multiple agencies from all the co-chair 

governments. We also work with the international financial institutions, the development banks, the United Nations. These organizations have played a key role in 

providing us with detailed assessments of Afghanistan’s needs and will be key players in successfully addressing those needs. Afghan reconstruction is truly an exercise of global scope. 

27

KEY RECONSTRUCTION ISSUES

Although the Tokyo conference was a good beginning to the reconstruction effort, 

many obstacles remain as we go forward. The AIA, the Administration, and the 

other Steering Group co-chairs have been concerned that reconstruction is not moving fast enough. There are inherent limitations, however, on the speed with which 

assistance programs can be implemented, such as:

• The uncertain security situation in many parts of the country is a major obstacle to the delivery of reconstruction assistance.

• We need to enhance the capacity of Afghanistan and the AIA to absorb the 

reconstruction effort. We are actively exploring with the UN and other international partners ways of strengthening the AIA’s administrative and bureaucratic capacity.

• It is essential resources be used in an accountable and transparent manner. 

Secretary Powell raised this issue with Chairman Karzai in Kabul, and he 

made a clear commitment that it was one of his priorities too. Nonetheless, 

we will remain vigilant and establish monitoring systems to guard against 

waste and malfeasance.

I would also like to make some additional observations regarding our assistance 

programs in Afghanistan:

• The United States and other Steering Group co-chairs agree that we need to 

make sure the reconstruction effort is used to politically strengthen the AIA 

and its legitimate successor, and advance the Bonn process. Assistance for regions and provinces and local communities should be used as a carrot to influence them to support the AIA and the Bonn process.

• Counternarcotics must be an important part of our assistance in Afghanistan. 

We will work with the UN, bilaterally, and with other donor countries to 

strengthen counternarcotics efforts, which will include alternative crop assistance.

• The bulk of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan is through USAID. About $200 

million in USAID programs are currently being implemented or will be implemented in the next few weeks. Mr. Natsios will provide you more detail on 

these programs, but let me say that our focus is on projects that are visible 

and create immediate employment and generate incomes.

• Return of displaced Afghans, whether they be in neighboring countries or 

within Afghanistan, will be an important gauge of progress, and will require 

significant international assistance. The State Department’s refugee account 

is prepared to support the reintegration of those refugees and displaced persons who choose to return home this year, and to assist communities in absorbing returnees back into their populations.

• It is vitally important that our efforts be coordinated with the AIA, the UN, 

and other donor countries and organizations to avoid duplication and gaps. 

To date our coordination has been exemplary.

• Looking ahead, we will come to the Congress for additional funding for Afghanistan. The process of establishing an effective and broad-based central 

government, managing a credible political process, enhancing the security situation, implementing counterterrorism and counternarcotics programs, demobilizing tens of thousands of troops, and supporting a return to economic 

stability is going to require significant resources.

• Some recent reports suggest that the drought in Afghanistan continues to be 

severe. As a result, the humanitarian assistance effort will continue longer 

than had been expected, and this may slow down the pace at which recovery 

can move forward. 

NARCOTICS

Working with the international community, the United States will offer strong 

support for Afghanistan’s policy to ban opium cultivation, processing and trafficking. 

We are concerned at initial reports that Afghan farmers have planted a substantial 

crop of opium poppy, which will mature for harvest in April and May. Unless action 

is taken in the next few months, Afghanistan is poised once again to become the 

world’s leading producer of illicit opiates. 

We are working actively with our G–8 partners to develop diplomatic and operational strategies to counter the Spring 2002 opium harvest in Afghanistan. We are 

working with the international community through the UNDCP to encourage the 

28

AIA to make eradication of the spring opium crop one of their top priorities, and 

to develop an effective counternarcotics capability within the AIA. At the same time, 

we are working with the AIA on developing employment generation projects in 

poppy growing areas, and on funding alternative crop and farmer input programs 

in poppy growing areas. A difficult security situation and the absence of effective 

law enforcement in the rural areas are complicating our efforts. 

BUILDING AIA CAPACITY

Much of what we hope to see happen in Afghanistan depends on the AIA and its 

successors being able to establish effective government. Yet reports from the field 

indicate AIA lacks the capacity at this time to engage fully with the international 

donor community on the reconstruction effort. It lacks equipment (e.g., phones, computers, pencils, paper), well-trained people, and technical assistance. 

We are working with our reconstruction partners, particularly the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group co-chairs, to address this gap. We have asked UNDP to 

reorganize the activities of their Fund for start up and recurrent costs. UNDP has 

focused on paying civil service salaries; we have urged them to shift some resources 

to capacity building. 

In addition, USAID has begun planning a mission to assess Afghan Ministerial 

capacity needs. This mission should give us a well defined idea of what the ministries need so we can gauge and plan the appropriate response. The study will also 

help us focus other donors on this issue, and help us generate resources from them. 

We will continue to work with the UN and the AIA to explore innovative ways of 

strengthening the AIA’s capacity. 

AIA OPERATING NEEDS

Another key issue is the short-term operating needs of the AIA. Before it fled 

Kabul and other cities, the Taliban looted the central bank vault, leaving no funds 

for AIA operations. As noted, government ministries had to start operations without 

even the most rudimentary supplies and equipment. 

Donors established a trust fund in the UNDP to assist with the short term operating needs of the AIA. To date donors have pledged about $37 million, and provided about $27 million to this trust fund. This money has been spent primarily for 

the salaries of civil servants. SRSG Brahimi has asked donors to increase the funding to $50 million. We have provided $4 million for this trust fund and have urged 

others to donate generously. 

On a separate track, the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury have worked aggressively to unblock over $240 million in gold and cash of the 

Afghan Central Bank at U.S. financial institutions. While the bulk of the unblocked 

Afghan deposits will likely remain in the U.S. as reserves (e.g., $195 million in 

gold), about $47 million in cash is available for the AIA to access and use now. We 

have spoken at length with AIA officials, and together we have developed procedures allowing access while ensuring that only the appropriate AIA officials can 

withdraw funds. The Afghan Central Bank also has considerable assets in other 

countries. We have worked with governments holding assets and the AIA to ensure 

those funds are unblocked as soon as possible. We have helped AIA receive its escrow overflight fees from IATA. 

INTERNAL COORDINATION

An effort as ambitious and complicated as Afghan reconstruction requires remarkably intensive coordination internationally and at home. The connections between 

the various levels of this enterprise—the security, humanitarian and developmental—cut across traditional bureaucratic lines. This requires people in a number 

of different parts of the US government—the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, USAID, the NSC and others—to talk frequently to make sure we’re all pointed 

in the same direction and that our plans, actions and words reinforce one another. 

The Secretary has named Ambassador James Dobbins as the coordinator to ensure 

this coherence. 

We have established a number of mechanisms to manage this constant dialogue. 

The interagency Policy Coordinating Committee on Development that I chair has a 

subgroup on Afghanistan chaired by our Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs 

that has met frequently—sometimes two or three times a week—since November. 

Officials on the security side have held daily secure video conferences in which we 

often discuss the relationship between security, reconstruction and humanitarian 

assistance. As a result, the interagency coordination has been close to ideal. 

29

STATUS OF EMBASSY

Obviously, our success will depend critically on our presence on the ground. Our 

embassy resumed operations in December. Charge ́ d’Affaires Ryan Crocker is leading our mission in Kabul. The Secretary visited our dedicated, enthusiastic staff in 

Kabul on January 17. Our staff is operating in very difficult conditions but we are 

doing everything possible to improve those conditions quickly. Many of your colleagues in Congress have visited Kabul and have seen first hand the difficult circumstances under which our Embassy personnel are operating. 

Currently, we have a relatively small number of State Department personnel in 

Kabul, which we expect to increase by about 40% by summer’s end. We have purchased modular housing units to accommodate our personnel and are planning 

chancery rehabilitation projects. We would, of course, be happy to provide, in a 

closed session or non-public report, any further details the Committee wishes to receive on a number of personnel and the housing and security arrangements for 

them. 

It goes without saying that our Embassy remains on the highest possible security 

alert in this critical threat environment. The 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade provides security for the chancery. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I want to say that the recovery and reconstruction of 

the country is an important Administration priority. The State Department and 

other U.S. agencies are working hard to achieve the President’s goals in Afghanistan. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Under Secretary. 

Before recognizing the Members for questions, I just want to say 

this is a perfect example of complicated and important legislation 

that we make a major effort, and a successful effort, in joining with 

the Democratic Members of the Committee and their staff because 

we understand and appreciate the need for bipartisanship on especially important foreign policy issues. 

That is not to say there are not disagreements and controversies, 

but I have never served on a Committee that has been more interested on both the Democratic and Republican side in reaching 

agreement on important legislation, because that is really the only 

way anything will get passed and get into law, and that is what 

we are here for. 

So I just want to pat ourselves on the back in a bipartisan way 

because it is very helpful. This legislation is important in that regard. 

And now, Mr. Gilman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Larson, do you see any significant restriction or earmarks in 

the Chairman’s bill? 

Mr. LARSON. Mr. Gilman, we are studying this very carefully, 

and we will be getting back with a full response to the various proposals in the bill. 

What I wanted to highlight in my brief remarks about flexibility 

was the fact that this is an extraordinarily fluid and complex situation, and I have noticed that so many of the Members who visited 

Afghanistan commented about this as well. 

So I am not commenting on any specific provision, but just wishing to underscore the need for flexibility of response as we move 

forward in this effort. 

Mr. GILMAN. Well, we certainly want to make certain there will 

be flexibility. We hope you will get back to us at an early date with 

your proposals. 

30

To both of our witnesses, what exactly are you planning to do to 

address the issues of the impending harvest of an opium crop in 

southern Afghanistan, as well as the impending selling of the summer crop in the northern areas? 

The Afghan government apparently does not have much jurisdiction in the south at this time. Are you prepared to work with the 

de facto authorities in the opium growing areas or are we going to 

wait until the Afghan interim authority has extended its full authority to those areas? 

Mr. NATSIOS. I can talk about the USAID strategy for dealing 

with this. 

We have learned a lot of lessons over the last 20 years, what 

works and what does not work. One thing you do need on the 

ground is order. If you do not have some degree of security on the 

ground, it is very difficult to run an anti-narcotics program in 

terms of the agricultural sector. 

Mr. GILMAN. Well, Mr. Natsios, who will be in charge of coordinating our assistance in that direction? 

Mr. NATSIOS. There is a UN agency that has some competence 

in this area which is setting up shop in Kabul. We have been having discussions with them at the field level about coordinating our 

anti-poppy activities with the Europeans who have a bigger interest, in fact, than we in that most of the heroin does not go the 

United States—it goes to Russia and western Europe. 

It is a serious problem. If you read Ahmed Rashid’s book called 

The Taliban, a good friend of mine, he notes that in 1990 there 

were 30,000 heroin addicts in Iran, 50,000 in Iraq—50,000 in Pakistan. There are now three million. In 10 years, three million addicts in Pakistan. It is catastrophic. 

I mentioned this to Chairman Karzai because I visited with him 

several times, once in Kabul, once here. I went on the plane with 

him when he came to Washington. He said it is also a very serious 

problem, heroin addiction, within Afghanistan itself. It has to be 

addressed. 

Mr. GILMAN. Well, because of that importance, who will be in 

charge out there in the field? 

Mr. NATSIOS. We cannot just do this alone. We need to do this 

internationally or we will be working at cross-purposes with other 

donors, and so we are relying on the UN coordination function that 

is being set up now to help us work together with the other donors. 

Mr. GILMAN. Who in the U.S. will be responsible? 

Mr. NATSIOS. The State Department. 

Mr. LARSON. Yes. 

Mr. GILMAN. Who? 

Mr. LARSON. Mr. Beers in the State Department is our coordinator on narcotics matters, and if I could just complement what 

Mr. Natsios said about what we have been doing. 

We are in very, very active discussions with the UN system and 

with a couple of key donors on immediate measures that we could 

take to address the crop in the ground. We are pleased that Chairman Karzai has not only made his pronouncement about banning 

poppy cultivation, but he and his administration have been in discussions with regional authorities about the importance of addressing this issue. 

31

The sorts of measures that we are considering are measures that 

would provide incentives to farmers to rip out this crop on their 

own, and we are prepared, Mr. Gilman, to come up and brief you 

and other Members of the Committee on this emerging plan as we 

are able to develop it further. 

Mr. GILMAN. Is there any reason why the DEA is not part of this 

planning and coordinating? 

Mr. LARSON. I am certainly open to considering any approach 

that works. But I think that what we want to do is make sure that 

we can operate through and with the assistance of the UN system, 

which has the presence on the ground that can help make these 

sort of efforts work. 

As Mr. Natsios has said and others have commented, we have to 

work within the security situation, and that makes it difficult to 

get to some of the regions where this poppy cultivation is a problem. And in that spirit, and recognizing that this is a crop that is 

going to be harvested within a couple of months, we are going to 

want to move very, very quickly. 

Mr. GILMAN. I hope——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. GILMAN. Just one last comment. 

I would hope that you would consider making the DEA part of 

your overall assessment for the program since they have such 

worldwide experience. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

leadership and the cooperation of yourself and your staff with our 

side. As you point out, this is too important an issue to be political 

about. 

Did I understand, Mr. Secretary, that you said that you would 

look at the bill and then get back to us with any suggestions you 

might have? 

I was under the impression from the notice to you, that both of 

you were to come here to talk to us about what the bill does. We 

are talking about spending maybe a billion dollars here, and we all 

know there is a problem. And we are trying to draft some serious 

legislation, and we are having you here as experts, and the people 

who are going to administer and oversee this. 

And to basically have you tell us that you are first going to look 

at the legislation—would you rather have us do just anything and 

then screw this up? If you want to have some input, this is the 

time, guys. 

Mr. LARSON. Mr. Ackerman, we take very seriously the legislation that has been drawn up. And as I said in my opening remarks, 

we see in the legislation a lot with which we agree. We think that 

the priorities that the Committee has identified and the emphasis 

on coordination, the emphasis on pulling together the various 

strands of what is a multifaceted effort are all things that we agree 

with. 

We think it is a serious proposal, and that therefore it needs a 

very, very serious intensive review. That is exactly what we have 

been engaged in. 

32

So I am prepared to give you some of our preliminary reactions, 

but we do not have a fully developed Administration position today. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. See, our responsibility is to do the specifics. We 

do not want to screw this up either, which is why we have asked 

you to comment on the legislation, because after we draft the legislation, and hopefully it becomes enacted into law with the President’s signature, we do not want to have somebody come back and 

say this is a failed policy because somebody drafted it wrong. To 

look at it after we do it is not helpful to us. We are talking about $950 million over 4 years. We do not break 

it down at all in here. Should we break it down? Do you have any 

comment or an opinion on that? Should we have a separate amount 

for reconstruction and a separate amount for humanitarian, or as 

we do with this particular version, lump it all together? 

Mr. LARSON. As I mentioned in an earlier remark, we do think 

that flexibility is a real virtue, given the fluidity of the situation 

in Afghanistan. For example, on the humanitarian effort, Mr. 

Natsios and I have both stressed in our written statements the importance of this effort as we go forward. It is hard to predict exactly how long and at what magnitude this humanitarian effort 

will need to continue. 

We obviously want to transition toward reconstruction, but the 

pace at which one will be able to do that is not something you can 

predict right now. And so I think having very strict breakdowns 

year by year is not something that would be helpful. 

Mr. NATSIOS. Congressman, if I could add to that. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Please. 

Mr. NATSIOS. In terms of disaggregating the relief from the reconstruction, I would urge you not to do that. The reason is we 

used to think, a dozen years ago, that there was sort of a finite 

quarterly movement from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction 

and then to long-term development. 

We know now that that is simply not the case. Sometimes humanitarian relief has to continue during the entire reconstruction 

period. Sometimes, if there is enough mortar in the society, we can 

end it very rapidly, which is what I prefer. In this particular case 

this drought is so severe that if there is another 12 months of this 

we will have to allocate more of the resources to keep people alive 

and to move them out of the areas where there is absolutely no 

water left. 

So I would urge you not to disaggregate it so we do have the 

flexibility to move funds——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I agree with flexibility, but you seem to be asking us to say that there is no guess. But we guessed at the amount 

of money, did we not? We said $950 million. We could have said 

850, we could have said two billion. Did we guess too little? Did 

we guess too much? Or did we guess just right? 

Mr. NATSIOS. We committed for this fiscal year $296 million in 

Tokyo. That was just this fiscal year. We have allocated money in 

our USAID budget for part of our work next year. There will be a 

supplemental budget that will be before the Congress in several 

weeks. I have seen parts of it, the final decisions have not been 

made on all of the decisions that affect this, but they affect all of 

the front line states——

33

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me try—let me try a different question. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I wish I had an answer, though. 

Chairman HYDE. Let me interject, if I may, by not coming to the 

defense of our witnesses, but they have only had 3 business days 

to study this bill. The viscosity of getting to the people who need 

to look at it to have input is, I guess, high. It takes time. More a 

pity that these things move slowly through the State Department 

to everyone who is entitled to have a piece of the action, and it all 

takes time. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I—— Chairman HYDE. So if we can communicate our sense of urgency, 

it might be helpful to you all. We do not mean to be critical, but 

it should not take too long to get this to the people who need to 

have some input. 

Mr. NATSIOS. Our staff is reviewing it, Mr. Chairman, right now. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I could just underscore what you have said, 

Mr. Chairman——

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. In highlighting the urgency of this 

and expressing a sympathy to the fact that we too on our side have 

only had 3 days to look at this legislation as well, but we have a 

responsibility to react to it and to help fashion it, and returning to 

you for some answers. 

So maybe we can hold another hearing, Mr. Chairman, when 

they have had a chance to look at this, so that we can ask these 

questions and they can actually comment on the legislation if they 

need more than this. 

Chairman HYDE. One way or other the questions will be answered, I am sure. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The sense of urgency that we are talking about today should underscore that the American people have to have a commitment to 

rebuilding Afghanistan at the same level of urgency and magnitude 

as our Government has had in fighting the military battle in Afghanistan. If we are to win the hearts and souls of the people of 

Afghanistan who have suffered so much on our behalf during the 

Cold War and suffered so much under the Taliban since then, we 

have to move forward not only in fighting the oppressors and the 

Taliban and the kooks that are in Afghanistan, but we have to 

have a commitment to making sure the lives of the people of Afghanistan are built up. And once we have that recognition by the 

Afghan people, at that point, I think, we will have accomplished a 

great thing for the cause of peace and also repaid a great debt that 

we owe the people of Afghanistan. 

With that said, I see three areas that are vitally important for 

us to be involved in. One is, and Mr. Gilman might have touched 

on this, we have to be involved, and as you did in your opening 

statement, mention political stability. 

This Loya Jirga has got to be successful in the coming months, 

and we have got to play a major role in helping the Afghan people 

establish the procedures they need to set up a government that will 

34

reflect their will and their desires; in other words, put the people 

of Afghanistan in control of their own destiny for the first time in 

a long time. The Loya Jirga, if it is going to be successful, has to 

have some resources from us. 

Second, we need to get involved in a big way in de-mining that 

country. It is a disgrace that the United States of America provided 

so many land mines to the people of Afghanistan to fight the Soviet 

Union, and then after the war we did not offer help to clear those 

land mines. Children are being blown up every day by land mines 

that we helped provide that country. There is no doubt, we must 

do the moral thing, and let us put some money into that. I would 

like to know how much we are putting into de-mining, and whether 

or not we are going to make the major commitment that is needed. 

And last of all, of course, Mr. Gilman has touched on this, if 

those poppies are harvested, there is going to be hundreds of millions of dollars that are going to exactly the wrong people, who will 

undermine the Loya Jirga, undermine democratic government, undermine all of the progress that we have made, and probably will 

undermine stability in Pakistan as well. 

So there is no excuse, gentlemen, today we have got to act, we 

have got to be partners with the people of Afghanistan, we have 

to help them de-mine, we have got to help them out on a successful 

strategy in the Loya Jirga to create stability in their country, and 

we have got to prevent the drug lords from becoming the dominant 

monetary force in that country, and that is what this is all about. 

Please feel free to comment. 

Mr. LARSON. First of all, Mr. Rohrabacher, I think we are totally 

in agreement on that, and as are other of the major partners in 

this reconstruction effort. The commitment to the political reform 

process is very, very strong, and all of the donors have made this 

clear in part by saying that their contributions are really contingent on the Bonn Agreements being implemented and on this Loya 

Jirga going forward in the creation of a representative government. 

We also take very seriously the importance of the de-mining effort, and we took the initiative for the United States in the margins 

of the Tokyo conference to hold a separate session, to organize donors who could work with us on the de-mining effort. 

Again, on the narcotics point, I think that Chairman Karzai himself has stressed that he recognizes their own strong interest in 

avoiding having the creation or the recreation of a narco-trafficking 

regime that would undercut the government. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, as you know, Chairman Karzai has 

very little power. 

Mr. LARSON. Right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. He does not have his own army. He is going 

to depend on the United States to be willing to use force, and our 

money, I might add. The King of Afghanistan mentioned a few 

days ago that he was disappointed that there was so much vigor 

on the part of the United States Government to fight the military 

fight, yet he had not seen much vigor and enthusiasm on the 

ground already in terms of rebuilding the country. 

Mr. LARSON. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that was a just criticism, and I understand it takes awhile to get these things going. But if we can so 

35

efficiently set up a military operation, it seems to me we could be 

a little more efficient in setting up the rebuilding operation. 

Mr. LARSON. Sure. 

Mr. NATSIOS. Mr. Chairman, if I could—— Mr. GILMAN. (Presiding) Yes, please. 

Mr. NATSIOS. There is a map here. You have a smaller version 

of it, Congressman, in your papers there from us. We did decide to 

put it in the form of a map so you can see by province what we 

are doing. 

We were given 167 million in aid in January. That was 2 months 

ago. Of the 167 million, 107 million, which is two-thirds of it, has 

already been signed into contracts and grants. The money is moving, and all of these activities are taking place as we speak in these 

provinces. The rest of the money will be spent in the next 2 

months. This, I have to tell you, is at speed we have never seen 

before in any reconstruction effort. So we are moving very rapidly. 

If you were on the ground on these remote areas, you would see 

these projects, and we do have photographs which we would be 

glad to provide you with. We are rebuilding a hospital in 

Kandahar, rebuilding a girl’s school in Mazar-e Sharif. We are 

building a cement factory—that was the first thing they asked 

for—in Kabul, which unfortunately one of our bombs hit. I am 

sorry to tell you that, but it did. 

If we can rebuild the cement factory, we can rebuild the country 

because that is the big factory that produces the cement to do all 

the reconstruction work. So, when I met with him in January, 

Chairman Karzai said please repair that immediately, and we are 

doing that. 

We have a whole series of grants that have gone in to begin the 

reconstruction of schools, of roads, of health clinics at the local 

level, and those literally are beginning now, so we are moving at 

a very rapid rate. I have to say I am very pleased as to how fast 

the staff of USAID has moved to get these things in place and get 

the money out the door. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am sorry I missed most of the testimony, so if I ask any questions that may be repetitive, just let me know, and I will get the 

answer. 

But I am concerned, and I think in the same vein of several of 

the questions that were asked and to make sure that we are getting the best bang for our buck. I understand that we pledged 300 

million, but only 100 million of that is in the form of new money. 

What we are going to do, and I think it is important for us, is to 

use the Japan strategy to build so that the country can become 

independent in and of itself again. 

So my question is, and I guess you have answered it in part, 

what are we doing to build the national institutions and to help 

structure capacity, which is what you were somewhat addressing 

now? 

My next question would be, you know, has any thought been 

given to what type of industries or enterprises that can sustain the 

economies of Afghanistan over the longer term? And what, if anyVerDate Feb 1 2002 16:37 Jun 12, 2002 Jkt 078205 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\031402\78205 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
36

thing, is the Administration doing to facilitate the exports of goods 

from Afghanistan to the United States or other parts of the world? 

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond to the 

Congressman’s very good question. 

USAID had a mission in the 60s and 70s, until the Soviet civil 

war started and we had to shut down and leave. One of our principal staff is Chris Brown, whose father was a chief of the USAID 

mission in Kabul in the 1970s. He went to high school there. He 

is now a foreign service officer with us, and he is the one that 

helped do this book project which I just talked about a few minutes 

ago. We are printing 9.7 million books. 

So we have staff who remember the old Afghani state and want 

to rebuild it so that we can bring back the great prosperity of the 

country. 

It is an agricultural society. Eighty percent of the people live in 

rural areas. Two-thirds of the people are either farmers or herders, 

and the rest are people who work off the rural economy by selling 

animal skins in the markets and that kind of thing. 

If we do not get the agricultural economy moving, there will be 

no economy. That is what the basis is. The cities rely on the agricultural produce to function. I actually saw the benefit of one of our 

big projects there when I was in Kabul in January. We saw some 

beautiful apples. I thought they had been imported, but they were 

from a USAID project 30 years ago. They were among the best apples I have ever seen in the developing world. They are still functioning, those orchards. 

The vineyards grow the best grapes and the best raisins. I might 

add they also used to have wineries. I asked several Afghans, I 

said I suppose in this country you would not have wines. They said 

we had elegant wines before the war, and we want to rebuild those 

wineries. I said that is probably something we probably cannot 

fund, but we will help you with the vineyards. 

The vineyards were vast. The Taliban destroyed them. But they 

did not kill the roots. And when I talk to agronomists who are 

crisscrossing the country now to invest in agricultural production 

programs, they are telling me most of the vineyards can be brought 

back. They have vast pomegranate groves, almond trees, quince 

trees. The amount of produce that was exported from Afghanistan 

before this chaos was enormous. It was a very rich agricultural 

country. We want to restore that. That is one of the central focuses 

of our program. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. And my last question then, do you see 

any opportunities starting to develop? We refer to model economy. 

I mean, develop certain skills so that in the world of today and the 

world of tomorrow they can be involved in a model economy, and 

their economy can grow. Are we doing anything to help in that 

area? 

Mr. NATSIOS. One of the things we need to do is work with the 

Afghan finance minister, which we are doing right now; they do not 

have a currency. They are making decisions now as to what they 

want to do. They had the afghani, but they have not printed any 

in many, many years. They need a currency. 

Also, they need a central bank. They do not have one. The 

Taliban left with the remaining gold in the central bank, what was 

37

left of it after all these years of destruction. They have to have a 

central bank or they cannot have a national economy. 

The ministries do not have the capacity to govern the country, 

and so Chairman Karzai and Ashran Ghani, a friend of mine, who 

is the chief advisor to Karzai, has come up with a list of things he 

would like us to do to strengthen the ministries. We are going 

through that list. We have been hiring contractors to come in and 

do what they can. For example, they do not have telephones in the 

ministries. They do not have heat. They do not have electricity. 

They do not have computers. Some people have computers, but the 

computers cannot talk to each other. 

We have to have all those things functional, and what we are 

doing now is designing a strategy with a contractor to come in and 

put all those things in place so that the ministry can actually do 

things. 

Now, all of these things we are doing, we are doing with the ministries. We are not doing things independently. I have told the 

NGOs and the UN if they want to work independently, they will 

get no money from us. We are there to support a stable, civilian 

government of competent people. 

I have to tell you, I am very impressed with the quality and the 

competence and the dedication and the honesty of the members of 

the cabinet that we have dealt with. Our mission director spent a 

lot of time working with them. He is very impressed. This is an unusually skilled group of people who are leading this interim government. We hope the government that comes out of the Loya Jirga 

will be as competent. We think it will be. 

So they are off to a good start. We now have to support them 

with this infrastructure so they can get their work done. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Afghanistan has seen over 3 years of drought, and the aqueducts, 

the water systems have all been destroyed by the Taliban. 

I had an opportunity when I was there in Bamiyan to see what 

had happened to a town that tried to stay non-aligned when the 

Taliban came in. There is one survivor who lost every member of 

his family, who showed us how they burned all the orchards, all 

the vineyards, and destroyed the system for infrastructure. There 

is no living thing in that town now. 

Congressman Rohrabacher and I come from an area in southern 

California with a high population of Afghan-Americans. Every 

month or so they hold a big rally. Dana Rohrabacher and I were 

just at one down in UCLA. 

We hear from Afghan-American bankers that one of their bankers has now gotten on a plane, collected the money, and gone back 

to Kabul. We also hear from Afghan-American civil engineers. 

Some of our top water people in this country are Afghans because 

they taught at the University of Kabul and fled here. They want 

to go back and rebuild Afghanistan. I would like to see the United 

States take advantage of Afghan-Americans who possess the very 

skills and the communication ability to do just that. So if they are 

willing to pick up and make great sacrifices for their homeland, 

even given the difficult conditions that they are going to have to 

38

live in over there, my question is, can we see that Afghan-Americans are given preference in great efforts in Afghanistan? Can we 

add to this legislation something that would give them the needed 

support because, in so doing, we would take a body of people who 

comprehend the society, who have the skills and are going to be 

able to communicate the values and probably help the new government? They are probably the only ones who are going to stay with 

it when the going gets tough over there in order to get the water 

systems back up, in order to get the banking system functioning. 

So let me get your response to that. I would really be interested 

in your response to us adding that into this legislation. 

Mr. LARSON. I am going to give a brief response and have Andrew comment on the specific aspect of this. 

We share your view, Mr. Royce, that this is a community that 

has a lot to offer, and we have met with them several times, and 

we have helped facilitate some meetings between representatives of 

this community and organizations like Ex-Im Bank and OPIC and 

the Trade and Development Administration (TDA) because we do 

see a continuum of cooperation that they can provide that ranges 

from technical assistance in the short run, just their physical presence working on projects over there, as well as beginning to develop some of the business ties that will become more important as 

time moves on. 

You had a very specific question that I think Andrew can answer. 

Mr. NATSIOS. We all support exactly what you say, Congressman. 

The question is how to do an operation so it works in a systemized 

way on a large scale. The Afghans are returning from Europe, Canada and the United States. The minister of construction, for example, was President of a very large construction company in Germany. He has returned to become the minister. 

Mr. ROYCE. A very small percentage. 

Mr. NATSIOS. Pardon me? 

Mr. ROYCE. A very small percentage at this point are returning. 

Mr. NATSIOS. Yes, very small percentage, but some very, very 

skilled people. 

Mr. ROYCE. Right. I would just like to see this—— Mr. NATSIOS. Expanded, and we have two ways to do that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Okay. 

Mr. NATSIOS. There is the International Organization for Migration (IOM). We have actually begun negotiation of a contract with 

them, the focus of which will be to bring people back because, if 

you bring them back and there is no place for them to live and 

there is no job, there is no way for them to work, no offices, there 

is going to be a problem. They will leave and come back here. 

And so IOM will work on that, and we have just had conversations last week with the Soros Foundation, which is interested in 

specifying that their private funding will be focused on exactly this 

issue. So we are going to work with them in the same way on the 

technical level, to specifically take these people and move them into 

different ministries and different disciplines. 

We have just dispatched a well known hydrologist from the 

United States to begin working with the ministry to bring some of 

the hydrologists in to do a national survey of the water situation, 

39

which is absolutely critical. If we do not do that, we may do the 

wrong thing, and we do not want to do that. 

So the hydrology part of it is, one, essential to the survival of the 

country, especially if there is another year of this; and, two, we do 

have two mechanisms in place, that will be in place shortly, they 

are not quite yet, they are in the middle of negotiations to systematically bring people back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Can you think of any preference concept that would 

maybe—— Mr. NATSIOS. Why do we not get language to you in the Committee that would—— Mr. ROYCE. That would be helpful to us. Yes. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Tancredo? 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I understand that there is a significantly large population, indigenous population in Afghanistan that is presently hook on opium, 

and especially women, we are told. 

First of all, is this a new phenomenon? Secondly, what do you 

think has caused it? And what, I guess, are we doing to try and 

stop this if it is there? 

Mr. NATSIOS. Let me just quote again what I had said earlier 

and expand a little bit. 

The preeminent work on Afghanistan in the nineties was by a 

Pakistani reporter from the Far Eastern Economic Review, Ahmed 

Rashid, a friend of mine, with his book The Taliban. He also just 

came out with a new book last month on Islamic Fundamentalists. 

I have not read it yet so I cannot commend it to you, but he is very 

able. 

He said in his book, and he did a lot of research on the issue, 

that the drug lords in the 1990s were given carte blanche by 

Taliban, and he says in the book they did it deliberately to poison 

the west and the neighboring countries who look out for their enemies. It was a deliberate strategy. 

The notion that they had a ban on poppy production is true, but 

they did not do it for health reasons, to stop the poppy production. 

They had produced so much opium that it was depressing the price 

of it in the market, and they wanted to jack the prices back up to 

make more money. That is why they put a ban on poppy production 

for 1 year, not for the sake of health and good governance or anything like that. 

There is a serious addiction problem in the country, but there are 

five and a half million addicts between just Pakistan and Iran, all 

of who became addicts in the 1990s. There was also no addiction 

prior to the 1990s, or very low levels of addiction according to what 

he has suggested. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Larson. 

Mr. LARSON. Yes, just very quickly. 

We are working with UNDCP on a proposal to reduce demand 

for illegal narcotics in Afghanistan, and we have been working with 

an entity called the Columbo Plan Drug Advisory Program to run 

narcotics demand reduction exercise throughout the Muslim world, 

and so these are two avenues that we want to pursue in tandem. 

40

Mr. TANCREDO. Let me then go immediately to that. The second 

point is that in terms of trying to actually stop the production in 

Afghanistan we have a model, but there is another place that we 

have worked and worked with the government very successfully, 

and that is Bolivia. What we did, along with the DEA, was go after 

the precursor chemicals. If we could in fact replicate that effort in 

Afghanistan—Bolivia has virtually stopped production because we 

were able to actually interdict and stop the precursor chemical 

which is necessary for the production of opium, one thing. 

Now, the problem is—well, I am not sure if it is a problem, but 

right now the DEA, as I understand it, is not involved in the effort 

to try and interdict any of the stuff coming into Afghanistan, and 

it needs to be. It really has the expertise. We have done it, and it 

can be done in Afghanistan. So please let me encourage you to 

think about, and not just think about, but to actually obtain the 

expertise of the DEA in our efforts to stop production in Afghanistan. 

Mr. LARSON. Congressman, we will certainly take that on board, 

and I wanted to assure you just quickly now that we already are 

working on border control programs on the Pakistan and Afghanistan border to address this precursor issue that you mentioned. 

Mr. TANCREDO. We understand and appreciate your efforts. It is 

just that I do not think the DEA is part of the plan yet and that 

is really important. They have the expertise so let us not reinvent 

this wheel. 

Mr. LARSON. Understand. 

Mr. NATSIOS. Congressman, if I could just add a couple of points. 

If you look at the textbooks, we passed four of them out, the textbooks, by the way, go from the back to the front, so what looks like 

the back is actually the front. It has writing on it. There are two 

cartoons on what look like the front. And the ministry of education—the minister of education insisted, along with Chairman 

Karzai, that we put those on before we publish the books. 

And what is says on it is one guy is eating fruit, he is healthy. 

The other guy is hooked on heroin on the back of these books, in 

pretty terrible condition. That will be on 9.7 million textbooks for 

every school child. 

I am not suggesting that is end of the opium trade. I am suggesting that the Afghans themselves are concerned enough about 

this that they insisted we alter the production of the book as its 

original book as a public service announcement. 

The second point is about the man who designed the USAID 

strategy in Latin America, particularly in Peru and Bolivia. It was 

successful on the development side, not on the enforcement side, on 

alternate crops. We transferred him——

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. 

Mr. NATSIOS [continuing]. Two weeks ago to design a strategy for 

Afghanistan. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I understand. 

Mr. NATSIOS. So he is working on that. 

Mr. TANCREDO. On the development side but not—— Mr. NATSIOS. On the development side. That is my job. I do not 

do enforcement. 

Mr. TANCREDO. All right, thank you. 

41

We should try to talk to McGraw-Hill about doing the same thing 

with our texts. Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

your testimony, and for what you are doing. You have a very big 

task ahead of you. 

I would like to associate myself with Mr. Royce about the importance of engaging the private sector. The non-governmental organizations of which we are the only ones left there, are doing a wonderful job. We visited them, the foundations, various aspects of the 

private sector, and explored sister relationships with institutions. 

These are very, very important since there is much work for everyone to do. 

None of this will be successful, however, unless we provide for 

safety and security in the country. And my questions are: What is 

your opinion about the current level of the international peacekeeping forces and their scope of mission? Are they sufficient to 

create a climate for reconstruction? 

What is the plan for providing assistance to the Afghans to provide for their own national defense force and national police force? 

And, what agency is going to take the lead on this? 

Mr. LARSON. Thank you, Congressman. 

We see a need for an extension in time of the mandate of ISAF, 

and I think that will be going forward. In addition, there is very 

active discussion about the expansion of the mandate geographically, and I think one can expect in a fairly short period of time 

to see some new developments on that as well. 

Mr. PITTS. Where are they now? 

Mr. LARSON. In Kabul. 

Mr. PITTS. That is it? 

Mr. LARSON. Yes. 

Mr. PITTS. I understood that. 

Mr. LARSON. Yes. 

Mr. PITTS. I just do not think most people understand that. Only 

in Kabul? 

Mr. LARSON. That is correct. That is correct. 

We are placing a high priority on supporting the efforts of the 

Afghan government to develop a national professional multi-ethnic 

army and a national professional multi-ethnic police force. 

On the police force, Germany has taken the lead on that internationally, which we support. They have a track record of involvement there. They built a capacity in the 60s and 70s, and they are 

in active discussions on getting their program started. We have 

also sent a team out to assess the needs for strengthening the police force, and we will be working very, very closely with the Germans on that, and that is being done out of the INL part of the 

State Department. 

On the national army, CENTCOM has just come back from a trip 

to assess the needs for training and equipping a national military 

force, and we will be assessing their recommendations, and looking 

forward, moving ahead with those efforts as quickly as we can. 

42

Mr. PITTS. Does the Administration intend to furnish support directly through ministries of the interim—or the government that is 

established? If so, what form and which ministries? 

Mr. NATSIOS. Do you mean for reconstruction or do you mean for 

the military? 

Mr. PITTS. No, I mean for reconstruction. I took your answer to 

be that we would help—— Mr. LARSON. Yes. 

Mr. PITTS [continuing]. With the military. 

Mr. LARSON. Yes. 

Mr. NATSIOS. We are working with the ministries, but at this 

point most of the ministries do not have the capacity. For example, 

there is no banking system. 

Mr. PITTS. I understand. 

Mr. NATSIOS. So how would we move monies into an account 

when there are no banks to move it into? The banks are in fact in 

the United States or neighboring countries. 

What we are working with them on is to create the capacity, reestablish the order of the civil service system so that in a year or 

two they will be able to take over much of the function. But right 

now it is a little early to do that. But all of the decisions we have 

made are made jointly. We are not doing anything independently, 

and our mission director and our Ambassador are spending a lot 

of time dealing with the ministries, Chairman Karzai, and Ashran 

Ghani, who is the Chief Advisor to the Chairman on reconstruction, 

who was with the World Bank for 20 years, a very, very skilled 

international civil servant, to work on this together. 

But right now it is a little premature, and they know that, and 

I said, do you want us—they said no, no, we just want to make 

sure we are making the decisions with you and not having these 

things be made, ignoring their interests, and that is what we are 

doing. 

Mr. PITTS. I think I have time for one more question. 

What about communications? You mentioned the Afghans cannot 

talk to each other. Have we sent over 500 cell phones so the government has the ability to communicate? Also have we sent a few 

towers to help them be able to communicate with their various 

ministries and their government around the country, or what are 

we doing in that regard that would help? 

Mr. NATSIOS. We are designing a contract now for a full array 

of services that will make the ministries functional in just a managerial sense. That will include computers that can talk to each 

other, that are connected to each other. It will include—they sent 

some desks in from Sweden, for example, which is nice, but there 

were under 100. You know, they have thousands of civil servants 

who have needs. Some of them are very skilled civil servants, I 

might add, who have stayed with this, who are from 20 years ago, 

and they are still in the ministries. They would like to work but 

because of the destruction over the last 20 years, they do not have 

a place to work in many cases. 

Mr. LARSON. I am sorry. If I could just add very quickly, Congressman, we see this as something we need to get others involved 

in as well. We have been working very closely with UNDP, and we 

will be organizing on the ground in Kabul next week a meeting of 

43

the core donors to talk about meeting these immediate capacity 

needs of the Afghan government, just to be able to operate effectively: Telephones, desks, computers and things of that sort, and to 

make sure that what we all do quickly, we do in a coordinated way. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Leach. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me express my appreciation for the leadership of both of you. 

Clearly, a lot of thought has gone into this issue. The question is 

can there be too much, and we are being tested, and we all know 

that in terms of both the military and military actions. 

I want to raise a couple of question on the sectorial aspects of 

society, one relates to demands. Very few societies can work economically if there is not an infrastructure of financial services. And 

what attention is USAID giving to that issue, or others? 

In particular, it is fairly self-evident that Afghanistan is a society 

that large institutions do not necessarily fit very well, and so one 

of the question is what are we doing on the issues that have been 

around for 20 years or so in the region, such as micro lending? 

And then from an American perspective relating to say Eastern 

European leadership 100 years ago in terms of cooperative lending, 

et cetera. And I express this because of the smallness of the communities and the lack of the relevancy of lots of the American kind 

of financial institutions at the highest levels. What attention is 

being given to this. Sectorially, what thinking is occurring within 

our Government on this subject? 

Mr. LARSON. Mr. Leach, I would like to make two quick comments and then Mr. Natsios is going to comment on what USAID 

is doing. 

One of the first steps that we took was to ask the World Bank 

and UNDP to begin a needs assessment of the country, and that 

has evolved into specific sector studies that they are leading. And 

they have had a number of teams in Afghanistan already, and 

more that are going very, very quickly to make sure that there are 

well thought-out sectorial plans that are developed in conjunction 

with the Afghan authority. 

On financing in particular, Mr. Natsios mentioned a little bit ago 

that one of the crucial issues they have to face is the selection of 

a currency, and the IMF is working very closely with the interim 

authority on basic financial issues like the establishment of a currency arrangement and the sort of preliminary steps that they need 

to take to have a functioning financial system. 

On our bilateral programs, Mr. Natsios will respond. 

Mr. NATSIOS. We have just completed a study which is for basically the southern and western half of the country. We interviewed 

750 people randomly in different social classes to find out what is 

really going on. I have to say I really did not understand the micro 

economic level. Why do people survive 4 years of drought and civil 

war and not have a famine? They should have had a famine 3 

years ago and they have not. We have never quite seen a coping 

and survival strategy this sophisticated or complicated or this successful before. I have never seen this and I have seen famines for 

13 years. 

44

They have the most elaborate, most sophisticated informal, informal banking sector, and system of any developing country in the 

world. And our staff has been astonished at the sophistication of 

it. They do not need any training in micro finance. All they need 

is more money in the system. 

We have given grants already last fall to some of the NGOs to 

begin micro lending, but it is to build on the existing structures 

that exist with high levels of accountability. But we do not have 

to train them in any respect. They are teaching us things. I have 

never seen anything quite like this before. We have surveyed people in the large cities: The only city we have not done now is in 

Mazar-e Sharif, and the person has gone up there to begin work 

in the northern half of the country to complete this survey data to 

give us a picture of what is really happening. 

In the areas we have done it already, which is more than twothirds of the country, 80 percent of the people are in debt, some 

of them heavily in debt. That is how they survived the things. They 

have borrowed money. They know people who are very wealthy and 

still have money, in a formal banking sector. They bought food and 

they survived. 

One of the problems we found, and I have never seen anything 

like this either, some of them are so heavily in debt that they cannot leave their houses without some money lenders coming in saying we want a little bit of money back now. And so their kids, their 

teenage children are supporting the families. We are seeing a very 

high portion of teenage children were the principal breadwinners 

in the urban areas, and it is attributable to this 80 percent debt 

level. 

So one of the things we are designing into our strategy, which 

we have had to expand based on this survey, is we need more jobs 

that will increase family income so they can pay off the debt and 

stabilize the economy. But their lending system helps them survive 

this chaos, and now we need to create a larger, more formal sector, 

which the banks, the World Bank will do, the Islamic Bank, and 

the International Monetary Fund, working with the finance ministry. Whatever help they need, we will certainly offer it. But they 

are taking the lead in that sector. 

But we are working in the informal sector at the local levels to 

get this debt thing under control because it is causing some dysfunction in the society. 

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the fact that the 

systems exist. I am not willing to think that this money lending 

system based on individuals historically worked very well. Often 

institutional arrangements are fairer to communities, so I want to 

repeat a suggestion, which is you might want to talk to people at 

the Credit Union National Association who have given advice to 

lots of different countries, and done lots of different studies on how 

to set up community-based lending institutions that move away 

from simply reliance on individuals making loans, and that may or 

may not be fitting in this society. But your description is not one 

that is exactly comforting. And so there are aspects that might be 

effective, but there are aspects that are also very discomforting. 

Finally, let me just ask one other sectorial issue, and that relates 

to health care to a degree. Obviously the overwhelming issue is the 

45

diseases that are so terrifying to the world’s society. What kinds of 

work are you doing in that area? 

Mr. NATSIOS. Let me just add one point to the last topic. We provide substantial funding to the Credit Union Association. We work 

with them all over the world. That network is primarily funded by 

USAID. So not only do we agree with it, we have funded it. We 

have had a long association with it, and I think, frankly, some of 

the officers who run it are former USAID officers, retired. We fully 

agree with you, and we intend to put that into—it is in the strategy. 

I did not mean to comfort you by my comments. I think it is very 

disturbing that 80 percent of the people are heavily in debt. I was 

trying to explain why they survive these horrendous situations in 

a way that was very surprising to us in terms of its sophistication. 

The health situation in Afghanistan is one of the worst we have 

ever seen anywhere in the world. They have the highest maternal 

mortality rate in the world. They have one of the two or three highest child mortality rates under 5 in the world. Twenty-five percent 

of the kids in the last survey died before they were 5. 

We do not know what the data is now because no survey was set 

up. We have just funded CDC to set up a surveillance system to 

tell us where the hot points, where the highest death rates are so 

that we can focus on it. We have done, I think, I think it is $7.5 

million worth of proposals we have funded in the last, just in the 

last few weeks to begin mass immunization campaigns through 

UNICEF, WHO, and the NGOs because we are really worried, 

given the levels of malnutrition, that we could have some measles 

epidemic which could wipe out huge numbers of kids. 

So the immunization campaign is just beginning now in the 

areas that we can work in. It is a terrible situation. The drought 

has made the water supply very dangerous to use because what is 

left is usually polluted water. And if people drink it and do not boil 

it first, you know what happens. The diarrhea problem is the worst 

killer right now for children. So we have a sanitation and water 

programs that have gone in place. 

If you see this chart here, there is a key that says which projects 

are water, which projects are sanitation, which are immunization 

programs by province. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank you, Mr. 

Leach. 

Gentlemen, I have just a few quick questions and if you do not 

belabor the responses we will try to get through very quickly. 

I did not get an answer to my earlier question about whether you 

were willing to work with the de facto authorities and deal with 

the drugs, or will we wait for the central government to establish 

an order? Could respond to that quickly? 

Mr. LARSON. We have tried the steps that we think are very 

strongly in our interest to provide our assistance in a way that 

strengthens the national or the interim authority and its successors. We have noted that the interim authority itself has been 

going out to regional leaders talking about the importance of suppressing this crop, and we are working on a plan which we are prepared to brief to you and other interested Members in more detail 

46

that would get after the crop in the ground by working through the 

interim authority. 

Mr. GILMAN. We would welcome receiving that any day. 

The opium crop, come April, will be ready for harvest. Does the 

Administration need any new authority to make certain the farmers are going to destroy their opium crops? 

Mr. LARSON. Mr. Gilman, I am not aware of any need for new 

authority. We do have this plan in the making which we will brief 

you on. If we identify any needs, obviously we will be very quick 

to tell you about them. 

Mr. GILMAN. And who is in charge of coordinating U.S. assistance efforts for Afghanistan? Who is the person? 

Mr. LARSON. The Secretary has asked Ambassador Jim Dobbins 

to coordinate both policy and reconstruction efforts on a day-to-day 

basis. And so Mr. Dobbins in the point person on this. I think what 

Mr. Natsios and I have been stressing in the remarks that we have 

been making is that there are many aspects to this, which we are 

trying very hard to pull together, and I think we are doing the best 

job I have ever seen in coordinating many different aspects of policy. 

Mr. Natsios has the responsibility of implementing our bilateral 

assistance programs. I have a team that has been working with me 

to try to make sure that the international organizations, the UN, 

the World Bank, the other development banks, as well as major donors are dovetailing their efforts with ours. And we have been involved in very, very frequent consultations with other major donors 

to make sure that we also stay in tandem, not just in the run up 

to donors conferences, but in the implementation period afterwards. 

Mr. GILMAN. Exactly what role will the coordinator play, and will 

he have a responsibility over assistance programs of the agencies 

other than the State Department and USAID? 

Mr. LARSON. The coordinator is responsible to the Secretary of 

State to make sure that this is working in the way it should, and 

to inform the Secretary and the President if there is any need for 

either resources or new approaches to make sure that our mission 

is successful. 

Mr. NATSIOS. If I could add, Mr. Chairman, the State Department has the lead. In the field the Ambassador does, and our mission director reports to the Ambassador and our office is next to 

him. And they have set up a database for all U.S. Government 

agencies. Before they can come into the country they must file a 

report on all of the initiatives they intend to take to make sure 

there is no overlap and no contradiction in strategy differences. 

So we have a database for all programs, because you have to receive country clearance to go into the country to Kabul. 

The second mechanism in place in terms of field coordination is 

an international system for exactly the same thing, to coordinate 

all donor assistance going into the country. In Islamabad, we are 

now working with the UN to transfer that database into the UN 

coordination unit that is being run by Nigel Fischer, who is the 

deputy to Mr. Brahimi, the head of the UN effort. That will be 

moved from Islamabad, where it has been functioning for some 

time now, into Kabul very shortly. We are paying for much of that 

47

and supporting that function in terms of international systems that 

coordinates at the field level. This is in Kabul itself. 

Mr. GILMAN. Just two last questions. Are the current levels of 

peacekeeping forces and the current scope of its mission sufficient 

to create a proper climate for reconstruction? 

Mr. LARSON. Well, again this is something that is under very, 

very active review—both the question of the time duration, the geographic expansion, and the size of the force and the resources needed. I signal that we are clearly intending to extend the duration, 

and I think we will be coming forward to the Congress with 

thoughts about the issue of expansion and the size of the force. 

Mr. GILMAN. And one last question. Which office or agency has 

the lead on supporting the Loya Jirga? 

Mr. NATSIOS. We have seconded who has done this before in 

other conflict situations at the request of the State Department. 

The Ambassador to the United Nations has the lead for this. It is 

a person experienced in this, and they are now working to set up 

the system in the field to brief villages as to how this process will 

work, making sure that logistics——

Mr. GILMAN. Who’s that person? 

Mr. NATSIOS. I can get you the name. I do not know the person 

personally. 

Mr. GILMAN. Would you let us know who that is? 

Mr. NATSIOS. Yes. 

Mr. GILMAN. This is a United States representative; is that correct? 

Mr. NATSIOS. This is an operational person, Mr. Chairman. This 

person is to make sure operationally this all happens. 

Mr. GILMAN. And he is in charge of the Loya Jirga? 

Mr. NATSIOS. No, he is not in charge of it. He is just a staff person. 

Mr. GILMAN. Yes. Who will be in charge to make sure that we 

are doing the right thing? 

Mr. LARSON. No, I——

Mr. GILMAN. Do you want to discuss this? 

Mr. LARSON. Yes. Let me just very quickly set the architecture. 

The United Nations, in the person of Mr. Brahimi, is the person 

that we collectively in the international community have asked to 

work with the Afghans to make sure there is a representative process politically, and that this Loya Jirga is successful. 

Within our own Government, Ambassador Dobbins and his team 

are the ones that are working with Mr. Brahimi and the United 

Nations as this process moves forward. 

Mr. GILMAN. Who in the U.S. Government will work with Mr. 

Brahimi? 

Mr. LARSON. That is what I just said. Ambassador Dobbins is the 

person that the Secretary has designated to coordinate on a dayto-day level all of our activities on the reconstruction. 

Mr. GILMAN. Ambassador Dobbins will be our man with the Loya 

Jirga? 

Mr. LARSON. He will be working with Ambassador Brahimi and 

the others that we collectively have asked to help the Afghan people organize this process of political reform and of the creation of 

a representative new government. 

48

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I want to thank you both for being here today. 

We thank you for your patience, and the Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

I want to thank Chairman Hyde for holding this important hearing on the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act. I also want to welcome our witnesses here today. 

Afghanistan and the Afghan people are at a critical crossroads in their survival. 

The country is being torn apart by the deadly manipulative interference of it neighbors and its warring ethnic groups, tribes, drug lords. Drought and fighting have 

caused a humanitarian crises that has left millions of Afghans with little hope and 

much despair. 

The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act attempts to help Afghans help themselves. 

It offers a mix of security, development, humanitarian and anti-narcotics assistance 

that will assist the Administration in its efforts to build a stable Afghanistan and 

a better future for the Afghan people. 

Mr. Chairman, in a little over a week the former King will be returning to Afghanistan to help bring together a Loya Jirga or Grand Assembly. His return and 

the Loya Jirga are important events for this Committee...both of which we can be 

proud of. Before September 11, this Committee had passed resolutions supporting 

the Loya Jirga and the King, and we brought together in this very room all the 

major Afghan factions to assist them in this effort. For many years Representative 

Rohrabacher has been at the forefront of this effort and I commend him for his vision and tenacity. 

The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act will help to bring all of our good work to 

fruition and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Last January in Kabul, Secretary Powell promised Chairman Karzai and the 

Afghani people that the United States would not abandon them. And I am pleased 

to see the International Relations Committee is looking for serious and long-term 

ways to help the Afghani people rebuild their war-ravaged country and rehabilitate 

their devastated society. 

Given its past record in the region, the United States owes it to the people of Afghanistan, the region, and the world to take the lead in the construction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. As we have seen, our past in Afghanistan has come back 

to haunt us in a very big way. It seems by our current behavior in Afghanistan and 

elsewhere, however, that our military and political leaders have yet to learn that 

important lesson. 

While the $297 million for FY 2002 pledged by the United States in Tokyo in January is an important first step, this amount is grossly inadequate. The United Nations estimates that at least $15 billion will be required over the next decade to rebuild Afghanistan. Given the nearly exclusive role of the U.S. military in the current war in Afghanistan, its superior economic capabilities relative to other donors, 

and its stated security and strategic concerns in the ongoing war against terrorism, 

the United States ought to pay its fair share. 

In addition, the Administration ought to seize the opportunities presented in Afghanistan to adopt a more multilateralist approach to its international dealings, 

particularly with the other ‘‘Six plus Two’’ countries, and hopefully moderate some 

of the caustic rhetoric that has done so much damage to the image of the United 

States in recent months. 

50

Our assistance to Afghanistan should begin first and foremost with a commitment 

to help clean up the mess we left there 13 years ago after we asked the Afghani 

people to help us fight our war against the Soviet Union, and the mess we are leaving now in the wake of our war against the Taliban and Al-Qaida. 

Many of us are concerned that U.S. interest in Afghanistan will be, if not shortlived, then certainly short-sighted. Already there are signs that despite the Administration’s noble rhetoric, U.S. concerns will in the long-term focus on security matters 

and economic interests. Sadly, recent meetings between the U.S. Ambassador to 

Pakistan and that country’s oil minister seem to suggest that there is more to this 

war than meets the eye. 

Human rights organizations have documented the many serious abuses committed 

by U.S.-backed anti-Taliban forces (Northern Alliance), including summary executions, looting, and the lawlessness that exists in many parts of the country. Meanwhile, according to Jane’s Intelligence Review, whereas by October 2001 ‘‘opium 

poppy cultivation has almost totally disappeared’’ in Taliban-controlled areas, ‘‘a rising tide of narcotics—both opium and the heroin refined from it’’ was pouring out 

of areas under the control of America’s new anti-Taliban allies, the Northern Alliance. 

In the name of political and strategic expediency, this Administration is greeting 

abuses committed by allied Afghan forces with a wink and a nod. If all this sounds 

familiar, it’s because we’ve been there before. Just as yesterday’s Mujahideen became today’s Taliban, today’s Northern Alliance may well become Afghanistan’s 

newest repressive government. We must not let our latest legacy in Afghanistan be 

that we helped the Afghan people to simply trade one set of oppressors for another. 

Human rights, rule of law,—especially helping to institutionalize an indigenous 

culture of tolerance, equality, and participation—must go beyond promises and rhetoric. Tangible support for these ideals and institutions is the surest way to guarantee Afghani, regional, and ultimately our own the long-term security interests. 

Let me also add that, as Congressman Rohrabacher has pointed out, the United 

States must also commit itself to helping rid Afghanistan of land mines we ourselves helped to lay down. Too many innocent, men, women, and children losing 

their lives and limbs as a result of these land mines; helping to remove them is the 

only decent thing to do. 

Meanwhile, in our current war, the United States must show that it is a responsible party and is prepared to right its own wrongs. There is no way to know exactly 

how many Afghani civilians have been killed, injured, or suffered property damage 

as result of U.S. bombing runs. But estimates run in the thousands. These hapless 

victims and their families have no political influence in Kabul and no lobbyists in 

Washington to take up their cause. But they do have a dedicated American aid 

worker named Marla Ruzicka. Ms. Ruzicka, a representative of Global Exchange, 

has worked tirelessly on behalf of Afghan civilian victims of U.S. bombing. She represents the other face of America—the one that shows that American values of justice and compassion have not been buried in the rubble of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, 

and Kandahar. 

By compensating these innocent and already embattled individuals and families 

for their losses, the United States would be sending a message that, when it comes 

to accountability, it practices what it preaches. Moreover, by living up to our own 

standards of respect for human rights, democracy, and freedom, we are demonstrating that the United States is prepared to lead in word as well as in deed. 

If we really want to win over the hearts and minds of people around the world, we 

ought to begin by showing people that, in addition to being feared, America is also 

worthy of being admired—something all the public diplomacy programs in the world 

cannot buy. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DARRELL E. ISSA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing, and Ambassador Natsios and 

Under Secretary Larson for taking time out of your busy schedules to testify before 

the Committee. 

Mr. Chairman, I am encouraged by the ‘‘Afghan Freedom Support Act,’’ which we 

are discussing today. The people of Afghanistan are living in conditions that are unimaginably desperate. Within the past two decades, the Afghani people have experienced droughts, famine, the occupation of a brutal Soviet military, a bloody civil 

war, and the fanatical misrule of a fundamentalist regime. The results have been 

devastating. The Soviet occupation left the country ravaged, with over two million 

people dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and over one million Afghan children 

51

who were born and raised in refugee camps outside the country. The Soviets also 

left the countryside littered with millions of landmines, in the process destroying Afghanistan’s agricultural capacity. After several years of chaotic and bloody civil war, 

the Taliban regime took power and systematically gutted Afghanistan’s judicial system, dismantled the economy, and brutalized the nation’s female population. With 

the Taliban deposed and the resulting uncertainty about the future, Afghanistan is 

clearly in need of help. 

This bill represents our nation’s interest in giving the Afghani people hope for a 

new life. It demonstrates that the war on terrorism does not involve only an assault 

on terrorism itself, but also on the seeds of terrorism, which are economic despair, 

poverty, and political oppression. Mr. Chairman, the fact that we are investing in 

the long-term development of Afghanistan, rather than simply walking away from 

the Afghani people’s plight, is a testament to the greatness of our nation and the 

compassion of our people. I hope that this legislation will serve as a model for our 

nation’s foreign assistance policy in the future. I look forward to the continued debate on the merits of this bill, and I thank the Chairman once again for providing 

the leadership to see that hope is restored to this broken region.

Æ