NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JING WANG, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 18-73480 

Agency No. A095-403-339 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 13, 2022**

San Francisco, California

Before: W. FLETCHER and KOH, Circuit Judges, and KANE,*** District Judge.

Jing Wang (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a 

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial by an 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the 

Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 17 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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immigration judge (“IJ”) of Petitioner’s application for a waiver of inadmissibility 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i). Petitioner also seeks review of the BIA’s decision 

affirming the IJ’s finding that Petitioner’s March 2002 asylum application was 

frivolous. We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. 

As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of Petitioner’s 

application for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i). In general, we 

lack “jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under 

section . . . 1182(i)” unless the petition for review raises “constitutional claims or 

questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D). Petitioner’s only argument 

regarding his application for a waiver of inadmissibility is that the IJ did not give 

sufficient weight to evidence that Petitioner’s wife would suffer extreme hardship 

if Petitioner were removed from the United States. Thus, because this argument 

does not raise a constitutional claim or question of law, we lack jurisdiction to 

review the agency’s decision regarding Petitioner’s application for a waiver of 

inadmissibility. See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“[T]he court cannot reconsider the discretionary, fact-based determination that 

petitioners failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship.” (citing Sarmadi v. INS, 

121 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997))). 

We now turn to the agency’s determination that Petitioner knowingly filed a 

frivolous asylum application. To determine that a petitioner filed a frivolous 
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asylum application, the agency “must make a specific finding that [the petitioner] 

deliberately fabricated a material element of the application.” Ahir v. Mukasey, 

527 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 2008). The agency must also find that the petitioner 

had “notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous application.” Id. at 917. 

The agency correctly determined that Petitioner fabricated material elements 

of his asylum application. A misrepresentation is material if it has a “natural 

tendency to influence the decisions of the [agency].” Forbes v. INS, 48 F.3d 439, 

442 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988)). 

Petitioner’s asylum application stated two fabricated bases for relief: (1) the 

Chinese government previously forced Petitioner’s wife to have an abortion; and 

(2) the Chinese government previously persecuted Petitioner for his membership in 

the Falun Gong social group. Petitioner repeated these fabricated bases for relief 

during his asylum interview. Petitioner later admitted to the agency, and now 

concedes on appeal, that his wife was never forced to have an abortion and that he 

is not a member of Falun Gong. Thus, because Petitioner’s misrepresentations 

could have caused the agency to grant Petitioner asylum, the agency correctly 

determined that these misrepresentations were material. See Tang v. Gonzales, 489 

F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “[v]ictims of coercive population 

planning policies, including those subjected to forced abortion,” are eligible for 

asylum); Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
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petitioner was likely to face persecution based on his membership in Falun Gong). 

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Petitioner 

received notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application. When 

Petitioner originally submitted the application, Petitioner signed the section that

described the consequences of filing a frivolous application. At both his 2002

asylum interview and his 2006 hearing before the IJ, Petitioner signed the 

application to confirm that he understood the contents of the application. 

Additionally, at his asylum interview, Petitioner signed a “Record of Applicant’s 

Oath During an Interview,” which described the consequences of filing a frivolous 

application. On each occasion, third parties attested that the documents had been 

explained to Petitioner in his native language. Under our precedent, this evidence 

is sufficient to support the agency’s finding that Petitioner had adequate notice. 

See Kulakchyan v. Holder, 730 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 

petitioner had adequate notice because her “application-preparer certified that the 

application was read to her in her native language, and a separate interpreter 

certified that she read the warnings to petitioner with regard to the ‘Record of 

Applicant’s Oath During an Interview’”). 

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.