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86–869PS 2003

NASA’S INTEGRATED SPACE

TRANSPORTATION PLAN AND

ORBITAL SPACE PLAN PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 8, 2003

Serial No. 108–18

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

JOE BARTON, Texas

KEN CALVERT, California

NICK SMITH, Michigan

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,

Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

CHRIS BELL, Texas

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

ZOE LOFGREN, California

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California

VACANCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

JOE BARTON, Texas

KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,

Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

CHRIS BELL, Texas

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director

ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member

RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member

KEN MONROE Professional Staff Member

CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member

RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member

TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

May 8, 2003

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee

on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ..................................................................................................................... 11

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12

Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Member, Subcommittee on Space

and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ....... 13

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14

Prepared Statement by Representative Tom Feeney, Member, Subcommittee

on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ..................................................................................................................... 15

Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 15

Panel:

Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19

Dr. Jerry Grey, Director of Aerospace and Science Policy, American Institute

of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29

Biography .......................................................................................................... 37

Mr. Dale D. Myers, President, Dale Myers and Associates

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 38

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 39

Biography .......................................................................................................... 44

Dr. Michael D. Griffin, President and Chief Operating Officer, IN-Q-TEL

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 45

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 46

Biography .......................................................................................................... 53

Discussion

Cancellation of ALT Access to Station ............................................................... 55

NASA Workforce Issues ....................................................................................... 57

Cancellation of X–38/CRV ................................................................................... 58

Ending the Shuttle Program ............................................................................... 63

ISS Crew Return Agreements ............................................................................. 65

Restart X–38/CRV ................................................................................................ 66

Marginal Cost of EELVs ...................................................................................... 73

Unmanned Shuttle ............................................................................................... 78

Page

IV

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration .......................................................................................... 84

Dr. Jerry Grey, Director of Aerospace and Science Policy, American Institute

of Aeronautics and Astronautics ......................................................................... 109

Mr. Dale D. Myers, President, Dale Myers and Associates ................................. 111

Dr. Michael D. Griffin, President and Chief Operating Officer, IN-Q-TEL ........ 113

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Letter to Ralph M. Hall, dated Jan. 15, 2003, from Charles T. Horner,

Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration .......................................................................................... 118

Letter to Sean O’Keefe, dated December 20, 2002, from Ralph M. Hall,

Ranking Democratic Member, and Bart Gordon, Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics ................................................... 119

Request For Cost Information On X–38/CRV and SLI Cost Estimates from

House Committee on Science, prepared by NASA Headquarters, Jan. 13,

2003 ....................................................................................................................... 120

Orbital Space Plane (OSP) Level II System Requirements Document (SRD) .... 216

(1)

NASA’S INTEGRATED SPACE TRANSPORTATION PLAN AND ORBITAL SPACE PLANE

PROGRAM

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:37 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

1The Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) consists of three elements: (1) The Space

Shuttle; (2) The Orbital Space Plane (OSP); and (3) Next Generation Launch Technologies

(NGLT). See chart in the Appendix. 2 NASA, CRV acquisition cost estimate, November 2002

3P.L. 108–7, H.Rpt. 108–10

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NASA’s Integrated Space

Transportation Plan and

Orbital Space Plane Program

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2003

10:30 A.M.–12:30 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

PURPOSE

The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold a hearing entitled NASA’s

Integrated Space Transportation Plan and Orbital Space Plane Program on Thursday, May 8th at 10:30 a.m. in 2318 Rayburn. The hearing will examine NASA’s proposed Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP)1 and plans for the Orbital Space

Plane (OSP). Topics will include the proposed ISTP architecture and OSP requirements, including NASA’s development strategy for the OSP, plans for risk reduction

and technology demonstrations, as well as the proposed schedule and total cost of

the OSP program.

BACKGROUND

Since the 1980s, NASA has struggled to develop a new launch system to provide

safe, routine, and less expensive access to space. Over the years, numerous concepts

have been studied, but few have made it beyond concept definition and none have

flown in space. In March 2001, NASA canceled the X–33 single-stage-to-orbit program and the X–34 technology demonstrator after spending $1.4 billion (not including $356 million spent by Lockheed on X–33). NASA concluded that the technical

barriers of the X–33 were too great and that the benefits of the X–34 did not justify

the cost. Last year, NASA canceled the X–38, a prototype of a Crew Return Vehicle

(CRV), because it was believed that a multi-purpose vehicle would be a better use

of its resources. NASA headquarters estimated costs for an X–38 vehicle and three

production CRVs in the range of $3 billion to $5 billion.2 NASA is continuing to

move forward with the X–37 flight demonstration as part of the OSP program, but

its value and relevance as a technology demonstrator for the OSP program is questionable because the on-orbit demonstration would not occur until after NASA made

its decision for full-scale development.

Last November, NASA submitted a budget amendment to its FY 2003 request to

restructure and refocus the ISTP. The budget amendment proposed to extend the

life of the Space Shuttle by creating a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), to

establish a program to develop an OSP for crew rescue and crew transportation to

Space Station, and to establish a technology program called the Next Generation

Launch Technology (NGLT) program. The budget amendment bolstered reserves on

the Space Station program, as recommended by the Young Commission.

Because the budget amendment was submitted late in the 107th Congress and because no hearings were held to review the proposal, Congress specifically stated in

the Omnibus appropriations report that the ‘‘funding level is not endorsed or denied,’’ but wanted to examine the details of the proposal, especially cost. The Omnibus bill did provide funding for the OSP at the requested level of $296 million for

FY 2003.3 Other than minor changes, NASA’s FY 2004 budget request reflects the

program proposed in the budget amendment. This is the first hearing held by any

committee on NASA’s ISTP and OSP plans.

4

Current Status of OSP

In January 2003, NASA finalized the OSP top-level requirements, known as the

Level 1 requirements. NASA divided these requirements into two parts: (1) the requirements for the crew rescue capability with a delivery date of 2010 (although the

need date is 2006 because the Russians complete their obligations for Soyuz crew

return capsules); and (2) the requirements for the crew transportation capability to

ISS and back with a delivery date of 2012. The complete Level 1 requirements are

provided in Appendix 3. NASA recently awarded three study contracts totaling $135 million: $45 million

each to Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and the Northrop Grumman/Orbital Sciences

team. NASA expects the contractors to perform technical engineering studies and

further refine the requirements. NASA will hold a System Requirements Review in

November 2003 and expects to make a decision on full-scale development by the end

of 2004. Key technical tradeoffs include: (1) one vehicle or a family of vehicles; (2)

a winged vehicle, lifting body, or capsule and; (3) entirely reusable, partially reusable, or expendable. The results of these tradeoffs will have a significant impact on

cost and schedule.

Apollo-style OSP Study

At the urging of several NASA Advisory Council (NAC) members, most notably

former Senator John Glenn, NASA enlisted a small group of distinguished aerospace

executives and system experts to assess the viability of using Apollo designs as a

jump-start toward satisfying the OSP Level 1 requirements. Mr. Dale Myers, a

former Deputy NASA Administrator and experienced manager from Apollo and

Shuttle, was a member of the Apollo OSP study team and will be a witness at the

hearing to present the findings of the team.

In short, the team unanimously concluded that an Apollo-derived crew rescue vehicle, with a four to six person crew, appears to have the potential of meeting most

of the OSP level 1 requirements for crew rescue, with the possible exception being

the requirement to transport an injured astronaut to definitive medical care within

24 hours. An Apollo derived crew transfer vehicle would also appear able to meet

most of the OSP Level 1 requirements for crew transfer with the addition of a service module for propulsion to rendezvous with the Space Station. The study team

concluded that the idea had sufficient merit to warrant a serious detailed study of

the performance, cost, and schedule for this approach as compared with other OSP

options. NASA does not plan to investigate the Apollo concept further, but is providing the study results to the contractors for their consideration.

OSP Schedule Acceleration Study

In addition to the Apollo study, NASA convened several in-house and contractor

teams to assess whether it was possible to accelerate the schedule for the OSP.

While the teams found limited potential for accelerating the schedule, up to possibly

two years, they agreed on several common themes, specifically to rely heavily on existing technology, narrow the design options early, set requirements and do not

change them, allow sufficient budget reserves to manage risk, and consider using

a single vehicle design for both the crew rescue and crew transfer functions. NASA

plans to incorporate the results of these studies into a revised (post-Columbia) Integrated Space Transportation Plan, due to be completed this summer.

KEY ISSUES

Vision for the Future?

NASA has yet to determine its goals for human spaceflight beyond Space Station.

Without long-term goals, it is very difficult to know how best to invest funds in developing a new space transportation system, and the agency runs the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past by building the system first and then deciding how they

want to use it later. While the ISTP is intended to fill a specific need for the Space

Station, such a large and long-term investment should be made in the context of

the agency’s long-term goals. A clear set of goals would provide the proper framework for making policy decisions and setting funding priorities.

Do We Need and Can We Afford Both Shuttle and OSP?

NASA defines the OSP as a ‘‘supplement’’ to the Space Shuttle, and in briefings

to staff, NASA has asserted that the Space Shuttle is required for the duration of

the International Space Station (ISS) program with or without OSP. However,

NASA has not substantially supported this argument. The ISTP plan calls for the

Space Shuttle to continue to operate at least until 2015 and possibly beyond 2020.

While plans for the Space Shuttle will certainly be examined again after the Columbia Accident Investigation Board reports, NASA has not made a compelling arguVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
5

ment that it needs both the Shuttle and an OSP, nor that it can afford building

and maintaining both systems. In addition, it is unclear to what degree NASA considered capabilities from the International Partners, such as Russian Soyuz capsules and Progress vehicles and the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV),

in deciding what capabilities the U.S. must develop.

How do Tech Demos Fit into OSP?

NASA proposes to spend approximately $750 million on technology demonstrations between 2003 and 2006. The projected budget for each of the three demonstration projects is provided in the Appendix. Major demonstrations include the X–37

space flight demonstrator, the Pad Abort Demonstration (PAD) to demonstrate crew

abort concepts on the launch pad, and the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART). All of these technology demonstrations were started

prior to the OSP program and, therefore, were not necessarily driven by the needs

of the OSP program. Since the OSP program has not yet progressed beyond establishing the Level 1 requirements, it is not clear that these are the highest priority

technologies to demonstrate and warrant the proposed $750 million investment.

What will OSP Cost?

NASA proposes to spend more than $4 billion on the OSP (including the technology demonstrations) between FY 2003 and FY 2008, but does not plan to field

the crew rescue capability until 2010 and the crew transportation capability until

2012. NASA has not provided an estimate for the cost to achieve each of these milestones or an estimate for the total cost of the program. Clearly, this is critical information for making any policy decision. NASA managers unofficially estimate the

total cost to be in the range of $9 to $13 billion, however this figure could grow dramatically and will be driven primarily by the complexity of the selected concept and

the amount of research and development NASA chooses to take on with the development of the OSP. Without a solid cost estimate the committee must decide whether

it has enough confidence in the plan to justify the $550 million requested for FY

2004.

Why did NASA Cancel Alternate Access to Station?

NASA proposes to eliminate the Alternate Access to Station (AAS) program later

this year despite the fact that the House Appropriations Committee reported out

strong language directing NASA to spend $62.7 million in FY 2003 on AAS to ‘‘demonstrate a near-term commercial ISS re-supply service.’’ NASA’s decision to cancel

AAS appears particularly short-sighted since the Space Station’s crew size is now

reduced from three to two because of the limited ability to deliver enough water,

food, and other supplies to support more than a two person crew while the Shuttle

is grounded. NASA’s FY 2004 budget request does not include the projected run-out

of $85 million for AAS included in the FY 2003 request. Some in industry have

highlighted that an architecture consisting of OSP and an Alternate Access capability for cargo delivery would obviate the need for the Space Shuttle entirely.

Why did NASA Cancel the X–38 Crew Return Vehicle Prototype?

Before NASA changed its program and submitted the budget amendment last November, NASA had an objective to provide a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV) capability

by 2012. NASA was pursuing a CRV prototype known as the X–38 program. The

X–38 performed several approach and landing demonstrations and could have provided an interim crew return capability for the ISS by 2006, but was canceled. On

June 13, 2002, NASA notified Congress of the project’s cancellation citing their desire to pursue a multipurpose vehicle, which could include both crew transport and

crew return capabilities as a more optimal use of NASA’s resources than pursuit of

a single-purpose vehicle, such as the X–38 project. After 2006 the Russians are not

required to provide any more Soyuz capsules and the U.S. is prohibited from purchasing Russian hardware because of the restrictions on doing so in the Iran NonProliferation Act of 2000. A key issue is whether NASA should re-examine its decision to cancel the X–38.

Are Expendable Launch Vehicles Acceptable for OSP?

The OSP will be launched on an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV), such as an

Atlas or Delta rocket. ELVs were used for the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs in the 1960s, however none of these programs had a winged vehicle on top

of the rocket as may be (but not necessarily) proposed on the OSP program. A key

issue is whether the use of ELVs poses an unacceptable risk for launching humans

into orbit. In addition, today’s ELVs cost approximately $150 million each, so the

cost of the launch vehicle combined with the cost of an OSP (amortized if it is reusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
6

able) could approach the cost per flight of the Shuttle, arguably in the neighborhood

of $500 million.

WITNESSES

The Honorable Frederick D. Gregory is the Deputy Administrator of NASA. He

serves as the Chief Operating Officer for the agency and reports directly to NASA’s

Administrator. Prior to his Senate confirmation in August 2002, Mr. Gregory served

as Associate Administrator for Space Flight, and for nine years as the Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. Mr. Gregory has logged over

455 hours in space as an astronaut, and has extensive experience as a test pilot,

and manager of flight safety programs and launch support operations.

Dr. Jerry Grey is the Director of Aerospace and Science Policy for AIAA, a member

of the Science Counsel of the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, and Visiting

Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University. Dr.

Grey has served as consultant to the U.S. Congress as Chairman of the Office of

Technology Assessment’s Solar Advisory Panel and several space advisory panels,

and as a member of the NASA Advisory Council, and Vice-chairman of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee.

The Honorable Dale D. Myers is the President of Dale Myers and Associates, and

has had a distinguished career in high-level management positions in government

and industry. Mr. Myers has served as NASA’s Deputy Administrator, and Associate

Administrator for Manned Space Flight; as Under Secretary of the U.S. Department

of Energy; as Vice President and Program Manager of the Space Shuttle Program

for Rockwell International; and prior to that as Vice President and Program Manager of the Apollo Command and Service Module for North American Rockwell. In

March of this year he led a team of experts tasked to assess the viability of using

Apollo heritage designs to satisfy the OSP requirements.

Dr. Michael Griffin is the President and Chief Operating Officer of In-Q-Tel. He

has nearly 30 years of experience managing information and space technology organizations. Dr. Griffin has served as Executive Vice President and CEO of Magellan

Systems Division of Orbital Sciences Corporation, and as EVP and General Manager

of Orbital’s Space Systems Group. Prior to that he served as both the Chief Engineer and Associate Administrator for Exploration at NASA, and at the Pentagon as

the Deputy for Technology of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

7

4 NASA, Justification for FY 2003 Budget Amendment, pg. 5.

Appendix 1

The table below summarizes the assumptions NASA has used when making space

transportation strategy decisions over the past decade, how they have changed, and

how they are now forecast in the revised ISTP.4

NASA studied the following options during the summer of 2002 during the development of the current ISTP:

• Baseline ISTP—Make the decision in 2006 to build a new RLV two-stage

booster and crew transfer vehicle to deliver crew and some cargo.

• Orbital Space Plane and delay RLV booster—Develop an Orbital Space Plane

by 2010–12 to be flown atop an existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle

(EELV) that must be human rated.

• Develop a Prototype RLV Booster by about 2011—Build a common RLV prototype booster with the Department of Defense. An operational booster would

come later.

• Breakthrough Technology—Continue to spend money on long-term, high payoff technology like hypersonic propulsion placing RLV on hold indefinitely.

NASA has decided to pursue the second option—Orbital Space Plane and delay

RLV booster. In the budget amendment submitted to Congress in November 2002,

NASA redirected the SLI program. SLI funds were transferred to the Orbital Space

Plane program, as well as the Space Shuttle, space station, and Next Generation

Launch Technology (NGLT) program.

8

9

10

Appendix 3

Orbital Space Plane Program Level 1 Requirements

1. The system, which may include multiple vehicles, shall provide rescue capability

for no fewer than four ISS crew as soon a practical but no later than 2010.

2. The system shall provide rescue capability that allows the safe return of

deconditioned, ill or injured crew members with ongoing treatment until arrival

at definitive medical care within 24 hours. Crew should not require suits in the

vehicle, but the vehicle should support crew wearing suits if the situation warrants.

3. The system for rescue shall provide for rapid separation from the ISS under

emergency conditions followed by return to Earth.

4. Safety requirements—system for crew rescue:

a. The availability (defined as ‘‘a full-up vehicle able to perform it’s mission’’)

for the escape mission shall be at least:

i. Objective: 99%

ii. Minimum Threshold: 95%

b. The risk of loss of crew shall be, with high confidence, lower than the Soyuz

for the rescue mission.

5. The system shall provide transportation capability for no fewer than four crew,

to and from the ISS as soon a practical, but no later than 2012.

6. Safety requirement—system for crew transport: The risk of loss of crew shall be,

with high confidence, lower than the Space Shuttle for the transport mission.

7. The system shall be designed for minimum life cycle cost.

8. The system shall meet all applicable ISS requirements for visiting and attached

vehicles.

9. Compared to the Space Shuttle, the system shall require less time to prepare and

execute a mission and have increased launch probability.

10. Compared to the Space Shuttle, the system shall have increased on-orbit maneuverability.

Orbital Space Plane Program Concept of Operations

1. The vehicle(s) shall initially launch on an ELV.

2. The system shall be operated through at least 2020. However, the system should

be designed so that I could be operated for a longer time.

3. NASA envisions that the systems for crew rescue and crew transport could be

different versions of the same vehicle design.

4. The system shall provide contingency capability for cargo delivery to or from the

ISS to support a minimal level of science.

5. The system shall support a nominal ISS crew rotation period of 4–6 months.

11

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. I hereby call this meeting of the

Space and Aeronautic Subcommittee to order. And without objection, the Chair will be granted authority to recess this committee

at any time. All right. Hearing no objection.

At today’s hearing, we will examine NASA’s Revised Integrated

Space Transportation Plan and the Orbital Space Plane. Given

NASA’s poor track record on space transportation programs, like

NASP, X–33, X–34, and more recently, SLI, and I think I supported every one of those programs, the American people have seen

little in return from the investment in these programs, unless—of

course, I am always willing to be corrected when I say something

like that. And so we see very little in return in terms of improving

our nation’s launch capabilities. And in light of these failures, or

at least non-successes, I welcoming—I am welcoming the restructuring of the Space Launch Initiative as a positive step toward

making good on the promise of cheap, reliable, and safe access to

space.

As we begin to peel back the layers of the onion, however, and

NASA’s proposed plan appears to be, perhaps, just another initiative that is long on promises and short on likely results. So let us

hear about it. That simply won’t cut it any more, and we have seen

this in the past, so let us discuss this and make sure that is not

going to happen.

In the wake of the Columbia tragedy, NASA continues to view

its space transportation requirements through a Space Shuttle

prism. For example, for the foreseeable future, NASA has only one

U.S.-controlled option for delivering cargo to the International

Space Station, and that is the Space Shuttle.

Just last weekend, we reduced the space station’s crew from

three to two, because NASA can not deliver enough water and food

to keep three people alive. Furthermore, we are now completely dependent on our European and Russian partners to deliver enough

supplies to maintain even this reduced crew. Unbelievably, NASA

is sticking by their plan to kill the Alternative Access to the Station program even when they are in the middle of—in a situation

like this. And they are hoping that the Shuttle’s return to flight

will solve this problem. Now that is, of course, until the next crisis

happens.

Something doesn’t make sense here. It just doesn’t make sense.

And that is what we want to find out today. Let us try to make

sense of this strategy. So further, let me note that NASA views the

Orbital Space Plane as merely a supplement to Shuttle, at least

that is what it appears. And it is unclear how NASA will pay to

develop the Orbital Space Plane while operating the Shuttle, which

we all know is a costly transportation system, let alone whether

NASA can afford to operate both the Orbital Space Plane and the

Shuttle at the same time.

Additionally, NASA has yet to provide a clear picture regarding

the strategy, schedule, and cost of the Orbital Space Plane. And let

me add that over the years, I have been supporting research

projects both in NASA and in the Air Force and in the DOD side

and NASA side that I would’ve expected something, at least a

schedule, that we could accept at this moment from all of the

12

money that has been put into that research. So we need to discuss

these things.

Some of us see the Orbital Space Plane and alternative cargo delivery capability as a potential path for an early phase-out of the

Space Shuttle that in order to save lives and money while maximizing the research potential of the Space Station. But—and considering the Challenger’s and the Columbia’s situation and the disasters we have had there, than maybe this makes sense. But NASA

has proposed a plan that offers little hope in this regard. Apparently NASA’s space transportation strategy continues to be all

things to all people, and we have got to pin that down today.

I have discussed these issues with well-informed individuals. I

had a personal discussion with Senator John Glenn, and I believe,

as many of these other experts believe, that NASA must give greater consideration to finding a viable near-term solution for our immediate space access challenges. NASA should not be spending

huge sums of money on an uncertain Orbital Space Plane design,

and we shouldn’t be depending exclusively on foreign partners for

ISS re-supply. So as Sean O’Keefe would say, ‘‘Hope is not a strategy. We need a clear and realistic plan that sets priorities and delivers results.’’ That is what happens when you testify. Sometimes

you get quoted back to yourself.

Post-Columbia realities demand that we reject a business-asusual approach. Today’s distinguished panel will help us focus our

attention on the barriers to achieving safe, reliable, and affordable

access to space.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANA ROHRABACHER

Today’s hearing will examine NASA’s revised Integrated Space Transportation

Plan and the Orbital Space Plane. Given NASA’s poor track record on space transportation programs like NASP, X–33, X–34, and more recently SLI, the American

people have seen little return from their investment in improving our nation’s

launch capabilities. In light of these failures, I welcomed the restructuring of the

Space Launch Initiative as a positive step towards making good on the promise of

cheap, reliable, and safe access to space. As we begin to peel back the layers, however, NASA’s proposed plan appears to be just another initiative that is long on

promises and short on likely results. That simply won’t cut it any more with this

subcommittee.

Even in the wake of the Columbia tragedy, NASA continues to view its space

transportation requirements through a Space Shuttle prism. For example, for the

foreseeable future, NASA has only one U.S.-controlled option for delivering cargo to

the ISS, and that is the Space Shuttle. Just last weekend we reduced the Space Station’s crew size from three astronauts to two because NASA cannot deliver enough

water and food to keep three people alive. Furthermore, we’re now completely dependent on our European and Russian partners to deliver enough supplies to maintain even this reduced crew. Unbelievably, NASA is sticking by their plan to kill

the Alternate Access to Station program, and hoping that the Shuttle’s return to

flight will solve this problem. . .that is until the next crisis.

Further, NASA views the Orbital Space Plane as merely a supplement to the

Shuttle. But it is unclear how NASA will pay to develop the Orbital Space Plane

while operating the Shuttle, let alone whether NASA can afford to operate both the

Orbital Space Plane and Shuttle at the same time. Additionally, NASA has yet to

provide a clear picture regarding the strategy, schedule, and costs for the Orbital

Space Plane.

Some of us see the Orbital Space Plane and alternative cargo delivery capability

as a potential path for early phase-out of the Space Shuttle in order to save lives

and money while maximizing the research potential of the Space Station. But

NASA’s proposed plan offers little hope in this regard. Apparently, NASA’s space

transportation strategy continues to be all things to all people.

13

I’ve discussed these issues with well-informed individuals like former Senator

John Glenn, and I believe, as they do, that NASA must give greater consideration

to finding viable, near-term solutions for our immediate space access challenges.

NASA should not be spending large sums of money on an uncertain Orbital Space

Plane design. We shouldn’t be depending exclusively on foreign partners for ISS resupply. As Sean O’Keefe would say: Hope is not a strategy. We need a clear and

realistic plan that sets priorities and delivers results.

Post-Columbia realities demand that we reject a business as usual approach. Today’s distinguished panel will help us focus our attention on the barriers to achieving safe, reliable, and affordable access to space.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And I would now like to see if Mr. Gordon, as our—would like to show us, perhaps—now just a note that

Mr. Gordon has been declared, officially now, the fastest member

of the United States Congress and—because he has won a marathon, something that—I challenged him to a surf contest. He would

not go along with that. So he won the marathon, and now we are

going to see just how fast he can be.

Mr. GORDON. Well, you want me to get my remarks over with

quickly, is that it, Mr. Chairman? Probably the quickest thing I

could do is say amen to your earlier remarks. I think you were

right on line.

Good morning, everyone. I would like to welcome the witnesses

to today’s hearing. I believe this hearing will be one of the most

important that the Subcommittee will hold this year. Last November, NASA proposed yet another redirection of its space transportation program. And it proposed to start up a new multi-billion dollar Orbital Space Plane project with price tags still to be determined. Those proposals would merit serious congressional scrutiny,

even in ordinary times, but these are not ordinary times.

In the aftermath of the Columbia accident, both Congress and

this Administration are going to have to make some tough decisions about NASA’s programs and priorities. While I think we can

not really make informed decisions about the Space Shuttle and

the Orbital Space Plane until we hear from the Gehman Board

later this year, we can start reviewing our options. I hope that this

hearing will help us to gather some of the information that we

need.

When NASA announced last November that it wanted to build

an Orbital Space Plane, I was skeptical, but willing to listen. I still

am. It seems to me that NASA has given us a solution, the Orbital

Space Plane, but it hasn’t yet given us a credible story on what the

problem is that we are trying to address. For example, the Administration canceled the Space Station Crew Return Vehicle Program

in 2001 in order to save money on the Space Station program. At

the time, Congress was told that the CRV fleet would have cost

about $1.3 billion, a figure supported by the Tom Young Task Force

and that the first vehicle could not have been ready—or could not

be ready—or could have been ready as early as 2006. That was

good, because the Shuttle—or rather the Russian commitment to

supply Soyuz CRVs expired also in 2006.

Now we are told that NASA wants to build the Orbital Space

Plane so it can serve as the space station’s CRV, but it won’t be

ready as a CRV until 2010, at best, and even a couple years later

for full capabilities, four years after it is needed. And NASA still—

and NASA will spend at least $4 billion on it over the next five

14

years, and perhaps two or three times more than that before the

OSP project is through.

That doesn’t sound like saving money to me. Instead, it looks like

NASA is trying to balance the Space Station books over the shortterm by shifting the costs of the CRV out into the future and making those costs a lot bigger than they otherwise would be.

NASA has also said they want to build the OSP to supplement

but not replace the Space Station—or the Space Shuttle for crew

transfer to and from Space Station, but not until another decade

has past. Well, that is the answer to a question that we are not

asking. Among the questions that we do need to ask—that we do

need answered are the following: will we have to phase-out the

Space Shuttle in the near future or can, and should we—should it

be flown for another 20 years; if a decision is made to phase-out

the Shuttle, what space transportation system should be built that

will best support the Space Station over the operational lifetime;

and what space transportation system will best support NASA’s future space exploration goals?

I think that the burden of proof has to be on NASA to convince

us that its latest space transportation plan addresses these important questions.

Well, we have a lot to talk about today, so again, I welcome our

witnesses and look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BART GORDON

Good morning. I’d like to welcome all of the witnesses to today’s hearing. I believe

that this hearing will be one of the most important that the Subcommittee will hold

this year.

Last November, NASA proposed yet another redirection of its space transportation

program. And it proposed to start up a new, multi-billion dollar Orbital Space Plane

project—with a price tag that is still ‘‘TBD.’’ Those proposals would merit serious

Congressional scrutiny even in ordinary times. But these aren’t ordinary times.

In the aftermath of the Columbia accident, both Congress and this Administration

are going to have to make some tough decisions about NASA’s programs and priorities. While I think we can’t really make informed decisions about the Space Shuttle

and the Orbital Space Plane until we hear from the Gehman Board later this year,

we can start reviewing our options.

I hope that this hearing will help us gather some of the information we will need.

When NASA announced last November that it wanted to build an Orbital Space

Plane, I was skeptical, but willing to listen. I still am.

It seems to me that NASA has given us a solution—the Orbital Space Plane—

but it hasn’t yet given us a credible story on what the problem is that they are trying to address. For example, the Administration canceled the Space Station’s Crew

Return Vehicle program in 2001 in order to save money on the Space Station program. At the time, Congress was told that the CRV fleet would have cost about $1.3

billion—a figure supported by the Tom Young Task Force—and that the first vehicle

could have been ready as early as 2006. That was good, because the Russian commitment to supply Soyuz CRVs expires in 2006. Now we are told that NASA wants

to build the Orbital Space Plane is so it can serve as the Space Station’s

CRV.. . .But it won’t be ready until 2010—four years after it is needed. . .and

NASA will spend at least $4 billion on it over the next five years—and perhaps two

to three times more than that before the OSP project is through.

That doesn’t sound like saving money to me. Instead it looks as though NASA is

trying to balance the Space Station books over the short-term by shifting the costs

of the CRV out into the future—and making those costs a lot bigger than they otherwise would have been. That’s not my idea of good financial management.

NASA has also said that they want to build the OSP to supplement—but not replace—the Space Shuttle for crew transfer to and from the Space Station, but not

until another decade has passed. Well, that’s the answer to a question we’re not

asking.. . . Among the questions that we do need answered are the following:

15

• Will we have to phase out the Space Shuttle in the near future, or can and

should it be flown for another 20 years?

• If a decision is made to phase out the Shuttle, what space transportation system should we build that will best support the Space Station over its operational lifetime?

• And what space transportation system will best support NASA’s future space

exploration goals?

I think that the burden of proof has to be on NASA to convince us that its latest

space transportation plan addresses those important questions.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for that very

provocative statement and again, you have made some points that

are really important. Without objection, the opening statement of

all of the Members will be put into the written record so we can

get right to the testimony. And hearing no objection, so ordered. I

would also ask unanimous consent to insert at the appropriate

place in the record the background memorandum prepared by the

majority staff at this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feeney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE TOM FEENEY

The loss of Columbia has prompted a worthwhile discussion about how to pursue

a rigorous but sustainable strategy for manned space flight and exploration. In particular, NASA must look beyond its reliance on a single, complex vehicle for space

access. Accordingly, in its strategic plan issued before February 1, 2003, NASA proposed an Integrated Space Transportation Plan.

So far so good. But the devil is in the details, which remain sketchy at best. Congress can’t fund an Integrated Space Transportation Plan unless it receives a measured, detailed, and well-conceived plan. Broad concepts won’t suffice.

Furthermore, NASA has a legacy of delivering paper and PowerPoint presentations and not operational vehicles. In the private sector, a business must eventually deliver a tangible good or service. Similar accountability must apply to the public sector. In its quest to place Americans on the moon, NASA consistently delivered

and flew Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo vehicles. NASA needs to repeat this legacy

of accomplishment that goes beyond keeping paper mills operating at capacity.

This paucity of details and NASA’s track record of undelivered promises provides

fuel for considerable frustration. So today’s hearing will probably feature a free and

candid discussion. Although I will politely disagree with some of the expressed sentiments, I also note that this subcommittee is united in our strong desire and support for a vigorous manned space program.

The Space Shuttle provides the only near-term means to transport the segments

and personnel needed to complete construction of the International Space Station

and then the supplies, equipment, and personnel needed to fully utilize the completed station. Thus, NASA must promptly yet prudently return the Shuttle to

flight.

But simultaneously, NASA must flesh out the details behind its Integrated Space

Transportation Plan and then get to the business of delivering an operational vehicle as expeditiously as possible.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for calling this hearing, which is a needed follow-up to our interactions

with NASA and Administrator O’Keefe last Congress. I am glad to see some fresh

faces before us today. My statement and my questions will likely be almost identical

to those I have been making for years. I hope that we will start getting some more

insightful answers about the mission and vision of NASA for the 21st Century, and

beyond.

I would like to thank our panel of experts for taking the time to come share their

ideas with us. I would like to offer a special welcome to Deputy Administrator Frederick Gregory, confirmed in August of last year. Mr. Gregory, I am sure that with

your vast experience as an astronaut and in service on Safety and Mission AssurVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
16

ance issues, you will be a great asset to the NASA leadership. I look forward to

hearing your personal views on the future of the NASA mission.

I think everyone here knows my passion for NASA and all of the exciting work

they do. NASA plays many roles, and means so much to America today. NASA is

a source of dreams for our young and old alike. It provides insights into the origins

and destiny, and wonder, of our universe. On the way to this noble goal, NASA develops innovations that spur on our economy and keep us on the cutting edge of

technology. NASA inspires young engineers and scientists to push their minds to

new levels of excellence.

The tragedy aboard the Space Shuttle Columbia has hit this entire nation hard—

especially those of us from Houston, the home of Johnson Space Center, and us here

in the Science Committee who have made Space exploration such a part of our own

lives. I think we all feel that NASA is truly an integral part of the future of the

United States. We are being patient, as Admiral Gehman and the C.A.I.B. are doing

the painstaking and meticulous work of unraveling the mystery of the Columbia disaster; however, I am also looking forward to seeing NASA moving forward—soon.

That is exactly why I am deeply troubled by the direction this important program

in taking. I do not want to see NASA become an exhibit in museums and history

books, instead of being the leader in technology and exploration that it should be.

At NASA recently, there seems to be a fundamental disconnect between logic and

policy. I feel the underlying cause of this disconnect is the lack of a clear vision for

the future of NASA. Once that vision is created, once a mission is designed, I believe

that the needs to fulfill that mission will become much more obvious. As we decide

the needs, I am confident that American policy-makers, American scientists and engineers, and the American people will step up the plate and launch us into the next

millennium. The first step though, must be the vision.

Today we will hear about the Integrated Space and Transportation Plan and the

Orbital Space Plane Program. Obviously, we have two primary needs—carrying people into space and carrying cargo. The Space Shuttle has been able to do both, but

regardless of the outcome of the CAIB investigation, it seems that using the shuttle

until 2020—when its technology will turn about 50 years old—might not be the best

we can do. The ISS is now achieving functionality after billions of dollars of investments, and we are talking about staffing it with only two or three crew members.

Having such a magnificent facility going unused during sleeping hours for the twoperson crew seems absurd. Also we may be putting the astronauts at risk because

if one of them becomes sick, it may be impossible for the other to provide help while

performing all of the other necessary duties to keep the ISS running.

It seems that we are close to glory in space, but are just not demonstrating the

necessary commitment, and boldness. I want to hear what goals the ISS can

achieve, and how many people it would take to achieve those goals. Then we can

make an informed decision on what kind of vehicle we need to get them there, and

how best to bring them back in the case of an emergency.

If the Orbital Space Plane will not be up and running fully until 2012, and the

ISS is scheduled to end operations in 2016—is it worth the investment? I would

guess that it is, if it is going to be used for other purposes after the ISS is shut

down, or if the ISS lifetime is going to be extended. What will those other purposes

be, and what is the future of the ISS? I assume that since we are running it at

one-third capacity—there will be plenty of work left to do come 2016. Again, we

need a statement of purpose and of vision, from the Administrator, or it will be

nearly impossible to decide on the credibility of the OSP program.

I am looking for some thoughtful, creative strategies to get NASA back on track.

NASA has a challenging puzzle before it in designing the crew and cargo transport

systems of the future. But I am confident that rising to challenges is what NASA

does best.

Thank you.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And let me note before I introduce the

witnesses that I will be chairing this hearing today. But as usually

happens, here we are, we are complaining about the way other people organize their aspect of the Federal Government. I am a senior

Member of the International Relations Committee, and we are

marking up the most important bill of the International Relations

Committee, of course, our authorization of the State Department as

we speak today. So I will be having—I am sure I will be called out

once or twice to make sure I get to a rollcall vote over in that Committee. And I apologize to those of you who are here as witnesses.

17

I—and I really am very grateful for you to be here, but I have got

that responsibility, too, so that is why I am running back and forth.

And when I run out, I believe Mr. Calvert will be—Mr. Calvert

won’t be taking over for me. It won’t be Mr. Gordon. We are not

going to give it to him yet. Okay. One of my other colleagues will

be taking over during that time.

So we have a distinguished panel with us today to provide their

unique perspective to this critical, critical issue in terms of Space

Station and how—and our Crew Return Vehicles and how we are

going to get up and back. And so we have asked them to summarize their statements and their testimony into five minutes, if possible, and we would appreciate that very much.

Our first witness, Fred Gregory, is the Deputy Administrator of

NASA. He is well known to all of us, and we are very, very appreciative that he is here today. Mr. Gregory, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FREDERICK D. GREGORY,

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND

SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. GREGORY. Thank you very much, sir, Members of the Subcommittee. I always welcome an opportunity to appear and share

the plans and progresses that we are making toward our implementation of the NASA Integrated Space Transportation Plan and

the development of the Orbital Space Plane Program.

Mr. Chairman, before I start, though, I would like to thank the

Science Committee, and, in particular, recognize Chairman Boehlert for his leadership and support in introducing H.R. 1085, the

NASA Flexibility Act, which provides many of the human capital

provisions that we feel are critical in our ability to reconstitute and

reconfigure NASA’s work force. We are hopeful that this bill will

be enacted expeditiously this year.

Mr. Chairman, you requested that I would address a number of

topics related to ISTP and the Orbital Space Plane system, and I

have responded to those questions within the written testimony.

During my oral testimony, I would like to highlight several important points relative to the ISTP and OSP.

NASA’s updated ISTP plan was driven by NASA’s new vision

and mission and supported by a comprehensive series of studies

and reviews that determined a more beneficial course of action for

NASA affecting many of the agency’s major programs. These budget changes reflect the interrelationship and tight coupling among

our Space Station, our Space Shuttle, and the SLI programs to support breakthrough research in science and space. They were

achieved within our budget, enabling NASA’s overall program to be

responsible, credible, and compelling.

The ISTP program provides an integrated and systematic approach to our space transportation needs. The plan sustains the

Shuttle through at least the middle of the next decade, aggressively

pursues crews transport and rescue systems, called the OSP system, and continues the development of the technologies that will

enable future launch systems. This plan allows NASA in the near

future to ensure that the Station can achieve U.S. Core Complete

ready to accommodate the international partner modules and better addresses the scientific research priorities.

18

In addition, we have established the position of the NASA Space

Architect, reporting to me to ensure our integrated approach remains consistent within NASA’s vision and mission. Under the

leadership of the Space Architect, NASA is aggressively studying

long-term science and exploration goals to provide further guidance

that will better inform these critical decisions.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn my discussion to the

measurable progress we have made on the OSP program since releasing the updated ISTP plan in November of 2002 as part of the

fiscal year 2003 budget amendment. Within the OSP program, a

program office has been established and management of the program has a direct reporting path to NASA headquarters. Clear,

concise Level 1 requirements for the OSP program have been established, which identify the critical, top-level specifications that

the OSP system must meet without dictating a design solution.

The trade space is open for innovative design solutions from industry to best meet NASA’s needs. There is no preconceived notion

on what the ultimate vehicle design will be, whether it would be

a winged vehicle, a lifting body shape, or a capsule. Each of these

shapes has competitive advantages and disadvantages that will be

explored during the formulation studies. Our requirements do not

specify whether the crew rescue and crew transport requirements

are met with a single vehicle, by similar vehicles adapted from a

common airframe, or by completely different designs.

The final design will be selected based on the ability to meet all

of the Level 1 requirements. The Shuttle will likely remain a workhorse for the agency throughout the—at least the middle of the

next decade, consistent with the framework of the ISTP program

plan. The Shuttle is required to complete the Station assembly and

to perform other critical NASA science missions, such as servicing

and perhaps returning the Hubble Space telescope.

In addition, its heavy lift capability and ability to return cargo

to Earth from the Station will continue to be used until a viable

system is developed to perform these functions. We will use the results of mission model studies to better guide our operational strategy on the best use of to space transportation resources available

for the Station to guide our investment strategy supporting the

ISTP, including consideration of alternate cargo concepts, and to

influence the Level 2 performance requirements.

Mr. Chairman, the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her

crew is a national tragedy. We are committed to a safe return to

flight as quickly as possible, but only after the cause of the accident is fully understood based on findings by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and corrective measures are implemented

and independently assessed by a task team led by General Tom

Stafford.

We are conducting an agency study, led by the NASA Space Architect, to be completed by this summer to review each leg of the

ISTP road map and each key decision to determine if changes are

warranted. We will incorporate our responses to the—Accident Investigation Board recommendations into this ISTP update. Importantly, we are conducting the ISTP update with an eye toward our

future needs. We will pursue building blocks that provide the

transformational technologies and capabilities that will open new

19

pathways of exploration and discovery and lay the foundation for

future human and robotic missions to Earth’s neighborhood and beyond.

A series of studies have been conducted to evaluate whether it

is feasible to accelerate the OSP program development schedule.

The studies identified a possible 6-month to 1-year schedule acceleration for the crew rescue capability and a potential savings of one

to two years for the crew transport capability. Cost implementations of accelerated efforts are still being assessed and no final conclusions as to the feasibility have been made.

Mr. Chairman, in summary, significant progress has been made

toward implementing the OSP program since its introduction of—

in November of last year. NASA is committed to safe return to

flight following the Columbia tragedy, and I want to thank you for

my opportunity to address the Subcommittee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gregory follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK D. GREGORY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and share the plans and

progress we are making toward implementation of NASA’s Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) and development of the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) system.

Mr. Chairman, you requested that I address a number of topics related to the

ISTP and particularly the OSP Program. I will respond to these questions by first

discussing the studies performed for the ISTP that led to the FY 2003 Budget

Amendment submitted in November 2002. Then I will discuss the progress made

toward implementation of the ISTP, and particularly the OSP Program, and, finally,

I will address our approach to the reevaluation of the ISTP as a result of the Columbia tragedy.

Introduction of the New Integrated Space Transportation Plan

NASA’s updated ISTP is driven by NASA’s vision and mission and supported by

a comprehensive series of studies and reviews that determined a more beneficial

course of action for NASA, affecting many of the Agency’s major programs. These

budget changes reflect the interrelationship and tight coupling among the Station,

Shuttle, and SLI programs to support breakthrough research in Space. They were

achieved within our budget—enabling NASA’s overall program to be responsible,

credible, and compelling. The updated ISTP resulted in the restructuring of the SLI,

and other adjustments, to accomplish the following:

• Extend safe Shuttle operations through at least the middle of the next decade;

• Ensure NASA’s ability to achieve Space Station Core Complete, meet international commitments, and provide a robust orbital research program by increasing Station reserves, consistent with independent review recommendations, and by increasing the Shuttle flight rate to adequately support scientific research priorities aboard the Core configuration;

• Fund long-lead items for enhanced ISS research that preserve the option of

expanding the ISS crew above three;

• Begin development of a new Orbital Space Plane system that yields crew rescue and crew transport capabilities; and, to make this possible, the ISTP also

• Defers development of a next-generation of launch vehicles until long-term

goals are adopted that can justify the expense.

Resulting budget changes reflect the interrelationship and tight coupling among

the Station, Shuttle, and SLI Programs to enable humans to conduct breakthrough

research in space. Achieving success in the assembly and operation of the ISS drives

launch demands for the Space Shuttle, our international partners’ vehicles and the

OSP system. Similarly, the expected lifetime of the ISS, coupled with the potential

for enhanced research and expanded crew post Core Complete, as well as our plans

for future exploration goals, will drive potential future launch requirements.

20

The ISTP provides an integrated and systematic approach to our space transportation needs. The plan sustains the Shuttle through at least the middle of the next

decade; aggressively pursues crew transport and rescue systems, called the Orbital

Space Plane system; and continues the development of the technologies that will enable future launch systems. This plan allows NASA, in the near-term, to ensure

that the ISS can achieve U.S. Core Complete, be ready to accommodate the International Partner modules, and better address scientific research priorities. In addition, we have established the position of the NASA Space Architect, reporting to me,

to ensure our integrated approach remains consistent with NASA’s vision and mission. Under the leadership of the Space Architect, NASA is aggressively studying

longer-term science and exploration goals to provide further guidance that will better inform these critical decisions.

Background: Original Aim of the Space Launch Initiative

To aid in addressing our thought process in the formulation of our new ISTP, I

would now like to reflect on the original aim of the Space Launch Initiative. In the

late 1990’s, NASA sponsored the Space Transportation Architecture Studies to examine candidate architectures for a new reusable launch vehicle and to assess the

launch market outlook. Both NASA and its contractors concluded that the market

was too small for industry alone to finance a new launch vehicle and thus, development would place a significant cost burden on the U.S. government. In addition, it

was concluded that a two-stage-to-orbit RLV could have many desirable performance

characteristics and would be within reach of existing technologies. As a result of

these studies, NASA proposed the SLI, initiated in the President’s FY 2001 budget.

The SLI Program’s stretch goals included reducing the cost of space access to $1,000

per pound to Low Earth Orbit and reducing the probability of loss of crew to 1 in

10,000 for a second generation RLV. The SLI Program planned to spend $5 billion

over five years to develop critical technologies and architecture concepts that would

reduce the risk of this approach, prove that these goals were attainable, and support

a decision by 2005 whether or not to build an operational RLV.

This SLI Program was part of a larger investment strategy that tied together

NASA’s various space transportation efforts. The strategy, the original ISTP, included milestones, decision gates and off-ramps for SLI, Space Shuttle, and thirdgeneration air-breathing hypersonic technologies. This is the ISTP that served as

the basis for the original FY 2003 Budget request.

The projected government investment in SLI was based on the assumption that

the development cost of a new RLV would be amortized across both the commercial

and NASA launch markets. The NASA market is currently dominated by the needs

of the Space Station program that requires nearly full use of the Space Shuttle.

Consequently, the RLV design was driven by unique Space Station requirements

that included cargo and crew transported into orbit, rendezvous and docking with

the Station, and return of cargo and crew to a landing site. To ensure the safety

of the crew, the new design of the RLV would be certified as human-rated.

Unfortunately, the key assumptions proved too optimistic. The commercial market

continued to decline. It was premature to base new RLV requirements on other potential markets, such as DOD or future NASA exploration missions. Revised estimates of the development cost of a new RLV were well above the original estimate.

Given the uncertainty of the market and the higher cost of RLV development, NASA

concluded that the economic case for a new RLV was in doubt for the foreseeable

future.

Options Considered for the New Integrated Space Transportation Plan

As a result, NASA decided to examine alternatives prior to making the large commitment required for full-scale development of the vehicles under study. NASA undertook an evaluation during the summer of 2002 to examine possible options for

the ISTP and SLI. The options studied included:

Option 1—Maintain the baseline ISTP program that assumed a decision in

2006, to concurrently build a new RLV two-stage booster and a crew transport

vehicle to deliver crew to and from orbit. The new RLV could replace the Space

Shuttle as early as 2012.

Option 2—Develop an Orbital Space Plane system and delay the RLV Booster.

This option built an OSP system by 2010–2012 to be flown on an Expendable

Launch Vehicle (ELV) that would be human-rated. In this option, the RLV

booster development was delayed.

Option 3—Develop a prototype RLV booster by around 2011. This option built

a common RLV prototype booster with DOD. In this option, an operational

booster and Orbital Space Plane would occur later.

21

Option 4—Breakthrough Technology. This option focused on long-term, highpayoff technologies, like hypersonic propulsion, and indefinitely delayed a new

RLV.

The ISTP options were evaluated based on the following factors and criteria:

Safety—the potential for improved crew survivability through development of an

ISS crew return vehicle and a crew escape system on a crew transport vehicle.

Assured Access—the provision of alternate independent means of meeting

launch requirements despite potential launch mishaps, Space Shuttle

groundings, or shortfalls in partner contributions to Station needs.

Economics—the affordability within the budget outlook and the potential for future cost savings.

Flexibility—the ability to evolve capabilities and adapt to changes in future

launch requirements that remain uncertain.

These option studies were complemented by a number of other studies, including:

SLI Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Crew Transport Vehicle

Development Studies, conducted by the SLI Program Office in 2002, evaluated

hundreds of alternative space transportation system designs and performed indepth evaluation of the 15 best candidates. A conclusion from these studies was

that separating crew transport and cargo delivery functions would provide the

optimum approach to improving crew safety and decreasing costs.

A Crew Transfer Vehicle/Crew Rescue Vehicle Study, conducted by the SLI Program in 2002, concluded that a multi-purpose Orbital Space Plane that can perform both the crew transfer and crew return functions for Station is viable and

could provide the most long-term benefit for NASA’s investment.

An ISTP Study by the NASA Independent Program Assessment Office in 2002

concluded that it was premature to commit to an RLV development, except that

an Orbital Space Plane launched on an Expendable Launch Vehicle promised

a number of benefits, including crew return from Station, assured crew access

to space, potential enhanced safety for crew transfer and crew return, and a potential long-term Space Shuttle replacement strategy.

The SLI Level One Requirements effort conducted by NASA Headquarters and

the SLI Program Office in 2002 indicated it was premature to commit to Level

One requirements for a next-generation RLV.

The 120-Day Joint NASA/DOD Study conducted by the SLI Program Office and

various Air Force organizations in 2001–2002 concluded there was common interest and benefit in development of the first stage of a two-stage RLV using

a kerosene-fueled engine.

The National Aerospace Initiative and the National Hypersonics Plan developed

by NASA and DOD in 2001–2003 chartered a joint NASA/DOD roadmap for

technology development of an advanced space transportation system.

The Space Shuttle 2020 Study completed in 2002 concluded that the Shuttle

lifetime could be extended to 2020. However, additional investments would be

needed to preserve and improve Shuttle safety and maintenance beyond 2012.

Based on the criteria and information from the complementary studies, NASA

chose Option 2—Develop an Orbital Space Plane system and delay the RLV Booster.

The OSP Program concept promises a number of benefits that rank well against the

criteria for safety, economics, assured access and flexibility.

It is aimed at providing assured crew access to the ISS, improving crew safety,

meeting the U.S. ISS crew return requirements from the ISS, and providing a

bridge to the future by demonstrating technologies on a new crewed vehicle and

supporting enhanced science on the Space Station. In summary, key changes to the

ISTP roadmap which resulted from this decision were to extend the Shuttle lifetime

from 2012 to at least the middle of the next decade and to delay the decision to

develop an RLV booster from 2006 to no earlier than 2009.

The new ISTP consists of three major programs: the Shuttle, OSP, and Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Programs. The OSP and NGLT Programs are

both managed within the restructured Space Launch Initiative. No strategy is without risk. Some of the key risk items within the ISTP that we must address include:

• The ability to sustain the Space Shuttle fleet to safely meet its service life

requirements;

22

• The design and integration of the Orbital Space Plane flight vehicle(s) onto

an Expendable Launch Vehicle including the associated human rating of the

system and ground launch processing needs;

• The ability to meet our objectives in the event of another Shuttle loss or extended down time; and

• The ability to meet each of these objectives within a responsible and credible

budget.

Our approach to mitigating these risks is to consistently address the issues using

an integrated approach within the framework of the ISTP. By pursuing multiple

paths with interim decision points, we are less susceptible to technical issues and

more flexible in dealing with changing requirements. We are striving to implement

robustness in our design solutions and ensure that our investment strategy provides

the greatest overall benefit to the Agency. The OSP program is a prime example,

providing multiple benefits including assured crew access to space, meeting the U.S.

commitments for crew return from the ISS, improving crew safety, and providing

a bridge to the future. We believe the OSP system will, in combination with other

launch systems, provide the vital human transport capability necessary to retire the

Shuttle. Finally, the NASA Space Architect will ensure an integrated approach is

taken to resolve any issues and remain consistent with NASA’s vision and mission.

An important feature of the new ISTP is the linking of key decisions across the

three space launch programs and NASA’s long-term strategy. The next two years

are critical for a series of decisions that will occur in the 2004 to 2005 timeframe.

These decisions include: whether to compete for long-term contracts for Shuttle operations; whether to proceed into the full-scale development phase of the OSP; and

whether to aggressively pursue a new launch vehicle or instead pursue a long-term

technology program in pursuit of breakthrough technologies. These decisions will

also be linked to the expected lifetime of the ISS, as well as any new space transportation requirements for exploration beyond low earth orbit. Currently, the ISS Program assumes Station mission life through at least the middle of next decade, and

likely extending into the following decade. NASA plans to aggressively study longerterm exploration goals to provide further guidance that will better inform these critical decisions.

Progress Made on the Orbital Space Plane Program

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn my discussion to the measurable progress

we have made on the OSP Program since releasing the updated ISTP in November

2002 as part of the FY 2003 Budget Amendment.

Within the OSP Program, a program office has been established and the management team has been put in place, with a direct reporting path to NASA Headquarters. NASA expertise is being provided from across the Agency to ensure program success, embodying the One NASA philosophy of an integrated NASA working

together. Clear, concise Level 1 Requirements for the OSP Program have been established and approved by the Agency. These requirements identify the critical toplevel specifications that the OSP system must meet without dictating a design solution within the requirement. Key requirements include providing rescue capability

for no fewer than four Space Station crew members as soon as practical, but no later

than 2010; and providing transportation capability for no fewer than four crew

members to and from the Space Station as soon as practical, but no later than 2012.

The OSP system must improve crew safety relative to either the Space Shuttle or

the Soyuz; offer increased on-orbit maneuverability and increase the launch probability relative to the Space Shuttle; and require less time to prepare and execute

a mission as compared to the Space Shuttle. The OSP system for crew rescue must

also provide for rapid separation from the Space Station under emergency conditions

and allow the safe return of deconditioned, ill or injured crew members with ongoing

treatment until arrival at definitive medical care within 24 hours; a capability not

currently available to the astronauts on the Space Station. The OSP system must

meet these requirements and all applicable Space Station requirements while minimizing life cycle costs.

The trade space is open for innovative design solutions from industry to best meet

NASA’s needs. There is no preconceived notion on what the ultimate vehicle design

will be—whether it is a winged vehicle similar to the Space Shuttle, a lifting body

shape like that of the X–38, or a capsule similar to the Apollo command module.

Each of these shapes has competitive advantages and disadvantages that will be explored during the formulation studies. Our requirements do not specify whether the

crew rescue and crew transport requirements are met with a single vehicle, by similar vehicles adapted from a common airframe, or by completely different designs.

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The final design will be selected based on the ability to meet all of the Level 1 requirements.

A Systems Requirements Review will be conducted this fall to establish an integrated set of NASA Level 2 Requirements to provide further definition in support

of the conceptual design activities. Three competing industry teams are under contract to perform trade studies, develop conceptual designs, and develop detailed

Level 3 Requirements in support of a Systems Design Review to be held during the

summer of 2004. This information will be used along with independent assessments

performed by NASA and other external review committees to support a decision on

whether to proceed with the full-scale development of the OSP flight system in September 2004. A full-and-open competitive procurement for the design, development

and production of the OSP system will be held next year leading to contract awards

in late 2004 if a positive decision is made to proceed with full-scale development.

The Space Shuttle will likely remain a workhorse for the Agency through at least

2015, consistent with the framework of the ISTP. The Shuttle is required to complete the ISS assembly and to perform other critical NASA science missions such

as the servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope. If the OSP proves sufficiently safe

and reliable, it could ultimately replace the Shuttle as the primary crew transport

and, thus, free up Shuttle to focus on cargo functions, or, possibly, a heavy lifter

for ambitious science-driven research missions. We will use the results of mission

model studies to better guide our operational strategy on the best use of the space

transportation resources available for the ISS; to guide our investment strategy supporting the ISTP including consideration of alternative cargo concepts; and to influence the Level 2 performance requirements to be placed on the OSP Program. Our

intention is to focus the Shuttle on the most critical functions that it alone can provide while meeting the ISS logistics needs, providing assured access to Station to

ensure science objectives are met, and improving crew safety. The OSP system will

be an integral part of that strategy.

NASA is committed to providing responsible, credible cost and budget estimates

prior to committing to new development programs. We will be following NASA policy guidelines of using the formulation phase of the OSP Program to establish cost

and schedule commitments for the implementation phase. At that point, the requirements and conceptual design will be sufficiently understood to ensure a responsible

and credible development cost commitment is made. As part of the OSP system design process, each competing architecture contractor is providing life cycle cost estimates as a major deliverable. Government cost experts are developing cost estimates

in parallel, utilizing legacy cost data from prior programs along with improved and

validated cost analysis and estimating tools. A Cost Credibility External Review

Team, reporting to the OSP Program Manager, is being established to provide expert assistance in ensuring credible cost estimation. In addition, an independent

cost validation will be performed utilizing a Cost Analysis Requirements Document,

as used by the Department of Defense and on the ISS Program. These various cost

estimates will be studied and understood prior to the Full Scale Development decision. In addition, we are ensuring fiscal accountability on all ongoing OSP Program

activities by using a proven Earned Value Management system to track actual cost

and schedule performance as compared to plans

Mr. Chairman, the estimates included in the President’s FY 2004 budget request

for the implementation phase of the OSP Program following the full-scale development decision are placeholder estimates only, until these life cycle analyses and

independent cost validation exercises are performed. We are actively examining the

near-term budget requirements for the OSP Program in support of the ongoing

budget submittal cycle to ensure adequate funding is maintained.

Flight Demonstrations

In addition to the OSP Program requirements definition and conceptual design activities, several flight demonstrator projects are in place to test critical technologies

in relevant flight environments and reduce the risk of developing a full-scale space

vehicle. Validating ground-based testing and analysis is a necessary part of fielding

a new space transportation system. Each of the OSP Program flight demonstration

projects will produce data that can be directly applied to the entire range of potential system designs and was selected based on previous SLI studies identifying the

most critical flight demonstration needs. Each was selected under a full-and-open

competition to produce data that will reduce the technical risk of a particular aspect

of the OSP system regardless of the design finally chosen for full-scale development.

The Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) flight demonstration will demonstrate automated rendezvous technology and proximity operations between a chase vehicle and an on-orbit satellite, validating an advanced

video guidance system that is needed to perform similar operations for the OSP sysVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tem. In addition, NASA is working with the Department of Defense on related

projects such as the Orbital Express to further demonstrate the technology, which

has utility for both agencies. The DART vehicle is nearing the end of the manufacturing and integration phase and is being prepared for system integration testing.

The Pad Abort Demonstrator (PAD) is a full-scale platform for testing and assessment of crew escape technologies. Adding to the experience base from the Mercury,

Gemini and Apollo Programs, the PAD Project will demonstrate crew escape and

survivability systems utilizing current technologies by performing an end-to-end

launch pad abort demonstration. Fully instrumented mannequins will generate data

on crew environments during testing of propulsion and parachute systems, orientation and landing techniques, and external structural configurations.

The X–37 technology demonstrator is an integrated platform to validate approximately 30 high-priority technologies in the orbital and re-entry environments. The

X–37 project consists of two distinct flight demonstration vehicles. An Approach and

Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) continued from an earlier full-and-open competitive

procurement award, will validate pilot-less operations during approach and landing

from an altitude of 40,000 feet and below after being dropped from a B–52 aircraft.

The vehicle is currently in the manufacturing and integration phase.

The X–37 Orbital Vehicle (OV) will provide a versatile technology platform to validate important technologies and obtain environmental data during critical stages of

the mission. It will be launched on an Expendable Launch Vehicle, operate autonomously on-orbit, and return to Earth.

The X–37 modularity allows for multiple advanced development demonstrations.

Flight experiments can still be defined and incorporated into the Orbital Vehicle

into the fall of this year without adversely impacting the overall project schedule.

Key X–37 technologies to be demonstrated include: pilot-less guidance, navigation

and control (including high crosswind landing and all-weather windward adaptive

guidance); aero-thermal and flight profile data collection; multiple high temperature,

wing leading edge, and durable acreage thermal protection system technologies;

lightweight landing gear and phase change brake technologies; avionics and power

technologies including high-energy/high-density batteries and electrical actuators for

aero-surfaces; advanced high-temperature structures; and ground operations including rapid thermal protection system waterproofing. As a particular example where

the X–37 will be used to demonstrate advanced technologies, the Space Shuttle uses

a Thermal Protection System (TPS) primarily composed of carbon-carbon for the

nose and leading edges, low-temperature thermal blankets in the low-temperature

areas, and silicate blocks. This complex system is difficult to process and maintain.

The X–37 will demonstrate the effectiveness of multiple advanced TPS technologies,

including high-temperature ceramic leading-edge material, durable high-temperature blankets, and metallic TPS.

Two competing interests arise when integrating the flight demonstration projects

into the Orbital Space Plane Program. The first desire is to perform the flight and

technology demonstrations early in the design cycle (and ideally prior to the fullscale development decision) in order to assist in that decision. The counter desire

is to defer flight demonstrations until the OSP system design is better defined in

order to maximize the utility of the flight demonstration. Because of the long lead

time required for flight demonstrator projects coupled with the time-critical urgency

of the OSP Program, it is not practical to meet both desires. We believe that the

present program achieves a balance between these competing interests. The DART

automated rendezvous and X–37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle flight demonstrations are scheduled to be completed prior to the Full-Scale Development decision. The PAD launch abort design will be completed and the X–37 Orbital Vehicle

design will be nearly complete prior to the Full-Scale Development decision. The

PAD and X–37 Orbital Vehicle flight demonstrations will be completed during the

OSP program design period, allowing their results to be directly incorporated into

the vehicle design.

It should be noted that all of the flight demonstrator contracts have built-in option periods to minimize the government’s risk, in the event that the contractor fails

to perform or the OSP Program concept definition studies determine that an alternative flight demonstration approach is required. This approach allows the government to end the contract without incurring termination penalties at the end of any

option period should the need for redirection arise. For example, the X–37 base contract expires in September 2003 followed by an option period and a decision on a

second option in August 2004. An independent cost estimate of the X–37 will be performed in support of the decision to implement the first option period of the contract. The second option decision point is consistent with the schedule for the OSP

Program full-scale development decision. Using this approach, we believe we have

25

adequately ensured that the demonstrations take place early enough to influence

the OSP system design without exposing the government to excessive risk.

We believe these flight demonstrations represent a high value investment when

considering the potential total development cost of the OSP system, and they will

provide valuable quantitative data in support of the full-scale development decision,

and that they will greatly mitigate risks during the development period. All of these

flight demonstrations are crosscutting in their nature, and will provide technology

data applicable to other potential future space transportation systems in addition

to supporting the Orbital Space Plane system.

ISTP Reevaluation as a Result of the Columbia Tragedy

The loss of Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew is indeed a National tragedy.

We are committed to a safe return to flight, as soon as the cause of the accident

is fully understood, based on findings by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

(CAIB), and corrective measures are implemented and independently assessed by a

task team led by Tom Stafford. We will finish the ISS assembly and optimize our

ISS utilization, support our national space transportation goals, and build a foundation for possible future science and exploration goals.

We are conducting an Agency study, led by the NASA Space Architect, to be completed by this summer, to review each leg of the ISTP roadmap, and each key decision point, in order to determine if a change is warranted. We will incorporate our

responses to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations into this

ISTP update. Importantly, we are conducting this ISTP update with an eye toward

our future needs. We will pursue building blocks that provide the transformational

technologies and capabilities that will open new pathways of exploration and discovery, and lay the foundation for future human and robotic missions to Earth’s

neighborhood and beyond.

We are evaluating options to prioritize the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to ensure a safe return to flight. A two-day summit was held in March

to explore, discuss, and determine the best strategy to safely and effectively fly the

Space Shuttle fleet to support key missions until at least the middle of the next decade. Recommendations from seven SLEP panels (Safety, Sustainability, Infrastructure, Aerospace Industry, Performance, Operations and Resources) provided recommendations to NASA’s Space Flight Leadership Council. From this, 60 candidate

projects were targeted for further consideration. A ‘‘Tiger Team’’ was established to

prepare an internal submittal to support Agency decisions this summer as part of

this ISTP review.

We are also re-evaluating whether we should more aggressively pursue a risk reduction program leading to a new launch vehicle to replace the Space Shuttle and

support our future space exploration needs. We are working with the Department

of Defense to ensure that any space transportation vehicle development or risk reduction activity is coordinated and that the investment will service both our agencies’ needs to the maximum extent practical. In addition, we are re-examining

whether we should place higher priority on providing assured U.S. cargo access to

and from the Station and whether a development activity should be implemented

in parallel to the assured crew access to be provided by the OSP system. Finally,

we are examining the possibility of accelerating the OSP Program to provide an earlier alternative for crew access to space.

A series of studies have been conducted to evaluate whether it is feasible to accelerate the OSP development schedule. In order to determine the most rapid development schedule possible, the OSP established an independent review team of aerospace experts (Aaron Cohen, Vance Brand, Dale Myers, John Young, and Ken

Szalai) to evaluate whether the proven Apollo Capsule could provide a relatively

quick solution to crew rescue and crew transport requirements. The review team

brought vast space transportation expertise and intimate knowledge of the Apollo

Program to this study. The Apollo capsule is a potentially attractive solution since

it was a robust design, its performance was well understood, and the full-envelope

abort-and-recovery system was simple and safe. This study team concluded that, for

a crew rescue vehicle, an Apollo derived vehicle that has the potential for meeting

most of the Level 1 requirements could be available four to six years after contract

award given adequate resources; hence, one to three years sooner than the OSP

plans.

Additional findings of the Apollo Capsule study team were that while the Apollo

system is well understood, virtually every system would have to be redesigned. In

particular, the structure would need to be redesigned for compatibility with the internal pressure of the International Space Station. In addition, Apollo hardware

could not be used due to obsolescence, changes in manufacturing techniques, and

lack of traceability; the drawings could not be directly used due to incompatibility

26

with modern systems; and life cycle costs would be strongly dependent on ground

support systems and recovery site infrastructure.

In addition to this best-case schedule improvement, the OSP Program organized

two other groups to provide an assessment of the schedule acceleration potential.

The first group was a NASA-wide Focus Group consisting of representatives from

several NASA Centers containing experienced Program and Project managers as

well as ‘‘out-of-the-box’’ thinkers. The second group established was a multi-disciplined team from within the program. Both groups were to address alternative approaches to the OSP system design and development that could, given no funding

or personnel constraints, result in schedule improvements by evaluating the current

plans for each phase of the program. In addition to these internal teams, the OSP

Program architecture contractors were solicited for their input on the acceleration

possibilities. The studies identified a possible 6-month to 1-year schedule acceleration for the crew rescue capability and a potential savings of one to two years for

the crew transport capability.

However, to accomplish an accelerated schedule, the following would be required:

• Conduct an early downselect of the shape and design concept. Select a single

design to serve both the crew rescue and crew transport functions;

• Limit the requirements and keep them simple, focusing on the primary role

of transporting crew;

• Develop the minimum flight vehicle test plan early in the program, including

qualification test flights, and adhere to that plan; and,

• Provide additional reserves to allow recovery from issues and problems as

they arise.

Cost implications of an accelerated effort are still being assessed, and no final conclusions as to the feasibility have been made. While the direct use of the Apollo heritage design does not appear to provide significant benefits, an advanced capsule remains a candidate that could be considered for the OSP system design. The results

of these studies are being incorporated into the ISTP update study to determine an

integrated NASA position once the data from all studies is available.

Summary

In summary, significant progress has been made toward implementing the OSP

Program since its introduction in November of last year. The OSP Program Level

1 Requirements have been established, and the program schedule and acquisition

strategy has been developed. The NASA/industry teams are in place to perform the

conceptual design studies and flight demonstrations that will support a full-scale development decision by the end of FY 2004 and future detailed design decisions. The

OSP Program provides a number of near-term and long-range benefits for the Agency. The new system offers operational flexibility for U.S. missions by providing assured crew access to the ISS and meeting the U.S. obligations for crew rescue. Safety will be improved beyond that of the Space Shuttle and Soyuz. In addition, the

OSP Program builds a bridge to the future by the experience gained from designing

and developing the system and by enabling increased Space Station crew size and

resultant science benefits.

The new ISTP represents a flexible roadmap to guide our space transportation investment strategies. NASA is committed to safe return to flight following the Columbia tragedy and to create new capabilities for continued exploration and development of space. As we look forward, we will continue to use an integrated approach

to guide our investment strategy and to ensure a responsible, credible plan.

Thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Mr. Gregory, I

just—this is an unpleasant part of my responsibilities, but your

testimony was very provocative, but we needed to look at it. We

didn’t get it until yesterday. And I don’t—my guess is that you

have got a pretty good staff. It does not reflect well on you or your

staff when this committee does not have the time to examine your

testimony to make sure that this hearing is as meaningful as it

should be. And I would advise you that you should make sure that

that testimony is in on time in the future.

Mr. GREGORY. Understood, sir.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Thank you. Next, we have Dr.

Jerry Grey, who is Director of Science and Technology Policy at the

27

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. And he is,

again, like most of our other panelists today, very well acquainted

with this committee, and we are very appreciative that he has

joined us today to loan us his expertise. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. JERRY GREY, DIRECTOR OF AEROSPACE

AND SCIENCE POLICY, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS

Dr. GREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As with Mr. Gregory, my

written statement has answered the 18 questions you posed. Since

there is no way I can address them in five minutes, I am just going

to hit the high points.

First, the ISTP. It has three elements. The Next-Generation

Launch Technology Effort should be strongly supported. For years,

the AIAA has decried the lack of an ongoing program to advance

and upgrade space transportation systems, that is to have each

successive generation of launchers in the pipeline to succeed the

current generation. It is the lack of such a program in the past that

has led to the current crisis in space transportation.

The Shuttle Service Life Extension Program should also be supported, because for the foreseeable future, as everyone has noted

already, the Shuttle will be essential to Space Station operations.

We now have only three Orbiters, and the likelihood of another

Shuttle failure in the next 10 to 15 years can not be ignored.

Finally, the Orbital Space Plane. Now if we assume successful,

on-time development of the OSP, the OSP EELV architecture suggested by NASA does, indeed, meet their critical needs. But that

is a big if. The OSP isn’t even a paper vehicle yet. And Mr. Chairman, as you have pointed out, NASA’s record for on-budget, onschedule development of new space launchers leaves some doubt as

to whether it will really be available on the proposed dates. One

troubling factor, again, is the current OSP development cost estimate, which ranges from 9 billion to 13 billion, although admittedly

premature. NASA might be better off to pursue an evolutionary

OSP development, which I will discuss later.

In summary, the revised ISTP is neither overly optimistic nor

overly conservative. The new OSP EELV architecture does make

sense, but it is too early to assess the risk involved in OSP development or the soundness of its cost estimates.

On continuing Shuttle operations, there is one overriding reason

for NASA to maintain the Shuttle: space transportation will remain

a high-risk activity for the foreseeable future, so reliance on a single system could once again precipitate a crisis much like the

present one should the OSP system fail or be grounded. Neither

the Russian nor the European access capabilities can be counted

upon.

In my written statement, I have cited several other strong reasons for maintaining the Shuttle. The only real negative is a big

one, of course, the additional cost of maintaining the Shuttle fleet.

With the OSP, the Shuttle could be kept on a standby basis, flying

only when needed, but that raises safety concerns and doesn’t reduce the Shuttle infrastructure, which absorbs the bulk of Shuttle

costs. The safety issue could be addressed by having the SLEP reduce the Shuttle crew and provide a flight deck escape capsule,

28

which doubles the chances for crew survival. However, the best

way to address both cost and safety issues of the Shuttle would be

to equip the Orbiters for fully autonomous operation.

If we look at design alternatives, as Mr. Gregory has stated,

NASA has suggested that the design trade space for the OSP is essentially open, but it would make sense to develop the required

functions, crew return and transport, serially rather than in parallel. The urgent need is for station crew rescue. Why not seek the

lowest cost design approach to meet that requirement and then use

the experience gained to develop the transport capability? There

are at least two viable, low-cost design options for crew rescue: the

original X–38 CRV concept, which Mr. Gordon mentioned, and an

Apollo-derived capsule, which Mr. Myers, I think, is going to address at length in a few minutes. I have mentioned several other

possibilities in my written statement.

An evolutionary OSP development program would provide crew

return at the earliest possible time with low risk. With the Shuttle

fleet operational, OSP transport capability is not urgently needed

and hence could be stretched out to reduce both risk and budget

impact. Some urgent cargo needs could be met by resurrecting the

Alternate Access to Station Program, as you have recommended,

Mr. Chairman.

Now there are some challenges in using ELVs with the OSP. The

primary challenge is safety, but that is true for any launch system,

not just ELVs. The current failure rate, that is loss of mission, of

the partly reusable Shuttle is now 2 in 114, or about 1.75 percent.

The current failure rate of the Delta 2 ELV is 3 in 125, or about

2.4 percent, and of the Atlas 2 to 5 family is 0 in 64. Any residual

safety risks can and should be reduced by an effective OSP crew

escape system.

Hence safety is a challenge, but the risk of flying people on an

ELV is certainly not unacceptable. The Soyuz launcher on which

we now rely for all Space Station crew operations is expendable, as

were the Atlas, Titan, and Saturn rockets used for Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo without a single launch failure. I have talked about

other challenges in using EELVs in my written statement. None of

them pose insurmountable problems.

There are trade studies that need to be done. Besides examining

serial versus parallel OSP development, a temporary cost-saving

option that should be explored is to extend the on-orbit lifetime of

the Shuttle fleet so as to allow an Orbiter to remain at the station

for extended periods, thereby serving both the functions for the

OSP. This approach has obvious disadvantages, which I have cited

in my written statement, but it would remove the time pressure on

OSP development and would also, and this is important, provide a

crew of seven to ten people for both Station maintenance and

science research. I have discussed other trade studies in my statement.

You asked about technology demonstrations. A flight demonstration is, by far, the most effective mission-assurance tool; hence the

planned X–37 program as well as the proposed DART and Pad

Abort demonstrations are of high value to OSP development and

should certainly be retained.

29

In closing, I would like to suggest a possible scenario for optimum servicing of the station. First, the Shuttle SLEP effort should

be initiated immediately and should include the following elements:

one, convert the four-person flight deck to an escape capsule for all

flight modes; second, provide the Orbiters with the option for fully

autonomous operation; and third, equip two Orbiters for orbital

stays of at least four months. As soon as one Orbiter is equipped

for long-term stays on orbit, it should be flown to the Station and

based there for four more months. Until the OSP crew return

version has been demonstrated, the two Orbiters suitably equipped

should alternate with each other.

Meanwhile, the NGLT program should be pursued and evolutionary development of the OSP should be conducted. OSP flights to

the station should begin as soon as the crew return function has

been demonstrated, relieving the on-orbit Shuttles. When the OSP

transport function has been demonstrated, the Shuttle should be

placed on a standby basis for autonomous operation to fly when

needed for lifting large payloads to the station, for crew and cargo

transport up and down during any OSP stand down, and also for

ambitious NASA science and exploration missions in the solar system. Smaller Station cargo needs could be met by one of the Alternate Access to Station designs should NASA choose to resurrect

them.

Thank you for this opportunity to address you, Mr. Chairman,

and that completes my statement.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Grey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JERRY GREY

Introduction

My name is Jerry Grey. I am Director of Science and Technology Policy for the

American Institute of Aeronautics (AIAA) and Visiting Professor of Mechanical and

Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University. Although the views I express here

on the orbital space plane program and related subjects are consistent with those

appearing in the AIAA’s publications, they are my own and do not necessarily reflect the formal position of the AIAA. Thank you for this opportunity to offer my

comments on this important subject.

As you requested, I focus my testimony on the questions you posed.

(1) What key factors should be considered when evaluating human space transportation architectures?

There are two principal factors: safety and cost. Included in ‘‘safety’’ are avoidance

of failures, tolerance of failures (i.e., no injury to the crew) should a failure occur,

and adequate life-support systems and provisions. Note that ‘‘tolerance of failures’’

implies consideration of crew escape systems. Included in ‘‘cost’’ are development

and operational costs, broken down into annual budget requirements and life cycle

cost.

(2) Is the proposed ISTP an overly optimistic or overly conservative approach to

meeting NASA’s needs? What areas of the proposed approach pose the greatest

risk? What recommendations do you have to reduce these risks?

NASA’s needs

It is first necessary to define NASA’s needs. By far the most critical current need

is to meet the International Space Station’s transportation requirements. Prior to

the loss of Columbia, the Shuttle fleet provided the large-payload capability needed

to transport major elements of the International Space Station (ISS) and carried ISS

crew members to and from the station, along with sizable amounts of both technological cargo (e.g., experiment apparatus) and expendables (e.g., water). Once the remaining Shuttle fleet returns to flight status, those functions can resume. When

that will be, however, is still uncertain.

30

Additional provisions and emergency crew return capability for up to three ISS

crew members have been provided by Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles. The

Russians are committed to provide Soyuz crew-return capability until 2006, and although funding for the number of Progress vehicles needed to continue ISS supply

flights without Shuttle support has yet to be identified, there are ‘‘workarounds’’

that are likely to allow the station to function at least minimally until the three

Shuttles return to flight status. These include measures already implemented; i.e.,

using Soyuz lifeboat-replacement flights to transport ISS crew members up and

down and reducing the ISS crew to two; finding ways to finance an increase in Russian Progress operations; and using the European Automated Transfer Vehicle

(ATV), whose initial launch aboard an Ariane-5 is planned for late next year (assuming the Ariane-5 will have successfully returned to routine service by then). The

main near-term concern is that if no source of funding for additional Progress flights

can be found, it may become necessary to mothball the ISS late in 2003 or early

in 2004 until the Shuttle fleet returns to flight status.

NASA’s other needs for space transportation, other than one more servicing mission to the Hubble telescope, do not require the Shuttle’s unique capabilities and

can be met by the existing Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) fleet. Hence the principal requirements for the ISTP, as far as NASA’s specific needs are concerned, are

(1) to provide an alternative to the Shuttle fleet for servicing the ISS, especially

after the next Shuttle failure occurs (at least one such failure is highly likely if the

Shuttle is required to operated until 2015 or perhaps even 2020), (2) to provide ISS

crew rescue capability after the Russian Soyuz commitment expires in 2006, and (3)

perhaps most important, to provide rescue capability for an ISS crew larger than

the present 3-person complement. This latter requirement is critical in order for the

ISS to fulfill its purpose as a viable research facility. Cancellation by NASA of the

original Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) program in February 2001 created this new requirement, which is of major concern to our foreign ISS partners as well as to the

U.S. science community.

There is another important function for the ISTP, however: to provide the technology advancement and demonstration necessary to support major improvements

in future U.S. access to space. Although not a specific NASA ‘‘need,’’ this is clearly

part of NASA’s overall mission as defined by the 1958 NASA act. Without such improvements all elements of the U.S. space program—commercial, civil, and military—cannot proceed very far beyond what we are able to do today.

The ISTP

The amended ISTP proposal has essentially three primary elements: a Shuttle

Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), the Orbital Space Plane (OSP), and development of Next-Generation Launch Technology (NGLT), the latter two of which constitute a revised Space Launch Initiative (SLI).

Next-Generation Launch Technology

The expansion of the former Generation 3 technology program into the NGLT, as

well as the increased emphasis placed on this type of effort in the amended proposal, should be strongly supported. For many years the AIAA has decried the lack

of an ongoing program to advance and upgrade space transportation systems; i.e.,

to have each successive generation of launch systems ‘‘in the pipeline’’ to succeed

the current generation. This is relatively standard practice in both the automotive

and the aviation industries. It is the lack of such a program in the past that has

led to the current crisis in space transportation. The NGLT also incorporates technology advances being pioneered by the DOD, including those of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering’s (DDRE) National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) and

the Air Force Space Command’s Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS) program,

thereby strengthening not only the NGLT’s technical base but also the potential

user base for future launch systems.

One area for concern, however, is the NGLT’s focus on hydrocarbon-fueled firststage designs for the future Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV). Although some offices

of the Air Force (mainly the laboratory community) also favor hydrocarbon fuels, a

definitive summer hypersonics study conducted by the Air Force Scientific Advisory

Board in 2000 concluded that a hydrogen-fueled first stage would be optimum for

both rocket-powered and airbreathing-propelled designs.

The planned NGLT also reduces the emphasis on rocket-powered launch systems

in favor of airbreathing combined-cycle propulsion. Hence an excellent propulsion

prospect, the robust high-thrust, high-pressure, high-performance expansion-cycle

engine, a derivative of the ultra-reliable RL–10 (which has employed an expansion

cycle with great success for four decades), will receive little or no attention in the

NGLT.

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Shuttle Service Life Extension Program

The Shuttle SLEP should also be supported, because for the foreseeable future the

Shuttle will be essential to ISS operations. With the loss of Columbia, we now have

only three remaining orbiters to conduct these operations through at least 2012 [and

possibly much later, because (a) the OSP is likely to encounter development problems that will delay its initial operational date and (b), as I will discuss later, Shuttle capability will be needed even after a successful OSP system is deployed]. Moreover, with this extended operational period, as I mentioned earlier, the likelihood

of another Shuttle failure cannot be ignored. One key capability that ought to be

explored in the SLEP (I don’t know if NASA is planning this) is conversion of at

least some missions to fully automated flight operations. More on this later.

Orbital Space Plane

Now, the OSP. In effect, the OSP and its expendable launch vehicle have been

moved chronologically ahead of the Generation-2 program in NASA’s original SLI;

that is, development of technologies for, and selection of, a reusable system that was

to have replaced the Shuttle’s function of carrying crew and cargo to and from the

ISS at lower cost and with higher reliability. Elements of the old Gen-2 program

now appear in the NGLT array of system applications, but the new plan postpones

a decision on developing an RLV to 2009—well into the development phase of the

OSP. The OSP also replaces the function of the original CRV that was canceled in

2001, as I’ve noted earlier.

So, does the proposed OSP/Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) architecture meet these needs of NASA’s?

If we assume successful, on-time development of the OSP, that architecture does

indeed meet those needs (except that the proposed initiation date for crew return

capability [no later than 2010] is four years beyond the Russian commitment to provide that capability).

But that’s a big ‘‘if.’’ Let’s look at the background.

X–33. NASA’s termination of the X–33 single-stage-to-orbit technology demonstrator was certainly a correct decision (although as I told this subcommittee on

April 10, 2000, I really regret the expenditure of over $1 billion and several years

on a program that, like the National Aerospace Plane, was doomed to failure by its

overambitious goals right from the beginning).

Space Launch Initiative (SLI). NASA’s subsequent decision to focus on a much

more realistic two-stage-to-orbit architecture for the original SLI was also a wise

one. As mentioned earlier, NASA has proposed to continue the evaluation of a reusable hydrocarbon-fueled first stage in the NGLT program, with significant cooperation from DOD. This evaluation could have some effect on the OSP development,

in that the new ISTP proposal identifies the possibility of ‘‘OSP bridge to a new

launcher’’ in 2016, but its major influence will be on the future (2009) NASA decision regarding a reusable booster. Contrary to NASA’s and the DOD National Aerospace Initiative’s focus on a hydrocarbon-fueled first stage, however, as I mentioned

earlier, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board’s Summer Hypersonics Study in

2000 concluded that a hydrogen-fueled first stage, whether rocket-powered or

airbreathing, is better than a hydrocarbon-fueled one. Hence consideration of hydrogen-fueled boosters should not be dropped from the NGLT.

Reusability. NASA should not, however, be blamed for postponing to 2009 a decision on development of a reusable launch system. The basis for that decision was

sound: neither the commercial launch market nor the government launch market,

even in combination, can support the estimated price tag of a new reusable launcher. Fortunately, while NASA was obeying the August 1994 Presidential directive to

spend its time and money pursuing a too-ambitious reusable launch concept, the Air

Force and its EELV contractors were able to develop two new expendable launcher

families that now open up real possibilities to help solve NASA’s near-term needs.

OSP/EELV Suitability. Back to the big ‘‘if.’’ First, although the EELV program

has demonstrated highly successful initial launches, it is still too early to tell if the

EELVs can reliably support a major ongoing NASA requirement such as is posed

by the ISS. The prospects are certainly good, and having two widely different vehicles rather than a single one is definitely a ‘‘plus.’’ I’ll return to this point later.

Next, the OSP itself isn’t even a ‘‘paper’’ vehicle yet. Although NASA has stated that

it will be based on low-risk, current or near-current technology, we won’t be able

to evaluate its risk until there is better system and subsystem definition. Again, the

concept makes good sense, but there is still much to be determined before one could

place a soundly based bet on its success. NASA’s record for on-budget, on-schedule

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development of new space transportation systems leaves some doubt as to whether

the OSP will really become available on the proposed dates.

Cost. One troubling fact is the current OSP development cost estimate, which, although admittedly premature, ranges from $9 billion to $13 billion. Whatever happened to the $1.2 billion CRV, which was to have performed at least one of the

OSP’s missions—and the much more critical one at that, in terms of near-term ISS

needs? NASA might be better off to focus solely at first on the ISS crew rescue requirement, which is urgently needed both to succeed the Russian Soyuz commitment

beyond 2006 and to increase the size of the ISS crew to a viable complement, and

put off adding the ISS access function (for both crew and cargo) until the OSP can

demonstrate its ability to meet this first milestone. Certainly planning for the access

function can begin, but it might make budgetary sense to conduct OSP development

in an evolutionary manner, one step at a time, starting with the most critical ISS

need. I will discuss this later.

Commercial Launch System Support

One further point on the ISTP: the original Gen-2 program in the ISTP was also

to have provided the technology basis and risk reduction for a new reusable launcher that could begin to serve the entire space launch market—commercial, civil, and

military—by the end of this decade. The OSP/EELV does not do that, and the new

NGLT postpones possible RLV risk-reduction efforts to 2004–2009. In essence,

NASA has proposed to delay its responsibility for risk reduction of low-cost reusable

launch systems to succeed the EELV and the Shuttle, postponing any decision on

proceeding with RLV development until 2009 at best. Indeed, if conditions such as

the commercial launch market, DOD interest, and budget concerns at that time are

not suitable, NASA may simply choose to put off any consideration of reusable

launch-system development until longer-term NGLT program efforts are able to reset the stage. This would leave the U.S. launch industry with only the two EELV

families for large-payload service.

Summary. In short, the revised ISTP is neither overly optimistic nor overly conservative. It is soundly based and should be supported. NASA’s thinking in proposing the new OSP/EELV architecture as a second source to the Shuttle for access

to and from the ISS does make sense. However, it is too early to assess the risk

involved in implementing OSP development or the soundness of its cost estimates.

The highest risk in the OSP element of the ISTP is in the budget and schedule

for full-scale OSP development to meet both the crew rescue and ISS transport functions. The highest risks in the NGLT element of the ISTP are (a) postponing RLV

risk reduction research to support a go-no go decision in 2009, (b) over-emphasis on

hydrocarbon-fueled first stage designs rather than a mix that includes hydrogenfueled concepts, and (c) the reduced emphasis on advanced expansion-cycle rocketpowered launch systems. The highest risk in the SLEP element of the ISTP is the

ability to provide crew safety for all flight modes over an extended period of operations.

To reduce these risks, I recommend (1) an evolutionary approach to OSP development, focusing first on the ISS crew return requirement and then on the transport

function; (2) inclusion of hydrogen-fueled first-stage designs and expansion-cycle

rocket technology development in the NGLT program, and (3) including in the SLEP

(a) a method for reducing the Shuttle crew to four and designing the flight deck as

an escape capsule for all flight modes, (b) providing an on-orbit thermal-protectionsystem inspection and repair capability, and (c) equipping the orbiters for optional

fully autonomous operation.

Further considerations are discussed in my response to your subsequent questions.

(3) How might the OSP alter NASA’s reliance on, and the flight rate of the Space

Shuttle? Should crew and cargo delivery be addressed by separate systems? If the

OSP and a separate cargo delivery capability for logistics re-supply were developed, would it be necessary to continue to fly the Space Shuttle? If so, what missions could not be accomplished without the Space Shuttle? If the Shuttle is required for the duration of the Space Station, is an OSP that performs both crew

rescue and crew transportation required?

NASA’s Needs

Assuming the OSP/EELV architecture is demonstrated successfully by the proposed date of 2012, it is again necessary first to project NASA’s needs for space

transportation at that time. Those needs will continue to fall into two categories:

robot spacecraft missions and those involving human crews. The latter category, at

least for the foreseeable future, is almost wholly focused on servicing the ISS. Robot

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spacecraft will almost certainly continue to be launched primarily by ELVs, including EELVs for the more demanding missions. Hence the primary motivation for continuing Shuttle operations after the (assumed) initial successful operation of the

OSP is its role in servicing the ISS.

Rationale for Continuing Shuttle Operations

There is one overriding reason for NASA to maintain the ability to conduct Shuttle fleet operations even if the OSP is initially successful. Space transportation will

remain a high-risk activity for the foreseeable future, so reliance on a single system

for ISS servicing (the OSP/EELV) could once more precipitate a crisis much like the

present one should the OSP/EELV system fail or otherwise be grounded for an extended period. In simple terms, maintaining a viable second source of access to the

ISS ensures its continued operation in the event of a launch system failure. The

Russian and European access capabilities could conceivably help to ameliorate this

need, but neither can be counted upon, and even if NASA were to resurrect the Alternate Access to Station program, its designs could be a useful supplement, but not

the primary ISS delivery system.

Other subsidiary reasons for maintaining Shuttle operational capability are:

(1) It may become necessary to replace one or more of the major ISS elements

(e.g., a solar-panel wing), which cannot be carried by any conceivable OSP

design;

(2) The sensitive economic situation in Russia (and also conditions in Europe)

may deteriorate even further, so that reliance on Soyuz, Progress, and ATV

for auxiliary ISS support may become impractical or impossible; and

(3) The Shuttle can provide services and facilities to the ISS that would not be

available from an OSP; e.g., extra crew members for major repairs or replacement operations and to help conduct science experiments, water from

Shuttle fuel cells, auxiliary equipment for short-term use on ISS research

experiments, greater cargo capacity both up and down, etc.

NASA has also pointed out that with an operational OSP the Shuttle could focus

on cargo missions to ISS, especially an automated version (discussed later), and

could serve as a heavy lifter for future space exploration missions.

The only real negative, of course, is a big one: the additional cost of maintaining

the Shuttle fleet in operational status. With a successful OSP available, the Shuttle

could be pared down to perhaps one or two flights per year, and possibly even be

maintained on a standby basis, flying only when its special capabilities are needed.

However, not only would that raise safety concerns, but it doesn’t reduce the required Shuttle infrastructure, which absorbs the bulk of Shuttle manpower and

costs.

The safety issue could be somewhat ameliorated by having the Shuttle SLEP program explore reducing the number of crew members and providing the Shuttle with

a suitable flight-deck escape capsule, which has been estimated to double the probability of crew survival. The best way to address both cost and safety issues of maintaining Shuttle capability, however, would be to equip the orbiters for fully autonomous operation, including automated docking at the ISS, as the Progress modules

now do, and autonomous landings, as the old Soviet Buran did. For those missions

in which a crew is needed at the ISS, they could be carried as passengers, as is

planned for the OSP.

However, the real justification for continuing Shuttle operations is that the optimum implementation plan for the OSP would be an evolutionary one, as I will discuss later. Hence the Shuttle would be needed at least until the phased implementation of the OSP has been completed. The annual cost impact of Shuttle plus OSP

for the next decade under such a plan needs to be established, of course, but the

prospect of automating the Shuttle could conceivably reduce that impact, along with

annual OSP evolutionary development budgets that are likely to be lower than the

annual cost of implementing a fully capable OSP by 2012, if the present high OSP

development cost estimates are to be believed.

Costs subsequent to 2012 are wholly dependent on the operating cost of the OSP/

EELV architecture, which has yet to be even estimated, plus the cost of maintaining

the Shuttles in flight-ready condition. Again, the operating cost benefits of a fully

autonomous Shuttle should be factored into any trade study of parallel vs. serial

OSP development, as should all viable alternatives such as dependence on Russian,

European, and commercial transport capabilities for both crew and cargo. But until

NASA has some idea of the OSP/EELV operating cost, it does not make sense to

commit to a full OSP developmental effort aimed at complete Shuttle replacement

as soon as the OSP becomes operational.

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Summary. In short, both the Shuttle and the OSP (or an equivalent Shuttle substitute) are required for assured access to, and egress from, the ISS. Second-level

design requirements for the OSP could focus on either a common vehicle for both

crew and cargo or, more likely, different versions having a common technology base.

The Shuttle SLEP should include autonomous operation of the Shuttle for cargo

functions and possibly also for ferrying crews to and from the ISS.

(4) Given that the OSP program has not yet progressed beyond establishing the Level

I requirements, do you think NASA’s plan for spending approximately $750 million on technology demonstrations between FY03 and FY06 is justified? What

technologies are the most critical to demonstrate before proceeding to full-scale

development?

The primary risk-reduction measure in mission assurance is elimination of singlepoint failure modes, which is best accomplished by a combination of heritage technologies, proven integrated system health-management techniques, and redundancy,

substantiated by test or demonstration and other means of independent verification.

A flight demonstration is by far the most effective mission assurance tool. Hence

the planned X–37 demonstration program would be highly valuable to OSP development, provided it does indeed address the critical technologies NASA has identified.

These include, among others, the thermal protection system; an autonomous, fastresponse flight control system; an integrated health-management system, preferably

embedded in an fault-tolerant vehicle architecture; and a crew rescue system. The

proposed Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) and padabort demonstrations are also of high value to OSP development.

It will not be easy to establish which of these technologies are mandatory, to what

level of development they need to be brought, the level of development risk, and

whether they are consistent with cost goals and OSP operational objectives.

Note that it is not necessary for NASA to wait until the X–37 technology demonstration program is complete before initiating OSP development, especially if the

phased development approach I have suggested is used. [Indeed, the NASA plan

calls for full-scale development of the OSP to begin in 2004, long before the scheduled completion of X–37 orbital testing]. However, in contrast to Shuttle development, the OSP development program should be structured so that useful technologies and processes demonstrated by the X–37 and the other planned demonstration programs can be readily inserted; i.e., the program should be ‘‘drop-in friendly’’

for new technologies. Again, this is best accomplished via a phased OSP development program.

(5) What design alternatives should NASA examine as it performs its concept studies

for the OSP? What changes to the OSP program would you recommend to reduce

the cost or accelerate the schedule?

Conceptual Designs

NASA has already suggested that the design trade space for the OSP is essentially open; that is, it could be one or more reusable winged vehicles with passive

or active thermal protection and powered or unpowered landing capability, or one

or more expendable capsules employing ablative heat shields much like the Apollo

capsule, or anything in between. Specific design options must await the formulation

of second-level requirements; e.g., mass and dimensions of payload facilities; propulsion and power requirements; the nature of required medical care equipment and

supplies; life-support requirements; integrated vehicle health-management system

needs; ground facilities; crew escape system requirements; ISS docking, interface,

and separation requirements; etc.

Design Approach

NASA level-1 requirements specify that the OSP system must accommodate both

rescue and transportation capability for no less than four crew members, although

different versions of the system design might be used to perform these two functions. The rescue function must be available no later than 2010; the transport function no later than 2012. NASA’s current proposal suggests that development of both

functions be implemented in parallel, at an (admittedly premature) estimated cost

of $9–$13 billion. In the interest of reducing that cost, or at least stretching it out

over a longer period to minimize the annual budget impact, it would seem to make

sense to develop the required OSP functions serially rather than in parallel.

The urgent need is for ISS crew rescue (which is actually needed by 2006 rather

than the specified 2010, in view of the end of Russia’s commitment to provide Soyuz

lifeboats for ISS). Why not seek the lowest-cost design approach to meet that requirement and then use the technologies demonstrated and experience gained durVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
35

ing that development to develop the transportation capability? There are at least

two viable low-cost design options for crew rescue: the original CRV concept and an

expendable (or partly reusable) capsule with an ablative heat shield. Other options

for use of modified experimental vehicles are discussed below.

Although it might turn out that the transportation capability might indeed require different design features than the rescue capability, NASA should at the very

least conduct trade studies on the parallel and serial design approaches before committing to full-scale development.

This evolutionary development option, as well as NASA’s proposed plan, requires

an operational Shuttle fleet until the OSP transport function is demonstrated, so

the trade study comparing the two approaches should include the Shuttle SLEP options I mentioned earlier, such as fully autonomous operation and a crew escape

system. Also implicit in this trade study would be the viability of some means for

persuading Russia to extend its Soyuz lifeboat commitment beyond 2006.

In conducting this (and other) trade studies NASA faces the challenge of ‘‘requirements creep;’’ that is, allowing requirements for technical demonstration of the

transport phase to affect low-cost rescue options. NASA needs to re-establish cost

credibility, and a properly phased, evolutionary program has the potential to do

that.

Other Trade Studies. Other trade studies that should be conducted before proceeding to full-scale OSP development include the following:

Basing a Shuttle at the ISS. A temporary cost-saving option that should be explored is to extend the on-orbit lifetime of some of the Shuttle fleet so as to allow

an orbiter to remain at the ISS for extended periods, thereby serving both functions

required of the OSP. This approach has obvious disadvantages; i.e., it only

postpones the requirement for a Shuttle replacement or supplement such as the

OSP; it reduces Shuttle operational availability by keeping a third of the remaining

fleet inactive for long periods; and it exacerbates the disruption that would occur

following another Shuttle loss.

However, it would remove the time pressure on OSP development, especially the

2006 deadline for ISS crew rescue capability, and the presence of the Shuttle crew

along with that of the ISS would provide full crew capability for both ISS maintenance and science research; e.g., 10 crew members (or 7, if the SLEP program recommends reducing the Shuttle crew to 4 so as to facilitate crew escape). Also, NASA

could reconsider its decision to cancel the low-budget Alternate Access to Station

program, whose designs could be evaluated for their ability to supplement ISS cargo

transport requirements in lieu of more frequent Shuttle deliveries, especially after

Russia ceases Progress flights.

Replacing Shuttle Columbia. Another temporary cost-saving option that should

be evaluated is simply replacing Columbia. A four-orbiter fleet, especially if augmented by the Shuttle SLEP, would significantly ameliorate the disadvantages of

basing a Shuttle at the ISS. Even if the ISS-based Shuttle option is not pursued,

a four-orbiter fleet could allow development of the OSP transportation function to

be stretched, relieving the time pressure (and annual budget impact) somewhat.

However, without an ISS-based Shuttle the four-orbiter fleet would not resolve the

crew rescue function or enable a full crew to occupy the ISS when a Shuttle is not

docked to the station. Hence the crew return function for the OSP would still be

needed by 2006.

Use of Modified Experimental Vehicles. Modifications that would be needed by

the X–37 technology demonstrator or the Air Force’s Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

(OMV) should be costed and evaluated for potential risks as interim solutions to

each of the two OSP functions, including the use of multiple vehicles to accommodate the 4-person minimum requirement. Should either provide significant cost reductions vs. the OSP without introducing unacceptable risk, this option could reduce

the pressure on near-term OSP development. Note, however, that the cost of incorporating a crew compartment could turn out to be prohibitive, even for multiple vehicles.

Other experimental vehicles that could be evaluated for the cost and risk of performing part or all of the OSP function would be NASA’s HL–20 and X–38 or the

Air Force’s X–24C. The Air Force has also contemplated developing a generic

transatmospheric vehicle, which could be considered as a potential means for augmenting OSP functions.

Evaluation of Apollo-type Systems for both Crew Return and ISS Transport. A top-level assessment of this approach, completed in March 2003, suggests

that it might be the lowest-cost option to meet OSP requirements in the shortest

time, especially if development of return and transport capabilities were to be conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
36

ducted serially, as I have suggested. The initial assessment report states, ‘‘The (assessment) team concluded unanimously that an Apollo-derived CRV (crew return vehicle) concept appears to have the potential of meeting most of the OSP CRV Level1 requirements. An Apollo-derived CTV (crew transport vehicle) would also appear

to be able to meet most of the OSP Level-1 CTV requirements with the addition

of a service module.’’ This option clearly needs to be evaluated in further detail.

(6) How does the decision to proceed with a design that is totally reusable, partially

reusable, or expendable drive design complexity, development schedule, cost, and

safety?

Reusability almost certainly implies increased design complexity, a longer development schedule, and increased development cost. The effect of reusability on safety, vis-a`-vis expendable systems, has yet to be evaluated. Also, increasing the degree

of reusability may or may not reduce operational costs, depending on specific design

attributes. It is possible that reusability will, in the long-term, prove to be a valuable attribute in terms of operating cost, turnaround time, and reliability, but there

is as yet no evidence to support its nearer-term benefit. The often-cited concept of

‘‘aircraft-like’’ operations to realize these benefits requires a full understanding of

what is meant by ‘‘aircraft-like.’’ Airplanes are basically designed for cruise conditions while space launch vehicles are designed solely as accelerators. Comparing

them without defining the basis of comparison is not realistic.

(7) Can the OSP schedule be accelerated significantly without introducing unwarranted risks? If so, what recommendations do you have?

Once the Shuttle fleet returns to flight status, the urgent need is for crew return

capability from the ISS. The evolutionary OSP development program I have suggested would accomplish this goal at the earliest possible time with low risk. The

transport capability is not urgently needed as long as the Shuttle fleet is operational, and hence could be developed according to NASA’s proposed schedule, or

even stretched out somewhat to reduce both risk and annual budget impact,

(8) What challenges may NASA face in using an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV)

as the boost vehicle for the OSP? Does the use of an ELV for human space flight

pose an unacceptable risk?

Safety. The primary challenge is, of course, safety, but that is true for any launch

system, not just expendables. The current failure rate (loss of mission) of the partly

reusable Shuttle is now 2 in 114, or about 1.75 percent. The current failure rate

of the Delta-2 ELV is 3 in 125, or about 2.4 percent and of the Atlas 2–5 ELV family

(including 2A, 2AS, 3A, 3B, and 5) is zero in 64. (That is formally 0 percent, which

is meaningless, but note that the Atlas-5 design failure rate is 0.45 percent compared with the Atlas-2AS design failure rate of 1.28 percent, with zero actual failures).

Single-point-failure tolerance is the key factor in launch-vehicle mission assurance. At least one of the EELV systems, the Atlas-5, is claimed to have full singlepoint-failure tolerance with the exception of its two main engines, the RD–180 firststage engine and the RL–10 upper-stage engine. However, the RD–180 is probably

the most robust large rocket engine ever built (its Russian designers claim it is even

reusable), and the RL–10 has proven its robustness over 40 years of operations.

Moreover, for components such as engines that are not subject to safe redundancy

management, the use of ‘‘safe-life’’ designs and criteria can be implemented, as is

common practice for aircraft jet engines (i.e., ground testing to certify design margins with appropriate safety margins). Finally, there are design options for the

heavy-lift EELVs which provide engine-out redundancy that would eliminate even

these single-point failure modes.

Note that any residual safety risk imposed by using an ELV can (and should) be

ameliorated by incorporating an effective crew escape system in the OSP. Such a

system (which may turn out to be the whole OSP itself) is likely to be specified in

the second-level OSP requirements.

Hence safety is a challenge, but the risk of flying people on an ELV is certainly

not unacceptable compared with the partly reusable Shuttle. Also note that the Russian Soyuz launcher, upon which we now rely for all crew-carrying operations to and

from the ISS, is expendable, as were the Atlas, Titan, and Saturn rockets used for

the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs without a single launch failure.

Recurring Cost. A second potential challenge in using ELVs is the recurring cost

per launch (after all, cost reduction was the prime motivation for developing the

Shuttle and for creating the X–33 program and the original ISTP). Current estimated launch cost levels released by the Air Force’s EELV System Project Office

range from $80 million for the MLV models to $150 million for the HLV models.

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Although these costs could certainly increase if any special provisions need to be incorporated for OSP operations (e.g., human-rating, if NASA decides not to rely wholly on the OSP crew-escape system), the EELV cost range remains well within the

Shuttle’s cost-per-launch envelope.

Booster availability. A third, although lesser, challenge is booster availability.

Having two widely different EELV families rather than a single one is definitely a

‘‘plus’’ in avoiding major downtime problems, although there are some cost implications (fortunately not major ones) associated with ensuring OSP compatibility with

both families. It will also be necessary to coordinate launch manifesting of the

EELV systems with both military and commercial customer demands, but this has

never been a serious problem with prior ELV families.

Flight Control Issues. If the OSP design turns out to be a lifting-body or winged

configuration, adequate control authority of the EELV booster during transonic

flight could become an issue, especially if NASA’s current plan to launch the X–37

technology demonstrator inside a fairing is pursued. The Titan vehicle that was to

be used to launch DynaSoar back in the 1960s required the addition of fins for the

necessary control authority and a strengthened structure to accommodate higher

bending moments. If the EELVs will require comparable ‘‘fixes,’’ there will be cost

and schedule implications, which could be exacerbated if no information is available

from an encapsulated X–37 flight demonstration. If the OSP design ends up as a

ballistic Apollo-like capsule, there will be cross-range restrictions on the return-toEarth launch window.

That completes my answers to the questions posed in your invitation. However,

I have a recommendation for the scenario that NASA should pursue for optimum

servicing of the ISS through the completion of its mission, which is estimated to be

2020–2025.

The first task, of course, is to resolve the issues surrounding the failure of Columbia and return the three remaining orbiters to service as soon as possible without

prejudicing crew safety.

The Shuttle SLEP effort should be initiated immediately, and should include the

following elements, to be implemented as soon as possible without excessive disruption of service to the ISS: (1) Converting the 4-person flight deck to an escape capsule suitable for egress during all flight modes; (2) Providing the orbiters with the

option for fully autonomous operation; (3) Providing a method for inspecting and,

if necessary, repairing the thermal protection system on orbit; and (4) Equipping

two orbiters for orbital stays of at least four months. Depending on the availability

of adequate budget resources, a replacement could be built for Columbia. Note that

during this period, we will continue to rely, to the same degree as prior to Columbia’s failure, on Russian Soyuz and Progress flights and possibly the European ATV.

As soon as one orbiter is equipped for long-term stays on orbit (which should be

prior to 2006), that orbiter should be flown to the ISS and based there for four or

more months. Until the OSP crew-return version has been demonstrated, the two

orbiters suitably equipped should continue to provide that capability, alternating

with each other.

Meanwhile, the NGLT program should be pursued and trade studies followed by

evolutionary development of the OSP should be conducted, beginning with the crew

return function and subsequently proceeding to the crew transport (and possibly

cargo transport) functions. (Pending results of the design trade studies, of course,

the lowest-cost, nearest-term option is likely to turn out to be an Apollo-derived design). OSP flights to the ISS should begin as soon as the crew return function has

been demonstrated, relieving the Shuttles of the need for on-orbit stays.

When the OSP transport function has been demonstrated, the Shuttles should be

placed on a standby basis for autonomous operation, to fly if and when needed for

lifting large payloads to the ISS, for crew-carrying and cargo-carrying during any

OSP standdown, and also for ambitious NASA science and exploration missions in

the Solar System.

BIOGRAPHY FOR JERRY GREY

Director, Science and Technology Policy

Dr. Grey received his Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering and his Master’s in Engineering Physics from Cornell University; his Ph.D. in Aeronautics and

Mathematics from the California Institute of Technology.

He was Instructor in thermodynamics at Cornell, engine development engineer at

Fairchild, Senior Engineer at Marquardt, and hypersonic aerodynamicist at the

GALCIT 5-inch hypersonic wind tunnel. He was a professor in Princeton University’s Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Sciences for 17 years, where he

38

taught courses in fluid dynamics, jet and rocket propulsion, and nuclear power

plants and served as Director of the Nuclear Propulsion Research Laboratory. He

was President of the Greyrad Corporation from 1959 to 1971, Adjunct Professor of

Environmental Science at Long Island University from 1976 to 1982, and Publisher

of Aerospace America from 1982 to 1987. He is now Director, Science and Technology Policy for the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Editor-atLarge of Aerospace America, member of the Universities Space Research Association’s Science Advisory Panel for the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, consultant to a number of government and commercial organizations, and Visiting Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton.

Dr. Grey is the author of twenty books and over 400 technical papers in the fields

of space technology, space transportation, fluid dynamics, aerospace policy, solar

and nuclear energy, spacecraft and aircraft propulsion, power generation and conversion, plasma diagnostics, instrumentation, and the applications of technology. He

has served as consultant to the U.S. Congress (as Chairman of the Office of Technology Assessment’s Solar Advisory Panel and several space advisory panels), the

United Nations (as Deputy Secretary-General of the Second UN Conference on the

Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1982), NASA (as a member of the

NASA Advisory Council), the Department of Transportation (as Vice Chairman of

the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee), the Department of Energy (as a member of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board), and the U.S. Air

Force, as well as over thirty industrial organizations and laboratories. He was Vice

President, Publications of the AIAA, Chairman of the Coordinating Committee on

Energy of the American Association of Engineering Societies, a Director of the Scientists Institute for Public Information, Vice President of the International Academy

of Astronautics, and President of the International Astronautical Federation.

He is listed in over twenty biographical publications, and has received national

awards from the Aviation/Space Writers Association and the American Astronautical Society.

1801 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 500, Reston, VA 20191–4344; Phone: 703–264–

7500; Fax: 703–264–7551; Website: http://www.aiaa.org

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Our next witness is Dale Myers and a former Deputy Administrator for NASA

back in the 1980’s. We welcome Mr. Myers and any illumination

that you might provide us today.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DALE D. MYERS,

PRESIDENT, DALE MYERS AND ASSOCIATES

Mr. MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the

Committee. I was asked by the Chairman to review a short study

that was done to determine the feasibility of using the Apollo Command Module for a Crew Return Vehicle from the Space Station

and for a Crew Transfer Vehicle and then to answer some questions that the Chairman has asked.

The Team, with over 150 years of space design and operations

experience, five guys, has had hands-on design, manufacturing, and

flight experience with spacecraft hardware. We had John Young on

the committee, who is the astronaut that first flew the Shuttle and

has, for many years, had a safety responsibility at the Johnson

Space Center, Vance Brand, who flew the Apollo Soyuz Program,

so he became aware of all of the design functions of the Soyuz Program. We really had a pretty great bunch of guys looking at this

background of whether the Command Module would make sense as

a CRV.

The Team unanimously concluded that a four- to six-person Command Module with a retrorocket attached to it would meet most of

the Level 1 requirements for the CRV—for the Crew Return Vehicle of the OSP. Replacing the retrorocket with a more powerful

Service Module, a Command and Service Module would meet most

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of the Level 1 requirements for a Crew Transfer Vehicle. It was

further agreed that a CRV/CTV looked attractive enough that it

should be studied thoroughly to compare its cost, schedule, and

safety and other advantages and disadvantages relative to the

other configurations being considered for OSP. The Team concluded

that existing Command Modules would not be safely used—could

not be safely used because of water immersion, lack of traceability,

and obsolescence and age of the equipment.

We visualize using the outer mold line of the Apollo Command

Module, that is the outer shape of the Command Module, so that

the launch escape system could be replicated and the tremendous

heritage of the Apollo would be directly applicable in the aerodynamics, thermal protection, and reaction control systems, couch

placement, and the general configuration of the design. The microfiche drawings that are available from the Command Module and

the specs and the myriad technical reports would blaze a trail for

the designers even though all of the hardware would probably be

new or replicated. Even the Command Module structure would be

new, because the Command Module would have to withstand 15

pounds per square inch internally to be compatible with the ISS.

It was designed for 5 psi for the Apollo program.

There was not full agreement by the Team as to the value of the

existing drawings in reducing costs and schedules, but the Team

did unanimously agree that a CRV would be much less expensive

than any other configuration that we could visualize. And a CRV/

CTV, in other words Command—Crew Return Vehicle combined

with a Crew Transfer Vehicle, would be less expensive than a

winged vehicle.

Operations is another matter. The Command Module Crew Return Vehicle with just a retrorocket to re-entry would require many

landing sites to meet the Level 1 requirement of making medicalspecific facilities available within a 24-hour period. With a Service

Module, smaller than the Service Module of Apollo, but a powerful

Service Module added, we anticipate a major reduction in landing

sites and expect the life cycle costs to be attractive. Water landings

are not a great environment for ill or injured crew members, although I will admit it is better than nothing.

The Team recommended a serious study of land landing systems

for capsules with a powerful Service Module—excuse me, for the

capsules. With a powerful Service Module and land landing, it

would surmise that life cycle costs would be very attractive. We

guessed that a combination Command and Service Module Crew

Return Vehicle and Crew Transfer Vehicle could become operational in six to seven years or less from Phase A with proper funding.

In the interest of time, I have answered some of the Chairman’s

questions in my written testimony, and I suggest that I respond to

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DALE D. MYERS

A team (Appendix 1) was chartered by NASA to make a top-level assessment of

the viability of using the Apollo Command and Service Modules (CSM) as the basis

for a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV), and potentially for a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV)

for the International Space Station (ISS). This assessment was conducted on March

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13–14, 2003. None of the conclusions can be other than judgmental, due to the short

time of study, but this small group does cover a broad background of knowledge and

experience about Apollo and about human space flight.

Major Conclusions

The Team concluded unanimously that an Apollo-derived Crew Return Vehicle

(CRV) concept, with a 4- to 6-person crew, appears to have the potential of meeting

most of the OSP CRV Level 1 requirements. An Apollo derived Crew Transport Vehicle (CTV) would also appear to be able to meet most of the OSP CTV Level 1 requirements with the addition of a service module. The team also surmised that

there would be an option to consider the Apollo CSM concept for a common CRV/

CTV system.

It was further concluded that using the Apollo Command Module (CM) and Service Module (SM) as an ISS CRV and CTV has sufficient merit to warrant a serious

detailed study of the performance, cost, and schedule for this approach, in comparison with other OSP approaches, to the same Level 1 requirements.

Cost and Schedule

It was not possible for the team to make an estimate of the cost of the design,

development, manufacturing and operational costs. On the one hand, the Apollo system is well understood, and proved to be a highly successful, rugged system with

a very capable launch abort system. Documentation would be very helpful in leading

the designers. On the other hand, nearly every system would have to be redesigned,

even if it were to be replicated. None of the existing hardware (such as CMs in Museums) was thought to be usable, because of age, obsolescence, lack of traceability,

and water immersion. There would be no need for fuel cells or cryogenics, and modern guidance and communications would be lighter and less expensive.

There was not full agreement on the cost benefit of using existing Apollo documentation in the design of, what was agreed would be, a new vehicle with all new

subsystems. However, it was judged that the development and manufacturing costs

of an Apollo derived CRV has the potential of lower cost than a winged vehicle due

to its lower complexity level.

The Operational costs would be high for a Command Module Crew Return Vehicle

(CM/CRV). Because of the very low orbital delta V and the low aerodynamic crossrange, many landing sites would be required and the infrastructure for 24 hour,

seven day operations would be expensive, particularly to meet the Level 1 requirement to bring the astronauts to medical care in 24 hours. By adding a Service Module, orbital delta V would make it possible to reduce dramatically the landing sites

required. This is why the team surmised that a Command and Service Module Crew

Return and Crew Transport Vehicle (CSM/CRV/CTV) looked attractive.

The team judged that a schedule for the CRV of 4–6 years (from contract goahead) and 5–7 years for the CTV or a CRV/CTV (from contract go-ahead) would

be reasonable.

Other Considerations

Although the flight hardware would be less expensive, and its impact on the Expendable Launch Vehicles would be minimal (it’s just another axisymmetrical payload), the landing sites for the CRV may drive the Life Cycle costs high. By adding

a Service Module (smaller than the one required to go to the moon), orbital crossrange of 3000 to 5000 ft/sec, might be gained, and the number of landing sites radically reduced. If land landings can be added to the system safely, another major reduction in life cycle costs would result, because the team believed that the system

could be made re-usable.

Some Personal Thoughts

Although the team was not asked to compare the capsules to winged vehicles, and

we did not, I have some comments relative to wings vs. capsules.

The Apollo Program never had a parachute failure in operation, although we had

failures during the test program. We had one parachute fail due to N2O4 leaking

onto the shrouds, but the vehicle landed safely on two parachutes.

The Shuttle has had a wing failure, but the failure was apparently caused by the

foam insulation from the tank. Shuttle runway landings have been 100 percent successful.

It appears to me that the robust launch escape system of Apollo, which worked

over a wide range from the launch pad to high altitude, will be hard to beat in a

winged vehicle.

This Apollo based system, without aerodynamic controls, wings, and landing gear

is clearly simpler.

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The ablative replaceable heatshield is simpler to build and install than the corresponding winged vehicle thermal protection system. We already know the thermal

distribution on the vehicle. With a land landing, a reusable heatshield might apply

to the Apollo system.

A land landing is a new development for a Command Module and not an easy

one. With a five-man crew, three parachutes (as proven on Apollo) or a parasail

might be used (although I’m not sold on parasail reliability, and wonder how redundancy is supplied). Close to the ground, a retrorocket could be used, with a blowout

hatch in the heat shield to expose the rocket. Alternately, air bags could absorb the

vertical landing velocity. Any of the means of softening the land landing could be

aided with crushable struts on the couches. I am not familiar with the reliability

record of the Russian land landing system, although I have heard that they have

had trouble with it. Tumbling while landing in a crosswind is a threat.

Landing with wings yields good atmospheric cross-range, and thus more flexibility

in when and where to land. The winged system may be more Life-Cycle Cost effective because of that feature, and it might give more safety because of its ability to

land at other airports.

Winged vehicles have less ‘‘g-load’’ (gravity load) during re-entry, relieving stress

on an injured or ill crew member.

If all things were equal, I’d choose winged vehicles. Unfortunately, they are not

known to be equal, and that’s why the team recommended a thorough study of the

Apollo CM/SM as a CRV/CTV.

Comments on the NASA Integrated Space Transportation Program (ISTP)

The Chairman asked that I comment on some issues other than the Apollo CRV

and CTV. These will be personal remarks, and not those of the Apollo CRV/CTV

Team.

I support the ISTP. The OSP schedule looks reasonable, but only if funding is

made available in a timely fashion. I’d like to see a strong effort in autonomous

docking for either system, and in launch escape if a winged vehicle is chosen. For

the Command Module CRV/CTV, development of a land landing system is the only

major new technology, other than long duration storage in space. I can’t really

strongly recommend the land landing until a Life Cycle Cost Effectiveness study is

completed. If earlier dates are strongly desired, I believe some time could be saved

by accelerating Phase A and Phase B studies and initiating procurement of long

lead time items just after Preliminary Design. Some increase in risk would result,

but it appears that the contractors have already invested significant funds, and configurations are reasonably stabilized as compared to the Phase A and B of the Shuttle or Space Station. In the case of the Apollo combined CRV/CTV, I would consider

giving the Service Module to a different contractor than the Command Module.

Doing so might make it possible to do the Crew Transport Vehicle schedule in 4–

6 years, and at the same time, stimulate new design at more than one contractor.

Using an Expendable Launch Vehicle for human transport is feasible, if the same

attention is, or has been, given to the reliability design requirements for the ELV

as NASA gives for human flight. The new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles

(EELVs) have been designed for high reliability, and first flights look good. A robust

launch escape system would reduce risk even further. A careful review of the

EELVs would be needed to determine whether the NASA version would be common

with the military and commercial EELV. If not, an additional expense is incurred,

and less reliability advantage gained from the repeated launch of common ELVs for

all launches.

The introduction of the CRV/CTV to be launched on Expendable Launch Vehicles

(ELVs) will allow NASA to use the Shuttle for cargo for the ISS, to share with the

OSP crew transport to the ISS, and for lower inclination orbits where heavy science

payloads can be placed in orbit, maintained and upgraded, repaired, and serviced.

Even if a logistics module were developed to be launched by an ELV, I firmly believe

that the Shuttle will be needed until a second-generation manned launch vehicle is

operational. The ISTP gives NASA more time to develop the technologies required

to design a low cost to orbit launch vehicle.

A key factor that must be considered is this. Will the U.S., or the world decide

to go back to the moon or Mars in the next 20 to 50 years? I’m sure space policy

is dealing with that question, but assuming there is interest, we must continue lowlevel system studies and technology development, including nuclear rockets (unless

and until something better comes along). An eventual plan to return to the moon

would favor choosing a capsule approach for a CRV/CTV.

The greatest risk is doing nothing. NASA and industry management, engineers

and manufacturing people are getting old, like me. A new hardware program is

sorely needed to bring vibrant new people in to bear on NASA Programs. An OSP

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followed by a new low cost launch vehicle, followed by a phased return to the moon

and Mars would be an ideal program that would bring stars to the eyes of every

young American child and help rebuild American interest in engineering.

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Appendix 1

Assessment Team Members

Vance Brand

Apollo Soyuz (ASTP) and Commander for STS–5, STS–41B, STS–35

Aaron Cohen

Former Director of NASA JSC; former Manager of the Command and Service

Module in the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office; former Shuttle Orbiter Project

Manager, responsible for design, development, production, and flight tests; former

acting Deputy Administrator.

Dale Myers

Former V.P. and Program Manager—Apollo Command and Service Module, NAA/

Rockwell; Former NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight; Former

NASA Deputy Administrator

Kenneth Szalai

Former Director, NASA Dryden; Chief Engineer NASA F–8 DFBW with Apollo

GNC systems. Team leader.

John Young

Gemini 3, Gemini 10 (CDR), Apollo 10, Apollo 16 (CDR), STS–1 (CDR), STS9

(CDR)

The Team convened 13–14 March 2003 to conduct the assessment.

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BIOGRAPHY FOR DALE D. MYERS

President, Dale Myers and Associates, P.O. Box 232518, Encinitas, CA 92023; Tel.

(760) 753–4043; Fax (760) 753–8796; E-mail: DaleMyers@cox.net

Education

B.S. Aeronautical Engineering, University of Washington, 1943

Employment/Experience

1989–present—President, Dale Myers and Associates, an Aerospace Consultancy

1986–1989—Deputy Administrator, NASA

1984–1986—President, Dale Myers and Associates

1979–1984—President, Jacobs Engineering Group, Pasadena, CA

1977–1979—Under Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy

1974–1977—Vice President, Rockwell International and President, North American

Aircraft Group

1970–1974—Associate Administrator, Manned Space Flight, NASA

1964–1969—Vice President and Program Manager Apollo Command and Service

Modules, North American Rockwell

1957–1964—Vice President and Program Manager, Hound Dog Air Launched Missile, North American Aviation

1943–1957—Aerodynamicist to Deputy Director, Aerophysics Department, North

American Aviation

Affiliations/Activities

Member

Honorary Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Fellow, American Astronautical Society

Sigma Alpha Epsilon (Chapter President, 1943)

National Academy of Engineering, 1974

California Chamber of Commerce, 1975–1977

Member, International Academy of Astronautics, 1991

Board of Directors

1992–1997—Board member, General Science Corporation

1989–1998—Board member, MacNeal Schwendler Corporation

1989–1994—Trustee, Logistics Management Institute

1984–1986—Board Member, SYS Technologies

1984–1986—Board Member, Aerovironment

1979–1984—Board Member, Jacobs Engineering Group

1974–1977—Board Member, Ducommun Corporation

Awards, Honors and Recognition

Honorary Doctorate Degree, Whitworth College, Spokane, WA 1971

NASA Distinguished Service Medal, 1971

NASA Distinguished Service Medal, 1974

Meritorious Service Award, Compton Schools, 1977

Achievement Award, Los Angeles City Schools, 1976

Department of Energy Distinguished Service Medal, 1979

Distinguished Alumnus, University of Washington, Department of Aeronautics and

Astronautics, 1982

Aerospace Hall of Fame, Museum of Science and Industry, Los Angeles, CA

Who’s Who in America, in American Politics, in Aviation, in Government, in Technology, in Finance and Industry

International Directory of Distinguished Leadership

Service

NACA Stability and Control Subcommittee, 1948–51

United Way, Chairman 2nd District, Los Angeles, 1983

NASA Advisory Committee, 1984–1986

American Delegate, AGARD, 1986–1989

45

Visiting Committee, University of Washington, 1990–1998

San Diego Fund Raising for University of Washington, 1990

Director, San Diego Aerospace Museum, 1993–present

NRC AF Study Board Committee on Pre-Milestone One, 1993

NASA Aeronautics Advisory Committee, 1994–1997

Visiting Committee, University of Washington Astronautics, 1998–present

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes, we have a few for you. All right.

Mr. MYERS. Thank you.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And our final

witness is Dr. Michael Griffin, who is President and Chief Operating Officer of In-Q-Tel, an independent, non-profit venture group

chartered to identify and invest in cutting edge commercial technologies. And would the private sector have something to contribute to this situation? You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, PRESIDENT AND

CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, IN-Q-TEL.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you. Thank you for inviting me to appear before this committee to discuss the NASA Orbital Space Plane Program and its relationship to the new NASA Integrated Space

Transportation Plan. I will try in the next few minutes to summarize the key points offered in response to this committee’s questions

in my written testimony.

First, I believe there are more effective alternatives, both strategically and economically, than the OSP program with the Level 1

requirements as presently conceived. If OSP is intended only to

support the International Space Station by supplementing the

Shuttle, if continued use of the Shuttle is intrinsic to the ISTP, and

if a viable Shuttle program requires several flights per year, then

normal ISS support requirements can be met without the OSP.

Moreover, a vehicle meeting but not substantially exceeding the

stated Level 1 requirements will have very limited capability to

execute any mission beyond support of the ISS. The OSP will thus

contribute only marginally to the Nation’s overall space transportation architecture and should not be funded under such conditions. The OSP should be developed as part of and in concert with

a more complete Integrated Space Transportation Plan. Such a

plan should provide a road map with scheduled goals and funding

requirements for development of robust and economical space

transportation technology and systems from the small payload

class up through heavy-lift capacity, sufficient to meet the needs of

lunar and Mars exploration programs.

The International Space Station can best be supported over the

next decade by, number one, making the minimally necessary

Shuttle modifications to enable flights to ISS in the near-term.

Two, restoring the alternate Access to Station Program thereby

augmenting the capability to re-supply the ISS when the Shuttle

system is temporarily grounded and helping to sponsor the commercial development of robust economic small and medium launch

vehicles by providing a known and guaranteed government payload

market. Three, developing an Orbital Space Plane along appropriate lines, taking into account the likely needs of future missions

beyond the requirement to support ISS. Four, deliberately phasing

out the Shuttle as the OSP becomes available. I offer this opinion

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reluctantly, because the Shuttle offers incredible capability, likely

irreplaceable with any single vehicle or design. But despite our

hopes during its design and development phase, the Shuttle has

proven to be expensive to operate, cumbersome to maintain,

logistically fragile, and technically unforgiving. It is time to move

on.

International Space Station crew escape requirements are important, but should not drive the design of the OSP. Crew escape capability should be needed, at most, a few times over the working

life of the ISS. Providing such capability should not be allowed to

affect the routine operations of a transportation system. Should a

new OSP be designed and built, it certainly makes sense to consider employing it as a Crew Return Vehicle, but its design should

be governed by the requirements for crew transfer, not crew rescue.

A key feature of any integrated space transportation architecture

must be the development of technology and flight systems for highly reusable, two-stage-to-orbit launch systems as rapidly as funding

permits. We have seen that industry alone can not close the business case for such an effort, a feature characteristic of many large

transportation infrastructure systems. But like the Nation’s air

traffic control network or interstate highway system, the benefits

will in the long run, far outweigh the costs, and it is to exactly such

projects that government investment should be allocated.

With that I conclude my oral statements and, as with the others,

I am ready to take your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN

Abstract

Requirements for NASA’s proposed Orbital Space Plane (OSP) and its place in the

new Integrated Space Technology Plan (ISTP) are discussed. Consideration and

adoption of appropriate top-level goals for the Nation’s space transportation architecture is advocated. The role of OSP relative to the Space Shuttle in support of

International Space Station (ISS) is treated. Key OSP design features, especially the

issue of a winged vs. semiballistic vehicle design, are discussed. OSP programmatic

assumptions are examined, with attention to cost, schedule, and technology development requirements.

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for inviting me to appear before this committee to discuss this most

important issue, that of the NASA Orbital Space Plane (OSP) program, and its relationship to the new NASA Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP).

I will open by noting that, in my opinion, this is not only a most important topic

for discussion, it is the single most important subject to be addressed by the Nation’s

leaders in connection with our nation’s future in astronautics.

In aeronautics, the air is merely a medium through which one must transit in

order to reach a desired destination. In astronautics, both air and space become navigable media, but space also becomes much more: It is itself a destination, a region

offering access to an enhanced vantage point, hard vacuum, microgravity, advantageous positioning, and new sources of energy and materials.

But to use these assets we must first reach the destination. The physics of Earth’s

gravity well are such that once we reach low Earth orbit (LEO) we are, in Arthur

C. Clarke’s famous turn of phrase, ‘‘halfway to anywhere.’’ This hearing, one of

many such discussions on the topic, is prima facie evidence that despite the passage

of sixty years since the invention of the first vehicles capable of reaching space, the

task of reaching LEO—reliably, routinely, and cost-effectively—continues to elude

us. We are still having trouble taking Clarke’s first half-step.

The task is difficult. To reach LEO, we must package the energy required for an

intercontinental aircraft flight in a container with the volumetric efficiency of an

eggshell, yet which is tough enough to withstand high inertial, thermal, and aeroVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
47

dynamic loads. The stored energy must be expended within a few minutes, and prevented from being expended in a few seconds. Each launch of an expendable vehicle

is its maiden flight, an event performed under only the most carefully controlled and

limited conditions in aeronautics, yet which in astronautics must be a maximum

performance event. A reusable vehicle must survive a return through an atmospheric flight regime so rigorous it cannot be simulated in even the highest performance wind tunnels; such a vehicle can be fully tested only by flying it ‘‘for real.’’

But while the task is difficult, we have allowed ourselves to make it more difficult

than it need be. We have sometimes concentrated so heavily on particular details

and ‘‘point designs’’ that we have failed to appreciate that each such design must

blend into, and be part of, a broader architecture. We have sometimes become enamored of specific requirements, to the exclusion of broader goals. We have at times

over-valued the role of government while failing to pay due attention to the skill

and expertise residing in our industrial base. At other times we have done the opposite, leaving too much to the discretion of contractors who, after all, bear no final

responsibility for the success or failure of any government enterprise. In some cases

we have stayed too long with proven but inefficient technology. In other cases we

have designated as ‘‘operational’’ those things which were, at best, operating at the

very edge of the state of the art, and possibly beyond it. We accept, without serious

objection, a ‘‘cost of doing business’’ in government space endeavors that should

shame us all were it to be examined on any sort of rational basis.

We have made most of the mistakes that can be made, mistakes which would

have put any commercial enterprise mercifully out of its misery, in favor of a competitor with a better approach. But because the development of space launch vehicles has been almost exclusively a government enterprise, and because the few and

only competitors have been other governments, normal market mechanisms are absent, and we continue to muddle along. This does not mean that all of our problems

would be solved if we merely turned space launch over to industry, and restricted

the government’s role to supervising the purchase of tonnage per year to orbit. The

contrary fact is true; the government’s role in sponsoring appropriate technology

and systems development is crucial, if effective launch vehicle technologies and an

efficient free market in space transportation are ever to exist. We simply need to

do it better than we have so far demonstrated.

In the wake of the Columbia accident, some have argued for restricting, once

again, the frequency and purposes of manned spaceflight, or of restricting shuttle

launches to orbits compatible with the International Space Station (ISS). One hears

it said that manned spaceflight should be restricted to those occasions when human

presence is ‘‘needed.’’ I cringe when I hear or read such views. Since there was no

human spaceflight at all prior to 1961, it is plain to see that we do not ‘‘need’’ to

do it. We do it from a fundamental desire, inherent in our genes and in our culture,

to explore our environment and expand our presence within that environment. We

do it, according to John F. Kennedy’s ringing quote, ‘‘not because it is easy, but because it is hard.’’ Bearing this in mind, I submit that NASA’s role is not to figure

out how to do less manned spaceflight; NASA’s role is to figure out how to do more

of it.

With these thoughts in mind, I offer the following in response to the questions

posed by this committee in its formal invitation to appear.

• What key factors should be considered when evaluating human space transportation architectures? Is the proposed ISTP an overly optimistic or overly conservative approach to meeting NASA’s needs? What areas of the proposed approach pose the greatest risk? What recommendations do you have to reduce

these risks?

The key element of any system architecture is that it be responsive to an overarching framework of goals. When a system architecture—or a specific vehicle—is

designed without reference to such top level goals, the result is a point design that

is unlikely to blend smoothly into any larger picture. Rather than being designed

to meet a higher purpose, the purpose becomes merely that set of tasks the system

can accomplish.

The proposed ISTP seems to lack the required global framework, the desired

broader view. Three elements are specified—the Space Shuttle, a new Orbital Space

Plane, and a reusable launch vehicle. This latter element, potentially the most important of the three, is hardly a factor in the present discussion because it is being

deferred for some unspecified period. What, then, are the questions being asked, for

which these three architectural elements are the answers? This discussion is nowhere to be found in the proposed ISTP.

NASA should lead the debate to define and enunciate the Nation’s goals in space,

and following from them, our goals in the development of space transportation—

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goals which will guide us for at least a generation. These goals should be embraced

within the Administration, and shared and supported by the Congress, for in this

matter there is no conceivable partisan interest. Properly chosen goals will be

shared by the majority of informed stakeholders, and will be broad enough to accommodate the flexibility of timing and funding that future Administrations and Congresses will need and want, without sacrificing their essence.

While others may certainly have their own ideas as to the appropriate goals for

the Nation in space transportation, I believe they should include at least the following:

— Robust and economical small, medium, large, and heavy lift capability to

LEO, to the 100 metric ton level or greater.

— Dependable, available crew transport to and from LEO.

— Crew escape capability from ISS and other space stations yet to be built in

other places.

— Reliable cargo transport to LEO, including the capability for automated rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking with pre-existing assets.

— The option, but not the requirement, to combine crew and cargo transport

as needed for a particular mission.

— LEO-to-higher-orbit transfer capability.

— Efficient lunar and interplanetary transfer capability for both unmanned

and manned missions.

If I may be permitted an imperfect but possibly useful analogy, NASA is the entity in the U.S. government charged with, and best suited to, creating the ‘‘interstate

highway’’ to space. This highway needs to be designed to handle shipments both

large and small, on known and reliable schedules, safely and economically. The

highway is needed because the existing patchwork of separately developed roads is

inadequate to serve the future we can envision. Industry can and must share in the

design, and must perform the actual construction. But only NASA can enunciate the

goals and architect the system.

Against this larger backdrop, the proposed ISTP can only be seen as far too conservative. It is not so much wrong, as it is incomplete. If fully realized, it would

leave us with little more capability than we have today to go beyond Earth orbit.

It would do nothing soon to reduce the cost of space access. It would saddle us for

the next two decades with continued primary reliance on the Shuttle, which is by

any reasoned measure the riskiest element in the system. Surely we can do better.

• How might the OSP alter NASA’s reliance on, and the flight rate of, the Space

Shuttle? Should crew and cargo delivery be addressed by separate systems? If

the OSP and a separate cargo delivery capability for logistics re-supply were

developed, would it be necessary to continue to fly the Space Shuttle? If so,

what missions could not be accomplished without the Space Shuttle? If the

Shuttle is required for the duration of the Space Station, is an OSP that performs both crew rescue and crew transportation required?

Given the existing Leve1 1 requirements and their interpretation, the OSP is unlikely to alter substantially NASA’s reliance on the Space Shuttle.

The OSP program is specified solely in terms of its requirements to ‘‘support’’ the

International Space Station (ISS), where ‘‘support’’ is defined as ‘‘supplementing’’

the existing capabilities of Shuttle and Soyuz. It must support ISS crew rotation on

4–6 month intervals, and system is to be designed to have minimum life cycle cost.

These constraining assumptions, offered without reference to a set of higher goals

such as articulated above, will have profound consequences in the generation to

come. To see where these assumptions can lead, let us consider the following train

of thought.

If the purpose of OSP is to ‘‘support’’ ISS operations by ‘‘supplementing’’ the capabilities of the Shuttle, and ignoring Soyuz for the moment, then clearly the Shuttle

must be kept flying, in accordance with the proposed ISTP. Estimates vary, but it

is accepted that a viable Shuttle program requires a minimum of several—let us say

three or four—launches per year. Thus, in the normal course of events, Shuttle

alone can easily accommodate ISS requirements. OSP would then fly only a couple

of times per year—if that—to maintain operational currency, or to rotate the vehicle(s) docked at ISS for purposes of emergency crew return. Under these assumptions, OSP is thus needed only when—as at present—the Shuttle is grounded. The

OSP system thus needs to be designed to accommodate a peak rate of possibly four

flights per year for short periods, and much less on average.

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With such assumptions, it will be almost guaranteed that the lowest-life cycle-cost

design is a simple (probably expendable) vehicle with the least capability consistent

with completing the tasks envisioned today. A basic semiballistic capsule designed

for a few days of independent flight could easily suffice. By choosing this path—and

it is inevitable if we accept the Level 1 OSP requirements as written—we accept

the requirement to maintain the inherently high cost Shuttle program. Worse, we

have as our only Earth-to-LEO transportation systems two designs (Shuttle and

OSP) which are wholly incapable of being adapted to the needs of lunar return or

Mars exploration, ventures which should certainly be of interest over the intended

design life of the OSP. Considered in such a broader context, radically different design choices might be made for OSP. But they are not possible given the requirements as written.

It scarcely needs to be said that it will be extremely hard to justify the development of such a vehicle, at a cost of several billion dollars, for such a limited purpose

as OSP will have, given the requirements envisioned for it today. And, indeed, such

development makes little sense economically. One could likely obtain several replacement Shuttle orbiters in a ‘‘block buy’’ for the same cost as a new OSP. Further

thought in this direction would likely show that the most economical crew return

vehicle for ISS would be the Shuttle itself—modified for a 60-to-90 day stay—with

four to six crew rotation missions per year. Following this logic, it becomes difficult

to see the path by which reliance on the Shuttle can be ended.

To me, the likeliest result of accepting the OSP Level 1 requirements as written

is that a sober analysis will show the OSP to be wholly unjustifiable in economic

terms, and the program will subsequently be cancelled in favor of continued use of

the Shuttle. Since the Shuttle is not capable of supporting the larger goals that I

have enunciated above, or any similarly broad set of goals, I would consider this

outcome to be another setback for NASA and the Nation.

With regard to separation of crew and cargo, the issue is not ‘‘should’’ they be separated, but ‘‘can’’ they be separated when it is advantageous to do so, as is so often

the case. With the Shuttle, they cannot. While the Shuttle’s large cargo bay is its

most impressive feature, it is also the feature which, in my opinion, results in the

greatest increment of risk to the astronauts who fly it. With the cargo bay attached

to the crew cabin, the Shuttle orbiter is inherently so large that only a sidemount

configuration is possible, leaving the crew with no escape path in the event of a

launch malfunction, as with the Challenger failure, and vulnerable to falling debris,

possibly including ice, as with the Columbia accident.

If the Shuttle system had been designed with a smaller manned vehicle atop an

expendable cargo pod, the overall system would have been much safer. A simple escape rocket would have sufficed to separate the crew vehicle from the launch system

in the event of a malfunction, which is of course ultimately inevitable, given a sufficient number of flights. The crew vehicle could have been launched, by itself, on a

smaller vehicle or vehicles when no cargo was required. The only lost capability

would have been the ability to handle ‘‘down cargo,’’ the least used feature of the

Shuttle system. My own view on the value of ‘‘down cargo’’ is somewhat simplistic:

It is so difficult and expensive to get payloads to space that, having done it, we

ought by and large to leave them there, and design them for that! But, if necessary,

I believe that the design of a reusable cargo pod capable of executing an autonomous

re-entry and landing would pose little challenge.

• Given that the OSP program has not yet progressed beyond establishing the

Level I requirements, do you think NASA’s plan for spending approximately

$750 million on technology demonstrations between FY03 and FY06 is justified? What technologies are the most critical to demonstrate before proceeding

to full scale development?

Numerous advances in thermal protection materials technology have been made

since the Shuttle was designed and built, and some relatively inexpensive demonstrations may be useful in this area. Automated rendezvous and docking, a procedure so basically straightforward that the Russians first demonstrated it more than

three decades ago, remains to be demonstrated in the U.S. program. Crew escape

system technology has been essentially absent from U.S. vehicles since Apollo, and

may need some investment. Isolated technology demonstrations may be required to

address issues relevant to a particular vehicle design, once such a design is selected.

However, these are details. I am unaware of any crucial, but as yet unproven, technology needed for Earth-to-LEO transportation. I believe money spent on technology

demonstrations would, in general, be better spent on vehicle development. Such an

approach would also offer the benefit of significantly shortening the planned OSP

development schedule.

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• What design alternatives should NASA examine as it performs its concept

studies for the OSP? What changes to the OSP program would you recommend

to reduce the cost or accelerate the schedule? How does the decision to proceed

with a design that is totally reusable, partially reusable, or expendable drive

design complexity, development schedule, cost, and safety? Can the OSP schedule be accelerated significantly without introducing unwarranted risks? If so,

what recommendations do you have?

We should be careful to avoid overburdening OSP with ISS crew return vehicle

(CRV) requirements. My view, harkening back to my involvement in the 1993 Space

Station redesign effort, and before, has always been that the CRV is properly viewed

as a ‘‘lifeboat,’’ to be used in an emergency, and likely not otherwise. As an order

of magnitude estimate, we might expect to use it once per decade. If it is used regularly or routinely, we are doing something seriously wrong with regard to the operation of ISS, something which needs to be remedied. But stretching the notion of

what constitutes a CRV is not the answer. Therefore, again in my view, crew transport requirements should determine the OSP design, with CRV requirements at the

margin.

As an aside, I have personally never been able to understand why a refurbished

Apollo spacecraft cannot be outfitted as a perfectly acceptable CRV. The need for

developing a new vehicle to meet the crew escape requirement has never been obvious to me.

Much in the news recently, and for good reason, is the question as to whether

the ‘‘Orbital Space Plane’’ should be a ‘‘plane’’ at all. In the wake of the Columbia

disaster, some have called for a return to a ‘‘capsule’’ design, more properly termed

a ‘‘semiballistic entry vehicle.’’ Certainly there is strong merit in such a recommendation. A semiballistic vehicle offers a number of advantages for Earth-toLEO transport. It is likely to be more volumetrically efficient and to have less mass

than a winged vehicle for the same overall mission requirements, and is much better adapted to any requirements to go beyond low Earth orbit. Either design can

be equally reusable, with the possible exception of the heat shield for the

semiballistic vehicle, which will almost surely encounter a higher heat load than for

a gliding entry vehicle. However, and in strong contrast to a winged vehicle, the

semiballistic can be designed such that the heat shield is both very simple, completely separable, and easily detachable from the core vehicle, resulting in a system

with only one non-reusable component that is not particularly weight critical and

can be, almost literally, dirt cheap.

It is often stated that the landing accuracy of a semiballistic vehicle will be inferior to that of a winged design. This is nonsensical. If a parachute or parasail is

used, today’s steerable designs, with pinpoint GPS guidance, allow either design to

achieve highly accurate landing point control. Furthermore, historical data indicates

that even without benefit of steerable parachutes and GPS, entirely acceptable landing accuracy can be obtained. The table below cites the mission-by-mission Apollo

landing accuracy (from ‘‘Apollo Program Summary Report,’’ NASA TM–X–68725,

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Johnson Space Center, Houston,

TX, April 1975). It is seen that the worst case landing dispersion would have been

trivially contained within the boundaries of Edwards AFB, or White Sands Missile

Range, or even within acceptable landing areas at Cape Canaveral or Wallops Flight

Facility. Most of the Apollo landing dispersions would have fitted easily within the

boundaries of Dulles Airport. It is not necessary to do better than that.

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Note the phrase above, ‘‘if a parachute is used.’’ It is not obvious that a parachute

is necessary (other than possibly as a backup system, wherein the goal becomes

crew, rather than vehicle, survival). The terminal velocity of a semiballistic vehicle

will be on the order of 300 miles per hour, probably less. Braking rockets ignited

at high altitude, initially at idle thrust, and then smoothly throttled to touchdown

can serve quite well, as the DC–X and DC–X–A programs have shown. Besides demonstrating the ultimate in pinpoint landings in the nominal case, these efforts also

showed how a backup parachute landing system can be efficiently incorporated into

the design, and used effectively in an emergency. Detailed studies have continued

to reveal no substantive mass difference between a semiballistic design with terminal rocket braking, and a more traditional winged design.

Of course, there is also the possibility of using conventional parachute descent,

with surface contact cushioned by short duration, high-thrust rockets as in the

Soyuz design. Thus, there is no need to assume the inconvenience of an Apollo-style

water landing if a semiballistic design is chosen, except possibly in a dire emergency

when, in contrast to a winged vehicle, the ability of a semiballistic to survive a

ditching then becomes an attractive option.

However, because we should carefully consider the merits of a semiballistic crew

vehicle design does not mean that we should ignore the merits of a winged design.

Various lifting body research programs, as well 198 successful X–15 flights and 116

successful Shuttle landings (including approach and landing tests with the Enterprise vehicle) have demonstrated the efficacy with which unpowered descent and

landing can be performed. Highly efficient blended delta-wing, lifting body shapes,

such as the NASA Langley HL–20 and its derivatives, have been thoroughly characterized. So there is a wide range of attractive options available.

When considering winged vehicle designs, however, I think we have ignored one

of the best options, the straight-winged design, for somewhat specious reasons. All

else being equal, it is well understood that a straight-wing design will have less

mass, lower heat loads, a higher subsonic lift/drag ratio, a lower landing speed, a

shallower glide path on approach, and better subsonic handling characteristics than

a comparable delta-wing design. The delta-wing design offers as its principal advantage a somewhat greater entry crossrange capability than for a comparable straightwing design. This allows greater maneuverability from orbit to reach a given landing site, as opposed to waiting on-orbit for perhaps half a day for another opportunity to reach the site. The delta-wing design also allows the so-called ‘‘abort once

around,’’ meaning that the Shuttle can land at its launch site after only one orbit,

in the event of a severe anomaly. This greater atmospheric maneuverability was the

reason for its selection for the Space Shuttle design, and was a source of considerable controversy at the time. But in over a hundred Shuttle flights, operational

practice has shown that this enhanced crossrange capability is at most a minor convenience, rather than a significant enabling feature. Any consideration of a new,

winged, spaceplane should take these facts into account in determining a design

configuration.

When contemplating designs for a new winged space plane, it may not be beyond

the bounds of reason to examine the swing-wing concept, so successful on the F–

14 fighter aircraft. Providing robust, mass-efficient thermal protection of the wing

leading edges is among the most difficult, and unforgiving, tasks in a spaceplane

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design. With a swing-wing concept, it might be possible to avoid this task altogether. For such a vehicle, the atmospheric entry phase would be performed as a

semiballistic design, while terminal area energy management, approach, and landing would be performed as a conventional winged vehicle. As always, there are

tradeoff analyses to be conducted, but the concept may be worth pursuing.

The issue of OSP reusability is complex, which of course is why it attracts so

much debate. The primary reason to prefer a reusable vehicle is that, in all reason,

it should be cheaper to operate. Secondary reasons may include the fact that ground

and flight crews gain experience with the nuances of a particular machine, a valuable benefit when compared to the obvious risks of undertaking a maiden voyage

for every flight of an expendable vehicle. However, for the moment let us restrict

the discussion to economic issues.

The economic benefits of reusability are strongly conditioned by the cost of incorporating the necessary features into the design and fabrication of the vehicle, and

by its assumed flight rate and operational lifetime. As a simple example, if it will

cost five times more to build a reusable vehicle than to build a comparable expendable design, the reusable vehicle must fly five times to break even with the expendable, assuming their processing costs are similar. Moreover, most of the cost for the

reusable vehicle is incurred ‘‘up front,’’ while a greater proportion of the expendable

vehicle cost is incurred only when the next unit is actually procured. Time-valueof-money considerations can thus strongly benefit the expendable vehicle when

flight rates are low, and when decisions are made on a lowest life cycle cost basis.

The issue of designing to minimize life cycle cost is worth some discussion. It

should be noted that, over more than two decades of Shuttle operation, the program

has encountered much criticism because year-to-year operational costs have been

quite high when considered on a per flight basis. This has been directly traced, in

part, to early 1970s budget constraints on initial design and development, when numerous choices were made which had the effect of minimizing (or appearing to minimize) development cost, while increasing operational costs. Again because of timevalue-of-money considerations, the strategy of designing the vehicle to minimize development cost is closely akin to that of a design based on minimizing life cycle cost,

especially when the vehicle will be in service for a long time. While neither principle

is inherently wrong, each should be applied in moderation. Life cycle costs are heavily biased by early year, or ‘‘up front,’’ costs. It is always easy to defer operational

funding problems to the ‘‘out years.’’ Yet, when the ‘‘out years’’ arrive, as they always do, we seem consistently to regret the pattern of earlier choices, which were

of course intended to ‘‘save’’ money. Is it possible, this time, that we could at least

make a new mistake?

As outlined earlier, it will be tempting on economic grounds to consider an expendable design for OSP, for the reasons just mentioned. I believe this is a mistake;

if done, it will represent a failure of government to lead where industry, by itself,

cannot go. An argument to go backward, toward deliberate use of expendable vehicles for manned spaceflight, is an argument which inevitably favors the doing of less

manned spaceflight, precisely because out-year operational costs will always been

seen as unacceptably high when the out-years arrive. This should not be our goal.

With respect to cost, I would like to offer a cursory figure of merit, a target costper-pound of delivered hardware. It is well established within the aerospace community that such figures of merit offer a valid first-order estimate of likely program

cost; indeed, such parameters form the basis of all accepted cost models. Therefore,

I would advocate that the OSP design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E)

costs should be upper bounded at $100,000 per pound for the dry mass of the vehicle. The Nation’s experience base with reusable manned space vehicles is limited,

but both X–15 and the Space Shuttle orbiter would seem to fit this definition. In

recent-year dollars, both were completed at a DDT&E cost of approximately $90,000

per pound of delivered hardware. If the OSP is allowed to cost more, we are conveying the message that nothing at all has been learned in 40+ years of manned

spaceflight.

Regarding the program schedule, it seems inconceivable to me that a nation which

required only eight years to reach the moon, from virtually a standing start, can

require a similar or greater length of time to design and deploy a simple crew transport vehicle. If the OSP program requires more than five years—at the outside—

from authorization to proceed until first flight, it is being done wrong. My primary

recommendation, the only one I think can affect the outcome in a significant manner, is this: Define carefully the goals the OSP is to meet. Pick a strong, effective,

proven, and trusted program manager, and accord to him or her the total authority

and responsibility for success. Set aside the necessary funds, with adequate margin.

And then see to it that everyone else stays out of the way.

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• What challenges may NASA face in using an Expendable Launch Vehicle

(ELV) as the boost vehicle for the OSP? Does the use of an ELV for human

spaceflight pose an unacceptable risk?

In the 1950s and 1960s, the term ‘‘man rating’’ was coined to describe the process

of converting the military Redstone, Atlas, and Titan II vehicles to the requirements

of manned spaceflight. This involved a number of factors such as pogo suppression,

structural stiffening, and other details not particularly germane to today’s expendable vehicles. The concept of ‘‘man rating’’ in this sense is, I believe, no longer very

relevant.

If a winged design is chosen for OSP, there will be an issue of coupling between

the OSP vehicle aerodynamics and the launch vehicle structural dynamics. Briefly,

the OSP must be oriented and flown very close to its zero-lift aerodynamic angle

of attack. Any significant amount of lift on the OSP wings will create lateral loads

at the OSP/launch vehicle interface that are quite likely unacceptable, at least without additional structural reinforcement at that interface. However, it must be said

that launch vehicle loads are likely not the limiting factor; the wings of a spaceplane

cannot themselves accept high lateral loads without being ripped off. The problem

is a familiar one; the Shuttle must be flown with a nearly zero angle of attack for

similar reasons.

Therefore, irrespective of the launch system used for a winged OSP, the vehicle

must be flown at essentially a zero-lift angle of attack, and any variations due to

vehicle aeroelasticity must be carefully controlled. While the problem is certainly

not trivial, it is not likely to be any more difficult for the new evolved expendable

launch vehicle (EELV) than it will be for a winged OSP attached to a future RLV.

The base reliability of unmanned expendable vehicles seems to arouse concerns

where that of the manned Shuttle system inexplicably does not. Many, if not most,

unmanned payloads are of very high value, both for the importance of their mission,

as well as in simple economic terms. The relevant question may be posed quite simplistically: What, precisely, are the precautions that we would take to safeguard a

human crew that we would deliberately omit when launching, say, a billion dollar

Mars Exploration Rover (MER) mission? The answer is, of course, ‘‘none.’’ While we

appropriately value human life very highly, the investment we make in most unmanned missions is quite sufficient to capture our full attention.

Logically, therefore, launch system reliability is treated by all parties as a priority

of the highest order, irrespective of the nature of the payload, manned or unmanned. While there is no EELV flight experience as yet, these modern versions

of the Atlas and Delta should be as inherently reliable as their predecessors. Their

specified design reliability is 98 percent, a value typical of that demonstrated by the

best expendable vehicles. If this is achieved, and I believe that it will be, and given

a separate escape system with an assumed reliability of even 90 percent, the fatal

accident rate would be 1 in 500 launches, substantially better than for the Shuttle.

Thus, I believe that launching OSP on an expendable vehicle would pose no greater

risk—and quite likely somewhat less risk—for human spaceflight than is already accepted for the Shuttle.

BIOGRAPHY FOR MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN

Michael D. Griffin is President and Chief Operating Officer of In-Q-Tel, the independent, nonprofit venture group chartered to identify and invest in cutting edge

commercial technologies for intelligence community applications.

Mike was previously CEO of the Magellan Systems Division of Orbital Sciences

Corporation, and also served as General Manager of Orbital’s Space Systems Group

and as the company’s Executive Vice President/Chief Technical Officer. Prior to joining Orbital, he was Senior Vice President for Program Development at Space Industries International, and General Manager of the Space Industries Division in Houston.

Mike has served as both the Chief Engineer and the Associate Administrator for

Exploration at NASA, and as the Deputy for Technology of the Strategic Defense

Initiative Organization. Before joining SDIO, he played a leading role in numerous

space missions while employed at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory,

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and Computer Sciences Corporation.

Mike holds seven degrees in the fields of Physics, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace Engineering, Civil Engineering, and Business Administration, and has been

an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University, the Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Maryland. He is the lead author of over two dozen

technical papers and the textbook Space Vehicle Design. He is a recipient of the

NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal, the AIAA Space Systems Medal, and the

54

DoD Distinguished Public Service Medal, and is a Fellow of the AIAA and the AAS.

He is also a Registered Professional Engineer in Maryland and California, and a

Certified Flight Instructor with instrument and multiengine ratings.

DISCUSSION

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Dr. Griffin. I

guess I will start the questioning, and I wonder if we could have

this graphic back up on the board up there, Mr. Gregory’s graphic,

is that possible? There it is.

55

Mr. Gregory, if you could—you know, I am taking a look at your

graphic here of the Orbital Space Plane, and the big tanks here

and can you describe for us what is on top of that tank there?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, that looks like a winged vehicle, but it was

not intended to focus you in on something that looked like a winged

vehicle. So I apologize for that and the lateness of the testimony.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Oh, I see. So that really—what do we

have in mind? If we don’t have in mind a winged vehicle, could—

maybe you could describe what is—we are going to put up there

and what you have in mind now.

Mr. GREGORY. In this particular configuration, if you can disregard the tail on it, which you are looking at, what you would

have is an unshrouded vehicle that could be either a Crew Transport Vehicle or a Crew Rescue Vehicle. In the Crew Transport Vehicle, and let me tell you why it is unshrouded. Part of the ability

to increase the safety would be the ability to safely remove the

crew from a launch vehicle. And so it would have to be unshrouded,

and as such, it could not be in the Space Shuttle. And so at least

on the Crew Transport Vehicle version of it——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. That—it would—what would it look

like? I know it is not shrouded. Do you have a design for the——

Mr. GREGORY. No, sir, we do not.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I think that is what I was getting at.

Mr. GREGORY. Oh, yes, sir.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. So in reality, we have this graphic, but

we don’t have anything at the end of these rockets, do we?

Mr. GREGORY. During the——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. So really there is nothing to put on the

end of this graphic. It was just sort of thrown here. I don’t—anyway, let me just suggest that my—if my memory serves me correctly, for the last five years, I have been personally supporting the

allocation of resources that would—and to the tune of tens of millions of dollars both for Air Force and for NASA expenditures that

would, in some way, develop an Orbital Space Plane, military space

plane, you name it, Crew Return Vehicle, all of these. And we still

don’t have anything after spending all of those tens of millions of

dollars that I personally have been involved in as Chairman of this

subcommittee. We have got nothing to show for it up here. There

is nothing to put on the end of your graphic. Let me just say I am

disappointed, and we will leave it at that.

CANCELLATION OF ALT ACCESS TO STATION

I have another question. The size of the crew on the Space Station was just reduced from three to two. Is this a—is there a vote?

Okay. The size of the crew on the Space Station was just reduced

from three people to two last week, because we can not keep them

supplied, as I noted in my opening statement, with water, food, and

other supplies. Scientific research will thus be slashed from 20

hours to 9 hours per week, which was as you know, a reduction to

a reduction. NASA’s Alternative Access Program, which is intended

to demonstrate the capability for just providing the various type of

need that we are talking about, I guess that has been—now we are

looking forward to ending that program. Now given that, how could

we cancel that program that is designed specifically to deal with

56

this challenge? And then—and with any straight face saying, oh,

we are going to just rely on the Shuttle, which we all—which we

know now is, you know, a risky proposition at best at this point.

And if—and will this decision to cancel this program be revisited?

Mr. GREGORY. Certainly the Columbia accident has caused an

awful lot of rethinking. During the reassessment, and certainly including the recommendations of the Adm. Gehman Board, we are

looking at, certainly, what would have to be modified with the

Space Shuttle, what the impact on the Space Station would be, perhaps new re-balancing with the international partners, but also we

will look at the kinds of technologies that would be necessary in

the future to support the future.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. But we have determined that the Alternate Access Program, which is aimed right at an immediate

need, should be canceled. We are going to look at all of that other

stuff, but here we have an immediate need at making sure that we

get that supply to the Station, and that program is canceled, and

we are not looking to that.

Mr. GREGORY. That program has been canceled, yes, sir. You are

absolutely right.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Does that make sense to you? It makes

no sense to me.

Mr. GREGORY. Well, if you look back at how we got to this—as

we got to this decision, we have to look back at how NASA was

going to acquire the alternate access or the heavy-lift launch vehicles. It included quite an acknowledgment of a very large commercial market. That commercial market has decreased significantly.

We are looking at common technology with the military at this

point and that is ongoing. We are certainly now looking at what

would be necessary as an alternate cargo transport capability, both

up and down, and how that could——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. But you are looking at that within the

context of just one particular program, not in terms of competition

among various alternatives.

Mr. GREGORY. Well, we are looking at this not only for the nearterm, but also for future terms as NASA expands its role.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. But you are looking at this within—

just in the context of one program being evaluated in time rather

than a program designed to look at all alternatives.

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, this summer, we will be looking at the entire

spectrum, not just one alternative.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. But then why isn’t it part of a—why

isn’t it organized into an organized decision-making rather than

talking about the various projects that you are talking—in other

words we have an access program that is now being canceled,

right? It is this Alternative Access——

Mr. GREGORY. The Alternative Access Program has been canceled.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Right. So but now you are telling me

we are continuing to look at the various options individually.

Mr. GREGORY. We are looking at the kinds of technology that will

be necessary to support whatever the future missions happen to be.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, anyway, we will—there

will be a second round, but I do not want to hog my time here. Mr.

57

Gordon has some very important questions to ask as well. Mr. Gordon, you may proceed.

NASA WORKFORCE ISSUES

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gregory, you digressed from your remarks to compliment Chairman Boehlert on

his NASA Flexibility Act, so let me just quickly also digress. If Admiral Gehman were to say that his report would address some of

the workforce issues that could be relevant within the NASA Flexibility Act, do you think it would prudent for us to wait to hear

what he had to say a few weeks before that we pass this bill?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, I think that the—I think the bill includes

more than just the workforce as associated with the Space Shuttle.

Mr. GORDON. Right, but I mean but if Admiral came and were

to say that his report could have information relative to this bill,

do you think it would be prudent for us to wait a few weeks and

hear that?

Mr. GREGORY. At this point, Mr. Gordon, I have not heard any

feedback from Admiral——

Mr. GORDON. Well, let us just—again, if Admiral Gehman—let

me—this is—I think this is a fairly clear question, isn’t it? If Admiral Gehman were to say that his Board could have some recommendations concerning the workforce that would be relevant to

this bill, do you think it would be prudent to wait to hear from him

before we pass this bill?

Mr. GREGORY. No, sir, I don’t believe so. I believe that the content of the bill should cover—if Admiral Gehman should recommend changes, they should cover all of the problems.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Gregory, I would say that is a sloppy way to

approach legislating, and I hope that you will take a little more seriously your job and trying to listen to his recommendations on fixing the Shuttle.

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, you are presupposing Admiral Gehman.

Mr. GORDON. No, sir, I am—well, let me just tell you this. Admiral Gehman told us, told the Chairman, told me, told Chairman

Boehlert that their report would have recommendations concerning

the workforce.

Mr. GREGORY. Well, this——

Mr. GORDON. So let us put it in the specific, so now that he said

that it will, do you think it would be prudent for us to listen to

what he had to say before we pass this legislation?

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, I believe that the content of the legislation

would not be effected one way or the other by Admiral

Gehman’s——

Mr. GORDON. Well, how are we going to know? You said, you

know—how are we going to know that until we hear what Admiral

Gehman has to say?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, you have heard, sir, and I——

Mr. GORDON. I know, and he stated he would.

Mr. GREGORY. Well, have you looked at the bill? Can you determine if there is an impact?

Mr. GORDON. I—all—I haven’t heard—Admiral Gehman has only

told us that he will have recommendations concerning this. He has

not told us what they are, and that is why, again, it would seem

58

to me prudent legislating would mean that we should listen to

what he has to say before we—knowing he is going to come before

us just in a matter of weeks. Again, I think it would be sloppy otherwise. You can take what—however you are going to do your job

the way you think you need to do it.

CANCELLATION OF X–38/CRV

Let me move on. Mr. Gregory, I have a number of questions

about the Orbital Space Plane that I would like to cover with you

and other witnesses today, however, I want to take a minute to

talk about something that has been very troubling. Last June, Mr.

Hall, the Ranking Member of the Committee, wrote to Administrator O’Keefe about the cancellation of the X–38 program. In response to one of Mr. Hall’s questions, Ambassador—or rather Administrator O’Keefe wrote, on September the 30th, the following response: ‘‘Based on an independent assessment of X–38 CRV project

conducted in 1999, an X–38 CRV program would cost approximately $3 billion depending on the approach used in design, development tests and evaluation, and production.’’ That didn’t square

with what we have been told previously, so Mr. Hall and I asked

for a copy of that assessment. What turns out that the Administrator’s characterization of the study was not accurate. What the aerospace study actually said was that CRV fleet costs would cost $2.45

billion if NASA followed a business-as-usual approach and that the

CRV fleet would cost only $1.26 billion if NASA followed the approach advocated by the X–38 Project Officer. And your cost analysis division acknowledged as much in the summary charts that

came over with the study. And Mr. Gregory, I am concerned that

NASA would tell the Ranking Member of this committee something

that appears to be both inaccurate and misleading, and we never

would have found this out if we hadn’t asked for the report. So Mr.

Gregory, do you agree with me that NASA’s response to Mr. Hall

was misleading?

Mr. GREGORY. I think that NASA’s response to Congressman

Hall was accurate.

Mr. GORDON. Well, then let me—I don’t want to take the time

of the Committee, so if—would you write us and explain why you

think——

Mr. GREGORY. I will.

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. It was not misleading since you——

Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir, I will.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Thank you. Okay. And the reason I raise

this, we are—you know, we really want to try to do our job properly. We have to have good information and credible information.

And we need to have a trusting relationship that we are getting

that information. So if on the surface it seems pretty clear to me,

but I would appreciate then you can write us and tell us why you

disagree.

Mr. GREGORY. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

59

60

Mr. GORDON. Now, Mr. Gregory, I am—I need to move quickly

here. I am trying to understand the rationale for the Orbital Space

Plane, so I am going to ask you some quick questions here. It is

my understanding that the Orbital Space Plane does not replace

the Shuttle, the Space Shuttle but simply supplements. Is this correct?

Mr. GREGORY. When the Orbital Space Plane begins its operation, as far as the crew transport portion of it would, it would supplement.

Mr. GORDON. Right. So the answer to that is correct?

Mr. GREGORY. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. I am just trying to—I am not trying to hurry

you, but I don’t want to—I have a limited amount of time here. It

is also my understanding that you plan to continue flying the Shuttle to the Space Station to deliver cargo and bring cargo back, is

that correct?

Mr. GREGORY. That is correct.

Mr. GORDON. So under your current plan, you will be flying both

the Orbital Space Plane and the Shuttle to the Station, is that correct?

Mr. GREGORY. That would be correct.

Mr. GORDON. So accelerating the Orbital Space Plane program,

even if it were possible, wouldn’t allow us to shut down the Shuttle

program any sooner, is that correct?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, there is a decision point in the middle of the

next decade where we would make that decision, sir.

Mr. GORDON. But still, that decision point is out further, so you

still wouldn’t be shutting down the Shuttle program any time soon?

Mr. GREGORY. No, sir. When we got an operational Crew Transport Vehicle and Crew Rescue Vehicle, there would be a period of

time where there would be a transition. And then as the transition

began to prove further, the reliability and the safety and the flexibility and——

61

Mr. GORDON. But you sure aren’t going to have the flexibility to

do cargo and other heavy loads.

Mr. GREGORY. The Shuttle, in fact, could be downloaded from a

human transport, as——

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Mr. GREGORY [continuing]. Was——

Mr. GORDON. Right. But you are still going to have to have them

both. I assume you are going to take heavy cargo or——

Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So that is—the answer is yes, specific to the

question then.

Mr. GREGORY. Well, sir, let me qualify that. It certainly could be

used as heavy cargo or whatever the next cargo vehicle happens to

be.

Mr. GORDON. The Orbital Space Plane could be used?

Mr. GREGORY. No, sir. The Shuttle could be used.

Mr. GORDON. Right. Right. So you are going to have—I mean,

simply put, you are going to have to have them both. You are going

to have to have the Orbital Space Plane for your—for transporting

your individuals. You are going to have to continue to have the

Shuttle for heavy load.

Mr. GREGORY. Right.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. That is all I was trying to ask. So what do

you estimate the marginal cost of the Orbital Space Plane flight to

be?

Mr. GREGORY. I don’t have that information, sir. I can provide

that to you.

[The information referred to follows:]

MATERIAL REQUESTED FOR THE RECORD

Cost estimation for the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) is in progress. NASA is committed to providing responsible, credible cost and budget estimates prior to committing to new development programs. We will be following NASA policy guidelines of

using the formulation phase of the OSP Program, to be completed by the end of FY

2004, to establish cost and schedule commitments for the implementation phase. At

that point, the requirements and conceptual design will be sufficiently understood

to ensure a responsible and credible development cost commitment is made. As part

of the OSP system design process, each competing architecture contractor is providing life cycle cost estimates as a major deliverable. Government cost experts are

developing cost estimates in parallel, utilizing legacy cost data from prior programs

along with improved and validated cost analysis and estimating tools. A Cost Credibility External Review Team, reporting to the OSP Program Manager, is being established to provide expert assistance in ensuring credible cost estimation. In addition, an independent cost validation will be performed utilizing a Cost Analysis Requirements Document, as used by the Department of Defense and on the International Space Station Program. These various cost estimates will be studied and

understood prior to the Full Scale Development decision. In addition, we are ensuring fiscal accountability on all ongoing OSP Program activities by using a proven

Earned Value Management system to track actual cost and schedule performance

as compared to plans.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Thank you. Well, the working assumption on

the OSP program is that you will need to launch it on a heavy

EELV rocket, is that correct?

Mr. GREGORY. On an EELV or an ELV depending on which configuration you are talking about.

Mr. GORDON. All right. Now as I understand it, the price of a heavy EELV is in the range of $150 million per launch, and could

62

wind up being much higher due to the lack of a big commercial

market, is that correct?

Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. And then, of course, you have also got the

cost of processing the Orbital Space Plane between flights, that is

correct?

Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So it seems reasonable to conclude that the

Orbital Space Plane will cost as much and possibly much more

than the Space Shuttle per flight, do you agree?

Mr. GREGORY. I can not answer that, sir. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. GORDON. Well, do you know what the cost of the Space Shuttle is now? It is 115 million. So if the cost of the Space Shuttle is

115 million and you are going to have to be spending well over 150

million, then you are not saving any money, are you——

Mr. GREGORY. Well, I can’t——

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. On the——

Mr. GREGORY. [continuing]. Discuss the relative costs, the marginal costs with you, but the—as we determine that there is an Orbital Space Plane requirement, we based it on improving safety,

greater assured access to space, flexibility, and things of that nature. And so the discussion about the Orbital Space Plane, which

is——

Mr. GORDON. [continuing]——but you are going to have to use

them both.

Mr. GREGORY. It is not purely a discussion of money versus

money.

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. With that, we have a series of votes. Bart, let me note that I think $150 million guesstimate for

the cost per Shuttle flight is fairly low. We had four flights last

year, and I think it was a——

Mr. GORDON. That is the marginal cost.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Marginal cost. For another one.

Mr. GORDON. Yes, because you have to keep it going anyway,

so——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I see.

Mr. GORDON. So the question of saving money then is off the

table in terms of a reason to have the Orbital Space Plane.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Now if you do have to take—if you do

have to take the program going.

Mr. GORDON. Which he is—which he said that we do. So you—

so there has to be other reasons, because you are certainly not saving any money there.

Mr. BARTON. Would the gentleman yield before we go for a

break?

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I certainly will.

Mr. BARTON. I just want to add to what our Ranking Member

and our Subcommittee Chairman said. It is an assumption that we

are going to keep the orbital Shuttle going.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. BARTON. It is an assumption. I am very skeptical of that, and

I hear a lot of skepticism by the Chairman and the Ranking MemVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
63

ber on that. So that may be an assumption that is a false assumption.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Right. Would—this is a very important

hearing. We need to discuss this. We are the ones in Congress who

are going to be most involved with making the decisions on these

things once we hear from the Gehman Commission. I would suggest that we go for these four votes, we grab a quick bit to eat and

be back here at 12:30. And we will resume this hearing at 12:30.

Thank you very much. Until then, we are in recess.

[Recess.]

ENDING THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM

Mr. BARTON [presiding]. The Subcommittee will come to order.

Chairman Rohrabacher is not yet back, and he has asked if I would

reconvene the hearing. We had—when we recessed, Congressman,

I think, Gordon had asked the last round of questions, so we are

going to—I am the next one to ask questions, so the Chair would

recognize himself for five minutes.

I would like to make a statement first. I was on this subcommittee back when the Challenger accident occurred. We had a

debate at that time whether to build a new technology Orbiter.

Congressman Nelson was the Subcommittee Chairman. He is now

a Senator. He is one of the two Congressmen who have been in

space. We decided because the Orbiter fleet was so young and we

thought we could correct the problems that we didn’t need to build

a new technology Orbiter. We have now had the Columbia accident. I am a registered professional engineer. Our Chairman has

returned as I say this, and an accident rate of one every 62c missions and 14 Americans have lost their lives is not acceptable. And

it is my opinion that we can’t make the existing Orbiter as safe as

it needs to be. The original programs, the Mercury program, the

Apollo program, the Gemini program, basically had military astronauts who were, most of them, former test pilots. And we assumed

that it was acceptable, the amount of risk to get the programs

going. I don’t think that it is acceptable now.

So my statement is, you know, I am not going to vote for any

funding for the existing Orbiter to go back up into space. You

know, I think we ought to scrap that program. I think we ought

to spend the money on building the best technology Orbital Space

Plane that we have. If it takes 10 years to do it, so be it. We put

a man on the moon between 1961 and 1969 in the Apollo program.

We certainly have the technology to do something similar today, if

we were to decide we want to put the resources into it. Now that

is the $64 question: is this country willing to put the kind of resources into manned space flight with the new technology Space

Plane or Orbiter that we did in the Mercury and the Gemini and

the Apollo days? And I don’t know the answer to that. But I am

just not going to sit by and put Americans at risk every time they

go into space. If we had the same accident rate in our commercial

aviation industry, thousands of people would be killed everyday in

this country, and we would not accept it.

So the other questioners have been a little more elliptical, a little

more nonjudgmental, but I don’t want to go through another investigation if I am in Congress six or seven or eight years from now

64

when we have the third Orbiter crash and kill another five or six

or seven astronauts. I am just not going to do that. So I am going

to ask you, Dr. Griffin, in your testimony you mentioned you were

the—you came the closest to being skeptical about the existing Orbiter still being used. Do you want to elaborate on that?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. I am not—I would not consider

myself skeptical. I want to phase-out the Shuttle, no ifs, ands, or

buts. I think that is the right thing to do. Given the investment

we have in International Space Station today and given that it

must be supported or eventually it will come down, and given that

today there is no other means to support it, in the words I used

in my testimony, we must do those things minimally necessary to

fly it until we can replace it with a, I hope, better system.

Mr. BARTON. Well, how soon, in your opinion, and I am going to

give Dr. Gregory—or Mr. Gregory an opportunity to answer this

same question. How soon, in your opinion, could we come up with

an alternative Space Plane or Orbiter that could service the Space

Station if we just stop putting resources into the existing Orbiter

fleet?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I think we need six months to study the issues and

make the decision on which of several attractive paths we would

like to go. And if we are not flying five years after that decision

is made, we have done something wrong.

Mr. BARTON. Okay. Mr. Gregory, would you like to respond to

that?

Mr. GREGORY. If you—your question, as I understand it, is if we

stopped the Shuttle right now——

Mr. BARTON. Stopped putting all resources into it is——

Mr. GREGORY. But basically don’t fly it again.

Mr. BARTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREGORY. Then I would guess that we would be talking

about an activity that might be in line with Apollo, if you are only

talking about human back and forth, not cargo. And I would

guess——

Mr. BARTON. I am a proponent of manned space flight. I have got

a record a mile long. I am not some—I don’t want to anger my

democratic friends, but I am not some wild-eyed, tree-hugging liberal who has been against the space program. I am as strong a proponent of it as there is, but I just—I don’t think you can sustain

the safety of the existing Orbiter fleet in a way that is acceptable.

Mr. GREGORY. You know, part of this Orbital Space Plane program that includes crew transport has taken into consideration

your concerns. And if you were to do that without a requirement

to support the Shuttle and if the Shuttle costs were not subtracted,

then I would guess that in the 7- to 8-year period you could have

a replacement for the human portion of it, not the cargo. So I think

I am in line with Dr. Griffin.

Mr. BARTON. Well, my time is expired, and I am going to turn

the Chair back over to the Subcommittee Chairman, but I will vote

for expanded resources for manned space flight. I will argue for it

on the Floor. I will fight for it at the Appropriations Committee,

with the Senate, and with the President, if necessary. So I am not

backing away from that commitment, but I am through turning my

eyes to an accident rate that costs human lives at the rate that the

65

existing orbital fleet does. It just—it is not, to my mind, the right

approach any more. I don’t know where the rest of the Subcommittee and the Full Committee is, but that is where I am very

firmly.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. We have this room until 1:30, and so

we probably will utilize that time, and so everyone will get a second round, if they want it, and we will try to be as generous as

we can. Let me note that there are alternatives overseas that can

carry us through a few years while we develop things of our own.

We will go probably explore that a little bit later on.

We have a very active Member, of course, from Texas, and—who

has always got great ideas, but he is also very aggressive when it

comes to these issues, so we are going to unleash him on you right

now. Mr. Lampson.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I love your introductions. Typically I look—try to look to the future. And I don’t mean

to turn to the back and to consider a decision that has been made,

but I think it is important for us to recognize that when a decision

is not made with the greatest of thought, that perhaps we can

learn from it and hopefully do something different. And so in that

line, I would—have a—some questions about just some things that

I think are hard for us to be considering right now.

ISS CREW RETURN AGREEMENTS

Under the international agreements, Mr. Gregory, governing the

International Space Station, the United States has a commitment

to provide a crew rescue capability by 2006. We have already discussed all of that. And that the Russian commitment to provide the

Soyuz return vehicle for non-Russian crew members expires in

2006. When the Administration canceled the existing CRV program

in early 2001, what was the alternative while fulfilling that obligation through 2006?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, first of all——

Mr. LAMPSON. Or after 2006.

Mr. GREGORY [continuing]. After 2006.

Mr. LAMPSON. Yeah.

Mr. GREGORY. The Russians have always been committed to

transport and return three folks. And during the time frame when

we have three people on board, a combination of Russians and

Americans, the Russian Soyuz was available for that. Even after

2006, the Russians are still available—are still responsible for

transporting up and back three. Now at that point, as originally

planned, the Station would be enhanced with a greater number

than three, a number that was based on a set of science requirements. And so there will always be a Russian Soyuz in support of

the Russian members on board.

The CRV, as you correctly identified, preceded by the prototype

X–38, the CRV was supposed to be available in that time frame.

In my searching of the documents and looking at the history, it appeared as though the X–38, when the CRV was scrubbed, was not

going to be available as a prototype until the 2008 time frame. And

the costs——

Mr. LAMPSON. Why did you—why do you—why are you saying

that?

66

Mr. GREGORY. Well, the assessments that I have seen, sir, and

I have reviewed as many documents, and we can provide all of

those for the record, if you like, it talked about the 2006 or whatever the time frame was a bit optimistic in that it was probably

going to be pushed to the right. At the same time, there were discussions about the cost. And I have seen, as you have seen the $1.3

billion, which was a rapid prototype of the—a number that was

around $1.5 or $2 billion, which was business as usual, which is

not a full cost, but the way we had previously accounted for things.

But I have also seen numbers that were in the $3 billion to $5 billion.

And so I think that when they began looking at the X–38, exactly

what its capability was, the indefinite availability and the imprecise cost, a decision was made to not use that as a vehicle, but to

begin to look at a multi-purpose vehicle or a series of vehicles. And

that is what my research has shown. And if it is any different from

yours, perhaps we can——

RESTART X–38/CRV

Mr. LAMPSON. I would appreciate it if you would provide that information for the record. And if I could ask our technician to put

this chart up, please.

[The information referred to follows:]

MATERIAL REQUESTED FOR THE RECORD

NASA provided the cost assessment and documentation supporting the cancellation of the X–38 CRV project to House Space and Aeronautics Committee staff with

formal notification to Congressmen Hall and Gordon by letter dated January 15,

2003. A copy of the letters and supporting documentation is located in Appendix 2:

Additional Material for the Record.

67

This—I got this a year ago from the Team, the X–38 Team at the

Johnson Space Center. And there was never—I never heard of any

disagreement with the numbers that were put there. So I would be

most interested in having the documentation of what you are explaining to us for the record for this committee. I think it is important for us to understand that.

The Orbital Space Plane wouldn’t be available for crew returns.

Well, no, let me back up for a second. We know that the language

in your testimony, I think, said that when we go out for the bids

or the design information on the Orbital Space Plane, we could reconsider use of a separate facility for a crew return, right. And that

68

could certainly be, so can you tell me what it would take to restart

X–38?

Mr. GREGORY. I think one of the strengths of the approach that

NASA has now in both the acquisition strategy and also bringing

on board the three primary contractors, I think in their deliberation, the X–38 could show up again as—or a derivative of the X–

38. But it also might show an advanced capsule or something else.

And so I think that I would not rule out something that looks like

the X–38, but I have been waiting until these three primary contractors come back with their recommendations.

Mr. LAMPSON. It is—and I know that because we shut it down

and in my opinion shut it down prematurely at a cost that would

have been greater to complete at least the phase within which it

was in that now that we give consideration to starting it back up

that we will have made a decision that is going to cost us tens of

millions of dollars if not hundreds of millions of dollars if we assume that that was a good decision.

Mr. GREGORY. Well, I don’t know if we have agreed that we will

start it up.

Mr. LAMPSON. I understand. I said if we chose to do that. I—

there may be other things. But it seems to me that somehow or

other we have—we don’t always—haven’t always looked at the best

way to attack the problems that we are facing. And if we have a

vision of something, if we know where we are going to go and it

goes back to the comments that you all were saying a while ago

or somebody, maybe it was Dr. Griffin, that if we are going to build

a facility and another line of questioning that I didn’t get to, and

I am running out of time already, when we know that the Space

Station is going to be phased out by 2016, at least considered to

phase-out, we have no plan for the Orbital Space Plane beyond

that. We are going to potentially use it for four years. We have an

extreme cost for it. I really wonder the logic in what we are doing

with the money that we have and what we are going to be doing

beyond all of those times. And I will give back my time. We will

come back to it in a few minutes.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. We will try to give everybody a second

round. And we would now like to hear from Sheila Jackson Lee I

believe was first. Go right ahead.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

this is a very important hearing. Mr. Chairman, let me ask if I

might put my entire opening statement in the record and ask

unanimous consent.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Oh, sure, without objection.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And proceed. First of all, let me indicate to

the panelists that we spent a lot of time reviewing your testimony,

but the best part is being able to hear you. And I apologize. I was

in Judiciary Committee with a hearing with respect to a large

merger of a communications company, one owned by Ruppert

Murddock, and so I was not able to be here at the beginning. But

this is a very interesting area for me, and I would like to specifically offer my special welcome to Deputy Administrator Frederick

Gregory. You were confirmed last August, and I hope and look forward to us having a series of meetings. Certainly I am very much

impressed by your vast experience as an astronaut, and particuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:11 Nov 28, 2003 Jkt 086869 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA03\050803\86869 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
69

larly your service on the safety and mission assurance issues that

are going to be a great asset during these very tough times.

And I might add that we all suffer our ups and downs. Sometimes staff gets our materials in, sometimes they don’t. So we are

fully understanding of that, and I look forward to having the opportunity to chat with you on a number of issues.

Let me compliment as well the witnesses as it relates to the technology of the Orbiter plane. And my commentary and questions

will not be in disregard of the importance of that technology. But

I think it is important to highlight that the importance of a vehicle

going to space and particularly the International Space Station is

to carry crew, one, and to be able to carry cargo. That is very, very

important, one of the enhanced tragedies. The first, and number

one, tragedy, of course, of Columbia 7 just recently is the enormous

loss of life, the talent, the wonderful people that we lost, our family

members from the Texas area. But added to that, of course, was

the research that was lost. And so we understand the Orbital

Space Plane, for example, will not be ready until four years before

we shut down the International Space Station. And then we wonder, of course, why we are going forward with a design of a vehicle

and we have not yet addressed the question of how many people

we want to take into space.

So I am going to pose some questions on the safety aspect. As

I say that, let me make it perfectly clear that I join Congressman

Barton, my colleague from Texas. And of course, as I heard his

words as I was entering the room, I am truly supportive, and I appreciate his support, because he is sort of way up the way in Texas

on the manned space flight. But I join him, and I link with him.

And I assume the Chairman, I don’t want to speak for the Chairman, and certainly my colleague Nick Lampson, on the questions

of safety. And certainly Columbia 7 raises just nightmares. And I

am hoping that this committee, Mr. Chairman, will soon be in the

investigatory mode of reviewing and not just leaving it to the Committee that is there in Houston. They are doing a fine job, but they

need to be before us on this investigation. I hope we will see that

soon.

And the Soyuz, I am grateful to them that they landed, but they

scared us to death. And I—that is something that I think is going

to not be a standard of tolerance that we like to do so. OSP, what

does the statement mean that the OSP will have a requirement to

be safer than the Shuttle? And what does that mean, or the Russian Soyuz, what is the current level of catastrophic accident risk

for the Shuttle? And what is the current level of catastrophic accident risk for the Soyuz? And if you can’t provide these numbers,

isn’t it true that you can’t define what it would mean for the OSP

to be safer than the Shuttle or the Soyuz? And I would appreciate

your response on those.

[The information referred to follows:]

MATERIAL REQUESTED FOR THE RECORD

The predicted risk of catastrophic Shuttle failure during a mission is 1 in 265.

This risk was based on the 2000 update to the 1998 Quantitative Risk Assessment

System (QRAS) model. The Shuttle program is completing a new probabilistic risk

analysis for the Space Shuttle due out in the fall of this year.

70

The Soyuz refers to the launch vehicle and to the crewed spacecraft. Since 1980,

when the current version of the Soyuz launch vehicle was put into service, it has

flown 577 times, with 562 successful missions. The Soyuz spacecraft first launched

on April 23, 1967; there have been two catastrophic failures out of approximately

89 missions.

I—and for a moment, Mr. Chairman, are you sitting in the chair

over there? May I, just for a moment, just say that I would like

those inquiries with respect to when we are going to get into the

meat and flesh of the investigation of Columbia 7 and I add to it

Soyuz. I know your leadership, but I really believe that Congress

has an obligation and duty to get into this in a very directed manner, but as quickly as we possibly can. There are many who are

looking for questions, and they really do look, Mr. Chairman, from

those answers, questions and answers, from the United States Congress. I——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And with any luck, we will have a second round of questions for you today, so we should get on with the

question and answers.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The question——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. You may answer the question that was

posed.

Mr. GREGORY. The requirement in the Level 1 says that it will

be safer than the Shuttle and the Soyuz. We can look at the history

of the Soyuz to determine what the number is. And if you allow

me, I will provide that for the record. For the American Shuttle,

based on probabilistic risk assessments and assessments that have

been done prior to the Columbia accident, the entire mission was

given a number like 1 in 250 or so, and please forgive me on the

tens. For the ascent, it was 1 in about 500 or so. So in fact, the

entire mission had a lower—or had a higher risk than just the ascent portion of it. And if that is okay, ma’am, I will provide the

Soyuz numbers to you.

And so we are talking about something that is better than that.

And when we talk about a vehicle of some sort on top of an expendable launch vehicle, and my apologies to the Chairman, I can’t define exactly what it looks like, but with the escape mechanism, it

is anticipated that our safety would be greater for the crew with

that configuration.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I would like to pursue it, if I have

the opportunity to be here for a second round and to press the envelope on this issue. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And thank you very much. Is Mr.

Sherman—has he left? Okay. We will make sure we go directly to

him when he comes back, but in the meantime, we will start a second round of questions. And let me just note the frustration of this

committee and it is—this is extraordinarily frustrating. And I mentioned earlier on that this—that I have personally been involved,

as Chairman of this subcommittee, in making sure that revenues

were available both through the Air Force and NASA for various

projects that could be labeled military space plane or orbital maneuvering vehicle or whatever is up there. So you know, we—a

Crew Return Vehicle, you name it, there has been money available

for the last five or six years on this. I know. I helped put it in the

budget. And yet we don’t have any idea of what the configuration

will look like much less have a blueprint ready to go. And here we

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are in the middle of a crisis. This does not speak well of America’s

space program and the people who are managing America’s space

program. And I am sorry. It is—maybe Mr. Myers, who was part

of America’s space program when it was being a little more successful, might want to comment on this overall problem.

Mr. Myers.

Mr. MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I went through the Apollo program, and, of course, had one major accident in that program

where we lost three brave astronauts. And I have always given

them credit for a large part of the success of the Apollo program,

because that accident galvanized every man in the program to do

the very best they could possibly do in making a reliable spacecraft.

And we proved it with Apollo 7 where it was judged to be 101 percent successful. And we proved it by going around the moon with

a second Apollo manned flight. And we proved it with Apollo 11.

We started the Shuttle program, because we saw there an opportunity to have a major breakthrough in cost of transport to space.

Well, it didn’t turn out that way. We thought we could develop

equipment as reliable as aircraft equipment. And it turned out that

we still had to do the tender loving care of every part of the vehicle

to make a successful flight. And that is where it has been ever

since. It never has really matured to what a commercial

aircraft——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Is this due to management or is this

due to just the fact that humankind has not reached a technological stage?

Mr. MYERS. I think it is the latter. I think that I have come to

judge that the space programs, with the enormously difficult environment that we are involved in getting into space and the lack of

immense production base of the components that are used for the

spacecraft require that kind of individual attention to each of the

components to be able to get a successful program. And I went

through the—I watched the attempts on the part of NASA to make

major improvements in the cost of launching to space. And you are

all familiar with them. The single-stage-to-orbit was going to be the

one—a giant step that didn’t work. And the Tokyo Express with

the supersonic combustion ramjet engines that didn’t make it.

And——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. X–33 didn’t make it, you know,

but——

Mr. MYERS. I give them credit for trying to make a major reduction in the cost.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. But you know, nobody gets—nobody

ever gets credit for trying. It is what—it is people who do who get

written in the history books. And it seems to me that we have been

standing—you know, everybody says, ‘‘Oh, every generation, you

know, has to stand on the shoulders of the last generation to reach

even higher.’’ It seems we are not standing on the shoulders of the

last generation. It looks like we have been sitting in the lap of the

last generation and not willing to—not reaching—in fact, we are

not even reaching as high as the last generation. Mr. Griffin, what

about it. Is it bad management of America’s space effort that we

haven’t been succeeding and plowing any new ground or is it just

72

that we have reached these technological impasses that humankind

hasn’t reached that level yet?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Probably will cost me the last friends I have in the

world, but it is not the technology, it is the management. But it

isn’t just the NASA management. It is at the national level.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. GRIFFIN. When we were doing Apollo, there was a consensus

that we wanted to do Apollo. That didn’t mean everyone agreed. I

will remember that Senator Mondale attempted to use the unfortunate Apollo fire as a reason to cancel the program in—back in ’67.

But although it wasn’t unanimous, there was a consensus that we

were going to do it. That consensus led us to overcome the difficulties that are inevitably there, because we were operating at the

technological state-of-the-art, as we are today, even though that

state-of-the-art has changed. We can, if we wish, do more today

than we could during Apollo, we just choose not to. So it isn’t just

NASA management, or for that matter, in DOD space management. It is at the national level.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, you know, in every business operation, you know, you hear about the stories about not invented

here as a syndrome for just not examining new ideas. And you hear

about the various bureaucratic maladies that plague every enterprise. And I will say that I believe that these bureaucratic maladies are plaguing America’s space program, and we have a situation where both in the political end as well as in the management

end of America’s space program. And by the way, I am not just

talking about NASA here. I am talking about the big corporations

that are involved in this as well. I don’t see any courage on the

part of major corporations at all in this area. And I will—what

about you, Dr. Grey? The same—I am going to pose the same question to you and let everybody else get a chance to get in more detail

on this, but I would like to—what is this? Is this mismanagement

and incompetence or have we just reached this plateau where we

can’t do any more?

Dr. GREY. I am sort of halfway between Mr. Myers and Dr. Griffin. I think it is a combination of both. We have a very tough technological problem facing us. It has been facing us ever since we

have started the program, ever since we began looking into space.

Why did it take us 50 years to get into space in the first place?

And the reason is because it is tough, and the technology is still

tough and it is going to be tough.

Now as far as management is concerned, I think, to some degree,

I have to agree with you that NASA has been wallowing in a kind

of an indecision phase. The current indecision we are talking about

is Orbital Space Plane, and yet the concept that I see is not just

an Orbital Space Plane. It is kind of the beginning of the next reusable launch vehicle. We are mixing up the Orbital Space Plane and

the NGLT. I think that is a mistake. I think the Orbital Space

Plane has a near-term immediate concern, and that is servicing the

Space Station, which has been pointed out as maybe another 10 or

15 years. But then we should accelerate the NGLT so that we can

accelerate that decision to proceed to a true Shuttle replacement.

And here I kind of support what Mr. Barton said. I don’t want to

see the Shuttle stop flying. I think it is still a good machine, if it

73

gets fixed, but I think we do need a replacement for the Shuttle,

and we have been stalling that decision for a long time.

So let us not confuse the Orbital Space Plane’s mission and the

Next-Generation Launch Technology, which is going to develop our

next generation flying machine.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, let me just go on the record before we open up to everyone, and I know there is to be a lot of

questions in your direction to give you a chance to respond to this.

But let me just say this for the record. We have got a lot of options

here. And if anything makes sense, it is using your options to get

by a crisis situation, and the Russians are providing us an alternative right now. Rather than trying to spend a great deal of our

seed corn money and just getting through the crisis, we should

make sure we spend that seed corn money developing the new

technologies and utilizing the Russians where we can to make sure

we get through the crisis. The Russians are our friends. They want

to work with us. And let us—for Pete’s sake, let us use a creative

means of bringing down the cost and not shut off examination into,

you know, alternatives on how we can supply the Space Station in

a much cheaper way. Let us look at the cheap ways of doing things,

and I think that was your testimony, and build upon them but

using our seed corn for developing these new technologies that will

push us ahead and get us out of the lap of the last generation.

With that said, I have a vote, and I will turn this over to Joe,

and Mr.—I recognize Mr. Gordon, who should have more than five

minutes, Joe.

MARGINAL COST OF EELVS

Mr. GORDON. Okay. We are going to have to close down here

soon. There are a lot of very important questions, and I hope that

we all have a chance to discuss some more after. I concur with you,

Dr. Grey. I think there has been a stalling of decision. It seems

that we keep pushing these decisions out, and it keeps costing us

more the longer we wait. What I would at least like to do is close

on one issue, and so Mr. Gregory, let me once again go back. I will

try to do this quickly. I would assume that you would agree that

we are going to have to continue to have both the flights of the

Shuttle for the heavy lift capability until it is replaced or not needed for some reason, as well as having the Orbital Space Plane. So

you are going to have to have both of them flying.

Mr. GREGORY. I think that is a fair assumption.

Mr. GORDON. Right.

Mr. GREGORY. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. All right. And NASA has told us that it is—that

the marginal cost of a Space Shuttle is at $115 million. Have you

been able to get that confirmed?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, from my Comptroller here, I am told that

the marginal cost is 60 to 70 million per launch. The average cost,

I guess this is full cost—the——

Mr. GORDON. Yeah, the 115 is full cost accounting terms. Is that

what you—I am sorry. Go ahead.

Mr. GREGORY. If you will allow me to check——

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREGORY [continuing]. With my Comptroller.

74

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREGORY. The 60 to 70 is the marginal cost. It is not in full

cost. And the 600 million per launch is the average cost per launch.

Mr. GORDON. But now what about the—again, we were told that

115 million per flight in full cost accounting terms. Is that not accurate? Again, I don’t know these either. I mean, you are doing the

proper thing to ask for help here, because I——

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, will you allow us to research that? That is not

a known number to us.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. What—who told us that? Okay. We got—the

Office of Space Science told us that, so we might want to get that

confirmed. What—you know, I am not trying to be tricky.

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, let me add something to that number. What

I gave you was a Shuttle. And when you add the payload integration into that, then the number would go up. Perhaps that is the

origin of the number.

Mr. GORDON. I am just interested in what the cost of—and again,

of launching it in the full cost accounting terms. The point, and

then I will let you—if you are going to get back to me, we—you can

get back to me with these.

Mr. GREGORY. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

MATERIAL REQUESTED FOR THE RECORD

Cost estimation for the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) is in progress. NASA is committed to providing responsible, credible cost and budget estimates prior to committing to new development programs. We will be following NASA policy guidelines of

using the formulation phase of the OSP Program, to be completed by the end of FY

2004, to establish cost and schedule commitments for the implementation phase. At

that point, the requirements and conceptual design will be sufficiently understood

to ensure a responsible and credible development cost commitment is made. As part

of the OSP system design process, each competing architecture contractor is providing life cycle cost estimates as a major deliverable. Government cost experts are

developing cost estimates in parallel, utilizing legacy cost data from prior programs

along with improved and validated cost analysis and estimating tools. A Cost Credibility External Review Team, reporting to the OSP Program Manager, is being established to provide expert assistance in ensuring credible cost estimation. In addition, an independent cost validation will be performed utilizing a Cost Analysis Requirements Document, as used by the Department of Defense and on the International Space Station Program. These various cost estimates will be studied and

understood prior to the Full Scale Development decision. In addition, we are ensuring fiscal accountability on all ongoing OSP Program activities by using a proven

Earned Value Management system to track actual cost and schedule performance

as compared to plans.

Mr. GORDON. Also, it is my understanding that the Orbital Space

Plane, you are going to have to send—you are going to have to

launch it on a rocket, aren’t you?

Mr. GREGORY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. And you might get some assistance here, but

it is probably going to be an EELV, is that correct?

Mr. GREGORY. The crew rescue portion of the Orbital Space

Plane program would be on an ELV, not an EELV.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. And what approximate cost is that going to

be? What kind of marginal costs are you going to have there? Go

ahead and ask your——

Mr. GREGORY. There has not—since we haven’t defined what the

vehicle is——

75

Mr. GORDON. But you know what the rocket cost is, a launch

cost, that is what I am asking.

Mr. GREGORY. Okay. Just a second, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Yeah.

Mr. GREGORY. Sir, would it be possible for us to submit that for

the record?

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir. What I am trying to determine is whether

there is any cost savings by having the OSP in terms of the marginal cost? There may be lots of good reasons to have OSP——

Mr. GREGORY. Including safety.

Mr. GORDON. Yeah, there may be lots of good reasons, you know,

but what I am trying to get to is the marginal——

Mr. GREGORY. I understand, sir.

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. Cost. And from everything that we

can—that your office, in the sense of NASA in the general sense,

has provided us is if there is no marginal cost savings. And just

would like to have—and you know, let me say this, too, I have got

time, and so we will just keep asking and asking and asking, if

necessary. And so, you know, try to make it complete, and—because you know what I want.

Mr. GREGORY. I understand, sir.

Mr. GORDON. You know. And I know that there are lots of things

you don’t know, what it is going to be designed, but what you can

determine is it is going to be—you can determine, in all likelihood,

what type of rocket it is going to take. And take the cheapest one,

if that has to be, you know. Just let me know that. You know, that

is all we are trying to accomplish. And again, we will just keep

working on it until we get it.

Mr. GREGORY. Would it be fair, then, for me, in addition to giving

you the marginal cost between the Shuttle and the rescue vehicle

on an expendable ELV, to also demonstrate and show the other

things that are part of this trade space as we talk about

flexibility——

Mr. GORDON. Yeah, there are—there could be lots of reasons. I

want to just try to get this one. You know, I mean, this is pretty

hard. You know, let us get one sort of answer, and then we will

go to the next. But I think—but I want more than just the rescue.

I mean, we are talking about the whole OSP program.

Mr. GREGORY. Oh, the whole. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARTON [presiding]. We are going to have—we have three

Congressmen——

Mr. GORDON. Yeah.

Mr. BARTON [continuing]. And we are supposed to be out of here

by 1:30, and 3 times 5 is 15, and so we are going to have to be

a little bit late, so we are going to ask the——

Mr. GORDON. Sure. Sure. Go ahead.

Mr. BARTON [continuing]. Ranking Member to cease the questions.

Mr. GORDON. Okay.

Mr. BARTON. And we recognize Mr. Bonner for five minutes for

questions.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I come

from a state that has a proud history of support of NASA, Alabama. And we are very proud of what has gone on in Marshall and

76

in Huntsville to play a permanent role in NASA’s previous success

and also what we hope will be a bright future. In saying that, I

am also a new Member of the Committee and a new Member of

Congress, and so I am trying to understand in your strategic plan

on page 25, NASA states, ‘‘We must improve our ability to deliver

crew and cargo and our ability to return crew members to Earth

without exclusive reliance on the Space Shuttle. New U.S.-based

access to and from the Space Station is a key near-term element

of the transportation plan.’’

Now in light of the events that have happened over the last 60

days, the tragic events, in one particular instance, I guess I am trying to understand why is it that NASA’s fiscal year 2004 budget

keeps us exclusively reliant on the Shuttle to deliver cargo to the

Station?

Mr. GREGORY. Of course the ’04 budget was written long before

the Columbia disaster accident, and so the numbers are adjusted

based on the situation at the time. We are obviously looking at all

of our aspects in the run-out ’05 and on out to determine what

would be the appropriate funding and how it should be allocated.

Mr. BONNER. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Mr. BARTON. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

We would go to Mr. Lampson for five minutes.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The reason I was asking a while ago about the cost on the X–38, I just want to make

two statements on it, and then I will let you provide me the information that we asked about. One of them was from the Young

study, it said that they agreed that the $1.3 billion expectation was

a plausible number. I—it wasn’t until November of 2002, five

months after the X–38 project was canceled that we got the estimates given to this number of $3 billion to $5 billion or so. I would

assume that some of the information that you will give me will at

least go back and—in time before that study was done, because it

wasn’t until after the decision was made to shut it down that we

started to get those kinds of numbers, so I would hope that that

would happen.

And then I asked about the use of—or how we were going to

keep our commitment between 2006 and 2010 for crew return. So

let me ask my question differently, because I didn’t get—I don’t

think I got enough of an answer. Given the prohibition on your

U.S. purchase of Soyuz vehicles, how will crew rescue capability for

the Space Station be provided between 2006 and 2010 and be specific. A vague answer about discussion with a partner is not acceptable.

Mr. GREGORY. At our heads of agency meeting in December in

Tokyo where all of the partners came together, and at that point,

it preceded the Columbia, so that wasn’t even a part of the issue.

There was a very clear gap between 2006 and when a crew rescue

capability could be provided. It was agreed at that time that the

Russians would provide, based on research requirements, and crew

requirements, that they would provide rescue capability from that

point until we had our capability within the United States for a

trade or a cost to be determined.

Mr. LAMPSON. Okay. Who will pay for it?

77

Mr. GREGORY. For a cost and for trades to be determined. That

was not part of the discussion at that point. But as far as America

is concerned, there has never been, nor will there be a request to

get a waiver or relief from INA. So that was also part of that agreement and well understood. Now you have——

Mr. LAMPSON. But what you are saying is that the internationals, our partners, will—or have agreed to pay for the cost of

that crew return activity?

Mr. GREGORY. The partnership agreed, the partnership, including the five members of the partnership, agreed that we would all

collectively depend on the Russians to provide transport and rescue

and that we would determine at some time how that would be paid

for or bartered for or traded for.

Mr. LAMPSON. Is there still not a plan then, I mean, that is going

to be——

Mr. GREGORY. By next——

Mr. LAMPSON [continuing]. That will be determined?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, we were supposed to now have a heads of

agency where we had now determined the architecture in June.

Now between December and now, we had the Columbia accident.

And so we kind of defaulted to a mode where we are maintaining

the Station, because that seems to be the best thing to do until we

can receive word from the Admiral Gehman’s Board on how long

it will take. And our next heads of agency meeting is scheduled for

the end of July, and I think return to flight will be the topic of

that, and the subject after that will be in your area, sir.

Mr. LAMPSON. Okay. All right. The Chairman a while ago expressed a sense of frustration. And I think that I share a great deal

of that. I know that I have often talked about the purpose for a lot

of the equipment that we are making, and I am not sure that we

have a destination that we want to try to achieve. And consequently, we don’t know what the heck we are trying to build and

whether—we are going to figure out—we will build something, then

we will figure out what we are going to do with it, where we are

going to go with it or something of the sort. And I read an interesting sentence in your testimony, Mr. Gregory, a while ago that

maybe gives me the impression that this may be where NASA is.

It says, ‘‘NASA is aggressively studying longer term science and exploration goals to further provide guidance that will better inform

these critical decisions.’’ I think we are trying to study things to

death and we don’t have a clear vision of what we want to accomplish, and I yield back my time.

Mr. BARTON. We thank the gentleman from Beaumont. The

Chair would recognize himself for the last five minutes of questions. For—oh, I am sorry. Well, as soon as I ask my questions, we

will recognize the gentlelady from Houston. I am sorry. I didn’t see

you come back in.

Before I get into my questions, I don’t want you guys to think

that we don’t like you folks. Okay. You know, Mr. Myers, you are

a true American hero. You know, the book ‘‘The Right Stuff’’ could

have been written about you. You know, I grew up, the seven original astronauts were heroes. I mean Gus Grissom and Wally

Schirra and John Glenn and those guys, Alan Shepard. I mean, I

knew Alan Shepard personally. He has, unfortunately, passed

78

away. And my dream as a little boy was to be an astronaut. So I

don’t want you all to think that—I don’t think this subcommittee

or the Congress is down on what you have devoted your lives to.

I don’t think we are trying to second guess too much some of the

basic decisions, but at least in my case, you know, I want to try

to help recapture the vision that made it possible to put a man on

the moon in less than 10 years. If we could do that in the ’60’s with

the technology base then, you know, and given the fact that we had

Vietnam going on. And we had a transition in our civil rights in

this country; we had a lot of problems in this country back in the

’60’s. But in spite of that, we put the resources and the technology

to put a man on the moon, an American, not just a man, but a

United States citizen on the moon. And I don’t view trying to keep

that era’s technology flying for another 10 or 15 years to be an adequate vision. I just don’t do it.

UNMANNED SHUTTLE

So my first question is to you, Dr. Grey. In your testimony, you

elude to using the existing Orbiter fleet in an unmanned capacity.

Now I am not—I don’t want to put the Orbiter back up with men

and women on it, I just don’t think it is safe, and I don’t think you

could make it safe. I don’t attribute that to a lack of leadership at

NASA. I just don’t think the technology can be made safe. But Congressman Gordon, the Ranking Member, has pointed out to me

that we need some heavy lift capacity if we are going to try to use

the Space Station in a meaningful way. Could we make the Orbiter

an unmanned Orbiter so that we could still use it and if we lost

one, we just lost hardware, we didn’t lose human life and start on

a new technology Space Plane or an Orbiter that was manned? Is

that technically possible? And if it is, do you have any kind of a

timeline and a cost estimate for that?

Dr. GREY. I believe it is technically possible. The current Orbiter

has flown through about, I would say, 98 percent of its mission

without a pilot at the controls. The only time manual control is

used today is in Space Station proximity operations and in the final

phase of landing the craft. Both of those tasks can be accommodated by computer-operated systems. The Progress and Soyuz dock

at the Space Station with nobody handling the controls. The Russian Buran shuttle 10 years ago was able to land automatically.

And I believe our Shuttle is equipped to do that, except we have

a pilot overriding it.

So in terms of operating the Shuttle autonomously, yes. The

problem comes if we want the Shuttle to carry humans, then we

still must go through the same safety provisions that we are doing

today. If we are flying only cargo, the cost of running a Shuttle

flight could be considerably less, because we could significantly reduce the infrastructure and the safety imposed operations that are

now required by having people on board.

Mr. BARTON. And Mr. Gregory, what is your response, as the

senior NASA person here, if the Congress directed you the appropriate fashion, not you personally, but the agency to follow-up on

what Dr. Grey eluded to. What is your response to that?

Mr. GREGORY. Well, as long as it is not near-term, we wouldn’t

come to ask for negotiation. But in the future, if you look at as we

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move from removing the humans, reducing the risk to humans into

something that is safer, at least in the ascent phase, you would

begin to look at what is a minimum crew on a Space Shuttle.

Mr. BARTON. Well, now don’t misunderstand. Let me—I don’t

want any more people going up in the existing Orbiter fleet, period.

I am talking about, if I understood Dr. Grey correctly, an unmanned Orbiter. And if we want to use the Soyuz or use the Russians to put some Americans up in the Space Station, so be it. But

I am talking about no more Americans going up in the existing Orbiter, no more people, period, but using it in an unmanned fashion

and then taking whatever the resources that we free up, plus additional resources to build a new manned Space Plane or Orbiter.

That is what I am——

Mr. GREGORY. Well, what I was trying to do is kind of walking

through a sequence on how you would get there.

Mr. BARTON. And do it quickly, because my time, unfortunately,

has expired.

Mr. GREGORY. Okay. You would move from a full crew complement down to, perhaps, a pilot and co-pilot, provide escape

mechanism for them. And then you would begin to look at the Orbiter in a cargo sense where you would then use such things as the

technology demonstrations that we are working on right now, the

DART, as an example, with the Rendezvous technology. And perhaps evolve the Shuttle into an autonomous cargo up and back capability.

Mr. BARTON. I am going to encourage Chairman Rohrabacher

and Ranking Member Gordon to join me in sending a letter, or I

don’t know the appropriate way to do it, but that we formally ask

that NASA investigate that.

My time has expired. I would now like to recognize for the last

rounds of questioning, the gentlelady from Houston, Ms. Jackson

Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I

appreciate very much the line of questioning of Mr. Gordon and

where we are in this question of the safety question. And I guess

I would like to go back to that and address Dr. Grey and Mr. Myers

and Dr. Griffin and others. What is your response to the question

of putting the horse before the cart, the idea of if we—having the

International Space Station as a focal point? If we know that we

need to have a vehicle that deals with crew transport and cargo

transport, shouldn’t it be the approach to be able to look at what

we want to do first before we design a vehicle? And then isn’t it

important—isn’t it imperative that we have precise understanding

of the safety factors that would bring about a statement that the

OSP would have a requirement to be safer than the Shuttle or the

Russian Soyuz? And we seemingly can not pinpoint that that is actually accurate. What is your assessment, Dr. Grey?

Dr. GREY. In response to the last question, I think the numbers

stand for themselves. Regardless of how you compute safety, the

Shuttle has a demonstrated failure rate of 2 in 113. The Soyuz has

a demonstrated failure rate of 2 in, I believe it is, 86. So you know

exactly what the historical failure rate is. That doesn’t mean that

is the projected failure rate. That could be different. So if that is

what we are dealing with, you know what the numbers are.

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Now in terms of defining the mission, I fully agree it is essential

to define what we are going to use these vehicles for. The Orbital

Space Plane’s job is to service the Space Station: first with crew

rescue, secondly with crew supply and cargo supply. The Space Station’s life is limited. Let us hope it will last until 2020, perhaps,

but certainly not much longer than that. What are we doing about

the next generation? We have a lot of missions we would like to

pursue. We would like to go to the moon. We would like to go to

Mars. We would like to improve the safety factor of our present vehicles. There is where the Next-Generation Launch Technology program comes in. It should be doing the risk reduction necessary for

us to make a decision as soon as possible on what the next generation vehicle is going to be for its uses. And——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But obviously we have to include safety in

that analysis as well.

Dr. GREY. Oh, yes. I think safety is a key factor in some of the

things that have been discussed. For example, providing escape capability from the Shuttle for all modes of flight or from the Orbital

Space Plane for all modes of flight is a key factor in those designs.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, keeping—let me just say, keeping in

synch with the general theme that I have utilized over these years

as a Member of this committee. I am very concerned that even with

the numbers that there is still not a—if you will, a coming around

the issue, getting your hands around the issue of the safety issue—

safety point. And that, to me, conflicts with where we are going in

terms of a very effective design of the Orbital Space Plane. But

until we answer those questions, I guess to my satisfaction, maybe

I should say that, maybe the numbers are 2 in 113 and 2 in 86 are

not helpful, because I want a projected analysis of what that frankly means. Until we do that, I think that we have a lot of work to

do, and I would encourage NASA to do so.

And I would encourage you, Deputy Administrator Gregory, to be

in touch with those of us who are concerned, and I look forward

to hearing with—hearing from you and meeting with you. And I

thank the panelists for their testimony. And I yield back.

Mr. BARTON. We thank the gentlelady. We have one more question that Subcommittee Chairman Rohrabacher asked that I ask.

We would like a little more definition on your budget estimate. I

think your testimony indicated that it was just a placeholder, so we

would like for you to give us, on the record, in writing, as much

definition as you can on that budget and with specifics about what

you think the OSP would actually cost. So you don’t need to respond to that, just Congressman Rohrabacher asked that I put it

in the record.

All Members of the Subcommittee will be allowed to put additional written questions to this panel. And if they do so, we would

ask you gentlemen to please respond as quickly as possible. We intend to aggressively oversee the ongoing investigation and also to

oversee the, perhaps, new definition of a new vision for NASA. And

again, I want to commend you for what you all have done in the

space program. You all are all great Americans, and especially Mr.

Myers for what you did in the Apollo program. It is really the best

of what America should be all about. With that, this hearing is adjourned.

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[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(83)

Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1a. Your written testimony states that the budgets for the Orbital Space Plane

(OSP) are ‘‘placeholder estimates only.’’

What specific steps is NASA taking to develop and refine a cost estimate for

the OSP?

A1a. We are following NASA policy guidelines of using the formulation phase of the

OSP Program to establish cost and schedule commitments for the implementation

phase. As part of the OSP system design process, each competing architecture contractor is providing life cycle cost estimates as a major deliverable. Government cost

experts are developing cost estimates in parallel, utilizing legacy cost data from

prior programs along with improved and validated cost analysis and estimating

tools. An Independent Cost Estimate will also be performed prior to a full-scale development decision in late FY 2004, and a Cost Assessment Requirements Document (CARD) will be developed to support this independent estimate.

A preliminary estimate of the OSP costs is being developed in support of the FY

2005 budget process, with particular attention placed on the FY 2004 and FY 2005

budgets. This estimate will be available in support of the FY 2005 President’s Budget.

Q1b. Will NASA have a better estimate of the cost of the OSP later this year to support deliberations with OMB and Congress? If so, when will this estimate be

available? If not, will the FY 2005 budget contain ‘‘placeholder estimates only?’’

A1b. Yes. A preliminary estimate will be available in support of the FY 2005 President’s Budget. The NASA cost and schedule commitment for the implementation

phase of the OSP Program will be provided at the end of formulation, per NASA

policy guidelines.

Q1c. Will a Cost Assessment Requirements Document (CARD) be developed for the

OSP? If so, when will a baseline CARD be established?

A1c. Yes. An independent cost validation will be performed utilizing a Cost Analysis

Requirements Document. The baseline CARD will be established by the full scale

development decision-point at the end of FY 2004.

Q1d. Will NASA seek help from the Defense Department or any other outside agencies in developing a cost estimate? If so, what will their role be? If not, why

not?

A1d. Yes, the Cost Credibility External Review Team (CCERT) supports the independent cost credibility team with membership that includes DOD CAIG, RAND,

Aerospace, Air Force, and the External Program Assessment Team (EPAT).

Q2a. How many flights of the OSP do you expect over the life of the Space Station

program?

A2a. At this time, the total number of flights to the ISS has not been determined.

The final number will depend upon the configuration chosen for OSP, the projected

life of the ISS, and ISS crew size. The OSP Level I requirements state a minimal

rotation of 4–6 months and a crew size of up to 4 persons. Based upon ISS lifetime

of 2016, and a crew rotation every 6 months beginning in 2010 for the first flight

of the CRV, a minimum of 14 flights would be required.

Q2b. If this is not known, how will you calculate life cycle cost, since a key Level

1 Requirement is to ‘‘minimize life cycle cost?’’

A2b. The three prime contractor teams will present their respective vehicle and

operational concepts at the System Requirements Review scheduled for later this

year (October 2003 timeframe). Each team’s estimate to design, develop, and operate

their system will be based upon a documented set of assumptions including flight

rates and projected life of ISS.

Q3a. The Committee asked you to address ‘‘what areas of the proposed approach

pose the greatest risk and how does NASA plan to reduce these risks?’’ Your

testimony provides a very general answer: ‘‘our approach to mitigating these

risks is to consistently address the issues using an integrated approach within

the framework of the ISTP.’’

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Please provide a more complete answer that identifies specific risks to the program and plans for reducing those risks.

A3a.

1) Risk: Failure to establish OSP Level 2 Requirements in a timely manner.

Mitigation: The OSP Program has established a detailed schedule of activities to develop and approve the Level 2 Requirements by the Systems Requirement Review. Leads are assigned to each task. Review teams have been

established and are conducting multiple review cycles of the draft Requirements documentation. The Program Manager is tracking progress,

relative to the schedule.

2) Risk: At the end of the Formulation Phase, the identified development cost exceeds expectations.

Mitigation: We are following NASA policy guidelines of using the formulation phase

of the OSP Program to establish cost and schedule commitments for the

implementation phase. As part of the OSP system design process, each

competing architecture contractor is providing life cycle cost estimates

as a major deliverable. Government cost experts are developing cost estimates in parallel, utilizing legacy cost data from prior programs along

with improved and validated cost analysis and estimating tools. A Cost

Credibility External Review Team, reporting to the OSP Program Manager, is being established to provide expert assistance in ensuring credible cost estimation. In addition, an independent cost validation will be

performed utilizing a Cost Analysis Requirements Document, as used by

the Department of Defense and on the ISS Program. These various cost

estimates will be studied and understood prior to the Full Scale Development decision. In addition, we are ensuring fiscal accountability on all

ongoing OSP Program activities by using a proven Earned Value Management system to track actual cost and schedule performance as compared to plans.

3) Risk: ELV proves incompatible with the OSP Level 1 and 2 requirements.

Mitigation: The ELV designs are being reviewed to understand their projected reliability, failure modes, and potential areas of improvement. The OSP

contractors are developing concept designs to ensure the OSP weights

and loads are compatible with the dynamic environment of the ELV. A

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool is being developed to understand the

failure modes and safety implications of the system.

4) Risk: Concept studies identify the requirement for additional flight demonstrations.

Mitigation: The OSP contractors are developing vehicle design concepts, including

an assessment of the technology development needs for the concepts.

The flight demonstration projects are being evaluated to ensure they are

addressing these needs.

Q3b. What specific technologies must be demonstrated with the X–37 that cannot be

analyzed tested or simulated adequately on the ground to bound the parameters of its use in space?

A3b. Analysis and ground testing cannot fully simulate the actual combined, flight

environments of a space mission. Flight-testing in the applicable environments provides verification of performance results to minimize risk. Extrapolation of analyses,

including ground tests, in certain key areas such as aerothermal predictions can result in as much as a 25 percent uncertainty factor. Current flight test aerothermal

experience is limited to the Shuttle database, and is configuration (weight, size, etc.)

dependent, with limited instrumentation. Flight tests such as X–37 address the

need to demonstrate different design solutions, and add to the limited database with

substantial instrumentation, without placing human life at risk.

Ground facilities cannot fully replicate the actual combined flight environments

since this would require duplication of the on-orbit and atmospheric environments

and associated transitions. Such duplication would be infeasible physically and cost

prohibitive. For example, thermal protection system (TPS) ground test facilities are

limited to Mach 8 and the corresponding temperatures. A flight test from orbit provides the only actual re-entry environment for the combination of temperature, pressure, and loads, including structural and thermal (i.e., heat rate, heat load) through

the entire Mach regime. Thus, complete verification of TPS performance can only

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be accomplished by flight test from orbit for exposure to the full re-entry heating

environments.

Another example of the need for flight tests is the autonomous guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) system. GN&C can be exposed to extensive ground testing

but only a test of all phases of flight, from orbit to final controlled wheel stop, can

exercise the algorithms used to verify performance in the combined environments

and solve the natural and mechanical dispersions of any re-entry.

Q4. Please provide the basis for the 25 percent uncertainty factor stated and the

method used to derive this figure. What specific parameters does this predicted

uncertainty apply to? Explain why this uncertainty factor could not be included

in the predicted aerodynamic, thermal, and mechanical loads to derive the worst

case predicted environmental loads.

A4. The uncertainties were determined by comparison of LaRC Navier-Stokes heating predictions using the LAURA code and available experimental ground and flight

test data. The 15 percent uncertainty on the windward acreage heating was developed from extensive ground test comparisons with test models for the X–33, X–37,

X–38, the Shuttle, current planetary configurations and several vehicles in the past.

The comparisons also include STS–2 flight heating data from a study performed approximately 10 years ago and recently from benchmarking efforts during the STS–

107 investigation. These flight comparisons are at high velocity entry conditions,

and thus include any chemistry effects associated with orbital entry conditions.

From the ground and flight test heating data comparisons with the corresponding

predicted results, we can demonstrate that the discrepancies are within 15 percent.

While the X–37 will be at slightly different flow conditions, the Shuttle heating comparisons give us a very strong confidence in stating a 15 percent uncertainty at

flight conditions.

For the wing leading edge region, the database is very, very limited. Most ground

test models are tested at too small a scale to make accurate measurements on the

very thin leading edges, and there are no leading edge flight heating data that exist

similar to the Shuttle acreage data. To provide some confidence in the X–37 wing

leading edge heating predictions, comparisons were made with a ground test of a

large Shuttle model tested at CALSPAN in the mid 70s. These comparisons have

shown discrepancies of approximately 18 percent. Unlike the general acreage heating database, we don’t have a wide range of configurations/flow conditions at ground

test conditions. Also, we do not have the flight data to give us insight into the effect

of chemistry on wing leading edge heating. The wing leading edge region is a far

more complicated flow region to resolve than a windward surface due to the shockshock interaction. Thus, we have placed a 25 percent factor on the heating uncertainty.

Q5. NASA has not decided on an OSP concept (mini-Shuttle, lifting body, or capsule; or decided whether it will be reusable vs. expendable). Given that these key

parameters have not been decided, and the statement above that re-entry loads

are configuration dependent and only an actual re-entry flight can exactly duplicate the environment (and since NASA asserts that ground testing would be

physically infeasible and cost prohibitive), what is the rationale for flying a specific vehicle configuration (X–37) which will almost certainly not be the same

configuration as OSP (weight, size, etc.)?

A5. The X–37, while a specific configuration, allows collection of flight data for a

known configuration, trajectory, and resulting combination of loads. The data allows

correlation of analytical models, which can be used for a variety of configurations,

and load conditions.

These flight conditions in terms of temperature, pressure, and loads will serve to

bound re-entry conditions expected for an actual OSP configuration. The TPS technologies demonstrated will be applicable to any OSP configuration, whether it is

winged, lifting body, or a capsule, and would also have applicability to Next Generation Launch Technologies and National Aerospace Initiative.

It is also true that the X–37 configuration will certainly be different from an actual OSP. However, it is the weight and size of the X–37 that makes it an excellent

flight demonstrator for advanced high temperature, more durable TPS technologies.

The re-entry weight of the vehicle will approach 7500 lbs. with a wingspan of only

15 ft. The re-entry flight profile will cause the wing leading edge surfaces to approach 3000 degrees F.

Q6. What levels of uncertainty would the variation in configuration introduce as

compared to the level of uncertainty introduced if the exact configuration were

known and could be ground tested?

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A6. Ground testing of the combined load conditions is not feasible in ground test

facilities. The variation in configuration can be assessed by analysis, using analytical models correlated to flight test data. The uncertainty level from configuration

changes is much less than the uncertainty level of material samples tested in

ground test facilities in less than the combined load conditions.

Q7. Is a real flight test of the wrong configuration, better than a ground test with

the right configuration? What would the difference in cost be?

A7. Yes. Ground testing of the combined load conditions is not feasible in ground

test facilities. The variation in configuration can be assessed by analysis, using analytical models correlated to flight test data.

Q8. Why does NASA not include Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Soyuz in its statement that aerothermal flight experience is limited to Shuttle? Are the

aerothermal data available from these past missions?

A8. Aeroheating data is available from these past programs. NASA’s knowledge of

entry environments evolved from Mercury through Apollo and has been extended

during the Shuttle Program. Flight tests such as the X–37 add to the database with

substantial flight instrumentation in representative flight environments. The statement that current flight test aerothermal experience is limited to the Shuttle database was meant to convey that this is the only data available from a reusable reentry space vehicle.

Q9. Does NASA’s use of the phrase ‘‘wheel stop’’ imply that the design will land horizontally and have wheels, landing gear and brakes?

A9. For X–37, the term ‘‘wheel stop’’ does imply that the design lands horizontally

and has wheels, landing gear and brakes.

Q10. The team chartered by NASA to make a top-level assessment of the viability

of using Apollo-derived Command and Service Modules (CSM) as the basis for

a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV), and potentially for a Crew Transfer Vehicle

(CTV) for the International Space Station concluded unanimously that an

Apollo-derived CRV concept, with 4- to 6-person crew, appears to have the potential of meeting most of the OSP CRV Level 1 requirements. An Apollo derived CTV would also appear to be able to meet most of the OSP CTV Level

1 requirements with the addition of a service module. It further concluded that

using the Apollo CSM as an ISS CRV and CTV has sufficient merit to warrant

a serious detailed study of the performance, cost, and schedule for this approach, in comparison with other OSP approaches, to the same Level 1 requirements.

Has NASA pursued a serious detailed study of the performance, cost and

schedule for this approach? If not, why not? If such a study is underway, when

will the results be available?

A10. Yes, as part of the independent cost estimate development, and the on-going

OSP to ISS mission model study, NASA has evaluated the capsule derived concepts

against multiple winged vehicles. The final results will not be available until after

the Systems Requirements Review later this year.

Q11a. Your testimony indicated that NASA would, ‘‘perhaps evolve the use of the

Shuttle into an autonomous cargo up and back capability.’’ Dr. Grey’s testimony stated, ‘‘The only time manual control [of the Shuttle] is used today is

in Space Station proximity operations and in the final phase of the landing.

Both of those tasks can be accommodated by computer operated systems.’’

Does NASA intend to pursue a fully autonomous Shuttle capability? If not,

why not?

A11a. A fully autonomous Shuttle capability, along with other strategic options, is

being considered to support the Integrated Space Transportation Plan. Currently,

the ISTP is being reevaluated in light of the Columbia accident.

Q11b. What issues would have to be addressed to develop a fully autonomous Shuttle capability to service the Space Station?

A11b. Major changes to the Shuttle’s software and hardware systems would be required to provide autonomous rendezvous and docking capability to the ISS. A new

docking mechanism would also have to be developed for the ISS. Because of the

magnitude of the design, development, and testing required to implement autonomous capabilities; a cost-benefit analysis will be required before commencing work.

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Q11c. What studies have been performed by NASA or by contractors in the last five

years to assess the desirability and cost required to develop:

• The Shuttle’s autonomous proximity operations capability, and

• The Shuttle’s auto-land capability?

What are the criteria for these studies? What are their results?

A11c. While neither NASA nor industry has conducted a study of Space Shuttle autonomous proximity operations or auto-land capability in the last five years, we believe that the concept is sound. Design studies would be instituted if NASA chooses

to develop such a capability.

Q11d. What studies has NASA performed at any time to arrive at the conclusion

that ‘‘the concept is sound’’ for autonomous proximity operations and autoland capability? Please provide a list of these studies.

A11d. Previous Studies:

1976 Unmanned Flight Capability (Rockwell)

1986 New Unmanned Orbiter (Rockwell)

• Initiated to identify gains with an unmanned orbiter to continue the orbiter flight schedule during the stand-down period following STS–51

1986–1988 Unmanned Orbiter (Rockwell)

1986–1988 NASA Unmanned Shuttle (NASA)

• Detailed study led by DA8/A1 Pennington

• 24-hour flight duration with IUS/TDRS deploy

• Modified OV 102 vehicle to support dual manned or unmanned capabilities

• Vehicle modification and operations/training impacts assessed

• Did not include autonomous docking methods or concepts

1987–1988 Unmanned Orbiter Design Reference Missions and Automation of

Manned Functions (Rockwell)

1989 Orbiter Mixed Fleet Strategy (NASA)

1989 Unmanned Orbiter (Rockwell, IR&D #89104)

• Developed unmanned orbiter and remotely piloted orbiter mission requirements

• Select preferred concepts for implementing this capability

1990 Fully Automated Shuttle Transportation (Rockwell)

1992 Automated Orbiter Requirement Definition Study (Rockwell, IR&D

#10201)

• Partially completed study due to lack of funding

• Products include Requirements Definition Document (RDD), Trade Analysis and Risk Assessment

1993 The Reusable Cargo Vehicle (RCV) Delivers Increased Cargo To and From

Space (Rockwell)

• Study assessed modifications to existing orbiter fleet

• Removed systems necessary for manned capabilities and adds systems

necessary for unmanned capabilities

• Removed crew cabin, provisions and associated consumables

• Added in automated capability

• Relocated equipment for payload CG enhancement

• Addressed RNDZ and docking operations at a high level

• Results: RCV satisfied delivery requirements, used existing Shuttle components and launch/landing facilities, some development risk, and test

bed for Shuttle evolution elements.

Current Studies:

As an element of the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), United

Space Alliance is being tasked perform an Autonomous Shuttle study. Tasks to be

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performed in this study are to review, consolidate and summarize previous autonomous studies in the areas of:

• top-level requirements and types of missions/draft reference missions (DRMs)

that an Autonomous Shuttle will perform;

• concept of operations;

• design concept/implementation trades;

• design concept/implementation analysis completed and remaining, and;

• rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate and implementation schedules.

Q11e. What were the results and conclusions of those assessments? (Crew escape

studies by NASA, USA, and Boeing)

A11e. Several of the options were deemed technically viable. However, none could

meet the requirement for providing escape for a seven-person crew nor could they

be incorporated into the Shuttle fleet by 2005.

Q11f. Why was incorporation into the fleet by 2005 considered a requirement? How

many crew could flown with the crew escape systems studied? What were the

cost estimates for each of these crew escape systems?

A11f.

• Guidelines for 1999 studies were based on a Shuttle replacement in 2010

timeframe. Upgrades needed to be incorporated by 2005 so that they could

be used for at least five years before Shuttle replacement.

• The concepts considered technically feasible could accommodate four to six

crew.

• The costs for the various feasible systems ranged from $1.2 to $4 billion.

Q11g. What additional development and testing is needed to implement the Shuttle’s

autoland capability?

A11g. Should auto-land capability be deemed a requirement for the Shuttle, a complete definition, design, development, and testing program would be required.

Q12a. In Dr. Grey’s written testimony he suggests converting the Shuttle’s four-person flight deck into an escape capsule suitable for egress during all flight

modes.

Has a similar crew escape method been evaluated and what were the conclusions?

A12a. Crew survivability has been studied continuously since the Challenger accident in 1986. The scenario described by Dr. Grey was not one of the options considered because NASA only reviewed options that would provide crew escape capability

for the entire crew.

Q12b. What other crew escape methods and systems have been studied by either

NASA, contractors, or by independent groups?

A12b. In 1999, the Orbiter Project together with the United Space Alliance and

Boeing Company studied 11 different crew escape concepts including ejections and

extraction options. The guidelines for the concepts included: using a seven-person

crew as the model; incorporating the changes into the fleet by 2005; and only studying options for crew escape during the ascent phase of the mission.

Q12c. What were the results and conclusions of those assessments?

A12c. Several of the options were deemed technically viable. However, none could

meet the requirement for providing escape for a seven-person crew nor could they

be incorporated into the Shuttle fleet by 2005.

Q13. If a decision were made to phase-out the Space Shuttle as soon as construction

of the Space Station was completed, including the international elements

(International Core Complete), what is the minimum number of Space Shuttle

flights necessary to achieve International Core Complete?

Please provide a schedule (manifest) identifying each of these Shuttle flights,

as well as all other supporting launches, such as Progress, Soyuz, and ATV

vehicles over this period. Please clearly identify any assumptions regarding the

use of Russian (or other international) or commercial capabilities.

A13. According to the current manifest, a minimum of 25 Space Shuttle missions

will be required to achieve assembly of the remaining International Partner elements. The flight schedules prior to the Columbia accident on February 1, 2003, for

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completion of the U.S. Core (Attachment 1) and the accommodation of the International Partner elements (Attachment 2) reflect all Space Shuttle ISS assembly

missions and flights of the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the

Japanese H–II Transfer Vehicle (HTV). Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicle missions are not included on the attachments. Currently, two Soyuz and four Progress

missions are planned in 2003 and two Soyuz and five Progress missions are planned

in 2004. Implementation of this launch schedule by Rosaviakosmos is contingent

upon the identification of additional funding by the Russian Government later this

year.

An updated ISS manifest will be determined when a Space Shuttle return to

flight date is established, along with updated utilization, ISS logistics and maintenance requirements.

Q14a. What is the definition of ‘‘definitive medical care’’ as used in the OSP Level

1 requirements?

How did NASA arrive at the requirement to ‘‘provide ongoing medical treatment to the crew until arrival at definitive medical care within 24 hours?’’

A14a. The definitive medical care requirement was based upon the input of NASA’s

Chief Medical Officer. ‘‘Definitive Medical Care’’ is interpreted as meaning the treatment of aspects of de-conditioning, illness, and/or injury of a crew member such that

the patient’s condition can be improved rather than just stabilized. ‘‘Within 24

hours’’ is interpreted as meaning the time from decision to return form the ISS until

arrival at the appropriate medical facility.

Q14b. What are the minimum requirements in terms the type of medical facility (i.e.,

what level trauma center or other recognized category of medical facility or

capability) that is necessary to meet the definition of ‘‘definitive medical care.’’

A14b. The definitive medical care requirement was based upon the input of NASA’s

Chief Medical Officer in consultation with the Astronaut Crew Office and the OSP

Program’s Requirements Development Team. As stated in the Draft Orbital Space

Plane (OSP) Level II System Requirements Document issued 1 August 2003, the

Medical Care facility must possess medical capability equivalent to a tertiary care/

Level I hospital (trauma and neurosurgery capabilities) with a hyberbaric chamber

facility.

Q14c. Would NASA revise this requirement if it turns out to be a major cost or

schedule driver?

A14c. We view the Level 1 requirements to be a living document, and can be

changed during formulation. If a requirement is determined to be a major cost or

schedule impediment, it will be reviewed for change at the Agency level.

Q14d. Will the OSP be owned by the government and operated by a contractor, as

the Shuttle is, or will it be privately owned and operated, as stated as one

of the original goals of the Space Launch Initiative?

A14d. This decision has not been made at this time. Because of current limited

market opportunities, the most likely scenario would be that the OSP would be government owned and contractor operated. The final operation concept will be determined after System Requirements Review (SRR) this fall.

Q14e. If the government is to own the vehicle, why did NASA change its philosophy

on this?

A14e. As stated above, the final policy decision has not been made at this time. The

original writing of the ISTP, the launch market was much different from today. Due

to low market demand, there is currently not sufficient commercial interest in a

crewed space vehicle to support a commercially-owned vehicle.

Q15a. Russia is expected to complete its obligation to provide crew rescue capability

for American astronauts using the Soyuz capsule in 2006. The International

Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) task force recommended that the 2006 crew rescue problem must be resolved before they

considered the ISS Core Complete as a credible option. Even with optimistic

assumption the OSP won’t be ready until at least 2010. NASA has not clearly

explained how it plans to handle the problem of emergency crew rescue for

American astronauts in the interim.

How will the Space Station program handle crew rescue needs while pursuing

the development of the OSP?

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A15a. At the December 2002 ISS Heads of Agency meeting in Tokyo, the ISS Partnership agreed to pursue a configuration option that, calls for increasing the size

of the ISS crew beyond three beginning in 2006–2007 timeframe to meet the ISS

utilization and resource requirements that had been re-validated in 2002. At this

meeting, the Partners agreed that crew rescue for the increased crew would initially

be provided by additional Soyuz crew rescue vehicles and eventually by both Soyuz

and the Orbital Space Plane. Any specific Soyuz vehicle requirements and financial

arrangements will be developed as part of the process of resolving ISS configuration

issues. All of the ISS Partners recognize that the solution must be consistent with

U.S. law regarding funding for NASA’s human space flight activities. The Partnership had planned to complete this process by December 2003, but the loss of Space

Shuttle Columbia in February 2003, interrupted the multilateral work on these ISS

configuration issues, including those related to the provision of crew return capability beyond a crew of three. A meeting of the ISS Heads of Agency will be held

in late July 2003 to discuss how this process can be reinitiated based the current

plans for the return to flight of the Space Shuttle.

Q15b. What promises has NASA made to the Russians to secure their cooperation

to provide the Soyuz services for American astronauts after 2006?

A15b. NASA has made no ‘‘promises’’ to Russia to secure Soyuz vehicles post 2006.

The ISS Partnership is addressing the requirements for accommodation of crew rescue capabilities after 2006 as part of the ISS Program Action Plan, established at

the Tokyo 2002 Heads of Agency meeting. All of the ISS Partners recognize that

any solution related to ISS crew rescue must be consistent with U.S. law.

Q15c. Given the recent experience of the Soyuz capsule landing more than 275 miles

away from its intended target, has NASA reconsidered the use of the Russian

Soyuz for this purpose?

A15c. No. The Soyuz is an extremely reliable spacecraft and our crews are well

trained for its operations. The U.S.-Russian Stafford-Anfimov Joint Commission has

been tasked to assess the Russian investigation of the Soyuz TMA–1 landing of the

ISS Expedition 6 crew on May 4, 2003 and report to NASA and Rosaviakosmos on

this matter before the planned landing of the Expedition 7 crew later this year. As

a result of the Soyuz landing, however, NASA and Rosaviakosmos have already sent

a GPS receiver and satellite phone to the ISS to facilitate crew location on future

Soyuz landings. NASA is confident that the Soyuz TMA–2 docked to the ISS is safe.

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Questions submitted by Representative George R. Nethercutt, Jr.

Q1a. The Mission Needs Statement for the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) indicates that

the vehicle shall initially launch on an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV). It

seems likely that the vehicle of choice will be the Evolved Expendable Launch

Vehicle (EELV).

Is there any reason we should not utilize the EELV to support this program?

A1a. OSP’s Level 1 requirement refers to an ELV in the generic sense, not a specific

vehicle or class of vehicle. NASA will not restrict industry by pre-selecting a class

of vehicles—the trade space remains open to all ELVs. The final vehicle/launcher

configuration will not be known until the OSP concept has been selected. The ultimate drivers for selection of an ELV will be the dry weight of the OSP, including

shroud if required, and the cargo payload capability of the OSP.

Q1b. Is it necessary to human-rate the EELV?

A1b. NASA will human rate the ELV, as part of the entire system including the

spacecraft and its crew abort and survival systems. Modifications will be incorporated to make these vehicles safer than the Space Shuttle and the launch vehicles

supporting Soyuz, which is an OSP Level 1 requirement.

Q2a. Are four variants of the EELV envisioned (two human rated, two cargo-rated),

or would the modifications for human-rating the vehicle become the standard

design for both versions of the EELV?

A2a. Again, NASA will not restrict industry by mandating the OSP design. The

operational concepts remain part of the ongoing trades and analyses. The Level I

requirements allow for a single or multiple vehicles to meet the mission needs. As

stated above, NASA will human rate the ELV as part of the entire system(s).

Q2b. If so, what modifications would likely be necessary and how much would these

changes cost the program?

A2b. It is impossible to define all modifications that may be required until the final

vehicle and operational concepts have been selected. The major changes will include

the modifications required to provide crew access and egress capabilities to the existing launch complexes. The cost impacts, which will vary depending on the concept

selected, are under evaluation by the OSP Program.

Q3. Which agency, the Air Force or NASA, would bear the cost of these modifications

and the recurring costs associated with a more expensive launcher? Please estimate the recurring costs associated with the modifications.

A3. NASA will bear the costs associated with any modifications to the ELV’s that

are uniquely required for the OSP. We cannot estimate recurring costs until the

OSP concept is determined, as well as the completion of studies to determine what

modifications will be required.

Q4. Is there sufficient price elasticity in the commercial market to absorb this additional marginal cost for each flight of the EELV?

A4. At this stage, it would be premature to speculate on the impact on the commercial market. We anticipate that the improved reliability of OSP will enhance the

competitiveness of U.S. suppliers.

Q5. Please provide a detailed explanation of joint NASA–DOD research and technology demonstration activities associated with the OSP. What commonality exists between DOD’s programs to assure access to space and the OSP?

A5. The level of cooperation between NASA and DOD is higher now than anytime

in the last decade. While the purpose of the OSP Program is to develop a crewed

vehicle for NASA missions only, there are some elements within the Program that

are of mutual interest to NASA and DOD. For example, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART), Project, is demonstrating advanced video

guidance technology needed for autonomous (no-pilot) approach and capture between two vehicles in space. This technology is needed for the OSP Program and

is also being used in the DARPA Orbital Express Program. In addition, the X–37

vehicle is demonstrating technologies that are of potential interest to both NASA

and DOD missions.

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Questions submitted by Representative Frank D. Lucas

Q1. Would you entertain proposals to meet the cargo and crew transfer needs for ISS

under pure commercial services contracts, rather than building dedicated government vehicles to meet the same needs? Please explain your answer and the

assumptions.

A1. NASA’s Space Architect is leading a comprehensive review of the Integrated

Space Transportation Plan (ISTP). The role of domestic commercial suppliers for

crew and cargo transfer in support of ISS requirements is a part of this review. In

the event there are changes to NASA’s ISTP investment strategy, they will be reflected in future budget proposals, and briefed to stakeholders as part of the budget

process.

Q2. Have you explored any development synergies or potential cost savings with

other space plane development efforts such as the DARPA RASCAL program or

the commercially developed suborbital tourism and X-prize vehicles? If not, why

not?

A2. No. NASA begins with requirements needed to complete our missions. The

Agency is now defining those requirements for the Orbital Space Plane (OSP), while

our industry partners are developing the vehicle conceptual designs and operations

concepts. Companies that have developed other vehicles have had an opportunity to

compete for design and development of OSP. The entire program is conducted

through full and open competition allowing an unlimited opportunity for industry.

Our existing industry partners can choose to leverage their work on OSP with other

‘‘space plane’’ efforts.

Questions submitted Representative Rob Bishop

Q1. Can NASA supplant the Russian Progress capability by developing the autonomous rendezvous and docking capability necessary to deliver cargo to the Space

Station using ELVs?

If ELVs are used to take cargo to the Space Station, what shuttle derived systems or unique equipment will be utilized?

A1. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) provides the basis for NASA’s

planning with regard to launch vehicles and capabilities. Currently, the ISTP does

not include the use of U.S. ELV-launched vehicles to transport cargo to the ISS.

NASA has funded studies to private companies to develop cargo vehicle concepts for

rendezvous and docking with the Space Station. In addition, the technology required

to enable automated cargo capability, including both resupply and return to Earth,

is planned to be demonstrated by DART (Demonstrator of Autonomous Rendezvous

Technology) as part of the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) program. Under the direction

of NASA’s Space Architect, NASA has opened the widest possible trade space to consider alternatives for future cargo transport to the ISS by both national and international service providers.

The Russian Progress has been a very dependable vehicle for resupply and reboost

of the ISS; Rosaviakosmos remains committed to continuing to fulfill their ISS Program obligations. Additionally, both our European and Japanese Partners have been

developing vehicles that are planned to be able to launch on ELVs and provide autonomous rendezvous and docking to the ISS. The European Ariane Automated

Transfer Vehicle (ATV) is planned to be available starting in the late FY 2004 timeframe and the Japanese H–II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) is planned to be available

starting in the early FY 2008 timeframe.

In the wake of the Columbia accident, NASA is reevaluating our approach to

space access. NASA’s Space Architect is leading a review of the ISTP to determine

if revisions should be made. The effort includes re-evaluating the need for assured

cargo access to ISS for resupply and return. We cannot at this point predict what

Shuttle-derived systems or equipment might be utilized should U.S. ELV-launched

vehicles be used for this purpose.

Q2. It appears that the Integrated Space Transportation Plan is not a long-term

plan, but rather a short-term plan to satisfy the people and cargo requirements

for the Space Station. Does NASA have a more global long-term strategic plan

for future space transportation?

A2. Objective 8.2 of NASA’s Strategic Plan calls for the Agency to ‘‘Improve the

safety, affordability, and reliability of future space transportation systems.’’ To implement this objective, we have developed the Integrated Space Transportation Plan

(ISTP), which is the Agency’s long-term investment strategy for space transportation

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systems. The ISTP provides a framework for the important near-term decisions and

developments, such as upgrading the Shuttle and developing the Orbital Space

Plane. The longer term portion of ISTP, the Next Generation Launch Technology

Program, will invest in key technologies that will be the foundation for the development of future launch vehicles. In light of the Columbia accident, the current ISTP

is now under evaluation and will be revised as necessary to ensure that our investments in space transportation remain consistent with the Agency’s top level missions and objectives.

Q3a. NASA has been unsuccessful in developing any new launch technology or systems. Other than safety and performance upgrades, and the new Service Life

Extension Program, what studies have been performed to expand the Shuttle’s

capability using an evolutionary approach?

A3a. NASA has recently undertaken a new study on the feasibility of sharing power

between the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle. If the feasibility of this concept is proven, it could enable longer stays at the ISS.

Q3b. What is required to develop the Extended Duration Orbiter or Long Duration

Orbiter capability to permit on-orbit stays of 30 days? 60 days?

A3b. The Space Shuttle currently has the capability to stay on orbit for 16 days

plus two additional contingency days with extended duration equipment. Unfortunately, the EDO pallet hardware was lost in the Columbia accident and we do not

have spare equipment of that kind. However, two of the three remaining Orbiters

have the necessary equipment interfaces to support extended duration.

NASA has completed a preliminary study to assess the feasibility of extending the

Shuttle’s on-orbit time to both 30 and 60 days. The study revealed that the extended

stay time is possible but requires extensive hardware and software development.

Depending on the recommendations from the Columbia Accident Investigation

Board and the requirements for extended time on-orbit, further definition studies

would be required before such a program could be undertaken.

Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall

Q1. NASA’s International Space Station (ISS) independent cost reviews assume that

the ISS operational lifetime ends in 2016. The updated Integrated Space Transportation Plan indicates that a decision could be made on whether to extend the

Space Station operations beyond that date. When would NASA make that decision, and what are the criteria that would be used?

A1. Since ISS elements are deployed over a multi-year period, the U.S. Lab launch

is frequently cited as the date of ISS deployment, which leads to the referenced lifespan to 2016. The key criterion that will be used to decide if ISS operations should

continue is the continuing value of scientific research performed on the ISS. NASA

and its International Partners will make the decision on whether to extend the life

of the International Space Station (ISS) several years in advance of the end of the

certification period, which is 15 years after being deployed into orbit.

Q2a. With respect to Orbital Space Plane (OSP) operations:

How many times a year do you estimate that the OSP will travel to the Space

Station on average? What is the maximum and minimum number of times?

A2a. We are currently refining the OSP to ISS mission model. With the assumption

that a single vehicle can handle a crew of at least 4 persons (per the Level I requirements) and a nominal crew rotation of 4–6 months (per the Level I requirements),

the minimum number of flights would be 2–3 per year. However, until the final vehicle and operational concepts have been selected as well as the final ISS crew size,

flight rates will remain an undefined variable in the analysis process.

Q2b. How many times do you estimate that the Orbital Space Plane would fly to the

Space Station over the Space Station’s lifetime?

A2b. As stated above, until decisions are made on crew size, crew rotation, cargo

delivery, ISS lifetime, and OSP design and operational concepts, the flight rates are

undefined. If you assume initial operational capability by 2010 for the CRV, rotations of 2 per year, and ISS lifetime of 2016, one could estimate a minimum of 14

flights.

Q2c. How many permanent crew will be on the Space Station when the OSP begins

its crew return function in 2010? When it begins its crew transfer function in

2012?

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A2c. The ISS Partnership has evaluated their research requirements for the ISS

and determined, based on current estimates of crew time and performance, that a

permanent crew of greater than 3 is needed to fulfill those requirements. The current crew size of two is constrained by consumables. Until the Shuttle returns to

flight, the crew will remain at two. Following the Shuttle’s return to flight, the crew

will return to three and will be constrained by the availability of emergency crew

return and the life-support capabilities of the ISS core configuration. With additional crew return capability and enhancements to the ISS, the permanent crew

could potentially be expanded beyond three. The Partnership is discussing options

for the provision of these enhancements. At the December 2002 ISS Heads of Agency meeting in Tokyo, the ISS Partnership agreed to pursue a configuration option

that, would increase the size of the ISS crew beyond three beginning in 2006–2007

timeframe to meet ISS utilization and resource requirements.

The number of permanent crew on the ISS after OSP becomes available also will

be dependant on research requirements and the crew capacity of the OSP. For instance, if the OSP can provide emergency return for a crew of four, the ISS crew

could potentially be expanded to seven (three accommodated in the Soyuz and four

on the OSP). The same formula will apply for the OSP crew transfer vehicle.

Q2d. By what date will you commit to a Space Station permanent crew size?

A2d. At the December 2002 ISS Heads of Agency meeting in Tokyo, the ISS Partnership agreed to pursue a configuration option that, would increase the size of the

ISS crew beyond three beginning in 2006–2007 timeframe to meet ISS utilization

and resource requirements. The Partnership further agreed on a process for selecting a final ISS configuration by December 2003. The Columbia accident and the

grounding of the Shuttle fleet have impacted this timeline. A meeting of the ISS

Heads of Agency will be held in late July 2003 to continue these discussions.

Q2e. How many vehicles will be in the OSP fleet and what is the basis of that number?

A2e. It has not been determined at this time. The preliminary data to support a

response to this question will be available after the SRR this fall.

Q2f. For any items that you are unable to answer, please provide the date by which

you expect to have the requested information.

A2f. Not applicable.

Q3. Will NASA disassemble and de-orbit the Space Station at the end of its operational life? If not, what do you propose to do? If so, will the Orbital Space

Plane be capable of that task, or would the Space Shuttle be required?

A3. At the end of its operational lifetime, the ISS must be decommissioned and disposed of in accordance with U.S. laws and international treaties. The ISS decommissioning plan is phased over several months and would begin with the suspension

of altitude maintenance six months before the final decommissioning phase. Final

lowering maneuvers over a series of three orbits will complete the de-orbit, enabling

the ISS to fall harmlessly into a remote region of the South Pacific Ocean. Neither

the Space Shuttle nor the Orbital Space Plane will be used in the decommissioning

of the ISS.

Q4. NASA’s June 13, 2002 letter to me announcing shutdown of the X–38/CRV program stated that ‘‘NASA has concluded that pursuit of a multipurpose vehicle,

which could include both crew transport and crew return capabilities is a more

optimal use of NASA’s resources than pursuit of a single-purpose vehicle, such

as the X–38 project.’’ However that statement is contradicted by the February 18,

2003 ‘‘Orbital Space Plane Level I Requirements Program Interpretation Document that states [page 4]: ‘‘The CRV and CTV vehicles) could be. . .completely

different designs.’’ Please explain.

A4. The OSP Level I requirements were specifically worded to allow the industry

partners the flexibility to consider numerous options for the OSP. From a cost-competitive perspective, pursuing different designs for CRV and CTV would certainly

be a challenge, but NASA will not preclude such an option. It is vital that the Level

I requirements, which include both CRV and CTV, are considered as a single requirement. The OSP must be capable of addressing all 10 of these requirements.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. In your testimony you stated that a decision on whether to proceed with the fullscale development of an Orbital Space Plane would be made in 2004.

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Q1a. What are the criteria that will be used to make that decision? Please provide

them for the record.

Q1b. How were the criteria derived? Were they externally reviewed? If so, by what

entity?

Q1c. If the criteria are not yet available, by what date will they be?

A1a,b,c. The final evaluation criteria have not been developed. The process will include a detailed engineering review of the each of the industry partners’ conceptual

designs and operational concepts and their respective abilities to meet the OSP

Level I requirements. The review will include an assessment of technical feasibility,

level of technology readiness, business case closure and the trade studies conducted

to develop their final plans. In addition to the evaluation of the inputs from the industry partners, the ultimate decision to proceed with a Full Scale Development will

depend upon the priorities within the Agency and the funding available to meet the

NASA missions and objectives. The criteria will be available prior to the RFP release, currently planned for early 2004.

Q2a. In your written testimony, you state that the updated Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) ‘‘defers development of a next-generation of launch vehicles until long-term goals are adopted that can justify the expense.’’ You also

state that: ‘‘Given the uncertainty of the market and the higher cost of RLV [Reusable Launch Vehicle] development, NASA concluded that the economic case

for a new RLV was in doubt for the foreseeable future.’’ However, the FY 2004

budget request projects spending almost $3 billion from FY 2003 through FY

2008 on the Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) program.

What is the specific rationale for the proposed $3 billion expenditure?

A2a. NASA’s Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) program is NASA’s only

investment in the development of advanced technologies for space-launch capabilities beyond the Space Shuttle and existing expendable boosters. The current ISTP

calls for decisions in FY 2004 and FY 2009 on whether or not to begin focused efforts leading to specific vehicles/systems concepts that could be operational approximately a decade after any such decision. Significant technological advancements are

required to assure major, concurrent increases in safety, reliability, affordability and

responsiveness in missions important to the U.S. The right investments in NGLT

will help to meet national needs for future space exploration, national security, and

civil/commercial markets in space.

Q2b. What criteria have been used to justify the $3 billion spending plan, and what

will be the specific products/accomplishments that will result from that expenditure?

A2b. The general criteria for justifying the FY 2005 to FY 2008 investment is derived in part from the more general missions and objectives of NASA and the Aerospace Technology Enterprise—in terms of national needs for future space exploration, national security, and civil/commercial markets in space. Specifically, Objective 8.2 of NASA’s Strategic Plan calls for the Agency to ‘‘Improve the safety, affordability, and reliability of future space transportation systems.’’ Both perspective and

data for justification are also available from the final report of the President’s Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace industry: NGLT provides implementation for many of the Commission’s key recommendations (such as reversing the decline in U.S. share of the commercial space-launch market, now down to 19 percent

from 75 percent in the 1970’s). International competition, industry workforce/expertise and prudence in nation-investment planning are also considered in the report.

The NGLT Program has developed more detailed criteria for investments by applying systems analyses to a balanced set of missions and associated mission requirements. The list of NGLT projects and scheduled milestones covers the most

critical technologies required for the full-scale development of a future space transportation system. NGLT includes technologies for both rocket- and air-breathing

propulsion, for reusable and expendable airframes, and for ground-based and flight

demonstrators.

Planned accomplishments of NGLT projects will include a number of firsts:

• Rocket Engine Prototype: demonstration of a highly reliable hydrocarbonfueled rocket-booster engine (1+ million-pound thrust), the first in 40 years

for the U.S.

• Auxiliary Propulsion: non-toxic propellants for on-orbit propulsion and maneuvering

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• Vehicle Research and Technology: airframes capable of both containing cryogenic propellants and re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere; durable, high-temperature thermal-protection systems; and intelligent, autonomous, ‘‘all-electric’’ launch systems

• Propulsion Research & Technology: Long-life, lightweight high-temperature

materials, seals and components

• X–43A & C: first controlled, atmospheric flights of vehicles powered by an airbreathing engine with no rotating parts, e.g., by scramjet from Mach 5 to 7

and Mach 10

• Turbine-Based Combined Cycle (engine): lightweight, long-life jet engines capable of flight at up to Mach 4 (4 times the speed of sound)

• Rocket-Based Combined cycle (engine): engines capable of both air breathing

(scramjet) and rocket propulsion within one system.

Q3. Please provide the planned dates of the following Orbital Space Plane milestones.

A3. The dates below reflect the current OSP Program Plan. These may change as

the formulation studies proceed.

a. System Requirements Review

10/27–12/9/03

b. System Design Review

4/20–6/16/04

c. Critical Design Review

1/23–3/7/07

d. Decision on Full Scale Development

9/17/04

e. Completion of Level II and Level III requirements

The Government-developed Level II requirements will be finalized in conjunction with the upcoming SRR this fall. The Level III requirements will

be finalized by the SDR. (4/20–6/16/04)

f. Request for Proposals

2/17/04

g. Contract Award(s)

12/2/04

h. Completion of independent cost estimates of acquisition cost and of life cycle

cost

Activities are underway with multiple interim deliverables concluding with

final product deliverables around mid September 2004.

i. Flight tests of OSP Crew Return Vehicle

Mid to late FY 2008 timeframe

j. Flight tests of OSP Crew Transfer Vehicle

Mid to late FY 2010 timeframe

Q4. Administrator O’Keefe told Rep. Hall on September 30th that, ‘‘based on an

independent assessment of X–38 CRV project conducted in 1999, an X–38 CRV

program would cost approximately $3 billion depending on the approach used

in DDT&E and production.’’ When the study actually said the CRV fleet costs

would be $2.45 billion if NASA followed a business as usual approach and only

$1.26 billion if NASA followed the approach advocated by the X–38 project officer, and which was acknowledged as such by the NASA cost analysis division.

Please explain this discrepancy?

A4. The figures included in the 1999 Independent Program Assessment Office

(IPAO) report included the $2.5 billion and $1.3 billion estimates. However, the

IPAO estimates assumed funding for the X–38/CRV in the years FY 1999–2005. At

the time of the Administrator’s letter to the Committee in late FY 2002, it was obvious that the funding estimates being provided should reflect ‘‘FY 2003 and outyear’’

dollars. When the $2.5 billion estimate for ‘‘business as usual’’ was converted to ‘‘FY

2003 and outyear’’ dollars, the estimate was converted to $2.908 billion, which is

consistent with the ‘‘approximately $3 billion’’ figure used in the Administrator’s letter. The figure used in the letter focused on the higher end of the range (i.e., the

$2.5 billion, which converts to $2.9 billion) because many observers of the X–38/CRV

program had doubts that a ‘‘rapid prototype approach’’ was suitable for a humanrated vehicle that would be required to service the International Space Station, and

that it would be prudent to use the more conservative cost number.

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The IPAO report does quote $2.5 billion for a ‘‘business as usual approach’’ to X–

38/CRV, but when this value is converted to the budget years that correspond to

the Administrator’s letter, the $2.5 billion estimate inflates to $2.9 billion (or rounded to $3 billion). Thus, the statements relative to the IPAO estimate are accurate,

as are the estimates used in the Administrator’s letter of September 30, 2002—the

estimates are simply using different ‘‘year dollars.’’

Q5. What do you estimate is the marginal cost of an OSP flight, including the procurement of the ELV?

A5. Cost estimation for the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) is in progress. NASA is committed to providing responsible, credible cost and budget estimates prior to committing to new development programs. We will be following NASA policy guidelines of

using the formulation phase of the OSP Program, to be completed by the end of FY

2004, to establish cost and schedule commitments for the implementation phase. At

that point, the requirements and conceptual design will be sufficiently understood

to ensure a responsible and credible development cost commitment is made. As part

of the OSP system design process, each competing architecture contractor is providing life cycle cost estimates as a major deliverable. Government cost experts are

developing cost estimates in parallel, utilizing legacy cost data from prior programs

along with improved and validated cost analysis and estimating tools. A Cost Credibility External Review Team, reporting to the OSP Program Manager, is being established to provide expert assistance in ensuring credible cost estimation. In addition, an independent cost validation will be performed utilizing a Cost Analysis Requirements Document, as used by the Department of Defense and on the International Space Station Program. These various cost estimates will be studied and

understood prior to the Full Scale Development decision. In addition, we are ensuring fiscal accountability on all ongoing OSP Program activities by using a proven

Earned Value Management system to track actual cost and schedule performance

as compared to plans.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. Mr. Gregory, under the international agreements governing the International

Space Station, the United States has a commitment to provide a crew rescue capability by 2006. As you know, the Russian commitment to provide Soyuz crew

return vehicles for non-Russian crew members expires in 2006.

Q1a. When the Administration canceled the existing Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) program in early 2001, what was its alternative plan for fulfilling the 2006 CRV

commitment? Did it have an alternative plan?

Q1b. The Orbital Space Plane will not be available for Space Station crew return

until 2010 under your plan. How do you intend to meet the U.S. commitment

to provide crew return over the years 2006 to 2010?

A1a,b. As currently envisioned, NASA’s Orbital Space Plane (OSP) will provide

crew return capabilities and crew transfer capability in the in the 2010 time frame.

As part of the Agency’s continuing ISTP reassessment, we are reviewing the timeframe in which OSP can be made available. The ISS Partnership is addressing the

requirement for accommodation of crew rescue capabilities after 2006 as part of the

ISS Program Action Plan, established at the Tokyo 2002 Heads of Agency meeting.

At this meeting, the Partners agreed that crew rescue for the increased crew would

initially be provided by additional Soyuz crew rescue vehicles and eventually by

both Soyuz and the Orbital Space Plane. The specific Soyuz vehicle requirements

and funding arrangements will be developed as part of the process of resolving ISS

configuration issues. All of the ISS Partners recognize that any solution related to

ISS crew rescue must be consistent with U.S. law.

Q1c. Since your written testimony indicates that accelerating the Orbital Space

Plane might advance its availability to serve as a CRV by only 6 months to

a year, the Soyuz is the only other means of providing a CRV capability for

the Space Station between 2006 and at least 2009. Does NASA plan to acquire

Soyuz services to meet its CRV commitment over this time period? If so, how?

A1c. At the December 2002 ISS Heads of Agency meeting in Tokyo, the ISS Partnership agreed to pursue a configuration option that, if followed, would increase the

size of the ISS crew beyond three beginning in 2006–2007 timeframe to meet the

ISS utilization and resource requirements that had been revalidated in 2002. At this

meeting, the Partners agreed that crew rescue for the increased crew would initially

be provided by additional Soyuz crew rescue vehicles and eventually by both Soyuz

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and the Orbital Space Plane. The specific Soyuz vehicle requirements and funding

arrangements will be developed as part of the process of resolving ISS configuration

issues. All of the ISS Partners recognize that the solution must be consistent with

U.S. law regarding funding for NASA’s human space flight activities. The Partnership had planned to complete this process by December 2003, but the loss of Space

Shuttle Columbia in February 2003, interrupted the multilateral work on these ISS

configuration issues, including those related to the provision of crew return capability beyond a crew of three. A meeting of the ISS Heads of Agency will be held

in late July 2003 to discuss how this process can be reinitiated based on the current

plans for the return to flight of the Space Shuttle.

Q1d. Any arrangement that would have the other International Partners pick up the

responsibility for crew return from 2006 to 2010 in exchange for some offset of

their own operating cost obligations would appear to be prohibited by the Iran

Nonproliferation Act—do you agree? If so, what will you do?

A1d. Until there is a proposed Partnership plan on how to address accommodation

of crew rescue capabilities using additional Soyuz in the 2006–2010 timeframe, it

is not possible to comment on the implications of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of

2000 on such a plan.

Q1e. Mr. Gregory, under the international agreements governing the International

Space Station, the United States has a commitment to provide a crew rescue

capability by 2006. As you know, the Russian commitment to provide Soyuz

crew return vehicles for non-Russian crew members expires in 2006. Has Russia agreed to provide Soyuz CRVs for non-Russian astronauts after 2006 without seeking any compensation or offsets?

A1e. No. The ISS Partnership is addressing the requirements for accommodation of

crew rescue capabilities after 2006 as part of the ISS Program Action Plan, established at the Tokyo 2002 Heads of Agency meeting. All of the ISS Partners recognize

that any solution related to ISS crew rescue must be consistent with U.S. law.

Q1f. Have any of the other International Partners agreed to provide Soyuz CRVs for

non-Russian astronauts after 2006 without seeking compensation or offsets? If

so, which one(s)?

A1f. No.

Q2. In your written testimony, you describe at length the process that led to the

adoption of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan. Was this plan reviewed

by independent external panel(s)? If so, by whom, and when?

A2. Yes, it was reviewed by the Aerospace Technology Advisory Committee in February 2003.

Q3. Please provide the cost assessments and documentation supporting the cancellation of the X–38 CRV project?

A3. NASA provided the cost assessment and documentation supporting the cancellation of the X–38 CRV project to House Space and Aeronautics Committee staff

with formal notification to Congressmen Hall and Gordon by letter dated January

15, 2003. A copy of the letters and supporting documentation is provided herewith.

[NOTE: See a copy of the letters referred to above and Request for Cost Information

on X–38/CRV and SLI Cost Estimates in Appendix 2: Additional Material for the

Record.]

Questions submitted by Representative Anthony D. Weiner

Q1a. Please clarify the relationship of the Orbital Space Plane program to Department of Defense or Intelligence requirements. Specifically, is NASA developing

the Orbital Space Plane in support of DOD or Intelligence Agency missions?

A1a. No. The OSP Level 1 requirements were developed for the NASA-specific mission of providing crew and limited cargo to the ISS only.

Q1b. Has the Administration tasked NASA to develop the Orbital Space Plane for

DOD or the Intelligence Agencies?

A1b. No.

Q1c. Have DOD or the Intelligence Agencies levied any requirements on the Orbital

Space Plane program? If so, what are they?

A1c. No.

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Q1d. Are DOD or the Intelligence agencies contributing any money to the Orbital

Space Plane program?

A1d. No.

Q2a. A chart released by NASA as part of the Space Shuttle Service Life Extension

Program conference in March 2003 said that the Orbital Space Plane would

serve NASA and DOD missions.

If that is so, what DOD missions will be served by the Orbital Space Plane?

A2a. The OSP Level 1 requirements were developed for the NASA-specific mission

of providing crew and cargo to the ISS only.

Q2b. What discussions have you had with DOD about contributing part of the funding for the Orbital Space Plane program?

A2b. NASA has not had discussions with DOD about DOD contributing funding for

development of the OSP. OSP Level 1 requirements have been developed to meet

NASA-specific requirements. However, NASA and DOD have agreed to share data

on Agency programs that are mutually beneficial. For example, there is mutual interest and cooperation in the development of autonomous rendezvous and proximity

operations technology. NASA is funding the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) technology demonstrator through the OSP program.

DART will demonstrate an Advanced Video Guidance Sensor that will also be used

by DARPA’s Orbital Express Program. NASA is interested in data from the Orbital

Express program, as well as the Air Force Research Lab XSS–11 program, which

is providing complementary autonomous rendezvous technology development and

may be relevant to the OSP Program.

Q2c. What funding has DOD agreed to provide?

A2c. None.

Q3a. Regarding potential DOD–NASA cooperation on space plane technology, Administrator O’Keefe has been quoted as having said on April 17, 2003 that:

‘‘I’m very optimistic that more of these technologies, if not certainly the final objective of any one of these craft, can be done in much greater concert. And we’re

moving in that direction and I think you’ll see greater evidence of that in the

coming budget effort that we’re putting together now.’’

Do you plan to establish a joint DOD–NASA Orbital Space Plane program?

A3a. At this time no formal joint program has been discussed or planned.

Q3b. If not, what is the Administrator talking about?

A3b. The Administrator was referring to the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI),

which is a partnership being established between NASA and DOD. The Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Program is heavily involved in this partnership,

as its scope encompasses the planned goals of the NAI.

Q4a. You state that the Orbital Space Plane has a requirement to be safer that the

Space Shuttle and the Russian Soyuz.

What does that statement mean?

A4a. That statement was taken from the OSP Level 1 Requirements, which were

established to provide the top-level guidelines the program, must meet to be successful. The language of the Level 1 requirements below are meant to convey the Agency’s intention to improve crew safety with the new system:

‘‘The risk of loss of crew shall be, with high confidence, lower than the Soyuz

for the rescue mission,’’ and ‘‘The risk of loss of crew shall be, with high confidence, lower than the Space Shuttle for the transport mission.’’

Further definition of how NASA will meet such a requirement will be developed

with the Level 2 requirements, which we expect to be finalized this fall.

Q4b. What is the current level of catastrophic accident risk for the Shuttle? What is

the basis of that number?

A4b. The predicted risk of catastrophic Shuttle failure during a mission is 1 in 265.

This risk was based on the 2000 update to the 1998 Quantitative Risk Assessment

System (QRAS) model. The Shuttle program is completing a new probabilistic risk

analysis for the Space Shuttle due out in the fall of this year.

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Q4c. What is the current level of catastrophic accident risk for the Soyuz? What is

the basis of that number?

A4c. The Soyuz refers to the launch vehicle and to the crewed spacecraft. Since

1980, when the current version of the Soyuz launch vehicle was put into service,

it has flown 577 times, with 562 successful missions. The Soyuz spacecraft first

launched on April 23, 1967; there have been two catastrophic failures out of approximately 89 missions.

Questions submitted by staff of House Committee on Science

Q1. What are the underlying assumptions, e.g., budget, technology and schedule,

used to develop the new ISTP?

A1. In light of the Columbia accident, the current ISTP is under evaluation and will

be revised, if necessary, to ensure that our investments in space transportation remain consistent with the Agency’s top-level missions and objectives. NASA awaits

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendations that will serve

as the foundation for any changes to the ISTP.

Q2. When will the new plan be ready?

A2. Any revision to the ISTP will be not be ready before the CAIB final report is

released. Some time will be needed after the release to respond to recommendations

and incorporate them, if necessary, into the ISTP.

Q3. Will the budget amendment reflect the new ISTP?

A3. No decision has been made on a budget amendment. If the ISTP is revised following release of the CAIB report, NASA will evaluate any associated resource implications.

Q4. What options other than the Shuttle is NASA considering for providing cargo

transport to the Station?

A4. NASA is considering several U.S. options for assuring cargo access to ISS in

the event that the Shuttle is unable to deliver cargo. For near-term contingencies,

NASA is considering the concepts proposed by the four Alternate Access contractors

that might satisfy ISS upmass and downmass requirements. For the longer term,

as part of the New Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) program, the ISTP has

a decision point at the end of FY 2004 to determine whether NASA should begin

a focused technology risk reduction program leading to a new launch vehicle.

Q5. Does NASA have specific plans and schedule milestones to develop the capabilities that would obviate the need for the Shuttle after the Station construction

is complete?

A5. No.

Q6. What reviews have the External Program Assessment Team (EPAT)/External

Requirements Assessment Team (ERAT) performed on the SLI and specifically

on OSP? Please provide names of the members of these teams?

A6.

EPAT-Completed (October 2001–December 2002)

• NRA8–30 Requirements and Program Plan

• Level 1 Requirements for SLI

• Reported Results of 3 Prime Contractors for SLI at Interim Program Reviews

against SLI 2nd Gen. RLV Requirements

• 2nd Gen. Systems Requirement Review–Independent Assessment

• 2nd Gen. Integrated Architecture Review Board Participation and Assessment

• Independent business case option for SLI 2nd Gen. RLV

• Assessment of 120 Day Study Results of NASA–Air Force RLV Options

• Assessment of Human Rating Requirements for 2nd Gen. RLV.

EPAT January–June 2003

• Sub-Team Participation in X–37 Management Review (complete)

• Sub-Team Participation in Apollo Command Module Study for OSP (complete)

• Level 2 Requirements for OSP (Report in preparation)

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• Assessment of external concepts (to OSP) for value added in OSP (Report in

preparation)

• Assessment of cost, schedule, performance balance for OSP (initiated 6/03)

EPAT/ERAT TEAM MEMBERS:

Angelo Guastaferro

Tom J. Gregory

Frederick H. Hauck

J. Wayne Littles

Chester L.Whitehair

Kenneth J. Szalai (Chair)

Q7. What additional independent and non-advocate reviews are planned for OSP

and when are they scheduled?

A7. The President’s FY 2004 budget request assumed a Non-Advocate Review

(NAR) and an Independent Cost Review (ICR) in mid 2004. Although a specific date

is not finalized for completion of the reviews, the accelerated OSP plan anticipates

they will begin in early 2004.

Q8. Has NASA established the OSP Cost Credibility Team? Who are the members

of the OSP Cost Credibility Team? What analysis has been done thus far?

A8. Yes, NASA has established the OSP Cost Credibility Team. The team includes

personnel from Marshall Space Fight Center, Johnson Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, and representatives from industry. Thus far, the Cost Credibility Team has completed the following tasks:

• Benchmarking efforts which include surveying industry to determine best

practices

• An internal assessment of the NAFCOM (NASA/Air Force Model) costing tool

• Asked contractors to evaluate NAFCOM.

The Team will continue its work to address issues such as cost estimate validation, consistency of funding profile to schedule, and cost risk identification and mitigation.

Q9. When will the Cost Analysis Requirements Document (CARD) be completed?

A9. The President’s FY 2004 Budget Request assumed a CARD prior to the contract

award late 2004. Although a specific date is not finalized at this time, the accelerated OSP plan anticipates a CARD will be completed by late summer 2004.

Q10. Please provide the latest OSP schedule.

A10. Following is the schedule assumed by the FY 2004 President’s Budget Submission:

• Late 2003: System Requirements Review completed

• Mid 2004: System Design Review completed

• Early 2004: Request for Proposals issued

• Late 2004: Contract Award

• Spring 2007: Critical Design Review

• 2010: Crew Return Vehicle Initial Operating Capability (IOC)

• 2012: Crew Transport Vehicle Initial Operating Capability (IOC)

Following is the schedule anticipated with acceleration of the OSPP:

• August 2003: JOFOC (Justification for other than Full and Open Competition) approved

• September 2003: Level Two Requirements completed

• September–October 2003: Request for Proposal (RFP) developed by joint

NASA/Industry Teams

• November 2003: Request for Proposal (RFP) issued to contractor teams

• January 2004: System Design Review (SDR) completed

• Early 2004: Non-Advocate Review (NAR) and Independent Cost Review (ICR)

• Spring 2004: Interim Design Review

• Spring 2004: Contractor proposals reviewed by NASA

• Late Summer 2004: Contract award

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• 2005: Critical Design Review (CDR) completed

• 2005: Start production of two operational units for atmospheric/orbital testing

and initial Crew Return Vehicles

• 2008 or sooner: Crew Return Vehicle IOC

• 2010: Crew Transport Vehicle IOC

Q11. What is the period of performance of the three existing OSP study contracts,

e.g., Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, and Orbital/Northrop-Grumman?

A11. The initial OSP study contracts were awarded in May 2001, modified in April

2003, and continue through July 2004. Consistent with the acceleration plan, a letter RFP will be issued by NASA to shorten the schedule for the studies while maintaining the existing scope.

Q12. At the end of this phase what are the contractor’s deliverables?

A12. The April 2003 contract modification includes work to develop system specifications, including systems analysis, trade studies and concept feasibility in preparation for the OSP Systems Requirements Review. The SRR was scheduled under

the President’s FY 2004 Budget Submission for late 2003. The accelerated plan anticipates September 2003 for completion of the SRR. Once the SRR is complete, the

contractors will begin work on the next phase, which includes trade studies, development of a conceptual design that meets Level Two requirements, and supporting

analysis leading to NASA’s Systems Design Review. The SDR was scheduled for

completion mid 2004 under the President’s Budget Submission and is scheduled for

completion January 2004 under the accelerated plan.

Q13. Does NASA plan to continue with the three contractors after the SRR?

A13. Yes. The three contractors will continue on until the Systems Design Review,

scheduled for mid 2004 under the President’s Budget Submission, and January

2004, under the accelerated plan.

Q14. When does NASA plan to release the RFP?

A14. The RFP was scheduled for early 2004 under the President’s Budget Submission and November 2003, under the accelerated plan.

Q15. When will NASA have a full life cycle cost estimate?

A15. A life cycle cost estimate for OSP was scheduled prior to Fall 2004 under the

President’s Budget Submission and is scheduled for late summer 2004, under the

accelerated plan.

Q16. The Level One Program Interpretation Document (PID) says the OSP program

will use the 2020 Concept of Operations and ISS Traffic/Mission Model as the

basis for life cycle cost calculations. Please provide these.

A16. Both of these efforts are in progress; results will be provided upon completion.

Completion of these activities is scheduled to occur in Fall 2004 under the President’s Budget Submission and late summer 2004, under the accelerated plan.

Q17. What analysis has NASA performed to arrive at the requirement to ‘‘provide

ongoing medical treatment to the crew until arrival at definitive medical care

within 24 hours?’’ Why is 24 hours the appropriate time constraint? Does the

Soyuz capsule meet this requirement? Would NASA revise this requirement if

it becomes a major cost or schedule driver?

A17. Several risk studies have been performed over the years using analog populations, space flight experience and ground-based data from flying populations. One

of the risk studies was a Probabilistic Risk Assessment by Futron. These studies

led to consistent risk determinations. A crew member has the likelihood of a serious

medical event that will need treatment and possible evacuation to a Definitive Medical Care Facility (DMCF) of 0.06 incidents per person-year. The likelihood of occurrence of a critical event that will require evacuation is 0.01 per person-year.

A 1989 survival study of military and civilian aircraft mishaps indicated the first

12 to 24 hours after an incident are the most critical for the recovery of survivors.

Injured survivors have a decreased life expectancy of up to 80 percent after the first

24 hours. A U.S. Air Force study noted the need to treat type II decompression sickness (DCS) cases (e.g., neurological injuries) within 12 hours for optimum treatment.

Twenty-four hours is the elapsed time from making a decision to bringing an injured or ill crew member to a terrestrial Definitive Medical Care Facility (DMCF).

The 24-hour requirement is a ‘‘worst case’’ scenario with transport of 12 hours or

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less highly desirable in certain critical medical care scenarios. The transport vehicle

only needs to provide medical care for the transport portion of this 24-hour window.

Yes, Soyuz landing operations meet the requirement to ‘‘provide ongoing medical

treatment to the crew until arrival at definitive medical care within 24 hours.’’

If the definitive medical care requirement (Level One) is determined to be a major

cost or schedule impediment, it will be reviewed for change at the Agency level.

Q18. The expert witnesses at the OSP hearing unanimously called for the inclusion

of a crew escape system during ascent. Does NASA believe that a crew escape

system is necessary to meet the PID requirement of 1/400 risk of crew loss?

A18. NASA has not yet received detailed proposals from the OSPP contractors that

specify how the contractors would meet crew escape requirements.

Q19. How will NASA determine the system reliability of the ELV?

A19. NASA will use both historical data and predictive models (e.g., Probability

Risk Assessments) to determine the reliability of the ELV.

Q20. Please provide the organization charts for the OSP program including those located at the field centers.

A20. See organization chart for the OSP program.

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Q21. What plans beyond the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology

(DART), if any, does NASA have to develop an operational autonomous rendezvous and docking capability?

A21. Outside of DART, NASA has no specific plans to develop an autonomous rendezvous and docking capability. In light of the Columbia accident, NASA will consider a variety of ISS cargo capability options, including the autonomous docking

of Shuttle.

Q22. According to NASA’s schedule the Pad Abort Demonstrator (PAD) tests are performed after the full scale development decision, will the PAD results be available in time to incorporate a crew escape system into the OSP?

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A22. Yes, PAD ground demonstrations are scheduled to begin after OSPP FSD decision but prior to OSPP Preliminary Design Review and will be completed prior to

Critical Design Review. While the OSPP contractor(s) are not required to use the

data from the PAD demonstrator in their designs, the data will be made available

to them in time to affect their designs.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Jerry Grey, Director of Aerospace and Science Policy, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1a. Should we move forward with large-scale manned spacecraft development efforts in the absence of a broader view or even a specific destination like the

Moon or Mars?

A1a. No.

Q1b. If so, please explain how we should move forward.

A1b. What is needed first is a plan, in some detail, for future manned missions beyond low Earth orbit. NASA is currently constrained from conducting any such

planning until the space station has been completed. But the original purpose of the

space station—and still its only truly unique function—is to learn and demonstrate

the operations needed for just such missions. Hence advanced manned-mission planning, at acceptably low budget levels, should be pursued. The guidelines for conducting such planning should include identifying and specifying first-level transportation requirements. Once these requirements have been defined, consideration of

future manned spacecraft would be appropriate, including development budget estimates. Decisions on proceeding with large-scale manned spacecraft development

could then be made on a sound basis.

Q2a. Does NASA have the management and technical depth to effectively assess the

results of [OSP] contractor studies?

Q2b. What recommendations do you have to strengthen NASA’s capability to successfully manage the OSP program?

A2a,b. NASA does have strong management and technical depth to assess the results of contractor studies, especially at the Marshall and Johnson centers. These

abilities could, however, be improved by creating a new NASA Advisory Council

committee, composed of senior spacecraft- and transportation-system engineering

and management experts outside NASA and the OSP contractors, to conduct an ongoing review of NASA management practices and decisions on contractor work during the OSP development process. This would ensure the timely identification and

correction of any inadequacies in NASA’s management of contractor work.

Q3a. Can you please provide specific examples of [OSP] technologies which must be

demonstrated?

A3a. The key technologies that should be demonstrated prior to initiating full-scale

OSP development are the thermal protection system; an autonomous, fast-response

flight control system; an integrated health management system, preferably embedded in an fault-tolerant vehicle architecture; a crew rescue system, autonomous rendezvous, and pad-abort. Although some of these are not ‘‘unproven’’ technologies,

they have not been flown on an OSP-like configuration or mission profile.

Q3b. Do you think NASA’s plan for technology demonstrations, more than $700 million, is the best use of funds for the OSP program?

A3b. Technology demonstrations, unlike technology development, are aimed primarily at mission assurance goals, rather than proving technology feasibility. In the

environment following the Columbia loss, mission assurance is perhaps the key feature any new transportation system must have. I cannot argue for or against

NASA’s contention that they would cost $700 million, but they are certainly worth

doing in a project whose ultimate cost is pegged at $9–$13 billion. A ‘‘drop-in friendly’’ design would help to ensure that promising new developments can be introduced

without incurring additional costs or scheduling delays.

Q3c. Should all this funding be spent on vehicle development rather than technology

demonstrations?

A3c. These technology demonstrations could perhaps be upgraded to culminate in

a full-up demonstration flight test of the final OSP design, which would be the best

possible mission assurance tool. However, this would entail higher risk than the

planned pre-development technology verification effort.

Q4. What recommendations do you have to prevent OSP from becoming the latest

failure [due to overambitious goals]?

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A4. The best way to avoid an overambitious program is to design a system that

draws heavily on existing, proven technologies and then verify their application in

the new program by proven verification methods (e.g., use of ‘‘heritage’’ components,

analysis, simulation, testing, and flight demonstration).

One key factor in ensuring program success within budget and schedule is to scrupulously avoid ‘‘requirements creep.’’ That is, extra time and effort should be spent

on design and technology verification, which is relatively cheap, to avoid the need

for introducing additional or more stringent requirements during full-scale development.

Q5. What must be done and how long would it take to expand the Orbiters’ capabilities to include autonomous [ISS] proximity operations and autonomous landing

capability?

A5. These capabilities are encompassed by current Orbiter technology. Although

some minor hardware modifications might be needed, the bulk of the effort needed

would be in the software. This should not offer any major barriers; the Russian

Soyuz and Progress spacecraft already have the software needed for ISS proximity

operations, and their Buran has already demonstrated autonomous landing. Hence

refitting the Orbiters for autonomous operations should be able to be accomplished

by the time the fleet returns to flight. Flight demonstration of this capability should

also be relatively risk-free, since the crew of the first flight can override the controls

if it becomes necessary.

Q6a. What needs to be done and how long do you estimate it would take to develop

the capability for converting the Shuttle’s four-person flight deck to an escape

capsule suitable for egress during all flight modes?

A6a. Converting the three orbiters as needed to make the flight deck a crew escape

capsule would not be simple or cheap. It would involve major redesign and restructuring of the current Orbiter configuration, as well as verification. However, cockpit

escape-capsule technology and processes have been in operational use for many

years in military aircraft, so no new technology development would be required. If

incorporated into the SLEP, I would estimate that it could be accomplished in a

year for the order of $1 billion.

Q6b. Are there other crew escape scenarios that would substantially improve crew

survivability?

A6b. There are certainly other alternative crew escape system design concepts that

could be explored in a low-cost research program. For example, a low-cost concept

based on the use of a small inflatable Rogallo-wing paraglider incorporating advanced materials that could be packaged in the payload bay and would survive the

re-entry environment for the requisite short period was developed by Aerojet-General under contract to the USAF Materials Laboratory about 40 years ago. However,

development, testing, and proper demonstration of any new design could take as

long and cost as much as the Orbiter conversion.

Q6c. What independent evaluation method do you recommend for future NASA crew

escape system proposals?

A6c. Again, the best verification method for any new system is a flight demonstration. Design, development, and verification of any proposed crew escape system

could be overseen by the same committee of the NASA Advisory Council I suggested

earlier, with the addition of one or more military personnel having experience in the

development and operational use of aircraft cockpit ejection systems.

Q7a. Does NASA’s Level-1 safety requirement for crew transport adequately address

your concern for a launch abort system?

A7a. ‘‘Risk of loss of crew lower than the Shuttle’’ does not adequately define the

crew rescue requirement. A system with a loss-of-crew risk better than 2 in 113 is

not an acceptable design criterion for any crew escape system. Remember, the Shuttle currently has no real crew-escape capability, so using it as a criterion for an escape system does not make sense.

Q7b. Should a launch-abort system requirement be spelled out in the Level 1 requirements?

A7b. The launch abort capability should be part of the overall crew rescue requirement as spelled out in detail in a Level 2 document. The Level 1 requirement should

define an acceptable loss-of-crew probability for all mission modes at some verifiable

level well beyond that of the current Shuttle.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dale D. Myers, President, Dale Myers and Associates

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1a. Should we move forward with a large scale manned spacecraft development efforts in the absence of a broader view or even a specific destination like the

Moon or Mars?

A1a. Yes. I don’t think we should stop development of the ISTP program.

Q1b. If so, please explain how we should move forward?

A1b. We should choose the moon, as an outpost, as our next destination, followed

by Mars. In my view, that sequence of events is inherent as a follow-on to the ISTP

program. First, a simple CRV and then a ‘‘Block 2’’ CTV, made up of an upgraded

CRV and a small service module would be developed that is reusable or not. In parallel, ruggedize the Shuttle and expect fewer flights per year. Continue the technologies to develop a low cost transport to low earth orbit. Finally start a robotic

outpost program to put living quarters on the moon. These quarters would become

occupied after several years of reliable robotic operation, including local generation

of oxygen and the recovery of water. After a decade or two of lunar operations,

transport the same type of equipment to Mars, and set up a robotic outpost on

Mars, followed later by human occupation.

Q1c. Would you please elaborate on the statement in your written testimony that ‘‘an

eventual plan to return to the moon would favor choosing a capsule approach

to a CRV/CTV’’?

A1c. I’m a great believer in block changes in the evolving configuration of complex

systems (like block I and block 2 in the Apollo Program). It is clear that winged

vehicles don’t make much sense in deep space operations. They are too complex, and

their atmospheric parts like wings and landing gear are too heavy to carry to the

moon and back. By starting with a capsule, and more specifically the Apollo CM

capsule, (which I believe would be less expensive and with a shorter development

time schedule than a winged vehicle) we start with an immense technology carryover. Then, because a capsule is the way to go to the moon, the huge background

of development and operational experience developed in the Apollo Program, and extended by the Command Module CRV/CTV, would carry over directly to the Lunar

program, and then to Mars.

I must say that I’m not sure that the CM CTV would be lower in life cycle cost

than a winged vehicle, because a capsule’s low L/D may require more landing sites

than the winged vehicle if the 24 hours to definitive medical help stays in the Level

I requirements. Imaginative operations analysis is needed to compare the life cycle

costs of both systems.

Q2a. Does NASA have the management and technical depth to effectively evaluate

the results of the contractor studies?

A2a. I don’t know. I haven’t been involved with NASA for about 13 years, except

for my 3 years on the Aeronautics Advisory Committee, and this recent study of

using the Apollo Command Module for a CRV and/or CRV/CTV. In the little activity

I have had, I found in NASA exceptional individual competence and a full commitment to doing things right. On the other hand, I didn’t see the giants that we had

in the Apollo Program, like Werner Von Braun, Bob Gilruth and George Low.

Q2b. From your experience with the Apollo and Space Shuttle programs, what recommendations do you have to strengthen NASA’s capability to successfully

manage the OSP program?

A2b. I would put the whole OSP program in one Center, with a small Headquarters

oversight responsibility and with responsibility for Level 1 requirements. The Program Manager could ‘‘subcontract’’ the management of subsystem elements to other

centers, but would not be required to do so. A very strong safety and reliability function would have to be developed, where anomalies like ‘‘O-rings’’ and ‘‘loose foam’’

type issues would be brought to the top headquarters function as they happen.

Q3a. Should NASA seek to develop a fully autonomous Shuttle Capability?

A3a. I can see cases where the Shuttle became a cargo system like the Russian

Progress, and the CRV/CTV became the active transport of people and smaller

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cargo. Heavy lift capability to orbit is an important capability for NASA, whether

or not the flight is autonomous.

Q3b. What technical barriers, if any, need to be addressed to develop a fully autonomous Shuttle?

A3b. I would be concerned about the enormous inertia of the Shuttle in proximity

to the ISS in case anything went wrong. Man is an overriding safety device during

docking. The conversion of the Shuttle to an entirely autonomous system is not a

simple task, because it was designed for human interface. I would think that consideration might have to be given to autonomy for the CTV instead of the Shuttle because of its lower mass and that you could start from the beginning to do so.

Q4a. Does this requirement (the Level one requirement for ‘‘the loss of crew shall be,

with high confidence, lower than the Space Shuttle for the transport mission’’)

adequately address your concern for a launch abort system?

A4a. I think the Level 1 document needs to be a living, changing document as the

Phase B program progresses. If NASA decides, out of the contractor’s studies and

their own, that a launch abort system is required, it should be incorporated in Level

1.

Q4b. Should a launch abort system requirement be spelled out in the Level 1 requirement?

A4b. Based on the answer to 4a above, the answer is ‘‘not now,’’ but it is my opinion

that it should be included soon.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Michael D. Griffin, President and Chief Operating Officer, IN-Q-TEL

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1. Your written testimony states that NASA’s plans ‘‘lack the required global

framework, the desired broader view,’’ and that this is ‘‘nowhere to be found in

the ISTP proposal.’’

Should we move forward with large-scale manned spacecraft development efforts

in the absence of a broader view, or even a specific destination like the Moon

or Mars?

A1. It would certainly have been very desirable to have made decisions to this point

on the Orbital Space Plane program in the context of, and relative to, an overarching set of goals and objectives for the U.S. space program, including our next

logical destinations (such as the Moon or Mars) and reasonable schedules for reaching them. As noted, this was one of the points that I made rather strongly in my

testimony. NASA and the Administration should be encouraged to advocate such objectives, and the Congress should join in their definition and approval on behalf of

the nation. Our progress in advancing the exploration and exploitation of space requires a long-term view, and a commitment to that view through good times and

bad, that has been lacking since the Apollo program.

However, it must also be noted and acknowledged that, in another sense, certain

elements of any space architecture are so fundamental, so basic to all that follows,

as to be less dependent on the nature and timing of later goals and objectives. Examples of such fundamental elements are core space technology programs (e.g.,

power, propulsion, life support, etc.) and, in my view, reliable and cost effective

transportation to low Earth orbit. In particular, the need for improvement in this

latter area is so great as that we really should not defer it until longer-term architectures and developed and agreed upon. In the wake of the Columbia failure, we

are at an especially critical juncture, where we must make a decision either to improve and upgrade the Shuttle and continue to use it for a significant period, or to

plan to phase out the Shuttle and aggressively develop a new system. I favor the

latter choice, but either way, a decision must be made.

Q2. NASA is relying heavily on the contractors to produce the design trade-offs and

cost evaluations of the Orbital Space Plane.

Q2a. Does NASA have the management and technical depth to effectively assess the

results of the contractor studies?

A2a. Yes, although it is always the case that in some cases it may be necessary to

hire outside the Agency to fulfill a particular requirement. But, overall, NASA’s

base of technical skills is both broad and deep. It may well be, however, that this

skill base has not so far been brought to bear on the OSP program.

Q2b. What recommendations do you have to strengthen NASA’s capability to successfully manage the OSP program?

A2b. NASA should elevate the OSP program to maximal importance within the

Agency. A reasonable schedule goal of approximately five years to first flight should

be enunciated and embraced. A new development program office, reporting to the

Administrator/Deputy Administrator should be established to lead the development

of OSP and related systems and facilities. This office should be authorized to draw

upon resources across NASA, excepting only those critically necessary to the continued safe flight of the Shuttle while OSP is in development, and should have complete responsibility within NASA for meeting OSP objectives, such objectives to be

agreed upon between Congress and the Administration. A proven manager should

be hired or assigned to lead this effort.

Q3. Dr. Grey’s testimony state, ‘‘The only time manual control [of the Shuttle] is used

today is in Space Station proximity operations and in the final phase of the

landing. Both of those tasks can be accommodated by computer-operated systems.’’

Q3a. Should NASA seek to develop a fully autonomous Shuttle capability?

A3a. No. The only value obtained by launching a payload on the Shuttle is that of

having people onboard to interact with the payload if and as necessary. If the shuttle is fully automated, then it is functionally no more capable than a conventional

expendable launch vehicle, but with a significant additional penalty in terms of cost

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and processing time. A better option, when human presence is not required, would

be to develop an automated rendezvous and proximity operations capability to fly

on conventional unmanned, expendable vehicles.

Q3b. What technical barriers, if any, need to be addressed to develop a fully autonomous Shuttle?

A3b. There are no technical barriers to such a development. The only significant

modification necessary is to automate the landing gear deployment process, which

today is manually controlled by the Shuttle pilot.

Q4. The testimony of all three of the outside witnesses recommended the need for a

‘‘crew escape system’’ or ‘‘launch escape system.’’ NASA’s Level 1 safety requirement for crew transport states, ‘‘The risk of loss of crew shall be, with high confidence, lower than the Space Shuttle for the transport mission.’’

Q4a. Does this requirement adequately address your concern for a launch escape system?

A4a. No. The requirement in this case is too broadly stated. There are at least two

highly ambiguous issues. The first is the question of what level of Shuttle reliability

should be assumed. Prior to the Columbia accident, in October 2002, NASA stated

publicly that the loss-of-crew probability for a generic Shuttle mission was 1/265.

However, if this were so, and if all Shuttle flights were identical insofar as risk were

concerned, then there is less than a 6 percent probability (based on Poisson statistics) that two fatal accidents could occur over the course of 113 flights. So, I submit

that NASA’s reliability analysis methodology is at best incomplete, and therefore

the target Shuttle reliability number, upon which the OSP must improve, is unknown.

The second issue is, of course, that the amount of improvement relative to Shuttle

is unspecified.

The proper approach is to specify a desired loss-of-crew probability; e.g., 1/1000,

and then review the means by, and the technical credibility with which, that goal

is intended to be achieved in the final design.

Q4b. Should a launch escape system requirement be spelled out in the Level 1 requirements?

A4b. Yes. That is, the requirement to have such a system, irrespective of the generic reliability of the new OSP system, should be a Level 1 requirement for the

OSP. However, the details by which crew escape is to be accomplished should not

be addressed at this level, but should instead be left to the discretion of the designers, and reviewed for adequacy and credibility by NASA prior to implementation.

Finally, the term ‘‘launch escape system’’ may itself be misleading. It is equally necessary to provide crew escape capability during as much of the landing phase as

possible.

These remarks should not, however, be taken to indicate that I believe crew escape necessarily to be a reasonable, or even possible, goal across the full range of

flight conditions. Most flight vehicles, not excepting commercial airliners, have

‘‘dead man zones’’ in the flight regime, from which a safe abort in the event of an

anomaly is not possible. The OSP will be no different. The goal should be to minimize them, but it should be recognized that they cannot be completely eliminated.

Question submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. Several years ago, the space transportation subcommittee of the NASA Advisory

Council (NAC) recommended that: ‘‘NASA (through Congress) should give the

Space Launch Initiative a program orientation to produce a robust, low-cost second generation RLV (reusable launch vehicle) by about 2015 at a specified development, test, and production cost managed in accordance with a milestone-oriented 2001–2015 schedule.’’ However, in his written testimony, Mr. Gregory

states, ‘‘NASA concluded that the economic case for a new RLV was in doubt

for the foreseeable future.’’ In the aftermath of the Columbia accident, what do

you think of the NAC space transportation subcommittee’s recommendation—

would it be a good way to proceed? Why or why not?

A1. In my opinion, any new launch system development should focus on exactly the

goal set forth by the NAC—a new, robust, low-cost, second-generation RLV. However, I believe the 2015 schedule goal is insufficiently demanding. A six- to sevenyear development program for such an effort should be entirely adequate. A longer

program risks loss of focus, encounters greater difficulty in retaining funding commitments, and will be outdated by newer technology before it flies.

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Mr. Gregory is entirely correct when he notes that the economic case for a new

RLV is in doubt. The demand for space launch is, like the demand for all other

goods and services, a function of the cost and availability of the service. Market demand analyses for future vehicles, based wholly or in part upon the demand for today’s existing launch vehicles, lack the necessary credibility upon which to base the

important decisions confronting us. The situation has been likened to the task of

trying to estimate the likely demand for a new bridge in a certain location, by counting the people who are observed to swim the river!

NASA does not exist to develop and build those systems for which the economic

case is apparent. NASA and its products are and should be an investment in the

future.

(117)

Appendix 2:

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

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