Egypt as a Failing State: 

Implications for US National 

Security 

Ruth M. Beitler and Cindy R. Jebb 

INSS Occasional Paper 51 

July 2003 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, 

or the US Government. The paper is approved for public release; 

distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

Global and Regional Security Environments: Potential 

 Catalysts for Instability 3 

 Implications of These Forces 7 

Defining a Failing State: Theory 10 

 Domestic Catalyst: Government Response 17 

Egypt’s Crises and Potential for Instability 20 

 Economic Crises 21 

 Legitimacy Crisis: Contracting Pluralism 23 

Policy Options 32 

 Status Quo: A Strategy of Tactics 32 

 Democratization: A Strategy of Opportunity 41 

Conclusion 56 

Notes 57 

Appendix 71 
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vi

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this fifty-first volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). This paper is recommended both 

for its conceptual applicability in today’s international security 

environment and for its specific policy analysis of the United States 

relationship with the Middle East and Egypt. In general terms, 

Ruth Beitler and Cindy Jebb present a pointed review of 

democratization theory and practice that is most timely given recent 

and ongoing United States experiences in the Balkans and in Iraq. 

They extend that analysis to address the dangers and realities of 

state failures—partial or complete—as these fuel the cycle of 

development of violent non-state actors. And most significantly, 

they apply that combined analysis to the critical realities of today’s 

Middle East, and specifically to the linchpin state of Egypt. Also of 

note, they address United States policy as a central element of this 

calculus, examining its multiple levels of effects. Thus, the paper 

has wide applicability to United States national security policy and 

outcomes both toward its central target of focus and well beyond 

into the region and the world today. We commend this research 

effort as well as the specific paper, and we endorse further inquiry 

into this emerging realm of security policy and practice—

particularly as US military forces find themselves serving as the 

“pointed end” of its “spear.” 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the 

Faculty, USAF Academy. Other sponsors include the Secretary of 

Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency; the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th 

Information Operations Squadrons; the Army Environmental Policy 

Institute; and the Air Force Long-Range Plans Directorate (XPXP). 

The research leading to the papers in this volume was sponsored by 

OSD/NA, DTRA, and XONP. The mission of the Institute is “to 

promote national security research for the Department of Defense 

within the military academic community, to foster the development 

of strategic perspective within the United States Armed Forces, and 

to support national security discourse through outreach and 
vii

education.” Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to 

our organizational sponsors: arms control and strategic security; 

counterproliferation, force protection, and homeland security; air 

and space issues and planning; information operations and 

information warfare; and regional and emerging national security 

issues. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

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JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
viii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Short-term solutions to more profound, long-term problems are not 

sufficient to safeguard United States interests in the Middle East. 

This paper challenges the current US policy towards Egypt and its 

underlying assumption that regime stability supercedes a US 

interest in true political development. The key question in this 

paper queries why the status quo policy towards Egypt is no longer 

fulfilling US objectives when it has been a successful pillar for US 

Middle East policy in the past. In the wake of terrorist attacks in 

the United States on September 11, 2001 leading to the US war on 

terror, along with the continued violence between the Palestinians 

and Israelis, the potential for acute political violence within Egypt 

is high. This study presents two scenario-driven US policy options 

and recommends a realpolitik view of democratization for Egypt. 

The United States can no longer afford to be timid about the power 

of democracy. For the United States, pushing for political systems 

that are accountable to their populations should not be viewed in an 

idealistic, normative sense, but rather in a strategic context. This 

paper contends that democracy is a security imperative for the post9/11 world. 
ix
EGYPT AS A FAILING STATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 

US NATIONAL SECURITY 

Ruth M. Beitler and Cindy R. Jebb 

“So something is going to have to get very badly out of whack for 

the relationship really to suffer.” 

Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, Middle East Policy, June 2001 

INTRODUCTION 

Short-term solutions to more profound, long-term problems are 

not sufficient to safeguard United States interests in the Middle 

East. This paper challenges the current United States policy 

towards Egypt and its underlying assumption that regime stability 

supercedes a US interest in true political development. The key 

question in this paper queries why the status quo policy towards 

Egypt is no longer fulfilling US objectives when it has been a 

successful pillar for US Middle East policy in the past. One can 

easily understand the seductive nature of adhering to the status quo 

policy by recalling Anwar Sadat’s initiatives moving Egypt 

squarely from the Soviet camp to the American one, the EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty, and Egypt’s support during the Gulf War in 

1991. The United States must take bold new steps towards its 

relationship with Egypt and leverage Egypt’s historical regional 

leadership to better support US interests for the future. 

What has changed in the global and regional security 

environment that demands the re-evaluation of our policy à propos 

Egypt? The global and regional security environments have 

undergone monumental shifts; new fault lines exist. Although 

President Husni Mubarak has led a state and society that has 

weathered economic dislocations, political “deliberalization,” a 

growing Islamist movement and an apathetic political culture, these 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

2

forces will quickly overwhelm Mubarak’s traditionally autocratic 

and oppressive short-term fixes. The United States must not be 

lulled into a false sense of security based on Mubarak’s grip on 

power for over twenty years. The possibility of unrest is real; with 

the correct confluence of domestic, regional, and international 

events, Egypt can quickly be added to the list of failed states. 

In the wake of terrorist attacks in the United States on 

September 11, 2001, leading to the US war on terror, along with the 

continued violence between the Palestinians and Israelis, the 

potential for acute political violence within Egypt is high. This 

study will present two scenario-driven US policy options and 

recommend a realpolitik view of democratization for Egypt. The 

United States can no longer afford to be timid about the power of 

democracy. For the United States, pushing for political systems that 

are accountable to their populations should not be viewed in an 

idealistic, normative sense, but rather in a strategic context. This 

paper contends that democracy is a security imperative for the post9/11 world. 

Heightened political turmoil within Egypt can adversely affect 

our regional and global interests and objectives. With the advent of 

attacks on US soil, it is vital for America to maintain a strong 

relationship with Arab and Muslim allies to combat global terrorism 

and to safeguard US interests. Particularly, the United States must 

evaluate first-, second-, and third-order effects of possible policy 

options. Pertinent to this analysis is understanding that Egypt’s 

state legitimacy is the primary target of terrorism. After the first 

World Trade Center bombing in 1993, Egyptian President Hosni 

Mubarak continued his policies of political de-liberalization coupled 

with a widespread assault on Islamic militants and other legitimate 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

3

opposition groups. His actions renewed a cycle of violence within 

Egypt. Due to the inevitable continuation of a US war on terrorism, 

the Egyptian government has used this instance to intensify a 

crackdown on opposition groups, thus increasing dissent and a 

potential for violence within Egypt. Egypt’s volatility poses a real 

threat to US interests in the Middle East. 

Due to Egypt’s importance to United States interests in the 

region, the first goal of this study is to understand the new global 

and regional security environments, which may serve to catalyze 

Egypt’s regime instability. Second, this study defines Egypt as a 

potential failing state by examining key indicators and catalysts, 

namely the lack of political participation, unequal distribution of 

wealth, harsh government repression, overpopulation, 

unemployment, and a rise of Islamist support. Central to this 

analysis is measuring the level of state legitimacy across the 

Egyptian population since opposition groups’ grievances, including 

those of the Islamic militants, stem from their exclusion from the 

political process, economic inequality, and human rights abuses. 

Third, using a scenario-driven examination of policy options, this 

project reveals possible second- and third-order effects 

domestically, regionally, and globally. Hard and unpleasant 

ramifications of policies, such as the abrogation of the Egypt-Israel 

peace treaty resulting in increased regional violence, a growth in 

radical anti-US groups and human rights abuses must be explored. 

Policy options that include a risk analysis allow decision makers to 

make prudent choices. 

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS1

: 

POTENTIAL CATALYSTS OF INSTABILITY 

An analysis of Egypt’s domestic security environment first 

requires a strategic context, one with an international and regional 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

4

perspective. There have been many proposed theories since the end 

of the Cold War designed to explain state behavior such as clash of 

civilizations, democratic peace theory, nationalism, and others. 

And perhaps September 11, 2001, marks another paradigm shift in 

the international security environment. According to Shibley 

Telhami, there has indeed been a paradigm shift. 

What has changed in the past two years is not al-Jazeera. It 

is the world. What has changed in the past two years is that 

there has been a complete transformation of the 

environment. We had a world in the 1990s that had a 

seemingly working Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 

People could point to it, and when a moderate in the Arab 

world debated an extremist on al-Jazeera or anywhere else, 

they could not only reject the extremist method, but they 

could put forth a positive alternative. They could say look, 

we have a peace process, peace is around the corner. 

We’re going to have an agreement.2

This study examines the interaction of observable forces in the 

domestic, regional, and international environments to gain an 

understanding of their full impact on the Egyptian regime. Yet, 

before scholars can offer theory, they must provide a systematic 

analysis of apparent forces to explain state behavior. 

First, there is the observable phenomenon of globalization. Its 

opposite, fragmentation or localization, is also a powerful force in 

the form of ethnic-nationalism and religious extremism. Both 

processes—globalization and localization—are neither good nor 

bad, democratic nor non- democratic, or security-enhancing or 

detracting. Indeed, both are dynamic processes that scholar James 

Rosenau explains simply. “In short, globalization is boundarybroadening and localization is boundary-heightening.”3

 Jessica 

Mathews describes the post-Cold War as reflective of a monumental 

“power shift,” that is a move from two superpowers to one, and a 

shift away from the nation-state to non-state actors. The reason for 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

5

this change stems, in part, from the information age in which, due to 

computers and telecommunication innovations, the government no 

longer has a monopoly on collecting and managing information. 

“In every sphere of activity, instantaneous access to information and 

the ability to put it to use multiplies the number of players who 

matter and reduces the number who command authority.”4

 This 

revolution alters communal relations by establishing new groupings, 

disconnecting established state-societal relations, and building 

communal bridges across borders.5

 

Likewise, the US Commission on National Security/21st

Century acknowledges these powerful forces by indicating “two 

contradictory trends ahead: a tide of economic, technological, and 

intellectual forces that is integrating a global community, amid 

powerful forces of social and political fragmentation.”6

 But as Dr. 

Josef Joffe commented, we may be witnessing a rise in the powers 

of nation-states.7

 The events of September 11 seem to have 

galvanized states to cooperate and defeat a common enemy, 

international terrorism. It is, however, beyond the purview of this 

study to argue which force is dominant, though it is crucial to 

understand that these trends affect state action and more 

specifically, the Egyptian regime’s behavior. 

It is clear the demise of the bipolar global structure has 

influenced a rise of competing forces in the international system 

including irredentism, nationalism, religion, and ethnicity. 

According to Bruce Hoffman, these developments fuel terrorism 

and he warns that they “long held in check or kept dormant by the 

cold war may erupt to produce even greater levels of non-state 

violence. . . .”8

 Of course, terrorism is only one of many global 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

6

threats as reflected in The US National Security Strategy’s

description of transnational threats. 

. . . threats that do not respect national borders and which 

often arise from non-state actors, such as terrorists and 

criminal organizations. . . . Examples include terrorism, 

drug trafficking and other international crime, illicit arms 

trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migration, and trafficking 

in human beings. . . . We also face threats to critical 

infrastructures, which increasingly could take the form of a 

cyber-attack in addition to physical attack or sabotage. . . .9

Furthermore, with the rise of weak, illegitimate and failing states, 

internal conflicts can quickly become regional or even global in 

nature. Michael Brown argues that internal conflicts matter because 

of their scope, their resultant human suffering, involvement of 

nearby states, and the impact on the interests of international 

organizations and “distant powers.”10 What happens inside Egypt 

matters and for Egypt, what occurs regionally and globally is also 

relevant. 

Due to the interconnectedness of the international, regional and 

domestic systems, opportunities exist that must not be 

disregarded.11 The common threat of terrorism can form the basis 

for alliances, treaties, international organizations, and international 

regimes. The European Union is a pertinent example of how 

pooling sovereignty enhances national interests. Initially, the 

European Community (EC) provided Germany with a means to 

secure iron and steel resources; acceptance in the international 

system; and a path for eventual reunification. For France, the EC 

mitigated the idea of a “German problem,” while providing a forum 

for France’s role in Europe.12 Additionally, the growth of non-state 

actors as evidenced by the growth of civil society in many countries 

including non-governmental organizations provides the United 

States with new targets of opportunities in international relations. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

7

The United States must recognize these developments and capitalize 

on them. 

Implications of these Forces 

In relation to the Middle East in general and Egypt specifically, 

there are three seemingly discreet events that reflect the intricate 

interrelationship among the international, regional, and domestic 

security environments: the US war on terrorism, the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, and US nation-building in post-conflict Iraq. 

Increased access to media, coupled with growing economic and 

political despair of a progressively more youthful population has 

begun to mobilize the Arab street. Thomas Friedman claims that 

We are seeing the convergence of three historical trends. . . 

The first is this terrible intifada, this Israeli-Palestinian 

violence that is of a level of intensity and depravity we’ve 

never seen in this conflict before. . . . From another 

direction, we have a huge pig in a python,” [namely] “a 

huge population explosion going on in the Arab-Muslim 

world. . . . Fifty percent of the Muslim world under 20 . . . 

or 25. . . . So a huge population explosion marching toward 

the workplace. And from a third direction we have an 

explosion of multimedia, Jazeera,13 satellite TV, Internet, 

and basically, what is going on is that the media is taking 

these images of this Intifada and feeding it to this 

population explosion coming up the road. . . .14 

Rampant despair in the region reflects anger towards the 

illegitimate, closed political systems, economic malaise and issues 

of foreign policy.15 Not only is the flame of the Israeli-Palestinian 

conflict fanned by the above mentioned forces, but also the US war 

on terrorism, and the perception of an American occupation in Iraq 

fuels these anti-Western sentiments. Already, thousands of 

Egyptians protested Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza 

Strip.16 And, a Gallup Poll reported that 77 percent of Islamic 

respondents feel that military action in Afghanistan is not 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

8

justified.17 The confluence of the war on terrorism, the PalestinianIsraeli conflict, and the presence of US troops in Iraq must be 

examined to understand the potential for Egypt as a failing state and 

any subsequent US policy towards Egypt. As “the Arab world’s 

natural leader,” the United States cannot afford to dismiss the 

domestic political and economic milieu of Egypt.18 As a key player 

in the coalition to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991, 

Egypt allowed over-flights, worked to keep the coalition together, 

facilitated passage of a US nuclear carrier task force through the 

Suez and sent troops to the Gulf. Therefore, Egypt remains an 

important cornerstone of US interests in the Middle East. Despite 

various conflicts of interests including lifting its embargo on Iraq, 

Egypt’s compliance with our regional objectives remains important. 

“Egypt’s involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation has been 

a vital ingredient of every Palestinian-Israeli agreement since 

1993 . . . [and the] Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty remains the 

cornerstone of the peace process”19 It is a country of 68 million 

with the region’s most educated and largest middle class.20 

Moreover, with Cairo as the cultural center of the Arab world, 

Egypt has the ability to lead; it is in the best position to influence 

public opinion and intellectual thought throughout the region.21 

However, as the Arab street becomes more volatile given the 

convergence of events and rampant frustration, many observers 

believe that a “a backlash against the Arab regimes themselves is 

closer than ever before.”22 And within the Middle East, the 

transnational threat of terrorism repeatedly manifests itself and 

reflects the inability for illegitimate regimes to effectively root it 

out. This phenomenon is especially keen when one looks at the 

authoritarian regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. While Egypt and 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

9

Saudi Arabia harshly repress domestic Islamic extremism and are 

successful, they cannot control the transnational effects of 

governmental crackdowns. “Despite Egyptian and Saudi claims 

that they have vanquished the violent Islamist threat, they have also 

fragmented, radicalized, and militarized the movement, inducing 

any survivors to leave the country.”23 In essence, the Egyptians 

have “exported” the threat as the world clearly learned on 

September 11. Also, due to the difficult economic situation in 

Egypt during the 1980s and 1990s, many Egyptians found work in 

the Gulf. During their tenure in Saudi Arabia, “the strong religious 

and conservative forces in Saudi society and Saudi financial 

religious institutions were already making inroads in the religious 

practices and beliefs of its foreign imported workforce as they 

returned home to Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, or Sudan.”24

For all these reasons, it is important to examine Egypt‘s 

potential for instability. Not only would the United States lose 

important regional leverage, but an unstable Egypt could define the 

region in a way unfavorable to American interests. A continued 

repressive regime in Egypt actually lends legitimacy to any 

opposition, even extremists. The confluence of exogenous events 

combined with intense despair and frustration may have 

transformed terrorism into a political movement that at least offers 

empowerment and hope.25 

Before we offer solutions, however, we must first understand 

the problem. Consequently, the following section will examine 

indicators for Egypt’s instability, and the concluding sections will 

recommend US policy that will best secure US interests, which 

includes a thriving Egyptian state and society. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

10

DEFINING A FAILING STATE: THEORY 

In much of the third world literature, scholars define the 

concept of political development to include differentiation within 

more sophisticated political systems, equality before the law and 

with regards to opportunity, and a regime’s capacity to absorb 

change. The argument follows that sustained political development 

leads to stability, while in its absence the potential for instability is 

high as reflected in a series of developmental crises. Yet political 

development as explained by the above mentioned imperatives 

overlooks crucial elements that this study contends are significant 

for true stability to occur. Democratic political development—

which includes both institutions and a democratic value system, or 

democratic political culture—is imperative to maintaining a stable 

system. This study argues that it is in the US interests to push 

sustained democratic political development and in doing so, help 

regimes alleviate developmental crises indicated by economic 

dislocations, legitimacy issues, gaps between governing and 

governed, and participation issues. This section will develop the 

concepts of political development, democratic political 

development, and the ensuing crises associated with a lack of 

democratic political development. 

In the aftermath of the colonial era, many states in the Middle 

East attempted to usher in a period of modernization and promised 

to implement liberal parliamentary democracy. Although 

enthusiastically endorsed, many rulers could not or would not 

deliver on their promises. Instead, Western-influenced rulers 

embarked on a period of rapid modernization following 

independence that did not lead to sustained political development. 

As such, economic and social dislocations associated with rapid 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

11

change led to increased frustration with most governments’ inability 

to provide more participatory systems. R. Hrair Dekmejian argues 

that aside from the effects of economic and social deprivation, 

contemporary Islamic states suffer from a “crisis of the spirit; the 

crisis of identity and culture; and the crisis of legitimacy—the 

erosion of the moral basis of authority and its dysfunctional 

concomitants: elite misrule, military importance, and class 

conflict.”26 

To determine whether or not Egypt’s stability is at risk, it is 

crucial to examine several indicators and catalysts leading to 

instability. This paper assesses the level of political and economic 

development in Egypt, along with perceived regime legitimacy to 

analyze the potential for unrest in that country. Nonetheless, the 

lack of political development and the ensuing developmental crises 

do not necessarily predict instability. A regime’s response to the 

crises, together with specific external catalysts, plays an important 

role in determining whether or not a regime can maintain control. 

Aside from providing insights into the stability of a regime, the 

scope and intensity of the crisis environment can also determine the 

level of Islamic revival within a society.27 In other words, whether 

or not the Egyptian Islamist movements adopt violent forms that 

threaten regime stability depends upon the amount of discontent 

present in society. Currently, Mubarak’s regime perceives the 

Islamist movement as its greatest challenge. Although the Egyptian 

government devotes its attention to the Islamists’ ability to pose a 

direct military and ideological threat to the government, it 

apportions less regard to the important role that sustained political 

development can play in deterring the Islamists’ ideological 

challenge and other secular opposition. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

12

There are a plethora of definitions of political development. 

Simply, it can be defined as “the capacity of government not only to 

sustain and adapt to the stresses of modernization, but to direct the 

course and rate of economic, social and political change.”28 It 

involves the creation of political institutions that include popular 

participation and various power competitors. Political development 

also refers to “a capacity not only to overcome the divisions and 

manage the tensions created by increased differentiation, but to 

respond to or contain the participatory and distributive demands 

generated by the imperatives of equality.”29 This definition 

provides the basis for three requirements that a regime must meet to 

achieve political development: differentiation, equality, and 

capacity.30

Differentiation refers to the greater specialization of roles 

within the political structure to accompany a more developed 

political system. Governments can best create this type of 

differentiation through the specialization of political functions and 

roles, as in a complex—but well integrated—bureaucracy.31 

Authoritarian governments concentrate all power in the hands of the 

governing elites rather than establishing institutions necessary to 

ensure the specialization of roles within the regime. Thus, a lack of 

differentiation is common in authoritarian governments. 

Moreover, the concept of equality obligates the government to 

provide universal national citizenship, equality under the law, and 

equal opportunity. According to Lucien Pye, to meet this 

imperative a government must include popular participation and a 

universalistic, impersonal legal system. Additionally, in an area of 

constant and significant change such as the Middle East, a 

government must have the ability not only to generate change 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

13

spurred on by modernization, but also to absorb those changes. As 

such, a regime must demonstrate the capacity, or ability, to adapt to 

pressures adherent to pursuing the first two imperatives.32 Clearly, 

the linkages between political development and democracy are 

evident. Although on a conceptual level political development does 

not dictate Western democracy, for our purposes, political 

development refers here to democratic political development with 

democracy being defined as “a political system characterized by 

representative decision-making institutions, by mass participation in 

the selection of decision-makers, and by open competition in both 

the electoral and policy-making processes.”33 

Yet institutional elements alone are not sufficient for a true 

liberal democracy to develop. A democratic political culture 

describes how citizens perceive and feel towards important aspects 

of liberal democratic systems to include “the legitimacy accorded to 

democratic ideals, tolerance of opposition parties, willingness to 

compromise and cooperate, and trust in the political 

environment.”34 This definition reveals why there exist many 

democracies, albeit illiberal democracies that hold elections and 

have legislatures. Larry Diamond reminds us, while democratic 

processes are important, they are insignificant if not backed by a 

liberal state of mind. According to Diamond, elections are only one 

aspect of democracy. A liberal democracy must include 

Freedom of belief, expression, organization, demonstration, 

and other civil liberties, including protection from political 

terror and unjustified imprisonment; a rule of law under 

which all citizens are treated equally and due process is 

secure; political independence and neutrality of the 

judiciary and other institutions of “horizontal 

accountability” that check the abuse of power, such as 

electoral administration, audits, and a central bank; an open 

and pluralistic civil society, including not only 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

14

associational life but the mass media as well; and civilian 

control of the military.35

Democratization, on an institutional level, generally trails well 

after social or economic transformation.36 Mir Zohair Husain points 

out that many Muslim nations experience difficulty in attaining 

political development because the pace of modernization has 

outstripped their capacity to transform political institutions.37 

According to the Arab Human Development Report from the United 

Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Arab States lag behind 

most regions “in terms of participatory governance.”38 To achieve 

stability, a regime must balance the population’s desire for political 

participation with a corresponding level of political 

institutionalization and have a democratic political culture. Since 

the ability to both generate and absorb change is crucial to achieve 

sustained political development, a regime that fails to meet any of 

the three imperatives will inevitably face a series of interrelated 

developmental crises.39 

The identity crisis often occurs with rapid industrialization and 

urbanization where traditional patterns of economy and social life 

are uprooted.40 The perception of alienation spurred on by this 

crisis contributes to problems of legitimacy that, according to 

Michael Hudson, proves a severe problem in the Arab world.41 One 

expert defines legitimacy as referring to “that crucial and ubiquitous 

factor in politics which invests power with authority.” 42 Many 

writing about revolutions in the third world concur that the main 

reason for unrest is intrinsically linked with the concept of 

legitimacy. The idea of legitimacy directly affects a regime’s 

stability, or as Timothy J. Lomperis claims, its ability to rule well.43 

Norton contends that the most important element for state survival 

is legitimacy, meaning “that authority which rests on the shared 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

15

cultural identity of ruler and ruled.”44 States base legitimacy on a 

“political formula” which justifies a leader’s rule. 

Intricately connected to legitimacy, effective leadership can 

only occur when the governing elite joins the gap to the governed 

through political institutions including governmental agencies, 

political parties, and village councils.45 With the fast pace of 

modernization programs implemented by the elites, a cultural chasm 

also alienates the political cultures of the elite and masses. 

Although elites create and control the political systems, “the longterm survival of these systems depends on popular support.”46 As 

such, it is crucial for the regime to bridge this cultural divide. 

Similarly, a participation crisis develops when governing regimes 

ignore the population’s demand for a greater say in the political 

realm.47

Ralf Dahrendorf explains legitimacy and effectiveness as two 

keys to a state’s stability and, although states may be effective 

without being legitimate, legitimacy will erode if the regime cannot 

deliver on its promises.48 The advent of internal war and revolution 

indicate a breakdown in legitimate political order. When the 

population challenges the government’s right to rule, revolution 

follows. Therefore, many governments deficient in legitimacy 

suffer from an inability to enforce their policies. 

When a government does not (or cannot) allocate resources, 

services, and other benefits equitably to its population, it will most 

likely suffer from a distribution crisis.49 Yet, political violence does 

not necessarily emerge out of absolute or relative poverty, but from 

a gap between expectations and what can be obtained realistically.50 

Therefore, a growth in expectations without an increase in 

achievement or a decrease in capabilities without a corresponding 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

16

decline in expectations will cause relative deprivation. 

Subsequently, this situation leads to an increase of frustration and 

probable aggressive reaction.51 Scholars have discovered that when 

people are concerned with basic needs, they are less likely to rebel. 

Instability occurs when a period of social and economic progress is 

followed by a sharp reversal. “It is the dissatisfied state of mind 

rather than the tangible provision of ‘adequate’ or inadequate 

supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the 

revolution.”52 Accordingly, it is not deprivation alone that causes 

people to exhibit an aggressive response to frustration, but an 

anticipation of not obtaining expectations.53 Adhering to this 

psychological explanation, economic and political control of a 

population does not necessarily lead to unrest. It is only when the 

dependents realize their state of dependency that discontent 

increases. When the population perceives it has the means to 

change its situation, instability will occur.54 

Concerning the situation in Egypt, the most likely scenario for a 

period of instability is not revolution à la Iran, but an overthrow of 

Mubarak’s government through other means including assassination 

or coup d’etat.55 Although Egypt suffers from all the crises to a 

certain degree, problems of political inclusion and economic 

inequalities are blatantly obvious. Both Islamist and other 

opposition groups have been mostly excluded from the political 

system, though there had been periods in contemporary Egyptian 

history where they were partially incorporated. Egypt created 

institutions to facilitate political participation, but in essence curbed 

access to these few existing participatory bodies. As such, the 

dearth of political avenues of expression has increased the potential 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

17

for instability in Egypt along with a reversal of more liberal 

policies. 

In Egypt, the extent of the legitimacy crises can be measured by 

the following indicators: lack of inclusive political institutions, 

accountability and free press, increased protests, radicalization of 

extremist groups, and the elite-mass gap. The distribution crisis can 

be examined by assessing the economic indicators including 

unemployment, population growth, GDP per capita, inflation, and 

the increased stratification of society. 

Domestic Catalyst: Government Response 

As mentioned previously, the existence of crises does not 

necessarily predict that violence and instability will result. 

According to Ronald Francisco, the relationship between protest 

and coercion is one key to understanding the direction unrest will 

take.56 The government’s perception of the threat in terms of 

regime maintenance compels the regime—when faced with 

opposition—to respond to the unrest. Although the discontent and 

motivations of the opposition are crucial to understanding 

conditions for instability, regime response determines the course 

violence will follow and its subsequent success or failure.57 The 

effectiveness of government response depends more upon the 

“degree of vigor, determination and skill with which the incumbent 

regime acts to defend itself, both politically and militarily” than the 

insurgent’s strength.58 The regime must have a clear picture of its 

adversary since a flawed assessment of the opposition group’s goals 

will lead to an incorrect choice of tactics. Thus, ruling powers that 

carefully explore insurgent strategies are better prepared “to 

conceptualize a broad and relevant counterstrategy.”59 A 

government must utilize good intelligence and assess both the 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

18

nature of the threat and the character of the opposition’s goals. If a 

government misreads its adversary and tactics, the costs to the 

regime might escalate. 

The government is usually faced with two choices when dealing 

with growing violent opposition and discontent in society. The 

regime can choose military measures coupled with positive 

sanctions to woo the dissatisfied members of society into its realm 

or it can deter further action by using coercive force. The most 

productive path to pursue is one with a mix of tactics. A prudent 

application of military and social-economic measures is designed to 

garner local support for the regime, while keeping unrest and antiregime actions in check. 

If a government concedes to the demands of the opposition and 

implements positive sanctions, the incentives may encourage 

neutral potential insurgents to join the government or at minimum, 

not lend support to the insurgents. In this way, the power holders 

can undermine insurgent actions.60 Yet nationalism and the pursuit 

of religious aims, with their potent appeal in many insurgencies, are 

difficult to combat over the long term. The government must show 

the potential insurgents that the benefits of either cooperating with 

the authorities or remaining neutral outweigh the advantages of 

joining the rebels. The regime in power, however, must be cautious 

because reform might not forestall unrest, but may actually 

encourage it. The character of the dissident group, the nature of 

reforms and their timing are crucial factors in determining if the 

changes will pacify the opposition.61

In other cases, the government might attempt to exacerbate 

internecine conflicts to lessen the united front against the regime. 

As Bard O’Neill contends, the government must realize that 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

19

insurgent groups might be factious and thereby the regime could 

exploit these group differences. If the ruling power does not 

recognize this potential, the government may be precluding an 

efficacious tactic.62 Nevertheless, the precarious nature of playing 

one group off the other carries potential danger if the governmentsponsored group has a greater attraction than expected. For 

example, Mubarak vigorously pursued the Islamic militants who 

were responsible for President Anwar Sadat’s assassination while 

simultaneously offering the Islamic establishment such as the 

Muslim Brotherhood the opportunity to enter mainstream Egyptian 

life. While the regime imprisoned and battled with the radicals, the 

Brotherhood continued to influence the population by enlarging 

their political role.63 Governments, therefore, are in a very difficult 

position when formulating a political/military policy for insurgents 

and most importantly for the potential insurgent population.64 

Accordingly, the initial responses of a government establishes 

the crucial parameters of the conflict, defines the issues at stake and 

the presumed character of the struggle.65 The main objective of a 

government at the commencement of violence is to maintain 

legitimacy. The inflexibility of the regime leads to a test of strength 

between the government and the rebels as to who defines the basic 

issues of the conflict and subsequently the solution. At the outset of 

a conflict, the government might characterize the conflict by 

perceiving the rebels, not as insurgents, but as criminals. This 

definition forces the government to implement tactics reflecting its 

assessment. The regime is compelled by this decision to pursue the 

impossible task of arresting all “criminals.”66 Understanding the 

futility of its task, the government must redefine the conflict and 

broaden its approach by creating an all-encompassing 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

20

counterinsurgency policy. Government inflexibility and indecision 

at the outset of the conflict decreases its legitimacy and creates a 

situation where the rebels believe the government has lost control. 

Therefore, a state’s response to unrest is a crucial determinant of the 

direction it will follow. 

EGYPT’S CRISES AND POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY 

The last section delineated some of the key indicators of a 

failing state including: political and social dislocations, economic 

disparities, population explosion, an alienated political culture and a 

crisis of legitimacy. Due to its impact on regime stability, an 

evaluation of the level of political development in Egypt is essential 

to understanding the potential for severe instability within this Arab 

nation. Thus, the following portion on Egypt details the country’s 

capacity for sustained political development. Although discontent 

cuts across sectarian lines, the possibility always exists to mobilize 

a disaffected population. According to Jack Snyder, national 

identity varies according to circumstance. Civic nationalism refers 

to national identity based on inclusion in a territory, whereas ethnic 

nationalism is founded on a belief in common ancestry and shared 

culture.67 When a group is viewed as equal before the law and has 

effective institutions through which to participate in the rule, then 

civic nationalism is prevalent. The group will identify strongly with 

the state in addition to its ethnic group. Yet when a country’s 

institutions fail to meet a group’s collective action needs, then 

ethnic nationalism comes to the forefront. Thus, in the face of 

institutional collapse where ethnic identity prevails, groups are more 

vulnerable to political mobilization and hence more susceptible to 

external influence.68 In Egypt where the majority shares a similar 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

21

ethnic background, it is the religious identity that comes to the 

forefront during periods of discontent. 

Economic Crises 

Although Mubarak’s government had allowed for limited 

political liberalization in the 1980s, by the early 1990s a process of 

“de-politicization” had begun. This occurred for several reasons 

including an economic downturn and a fear of the mounting 

influence of Islamic revivalism. Furthermore, the remittances from 

its citizens working in the oil industry in the Gulf States during the 

oil boom of the 1970s and 80s ended, precipitating an economic 

downturn in Egypt.69 

As such, Egypt’s economic situation remains challenging. 

With a population of approximately sixty-eight million, a reduction 

of oil revenues together with a stagnant tourist industry due to both 

internal and external violence, Egypt’s economic growth has been 

severely harmed.70 Some economists agree that mass privatization 

must continue to expand the Egyptian economy. However, in the 

short-term, privatization means dismissing large numbers of people 

from their state jobs in a bloated bureaucracy, thus exacerbating an 

already troubled economic situation.71 Although the economy has 

expanded since the early 1990s sustaining growth rates of five 

percent and improving public services and infrastructure, the 

population explosion leading to a lowering of per capita income in 

Egypt along with a government crackdown on dissent is causing a 

more radical element to appear in Egypt.72 In a 2001 report on 

Egypt’s economy, the unemployment rate hovered around nine 

percent.73 Unofficial data place the rate at closer to twenty percent. 

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, Egyptian tourism 

declined further. It had still not recovered from the low level of 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

22

tourism due to attacks in 1997 by Islamic militants in Luxor, an 

important tourist stop. The Gamaat Islamiyya took responsibility 

for murdering 58 tourists visiting Luxor’s ancient ruins. Militant 

groups strike at the tourist industry determined to undermine the 

government by destabilizing the economy. The Asian crisis of the 

same year further aggravated Egypt’s economic woes. Revenues 

from the Suez Canal also fell off as both investors and insurance 

companies viewed the area as a war zone. Even prior to the attacks 

on the WTC, Egypt’s economic and political arena suffered from 

severe stagnation manifesting itself in the form of a recession.74 

According to some estimates, prior to September 11th, tourism 

represented ten percent of Egypt’s GDP. Current projections call 

for at least a fifty percent decline in money from tourism. 

Yet Egypt’s economic tribulations also stem from poor 

economic choices such as failing to reform the banking system and 

to develop a larger export sector.75 According to the World Bank’s 

vice president for Middle East and North Africa, Jean-Louis Sarbib, 

“It was Egypt’s non-tradable sectors such as services and 

construction that accounted for a significant share of GDP growth 

during the 1990s, not participation in world trade as was the case in 

countries that performed best on the world stage,”76 Under the 

auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World bank, 

in the early 1990s Egypt began an economic recovery and structural 

adjustment program (ERSAP) to increase privatization and 

encourage foreign investment in Egypt. Yet due to structural 

adjustment and other factors, the gap between rich and poor has 

grown leaving almost forty percent of Egypt’s population living 

below the poverty line. Although Egypt had made some progress 

economically, Samiha Fawzy, the deputy director of the Egyptian 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

23

Center for Economic Studies, contends that whenever Egypt was 

doing well it was usually not due to a solid economy, but to 

“external sources.”77 

Pertinent to this analysis is the link between economic decline 

and instability. Some scholars argue that there is a connection 

between the growth of militant movements and an economic 

downturn. Professor Eliyahu Kanovsky of Bar Ilan University finds 

the link to be significant.78 The growing disparities in wealth along 

with more difficult economic times have made it challenging for the 

Egyptian government to penetrate the masses. In sum, unless Egypt 

can improve its distribution crisis and the subsequent destabilizing 

factor of relative deprivation by allocating goods and services for 

the well-being of a majority of the population, the potential for 

instability is strong. Additionally, unchecked population growth 

puts added stresses on society not least of which is a greater number 

of people entering the workforce and greater demands on resources. 

Legitimacy Crisis: Contracting Pluralism 

Along with the economic woes of the country, Egypt suffers 

from a series of crises connected to its process of political “deliberalization.” Mubarak, who assumed power after the 

assassination of Anwar Sadat by Islamic militants in 1981, has 

managed to maintain control and stability through a judicious mix 

of accommodation and repression of opposition forces. For years, 

the Egyptian president balanced the growth of radical Islam, 

economic liberalization and state bureaucracy à la Nasser.79 

Nevertheless, economic mismanagement, along with external 

events, has continued to batter the Egyptian economy and nourish 

the growth of Islamic groups. Although there has been an increase 

in political parties and an opening of the economic system 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

24

beginning in the 1970s, currently several serious factors operate 

against the stability of the Arab Republic. 

In the 1980s President Mubarak embarked on a series of moves 

designed to expand the political system. He met with opposition 

leaders, allowed NGO’s with a democratic bent to operate, and 

tolerated a more open media. However, the liberalization of the 

economy forced Mubarak to relinquish some power to businessman 

and other elites who demanded more political and economic 

influence.80 Traditionally, professional societies were independent 

from government control, yet in recent years, the Engineer’s 

Syndicate and the Bar Association were banned from electing their 

own officials after government allegations that they were controlled 

by the Islamists. 81 Indeed, the regime took measures to control 

Islamic militants that inhibited the growth of a vibrant civil 

society.82 Many indicators of corporatist life including professional 

groups, labor unions, and other populist associations have been 

weakened under the guise of protection from Islamist control. 

Although this is a useful policy for the short-term, the legitimacy 

and penetration crisis may come to the forefront in the long-term. 

An aggressive media campaign by the incumbent regime 

coupled with an offensive on opposition groups has disconnected 

the masses from political activity resulting in a participation crisis. 

In 1999, the Group for Democratic Development (GDD) organized 

a conference to instruct teachers on how to implement more 

democratic techniques in the classroom. Government officials 

detained participants and docked them fifteen days pay for taking 

part in the meeting. The result of these harsh actions has been to 

deter the masses from convening any type of political activity. 

Additionally, in 1998 the government cracked down on human 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

25

rights groups especially ones working with Non Governmental 

Organizations (NGOs). “The real aim of the case appears to have 

been to warn people to stay away from troublesome NGOs as well 

as dissuade common people from wanting to participate in 

politically relevant activities for fear of punishment or simply 

governmental hassle.”83 

Beginning with Sadat’s economic liberalization program, or 

infitah, of the 1970s, Egypt was seen as more liberal than its Arab 

counterparts, although by the 1990s, it was considered a “blocked 

transition to democracy.”84 In actuality, the roads to political 

participation were not stopped completely, as implied by “blocked 

transition,” but restricted. Yet according to Eberhard Kienle, 

Egypt’s political system was never as liberal as it appeared. 

Although Sadat created a multi-party system after disbanding 

President Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union in 1977, the National 

Democratic Party (NDP) has always held a majority of seats as a 

result of government interference with a free and open political 

process.

85 Since Sadat’s assassination, the government has 

instituted emergency laws which has “eroded the constitutional 

foundation of the government and has undermined its legitimacy.”86

Despite democratic rhetoric and the appearance of opposition 

parties, real political development is severely restricted. The 

executive branch of government wields inordinate powers which 

“overwhelm the legislature and marginalize the judiciary.”87 

According to one study, due to the dominant presidency and the 

nature of Egypt’s political institutions, progress towards 

democratization has actually retreated since 1990.88 Mubarak’s 

legitimacy began to erode further in 1993 when he abandoned his 

promise to serve only two terms. With this decision, “a healthy 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

26

measure of the regime’s legitimacy seemed to vanish overnight.”89 

Additionally, his decision not to appoint a successor or set a process 

in place for succession solidifies Mubarak’s autocratic rule. New 

laws have been invoked expanding police power, and in 1995 a 

Press Law was passed warning that criticism of the government 

would not be tolerated.90 Also beginning in 1992, to counter the 

increasing attacks from Islamic militants, the regime instituted a 

policy to try civilians in military tribunals further marginalizing the 

judiciary. 

Although Egypt boasts 14 legal political parties, only three can 

be viewed as opposition parties. The incumbent party maintains a 

close hold on the activities of other political parties. For example, 

in May 2000, the Labor party was frozen and its newspaper 

banned.91 The perception by a majority of the population of the 

futility of influencing politics has contributed to an apathetic 

political culture and hence, an inability of the elite to be effective on 

a local level. The last election in 2000 appeared more impartial 

than in the past due to judiciary control of elections rather than their 

being under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. Despite this 

change, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) still 

maintained key advantages.92 The government’s monopoly on the 

media allowed it to air its platforms without equal time for its 

opposition. Additionally, the use of state resources allowed the 

NDP to bus people in to particular areas. In some provinces where 

the ruling party’s candidate was Christian, people in Islamic dress 

were turned away from the polls. Even with the advantages of 

being an incumbent power, the NDP experienced important losses, 

garnishing 87 percent of the vote, perhaps indicating that changes 

are occurring with respect to political culture.93
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

27

One impediment to true political development is the 

government’s ongoing battle with Islamic groups. Indeed, the 

Islamist movement is the most visible opposition to Mubarak’s 

regime. In Egyptian society where many avenues to participate in 

political life are blocked, the mosques provide a place to air 

grievances. Prior to 1993, the mosques had more or less operated 

independently from government control. As such, they became 

hotbeds of government opposition forces and further eroded regime 

legitimacy. In response, Mubarak’s regime has implemented a 

broad program to combat Islamic opposition and, more specifically, 

militant opposition using a mix of accommodation and repression. 

As part of this approach, the Egyptian government nationalized 

many private mosques and brought them under the control of the 

Ministry of Religious Endowments. Even so, many mosques 

continue to use Friday prayer times to denounce the government 

and encourage antigovernment fervor.94 

Mubarak’s concessionary policies coupled with a constricted 

political system, however, are proving to be a double-edged sword. 

Even those Islamists who forsake violence to work within the 

political system to assume power envision an Islamic state based on 

the Sharia as the end goal. Allowing the more moderate Islamic 

groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to operate within society 

has actually led to an increase in their influence. In order to 

neutralize the more militant Islamists, Mubarak allowed the Muslim 

Brotherhood access to media to denounce the use of violence. 

During this period, Mubarak ignored the political gains being 

made by the group. The Muslim Brotherhood continued to expand 

its power base by providing social services where the government 

could not. Although denied the status of a political party, it aligned 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

28

with other parties to win seats in the parliamentary elections. In 

1984, it won seven seats when it joined the Wafd party and by 1987 

gained thirty-eight seats in an alliance with the Socialist labor and 

Liberal parties.95 Subsequently, the regime found the moderate 

Islamist groups to be more of a challenge than expected. “The 

ruling National Democratic Party lacked grassroots support, 

because it had allowed the Islamists to assume the role of 

socializing the grassroots by penetrating the education system and 

redefining the norms of political legitimacy.”96 As such, the 

government was losing the battle of legitimacy due to its inability to 

offer effective political and social reform. 

Though Mubarak, like his predecessors, tried to reach an 

accommodation with several Islamic groups, he returned to severe 

crackdowns following the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. 

Harsh repression, like the concessionary policies, boasts mixed 

results. In addition to targeting Islamists, the government cracked 

down on any legitimate dissent further exacerbating the 

participation and legitimacy crises. Mubarak repressed Islamists, 

but also “cracked down on non-threatening activities of the Muslim 

Brotherhood and imposed strict limits on permissible NGO and 

human-rights activity.”97 A prominent sociologist and human rights 

activist, Said Ibrahim, was sentenced to seven years in prison in 

May 2001 convicted of taking foreign funds from the European 

Commission and offering bribes. Twenty-seven other codefendants were also found guilty. The charges were leveled to 

stifle Ibrahim’s anti-government comments alleging corruption 

during elections and exposing an institutional bias against the 

Coptic Christian minority.98 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

29

According to the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 

(EOHR), “the state is practicing a form of terrorism against civil 

society institutions to deplete their resources and discourage them 

from defending human rights or backing democracy. . . .”99 The 

group also believes that the Egyptian government wanted to silence 

calls for more democracy prior to parliamentary elections in 

November 2000. Likewise, the Egyptian regime used the 

September 11, 2001 attacks to increase repression of political 

opponents including, but not limited to, the Islamic militants. In 

May 2001, the government rounded up members of an Islamic 

group, Al-Waad, and charged them with conspiring to transfer 

weapons into the Gaza Strip. After the World Trade Center and 

Pentagon attacks, they amended the charges to include domestic 

terrorism.100 In essence, the fight against the Islamist groups has led 

to the erosion of institutions and civil society, weakening the 

regime.101 In order to maintain control, the regime must implement 

harsher methods to counter its eroding legitimacy. 

Therefore, although many scholars recognize that Mubarak has 

been effective in controlling dissent, they also concede that a 

change of domestic and international events can easily challenge 

Egypt’s stability. Historically, Egypt has undergone periodic, sharp 

eruptions of public discontent. By increasing repression to maintain 

stability while simultaneously narrowing his political base, 

Mubarak may have inadvertently lessened his ability to control 

future outbursts.102 Accordingly, one scholar argues that Egyptian 

political culture is not inherently anti-democratic, but suffers from 

political apathy due to the antidemocratic nature of its institutions 

and leaders. As such, the masses’ alienation from the political 

sphere has resulted in an apathetic population concerned more with 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

30

the economic realm.103 Frustration caused by political deprivation 

and lack of penetration by the government paves the way for severe 

instability. The gap between the political culture of the elite and 

masses also exacerbates the crisis environment in Egypt. The 

“ambivalent and schizophrenic” nature of the Egyptian intellectuals 

who believe in democratic institutions to promote legitimacy, yet 

oppose democracy in Egypt due to their fear that Islamist groups 

would garner considerable support as they did in Algeria, alienates 

the masses who have been convinced by the authoritarian nature of 

the government not to participate in political life.104

Yet, despite the argument that the lack of political development 

has led to an apathetic political culture in Egypt, it would be 

dangerous to assume that the population cannot be mobilized if a 

potent “tipping” event occurred. As Dekmejian warns, “given the 

magnitude of Egypt’s problems, the traditional patterns of authority, 

legitimacy, and obedience are likely to change under the impact of 

modern conditions.”105 Although the heavy restrictions on public 

demonstrations exist, an Israeli military response in the West Bank 

in March 2002 to a wave of suicide bombings in major Israeli cities 

unleashed an unprecedented response from Egyptians. Thousands 

of students protested almost daily after Israel’s action began on 29 

March with calls for the abrogation of the peace treaty between 

Israel and Egypt signed in 1978.106 In fact, riot police killed one 

Egyptian student in Alexandria frustrating further an already 

mobilized population.107 

Additionally, Mubarak’s tight control of the opposition and 

fervent control over the media might prove to be his downfall. 

Since the Al-Aqsa intifada erupted in September 2000, the Egyptian 

media has been viciously anti-Israel, provoking strong reaction 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

31

within Egypt. The Palestinian-Israeli issue could prove to be the 

motivating factor for the politically apathetic masses. If progress is 

not made towards a two-state solution, the masses may push for a 

more militant response from the Mubarak regime. 

The future challenge does not stem from the Islamists alone. 

The curtailing of legitimate opposition along with increased 

stratification of society can mobilize the population to question the 

legitimacy of the regime. The regime response to the Islamists has 

led to a narrower base supporting Mubarak. The Islamists 

themselves are a major challenge to the regime, but regime response 

to the Islamists has made political development and long-term 

regime stability the real victims. 

With this said, Mubarak retains a tight grip on power and it 

appears as if Egypt will be stable for the short-term due to political 

apathy, aggressive regime policies towards Islamic militants, and 

Mubarak’s understanding of his opposition forces. Yet the 

indicators including increased stratification of society, 

unemployment, growing poverty, an expanding population, and a 

dearth of routes for political participation all portend the potential

for Egypt to become a failing state. Pair these indicators with a 

confluence of unexpected internal and external events and the tide 

of stability can easily flow chaotic. 

Despite the fact that Mubarak’s regime has managed to control 

and balance internal threats for over twenty years, the West would 

be foolish to assume that instability can be staved off for the longterm. Mubarak’s success in repressing the threat posed by militant 

Islamic groups adds to future instability. Unable to operate in 

Egypt, militants fled the country and joined Al-Qaeda and other 

terrorist groups. With Al-Qaeda members on the run due, in part, to 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

32

the US war on terror, the probability exists for these militants to 

return to their home countries at some future date.108 Given 

difficult internal circumstances and exogenous events, the potential 

exists for the current regime to face severe instability. Clearly the 

observable forces in the domestic, regional, and international 

environments have impacted the Egyptian regime. 

POLICY OPTIONS 

Already, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war on 

terrorism have mobilized and increased anti-American dissent. As 

such, the United States needs to reassess its policy towards Egypt to 

safeguard its interests in this post-September 11 security 

environment. Since the potential for instability in Egypt is 

heightened, the time is ripe to assess the risks and benefits of 

retaining the status quo policy and to analyze the costs and 

advantages associated with prodding Egypt to democratize. Within 

the policy options, the impact that an unstable Egypt will have on 

US national security interests will be discussed. 

Status Quo: A Strategy of Tactics 

United States policy in the Middle East, according to Kenneth 

Pollack, director of national security studies at the Council of 

Foreign Relations, “seems a little like a cushion: it seems to take 

the shape of the last person to sit on it.”109 Maintaining stability in 

Egypt is a security necessity for the United States, but its means to 

attain this goal are questionable. The lack of a long-term strategy 

which ignores the Mubarak regime’s stifling of most political 

activity along with a crackdown on legitimate dissent will spell 

disaster for US regional interests in the future. 

Since Mubarak assumed power after President Sadat’s 

assassination in 1981, US policy has varied little, though the 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

33

rhetoric emanating from most administrations has vacillated from 

encouragement of peace and stability to democracy and 

liberalization. During the Cold War, US interest in stable, proWestern governments were clearly the priority. With the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union and the onset of the Gulf War in 

1991, the United States again was more interested in gaining 

support from regional allies in its fight against Saddam Hussein, 

than in pushing for democratic reform in the mostly authoritarian 

regimes of the Arab world. By 1993, following the guise of a “new 

world order,” then National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 

delineated “a new foreign policy vision replacing ‘containment’ 

with the ‘encouragement’ of free market democracies.”110 Yet with 

regards to US policy toward Egypt and other regimes such as Saudi 

Arabia and Jordan, “the shift in emphasis was as seductive as it was 

disingenuous.”111 

In reality, the United States pursued its vital objective of 

stability for regimes of key regional allies at the detriment of 

encouraging genuine liberalization of these governments. To 

explore the relationship between US policy statements and actual 

policy, one scholar examined the following: “To what extent are 

the instruments of US foreign policy used in a manner consistent 

with proliberalization rhetoric?”112 By measuring whether or not 

the United States limited its exports of arms to countries that have 

strong human rights records and democratic government, the author 

concluded that human rights and democracy were important with 

respect to an initial decision to export arms, but were less 

significant with respect to Egypt and other Middle Eastern 

countries.113 Also in 1993, Human Rights Watch produced a report 

citing Egypt’s human rights violations and, although the 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

34

organization acknowledged that the Clinton Administration stressed 

human rights issues more than the previous Reagan and Bush 

administrations, it still fell “significantly short” in supporting or 

acting in crisis areas worldwide.”114 Additionally, the 

administration lacked the ability to stay the course when the “going 

got rough.”115 

For more than twenty years, US policy towards Egypt was more 

extemporized than a reflection of a well-thought out, long-term 

policy. In 1997, Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute testified 

before a House Committee on International Relations, that “for two 

decades, the US-Egyptian relationship has been a centerpiece of US 

efforts to bolster peace and security in the Middle East. This 

reflects Egypt’s dominance in Arab political, military, diplomatic 

and cultural circles.”116 Four key elements established the basis for 

the US-Egyptian including a strategic alliance, pursuit of peace and 

economic reforms, and a gradual shift towards liberalization and 

democratization.117 Yet despite the professed American support of 

political and economic liberalization in non-democratic countries, 

President Clinton’s concern was cautious, especially with regards to 

human rights and a narrowing of political freedoms in Egypt. The 

Clinton Administration continued to provide aid and arms to Egypt, 

obviously calculating that in the immediate future a stable Egypt 

was more important than one accountable to its people. 

America’s difficulty with its status quo policy concerning 

Egypt and other Middle East allies became readily apparent in June 

2002. On June 24, 2002, President George W. Bush called for 

“regime change” for the Palestinians. He envisioned a new, 

democratic ruler assuming power to replace a corrupt and 

authoritarian Yasir Arafat.118 As a sign of President Bush’s interest 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

35

in promoting democracy, Lorne Craner, the Assistant Secretary of 

State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor was sent to the 

Middle East in June to meet with several leaders of key US strategic 

allies. The United States “is gingerly beginning to nudge 

authoritarian Arab governments to undertake democratic reforms, a 

process fraught with risk for the Bush administration and for Middle 

Eastern governments themselves.”119 

In actuality, although the Bush administration supports rapid 

change for the Palestinians, it is more cautious about its approach to 

Egypt. Since the attacks in the United States on September 11, 

many human rights groups are apprehensive that the United States 

is more concerned with anti-terror activities of strategic allies than 

their human rights abuses or lack of democracy.120 

Ends. The United States perceives Egypt as a lynchpin in the 

Arab-Israeli conflict, in control of strategic waterways and 

necessary to secure our interests in the region including access to oil 

and the security of Israel. As such, maintaining stability by 

supporting regimes that are friendly to the US—without regard to 

their political structure—has been the prevalent policy. United 

States aims concerning Egypt since September 11, 2001 has been to 

pursue an Israeli-Palestinian peace track with Egypt’s assistance, 

garner support for the war on terrorism while continuing to secure 

the constancy of the Mubarak regime with economic aid. 

Although the US professes to support democracy around the 

globe, it is clear that goal is secondary. For example, America’s 

consideration of utilizing military tribunals to try those allegedly 

involved in the terror attacks inadvertently signaled to the Egyptians 

that their emergency laws were acceptable. “While still denied such 

a forum, Egyptian officials say Western governments, once critical 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

36

of Egypt’s use of military tribunals and summary justice, are 

showing a new willingness of their own to invoke harsher measures. 

The US has said it will try some foreigners linked to Sept. 11 in 

military tribunals.”121 Additionally, the Israeli-Palestinian question 

has made it increasingly difficult for the administration to articulate 

a coherent Middle East policy. “In the face of demands for rigor 

and precision, though, Mr. Bush and his top advisers often seem 

less like a well-conducted orchestra than like improvisers in a jazz 

combo.”122 At one point, when President Bush met with Mubarak, 

he proposed working expediently to establish a Palestinian state. 

Within a day of that meeting, he told Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 

Sharon that the Palestinian Authority needed to reform before peace 

could occur.123 

As seen from an Egyptian perspective, witnessing increased 

crackdowns following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United 

States is “supporting a regime that crushes dissenting voices and 

limits individual liberties because to do so suits Washington’s 

interests.”124 American support for democracy is only rhetoric, 

according to many Arabs. Mohammed Zarei, the founder of the 

Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners, contends that 

“if there was democracy in Egypt, and people would be free to 

choose, probably [Mubarak’s party] would not be in power. The 

Islamists would control parliament and government, and that is 

against what America wants.”125 It is clear that stability supercedes 

our commitment to democracy in Egypt. The United States pursuit 

of stability in the absence of democracy ignores the long-term 

implications of its actions. 

Means. How have we executed our policy towards Egypt? In 

other words, how do we exercise our power to fulfill our interests in 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

37

Egypt and assist the Mubarak regime to maintain stability? The 

United States has several elements of power available to achieve a 

state’s objectives vis-à-vis another state, including diplomatic, 

economic, informational, and military choices. Since President 

Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in 1978 and its overture to closer 

relations with the United States, contacts between the two nations 

have been strong. To cement the peace treaty with Israel, America 

promised approximately two billion dollars of aid each year making 

Egypt the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel. According 

to the State Department, “An important pillar of the bilateral 

relationship remains US security and economic assistance to Egypt, 

which expanded significantly in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli 

Peace Treaty in 1979.”126 The economic aid also assists Egypt by 

funding projects to expand water and sewage systems, electricity, 

telecommunications, housing, and other investments. Ahmed Galal, 

the executive director of the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 

expressed the belief that the Egyptian economy “would have been 

starved for resources” without this aid.127 

This aid not only benefits Egypt, but gives the United States 

leverage to influence the government to pursue American interests. 

“US assistance promotes Egypt’s economic development, supports 

US-Egyptian cooperation, and enhances regional stability.”128 

During the Gulf War buildup, Mubarak helped assemble an Arab 

coalition and sent 35,000 troops to force Hussein to leave Kuwait. 

After the war, the United States and others forgave Egypt billions of 

dollars in loans. Thus, as a result of Egypt’s participation in the 

war, the United States recognized the importance of it investment in 

Egypt.129 Egypt’s participation in the coalition gave legitimacy to 

the operation and eased the problems associated with linking Arab 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

38

and Western forces. The United States continues military contacts 

through the annual Bright Star exercise to build cooperation with 

Egypt and other states in the region. “US military cooperation has 

helped Egypt modernize its armed forces and strengthen regional 

security and stability.”130 

Additionally, America continues to fund a variety of economic 

projects through the United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and private investments. USAID also has 

become “a driving force in a long-term effort to reform a number of 

Egypt’s sclerotic public institutions—including the court, customs 

and financial systems—but the jury is still out on that project.”131 

Benefits. Many argue that the benefit of maintaining the status 

quo policy towards Egypt is that it has succeeded for over two 

decades. A pro-Western leader, supportive of United States policies 

in the region, has retained control of the Egyptian regime. 

Proponents of the status quo point to the Gulf War in 1991 when 

Egypt joined the American-led coalition to force Saddam Hussein to 

withdraw from Kuwait. 

Since one of the US interests in the region centers on a secure 

Israel, Mubarak’s continued encouragement of peace over military 

action assists the United States in fulfilling this goal. Although 

Mubarak broke off all government-to-government contacts 

following Israel’s military operation into the West Bank in March 

2002, he would not expel the Israeli Ambassador nor did he 

mention abrogating the peace treaty, despite popular protests in his 

country.132 Mubarak had removed his ambassador from Israel 

following Israel’s incursion into Lebanon in 1982. As such, the 

breaking of “all contacts” with Israel can be interpreted as merely 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

39

symbolic and as an appeasement to his population calling for some 

Egyptian response to Israel’s actions in the occupied territories. 

Mubarak contends that peace with Israel is in his country’s 

interest and that Egypt can play a role in ameliorating the 

Palestinian condition. A crucial United States concern is the 

question of what happens to Egypt if Islamists gain power. Since 

the Islamists do not hide their disdain for the Jewish State, many in 

the US government assert that if the Islamic groups achieve power, 

they would almost certainly terminate the peace with Israel. The 

ramifications of this action, according to US officials, would be 

disastrous for the entire region. 

Risks of the Status Quo. As mentioned previously, the 

potential for volatility does not dictate destabilization. Several 

factors can produce “tipping events” including a government’s 

response to discontent, a confluence of external events and elements 

of the political culture. Accordingly, in today’s global security 

environment maintaining the status quo policy has several perils and 

can actually undermine the American policy of retaining stability. 

If the US is viewed as continuing to support Mubarak’s 

authoritarian rule, while simultaneously calling for regime change 

in other states, specifically within the Palestinian Authority, antiAmerican sentiment will increase. It is evident that there has been 

an intensification of public anti-US views in Egyptian media. 

Hamdy Qandil, a television personality who harshly criticizes 

American and Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the US 

war on terrorism, has gained popularity.133 United States officials 

believe that the Egyptian regime allows the show to air in order for 

the population to vent frustration over US action in Afghanistan and 

the deteriorating situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.134 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

40

Additionally, the print media has become viciously anti-American 

and anti-Semitic. 

Again, the confluence of external events can mobilize a 

population. Currently, the US war on terrorism, the explosive 

Israeli-Palestinian issue, and the difficulties of stabilizing a post 

conflict Iraq will all affect US policy in Egypt. The continuation 

and exacerbation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can marshal the 

Egyptian population. Former Al-Ahram editor, Mohamed Hakki is 

convinced that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 

crucial to decreasing anti-US sentiment in the Middle East. This is 

due, in part, to a belief that the United States is not a fair arbiter of 

the conflagration. Hakki argued that although the elite might 

condemn the Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel, the majority of the 

“Arab street” supports them.135 Egyptian analysts argue that there 

is an upsurge of terrorist cells in Egypt, but a resolution of the 

violence would stem their growth.136

Yet others contend that although the Israeli-Palestinian issue is 

a key target of the Islamists discontent, their agenda extends beyond 

Israel. Many are dismayed by Mubarak’s authoritarian and secular 

regime and are waiting for the “right time to spring into action.”137 

As such, along with the fomenting of anti-US attitudes is an 

increase in anti-Mubarak sentiment who some oppositionists view 

as supporting America’s stance on Israel along with stifling the 

growth of more open political processes. Interestingly, while 

President Bush called for immediate reform of the Palestinian 

regime, he supports a more gradual approach with strategic allies 

including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. “The irony will not be 

lost on people in the region, of course—Egyptians and Jordanians 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

41

will once again conclude that the United States cares about 

democratic values only when it is strategically convenient.”138

Added to this conflict is the continuing “war on terrorism” and 

post conflict nation-building in Iraq. According to a Gallup Poll in 

February 2002, seventy-seven percent of Arabs surveyed perceive 

the US war on terrorism as “morally unjustified and express a 

breathtaking depth of anti-US sentiment.”139 As such, the risks of 

maintaining the status quo policy in a vastly modified global 

security environment may prove costly to the United States. 

Already anti-American fervor is high; this, coupled with the 

potential for instability that exists in Egypt due to economic and 

political dislocations, can create the type of unstable political 

situation that the United States is trying to avoid. Thus, it is in the 

US interests to assess the value of a new policy. 

Democratization: Strategy of Opportunity 

This following strategy takes a long-term view towards US 

interests and the means available to secure those interests. As with 

the status quo strategy, this section assesses risks along with the 

second- and third-order effects of this policy while remaining 

flexible and open to constant re-assessment. The key is to 

anticipate changes in the security environment as a result of actions 

implemented in support of US policy and to plan for the 

unexpected. To do this, this section explores scenarios based on the 

driving forces observed in the domestic, regional, and international 

environments as discussed in earlier sections. To foresee the 

unexpected requires a re-examination of long-held assumptions and 

the questioning of the conventional wisdom of the day. Peter 

Schwartz warns that, “Rather than asking questions, too many 

people react to uncertainty with denial.”140 For example, why 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

42

should the US anticipate only an Algerian outcome should free and 

fair elections take place in Egypt? If Islamists come to power, 

could there be a democratic mechanism to oust undemocratic 

leaders? As one high official explains, “It is not undemocratic to 

oust the wicked.”141 

Ends. This strategy views democratization as a “security 

imperative.”142 In the long term, not only will democratization help 

alleviate the current economic and societal malaise, but it will offer 

a legitimate alternative for the Egyptian people. Of late, the only 

substitute to the authoritarian regime has been Islamist ideology 

(although, in the past an assortment of ideologies have been 

attempted, such as Pan-Arabism, socialism, Nasserism, etc) While 

it is still important to rid society of Islamist extremists as Mubarak 

has attempted, more must occur to implement real democratic 

reform. Increased crackdowns without far-reaching reforms will 

only radicalize segments of the population, whereas democracy will 

bolster state legitimacy, while marginalizing terrorism. Since 

terrorism cannot be completely eliminated, excusing the 

maintenance of an authoritarian regime as the only solution to a war 

on terrorism is not helpful for US interests. However, any 

democratic transition is extremely dangerous; terrorists operating in 

such environments view transitions as their last window of 

opportunity to garner support. 

For example, during vulnerable transitional periods, terrorists 

have increased violence to incite harsh government reactions to delegitimize the state. One need only look at the example of the 

Euzkadi ta Askatasuna’s (ETA) violent actions implemented to delegitimize Spain after Franco. Spain, however, adhered to 

democratic principles and successfully transitioned to democracy 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

43

while marginalizing the ETA. Unfortunately, terrorism persists in 

Spain forcing a flexible reassessment of Spain’s security policies 

while balancing civil liberties.143 The United States needs to be 

prepared for a tumultuous period of transition in relation to Egypt. 

Means. Interests and objectives are just one facet of the 

strategic equation. The operationalization of objectives and 

interests lies with the integration and choice of the elements of 

power. These elements of power affect the security environment 

and may have unintended consequences with ramifications for the 

achievement of goals. As such, it is imperative for US policymakers to assess the potential outcomes of a new policy. As Dr. 

Said Aly, the Director of Al-Ahram Center, explains, “I think 

bilateral and regional are linked. But both sides realize that without 

a regional settlement, Egypt cannot go too far. Nobody invests in a 

country; they invest in a region. And tourism is very vital to us and 

is highly sensitive to developments in Palestine and Israel.”144

Moreover, gradual democratization emphasizes utilizing economic, 

diplomatic, political, and informational elements of power along 

with military support. 

This aforementioned combination of tools of power recognizes 

the media’s influence on the Arab street, the growing 

socioeconomic problems, the burgeoning and increasingly youthful 

population, and the existence of Islamist extremism in the region. 

For Egypt, the influence of these factors is most critical on 

Mubarak’s traditional bases of support, especially the junior 

officers.145 First, the media’s influence requires American 

sensitivity to Arab sentiment towards regional events. Polls taken 

by Zogby international reflect intense anti-Israeli sentiments 

coupled with a profound importance placed on the plight of the 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

44

Palestinians.146 Eighty percent of Egyptians surveyed viewed 

Palestine as one of the most significant global issues.147 As 

mentioned earlier, other surveys reveal minimal support for the US 

military action in Afghanistan. Moreover, despair and frustration 

lead many to cling to ethnic-nationalist sentiments, religion, or 

traditional values. These responses to frustration manifest 

themselves in the adulation of such tyrants—and defiantly antiWestern tyrants—such as Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin 

Laden.148 

The United States must understand these sentiments as it crafts 

regional foreign policies since they will affect the Arab street 

directly. If Egyptians perceive that they have no alternative means 

of expression within their country, attitudes may solidify further in 

an anti-Western mold, undermining any US regional foreign 

policies. As such, the best way to affect the Arab street is with soft 

power. Soft power refers to civil society, that network of nongovernmental institutions that helps empower individuals and 

develops those attributes necessary for a thriving democracy.149 

Before September 11th, US policymakers became increasingly 

aware of the impact of autocratic regimes in the Arab world and the 

anger they elicited. Without political space, the Arab street has 

increasingly blamed its own autocratic leaders and the United 

States. One observer noted that before September 11th, US 

policymakers regarded “the street” as a “new phenomenon of public 

accountability, which we have seldom had to factor into our 

projections of Arab behavior in the past.”150 Information 

technologies and the explosion of media in the region, including 

CNN and al-Jazeera, are fueling public opinion, thereby putting 

pressure on the Arab regimes. No one knows, including the Arab 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

45

leaders, how this stress will shape these regimes and their 

policies.151 In February 2001, Director of Central Intelligence 

George J. Tenet testified before the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence that the “right catalyst—such as the out-break of 

Israeli-Palestinian violence—can move people to act. Through 

access to the Internet and other means of communication, a restive 

public is increasingly capable of taking action without any 

identifiable leadership or organizational structure.”152

Therefore, this increased significance of the Arab street 

provides the United States with an opportunity to relay its messages. 

Public diplomacy that allows the United States to speak directly to 

the Arab public can be a powerful tool, especially as the masses 

become political players.153 Egypt, as well as the other Arab states, 

will have to acknowledge that in this information age of improved 

levels of education, travel, and the new communications media, the 

people—not just the political and economic elite—will have a role 

in governance and political life.154 Public diplomacy, consequently, 

should include more than professional diplomats. In fact, to be 

effective, citizens and private institutions will make the most 

headway towards understanding and good will between the West 

and the Middle East as activities including teaching and providing 

effective health care are strong instruments for building mutual 

awareness. Even sports events are valuable mechanisms for cultural 

comprehension. In actuality, these vehicles are more readily trusted 

and accepted than professional diplomats.155 

Fulfillment of basic needs also cultivates an allegiance to the 

political system. As such, the United States must continue 

economic aid to Egypt, while simultaneously promoting political 

reforms. Transparency in government ensures that aid is directed 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

46

towards socio-economic development, not corrupt bureaucrats. 

“Securing a better future for all requires putting the attack on 

poverty at the top of national agendas in Arab countries.”156 

Additionally, transparencies, accountability mechanisms, a free 

press, civil society, NGOs, community groups, and widespread 

political participation will facilitate the efforts focused on 

socioeconomic development.157 These actions, in turn, will 

encourage foreign investment and business growth. Moreover, a 

regime less dependent on the military can channel US aid from the 

military and towards economic development. 

The United States need not start from scratch regarding its 

efforts in Egypt. The Zogby polls (see Appendix) suggest that a 

sizeable percentage of those surveyed favor American education, 

movies, television, people (although this percentage is only at 35), 

freedom, democracy, and American science and technology. From 

these polls, it is evident that education provides an important 

medium for transforming Egyptian political culture. Interestingly, 

in the Arab countries, the youth’s views towards US education were 

very favorable.158 This bodes well for future prospects for change. 

How can the United States capitalize on these favorable 

sentiments towards American education? Strategically, it is 

important for the United States to assist Egypt in educational reform 

and encourage democracy as a means of empowerment. 

Unfortunately, Osama Bin Laden appealed to those without power 

and explained that “with a few dozen men and knives, we’re able to 

shake up the world. You can do it.”159 A reformation in education 

offers a non-violent and democratic alternative to Bin Laden’s pull. 

Education can transform Egyptian political culture, a necessary 

vehicle for Egypt’s political development and a crucial medium 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

47

through which the regime can absorb change and respond to the 

imperatives of differentiation, equality, and capacity. These 

imperatives are the basis for democratization in the form of 

institutions and liberal values or a democratic political culture. 

These values can be learned without turning away from Arab 

culture or Islam.160 There have been other current democracies that 

in the past were considered unable to democratize due to their 

culture such as Spain, Portugal, along with several Asian countries. 

According to Michael Ignatieff, “adopting the values of individual 

agency does not necessarily entail adopting Western ways of life. 

Believing in your right not to be tortured or abused need not mean 

adopting Western dress, speaking Western languages, or approving 

of the Western lifestyle.”161 Moreover, seeking human rights 

should not be antithetical to any civilization. It is a human impulse 

“to be free from oppression, bondage, and gross physical harm.”162 

The UNDP concludes, further, that Egypt and the Arab region as a 

whole must meet the challenge of correcting the three deficits as 

noted in its report: “the freedom deficit; the women’s 

empowerment deficit; and, the human capabilities/knowledge 

deficit relative to income.”163 

Previous sections of this paper described Egyptian political 

culture as one of “apathy, isolation, and alienation.”164 However, 

political culture can change, but “change won’t come about unless 

ordinary Arabs want it themselves. . . . A second, related point is 

that if we’re talking about changing the political culture of the Arab 

world, then ‘soft power’ is as important as hard military power.”165 

By affecting socialization agents, such as education and civil 

society, including a free press, at the grassroots level, political 

culture can change and embrace liberal values.166
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

48

Furthermore, it is not just the masses that have been influenced 

by domestic, regional, and global events. In fact, one could argue 

that the elites have been ripe for anti-regime sentiment for some 

time. Mubarak’s support base among the elite seemed to be in 

decay even as early as 1986. Robert Springborg observed indicators 

of regime instability as 

the lack of organizational and ideological cohesiveness 

within the elite, increasing lassitude with state structures, 

the emergence of counterelites and ideologies within the 

increasingly active legal and underground political 

oppositions, and the growing independence of associational 

groups and even governmental bodies, such as the 

judiciary.167 

Increasingly, there is evidence of discontent in the junior officer 

corps especially with regard to the regime’s response to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.168 This is worrisome for Mubarak as the 

military has always been a solid base of support. For democracy to 

take root in Egypt, political culture not only must transform from 

below, but also from the top; political culture reflects the attitudes 

of the elite, as well. 169 

Consequently, interactions at the elite level must also occur. 

Dr. Said Aly suggests that the Egyptian leadership must take some 

diplomatic initiatives. 

Egypt needs to promote itself better. When other heads of 

state come to the United States, they visit other cities. 

They don’t stay in Washington. They go to Chicago, 

Houston, San Francisco to promote their countries. Some 

countries even have a ‘Minister of the Month’ program 

where every month the oil minister, the education minister, 

the trade minister come and there’s a constant flow and 

reminder of the relationship.170 

Cultural exchanges are very important at all levels.171 For 

example, Ambassador Frank Wisner remarked that there 

can be much to gain with an exchange among judges as the 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

49

quality of Egyptian judges is high. The United States 

currently participates in exchanges between chief justices 

of other countries. Definitely, such an exchange with 

Egypt would enhance rule of law providing a stabilizing 

influence on democratization. Other fruitful exchanges 

would include ones in journalism, parliamentarian, 

military, business, and technology.172 

Religious elites must also establish a dialogue as part of a 

reformation of Islam. “It is time for the Arab-Muslims to break the 

heavy shackles of the past and to try to come to terms with the 

West”173 According to Fuller, moderate religious and social leaders 

of the Muslim world must find the courage to critique Islam and call 

for changes. “When highly traditional or fanatic groups attempt to 

define Islam in terms of a social order from a distant past, voices 

should be raised to deny them that monopoly.”174 The current wave 

of violence is not derived from religion, even though the 

perpetrators claim otherwise. 

There is an alternative ideology for the Egyptians that could 

strengthen political allegiance and, therefore, legitimacy. Egyptian 

nationalism has a seven thousand year long history. It is a 

sentiment that Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak tapped for legitimacy 

when forced to make hard foreign policy decisions, such as Egypt’s 

realignment with the West in the 1970s and Mubarak’s support 

during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Along with asserting the primacy of 

Egypt in the Middle East, the United States can provide diplomatic 

incentives for Mubarak or his successor to democratize. Namely, 

the United States can highlight Egypt’s role in negotiations 

concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; turn to Egypt on other 

regional matters; and provide Egypt with the forums required to 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

50

lead. While transitions can be unstable in the short term, the 

Egyptians tend to support their leaders when hard regional decisions 

are required. 

On the international level, the United States must recognize that 

the war on terrorism cannot be won unilaterally; international 

cooperation is necessary to fight the transnational threat of 

terrorism. More work must be done with the UN to arrive at a 

common understanding of this threat. Telhami suggests that the 

deliberate targeting of civilians should be the defining measure of 

terrorism and the basis of an international treaty.175 He also 

suggests that the United States help moderates in the region to 

accept and articulate a “global vision.” One way to accomplish this 

goal is to establish an international forum that discusses economic 

and political change backed by resources. Second, there must be an 

Arab-Israeli peace, not as a sufficient condition, but a necessary 

one. This is a long term process, and “we are not going to buy hope 

in the short term.”176

Risks. In conceptualizing the problems of pushing for 

democratization in Egypt, several scenarios come to mind. They 

include the following: 1) Islamists assume power and abrogate the 

peace treaty with Israel, 2) an anti-US leader assumes power, and 3) 

a weak leader follows Mubarak. We will take each one of these 

cases in turn to assess the risks involved with prodding Egypt to 

democratize. 

Islamist in Power. The argument against free and fair elections 

concludes that Islamists will come to power and subsequently end 

the democratization process. Proponents of this argument invoke 

the example that Hitler came to power through democratic 

institutions. This oft-uttered comment regarding Egypt and 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

51

democratization begs the comparison between Egypt’s situation and 

that of Iran in 1979 or Algeria in 1990. No one can say for sure that 

an Islamic group will or will not assume power if a democratic 

election were held in Egypt, yet the argument that the situation 

would be similar to revolutionary Iran and Algeria is not valid. 

Regarding Algeria, President Chandli Benjadid terminated oneparty rule and phased elections began in 1990. In local elections, 

the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won “sixty percent of regional 

assemblies and fifty-five percent of municipal councils.”177 In the 

second round of elections choosing parliament members, FIS gained 

188 of the 231 seats. After Benjadid was forced to resign, the third 

phase of elections was cancelled and the democratic process stifled. 

As Robin Wright explains, “the world’s first Islamic democracy 

never had a chance to prove itself.”178 As such, the effect of having 

an Islamic party in power in Algeria remains unknown. 

By contrast, in 1989 Jordan held elections and the Islamists 

won 34 out of 80 seats in the lower house of Parliament. In 

subsequent elections in 1993 after King Hussein ushered in 

multiparty elections, the Islamists captured 18 of the 80 seats. The 

King believed that he could co-opt the Muslim Fundamentalist 

groups through political liberalization rather than employing harsh 

crackdowns. 

Regarding Iran, a revolution, not an election created an Islamic 

theocracy. Although the potential exists that an Islamic theocracy 

may develop in Egypt after an election, it is unlikely to take the 

same form as Iran in 1979. Ambassador Frank Wisner contends 

that it would be difficult to argue whether or not Egypt would 

follow in Iran’s footsteps since the environment of 2002 is 

significantly different than the historical context of 1979. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

52

Clearly the concern of many is that Islamists by their very 

nature are undemocratic, and, therefore, could not promote political 

development.179 An Islamist win would be antithetical to meeting 

the challenges of under-development and the deficits described in 

the UNDP’s report. Many women are concerned with an Islamist 

regime. One participant in a roundtable sponsored by the Institute 

for Democracy and Electoral Assistance commented that, 

“Democracy should not include [violence] or be violent itself . . . 

and violence for me as a woman is to want to apply sharia 

literally.”180 However, Islamists could serve in a representational 

capacity in a democratic framework. A constitutional framework 

that provides for a democratic process with free and fair elections 

can also insist on democratically minded leaders and prohibit those 

who are not democratically inclined from assuming a governing 

role. This type of constitutional arrangement may be the necessary 

stop-gap for transitioning regimes that are still developing 

institutions and democratic political cultures. 

There are some models that could be explored as viable ways to 

deal on a political level with undemocratic Islamists. In Turkey, the 

military ousted the ill-performing Islamist-led government only one 

year after they assumed power. However, Islamist mayors in cities 

across Turkey, including Istanbul and Ankara, continue to capture 

votes because they are responsive to their constituency.181 (This is 

the point of democracy, and it is where many Islamists fail.) Jordan 

and Morocco have been able to sustain various political and 

economic reforms, while integrating Islamists into political life. 

Jordan has done this while pursuing terrorists and maintaining a 

peace treaty with Israel. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

53

In fact, one may argue that it was intractable American support 

of the Shah that created the conditions for the Iranian revolution.182 

In a study of Islamic revivalism in Pakistan, the author concludes 

that the Islamic extremists could not cultivate a following, and “in 

the final analysis, participation in the political process can do more 

to tame Islamic revivalism than repression from the state.”183 

Furthermore, as an opposition group, Islamists succeed because 

they represent a veto to the current regime. However, by being 

ambiguous about democracy and human rights, while resorting to 

terror, these groups quickly lose credibility.184 

As such, United States policymakers should recognize that 

Islamic resurgence is not inevitable if democratization takes root. 

The popularity of Islamists stems from a crisis environment 

including closed political systems, the gap between elite and 

masses, and the inability of regimes to absorb change. Moreover, 

one should temper the appearance of a large Islamist political 

movement with Egyptian a political culture that is attuned to state 

power. Egypt has had a secular regime for more than 200 years and 

has never been revolutionary.185 Perhaps, the answer to how to 

pursue US interests in the Middle East is in staring directly at US 

policy-makers—a persistent push for democracy.186 

Abrogation of the Peace Treaty. A scenario involving an 

Egyptian ruler abrogating the peace treaty with Israel seems 

unlikely. First, Egypt continues to be concerned about it borders 

with Sudan and Libya and therefore appreciates a peaceful border. 

Second, coupled with the fact that the United States is the sole 

superpower, an Egyptian government is unlikely to reject billions of 

dollars of US military aid.187 Third, Egypt’s treaty with Israel gives 

it regional prestige that is also a source of legitimacy at home. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

54

Additionally, what would Egypt gain from withdrawing from the 

peace treaty? Perhaps the more prescient question is what would it 

lose? 

When one looks at the treaty, it becomes clear that it is very 

advantageous for Egypt. For example, Egypt regained the Sinai and 

established normal relations with Israel defined as “full recognition, 

diplomatic, economic and cultural, termination of economic 

boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people 

and goods. . . .” The treaty’s preamble also states that the intent is 

“to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel 

but also between Israel and each of the other Arab neighbors....”188 

But the so-called pro-US Egyptian regime has been ineffective and 

uncooperative in its roles to facilitate the Arab-Israeli peace 

process. Egypt even opposed US efforts to advance Israel’s 

regional integration.189 In reality, in the absence of “hot war” the 

relationship has not moved beyond “cold peace.” In fact, many 

Egyptian intellectuals, and cultural and religious figures, do not 

support normalization with Israel.190 In a 1994 poll by Al Ahram 

Weekly, seventy-one percent of Egyptian surveyed said that they 

would not buy Israeli goods, sixty-three percent said that they 

would not visit Israel, and seventy-five percent did not want 

industrial cooperation with Israel.191 While Egyptian-Israeli 

relations do not seem to reflect the spirit of the treaty, abrogation of 

the treaty does not mean war. In fact, sixty-five to seventy percent 

of Egyptians surveyed held that “peace is good for Egypt.”192 

The next order question becomes, what would change should 

Egypt abrogate the peace treaty? Edward N. Luttwak envisions the 

worst case scenario as Egypt going to war with Israel. Most likely, 

if Egypt launched an attack on Israel, the United States would cut 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

55

all aid. Although other Arab countries may follow Egypt in battle, 

Israel still maintains the advantage in conventional combat.193 The 

more probable scenario is that if Egypt abrogated the peace treaty, 

Egypt’s support of Islamic extremists in asymmetrical warfare 

against Israel would increase. The United States, however, retains 

key financial leverage. By cutting off much needed aid, Egyptian 

leaders would face severe socio-economic challenges. 

Anti-US Leader in Power. This scenario is another worst-case 

scenario. However, the United States de-legitimizes itself when it 

supports an autocratic leader and issues no admonishment for the 

sentencing of Saad Eddin Ibrahim to seven years of hard labor “for 

promoting the peaceful alternative to fundamentalist violence....”194 

Friedman warns that “if there is no space in Egypt for democratic 

voices, then Egyptians will only be left with the mosque. If there is 

no room in Egypt for Saad Ibrahims, then we will only get more 

Mohammed Attas. . . .”195 For the same reasons why it is not 

prudent to abrogate the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, anti-US 

sentiment will provoke a rethinking of the US aid package to Egypt. 

Moreover, Egypt’s harsh crackdown on Islamists included 

repression of legitimate opposition groups. As Egypt tightened the 

noose around the already limited political space, it deflected regime 

criticism towards the United States. Egypt, our strategic partner, 

has created a widespread anti-American consensus that includes not 

just the Islamists, but also the pan-Arabists, and intellectuals.196 

The question then becomes, how much more anti-American would a 

democratically elected leader be than the current regime? 

Weak Leader takes Over. This risk is one without any option. 

Mubarak has been a strong, autocratic leader for 21 years. Whoever 

succeeds him will most likely be weaker in comparison.197 If the 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

56

leader is indeed a product of free and fair elections, then he or she 

must be held accountable. At the end of the day, it takes a much 

stronger leader to serve the interests of his or her citizens than to 

serve him- or herself. 

CONCLUSION 

With the confluence of the domestic, regional, and international 

events discussed, it appears that Mubarak has reached the 

crossroads—and so has US policy. The strategy of opportunity 

minimizes future risks and considers US strategy towards Egypt 

with a regional and global perspective. This study reveals that any 

modification in US Middle East policy must contemplate all factors. 

For example, as the United States struggles with post-conflict 

nation-building in Iraq, the possibility of a regional backlash must 

be assessed. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are particularly 

fearful of unrest within their borders if the Iraqi people do not begin 

to reap the benefits of “regime change.” 

Augustus Richard Norton asks, “Will America now define 

national security as it did a half century ago to see the betterment of 

others’ conditions as key to ensuring its own safety and well-being? 

Or will it be satisfied merely to aggressively police the frontiers of 

hostility at home and abroad to reduce the likelihood of a new 

terrorist-inflicted disaster? The lessons of 1947 would be to do 

both. . . .”198 The United States must recognize that the post-9/11 

world is a “war of ideas, and it will be much more difficult than the 

military campaign.” 199 The problems are not only those of the 

United States, but of the global community. 

Most importantly, the United States cannot afford to be timid in 

its insistence on principles of democracy; it is the best antidote to 

Islamist extremism and hardened authoritarianism. Calling it the 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

57

“End of History,” Francis Fukuyama, assessed the demise of the 

Soviet Union and communism as the end of ideological conflict.200 

However, this post-September 11 period reveals that democracy is 

not only the ideological victor over communism, but can be 

extended as an ideological champion over extremism. More than an 

ideological force, however, democracy is exactly the security 

imperative the United States has sought; perhaps post-9/11 will be 

the true end of history. 

NOTES 

 

1

 A more detailed discussion of these environments is found in Cindy 

R. Jebb, The Fight for Legitimacy: Liberal Democracy versus 

Terrorism (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2001), 5-16. 

2

 Shibley Telhami, “Understanding the Challenge,” Middle East 

Journal (Winter 2002): 5. Accessed 1 August 2002 from 

http://proquest.umi.com. 

3

 The discussion on globalism and globalization is found in James 

Rosenau, "The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization, " in 

Understanding International Relations, eds. Daniel J. Kaufman, Jay 

Parker, and Kimberly C. Field (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 756-

758; the quote and the idea of the predominance of globalization is 

found on 758-759. 

4

 Jessica Mathews, "Power Shift," in Strategy and Force Planning, 3rd

ed., eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport, RI: US Naval 

War College, 2000), 94. 

5

 Mathews, "Power Shift," 94-95. 

6

 "Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and 

Promoting Freedom," The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st

Century (April 15, 2000), 5. 

7

 Speech by Dr. Josef Joffe at the Partnership for Peace Conference, 

Paris, France 17-19 June, 2002. 

8

 Bruce Hoffman, "Low-intensity Conflict: Terrorism and Guerilla 

Warfare in the Coming Decades," in Terrorism: Roots, Impact, 

Responses, ed. Lance Howard (New York: Praeger, 1992), 139. 

9

 "A National Security Strategy For A New Century," The White 

House, December 1999, 2. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

58

 

10 Michael Brown, “Introduction,” The International Dimensions of 

Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press, 

1996), 3. 

11 For a comprehensive discussion of a security framework that 

includes a security environment consisting of opportunities, threats, 

vulnerabilities, and challenges, see Richmond Lloyd, "Strategy and 

Force Planning Framework," Strategy and Force Planning, 3rd Edition, 

ed. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport, RI: US Naval War 

College, 2000), 1-17. 

12 For a comprehensive discussion of the European Union’s role see, 

Robert Cooper, "Integration and Disintegration," Journal of Democracy

10 (1999): 3-4. 

13 Note that according to “Al-Jazeera: Arabs Rate Its Objectivity,” 

Gallup Tuesday Briefing, 23 April 2002, 1. Accessed 10 July 2002 

from http://www.gallup.com, “Al Jazeera boasts a regular viewership 

of some 35 million Arabs in its primarily Middle East market, as well 

as hundreds of thousands of viewers in the United States and 

Europe....”13

14 “Tom Friedman and Bill Kristol Discuss Violence in the Middle 

East,” interviewed by Tim Russert on Meet the Press, 17 March 2002. 

Accessed on 6 August 2002 from http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 

15 Telhami, 3. 

16 Philip Smucker, “Egypt’s Unrest a Two-Edged Sword,” Christian 

Science Monitor (4 August 2002): 1. Accessed 22 July 2002 from 

http://ehostvgw.com. 

17 Tim Russert cites this poll in “Tom Friedman and Bill Kristol 

Discuss Violence in the Middle East,” 2. 

18 “The Poor Arab Street,” Economist, 3 July 2002, 1. Accessed 10 

July 2002 from http://proquest.umi.com. 

19 Ambassador Robert Pelletreu as quoted in, “U.S. Egyptian 

Relations,” Middle East Policy 8, no. 2 (June 2001). Accessed 23 July 

2002 from http://proquest.umi.com. 

20 Thomas Friedman, “Hardball with Chris Mathews,” 5 June 2002. 

Accessed on 6 August 2002 at http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 

21 Ambassador Pelletreau in U.S Egyptian Relations.” 

22 Smucker, “Egypt’s Unrest a Two-Edged Sword.” 

23 Singerman, 34. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

59

 

24Ibid. 

25 The idea of today’s terrorism taking on the characteristics of a 

political movement is taken from Bruce Hoffman, “Lecture to 

Terrorism Seminar,” at the United States Military Academy, April 

2002. 

26 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the 

Arab World, 2nd ed., (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 7. 

27 Dekmejian, 6. 

28 Mir Zohair Husain, Global Islamic Politics (New York: 

HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), 163. 

29 James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East

(New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), 6. 

30 Husain, 164. 

31 Stephen Chilton, Defining Political Development (Denver: Lynne 

Rienner Publishers, 1988), 105. 

32 Husain, 164. 

33 Gilbert R. Winham, “Political Development and Lerner’s Theory: 

Further Test of a Causal Model,” The American Political Science 

Review 64 (1970): 810. 

34 Joshua A. Stacher, “A Democracy with Fangs and Claws and its 

Effect on Egyptian Political Culture,” Arab Studies Quarterly (Summer 

2001): 2. Accessed on 29 July 2002 at http://proquest.umi.com. 

35 Both quotes are from Larry Diamond, "The Global State of 

Democracy," Current History, 99, no. 641 (December 2000): 414-415. 

36 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 4. 

37 Husain, 164. 

38 “Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for 

Future Generations (New York: United Nations Development 

Programme), 2. Accessed 28 July 2002 from http://www.undp.org/ 

rbas/ahdr/bychapter.html. 

39 Husain., 162. 

40 Husain., 165. 

41 Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 2. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

60

 

42 Barry M. Schutz and Robert O. Slater, eds., Revolution and Political 

Change in the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 

1990), 5. 

43Timothy J. Lomperis, From People’s War to People’s Rule: 

Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: 

The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 32. 

44 Ibid., 24. 

45 Hudson, 168. 

46 Husain, 168. 

47Husain, 171. 

48 Ralf Dahrendorf, “On the Governability of Democracies,” in 

Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, eds. Roy C. Macridis and 

Bernard Brown (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 

1996), 332. 

49 Husain, 168. 

50 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University 

Press, 1970), 13. 

51 Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative 

Analysis Using New Indices," in Anger, Violence and Politics, eds. Ivo 

and Rosalind Feieraband (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), 185. 

52 James Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," in American 

Sociological Review 27 (1962): 6. 

53 Leonard Berkowitz, "The Study of Urban Violence," in When Men 

Revolt-and Why, ed. James Chowning Davies (New York: The Free 

Press, 1971), 184-185. 

54 Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence: 

Revolution in the Modern World (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 

1968), 39. 

55 There have been both assassination and coup attempts against the 

Mubarak regime in the past. 

56 Ronald A. Francisco, “The Relationship Between Coercion and 

Protest: An Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States,” Journal of 

Conflict Resolution 39 (June 1995): 263-265. 

57 Leiden and Schmitt, 21. 

58 Bard T. O'Neill, William R. Heator and Donald J. Roberts, eds., 

Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 19. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

61

 

59 Bard O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism (New York: Brassey's Inc., 

1990), 126-127. 

60 O'Neill, Insurgency in the Modern World, 21. 

61 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. 

62 O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 127. 

63 See Dekmejian, 178. Another interesting example concerns Israel 

and its relationship with the Palestinians. Israel supported the growth 

of the Islamic movement in the 1980’s, specifically HAMAS (The 

Islamic Resistance Movement), in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a 

counterbalance to nationalist groups. The Israelis hoped the new group 

would gain support, thereby weakening the pull of the nationalist 

opposition parties. The Islamic groups, however, have continued to 

gain influence and have become a threat to the Israelis. 

64 John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Pennsylvania: 

Stackpole Book, 1966), 35. 

65 Lucian W. Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement 

of Rebellions," in Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein (London: Collier, 

Macmillan Ltd., 1964), 167. 

66 Ibid, 168. 

67 Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in 

Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Michael E. Brown, ed., 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 81- 86. 

68 Ibid. 

69 Yedidya Atlas, “Poor Economies Foster Muslim Extremism,” 

Human Events 53, no.29 (July 1993): 15. 

70 Hilal Khasan, “The New Arab Cold War,” World Affairs 159, no.4 

(Spring 1997): 158. 

71 Atlas. 

72 Economist, 19 June 1999 accessed 29 April 2002 from 

http://www.nexis.com. 

73 AP Worldstream, 27 February 2002. Accessed 29 April 2002 from 

http://www.nexis.com. 

74 G. Jefferson Price III, “Egypt Sees Bias in U.S., Not Unrest at 

Home,” The Baltimore Sun, 3 March 2002, 1F. Accessed on 29 April 

2002 from http://www.nexis.com/.
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

62

 

75 Mark Goldrup, “Planning a Comeback,” Business Today 1 March, 

2002 Accessed on 29 April 2002, http://www.nexis.com/. 

76 Ibid. 

77 Michael Slackman, “Egypt’s Dinosaur Economy Lumbers on with 

Aid,” Los Angeles Times, 17 February 2002, A5. Accessed 29 April 

2002, http://www.nexis.com/. For a discussion of a how the U.S. can 

help Egypt’s economy by creating a free trade zone, see Abeer Allam, 

“Egypt Hopes for Free Trade Pact with U.S.,” New York Times, 6 

March 2002. Accessed 29 April 2002, http://www.nexis.com/. 

78 Atlas, 15. 

79 A. K. Benerji, Round Table, no.317 (January 1991). Accessed 8 

May 2002, http://proquest.umi.com. 

80 Emad Makay, “Denial,” The New Republic 11 September 2000 

accessed 8 May 2002, http://proquest.umi.com. 

81 Ibid. 

82 Stacher. 

83 Ibid. 

84 Eberhard Kienle, “More than a Response to Islamism: The Political 

Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990’s,” The Middle East Journal 52, 

no.2 (Spring 1998): 219. 

85 Ibid. 

86 Larry P. Goodson and Soha Radwan, “Democratization in Egypt in 

the 1990s: Stagnant, or Merely Stalled?” Arab Studies Quarterly 19, 

no.1 (Winter 1997). Accessed on 22 July 2002 from http://ehostgw5. 

epnet.com. 

87 Ibid. 

88 Ibid. 

89 Fouad Ajami, “The Sorrows of Egypt,” Foreign Affairs

(September/October 1995): 85. 

90 Goodson and Radwan. 

91 Stacher. 

92 Mona Mokram-Ebaid, “Egypt’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections,” 

Middle East Policy (June 2001) accessed 29 April 2002 

http://proquest.umi.com. 

93 Ibid. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

63

 

94 Husain, 173. 

95 Dekmejian, 182. 

96 Ibid, 183. 

97 “U.S. Egyptian Relations,” Middle East Policy. 

98 Michael Slackman, “Egyptian American in Cairo Gets 7-Year Jail 

Term for Rights Work,” The Los Angeles Times, 22 May 2001, A3. 

Accessed 3 May 2002, from www.nexis.com. 

99 Mideast Mirror, 3 July 2000. Accessed 3 May 2002, from 

http:/www.nexis.com. 

100 Ed Blanche, “Arab Regimes Crack Down on Islamists,” Janes 

Intelligence Review, March 1 2002. Accessed 2 May 2002, 

http://www.janesonline.com. 

101 Raymond William Baker, “Egypt in the Time of Space and 

Globalism,” Arab Studies Quarterly (Summer 1999). Accessed on 8 

May 2002, http://proquest.umi.com. 

102 Jon B. Alterman, “Egypt Stable, But for How Long?” Washington 

Quarterly 23, no.4. (Autumn 2000). Accessed 1 October 2001 from 

http://ehostvgw.com. 

103 Stacher. 

104 Ibid. 

105 Dekmejian, 185. 

106 Agence France Presse, 23 April 2002 accessed 7 May 2002, 

http://www.nexis.com. 

107 Agence France Presse, 10 April 2002 accessed 7 May 2002, 

http://www.nexis.com. 

108 Authors’ interview with Sara Daly, Political Analyst at Rand, 25 

July 2002, Washington D.C. 

109 Elaine Sciolino, “In Mideast Diplomacy, Few Secrets or Solutions,” 

New York Times, 16 June 2002. Accessed on 31 July 2002, 

http//:proquest.umi.com. 

110 Patrick Cockburn, “U.S. Shifts Focus of Middle-East Policy: 

Containment has been replaced by Encouragement of Democracy,” The 

Independent, 23 September 1993, 14. Accessed 1 August 2002 at 

http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 

111Ibid. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

64

 

112 Shannon Lindsey Blanton, “Promoting Human Rights and 

Democracy in the Developing World: U.S. Rhetoric versus U.S. Arms 

Exports,” American Journal of Political Science 44, no.1 (January, 

2000): 123. 

113 Ibid, 123-131. 

114 Robin Wright, “Clinton Given Mixed Grade on Human Rights,” Los 

Angeles Times, 10 December 1993. Accessed on 1 August 2002 from 

http://proquest.umi.com. 

115 Ibid. 

116 Robert Satloff, Executive Director, The Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy Before the House Committee on International 

Relations, “U.S. Policy Towards Egypt,” April 10, 1997. Accessed on 

1 August 2002 from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/ 

satloff/satloff.htm. 

117 Ibid. 

118 David Ignatius “Winning Friends In the Arab World,” The 

Washington Post; 5 July 2002, A.21. Accessed on 31 July 2002 at 

http://proquest.umi.com. See also New York Times 25 June 2002 and 

Los Angeles Times, 25 June 2002 for President Bush’s statements 

regarding change in the Palestinian leadership. 

119 Warren P. Strobel, U.S. begins push for human rights in Middle 

East,” The Houston Chronicle, 5 June 2002. Accessed on 2 August 

2002 from http://lexis.nexis.com. 

120 Phillip Smucker, The Christian Science Monitor, 7 May 2002. 

Accessed 8 May 2002 from http://www.nexis.com. 

121 Phillip Smucker “Egypt Cautions West on Intruding,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 31 December 2001. Accessed on 31 July 2002 from 

http//:ehost. 

122 Elaine Sciolino, “In Mideast Diplomacy, Few Secrets or Solutions, 

New York Times, 16 June 2002. Accessed on 31 July 2002 from 

http//:proquest.umi.com. 

123 Ibid. 

124 Michael Slackman, “Egypt Sees U.S. Going Cairo's Way,” Los 

Angeles Times; July 10, 2002 A.4. Accessed 31 July 2002 at 

http://proquest.umi.com. 

125 Ibid. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

65

 

126 U.S. Department of State Dispatch; Washington; 29 August 1994. 

Accessed 9 August 2002 from http://proquest.umi.com. 

127 Howard Schneider, “U.S. Aid Fueling the Development of Modern 

Egypt; Program Reshaped the Nation's Military, and Its Citizens' 

Lives,” Washington Post, 26 December 2000. Accessed 9 August 2002 

from http://proquest.umi.com. 

128 U.S. Department of State Dispatch; Washington; 29 August 1994. 

Accessed 9 August 2002 from http://proquest.umi.com. 

129 Schneider. 

130 U.S. Department of State Dispatch; Washington; Aug 29, 1994 

accessed 9 August, 2002 from http://proquest.umi.com. 

131 Ibid. 

132 Patrick E. Tyler, “Swamped by Protests, Egypt Cuts Nearly All Ties 

to Israel,” 4 April 2002, New York Times, A12. Accessed on 2 August 

2002 at http://lexis.nexis.com. 

133 Although viewing figures were unavailable, the current affairs press 

review-cum-talk show has become the most talked-about television in 

Egypt since Qatari maverick television station Al Jazeera first broke 

political taboos in the Arab world with its rowdy Opposite Direction 

show in 1996.” Andrew Hammond, “A New Era of Openness,” Middle 

East, no. 320 ( February 2002): 46. Accessed on 31 July at 

http://ehostvgw4.epnet.com. 

134 Ibid. 

135 Muhammed Hakki, Interview by Authors in Washington, D.C. 26 

July 2002. 

136 Phillip Smucker, “Egypt fights terror with imams and newsprint. 

The state-controlled media and clergy are campaigning to calm Islamic 

militancy,” Christian Science Monitor; 16 July 2002. Accessed on 31 

July 2002 at http//: ehostvgw.com. 

137 Ibid. 

138 Jackson Diehl, “Don't-Rock- The-Boat Diplomacy,” The 

Washington Post; 24 June 2002, A19. Accessed 1 August 2002 from 

http://proquest.umi.com. 

139 “Islamic World sees U.S. Negatively,” Veterans of Foreign Wars 

Magazine ( May 2002). Accessed 1 August 2002 from 

http://proquest.umi.com. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

66

 

140 Peter Schwartz, “The Art of the Long View,” Strategy and Force 

Planning, 2nd edition, eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty 

(Newport: US Naval War College, 1997), 29. For further explanation 

of scenario building, that is identifying driving forces, predetermined 

elements and critical uncertainties, see Ibid, 29-44. 

141 Dr. Bill Luti, interview conducted by authors, 24 July 2002 in 

Washington D.C. 

142 Jebb, 115. 

143 See Jebb, 21-38 for full discussion of the case of Spain and ETA. 

144 Aly and Pelletreau, 10. 

145 Ambassador Wisner explained that while Egypt does not have a 

revolutionary culture, the impact of these factors on Mubarak’s narrow 

support base is dangerous for him in an interview with the authors on 

18 September 2002, New York City. 

146 Tables and explanations are depicted in Appendix. The polls are 

taken from “The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll,” Zogby 

International, 11 April 2002. Accessed 31 July 2002 at 

https://interactive.zogby.com/clickon/products.dbm. 

147 Shibley Telhami supports the Zogby statistic and found 79 percent 

of Egyptians surveyed felt that the Palestinian issue “was the single 

most important issue to them personally,” in Telhami, 4. Moreover, he 

claims that the Palestinian issue “...is central to the collective 

consciousness in the region, to the collective Arabic and Islamic 

identity.... And thus when an Arab or Muslim makes a judgment about 

the world, subconsciously he or she makes a judgment through the 

prism of the Palestinian issue.” The West does not understand this, and 

“We think of it in very simplistic terms.” See Telhami, 4. 

148 Fuller, 6. 

149 Ignatius, 2-3. 

150 Author cites Edward S. Walker, “The New U.S. Administration’s 

Middle East Policy Speech,” Middle East Economic Survey 44, no. 26 

(June 25, 2001) in Dale F. Eikelman, “Bin Laden, the Arab ‘Street,’ 

and the Middle East’s Democracy Deficit,” Current History: A Journal 

of Contemporary World Affairs 101, no. 651 (January 2002): 38. 

151 Ibid. 

152 Eickelman, 38. 

153 Eickelman, 38-39. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

67

 

154 Eickelman, 39. 

155 Michael Holtzman, “Privatize Public Diplomacy,” New York Times, 

8 August 2002, A25. See also Shibley Telhami expresses concern that 

politicians who speak directly to the Arab Street are really speaking to 

Congress. Consequently, they are ineffective as messengers of public 

diplomacy in Telhami. 

156 Arab Human Development Report 2002, 11. 

157 Arab Human Development Report 2002, 12. 

158 Zogby International, 16. 

159 Telhami, 3. 

160 The idea that political culture is learned is from Stacher, “A 

Democracy with Fangs and Claws.” 

161 Michael Ignatieff, “The Attack on Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs

80, no. 6 (November/December 2001): 110. 

162 Ibid. 

163 Arab Human Development Report 2002, 27. 

164 Stacher, 3. 

165 Ignatius, 2-3. 

166 During the authors’ interview with Mohamed Hakki, he stressed the 

importance of a free press as an agent of change. 

167 Jon B. Alterman cites Robert Springborg, Mubarak’s Egypt: 

Fragmentation of the Political Order (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 9 in 

Jon B. Alterman, “Egypt: Stable, but for How Long,” The Washington 

Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2000): 2. 

168 This point has been confirmed by several high ranking officials and 

analysts interviewed by the authors and Dr. Sara Daly, analyst at 

RAND, interviewed 25 July 2002, and Mr. Hakki, interviewed 26 July 

2002. 

169 Stacher, 2. Quote is taken from Larry Diamond, Political Culture 

and Democracy in Developing Countries, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 

1994), 19. 

170 “U.S. Egyptian Relations.” 

171 The point of cultural exchange was stressed during the authors’ 

interview with Mr. Hakki. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

68

 

172 The idea about exchanges among judges, journalists, and 

parliamentarians was based on an interview with Ambassador Frank 

Wisner, former Ambassador to Egypt and India, on 18 September 2002, 

in New York City. 

173 Mahmud A. Faksh, “Islam and the West,” Maine Telegram, 7 

October 2001, section c, c1. 

174 Fuller, 7. 

175 The idea of cooperation is taken from Jebb, 112-115 and Telhami, 7. 

Also the idea of a common definition concerning the targeting of 

civilians is from Telhami, 7. 

176 Telhami, 7. 

177 Robin Wright, “ Islam, Democracy and the West,” Foreign Affairs

71, no. 3 (Summer 1992) Accessed 2 October 2002 at http:// 

www.proquest.umi. 

178 Ibid. 

179 In this paper we are not arguing whether or not Islam is compatible 

with democracy, but we are arguing that for democratic political 

development to occur, it is necessary to have the conditions mentioned 

in this paper. As such, a country run strictly by Shariah law will not 

satisfy these conditions. 

180 This quote is from a roundtable discussion that took place over a 28-

29 March 1999 and reported in “Democracy in the Arab World – 

Challenges, Achievements, Prospects,” Institute for Democracy and 

Electoral Assistance, 2. Accessed 10 July 2002, http://www.idea.int/

publications/arab_world_excerpt.htm. 

181 The idea about Turkey is taken from Graham Fuller, “The Future of 

Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2002), 3. Accessed on 7 

August 2002 at http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 

182 Indyk, 86-87. 

183 S.V.R. Nasr, Democracy and Islamic Revivalism,” Political Science 

Quarterly, 110, no. 2 (Summer, 1995), 284-285. Accessed 6 August 

2002 at http://www.jstor.org/. 

184 Gerges, 600. 

185 Interview with Ambassador Frank Wisner, former Ambassador to 

Egypt, 18 September, New York City. 

186 It will be interesting to see if, in fact, the Palestinian National 

Authority (PNA) democratizes. It will be harder for the U.S. not to 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

69

 

insist on democracy in Egypt, while promoting the democratization 

elsewhere. 

187 Alterman, 6. 

188 The first quote is found in The Middle East, 8th ed. (Washington 

D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 397, and the second quote is 

found in Ibid. 396. 

189 Martin Indyk, Back to the Bazaar,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 

(January/February 2002), 79-80. 

190 Fawaz A. Gerges, “Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour,” Foreign 

Affairs, May 1995, 3. Accessed 7 August 2002 at http://proquest.umi. 

com. 

191 Ibid, 4. 

192 “U.S. Egyptian Relations.” 

193 Edward Luttwak, “Worst Case Scenario,” Time 8 April 2002, 1-2. 

Accessed 10 July 2002 at http://proquest.umi.com. 

194 Thomas L. Friedman, “Bush’s Shame,” New York Times, 4 August 

2002, sect 4, 13. 

195 Friedman, 13. 

196 Indyk, 82. 

197 Interview with Sara Daly, RAND. 

198 Augustus Richard Norton, “America’s Approach to the Middle East: 

Legacies, Questions, and Possibilities,” Current History: A Journal of 

Contemporary World Affairs 101, no. 651 (January 2002): 4. 

199 Telhami, 7. 

200 Stanley Hoffman refers to the Francis Fukuyama piece in Stanley 

Hoffman, “Clash of Globalizations,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 

2002), 2. Accessed 13 August 2002 from http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 
Beitler and Jebb—Egypt as a Failing State 

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US Policy towards Palestine and the Arab World 

x Incredibly low marks are given everywhere for United States policy toward the Arab nations and towa

x The United States is given single-digit favorable ratings on its dealings with the Arab nations by every 

UAE where it is 15%, driven mostly by the large numbers of non-U.A.E. citizens included in the poll) 

Support is extremely low everywhere else – Pakistan (20%), Iran (23%), France (17%), and even Vene
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four everywhere but Venezuela and are about nine in ten in every Arab nation except UAE (where 
73

x In every country but Iran, the “Palestinian issue” is viewed as “the most” or “a very important” issue 

world today. The range on this is from two in three in Saudi Arabia up to four in five in Lebanon and E

Venezuela, at least seven in ten call the Palestinian issue the “most” or “very” important issue facing 
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x Those polled in every country except Iran would overwhelmingly react more favorably toward the US i

pressure to ensure the creation of an independent Palestinian state”. This includes 69% in Egypt, 79% 

87% in Kuwait (91% of Kuwaiti nationals), 59% in Lebanon, 67% in UAE (76% of Emiratis), 73% in P

France, 61% in Venezuela, and 66% in Indonesia.
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x Almost every Kuwait national (98%) said that they supported the “American-led effort to free Kuwait”

ends there. It drops to 69% among non-citizens living in Kuwait. The only other countries where there 

Pakistan (55%), France (50%), and Venezuela (56%).
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x If the US is looking for support in the war against terrorism, it will find it hard to come by in the Arab 

majority support in any of the Arab countries and no support at all in Iran. The only majority support c

(59%), France (68% favorable, 24% unfavorable), and Venezuela (71% support, 21% unfavorable).
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x American education receives high grades in all countries except Iran and France. In every Arab count

polled are most enthusiastic about American education – though that is not the case in all of the non-A

with the highest percentages of Internet access are most positive everywhere except Iran and France.

x Strong majorities in all five Arab countries are favorable toward American education, ranging from hig

UAE (where 8 in 10 are favorable) to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where the favorable-unfavorable rating 

x Pakistan and Indonesia are extremely favorable toward American education, as is Venezuela. Only Iran 

negative attitudes (Iran 20 to 67, and France 27 to 44). 

x In Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, young people, Internet users and those with access to satellite TV 

favorably inclined toward American education than older people with no access to the Internet and sate

detailed analysis, see Appendix A, tables 6a and 6b.
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x Those polled have a high regard for American science and technology. In most instances, the majoritie

are overwhelming.

x In all countries polled, strong majorities displayed high regard for American science and technology. In 

countries covered by the poll, the favorable/unfavorable ratios ranged from Kuwait’s 86 to 12, to Saud

x The three non-Arab Muslim countries similarly registered strong favorable ratings ranging from Iran’s 

Indonesia’s 93 to 7. 

x France recorded the lowest favorable and highest unfavorable rating of any of the countries covered in 

while Venezuela gave American science and technology the highest rating. 

x Three demographics had a substantial impact on Arab attitudes in this area: age, Internet use, and acces

television. Arabs who are younger and who have access to the Internet and satellite TV were much mo

to American science and technology than those who were older and had no such access. In Egypt, the g

but in each of the other four countries it was also quite significant.(For detailed analysis, see tables 1a 

x No such gaps appeared in Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia or Venezuela. In France, however, those 18-29 yea

Internet access recorded 13-14 point more favorable attitudes than older and non-Internet users of Fren
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x The reviews are mixed about American freedom and democracy. While majorities are favorable everyw

and Indonesia, there are substantial minorities in all places (except Venezuela, France, and Pakistan) w

Egypt (38%), Saudi Arabia (44%), Kuwait (39%), Lebanon (40%), UAE (44%), and Indonesia (53%). 

x In the five Arab countries covered in the poll, results were somewhat similar, ranging from Lebanon’s 

unfavorable ratio to the U.A.E.’s 50 to 44 net favorable rating toward American freedom and democrac

x The non-Arab Muslim countries displayed significantly different attitudes, with Pakistan most favorabl

American freedom and democracy (72 to 19), and Indonesia recording only a 36 to 53 rating. Iran, on t

an extremely negative attitude with only 7% of Iranians favorable and 92% recording unfavorable attitu

x France’s attitudes were similar to the high end of the Arab countries (57 to 29), while Venezuela was m

inclined (87 to 9). Once again, only in the Arab countries were age and Internet and satellite access fac

attitudes. In most cases, these factors produced a 15% or greater impact in favorable ratings. 

x Only in Iran of all of the other five countries polled, did age and Internet access have a comparable imp

analysis, see Appendix A, tables 2a and 2b.)
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x While there are net negative feelings toward the American people in Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia (51

the only majority), majorities of Kuwaitis and Lebanese are favorable – including 63% of Kuwaiti nati

age patterns can be seen, though interestingly 35% of the youngest French have unfavorable views of t

x Arab attitudes toward the American people are mixed (somewhat paralleling US attitudes toward the A

range from a high favorable rating in Lebanon (63 to 33) to a low rating in Egypt, with only 35% favor

unfavorable. The other countries are more evenly split. 

x The three non-Arab Muslim countries display wide variation in views toward the American people. Pak

favorable attitude 71%, with 24% unfavorable, while Iran records the lowest ratings, 34% favorable to 

x Venezuela and France show strong favorable attitudes toward Americans. Kuwaiti citizens are more fa

toward the American people than non-citizens in Kuwait; the opposite is true in UAE. 

x Age, along with Internet and satellite TV access, have a measurable impact in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

analysis, see Appendix A, tables 3a and 3b.)
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x American movies and television are well received by majorities in all countries except France. The hig

ratings were found in Venezuela, Indonesia and Iran, with UAE, Lebanon and Pakistan close behind.

x Of the five Arab countries covered in the poll, two-thirds of those interviewed in Lebanon and the UAE 

disposed to those American products. Favorable majorities also exist in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egyp

x Strong majorities in the three non-Arab Muslim countries are also favorably inclined toward American 

television, with Indonesia and Iran showing the most favorable ratings. 

x Of all of the countries covered in the poll, Venezuela displayed the highest rating of approval for Amer

television (82 to 16), while France had the lowest rating (47 to 49). 

x Age is a significant factor in this effort to measure attitudes toward American movies and television. Y

substantially more favorably inclined toward those products in every country, except Venezuela (becau

high, age has no impact). Internet and satellite access are also important factors in Egypt, Saudi Arabia

Indonesia.(For detailed analysis, see Appendix A, tables 4a and 4b.)
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x American-made products have a huge number of fans in the nations polled – majorities everywhere, esp

Venezuela, Iran, Pakistan, Lebanon and Indonesia. However, there are substantial minorities who are 

Saudi Arabia (44%), Kuwait (39%), and France (42%). 

x Majorities in all countries covered in the poll are favorably inclined toward American-made products. 

x Among the five Arab countries, Lebanon and UAE are the most favorable. 

x In the three non-Arab Muslim countries, extraordinarily strong majorities are favorable toward Americ

The same is true in Venezuela, while in France only a simple majority are favorable toward American-

x As in other areas, age and Internet and satellite access are factors in determining favorability, but the im

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and France do these three factors make a measurable difference in attitudes.(For d

Appendix A, tables 5a and 5b.)
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