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89–546 PDF 2003

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING

MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 13, 2003

Serial No. 108–56

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS BELL, Texas

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

PETER SIRH, Staff Director

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Deputy Staff Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHILIP M. SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DAN BURTON, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

CHRIS BELL, Texas

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

R. NICHOLAS PALARINO, Senior Policy Advisor

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 13, 2003 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Greene, Richard L., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population,

Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State; and William J.

Garvelink, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................................................................... 33

Welling, Curtis R., president and CEO, AmeriCares; George C. Biddle,

senior vice president, International Rescue Committee; Rudy Von

Bernuth, vice president and managing director, Children in Emergencies and Crisis, Save the Children; and Kevin M. Henry, director,

policy and advocacy, Care ............................................................................ 79

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Biddle, George C., senior vice president, International Rescue Committee,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 92

Garner, Lieutenant General Jay, retired, Director of Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Department of Defense, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 23

Garvelink, William J., Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development, prepared statement of ........................................... 44

Greene, Richard L., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population,

Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 36

Henry, Kevin M., director, policy and advocacy, Care, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 115

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio:

Article dated May 10, 2003 ...................................................................... 6

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 15

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut:

Discussion Paper, Protecting Iraqis from a Security Vacuum ............... 125

Information concerning critical tasks ...................................................... 55

Letter dated May 9, 2003 and prepared statement of Bill Frelick ....... 69

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Von Bernuth, Rudy, vice president and managing director, Children in

Emergencies and Crisis, Save the Children, prepared statement of ........ 103

Welling, Curtis R., president and CEO, AmeriCares, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 83

(1)

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING

MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS

TUESDAY, MAY 13, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Janklow, Kucinich, Maloney,

Ruppersberger and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R.

Nicholas Palarino, Phd, senior policy advisor; Robert A. Briggs,

clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging

Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, ‘‘Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations: Overcoming Barriers,’’ is called to order.

In defense of international peace and human dignity, coalition

Armed Forces have liberated Iraq from the death grip of a brutal

corrupt regime. They did so brilliantly and bravely, executing a

battle plan that demanded unparalleled military precision and unprecedented efforts to minimize civilian casualties.

That same concern for the long oppressed people of Iraq now motivates our efforts to stabilize that nation, bring relief to millions

in need, and help them create a government they can trust and

support. We cannot fail to complete this journey. The forces of liberation, military and civilian, are working to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of Saddam’s insidious tyrannical control apparatus.

The same urgency that propelled armored columns into Baghdad

must now drive efforts to establish civil order, restore basic services, and reopen safe passage for people, food, medicine, and necessities.

During my very brief stay in Iraq last month, as the guest of

Connecticut-based humanitarian organization Save the Children, I

saw heart-wrenching poverty and unendurable living conditions.

Not the war, but decades of Saddam’s sadism and brutal selfishness robbed the Iraqi nation of the means and capability to thrive.

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As liberators, the culminating, perhaps more difficult, duty of regime change is to care for the people of Iraq until they are able to

harvest the fruits of human dignity and freedom for themselves.

The task is absolutely enormous. Before the war, 60 percent of

the population relied solely on the United Nations’ Oil for Food

Program for basic needs. After the war, food warehouses were

looted. Lack of clean water and reliable power are crippling an already inadequate health care system. In an oil-rich country, shortages of cooking fuels and other refined products inflame hardship

and resentments.

We cannot and should not expect to meet the challenge alone.

International aid programs and nongovernment organizations referred to as NGO’s have the most experience assessing humanitarian needs and getting essential supplies through logistic and political barriers. NGO staff are willing to take risks, but they cannot

yet operate fully or freely in an unsettled security environment

that threatens the physical safety and political neutrality of humanitarian workers.

The transition from combat to police operations has not been as

rapid or as smooth as planned. Hard lessons learned in Bosnia,

Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan on the need to quell emergent lawlessness seems to have fallen out of the battle plan during

the dash to Baghdad. The military mechanics of basic security and

free-flowing humanitarian assistance need to be brought forward

quickly before vicious thugs and radical mullahs can occupy the

moral high ground so nobly gained in battle.

The President charged the Pentagon’s Office of Reconstruction

and Humanitarian Assistance with bringing civil order and much

needed aid to Iraq. Ambassador Paul Bremer and Retired Army

General Jay Garner are leading U.S. efforts to meet that challenge.

We will hear a taped message from General Garner this afternoon.

We will also hear from Federal agencies and NGO’s directly involved in rebuilding Iraq. Their testimony will help us understand

the difficulties of delivering assistance in postwar Iraq and the

scope of humanitarian mission facing the world.

With military might and precious lives, we have paved the way

for peace and Democracy in Iraq. For that struggling nation, that

troubled region and a changing world, the road ahead is perilous

and the stakes are enormous. We cannot fail to complete the journey.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Kucinich, for an opening statement.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the Chair for his dedicated efforts

to try to obtain General Garner’s testimony today.

And I want to state, for the record, that I am concerned about

the Defense Department’s refusal to send any department officials

to this hearing so we could have our questions answered.

General Garner’s testimony will be on videotape, and we are not

going to have any opportunity to question him. I might add that,

for the Department of Defense, that this is a U.S. congressional

oversight subcommittee with responsibility for the Department of

Defense. In my view, a videotape testimony is not acceptable. This

is not Emerald City, folks, and General Garner is not the Wizard

of Oz. I mean, we have an obligation to get answers to our questions. And it’s also a great concern, because the International Relations Committee is holding a hearing on Thursday in which the

general will testify and is sending the Department’s Under Secretary for Policy as a personal representative.

I also want to say that I am disappointed in the administration’s

approach to the security situation in Iraq. Based on all evidence,

it appears the administration is more concerned about the security

of oil reserves than of the Iraqi people or in its supposed weapons

of mass destruction. Let me tell you why.

First, the administration did not begin preparations for Iraqi reconstruction until early 2003. Although AID, AID’s secret and exclusive contracting process has been criticized elsewhere, the bottom line is that the White House did not tell them to start preparing for the war’s aftermath until 2003.

In contrast, the administration began preparing to secure Iraqi

oil fields months earlier. The Army asked Halliburton back in November to develop a contingency plan for extinguishing oil well

fires, repairing damage, and continuing operations. This begs the

question, why wasn’t the same level of preparation given to the humanitarian relief?

With respect to weapons of mass destruction, during the first

days of occupation in Baghdad, the military rushed to secure a single government agency, the oil ministry. They did not secure hospitals, electrical grids, or water facilities. As the military rushed by

these facilities—and rushed by, I might add, the Iraqi National

Museum—it also bypassed Iraq’s nuclear headquarters and the nuclear research facility. These are known nuclear sites that the

IAEA has inspected dozens of times, and that contained sealed containers of nuclear material. U.S. forces left them unguarded for

weeks while hundreds of people looted them.

In a series of investigative articles on these lootings, the Washington Post reports that, inexplicably, these facilities are still not

secure. As a result, the military says it is now impossible to determine whether nuclear material was stolen. I would like to submit

these articles, Mr. Chairman, for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. If this is the administration’s record for securing

materials that are highly questionable, this is their record for securing materials that can be connected to the concerns that many

have expressed, if this is their record, we need to reflect on the

whole reason why this administration went to war against Iraq.

And one can only imagine the state of security for humanitarian

relief efforts.

Mr. Chairman, before the war, the Army’s Chief of Staff General

Shinseki testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

When asked how many troops were necessary to secure Iraq after

the war, he said several hundred thousand; but superiors in the administration refused to listen. Two days after the general testified,

the administration sent Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz to

publicly rebuke him, saying his estimate is way off the mark. The

administration has now reduced the number of troops in Iraq to

fewer than 150,000. As a result, this weekend General David

McKiernan, the commander of ground forces in Iraq, made a frank

and disturbing comment. He said, ‘‘Ask yourself if you could secure

all of California with 170,000 troops. The answer is no.’’ This individual is the commander of the U.S. ground forces.

But, again, in spite of this dire situation, the administration

plans to reduce the number of troops by tens of thousands more

over the coming months. What is most troubling about these actions is that they are taking place while the administration is excluding the international community from assisting with security

and other critical functions. Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei, for example have both offered to dispatch trained international weapons inspectors to assess the looted nuclear facilities and help search for

those elusive weapons of mass destruction, but their offers have

been rebuffed.

On January 14, only 6 weeks after U.N. inspectors began their

search for such weapons, the President denounced the U.N. inspection process for taking too long. Yet today, almost 2 months after

the start of the war, and without the obstacles of the Hussein regime, the administration still has not found such weapons.

It is a misconception to assume that the U.S. forces are the most

effective to administer a post-Saddam Iraq. Certainly, Iraqis are

happy to be rid of Hussein, but many Iraqis blame their current

humanitarian crisis on a decade of U.S. support for economic sanctions. Certainly, they are pleased to be free of a tyrant, but they

are extremely skeptical of a reconstruction effort by a single occupying Nation, and especially by that Nation’s military force.

Mr. Chairman, we know the factions inside and outside Iraq are

trying to exploit this anti-American sentiment to their advantage.

The Washington Post reported that in the city of Najaf, for example, Shiite leaders are denouncing the U.S. military occupation. As

a result, U.S. troops are not patrolling or providing security there.

At least in this portion of Iraq, it appears, U.S. troops are not being

used to support security efforts. And unilateral actions by the administration can only serve to further inflame these factions. Without the inherent legitimacy and expertise of the international community, the administration may end up creating a larger problem

than it hoped to solve.

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Mr. Chairman, last week the President landed aboard the USS

Lincoln and proclaimed victory in Iraq. He spoke in front of a large

banner that read: Mission Accomplished. Clearly, this mission is

nowhere near finished, and I’m concerned that the administration’s

cavalier attitude will end up costing this country more than we

know.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Janklow, Governor.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I will

be extremely brief with my comments.

I really appreciate, Mr. Chairman, you setting up this meeting

for today. At this point in time, there can’t be anything more appropriate than to look at the question of humanitarian assistance

following the military operation overcoming barriers.

I’m not as smart as a lot of other people that have all the answers to these types of things. My understanding is, we just came

through a war. In this war, all kinds of different things happened.

Very little goes according to actual plan. A perfect example of the

kinds of misinformation you can get in a war is you can read stories in very credible newspapers that talk about a hundred thousand objects plus disappearing from a museum, and then you can

find out that in reality it may be a couple hundred objects that

have disappeared from a museum. These kinds of misinformation

happen during war.

As a matter of fact, I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that the testimony before this committee is under oath with people appearing.

And I realize, I wish the administration also would send folks from

the Defense Department. But to say that they will be here Thursday as opposed to today, at this point in time, doesn’t violate any

sensitivities that I have. I think it’s more important that things

continue on an orderly basis, recognizing that Congress bears the

ultimate responsibility on behalf of the people for the oversight.

I also think, Mr. Chairman, that we now get an opportunity to

look at what worked, what didn’t. But as you said in your opening

statement, Mr. Chairman, I think it’s incredibly important that we

understand that there are basic levels of service that have to become functioning. I am old enough to remember some of the things

following the Second World War and how long it took, for example,

in some of those countries to get the electrical system running, to

get the water systems working, to get the basic public transportation operating. I realize that Iraq is about the size of California,

but I also understand that’s where it ends. That the vast, vast majority of people in Iraq are clustered into metropolitan centers as

opposed to cities that run for hundreds of miles, as you have in the

State of California. The difference between the two is really what

takes place outside the cities. But for all practical purposes, there’s

still basic telephone service, there is still water that has been restored. There is electrical services that are up and running. And

clearly these weren’t world class operations before the war started.

So I think our country has been able to accomplish a lot. We all

wish it was more.

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing so we

can find out the extent to which humanitarian assistance that follows military operations has barriers; where are they. Let’s hope

we can all learn from this and go forward.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. I thank both gentlemen.

I ask unanimous consent that all members of this subcommittee

be permitted to place an opening statement in the record, and that

the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

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I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. And, without objection, so ordered.

We have two panels. Part of that panel will be Lieutenant General Jay Garner, retired, Director of Office of Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance, Department of Defense, in a taped testimony. I would just acknowledge to my ranking member and colleague, Mr. Janklow, that we did, in fact, ask Jay Garner to testify

using modern technology. They said they would provide a tape, and

I didn’t pursue it. And the part of me that didn’t pursue it was not

wanting the system to break down as we tried to make it work. But

also, the recognition that he will be available to this committee in

the future to testify and, in fact, will be testifying to others. So I

just basically feel this is an introductory hearing to an effort that

this committee, with ranking member support, will be pursuing

with some vigor.

So we will be hearing first from Jay Garner. We will not be able

to question him, we will not be able to swear him in. We will take

his testimony as it comes in tape, and I guess we are going to lower

the lights a bit and listen to that. Then I will swear in both our

witnesses in our first panel, and then go to the second panel.

So if we can start the tape. Any popcorn?

[Videotape played.]

Mr. SHAYS. We thank General Garner’s participation. When I

was in Iraq, he was very generous with his time, and I think he

was very generous in his very long statement, but that doesn’t get

around the fact that we aren’t able to question him. And Congress

will be able to, I guess, later this week. Is that right?

[The prepared statement of General Garner follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I’d like to thank Mr. Ruppersberger for being here,

and Mr. Tierney.

We have not yet sworn in our first panel, and so if you had any

opening statements or any comments, I would be happy to recognize you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Not at this time.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me announce that Mr. Richard Greene, Principle

Deputy Assistant, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration,

Department of State and Mr. William J. Garvelink, Senior Deputy

Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development

under the auspices of the State Department, as well, are here.

And at this time, gentlemen, if you’d rise, we’ll swear you in.

Then we’ll take your testimony.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record both our witnesses have responded in the affirmative, and Mr. Greene, we’ll start with you.

I think you realize your statement will not be as long as the previous one on video, but we’re very eager to hear your testimony and

thank you both for participating.

Mr. Greene.

STATEMENTS OF RICHARD L. GREENE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND

MIGRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND WILLIAM J.

GARVELINK, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. GREENE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll summarize my

record statement.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the

opportunity to discuss humanitarian assistance following military

operations. Providing effective humanitarian assistance is critical

in establishing stability in postconflict situations——

Mr. SHAYS. Move the mic a little closer. Even though we’re hearing you, just a little closer would help.

Mr. GREENE [continuing]. And is in keeping with America’s core

values. In Iraq, we’re dealing with major humanitarian challenges

every single day. In our context, as emphasized by General Garner,

is that there were significant infrastructure problems preconflict,

and that so far General Garner has only been there for 3 weeks,

it has only been 12 days since President Bush declared the end to

major combat operations in Iraq, and that we’re making dogged

progress every single day.

Our approach to Iraq incorporates many lessons from previous

postconflict assistance efforts, and it includes the following elements. First, civil/military cooperation and coordination is absolutely essential, from the first stages of planning and assessment

to the eventual—through delivery of assistance to the eventual

handover to nationally led institutions. We do everything we can

to ensure that military plans take into account vulnerable noncombatants and the humanitarian infrastructure, so that there is

minimal damage to both.

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For Iraq, the multiagency humanitarian planning team and numerous exchanges between senior State and DOD officials underscored the importance of incorporating effective humanitarian response into our overall Iraq campaign efforts. The civil/military exchange continues on a daily basis on a whole range of humanitarian assistance issues in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, our approach relies on the expertise of the main providers of humanitarian assistance worldwide, which are humanitarian

agencies and other international and nongovernmental organizations. They have the technical expertise and experience to assess

the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons across the

sectors of protection, food, water, sanitation, health, shelter and

education.

Third, the prompt and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance depends upon a permissive security environment where adequate security and public safety measures are in place. Clearly, the

most pressing concern of humanitarian agencies in parts of Iraq

and Afghanistan is the absence of a permissive security environment, again, a point emphasized by General Garner.

Fourth, our approach reflects a clear linkage between the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms among the humanitarian agencies operating on the ground and how well assistance

programs actually work. In Afghanistan, for example, the Afghans

and the international community developed a new mechanism for

coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance efforts.

This initiative called the ‘‘Program Secretariat’’ structure twinned

U.N. agencies with counterpart Afghan government ministries, and

perhaps just as importantly, provided an overall framework for

NGO’s to help plug into.

Our emphasis on effective coordination mechanisms is also why

we strongly supported the recent—strongly supported recent reentry to Baghdad of the U.N.’s humanitarian coordinator for Iraq

and other U.N. international staff to join the almost 4,000 U.N. national staff who remained in Iraq during the recent conflict.

Fifth, our approach aims to leverage the capacity of these skilled,

experienced, and internationally mandated humanitarian assistance organizations by establishing formal civilian/military coordination operation centers. We set up one in Kuwait, set up one in

Jordan and, as General Garner said, about to set up one in Baghdad. These centers provide direct access between humanitarian

planners and military officials on the myriad of logistical and security issues involved in postconflict relief operations.

Sixth, our approach emphasizes the importance of early and significant funding. We built our funding requirements and decisions

around the needs of the populations that these organizations will

assist. In Afghanistan, the 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act provided the U.S. Government the ability to jumpstart the efforts of the key international humanitarian organizations, thus averting a humanitarian disaster.

In Iraq, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriation

Act of 2003 provides $2.4 billion for relief and initial reconstruction

that will serve a similar purpose.

Seventh, our approach relies on the assessments and work plans

done by the international organizations for the international comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:43 Nov 07, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\89546.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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munity. We also work closely with our NGO partners to get their

assessment of the needs in an affected country as they play an important role in filling critical gaps in the programming done by

international organizations. Our funding decisions are based on

needs and activities outlined in these work plans, which are closely

coordinated among the agencies.

Eighth, also on the critical funding issue, our approach emphasizes the importance of international burden sharing. Securing fairshare contributions from other international donors is a major USG

goal.

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, each postconflict humanitarian

relief operation has it own set of unique circumstances, but we

don’t have to reinvent the wheel each time. Providing humanitarian assistance in postconflict environments is an extraordinarily

challenging task, and you can just hark back to some of the examples General Garner was providing.

We’ve worked hard to coordinate planning and implementation

within the U.S. Government and to forge good working relationships with our key U.N. and NGO partners in providing humanitarian assistance in complex humanitarian emergencies. We’ll continue to do everything possible to facilitate the great work they do

on behalf of the international community.

Thank you, and I’d be glad to answer your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Greene.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Greene follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Garvelink.

Mr. GARVELINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the

committee.

I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you about humanitarian

assistance efforts following military operations. Although, the specific circumstances our relief teams face today in Iraq are unique,

we have learned a great deal from previous experiences in northern

Iraq more than a decade ago, as well as in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti,

Rwanda, Kosovo and, most recently, Afghanistan.

There is a division of responsibility between the State Department and my agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]. In very general terms, State works most closely

with U.N. agencies, with a special emphasis on refugees and the

International Committee of the Red Cross. USAID works mostly

with its Private Voluntary and Non-Governmental Organization

[PVO-NGO] partners providing general humanitarian assistance

and responding to the needs of internally displaced persons.

The exception is that USAID is the principal funder of the World

Food Program, but regardless of the division of responsibilities, we

share general principles when responding to humanitarian emergencies.

First, early planning is essential. Sometimes we have only hours

or days to plan if it’s a hurricane, or we have weeks in the case

of Afghanistan, and sometimes we have months, which we did in

the case of Iraq. The earlier planning begins the better, and this—

a good example of this was Iraq, where for several months teams

met in Tampa with the Department of Defense Central Command

and in Washington. The team included all of the U.S. Government

agencies that were involved, plus NGO’s and U.N. agencies.

Second, we cannot plan in isolation. We must engage immediately all the international humanitarian agencies that will be involved. We need to rely on the full range of these organizations.

Each has its own strengths, and all are necessary to accomplish the

job. United Nations agencies work effectively with host governments and national programs, the International Committee of the

Red Cross is most effective in conflict situations, and the NGO’s

are most effective in smaller community situations and community

development activities.

Third, the provision of assistance must be driven by needs assessments. To use our expertise and our resources effectively, we

must know precisely what is needed and where it is needed. We

can’t justify sending assistance to these countries blindly.

Finally, United States and one or two other donors cannot respond to humanitarian emergencies alone. The international community must share the burden.

When humanitarian assistance follows military operations, these

principles become even more important. The military plays several

critical roles in these kinds of relief operations. The military becomes an enabler for the humanitarian community. The military

often provides the initial assistance in unstable environments. It

does some of the initial assessments, and the military facilitates

the entry or return of humanitarian organizations.

Consequently, early planning with the military is critical, as it

allows the military to understand the humanitarian architecture

43

that is on the ground. In Afghanistan, for example, U.N. agencies

and NGO’s had a long presence. In the center and south of Iraq,

there were no NGO’s, and the U.N. presence was limited to only

monitoring activities. And that is important to know, as we plan

to work together to provide humanitarian assistance.

Coordination and information sharing are essential to identifying

the most critical needs in the emergency and the bottlenecks to

providing that assistance.

In one of the first operations of this sort in Somalia, we established a Humanitarian Operations Center to coordinate with military forces on the ground, U.S. Government agencies, the United

Nations, and NGO’s. That model has been refined several times

until it has been used effectively in the Humanitarian Operations

Center in Kuwait City today.

Finally, assessments are critical, and for the first time in Iraq,

the military and civilian agencies are using the same assessment

tools. We have learned a lot about how to coordinate with each

other in the past decade, and though we have a ways to go, civilian

agencies and the military have learned to meet the humanitarian

needs of civilians in post-conflict settings.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garvelink follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

We will go to you first, Mr. Janklow, Governor. And I think what

we’ll do is, we’ll do 5 minutes the first pass and maybe 10 the second.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

If I could ask both of you gentlemen, when I look at your testimony, you have well-thought-out, laid-out plans in advance, criteria, protocols, whatever you’d like to call that you follow.

Let me ask you first, Mr. Greene, what didn’t work according to

your criteria? And I realize the Xs and Os always score touchdowns

on the wall.

Mr. GREENE. Sir, I think that, again, given the—I’m not—given

the context—let me put your question into a context, in that I

think that a lot is working——

Mr. JANKLOW. No, no. What didn’t work specifically? I think a lot

is working too.

Mr. GREENE. And I think that a lot of our planning focused on

dealing with major population displacements. We and many others

went—the other international organizations projected that somewhere between 2.3 and 3 million Iraqis would be displaced during

conflict, and that we’d have to put systems in place, and that a lot

of our focus would be getting assistance to displaced populations,

and we didn’t—thankfully we didn’t have that problem.

I think what also didn’t work was that there was a pretty grand

underestimation by us as to the degree of looting that would take

place, and now we’re faced with dealing with a lot of problems created by looting that I don’t think the extent was anticipated by

anybody in the planning process.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Garvelink, what didn’t work?

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, again, I would characterize it a little bit

more like Rich Greene. I think we didn’t anticipate some of the

things that happened. Again, as Rich said, the population movements didn’t happen. The intensity of the humanitarian crisis has

not occurred.

I think what we did not anticipate to the extent that it is out

there now, is some of the water and sanitation problems and the

importance of electricity to maintaining reliable water supplies for

hospitals and health clinics. I don’t think we focused on those sorts

of things. We were focused on population movements and

refugees——

Mr. JANKLOW. Let me ask you, if I could, and I’ll start with you,

Mr. Greene—or you, Mr. Garvelink, either one of you, are the

international organizations in place? I realize about 4,000 U.N.

workers stayed there. We keep hearing conflicting reports. Is the

U.N. there at work, or isn’t it?

Mr. GREENE. The U.N. is coming back into Iraq.

Mr. JANKLOW. Does that mean they are not at work now, they

are coming back——

Mr. GREENE. They are at work now, but not at full capacity. At

the end of this week, there will be about, something like, 200 international staff, and they’re starting to come back in. This is where

we tie back to security considerations, where security considerations are impacting their ability to get out in the country and provide assistance efforts.

50

Mr. JANKLOW. Let me, if I can—and I’m trying to be very poignant. We’d like to know what are the barriers. I mean, as both of

you say in your testimony, whether it was Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, every operation, you learn—every crisis, every incident, you

learn something. What is it that we’re going to learn from this one,

at this point in time? And I realize it’s not over. We’re looking at

barriers. What barriers are there to overcome, you didn’t plan for

other than the security barrier?

Mr. GREENE. In my view, that is the single-most important

barrier——

Mr. JANKLOW. What is No. 2?

Mr. GREENE. Quickly setting up a civil administration structure

in Iraq, getting ministries up and running.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Garvelink.

Mr. GARVELINK. We seem to be saying a lot of the same things,

so I’m agreeing with Rich again. I think the security obviously is

something that we thought would not be the kind of problem it has

turned out to be.

Mr. JANKLOW. No. 2?

Mr. GARVELINK. No. 2, I think is the reestablishment of civil administration and rule of law.

Mr. JANKLOW. Well, if we bombed several of these ministries,

which we did—I don’t know whether we bombed them all, but I

know we bombed several of them. If we deliberately took out the

communication system, what is it that we didn’t anticipate with respect to setting up civil government? I mean, did we honestly think

they’d all just show up for work when the shooting stopped or

quieted down?

Mr. GREENE. I think there were——

Mr. JANKLOW. Let me preface it with one more thing. According

to testimony we heard from—I believe it was the general—the police were corrupt, they were ill-trained, they weren’t very good. The

other technocrats were pretty good, so what is it that we—and I’m

not trying to be critical. OK. What I’m trying to do is figure out

how can we all learn, what is it that we need to learn. So from that

perspective, what is it about the Civil Service that we didn’t anticipate?

Mr. GREENE. I think, with all due respect, sir, we’re learning lessons while we’re on the ground there, and I think we found out the

difficulty of accurately assessing the quality of the civil service, the

linkage to the Ba’ath Party by being outside of Iraq, and now that

we’re in and having conversations with people on a daily basis,

we’re in a much better situation to assess what’s going on and

what’s needed to happen.

Mr. JANKLOW. What about you, Mr. Garvelink?

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, one of the things that we’ve seen in other

humanitarian situations of this nature, in post-conflict situations,

is that the pace with which a conflict ends and the pace with which

rule of law is restored is usually different. And that seems to be

a problem that’s very hard for the international community to deal

with. It’s easy, and whether it’s Bosnia or Kosovo, to win a conflict.

It’s a little more difficult to train a police force and put it in place.

Mr. JANKLOW. Both of you heard the testimony of the general.

Which of his 11-point criteria do you think we’re not going to be

51

able to meet the deadline on, with respect to June 15 or thereabouts? Because he made it sound like—and I realize he may not

get all 11, but this was a darn important list from the perspective

of making sure that things went smoothly, and without it, he

looked for the opposite to take place in Iraq. Which of his list do

you think we’re going to have trouble meeting and why?

Mr. GREENE. I think we’re going to be able to accomplish or

make significant progress on every one of these things. I know that

a lot of activity is going on now, and I think that all these are doable.

I think a big variable here is getting police trained. It’s one thing

to get police back to work. It’s another thing to have police back

and trained that people trust and respect and that could

implement——

Mr. JANKLOW. That can’t happen by June 5——

Mr. GREENE. Getting police back to work, and there are significant numbers of police back to work, can happen.

Mr. JANKLOW. What about you, Mr. Garvelink?

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, I’m just looking over the list, and some of

the activities that he has listed here which my agency is involved

in, I think there’s a real chance to, if not accomplish them by June

15, to come very close.

Mr. JANKLOW. No, sir. I don’t mean your agency. I mean all of

them.

Mr. GARVELINK. I know. I can’t speak to a number of these, because I have not been involved with them.

If you talk about the public distribution system, I think they will

be up and running. We’ve made a lot of progress working with the

world food——

Mr. JANKLOW. A fuel crisis?

Mr. GARVELINK. Pardon?

Mr. JANKLOW. Are we going to be able to avoid a fuel crisis?

Mr. GARVELINK. Again, that’s not one I’m very familiar with.

Mr. JANKLOW. Are you, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. I think that already we’ve brought in emergency deliveries of LPG gas, which runs a lot of the cooking stoves throughout Iraq, and so we’re figuring out how to, again, respond to the

emergency. Will it be a normal distribution pattern, no, but will we

be able to respond in an emergency, I think the answer is yes.

Mr. JANKLOW. Were the town councils democratically elected in

the past?

Mr. GREENE. I don’t know, sir.

Mr. JANKLOW. Do you, sir?

Mr. GARVELINK. No. I’m not sure.

Mr. JANKLOW. How are we going to set up elected democratic

councils? What agency is this? Who will be doing that?

Mr. GARVELINK. For the Agency for International Development,

we have our responsibilities for Iraq divided in two basic categories. One is the bureau I work for, which does humanitarian assistance, and another bureau does reconstruction. And the way

we’ve divided up responsibilities, democracy and governance, these

sorts of activities are in the other bureaus.

Mr. JANKLOW. And they are not here today?

52

Mr. GARVELINK. Correct, and so I have a hard time addressing

the issue.

Mr. JANKLOW. We don’t know how they’re electing them, do we?

Mr. GARVELINK. No.

Mr. JANKLOW. Sir?

Mr. GREENE. No. I do not know that, sir.

Mr. JANKLOW. One other question. With return to the buying of

the crops, I assume you have got—I mean, they were able to continue farming during all of this, and what you’re saying is to the

extent you can buy the crops, you cool off the farmers, and you get

the food on the shortest travel distance.

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, yeah, it’s all of those. What’s happened

over the past few years and under the Oil for Food Program and

the sanctions in Iraq is that the local production was not allowed

to be purchased, and in the northern part of the country, they have

a fairly large wheat crop. I think they’re expecting in the neighborhood of 600,000 tons this year. We’re hoping to buy the surplus

from the farmers and then feed it into the distribution system, but

there’s been no incentive for the past few years for farmers to grow

anything, because they can’t legally sell their crops.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you. My time is expired.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Ruppersberger, please.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, first, there are a lot of issues that we

have to deal with here today. In the time that I have, I would like

to address the planning that we had, really, prior to the war. There

were some statements made by certain people in the military that

we should have done a little more planning, but what I would really like to get to, at this point, I think right now, whenever you’re

going to stabilize a country, you need to have order, and I assume

that, based on your testimony today, that the order needs to be

clearly taken care of. And at this point we’re having problems.

From information that I’ve received, is that one of the biggest

issues that the coalition forces are having problems with is that

there are a lot of civilians that have guns, and there are a lot more

guns than was anticipated. Is that your understanding, or do you

have any knowledge to that effect?

Mr. GREENE. That is a significant problem, and I think, sir, in

order to get a more detailed response on what the response locally

will be to that question, we’re going to have to talk to representatives of the Defense Department.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Right, which are not here, but I think that

the whole issue, as we’re trying to study and get information today,

is how do we best deal with that. You have to deal with the basics,

and as a result of that, the lack of security that exists at this point

really is preventing the humanitarian efforts to go forward. Correct? Is that your understanding?

Mr. GREENE. The——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Either one.

Mr. GREENE [continuing]. Humanitarian efforts are going forward, and the issue is can they go forward more effectively? And

the answer is clearly, yes, in a more secure environment.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And what we’re trying to establish is how

we can, in our role, develop a plan to help the military. You know,

53

you go in as the military to invade. Then you change your roles,

and these roles are a lot different, and what we really would like

to know is how, from your opinion, that we can effectuate something to help or to give resources or whatever is needed with respect to establishing security, so that we can get to the next level.

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, clearly, security is an issue, and as you

say, it’s very difficult to provide humanitarian assistance or to expand the humanitarian assistance that is being provided without

a secure environment, without the protection of silos where wheat

and other commodities are stored, and, you know, clearly, that is

a concern for us. I’m sure it’s a concern for our NGO colleagues,

but it’s a problem for the military, and that’s an issue that, you

know, I wouldn’t presume to answer on their behalf. It’s a big concern, and it complicates the humanitarian picture, but not

being——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. From your perspective, you know, what do

you feel that we need? You’ve been involved in other countries.

What do you feel that we need?

Now, this is a different situation. Each situation was different to

move forward.

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, I guess from experience in other situations

like this, we need the rule of law established as soon as possible.

That’s a police force. It’s not really the military that does that, and

so the introduction and establishment of a police force would be

very important.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And the reasons we talked—I raised the

issue about the guns, I mean, how to effectuate that, and there’s

why we do have military police, and they’re becoming very active,

and there are ways to do it.

Let me get on to something that maybe you might know a little

bit more about and answer the questions. We talk about the costs

of what we need to do. We talk about after we have order and establish some type of government, that the citizens of Iraq need to

develop a quality of life, and that’s, hopefully, what we can do

through jobs, through dealing with humanitarian concerns. But

that costs a lot of money, and the unique situation about Iraq is

that there is a lot of oil if it’s taken care of in the right way, if it’s

marketed the right way. And I praise President Bush and the military for taking control of the oil fields and making sure that they

were secure, and I believe they are secure.

Is there in effect now—and I guess this is through—really a

State Department question—negotiations with other countries and

working with people within Iraq to develop that source of oil that

will help to bring money into the citizens of Iraq?

Mr. GREENE. Sir, clearly the anticipation is that the oil industry

will get going and that oil revenues will be utilized by the Iraqi

people to reconstruct and redevelop their country. Clearly, there is

the anticipation that will play the major role.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I’m not talking of anticipation. Is there,

right now, ongoing communications? Is there, right now, an effort,

a strong effort to——

Mr. GREENE. There is a strong effort going on, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And where are we going, or is it too confidential to talk about it in this hearing?

54

Mr. GREENE. I’d rather not—I don’t think it’s confidential, but I

don’t believe I should be the one to talk about it. All I can tell you

is that a major emphasis is on that going on there——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. From my point of view in this hearing, I

want to make sure that unless there’s a reason that we shouldn’t,

I want to do what’s best for our country first. To help the situation,

which would be best for our country and the world, we need to be,

in my opinion, aggressive. If we’re being aggressive that’s fine, but

I want to raise the issue of what we’re doing in order to do two

things, to work with other countries in establishing what we need

to do with respect to the oil, which will give the resources to help

that country. But second, there are a lot of countries that are out

there and should be allies of ours, that are we or are we not working with them, including France and Germany and those countries

that gave us a hard time prior to the war?

Mr. GREENE. We’re doing everything possible to get the oil flowing in Iraq again, A, and, B, we have mounted a major effort with

countries around the world to solicit major contributions to the Iraq

relief and reconstruction effort. The feedback from every country is

that people are willing to come up with big bucks to contribute toward this effort.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Are they also going to come up with the resources and also the people power, so to speak, to do the things

that are necessary once we get this security there? Are they willing

to move to that level so the burden isn’t completely on the United

States and Great Britain?

Mr. GREENE. There have been offers from in-kind contributions

of people and equipment from countries around the world, and

we’re having ongoing discussions with many countries——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How about France?

Mr. GREENE. There has been discussions with France on contributions to—on a number of areas.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. That’s all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

I would love make sure that you have a list of the 11 items that

General Garner gave. Were they given to you? I’m going to ask you

to look through that list and tell me what you would think needs

to be part of that in the first—mid to late June to establish a positive slope. He said 11 critical tasks to complete by mid to late June

to establish a positive slope toward success in Iraq.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. So if you would please, look at that and see if there

is anything that you would add to it. Is there anything that you

catch right off that you would add?

Mr. GREENE. It looks pretty comprehensive to me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Is there anything?

Mr. GARVELINK. The only other thing, and it——

Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to ask you to put your mic a little closer,

even though I hear you, both of you.

Mr. GARVELINK [continuing]. Is the restoration of the electrical

grid.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. The restoration of the electrical grid. OK.

If you think about anything that you had to add to it before the

hearing ends, I’d love for you to add. So periodically, maybe if you

would take a second look.

There’s a general acceptance that on a scale of 1 to 10, the war

effort was an 11, that it was pretty stunning, and I think there’s

a feeling that people will look back and say, this was a moment in

time in which there was some classic changes in battle. it will be

studied. But I think most people would agree that the failure to rebuild Iraq, the failure to get it on a positive slope in which people

are back to work, kids are back to school, the economy is starting

to percolate after 20 years of being somewhat dormant, that there’s

a government established that recognizes majority rule but appreciates minority rights. I think it’s very easy for people who aren’t

used to democracy to get the idea of majority rule. I’m not sure it’s

easy for them to accept the concept of minority rights.

But that, I think, has got to be the key issue, and I don’t think

there’s any option for failure. And so you both are involved in

something that I think is huge, and I would say to you, as someone

who voted to go into Iraq with great conviction, that if in the end

we fail to rebuild this country, that the critics of my vote will in

some ways be right.

Would you tell me a logical reason why you would not want

Members of Congress to be in Iraq, to understand the problem, to

talk with people, to size up the problem and to be able to—as leaders of a country, be able to do our job of knowing how to provide

resources and so on. Is there a logical reason that you can see why

Members of Congress shouldn’t be in Iraq?

Mr. GREENE. There’s not a logical reason, except if there were security considerations.

Mr. SHAYS. Are you free to go to Iraq?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Is the press free to go to Iraq?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you think Members of Congress should get their

positions based on what they see in the press, or should we try to

get it firsthand? If it’s possible?

Mr. GREENE. In Iraq and every place else in the world, we welcome Members of Congress visiting.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Garvelink.

Mr. GARVELINK. I would agree. I think the only constraint would

be the security situation, and there—I think while we’re free to go

to Iraq, if you’re going for extended periods of time, there are certain kinds of training we’re still required to get before we go, and

57

I think everybody is. But I agree with Mr. Greene, everybody would

welcome your presence as Members of Congress in Iraq to see

what’s going on and understand the programs that are underway

there.

Mr. SHAYS. The 8 hours I spent in Iraq were the most vibrant

8 hours I’ve spent in a long time, and everything I saw was not

necessarily a surprise, but there were heightened degrees of, I

didn’t realize this was here or not. So it wasn’t like everything was

new, but everything I saw had an impact on me. I was struck by

the poverty. I was struck by, in this one town, the lack of roads.

I was struck by the housing conditions. I was struck by the failure

of having running water. I was struck by the fact that the gas station I went to had nothing there, nothing. It was just like a skeleton, and it made me appreciate how immense the task was.

I was struck by the fact that when I went there and the Save

the Children were negotiating when they would bring in the fuel

for the heat, that they were having to debate with the gas station

attendant that there would be security, because there was a concern that as soon as the supply of this fuel came, it would just be

taken by a mob of people.

I might be able to see that on TV, but somehow hearing someone

talk about it.

Now, let me ask you, should I be surprised that neither of you

knew what form of elective government exists in the local level?

Mr. GREENE. I don’t know, Mr. Chairman. My focus has been on

the relief efforts. I mean, I could have hazarded a guess that, of

course, there wouldn’t have been any democratic government elected locally.

Mr. SHAYS. No. I wouldn’t want you to hazard a guess, and there

are going to be things you don’t know. And that’s not my point. I’m

just asking if I should be surprised.

Mr. GREENE. No. I think it points to the—at least for my part,

the lack of information about what was going on inside of Iraq.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Garvelink.

Mr. GARVELINK. Yeah. I guess I would agree. For the past 4, 5,

or 6 months, I don’t know quite how long it’s been that we’ve been

working on these issues, I think a lot of folks have been working

on a lot of different humanitarian issues, and you focus on what

you’re doing. And I think Jay Garner gave a fairly good indication

the task was a big one. One of the things we’re doing at USAID

is trying to get 487,000 tons of food to people every month. That

requires something in the order of 10,000 trucks a month. One

really has to focus one’s attention to make that work. So this was

not one of the areas I’ve been focused on.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. Abdul Hassan Mohammed when I was

in Umm Qasr said to me—after he had pointed out some other concerns, he looked me in the eye, and he said, you don’t know us, and

we don’t know you.

I know what it said to me. What does that say to you? He was

talking about Americans and Iraqis. We don’t know you and you

don’t know us, what does that say?

Mr. GREENE. I just think it points to the—sort of the years of images we’ve built up about each other through various discussions

in the press and in the media. It points to a lack of direct contact

58

between Iraqi and Americans on issues that are of importance to

how people carry out their daily lives, and it points to how we have

to resume that as quickly as possible.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you just elaborate on that last point, because

it shows what they didn’t know, and now you’re stating an action,

and what do you think that action has to be?

Mr. GREENE. The action means that we have to get out and get

into the country as quickly as possible and factor in what Iraqis

want for their country and to understand what the problems are,

to understand what they’ve been going through, to understand how

they see solutions emerging. There has to be a huge Iraqi involvement in everything that we do, and the only way you get that involvement is to get out and get into the country and talk to people.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Garvelink.

Mr. GARVELINK. Yes. I would agree completely. The way—from

your own explanation, when you’re in the country and see things,

it’s very different. There are perceptions that both nations or both

peoples have of each other that may be accurate. A lot of it is also

inaccurate. Until we work together, you know, and start to understand each other’s culture, we’re never going to resolve some of the

problems that are between us. You can’t do that unless you work

hand in hand.

Mr. SHAYS. When I was in the Peace Corps in the south Pacific

in the Fiji Islands, when you went from one village to another, if

it was on one of the smaller islands, you couldn’t go to the other

village through one village without stopping in, and if there were

three villages along the way, you had to stop in every village. You

had to interact, you had to sit, you had to talk. You had to just go

through these so-called niceties and kind of get to know each other.

The next time you could walk through all three villages to get

to that final destination, and so I felt the same way that you’re basically stating, that in order for us to succeed, we’re going to have

to get to know them, and they’re going to have to get to know us,

besides our just trying to do good things for them.

And I’m curious as to how you think that happens.

Mr. GREENE. I think that goes hand in hand with the—sort of

the theme that we’ve had here in General Garner and part of your

questions, is improving the security situation, so we can get out

and have greater freedom of movement. So when we do have this

freedom of movement, it’s not in bullet-proof vests and heavy armored accompaniment, that we hold normal regular conversations

with the regular Iraqi citizens. I mean, it’s clearly what General

Garner wants to get to as quickly as possible, and it’s clearly what

our entire team wants to get to as quickly as possible.

Mr. SHAYS. I would tell you this is someone who has observed

General Garner. He is an easy guy to talk with. He’s very unassuming, and I would think that the Iraqi people, if they get to

interact with him, would find him a very good man to work with.

That’s just kind of my—not my hope, but it’s—I guess it’s my hope

as well.

I’d like another 10 minutes, but we’re going to go to you, Mr.

Janklow, and then we’ll go to you, Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to be brief.

59

The question was asked earlier about safety in the communities.

As I recall, prior to the war, the government of Iraq passed out

weapons to the general public, tens of thousands of rifles. Is that

accurate as far as either one of you know?

And I’m also under the impression from—at least from news reports I saw prior to the war, that they sent the prisoners home.

Mr. GREENE. I’ve read probably the same reports you have about

that, sir.

Mr. JANKLOW. To what extent do either of you think on one of

our secret weapons in this whole—we don’t know us and you don’t

know us thing are the men and women of our Armed Forces—I

mean, there’s a helicopter pilot from my home State we were just

notified was killed rescuing a young Iraqi girl that had been injured by a land mine. I’m not aware that Saddam Hussein’s military was known for those kinds of acts. I’m not sure that their military were known for treating individuals that were sick as opposed

to just injured. I’m not aware that their military was known—at

least even our media, some of whom don’t like the effort, weren’t

known for writing stories about how their military went in and

mingled amongst the people, fed them, transported them, assisted

them. I’m just wondering to what extent you’re planning on that

being a secret weapon, if I can call it, in a getting to know each

other routine.

Mr. GREENE. The men and women of our Armed Forces have

been incredible Ambassadors for what we stand for as a country,

and the more they get out, the more they get in situations where

people can see what they’re about and to see what our intents are,

the better off we are and the more progress we’ll make on this

overall situation. I mean, they’ve been fantastic in every aspect of

this operation.

Mr. JANKLOW. Let me ask you, if I can, we’ve seen the looting,

but to my understanding, it hasn’t involved private property. It’s

involved governmental buildings of one sort or another. Is that relatively accurate or not?

Mr. GREENE. There’s been reports—I mean, I’ve seen plenty of

reports of looting of private property as well as——

Mr. JANKLOW. Of individual’s homes?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir.

Mr. JANKLOW. I’m talking about the general citizenry as opposed

to the people that own lots of palaces and things like that.

Mr. GREENE. Most of the reports that I’ve seen of general looting

have been probably people with a lot of wealth.

Mr. JANKLOW. Do you agree with that, Mr. Garvelink?

Mr. GARVELINK. Yeah. I’ve probably seen the same thing he has,

and the great majority of the looting that has gone on has been of

government buildings.

Mr. JANKLOW. Both of you indicated that it was somewhat of a

surprise the level of the looting that we’ve all seen and heard

about. What I’m wondering is why, if I can ask that question general? This is a country where $20 in wages is a significant—is an

at least an increase over what people were getting. It’s a country

where individuals didn’t have, for all practical purposes from the

testimony today, a water system that worked, a sewer system that

worked, an electrical system that worked, schools where they didn’t

60

have books for the students, why wouldn’t we think that where

there’s largesse out there, people under these circumstances

wouldn’t go after it as soon as they could, especially given the fact

that they have lived for decades under these kinds of circumstances. What I’m wondering is why is this a surprise?

Mr. GREENE. I think that the fact that there was looting was not

a surprise. I think that the extent of the looting was a surprise to

the extent that water treatment plants had been looted, hospitals

stripped bare, things like that.

Mr. GARVELINK. Yeah. I guess I was quite surprised by the extent of it. Having spent a lot of time in Somalia and Rwanda and

other places at the time when we were providing humanitarian assistance, there was a lot of looting that went on, but I’ve never seen

anything on the scale of this.

Mr. JANKLOW. But in none of those countries do I think the government was overthrown by us when they were there. Here the

government was gone, and we were the new people in town.

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, that’s true. I’m thinking of terms where

there was just general—well, in both—in Somalia there was no

government, and the looting that went on just never reached this

magnitude. I’m not sure that—I don’t know why it would happen.

Mr. JANKLOW. Look, I’m not going to take all my time. I just

want to say it’s been 3 weeks since the general shooting has

stopped. As late as a few days ago, we still had members of our

Armed Forces being killed. There have been phenomenal accomplishments made. I was sworn in on January 7, and Congress

didn’t even come back until the end of the month. That was 3

weeks, and you got a lot more done in that 3 weeks than I did my

first 3 weeks around here. So I think you’ve done an awful lot, and

I think we’ve done an awful lot since January.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. We’re talking about security, and I want to

get into just a couple comments that were made. Let me say this

before I get into these comments. It’s very easy to criticize after the

fact. The purpose of maybe the criticism would be to point out what

we can learn, so that we can make sure that we can do it better

the next time.

After the President gave his speech about the mission accomplished, some media accounts and reports from nongovernmental

and some governmental agencies is that we really did not sufficiently plan for or implement security measures in Iraq to the extent they should have been, except maybe for the oil fields.

And as a result of that, we do have a lack of humanitarian assistance, and the pace still has not been where we need to be because of security, and we do have to have security first. We can’t

put people’s lives on the line, whether it’s our military or the civilians or whatever.

And also I think just to quote a couple, it was an issue that I’m

sure the administration wasn’t happy about, but the Army’s Chief

of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, testified before the Senate Armed

Services Committee and several hundred thousand soldiers—over

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rity after we—the war was over. He also was involved in the stabilization of Bosnia. Did you work with him at all?

Mr. GARVELINK. No.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Also we have retired Major General William Nash who commanded the first Army peacekeeping operations

in the Balkans in 1995, and then he also said that there needed

to be at least 200,000 U.S. and Allied Forces to stabilize Iraq.

Now, Secretary Wolfowitz countered Shinseki saying that he disagreed. And since the war was over, the Pentagon has reportedly

reduced the number of troops from 250,000 to 135,000. Do you have

any knowledge of that?

Mr. GARVELINK. No, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, if you did have, assuming that is a

reduction, would you have an opinion whether or not that is appropriate at this time, based on the fact that there are security problems that exist which really affect the humanitarian assistance we

can start giving the citizens and stabilizing the country? Would you

feel that there needs to be more Armed Forces there?

Mr. GREENE. Sir, I’m not going to comment on any force deployment decisions by the Department of Defense, and I’m only going

to highlight that every person associated with this operation at

every level knows that restoring security is the highest priority

and, sir, that currently there is no humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

There are clearly pockets of need.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Did I say crisis? I didn’t mean to say crisis.

I take that back. Humanitarian problem that exists.

My point is that, if in fact it is necessary—there’s a difference

of opinion. That’s always the way it is. It’s just we want to try and

get it right.

Now, let me go to some specifics as far as what we’re doing with

respect to the humanitarian issues, and first ask you, did we learn

anything from what was going on and what is still going on in Afghanistan that might help us in dealing with the issues that are

going on from a humanitarian point of view that might help us

with respect to Iraq? Or are they two different countries and it’s

tough to compare?

Mr. GARVELINK. I think, first of all, the situations are quite different and it’s tough to compare the two. I think one of the lessons

that we’re seeing is that it’s important to get to rural areas and

to work in the rural communities and to emphasize assistance

there. We’re trying to do that in both locations, and it made very

clear that’s an important thing to do in Iraq.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask this question. I think a lot that

we have to look at—and I’m sure you have some expertise in the

field. But what is our process of determining the types and

amounts of humanitarian assistance needed for this postconflict? I

mean, we have to have a plan. What is the process that we’re looking at with respect to Iraq? I mean, are we focusing on—we have

the list that was given to us, but there are also some other issues.

I think you have different religious conflicts. You might have certain areas of the country that need to be targeted, where others

might not. I mean, what process maybe that we’ve used in the past

do you think is effective where we need to move forward?

62

Mr. GREENE. There is an extensive interagency planning process

that has gone on for months in Iraq. General Garner talked about

the entire Orhau operation. Ambassador Bremer has just gone out

to Iraq to take over his position. We get extensive information and

assessments of needs by international organizations and NGO’s.

We rely heavily on those assessments. There’s just a wealth of information that we tap into and use to decide strategies.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. From a medical point of view, do you feel

that, at this point, we are getting the resources both with respect

to physicians and nurses—the physician assistance or the drugs

that are needed to help those people that are in need? Where are

we with respect to the medical option or the medical area of this

humanitarian issue?

Mr. GARVELINK. I think we’re doing quite well, but what we’ve

done prior to the conflict is preposition medical supplies and equipment in the region. We had what they call World Health Organization [WHO] kits that could provide a basic—it provides basic medicine and equipment for 10,000 people for 3 months.

We had enough of those kits to have that kind of medical care

for a million people in place when the conflict started. So WHO kits

were moved into Iraq with military civil affairs units as soon as

possible to health units and health clinics.

When our teams actually could get into the country, they looked

at clinics and at hospitals and looked at what more extensive repairs could be carried out. I think we’re meeting a lot of the needs

in the health sector that we can reach at this point in time, and

as I mentioned earlier, one of the issues that is a concern is electricity, because you have to have a constant source of power for the

hospitals, and that is improving, but that has been a concern.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do we have American doctors that are

going over to Iraq and either volunteering their services or going

over with fellowship or other programs? I know we did that in the

Gulf war. I was on a board of the University of Maryland Shock

Trauma System where we had physicians that were going. Do we

have that program in place?

Mr. GARVELINK. On our USAID teams that we have, meaning the

USAID teams, we have four or five physicians in Iraq right now

or in Kuwait, and I think that your NGO panel that is coming later

will probably be able to talk specifically about American doctors

going back and forth.

We have them on our USAID team, but the NGO’s will be better

placed to answer that question.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Unfortunately, I have to leave at 4 p.m., so

I’m raising the issue now.

That’s all. Thanks.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman for participating.

I’d like to just go through another round of questions here as

well.

I’d like to know how long we have been preparing for the rebuilding of Iraq. When did humanitarian assistance planning for Iraq

begin? Mr. Garvelink, do you want to start?

Mr. GARVELINK. I’m trying to think of the exact month. I got into

it a little bit later, I think in October.

63

Mr. GREENE. My participation in the effort started in late August, I think.

Mr. SHAYS. Full time?

Mr. GREENE. Not full time but a lot of time, a lot of meetings.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I know you are both very dedicated public servants, and I know you work far more than 40 hours a week, but I

really would like to get a sense of when this became your primary

focus and responsibility.

Mr. GREENE. Became my primary focus probably with the first

meeting in late August.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. That’s good. What did that process entail? I

mean, did it entail a lot of meetings? Did it entail a lot of contacts

with people? How does one start to begin to—did it involve contacting a lot of NGO’s and saying, you all better get started here, we

may be going in?

Mr. GREENE. It involved participating with Mr. Garvelink and

many others on an interagency planning team, talking about various scenarios, trying to link up with possible military options. Obviously, no decision had been made about the use of force then or

for many months afterwards. It also involved reaching out to international organizations, trying to get an assessment of their plans

and their requirements and trying to match up our planning with

their planning.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, we all work for one country.

Did you want to say something, Mr. Garvelink?

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, I was going to say, we’ve spent a lot of

time together in the past 7 or 8 months in meetings. The other element to this is trying to determine budget requirements.

Mr. SHAYS. But the——

Mr. GARVELINK. We’ve both made a few trips to the region to

talk to countries there. So it’s been——

Mr. SHAYS. So the argument that somehow this plan to help rebuild Iraq was put together without a lot of thought or care is simply not true.

Mr. GREENE. I agree with that, sir.

Mr. GARVELINK. Correct. A lot of thought and work has gone into

the planning.

Mr. SHAYS. Did the war end a little sooner—I mean, most of the

combat—sooner than you expected? Was there this thing, my God,

we’ve got to be ready a little sooner than we anticipated? Was this

a factor in this process?

Mr. GREENE. I don’t think so. We focused I think, as I said to

an earlier question, on a lot of—a lot of our focus earlier on was

getting ready for large population displacements, and then——

Mr. SHAYS. That never happened.

Mr. GREENE. That never happened. But to get ready for that, we

talked about prepositioning assets around the region and doing

what was necessary to be able to quickly move people quickly into

the region.

Mr. SHAYS. So there was some preparation for something you

never had to deal with, and that was a relief. Then there was some

surprise that some of the facilities became vulnerable and actually

were a tempting target for looting, which was a surprise that you

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didn’t anticipate in August—and I’m not sure I would have either—

that you then had to do a little getting caught up to speed?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, you are both from the State Department. I get

a little confused. USAID doesn’t like to say they’re from State Department, so——

Mr. GARVELINK. I think technically we are separate from the

State Department.

Mr. SHAYS. I knew you would say that.

Mr. GARVELINK. I have to say that or I can’t go back to work.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, we’ll say you’re separate from, but you

have to come under their budget; and if Secretary Powell tells you

to jump, you jump. But other than that, you are separate.

Mr. GARVELINK. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. But I’m not quite sure whether I’m to view State

Department as under the direction of DOD as things stand now. In

other words, technically Mr. Bremer was with State, Ambassador

with State, but his chain of command is through Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to the White House. So are you technically working

with the Department of Defense or do you view yourselves as working not under the Department of Defense? I just——

Mr. GREENE. Clearly, the State Department is not working for

the Department of Defense. Ambassador Bremer, as you point out,

is reporting to Secretary Rumsfeld; and we are working very closely

with the whole effort. We all at ORHA—we are all trying to make

it work, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. GARVELINK. Our view of how this all operates is through a

Country Team approach. When an ambassador is in his country or

her country, all U.S. agencies are represented there, and the overall authority in the country is the U.S. Ambassador. And that’s the

way we viewed this. General Garner, Ambassador Bremer, is the

overall authority there. We are all working under the general guidance of that individual.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Bremer? You are working under the guidance of

Mr. Bremer?

Mr. GARVELINK. I’m not sure where it stands at the moment,

with the shift. But it would be under the senior U.S. official in the

country.

Mr. SHAYS. Wouldn’t you agree by your answer that there is a

little bit of uncertainty as to how this works, both of you?

Mr. GREENE. I’m——

Mr. SHAYS. These questions are not to put you on the spot. It’s

to understand—you both are doing a great job, and I know that

from many people who have spoken to me and knowing of your

coming to testify. But the bottom line is, should I just view this as

kind of a fluid situation a bit?

I mean, what I get nervous about is, in my office, if three people

have control, nobody has control. In the end, I say, if something

goes right or wrong, it rests with—and I pick somebody, because

I need to have one person ultimately know.

So you both—you report to your superior at USAID, and you ultimately report to the Secretary of State. Correct?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir.

65

Mr. SHAYS. But you are working under the auspices of ORHA

and under the Department of Defense, and is that just kind of the

way I’m to view it?

Mr. GREENE. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. GREENE. We are working with ORHA in a collaborative effort. The people that are on the ground in Iraq are working under

ORHA report to—will now report to Ambassador Bremer who reports to the Secretary of Defense. But here, back here at headquarters, we are working collaboratively with the Department of

Defense on these issues.

Mr. GARVELINK. Because the perspective I was offering was from

the field. Rich is right from back here.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. What criteria does USAID use to gauge

the capacity and success of humanitarian assistance organizations

and their suitability as partners? That’s your responsibility pretty

much, Mr. Garvelink?

Mr. GARVELINK. Yeah.

Mr. SHAYS. You work with the NGO’s. And let me just editorially

say, for me, the big heros in this process are the NGO’s. I mean,

for me to see them kind of getting ready—they are in Jordan. They

are in Cyprus. They are in Kuwait. They do this all the time, that

they go to many places around the world where life is a danger.

They are pros, they are experienced people, and you make them—

it seems to me you help them with the extraordinary resources you

provide them. But they are absolutely—you are absolutely dependent on them, I gather, in order to accomplish the tasks that USAID

needs to accomplish. Is that correct?

Mr. GARVELINK. Correct. We have a very close working relationship with the NGO community, and we are an agency that provides

support to them. Our job is to facilitate their work. We do not implement our humanitarian programs. We rely primarily on the

NGO’s to do that.

Mr. SHAYS. And that’s a policy over the last 10 years. That’s a

shift in policy over the last 10 to 15 years?

Mr. GARVELINK. I think for USAID that’s always been their approach to providing humanitarian assistance, is through the

NGO’s.

Mr. SHAYS. My sense was that we squeezed down the number of

people in USAID, and that you became more and more dependent

on NGO’s to accomplish the operational task. But that’s not true?

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, I’m looking at it from the humanitarian

side of USAID. We’ve always been kind of small, and we have always been reliant on the NGO’s.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. So, getting to my question: What criteria do you use to gauge the capacity and success of humanitarian

assistance organizations?

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, the organizations that we work with we

know and have worked with for a long time; and so we know their

capacity for management back in their headquarters. We travel frequently to the field and look at their programs, talk to them, plan

their programs.

One of the issues that’s just a very fundamental one is the accounting structure that’s a requirement to handle U.S. Government

66

funds. So all of these NGO’s certainly have that capacity, and in

our working with these—and as I have over the years you get to

know the strengths and weaknesses of each organization.

Mr. SHAYS. Because you’ve worked with them in so many parts

of the world?

Mr. GARVELINK. All over the world and for the past 25 years.

Mr. SHAYS. I mean, is it conceivable that five NGO’s are going

to compete for the same grant, or do you have so many grants right

now there is not this kind of competition? Are you running out of

NGO’s to do the work, or are NGO’s running out of money to get

from you?

Mr. GARVELINK. Neither.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. GARVELINK. There is resources to go around to fund the

NGO’s. And I think the way we have divided up—if you are speaking specifically of Iraq, we have six cooperative agreements with

major NGO’s to work in certain parts of the country and provide

a whole range of assistance; and under the circumstances right

now, that seems about right.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you explain to me—the NGO’s will tell me

why neutrality is extraordinarily important. Would you both—Mr.

Greene, you get involved with the NGO’s as well.

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you both explain to me in your words while

you believe neutrality is important.

Mr. GARVELINK. I think impartiality is important. I’m not so sure

that I would put neutrality in that same category. And I think Iraq

may be a good case. We are not neutral in Iraq. We are——

Mr. SHAYS. The issue is, are these NGO’s to be an instrument

of the U.S. Government, or are they an instrument of their own organization to do good works using the resources of the U.S. Government? They would argue that they can’t go into a place as an instrument of the U.S. Government.

Mr. GARVELINK. I would accept that.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s how I meant the word neutrality.

Mr. GARVELINK. OK. We do not view the NGO’s as an instrument

of the U.S. Government. We view them as a partner in providing

humanitarian assistance, and they have expertise in skills and

characteristics that the U.S. Government does not have. We are not

there for that long period of time. We are not on the ground. We

don’t know the people like they do. NGOs have to maintain a certain independence from us, and that makes sense to us.

Mr. SHAYS. And that makes sense.

Mr. Greene.

Mr. GREENE. I would agree with that, sir.

I would also add that there are many cases—in most cases

there’s a confluence of objectives between what NGO’s want to have

happen and what we as a U.S. Government also want to have happen in terms of responding to the humanitarian distress.

Mr. SHAYS. You know, I think you both have extraordinary opportunities. I think you’re—if I could say it this way, I think you

are doing the Lord’s work. And one of the things that moved me

deeply when I got to go into Iraq was I looked at these NGO’s as

we were having a meeting in the base, the British base at the port;

67

and I was thinking these folks devote 80 hours plus a week. They

are not—their remuneration isn’t what it might be in some other

business. But they are doing extraordinarily good things with the

resources, in many cases, of the U.S. Government; and they do it

with a lot of courage, frankly.

When we went in, there was the argument that there needed to

be someone guarding me; and Save the Children’s folks said, we

are not going in under any protection, military protection. The explanation was because they have to go in as a neutral force; and

I thought, they do this all around the world, and I just pray that

we use them well.

Just one last area. I would like to know if you believe that we

should be—excuse me. This is a policy issue, so I don’t want to put

you on the spot this way.

How do you react to the argument that the U.N. has—first, let

me ask you this. How did you react to the fact that the U.N.

seemed reluctant to end the embargo?

Mr. GREENE. I don’t accept the premise that the U.N. was reluctant to enter Iraq. U.N.—I know that the U.N. relief agencies were

doing everything possible to get into Iraq and are now in Iraq and

gathering storm and gathering momentum.

Mr. SHAYS. And these are very skilled people. Correct?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir; and they also provide the overall coordination structure that the NGO’s will plug into. Their presence and coordination is essential to this process.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s very important to put on the record. In other

words, we need their network or their system in order for the

NGO’s to be successful.

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you agree with that, Mr. Garvelink?

Mr. GARVELINK. Yeah. I think the various organizations that we

work with all have particular skills and strengths, and the U.N. is

very important as the overall umbrella to humanitarian operations.

Its presence is critical for dealing with host governments and setting the stage for what the rest of us do. No one else can play that

role, and we can’t operate without them.

Mr. SHAYS. I had this feeling, if I didn’t have the job I have right

now, I would love the job that both of you have. And you might say

I’m crazy because I maybe don’t understand what keeps you up at

night. But I would think that you are doing very important work.

The success of our Nation’s endeavor depends in large measure on

what you do with the people that you work with; and the impact

in the region and ultimately on the world, to me, rests with your

good work. So, not to put a burden on you, I hope to God you succeed with flying colors.

Do you have anything you want to put on the record before we

go to our next panel?

Mr. GREENE. No, sir. Only that we greatly appreciate your support.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you have it.

Mr. GARVELINK. Yes. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you both very much. I appreciate it a lot.

Our final panelists are Mr. Curtis Welling, president and CEO

of AmeriCares; Mr. George C. Biddle, senior vice president, InterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:43 Nov 07, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\89546.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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national Rescue Committee; Mr. Rudy Von Bernuth, vice president

and managing director, Children in Emergencies and Crisis, Save

the Children; Mr. Kevin M. Henry, director, Policy and Advocacy,

CARE.

And for nothing but honesty in government, I would like to disclose that two of these witnesses—and with some pride—disclose

that two of these witnesses or organizations, AmeriCares and Save

the Children, are based in the Fourth Congressional District of

Connecticut.

I would ask unanimous consent to insert the following documents

into the record: a letter from Dean R. Hirsch, president, World Vision, stating they will not be able to testify; and written testimony

from Mr. Bill Frelick, Refugee Program, Amnesty International.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to ask all of our four witnesses to stand.

Gentlemen, I’m sorry to keep you waiting so long, but it’s great to

have you here.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record all four of our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

We will go in the order that you are sitting and do really appreciate your being here. Thank you very much.

Mr. Welling.

STATEMENTS OF CURTIS R. WELLING, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

AMERICARES; GEORGE C. BIDDLE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE; RUDY VON

BERNUTH, VICE PRESIDENT AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,

CHILDREN IN EMERGENCIES AND CRISIS, SAVE THE CHILDREN; AND KEVIN M. HENRY, DIRECTOR, POLICY AND ADVOCACY, CARE

Mr. WELLING. Thank you, Congressman——

Mr. SHAYS. You need to move that mic up and turn it on.

Mr. WELLING. Is that better?

Mr. SHAYS. That’s wonderful.

Mr. WELLING. Thank you, Congressman Shays. It’s a pleasure

and honor to be here to discuss our experience in providing emergency medical assistance in the context of the war in Iraq.

AmeriCares is a privately funded disaster relief and humanitarian aid organization. For 20 years we have been providing rapid

humanitarian response to disasters worldwide in the form of medicines, medical equipment, and other shelter and relief supplies.

Over that time, we have worked in 137 countries and we have been

involved in virtually all significant disasters for two decades, including earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, as well as man-made disasters in places like Rwanda, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. To date, we have delivered more than $3 billion worth of humanitarian assistance, and we stay after the disaster is completed. Last

year, we provided ongoing humanitarian medical assistance in over

50 countries around the world.

Our model stresses speed, careful needs assessment, the identification of strong local partners, leveraging cash donations with inkind contributions to maximize volume and impact of assistance.

Our donors responded immediately and enthusiastically to the crisis in Iraq. To date, we have raised $700,000 in cash and over $10

million in in-kind contributions from a broad range of America’s

pharmaceutical and medical companies.

Despite the logical difficulties and impediments that one is confronted with in this situation, I’m happy to report that the model

has worked in Iraq. As a result, on April 23, we were able to move

20 tons of critical medical supplies over land through Turkey into

Erbil and Kirkuk. We are told that’s the first distribution of emergency medical assistance of any consequence in that part of Iraq.

More recently, just this past Sunday, on May 11, an Ilyshin 76,

a plane not of our manufacture, with 40 tons of medicines and

other critical supplies landed in Baghdad. We believe that was the

first NGO flight of emergency medical supplies.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you fly in that plane?

80

Mr. WELLING. I didn’t, although I expect to go in one soon.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. WELLING. And those medical supplies are being distributed

as we speak pursuant to an assessment that had been going on on

the ground by AmeriCares’ personnel for the preceding week.

We are planning another airlift of equal size, about 40 tons, for

the 22nd of this month; and, Congressman, I am here to tell you,

pursuant to the question that you asked earlier, if you would like

to go with us, we would be happy to have you accompany us on

that trip on the 22nd.

Despite these missions, we all believe that this is just the beginning. We expect to be working in Iraq for a considerable time; and

despite the fact that these are early days, we have learned much

from our experience.

One of the unique things about this situation is that we had time

and a great deal of information, and that’s not the norm in a disaster context, as you know. So there was time to plan and organize.

There was time to consider the very substantial amount of information that had been produced by the NGO’s and the multi-lateral organizations on the ground. We knew the war would cause significant incremental deterioration; we knew it would require massive

effort; and, very importantly, we knew that America would be

judged in part by how well we met the challenge. And, reflecting

that, the President made a pledge on behalf of the American people

to provide immediate humanitarian assistance.

Notwithstanding all of these things—the time to plan, the information, the understanding of what was at stake and, I have to say,

notwithstanding the good-faith efforts of hundreds if not thousands

of people in and out of government—our experience has caused us

to conclude that there are things that we could have done better.

The first thing that we learned was not to trust or be complacent

about our assumptions but to question and plan for contingencies.

The government and the nongovernmental worldwidely anticipated

a refugee and displacement crisis perhaps of historic magnitude. In

the event, happily, that crisis never materialized. However, substantial redeployment and retooling of the plan was required as a

result of that planning assumption. The lesson is that contingency

planning and flexibility are critical, given the extraordinary complexity of the situation.

But of all the lessons that we learned—and our learning continues—two stand out to us as particularly important.

First, we think it’s critically important to designate and empower

a central point of authority at the highest level. I want to say that

again, because we believe it’s so important. We believe it’s critically

important to designate and empower a central point of authority at

the highest level.

What I mean by this is an authority which is clearly in charge,

an authority which can speak with clear, unambiguous, and authoritative voice, which can cut decisively across departmental and

organizational lines to direct, facilitate, communicate and control

and to ensure that efforts are planned and not duplicated or frustrated because of turf, confusion, or red tape.

Clearly, this was not done. Many organizations were created

with lots of acronyms, but, in our view, if there was ever a need

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for a government czar empowered at the highest level to oversee

planning and execution of a critical government priority, this was

such a time.

In our own case, the absence of an authority to cut through some

of this red tape was particularly dramatic. The fact that it took us

24 days to receive OFAC and U.N. 661 approval, which approvals

had clearly been rendered moot by the stunning military success of

our Armed Forces, while at the time we waited on the Iraqi border

with 65,000 pounds of critical medicines and supplies was both

frustrating and deeply troubling.

The second key lesson we take from this crisis is that planning

and preparedness are crucial, and we’ve heard much about planning and preparedness in the discussion so far today. Simply put,

it’s our view that the resources committed to planning and preparation for the humanitarian response were not well coordinated, were

not transparent, and didn’t match the magnitude of the challenge

nor the importance of success.

Consider, if you will, as a counterpoint the experience of the journalist community and the resources committed to facilitate an unprecedented level of access and media coverage. Giving credit

where it’s due, the Department of Defense did a remarkable job in

anticipating and finding creative ways to plan for and manage the

process, down to the reporters’ boot camp. The same level of preparation, planning, and transparency could have been employed with

respect to post-conflict security and humanitarian assistance. Such

a thoughtful commitment would have facilitated better coordination, earlier access for evaluation and analysis purposes, clearly

would have facilitated a speedy transition from military to civilian

control.

While I’m not sure if humanitarian boot camp is the appropriate

characterization, the same rationale is valid: Creative planning,

transparency, and preparation under the direction of a central

point of control are critical elements for success.

To those who argue that the situation is too complicated, I respectfully disagree. The greater the complexity of the crisis and in

the resource coordination, the geometrically greater the need for

thoughtful planning, modeling and one person to be held accountable.

Finally, let me conclude my remarks with a word about safety

and security. Much has been made and reported about the reluctance of nongovernmental organizations to work under the direction or protection of a military force; and, as you have observed,

different organizations will accept different boundaries in this context. This is a valid and important issue, and it’s important for this

body to recognize it as such.

The reluctance of NGO’s to work under the control of a military

power is appropriate. One of the first principles of humanitarian

assistance is neutrality and independence. It’s the cornerstone of

our reason for being and a source of much of our credibility.

In order to maximize the effectiveness of the humanitarian response, this principle must be acknowledged and respected. It’s as

simple as that. No one doubts the need to have military in control

of all the activities during the period of active hostilities. Further,

it’s clear that for a period of time thereafter, the period in which

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we now find ourselves, all parties are acting under the security umbrella provided by the Coalition forces as an occupying force. This

is correct. It’s also the Coalition’s responsibility.

I’m pleased to tell you that in our own activities in Iraq so far

we have received superb coordination from the military units we

have dealt with in Iraq, both in Kirkuk and in Baghdad. Simply

put, however, it does not seem at the policy level that a high

enough priority was given to providing security arrangements to facilitate access of humanitarian aid organizations for evaluation and

assessment purposes. Obviously, this is an important consideration

in an environment where speed, days and weeks, desperately matter. Our future response in future contexts will be compromised to

the extent that these principles are not well understood or accepted.

Once again, we thank you for the opportunity to share these

views with the committee today, and we look forward to your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you so much, Mr. Welling.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Welling follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Biddle.

Mr. BIDDLE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,

thank you for the opportunity to speak about Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations: Overcoming Barriers.

I have submitted my statement for the record and will take this

opportunity to highlight the critical actions that should be taken to

overcome barriers and best ensure that humanitarian activities in

Iraq and Afghanistan will be carried out successfully and effectively. They include: No. 1, protecting civilian populations and establishing a secure environment; No. 2, obtaining the greatest level

of international legitimacy and support by defining a clear role for

the United Nations; and, No. 3, separating military and humanitarian efforts.

Delaying or not carrying out these actions can have profound

consequences for the successful delivery of humanitarian assistance

after military operations.

Protecting civilians and establishing a secure environment. If you

ask the United Nations and the humanitarian and human rights

nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan what the greatest

obstacle is to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation, they all give the same

answer, lack of security. The U.N. Security Council supported establishment of the international security assistance force in Afghanistan following the war. To date, the 5,000-member force has

deployed in and around Kabul but not to the other regions of Afghanistan. The need to enhance security because of the multitude

of threats is critical to the ability of aid organizations and the U.N.

as well as the government of Afghanistan to deliver assistance to

communities in need.

I recommend that you read the May 6 report to the U.N. Security

Council from Lakhdar Brahimi, the Secretary General’s Special

Representative in Afghanistan, which gives an unvarnished view of

this acute problem.

There are a number of efforts under way to address the security

crisis in Afghanistan, including demobilization of combatants, decommissioning of weapons, the creation of an inter-ethnic Afghan

international army, and the establishment of a national civilian police force.

Beyond strengthening these efforts, the real issue at hand is the

critical need to extend the international security assistance force

beyond Kabul, to assist the government, the international community and local and international NGO’s to meet the real needs of

Afghan citizens.

NATO is due to take the lead in ISAF this summer, and we hope

that NATO’s involvement will be more robust and more effective in

disarming the warlords, securing the borders and creating an environment for the central government to develop and govern beyond

Kabul. NATO can aid the national army in securing the countryside and protecting the Afghan people. A firm NATO mandate in

Afghanistan is critical to that country’s future, especially in advance of national elections in 2004.

The threats to security in Afghanistan and Iraq are eerily similar. They include insecurity in the aftermath of war, desire for revenge and retribution, ethnic and sectarian divisions, displaced

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populations, factional competition, and interference by neighboring

countries.

There are currently over 200,000 U.S. forces deployed for Iraq.

At present, they are unable to maintain effective law and order,

and there is no administration of justice. Under the Geneva conventions, the Coalition is legally responsible as the occupying

power to protect civilians, including restoring law and order, basic

due process, and judicial guarantees. The upsurge in violence and

crime in Baghdad, the looting of hospitals, and the recent violence

in Falujah all speak to the urgency of this critical issue.

The Iraqi people are not accustomed to this level of chaos and

crime. They are becoming increasingly scared and angry and are

beginning to lose confidence in the coalition’s ability to do what it

said it would do: restore electricity, water, and sanitation services,

rehabilitate hospitals and clinics and meet the critical needs of the

populace.

The Coalition must comply with international humanitarian law

and do more to protect Iraqis from the looting, lawlessness and

frontier justice developing in the center and southern regions of

Iraq. Civilians are asking Coalition forces for more security and

protection measures. Shadow security networks are now emerging.

Tribes, villages, ethnic groups, mosques, communities are banding

together or around leaders to man armed neighborhood watches

and administer on-the-spot justice. This will only develop and

spread in the absence of legitimate security authorities and make

the work of humanitarian actors more difficult.

If the Coalition doesn’t get a grip on the situation quickly, they

will find themselves in a dire situation. Temperatures are reaching

close to 100 degrees Farenheit in parts of the country, and outbreaks of waterborne disease, like cholera, which recently appeared

in Basra, will likely become more widespread. It is urgent that the

security environment be addressed immediately so that the Coalition doesn’t ‘‘lose the peace.’’

Obtaining the greatest level of international legitimacy and support by defining a clear role for the U.N.

Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.N. has been an integral leader in providing humanitarian assistance as well as developing a

transitional administration in Afghanistan. At the Bonn Conference to decide the transitional administration and loya jirga

process in Afghanistan, the U.N. effectively facilitated the overall

post-conflict effort to ensure peace and improve the welfare of Afghans.

Once the Afghan interim administration took office, the U.N. assistance mission in Afghanistan, known by its acronym UNAMA,

was established in Kabul to support and provide technical assistance to the interim administration in meeting humanitarian and

protection needs. Another critical role the U.N. has played is to

rally the donor community to meet Afghanistan’s needs.

In Iraq, the Coalition continues to go it alone and has just indicated its support for a clear U.N. role. The International Rescue

Community, together with other NGO’s, has called on President

Bush to turn to the U.N. to lead humanitarian efforts in Iraq. The

World Food Program and UNICEF have worked in Iraq for the last

decade, and the U.N. has managed the Oil for Food Program, the

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largest single relief effort in the world, for the past 12 years. U.N.

involvement will help to coordinate agencies, international donors,

and local and international NGO’s and will encourage burden sharing by the international community in meeting the needs of the

Iraqi populace. A U.N. role will also ensure the independence and

impartiality of humanitarian assistance in a way that no occupying

power can. This will enhance the trust of national and international actors, which is critical to a successful humanitarian effort.

A clearly defined and leading U.N. role in the relief and reconstruction of Iraq is also necessary for the development of civil society.

In many towns and cities, Iraqis are beginning to form city councils and reinvigorate civic organizations. To date, it has been the

Coalition forces, specifically the Civil Military Operations Centers,

that have encouraged and at times even co-located with fledgling

city councils as they begin to address key issues such as water,

sanitation, power, education, and health services. Yet for all the

good intentions and even early progress, the city councils’ military

association may have a divisive and discrediting long-term effect in

the eyes of many Iraqi citizens wary of occupation.

According to an IRC senior staff member just back from 6 weeks

in the region, a sustained military role in the development of Iraqi

society to the exclusion of the United Nations may well be self-defeating. In An Nasiriyah, for example, some key community groups

such as a women’s volunteer association composed of education and

health professionals are intentionally staying away from relief and

reconstruction efforts perceived to be military led.

This is a critical time for Iraq and its nascent civil society. It is

imperative that structures be put in place that encourage maximum civilian participation. A clear and robust role for the U.N. can

help bring Iraqis together to develop the practices and institutions

necessary to ensure a free and democratic society.

Last, just a few points on the separation of military and humanitarian efforts.

The blurring of the lines between military and humanitarian operations is of the utmost concern to the humanitarian community.

It is important to understand the humanitarian community’s perspective on the reasons why U.N. authority and civilian oversight

of humanitarian activities are so important, and in my remarks I

will echo what my colleague has just said.

First, the military should do what it does best—fight wars and

provide security—and humanitarian organizations should do what

we do best—care for civilians and deliver assistance to those in

need.

Second, humanitarian assistance must be provided on an impartial basis to ensure that all civilians in need—regardless of race,

creed, nationality, or political belief—have fair and equal access to

aid. The U.N. is clearly more independent and more impartial than

any one party to a conflict and therefore should coordinate and direct relief efforts.

Although the Pentagon’s Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is currently heading the humanitarian response

in Iraq, the IRC and other humanitarian organizations have been

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assured that our efforts and implementing partnerships remain

with USAID and the State Department. This distinction, while critical to the provision of aid in this circumstance, is a dangerous

precedent and one that calls into question the motivations as to

why, how, and where humanitarian assistance is provided. This is

shared by other NGO’s and many in the international donor community and will likely become a greater concern of local Iraqi communities over time.

For NGO’s such as the IRC to work effectively in a post-conflict

setting, we must establish a close and trusting relationship with

the communities we serve. To do so, we must be seen and known

to be impartial and independent of any military force.

Last, confusing military and humanitarian activities carries

great security risks for those delivering assistance. Our safety often

depends on local perceptions. Aid workers are obviously not armed,

cannot defend themselves, and must never be mistaken for members of the military. Their lives depend on it.

The humanitarian agencies respect and appreciate the critical

role the military plays in establishing security after conflict, and

we are grateful for it. But because of our commitment to impartiality and independence and the critical need to develop a trusting relationship with he communities we serve, we cannot accept military

supervision. This is a challenge we are facing in Iraq. As a result,

we have had to add conditional language to our grant agreements

with USAID to ensure traditional civilian reporting structures.

If this trend continues, the space for humanitarian agencies will

shrink and fewer will be involved in responding to crises such as

exist in Iran and Afghanistan. Donors from other countries will

likely refuse to coordinate and cooperate and the result will mean

fewer people in need will receive the services they so desperately

require.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very, Mr. Biddle.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Biddle follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Von Bernuth.

Mr. VON BERNUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you

again for providing Save the Children the opportunity to testify before your committee. I want to thank especially you, Congressman

Shays, for your leadership and support of Save the Children’s work

in Connecticut and around the United States and in more than 40

countries around the world. Your recent visit, which you have referenced several times, to our programs in Iraq and West Bank and

Gaza and your subsequent support for the Women and Children in

Armed Conflict Protection Act are greatly appreciated by myself

and all of my colleagues.

Save the Children has been active in the Middle East for more

than 30 years. We are committed to addressing the ongoing needs

of children and their families in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as

those in need around the world.

My comments today will focus on three points regarding the role

of nongovernmental organizations in post-conflict settings: the lessons we have learned from Afghanistan, the barriers that we are

encountering in Iraq, and finally the solutions that we recommend

for overcoming these barriers in Iraq and in future conflict situations. And I will try to lightly edit my remarks to eliminate too

many repetitions of what George has recently said.

In 1985, Save the Children established its Pakistan-Afghanistan

Field Office to respond to the needs of an estimated 3.5 million Afghan refugees then living in Pakistan. We expanded our work to

Afghanistan in 1989. We opened our first offices in 1993 inside of

Afghanistan, and we have been working there ever since, throughout the Taliban period and afterwards.

In the year following September 11, Save the Children delivered

approximately $25 million in relief and reconstruction assistance in

that country.

In Afghanistan, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief

[ACBAR], of which Save the Children serves with CARE, IRC, and

other major NGO’s, has articulated the following two key points

about the role of NGO’s working in Afghanistan: the importance of

a secure environment for reconstruction, the necessity of long-term

funding commitments for Afghanistan.

Indeed, these two key issues and the failure to address them currently compromise the prospects for an Afghan recovery. Let me

address each of them.

The importance of a secure environment for reconstruction. Security and protection are vital to the work that we do and to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Because of the international desire to support the notion of a successful interim government, the fragility of the political and security situations today

tend to be underplayed by our government and in representations

to the international media. Let me assure you that anyone who has

staff on the ground in Afghanistan today knows that there is no

question but that security is tenuous and is getting worse.

In Kabul, the biggest risks today are terrorist acts and armed

robbery; and George has already talked a bit about the role of ISAF

and the need to expand that role to provide a secure working environment throughout the country.

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Anecdotally, I would just mention that outside of Kabul in the

north, where Save the Children conducts programs, the tensions

between the political parties seem to be on the increase; and where

politics fail, security also fails.

For example—and this is just one of a number of incidents over

the last year which have affected our staff. On April 8, following

the appointment of a new civilian Governor, tensions between

Jamiat and Jumbush troops came to a head, resulting in 2 days of

heavy fighting and 3 days of sporadic fighting. A Save the Children

international staff member based in the town of Maimana was

evacuated along with others in a convoy of U.N. and NGO staff on

April 9. As of April 17h, an unexploded rocket propelled grenade

was still lodged in the wall of the house of one of our national staff

members who was waiting for de-miners to remove it, a reminder

of the continuing risk posed by the conflict.

So, the bottom line, we need the U.S. Government to support efforts to ensure security and to recognize that this requires an external presence in order to succeed.

Point two, the necessity of long-term funding commitments for

Afghanistan. We have learned from our experience in Afghanistan

that the only way to ensure development success is by ensuring

long-term funding that provides the bridge from emergency humanitarian assistance to sustainable community-based development

programs. And yet we are woefully behind meeting the funding levels agreed to in the Afghan Freedom Support Act, and we are seeing an increasingly dangerous situation for NGO’s working in Afghanistan.

From the start, the money pledged to Afghanistan did not compare well to other host conflict situations, for instance, the countries in the Balkans. Even more serious, those commitments have

not been fulfilled as donor aid has fallen far short of the Tokyo

pledges.

Among my colleagues in the field, we are seeing a general sense

of progressive disengagement by our government toward the Afghan people. Having seen U.S. interests and commitments to Afghanistan wax and wane several times over the last decade, Save

the Children calls on the U.S. Government to make commitments

on a multi-year basis. The United States and other countries need

to keep faith with Afghanistan and stay the course with substantive and sustained support if we hope to achieve a sustainable

peace.

Working in Iraq. Save the Children currently has 26 expatriate

staff, most of them now in Iraq. Congressman Shays, when you

were there, many of them were still in Kuwait. We have received

a $10 million award from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,

part of AID, and have also allocated over $100,000 in private funds

to support our agency’s work in Iraq.

Initially, Save the Children has provided assistance in Umm

Qasr, cooking gas distributions to hospitals and clinics in Az

Zubayr, and preschool education kits distributed in Safwan. On an

ongoing basis now, we have established a main program office in

Basra last week, and we now have a dozen expatriate staff based

there.

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We have done initial assessments in Karbala and An Najaf, and

we will begin setting up programs and offices in both of those

gubernots next week. I have more detailed information in my written testimony on our programs there.

Roadblocks and solutions to providing humanitarian assistance

in Iraq. The primary obstacle to providing humanitarian assistance

right now, as everybody else has said, is security—or insecurity.

The lack of security has created an anarchic situation where citizens cannot access basic services such as education and health

care.

Our team in Baghdad says that parents are not letting their children attend schools because roving criminal gangs are kidnapping

children from local neighborhoods. Consequently, schools are operating at 30 percent of normal capacity. People are also not visiting

health clinics or returning to work because of the lack of order.

Many ministry employees are still unable to go back to work, and

ministries are closed. Employees often are stopped by U.S. military

at the doors of the ministries because the military can’t distinguish

who are employees and who are looters.

Further, as has been mentioned by everybody, including General

Garner, government salaries must resume so that people can get

back to work. These employees and the systems they run will ultimately be responsible for feeding, educating, and vaccinating the

Iraqi people.

Point two. The U.S. military must move quickly to establish a

functioning police force that can restore order. Until basic order is

restored, life-saving humanitarian assistance cannot be delivered

with the speed and the quantity that is now needed. Many of our

European allies have experienced police trainers who are skilled in

providing policing and training local police forces at the same time.

Kosovo provides a good example of this sort of policing support provided by NATO members.

I think it’s also important that the Department of Defense understands the very delicate cultural and political issues at play and

the way in which our military performs in communities throughout

Iraq. I have just heard an alarming report from one of my colleagues who yesterday met with senior Shiite clerics in Kerbala

where he heard tremendous anger and concern about the way U.S.

tanks had rolled up next to some of the holiest Shiite shrine and

their fear that this could spontaneously erupt into some sort of a

bloodbath.

We need experienced leadership that knows how to deal with

these sensitive cultural and political issues. The U.S. military has

done a great job of winning the war, a job they have trained for.

Now is the time to let people trained and experienced in rebuilding

societies do the job that we have been trained to do.

In Iraq, even before the outbreak of the war in March, women

and children were facing very severe risks and unmet protection

needs. These risks have now risen. Protection from sexual violence

and physical harm is one of the six critical protection needs measured in our recent State of the World Mothers Report. According

to yesterday’s Washington Post, the dark accounts of kidnapping,

rape, and sexual abuse of women and children are only likely to increase.

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Our Iraq team is also seeing many children harmed by

unexploded ordinance. The clearing of exploded ordinances must be

stepped up, and education of children on avoiding them also has to

be stepped up.

We are concerned that neither in the initial office of foreign disaster assistance awards that some of us at this table received nor

the more recent requests for application from AID for community

rehabilitation has women and child protection been listed as a

prioritized project activity. U.S. Government and NGO’s must

prioritize the protection needs of women and children in the onset

of our humanitarian response.

Finally, Save the Children supports an expanded role for the

United Nations for post-conflict reconstruction.

Again, to summarize four key recommended solutions: The

United States must move quickly to establish a functioning police

force that can restore order, and we probably need European expertise to accomplish this.

The differentiation between the roles of humanitarian workers

and the military must be made clear.

The U.S. Government and NGO’s must prioritize the protection

needs of women and children at the onset of our humanitarian response.

And the role of the United Nations in post-conflict reconstruction

must be expanded.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee; and I am happy to answer any questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Von Bernuth follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Henry, and then we will get to the questions.

Mr. HENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting CARE to participate in today’s hearings. CARE International has been working continuously in central

and southern Iraq since the 1991 Gulf war.

As the last panelist, I have the challenge of saying something

that hasn’t already been said, and I’m not sure that I can do that.

I’m pleased to say that what I will have to say coincides largely

with what my colleagues had to say, despite the fact that we had

no opportunity to coordinate our testimony.

I will focus my testimony on the efforts of CARE and other humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance in Iraq today, the

context in which we are operating, and our recommendations for

priority action by the U.S. Government. I will also, like my colleagues, highlight critical lessons that need to be learned from our

experience in Afghanistan.

The central reality in Iraq today is that a vacuum has developed

in a country that was for decades completely dominated by institutions that now no longer exist—the Iraqi Government led by Saddam Hussein, the Ba’ath party, and the Iraqi security and intelligence services. A swift military victory must now be followed by

an equally effective response in filling this vacuum. Failing to do

so could prove tragic for the Iraqi people and very damaging for the

international credibility of the U.S. Government.

What is required of the U.S. Government is obvious and straightforward: restore order, reestablish the central public services, and

set in motion a process that will allow the Iraqi people to rebuild

their country and establish a legitimate government.

I say straightforward. And while it’s straightforward, the magnitude of the challenges that we face in doing all that is required

in Iraq is enormous, and we should not underestimate those challenges.

So the question is, what are the priorities? General Garner in his

testimony today did David Letterman one better and came up with

11 on his top list of things that need to be done in Iraq. We are

a little bit more realistic, perhaps, or a little less ambitious, and

we would focus on four priorities.

The first I think we all absolutely agree—it was No. 1 on General Garner’s list, all my colleagues have raised it—it is that immediate action must be taken to restore law and order.

While the Iraqi people have no desire to return to the police state

that was Iraq under Saddam Hussein, they are urgently calling for

a restoration of security. Many Iraqis are still afraid to venture

outside their homes, especially at night, and most parents are still

unwilling to send their children back to school fearing for their

safety.

The lack of security is already having a very detrimental effect

on the ability of CARE and other humanitarian organizations to do

our work. Just since the end of the conflict, CARE’s warehouse in

Baghdad has been looted. Just this past weekend, two of our cars

have been hijacked. Over the last few days, we have had to send

international staff that we just recently deployed into Baghdad

back to Amman for their own safety. So that’s a measure of our

sense of the security problems in Baghdad.

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You know, as one of my colleagues in Baghdad said today, what

does it say about the situation when criminals can roam freely

around Baghdad and humanitarian aid workers cannot? Unless

law and order can be reestablished promptly, there is a risk of

rapid downward spiral in the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and

civilian relief agencies will be in no position to respond. Establishing security throughout Iraq must be priority No. 1 of the U.S.

Government, and the assets required to accomplish this objective

should be deployed immediately.

The other three priorities on our list—and I will go through these

very quickly because they have been touched on and actually they

figure near the top of General Garner’s list as well.

First is the restoration of electricity, water supply, and waste

treatment. These services are essential, not just because of their

tangible benefits and impact on the health system but also for the

positive signal they would send to the Iraqi people that life is returning to normal.

Second—and here I would take issue with the testimony of our

colleague from USAID—we fear that the health system in Iraq is

in danger of complete collapse unless urgent action is taken. We all

saw the footage of hospitals being looted. Anyone who has visited

the hospitals in Iraq today know that they are struggling to cope

with a very difficult situation. So we think urgent action needs to

be taken to prevent a complete collapse of that system.

Finally, we were pleased to hear General Garner report on

progress being made in making emergency payments to civil servants. We think that’s very important. We think that should be expanded immediately. It’s important to remember that, in Iraq prior

to the war, the Iraqi Government was by far the largest employer.

So getting civil servants—getting money back in the pockets of civil

servants not only allows them to do their important jobs and support their family, it helps get the Iraqi economy going again.

Like my colleagues, I also believe that it’s extremely important

that we learn lessons from our recent experience in Afghanistan;

and I fear for the most part that these lessons are not yet being

very well learned. I would highlight briefly four lessons that I

think are most critical.

First is, following regime change, priority must be given to establish a nationwide law and order as a basis for economic reconstruction and political transformation. Regime change by definition creates a security vacuum. If it is not filled by international peacekeepers and new national security forces, it will be filled by less

savory forces, including criminals, warlords, terrorists, and drug

traffickers.

One and a half years after the end of the war in Afghanistan to

unseat the Taliban and defeat al Qaeda, a large portion of the

country remains insecure. Despite repeated calls, the U.S. Government and the rest of the international community have failed to expand international peacekeepers beyond Kabul. Current U.S. Government strategy in Afghanistan, which includes the deployment of

small provincial reconstruction teams and the very slow training of

a new national army are simply, in our judgment, inadequate to

the task; and we urge Congress to ensure that similar policy mistakes are not made in Iraq.

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Second, post-conflict reconstruction is a long and costly undertaking, requiring sustained commitment from the U.S. Government

and the rest of the international community. There, I would only

say that, although the U.S. Government has been very slow in the

case of Afghanistan to get off the mark, there has been progress

recently. Congress did—despite President Bush’s failure to make a

specific request for funding for Afghanistan in this year’s budget,

Congress has appropriated money and Congress has appropriated

additional resources in the Iraq supplemental; and we congratulate

you for doing that. The Iraq supplemental also already has $21⁄2

billion in relief and reconstruction funding for Iraq. We view that

as a good down payment on what will be a large-scale, multi-year

effort.

Third, establishing an international framework for managing

post-conflict situations like Afghanistan and Iraq is in the best interest of those countries as well as the American taxpayers. The

people of Iraq and the eventual new Government of Iraq will need

all the help they can get—financial aid, technical assistance, trade

and investment and debt relief—in rebuilding their country economically and politically. Creating a framework that enjoys the

widest possible international support is, thus, vital. Like my colleagues, I believe that necessitates a major role for the United Nations.

Finally, the last lesson for us in Afghanistan—and it’s been alluded to not only by members of this panel but by Congressman

Shays as well—is the issue of civilian leadership; and we urge

transitioning as quickly as possible to full civilian leadership and

control of relief and reconstruction in Iraq because we believe that

will encourage the widest possible participation of U.S. and international humanitarian organizations in those efforts.

The military’s expertise is in the security area, and that should

be their focus in Iraq. By contrast, most experience in relief and

reconstruction resides in the civilian branches of the U.S. Government, the United Nations, and humanitarian NGO’s like those testifying here today.

Also, as we have learned the hard way in Afghanistan, it is vital

that the military respect the need for humanitarian organizations

to be seen as impartial and independent and that they do nothing

to blur the distinction between military and humanitarian action.

Organizations like CARE work in many very dangerous situations.

The safety of our staff largely depend on their reputation in local

communities as unbiased providers of humanitarian assistance,

and I was reassured to hear the dialog between Congressman

Shays and Mr. Garvelink on that point reaffirming the importance

of impartiality.

In conclusion, I would say this week’s news from Baghdad is unsettling. The Saddam Hussein regime clearly is no more, but in its

place a security vacuum has developed. Clearly, the team of U.S.

officials tasked with governing Iraq in the interim is also in a state

of flux. A high degree of insecurity coupled with confusion as to

who is in control make Iraq a difficult and dangerous place for humanitarian organizations to work. We urge the President’s new

special envoy for Iraq to accord highest priority to the establishment of law and order throughout Iraq, as that is the foundation

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on which economic and political reconstruction must be built. If

that is done, we can work to ensure that the basic needs of Iraq’s

24 million people are met, and a humanitarian crisis can be avoided.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Henry.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Henry follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. We have heard four excellent statements that’s constituted over 40 minutes, but there will be questions. But it’s been

very, very helpful; and it’s been a very wonderful panel and statements.

Mr. Janklow, Governor, you are on.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Biddle, I couldn’t help, as I listened to you and read your testimony, pick up what I thought was somewhat of a difference between you and the other three panelists, especially with respect to

the—if I can call it—the primacy of getting the United Nations involved as opposed to having the United Nations involved. Do you

understand the distinction?

And I’m just wondering did I pick up something incorrectly, or

do you feel that strongly about the United Nations?

Mr. BIDDLE. No. I think it’s a question of clarity in terms of the

role. Our previous panel, Mr. Greene referenced the fact that the

U.N. agencies humanitarian and—the humanitarian arms of the

United Nations such as the World Food Program and WHO and

others are beginning to return, but I think it’s important as well

that the coalition make clear that they would welcome that in a

more specific fashion so there’s an understanding of the coordinating role in providing relief which will help to facilitate an understanding at the community level that this is a coordinated international impartial process to rebuild and both address acute needs,

as well as to rebuild the infrastructure and the society.

Mr. JANKLOW. Help me, if you would, sir, for a second. What I

don’t understand is that where you have—let’s just say that your

organizations directly deal with the people and the U.N. is not

there, and I’m not suggesting that not be the case at all, but do

they really care who gives them or provides for them textbooks,

gets the electricity turned on, gets the water functioning, gets the

garbage hauled away, brings them the security and assists them in

getting food for their families? Does it really make that big a difference to people?

Mr. BIDDLE. I think it does from the perspective of civilian interaction.

Mr. JANKLOW. Where else has that been the case around the

world, an example of that?

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, I think if you take a look at many different

crises in the world community, you’ll find that the both—two points

that I think are critical here.

One is the role—the coordinating role that the U.N. plays in

working both the local NGO’s international organizations——

Mr. JANKLOW. Excuse me, sir. I want to know if people have reacted negatively to those people that are providing them assistance

with respect to food, clothing, education, medical care and housing

when it’s provided by a government as opposed to—or not—or

NGO’s as opposed to the U.N.

Mr. BIDDLE. I think it depends on the political context in which

it occurs, and I think what we’re trying to do in supporting a clear

role for the U.N. in leading and coordinating humanitarian relief

here is that we don’t give succor or support to those parts of a

given society—it can be any group, and obviously there are a number of factual forces at work in Iraq—that could perhaps——

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Mr. JANKLOW. I’m sorry, sir. What I’m asking—I hate to interrupt, but I’m trying to be very focused. Can you cite to me anything

historically or anecdotally where it has been a problem where

NGO’s or a government have provided elsewhere in the world food,

clothing, education, health or housing and it’s been perceived as

negative by the recipients?

Mr. BIDDLE. I mean, I’d like to think about that for a minute to

come up with a specific example. I think the issue that we’re looking at, though, is the overarching——

Mr. JANKLOW. I understand the issue. I understand the issue,

sir. I’m just wondering, because I sense that there was a—maybe

what I perceived to an overreliance on the U.N. as posed—and I’m

not knocking the U.N. I think they do marvelous work. There was

a lady who was in the Somalian group that was slaughtered, the

charitable workers, the Filipino-American group that was slaughtered as missionary nurses, and so I have some appreciation for

what your various organizations do in various places around the

world.

But, again, let me ask you, if I can, Mr. Henry, how strong do

you think it has to be the United Nations, as opposed to agencies

like yours and all the others from our country and other countries—clearly we don’t have the only NGO’s in the world. There are

a lot of them.

Mr. HENRY. We see the primary role of the U.N. in playing that

coordination and facilitation role, and also very importantly, in mobilizing resources. Even with the U.N. programs, the NGO’s do

most of the heavy lifting. OK? But in our estimation, if the U.S.

Government wants to mobilize the widest possible participation of

the international community in providing peacekeepers, in providing funding for reconstruction, then the U.N. is the vehicle that

will get that broad support. So, I mean, setting aside all of the philosophical reasons from a purely practical point of view, I think

that’s the best reason to involve the United Nations.

Mr. JANKLOW. What is it—if I can ask you this, recognizing

that—it’s 3 weeks since, basically, the war has ended, and but for

a few individuals, who may have known better, I think most of us

think it really went very quickly and with an incredibly small

amount of damage to the civilian infrastructure given the enormity

of taking over a whole country that’s one of the most armed in the

whole world, you know. And I hear about, like, people being upset

that the tanks are parked next to a mosque, but they had to be terribly upset when they had Fedayeen, several hundred of them, in

Baghdad in the mosque shooting at the soldiers that were coming

through the community, and the arms that we found in the schools

can’t have made any mother feel well about sending her children

to school, given the laws that came down and what we found behind those walls in a lot of the school systems.

So I guess what I’m asking is, do you folks think we were that

unprepared for—what have your organizations been doing to get

ready for this? Is it just the government that was unprepared? Let

me ask you, Mr. Welling, what did you do during the months that

you thought we were leading up to this?

Mr. WELLING. Well, I think everyone was working in their own

way to prepare, in our own case——

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Mr. JANKLOW. When did you start?

Mr. WELLING. We started in February, and as I think I mentioned in my written testimony by——

Mr. JANKLOW. Prepositioning——

Mr. WELLING. In March, we prepositioned a substantial volume

of supplies.

I think there’s a point here to be made about the volume of planning versus the coordination and the quality of planning. I don’t

think there’s any debate about the fact that each of the organizations and each of the agencies that had a potential role in what is

now the postwar environment spending a lot of time planning.

When a division of labor becomes fragmentation, redundancy, I

think, is an important question, and so one of our observations

would be that absent the central point of control that we talked

about, that there was a lot of planning going on, that it wasn’t necessarily going on in a consistent way, and it wasn’t necessarily

being done in a way that maximized the potential contributions of

each of the organizations.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Biddle, when did your organization start planning for the fact that you may end up in Iraq providing substantial

assistance?

Mr. BIDDLE. We began preliminary discussions in headquarters

in July or August as we saw the possibility of——

Mr. JANKLOW. And you, Mr. Von Bernuth, your organization?

Mr. VON BERNUTH. We began in the early autumn, and we did

a planning workshop in Jordan in December to prepare staff

for——

Mr. JANKLOW. And you, Mr. Henry.

Mr. HENRY. Similar to Save the Children, in the fall of last year.

Mr. JANKLOW. And I realized, you know, the U.N. assisting coordination, but is there ever a point in time when all of your organizations or some of them and others sit down with each other

planning for going into it? I assume you’re all basically in sort of

the same—you at least have a lot of overlapping in terms of what

you do. Some of you are faith-based. Some of you are not, but I

think all your hearts are in about the same place when it comes

to what it is that you do. Do you ever sit down and plan with each

other over who is going to do what?

Mr. HENRY. There has been extensive coordination among our

agencies and many others.

Mr. JANKLOW. Prior—specifically with respect to Iraq.

Mr. HENRY. Yes.

Mr. BIDDLE. As a matter of fact, USAID provided a $900,000

grant to what was termed the Joint NGO Emergency Preparedness

Initiative which was set up in Arman, Jordan and included CARE,

Save the Children——

Mr. JANKLOW. When was that done, sir?

Mr. BIDDLE. I think that was initiated in the late winter. I think

it was probably March—February, March.

Mr. JANKLOW. Of this year?

Mr. BIDDLE. Yes.

Mr. JANKLOW. What I’m trying to get at is how much planning

did our government do preparing for the eventuality they may have

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to be providing substantial humanitarian assistance on the ground

in Iraq at some point?

Mr. BIDDLE. I think if I can respond to that, I think one of the

issues was a lot of the planning was classified. So it was difficult

for us to know exactly what they had in mind. I think everyone had

anticipated a larger displacement crisis, and we’re thankful that

there wasn’t one.

At the same time, there were some impediments to the kind of

planning that humanitarian NGO’s traditionally do, which are on

the ground assessments and prepositioning of supplies, as well as

building relationships with local communities, and those were hindered by the presence of U.S. sanctions, the OFAC restrictions on

our being there.

Mr. JANKLOW. Sir, I noticed in your oral testimony you talked

about the fact of cholera having appeared and the concern of that.

And you, Mr. Von Bernuth, in your testimony I believe it is, I read

what has been endemic in Iraq, in rural areas in Iraq since 1991.

So it doesn’t appear to be—it may be new in some areas, but it’s

not new on the scene.

What I’m wondering is, that with respect to the assistance that

has to be provided, what’s the biggest surprise that you folks have

encountered? I mean, I can’t believe that y’all didn’t think security

might be a problem. Are any of you shocked that security is a problem 3 weeks after the occupation of a country?

Mr. HENRY. No. The only thing that I would say surprised me

was the looting, specifically of hospitals and facilities of that nature. The more general looting wasn’t a surprise, but that it would

extend to hospitals surprised us, and that is—that definitely complicated matters.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Von Bernuth, what was your biggest surprise

for your organization?

Mr. VON BERNUTH. I think it has been the slowness to get access

to get into places, even in the southern part of the country that had

been bypassed or liberated early on in the war and then the difficulty of developing local staff. Almost all of us depend tremendously on local staff in all the countries we work in to succeed, and

with the exception of CARE, which had a previous basis in the

country, the rest of us didn’t, and therefore, that has been a surprise, how difficult it’s been.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Biddle.

Mr. BIDDLE. I think that the issues we had to face were in our

own preparations for the responding to the humanitarian needs

and that we couldn’t get access earlier, we couldn’t develop local

partnerships. And now, of course, we can’t move as freely in the

country as we’d like. So those——

Mr. JANKLOW. You and Congress, huh.

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, it’s field travel. Obviously we’d like to be able

to get into Baghdad a little more effectively. CARE has had a longstanding presence there, but our staff had trouble getting from our

northern locations down there because of security concerns.

Mr. JANKLOW. And very briefly you, Mr. Welling.

Mr. WELLING. Our biggest surprise was the extent to which for

all this planning the questions of access were not better thought

out and more transparent.

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And I would also add that with respect to the preexisting conditions that we have found when we got there, the fact that the conditions are preexisting doesn’t diminish its importance in terms of

providing humanitarian assistance.

So that would be a relatively low standard for compliance to restore things to preexisting conditions.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one quick question,

please.

Mr. SHAYS. Ask it.

Mr. JANKLOW. And I’ll be brief. In your planning up to this point,

did you ever—prior to the time the war was over, was there ever

a time when your NGO’s sat down, literally, with our military talking about how we would proceed when the war was successful, because I don’t think anybody ever doubted the outcome. So given

that fact, was there ever a planning session or coordination between you folks and the military as to how you would proceed once

the war was over?

Mr. BIDDLE. I mean, I can answer. I know there were many discussions in Washington through the interaction consortium of humanitarian agencies to meet with officials at DOD to discuss what

our views of the situation were at that time and what they might

become as a result of the war.

One of the issues I’d just like to go back to is the security situation. Our vice president for government relations here in Washington issued a paper in January and then testified before the Senate

Foreign Relations which on this issue going through the various

threats to security in Iraq as a result of a war there and the fact

that we would be in a position to be responsible under the Geneva

conventions as the occupying power for law and order of protection

of civilians. That paper Protecting Civilians From the Security Vacuum, I’d like to make available for the record. I think it would be

very interesting for you all to see, and we did share that widely

with the U.S. Government at the time when it was issued in January and also presented at the hearing in May—excuse me, in

March.

Mr. HENRY. Just on the subject of exchange of information with

the military——

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection, we’ll make that a part of the

record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. HENRY. I would just like to say that there were any number

of meetings that NGO’s participated in with representatives of the

Pentagon. On the whole, as my colleagues have said, our ability to

get information was hampered by the level of secrecy and confidentiality of the planning within the U.S. Government. Much we didn’t

find out until very late in the game, and in general with the Pentagon, their idea of information exchange was, you know, NGO’s, give

us all the information you have. Thank you. And, you know, we’ll

call you if we have anything to share with you at a later date.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m loving this panel, and I have so many questions

I’d love to ask, but I’d love to have you tell me if you agree or not

or want to elaborate or whatever with Bill Frelick’s testimony that

we put into the record, who is the humanitarian assistance—this

is from Amnesty International. He is the Director of Refugee Program. This is the paragraph. If you’ll listen to this paragraph and

tell me if you agree with it, ‘‘for security reasons, U.N. agencies

themselves were not able to establish offices in Iraq during the

first critical weeks. This created a circumstance in which the

NGO’s inside Iraq could not establish connections with U.N. agencies but only with the DART teams or ORHA, making their ties to

the occupying power stronger. (The U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Romiro Lopes da Silva, moved into Baghdad on the 5th

of May.) NGO’s will be watching closely how the Kuwait-based Humanitarian Operations Center, run by U.S. military and civilian

forces, will be affected by the establishment of the U.N. Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance inside Iraq. If there are two competing centers of humanitarian coordination with significantly different objectives and principles, each with its own resources to

bring to bear, humanitarian assistance could become paralyzed.’’

Let me just tell you how I comment, and then I want to go to

you, Mr. Welling. My sense was kind of the more the merrier, and

I am missing something here that I don’t understand about the

system? And I gather that the U.N. somehow has—over time has

become the structure in which NGO’s kind of fit in.

So Mr. Welling, do you have a comment on what I read?

Mr. WELLING. I do. I think perhaps so we have a clarification,

I certainly agree from a capacity standpoint that your observation

of the more the merrier in terms of the aggregate resources that

could be brought to bear is a desirable thing.

Clearly, it creates coordination problems, and I think one of the

issues that we’re all groping here with is the fragmentation of the

parties that had responsibility or thought that they had responsibility for a piece of the activities. And uncertainty with respect

to who had responsibility for the totality of the activities, and if it

was ORHA, it wasn’t clear that it was ORHA, and if it was the

United Nations, it wasn’t clear that it was the United Nations. And

to our way of thinking, in fact, that uncertainty persists today.

So I would say capacity maximization is an important thing pursuant to an intelligent assessment and the coordination of capacity.

So we don’t see, for example, some of the things we saw in Kosovo,

where tons and tons of medical supplies had to be destroyed because they were redundant or inappropriate.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Mr. Biddle.

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Mr. BIDDLE. Yes. I think they’re—I’ve had conversations with officials at the U.N. who were confused as to what role they should

be playing. There’s the Offices of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at the United Nations, which tends to try and coordinate both

the U.N. agencies and bring the NGO’s in in cooperation with donors, and their role has been somewhat confused at the field level,

both in terms of how NGO’s interact with them, as well as interaction with other bodies related to the U.S. Government, if it is

ORHA or others.

I have seen it in the draft resolution that was at least put forward in the press to the U.N. There was attempt to begin to clarify

the role of the U.N. in that role, and I think that’s an important

thing that needs to be pushed from the U.S. perspective to make

sure that there is an understanding of what they will be doing and

how they will interface both with the United States and the coalition efforts to reconstruct and rehabilitate——

Mr. SHAYS. And would you care to say how you think that should

be, that——

Mr. BIDDLE. We’ve been on the record, and we’ve written to

President Bush saying that they should be the lead coordinating

body in bringing both humanitarian and longer-term reconstruction.

Mr. SHAYS. Which is consistent with your testimony. Right?

Mr. Von Bernuth.

Mr. VON BERNUTH. A couple comments. One, yes, the U.N. was

late getting into the country, but on the other hand, there had been

an active dialog in Larnaca and Jordan and Kuwait between the

U.N. agencies and NGO’s, so it wasn’t that there wasn’t a lot of discussion going on.

Second, we almost always do have a problem in emergencies with

multiplicity in terms of direction. Usually, it’s a donor working

group on the one hand and a U.N. group on the other hand. But

lip service, at least, is usually given to the U.N. as taking primacy

in terms of that coordinating role.

Third, in practical terms, if you’ll look, for instance, at education,

UNICEF can play a very constructive role, for instance, in bringing

together multiple donors who will support a UNICEF-mandated

education reform package. Multiple NGO’s who regularly work

with UNICEF and government officials within Iraq who will feel

comfortable working with a U.N. agency in a way that a bilateral

donor or government is not going to be able to do.

So there really is a special role that the U.N. can play, for instance, in organizing the education sector or organizing the health

sector, that a unilateral donor will not be able to do.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Henry.

Mr. HENRY. Oh, yes. CARE has made an effort from the beginning to coordinate very actively with the United Nations, and despite their lateness in arriving and in Baghdad, we have been coordinating with them closely, primarily in Aman. If we’re critical

of anything, it was their decision to originally base their operations

in Larnaca, Cypress, which was too far from the scene when most

NGO’s were actually either in Jordan or in Kuwait.

In terms of the role of the United Nations, I think, you know,

what it comes down to at the end of the day are two things. One,

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who sets the priorities. Right? The more the merrier, yes, but at

the end of the day in something like this, there have to be priorities, someone has to set them, and, you know, you do have the potential for two competing frameworks, right now the ORHA framework and the U.N. framework, and that is potentially problematic.

And second who is, will——

Mr. SHAYS. And they differ?

Mr. HENRY. Sure. I mean, one is a U.S. Government Pentagonmanaged structure, and the other one is——

Mr. SHAYS. And those structures are different, but do their goals

differ and their objectives and so on differ?

Mr. HENRY. Well, I think both sides would probably—you know,

ask them, but I think both the Pentagon and the United Nations

would probably say that, you know, once you get beyond the very

high-level goal of rebuilding, you know, Iraq, they would disagree

on a lot of things.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you all agree with that really quickly? Mr.

Von Bernuth, you’ve said——

Mr. VON BERNUTH. I’d agree.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Biddle.

Mr. BIDDLE. I’d agree, and there are going to be micro and macro

issues. There’s the large-scale issues, and then there’s going to be

what a U.N. agency or body might see at the community level versus what another agency, bilateral or in this case U.S. Government

agency might see.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Welling.

Mr. WELLING. I don’t have anything to add.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Henry, I interrupted you.

Mr. HENRY. The final thing is what’s very important in these

kind of complex emergencies when you have so many actors is

there has to be a form and there has to be a framework within

which we all interact, and the question is going to be who is going

to provide and create that framework. So, you know, at the end of

the day NGO’s will do a lot of the work, you know, with funding

from the U.N. and from the U.S. Government and other donors, but

the existence of that framework in that form is vital for our efforts

in making sure that there aren’t major gaps on the one hand or big

overlap and duplication.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I came with a bias that maybe is so offbase, that

you need to correct me. I came with a bias that the U.N. takes so

long to make a decision, that basically you just can’t wait that long.

So I came with this decision that if the U.S. military did it, it

might be 3 years, and if the U.N. did it, it might be 7 or more. But

what I’m getting a sense from your testimony is that they go into

automatic pilot. There’s not a lot of decisions that go back to the

U.N. that take a long time to be decided. Is that correct? I don’t

want to put words in your mouth, but disavow me of my misconception here or confirm it.

Mr. WELLING. Well, I don’t think it’s necessarily a question of

timeframe. I think it’s a question of experience and expertise. I

think that the point that’s been made before about expertise and

division of labor, I think, is a valid one.

Mr. SHAYS. And the U.N. has it then?

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Mr. WELLING. The U.N. has it and the expertise, and I also think

an important point from a U.S. taxpayers standpoint and from an

aggregate capacity standpoint, it’s clear the United Nations has access to donors on a basis that no unilateral organization is going

to have. The U.S. Government will not have the same access to

donor resources that the United Nations would have on some of

these programs in education, health care and infrastructure rehabilitation.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Biddle, anything to add to what?

Mr. BIDDLE. I would echo that. I think the burden-sharing aspect

is critical because donor governments are going to participate if

they view it as an international effort as opposed to an effort by

one, two or a small group of governments and the expertise factor

is a given in that. There’s no question that the U.N. is an international body, and sometimes things will take longer in working

through it, but from the perspective also of the current situation

in Iraq, the military and the other efforts of the U.S. presence in

the field is going to need to be directed, especially at this time, to

providing a secure environment. So you’re also dealing with capacity. You want to allow others to come in and share in the relief and

rehabilitation efforts, and the U.N. is the best vehicle to ensure an

international cooperative effort.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Von Bernuth.

Mr. VON BERNUTH. The U.N. in the aggregate, certainly can be

slow and cumbersome and many times has been, but the agencies

that we’re talking about, UNHCR, World Food Program, UNICEF

have each of them a particular mandate, a particular set of interventions that they’ve worked on and a number of other crises like

this. They’ve worked in the Balkans. They’ve worked in Afghanistan, etc., and the people that they’re bringing in to work on the

ground are people that many of us have worked with in other crises, and I think they can be reasonably efficacious, as well as

bringing in a far broader spectrum of supporters.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Henry.

Mr. HENRY. I think the U.N. is imperfect, as are all institutions

created by man, but they have a role to play, and if they put some

of their best people, you know, in the field, in Iraq, they can play

a very important role.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I’m struck by the fact that—Mr. Welling, you

were the most forceful on this, about the need to designate a central authority, and you talked about turf battles and so on. And before I go to Mrs. Maloney who has joined us, can I envision a U.N.

being a major participant without the United States losing its ability to kind of take some definitive action in terms of humanitarian

efforts? In other words, will the United States have to give up as

they invite the U.N. in?

Mr. WELLING. No. I don’t see it as a zero-sum game. In other

words, I don’t think there’s any sense in which the United States

would have to compromise its interests. You made the point several

times during these hearings that with respect to goals, broad-based

objectives, the objectives of the humanitarian community and the

objectives of the American people and the British people have the

same objectives. I think this is a question now of effectiveness and

efficiency. The war has been won. There’s a set of tasks that need

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to be accomplished, and we should be about identifying the parties

who are the most competent to accomplish the tasks on the table.

Mr. SHAYS. Anybody have something to add to that before I go

to Mrs. Maloney?

Well, I’m going to want another shorter round, but Mrs.

Maloney, you have the floor. And thank you for joining us.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you very much, and I—you all represent

extraordinarily important organizations that have really responded

to world crises in the past. That I believe our government is working very strongly with the United Nations. In fact, we are funding

them. USAID has provided $1.2 million to the United Nations office for the coordination of humanitarian assistance to support several initiatives in Iraq, including the Humanitarian Information

Center. So we are working with them.

I’d like to ask each of you, to whom do you, as a nongovernmental organization involved in assistance programs in Iraq, report? Who do you report to? Do you report to the Humanitarian Information Center? Do you report to the U.S. Government, USAID

or to your board of directors?

Mr. Henry.

Mr. HENRY. Well, yes. I mean, first and foremost as a nongovernmental organization, we are accountable to our board of directors

and our mandate and mission as an organization.

Now, of course working in a context like Iraq, we’re subject to

whoever, you know, is the power that be in any given context,

ma’am.

Mrs. MALONEY. So who do you report to?

Mr. HENRY. Well, we don’t report to anyone, but, for instance, we

have accepted funding from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and one of the issues that we have worked to clarify is we’ve

said, look, in that context, we will report to the Disaster Assistance

response team, which is part of OFDA and that we do not want to

amend, will not accept reporting directly to the military.

So as regards U.S. Government funding, we are reporting to and

accountable to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which is

a part of AID and under the Department of State.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, are you reporting to the United Nations

Humanitarian Information Center to let them know what you’re

doing so that they can coordinate? Because now they are funded by

our government to help coordinate. I’m wondering have you

interacted with them?

Mr. HENRY. We are actively interacting with all of the specialized

agencies of the U.N. We’re working particularly closely with

UNICEF and the World Food Program, because our programs focus

on water supply, sanitation, food, health. So that’s the main—the

main players really in Iraq for the United Nations today are the

specialized agencies such as UNHCR, the World Food Program,

UNICEF, and they are the people we’re working with.

The coordination folks had literally just arrived in Baghdad in

the last week or two and really haven’t fully gotten up to speed.

Mrs. MALONEY. Although you have been supported by USAID in

the past, did your funding increase dramatically recently because

of Iraq to respond to this problem?

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Mr. HENRY. Not dramatically, but we have received assistance. We have received CARE, a grant of $4 million which we understand could go up to as much as $10 million for immediate relief

and reconstruction activities including in the water supply, sanitation and health sectors.

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Von Bernuth.

Mr. VON BERNUTH. We’ve received a mix of funding. We have,

right now, received funding from Norway, the British Government,

USAID through an instrument similar to the one that Mr. Henry

just described, the World Food Program and private resources.

In regard to the utilization of each of those moneys, we have a

reporting obligation to the donor. Overall, in terms of overall program, I would not say that we report to any of them. I would say

as a member of the community, we have an information-sharing responsibility, both with ORHA in Kuwait and when it gets underway, with the UNOCHA coordinating mechanism in Baghdad. But

it doesn’t constitute a report to; it constitutes a share information

with and collaborate with.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, as one who works for our children, Save

the Children—and I think they’re probably the most vulnerable.

I’ve read about children being kidnapped, being blown up by mines,

just terrible, parents not wanting their children to go to school because of the turmoil and the fact that they do not believe security

is there, and when the U.S. Government is withdrawing troops,

who do you call when you have a security problem? Who do you

call when you find out that there’s such turmoil in a certain area,

that children cannot go out in a street? Is there a phone number

you call? Do you call the military? Who do you call for security for

the children?

Mr. VON BERNUTH. That is a very good question. We have all of

us today in our testimony basically said that as the occupying

power in Iraq today, we would call on the U.S. Government to ensure that adequate police services are in place, security is in place,

so that people don’t need to worry about leaving their homes and

don’t need to worry about sending their children to schools.

Mrs. MALONEY. But there is turmoil. I have numbers I could call

in New York when there’s a security problem.

Mr. HENRY. There is no 911 in Baghdad today.

Mrs. MALONEY. There is no 911, there is no police department,

there is no place you can call and say, there’s turmoil in this particular school.

Mr. BIDDLE. And that’s one of the reasons that children aren’t

going to school and women are staying at home and allowing men

to go out and do the shopping. Especially in Baghdad, there’s a real

fear on the security level.

Mrs. MALONEY. And I support the United Nations for many,

many reasons, one of which is burden sharing, and I just came

from a hearing on Financial Services where we’re talking about the

deficit, we’re talking about the trade deficit, the growing deficit and

the economic challenges that we have in our own country, and I’d

like to know, what is your USAID commitment, and did it come—

grow up or grow because of Iraq, Mr. Von Bernuth?

Mr. VON BERNUTH. The Iraq instrument that we received represents $10 million, and it’s a short-term instrument all to be used

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within this given fiscal year. About 50 percent of our total funding

comes from the U.S. Government, mostly from AID, and that represents about $85, $90 million a year from the U.S. Government.

So this represents a tenth of it for this fiscal year.

Mrs. MALONEY. And how long do you think you’ll be in Iraq? Is

there any timetable that’s been given to you? This contract you

said was for a year, but are they saying it’s going to be a continuing contract? Do you have any sense of how long you’ll be in Iraq?

Mr. VON BERNUTH. The current U.S. contract we have is for 6

months actually, not for a year, and we’ve been offered the opportunity to bid another contract which would be for, I believe, a year,

possibly extendable to a year and a half. So the U.S. Government,

in terms of its funding, is looking at fairly short-term instruments

right now. I think we strongly believe that the commitment in

terms of work in Iraq has to be in a much more multi-year basis.

Rebuilding a society isn’t going to take place in 6 months or a year.

So we would hope that we would be able to work with the Iraqi

people for a number of years.

I gave the example earlier of Afghanistan, where we’ve been

working in Afghanistan since 1989, and we stayed through the

Taliban period. And we’re still working there. We’ve seen U.S. Government funding instruments wax and wane during that period

several times.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, we’re hoping that other citizens of the

world community will donate not only to the United Nations and

donate to Iraq, but donate to organizations such as the one that

you represent. Are foreign governments coming up and contributing to the effort, or is our country carrying the whole burden?

Mr. HENRY. Well, CARE, I can say, is receiving funding from the

Australian Government, the UK Government, the European Government, the Norwegians, the Canadians and the United States,

and we are also working with both UNICEF and the World Food

Program. So there is an international effort.

Mrs. MALONEY. What about Mr. Von Bernuth with the Save the

Children?

Mr. VON BERNUTH. I mentioned earlier that we’ve received funding support so far from Norway, from DFID, which is the British

Government equivalent of AID, from the World Food Program, and

we currently have proposals funding with Finland and Canada.

Mrs. MALONEY. That’s terrific, and I’d like to ask the same questions if I could from Mr. Biddle and Mr. Welling. What is the U.S.

commitment? Has it grown larger? How long is the commitment for

you to be in Iraq? And are other nations coming to help you? And

also going back to the Humanitarian Information Center, it seems

if we’re funding someone to somewhat coordinate information on

humanitarian efforts with the United Nations, it seems that like

all of you should be, sort of, in there sharing information so that

you—there’s a central place—you said we need a central place. Possibly this could serve as a central place to share this information.

Mr. BIDDLE. We’re actively in touch and coordinating with the

UNOCHA team on the ground, as well as with other NGO’s in locations that we operate in and with any other bodies that are working, including, obviously, local communities, which is the critical

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ing the most vulnerable populations and building in a mechanism

to sustain our work past our involvement.

We also received a cooperative agreement to respond to humanitarian needs in Iraq from the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. In our case it was

a $5 million cooperative agreement for 6 months. We have not applied for further funding at this stage. We’re going to watch to see

how the situation evolves, whether our services will be needed over

the long-term in Iraq.

There have been large, I think, requests for proposals put out by

USAID for longer-term work, which we declined to apply for at the

time. And in terms of European or international support for our

work, I just came back from a visit to some of the European capitals and some of the funding agencies in Europe, and a lot of the

questions I got were specifically wanting to know how we were

going to operate in an impartial fashion, were we being directed by

the U.S. military, and what assurances could we give to some of

our traditional donors that, in fact, we were maintaining our own

standards and our own commitment to our principles of being both

impartial and responsible to ourselves in assessing and delivering

services on a needed basis.

And I should come back to Congressman Janklow’s question specifically. I was trying to think. Nothing came into my mind at the

time of your question, but in the case of Colombia, we’ve had some

local partners in Colombia that have refused to work with us if we

had U.S. Government funding, not because they were opposed necessarily to U.S. policy or the money itself, but because it actually

endangered their operations. They could be seen as a potential target from a particular group, be it a paramilitary force or one of the

guerilla forces for whatever view that funding may—how it may be

perceived at the local level.

So it’s a question of perception sometimes as much as anything,

and one of the reasons I raised the U.N. to begin with is the perceptions in some communities in Iraq that they may not want to

work with the United States because it’s directing the assistance

with a particular goal in mind that may be not necessarily accurate, but unfortunately can add to confusion as to what the objectives of an assistance program are.

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, all of you represent in many ways truly

international organizations. My time is up and the chairman is

going to continue, but I did want to let you know, Mr. Biddle, that

we had a fundraiser for your organization yesterday in the district

that I represent. So I hope that will be helpful—more helpful in

your efforts, and I congratulate all of you, and we’re all praying for

you.

Mr. SHAYS. You’ve got a nice district.

Governor Janklow.

Mr. JANKLOW. Thank you very much. If I could, I just really have

a couple of questions. Y’all heard the testimony of General Garner,

his kind of speech. Which one of his 11 points were—and I realize

maybe you didn’t write them all out, but to the extent you can recall, did any of them trigger your head? I guess they’re up on the

board there. Like, geez—is he too optimistic, and if so, with respect

to which ones?

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Go ahead, Mr. Henry.

Mr. HENRY. Well, I think reestablishing town councils and provincial governments that are seen to have genuine legitimacy in

the eyes of their communities in that kind of timeframe would be

very difficult. You could put in place very temporary kind of structures, but I think we need to recognize that those kind of political

processes will take much more time than something like purchasing the crop or getting the refineries moving so that you can buy

gasoline in Baghdad.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Von Bernuth.

Mr. VON BERNUTH. I noted that on three points from his list,

that I thought were probably not as feasible as some of the others,

of which installed town councils was one. The second one was the

training of the police, getting a police force actually to be credible

and operational by June 15, I think it was. And the third, deeply

related to the second, was establishing security.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Biddle.

Mr. BIDDLE. I would echo what Rudy had to say, that security

issue is going to be the most challenging. If we look at Afghanistan,

the bombing ended there in December 2001 and it’s still a very unsecure environment. These are very different countries obviously,

different stages of development, but the fact is, postconflict settings

are extremely difficult to sometimes assess where the threats

may—where they may come from and what the circumstances may

be. And the issue of policing and creating basic judicial procedures

and law and order throughout the country is going to be very difficult. And to have that in hand within the next 45 days would

seem to me to be a very great task.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Welling.

Mr. WELLING. Yes. To be fair to General Garner, I’m not sure

whether he meant these to be in priority order, but if he did, we

would probably have all different opinions of——

Mr. JANKLOW. I’m just wondering which ones you think aren’t

feasible to get done.

Mr. WELLING. I don’t have anything to add to what my colleagues have said about feasibility. I would say our perspective, we

were surprised that a higher priority and more discussion wasn’t

given to dealing with the emergency health care needs of the already fragile or endangered populations, cholera being a subset of

all that, but there’s clearly a much wider range of things that require immediate assistance from a health care standpoint.

Mr. JANKLOW. Look, if I could to all of you at the risk of being

accused of being insensitive, which, you know, I don’t think I am,

but who knows, I think everybody understands the concern of a

great number of Americans with respect to some of the people on

the continent who historically have been somewhat givers, at least

to their old colonies and old areas. And I’m not into France bashing, but given their conduct prior to the war, given the way they

treated our Secretary of State, basically sandbagging him, giving

the documentation that’s been found and the business relationships

between the last government of Iraq, which I assume people like

as little as our Armed Forces over there, I think all of your organizations can understand the concern about a lot of taxpayers in this

country about contributing money into a pool where that country

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may have—and some others may have any voice at all with respect

to what’s going on, at least in the short-term in Iraq. Am I making

sense?

Mr. WELLING. Yes. I guess I’d like to say—and I didn’t get to answer Mrs. Maloney’s question——

Mr. JANKLOW. And I don’t want you to answer in such a way as

to jeopardize your people.

Mr. WELLING. No. I understand. We don’t take any money from

the U.S. Government, so we’re certainly sensitive to our donor’s attitudes with respect to political questions.

I think two observations. I think one is most Americans—and I

think this is the strength of the American people—have the ability

to disassociate political things from humanitarian things, and the

response that we got in the wake of Iraq, both from individual donors and from corporate donors suggests to us that they have the

ability to make that differentiation.

I certainly understand the emotional dynamic that you’re describing, that people would like some company in this boat, they

would like some people to be contributing and they wouldn’t be

very happy about relieving some of these other countries’ obligations of bearing their fair share. I think that’s perfectly reasonable.

But I do think that the American people have the ability to differentiate between those two things.

Mr. JANKLOW. Any of the rest of you?

Mr. HENRY. Well, I would just say that I think the U.S. Government, you know, can choose. We can have a smaller pool of money

that we completely control, or we can have a bigger pot of money

into which, you know, as many governments as possible will be

contributing.

And, you know, that is in part the debate that will play out in

the U.N. Security Council in the next week or two, and I think, you

know, our perspective is, you know—you have to create an international framework that everyone can buy into if you want them

to also be putting their money, you know, into that structure.

So it just comes down to that simple calculus.

Mr. JANKLOW. I’m not sure their money is not important at this

point in time.

Mr. HENRY. That is a decision we have to make.

Mr. JANKLOW. Right, that is a value judgment we have to make,

but you would understand given the fact that none of you work for

a government, you’re all independent, you’re true to your own

ideals of each of your respective organizations, you can understand

the concern of taxpayers of this country vis-a-vis contributing to

your organizations to the extent you may or may not be dealing

with others that some consider to be at least in the short term if

not the long term people who tried to get some of our soldiers killed

and tried to make the endeavors that our country embarked on unsuccessful.

Any of you disagree with that?

Mr. HENRY. How dare we?

Mr. JANKLOW. No, no. You——

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, I think we wouldn’t want to put it in that

purely bilateral context. I think what we’re looking at is the multilateral framework that the U.N. provides and using that as the

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mechanism to move forward burden-sharing and cooperation and

building that extra layer of legitimacy so that others build into the

process in a way that hopefully will make it that much more successful which is in the U.S.’s interest. That I think is the bottom

line.

Mr. JANKLOW. If you can help me—Mr. Biddle, maybe you can

help me with something else. I think you feel pretty strongly that

you need to be separated from our government, our military. I accept that.

Mr. WELLING. Those are not the same things.

Mr. JANKLOW. I’m sorry. I mean the military side of our government in Iraq. I apologize. That’s what I meant to say, one.

And two, that you’ve been very forceful in terms of your testimony that our military should be in a security role, because anything else they basically do, they’re not going to be trusted or they

run the risk of not being trusted of substantial numbers of people

in Iraq. Yet at this point in time, at least from the television stuff

that we’re able to see at times, there’s a huge amount of support

when the military has been able to work with civilians to get the

electricity turned on, watching the military give water to people

when it’s given out, watching the British troops distributing food.

I haven’t—sure I see the animosity and I see they’re able to bring

large crowds. It’s in a particular area where no one has been

friendly to us anyhow, so I don’t think that surprises too many people, but my point is that is it that’s unique about aid-giving now

that’s different about what we’ve been able to see over the last several weeks in terms of the enthusiasm for the public for the nonmilitary functions that military people are doing?

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, I think the bottom line is—if I can get to the

perception aspect of this, there is obviously a fear as to what the

long-term intentions of the U.S. Government may be among some

sector of the population.

Mr. JANKLOW. But isn’t that true as long as we have people with

uniform there, no matter what their function and role is, whether—

if they’re not giving out food, they’re not helping with medical care,

they’re not restoring services but they’re patrolling the streets helping guard the citizenry, I would think that the public would be far

more concerned about that than the——

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, I think that’s right, and I think that’s where

the conformity aspect comes into play where on an expertise level,

obviously civilians with expertise in providing humanitarian assistance are best suited to do to play that rule and the military is best

suited to provide security so that those actors can go about doing

their job.

And, in fact, I’ve seen on television certain members of the military saying, you know, let’s go back to our primary mission which

is to fight wars and provide a secure environment, so I think there

is an understanding. As conflicts and as you get into a secure

enough environment for civilian agencies or private contractors or

companies that are obviously going to be going into Iraq, there is

a role for the military in that transitional phase and obviously

they’re doing an outstanding job at that—those tasks at that time.

But I think as you go further down the line, you want to actually

have specialization in——

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Mr. JANKLOW. I agree. I don’t think we have a huge level of disagreement on that.

Mr. WELLING. I think I may have a slightly different view about

this in the following respects. I don’t think anyone is saying—we’re

not saying that it’s outside the scope of the American government’s

resources to accomplish this objective. I think what we’re saying is

that there are important policy issues that arise in the context of

assigning responsibility to in that each organization is going to feel

deferently about and depending on how you come down on those

issues, you may have diminished expert capacity. But what we’re

saying is from the perspective of the American people, what’s the

most efficient way to accomplish these objectives and what’s going

to be the smart way for the U.S. Government to do it from a

longer-term policy standpoint. If we were so convinced that we

could do this effectively and we were prepared to take the accountability and be judged based on the results, that’s clearly our prerogative. I think the question is being raised whether that’s both

the smart thing to do and the cost-efficient thing to do.

Mr. BIDDLE. There’s of the aspect to this which was raised to

your question Congressman Shays about getting to know each

other and there are force protection guidelines that the military

has to adhere to. And unless those are changed, it’s difficult for the

military to go out and do some of the things it needs to do at the

local community to be able to interface, get to know what’s going

on and to do their job, especially obviously they’re armed and they

have a different role traditionally in the eyes of a civilian population. And for that reason, it seems appropriate, as my colleague

has just said, to allow those different actors to play their separate

roles.

Mr. HENRY. If I could just say a couple things, first of all, CARE

believes that if the military are the only actors in a position to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to people, they should do

it, and we congratulate them for doing that where they have done

it in Iraq. So it isn’t, you know, just a turf kind of thing. We’re not

saying the military should never do that. Saving lives is the most

important thing, and if the military are the only people who can

do it, then they should absolutely do it.

You know, on this sort of burden-sharing issue, the way I look

at it as a taxpayer myself is we the American taxpayers can either

pick up the whole tab for what is going to be a very expensive banquet in Iraq in the coming years, or we can go Dutch with the rest

of the international community. And I would rather go Dutch. And

the way to do that is to bring everyone in to a framework that

makes them feel a sense of—a part ownership of that process.

Mr. JANKLOW. I’d just far rather go Dutch than French.

Mr. SHAYS. Mrs. Maloney has a few questions. I’ll have a few. We

will get you out of here. Your problem, gentlemen, is that you’re

too interesting and too informative. That is the problem.

Mrs. MALONEY. I have constituents and organizations calling me

that want to contribute and want to be part of this effort to help

Iraq.

During 9–11, we had a command central that would pool—you

could go to with your resources and they would tell you where to

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rect constituents and organizations that are calling me saying they

want to be part of this great effort to help Iraq? Where do they go?

Where do we direct them?

Mr. BIDDLE. I would say to each of these organizations, Web

sites—you can get online. You can find out how to volunteer.

There’s a wealth of information available.

Mrs. MALONEY. But I think they want to be plugged in, I think

into the whole U.S. effort and not particularly an organization, an

who’s coordinating it? USAID? Would you direct them to USAID?

I don’t know.

Anyway——

Mr. HENRY. Most of our organizations are—not all our members

have interaction, which is the biggest umbrella of international

agencies and they have a list of all the member agencies doing

work in Iraq, and you can get to their Web site and from their Web

site to ours.

Mrs. MALONEY. That’s helpful.

One of the most troubling things that you’ve said to me is that

there is nowhere to call for security, and if you don’t have security,

you don’t really have a society, because society cannot function if

people are afraid to walk out of their homes to buy food or go to

school. And we have to restore security before we can really provide

adequate health care or aid to our children or food or whatever. So

what is your idea of how we should do that? Should we—we have

to—what is your idea of how—should we bring in an international

force? Should it be the U.S. military? Should it be a funded Iraqi

group? How do we make this happen?

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, that—under the Geneva conventions, that’s

the responsibility of the occupying power to find out and determine

the best ways to do that. There are obviously—there are various

options that might be available to them, internationalizing the

peacekeeping efforts to increase the number of forces on the ground

or bring in more coalition forces. International constabulary force

to support police training and expand the level of security across

the country, changing the force protection guidelines of the coalition forces to be able to do more creative things on a security measure. We’re not experts on this. These are just ideas and things that

we’ve seen in other settings around the world, but the bottom line

is that it is the responsibility of the occupying power to develop approaches to meet this need, and I do think it permeates all the aspects that we’ve described of our work in the field.

Particularly there was a report in the New York Times today

that one of the issues in addressing cholera right now is the fact

that the health system is so affected by the security environment,

that hospitals are underequipped, staff are scared to go into the

hospitals, that they’ve had to send the cholera tests up to Kuwait

to have them checked.

So it’s not just a question of the sewage and the electricity and

the mechanized aspects of addressing this in an urban environment. It’s also the fact that you can’t even address the specific

health intervention for a given case because of the environment in

the country right now. And granted, there have been challenges in

the case of cholera in the country over the last 12 years, but usually the health system was trying to identify cases and respond to

145

it quickly. So preventing a cholera outbreak is going to be that

much more difficult because of that.

Mrs. MALONEY. In conclusion, I’m concerned very much about the

economic burden to America. We have many problems here at

home in our own schools and our own health care delivery system,

and I agree with Mr. Henry that we should go Dutch, that we

should get as much help as we can. And one obvious place is the

frozen Iraqi assets. I believe $1.7 billion in our own country, and

there are probably assets from the Saddam Hussein Government in

many countries around the world. And one approach would be to

freeze that money and return it to the Iraqi people in terms of hospitals, teachers, schools, sanitation and clean water systems. And

I wondered what your comments would be on that.

Mr. HENRY. Well, by all means what we have to remember is

that Iraq not only has some assets that can be seized, they have

massive debts, and that is probably the biggest financial problem

that’s going to have to be sorted out in the years to come, is how

can we pay for the reconstruction of Iraq while, you know, also allowing Iraq to overcome its huge debt burden.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. Any other comments on freezing

Iraqi assets in foreign countries?

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just finish up here real quick. I’m not asking

for you to comment if you don’t have a particular reaction, but I

want you to react to anything General Garner said or Mr. Greene

or Mr. Garvelink said. You’ve sat here all day long since 2 p.m.,

plus, and was there anything that General Garner said that you

want to put on the record either reacting positively or negatively

to what Mr. Greene or Mr. Garvelink said, any of you? Yes.

Mr. VON BERNUTH. Just for starters, I was a little bit surprised

when General Garner said there was no humanitarian crisis in

Iraq, and he then went on to describe the conditions that he had

just observed in Basra of sewage flowing through the streets, hospitals that weren’t functioning very well, etc. I think there was a

preexisting humanitarian crisis in Iraq before the war happened,

and I think that crisis in some areas has only been exacerbated as

the health systems, etc. have been looted and savaged and what

have you.

So I would take issue with that statement.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Any other comment that any of them said that

you would like to speak about?

Mr. HENRY. Well, as I’ve already noted, I think Mr. Garvelink’s

suggestion that things aren’t so bad in the health care system, I

just don’t accept as being an accurate statement of the current situation in Iraq.

Mr. BIDDLE. And I would just say that General Garner’s timeline

might be a bit optimistic on the number and variety of issues need

to be addressed during that short a period.

Mr. WELLING. I’m just going to add that I think that the point

that you made earlier is, if you have someone in your office who

you want to be responsible for something so you can go to one place

and give credit if it succeeds or one place to understand why it

doesn’t if it didn’t, was manifest in some of the discussion that we

had here today with people being responsible for different parts of

the puzzle and not necessarily being able to address questions, that

146

if you had someone who had primary responsibility as the central

point of control here, some of the questions that were presented

would have been answered.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t want this last question to take 5 minutes to

answer, but I would like someone to define success and then tell

me if we are going to succeed. Mr. Biddle, your mouth started to

move first.

Mr. BIDDLE. I mean, I’ll take it in the short-term. I think one of

the reasons all of us have focused on the security issue is we’re

worried about losing the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.

They’ve lived under 12—or 25 years of a brutal dictatorship. They

suffered through a number of wars, repression of minorities and

dissident. They’ve had a very challenging time, and the opportunity

now to create a better society obviously through the removal of

Saddam Hussein means that you need to touch people at their very

core existence, which means being able to help them achieve some

of their particular needs in the near-term.

So health care, education for children, a secure environment to

live in and obviously the transition to a governing process at the

local and provincial and national level.

But in the near-term, I think that really means the law and

order, secure environment and then beginning to address these

critical services, health, water, education and, of course, the food

issue could become a challenging one in the near-term as well, and

making sure that the Oil for Food Program distribution process is

successful in meeting the needs of the population in the near-term.

I would say that’s going to determine the success over the next 6

months or so.

So security on the one hand and basic human needs as you move

to a larger reconstruction, transitional governance, larger issues

that will obviously take some time. But I think those two aspects—

and they go hand in hand together.

Mr. SHAYS. Anybody else want to make a comment? Yes?

Mr. VON BERNUTH. I go back to your observations of your visit

to Iraq not very long ago and what it meant to see it as opposed

to read about it, and I think for me success is going to be when

I visit Iraq and see kids going to school in the morning, see women

being able to go out to market, see people milling about the streets

in a casual way in the evenings, see storefronts opening up and be

able to travel from town to town without going in a convoy. That’s

going to be success.

Mr. SHAYS. I saw you, Mr. Biddle, nod your head as well.

Mr. BIDDLE. It was more eloquently put in terms of the image

he created. So I laud him for that.

Mr. SHAYS. But you started it. And so you gave him time to

think.

Mr. Welling.

Mr. WELLING. It’s a very important thing, to have time to think,

yes. I think that success will be defined both for the Iraqi people

in terms of quality of life which is better than the quality of life

that they had prior to the war, so that not only do we need to meet

the standard of what existed there before, but obviously our aspiration is to do something substantially better than that, and I personally think there’s no question that we’ll succeed, because I think

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that the—I think the American people have been engaged in this

and understand that not only is it a great opportunity, but it’s part

of our obligation in undertaking this in the first instance.

Mr. SHAYS. Should we end on that positive note? You all have

been a wonderful panel. Mr. Henry, you wanted to say something.

Mr. HENRY. No. I just wanted to say that we will know that

we’ve achieved success when the majority of the Iraqi people say

that their lives are better than they were before, not just before the

war but before this long nightmare that they’ve been living

through.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. And do you think we are going to succeed?

Mr. HENRY. I think we can succeed if we’re prepared to commit

the resources and stay the course.

Mr. SHAYS. And based on what you’ve said we have done in Afghanistan, that would not be a positive model for us.

Mr. HENRY. We think more would need to be done.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I think all of you are a credit to your organization, and I think very highly of each of your organizations, in part

by the presentation that you all have made today, and I thank you

very much for participating in this very—I think very educational

and helpful hearing. Thank you so much. And with that, the record

will remain open for 2 weeks to provide information about documents, and with that we will adjourn this hearing. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 6:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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