NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2522- 21 PAUL ROIK, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. ANITA ROIK, Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________

Argued November 27, 2023

– Decided January 18, 2024 Before Judges Sabatino, Mawla, and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FM- 13

- 0156

- 21. Edward Peter Fradkin argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Edward Fradkin, LLC, attorneys; Edward Peter Fradkin, of counsel and on the briefs)

. Coulter Richardson argued the cause for respondent (Richardson & Richardson, LLC, attorneys; Coulter Richardson, of counsel and on the briefs ). The opinion of the court was delivered by MAWLA, J.A.D. APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION January 18, 2024 APPELLATE DIVISIONA- 2522

- 21 2 As a general proposition, when a spouse dies pendi ng a divorce, the divorce proceeding abates, and with it the statutor y right to equitable distribution attendant to a divorce. Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 342-43 (1990). The exception to this rule is where "unusual or exce ptional" circumstances exist that permit a party to invoke equitable remedies to effect a distribution of marital property notwithstanding the other party's death. Id. at 343, 349-50. Recently, our Legislature amended our intestacy laws and the equitable distribution statute
to remedy this issue and close the proverbial "black hole" of Carr. We hold the amended statutes , namely, N.J.S.A. 3B:5-3(d), N.J.S.A.
3B:8- 1, and N.J.S.A. 2A:34

- 23 .1(h)(2) apply retroactively. Independent of the new statutes, we hold where, as here, parties have entered a matrimonial settlement agreement (MSA) and one of the parties h as died pending an uncontested divorce hearing, the Family Part may enfo rce the MSA as long as it is entered at arm's length, and it is fair and equi table to effectuate the parties' mutual intent to divide their assets and liabilitie s. For these reasons, we reverse and remand the trial court's April 11, 2022 order f or further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Plaintiff Paul Roik and defendant Anita Roik were married for forty-six years when plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on August 3, 2020. TheA- 2522

- 21 3 complaint attached a certification of insurance cov erage indicating there was a life insurance policy, but plaintiff did not own it

. The parties had three children; two sons and a daugh ter, all of whom were adults and emancipated. During the marriage, plain tiff was employed as an executive until he became disabled and retired; def endant was employed as a librarian and later retired. In 2013, plaintiff ex ecuted a will leaving his estate to the children and naming the eldest son executor. In November 2020, plaintiff filed a Case Informatio n Statement (CIS), which listed a life insurance policy, but stated he did not own it. In January 2021, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim an d subsequently filed her CIS in April 2021. Through counsel, the parties ne gotiated an MSA, which plaintiff and defendant signed on November 24 and N ovember 27, 2021, respectively. Their attorneys signed the document as witnesses to their clients' signatures. Notably, the MSA contained a provision stating the agreement became effective "upon the date that the last party execut es this [a]greement . . . ." There was also a provision that acknowledged the parties' right to a trial and waived the right given the settlement. The parties acknow ledged they were "fully and adequately informed of the financial structure of t he marriage including their incomes, assets, liabilities and expenses" and waiv ed their right to completeA- 2522

- 21 4 formal discovery. They also waived their rights of inheritance. The MSA stated the parties read the agreement before signing it an d entered it "voluntarily, without threat, force, coercion or duress . . . ." They further acknowledged the agreement was "fair and equitable . . . under all o f the circumstances." The MSA required defendant to pay plaintiff open du rational alimony totaling $7,500 per year. The agreement acknowledg ed neither party could afford to maintain the marital standard of living. The MSA divided the marital assets equally, save fo r defendant's pension, which she kept and would use in part to pay alimony . The parties agreed plaintiff would purchase defendant's interest in th e former marital residence for $380,000 and assume the expenses associated with th e residence. They divided the bank and retirement accounts subject to equitab le distribution equally. This meant defendant owed plaintiff approximately $9,409 from the bank accounts and $119,892 from the non-pension retirement assets . Defendant retained her inherited bank and retirement accounts. The parties agreed the MSA would be incorporated in to a judgment of divorce. The MSA also contained the following lang uage: "In any event, whether the [c]ourt allows this [a]greement to be i ncorporated into said [j]udgment, this [a]greement and all of its terms a nd provisions shall survive the judgment and shall be valid and enforceable forever ." The agreement also notedA- 2522

- 21 5 it was binding upon the parties' estates, heirs, executor s, administrators, assigns and legal representatives. On November 29, 2021, defendant's counsel emailed the court seeking an uncontested divorce hearing date in January 2022. The court scheduled an uncontested hearing for January 11, 2022. Beginnin g December 16, 2021, an email discussion ensued between the parties, the el dest son, and the daughter, regarding the uncontested divorce hearing. The dau ghter urged defendant to opt into a divorce "on the papers" rather than pay two attorneys to attend a virtual uncontested hearing on Zoom. She stated it did not "make sense to wait until [the Zoom hearing date] . . . if you both want thin gs finalized sooner. It's not right that neither of you were given the option to handle it through a faster and cheaper route than . . . [Z]oom." Defendant respon ded she had no information about the hearing and asked: "Wasn't that arranged two months ago?" On December 23, 2021, defendant sent plaintiff the following email: "My la wyer says it is more expensive to do paperwork rath er than Zoom." That afternoon she emailed the following message: "My l awyer says it would take an hour and a [half] to [two] hours to prepare. Zo om would take only [half an] hour." On December 25, 2021, plaintiff signed a certifica tion in support of a judgment of divorce on the papers. He died on Dece mber 29, 2021.A- 2522

- 21 6 On January 19, 2022, the eldest son, as executor of plaintiff's estate, moved: to substitute the estate as the real party in interest; enforce the MSA; for a constructive trust; or alternatively to inter vene in the divorce litigation; and for other relief not pertinent to this appeal. Def endant opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for other relief, including to dismiss the divorce. Defendant certified she knew about plaintiff's will when he executed it in 2013. She knew plaintiff "was in ill health for [a ] variety of reasons for a very long time" but denied purposely delaying the divorc e until plaintiff died. Instead, she claimed the children were orchestratin g the divorce to reap the benefits of plaintiff's estate as his beneficiaries . Enforcing the MSA's provisions would "impoverish her for the remainder of her reti rement" and leave her without a residence. Notably, defendant certified as follows: "The desi re to get divorced in a hearing, as opposed to the papers, had nothing to d o with delaying the process. The associate I worked with over the summer, and wi th whom I was very fond, wanted to be able to voir dire me during the uncont ested hearing." Defendant also certified she knew plaintiff "had a life insurance policy with American General

– United States Life Insurance Company, on which he was making payments, the death benefit of which was $750,000." She claimed she "recently learned that perhaps as early as 2011 " plaintiff transferredA- 2522

- 21 7 ownership of the policy to the eldest son and chang ed the beneficiary designation from defendant to someone else. "At so me point after that, . . . [defendant] became aware that [the] son . . . bough t out or pre-paid the remainder of the payments on that life insurance policy." De fendant's certification attached a March 29, 2011 letter from the insurance carrier enclosing change of beneficiary and change of owner forms. The letter contained a handwritten notation stating: "$40,000 prepaid by son[.] $750 ,000 policy." Defendant certified the transfer of the policy's owner was "b orne out on [plaintiff's] CIS[;] it lists a life insurance policy on his life, with the notation '[p]laintiff does not own [a] life insurance policy.'" The eldest son's reply certification noted defendan t conceded she knew plaintiff no longer owned the life insurance policy because it was disclosed on the CIS. The policy was disclosed and "was never o utside the realm of discovery [because plaintiff] provided a statement to [d]efen dant's attorney through his attorney during the divorce." The son took over th e policy at plaintiff's request because plaintiff could no longer afford the premiu ms. Following oral argument, the trial court issued a detailed written opinion denying the motion and granting the cross-motion. After surveying the extant case law, the judge concluded there were no

unusual or exceptional circumstances to abatement o f the divorce proceeding . . . present[ed] in this ma tterA- 2522

- 21 8 [because defendant] did not intentionally cause [plaintiff's] death. There was no adjudication of facts during the lifetime of the parties[,] justifying en try of the final judgment of divorce. There was no court ordered disposition of any property prior to [plaintiff's ] death. Nor was there any pendente lite agreement t o sell or divide marital assets. The judge concluded he could not enforce the MSA b ecause there was no way of discerning, by voir dire, the parties' mutua l intent, and whether they knowingly and voluntarily entered their agreement. The judge cited Administrative Office of the Courts Directive #18-2 0, which promulgated the form "Certification in Support of Judgment of Divor ce" required for a divorce on the papers. However, he found "[e]ven if the pa rties proceeded with a divorce on the papers, which they didn't, such a procedure does not relieve the court of its obligations to find the parties knowingly and v oluntarily entered the MSA." The judge concluded he could not grant the motion b ecause

while the MSA reflects electronic signatures of the parties witnessed by their respective attorneys, at no time prior to [plaintiff's] death did the court mak e findings as required pursuant to Rule 1:7 -4 to establish that the parties knowingly and voluntarily entered the MSA without coercion or duress, a precondition to enforcement of the MSA. . . . Further, the MSA was never made part of a [f]inal [j]udgment of [d]ivorc e, either through an [u]ncontested [d]issolution [h]ea ring or divorce on the papers, and hence, the MSA is not enforceable as a court order.A- 2522

- 21 9 The estate was not entitled to a constructive trust because there was no evidence of wrongdoing by defendant showing she wou ld be unjustly enriched. She owned the marital residence with plaintiff as t enants by the entirety and would receive the residence by operation of law. A nd the estate's claim defendant delayed the divorce proceedings lacked me rit.
II. On appeal, the estate argues the judge erred becau se the existence of a signed MSA demonstrated unusual and exceptional cir cumstances warranting substitution of the estate as the real party in interest in the divorce proceeding. The court should have enforced the MSA to avoid a w indfall to defendant. Also, the parties and their attorneys indicated their des ire to proceed to an uncontested hearing, and multiple provisions of the MSA prove the partie s contemplated the agreement was final and irrevocable, even in the ev ent of death. The estate urges us to remand to a different judge. Following the initial brief ing and before oral argument, A

. 2351 /S

. 2991 (2022) were introduced proposing to amend our intes tacy and equitable distribution statutes to close the black hole by pe rmitting the court to make an equitable distribution where a party died pending a divorce proceeding. We requested counsel address the relevancy of the prop osed legislation at oral argument and whether the legislation could be retro actively applied by courts ifA- 2522

- 21 10 it became law. Following oral argument, the legisl ation passed the Assembly and Senate by unanimous vote, and we directed couns el to file supplemental briefs on the retroactivity issue. Governor Murphy signed the new legislation into law on January 8, 2 024 , which we will discuss in greater detail below.
III. Although we typically defer to a trial judge's factfinding when "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence," Cesar e v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
411 -12 (1998), we do "not accord the same deference to a . . . judge's legal determinations." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 5 46, 565 (App. Div. 2017). "[T]he trial judge's legal conclusions, and the app lication of those conclusions to the facts, are subject to our plenary review. . . . Our review of a trial court's legal conclusions is always de novo." Reese v. Wei s, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013) (internal citation omitted).
IV. We, like the trial judge, have canvassed our case l aw and are unable to find circumstances like those presented here. Inde ed, in Olen v. Olen, the trial court tried a divorce matter to conclusion but ente red a judgment of divorce only memorializing the court's decision on the cause of action. 124 N.J. Super. 373,
374 -75 (App. Div. 1973). Subsequently, one of the par ties died, and the surviving spouse argued an amended judgment of divo rce bearing the trialA- 2522

- 21 11 court's rulings regarding the parties' assets could not be entered. Id. at 376. We held the amended judgment could be entered, nunc pr o tunc, as of the date of the trial court's ruling because it had adjudicated the facts during the parties' lifetimes. Id. at 377. In Witt v. Witt, a court e nforced the parties' pendente lite agreement to sell the marital home where one party subsequently went missing. 165 N.J. Super. 463, 464-66 (Ch. Div. 1979). Olen and Witt are clearly inapposite. The former c ase involved an adjudication of facts whereby only the ministerial act of entering the judgment memorializing the disposition of the issues remaine d. The latter case did not involve the death of a spouse and turned more so on the court's equitable authority to preserve the marital estate pendente l ite, a power of the Family Part, without question, poss esses. Randazzo v. Randazzo, 184 N.J. 101, 113 (20 05). Carr stands for the proposition that the court can exercise its equitable powers where a party dies during a divorce and can neither receive equitable distribution because the divorce has abated nor a s pousal elective share from the deceased spouse's estate because a divorce was init iated. 120 N.J. at 345-46. There, following a protracted pendente lite litigat ion and discovery, the supporting spouse failed to appear for trial and wa s subsequently hospitalized. Id. at 340. During his hospitalization, he disinhe rited the supported spouse, leaving his entire estate to his children and subse quently died. Id. at 340-41.A- 2522

- 21 12 Our Supreme Court held the trial court correctly fo und the supported spouse was
not entitled to equitable distribution because there w ere no "circumstances that ma[d]e [the] surviving spouse's claim unusual or ex ceptional" to overcome "the general rule[ that] equitable distribution is condi tioned on the termination of marriage by divorce." Id. at 343. The statutory s pousal elective share was likewise unavailable to the supported spouse, pursu ant to N.J.S.A. 3B:8-1, because of the divorce filing and the parties' sepa ration. Id. at 344. However, the Court concluded, notwithstanding the lack of st atutory right to the marital assets, the equitable remedy of a constructive trus t may be invoked to prevent an unjust enrichment or fraud. Id. at 351. In Kay, we applied the holding i n Carr and overturned the trial court's denial of a constructive trust on behalf of the decea sed spouse's estate. 405 N.J. Super. 278, 280-81 (App. Div. 2009). There, the su rviving spouse, and her daughter (not decedent's daughter) charged expenses to the decedent's credit card prior to his death, titled family assets in her name and the daughter's name, and following decedent's death attempted to withdra w escrowed funds from the sale of the former marital residence. Id. at 281-8 2. We concluded the fact the estate sought the constructive trust rather than th e surviving spouse, did not bar the estate's ability to assert equitable claims aga inst the marital estate because "[t]he equities that warrant an equitable remedy ar ise from 'facts which call forA- 2522

- 21 13 relief from the strict legal effects of given situations.'" Id. at 284 (quoting Carr , 120 at 351). "A blanket prohibition against equitable claims press ed by the estate would have the inherent potential to disserv e public policy by encouraging spouses contemplating divorce to deal unfairly with one another." Id. at 285. In Kay, the public policy issue was the prevention of the dissipation of marital assets by the surviving spouse; a statutory conside ration in equitable distribution, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A :34 -23.1(i). Ibid. Like the trial judge here, we discern no basis to i nvoke the equitable remedy of a constructive trust because the facts do not support a finding defendant engaged in untoward conduct of the sort i n Carr and Kay. That, however, does not end the inquiry. Indeed, the dut y of spouses to deal fairly with one another is a general obligation not limited to insta nces where an unjust enrichment is alleged. Fattore v. Fattore, 458 N.J . Super. 75, 88 (App. Div. 2019). There are other public policy considerations at pla y here because the parties had a signed MSA. "An agreement that resol ves a matrimonial dispute is no less a contract than an agreement to resolve a business dispute." Quinn v. Quinn , 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) (citing Sachau v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5 (2011)). Public policy favors the enforcement of such agreem ents "as the parties intended." Id. at 47. However, the court must fin d the parties knowingly andA- 2522

- 21 14 voluntarily entered into the provisions of the agreement for it to be enforceable. Id. at 39. "Family Part judges possess a broad sup ervisory role in determining the fairness of agreements between spouses." Fatto re, 458 N.J. Super. at 87. With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts a nd evidence presented to the trial judge. At the outset, we note althoug h the judge cited extensively from Directive #18-20, including the fact that it " change[d the] procedure [for an uncontested divorce,] such that only the filing party must complete and submit the [c]ertification when requesting a dissol ution judgment without a personal appearance" he overlooked the fact that pl aintiff had filed such a certification in support of judgment. The certific ation contained sufficient information for the judge to evaluate whether plain tiff had entered the MSA voluntarily. Although there was no evidentiary obj ection asserted to the court's ability to consider the certification, if there was , it would be admissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) (the hearsay exception for trust worthy statements by deceased declarants). Even without the certification, the MSA expressed t he parties' mutual intent and belief the MSA was fair and equitable, a nd they wished to be bound by it. The record is devoid of evidence to the con trary or any evidence defendant considered the agreement to be unfair. Defendant's r easons for wanting a Zoom divorce proceeding were based on her understanding it would be more costA- 2522

- 21 15 effective than filing documents for a divorce on th e papers. Her decision was also borne seemingly of a desire to give the associ ate representing her some courtroom experience. In other words, defendant di d not plan on objecting to either the entry of a judgment or the MSA. Furthermore, defendant knew about the life insuranc e policy, and nonetheless settled the case. And the MSA's equita ble distribution provisions were otherwise unremarkable and worked to defendant 's advantage as she no longer had an alimony obligation once plaintiff die d. Her assertion she would be without the home was also unpersuasive because s he agreed plaintiff could buy out her interest. The overwhelming evidence showed a final judgment w ould have been entered, but for the scheduling delay of the divorc e hearing. The equities, therefore, did not support discarding the MSA and d ismissing the matter. For these reasons, we reverse and remand the matter to the trial judge and direct him to grant the estate's request to substit ute as the real party in interest and enter a judgment incorporating the MSA. In doing so, we do not undermine the potential value of the solemnity of an uncontes ted divorce proceeding when it is desired by the parties, or Directive #18 -20's requirements for a divorce on the papers. Our rul ing is based on the discrete circumstances of this fact p attern

. V.A- 2522

- 21 16 At oral argument and in its supplemental brief, the estate argued we must apply the new ly passed statutes retroactively. Defendant's submis sions assert the new law took effect on the day the Governor signed it and is pr ospective and therefore inapplicable here

. We examine the text of the new statutes. The Legislature created N.J.S.A. 3B:5-3(d), which s tates: "Surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or dom estic partner" shall not include : an individual who has filed a complaint not dismissed pursuant to [Rule] 4:6-2

. . . or against whom a complaint not dismissed pursuant to [Rule] 4:6 -2 . . . has been filed for: divorce, dissolution of civil union, termination of domestic partnership , or divorce from bed and board. [(Emphasis added).] The Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 3B:8-1 governing t he spousal elective share to read as follows:

If a married person, partner in a civil union, or p erson in a domestic partnership dies domiciled in this St ate the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of the augmented estate under the limitations and conditions hereinafter st ated, unless either the decedent or the surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or domestic partner had f iled a complaint not dismissed pursuant to [Rule] 4:6-2 .

. . for divorce, dissolution of civil union, terminatio n of domestic partnership or divorce from bed and board. [(Emphasis added).]A- 2522

- 21 17 And the Legislature amended the equitable distribut ion statute to read as follows: If a complaint not dismissed pursuant to [Rule] 4:6

-

2 . . . has been filed for [divorce, dissolution of civil union, or divorce from bed and board] and either pa rty to the litigation dies prior to the entry of the fi nal judgment, the court's authority to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property shall not ab ate. [N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h)(2) (emphasis added) .] Furthermore, the Legislature created N.J.S.A. 2A:34 -23(h)(3), which reads as follows: "The court may not make an award concerni ng the equitable distribution of property on behalf of a party barre d from inheriting under [N.J.S.A. 3B:8-1]." As we noted, the Legislature made the new laws effe ctive immediately. The legislative statement accompanying the new law, in part, states: This bill provides that if a complaint has been fil ed for divorce, dissolution of a civil union, or divorce f rom bed and board, and either party to the litigation d ies prior to the entry of the final judgment, the court has authority to effectuate an equitable distribution o f the property. In addition, the bill expands the laws o f intestate succession and elective share to include partners in a civil union and also provides that a surviving spouse, partner in a civil union, or dome stic partner who has filed a complaint or against a comp laint has been filed for divorce, dissolution of civil un ion, termination of domestic partnership, or divorce fro m bed and board, would not receive an intestate share of the decedent's estate and has no right of election to take an elective share of the estate. This bill is inte nded toA- 2522

- 21 18 eliminate what has been known as the "black hole" that exists when a surviving spouse is excluded from receiving his/her share of equitable distribution w hen a spouse dies prior to a final judgment of divorce be ing issued and the surviving spouse is therefore left w itho ut a remedy. [Sponsors' Statement to A. 2351 (February 7, 2022). ] As a general proposition "the law favors prospectiv e, rather than retroactive, application of new legislation unless a recognized exception applies." Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 444 N.J. Super. 57 6, 587 (App. Div. 2016). "Courts must apply a two-part test to determine whe ther a statute should be applied retroactively: (1) whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application; and [if so] (2) whether re troactive application 'will result in either an unconstitutional interference with ves ted rights or a manifest inj ustice.'" Id. at 587 (quoting James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 563 (2014)). The presumption against retroactivity "can be overc ome by an indication of contrary legislative intent, either e xpressed in the language of the statute itself, or implied in its purpose." State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 103 (1988). If we determine that retroactive legislative intent exists, we must "apply the statute in effect at the time of [our] decision . . . to effectuate the current policy declared by the legislative body." Ibid. (quoting Kruvant v. Mayor & Council of Twp. of Cedar Grove, 82 N.J. 435, 440 (1980)).A- 2522

- 21 19 The exceptions to the general rule of prospective a pplication are where: (1) when the Legislature intended retroactive appli cation of the statute either

ex pressly, as "stated in the language of the statute or in the pertinent legislative history," or implicitly, required retroactive appli cation to "make the statute workable or to give it the most sensible interpreta tion"; (2) when the statute is "ameliorative or curative"; or (3) when the "expect ations of the parties may warrant retroactive application . . . ." Gibbons v. Gibbons , 86 N.J. 515, 522-23 (1981). "Under the second exception to the general rule, th e term 'ameliorative' refers only to criminal laws that effect a reduction in a criminal penalty." Street v. Universal Mar., 300 N.J. Super. 578, 582 (App. D iv. 1997) (quoting Kendall v. Snedeker, 219 N.J. Super. 283, 286 (App. Div. 19 87)). There is also pipeline retroactivity whereby a new rule of law applies retroactively to a certain type of case. "In the c ivil context, pipeline retroactivity of a new rule of law contemplates that three classe s of litigants will be beneficiaries: those in all future cases, those in matters that are still pending, and the particular successful litigant in the decid ed case." N.H. v. H.H., 418 N.J. Super. 262, 285 (App. Div. 2011). The degree of retroactivity "depends largely on the court's view of what is just and consonant with public policy in the partic ular situation presented." Primmer v. Harrison, 472 N.J. Super. 173, 189 (App. Div. 2022) (quotingA- 2522

- 21 20 Beltran v. DeLima , 379 N.J. Super. 169, 174 (App. Div. 2005)). Releva nt considerations include "(1) 'justifiable reliance b y the parties and the community as a whole on prior decisions,' (2) whether the pur pose of the new rule will be advanced by retroactive application, and (3) any ad verse effect retrospectivity may have on the administration of justice." Ibid. Pursuant to these principles and our reading of the plain language of the new laws and the legislative statement, we conclude the new statutory provisions should apply retroactively to pending cases that we re not dismissed prior to the effective date of the new statutes. The revised statutes and the statement ostensibly create pipeline retroactivity because th e new law applies to pending complaints, which have not been dismissed under Rul e 4:6 -2(e) for failure to state a claim. As we highlighted above, the revise d statutes speak in the past tense and apply to cases where a party "had" filed a complaint or where a complaint "has been" or "had been" filed. The revised statutes are clearly curative, which al so supports their retroactive application to cases in the pipeline. The legislative statement expressly says the new laws were designed to close the Carr black hole.
A pplying the new laws to cases in the pipeline advances the purpose of the law

an d does not frustrate the administration, but instea d provide trial courts grappling with this issue a means to resolve cases in accordance with the law.A- 2522

- 21 21 VI. Finally, we decline to assign the matter to a diffe rent judge. The trial judge made no credibility findings and, although we have concluded he misapprehended the court's equitable powers, his op inion reflects a conscientious effort to apply the law to the facts presented. In short, we are unconvinced the judge was so committed to his findi ngs to warrant his disqualification on remand. Div. of Youth & Fam. S ervs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 617 -18 (1986). Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdict ion.