COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bray 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

TYRONE JERROD PETTIFORD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2770-97-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 NOVEMBER 24, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Susan D. Hansen, Deputy Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 On April 16, 1997, Tyrone Jerrod Pettiford (defendant) was 

convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to five 

years imprisonment, all suspended subject to supervised probation 

with attendant terms and conditions. Upon the Commonwealth's 

motion, the trial court subsequently ordered defendant "to show 

cause why the suspended sentence . . . should not be revoked" as 

a result of alleged violations of probation, including 

defendant's failure to "obey all . . . laws and ordinances." At 

a related hearing, the court found that defendant had violated 

"conditions of . . . supervision," and revoked a portion of the 

suspended sentence. Defendant appeals, complaining that the 

court acted without proper evidence to support the order. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Finding no error, we affirm the order. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to 

disposition of the appeal. 

 During the show cause hearing, the attorney for the 

Commonwealth represented to the court that defendant had been 

"convicted of trespassing, obstruction of justice, assault and 

battery, and . . . [had] absconded from probation," since the 

imposition of the suspended sentence. In response, defendant's 

counsel conceded that defendant had been convicted of trespass 

and assault and battery and explained that the offenses arose 

from disputes related to visitation with his son. Counsel 

acknowledged that, "once [defendant] had those convictions, . . . 

he wasn't seeing [his] probation officer . . . [for fear] of 

being violated." 

 It is well established that "probation revocation hearings 

are not a stage of criminal prosecution and therefore . . . 

'formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed' 

. . . . [T]he process of revocation hearings 'should be flexible 

enough to consider evidence . . . that would not be admissible in 

an adversary criminal trial.'" Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 

App. 81, 84, 402 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1991) (citations omitted). 

"[W]hether to revoke the suspension of a sentence lies within the 

sound discretion of the trial court." Singleton v. Commonwealth, 

11 Va. App. 575, 580, 400 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1991); see Code 
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§ 19.2-306. "However, the trial judge may only revoke the 

suspension of a sentence for reasonable cause." Preston v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 731, 733, 419 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1992) 

(citation omitted). 

 Here, the Commonwealth, without objection, advised the court 

of those misdemeanor convictions which had prompted the instant 

revocation proceedings. Immediately thereafter, defense counsel 

admitted to the alleged trespass and assault and battery offenses 

and explained the underlying circumstances to mitigate the 

misconduct. Thus, violations of law contrary to express 

conditions of probation were uncontroverted and clearly before 

the court. Manifestly, "[a] [c]onviction for a misdemeanor that 

occurred during the probationary period, . . . is reasonable 

cause to revoke . . . a suspended sentence." Hess v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 738, 741, 441 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1994). 

 Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court and affirm the disputed order. 

 Affirmed.