NORTH KOREA

COUNTRY HANDBOOK

MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

3300 RUSSELL ROAD, SUITE 250

QUANTICO, VA 22134-5011

(703) 784-6126

DSN: 278-6126

MAY 1997

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

U N ITE D STATES O F A M E R I C A

D

EPARTMENT OF DEFENS

E

MCIA-2630-NK-016-97
This product is published under the auspices of the

Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program

(DoDIPP). This handbook has been produced as a joint

effort of many organizations within the U.S. Department of

Defense, with the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

designated as the Executive Agent for the Country

Handbook Program. This product reflects the coordinated

Defense Intelligence Production Community position.

WARNING

Although unclassified, the use of this publication is

restricted to official military and U.S. government personnel. Further dissemination of the information contained

in this document, to include excerpts and graphics, is strictly

prohibited. Local reproduction is authorized.
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Country Handbook—North Korea

1. This handbook provides essential information on North Korea. It is intended 

to provide Marines and other U.S. military personnel with a base of information 

for conducting effective operations on the Korean Peninsula. By making this 

handbook unclassified and in a cargo-pocket size format, the handbook will 

fulfill the need for a “field” ready-reference publication. Local reproduction is 

authorized.

2. This product is in response to PR#J582-97-0002. The Information cutoff 

date for this handbook is 30 April 1997. 

3. This handbook is one of several scheduled for publication by the Marine 

Corps Intelligence Activity. 

4. All questions and comments on this document may be directed to the:

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MCIA 10

3300 Russell Road, Suite 250 

Quantico, VA 22134-5011
iii

Contents

List of Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

SECTION 1 — KOREAN PENINSULA 

 GENERAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

North Korea—Political and Economic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Inland Waterways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Pipelines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Airports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

DPRK Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Cultural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Korean Peninsula Geographic Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Borders and Neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

East Asia—Korean Peninsula Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Lowlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Major Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Yellow Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Effects of Terrain on Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Contents (Continued)

iv

Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Spring Pattern (April-May) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Summer Pattern (June September) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Fall Pattern (October-November) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Winter Pattern (December-March) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Effects of Climate on Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Vegetation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Effects of Vegetation on Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Surface Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

SECTION 2 — MILITARY FORCES OF THE DPRK . . . . . . 33

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

National Military Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

The North Korean Army (NKA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

The North Korean Navy (NKN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Nuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Biological. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Chemical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Special Operations Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

National Military Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Military Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Military Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Contents (Continued)

v

Operational Level of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Operational Level Offense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Exploitation Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Avenues of Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

The Second Front. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Operational Level Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

NKA Tactics in the Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

NKA Tactical Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

NKA Tactical Formations in the Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

NKA March Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

NKA Attack Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

NKA Tactical Frontages and Depths in the Offense . . . . . . . . . 62

NKA Tactical Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Meeting Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Movement to Contact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Deliberate Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Bypass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Night Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Armor Support to Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Artillery Support to Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Air Defense Support to Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Engineer Support to Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Support 

to Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Amphibious Support to Offensive Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

NKA Tactics in the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Defensive Frontages and Depths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Positional Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Mobile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Retrograde Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Contents (Continued)

vi

Counterattack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Escape From Encirclement (Breakout) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Night Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Armor Support to Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Artillery Support to Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Engineer Support to Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Air Defense Support to Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

North Korean Antilanding Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Special Operations Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

SECTION 3 — RANK INSIGNIA AND UNIFORMS . . . . . . . 107

SECTION 4 — ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS . . . . . . . . . . . 117

SECTION 5 — MEDICAL ASSESSMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Key Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Disease Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Diseases Contracted From Insects or Animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Diseases Contracted From Other People/Poor Hygiene . . . . . . 149

Environmental Health Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Water Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Living and Sanitary Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Pollution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

Climate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Hazardous Animals and Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Ways to Protect Yourself Against Disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Contents (Continued)

vii

APPENDICES

A. Equipment Recognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. International Time Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

C. Conversion Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

D. Korean Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

E. Individual Protective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

F. First Aid/Hot and Cold Weather Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

G. International Telephone Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

National Flag of the Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

National Flag of the DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Kim Chong-il and the Late Kim Il-song. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

South Korean Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

North Korean Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Eastern Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

North Korean Topography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Climate Data

Pusan, South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Seoul, South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Taejon, South Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Hyesan, North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Pyongyang, North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Wonsan, North Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Yangdok, North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Land Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Corps Level Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

NKA Force Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Avenues of Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Contents (Continued)

viii

Division and Regimental Depths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Basic March Formations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Infantry Regiment in March Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Mechanized Brigade March Column . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Average March Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

NKA Infantry Platoon Attack Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

NKA Infantry Company Attack Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

NKA Tank Company Attack Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

NKA Infantry Battalion Attack Formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Regiment in the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

NKA Mechanized Brigade in the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

NKA Division in the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

North Korean Army Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

North Korean Army Maneuvers (Continued). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Artillery Groups—Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Fire Support During the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Division Defense Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

NKA Battalion Defense Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

NKA Mechanized Brigade in the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Mobile Defense of the Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Regimental Positional Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Regimental Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Supporting Fire in Regimental Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

North Korean Tunnel Operations Under DMZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Tunnel Constructed by the North Under DMZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

ROK Enlisted Rank Insignia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

North Korean Enlisted Rank Insignia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

North Korean Officer Rank Insignia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

North Korean Army Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

North Korean Navy Officer Rank Insignia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

North Korean Navy Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

North Korean Air Force Officer Rank Insignia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Contents (Continued)

ix

North Korean Air Force Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

North Korean Branch Insignias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Organizational Charts

Unit Symbol Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

North Korean Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Infantry Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Mechanized Infantry Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Armor Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Artillery Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Infantry Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Infantry Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Infantry Battalion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Infantry Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Infantry Platoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Field Hospital. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Chemical Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Signal Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Corps Antitank Guided Missile Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Corps Antitank Guided Missile Company. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

AAA Battalion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

SAM (SA-5) Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

SAM (SA-3) Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

SAM (SA-2) Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

River-Crossing Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Technical Engineer Battalion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Engineer Construction Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Strategic Level SCUD B Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Strategic Level FROG Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Corps MRL Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Corps MRL Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Strategic Level Heavy Artillery Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Corps Artillery Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Contents (Continued)

x

Division 122/152mm Towed Artillery Regiment. . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Artillery Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Regimental Mortar Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Tank Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Basic Tank Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Basic Tank Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Light Tank Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Reconnaissance Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Reconnaissance Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Seaborne Sniper Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Light Infantry Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Light Infantry Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Mechanized Infantry Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Mechanized Infantry Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Equipment

BRDM-2 Armored Amphibious Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

BMP-1 (KORSHUN) Infantry Fighting Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . A-2

BTR-60PA/PB Armored Personnel Carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-3

BTR-152 Armored Personnel Carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-4

BTR-40 Command and Reconnaissance Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . A-5

MT-LB Armored Tracked Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-6

Model 531A Armored Personnel Carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-7

VTT-323 (M-1973) Armored Personnel Carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . A-8

Type 85 ATGM Carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-9

BTR-50 Armored Personnel Carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-10

PT-76 Amphibious Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-12

Type-62 Light Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-13

Type-63 Light Amphibious Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14

T34/85 Medium Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-16

T-54 Medium Tank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-17

T-55 Medium Tank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-18

Type-50 Medium Tank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-19
Contents (Continued)

xi

T-62 (CH’ONMA-HO) Medium Tank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-20

SU-100 Assault Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-21

M-1943 (ZIS-2) Antitank Gun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-22

M-1942 (ZIS-3) Antitank Gun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-23

D-44 Antitank Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-24

D-48 Antitank Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-25

M-1944 (BS-3) Antitank Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-25

ATGM System Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-26

AT-1/SNAPPER ATGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-27

AT-3/SAGGER ATGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-28

AT-4/SPIGOT ATGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-29

AT-5/SPANDREL ATGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-30

RPG-7 Antitank Grenade Launcher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-31

RPG-2 Antitank Grenade Launcher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-32

B-10 RCL Antitank Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-33

B-11 RCL Antitank Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-34

M-30 (M-1938) Towed Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-36

A-19 (M-1937) Towed Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-37

M-46 Towed Gun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-38

D-20 Towed Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-39

M-1977 Self-Propelled Gun/Howitzer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-40

M-1978 (KOKSAN) Self-Propelled Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-41

12 Round 107mm Multiple Rocket Launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-42

BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launcher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-43

BM-11 Multiple Rocket Launcher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-44

BMD-20 Multiple Rocket Launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-45

240mm Rocket Launcher M-1985/M-1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-46

FROG-7 Artillery System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-47

SCUD-B (SS-1C) Guided Ballistic Missile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-48

M-38/46 DSHK Heavy Machinegun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-49

ZGU-1 (Mountain Pack) Heavy AA Machinegun. . . . . . . . . . . A-50

ZPU-2 Heavy AA Machinegun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-51
Contents (Continued)

xii

ZPU-4 Heavy AA Machinegun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-52

M-1939 Automatic Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-55

Type-65 AA Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-56

Type-74 Automatic Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-57

S-60 Automatic AA Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-59

Twin 57mm Self-Propelled Automatic AA Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . A-60

KS-12 AA Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-62

KS-19 AA Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-63

SA-2 SAM System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-64

SA-3 GOA SAM System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-65

SA-5 GAMMON SAM System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-66

SA-7B SAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-67

SA-14 SAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-68

SA-16 SAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-69

STINGER SAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-70

CSA-3A SAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-71

PGLM SAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-71

Type 64 7.62mm Pistol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-72

TOKAREV TT-33 7.62mm Pistol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-73

MAKAROV 9mm Pistol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-74

AK-47 Assault Rifle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-75

AK-74 Assault Rifle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-75

GP-25 Grenade Launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-76

Type-68 (AKM) Assault Rifle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-77

Type-56 Semiautomatic Carbine (SKS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-78

PPSH 1943 Submachine Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-79

PPSM 1943 Submachine Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-80

DRAGUNOV Sniper Rifle (SVD). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-81

M1891/30 Sniper Rifle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-81

RPK-74 Light Machinegun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-82

RPK Light Machinegun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-83

RPD Light Machinegun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-84
Contents (Continued)

xiii

RP-46 Light Machinegun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-85

SMG Machinegun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-86

DSHK 38/46 Heavy Machinegun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-87

ROKS-3 Flamethrower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-88

AGS-17 Automatic Grenade Launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-89

120mm M-1943 Mortar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-91

F-1 Fragmentation Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-93

RG-42 Fragmentation Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-94

RGD-5 Fragmentation Hand Grenade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-95

Unknown Fragmentation Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-96

Unknown Fragmentation Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-97

RDG-1 Smoke Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-98

RDG-2 Smoke Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-99

Type-S Smoke Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-100

Lacrimatory Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-101

RPG-43 Antitank Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-102

RKG-3 Antitank Hand Grenade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-103

ATM-72 Antitank Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-104

TMD-B Antitank Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-105

TMD-44 Antitank Mine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-106

TM-46 and TMN-46 Antitank Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-107

TM-41 Antitank Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-108

POMZ-2 Antipersonnel Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-109

PMD-6 Antipersonnel Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-110

OZM-3 Antipersonnel Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-111

BTM High Speed Ditching Machine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-113

BAT-M Dozer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-114

MDK-2 Trench Digging Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-115

GSP Amphibious Ferry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-116

BLG-60 Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-117

MTU-20 Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-118

MT-55 Tank-Launched Bridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-119
Contents (Continued)

xiv

K-61 Tracked Amphibious Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-120

Self Reliance 68 NA (KAENSAENG) Utility Truck . . . . . . . A-122

UAZ-469 Utility Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-123

Victory 58 (SUNGNI) Utility Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-124

Fight 66 (TUJAENG) Cargo Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-125

ZIL-157 General-Purpose Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-126

Isuzu TWD35 Cargo Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-127

Isuzu HTW11 Cargo Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-128

Nissan TZA52PP 30-ton Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-129

ZIL-131 General-Purpose Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-130

KRAZ-260 General-Purpose Truck. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-131

Independence (CXHAJU) 11-ton Dump Truck. . . . . . . . . . . . A-132

Independence 82 (CHAJU 82) 10-ton Dump Truck . . . . . . . . A-133

ARS-12U Truck-Mounted Decontamination Apparatus . . . . . A-135

Model RDP-4V Backpack Decontamination Apparatus . . . . . A-136

Model DP-62 Lightweight Survey Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-137

Model DP-1a/b Area Survey Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-138

PKHR Chemical Agent Detection and ID Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-139

Mi-2 HOPLITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-140

Mi-4 HOUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-141

Mi-8 HIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-142

Mi-17 HIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-143

Hughes 500 D/E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-144

F-5 (MiG-17) FRESCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-145

F-6 (MiG-19) FARMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-146

MiG 21 FISHBED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-147

MiG-23 FLOGGER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-148

MiG-29 FULCRUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-149

Su-7B FITTER A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-150

Su-25 FROGFOOT A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-151

IL-28 BEAGLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-152

Y-5 (AN-2 COLT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-153
Contents (Continued)

xv

AN-24 COKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-154

IL-18 COOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-155

BACK NET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-156

BAR LOCK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-157

FAN SONG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-158

FLAT FACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-159

KNIFE REST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-160

LOW BLOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-161

SIDE NET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-162

SPOON REST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-163

SQUAT EYE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-164

TALL KING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-165

NAJIN FFL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-167

CHONGJIN PB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-168

P-6 PB/PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-169

SHANTOU PB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-170

CHAHO PB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-171

CHODO PC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-172

CHONGJU PC/PT/PTG/WPC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-173

HAINAN PC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-174

K-48 PC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-175

S.O. 1 PC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-176

SHANGHAI II PC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-177

TAECHONG I/II PC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-178

SARIWON PG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-179

T CLASS PG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-180

P-4 PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-181

SHERSHEN PT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-182

SINHUNG PT/PTH/WPB/WPBH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-183

SINNAM PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-184

KOMAR PTG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-185

OSA I PTG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-186
Contents (Continued)

xvi

SOHUNG PTG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-187

SOJU PTG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-188

NAMPO LCP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-189

YUKTO I/II MSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-191

HANCHON LCU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-192

ROMEO SS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-193

WHISKEY SS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-194

ALCM Shallow Water Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-196

PDM-1M Shallow Water Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-197

PDM-2 Shallow Water Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-198

CSS-N-1 SRUBBRUSH Antiship Cruise Missile . . . . . . . . . . A-199

CSSC-2 SILKWORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-200

CSSC-3 SEERSUCKER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-201

International Time Zones Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

Daily Water Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-10

Windchill Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-13
1

SECTION 1

KOREAN PENINSULA GENERAL INFORMATION

National Flag of the Republic of Korea

National Flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
2

North Korea—Political and Economic Overview

The long form name of North Korea is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK is a Communist state led by a Stalinist

type dictatorship, with its capital city as Pyongyang. 

Administrative divisions include nine provinces (do, singular and plural); Chagang-do, Hamgyong-namdo, Hamg-yong-pukto, Hwanghaenamdo, Hwanghae-pukto, Kangwon-do, Pyongan-pukto, Pyongannamdo, Yanggang-do; and three special cities (jikhalsi, singular and plural); Kaesong-si, Nampo-si, and Pyongyang-si.

In August 1945, the Japanese in Korea surrendered to the former Soviet

Union, which gained control of the Korean peninsula south to the 38th

parallel. In August 1948, supposedly following general elections

throughout the peninsula, the DPRK was established, with Kim Il-song

heading the central government. These factitious elections are the basis

for Pyongyang's claim as the only legitimate government of Korea, and

Pyongyang has made a national goal of reunifying the country on its

terms. In pressing this claim, the DPRK has engaged in a political, economic, and military competition with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

However, in any comparison except military power, Pyongyang is a

poor second.

On Saturday, 24 June 1950, DPRK forces invaded the ROK. The United

States, acting with a mandate from the UN, took the lead in defending the

ROK. The Chinese entered into the fighting, and the war's inconclusive

end led to a return to the status quo at the 38th parallel. An armistice,

signed in July 1953, was followed 2 months later by the signing of a

mutual defense treaty between the United States and the ROK.

The country is currently being led by Kim Chong-il who succeeded his

father upon the latter's death on 8 July 1994. The elder Kim was a ruthless, charismatic leader who retained tremendous loyalty from the people, despite their hardships. Kim Chong-il has been described as

paranoid, spoiled, and suspicious, not having his father's abilities, and
3

his access to the government bureaucracy is through a clique. The country is facing insurmountable internal problems and is unstable politically, economically, and socially.

Other political setbacks have further isolated the DPRK and include the

1990 formal recognition of the ROK by the former Soviet Union, and the

1991 entrance of both Koreas to the UN. The DPRK lost one of its major

supporters with the demise of the Soviet Union. Moreover, although the

People's Republic of China (PRC) remains the only credible supporter of

the DPRK, economic and political rapprochement between the PRC and

the ROK continues. The DPRK will continue to be both economically

and socially repressed and will become increasingly isolated. The DPRK

Kim Chong-il (Left) and the Late Kim Il-song
4

will likely cling to its outmoded style of communism and political

change will not occur until the current leaders are gone.

Negative economic growth, chronic shortages of raw materials (especially oil), ineffective centralized economic planning, and an emphasis

on military power have contributed to the economic failure of North

Korea. The requirement by Russia and the PRC that materials exported

to the DPRK be paid for with cash has further degraded North Korea's

economic viability. The DPRK can no longer generate sufficient electrical power to meet industrial needs, social services have been severely

degraded, and segments of society have been reduced to one meal a day.

There are chronic shortages of many of the basic commodities required

for subsistence and industrial production. Critical resources continue to

be dedicated to the military with increasing detriment to the economy.

There will be no relief from the severe shortages, which could foster

growing dissatisfaction among the intelligentsia, workers, students, and

bureaucrats. The DPRK's management of its economy provides no freedom of action for producers, real incentives for individuals to excel, or a

government responsive to scientific and technological progress. If the

DPRK keeps its emphasis on its military and does not reform its economic system, the country could eventually be in grave danger of

imploding. The DPRK is, and will likely remain, one of the most dangerous countries in the world.

Transportation

Railroads

North Korea: 4,915 km (3,055 mi) total; 4,250 km (2,641 mi) 1.435 m

(4.7 ft) standard gauge, 665 km (413 mi) 0.762 m (2.54 ft) narrow

gauge; 159 km (99 mi) double track; 3,397 km (2,111 mi) electrified;

government owned (1995).

South Korea: 3,149 km (1,957 mi) total operating in 1995; 3,129 km

(1,944 mi) 1.435 m (4.7 ft) standard gauge, 20 km (12 mi) 0.61 m (2.0 ft)
5

narrow gauge; 847 km (526 mi) double track; 525 km (326 mi) electrified;

government owned.

Highways

North Korea: Approximately 30,000 km (18,645 mi) 1995; 85 percent

crushed stone, or earth surface; 15 percent paved.

South Korea: Approximately 63,171 km (39,253 mi) 1995; 46,500 km

(28,894 mi) paved of which 1,521 km (945 mi) are expressways and

12,190 km (7,575 mi) national highway; 49,460 km (30,740 mi) provincial and local roads.

Inland Waterways

North Korea: 2,253 km (1,400 mi); mostly navigable by small craft

only.

South Korea: 1,609 km (1,000 mi); use restricted to small craft.

Pipelines

North Korea: Crude oil 37 km (23 mi).

South Korea: Crude oil 455 km (283 mi).

Ports

North Korea: Chongjin, Haeju, Hamhung, Nampo, Wonsan, Songnim,

Najin, Sonbong (formerly Unggi), and Kim Chaek.

South Korea: Pusan, Inchon, Kunsan, Mokpo, Ulsan, Chinae and Pohang.

Airports

North Korea: 51 total, 51 usable (est); about 24 with permanent surface

runways. 

South Korea: 105 total, 97 usable; 60 with permanent surface runways. 
6

South Korea

Major Roads

Secondary Roads

Main Railroads

Secondary Railroads

Major Ports

Major Airfields

SEOUL

JAPAN

NORTH

KOREA

Yellow

Sea

CHEJU DO

Korea Strait

Demarcation

Line

Sea

of

Japan

PYONGYANG

TSUSHIMA

KAIKYO

Sariwon

Haeju Kaesong

Kosong

Chunchon Kangnung

Wonju

Chungju

Sangju

Chongju

Taejon

Andong

Taegu

Pohang

Pusan Masan Chinju

Sunchon

Mokpo

Kwangju

Kunsan Chonju

Anhung

Inchon

Ulsan

Kansong

Cheju Do

South Korean Transportation System
7

DPRK Transportation

Road and rail networks follow a general north-south axis, with limited

east-west routes, especially in northern areas. Rugged mountainous terrain restricts or channels supply movement to a few routes. Shortages of

Inchon

SEOUL

PYONGYANG

Haeju Kaesong

Wonsan

Hamhung

Hungnam

Sinuiju

Kilchu

Chongjin

Najin

CHINA

SOUTH

KOREA

Demarcation

Line

RUSSIA

Sea

of

Japan

Korea

Bay

Yellow

Sea

Ongjin

Changyon

Chaeryong Sariwon

Samdung

Ichon Pyonggang

Kumhwa Chorwon

Kosong

Sokcho

Kangnung

Yonghung

Kosan

Unsan

Anju

Chongju

Sakchu

Tongju-ri

Huichon

Chosan

Kanggy

Manpo

Hyesan

Kapsan

Changjin

Pungsan

Hongwon

Pukchong

Kimchaek

Tanchon

Musan

Hoeryong

Onsong

Kanghwa

Nampo

Sonbong

Songnim

North Korea

Major Roads

Secondary Roads

Railroads

Major Ports

Major Airfields

North Korean Transportation System
8

heavy rolling stock, scarcity of heavy rail lines, and lack of centralized

traffic control hamper the rail system. Poor surfaces and maintenance and

an insufficient number of roads constrain the highway system.

About 75 percent of the DPRK's 4,915-km railroads are electric. A

major priority is to electrify all primary rail lines, which would nearly

double the rail capacity without additional track. However, electric railroads could become a liability during wartime if key transformers or

hydroelectric power plants were rendered nonfunctional. The DPRK

produces both diesel and electric locomotives. Diesel locomotives operate mostly in yards. Most steam locomotives, acquired from various

sources shortly after World War II, still operate. The DPRK also manufactures several types of railcars, including 60- and 100-metric ton

freight cars. However, rolling stock shortages are frequent.

The DPRK's economic plans include upgrading and expanding several

primary maritime ports. Construction of the Nampo Lockgate stabilized Taedong River water levels, allowing Nampo Port expansion and

facility development farther up the river. Songnim Port is an example

of this process.

Some of the DPRK's rivers are navigable by small craft and are used as

an auxiliary means of transportation to ease the strain on the railroads

and highways. The Taedong, in the west central region, serves as a

major artery for commerce.

The DPRK's civil airlift remains limited. In addition to Sunan International Airfield, the Civil Air Administration operates a few domestic terminals throughout the country. Personnel and equipment assigned to

civilian flights do not have a direct military function, but could offer

limited support during wartime.

Cultural Overview 

The people of the DPRK (a population of over 22,000,000) are mostly

ethnic Korean, speak the Korean language, and use the Korean phonetic

alphabet. The Koreans take pride in both their antiquity and in the conti-
9

nuity of their society, which dates back to pre-Christian times. They

descended from migratory groups that entered the region from Siberia,

Manchuria, and inner Asia several thousand years ago. The society is a

clearly defined ethnic, cultural, and linguistic unit distinct from the neighboring populations of the Asian mainland and Japan. The North Korean

society is a mixture of ancient, indigenous traditions with a system of

totalitarian ideology imposed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War

II. This ethnic solidarity has deep geographic, historical, and political

roots. Until the imposition of communism, the people lived for centuries

in an exceptionally homogeneous society and culture. With the partition

of the peninsula, sharp political and economic differences developed, with

some cultural variations, between both North and South Korea.

Traditionally, Koreans have never conceived of society as merely an

aggregate of individuals, each pursuing private ends, but as a harmonious and collective whole; more important than the individuals composing it. This emphasis on harmony has justified the DPRK government's

paternalistic intervention in the lives of the people. In the DPRK today,

the dominant ideology is Marxist-Leninist, strongly influenced by traditional Confucian values and Kim Il-song's chuche (self-reliance) ideology. By Western standards, life in the DPRK is regimented and grim.

The centralized party state maintains tight control over all aspects of

daily life, and citizens must dedicate their lives to state-defined goals

rather than personal interests. Proper attitudes and correct human relations are stressed. It would be a mistake to assume that North Koreans

see their lives as harsh and colorless, since the majority have spent their

entire life under a totalitarian regime. The average person is unaware of

conditions abroad, and is subject to a constant barrage of propaganda

extolling the virtues of Kim Chong-il's rule and the heroic myth of Kim

Il-song's past. In addition, this propaganda campaign harshly denounces

the United States and the ROK. 

Korean is a Uralic language, remotely related to Japanese, Mongolian,

Hungarian, and Finnish. Although there are dialects, the Korean spoken

throughout the peninsula is comprehensible to nearly all the populace.
10

Chinese characters were used before the invention of the Korean Hangul

alphabet in the 15th century. A number of specialized terms have been

introduced in the north, especially in written usage. 

Korea's traditional religions are Buddhism, Shamanism, and Chongbogyo. Christian missionaries arrived in the 19th century and founded

schools, hospitals, and other modern institutions throughout Korea.

Major centers of missionary activity included Seoul and Pyongyang.

Although religious groups nominally exist in the DPRK, most available evidence suggests that the government severely restricts religious activity, allowing these groups to exist only for the sake of its

international image.

Korean Peninsula Geographic Position

The Korean Peninsula protrudes southward from the Asian mainland

separating the Yellow Sea (West Sea) to the west from the East Sea (Sea

of Japan) to the east. The Peninsula is roughly 346 km (215 mi) wide at

its broadest point (approximately 38°10'N), roughly 169 km (105 mi) at

its narrowest point (approximately 39°20'N), and approximately 965 km

(600 mi) long. The northern-most point of the peninsula is located on

the Chinese border at approximately 43°N (about the same latitude as

Buffalo, New York), the southern-most point on the peninsula is located

at approximately 34°20'N (about the same latitude as Wilmington,

North Carolina) on the East China Sea. The western-most point on the

peninsula is located at 124°40'E on the Yellow Sea, and the eastern most

point on the peninsula is located at 129°35'E on the East Sea (Sea of

Japan)/Korea Strait (Straits of Tsushima).

The total land area for North Korea is 120,410 km (46,490 mi), or slightly

smaller than Mississippi. The total land area for South Korea is 98,190

km (84,401 mi), or slightly larger than Indiana. North Korea's coastline is

2,495 km (1,551 mi) and South Korea’s is 2,413 km (1,550 mi).
11

Borders and Neighbors

The northern border with Russia is 19 km (12 mi) long, and follows the

Tumen River northwest from its mouth. The border with China is 1,416

km (880 mi) long. Starting from where the Russian border ends, it follows the Tumen River to its headwaters (approx. 42°N 128°05'E); it then

follows the Yalu (Amnok) River from its headwaters (approx. 42°N

128°05'E), southwest, to the Yellow Sea. The border between North and

South Korea is the military demarcation line (MDL), that marks the line

of separation between the two belligerent sides at the close of the

Korean War. A demilitarized zone (DMZ) extends for 2 km (1.24 mi)

on either side of the MDL and extends out to sea. Both the DPRK and

CHINA

RUSSIA

NORTH

KOREA

SOUTH

KOREA JAPAN Yellow

Sea

Sea of Japan

Pacific

Ocean

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Demarcation

Line

Occupied by the Soviet Union in

1945, administered by Russia,

claimed by Japan.

East

China Sea

SEOUL

CHEJU DO

Korea

Strait

PYONGYANG

TOKYO

HOKKAIDO

HONSHU

SHIKOKU

KYUSHU

Sapporo

Osaka Hiroshima

Shanghai

Dalian

Vladivostok

Eastern Asia
12

ROK governments hold that the MDL is only a temporary administrative line, not a permanent border. Korea's remaining borders are coastlines, generally following the peninsula, but in places the border leaves

the peninsula to encompass islands and archipelagoes. 

Korea's closest sea-neighbors are Japan and China. The Japanese island

of Tsushima is approximately 50 km (31 mi) off Korea's southeast coast

(34°42'N 129°20'E), while the main island of Honshu is approximately

180 km (112 mi). The Shandong Peninsula of China is approximately

190 km (118 mi) to the west and bisects the Korean bay to the north and

the Yellow Sea to the south.

East Asia — Korean Peninsula Geography

Korea's geographic position serves as a natural bridge between the Asian

continent and the Japanese islands. The coastline is highly indented with

approximately 3,500 islands, mostly located off the south and west

coasts. Korea, though comparatively small in size, is noted for the

extraordinary variety of its geography. The country is punctuated with

rough mountains, large streams, and rugged narrow passes with only

about 20 percent of the peninsula suitable for cultivation. Another factor

is the shallowness of the Yellow Sea, contributing to the extreme tidal

range (9.7 m (32 ft), the second largest in the world) on the west coast. 

Mountains

The Korean Peninsula is primarily a region of mountains (approximately 70 percent) and they are the defining characteristics of the terrain. The mountains are generally of medium height, about 1,500 m

(4,921 ft), with lower mountains 200-500 m (656-1,640 ft) high (all elevations of 2,000 m (6,600 ft) or more are found in North Korea). Relief

differentials (as measured from valley floor to peak or ridge tops) for

even the lowest mountains, are generally 300-400 m (980-1,300 ft). The

elevated places are heavily bisected by river valleys, which frequently

have deep narrow passes and canyons, with steep slopes or near vertical

or vertical walls. Paektu-san, at 2,744 m (9,003 ft), is the highest moun-
13

tain in the Koreas, rising out of the Kaema Plateau, in the far northeast,

which is the headwater for the Yalu and Tumen Rivers.

Mountain ranges generally parallel the coastlines, but nearly all emit a

number of mountain chains that extend in various directions and intersect one another, making the country's relief system complex and tangled. Korea's mountain system may be broken into three segments:

North Korean Mountain Regions

These are divided into the Tumen and the Yalu (Amnok) River mountain

regions. The Tumen region (the area between the Tumen River and the

East Sea (Sea of Japan)) is in the northeast corner of North Korea.

These mountains are relatively low and passable in the northeast, but

gradually increase in elevation toward the southwest, becoming less and

less accessible. Their high region reaches 2,500 m (8,202 ft). Their

southwest direction is interrupted by the Materyong mountains, which

extend southeast from the Manchurian border to the East Sea (Sea of

Japan).

The Yalu (Amnok) mountain region is between the Yalu River and the

Yellow Sea. The region forms the mountain roof of the Korean Peninsula. These ranges are noted for their complicated structure, severity,

inaccessibility, and lack of settlers. The western portion of this region

becomes gradually lower, rarely exceeding 1,000 m (3,281 ft), but the

ranges have steep slopes, are highly dissected, and contain dense forests.

Communication is usually only practical via the deep river valleys.

East Korean Mountain Region

These mountains extend south along the shore of the East Sea (Sea of

Japan) in three parallel lines to the southern extreme of the peninsula.

These mountains reach 1,500 m (4,921 ft) and are characterized by narrow, jagged crests and steep slopes that are cut by deep gorges. The

relief difference between the flat littoral valleys and the abrupt elevation

change of the mountains handicap cross-country movement. 
14

South Korean Mountain Region

This region consists of a series of short ranges that extend in parallel

rows to the southern shore of the peninsula. These mountains reach

Inchon

SEOUL

PYONGYANG

Haeju Kaesong

Wonsan

Hamhung

Hungnam

Sinuiju

Kilchu

Chongjin

Najin

CHINA

SOUTH

KOREA

Demarcation

Line

RUSSIA

Sea

of

Japan

Korea

Bay

Yellow

Sea

North Korea

ELEVATION IN FEET

2000+

1500-2000

1000-1500

500-1000

200-500

100-200

0-100

North Korean Topography
15

1,500 m (4,921 ft) and most of the region is easily accessible, except for

the central region which is characterized by sharp jagged crests with

high passes and steep rugged slopes.

Lowlands

The largest and most important tracks of lowland lie near the shorelines

(coastal alluvial plains). Besides these coastal alluvial plains, erosional

basins were formed in the mountains at the junctions of rivers and

streams and are usually found in central and southern Korea (mostly

expanded river valleys or nearly closed inter-mountain valleys).

Between the mountains lie lowlands that were formed by river valleys

and sea terraces. Most lowlands are settled/cultivated.

The wide range of temperature fluctuations (between summer highs and

winter lows) and concentrated summer rains induce intense weathering

and erosion of surface material. Gentle slopes at the foot of mountains,

hills, and near basins, are covered with thick deposits of weathered

materials formed from the erosion of upland material. Alluvial fans are

rarely developed.

The largest lowlands are river deltas found along coast of the Yellow

Sea. The lowlands of the eastern and southern coastline are usually

river deltas and as a rule are small, due to the mountains in the east

abruptly dropping into the sea. Large tidal ranges (west coast) and

funnel shaped river mouths prevent the formation of large active (growing) deltas, although rivers transport large amounts of deposited material during the wet season (summer). The wide coastal plains near the

river mouths change abruptly into narrow flood plains a short distance

upriver. Most river delta lowlands, especially those on the Yellow Sea,

are subject to inundations by seasonal river flooding (summer) and high

tides. During the flood season (summer), small dikes (2-3 m /6.5-9.8

ft) are built to protect fields and homes. While mountains are the dominate geological feature, lowlands have played a key role in Korea's culture/history.
16

Major Rivers

Name Length Navigable Length

km (mi) km (mi)

Ch'ongch'on 198 (123) 152 (94)

Han 514 (319) 330 (205)

Imjin 254 (158) 124 (77)

Kum 401 (249) 130 (81)

Naktong 525 (326) 334 (208)

Somjin 212 (132) 39 (24)

Taebong 438 (272) 260 (161)

Tumen 520 (323) 85 (53)

Yalu (Amnok) 790 (491) 698 (434)

Yesong 174 (108) 65 (40)

The Yalu (Amnok) and Tumen Rivers form the border between the

DPRK and the PRC; the Tumen River forms the border between the

DPRK and Russia. All river flows fluctuate widely, with the river discharges swelling during the summer wet season, often flooding valley

floors. In the other seasons, which are relatively dry, water levels

become very low, often exposing the river beds. River gradients are

mostly very flat in their lower reaches, permitting navigation for long

stretches above the river mouths.

All of Korea's principal rivers (with the exception of the Tumen) empty

into the Yellow Sea or the Korean Strait (Straights of Tsushima). The

Tumen is the only river of consequence that flows into the East Sea (Sea

of Japan). With the introduction of motor transportation, primarily

impacting South Korea, rivers have become secondary means of transportation. However, farmers depend on the rivers for over 70 percent of

the water required to irrigate their crops, and they are a major source of

power (hydroelectric), surpassing coal. Many of the rivers are dammed
17

for either hydroelectric or irrigation use. The majority of the rivers in

Korea are less than 100 km (62 mi) long and generally 20 to 30 m (66-

98 ft) wide. During the dry season (winter), rivers are fordable (via

foot) for nearly their entire course, especially rivers in the eastern portion of the peninsula where the watershed divide is closest to the shoreline. During the rainy season (summer), rivers, streams, and intermittent

streams quickly fill. Mountain streams are steep sloping, strewn with

boulders, have numerous rapids, and may contain many waterfalls

(especially during the rainy season).

Yellow Sea

The Yellow Sea forms the western coastline. With an average depth of

only 45 m (150 ft), and with the large quantity of water the Pacific

Ocean pumps into the shallow basin, the tides along the coastline of the

Yellow Sea are tremendous. At Inchon, the tides may reach 9.7 m (32

ft), and average 5.8 m (19 ft).

Mean Neap Tide Range 3.47 m (11.4 ft)

Mean Tidal Range 5.72 m (18.8 ft)

Mean Spring Tidal Range 7.98 m (26.2 ft)

Maximum Tidal Range 9.84 m (32.3 ft)

The rapid ebb and flow of the tides create strong currents, exceeding 7

kts, in the channels between islands. At low tide approximately 1,000 sq

mi of mudflats are exposed and may extend for miles away from the

coastline. When the tides flow back, the speed of their advance may

outpace that of a running man. 

Effects of Terrain on Military Operations

The Korean Peninsula is extremely mountainous, offering excellent

observation along avenues of approach and lines of communication

(LOCs) in the northern and central mountain areas. Observation in the

eastern coastal lowland area is limited, but improves the further west
18

one travels. Observation in the northwest, southwest, and southern

plains areas is fair to limited. Fields of fire are poorest in extremely rugged regions of the northern and central mountain areas, due to numerous

spurs and areas offering cover from direct fire weapons. The regions

offering the best fields of fire would be the northwest, southwest, and

southern plains, where the terrain is relatively flat and open, except in

built-up areas.

The Korean Peninsula comprises numerous ridge lines and hills. Only

20 percent of the total land area consists of plains and lowlands. The

folds in these ridgelines and hills afford excellent cover and some

degree of concealment from direct fire and ground observation.

The majority of ridge lines run in a north-south direction, severely

restricting east-west movement. This restriction of lateral movement

becomes more prevalent the further north operations move. The major

water obstacles on the peninsula are its rivers. During most of the year,

the rivers are shallow, exposing very wide, gravel river beds; however,

these rivers can become formidable obstacles as a result of the increased

precipitation during the rainy season.

Climate

Korea's climate is defined by its latitude, peninsular shape, terrain, currents and close proximity to the Asian continent. It is characterized by

continental winters and monsoonal summers. Though Korea juts far out

into the sea, the west coast climate is less maritime due to the shallowness of the Yellow Sea; its shallow (depths average 45 m/150 ft) water

basin heats and cools rapidly, contributing little to moderating the climate, where as the East Sea (Sea of Japan) moderates the east coast's

climate due to its deeper waters (1,500 m/ 5,000 ft).

The southern climate is less continental and more subtropical with a significant warm period lasting approximately 6 to 7 months. In the north,

winter conditions may last for 6 months, while in the south it may only

last for 3 months. However, 3 successive cold days are typically
19

followed by 4 successive days of warm weather. The peninsula's west

coast is generally open to the influence of the cool air masses that roar

out of the Asian mainland, while the east coast is protected by the chain

of mountains that parallel the coast (Chungnyong Mountains) and is

warmed by the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

In the northernmost regions, the winter lasts a full 6 months and in January the average temperatures may fall below -18 °C (0 °F). The hottest

time of the year is the summer, with average temperature ranges

between 25 °-27 °C (77 °-80 °F) in most of the southern regions and

milder temperatures of 22 °C (72 °F) along the northeast coast. The

range of temperatures is much greater in the north and in the interior

than along the coasts. The annual average difference in temperature

between the coldest and hottest months for Seoul is approximately

28.3 °C (83 °F).

Korea is located in the East Asian Monsoon belt. Seasonal monsoon

winds affect Korea's weather throughout the year. The Southwest Monsoon blows in from the south and southeast during the summer, bringing

hot, humid weather. The cold, dry, Northwest Monsoon blows in from

the north and northwest during the winter, bringing cold weather.

Korea's massive mountains protect the peninsula's east coast from the

winter monsoon, though occasional heavy snows can fall along the eastern mountain ranges. As a result, the east coast generally has warmer

winters than the rest of Korea.

Heavy rainfall from June through September accounts for about 70 percent of Korea's yearly precipitation, with annual precipitation averages

between less than 500 mm (20 in) in the northeastern inland areas and

1,500 mm (59 in) along the southern coast. Mean precipitation

decreases from south to north. Some regions will have particularly

heavy rains due to orographic effects (air uplifted by mountains) and the

convergence of moist air masses. In most years, one or two typhoons hit

the peninsula during July and August.
20

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

TEMPERATURE

DEGREES (F)

Extreme High

Average High

Average Low

Extreme Low

PUSAN,

South Korea

35o 10'N

129o 08'E

Precipitation (In) Mean

Max Precipitation 24 Hours

Mean (In) Snow

Surface Wind Direction

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Mean

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Max

Relative Humidity 0400 LST

Relative Humidity 1300 LST

Dewpoint

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

0.8

2.9

0.1

NW

9

52

66

54

20

2.9

4.4

0.1

NW

8

51

68

56

24

3.3

2.9

0.1

NW

8

47

73

60

33

4.9

7.0

0.1

NW

7

58

78

63

44

5.1

5.7

0.0

NW

7

54

82

67

52

6.1

7.2

0.0

NW

6

56

84

74

61

8.5

9.9

0.0

SW

6

52

90

79

70

6.8

8.2

0.0

SW

7

61

88

74

71

7.1

8.0

0.0

NW

7

68

87

70

62

2.9

7.0

0.0

NW

8

45

82

60

50

2.7

5.5

0.1

NW

8

45

79

58

41

1.0

2.7

0.1

NW

8

56

73

55

28
21

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

TEMPERATURE

DEGREES (F)

Extreme High

Mean

Extreme Low

SEOUL,

South Korea

37o 26'N

127o 07'E

Precipitation (In) Mean

Precipitation (In) Extreme Max

Precipitation (In) Extreme Min

Max Precipitation 24 Hours

Mean (In) Snow

Surface Wind Direction

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Mean

Relative Humidity 0700 LST

Relative Humidity 1300 LST

Dewpoint

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

1.2

4.5

0.1

1.6

7.0

3

75

57

14

1.3

5.0

0.1

2.6

4.0

W

3

75

54

18

2.3

5.5

0.2

2.6

2.0

W

3

80

52

28

4.4

18.0

0.2

5.6

0.1

W

3

82

51

40

3.3

9.5

0.3

6.0

0.0

W

3

83

52

51

5.0

15.0

0.3

7.0

0.0

S

2

86

60

61

12.0

25.0

1.2

11.0

0.0

S

2

90

68

70

10.0

35.0

1.2

13.0

0.0

S

2

89

66

70

6.0

15.0

0.8

13.0

0.0

S

2

90

60

60

1.7

8.0

0.6

5.4

0.1

W

2

90

55

47

1.7

6.0

0.3

2.9

2.0

3

84

57

34

1.2

4.5

0.3

2.8

4.0

NW

3

79

59

21

WNW WNW
22

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

TEMPERATURE

DEGREES (F)

Extreme High

Average High

Average Low

Extreme Low

TAEJON,

South Korea

36o 27'N

127o 26'E

Precipitation (In) Mean

Max Precipitation 24 Hours

Mean (In) Snow

Surface Wind Direction

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Mean

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Max

Relative Humidity 0400 LST

Relative Humidity 1300 LST

Dewpoint

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

1.3

2.0

6.0

N

2

27

81

69

20

1.2

1.8

3.0

N

3

27

82

58

25

1.8

2.1

2,0

N

3

27

84

64

34

3.5

4.1

0.1

SW

4

33

85

62

45

3.3

3.8

0.0

SW

3

33

86

57

54

5.6

6.9

0.0

E

3

33

88

62

62

12.6

8.9

0.0

E

3

21

91

74

72

8.4

9.5

0.0

E

3

40

91

68

72

5.2

3.5

0.0

N

2

27

92

65

62

1.5

1.9

0.0

N

2

40

91

59

49

1.6

1.3

1.0

N

2

27

89

62

37

1.5

2.1

0.1

N

2

27

85

66

26
23

HYESAN,

North Korea

41o 24'N

126o 12'E

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-20

TEMPERATURE

DEGREES (F)

Extreme High

Average High

Average Low

Extreme Low

-10

-30

-40

Precipitation (In) Mean

Max Precipitation 24 Hours

Surface Wind Direction

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Mean

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Max

Relative Humidity 0600 LST

Relative Humidity 1400 LST

Dewpoint

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

0.4

1.0

W

2

23

85

60

-14

0.3

0.9

NE

3

27

85

56

-3

0.4

0.8

W

4

23

81

49

11

1.0

1.1

W

4

29

79

38

21

2.4

1.7

NE

5

31

77

33

28

3.6

1.7

NE

2

16

90

56

43

5.2

2.6

NE

2

17

92

58

55

5.2

2.6

NE

2

17

92

58

54

2.3

4.9

NE

3

19

90

46

38

1.1

1.4

W

2

19

85

40

24

0.6

0.8

NE

2

27

84

53

13

0.5

1.2

NE

2

27

86

58

-2
24

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-20

TEMPERATURE

DEGREES (F)

Extreme High

Average High

Average Low

Extreme Low

-10

PYONGYANG,

North Korea

39o 01'N

125o 49'E

Precipitation (In) Mean

Max Precipitation 24 Hours

Mean (In) Snow

Surface Wind Direction

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Mean

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Max

Relative Humidity 0600 LST

Relative Humidity 1300 LST

Dewpoint

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

0.6

1.2

3.0

NW

4

32

81

57

13

0.4

2.0

3.0

NW

4

31

82

52

17

1.2

2.0

1.0

NW

6

36

81

48

26

2.1

1.9

0.1

NW

5

35

82

44

37

2.5

3.7

0.0

NW

5

32

81

47

48

3.3

4.1

0.0

W

4

30

88

50

59

9.9

9.5

0.0

E

4

31

92

66

68

9.2

8.3

0.0

E

3

32

92

65

69

4.6

7.0

0.0

E

3

36

91

55

57

1.8

4.0

0.1

NW

3

28

88

50

45

1.6

1.9

1.0

NW

4

31

84

55

32

0.8

1.8

2.0

NW

4

31

83

58

19
25

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-20

TEMPERATURE

DEGREES (F)

Extreme High

Average High

Average Low

Extreme Low

-10

WONSAN,

North Korea

39o 11'N

127o 26'E

Precipitation (In) Mean

Max Precipitation 24 Hours

Mean (In) Snow

Surface Wind Direction

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Mean

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Max

Relative Humidity 0600 LST

Relative Humidity 1300 LST

Dewpoint

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

1.0

2.9

5.0

W

6

28

58

45

13

1.2

2.9

10.0

W

6

29

67

49

16

1.9

3.0

7.0

W

6

29

65

50

24

2.6

4.7

1.0

6

35

69

52

36

3.2

5.0

0.1

5

33

75

56

47

4.8

4.8

0.0

NE

5

36

84

66

58

11.3

6.9

0.0

5

51

88

74

67

12.9

14.2

0.0

SW

5

42

90

74

68

6.9

9.6

0.0

SW

5

43

85

65

58

2.8

8.8

0.1

SW

5

36

76

55

45

2.5

3.4

1.0

6

40

66

50

30

1.2

3.3

6.0

W

6

27

58

47

17

WSW WSW ENE WSW
26

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-20

TEMPERATURE

DEGREES (F)

Extreme High

Average High

Average Low

Extreme Low

-10

YANGDOK,

North Korea

39o 10'N

127o 18'E

Precipitation (In) Mean

Surface Wind Direction

Surface Wind Speed (Kts) Mean

Relative Humidity 0600 LST

Relative Humidity 1300 LST

Dewpoint

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

0.6

W

6

86

62

8

0.6

W

6

89

57

12

1.0

W

7

86

52

24

2.1

NW

7

84

43

33

3.2

W

7

85

43

43

4.3

SE

5

89

55

57

10.4

SE

5

92

69

63

9.1

SE

5

92

66

63

4.3

SE

5

93

58

53

2.1

W

6

91

49

40

1.3

W

6

87

62

17

0.8

W

6

87

62

17
27

Spring Pattern (April-May)

April marks the start of the transition from the cold, dry winter to the

summer rainy season. This transition lasts nearly 2 months. Low pressure systems start forming near the Gulf of Bo Hai and the Shantung

Peninsula. These lows significantly erode the dominance of the Siberian High ("Asiatic High") pressure system. As a result, cloudiness

and precipitation increase during the spring months. Korea is occasionally influenced by the "Yellow Wind" during the spring months.

The Yellow Wind occurs when storm winds behind a trough cause dust

from the Gobi Desert to become suspended in the air. The dust laden

air is subsequently transported over Korea. During a strong yellow

wind, visibility can be reduced to less than 1 mile. Spring is also the

time for heavy sea fog to form over the coastal areas. The fog forms as

the warmer air passes over the cooler Yellow Sea and the East Sea (Sea

of Japan). Wind gusts of up to 59 kts have been recorded as well as

tornados. The average April temperature in the north is approximately

10 °C (50 °F) and in the south 12 °C (54 °F); spring is generally cooler

than fall. 

Summer Pattern (June-September)

Summer is the rainy season in Korea. During the summer, southern

monsoon winds engulf the country, the winds shift to the southwest, and

the warm, moisture laden air moving off the oceans clashes with the

drier air to the north. These fronts oscillate back and forth across Korea

during the summer months. The interior highlands disturb the winds,

forcing them into a westerly/southwesterly direction. The majority of

the annual precipitation falls between late June and the middle of September, with rains fully developing along the entire peninsula by midJune. Seoul receives approximately 126 mm (5 in) of precipitation during the winter (December-March), but in July alone receives approximately 383 mm (14.3 in).
28

Thunderstorms usually occur about 2 to 5 days per month during this

period. Summer precipitation in Korea is as likely to occur at 0200 as at

1400. Humidity is very high and fog will develop whenever a cold air

mass confronts this moisture laden air, often forming on cloudless days.

The typhoon season occurs from July through September. About once

each year, a typhoon will pass very close to or move over Korea, causing

heavy showers. Strong winds are usually confined to islands and

exposed coastal areas. Although winds might not pose a problem, the

associated rainfall can cause significant flash flooding, a very real threat

during the rainy season, especially in rough terrain. The mean temperature for Seoul in August is 25.3 °C (78 °C)

Fall Pattern (October-November)

October is the transition month between the summer rainy season and

the cold, dry winter. The predominantly tropical cloudy weather of the

summer is replaced by cooler, drier, and less cloudy conditions. The

primary weather producers during October are cold frontal systems

from the Asian mainland. On the average, one frontal passage per week

can be expected during the month. A typical frontal passage is preceded

by increasing middle and high cloudiness with light rain. Following the

frontal passage, mostly clear skies can be expected for 3 or 4 days. During this clear period it is very likely for fog to form. Fog is especially

prevalent in river valleys and in low lying areas. 

Winter Pattern (December-March)

The winter in Korea is controlled by the large Siberian High (Asiatic

High) pressure system which results in predominantly cold, dry northwesterly winds. About every 4 to 5 days a low-pressure trough will

move through Korea, bringing with it cloudiness and light precipitation.

The amount of precipitation locally depends mostly on the elevation of

the station and the length of time that the air has been over the Yellow

Sea. Maximum snowfall occurs over the northwest coast, which is the

most exposed to the northwesterly flow, and in the mountain areas. Normally less than 10 percent of the annual precipitation falls during the
29

winter. Frequently the weather is cloudless, clear, and dry, except for

the southwestern region of the peninsula. The mean January temperature in Seoul is -4.4 °C (24 °F)

Effects of Climate on Military Operations

Extremely cold outbreaks during winter could have a serious impact on

ground and air operations. During colder temperatures, hypothermia,

frostbite, and cold related injuries will slow the tempo of ground operations. Cold weather also impacts the turnaround time of aircraft as

maintenance, refueling, and ammunition loading are affected. Trafficability is favorably impacted by the state of the ground. The ground

freezes around 10 November in the extreme north, around 20 December

along the DMZ, and not until 30 January in the extreme south. Thawing

begins around 30 January in Pusan, mid-February along the DMZ, and

not until 20 March in the far north. Ice also impacts naval operations

from December until March.

Rain is the biggest problem for military operations in Korea. Heavy

rains during the Southwest Monsoon saturate the ground and make conditions ideal for flash flooding. Trafficability is impaired by the wet

ground and the effects of suddenly changing shallow, slow moving

streams into rapid, deep rivers. In addition, mountain passes and rough

mountain terrain become even more difficult to traverse due to the rains.

Winter snows have an impact on aircraft takeoff/recovery at coastal

bases and in mountainous terrain where snows are normally more significant. With limited highway LOCs available, heavier snowfalls can

cause a significant impact on supply/resupply operations. The worst

flying weather of the year occurs during the summer rainy season.

About half the season, ceilings and visibilities are less than 3,000 ft and

3 mi, respectively.

In determining the effect of surface winds, direction is the most significant criteria. During the Northwest Monsoon (November-March), the

effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare to the south

are heightened. Although temperatures modify the effect of NBC
30

agents at this time, dispersion patterns would be favorable for North

Korean use. The Southwest Monsoon (June-September) has temperatures and humidity favorable to North Korean NBC use, but dispersion

patterns are less favorable. The Southwest Monsoon pattern also has

periods of strong wind speeds which may adversely affect air operations, air defense, and communications which are antenna-dependent.

The best period for air and ground observation is the generally clear

winter period, December through March. Flying weather in the winter

is the best of any time of the year, although pilots must take note of frequent severe turbulence and icing. Both hazards can be associated with

the passage of a trough. The fall period, October through November,

permits good air and ground observation; however, air operations are

frequently marginal during morning hours due to periods of ground fog

in river valleys and low-lying areas. During the spring, April through

June, air and ground observation are often limited as a result of increasing cloud cover and precipitation. Additionally, the spring period brings

with it an increase in early morning fog that burns off by late morning.

Also during the spring, dust resulting from Yellow Wind can reduce visibility at times to less than 1 mile, affecting both ground and air observation. Periods of rain during the summer, when the peninsula receives

the majority of its annual precipitation in the form of monsoons, greatly

reduce air and ground observation capability.

Vegetation

During World War II and the Korean War, the Korean Peninsula was

nearly deforested. As a result, only scrub tree growth and relatively

young forests exist. Areas not classified as cultivated or built-up are generally categorized as forests. Areas that contain trees over 6.1 m (20 ft)

occupy only one-third of South Korea and are usually dense with tightly

spaced trees that are generally less than 10 m (33 ft) tall. In these forests,

maneuvering vehicles is difficult because trees are so closely spaced.

The valley floors are consistently terraced and planted with rice crops,

assuming that adequate supplies of water are available for these terraced
31

fields. Low, dry crops are planted where adequate supplies of water are

not available, usually on the edges of valleys. The terrain and climate

conditions of Korea are favorable for growth of coniferous forest including pine, fir, larch, and spruce trees. In the past, most of the forest land

on the peninsula has been denuded, and the only remaining mature natural forests are on the higher mountains, particularly in the north. Most of

the peninsula's woodlands are 20- to 30-year-old scrub deciduous forests.

The central regions have a mixed cover of hardwoods and conifers, but

near urban areas the forests have virtually disappeared. In the southern

portion, scattered stands of bamboo and pine are found among the generally deciduous growth.

Inchon

SEOUL

PYONGYANG

Haeju Kaesong

Wonsan

Hamhung

Hungnam

Sinuiju

Kilchu

Chongjin

Najin

CHINA

SOUTH

KOREA

Demarcation Line

RUSSIA

Sea

of

Japan

Korea

Bay

Yellow

Sea

North Korea

Land Utilization

Cultivated areas

Uncultivated areas
32

Effects of Vegetation on Military Operations

Because large stands of trees and forests are virtually nonexistent,

except for remote mountainous areas in the northern half of the peninsula, vegetation will have little impact on observation and fields of fire.

The concealment afforded by vegetation is generally good year round

but is restricted mainly to evergreen trees in mountainous areas. As

operations move north into the more mountainous terrain, concealment

increases. Concealment for ground troops is fair in areas of cultivation,

mainly in rice paddies and orchards, but these are seasonal except in

dikes and ditches. Concealment, especially from aerial observation, is

limited in the young forests throughout Korea. 

Surface Materials

The predominant surface material throughout the peninsula is sand composed of rocks and silt. The soil cover is usually thin outside the valleys, on hills, and on mountains. In the valleys, natural soils are

normally thick sands, and silty sands with considerable cobble-sized

rock in the upper reaches of the valleys. In the wide valleys of the western portion of the peninsula, minimal rock is present in the natural soil.

Cultivated soils, especially in terraced rice paddies, are artificially

developed through regular plowing, irrigating, and fertilizing over long

periods. Settling of silts from annual irrigation and also from occasional

flooding of rivers has changed the soil composition from its original

character. In most areas, rice paddy soil is a uniform silty-loam, which

is totally unlike the natural soils in the vicinity. During spring planting

these soils are usually supersaturated to allow an easy transition for the

transplanting of rice seedlings. The introduction of this moisture in the

spring and constant flooding throughout most of the summer months

make these fields impossible for off-road movement of even the lightest

motor vehicles. During early fall, these rice paddies are drained to

allow for the rice harvest and for the turning of the soil for nutrient

retention. The turning of the soil allows the ground to dry and become

hard enough for some trafficability.
33

SECTION 2

MILITARY FORCES OF THE DPRK

General

The DPRK remains the world's most militaristic state. It commits

roughly 25 percent of its GDP to military spending. Out of every 1,000

people, 40 serve in uniform. By comparison, the ROK spends 4 percent

of its GDP on the military and 14 of every 1,000 people serve in uniform. The DPRK maintains imposing forces in terms of numbers. Over

1,200,000 personnel serve in the active forces, with reserve forces

totaling over 5,000,000, making it the fourth largest military force in

the world. The majority of DPRK forces are forward deployed, in

attack positions, within 65 km (40.4 mi) of the DMZ. This concentration along the border supports a military strategy that is directed

against the ROK. Technically, a state of war exists between the two

Koreas, as no peace treaty or terms were agreed upon at the end of the

Korean War. Although the armistice of 1953 marked the end of conventional combat for the DPRK, it did not signify the end of hostilities or

the preparation for continuing battle.

National Military Organization

DPRK defense activities are coordinated by the Ministry of the People's

Armed Forces (MPAF). The MPAF is headed by the Minister of

National Defense and consists of the Political Department, Operations

Department, and Rear Services Department. The Minister of Defense

reports to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as well to the

Central People's Committee, the main political committee of the

Korean's Worker Party. There is a separate General Staff that acts as an

advisory committee to the MPAF. The DPRK maintains an Army, Air

Force, Navy, and a Special Operations Force (SOF). There is no separate

Marine Corps, although the Navy does conduct some amphibious and

ground support operations. 
34

The DPRK enforces a mandatory conscription law for citizens age 17

and over. Minimum service periods are as follows: 5 to 8 years (army), 3

to 4 years (air force), and 5 to 10 years (navy). Those not able to serve

actively for that period of time are enlisted Red Guard militia, a large

paramilitary force. Active service is followed by part-time service in the

military reserves or service in the Worker-Peasant Red Guard to age 60.

The DPRK military has an estimated manpower pool of approximately

5,000,000 personnel, although the estimate for reserve troops actually

assigned to a military unit number is closer to 750,000 in the army and

40,000 in the navy. 

The Worker-Peasant Red Guard militia is the largest civilian defense

force in the DPRK with a strength of approximately 3.8 million. The

militia is organized on a provincial/town/village level. Command structure is brigade, battalion, company, and platoon. The militia maintains

infantry small arms, mortars, and air defense artillery, although some

units are unarmed. Those under conscription age are assigned to the Red

Youth Guards for training. Membership in the Red Youth Guards is

approximately 1,000,000. In addition, the security forces and border

guards, numbering approximately 115,000 personnel, are used for internal security duties.

The North Korean Army (NKA)

The ground forces are by far the largest and most formidable of the

DPRK's military forces. In the 1980s, NKA force structure became

increasingly mobile and mechanized, with a steady increase in tanks,

self-propelled artillery, armored personnel carriers, and trucks.

The NKA ground combat vehicle inventory consists of medium and

light tanks, which include the T-62 and T-54/55 main battle tanks. The

NKA light tank inventory includes the indigenously produced M-1975,

the former Soviet PT-76, and the Chinese Type 62 and 63 variants. The

NKA armored personnel carrier inventory includes the M-1973/M-1967

and a few BTR-60s.
35

The NKA relies on massive numbers of artillery systems to support

ground operations. The North Korean Air Force's perceived vulnerability contributes to this reliance on field artillery as the major combat multiplier. In the 1980s, the DPRK produced a significant amount of selfpropelled artillery by mating towed artillery tubes with chassis already

in the inventory. Also produced are a variety of self-propelled guns,

howitzers, gun-howitzers (ranging from 122-mm to 152-mm), and two

versions of the KOKSAN gun (170-mm). The DPRK also manufactures

at least three calibers of multiple rocket launchers - 107-mm, 122-mm,

and 240-mm - and mounts many of them on heavy trucks.

The DPRK produces a wide range of former Soviet antitank guns, from

57-mm to 100-mm. This includes the 76-mm field gun and SU-85 100-

mm SP. Infantry fire support weapons include mortars ranging from 60-

mm to 160-mm, hand-held rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and AT1/SNAPPER and AT-3/SAGGER wire-guided antitank missiles. The

DPRK probably produces the AT-4/5.

Major units of the NKA are listed as follows: 

8 conventional corps

1 armored corps

4 mechanized corps

2 artillery corps

1 capital defense command

30 infantry divisions and

4 infantry brigades

15 armored brigades

20 motorized/mechanized infantry brigades

Special Purpose Forces Command 
36

The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) 

The primary mission of the NKAF is air defense of the homeland. Secondary missions include tactical air support to the Army and the Navy,

transportation and logistic support, and SOF insertion.

Interceptor, ground-attack, transport, attack helicopter, and transport

helicopter regiments are formed from over 730 combat aircraft, approximately 300 helicopters, and 92,000 personnel. Although DPRK airbases are located throughout the country, the majority are in the

southern provinces. Pyongyang has the capability to protect combat aircraft in hardened shelters.

The DPRK does not produce aircraft indigenously. Its inventory, though

large, consists of many aircraft manufactured using 1950s and 1960s

former Soviet or Chinese technology. However, in the 1980s the former

Soviet Union supplied some more modern, all-weather air defense and

ground-attack aircraft.

Interceptor aircraft are an integral part of the DPRK's air defense network, which also includes surface-to-air missiles and numerous mobile

and fixed antiaircraft artillery weapons. Interceptors fly combat air

patrol missions to protect DPRK coastlines, military installations, and

key urban areas. The MiG-23/FLOGGER and MiG-29/FULCRUM are

the most modern interceptors in the inventory. However, the backbone

of the air force remains the MiG-21/FISHBED. The DPRK has 120

MiG-21s and over 100 MiG-19/FARMERs. The MiG-21 has a twin barrel 23-mm cannon and AA-2/ATOLL heat-seeking air-to-air missiles.

The DPRK's air defense capability improved in 1984 when the Soviet

Union began supplying the first of the 46 MiG-23/FLOGGER interceptors. This all-weather interceptor can carry the AA-2/ATOLL or AA-8/

APHID and the longer range AA-7/APEX missile. Until the MiG-29/

FULCRUM arrived in 1988, the FLOGGER was the DPRK's most modern aircraft. The FULCRUM, an all-weather counterair fighter, entered
37

service in the former Soviet Union in 1985. Equipped with a look-down,

shoot-down radar, beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, and close-in

dogfight missiles, it provides the best airframe against the more modern

CFC combat aircraft.

Most ground-attack regiments have Russian- and Chinese-produced

light bombers and fighters with technology from the 1950s and 1960s.

The NKAF has three regiments of Il-28/BEAGLEs, one regiment of

Su-7/FITTERs, five regiments of MiG-15/FAGOTs and MiG-17/FRESCOs, and two regiments of MiG-19/FARMERs. The 82 BEAGLEs are

medium-range bombers with a radius of 550 nm and a bomb load of

2,205 lb. Other attack aircraft include about 100 FARMERs and Chinese

versions of the FARMER that have been modified for ground attack.

These older aircraft can operate only in daylight and good weather and

can only carry small bomb loads. The NKAF also has 20 1961 vintage

Su-7/FITTER ground-attack fighters.

The NKAF modernized its ground-attack capability by importing Su25/FROGFOOT aircraft from the former Soviet Union. Deliveries began

in 1988, totaling approximately 36 to date. The Su-25 is a late-1970s

aircraft, has a combat radius of 300 nm, and can carry up to 8,800 lb of

bombs and rockets. During the initial stages of the surprise attack, the

most likely targets for the Su-25 are airfields, surface-to-surface missile

sites, headquarters, and other military targets of opportunity.

During the 1980s, the NKAF substantially increased its helicopter

inventory from 40 to 275. Helicopters in service include Mi-2/HOPLITE, Mi-4/HOUND, and Mi-8/HIP. In 1985, the DPRK circumvented

U.S. export controls to buy 87 U.S.-manufactured Hughes helicopters.

These helicopters are considerably more advanced than those received

from the Russians. Although the DPRK has the civilian version, they

probably have modified some of them to carry guns and rockets.

Because the ROK produces the same model helicopter for its armed

forces, the DPRK could modify their Hughes helicopters to resemble

the ROK counterparts to confuse CFC air defenses during SOF

operations.
38

The transport fleet has some 1950s- and 1960s-vintage former Soviet

transports, including more than 270 An-2/COLT light transports and 10

An-24/COKEs. The COLT's ability to land on short, rough strips, makes

it especially suited for the task of transporting SOF units. It can hold 10

combat troops and cruise at 160 kilometers (km) an hour. The NKAF

has at least six COLT regiments and at least six regiments of attack and

transport helicopters. 

DPRK operational thinking reflects both Russian doctrine and North

Korean experiences with heavy UN bombing during the Korean War; it

relies heavily on air defense. The DPRK houses a large percentage of its

military industries, aircraft hangars, repair facilities, ammunition, fuel

stores, and even air defense missiles underground or in hardened shelters.

The DPRK, with over 8,800 AA guns, combined with SA-2, SA-3, and

SA-5, and handheld SA-7 and SA-16 surface-to-air missiles, has constructed one of the world's most dense air defense networks. In the mid1980s, the former Soviet Union supplied SA-3/GOA surface-to-air missiles to the DPRK. The SA-3 provides short-range defense against lowflying aircraft. In 1987, the former Soviet Union provided SA-5/GAMMON surface-to-air missiles that gave Pyongyang a long-range, highaltitude, surface-to-air missile capability. The SA-2 GUIDELINE system provides medium-range, medium-altitude point defense for cities

and military airfields, as well as a barrier defense along the DMZ.

SA-2 and SA-3 battalions are concentrated along the coastal corridors,

while most SA-5 GAMMON battalions are located near the DMZ and

are extended north to cover Pyongyang.

The North Korean Navy (NKN)

The 46,000-man NKN is primarily a coastal navy. The NKN is organized into two fleets: the East Coast Fleet, with eight operational commands, and the West Coast Fleet, with five operational commands. The

East Coast Fleet is headquartered at Toejo Dong, with major bases at

Najin and Wonsan. The West Coast Fleet is headquartered at Nampo,
39

with major bases at Pipagot and Sagon Ni. Numerous smaller naval

bases are located along both coasts. The fleets do not exchange

vessels because geographical limitations make mutual support almost

impossible. The NKN does not have a Marine Corps or naval air.

Amphibious operations are conducted by SOF units in addition to

naval personnel. 

Most NKN vessels are small patrol-size craft unable to operate over 50

nautical miles (nm) from the coast but capable of policing the DPRK's

territorial waters. The navy's numerous amphibious craft and midget

submarines are intended to clandestinely insert SOF units into the ROK.

The DPRK also maintains coastal defense artillery and missile sites.

Coastal defense artillery includes 122-mm, 130-mm, and 152-mm systems. Land-based coastal defense missiles include the SSC-2B SAMLET, CSSC-2 SILKWORM, and CSSC-3 SEERSUCKER.

The NKN's most capable weapons systems are their approximately 43

guided-missile patrol boats equipped with the SS-N-2A STYX antiship

missile (or its Chinese version, the CSS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH). Though

their small size limits operations to coastal waters and calm seas, they

have a capability to quickly respond to Combined Forces Command

(CFC) shipping approaching the coast. The NKN has 12 OSA-1 guidedmissile patrol boats, 10 DPRK versions of the OSA-1 called the SOJU,

and 19 other fast-attack missile craft; the OSA and SOJU are all

equipped with four CSS-N-1 missile launchers. The missiles have a

maximum range of 25 nm and carry radar or infrared homing seekers.

The largest part of the NKN consists of small combatants, including torpedo boats, patrol boats, patrol craft, fast attack craft, and small amphibious landing craft. Of the approximately 200 torpedo boats, nearly half

are DPRK-built. Most are equipped with 25-mm to 37-mm guns. The

DPRK built at least 62 CHAHO fire-support patrol units. This unique

vessel has a multiple rocket launcher in the center of its deck to provide

fire support to ground troops or attack surface ships.
40

The DPRK's attack submarine inventory is estimated to include 4

former Soviet WHISKEY Class, 22 Chinese ROMEO Class, and

DPRK-built ROMEO Class submarines. The WHISKEYs, acquired in

the 1960s, can carry 12 torpedoes or 24 mines. Shortly after delivering

four ROMEOs in the early 1970s, China helped the DPRK start its own

ROMEO construction program. The ROMEOs are well equipped, have

an improved sonar, and can carry 14 torpedoes or 28 mines.

To date, the DPRK has indigenously produced over 200 personnel landing craft. This includes approximately 100 NAMPO personnel landing

craft based on a former Soviet P-6 torpedo boat hull. The NAMPO has a

maximum speed of 40 knots and a radius of 335 nm at 28 knots. The

NAMPOs provide a limited amphibious capability, each carrying up to

30 troops with a basic combat load. Amphibious assaults against CFC

probably would be small, clandestine landings involving two to six

NAMPO craft; CHAHO or other naval craft could provide fire support.

Other amphibious craft include 8 HANTAE medium landing ships,

which can carry 3 to 4 light tanks, and approximately 125 KONG

BANG amphibious hovercraft.

The DPRK has a credible mine warfare capability. There are numerous

small surface ships that are capable of delivering mines within both the

navy and civilian sectors. Mines will be used to defend against amphibious assaults, defend strategic ports, and provide seaward flank protection for land forces. Defensive mine fields will be monitored by coastal

observation teams and radar, and they will be supported by well

emplaced artillery and missile batteries. This will make close approach

and mine clearing operations extremely hazardous. DPRK has a large

inventory of older technology mines, significant historical experience

with their effectiveness, and, most importantly, the willingness to use

them.
41

Other Considerations 

Biological

Biological warfare has not received the same attention as chemical or

nuclear warfare. However, if the DPRK did choose to employ biological

weapons, it probably could use infectious agents, such as those causing

anthrax or plague, against CFC forces.

Chemical

The DPRK is capable of producing nerve, blood, choking, and blister

agents. They have at least eight industrial facilities that could produce

these agents. While production rates are uncertain, large quantities of

agents are believed to be available.

Chemical weapons can be delivered by virtually all DPRK fire support

systems. This includes most artillery, multiple rocket launchers (including those mounted on CHAHO-type boats), mortars, FROGs, SCUD

missiles, and some aerial bombs.

The DPRK plans to operate in a chemically contaminated environment.

Chemical defense units are organic to combat units down to regiment

level. For example, an army corps has a dedicated chemical defense battalion and a regiment has a subordinate chemical defense platoon. These

chemical defense units have both detection and decontamination systems. Their missions include reconnaissance and the training of personnel in the use of protective equipment. Chemical training and exercises

for both military and civilian personnel have increased consistently over

the years.

DPRK chemical weapons would compliment conventional military

power. In a surprise attack, DPRK forces are expected to use chemical

weapons to demoralize defending forces, reduce their effectiveness, and

deny use of mobilization centers, storage areas, and military bases without physically destroying facilities and equipment. Non-persistent

chemical agents could be used to break through CFC defensive lines or
42

to hinder a CFC counterattack. Persistent chemical agents could be used

against fixed targets in rear areas, including command and control elements, major LOCs, logistic depots, airbases, and ports.

Special Operations Force 

Nearly 60,000 military personnel assigned to the 22 SOF brigades and

light infantry battalions would be available to open a second front in

CFC's rear area. These forces have five basic missions: conducting

reconnaissance, performing combat operations in concert with conventional operations, establishing a second front in the enemy's rear area,

countering CFC special operations in the North's rear areas, and maintaining internal security. These forces perform operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. During offensive operations, corps

reconnaissance units would conduct penetration missions to collect military intelligence and launch raids on military and civilian targets. Prior

to the main attack, some units would infiltrate behind allied lines by air

and sea, while others would cross into the ROK through tunnels under

the DMZ. These units would penetrate at night to locate and destroy

command posts, create confusion in rear areas, interdict troop and supply convoys, attack military and civilian installations (to include ports

and airfields), and gain control of critical terrain.

Summary

Most of the DPRK's military equipment is technologically inferior to

CFC equipment. The state of readiness and training for the force will

decline due to the age of equipment and lack of repair parts. Therefore,

the ability of the DPRK to threaten the South with conventional forces

will be reduced by the turn of the century.

National Military Policy 

DPRK military policy focuses on maintaining and sustaining a military

force capable of conducting an offensive operation into the ROK to

attain the national goal of reunifying the peninsula. DPRK military doc-
43

trine and policy specify the structure of DPRK armed forces, allocate

industrial resources and output, and orient research and development to

support the armed forces. This doctrine is the blueprint, drawn up by the

highest DPRK political leaders, that describes in detail the shape of the

armed forces and the way in which they are to be used. It is based on

three fundamental and interconnected concepts shaped by the late Kim

Il-song's vision of the future of the Korean Peninsula:

■ Eventual reunification,

■ DPRK regime survival and leadership of a unified Korea, and

■ the application of military force to achieve reunification.

DPRK force development and weapons acquisition strategy focuses on

countering the strengths and weaknesses of CFC forces while remaining

independent and self-sufficient in maintaining and modernizing their

armed forces. The DPRK military is attempting to meet the following

force objectives:

■ Develop and refine self-sufficiency in armament.

■ Maintain active force size and rapid force generation capabilities of

reserve forces.

■ Overcome terrain and technological disadvantages.

■ Ensure sustainability and improve warfighting infrastructure.

A major hurdle faced by the DPRK in attaining its force objectives is the

dismal state of its economy. Though the DPRK dedicates critical

resources to the military, at the expense of all other sectors of society,

the country may be facing economic collapse during this decade.

Because of this, the DPRK may be reaching a decision point, either to

use its military force or risk losing the military option. Consequently,

there is more pressure on the DPRK to complete its force objectives.

Barring economic collapse or military action, DPRK military policies

will continue to support the national goal of reunification.
44

The primary strength that the DPRK can draw upon is the support of the

North Korean people. Whether by force of indoctrination or genuine feelings of nationalism, this support constitutes a reservoir of national power.

DPRK soldiers are taught that the outcome of a war is not decided by

modern weapons and military technology, but by the "noble mission and

revolutionary spirit with which it fights for the liberation of the people."

This translates into a military force capable of supporting a wide range of

combat options without consideration for danger or moral values.

Vulnerabilities of this military doctrine include the sheer physical

exhaustion of the DPRK population. This is perhaps the greatest impediment to the North's attempt to offset the growing economic and military

power of the ROK. On the battlefield, perhaps the most decisive shortcoming of the DPRK would be the lack of modern reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition systems. This shortcoming is amplified

by the relative inaccurate and cumbersome characteristics of most of the

DPRK's major weapon platforms.

Military Strategy

The primary objective of North Korea's military strategy is to reunify

the Korean Peninsula under North Korean control within 30 days of

beginning hostilities. A secondary objective is the defense of North

Korea. To accomplish these objectives, North Korea envisions fighting a

two-front war. The first front, consisting of conventional forces, is

tasked with breaking through defending forces along the DMZ, destroying defending CFC forces, and advancing rapidly down the entire peninsula. This operation will be coordinated closely with the opening of a

second front consisting of SOF units conducting raids and disruptive

attacks in CFC's rear.

In developing the force to fulfill this two-front strategy, North Korea's

leaders realized that they could never reach technological parity with the

United States or U.S.-supplied South Korea. Instead, they focused on

attaining overall combat superiority through the use of surprise, shock,
45

speed, and overwhelming quantities of troops and firepower coupled

with a well-trained SOF.

North Korea, devastated during the Korean War, also places great

emphasis on maintaining a strong defense. To achieve the strategic

defense mission, North Korea has established defensive belts. They are

designed to defeat any attack from ground or amphibious forces. The

main strategic belt runs from the DMZ to Pyongyang. This belt contains

over two-thirds of the DPRK's active maneuver ground forces. Ground

defense along this belt is carried out by MPAF and corps level units.

Two army-level headquarters may be activated for wartime operations.

Coastal defense is provided by the navy, and ground antilanding defense

is provided by the army. Defense of DPRK airspace is provided by the

air force and antiair artillery units of the army. At the initiation of a

DPRK ground offensive, the North's reserve forces, numbering

some 5 million, would man a pre-established, in-depth national defense

network.

Military Doctrine

DPRK military doctrine is based on a blend of Russian operational art,

Chinese light infantry tactics, and North Korean lessons learned during

the Korean War. This doctrine is tempered by the national goal of

chuche (self reliance). The impact of chuche is that imported military

concepts have been adapted to the unique geography, social conditions,

and economic conditions found on the Korean peninsula. The guiding

principles within DPRK doctrine are as follows:

1. Annihilation: Destroy defending CFC forces in place. Do not allow

them to withdraw and regroup.

2. Surprise Attack: Achieved by making an unexpected assault in an

unexpected manner. Prevent CFC from taking effective countermeasures. Position forces to attack with little preparation. Practice excellent

OPSEC and deception. Attacks at night and during adverse weather are

the best way to achieve surprise. 
46

3. Overwhelming Firepower: Employ continuous massing fires

(including chemical) from heavy guns and multiple rocket launchers to

create opportunities for maneuver and to pulverize CFC forces.

4. Mobility: Employ tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled

artillery, vehicle-mounted rocket launchers, and vehicle-mounted antiaircraft guns to be able to attack/counterattack while moving. Utilize a

redundant C2 system while moving.

5. Impregnable Rear: Ensure that rear areas are secure from CFC

attack to remain fully capable of continuous support to attacking forces.

6. Conduct Special Operations and Guerrilla Warfare in the

Enemy's Rear: These operations are to be conducted in close coordination with conventional operations to maximize disruption of CFC air,

artillery, and logistics support to frontline CFC units.

7. Use the NKN and NKAF in Coordination with Ground Forces:

Employ the unique fires available from these forces to carry the fight to

the depths of CFC defenses. Use their transport capabilities to insert

SOF. Use them to safeguard the impregnable rear from air and sea attack.

8. Echelon Forces: Echelon at corps and below to provide both offensive

and defensive options as a conflict unfolds. Normally three echelons:

about two-thirds of force in first echelon, about one-third in the second

echelon, with about one-ninth held in reserve or as the third echelon.

9. Combined-arms Operations: Coordinate the actions of all forces,

large and small, conventional and unconventional, to successfully execute combat engagements.

10. Adequate Logistics: Ensure that there are sufficient logistic units to

support combat operations and long LOCs.

11. Use Terrain to the Best Advantage: Emphasize mountain operations.
47

12. Detailed Reconnaissance: Know CFC locations and be able to target them.

Operational Level of War

Operational Level Offense

The operational objective of DPRK forces in the offense is the destruction of CFC forces in a short duration, high intensity campaign employing maneuver warfare.

To achieve these objectives, the DPRK has developed a mobile ground

force emphasizing the utilization of overwhelming firepower. The latest

evolution in force structure and doctrine, begun in the late 1970s, has

resulted in two distinct force organizations: a large, mobile active force

(including SOF) organized, trained, and deployed to carry out offensive

operations against the CFC, and an extensive, well trained reserve force

to defend the DPRK.

The DPRK offensive against the ROK will consist of three phases. The

objective of the first phase will be to breach the defenses along the DMZ

and destroy the forward deployed CFC forces. The objective of the second phase will be to isolate Seoul and consolidate gains. The objective

of the third phase will be to pursue and destroy remaining CFC forces

and occupy the remainder of the peninsula.

The four forward conventional corps, I, II, IV, and V, are considered the

"warfighting" corps. They are expected to conduct the initial attacks

with the primary mission of annihilating CFC forces north of Seoul. The

concept of annihilation is the key to the NKA doctrine, as it continually

states the necessity to destroy enemy forces in place. The forward corps'

follow-on mission is the defeat of CFC forces in depth.

The remaining conventional corps, III, VI, VII, VIII, and the Capital

Defense Corps (CDC) have several possible missions. These missions

include providing follow-on forces, round-out forces, and serving as
48

coastal, rear area, or capital defense forces. Dependent on the forward

corps' success, the rear corps will release units to serve as replacements. 

Two mechanized corps and part of the armor corps will provide the

exploitation forces to carry the battle beyond Seoul. The remaining

mechanized corps and armor from the armor corps could provide the

strategic reserve north of the DMZ.

Just prior to the initiation of hostilities, two army-level commands may

be established. These commands are expected to control operations

from the DMZ to the port of Pusan. Army Group I would be responsible

for conducting the main attack into the western portion of South Korea

and destroying the bulk of CFC forces north of Seoul. Army Group II

would be responsible for conducting supporting attacks down the eastern portion of the ROK and securing the left flank of Army Group I. 

Army Group II would most likely consist of the following forces:

First Echelon: Will consist of the forward corps. Their mission will be

to conduct the initial infantry assault across the DMZ and break through

CFC defenses.

Second Echelon: Will consist of mechanized and armor forces. The primary mission of these forces will be to envelop and destroy forward

deployed forces.

Third Echelon: Will also consist of mechanized and armor forces. The

mission of these forces will be to pursue and destroy the remaining CFC

forces and to occupy the entire peninsula. Additionally, strategic reserve

forces or follow-on forces exist to augment all echelons if required.

Although the NKA places great emphasis on maneuver, it has elected

not to rely on extensive mechanization of its infantry forces. It is important to note the NKA concept of "mechanization." To the NKA, mechanization is designed to provide rapid "protected" movement of an

infantry force. For the most part, personnel travel in armored personnel

carriers or trucks, not infantry fighting vehicles. Once the force reaches
49

its destination, troops dismount to conduct traditional infantry operations rather than Russian-style infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) tactics

while fighting a mounted battle, whenever possible, through the enemy

defenses. Selective mechanization has been accomplished through the

use of self-propelled artillery and antiaircraft systems and tanks, but not

CHINA

SOUTH KOREA

RUSSIA

Sea of Japan

Yellow Sea

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Korea Bay

 PYONGYANG

Demarcation Line

Kaesong

Sariwon

Wonsan

Hamhung

Sinuiju

I

II IV

III

V

VII

VI

Chongjin

Panmunjom

620th

Armament

Corps

Corps

Corps Boundary

Capital Defense Corps

Artillery Corps

Mechanized Corps

NORTH KOREA VII

Corps Level Organization
50

large quantities of armored personnel carriers or IFVs. As in the past,

the DPRK ground force of the 1990s relies on the foot soldiers' ability to

exploit nontrafficable terrain. The objective is to overwhelm CFC units

with conventional forces and exploit breakthroughs with mechanized

assets without becoming roadbound.

Exploitation Forces

To support offensive operations of the forward corps, the NKA has created four mechanized corps and an armor corps. Two mechanized, the

806th and 815th, and the 820th armored corps are positioned to support

strikes by the forward conventional corps and are considered to be tactical exploitation forces. Individual mechanized brigades may be turned

over to the control of the forward corps to exploit breakthroughs

achieved by the infantry. Their main objective is to drive deeply behind

CFC lines and set up blocking positions to cut off withdrawing or reinforcing CFC forces. Each mechanized brigade is capable of independent

operations behind enemy lines.

Successful destruction of CFC forces north of Seoul will enable the NKA

to commit its operational exploitation forces. This force will operate

under the control of an army command and conduct corps level, cohesive

operations. They are expected to be committed at the time forward CFC

forces are annihilated. Their mission is to quickly seize and secure key

terrain leading to control of the area between Seoul and Pusan.

The NKA will seek force ratios of 3-5 to 1 in armor, 6-8 to 1 in artillery,

and 4-6 to 1 in infantry forces to mount an attack. In attempting to

breach a well prepared defensive position, the NKA may be expected to

seek even larger ratios. This undoubtedly would be the case in attempting to break through DMZ defenses.

Combined-arms operations constitute the foundation of tactical battle in

NKA doctrine. Utilization of the forward conventional corps, reinforced

by the mechanized and armor corps, to fight from the DMZ to Pusan is

called the Strike Force concept. This concept embodies how the NKA is

expected to fight, especially south of Seoul or in defense of the DPRK.
51

The Strike Force concept was devised to compensate for DPRK deficiencies, CFC strengths, and terrain considerations. Using a task organization approach, the NKA fields, trains, and exercises a large ground

force, designed to overcome the strengths and exploit the weaknesses of

CFC forces. Strike Forces/Groups are formed around a core unit, either

a corps, division, or regiment/brigade. As the situation develops, additional units, such as armor, or artillery, may be diverted to the Strike

Force to significantly increase available fire support.

The DPRK maneuver forces will echelon in three parts: a forward element (most likely reinforced light infantry), which is a self-contained

maneuver force and two maneuver elements. Although the second

maneuver element is sometimes referred to as the reserve, it contains

sufficient combat weight to assume the lead of the main attack should

the first maneuver element fail or stall, or to attack another objective.

Avenues of Approach

The NKA is expected to use three primary avenues of approach into

the ROK. They are the Kaesong-Munsan approach, the Chorwon Valley approach, and along the east coast. There are several sub-maneuver

NKA FORCE STRUCTURE

FUNCTION

REAR ARMY

CORPS

STRATEGIC

REVERSES

2ND OPERATION

ECHELON

1ST OPERATION

ECHELON

CORPS/CORPS-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS

837 6

4 25 1

806

108

815 820

425

AC

XXX

XXX

XXX XXX XXX XXX

XXX XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX XXX XXX XXX

XXXX

AG

XXXX

AG

XXX
52

PYONGYANG

SEOUL

Koksan

Wonsan

Kangnung

Osan

TDC

Uljongnu

Sariwon

KAESONGMUNSAN

APPROACH

K-M North

CHORWON

APPROACH

EAST COAST

APPROACH

MSR 3

Taedong Mountains

Kumwha Valley

DMZ

DMZ

KAESONG-MUNSAN CHORWON VALLEY EAST COAST

Kaesong-Munsan North Kumwha Valley

Chorwon West (MSR 3)

Taedong Mountains

Avenues of Approach
53

corridors that can facilitate maneuver from the three major avenues of

approach.

The Second Front

As the attack against the forward defenses along the DMZ begins,

DPRK forces will initiate SCUD and FROG missile attacks with high

explosives, smoke, and possible nonpersistent chemical warheads

against airfields, lines of communications, C2 and logistics facilities.

Additionally, the DPRK attacks will be supported by the opening of a

"second front" in CFC's rear areas by teams of SOF units. These soldiers, some dressed in ROK army uniforms and carrying ROK weapons

and equipment, will infiltrate into the south by air, sea, and through tunnels under the DMZ to attack CFC airfields, C3, and other key targets.

Operational Level Defense

In the defense, DPRK forces have an operational objective of coordinating the defense and conducting counterattacks to repel CFC forces from

DPRK-controlled territory and adjacent waters. The DPRK views the

offensive as the only means with which to achieve decisive victory. Thus,

DPRK forces would use the defense only to consolidate gains, await

additional resources when temporarily halted, protect flanks, repulse

CFC counterattacks, or free resources for other offensive actions. 

In the defense, DPRK forces plan to use counterattacks to quickly disrupt CFC offensive operations. Once it appears that these forces have

been, or will be, successful in breaching the defense, DPRK forces will

attempt an immediate counterattack. 

Fire support in the defense is well planned and highly concentrated to

cover flanks and forward sectors. Artillery fires in the defense include:

■ Long-range fires: Designed to engage CFC forces before they can

organize into attack formations.
54

■ Close combat fires: Designed to concentrate fire on CFC forces just

prior to the assault on DPRK defensive lines.

■ Final protective fires: Designed to begin just prior to CFC breaching operations and intended to limit avenues of approach and thwart

CFC penetration of the main defensive position. 

■ Fires within the defensive positions: Designed to blunt CFC penetrations of the defense while DPRK forces mount a counterattack.

In the defense, the DPRK also places great emphasis on antiaircraft

artillery (AAA) and engineer support. The first priority of AAA is the

protection of artillery assets, but they would be deployed to cover the

defense in depth. Engineer support would include the use of antitank

and antipersonnel obstacles to deny CFC avenues of approach, especially armor, into the main defensive area. The antitank plan is an integral part of DPRK defensive operations. They view tanks as a primary

threat to a successful defense. As such, a DPRK defensive plan would

include antitank operations, engineer support, and artillery support. In

all defensive operations, the North Koreans plan for an antitank support

area forward in the defensive zone.

NKA Tactics in the Offense

NKA Tactical Principles

Division and lower echelon units are considered tactical level elements.

They are charged with winning battles and engagements that support

operational objectives. Combined-arms operations constitute the foundation of tactical battle in NKA doctrine. The most important tactical

principles of this doctrine are as follows:

1. Mass: The focusing of sufficient combat power against CFC's center

of gravity to disrupt operational or tactical decision making.

2. Surprise: Used to significantly multiply combat power to provide a

decisive advantage over a numerically or technologically superior CFC

force. 
55

3. Annihilation: Of utmost importance to the NKA, used so that CFC

formations cannot regroup to counterattack or reconstitute.

4. Fluidity: The NKA emphasizes the need for a continuous flow of battle. Forces designated to achieve breakthroughs in CFC defenses are

quickly followed by mechanized forces that are tasked to penetrate deep

into CFC's rear area.

NKA Tactical Formations in the Offense

The infantry division is the basic combat unit in the NKA and was

designed to provide maximum flexibility for maneuverability. Infantry

divisions are organized with tanks, artillery, and engineers to aid in

accomplishing the mission. Artillery provides orchestrated fire support, and during offensive operations, it is designed to protect the

advancing force by continually placing a heavy barrage in front of the

assaulting echelons.

Regimental

Rear

Boundary

Line

X X XX X

X X

X X X

XX

XX XX

XX

OFFENSE

DEFENSE

OFFENSE OR DEFENSE OFFENSE

DEFENSE

Division

Rear

Boundary

Line

I I I

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

KILOMETERS

KILOMETERS

Division and Regimental Depths
56

The NKA uses two primary tactical formations for the division, brigade,

regiment, and battalion: the march formation and the attack formation. 

NKA March Formation

Generally, the NKA plans to move during darkness or under conditions of limited visibility. When forces move during daylight hours,

special countermeasures, such as camouflage, antiair and antitank

defense, are emphasized.

The composition of the march formation includes a forward-deployed

reconnaissance unit, advance guard, security force, main body, and a

rear guard. For an NKA regiment, the forward security for the main

body is a reinforced company, located 5-10 km forward of the main

body. Flank security for the regiment are reinforced platoons, one each,

operating 2-3 km to each flank. The main body consists of two-thirds of

the combat power of the march formation. Its mission is to maneuver

and destroy CFC formations that cannot be overcome by the advance

guard. The regiment's rear guard usually consists of a platoon that follows 2-3 km behind the main body. During a retreat, the rear guard

probably would consist of a reinforced company, operating 5-10 km

behind the main body. 
57

DIRECTION

OF ATTACK

BASIC FORMATIONS

COLUMN (or file) RANK (or on line)

Weak to the front

WEDGE

Used when the situation is uncertain

In anticipation of incidental engagement

ECHELON LEFT

Used when a flank attack

is expected from the left

1

1

2

2

3

3

USUAL TRANSITION FROM

THE MARCH INTO COMBAT

DEPLOYMENTS COMMANDER'S

LOCATION

Used when a flank attack

is expected from the right

ECHELON RIGHT

INVERTED WEDGE

Used when the situation is certain

Normal formation

Weak to its flanks

Enemy situation is known

Front is broad
58

ADVANCE

GUARD

KILOMETERS

DIRECTION OF MARCH

ADVANCE

GUARD

SUPPORT

I I I I I

FLANK

GUARD

FLOATING

FLANK

GUARD

MAIN

BODY GUARD

REAR

KILOMETERS

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

0

2

4

6

8

10

RECON

UNIT

I

REAR

GUARD RESERVE

FORCE

SECOND

ECHELON

FIRST

ECHELON

FORWARD

RECON/SCREEN

ELEMENT

KILOMETERS

DIRECTION OF MARCH

MAIN BODY

I I I I I I I I

0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 64

Infantry Regiment in March Formation

Mechanized Brigade March Column
59

VEHICLES

COMPANIES

BATTALIONS

REGIMENTS ON THE SAME ROUTE

DIVISION MAIN BODY AND DIVISION REAR SERVICES

INTERVALS

25 - 50 Meters

3 - 5 Kilometers

5 - 10 Kilometers

15 - 20 Kilometers

UNIT/VEHICLES INTERVALS

TYPE OF ROAD

Paved

Gravel/Rubble

Dirt

10% SURFACE

DAMAGE

40 - 50 Km/Hr

40 - 45 Km/Hr

15 - 25 Km/Hr

AVERAGE VEHICLE SPEED

UNDAMAGED

SURFACE

> 10% SURFACE

DESTRUCTION

20 - 35 Km/Hr

20 - 30 Km/Hr

8 - 15 Km/Hr

10 - 20 Km/Hr

10 - 20 Km/Hr

5 - 10 Km/Hr

MARCH

Foot

Vehicles

MARCH DISTANCE

1 Day (Km)

DAY

4 - 5

15 - 20

AVERAGE MARCH RATES

RATE OF MARCH

(Km/Hr)

REMARKS

(Hrs)

Regular: 7 - 8

Forced: 10 - 12

NIGHT

4 - 5

10 - 15

Regular: 30

Forced: 45

Regular: 150

Forced: 200
60

NKA Attack Formation

NKA combat organization is determined by the mission assigned, terrain, and enemy capabilities. Combat formations are divided into the

forward element, the first and second maneuver echelons, and the

reserves. The first echelon is responsible for penetrating initial CFC

positions and achieving the immediate objective. The second echelon or

reserve, is tasked with destroying all bypassed CFC elements. The second echelon is also used to secure the flanks and rear area of the first

echelon. The reserve forces are used to reinforce the first and second

echelons and as a standby for a counterattack. Divisions and regiments

will also have an artillery group (DAG or RAG) consisting of organic

artillery augmented with artillery from higher echelons. For offensive

operations, forces are organized as follows:

1. Division

■ Forward Element: Reinforced light infantry battalion.

■ First Echelon: Two regiments reinforced by tanks and artillery.

Responsible for accomplishing the division's immediate objective,

the destruction of CFC's regimental reserve. On order, continue the

attack to accomplish subsequent objective of destruction of CFC's

division reserve.

■ Second Echelon: One regiment (-). Follows the first echelon by 6-8

km, reinforced by tanks and artillery when committed. On order,

continue the attack to accomplish division's subsequent objective.

■ Reserves: Battalion-size element composed of infantry, tank, and

antitank reserve. Responsible for flank and rear area security for

attacking echelon and mop up operations to exploit success. Acts as

replacement or infiltration force as needed.
61

2. Regiment

■ Forward Element: Reinforced infantry company.

■ First Echelon: Two battalions reinforced with tanks and artillery.

Accomplish regiment's immediate objective of destroying CFC's battalion reserve. On order, continue the attack to accomplish regiment's

subsequent objective of destroying CFC's regimental reserve. 

■ Second Echelon: One battalion (-). Follows first echelon at 3-5 km,

reinforced with tanks and artillery upon commitment. On order,

accomplish regimental subsequent objective. 

■ Reserves: Composed of a company-size element. Mission and

employment are the same as division reserves.

3. Battalion

■ Forward Element: Infantry company.

■ First Echelon: Two companies reinforced with tanks and engineers.

Companies and platoons attack together; responsible for achieving

battalion's immediate objective of penetrating CFC's front lines. On

order, continue the attack to battalion's subsequent objective of

destroying CFC's battalion reserve.

■ Second Echelon: One company (-). Follows the first echelon at 0.4-1

km. When committed to the offense, receives tank support to accomplish battalion's subsequent objective. On order, continue the attack

to accomplish the regiment's subsequent objectives.

■ Reserves: One platoon-size force. Reinforces the attack echelon,

conducts mop-up operations, and supports the exploitation of battle

successes.
62

NKA Tactical Frontages and Depths in the Offense

500-700 Meters

Company 

Commander

VULNERABILITIES: The platoon leader is the only link to company and battalion. Get him and you will 

decrease the platoon's ability to fire and maneuver.

WEAPONS:

AK-47

RPK (LMG)

RPG-7

SNIPER RIFLE

27

3

3

1

NOTE: The platoon will be supported by company crew-served and 

battalion indirect-fire weapons.

NKA INFANTRY PLATOON

ATTACK FORMATION

500-700 Meters

Company 

Commander

VULNERABILITIES: The company will come on line about 300m from your position. Use mines, small arms 

and mortars to disrupt his advance. Rough terrain may force him to expose his flanks.

WEAPONS:

AK-47

RPK (LMG)

RPG-7

SNIPER RIFLE

HVY MACHINE GUN

81

9

9

3

2

NOTE: The company will be supported by battalion and regimental 

indirect-fire weapons.

NKA INFANTRY COMPANY

ATTACK FORMATION

1 X BMG 1 X BMG
63

VULNERABILITIES: Engage the tanks at maximum range with TOWs. Use M60 and .50 CALs to 

keep tank crews buttoned up. That will cut their ability to see by half. Move to 

alternate sites often.

WEAPONS:

10 T-55/62 TANKS

NOTE: The tank company will be supported by battalion and regimental 

indirect-fire weapons.

NKA TANK COMPANY

ATTACK FORMATION

1000-1500 Meters

WEAPONS:

AK-47

RPK (LMG)

RPG-7

SNIPER RIFLE

HVY MACHINE GUN

B10 (82mm RCL)

82mm MORTARS

345

27

31

9

6

3

9

NOTE: The battalion will be supported by indirect fire from 

regiment and division.

NKA INFANTRY BATTALION

ATTACK FORMATION

3 X BMG 3 X BMG

B10 RCL GUN

82mm

82mm 82mm

I

I I
64

Regiment in the Attack

RAG

I I I

I

I (-)

I I I I I I

I

I

I

I

AT

I

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

3 - 5 KM

KILOMETERS
65

NKA Mechanized Brigade in the Attack

REAR

FWD

I I

I I (-)

I I

I I (-)

152 MM

152 MM 152 MM

122 MM

122 MM 122 MM

120 MM

120 MM 120 MM

82 MM 82 MM

LT

2.5 - 5 KM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

5 - 10 KM

KILOMETERS

X

I I

I I

I I I I

X

I

I

I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I
66

NKA Division in the Attack

MAIN

I I

XX

I I

I I

XX

FWD I

I I I DAG I I I

I I I I

RAG RAG

I

I I I I I I I I

I

I I I

I I I

3 - 5 KM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

6 - 10 KM

KILOMETERS
67

NKA Tactical Maneuver

The NKA offensive tactical maneuver includes the meeting engagement, movement to contact, deliberate attack, pursuit, spoiling attack,

and bypass.

Meeting Engagement

The NKA will conduct a meeting engagement when there is a demand

for the redirection of combat deployments because of rapid situational

changes. They are characterized by hasty planning due to limited time, a

continuous effort to seize and retain the initiative, deployment into combat from the march column at high speed, and a lack of detailed intelligence. The meeting engagement unfolds as follows:

■ March to contact with emphasis on forward reconnaissance.

■ Initial contact and combat development by the advance guard.

■ Maneuver and engagement of the main force.

■ Termination and transition to subsequent actions.

When the forward element guard of a marching unit comes into contact

with the enemy, the actions of the main body would depend on the size

of the CFC force encountered. If it is equal to or smaller than the forward element, the forward element would attempt to decisively engage

and destroy the CFC force. If it is larger than the forward element, the

main body would either bypass or envelop the enemy strongpoint.

Movement to Contact

NKA movement to contact is designed to gain initial ground contact

with CFC forces or to regain lost contact. Though little is known on the

specifics of NKA doctrine for movement to contact, there are certain

principles that apply to this type of offensive operation. The NKA will

probably seek to make contact with the smallest CFC element possible

to maintain freedom of maneuver with the bulk of its force. All available

reconnaissance and security means would be employed to ensure that
68

the main force is committed under the most favorable conditions. At the

division level, subordinate units would be expected to act boldly within

clear directives in order to seize the initiative, to keep CFC off balance,

and to exploit success. The NKA force conducting a movement to contact will organize in a march formation, with advance, flank, and rear

security elements protecting the main body. NKA movement to contact

would end when CFC resistance requires the deployment and coordinated effort of the main body. It normally ends in a meeting engagement

or a deliberate attack maneuver.

Deliberate Attack

When an NKA division conducts a deliberate attack, several types of

maneuvers contribute to the overall execution and flow of the battle.

When attacking a defending CFC force that cannot be bypassed (or

should not be bypassed because of possible future combat potential), the

NKA would plan to begin with a penetration. This would be followed

with the envelopment and destruction of CFC forces and then a pursuit

of any withdrawing CFC forces to ensure complete destruction. 

In the conduct of a deliberate attack, the NKA assigns a specific mission/objective to a company-size unit. A battalion or larger unit is

assigned an immediate and a secondary mission/objective. The secondary mission/objective is the immediate mission/objective of the next

higher headquarters. For example, the secondary mission of a battalion

would be the immediate mission of its parent regiment. At night or when

visibility is poor, a single broad mission would normally be assigned.

The objective of the penetration is to penetrate CFC's defense and

would be used when CFC's flank is exposed, or when an exploitable gap

or weakly defended point exists in CFC's forward defensive positions. A

successful penetration employs the elements of surprise and strong firepower. The selection of the penetration direction and effective employment of secondary attack force and infiltration units are important to the

success of this maneuver.
69

The envelopment is the primary and preferred tactical maneuver for

NKA ground forces. Whenever possible, it would be attempted, using

the forward element to fix and engage CFC defensive positions, while

first echelon forces attack CFC's flank and rear. The second echelon will

conduct a penetration once the enemy front is weakened or a second

envelopment. The main combat weight during an NKA envelopment

would be against CFC's flank with the intent to divide and destroy and

prevent the arrival of CFC reinforcements. 

A split envelopment would be used after the first breakthrough of CFC

defensive positions. As the main NKA force continues to advance

deeper into the defense, subordinate elements would be tasked to conduct split envelopments to divide, isolate, encircle, and destroy remaining CFC forces one by one. This maneuver requires close coordination

and maneuver among NKA units. During an NKA deliberate attack,

several small unit maneuvers are designed to contribute to the overall

success of the penetration or envelopment. They are the POCHO and

CHEON IB.

The POCHO (main attack) is emphasized at the squad and platoon levels and plans for the infiltration through gaps in CFC defensive strongpoints and attack to CFC's rear.

The CHEON IB (supporting attack) is a tactical maneuver that stresses

the exploitation of small gaps in CFC's defensive positions to allow for

infiltration to the rear. It differs from the POCHO in that it normally

would be conducted by small elements of the support attack.

During the deliberate attack, some NKA units may be assigned the mission of conducting a pointed advance. This would be conducted by

straight-leg infantry units along a narrow front with the intention of penetrating CFC defenses along a perpendicular ridgeline that is linked to

the defensive deep area. This form of maneuver would commonly be

used in combination with the breakthrough of the main attack or with an

envelopment, and calls for heavy fire support. Although a pointed

advance would normally take place in an area adjacent to the main
70

attack, it can also take place in the frontal area of the main attack when

no avenue of approach exists that is favorable for a breakthrough deep

into CFC's defense. In the execution of a pointed advance (and subject

to terrain limitations), an NKA division would use two battalions

located 1 to 1.5 km from the main assault to penetrate to a CFC battalion's front line and an NKA regiment would use two companies located

500 to 700 m from the main assault to penetrate into a CFC company's

front line.

Pursuit 

The NKA would execute the pursuit to block CFC's withdrawal routes.

This maneuver calls for advancing to a point of key terrain before CFC

forces begin to withdraw and destroying them in a series of meeting

engagements.

Generally, NKA pursuit operations would use a column formation to

provide speed and flexibility. The lead elements in the pursuit would

attempt to apply pressure on CFC forces to prevent disengagement from

contact. Concurrently, NKA artillery would attempt to form a barrier at

road intersections or other chokepoints, in an attempt to cut off CFC

withdrawal routes. Throughout the pursuit, the NKA plans for the forward deployment of artillery and mortars to maintain a high level of fire

support. NKA engineers are expected to eliminate obstacles to facilitate

the advance while the assault forces push forward in an attempt to commit the CFC reserve force. NKA reserve forces are expected to infiltrate

CFC rear areas. NKA doctrine includes three types of pursuit: frontal,

parallel, and composite.

A frontal pursuit would be executed when there are no parallel bypass

routes or when strong pressure is required to keep CFC forces from disengaging from combat. The NKA might also use frontal pursuit to cover

other forces conducting a parallel pursuit into CFC's flank and rear areas.
71

The NKA would execute a parallel pursuit when routes exist on CFC's

flanks. The NKA would attempt to conduct a surprise attack on these

flank areas to cut off CFC withdrawal routes. The NKA might also conduct a composite pursuit, a combination of the frontal and parallel pursuits. The NKA main force would attempt to pressure CFC's covering

forces, while simultaneously attempting to cut off CFC's withdrawal

routes. An attack would be conducted into CFC's flank and rear areas.

An NKA pursuit operation would cease when CFC forces are completely destroyed, NKA forces have outdistanced their logistic lines,

NKA forces in the pursuit are overextended, or when confronted with a

powerful CFC defensive position.

Bypass

NKA forces would conduct a bypass maneuver in an attempt to force

CFC forces to abandon or shift defensive postures. A bypass maneuver

is characterized by an attempt to annihilate CFC reinforcements and

block withdrawal routes to prevent a CFC withdrawal. An NKA bypass

would have a secondary attack axis with emphasis on superior firepower

and maneuverability and is a combined-arms operation with a goal of

striking deep into CFC's rear area. A successful bypass operation would

make use of surprise, deception, and terrain. The bypass as an attack

maneuver is like an envelopment, except the first echelon does not

become engaged.
72

North Korean Army Manuevers

I I I

LT

1

1

2

I I I

I I I

I I I

I I

Secondary

Attack

(Fixing)

Main Attack

(Envelopment)

Infiltration

Force

(Rear Area

Harassment)

Interval of

6 to 8 km

I I I

1

I I I

Secondary

Attack

(Fixing)

1

2

I I I

I I I

Main

Interval of Attack

6 to 8 km

(Rear Area

Harassment)

Infiltration

Force LT

I I

*(Bypass)

ENVELOPMENT BYPASS

1

I I I

Secondary

Attack

(Holding)

1*

2

I I I

I I I

Main

Attack

Interval of

6 to 8 km

(Rear Area

Harassment)

Infiltration

Force LT

I I

PENETRATION

11st Echelon Forces

22d Echelon Forces

3Immediate division to envelop and

 destroy Regional Reserve Force.

11st Echelon Forces

22d Echelon Forces

*Main attack forces avoid enemy forces in 

 defensive positions. They attack the enemy 

 as they are occupying secondary positions.

11st Echelon Forces

22d Echelon Forces

*Upon penetration of enemy

 lines, envelopment is initiated.
73

Frontal Pursuit

Parallel Pursuit

Combination Pursuit

Enemy

Enemy

Enemy

Split Envelopment

Split

Envelopment

Split

Envelopment

Breakthrough

North Korean Army Maneuvers (Continued)
74

Night Attack

The NKA views night operations as offering the greatest opportunity for

surprise and would use this method for closing with CFC forces without

being detected by forward defenses, attacking targets, opening passages

through obstacles, and secretly moving second-echelon forces forward.

Though based on simple movements and attack formations, the NKA

regard the night attack as an important and complex form of combat

requiring close control, detailed reconnaissance, and daylight preparation. It could be a continuation of a daylight attack or a counterattack

from an established defensive position.

Although the starting time for an NKA night attack could vary depending on the situation, the NKA would take into consideration times when

CFC patrol activities appear to be relaxed, during poor weather, when

CFC troops are asleep, or when they appear to be off-guard because of

lack of previous combat operations. Night attacks launched before midnight would be executed for the purpose of expanding previous daytime

exploitation operations. Night attacks launched after midnight would be

executed as the beginning of daylight offensive operations.

Night attack formations would be selected based on the location of the

attack starting position. NKA doctrine includes three types of night formations: the column, standing abreast, and dispersed. The column formation would be used when the attack starting position is located a long

distance from CFC defensive lines. The standing abreast formation is the

standard night attack formation. The dispersed formation would be used

when the attack starting position is located near CFC's defensive lines.

The NKA night attack formation would normally use a narrower front

than in the day. Also, the assault line would normally be closer to CFC

positions than in the day (less than 150 m) and movement to this point

would stress the need to avoid detection by CFC reconnaissance or surveillance. During the advance, NKA personnel would quickly drop to the

ground at CFC employment of illumination and then quickly resume the
75

advance when the illumination is negated. Should they encounter a CFC

patrol or security force, the advancing force would attempt to quietly

capture or dispose of these forces with "gun barrel or soundless arms."

To improve command and control, precise avenues of approach would

be designated. Easily recognizable terrain features would be selected as

control points to facilitate movement and to indicate the direction of the

attack. Additionally, a compass-bearing specialist would be assigned to

each sector unit.

Should the NKA force conducting a night attack be discovered and

come under fire and illumination, it would move promptly, without stopping, towards the attack line, avoiding fire as much as possible and

maintaining communication silence. Upon initiation of the attack, artillery and mortar units would open fire at designated targets while the

infantry initiates the attack throwing hand grenades, engaging in handto-hand combat, and shouting battle cries. To maintain the proper direction of the attack, tracer and artillery illumination rounds may be used.

Armor assets would be held at the initial attack positions and, on order,

advance to join the infantry.

Armor Support to Offensive Operations

NKA armor units are designed to act decisively in combat and operate

independently or as part of combined-arms operations providing direct

support to the infantry, conducting antiarmor operations, and facilitating

the seizure of territory and the annihilation of CFC forces through

maneuver and pursuit.

When the NKA tanks are operating in small groups, it is normal to have

one or two platoons of infantry attached to a company, or vice versa,

where tanks support an infantry attack. In larger unit operations, a company of mechanized infantry is attached to tank battalions performing

independent tasks; likewise, a tank company will be attached to a mechanized infantry battalion when attacking a strong defensive position.

Attached companies may be employed as whole units or be divided and

distributed as needed.
76

NKA armor and infantry forces are expected to coordinate their efforts

during the attack, each using its strength to compensate for the weaknesses of the other. Tanks would propel the attack, maintaining a vigorous pace, attempting to destroy CFC vehicles and hardened positions.

Armored forces would be capable of delivering firepower to a greater

depth than most infantry weapons and would be expected to destroy

CFC obstacles such as pillboxes, wire entanglements, and minefields

(through the use of anti-mine rollers and blades), as well as providing

the infantry cover as it advances behind NKA artillery shelling. The

infantry would be tasked with destroying any antitank positions, reporting other targets for destruction by tanks, and providing cover for damaged tanks pending their recovery.

NKA armor units would perform the same types of offensive maneuver

as the infantry and are well suited to attacking directly from the march.

In the movement to contact, a tank formation would leave its assembly

area with its elements deployed in such order as to allow for a quick

transition to the attack formation. In the attack and penetration, NKA

tank formations would be selected to allow tanks and infantry to arrive

at CFC's first line of defense at the same time. Tanks would support the

infantry advance by fire and destruction of antipersonnel obstacles. During exploitation operations, tanks would assist the infantry in carrying

the assault into CFC's defensive positions. Here, the speed and shock

value of armor would be stressed in denying CFC an opportunity to

counterattack or reinforce the defense. Tanks would also assist in

bypassing CFC defensive strongpoints by blinding or screening through

the use of smoke. In the pursuit, the speed and maneuverability of NKA

armor assets would be used to maintain pressure directly on CFC forces

and to envelop for eventual annihilation.

In organizing for combat, an NKA armor brigade's assets would be

assigned to the two combat echelons and reserve of the unit conducting

the attack. These echelons would be reinforced according to their

assigned combat tasks. 
77

NKA armor formations would include the column, rank, wedge,

inverted wedge, and echelon to the right or left.

Artillery Support to Offensive Operations

In the offense, the mission of NKA artillery would be to suppress or

destroy CFC personnel and equipment which pose a threat to NKA

infantry and tank units. The NKA is capable of delivering massed or dispersed fires from fixed positions over relatively long ranges with highly

destructive power. The NKA considers the ability of artillery to maneuver and to fire accurately under limited visibility, weather, and terrain

conditions to be very important.

Tactical employment of NKA artillery would be based on flexibility of

organization, integration of the fire plan, centralized control, concentration of firepower, and mobility:

■ Flexibility of organization would be used to concentrate firepower

on the axis of the main attack by forming temporary mission-oriented

artillery groups at all echelons.

■ Integration of the fire plan would be used for the integration of the

fires of field guns of various calibers with the machinegun fires of

infantry companies into a single fire plan.

■ Centralized control would give the maneuver unit commander at

each echelon control over artillery assets as the NKA does not assign

tactical missions to its artillery. As the attacking units advance, control of artillery would be decentralized starting at the lowest echelon.

The maneuver commander would centralize the control of artillery

again as needed.

■ Concentration of power would be achieved through the use of all

calibers of guns in concentrated fire to the maximum extent possible.

■ Mobility would be used for quick dispersion or the concentration of

artillery fire in support of a maneuver unit.
78

The combined-arms theory of the NKA is similar to that of the former

Soviet Army in that artillery fire support required for regiment and division-size battles exceeds the organic fire support capabilities of regiments and divisions. Therefore, the NKA would form multi-battalion

artillery groups at all echelons to support specific combat missions. The

groups would be formed at army, corps, division, brigade, and regiment

level and would include artillery assets organic to these echelons plus

artillery attachments. At least a corps artillery group (CAG) would normally consist of two to three long-range artillery battalions that have the

mission of general support to the corps, support of the division(s) conducting the main attack, counterbattery fire, and deep fire on CFC's rear

area. A division artillery group (DAG) would normally be composed of

at least two or three battalions equipped with guns, howitzers, mortars,

and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). A regimental artillery group

(RAG) would normally be composed of two to four battalions provided

by division or corps and would provide support to forward maneuver

units. This organization of artillery groups allows for a concentration of

firepower to support the main attack, the ability to support unanticipated

requirements, or the requirements of a higher echelon. 

During the attack, NKA artillery firing positions would be selected

through reconnaissance of the actual location. Subsequent firing positions would be selected through visual reconnaissance (observation) and

by selecting a general area on the map and moving to that area. After

destroying pre-planned targets during the preparatory fire, the guns

would change positions. Normally, artillery pieces would be placed at a

distance of one-third of their maximum range from the line of contact

with CFC forces. When needed, the firing positions would be set up in

an area where artillery can conduct direct fire.

In order to assure continuous and effective command of artillery asset

and fire direction, the NKA would establish and employ artillery observation posts (OPs) at each echelon. Based on their surveillance of the

terrain and CFC activity, the OPs would observe and adjust artillery fire

as well as provide command and fire direction.
79

NKA conduct of artillery fire in the offense would be broken down into

three types of fire: preparatory fire, fire support of the attack, and fire

support in depth during the attack.

In the offense, preparatory fire would be conducted to destroy CFC

CPs and observation facilities, cause the collapse of defensive organization, and clear a path through obstacles for infantry, tanks, artillery, and

engineers. Fire would be sustained for 10 to 20 minutes in preparation

for a hasty attack, or 30 to 40 minutes for a deliberate attack. Preparatory fire would normally be divided into four phases:

1st Phase: CFC front platoon area (suppressive fire).

2nd Phase: CFC company reserve area.

3rd Phase: CFC battalion reserve area.

4th Phase: CFC front platoon area (annihilation fire).

Preparatory fire probably would not be divided into phases when visibility is poor and observation of fire is not possible or when CFC has gone

into a hasty defense and has not yet constructed its defensive positions.

NKA fire support of the attack would be conducted to assist the

advance of maneuver units by shifting fires at pre-planned rates (normally

2 to 3 minutes) deeper into the defense. For this purpose several basic firing phase lines would be established at 200- to 400-m intervals from the

offensive start line out to 2,500 m into the CFC's defensive depth.

1st Basic Firing Phase Line: CFC obstacle area.

2nd Basic Firing Phase Line: CFC defensive frontline.

3rd Basic Firing Phase Line: CFC reserves.
80

The supporting artillery unit or artillery group would provide general

support to the maneuver unit by providing rolling barrage or successive

fire concentrations. Long-range artillery and the corps artillery group

would conduct counterbattery fire and fire on command and communication facilities. When the maneuver unit cannot suppress CFC resistance with its own firepower, some units from the supporting artillery

units would be attached to provide direct support to the attacking unit. 

Fire support in depth during the attack would provide fire for exploitation units penetrating into the depth of the CFC defense. The artillery

which is in direct support of the penetrating force would have the mission to continue suppressing CFC resistance and blocking counterattacks or withdrawals. Accompanying artillery gives priority to

destroying individual enemy weapon positions and conducting suppressive fire. Missions for long-range artillery are to conduct counterbattery

Artillery Groups — Offense

KILOMETERS

KILOMETERS 8

6

4

2

0

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

RAG

RAG

DAG

CAG

AAG

I I I

XX

XX
81

fire, suppress and destroy strongholds within the depth of the defensive

area, prevent maneuvering of enemy reserves, and to disrupt command

and control nodes.

Another mission of NKA artillery is that of antitank. The NKA uses

artillery in an antitank role by direct fire (bore sighting). Following Russian tactics, the NKA forward deploys medium caliber guns within

2,000 m of the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

OBJECTIVE I I I

X

X

X

X

LD LD

I I I

I I I

I I I I

I

I I I I

I I

I I I I

I I

DAG

RAG RAG

I I I

1

2

1

1st Basic Firing Line*

Enemy Obstacle Area

Supplemental Firing 

 Phase Line 

Mass Fire Area

Supplemental Firing 

 Phase Line 

Mass Fire Area

2d Basic Firing Phase Line

Defensive Frontline

3d Basic Firing Phase Line

Reserves

* Firing lines are established 

 at 200 to 400 meter intervals 

 from line of departure to 2,500 

 meters into enemy's defense 

 depth. Fires shift automatically 

 to supplemental lines after 

 2 minutes.

Fire Support During the Attack
82

Air Defense Support to Offensive Operations

NKA air defense in support of offensive operations would be performed

primarily by AAA units. Besides combating aircraft, AAA units, when

needed, will reinforce ground firepower against ground targets. The

larger AAA weapons have limited antiarmor capability.

The tactical mission of the NKA's AAA would be to cover the maneuver

unit in support of the attack. The AAA unit also defends important positions and critical target areas. 

In the forward area, the AAA would be deployed to cover troop concentration areas, forward CPs, artillery firing positions, forward LOCs, and

other important facilities. In the rear area, it would be employed to cover

maneuver units, troop concentrations, field gun areas, missile sites,

munition facilities, and LOCs.

Besides a large inventory of AAA, the NKA also has a large number of

man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to include SA-7, SA-14,

and SA-16.

Engineer Support to Offensive Operations 

Engineers are expected to expedite NKA offensive operations by assisting in increasing the mobility of attacking forces and performing countermobility operations against CFC. Other tasks would include

providing camouflage, cover, and concealment support, and acting as

infantry when needed.

Specific tasks of an NKA division's engineer battalion would include

reconnaissance, route support, river crossing, obstacle clearance, obstacle laying, illumination, water supply, and fortification. Higher echelon

assets, such as the corps' river-crossing regiment and technical engineer

and construction battalions, would provide the division river crossing

and obstacle breaching support.
83

At the regimental level, the engineer company would assist offensive

operations by performing reconnaissance, route support in the rear area,

limited river crossing support, obstacle clearance, and fortification. The

regimental engineer company would normally attach platoon-size elements to infantry battalions and squad-size elements to infantry companies. Higher echelons would assist the regiment with engineer support

for such tasks as obstacle breaching and river crossing.

In organizing for combat, engineer battalions and companies would provide sapper elements to carry out tasks separately or as part of a combined-arms team. A reconnaissance team would conduct engineer

reconnaissance. An advance guard engineer team would construct

routes. A clearance team would precede the infantry, clearing obstacles

and constructing routes of advance to include detours for the main body.

A raiding team, composed of engineers and SOF units, would attack

special targets and reinforced CFC positions. A mobile obstacle team

would emplace obstacles to protect the flanks of attacking NKA units

and an engineer element in the antitank team would set up camouflage

and field fortifications.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Support to Offensive 

Operations

In NKA offensive operations, the infantry division would have the primary responsibility for reconnaissance and surveillance. This includes

all aspects of the area of operations, to include weather and terrain, and

CFC capabilities. However, every echelon of each of the armed services

is expected to conduct military reconnaissance and surveillance in support of NKA offensive operations.

By echelon, regimental reconnaissance and surveillance would extend

into the rear of a CFC regiment and that of a front line division. Division

would be expected to cover a CFC division's rear area and that of a front

line corps. Corps would be tasked to cover the rear area of a CFC corps

as well as the rear area of the next higher CFC echelon. Reconnaissance
84

assets at the service and national level are expected to cover the entire

rear area of CFC.

NKAF aerial reconnaissance is expected to acquire information on the

nature of CFC locations, groupings, and activities along a broad front in

a relatively short period of time. Surveillance, photography, and radar

detection would be performed by reconnaissance aviation, bombers, and

pursuit aviation in support of combined-arms operations.

NKN reconnaissance would be conducted by naval platforms, technical

surveillance sentries, naval reconnaissance aviation forces, coastal

defense forces, and coastal artillery forces to quickly identify an area

threatened by CFC amphibious forces.

The mission of ground reconnaissance would be to acquire detailed

information concerning CFC combat forces, terrain, and weather, by

using the special skills and assets of army technical personnel. This

information along with that collected by air and naval reconnaissance

would be combined in an attempt to verify CFC disposition, strengths,

and weaknesses.

Amphibious Support to Offensive Operations

Though North Korea does not have the capability to conduct large

amphibious operations, it can insert small units of landing parties from

the sea to accomplish the following:

■ Support the advance of NKA ground offensive operations.

■ Conduct amphibious raids to occupy/destroy critical targets in CFC's

rear area.

■ Surprise and harass CFC's rear area.

Forces that would conduct amphibious operations against CFC would

come from the two amphibious landing brigades and naval forces. Specific missions would include the following:

■ Encircling and destroying CFC defensive positions.
85

■ Delaying reinforcement of CFC defensive frontlinesOccupying or

otherwise paralyzing CFC air bases/operations.

■ Occupying/attacking island groups, harbors, naval bases, and areas in

which future operations are anticipated.

■ Destroying CFC command and control centers/systems and other

critical targets in CFC's rear area.

■ Occupying/destroying bridges, river crossing sites, or other targets to

reduce CFC maneuverability.

■ Conducting missions to harass or otherwise create confusion in

CFC's rear.

NKA Tactics in the Defense

The defense would be used by NKA in an attempt to gain time, prevent

troop losses, or cover a unit short of personnel. A defensive area would

be selected because it gives mutual support and provides all-around

defense. NKA doctrine calls for three types of defensive operations:

position defense, mobile defense, and retrograde operations. 

The position defense would be used to hold or destroy CFC's attack or

to hold key terrain or a key area. A mobile defense would be used to

gain time, exact losses on CFC forces, and preserve combat strength

while losing ground. NKA retrograde (or disengagement) operations

would be used to gain time to plan for the next operation or to restore

combat capability. In all three types of NKA defensive operations, the

organization and composition would be similar, but the conduct would

be different.

NKA defensive plans will vary depending on the type of defense

required and the status of contact with CFC forces. The integration of

mechanized, artillery, armor, AAA, and antitank fire support (both

organic and adjacent unit's), and the use of engineers, camouflage, and

deception will all be vital elements of a NKA defensive operation. However, NKA planning and execution of antitank defense may well be the

number one priority when preparing for a CFC attack.
86

Generally, when in the defense, the NKA will organize and manage the

conduct of the defense into four defensive echelons/zones, and areas:

the security echelon, the main defensive echelon (or main defense line),

the rear area defense echelon, and the antitank support area. Distances,

frontages, and depths are situational dependent. They will be adjusted

by NKA defenders in accordance with time to prepare the defense, terrain, and combat strength of both NKA defenders and CFC forces

expected to attack.

The security echelon will consist of three zones: the general outpost, the

combat outpost, and local security. Each will be organized for the purpose of holding and frustrating attacking CFC forces while gaining time.

The security echelon will be reinforced by engineer, artillery, and armor

units. The main purposes of the security echelon will be to:

■ cause early deployment of CFC forces into attack formations,

■ prevent CFC surprise attacks,

■ hamper CFC forces from conducting reconnaissance and artillery

observation,

■ mislead CFC forces in finding the actual location of the main defensive echelon, and

■ provide concealed lookouts during the withdrawal of NKA forces.

The general outpost will be established approximately 10 to 15 km forward of the defensive front line and would be manned by a reinforced

battalion. It would be established by a division or army group and would

not have to be deployed if there is not enough time. Its mission will be to

impede the CFC advance and to cause early deployment.

The combat outpost will consist of a reinforced platoon and would be

established approximately 1 to 2 km forward of the defensive front line.

The division would establish it and the regiment would be responsible

for this outpost. Its mission will be to prevent CFC surprise attacks, confuse CFC reconnaissance, and deceive CFC as to the location of the

main defense echelon.
87

Local security will consist of a small number of NKA troops and would

be established approximately 200 to 400 m forward of the defensive

front line under authority of the forward company commander.

The main defensive echelon would contain most of the defense's firepower. NKA units with the strongest firepower and most of the antitank

weapons would be assigned missions within this echelon. The main

defensive echelon is organized into two smaller echelons and a defensive

perimeter would be established to check CFC attacks from any direction.

The first echelon of the main defensive echelon would be responsible

for determining whether CFC is moving to conduct a deliberate attack

and, if so, where. If CFC forces are moving to attack, a combat security

detachment or a smaller unit would be dispatched to conduct reconnaissance in force or limited spoiling attacks, respectively. Tanks dug in at

the front line will engage at 1,000 m. If CFC forces reach the front line

and threaten penetration, defending forces will strengthen their flanks

and engage with all available fire support. As CFC enters the defensive

area, tanks and antitank teams will attempt to ambush and destroy the

attackers' mobility and inflict heavy combat losses. If CFC reaches this

point, the NKA defenders would probably commit their reserves.

The second echelon of the main defensive echelon would be responsible for holding one or two blocking positions or to counterattack to

regain the initiative and drive out penetrating CFC forces. If CFC

attempts a flanking movement, a company from the second echelon will

take defensive positions on that flank.

The rear area defense echelon would usually be 8 to 12 km deep. Positions will have been prepared in advance. This echelon would be used to

prevent an advance following the penetration of the main defense echelon, to slow a CFC advance, to provide logistical support during the

defense, or to execute a counterattack. Underground positions, artillery,

and rear area service support will be located in this area. Mobile units

that could conduct counterattacks or serve as reinforcements will be
88

deployed here. NKA reserves will be deployed in such a manner that

allows counterattack in any direction.

The NKA considers antitank defense as one of the most vital components of the defense and will establish the antitank support area

(ATSA). NKA doctrine calls for the employment of from two to five

antitank guns within every 100 m of the defensive front.

The maneuver unit would establish the ATSA and locate it where it

would be inaccessible to tanks or IFVs. NKA forces assigned to the

ATSA would be tasked to establish several indirect fire rolling barrier

fire lines and direct fire antitank security lines along potential CFC tank

approach routes. Antitank security lines would be established in the forward security zone, near the defensive front line, and in the depth of the

main defensive zone. Rolling barrier fire lines would be established parallel to the main defensive line, starting 300 to 400 m forward of the

defensive front line. From this point outward, additional lines would be

established at intervals of 300 to 500 m. Each fire sector should be

observable from a ground OP and located at a point that CFC tanks cannot bypass.

In antitank defense, NKA artillery units will attempt to deliver battalionsize salvos of antitank support fire before CFC tanks can advance to

within the effective ranges of antitank weapons. At the request of the

OP, several battalions may concentrate fire on key areas, firing at maximum rate. If CFC penetrates the fire areas and the tank advance continues, the artillery units would shift fire to subsequent fire areas. During

rolling barrier fires, whenever CFC tanks advance within 1,000 m of

antitank gun positions, antitank guns would engage with direct fire.

Individual antitank guns will also conduct ambush fires from positions

along high speed avenues of approach. In addition, antitank obstacles will

be positioned so that they can receive protecting fire from antitank weapons. The NKA will also make use of both manmade and natural obstacles. 
89

Defensive Frontages and Depths

Unit Frontage Depth (km)

Company 1.5-2.5 1-1.5

Battalion 3-5 < 3

Regiment 6-10 8-12

Division 12-20 16-22

FORWARD

ELEMENT

ATSA

ATSA

REAR

AREA I I I

XX

XX

GENERAL

OUTPOSTS

MAIN DEFENSE LINE

COMBAT OUTPOSTS

FIRST

POSITION

SECOND

POSITION

THIRD

POSITION

20

16

12

8

4

0 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 2nd 

ECHELON

BASIC DEFENSE ZONE

KILOMETERS

KILOMETERS

Division Defense Zone
90

I (-)

REGIMENT

ARTILLERY

A

1.5 - 2.5 KM

BATTALION

DEFENSIVE

STRONGHOLD

PERIMETER

MORTAR

TANK CONCENTRATED FIRE AREA

COMPANY

STRONGHOLD

PLATOON

STRONGHOLD

CLOSE RANGE WEAPONS FIRE AREA CONCENTRATED FIRE AREA

AMBUSH POSITION

NKA Battalion Defense Plan
91

REAR

FWD

I I (-)

152 MM

152 MM

152 MM

122 MM

122 MM

122 MM

120 MM 120 MM

120 MM 82 MM 82 MM

I I I I

I

I

I

I (-)

LT

4 - 8 KM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

8 - 16 KM

KILOMETERS

X

I I

I I

X

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I

NKA Mechanized Brigade in the Defense
92

Positional Defense

Positional defense (sometimes called area defense) will be conducted

when the NKA decides to hold key terrain or a key area, or to impede or

destroy a CFC attack. It will be centered on the expected main axis of a

CFC attack and the main defensive echelon will be selected to provide

all around fields of fire and mutual support.

Mobile Defense

The mobile defense (sometimes called moving defense) will be used

when an inferior NKA force decides to trade space for time while

inflicting casualties on a superior CFC force. It is characterized by counterattacks and withdrawals. Predetermined phase lines will be used to

control NKA units as they fall back to subsequent positions. Within the

defense, each battalion will occupy two sets of positions at the same

time. Main combat troops and weapons will be concentrated in the first

position while reserves maintain the second position. Antitank ambush

teams will be emplaced between these positions.
93

3d Phase Line

2d Phase Line

1st Phase Line

X

X

I I I

Order of Movement

1st Move

2d Move

3d Move

4th Move

Mobile Defense of the Regiment
94

Regimental Positional Defense

Retrograde Operations

The NKA defensive doctrine plans for three types of retrograde operations: withdrawal, disengagement, and retreat. The NKA would use a

disengagement (a form of withdrawal) to physically break contact from

CFC observation or direct fire.

An NKA withdrawal would be conducted by NKA units to avoid a

superior CFC force in the attack, lure CFC forces into terrain unfavorable to offensive operations, and change the battlefield. When possible,

the withdrawal will take place by echelon. The rear service units would

withdraw first, while artillery and second echelon forces occupy security

positions. First echelon forces would then withdraw under the cover of

the security positions.

An NKA division-size withdrawal would be characterized as follows:

■ Second echelon provides security for all rear defense lines occupying

positions in advance.

I

8

I I I

XX

KILOMETERS

KILOMETERS 10

6

4

2

0

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

SECURITY BRANCH RESERVE

I I I

3rd AT

Defense

Line

FEBA

2d AT

Defense

Line

1st AT

Defense

Line

(COP)

Combat

Observation

Point

X

X

X

X
95

■ Regiment's second echelon occupies preselected phaselines covering

regiment's first echelon disengagement.

■ Frontline battalions withdraw under the covering fire of platoon size

units reinforced with the second echelon battalion's antitank weapons

and machine guns.

■ Companies withdraw using fighting positions and connecting

trenches or bounding overwatch movement.

■ Attached tanks withdraw in bounding overwatch movement while

covering infantry withdrawal.

■ Bridges and roads are destroyed and obstacles emplaced to restrain

CFC advance.

■ During withdrawal, division command post is located in the covering

sector.

An NKA retreat would be conducted to avoid battle with CFC forces. It

would normally follow a combat disengagement. Once contact with

CFC has ended, the NKA would form a march column for moving to the

rear; at that point, a retreat would begin. The purposes of an NKA

retreat are to —

■ maintain distance from CFC forces,

■ occupy an advantageous position,

■ replace other units and align combat lines,

■ transfer the force to another area for other operations, and

■ reduce distance from rear areas.

After passing through a designated line in combat disengagement, the

NKA unit conducting the retreat would move to a preplanned area or

defense line, under cover provided by a rear guard. When a retreat is

conducted while marching under contact with CFC, a powerful security

force would be deployed to secure the flanks and rear. An NKA retreat

would terminate with the occupation of an assembly area, for achievement of follow-on duties, or occupation of a defensive line.
96

Counterattack

A counterattack would form the basis of NKA defensive combat. After

attempting to establish the best defense plan possible, NKA units would

launch their counterattack plan. It would usually be performed by the

second echelon and intended to be decisive. The counterattack would be

directed at CFC's flank or rear while CFC forces are fixed by the first

echelon. Fires in support of the counterattack would be intended to

delay or collapse CFC's attack.

The first echelon would support the counterattack by halting or slowing

the CFC advance or by channeling it toward areas favoring the counterattack. Flanks would be vigorously held to restrain the width of any

areas penetrated by CFC.

The second echelon conducting the counterattack would send out reconnaissance to verify the situation and then the counterattack force would

strike at CFC's flank or rear. If the counterattack is successful, the NKA

would attempt to resume offensive operations directly, conducting

exploitation or pursuit operations.

8

PENETRATION

I I I

XX

I

KILOMETERS

KILOMETERS 10

6

4

2

0

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

I I

X

X

Regimental Counterattack
97

Escape From Encirclement (Breakout)

NKA units conducting a breakout would execute it in the following

order: penetration unit, cover echelon, and reserves. The penetration

unit would be formed mainly of artillery, tank, and mortar units. Normally it would comprise one-half or two-thirds of the entire combat

power and would be composed of two echelons. The cover echelon

would be formed by artillery, mortar, tank, engineer, and chemical warfare units. It would be tasked to prevent a CFC counterattack and to hold

the area where the breakout will take place. The reserves would be

deployed to an area between the penetration and cover echelons in order

to provide fire support to both.

Night Defense

NKA defense at night will be a continuation of daytime defensive operations. Only fire support plans and barrier fires will be modified. Plans

will be adjusted to include proactive reconnaissance, fire plans, and use

of illumination. Reserve forces will normally be moved closer to the

main defense line. The fire plan will be reinforced, security strengthened, and additional obstacles added to the defense.

When a CFC night attack is not expected, about one-half of NKA troops

will remain on alert. All others will rest. Ambush teams and combat outposts will immediately report any contact with CFC forces and then

withdraw. Concentrated fires will be brought upon approaching CFC

forces. Direct small-arms fire and hand-to-hand combat commences

with any CFC breech of forward NKA strongpoints.

Armor Support to Defensive Operations

NKA tanks will participate in the defense either statically by stubbornly

holding prepared positions, or by maneuvering in counterattacks, usually against a CFC flank. In the positional defense, tanks will be supported by mechanized, artillery, and engineer elements. Tank positions

will be dug in and located on favorable terrain and will have the mis-
98

sions of repelling CFC attacks and thwarting infiltration as well as conducting counterattacks. Small units of tanks may be attached to NKA

infantry and conduct screening or reconnaissance. Tanks could be used

at the front line to counter CFC tank attacks, but most likely will be held

in the second echelon or in the reserves.

Artillery Support to Defensive Operations

The NKA would use fire support weapons in the defense to deter or stall

a CFC attack and to engage and destroy CFC attacking forces in their

preparatory stage. Defensive fires would be accomplished according to

the sequence of defensive fire support stages and would be delivered

within prescribed fire zones.

NKA artillery groups (see section on fire support to offensive operations

for a discussion on artillery groups) and units will develop their fire support plans based upon the fire support plans at corps or division level as

well as guidance issued by the supported maneuver unit. The maneuver

unit will designate areas for barrage fires and barrier fire lines as well as

develop a fire plan for exposed flanks and counterattack. Fire support in

the defense will include the following zones: long-range fire, close

defensive fire, and a main defense support fire.

In the long-range fire zone, corps and division artillery groups will conduct harassing and interdiction fires before CFC forces enter attack formations. These fires will be meant to destroy the momentum of the CFC

attack, disrupt the employment of CFC troop concentrations, and cover

the withdrawal of NKA security units.

Fires in the close defense zone include fires prior to the attack, fires during the attack, and final protective fires. Fires prior to the attack are

intended to disrupt CFC's attack preparations by breaking up attack formations and destroying command posts, observation posts, and communications facilities. Fires during the attack are intended to destroy CFC

tanks and other armored vehicles as well as suppress CFC artillery.
99

Final protective fires will consist of fire, at a maximum rate, at the

defensive front line for annihilation of CFC forces and at concentrated

barrier positions.

Fires in support of the division's main defense zone will be used to support a counterattack or to cover a withdrawal of main defense forces.

They will also be used to support deeper defensive positions by suppressing CFC forces that have penetrated the main defenses, and by providing covering fires during the displacement of artillery supporting the

main defensive zone.

All fires in support of the defense will be divided into five phases:

■ Long-range fire

■ Counterbattery fire

■ Frontline area final protective fire

■ Fire on CFC forces penetrating forward positions

■ Counterattack support fire

Supporting Fire in Regimental Defense

76mm

(500m)

82mm

(3,041m)

8

I I I

XX

KILOMETERS

KILOMETERS 10

6

4

2

0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

REGIMENT

FEBA 76.2mm

(13,300m)

X

X

140mm

(9,000m) 160mm

(5,020m)

BATTALION

COMPANY

RANGES

122mm

(11,800m) 120mm

(57m)

122mm

(3-7km)

76.2mm

(3-7km)

107/140mm

(3-6km)

160mm

(1-2km)

76.2mm AT RESERVE

120mm

(1-2km)

82mm

(300-

800km)
100

Engineer Support to Defensive Operations

In rear areas of the defense, engineers will either rig for demolition or

demolish probable avenues of approach. Also, engineers would emplace

obstacles and prepare potential NKA withdrawal routes. In the main

defense zone, engineers would emplace obstacles and provide support

for the construction of defensive positions and command posts as well

as clear routes for the counterattack, construct artillery and tank positions, and camouflage equipment and positions. Engineers in the main

defense zone will operate the water supply point, function as an element

of the antitank reserve, and repair and maintain the main supply route.

During retreats, engineers will normally be attached to security units.

They will select, maintain, and repair withdrawal routes and emplace

obstacles to protect exposed flanks. After the rear guard withdrawals,

engineers will emplace various types of obstacles across potential CFC

approach routes.

Air Defense Support to Defensive Operations

In the defense, the NKA will give priority to the protection of critical

facilities from CFC air assets in the main and rear defensive zones. The

missions of air defense units in the defense are —

■ detection of CFC air activity,

■ interdiction of CFC aerial attack of forward and rear areas,

■ utilization of electronic countermeasures (ECM) against CFC aircraft

and air-related communication and radar systems,

■ air defense in depth,

■ prevention of CFC aerial reconnaissance,

■ air defense protection to NKA artillery and armor units, and

■ air defense against CFC airborne operations.

The NKA will plan to use air observation posts within 10 to 15 km of

the defensive front lines. Firing positions will be selected to provide

maximum protection of critical fire support assets (concentrations of
101

artillery and tanks) and command and communications sites. Special

attention will be given to anticipated CFC aerial avenues of approach. 

Antiaircraft guns will be deployed down to the platoon level. Man-portable SAMs such as the SA-7 and SA-16 will be deployed down to the

company level. Though part of the NKA strategic air defense system,

larger SAM systems such as the SA-2 can range into South Korea. As

part of NKA deception operations, dummy SAM sites for larger systems

will be employed to deceive CFC as to the actual location.

North Korean Antilanding Operations

Considering the devastating effect that amphibious operations had

against North Korean offensive operations during the Korean War, the

emphasis by North Korean military planners on lessons learned from

that war, and CFC's capability to conduct operations from the sea, it can

be assumed that North Korea has made extensive preparations to oppose

a CFC amphibious task force (ATF) composed of U.S./ROK Navy and

Marine amphibious forces. 

To date, North Korea is limited in its capability to project military power

beyond the Korean Peninsula and, as such, is limited in conducting significant conventional military operations against a CFC ATF in the early

phases of the preparation, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and

assault (PERMA) cycle of amphibious operations. During the preparation, embarkation, and rehearsal stages, North Korea will attempt to collect information and intelligence against CFC's amphibious forces.

However, other considerations, such as North Korea's emphasis on its

SOF, the ranges of NKN submarines and some NKAF aircraft, and the

development of long range missiles, cannot be discounted. 

During the assault phase, North Korea antilanding operations will consist of the following:

■ NKN and NKAF reconnaissance assets will attempt to locate the

ATF in order to engage with attack aircraft and/or naval antiship missile platforms and to identify the probable location of the beachhead.
102

■ Employment of land-based antiship missiles.

■ Extensive use of naval mining.

■ Utilization of water obstacles.

■ Employment of coastal artillery.

■ Employment of land obstacles and mines.

■ The reinforcement of NKA ground antilanding forces with any available infantry, mechanized, artillery, antiair, or armor assets.

Special Operations Force 

North Korea's SOF is organized into 22 brigades and 7 independent battalions. The SOF has five basic missions: conducting reconnaissance,

performing combat operations in concert with conventional operations,

establishing a second front in the enemy's rear area, countering the CFC

special operations in North Korean rear areas, and maintaining internal

security.

The MPAF has two primary commands that control special operations

units, the Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Infantry Training

Guidance Bureau. North Korea classifies its special operations units as

reconnaissance, light infantry, or sniper.

NOTE: Though light infantry units will perform SOF missions, all

NKA divisions and brigades will have a light infantry element which

will be forward deployed to conduct conventional infantry tactics in the

offense. Light infantry SOF missions will include combat operations

conducted by company or battalion size units against military, political,

or economic targets. Sniper operations basically are the same as light

infantry SOF except they are conducted in team-size units.

North Korea's SOF will perform operations at the strategic, operational,

and tactical levels. Basically, strategic operations will support national or

MPAF objectives, operational operations will support corps objectives,

and tactical operations will support maneuver divisions and brigades.
103

SOF strategic missions will include reconnaissance, sniper, and agent

operations. Strategic reconnaissance will be intended to ascertain CFC

intentions, develop targeting information, conduct poststrike assessments of CFC units and facilities, and assess the potential reactions of

the South Korean civilian and military populace. Sniper missions will

include attacking critical nodes, such as special weapon delivery systems and storage facilities, command, control, and communications

facilities of combined field command and higher, and air and air defense

facilities. In addition, snipers will attempt to assassinate, kidnap, and/or

interrogate key personnel to hinder allied operations and lower morale.

SOF operational missions will include reconnaissance, sniper, and light

infantry operations. Operational reconnaissance will be conducted to

ascertain CFC intentions, develop targeting information for SSMs and

long-range artillery, conduct poststrike assessments, and determine the

status of LOCs, chokepoints, and CFC reserve locations. At the operational level, sniper missions will be similar to those at the strategic level

but will also include attacking port facilities and major LOCs. Light

infantry units will concentrate on attacking division and higher command posts, capturing key terrain to assist maneuvering units, and locating CFC reserve forces.

The tactical mission of the SOF will be to support maneuver divisions

and brigades objectives with light infantry operations. The organic

reconnaissance element of the maneuver unit will perform tactical

reconnaissance. Both the light infantry and reconnaissance elements

will develop targets for destruction. These targets will include CFC

command, control, and communications facilities, air and air defense

sites, CFC force concentrations, and LOCs. Light infantry units will

concentrate on attacking brigade and division command posts, capturing

key terrain, and locating and destroying CFC reserve forces.

Personnel selection for SOF units come from politically reliable troops

who are members in good standing of the Korean Workers Party and

who have served 4 to 7 years in the combat branches. Only under special
104

circumstances (language capabilities and technical skills) will they be

recruited and trained directly from civilian status.

The training of SOF personnel is believed to take 12 to 24 weeks or

longer, depending on the skill levels. The skill and training that SOF

personnel receive, such as infiltration, mountaineering, night operations,

swimming, martial arts, airborne, intelligence collection, demolition,

and rigorous physical fitness, are typical of elite units throughout the

world. Discipline is strong and harsh, with an emphasis placed on intensive physical training and political indoctrination. When training is

completed, the trainee is awarded a senior NCO or junior officer rank

and assigned to an operational unit for the remainder of his career.

During combat operations it can be expected that many deep-strike SOF

personnel will be attired in civilian clothing or South Korean military uniforms. Infiltrations will normally occur at night or during periods of limited visibility, with the assistance of escorts who are familiar with the area.

The equipment carried by most SOF personnel will vary considerably,

depending on the mission. Typical equipment will include a dagger and/

or bayonet, pistols (to include silenced versions), rifles (AK-47 or

M-16), submachine guns, hand grenades/demolitions, rocket launchers

(RPG-7 or AT-3), 60-mm mortars, or other allied weapons.

North Korean SOF infiltration methods into CFC rear areas will include:

overland, through tunnels under the DMZ, air, and from the sea. The

NKAF will support SOF operations with airborne infiltration and resupply missions. The primary aerial insertion aircraft will be the An-2/

COLT and helicopters. The NKN will support SOF operations by using

amphibious operations, covert sea infiltration, and resupply. The principal vessels that will be used to support these operations will be the

KONG BANG I/II/III, NAMPO A/B LCPA (air-cushioned), and

NAMPO LCPs. In addition, mini-submarine and semi-submersible

insertion craft may also be used to support SOF operations from the sea.
105

ENTRANCE

NORTH

KOREA

MILITARY

DEMARCATION

LINE

INTERCEPTION

TUNNEL

1,200 M 435 M

THIRD TUNNEL

NORTH KOREAN TUNNEL

OPERATIONS UNDER DMZ

NORTH KOREA

SOUTH KOREA

PANMUNJOM

TUNNEL 3

OCT 1978

TUNNEL 1

NOV 1974

TUNNEL 2

MAR 1975

TUNNEL 4

MAR 1990

Demilitarized

Zone

Military

Demarcation

Line

Known Tunnels

Suspected Tunnels

Tunnel Operations Under DMZ

All but the last few meters would be completed before an attack. Although 4 have 

been discovered, as many as 20 or more may exist.
106

Tunnel Constructed by the North Under DMZ

A regiment could pass through this tunnel in about an hour and 

come up south of the DMZ.
107

SECTION 3

RANK INSIGNIA AND UNIFORMS

N

A

V

Y

A

R

M

Y

&

A

I

R

F

O

R

C

E

SO-WI CHUNG-WI TAB-WI SO-RYONG CHUNGYONG

TABRYONGCHUNJANGSO-JANG CHUNGJANGTABJANG

O-1

2nd Lieutenant

US EQUIVALENT

O-2

1st

Lieutenant

O-3

Captain

O-4

Major O-5

Lieutenant

Colonel

O-6

Colonel

O-7

Brigadier

General

O-8

Major

General

O-9

Lieutenant

General

O-10

General

ENLISTED RANK STRUCTURE

SB-YONG ILB-YONG SAMBYONG LYONGJANG BASA CHUNGSA SANGSA CHUM SANGSA

Private

First Class

Lance

Corporal

Corporal Sergeant Staff

Sergeant

Gunnery

Sergeant

Master

Sergeant

Master

Sergeant

ROK Enlisted Rank Insignia
108

North Korean Enlisted Rank Insignia ARMY NAVY

AIR FORCE

Private

First Class

Corporal Sergeant Senior

Sergeant

Master

Sergeant

Private

Senior

Private

Junior

Sergeant

Sergeant Senior

Sergeant

Master

Sergeant

Private

Seaman Chief Petty

Officer

Seaman

Apprentice

First Class

Petty Officer

Second Class

Petty Officer

Third Class

Petty Officer
109

Marshall Lieutenant

General

Colonel Captain Junior

Lieutenant

General Colonel

General

Major

General

Senior

Colonel

Lieutenant

Colonel Major SeniorLieutenant Lieutenant

North

Korean

Army

Rank

Insignia

Officer Collar Tabs

Worn on Closed Collar Uniform

Army

Colonel

Navy

Commander

Air Force

Lieutenant

North Korean Army Officer Rank Insignia
110

Winter Full

Dress Uniform

(Generals)

Summer Full

Dress Uniform

(Generals)

Winter Service

Overcoat

(Generals)

Service

Uniform

(Officers)

Service

Overcoat

(Officers)

Field

Uniform

(Officers)

Full Dress

Uniform

(Officers)

Dress

Overcoat

(Officers)

Service

Uniform

(Officers)

Winter

Jacket

(Officers)

North Korean Army Uniforms
111

Winter Field

Uniform

Summer

Service Uniform

Winter Service

Overcoat

Service

Uniform

Winter Field

Overcoat

Winter

Service Uniform

Camouflage

Uniform

Winter Tanker

Jacket

Summer Field

Uniform

Summer Tanker

Jacket

North Korean Army Uniforms
112

Rear

Admiral

Commander Junior

Lieutenant

Admiral Vice

Admiral

Senior

Captain

Captain Lieutenant

Commander Ensign SeniorLieutenant Lieutenant

North

Korean

Navy

Rank

Insignia

Senior

Admiral

Enlisted Collar Tabs

Collar Tab Denotes Branch of Service

Master

Sergeant

1st Class

Petty Officer

Sergeant Junior

Sergeant

Seaman Private

North Korean Navy Officer Rank Insignia
113

North Korean Navy Uniforms

Winter Full

Dress Uniform

(Officers)

Winter Full

Dress Uniform

(Officers)

Winter Service

Uniform

(Officers)

Summer

Service Uniform

(Officers)

Work

Uniform

(Officers)

Winter Service

Uniform

(Enlisted)

Winter Service

Uniform

(Seaman)

Summer

Service Uniform

(Seaman)

Summer Service

Uniform

(Enlisted)

Work

Uniform

(Enlisted)
114

North Korean Air Force Officer Rank Insignia

Lieutenant

General

Colonel Captain Junior

Lieutenant

General Colonel

General

Major

General

Senior

Colonel

Lieutenant

Colonel Major SeniorLieutenant Lieutenant

North

Korean

Air Force

Rank

Insignia

Field and Company

Grade Officer

Collar Tabs

General Officer

Collar Tabs
115

North Korean Air Force Uniforms

Full Dress

Uniform

(Officers)

Service

Uniform

(Pilot)

Summer Field

Uniform

(Enlisted)

Pilot

Uniform

Officers Cap

Winter

Jacket

(Enlisted)

Service

Uniform

(Officers)

Service

Uniform

(Enlisted)

Officers Cap Service Cap

(Enlisted)
116

North Korean Branch Insignias

Band

Pilot Wings

Seaman Cap Ribbon

Air Force

Cap Insignia

National Emblem

Worn on Flag Officers'

Shoulder Boards and

Collar Tabs

Veterinary

Officers Cap

Head Gear

Insignia

Chemical Medical

Judge Engineer

Advocate

Rear

Services

Infantry Signal

Artillery Tanker Finance Transportation
117

SECTION 4

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

REAR

SER

ARMORED

RECON

130/152

AT-3

LT

120

HQ TECH

SPT

TGT

ACQ

AIRBORNE

INFANTRY

ANTITANK

GUN

(85-100mm)

ANTITANK

MISSILE

(AT-3)

ARTILLERY

(130/152mm)

INFANTRY MOTORIZED

INFANTRY

LIGHT

INFANTRY

MECHANIZED

INFANTRY

RECON TANK/

ARMOR

85/100 SA-2 14.5

ANTI-A/C

MISSILE

(SA-2)

ANTI-A/C

GUN

(14.5mm)

FROG

MISSILE

SCUD

MISSILE

MORTAR

(120mm)

MULTIPLE

ROCKET

LAUNCHER

(122mm)

122MRL

SP

ARTILLERY

(122mm)

122

AVIATION

OR HELO

ATTACK

HELO

ENGINEER CHEMICAL

OR DECON

SIGNAL FIELD

HOSPITAL

HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS

& HQ COMPANY HEAVY

MACHINE

GUN

REAR

SERVICES

TECHNICAL

SUPPORT

TARGET

ACQUISITION

Army

Corp

Division

Brigade

Regiment

Battalion

Company

Platoon

Squad

XXXX

XXX

XX

X

I I I

I I

I

FROG SCUD

HHC HMG
118

North Korean Military

President

Central People's Committee

Ministry of

the People's

Armed Forces

General Staff

Department

Armored

Corps

Artillery

Corps

Capital

Defense Corps

Reconnaissance

Bureau

North Korean

Air Force

North Korean

Navy

Forward

Army Corps*

1st Corps

2d Corps

4th Corps

5th Corps

Rear

Army Corps

3rd Corps

6th Corps

7th Corps

8th Corps

108th Corps

Mechanized

Corps

425th Corps

806th Corps

815th Corps

Light Infantry

Training/

Guide Bureau

Reserve

Bureau

Reserve

Divisions

General 

Reserve

Administrative

Command

Artillery

Command

Mechanized

Command

Antiaircraft

Artillery Command

*Typical Corps includes:

 Infantry Divisions

 Armored Brigades

 Artillery Brigades

 Light Infantry Brigades

 River-Crossing Regiments
119

SNIPER

C & S

REAR

SVC

EW/

SIGINT

MRL

BRIDGE

X

X X X X I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I I

XXX

XX XX XX XX XX

LT

Infantry Corps
120

C & S

X I I I I

LT

XXX

REAR

SVC

X I I

X X X X X

I I

I I I I I

EW/

SIGINT

I I

Mechanized Infantry Corps
121

X X

MRL

XXX

Artillery Corps

I I

BRIDGE

I I

C & S

XXX

REAR

SVC

X X X X X

I I

Armor Corps
122

Infantry Division

I

HQ

I I I

INFANTRY

DIVISION

T-54/55

M1985/Type-62/63/PT-76

D-20 152mm Howitzer

D-74/M-38 122mm Howitzer

T-63/RPU (107/140 MRL)

D or M-44 (85/100 AT Gun)

M-39 (76.2 AT Gun)

AT-3 SAGGER

B-10/11 (82/107 RG)

RPG-7 (AT Lchr)

M-43 (120mm Mortar)

M-37 (82mm Mortar)

T-31 (60mm Mortar)

Flamethrower

RPD/RP-46/SMG

SA-7b

ZPU-2/4 (14.5 AAA HMG)

M-39 (37 AAA Gun)

S-60 (57 AAA Gun)

FIRE CAN (FLAP WHEEL)

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

M-72 Motorcycle

T-34-T Tank RTVR

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

Tk

Bn

Art

Reg

AT

Bn

INF

Reg

LINE

Bn

AAA

Bn

Eng

Bn

Sig

Bn

Recon

Co

CML

Co

HQ

+RS

31

2

18

54

27

12

18

27

27

658

81

81

18

4

859

42

60

6

6

2

57

692

29

1

10359

1333

9026

31

2

2

3

18

1

226

22

204

18

54

8

34

8

110

930

118

812

12

8

1

21

195

23

172

9

6

9

9

192

18

27

4

257

12

18

8

126

2379

182

2197

REAR

SER

*SOME DIVISIONS WILL ALSO HAVE AN EW/SIGINT BATTALION

18

18

18

1

450

30

420

6

6

6

6

2

1

43

282

23

259

10

6

3

25

279

25

254

4

8

5

30

8

260

21

239

4

4

1

1

5

95

5

90

4

4

10

105

5

100

36

12

12

75

16

400

95

305

I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I

XX

14.5/37/57

122/152 85/100
123

Infantry Regiment

I I I HQ

INFANTRY REGIMENT

T-63/RPU (107/140 MRL)

M-39 (76.2 AT Gun)

AT-3 SAGGER

B-10/11 (82/107 RG)

RPG-7 (AT Lchr)

M-43 (120mm Mortar)

M-37 (82mm Mortar)

SA-7b

ZPU-2/4 (14.5 AAA HMG)

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

Flamethrower

RPD/RP-46/SMG

AK Rifle

M1891 30 Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

INF

Bn

MTR

Bn

AAA

Bn

MRL

Btry

AT

Btry

Eng

Co Sig

Co

Recon

Plt

CML

Plt HHC

9

6

9

9

192

27

27

12

18

8

126

4

257

1896

18

182

2379

182

2197

3

3

58

9

3

1

8

81

360

6

29

476

29

447

8

27

1

31

8

156

26

206

26

180

3

18

1

33

259

23

282

23

259

9

9

70

5

75

5

70

6

7

73

5

78

5

73

3

5

4

3

61

5

76

5

71

3

5

3

54

5

65

5

60

5

30

1

31

1

30

25

1

26

1

25

4

3

7

88

24

112

24

88

I I

120

I

I I I I I

I I I

107/140 MRL

14.5
124

Infantry Battalion

INFANTRY BATTALION

AT-3 SAGGER

B-10/11 (82/107 RG)

RPG-7 (AT Lchr)

M-37 (82mm Mortar)

SA-7b

V-415 (jeep)

2 1/2T Utility Truck

RPD/RP-46/SMG

AK Rifle

M 1891 30 Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Radio, R116/126

Radio, R106

Radio, R105

Radio, RDM

Telephone, TAI-43

Switchboard

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

INF

Co

MTR

Btry

AT

Plt HQ

3

3

58

9

3

1

8

81

360

6

29

17

9

2

1

24

6

476

29

447

18

27

83

1

5

5

1

5

1

116

5

111

9

3

57

5

1

5

1

62

5

57

3

3

4

3

20

1

1

1

21

1

20

3

1

2

34

3

8

2

4

2

1

3

2

45

8

37

I

82

I I

I

HQ AT-3
125

Infantry Company Infantry Platoon

INFANTRY COMPANY

RPG-7 (AT Lchr)

RPD/RP-46/SMG

AK Rifle

M 1891 30 Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Radio, R116

Radio, R106

Telephone, TAI-43

Switchboard

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

INF

Plt HQ

18

27

83

1

5

5

1

5

1

116

5

111

6

9

27

1

1

1

37

1

36

2

1

2

2

1

2

1

5

2

3

INFANTRY PLATOON

RPG-7 (AT Lchr)

RPD

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Radio, R116

Telephone, TAI-43

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

INF

Sqd HQ

6

9

27

1

1

1

37

1

36

2

3

9

12

12

1

1

1

1

1

HQ

I

HQ
126

Field Hospital

Chemical Battalion

FIELD HOSPITAL

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total HHC

MT

Co

OP Rm

Co H&E

Co

370

65

4

63

445

65

370

84

6

4

5

90

6

84

81

24

12

105

24

81

142

30

10

172

30

142

63

5

36

68

5

63

I

Operating

Room

I

Holding &

Evacuation

I

Medical

Treatment

I

HHC

CHEMICAL BATTALION

RPG-2/7 (40 AT Lchr)

RPD/RPK

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total DECON

Co

IMPRG

HQ Co

12

12

276

15

1

30

315

15

300

3

3

42

6

1

6

54

6

48

3

3

84

3

9

93

3

90

3

3

66

3

6

75

3

72

DECON IMPRG

I I

HQ

I I
127

Signal Battalion

SIGNAL BATTALION

RPG-2/7 (40 AT Lchr)

RPD/RPK

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Truck

M-72 Motorcycle

Radio

Switchboard

Telegraph

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total RADIO

Co

MSGR &

COMM

WIRE

HQ Co

12

14

234

39

5

37

20

9

14

5

299

39

260

2

4

47

21

2

6

3

1

74

21

53

2

2

48

7

1

4

20

4

5

59

7

52

4

4

72

6

1

10

9

86

6

80

4

4

67

5

1

17

6

80

5

75

WIRE RADIO

I I

I

HQ

I I I MSGR &

COMM
128

Corps Antitank Guided Missile

Battalion

Corps Antitank Guided Missile

Company

AAA Battalion

AT-1

ATGM BATTALION

UAZ-69 ATGM AT-1

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2 T Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

ATGM

Co HQ

54

254

35

4

21

291

35

256

18

72

9

1

5

81

9

72

38

8

1

6

48

8

40

AT-1

AT-1

AT-1

ATGM COMPANY

UAZ-69 ATGM AT-1

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2 T Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

ATGM

Plt HQ

18

72

9

1

5

81

9

72

6

17

2

1

19

2

17

21

3

1

2

24

3

21

AT-1

AT-1

HQ

I I

I I

AT-1

HQ

I

AT-1

AAA BATTALION

M-39 (37 AAA Gun)

S-60 (57 AAA Gun)

ZPU-2/4 (14.5mm)

FIRE CAN or BREAD BIN

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

Total

6

6

6

4

1

43

I I I

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

259

23

282

23

259

I I

HQ & S

I

14.5/37/57

14.5 37 57
129

SAM (SA-5) Regiment

SA-5 REGIMENT

SA-5 SAM Lchr

BAR LOCK Radar

SQUARE PAIR Radar

BIG BACK Radar

SIDE NET Radar

MERCURY GRASS Truck

Radar Control Truck

Misc Trailers

ZIL-157V Transporter

Misc Trucks

V-415 Jeep

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

Cmd &

Control

Tech

Spt

SAM

Bn

18

3

3

1

1

4

4

38

30

91

7

910

86

824

6

1

1

1

1

10

6

14

1

115

12

103

1

1

1

2

6

11

3

90

14

76

2

12

38

1

106

10

96

SA-5

SA-5

I

I I I

SA-5

Command

& Control

I I

Technical

Support

I I

SA-5
130

SAM (SA-3) Regiment

SA-3 REGIMENT

SA-3 SAM Lchr

ZPU-4 (14.5 AAA HMG)

LOW BLOW Radar

FLAT FACE Radar

SPOON REST Radar

SIDE NET Radar

MERCURY GRASS Truck

Radar Control Truck

Misc Trailers

ZIL-131 Transporter

Misc Trucks

V-415 Jeep

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total Cmd &

Control

Tech

Spt

SAM

Bn

16

18

4

5

1

1

5

6

48

24

119

9

910

86

824

4

1

1

1

1

10

4

12

1

108

10

98

18

24

1

282

23

259

2

8

36

1

112

11

101

AAA

Bn

1

1

1

1

2

6

11

3

84

12

72

SA-3

SA-3

SA-3

I

I I I

SA-3

Command

& Control

I I

Technical

Support

I I

SA-3

I I

14.5
131

SAM (SA-2) Regiment

SA-2 REGIMENT

SA-2 SAM Lchr

ZPU-4 (14.5 AAA HMG)

SPOON REST Radar

FAN SONG Radar

FLAT FACE Radar

MERCURY GRASS Truck

Radar Control Truck

Misc Trailers

ZIL-157V Transporter

Misc Trucks

V-415 Jeep

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total Cmd &

Control

Tech

Spt

SAM

Bn

18

18

4

3

1

4

5

38

30

137

8

833

88

745

6

1

1

1

1

10

6

18

1

115

12

103

18

24

1

282

23

259

2

12

48

1

116

15

101

AAA

Bn

1

1

1

2

6

11

3

90

14

76

SA-2

SA-2

I

I I I

SA-2

Command

& Control

I I

Technical

Support

I I

SA-2

I I

14.5
132

River-Crossing Brigade

RIVER-CROSSING

BRIGADE

K-61 Track Amphibious/PTS

GSP Ferry Track Hvy Amph

LPP Bridge PTN Set

GAZ-63 Truck PTN Carry

BMK-90 Boat Power w/TLR

TPP Bridge PTN Set

ZIL-151 Truck PTN Carry

Utility Tractor

Utility Bulldozer

K-51 Crane

K-32 Crane

GAZ-46 Vehicle Amphibious

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Truck

RPG-2/7 (40 AT LCHR)

RPD/RPK

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

AMPH

Veh

LT

BRG

Hvy

BRG

Tech

Spt HHC

120

24

48

144

36

48

96

6

4

1

4

10

12

196

169

249

2367

109

2258

60

12

2

1

16

22

32

319

38

281

24

72

12

2

1

1

32

24

36

388

38

350

12

48

96

1

2

1

44

36

55

502

40

462

6

4

2

1

3

42

21

30

298

37

261

Bridge

1

4

14

20

28

153

32

121

X

I

HHC

Amph Veh

I I

Amph Veh

I I

Tech Spt

LT Bridge

I I

LT Bridge

I I

Hvy Bridge
133

TECHNICAL ENGINEER 

BATTALION

Trucks

Bulldozers

Compressors

Generators

Graders

Elevators

Band Saws

Mine Detectors

Total

2

11

7

2

2

1

3

3

I I

I I

Tech

HHC

I

Obstacle Const

I

Rd Const

I I

Tech

Const

ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION

BATTALION Total

12

24

1

3

3

4

4

2

Const

Trucks

Bulldozers

Compressors

Generators

Excavators

Rock Crushers

Cranes

Band Saws

I

Const

HHC

I

Technical Engineer Battalion

Engineer Construction Battalion
134

SCUD BATTALION

SCUD-B TEL

END TRAY Radar

2 1/2T Truck

ZIL-135 Truck Resupply

GAZ-69 Vehicle Survey

K-51 Crane

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total Btry

Cmd &

Met

6

1

54

3

1

4

173

23

150

2

16

1

1

41

5

36

1

6

1

1

8

42

50

FROG BATTALION

FROG-7 Launcher

END TRAY Radar

2 1/2T Truck

ZIL-135 Truck Resupply

GAZ-69 Vehicle Survey

OR

FROG-3/5

BREAD BIN Radar

2 1/2T Truck

ZIL-135V Truck Resupply

GAZ-69 Vehicle Survey

K-51 Crane

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total Btry

Cmd &

Met

3

1

54

3

1

3

1

54

3

1

3

173

23

150

1

16

1

1

16

1

1

41

5

36

1

6

1

1

6

1

50

8

42

Command

& Met

I I

I I

SCUD

SCUD Command

& Met

I I

I I

FROG

FROG

Strategic Level SCUD B Battalion

Strategic Level FROG Battalion
135

Corps MRL Battalion

Corps MRL Brigade

MRL BATTALION

(240MM)

BM-24 (12rd 240mm MRL)

RPD/RPK (7.62mm LMG)

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Total

15

8

184

17

122MM HAS THE SAME ORDER OF BATTLE

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

1

12

209

17

192

I

240 MRL

I

240 MRL

I

240 MRL HQ&S

I I

240 MRL

122 MRL

122 MRL

122 MRL

122 MRL

MRL BRIGADE (122mm)

BM-11 (122mm)

RPD/RPK (7.62mm LMG)

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Total

108

122 MRL

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

END TRAY Radar

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

1500

NOTE: Corps MRL Brigade can be either 122mm or 240mm.

I I

X

122 MRL

I

HQ

I

122 MRL

I I I

Target

Acquisition

Technical

Support
136

Strategic Level Heavy Artillery Brigade

I

HQ

ARTILLERY BRIGADE

(170mm SP "KOKSUN")

M-1978/M-1989 (170mm SP)

RPD/RPK (7.62mm LMG)

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

END TRAY Radar

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

72

170

170

170

170

X

I I I

14.5

I

170

170

170

I

Target

Acquisition
137

Corps Artillery Brigade

I

HQ

CORPS SP

ARTILLERY BRIGADE

M-1974 (152mm D-20)

M-1975 (130mm M-46)

M-1981 (122mm D-74)

RPD/RPK (7.62mm LMG)

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

END TRAY Radar

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

54

54

54

X

I I

Target

Acquisition

130

I I

130

130

152

I I

152

152

122

I I

122

122

I

14.5
138

Division 122/152mm Towed Artillery Regiment

Artillery Battalion

ARTILLERY REGIMENT

122/152mm TOWED

D-74 (122mm How)

M-30 (122mm How)

D-20 (152mm How)

RPG-2/7 (40AT Lchr)

RP-46 (7.62 MG)

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Total

11

36

18

8

34

778

118

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

8

118

930

118

812

122

122

I I

122

I I I I

152 H&S

I I I

122/152

D-74

M-30

D-20

ARTILLERY BATTALION

122mm TOWED

M-38 (122mm How)

RP-46 (7.62 MG)

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Total

18

8

190

26

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

1

26

224

26

198

122

I

122

I I

122 H&S

I I

122
139

Regimental Mortar Battalion

MORTAR BATTALION

120mm

M-43 (120mm Mortar)

RPG-2/7 (40AT Lchr)

RP-46 (7.62 MG)

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

27

8

8

158

26

1

31

206

26

180

H&S

I I

120

I

120

I

120

I

120
140

Tank Brigade

I I

I

HQ

ARMOR BRIGADE

T-62

VTT-323/BTR-60/M1967

M1985/BRDM AT-3/4

M1985/Type-62-63/PT-76

152mm SP Howitzer

122mm SP Howitzer

ATGM AT-3 Manpack

RPG-2/7 (40 AT Lchr)

M-37 (82mm Mortar)

SA-7b

M1983/BTR-152A (14.5)

SPAAG (37)

Type-80/ZSU-57 (57)

FIRE CAN Radar

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

T-54-T Tank RTVR

RPD/RPK LMG

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

Tk

Bn

LT Tk

Bn

M Inf

Bn

152

Reg

122

Bn

Eng

Co HQ

Tech

Spt

CML

Plt

124

58

3

40

18

18

3

43

9

12

6

6

6

3

26

162

6

70

2481

224

2257

31

2

3

18

1

2

226

22

204

40

3

11

1

2

190

21

169

43

3

3

31

9

3

1

14

33

504

31

473

TECH

SPT

LT

18

1

12

9

230

28

202

18

1

12

9

230

28

202

6

6

6

6

3

1

30

282

23

259

4

7

4

76

5

71

AAA

Bn

6

2

3

5

10

2

120

14

106

6

4

12

2

5

145

7

138

3

1

26

1

25

X

I I

I I I

I I I I

I I
141

Basic Tank Battalion (Top Left)

Basic Tank Company (Top Right)

Light Tank Battalion (Bottom)

TANK BATTALION

T-55(59)/62(69)

M1985/Type62/63/PT-76

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

T-34-T Tank RTVR

RP-46

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

Tk

Co HQ

31

2

3

18

1

2

204

22

226

22

204

10

3

50

5

55

5

50

1

2

3

9

1

2

52

7

61

7

54

TANK COMPANY Total

Tk

Plt HQ

10

3

50

5

55

5

50

3

11

1

12

1

11

1

3

17

2

19

2

17

I

HQ

T-55(59)/62

2 1/2T Utility Truck

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

I I

I

I

HQ

LIGHT TANK BATTALION

M1985/Type62/63/PT-76

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

T-34-T Tank RTVR

RP-46

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

Tk

Co HQ

40

3

11

1

2

204

22

190

21

169

10

2

40

5

45

5

40

10

3

5

1

2

49

7

55

6

49

I

HQ LT

I I

I

LT
142

I I

I

HQ

I

HQ

I I

I

HQ

I

I I I I

DIRECT

ACTION

I

REAR

SERVICE

RECONNAISSANCE BRIGADE

REAR

SERVICE

RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

I REAR

SERVICE

SEABORNE SNIPER BATTALION

X
143

LIGHT INFANTRY

BRIGADE

RPG-2/7 (40 AT Lchr)

60 MTR

RPD/RPK

AK Rifle

T-64/68 Pistol

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Truck

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total Bn Comp

138

105

136

2950

3220

2

13

3300

80

3220

18

21

18

414

450

1

450

450

60

3

3

3

66

72

72

72

HQ&S

I I

HQ &

CMD

LT

LT

I

X

I I

LT

Light Infantry Brigade

Light Infantry Battalion
144

Mechanized Infantry Brigade

I I I I

122 152

MRL

I

HQ

MECHANIZED INFANTRY

BRIGADE

T-62

M1985/Type-62/63/PT-76

VTT-323/BTR-60/M1967

M1985/BRDM AT-3/4

122/152mm SP Howitzer

BM-21 (122mm MRL)

ATGM AT-3 Manpack

SPG-9 (73mm)

B-11 (107 RG)

RPG-7 (AT Lchr)

M-43 (120mm Mortar)

M-37 (82mm Mortar)

SA-7b

BTR-152A (14.5)

SPAAG (37)

Type-80/ZSU-57 (57)

FIRE CAN Radar

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

M-72 Motorcycle

T-54-T Tank RTVR

RPD/RPK LMG

AK Rifle

M1891/30 Rifle

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

M INF

Bn

Mt INF

Bn

Tk

Bn

Art

152

Art

122

MTR

Bn

AT

Bn

AAA

Bn

MRL

Brg HQ

Tech

Spt

31

5

56

15

18/18

6

15

12

15

285

27

45

24

6

18

6

3

28

376

8

7

383

3780

18

4781

364

4417

43

3

3

3

31

9

3

4

1

14

33

408

555

32

523

TECH

SPT

Rec

Co

Eng

Co

Sig

Co

Chm

Co

3

3

62

9

3

2

1

37

85

383

6

506

31

475

31

2

3

18

1

204

226

22

204

18

1

12

9

184

230

28

202

18

1

12

9

184

230

28

202

8

27

1

31

8

158

208

28

180

9

12

3

35

8

156

195

23

172

6

6

6

6

3

1

30

259

282

23

259

6

3

2

60

66

4

62

6

2

3

6

50

2

152

180

24

158

6

4

16

6

6

155

175

8

167

3

7

9

1

5

8

6

75

96

6

90

4

7

4

63

76

5

71

4

1

8

4

52

65

5

60

4

1

10

4

113

126

5

121

I I I I I

I

I

X

I

I I I I I I

I
145

Mechanized Infantry Battalion

82 AT-3

MECHANIZED INFANTRY

BATTALION

VTT-323/BTR-60/M1967

M1985/BRDM AT-3/4

AT-3 SAGGER Manpack

B-11 (107 RG)

RPG-7 (AT Lchr)

M-37 (82mm Mortar)

SA-7b

SPAAG

V-415 Jeep

2 1/2T Utility Truck

RPD/RPK-46/SMG

Rifle AK

T-64/68 Pistol

Radio, R-112

Radio, R-114

Radio, R-113

Receiver, R-311

Personnel

 Officer

 Enlisted

Total

INF

Co

MTR

Btry

AT

Plt

AAA

Plt HQ

43

3

3

3

31

9

3

4

1

14

33

408

96

2

14

38

1

555

32

523

10

1

9

1

9

87

26

4

10

120

5

115

Sig

Plt

10

9

2

57

5

4

62

5

57

3

3

4

2

20

1

1

25

1

24

4

1

17

1

16

3

4

17

1

26

1

25

3

3

1

4

2

53

9

2

2

2

1

65

9

56

I I

I I HQ
147

SECTION 5

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT

Key Judgments

U.S. military personnel deploying to the Korean Peninsula will encounter significant infectious disease and environmental health risks. Disease

and non-battle injuries (DNBIs) present a major risk to the effectiveness

of operational units and the success of the overall mission. Command

emphasis on preventive medicine measures, good personal hygiene, disease surveillance and reporting, and troop discipline at all levels is

essential for limiting infectious disease and environmental health risks.

The primary infectious disease risks are from scrub typhus, hemorrhagic

fever with renal syndrome (Korean hemorrhagic fever), and Japanese

encephalitis. Risks from food- and water-borne diseases include diarrheal diseases, typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, and hepatitis A. Risks

may vary among geographic areas and seasons. Environmental health

risks are primarily attributable to extremes of heat and cold, depending

on the region and season, and poor food and water sanitation. Unregulated industry and agriculture heavily pollute air, water, and soil

resources.

Preventive countermeasures are the key to combat strength, and their

implementation and continued emphasis must be a command responsibility. Use of local and regional food, water, and ice sources without

proper inspection and approval by U.S. medical personnel (military

public health, veterinary, and preventive medicine units) will put operational forces at great risk of acquiring food- and water-borne diseases

that could significantly degrade the effectiveness of over 10 to 20 percent of the entire force within 24 to 48 hours. Additionally, without the

implementation of effective preventive medicine countermeasures,

small point-source outbreaks could degrade company-size units to the

point of being operationally ineffective for up to 7 days. 
148

Disease Risks

Diseases Contracted From Insects or Animals

Malaria. This disease is transmitted by the bite of an infective mosquito. Likely prevalent at low levels along the DMZ. Transmission has

been occurring in South Korea’s northwestern province of Kyonggi-do

along the DMZ. Reported cases in South Korea have been increasing

each year (21 in 1994; 107 in 1995; and 306 in 1996, including U.S. personnel). Vector mosquitos are present in North Korea. Transmission

usually occurs from May through September with the peak season during July and August.

Japanese Encephalitis. This disease is an acute mosquito-borne infection of the central nervous system. It is frequently associated with ricegrowing areas. Greatest risk period is from May through late September.

It is found countrywide in areas where mosquito-breeding sites and pigrearing areas coexist. The last major epidemic of Japanese encephalitis

in the ROK occurred during 1982, with 1,197 reported cases among

local nationals. Human cases of the disease have decreased in the ROK,

partially because of a national vaccination program and changes in agricultural practices.

Korean Hemorrhagic Fever. This was a disease of historic significance

to U.S. military forces in the Korean War. The disease continues to

exhibit a low level of annual incidence (0 to 5 cases among U.S. forces

per year). Primary transmission is from inhaling airborne dust particles

contaminated with infective rodent excreta or saliva. Risk occurs countrywide and year-round, although peak disease incidence occurs October through December. Elevated risk is associated with dusty, dry

conditions and peak rodent populations. Korean hemorrhagic fever is

characterized by an abrupt onset of fever of 3 to 8 days duration,

prostration, backache, headache, abdominal pain, anorexia, and vomiting. 
149

Typhus. Typhus includes any of several forms of infectious diseases

caused by microorganisms of the genus Rickettsia. It is characterized

by severe headache, sustained fever, depression, and red rashes. Mites

are the primary vector of scrub typhus, an infection prevalent where

scrub brush and secondary growth vegetation coexist. In South Korea,

90 percent of all scrub typhus cases occurred between October and

December. Louse-borne (epidemic) and flea-borne (murine) typhus are

contracted by scratching louse and flea feces into the skin respectively.

Louse-borne typhus has been responsible for large epidemics in Korea

and is still a threat under adverse circumstances, such as war or natural

disaster. Sporadic outbreaks of flea-borne typhus have occurred around

seaports and warehouse areas.

Helminthic Infections. These infections include ascariasis, clonorchiasis, and hookworm infection. Transmission primarily occurs when the

skin comes in contact with soil or water containing any of a large variety

of parasitic intestinal worms. 

Rabies. Before 1975, rabies was a serious concern on the Korean Peninsula. Since 1976, there have been only two cases of human rabies in

the ROK, with none occurring since 1984. Some cattle and dog cases

were reported in South Korea in 1996.

Diseases Contracted From Other People/Poor Hygiene

Stomach/Intestinal Infections. Prevailing unsanitary conditions make

stomach/intestinal infections a principal threat. Transmission is common

from contaminated food, water, and ice. Diseases of greatest concern

include:

“Traveler's Diarrhea”: Diarrheal diseases probably are the greatest

infectious threat for troops deployed to the Korean Peninsula. Bacterial, viral, parasitic, and viral causes are all possible. Local food and

water should be considered contaminated unless otherwise indicated

by medical personnel. If you get traveler's diarrhea, drink plenty of

fluids to avoid becoming dehydrated.
150

Hepatitis A: Hepatitis A infection rates are moderate to high in local

populations. Most U.S. personnel have no immunity and are susceptible to this disease. Enure shots are up to date prior to deployment.

Cholera: Extensive countrywide outbreaks occurred throughout the

summers of 1995 and 1996 and affected all provinces. The outbreaks

were associated with the consumption of contaminated seafood and

municipal water. Risk is elevated May through November. 

Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fevers: Risk is year-round and countrywide, with highest numbers of reports from North Hamyong Province. Outbreaks frequently occur. Typhoid immunization is

recommended. 

Respiratory Infection. Acute respiratory infections have been noted to

be a common affliction on deployments to the Korean Peninsula.

Crowding in staging areas and tent camps, combined with poor personal

hygiene, assists in the transmission of respiratory disease agents.

Annual influenza vaccines should be current prior to deployment.

Tuberculosis is also present in the civilian and military populations in

the DPRK and the ROK. 

Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs). Syphilis, gonorrhea, venereal

warts, herpes, chlamydia, and hepatitis are common sexually transmitted diseases in Korea, some of which are reportedly penicillin resistant.

The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV—the virus that causes AIDS)

is not currently a significant problem in Korea, although the disease is

present. The majority of HIV infections reported from South Korea have

been acquired through heterosexual contact. Hepatitis B is prevalent at

high levels. Risk is year-round and countrywide. 

Environmental Health Risks

Most water sources are fecally contaminated. Living and sanitary standards are poor throughout the DPRK. Fertilization with night soil and

poor food handling practices present significant risks of food-borne ill-
151

ness. Water and air pollution are widespread throughout the DPRK.

Extremes of heat and cold also present risks, depending on the region

and season. 

Throughout the ROK, living and sanitary conditions are below Western

standards. Heavy industrialization and a high population density overburden the ROK's infrastructure. Years of continual pollution have

severely contaminated the air, water, and soil. 

Water Supply

The DPRK's water sources include rivers, creeks, springs, and wells;

supplies usually are plentiful, but seasonal shortages occur. The ROK's

water sources include streams, springs, wells, lakes, and reservoirs; supplies are adequate, although shortages have been reported in urban areas

during summer.

In the DPRK, major cities use slow sand filtration and chlorination to

treat water; however, contamination occurs during distribution because

of seepage and back siphoning. Although some urban water supplies are

delivered via individual house hookups, most households obtain water

from public taps. In the ROK, municipal water is supplied to more than

50 percent of the population countrywide and to nearly 100 percent in

the larger cities. ROK's drinking water needs are not being met because

of inadequate treatment and storage capacities, obsolete equipment, and

lagging government investment. 

Living and Sanitary Conditions

DPRK's living and sanitation conditions are well below those in most

developed nations. Overcrowded living quarters are common because

the demand for housing exceeds supply. Although larger cities, such as

Pyongyang, have a limited number of modern, well-equipped apartment

buildings, most urban and rural housing consists of small, one-room

houses without plumbing. Charcoal-burning home-heating systems frequently malfunction, resulting in dangerous levels of carbon monoxide
152

within the dwellings. In rural areas, most housing offers minimum shelter, poor ventilation, and an excellent environment for vermin. Sewage

disposal throughout most of the DPRK is inadequate. Although sewage

treatment plants and septic systems are used in some large cities, sewage

systems in most urban areas, consisting of both open and covered

ditches, discharge raw sewage directly into streams or the sea. Rural

inhabitants use outdoor privies for waste disposal, and night soil commonly is used as fertilizer.

ROK's living conditions are below developed nations' standards. The

average Korean home is built partially of wood, brick, or stone, with tile

or slate roofs. Millions of Koreans now live in small, cramped high-rise

apartments. Sewage treatment and trash disposal services are limited to

urban areas. Most sewage is not treated before being discharged. Charcoal-burning home-heating systems frequently malfunction resulting in

dangerous levels of carbon monoxide within the dwellings.

Pollution

In the DPRK, it is unlikely that special efforts have been made to protect

the environment from industrial contaminants, since raw sewage is routinely discharged into the environment. DPRK authorities and the media

are reporting heavy industrial contamination of the Tumen,

Chongchong, and Taedong Rivers. The sources of the pollution are

believed to be mining companies, paper factories, steel mills, refineries,

and chemical factories along the rivers. Heavy industrial and vehicle

emissions produce high levels of heavy metals and photochemical pollution in and around Chongjin, Hamhung, Sunchon, and Pyongyang.

In the ROK, pollution is a pressing environmental problem. Water, soil,

and air pollution impact morbidity and mortality throughout the ROK.

Thirty toxic chemicals banned by the World Health Organization, most

of them pesticides, are still used by farmers. Of these, aldicarb, captafol,

and disulfoton are classified as extremely hazardous, while the remain-
153

der are classified as highly hazardous. Heavy metals from indiscriminate

discharge of industrial waste contaminate ROK's watershed. The level

of air pollution in Seoul is well above World Health Organization recommendations, with peak levels occurring during late fall and winter. 

Climate

Seasonal and regional extremes of heat and cold present significant

exposure risks. Winter months on the Korean Peninsula (November

through March) are extremely cold and windy, making cold-related injuries a major medical threat. During the Korean War, over 8,000 soldiers

suffered cold weather injuries. Winter temperatures can be as low as -4

°C (24 °F) with windchill temperatures of -31 °C (-25 °F). Summers

(June through September) can have extreme highs of 37 °C (100

°F). Heat is not only a primary medical problem, it also exacerbates

other diseases, making diagnosis and treatment more difficult. See

Appendix F, First Aid and Hot and Cold Weather Survival, for more

information.

Hazardous Animals and Plants

The Korean mamushi (Agkistrodon blomhoffi) is the only venomous

snake found on the Korean Peninsula, primarily in southern areas. Scorpions, centipedes, and black widow spiders are also present. Poisonous

plants include nettles, lacquer trees, poison ivy, poison sumac, agrimony, cow parsley, and soapberry which all produce a contact vesicant

(an agent that induces blistering). 

Ways to Protect Yourself Against Disease

■ Avoid stagnant water. Stagnant water is a breeding ground for both

diseases and disease-carrying insects like mosquitos. Areas with

many stagnant pools such as rice paddies, marshes, or junk piles

should be avoided if possible.
154

■ Protect yourself against mosquito bites to reduce the risk of contracting malaria and Japanese encephalitis. Protection from mosquitos

and other biting flies can be accomplished by the use of screened eating and sleeping quarters (including head and bed nets) and by limiting the amount of outside activity during the evening/night hours if

possible. Use plenty of insect repellent and keep sleeves rolled down,

especially during field operations and at night. The repellent lotion

should be applied to exposed skin including ears, face, and neck. Its

area of application should extend 2 to 3 inches under the edges of the

uniform to prevent biting insects from crawling into those areas.

■ Keep mites out of the campsite. This can be done by clearing campsites of non-woody (low brush and scrub) vegetation and by the use

of insect repellent on the skin and clothing. 

■ Avoid breathing dust and dirt to reduce risk of contracting Korean

hemorrhagic fever. Use dust masks when necessary. Other dust

control measures include wet sweeping, wetting roads, etc. 

■ Maintain an effective, complete police of the area, particularly in the

field. The number of mosquitos and other hazardous pests (mites,

ticks, fleas, and rodents) in the area will be greatly reduced by the

elimination/proper disposal of all open, water-holding containers

(such as empty cans, tires, etc.), waste materials, and human waste.

■ Avoid extended contact of bare skin with the soil, particularly in

rural areas. Many parasites can penetrate the skin. Poor sanitation

practices throughout the Korean Peninsula greatly increase the risk of

this type of infection, particularly in rural areas and areas where the

soil is moist and rotting vegetation is present. The soil in these areas

may be contaminated with infected animal feces, so direct contact

with bare skin can result in infection. Prevention of infection involves

minimizing soil/skin contact as much as possible — so, do not go

barefoot, even in the campsite. Avoid sleeping on bare ground

during field operations. Do not use mud or vegetation for camouflage.
155

■ Keep as dry as possible. Many disease organisms are transmitted to

man by direct skin contact with water or wet vegetation. To avoid

becoming infected by these organisms, avoid fresh water contact

when the mission permits. Swimming, wading, and crossing flooded

fields should be avoided to the greatest extent possible. Also, keeping

dry will greatly reduce the likelihood of having skin problems.

■ Limit contact with local wild and domestic animals. Adopting pets

from local animal populations is strictly forbidden. If bitten or

scratched by an animal, thoroughly cleanse the wound/skin area with

soap or detergent, even if there is no broken skin, and seek medical

assistance immediately. This includes snake bites.

■ Avoid engaging in sexual activities with local persons, particularly

prostitutes. All deploying personnel must be educated and convinced

of the serious risk of HIV/STD infection associated with prostitutes.

Abstinence is your best protection against infection with an STD.

Though not 100 percent effective, condoms will greatly reduce your

risk of becoming infected with an STD. 

■ Be extremely careful about eating and drinking. The safest bet is to

restrict the diet to food and drink only from approved sources, particularly during field operations. High risk food items (raw seafood or

shellfish, fresh eggs, dairy products, and lettuce or other uncooked

vegetables) should be avoided unless from officially approved

sources. 

❏ Do not use local water for drinking or brushing teeth. Local ice is

also considered unreliable. If local water must be used, boil or

disinfect with iodine tablets (per label instructions). Ordinary

chlorine bleach (2 to 4 drops per quart, allow 30 minutes contact)

will also disinfect water.

❏ Make sure all food, especially meat, is thoroughly cooked and

served hot. Avoid salads or raw foods of any kind. Fresh fruit is

safe for consumption if you peel it. Dairy products represent a

very high risk of disease if not pasteurized.
156

■ Maintain as strict a standard of personal hygiene as possible at all

times. One of the best ways to stay healthy when in an unsanitary

environment is to frequent handwashing, particularly prior to meals,

toothbrushing, or touching the eyes/face. Any open cuts or scrapes

should be treated with disinfectant and cleaned repeatedly until

healed. Sanitary disposal of human waste, fly control, and enforced

handwashing should be priority measures in the field.

■ See a medic if you are sick. Report to appropriate medic if diarrhea,

cough, fever, weakness, or any symptom that can’t be explained are

noted. 
A-1

APPENDIX A: 

Equipment Recognition

BRDM-2

Type: 4 wheel drive, armored amphibious vehicle

Variants: Command, reconnaissance, chemical 

reconnaissance (filtration/overpressure system, 

rear marking flag dispenser), antitank (AT-2/3/5), 

surface-to-air missile (SA-9)

Armament: 14.5mm, 7.62mm machineguns

Crew: 2

Troops: 6

Hull Thickness: 10-14mm

Road Range: 750 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 10 km/hr

 Paved Road: 100 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .4 m

Trench: 1.25 m

Other: IR lights driver/commander, rear engine, central 

troop compartment
A-2

BMP-1 (KORSHUN)

Type: Amphibious, armored, tracked infantry combat 

vehicle

Variants: Command, reconnaissance (BRM/BRM-1), Type 

WZ-501 (Chinese version, carries 1 Red Arrow 

AT missile)

Armament: 73mm smooth bore main gun with 3 km max 

range, 7.62mm machinegun, AT-3

Crew: 3

Passengers: 8

Hull Thickness: 5-19mm, turret 23mm

Road Range: 500 km

Max Speed 

Water: 6-8 km/hr

Paved Road: 80 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .8 m

Trench: 2.2 m

Other: Overpressurized for NBC protection, smoke laying 

capability, IR searchlight, 4 firing ports each side 

and 1 rear
A-3

BTR-60PA/PB

Type: Amphibious, armored personnel carrier

Variants: BTR-60PA (overhead armor/NBC protection)

BTR-60PB (14.5mm and 7.62mm machineguns)

BTR-60PU (command)

Armament: 7.62mm machineguns (some with 12.7mm 

machineguns)

Crew: 3

Passengers: 11

Hull Thickness: 9-14mm

Road Range: 500 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 9-10 km/hr (P model/water jet propulsion)

 Paved Road: 80 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .4 m

Trench: 2 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: DPRK has mostly PA and PB models, searchlight 

and IR equipment, vulnerable to small arms fire/

fuel will ignite easily when fuel tanks punctured, 

3 firing ports each side
A-4

BTR-152

Type: Wheeled armored personnel carrier

Variants: Command, twin 14.5mm machinegun for antiair, 

twin 23mm cannon version has been seen

Armament: 7.62mm machinegun

Crew: 2

Passengers: 17-18

Hull Thickness: 6-14mm

Road Range: 650 km

Max Speed 

 Paved Road: 65 km/hr

Fording: .8 m

Verticle Obstacle: .6 m

Trench: .7 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: Both 4 and 6 wheel drive, the V3 model has IR 

light, K model has overhead cover
A-5

BTR-40

Type: 4-wheel drive command and reconnaissance 

vehicle

Variants: K model has armored roof

Armament: 7.62mm machinegun, some may carry 14.5mm 

AA machinegun instead

Crew: 2

Troops: 8-9

Hull Thickness: 8-13mm

Road Range: 285 km

Max Speed 

 Paved Road: 80 km/hr

Fording: .9 m

Verticle Obstacle: .47 m

Trench: .7 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: Built on GAZ-63 chassis, sloping front, flat rear, 

open roof
A-6

MT-LB

Type: Amphibious, armored tracked vehicle

Variants: Command, technical support, engineer

Armament: 7.62mm machinegun

Crew: 2+, varies with mission

Troops: 10

Hull Thickness: 7-14mm

Road Range: 600 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 6 km/hr

 Paved Road: 80 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .7 m

Trench: 2.7 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: IR searchlight, NBC filtration system, vulnerable 

to armor piercing ammunition, prime mover for 

artillery and as cargo or general transport vehicle
A-7

MODEL 531A

Type: Chinese, amphibious, armored personnel carrier

Armament: 7.62mm machinegun

Crew: 4

Troops: 10

Hull Thickness: 12mm

Road Range: 400-425 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 7 km/hr

 Paved Road: 50 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .6 m

Trench: 2 m

Climb Slope: 32 degrees

Other: One firing port each side, no vision blocks, 

no night vision or NBC equipment
A-8

VTT-323 (M-1973)

Type: The VTT 323 APC is based on the earlier Chinese 

YW531. The vehicle features a welded steel, boxlike hull with a small turret positioned just to the 

rear of the hull centerline

Armament: Twin 14.5mm hvy MG, AT-3 ATGM

Crew: 2

Troops: 13

Hull Thickness: 24mm

Road Range: 450 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 10 km/hr

 Paved Road: 80 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .6 m

Trench: 2.2 m

Climb Slope: 34 degrees

Other: May also carry SA-7/16 SAM
A-9

TYPE 85 ATGM CARRIER

Type: ATGM carrier

Armament: AT-3, 14.5mm machinegun

Crew: 4

Road Range: 500 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 7 km/hr

 Paved Road: 65 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .6 m

Trench: 2.2 m

Climb Slope: 32 degrees
A-10

BTR-50

Type: Amphibious, armored personnel carrier

Variants: BTR-50P (open top), BTR-50PK (armored roof), 

BTR-50PU (command vehicle)

Armament: 12.7mm machinegun

Crew: 2

Troops: 14

Hull Thickness: 10mm

Road Range: 240 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 11 km/hr

 Paved Road: 45 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: 1.1 m

Trench: 2.8 m

Climb Slope: 38 degrees

Other: Vulnerable to small arms fire, no NBC capabilities
A-11

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

M1992

Type: Amphibious, armored personnel carrier

Armament: 30mm automatic grenade launcher, AT-4 ATGM

Crew: 2

Troops: 8

Hull Thickness: 10mm, 15mm 60 degree frontal arc

Road Range: 500 km

Max Speed 

 Water: N/A

 Paved Road: 60 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .6 m

Trench: .4 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: Probably 4-wheel drive, resembles BRDM, 

no NBC capabilities
A-12

PT-76

Type: Amphibious tank

Armament: 76mm main gun

Max Range: 12 km

 Effective Range: 650 m

Rate of Fire: 6-8 rds/min

Stabilization: Some models

Ammunition: HE-FRAG, HEAT, HVAP-T, AP-T

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 32mm (HVAP-T), 60mm (AP-T), 

120mm (HEAT, any range)

Basic Load: 40 rds

Hull Thickness: 25mm

Road Range: 260 km (450 with tanks)

Max Speed 

 Water: 10 km/hr

 Paved Road: 44 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: 1.1 m

Trench: 2.8 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: 12.7mm machinegun, no night devices, no NBC 

protection, main gun elevation -4 to 30 degrees
A-13

TYPE-62 LIGHT TANK

Type: Light tank

Armament: 85mm cannon, 7.62mm coax and bow MG

Basic Load: 85mm — 47 rds

Hull Thickness: 45mm

Road Range: 500 km

Max Speed 

 Paved Road: 60 km/hr

Fording: 1.3 m

Verticle Obstacle: 9.7 m

Trench: 2.55 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: Resembles a scaled down Type-59
A-14

TYPE-63 LIGHT AMPHIBIOUS TANK

Type: The Type-63 amphibious tank’s chassis is based on 

the Type-77 APC and its turret on the Type-62 

light tank

Armament: 85mm cannon, 12.7mm and 7.62mm MG

Basic Load: 85mm — 44 rds

Hull Thickness: 23mm

Road Range: 370 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 12 km/hr

 Paved Road: 64 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .87 m

Trench: 2.9 m

Climb Slope: 38 degrees

Other: Resembles a scaled down Type-59
A-15

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

PT-85 (TYPE-82)

Type: North Korean produced amphibious tank, 

based on the VTT-323 APC chassis

Armament: 85mm main gun, AT-3

Hull Thickness: 30mm

Road Range: 500 km

Max Speed 

 Water: 10 km/hr

 Paved Road: 60 km/hr

Fording: Amphibious

Verticle Obstacle: .87 m

Trench: 2.9 m

Climb Slope: 38 degrees

Other: AT-3 ATGM, turret similar to PT-76 with 

several modifications
A-16

T34/85

Type: WWII vintage medium tank

Armament: 85mm main gun

Max Range: 15,560 m

 Effective Range: 900 m

Rate of Fire: 3-4 rds/min

Stabilization: No

Ammunition: HE-T, HEAT, HVAP-T, AP-T, APC-T

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 155mm (HVAP-T), 120mm (AP-T), 

300mm (HEAT, any range)

Basic Load: 56 rds

Thickness:

 Hull: 45mm

 Turret Frontal: 75mm

Road Range: 300 km

Max Speed 

 Paved Road: 55 km/hr

Fording: 1.3 m (5.5 m with snorkel)

Verticle Obstacle: .73 m

Trench: 2.3 m

Climb Slope: 37 degrees

Other: 4 man crew, 7.62mm machinegun, 

main gun elevation 5 to 25 degrees
A-17

T-54

Type: Medium tank

Armament: 100mm rifle-bored main gun

Max Range: 16,800 m Effective Range: 1,500 m

Rate of Fire: 3 rds/min

Stabilization: Yes

Ammunition: HE-FRAG, HEAT, APDS, AP-T

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 180mm (AP-T), 300mm (HEAT, any range)

Basic Load: 43 rds

Thickness:

 Hull: 15-100mm

 Turret Frontal: 140-180mm

Road Range: 400 km (600 km with tanks)

Max Speed 

 Paved Road: 48 km/hr

Fording: 1.4 m (5.5 m with snorkel)

Verticle Obstacle: .8 m

Trench: 2.7 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: 12.7mm and 7.62mm machineguns; 

IR driver, gunner, and commander
A-18

T-55

Type: Medium tank

Armament: 100mm main gun

Max Range: 16,800 m Effective Range: 1,500 m

Rate of Fire: 3 rds/min

Stabilization: Yes

Ammunition: HE-FRAG, HEAT, APDS, AP-T, APC-T

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 180mm (AP-T and APC-T), 

390mm (HEAT, any range)

Basic Load: 43 rds

Thickness:

 Hull: 15-100mm

 Turret Frontal: 140-180mm

Road Range: 400 km (650 km with tanks)

Max Speed 

 Paved Road: 50 km/hr

Fording: 1.4 m (5.5 m with snorkel)

Verticle Obstacle: .8 m

Trench: 2.7 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: 12.7mm and 7.62mm machineguns; 

IR driver, gunner, and commander
A-19

TYPE-59

Type: Medium tank

Armament: 100mm rifle-bored main gun

Max Range: 16,800 m

 Effective Range: 1,500 m

Rate of Fire: 3 rds/min

Stabilization: Yes

Ammunition: HE-FRAG, HEAT, APDS, AP-T

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 180mm (AP-T), 300mm (HEAT, any range)

Basic Load: 43 rds

Thickness:

 Hull: 15-100mm

 Turret Frontal: 140-180mm

Road Range: 400 km (600 km with tanks)

Max Speed 

 Paved Road: 48 km/hr

Fording: 1.4 m (5.5 m with snorkel)

Verticle Obstacle: .8 m

Trench: 2.7 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: 12.7mm and 7.62mm machineguns; 

IR driver, gunner, and commander
A-20

T-62 (CH’ONMA-HO)

Type: Medium tank

Armament: 115mm main gun

Max Range: 12,200 m

 Effective Range: 1,870 m

Rate of Fire: 3-5 rds/min

Stabilization: Yes

Ammunition: Frag-HE, HEAT, APFSDF-T

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 495mm (HEAT), 360mm (APFSDF-T)

Basic Load: 40 rds

Thickness:

 Hull: 15-100mm

 Turret Frontal: 200mm

Road Range: 450 km

Max Speed 

 Dirt Road: 35 km/hr

 Paved Road: 50 km/hr

Fording: 1.4 m (5 m with snorkel)

Verticle Obstacle: .8 m

Trench: 2.85 m

Climb Slope: 30 degrees

Other: 7.62mm machinegun, some may have 12.7mm

machinegun, smoke, can be fitted with mine

clearing device
A-21

SU-100

Type: Assault tank

Armament: 100mm main gun

Max Range: 15,650 m

 Effective Range: 800 m

Rate of Fire: 7 rds/min

Ammunition: APHE, HEAT

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 185mm (APHE), 380mm (HEAT)

Road Range: 300 km

Max Speed 

 Paved Road: 50 km/hr

Other: Elevation -2 to 17 degrees
A-22

M-1943 (ZIS-2)

Type: Antitank gun

Caliber: 57mm

Max Effective Range: 8,400 m

Rate of Fire: 25 rds/min

Armor Penetration

 at 500 m: 106mm (AP), 140mm (HVAP)

Elevation: -5 to 25 degrees

Traverse: 54 degrees

Other: Distinguished by its long thin tube with no 

muzzle brake
A-23

M-1942 (ZIS-3)

Type: Antitank gun

Caliber: 76mm

Max Effective Range: 1,000 m

Rate of Fire: 15-20 rds/min

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 61mm (AP), 58mm (HVAP), 120mm (HEAT)

Elevation: -5 to 37 degrees

Traverse: 54 degrees

Other: Double baffle muzzle brake, also designated 

Chinese Type-54
A-24

D-44

Type: Antitank gun

Caliber: 85mm

Max Effective Range: 950 m (APHE), 1,150 m (HVAP), 

15,700 m (HE)

Rate of Fire: 15-20 rds/min

Armor Penetration

 at 1,000 m: 100-110mm

Elevation: 17 to 35 degrees

Traverse: 54 degrees

Other: Adaptation of T-34 tank main gun, basic unit 

of fire 140 rds, double baffle muzzle brake

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

SD-44

Type: Antitank gun

Caliber: 85mm

Max Effective Range: 950 m (APHE), 1,150 m (HVAP), 

15,700 m (HE)

Rate of Fire: 10-15 rds/min

Other: Propelled by 14hp engine, 25 km/hr road, 

10 km/hr cross-country, made for use by 

airborne units
A-25

D-48

Type: Antitank gun

Caliber: 85mm

Max Effective Range: 1,200 m (HVAP), 18,900 m (HE)

Rate of Fire: 15 rds/min (8 rds/min sustained)

Other: Long rifled barrel, basic unit of fire 150 rds

M-1944 (BS-3)

Type: Antitank gun

Caliber: 100mm

Max Effective Range: 900 m (HEAT), 1,100 m (AP), 21,000 m (HE)

Rate of Fire: 8-10 rds/min (1-2 rds/min sustained)

Armor Penetration: Estimated at up to 180mm (AP), 

390mm (HEAT) (uses same ammunition as 

SU-100 and T-54 which would allow for 

considerable increase in penetration)

Other: Basic unit of fire is 60 rds
A-26

ATGM SYSTEMS

North Korea has the Russian designed AT-1/SNAPPER, AT-3/SAGGER,

AT-4/SPIGOT (A and B), and probably the AT-5/SPANDREL in its

inventory. North Korea has the capability to produce the AT-3. ATGMs

are used in the crew-portable role (AT-3), the vehicle-borne role (AT-1,

AT-3, AT-4, and possibly AT-5), and possibly in the heli-borne role (AT3).

ATGM SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

SYSTEM

AT-1/SNAPPER

AT-3/SAGGER

AT-4ASPIGOT

AT-4BSPIGOT

AT-5/SPANDREL

Min/Max

Range

Armor

Penetration

Guidance

Command Link

Launch

Platforms

600/2000

400/3000

75/2000

75/2500

70/4000

380

500

500

550

650

MCLOS/Wire

MCLOS &

SACLOS/

Wire

SACLOS/Wire

SACLOS/Wire

SACLOS/Wire

Vehicle

Ground,

LAV,

Helicopter

Ground, LAV

Ground, LAV

Ground, LAV

MCLOS: Manual Command to Line of Sight

SACLOS: Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight
A-27

AT-1/SNAPPER

The AT-1 is a MCLOS ATGM system launched from jeep-type wheeled

vehicles. The AT-1 has a warhead capable of penetrating 380mm of

armor and a range of 2,000 meters. The AT-1 is easily recognized by its

wide wing span and pointed nose. The AT-1 is obsolescent and is probably found only in reserve units. The Russian name for this system is

SHMEL (Bumblebee).
A-28

AT-3/SAGGER

The AT-3 is both a MCLOS and a SACLOS guided ATGM that can be

fired from a variety of launch platforms. The MCLOS AT-3 includes the

man-portable (suitcase) and light tank mounted versions. The AT-3 may

be deployed in very limited numbers on helicopters. Any heliborne versions almost certainly will use MCLOS guidance. Dedicated ATGM

vehicles are likely to be equipped with SACLOS AT-3 systems. The

missle has a 3,000 m range and a wire command link. The AT-3’s armor

penetration has been estimated in excess of 400mm. The AT-3 is the

most widely deployed ATGM system in North Korea. It is believed that

the AT-3 has been in production in North Korea since the early 1980s.

The Russian name for the AT-3 is MALYUTKA (Little Baby).
A-29

AT-4/SPIGOT

The AT-4 is a SACLOS guided ATGM that is launched from a crew portable tripod placed on the ground or mounted on a light armored vehicle.

The AT-4 system was first identified as being in the North Korean inventory during the April 1992 military parade in Pyongyang. The same

launcher is used when firing both the AT-4 and the AT-5. Two versions

of the AT-4, the AT-4A and AT-4B, are available but it is unknown which

version North Korea has. The AT-4A and AT-4B can penetrate 500mm

and 550mm of armor and have ranges of 2,000 and 2,500 m, respectively. The Russian names for this system are FAGOT (Bassoon) and

FACTORIA.
A-30

AT-5/SPANDREL

The AT-5 is a SACLOS guided ATGM that is launched from the same

launcher as the AT-4 (portable ground or LAV). The AT-5 has a warhead

that can penetrate 650mm of armor and a maximum range of 4,000 m.

The Russian name for the AT-5 is KONKURS (Contest)
A-31

RPG-7

Type: 85mm warhead, 40mm launch tube, antitank 

grenade launcher

Ammunition: Variety of fin stabilized rounds, including 

rocket assisted HEAT round

Max Range: 920 m

Max Effective Range: 500 m stationary target, 300 m moving target

Rate of Fire: 4-6 rds/min

Armor Penetration: 330mm (HEAT), armor penetration not

affected by range due to use of shaped charge, 

severely affected by angle of impact

Other: Reusable, shoulder fired, hit probability 

reduced 50% in crosswinds as low as 7 mph, 

folding version (RPG-7D), RPG-7V can be 

fitted with telescope, IR sight, and passive 

night sight
A-32

RPG-2

Type: 82mm warhead, 40mm launch tube, antitank 

grenade launcher

Ammunition: HEAT

Max Effective Range: 100 m

Rate of Fire: 4-6 rds/min

Armor Penetration: 152-180mm

Other: Reusable, shoulder fired
A-33

B-10 RCL

Type: 82mm smoothbore antitank weapon

Ammunition: HE, HEAT (fin stabilized)

Max Range HE Round:7,300 m

Max Effective Range: 400 m

Rate of Fire: 6-7 rds/min

Armor Penetration: 240mm (HEAT)

Other: Towed on 2 wheels which are removed to fire, 

but can be fired on wheels, telescopic sight

for direct fire, panoramic sight for indirect

fire, both sights can be illuminated for night

firing, bar muzzle allows B-10 to be dragged

into position, Chinese T-65 is a copy of B-10
A-34

B-11 RCL

Type: 107mm smoothbore antitank weapon

Ammunition: HEAT, HE (fin stabilized)

Max Range HE Round:7,300 m

Max Effective Range: 450 m

Rate of Fire: 5-6 rds/min

Armor Penetration: 380mm (HEAT)

Other: HE round for indirect fire, towed by muzzle on 

two wheeled carriage
A-35

OTHER ARTILLERY EQUIPMENT

The following artillery systems are known to be in the North Korean

inventory. No open source data was available at handbook publication

date.

120mm SP combination gun M-1992

122mm SP gun M-1981

122mm SP howitzer M-1991

130mm SP gun M-1975

130mm SP gun M-1992

152mm SP gun-howitzer M-1974

152mm gun-howitzer M-1985
A-36

M-30 (M-1938)

Type: 122mm towed howitzer

Max Range: 11,800 m

Max Rate of Fire: 6 rds/min

Elevation: -3 to 65 degrees

Traverse: 49 degrees

Other: No muzzle brake, used in the Korean War
A-37

A-19 (M-1937)

Type: 122mm towed gun

Max Range: 20,400 m

Max Rate of Fire: 5 rds/min

Elevation: -5 to 69 degrees

Traverse: 58 degrees

Other: Developed in 1931, improved and fully fielded 

in 1937, finished production in the late 1940s, 

and used in the Korean War, estimated 160mm 

armor penetration, thick gun tube with muzzle 

brake
A-38

M-46

Type: 130mm towed gun

Max Range: 27,500 m

Max Rate of Fire: 8 rds/min (5 rds/min sustained)

Elevation: -2.5 to 45 degrees

Traverse: 50 degrees

Other: Accurate multipurpose gun that can be used as 

both a field artillery piece and a coastal 

defense weapon, 239mm armor penetration, 

long barrel, pepper pot muzzle brake
A-39

D-20

Type: 152mm towed howitzer

Max Range: 17,000 m

Max Rate of Fire: 6 rds/min (4 rds/min sustained)

Elevation: -5 to 45 degrees

Traverse: 45 degrees

Other: Armor penetration is 400mm with HEAT-SS, 

circular firing jack and 2 caster wheels make it 

possible to swiftly rotate entire D-20 360 

degrees, short gun tube, double baffle muzzle 

brake
A-40

M-1977

Type: 122mm self propelled (SP) gun/howitzer 

(uses 122mm D-30 mounted on vehicle 

superstructure)

Max Range: 15,300 m (21,900 m rocket assisted 

projectiles)

Max Rate of Fire: 7-8 rds/min (1.7-4 rds/min sustained)

Max Speed: 40 km/hr approx

Road Range: 400 km approx

Other: Produced in North Korea, sides enclosed, 

top open
A-41

M-1978 (KOKSAN)

Type: 170mm self propelled (SP) gun

Max Range: 40,000 m

Max Rate of Fire: 1-2 rds per 5 min (estimate)

Max Speed: 40 km/hr approx

Road Range: 300 km approx

Other: KOKSAN gun is probably mounted on a 

T-54 chasis
A-42

12 ROUND 107MM ROCKET LAUNCHER

Type: 107mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL)

Max Range: 8,500 m

Rockets: HE and incendiary

Reload Time: 3 min

Elevation: -4 to 58 degrees

Traverse: 32 degrees

Other: 12 launch tubes in array of 3 rows of 4 tubes

(two other SP versions exists: one with 18

tubes and one with 24 tubes), can be towed or

mounted on a 4 leg stand, 12-tube launcher

can also be mounted on any suitable wheeled

or tracked vehicle
A-43

BM-21

Type: 122mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL)

Max Range: 20,380 m

Rockets: Frag-HE, incendiary, smoke, possible chem

Rate of Fire: .5 sec per rocket

Reload Time: 8 min

Elevation: 0 to 55 degrees

Other: 40 launch tubes in array of 4 rows of 10 tubes, 

each tube is grooved to provide spinning 

motion (a combination of spin and fin 

stabilization), rocket provides closely 

grouped fire that can be operated and fired 

from truck cab or fired remotely from up to 

60 ft away, BM-21 and other 122mm 

rocket launchers can fire all 122mm rockets 

designed to fit in Soviet-derived 122mm 

launchers (including those that can achieve 

ranges of 30,000 to 36,000 meters), mounted 

on a URAL 375D (6x6) truck
A-44

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

M-1985

Type: 122mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL)

Other: 40 rd, North Korean produced, mounted on 

Isuzu truck

BM-11

Type: 122mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL)

Max Range: 20,500 m (estimated)

Rockets: All standard Russian, Chinese, and North 

Korean 122mm

Rate of Fire: 30 rds per 15 sec

Reload Time: 8-9 min

Other: 2 banks of 15 tubes mounted on single 

turntable, North Korean derivative of BM-21, 

mounted on URAL-375D or Japanese truck
A-45

BMD-20

Type: 200mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL)

Max Range: 19,000 m

Rocket: Frag-HE

Rate of Fire: 4 rds per 4 sec

Reload Time: 6-10 min

Elevation: 9 to 60 degrees

Traverse: 20 degrees

Other: Fires fixed fin rockets from a single row of 

4 large, square, open framework launch tubes, 

mounted on ZIL-157 6x6 truck
A-46

240MM ROCKET LAUNCHER M-1985 &

240MM ROCKET LAUNCHER M-1991

The North Koreans have produced two different 240mm rocket launchers, the 12 round M-1985 and 22 round M-1991. The M-1985 rocket

pack is easily identified as it has 2 rows of 6 tubes and is mounted on a

cab behind engine chassis. The M-1991 is mounted on a cab over engine

chassis. Both launch packs could be adapted to any suitable heavy crosscountry truck.

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

FROG-3

Type: Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG) artillery system

Range: 10,000 to 35,000 m

Warhead: 454kg

Other: Unguided, spin stabilized, solid fuel, 30-40 mins to 

prepare missile for firing, 60-70 mins to reload, 

mounted on wheeled chassis
A-47

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

FROG-5

Type: Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG) artillery system

Range: 10,000 to 61,000 m

Warhead: Up to 800lbs

Other: Unguided, spin stabilized, solid fuel, 30-40 mins to 

prepare missile for firing, 60-70 mins to reload, 

mounted on wheeled chassis, vehicle can travel up to 

44 km/hr

FROG-7

Type: Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG) artillery system

Range: 70,000 m

Warhead: Up to 450kg, HE, possibly chemical

Other: Unguided, spin stabilized, solid fuel, 20-30 mins to 

prepare for firing, system consists of a TransporterErector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle (ZIL-135 8x8) and a 

similar seperate vehicle used to transport 3 additional 

rockets
A-48

SCUD-B (SS-1C)

Type: Surface-to-surface guided ballistic missile

Range: Approximately 300 km

Warhead: 1,000kg, HE, chemical

CEP: 1 km

Other: 8 wheeled TEL, reload vehicle, fire control center 

van, communication vehicle, 1-1.5 hrs to prepare 

for firing

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

SCUD-C AND NODONG

Type: Surface-to-surface guided ballistic missile

It has been reported in open source documents that North Korea has

developed a SCUD-C ballistic missile, thought to be an enhanced-range

version of the SCUD-B with an alleged warhead of 700kg. The first of

three successful test firings of the SCUD-C was reported to have been

completed in June 1990. Recent open source reporting suggests that

North Korea is developing the NODONG-1 missile. The NODONG-1

has a reported estimated range of 950-3,000 km, which includes not

only the entire Korean Peninsula, but also Japan.
A-49

M-38/46 DSHK

Type: 12.7x108mm heavy machinegun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 1,000 m

Rate of Fire: 540-600 rds/min

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -10 to 85 degrees

Fire Control: Mechanical lead computing sight

Ammunition: API, API-T

Other: Manufactured in Russia and China, 

towed tripod mount
A-50

ZGU-1 (Mountain Pack)

Type: 14.5x114mm heavy AA machinegun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 1,400 m

Rate of Fire: 550-600 rds/min

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -20 to 90 degrees

Fire Control: Optical reflex sight (AA), telescope (ground)

Ammunition: API-T, HEI, I-T

Other: Manufactured in North Korea, Russia and 

China
A-51

ZPU-2

Type: 14.5x114mm twin heavy AA machinegun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 1,400 m

Rate of Fire: 550-600 rds/min

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -15 to 90 degrees

Fire Control: Optical mech computing sight (AA), 

telescope (ground)

Ammunition: API, API-T, HEI, I-T

Other: Manufactured in North Korea, Russia and 

China
A-52

ZPU-4

Type: Towed 14.5x114mm quad heavy AA 

machinegun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 1,400 m

Rate of Fire: 550-600 rds/min per barrel

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: 8.5 to 90 degrees

Fire Control: Optical mech computing sight (AA), 

telescope (ground)

Ammunition: API, API-T, HEI, I-T

Other: Manufactured in North Korea, Russia and 

China (Type-56)
A-53

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

M-1983

Type: Quad 14.5mm SP heavy machinegun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 1,400 m

Maximum 

 Vertical Range: 3,600 m

 Horizontal Range: 5,800 m

Rate of Fire: 550-600 rds/min per barrel

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -5 to 85 degrees

Fire Control: Radar, optical speed ring

Ammunition: API, API-T, HEI

Other: Manufactured in North Korea, main battle tank 

chassis, recoil operation, belt fed, 4 barrels

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

M-1990

Type: 30mm gatling gun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 3,000 m

Rate of Fire: 2,400-3,400 rds/min

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -5 to 85 degrees

Fire Control: Radar, speed ring

Ammunition: HEI-T (30x210mm)

Self Destruct Time: 7 to 10 secs

Self Destruct Range: 3,600-4,500 m

Other: Manufactured in North Korea, 4 wheeled 

carriage (towed), 4 barrels, externally driven by 

electric motor
A-54

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

M-1992

Type: Twin 30mm SP automatic cannon

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 3,000 m

Rate of Fire: 800 rds/min per barrel

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -5 to 85 degrees

Fire Control: Radar, optical speed ring

Ammunition: HEI-T (30x210mm)

Self Destruct Time: 7 to 10 secs

Self Destruct Range: 3,600-4,500 m

Other: Manufactured in North Korea, gas operated, 

ZSU-23-4 variant chassis, max road speed 

50 km/hr
A-55

M-1939

Type: 37mm automatic cannon

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 2,500 m

Rate of Fire: 160-180 rds/min

Ammunition: HEI-T (37x252mm)

Self Destruct Time: 8 to 12 secs

Self Destruct Range: 3,700-4,700 m

Other: Manufactured in Russia and China (Type-55), 

4 wheeled carriage (towed), 1 barrel, 5 round 

clip, recoil operation
A-56

Type-65

Type: Twin 37mm AA gun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 3,500 m

Rate of Fire: 150-180 rds/min per barrel

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -10 to 85 degrees

Fire Control: Optical mech computing sight

Ammunition: HEI-T (37x252mm)

Self Destruct Time: 9 to 12 secs

Self Destruct Range: 4,000-4,750 m

Other: Manufactured in China, recoil operated, 

4 wheeled carriage (towed)
A-57

Type-74

Type: 37mm twin automatic cannon

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 3,500 m

Rate of Fire: 220-240 rds/min per barrel

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -5 to 87 degrees

Fire Control: Optical mech computing sight, radar

Ammunition: HEI-T (37x252mm)

Self Destruct Time: 9 to 12 secs

Self Destruct Range: 4,000-4,700 m

Other: Manufactured in China, recoil operated, 

4 wheeled carriage (towed)
A-58

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

SP AA GUN

Type: 37mm SP AA gun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 2,500 m

Rate of Fire: 150-180 rds/min per barrel

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -5 to 85 degrees

Fire Control: Optical mech computing sight

Ammunition: HEI-T (37x252mm)

Self Destruct Time: 9 to 12 secs

Self Destruct Range: 4,000-4,700 m

Other: Manufactured in North Korea, recoil operated, 

5 round clip, armored personnel carrier

(tracked) carriage
A-59

S-60

Type: 57mm automatic AA gun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 4,000 m w/o radar, 6,000 m w/radar

Rate of Fire: 105-120 rds/min

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -4 to 87 degrees

Fire Control: Optical mech computing sight, radar

Ammunition: HEI-T (57x348mm)

Self Destruct Time: 13 to 17 secs

Self Destruct Range: 6,000-7,200 m

Other: Manufactured on a 4 wheeled towed carriage, 

Chinese variant is the Type 59
A-60

TWIN 57MM SELF-PROPELLED AA GUN

Type: 57mm automatic AA gun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 4,000 m

Rate of Fire: 150-180 rds/min per barrel

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: 0 to 87 degrees

Fire Control: Optical mechanical computing sight

Ammunition: HEI-T (57x348mm)

Self Destruct Time: 13 to 17 secs

Self Destruct Range: 6,000-7,200 m

Other: Mounted on a modified YW 531 APC, 

DPRK produced
A-61

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

TWIN 57MM AA GUN

Type: 57mm automatic AA gun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 4,000 m w/o radar, 6,000 w/radar

Rate of Fire: 105-120 rds/min per barrel

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -4 to 87 degrees

Fire Control: Optical mechanical computing sight

Ammunition: HE-T (57x348mm)

Self Destruct Time: 13 to 17 secs

Self Destruct Range: 6,000-7,200 m

Other: Mounted on a 4 wheeled towed carriage, 

DPRK produced
A-62

KS-12

Type: 85mm single shot AA gun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 4,000 m w/o radar, 10,200 w/radar

Rate of Fire: 15-20 rds/min

Azimuth: 720 degrees

Elevation: -3 to 82 degrees

Fire Control: Optical telescope, radar

Ammunition: HE-T, APC-T (85x__mm)

Self Destruct Time: 1 to 33 secs

Self Destruct Range: 800-10,200 m

Other: Mounted on a 4 wheeled towed carriage, 

Chinese variant is Type-72
A-63

KS-19

Type: 100mm single shot AA gun

Tactical Antiair 

 (AA) Range: 4,000 m w/o radar, 12,600 w/radar

Rate of Fire: 15 rds/min

Azimuth: Unlimited

Elevation: -3 to 85 degrees

Fire Control: Optical telescope, radar

Ammunition: HE-T, APC-T (100x__mm)

Self Destruct Time: 1 to 33 secs

Self Destruct Range: 800-12,600 m

Other: Mounted on a 4 wheeled towed carriage, 

Chinese variant is Type-59
A-64

SA-2 B/C/D/E/F GUIDLINE

The SA-2 is a somewhat mobile, medium to high level guided SAM

system.

Maximum 

 Speed: 4.0 B/C/D, 4.5 E/F Mach

 Effective Altitude: 27 B/C/F, 40 D/E km

 Effective Range: 35 B/F, 44 C, 50 D/E km

Warhead: HE 200kg (295kg SA-2E)

Fuze: Contact, proximity, or command

Kill Radius: 65 m

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

HQ-2B/F/J/P (SA-2 CHINA)

The HQ-2B/J is a Chinese reversed engineering version of the SA-2.

Maximum 

 Speed: 3.5-4 Mach

 Effective Altitude: 27 km

 Effective Range: 35 2B, 50 2J km

Warhead: HE 188kg

Fuze: Contact, proximity, or command

Kill Radius: Unknown
A-65

SA-3 GOA

The SA-3 B/C is a somewhat mobile low to medium level guided SAM

system.

Maximum 

 Speed: 3.5 Mach

 Effective Altitude: 22 km

 Effective Range: 25 km

Warhead: HE 60kg

Fuze: Proximity doppler radar

Kill Radius: 12.5 m
A-66

SA-5 GAMMON

The SA-5 is a long range, medium to high altitude strategic semi-active

guided SAM system.

Maximum 

 Speed: 4 Mach

 Effective Altitude: 30.5 km

 Effective Range: 300 km

Warhead: HE 215kg

Fuze: Proximity and command

Kill Radius: Unknown

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

HN-5/5A (SA-7 CHINA)

The HN-5 is the Chinese version of the SA-7 short range, man-portable,

passive IR homing SAM.

Maximum 

 Speed: 1.5 Mach

 Effective Altitude: 2,300 m (both)

 Effective Range: HN-5 — 4,200, HN-5A — 4,400 km

Warhead: Unknown

Fuze: Unknown

Kill Radius: Unknown
A-67

SA-7B

The SA-7B is a short range, man-portable, shoulder-fired, fire and forget

IR SAM.

Maximum 

 Speed: 1.7-1.95 Mach

 Effective Altitude: 2,300 m

 Effective Range: 4,200 m

Warhead: HE 1.8kg

Fuze: Contact and graze

Kill Radius: Unknown
A-68

SA-14

The SA-14 is a short range, man-portable, shoulder-launched, fire and

forget IR SAM.

Maximum 

 Speed: 2+ Mach

 Effective Altitude: 5,500 m

 Effective Range: 4,500 m

Warhead: HE

Fuze: Contact and graze

Kill Radius: Unknown
A-69

SA-16

The SA-16 is an improvement over the SA-14. It has a bigger warhead,

more speed, and more manueverability.

Maximum 

 Speed: 2+ Mach

 Effective Altitude: 3,500 m

 Effective Range: 5,000 m

Warhead: HE 2kg

Fuze: Contact and graze

Kill Radius: Unknown
A-70

STINGER

The Stinger is a short range, man-portable, shoulder-fired, passive IR

homing SAM. North Korea may have obtained a limited number of

these U.S. made SAMs.

Maximum 

 Speed: 2.2 Mach

 Effective Altitude: 4,000 m

 Effective Range: 6,000 m

Warhead: HE 3kg

Fuze: Contact

Kill Radius: Unknown
A-71

CSA-3A

PGLM

No data is available on the above systems; however, they are believed to

be in the NKA inventory.
A-72

TYPE 64 7.62MM PISTOL

The Type-64 is a DPRK copy of the old Browning Model 1900. This

pistol is capable of taking a silencer.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 1kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Max Effective Range: 50 m

Capacity: 8 rounds
A-73

TOKAREV TT-33 7.62MM PISTOL

The Tokarev is a recoil operated, magazine fed, automatic pistol.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: .94kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Max Effective Range: 50 m

Capacity: 8 rounds
A-74

MAKAROV 9MM PISTOL

The Makarov can be recognized by the external hammer, the safety

lever on the side, and the very compact design.

Caliber: 9mm

Weight: .73kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Max Effective Range: 50 m

Capacity: 8 rounds
A-75

AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLE

The AK-47 is a gas operated, rotary bolt, magazine fed, selective fire

weapon. The Type-46 is a Chinese produced version of the AK-47, and

the Type-58 is a DPRK version of the same weapon.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 4.81kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball, tracer, API

Maximum 

 Range: 2,500 m

 Effective Range: 300 m

Cyclic Rate: 600 rpm

AK-74 ASSAULT RIFLE

The AK-74 is a gas operated, magazine fed, selective fire assault rifle.

Caliber: 5.45mm

Weight: 3.95kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball, tracer, incendiary

Maximum 

 Range: 3,150 m

 Effective Range: 450 m

Cyclic Rate: 650 rpm
A-76

GP-25 GRENADE LAUNCHER

The GP-25 is a muzzle loaded, single shot, detachable 40mm underbarrel grenade launcher. It can be mounted on all variations of the Kalashnikov assault rifles.

Caliber: 40mm

Weight: 3.95kg (loaded)

Ammunition: HE

Maximum Range: 450 m
A-77

TYPE-68 (AKM) ASSAULT RIFLE

The Type-68 is a DPRK copy of the Russian AKM assault rifle. It does

not have the rate reducer found on the AKM.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 3.6kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: 2,500 m

 Effective Range: 300 m

Cyclic Rate: 640 rpm
A-78

TYPE-56 SEMIAUTOMATIC CARBINE (SKS)

The Type-56 (SKS) features include a permanently attached folding

bayonet, protruding 10 round internal magazine, high front sight, and a

top mounted gas cylinder. Some variants of this weapon are modified to

take a 30 round detachable magazine.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 4kg

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: Unknown

 Effective Range: 400 m

Cyclic Rate: 900 rpm
A-79

PPSH 1943 SUBMACHINEGUN

(TYPE-50 CHINA/MODEL-49 DPRK)

The PPSh can be fired on either full or semiautomatic. It has a wood

stock and uses a 71 round drum or a 35 round curved box magazine.

However, the Type-50 only accepts the box magazine and the Model-49

only uses the drum magazine.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 3.5kg (unloaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: Unknown

 Effective Range: 200 m

Cyclic Rate: 900 rpm
A-80

PPSM1943 SUBMACHINEGUN (TYPE-54 CHINA)

The PPS is a fully automatic weapon. It has a hinged stock which folds

up and forward.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 3kg (unloaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: Unknown

 Effective Range: 200 m

Cyclic Rate: 650 rpm
A-81

DRAGUNOV SNIPER RIFLE (SVD)

The Dragunov is a semiautomatic, gas operated rifle which feeds from a

10-round magazine. The SVD has a 4 power scope that has a battery

illuminated reticle and an IR detection capability for night firing.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 4.7kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: 3,500 m

 Effective Range: 800 m

Cyclic Rate: 30 rpm

M1891/30 SNIPER RIFLE

The M1890/30 sniper rifle is an M1891/30 Mosin Nagant modified for a

telescopic sight.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 5kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: 3,500 m

 Effective Range: 1,400 m w/4X scope

Cyclic Rate: 10 rpm
A-82

RPK-74 LIGHT MACHINEGUN

The RPM-74 is the machinegun version of the AK-74. The RPM-74 is

equipped with a bipod and a longer magazine than the AK-74.

Caliber: 5.45mm

Weight: 5kg (loaded)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: 2,500 m

 Effective Range: 800 m

Cyclic Rate: 600 rpm
A-83

RPK LIGHT MACHINEGUN

The RPK is a gas operated, box or drum fed light machinegun.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 5.6kg (empty)

Ammunition: Ball, tracer, API

Maximum 

 Range: 3,000 m

 Effective Range: 800 m

Cyclic Rate: 600 rpm
A-84

RPD LIGHT MACHINEGUN

The RPD is a gas operated and belt fed light machingun.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 7.1kg (empty)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: 3,000 m

 Effective Range: 800 m

Cyclic Rate: 700 rpm
A-85

RP-46 LIGHT MACHINEGUN

The RP-46 is a gas operated, air cooled, and belt fed light machinegun.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 13kg (empty)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: 3,500 m

 Effective Range: 800 m

Cyclic Rate: 600 rpm
A-86

SMG MACHINEGUN

The SMG is an air cooled, belt fed machinegun. This machinegun can

be mounted on a tripod or wheeled mount.

Caliber: 7.62mm

Weight: 13kg (gun only)

Ammunition: Ball

Maximum 

 Range: 3,500 m

 Effective Range: 1,000 m

Cyclic Rate: 600-700 rpm
A-87

DSHK 38/46 HEAVY MACHINEGUN

The DShk 38/46 is a gas operated, belt fed, air cooled weapon which

fires from the open bolt position. The Chinese Type 54 heavy machinegun is an exact copy of the DShk 38/46. Both weapons are found in the

DPRK forces.

Caliber: 12.7mm

Weight: 35.6kg (empty)

Ammunition: API, API-T

Maximum 

 Range: 7,000 m (ground)

 Effective Range: 1,000 m AA, 2,000 m ground

Cyclic Rate: 540-600 rpm
A-88

ROKS-3 FLAMETHROWER

The ROKS-3 is a typical portable flamethrower. It has a single cylindrical fuel tank with a filling aperture centrally located at the top and a battlefield filler with compressed nitrogen attached to the side. A spring

loaded, pressure release valve is located beside the filling aperture. A

hose connects the ignition cartridges in an ignition cylinder that

advances automatically after a shot to bring the next unfired cartridge

into the firing position. The ROKS-3 carries 10 igniters and has a total

firing duration of 5-6 seconds.

Weight: 26kg full

Fuel Capacity: 4 gallons

Maximum Range: 35 m
A-89

AGS-17 AUTOMATIC GRENADE LAUNCHER

The AGS-17 is a belt fed, blow back operated weapon which is mounted

on a tripod. A circular extension is provided on the left hand side of the

weapon to receive an optical sight unit which allows the weapon to be

used in either the direct fire or the indirect fire mode.

Caliber: 30mm

Weight: 33kg

Ammunition: HE Frag

Maximum 

 Range: 1,730 m

 Effective Range: 1,200 m

Cyclic Rate: 400 rpm
A-90

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

60MM TYPE-31 MORTAR

The Chinese Type-31 is almost identical to the U.S. 60mm mortar. It is

believed that the rounds for the U.S. model are interchangeable with the

Chinese variant.

Caliber: 60mm

Weight: 20kg

Crew: 2

Ammunition: Unknown

Range: 200-1,630 m

Rate of Fire: 15-20 rpm

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

82MM M-37 MORTAR

The Soviet M-37 is a mortar with a fixed firing pin for drop firing.

Caliber: 82mm

Weight: 56kg

Crew: 5

Ammunition: Frag-HE, smoke, illuminating, incendiary

Range: 100-3,000 m

Rate of Fire: 15-25 rpm
A-91

120MM M-1943 MORTAR

The Soviet M-1943 is a mortar that can be drop fired or trigger fired by

use of a lanyard. The Chinese variant of this mortar is the Type-53.

Caliber: 120mm

Weight: 500kg

Crew: 6

Ammunition: Frag-HE, HE, smoke, illuminating, 

incendiary, possible chemical

Range: 460-5,700 m

Rate of Fire: 12-15 rpm
A-92

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

160MM M-43 MORTAR

The Soviet M-43 is a breech loaded mortar that is towed on a single

axle carriage.

Caliber: 160mm

Weight: 1,170kg

Crew: 7

Ammunition: Unknown

Range: 630-5,150 m

Rate of Fire: 3 rpm
A-93

F-1 FRAGMENTATION HAND GRENADE

The F-1 produced by the DPRK is a copy of the Soviet designed grenade of the same designation. It is oval in shape, quite heavy, and produces a wide variety of fragmentation patterns and ranges because of the

unpredictable breakup of the body.

Grenade Case: Cast iron

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: Striker release

Delay: 3.2-4.2 seconds

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: 60g

Casualty Radius: 15-20 m
A-94

RG-42 FRAGMENTATION HAND GRENADE

The RG-42 produced by the DPRK is a copy of the Soviet designed grenade of the same designation. It is cylindrical in shape. The sheet steel

body, closed with end caps in a fashion similar to a tin can, encloses a

pre-engraved steel fragmentation liner.

Grenade Case: Sheet metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: Striker release

Delay: 3.2-4.2 seconds

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: 118g

Casualty Radius: 20 m
A-95

RGD-5 FRAGMENTATION HAND GRENADE

The RGD-5 produced by the DPRK is a copy of the Soviet designed

grenade of the same designation. It is oval in shape. The two piece sheet

steel body is joined in the center by a circumferential crimp. A two piece

serrated steel fragmentation liner is placed between the grenade body

and the explosive filler.

Grenade Case: Sheet metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: Striker release

Delay: 3.2-4.2 seconds

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: 110g

Casualty Radius: 20 m
A-96

UNKNOWN FRAGMENTATION HAND GRENADE

The hand grenade is produced by the DPRK for use in special operations. It is oval in shape. The cast aluminum body forms a matrix in

which preformed cast iron ball fragments are embedded. There is a possibility that this grenade has been adapted to fire from a rifle.

Grenade Case: Aluminum

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: Striker release

Delay: 3.2-4.2 seconds

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: 60g

Casualty Radius: 20 m
A-97

UNKNOWN FRAGMENTATION HAND GRENADE

The hand grenade is rectangular in shape and is referred to as a “box”

grenade. The body is sheet metal. Preformed steel balls, each with a

diameter of approx. 6.3mm, are enclosed in the body for additional

fragmentation.

Grenade Case: Sheet metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: Striker release

Delay: 3.2-4.2 seconds

Explosive Type: Comp B

Explosive Weight: 55g

Casualty Radius: 20 m
A-98

RDG-1 SMOKE HAND GRENADE

The RDG-1 smoke grenade is produced by the DPRK and is a copy of

the Soviet designed grenade of the same designation. It is cylindrical in

shape. The body of the grenade, made from molded cardboard, is affixed

to a wooden handle. The grenade will float and therefore can be used in

water. The primary purpose of the grenade is to provide signaling capability. Both black and white smoke grenades are produced.

Grenade Case: Cardboard

Color: Gray

Fuze Type: Pull friction

Delay: 5-10 seconds

Filler: Potassium chloride

Duration: 60-90 seconds

Dispersion: 460 sq m
A-99

RDG-2 SMOKE HAND GRENADE

The RDG-2 smoke grenade is produced by the DPRK and is a copy of

the Soviet designed grenade of the same designation. It is cylindrical in

shape. The body of the grenade is made from molded cardboard. The

primary purpose of the grenade is to provide limited concealment for

maneuvering troops. The RDG-2 is white smoke, RDG-2ch is black

smoke, and the RDG-2kh is gray smoke.

Grenade Case: Cardboard

Color: Gray

Fuze Type: Pull friction

Delay: 10-15 seconds

Filler: HC smoke

Duration: 90 seconds

Dispersion: 160 sq m
A-100

TYPE-S SMOKE HAND GRENADE

The Type-S smoke grenade is produced by the DPRK and is a copy of

the Soviet designed grenade of the same designation. It is cylindrical in

shape and has a metal clip affixed to the side for fastening the grenade

onto a belt for carrying. The body of the grenade is made from sheet

metal. The primary purpose of the grenade is to provide screening

smoke. Only white smoke is available.

Grenade Case: Sheet metal

Color: Unknown

Fuze Type: Pyrotechnic

Delay: 12-15 seconds

Filler: Potassium chloride or ammonium nitrate

Duration: 60-90 seconds

Dispersion: 15-20 m
A-101

LACRIMATORY HAND GRENADE

The grenade is a copy of a North Vietnamese model. The design follows

the typical Vietnamese construction with a wooden handle and a thin

sheet metal body. A small explosive charge is present in the grenade to

disperse the tear agent filler. The illustration is that of a Vietnamese

model, but is reportedly similar to those used by the DPRK.

Grenade Case: Sheet metal

Color: Light blue/green with red band

Fuze Type: Pull friction

Delay: 3-4 seconds

Filler: TNT/CS mixture

Duration: Unknown

Dispersion: 10 m
A-102

RPG-43 ANTITANK HAND GRENADE

The RPG-43 hand grenade produced by North Korea is a copy of the

Soviet designed grenade of the same designation. It is cylindrical in

shape with a large wooden handle. The RPG-43 is large, bulky, and

lacks sufficient stabilization to allow it to accurately impact and function on the target. This grenade is being replaced by the RKG-3 and is

seldom encountered.

Grenade Case: Sheet metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: Impact

Delay: None

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: 600g

Armor Penetration: 75mm
A-103

RKG-3 ANTITANK HAND GRENADE

The RKG-3 hand grenade produced by DPRK is a copy of the Soviet

designed grenade of the same designation. It is cylindrical in shape. The

grenade employs a shaped charge warhead for armor penetration. The

size, weight, and characteristics of the grenade make it hard to throw

and difficult to accurately place on the target.

Grenade Case: Sheet metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: Impact

Delay: None

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: 575g

Armor Penetration: 125mm
A-104

ATM-72 ANTITANK MINE

The ATM-72 is an antitank blast mine.

Mine Case: Metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: MF-2 pressure

Actuation Force: 300-600kg

Explosive Type: TH-50

Explosive Weight: 9kg
A-105

TMD-B ANTITANK MINE

The TMD-B is an antitank blast mine.

Mine Case: Wood

Color: Olive drab or natural wood

Fuze Type: MV-5 pressure

Actuation Force: 200-500kg

Explosive Type: Amatol

Explosive Weight: 9-9.7kg
A-106

TMD-44 ANTITANK MINE

The TMD-44 is an antitank blast mine.

Mine Case: Wood

Color: Olive drab or natural wood

Fuze Type: MV-5 pressure

Actuation Force: 200-500kg

Explosive Type: TNT or Ammonite 80

Explosive Weight: 4-6.7kg
A-107

TM-46 AND TMN-46 ANTITANK MINE

The TM-46 and TMN-46 are antitank blast mines. The difference

between the two is that the TMN-46 has a second fuze well for boobytrap purposes where the TM-46 does not.

Mine Case: Metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: MV-5 and MV-46 pressure

Actuation Force: 180kg for MV-46 and 200-500 for MV-5

Explosive Type: TNT or Amatol

Explosive Weight: 5.7kg
A-108

TM-41 ANTITANK MINE

The TM-41 is an antitank blast mine.

Mine Case: Metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: MV-5 pressure

Actuation Force: 160kg

Explosive Type: TNT or Amatol

Explosive Weight: 4kg
A-109

POMZ-2 ANTIPERSONNEL MINE

The POMZ-2 is an antipersonnel fragmentation mine.

Mine Case: Metal

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: MUV trip wire

Actuation Force: 2-5kg

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: .075kg

Effective Range: 4 m
A-110

PMD-6 ANTIPERSONNEL MINE

The PMD-6 is an antipersonnel blast mine.

Mine Case: Wood

Color: Natural wood

Fuze Type: MUV pressure

Actuation Force: 1-10kg

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: .02kg

Effective Range: Limited
A-111

OZM-3 ANTIPERSONNEL MINE

The OZM-3 antipersonnel mine is a bounding fragmentation mine. The

OZM-3 also has electronic fuzing for use in controlled minefields.

Mine Case: Cast iron

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: MUV trip wire

Actuation Force: 2-5kg

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: .075kg

Effective Range: 10 m

Electric

Leads

Propelling

Charge

Delay

Detonator

Main

Charge
A-112

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

PMR-3 MECHANICAL MINELAYING TRAILER

The PMR-3 consists of a single chute and a plow attachment. The

attachment provides the option of burying the mines or depositing them

on the surface of the ground. The mines can be spaced 4 to 5.5 meters

apart, depending on the control setting. If buried, the mines are

emplaced at a depth of 6 to 12 centimeters at a speed of 5 km/hr. The

trailer can store 200 to 300 antitank mines. The PMR-3 carries a crew of

4-5 personnel.

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

PT-54/55 MINE CLEARING ROLLERS

The PT-54/55 is a tank mounted mineclearing roller system with two

independent roller sets attached to arms in front of each tread on a tank.

Used at speeds of 8-12 km/hr, the PT-54/55 can clear a path .8-1.3m

wide in front of each roller. The rollers cannot detonate most modern

mines and can only withstand about 10 antitank mine explosions.
A-113

BTM HIGH SPEED DITCHING MACHINE

The BTM is a high speed, bucket wheel ditching machine mounted on

the AT-T heavy tracked artillery tractor. The ditching wheel is mechanically raised and lowered by cables or chains. The BTM can be used to

dig individual protective positions, trenches for shelter, firebreaks and

strips. Ditching speed is 300-500 m/hr in sandy loam soil.

Maximum Speed: 35 km/hr

Crew: 2

Ditch Depth: 1.5 m

Ditch Width: 1 m
A-114

BAT-M DOZER

The BAT-M dozer has a hydraulic operated, two section adjustable

dozer blade mounted on an AT-T heavy artillery tractor with a rotary

crane mounted on the bed of the vehicle. The BAT-M can move material

with its blade at a rate of 200-250 cubic meters per hour. Its crane capacity is 2 metric tons. BAT-M also has an air filtration system and can

operate in contaminated areas for short periods of time.

Maximum Speed: 35 km/hr

Crew: 2
A-115

MDK-2 TRENCH DIGGING MACHINE

The MDK-2 trench digging machine is based on the chassis of the AT-T

heavy tracked artillery tractor. The circular digging machine is used for

digging weapon trenches, pits for vehicles, and other equipment.

Depending on the soil conditions, the MDK-2 can dig a maximum of

300 cubic meters per hour.

Maximum Speed: 35 km/hr

Crew: 2

Maximum Ditch Depth: 4.5 m

Maximum Ditch Width: 4 m

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

PMP PONTOON BRIDGE

The PMP pontoon bridge is a version of the Russian PMP pontoon

bridge. The PMP ribbon set consists of pontoons and approach ramps

constructed of a low alloy steel. Each pontoon section is launched from

a truck and automatically unfolds upon entering the water. The PMP has

a 60 ton capacity and can be constucted in rivers with a current flow or

still waters.
A-116

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

TPP PONTOON BRIDGE

The TPP by today’s standards is an obsolete bridging system. However,

it is still well suited for use in the LOC role. A full bridge set consists of

96 steel decked pontoon sections that are connected end to end in combinations of two or three to form a single full pontoon. The strong points

of the TPP are high load capacity and its ability to operate in high river

velocities. However, it requires 116 2.5 ton trucks to transport the system, lacks ramps for loading/unloading directly onto the shore, and is

manpower intensive to construct. The TPP can form a 181 m bridge with

a 70 ton capacity or a 241 m bridge with a 50 ton capacity. 

GSP AMPHIBIOUS FERRY

The Russian GSP ferry consists of two tracked amphibious vehicles

which make up the left and right halves of the ferry. To make the full

ferry, the vehicles are joined together in the water and the pontoons are

lowered to the float position. There are two retractable scissor-type

ramps on each side of the full ferry for loading and unloading. The GSP

can carry up to 50 metric tons at a water speed of 7.7 km/hr. Unloaded it

can go 10.8 km/hr in water. The six-man crew (2 vehicles) can assemble

the ferry in 3 to 5 minutes. The GSP cannot operate with the river current faster than 2 m/sec or the river bank is higher than .5 m.
A-117

BLG-60 ARMORED VEHICLE-LAUNCHED BRIDGE

The BLG-60 armored vehicle-launched bridge (AVLB) system is used

to emplace a treadway bridge over obstacles up to 19 meters wide. The

BLG-60 consists of a scissor bridge mounted on a modified T-55 hull.

The bridge is a two box treadway system. Once erected it can support

vehicles up to 50 tons.

Emplacement Time: 3 min

Treadway Width: 3.45 m

Crew: 2

Maximum Speed: 50 km/hr
A-118

MTU-20 ARMORED VEHICLE-LAUNCHED BRIDGE

The MTU-20 armored vehicle-launched bridge (AVLB) system is used to

emplace a treadway bridge over obstacles up to 18 meters wide. The

MTU-20 consists of a twin treadway superstructure mounted on a modified T-55 hull. Once erected the bridge can support vehicles up to 50 tons.

Emplacement Time: 5-7 min

Treadway Width: 3.3 m

Crew: 2

Maximum Speed: 50 km/hr
A-119

MT-55 TANK-LAUNCHED BRIDGE

The MT-55 is a tank-launched bridge based on a T-55 MBT hull. The

MT-55 span is 18 meters long and can support loads up to 50 tons. The

launcher has a gap measuring device and infrared equipment for bridge

laying at night.

Emplacement Time: 3 min

Treadway Width: 3.2 m

Crew: 2

Maximum Speed: 50 km/hr
A-120

K-61 TRACKED AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE

The K-61 is a large, unarmored tracked amphibious vehicle used extensively to transport cargo, equipment and personnel in river crossing operations. It is capable of carrying light vehicles and equipment up to 5 tons

or 50 troops across water. It can carry up to 3 tons on land. The K-61 is

powered by a 4 cylinder 135 hp diesel engine and is propelled in the

water by two propellers located in the rear of the vehicle. Generally considered obsolete, it is an important and integral part of the DPRK ERC

units.

Maximum Speed: Land 36 km/hr, water 10 km/hr
A-121

GROUND TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES

The numbers of transport equipment organic to combat units in the

NKA have greatly increased since the 1950s. The numbers of motor

transportation brigades for resupply have also increased, along with

quality and performance. The NKA prefers foreign trucks over indigenously produced trucks. Indigenously produced trucks are usually used

in the civil sector. Most trucks imported to the DPRK are from the

former Soviet Union (FSU) and Japan. Trucks from the FSU offer the

NKA the highest performance levels while the Japanese trucks are rated

second, but with higher technology and reliability.

All NKA wheeled transport vehicles for either general transport or

weapon systems are thin-skinned vehicles. They are all vulnerable to

small arms fire, fragmentation explosives, and anything more destructive.
A-122

SELF RELIANCE 68 NA (KAENSAENG)

The Self Reliance 68 NA (KAENSAENG) is the only light utility model

vehicle the DPRK has produced since 1970. Two variants are produced,

a utility and a cargo model. The KAENSAENG is a 4x4 half ton utility

truck that appears to be an exact copy of the former soviet Union GAZ69. Statistics for the GAZ-69 are as follows:

Maximum Speed: 90 km/hr

Range: 530 km

Maximum 

 Cargo Weight: 500kg

 Towing Weight: 800kg
A-123

UAZ-469

The Russian designed UAZ-469 utility truck was developed to replace

the GAZ-69. The outstanding features of this vehicle include improved

cross-country performance, better gas milage, greater starting torque,

increased maximum and cruising speeds, greater load capacity, and a

better heating system than the GAZ-69. The UAZ-469 can be transported and airdropped by airplanes and helicopters. One of the DPRK

variants of this vehicle is the UAZ-469 RKh. This vehicle is used in

NBC defense units and is equipped with NBC detection equipment.
A-124

VICTORY 58 (SUNGNI)

The Victory 58 (SUNGNI) is a copy of the former Soviet Union GAZ51, but it has weaker springs than the GAZ-51. The engine is hard to

start, and the crudely copied carburetor, used since 1961, wastes gasoline badly at low speeds, accounting for the usually high fuel consumption. Military usage is probably limited due to the vehicle’s age.
A-125

FIGHT 66 (TUJAENG)

The Fight 66 (TUJAENG) 2.5 ton, 4x2, cargo truck was introduced

about 1976 as the replacement for the Victory 58. The major change

noted between the two designs is the new and more modern looking

cab. Today, the Fight 66 is probably the largest portion of the DPRK’s

truck production.

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

ZIL-130

The ZIL-130 started production in late 1962 in Russia. It is a medium

truck with a rated payload capacity of 5 tons. Its body consists of a

wooden platform with hinged, drop side boards. Its metal cab seats three.
A-126

ZIL-157

The ZIL-157 is one of the principal medium trucks of the DPRK forces.

The ZIL-157 is used to carry cargo, multiple rocket launchers, TPP pontoons, and other specialized equipment.

Maximum Speed: 65 km/hr

Range: 580 km

Maximum Payload: 4.5 tons
A-127

ISUZU TWD25

This 6x6 2.5 ton cargo truck is imported from Isuzu Motors of Japan.

This vehicle can transport 5,000 kg of cargo on hard surfaces and 2,500

kg of cargo in off road conditions. The Isuzu TWD25 is equiped with a

210 hp, 6 cylinder, liquid cooled diesel engine.

Maximum Speed: 85 km/hr
A-128

ISUZU HTW11

This 6x6 8 ton Japanese import is equipped with all wheel drive for

good on/off road performance. The HTW11 is equipped with a 150 hp,

6 cylinder, liquid cooled diesel engine.

Maximum Speed: 82 km/hr

Maximum Payload: 4,700kg
A-129

NISSAN TZA52PP

This 6x6 30 ton Japanese import, equipped with all wheel drive and a

30,000 kg payload, makes for a dependable military vehicle. The

TZA52PP is equipped with a 300 hp, 8 cylinder, direct injection, water

cooled diesel engine.
A-130

ZIL-131

The ZIL-131 was produced by the former Soviet Union as a replacement to the ZIL-157 as a basic tactical general purpose truck. ZIL-131

improvements over the ZIL-157 include increased payload, higher output engine, improved power train, shorter wheelbase, power steering,

waterproof ignition, and a modified cab controlled tire inflation system.

Another unique feature of the ZIL-131 is the ability of the front axle

drive to engage automatically when first gear is engaged. Additionally,

the driver can manually engage the front axle drive in second gear.
A-131

KRAZ-260

This Russian produced vehicle was designed to replace the KRAZ255B. The KRAZ-260 is an improvement to the KRAZ-255B in several

areas. The power has been increased by turbocharging the engine. This

has resulted in improved highway and cross-country speeds. Payload

has been increased by 1,500 kg. This vehicle has full time all wheel

drive and a fully bolted together frame.

Maximum Speed: 80 km/hr
A-132

INDEPENDENCE (CHAJU)

The North Koreans emphasize heavy payload vehicles to support their

heavy industry. Currently, one of these vehicles known to be in production is the Independence (CHAJU). The Independence entered production in 1971. It is apparently identical to the Russian KRAZ-255B. It is

an 11 ton dump truck with a cab behind engine design which can seat

the driver and two passengers.
A-133

INDEPENDENCE 82 (CHAJU 82)

The Independence 82, a 10 ton 4x2 dump truck prototype, was first produced in 1982 as an improvement to the older Independence. The Independence 82 is still in production and in service with DPRK military

and civilian transportation units. It is believed to be powered by a 240

hp, 8 cylinder diesel engine and available in 2 and possibly 4 wheel

drive. Configurations include a dump truck, a standard cargo bed model,

and a truck tractor. The vehicle has a 7 cubic meter volume cargo body,

a maximum speed of 94 km/hr, and a turning radius of 9 meters.
A-134

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

M-65 PROTECTIVE MASK

Features prominent filter housing on left hand cheek of facepiece and

prominent voicemitter at front. Large lens eyepieces are provided and

mask is held in position by six straps. Filter has efficiency of 99.995%

and can withstand aerosol droplets down to 0.3 microns.

Weight: 0.6kg

Status: In service with DPRK forces.

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

MODEL SHLEM HOOD TYPE PROTECTIVE MASK

The Shlem mask consists of a facepiece (w/o voice transmitter), hose, and

filter canister, which can be changed without taking the mask off. The

valves of the Shlem tend to freeze and the hoses crack in cold weather.

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

L-1 LIGHTWEIGHT PROTECTIVE SUIT

Rubberized suit consisting of jacket with fitted hood, overtrousers with

integral overboots, two pair of two-fingered gloves, and carrying

satchel. Suit provides complete protection against most NBC agents

when worn with a face mask.

Weight: 3kg (approx.)

Status: In service with chemical units.
A-135

ARS-12U TRUCK-MOUNTED

DECONTAMINATION APPARATUS

The ARS-12U is mounted on a ZIL-131 or ZIL-157 truck. It can be used

to decontaminate vehicles, large weapon systems, heavy equipment, and

terrain. It is also used to refill portable decontamination equipment,

transport water, fight fires, and provide cold showers. It has a 2,500 liter

tank that can decontaminate about 25 tanks, 50-80 artillery pieces, or

500 m of road with a 5 m width before needing to resupply.

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

MODEL BU-4 TRUCK-MOUNTED CLOTHING

DECONTAMINATION APPARATUS

The BU-4 is a boiling apparatus that can be used to decontaminate

chemically and biologically contaminated clothing, shelters, tarpaulins,

and other items that can be laundered. The system consists of boilers

with integral furnaces, tanks to hold reserve water, a hand pump, a hand

press, and a drying tent. The BU-4 is normally carried on a GAZ-53 or

GAZ-63 truck.
A-136

MODEL RDP-4V BACKPACK

DECONTAMINATION APPARATUS

The RDP-4V is a hand operated backpack spray apparatus that is used to

decontaminate vehicles, weapons, material, buildings, and small areas

of terrain. The apparatus is composed of a metal tank with a large filling

aperture, clamp on pressure lid, shoulder/waist straps, a piston-type air

pump mounted inside the tank, a shutoff valve, a discharge hose, and a

spray pipe with control valve and nozzle.

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

GSP-1 DETECTOR-ALARM, AUTOMATIC

Detects G-type nerve agents in the atmosphere and nuclear radiation in

the immediate environment. The detector activates both a light and an

audible alarm when it detects either of these contaminants. The detector

is usually mounted in a reconnaissance vehicle, but may also be used at

a fixed point. The GSP-1 can operate up to 8 hours before the batteries

need to be recharged.

Weight: 18kg (approx.)

Status: Probably in service with chemical units.
A-137

MODEL DP-62 LIGHTWEIGHT SURVEY METER

The DP-62 lightweight survey meter is used to detect and determine the

level of beta-gamma radiation in the field. It consists of a hand generator

and instrument proper. The presence of radiation is indicated by flashes

of a neon tube, viewed through a condensing lens on the upper surface

of the instrument. The celluloid window on the bottom of the instrument

permits the access of beta particles to the radiation sensitive element of

the meter. The detection range of the meter is from 10 to 500 millirads/

hour. The meter is rugged, lightweight, compact, and simple to operate.

The hand generator affords a constant source of power, making the

meter independent of batteries.
A-138

MODEL DP-1a/b AREA SURVEY METER

The Model DP-1a area survey meter is a gamma detection and measuring device that can be used to measure radiation intensities in four subranges from .04 to 400 rads/hour. The Model DP-1b is a battery

powered area survey meter and is used to measure gamma radiation and

to detect beta radiation. The instrument uses an ion chamber.
A-139

PKHR CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTION

AND IDENTIFICATION KIT

The PKhR chemical agent detection and identification kit will identify a

wide array of chemical agents to include mustard, lewisite, hydrogen

cyanide, phosgene, choroacetophenone, adamsite, and G/V type nerve

agents.

1 2

6

6

8 5 7

11 9

12

4

3

10

1. Case

2. Case lid

3. Air pump

4. Packets of indicator tubes

5. Smoke filters

6. Sample jar

 7. Pump attachment

 8. Protective covers for pump attachment

 9. Spatula

10. Tape for marking contaminated areas

11. Flashlight

12. Shoulder strap
A-140

MI-2 HOPLITE

The Mi-2 is a twin turbine light utility helicopter. Possible armament

includes up to 23mm machineguns, 57mm rockets, or the AT-3C ATGM.

The Mi-2 can carry 6-8 troops or 700 kg internal cargo or 800 kg slung

external.

Maximum Speed: 210 km/hr

Weight: 3,500kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 4 km

Maximum Range: 580 km (maximum fuel)

Combat Range: 170 km
A-141

MI-4 HOUND

The Mi-4 is a multirole helicopter used for troop assault, armed support

and general cargo transport. Optional weapons pylons can be added to

support four 16 shot, 57mm rocket pods, or four AT-2 or AT-3 ATGMs.

Maximum Speed: 210 km/hr

Weight: 7,800kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 5.4 km

Maximum Range: 460 km (maximum fuel)

Combat Range: 250 km
A-142

MI-8 HIP

The Mi-8 is a medium utility helicopter. The Mi-8 can carry up to 24

fully equipped combat troops or 2,425 kg of cargo when the aircraft is

fully armed. The Mi-8 can carry rocketpods, ATGMs, general/special

purpose bombs (250/500kg), and a nose mounted machingun.

Maximum Speed: 250 km/hr

Weight: 12,000kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 3.5-4.5 km

Maximum Range: 410 km (maximum fuel)

Combat Range: 200 km
A-143

MI-17 HIP

The Mi-17 has an airframe basically identical to that of the Mi-8, but

has more powerful 1,900 shp turboshaft engines. The Mi-17 has the

same armament options as the Mi-8 supplemented with GSh-23 23mm

gun packs.

Maximum Speed: 250 km/hr

Weight: 13,000kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 5 km

Maximum Range: 950 km (maximum fuel)

Combat Range: Unknown
A-144

HUGHES 500 D/E

The Hughes 500 is a multirole utility helicopter. The DPRK has at least

75 civilian D/E model helicopters. Although these aircraft were not sold

with weapons on them, it is possible that some weapons systems have

been added.

Maximum Speed: 280 km/hr

Weight: 1,700kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 4,800 m

Maximum Range: 327 km (maximum fuel)

Combat Range: Unknown
A-145

F-5 (MIG-17) FRESCO A/B/C/D

The DPRK has about 100 of these in a ground attack role and about 30 aircraft as fighters. The F-5 is a single seat aircraft with a single turbojet

engine. It has three 23mm cannons and/or four AA-1 ALKALI missiles.

There are two under-wing hardpoints for drop tanks or stores up to 500 kg.

Maximum Speed: 1,145 km/hr

Weight: 6,700kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 16.6 km

Maximum Range: 2,250 km

Combat Range: Unknown
A-146

F-6 (MIG-19) FARMER

The DPRK has about 160 of these aircraft. The F-6 is the Chinese version

of the MiG-19. The F-6 has six attachment points for external stores

(three on each wing). The outboard wing stations can carry a 250 kg

bomb. The outboard wing stations can also carry a 760 or 400 liter drop

tank or the CAA-1b AAM. The inboard wing stations can carry practice

bombs or rocket pods with either 8 x 57mm, 16 x 57mm, or 7 x 90mm

rockets.

Maximum Speed: 1.16 Mach

Weight: 9,040kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 16.7 km

Maximum Range: Unknown

Combat Range: Unknown
A-147

MIG-21 FISHBED D/F/J

The DPRK has about 160 of these aircraft. The FISHBED D/F is armed

with a twin barrel 23mm GSh-23 gun with 200 rounds a belly pack. The J

model carries the GSh-23 internally. All models also have four underwing pylons for weapons and drop tanks. The MiG-21 has a JAY BIRD/

SPIN SCAN search and track radar with a 20 km range. Typical loads for

the intercept role are two AA-2/2D ATOLLs and two radar homing AA2C ATOLLs; two UV-16-57 rocket pods on the outer pylons, or two drop

tanks and two AA-2/2D or AA-2C AAMs. Typical loads for ground attack

are four UV-16-57 rocket pods, two 500 kg and two 250 kg bombs, or

four 240mm S-24 rockets.

Maximum Speed: 2.05 Mach

Weight: 9,800kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: 18 km

Service Ceiling: 15.2 km

Maximum Range: 971 km

Combat Range: 593 km (with drop tanks)
A-148

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

F-7

The DPRK has about 40 of these aircraft. The F-7 is the Chinese version of

the FISHBED C. The F-7 is armed with two 30mm Type 30-1 belt-fed cannons with 60 rounds per gun. There are two hardpoints under each wing,

with the outboard ones sometimes used for drop tanks. Each inboard pylon

is capable of carrying a PL-2, PL-2A, PL-5B, AA-2 AAM; or a Type-57-2

pod with18 x 57mm rockets; or a Type-90-M1 pod with 7 x 90mm rockets;

or bombs of 50/150/250/500 kg. The outboard pylons can also carry one of

the rocket pods, a 50/150 kg bomb, or a 500 liter droptank.

Maximum Speed: 2.05 Mach

Weight: 5,240kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: 18.7 km

Service Ceiling: 19.8 km

Maximum Range: 1,203 km

Combat Range: 939 km (with drop tanks)

MIG-23 FLOGGER

The DPRK has at least 46 MiG-23ML fighters. The MiG-23ML (FLOGGER G) is equipped with the HIGH LARK radar and can be armed with

AA-2/ATOLL, AA-7/APEX, and AA-8/APHID AAMs. It also carries a

twin barrel GSh-23 gun.

Maximum Speed: 2.35 Mach

Weight: 18,900kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 18 km

Maximum Range: Unknown

Combat Range: 900-1,300 km
A-149

MIG-29 FULCRUM A/B

The DPRK has about 10 MiG-29 aircraft. The MiG-29 is a twin engine

fighter. It can carry two medium range radar homing AA-10/ALAMO and

four close range AA-11/ARCHER AAMs on three pylons under the

wings. It can also carry AA-8/APHID missiles, bombs, and 57/80/240mm

rocket pods. The MiG-29 also has one 30mm gun.

Maximum Speed: 2.3 Mach

Weight: 18,900kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 18 km

Maximum Range: 2,900 km (ferry mission)

Combat Range: 1,500 km
A-150

SU-7B FITTER A

The DPRK has about 20 of these aircraft. The Su-7B is a single seat

ground attack aircraft. It is armed with two 30mm NR-30 guns in wing

roots, each with 70 rounds. Under-wing pylons allow two 742 kg or two

495 kg of bombs or rocket pods.

Maximum Speed: 1.6 Mach

Weight: 13,387kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 18 km

Maximum Range: 1,449 km

Combat Range: 250-350 km (with drop tanks)
A-151

SU-25 FROGFOOT A

The DPRK has about 35 of these aircraft. The Su-25 is a single seat

ground attack aircraft. It is armed with one twin barrel 30mm gun in the

bottom of the fuselage with 250 rounds. There are 8 pylons under the

wings which can carry about 4,000 kg of air-to-ground weapons, including 57mm to 330mm rockets. There are two small outboard pylons for

AA-2D/ATOLL or AA-8/APHID AAMs.

Maximum Speed: .8 Mach

Weight: 17,600kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 7 km

Maximum Range: Unknown

Combat Range: 1,250 km (with drop tanks)
A-152

IL-28 BEAGLE

The DPRK has about 80 of these aircraft. The Il-28 is a three seat light

bomber. It has an internal bay for up to 3,000 kg of bombs or two air

launched torpedoes. It is also armed with two fixed 23mm cannons

mounted in the nose and two in the tail turret.

Maximum Speed: 900 km/hr

Weight: 21,000kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 12.3 km

Maximum Range: 2,180 km (w/1,000kg payload)

Combat Range: Unknown
A-153

Y-5 (AN-2 COLT)

The DPRK has about 270 of these aircraft. The Y-5 is a general purpose

biplane used mostly to insert SOF troops. It can be used to drop 100/250 kg

bombs or to spray chemicals.

Maximum Speed: 220 km/hr

Weight: 5,250kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 3.5 km

Maximum Range: Unknown

Combat Range: 450 km
A-154

AN-24 COKE

The DPRK has about 6 of these aircraft. The An-24 is a short range transport aircraft.

Maximum Speed: 484 km/hr

Weight: 21,800kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 8.75 km

Maximum Range: Unknown

Combat Range: Unknown
A-155

IL-18 COOT

The DPRK has 2 of these aircraft. The Il-18 is a medium transport aircraft, which can carry up to 90 troops.

Maximum Speed: 675 km/hr

Weight: 64,000kg (loaded)

Maximum Ceiling: Unknown

Service Ceiling: 8-10 km

Maximum Range: Unknown

Combat Range: 3,700 km (loaded)
A-156

BACK NET

Type: EW/GCI

Freqency Band: E

Maximum Range: 300 km

Associated With: SA-5

Comments: 3-6 rpm Scan
A-157

BAR LOCK

Name: P-35/37

Type: EW

Freqency Band: E/F

Maximum Range: 200 km

Associated With: SA-5

Comments: 1 mw/b power, PRF 375pps, 7 rpm Scan, 

BW .7deg, PW 1.5, 4.5 us, Accuracy range 

350m-AZ .14 deg
A-158

FAN SONG A/B/C/E/F

A/B C/E F

Type: FC/TRK FC/TRK FC/TRK

Freqency Band: E/F G E/F

Maximum Range: 60-120 km 70-145 km 70-145 km

Associated With: SA-2 SA-2 SA-2

Comments:

 FAN SONG A/B: 600kw power, Vert Ant BW 10 10x2deg

Hort Ant BW 2x10deg, Scan 15.5-17HZ

 FAN SONG C/E: 1.0mw power, Vert Ant BW 7.5x1.5deg

Hort Ant BW 11.5x7.5, Scan 15.5-17HZ

PRF 828-1440 Search, 1656-2880 Trk

PW .4-1.2ms us, .2-.9ms us

 FAN SONG F: 600kw power, Vert Ant BW 10 10x2deg

Hort Ant BW 2x10deg, Scan 15.5-17HZ

 (guidance): PRF 44pps
A-159

FLAT FACE

Name: P-15

Type: EW/ACQ

Freqency Band: C

Maximum Range: 200 km

Associated With: SA-3, Guns

Comments: Power 380kw, BW AZ 4.3deg-ELEV 4.3 deg

PW 2us, PRF 200-700pps, 70km range at 

300m alt, accuracy 650m range, 1.8 deg AZ
A-160

KNIFE REST A/B/C

A B/C

Name: P-8 Dolfin P-10

Type: EW EW

Freqency Band: A A

Maximum Range: 75 km 70 km

Associated With: SA-2 SA-2

Comments: 75kw power, 

PW 4-12us
A-161

LOW BLOW

Type: FC Trk/FC Guid

Freqency Band: IID

Maximum Range: 40 km 40-85 km 29 km

Associated With: SA-3 SA-3 SA-3

Comments:

 FC Power 250kw, PRF 1750-3500pps,

PW .25-5ms(us), BW 12x1.5, 

Scan (trough) 16HZ

 Trk/FC PRF 3560-3585HZ, Scan (Para) 25HZ
A-162

SIDE NET

Name: PRV-11

Type: Height

Freqency Band: E

Maximum Range: 28 km

Associated With: SA-2/3/5

Comments: Max altitude 32km
A-163

SPOON REST A/C/D

Name: P-12

Type: ACQ/EW

Freqency Band: A

Maximum Range: 200 km

Associated With: SA-2/8

Comments: Power 314kw, BW 6x22.5, PRF 310-400pps,

PW 4-6us, Max Alt 32km, Scan 2-6rpm
A-164

SQUAT EYE

Name: P-15M(2)

Type: EW

Freqency Band: C

Maximum Range: 128 km

Associated With: SA-3/5

Comments: Power 380kw
A-165

TALL KING

Name: P-14

Type: BW

Freqency Band: A

Maximum Range: 605 km

Associated With: SA-5

Comments: Scan 2-6rpm
A-166

OTHER RADAR SYSTEMS

RADAR

BACK TRAP

BIG BACK

DOG EAR

GIN SLING

 (range meas)

 (Msl Guidance)

ODD PAIR

SJ-202

SQUARE PAIR

TIN SHIELD

Type

EW/ACQ

EW/GCI

ACQ

FC/TRK

Height

FC/ACQ

FC

EW/GCI

Freq

Band

E

L

G

E/F

I/J

D

E

H

Power: 2mw; Scan: 6rpm

(Main R/T)

(Range Measurement)

Scan: 3-6rpm

410km

600km

50km

35km

100+km

115km

255km

(160-270)

200km

SA-5

SA-5

SA-9/13

ZSU-23-4

HQ-2

SA-5

HQ-2

SA-5

SA-2/3/5

Maximum

Range

Associated

With Comments
A-167

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

SOHO FF

LOA/Beam/Draft: 242.1x50.9x12.1 ft

Missile Launchers: 4xCSS-N-1 single tube SSM

Guns: 100mm single barrel, 2x37mm, 30mm, and 

25mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 4xRBU-1200; mines; d.c.

Maximum Speed: 23kts

Aircraft: Platform for 1 medium helo

NAJIN FFL

LOA/Beam/Draft: 335x33x10 ft

Missile Launchers: 2xCSS-N-1 single tube SSM

Guns: 2x100mm single barrel

2x57mm, 30mm, and 25mm twin barrel

4x14.5mm quad barrel

Other Weapons: 4xRBU-1200; mines; d.c.

Maximum Speed: 24.3kts

Aircraft: None
A-168

CHONGJIN PB

LOA/Beam/Draft: 85.3x19x6.6 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 85mm single barrel tank turret

2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 40kts

Aircraft: None

14.5mm

(staggered

pt, stbd)

Latticed

mast

Wheelhouse

85mm
A-169

P-6 PB/PT

LOA/Beam/Draft: 83.7x20.3x5.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x25mm twin barrel or

2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 2x53cm single torpedo tubes (PT)

Maximum Speed: 43kts

Aircraft: None

53cm TT

(pt, stbd)

Radar stop

latticed mast

Wheelhouse

d.c. 25mm

25mm
A-170

SHANTOU PB

LOA/Beam/Draft: 82x17.4x6.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x37mm twin barrel or

2x37mm single barrel and

2x25mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 24kts

Aircraft: None

Tripod

mast

Wheelhouse

37mm 37mm

VERSION 2

VERSION 2
A-171

CHAHO PB

LOA/Beam/Draft: 85.3x19x6.6 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 122mm (BM-21) MRL

Maximum Speed: 40kts

Aircraft: None
A-172

CHODO PC

LOA/Beam/Draft: 140.1x19x6.2 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 85mm single barrel

2x37mm single barrel and

14.5mm quad barrel

Other Weapons: Mines

Maximum Speed: 20kts

Aircraft: None

14.5mm

Pylon

mast

Wheelhouse

85mm

37mm
A-173

CHONGJU PC/PT/PTG/WPC

LOA/Beam/Draft: 139.8x24x6.6 ft

Missile Launchers: 4xCSS-N-1 single tube (PTG)

Guns: 85mm, 2x37mm, 25mm, and 

14.5mm (PC/WPC)

2x30mm (PT/PTG)

Other Weapons: 2 possible RBU-1200 (PC/WPC) and

at least 2 torpedoes (PT)

Maximum Speed: 22.5kts

Aircraft: None

Ammo housing/

loading ramp

for MRL

Latticed

mast

85mm

14.5mm

(pt, stbd)

CHONGJU Class PTG

CHONGJU Class PTG
A-174

HAINAN PC

LOA/Beam/Draft: 192.9x23.6x14.1 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x57mm and 25mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 4xRBU-1200 5 tube launcher, mines, d.c.

Maximum Speed: 30.5kts

Aircraft: None

RBU-1200

(2 pt, 2 stbd)

Tripod

mast

57mm

d.c. 25mm 25mm

57mm
A-175

K-48 PC

LOA/Beam/Draft: 125x18x5.6 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 76mm and 3x37mm single barrel

2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: Mines

Maximum Speed: 18kts

Aircraft: None

MGs

(pt, stbd)

Folding

mast

76mm 37mm

37mm

Pole

mast
A-176

S.O. 1 PC

LOA/Beam/Draft: 137.8x20x7.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 100mm (one unit) 

76mm single barrel

3x25mm twin barrel 

14.5mm quad mount

Other Weapons: 4xRBU-1200, mines, d.c.

Maximum Speed: 28.5kts

Aircraft: None

25mm d.c.

RBU-1200

(2 pt, 2 stbd)

Pole

mast

14.5mm

25mm

25mm

position
A-177

SHANGHAI II PC

LOA/Beam/Draft: 127.3x17.7x5.3 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x37mm and 25mm twin barrel

At least one 82mm RR (on some)

Other Weapons: Mines, d.c.

Maximum Speed: 30kts

Aircraft: None

25mm

(pt, stbd)

Latticed

tripod mast

Wheelhouse

37mm 37mm
A-178

TAECHONG I/II PC

Taechong I Taechong II

LOA/Beam/Draft: 197.5x23.6x6.6 ft 199.5x23.6x6.6 ft

Missile Launchers: None None

Guns: 100mm or 85mm 100mm or 85mm

single barrel single barrel

25mm twin barrel 57mm twin barrel

57mm twin barrel 2x30mm twin barrel

14.5mm twin barrel 14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 2xRBU-1200, d.c.

mines, d.c.

Maximum Speed: 30kts 30kts

Aircraft: None None

25mm

(pt, stbd)

Crow's nest

pylon mast

85mm

RBU-1200

(pt, stbd)

d.c.

57mm

14.5mm

(pt, stbd)

100mm
A-179

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

MAYANG PG

LOA/Beam/Draft: 196.9x32.8x9.8 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 85mm single barrel

57mm and 4x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 16kts

Aircraft: None

SARIWON PG

LOA/Beam/Draft: 201.8x24.6x7.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 85mm single barrel

1 or 2x57mm twin barrel

2x37mm twin barrel

4x14.5mm quad barrel

Other Weapons: RBU-1200, mines

Maximum Speed: 18kts

Aircraft: None
A-180

T CLASS PG

LOA/Beam/Draft: 203.4x23.6x7.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 85mm single barrel

2x37mm twin barrel

4x14.5mm quad barrel

Other Weapons: Mines

Maximum Speed: 18kts

Aircraft: None
A-181

P-4 PT

LOA/Beam/Draft: 63.3x12.1x3.3 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 2x45cm single topedo tubes

Maximum Speed: 55kts

14.5mm

Folding

mast

Wheelhouse

14.5cm

(pt, stbd)
A-182

SHERSHEN PT

LOA/Beam/Draft: 113.8x22x6.6 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x30mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 4x53cm single topedo tubes

Maximum Speed: 45kts

Aircraft: None

30mm

DRUM TILT

FC radar

Wheelhouse

d.c. 30mm

53cm TT

(2 pt, 2 stbd)

Latticed

tripod mast
A-183

SINHUNG PT/PTH/WPB/WPBH

LOA/Beam/Draft: 75.5x16.1x4.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 2x53cm single topedo tubes (PT/PTH)

Maximum Speed: 52kts (57kts PTH)

Aircraft: None

14.5mm

Folding

mast

Wheelhouse

14.5mm

53cm TT

(pt, stbd)
A-184

SINNAM PT

LOA/Beam/Draft: 81.4x20x5.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: 2x53cm single topedo tubes, deck rails

Maximum Speed: 43kts

Aircraft: None

Pole

mast

Wheelhouse

53cm TT

(pt, stbd)
A-185

KOMAR PTG

LOA/Beam/Draft: 83.7x23x6.6 ft

Missile Launchers: 2xCSS-N-1 single tube SSM

Guns: 25mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 40.5kts

Aircraft: None

88mm

(pt, stbd)

Latticed

tripod mast

Wheelhouse

25mm
A-186

OSA I PTG

LOA/Beam/Draft: 126.6x24.9x8.9 ft

Missile Launchers: 4xSS-N-2 or CSS-N-1 single tube SSM

Guns: 2x30mm or 25mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 35kts

Aircraft: None

30mm

Pylon mast

Wheelhouse

30mm

SSM

(2 pt, 2 stbd)

DRUM

TILT
A-187

SOHUNG PTG

LOA/Beam/Draft: 84x24x6.6 ft

Missile Launchers: 2xCSS-N-1 single tube SSM

Guns: 14.5mm or 25mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 40kts

Aircraft: None

SSM

(pt, stbd)

Tripod

mast

Wheelhouse

25mm
A-188

SOJU PTG

LOA/Beam/Draft: 138.1x25.6x9.8 ft

Missile Launchers: 4xCSS-N-1 single tube SSM

Guns: 2x30mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 33kts

Aircraft: None

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

HUNGNAM LCM

LOA/Beam/Draft: 55.8x14.1x3.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 9kts

Aircraft: None

30mm

Pylon mast

Wheelhouse

30mm

SSM

(2 pt, 2 stbd)

DRUM

TILT
A-189

NAMPO LCP

LOA/Beam/Draft: 85.3x19x6.6 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 40kts

Aircraft: None

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

KONG BANG I/II/III LCPA

Kong Bang I Kong Bang II Kong Bang III

LOA/Beam/Draft: 75.5x29.5 ft 68.9x26.2 ft 60.7x23 ft

Missile Launchers: None None None

Guns: None None None

Other Weapons: None None None

Maximum Speed: 52kts 52kts 50kts

Aircraft: None None None

14.5mm

(to stbd)

Latticed

mast

Wheelhouse

Bow

door

14.5mm

(to port)
A-190

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

KOWAN ASR

LOA/Beam/Draft: 275.6x46.3x13.1 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 6x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 20kts

Aircraft: None

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

KIMJIN WPB

LOA/Beam/Draft: 59.1x9.8x4.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 2x14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 46kts

Aircraft: None

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

YONGDO WPB

LOA/Beam/Draft: 53.5x14.4x2.3 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 14.5mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 25kts

Aircraft: None
A-191

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

HANTAE LCU

LOA/Beam/Draft: 154.2x21.3x5.6 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 4x25mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 22.5kts

Aircraft: None

YUKTO I/II MSI

Yukto I Yukto II

LOA/Beam/Draft: 78.7x13.1x5.6 ft 69x13.1x5.6 ft

Missile Launchers: None None

Guns: 14.5mm twin barrel 14.5mm twin barrel

37mm single barrel or

25mm twin barrel

Other Weapons: Mines Mines

Maximum Speed: 18kts 18kts

Aircraft: None None

37mm or

25mm

Pole

mast

Wheelhouse

14.5mm
A-192

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

NAMPO A/B LCPA

LOA/Beam/Draft: 55.8x22.6x-- ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: Unknown

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 52kts

Aircraft: None

HANCHON LCU

LOA/Beam/Draft: 117.1x25.9x3.9 ft

Missile Launchers: None

Guns: 14.5mm

Other Weapons: None

Maximum Speed: 10kts

Aircraft: None
A-193

ROMEO SS

LOA/Beam/Draft: 252x23x20 ft

Propulsion: Diesel electric; 2 shafts

Missile Launchers: None

Torpedoes: 53cm; 8 tubes (6 bow, 2 stern)

Maximum Speed: 16kts surfaced; 13kts submerged
A-194

WHISKEY SS

LOA/Beam/Draft: 249x21x16 ft

Propulsion: Diesel electric; 2 shafts

Missile Launchers: None

Torpedoes: 53cm; 6 tubes (4 bow, 2 stern)

Maximum Speed: 17kts surfaced; 13kts submerged

LINE DIAGRAM UNAVAILABLE

YUGO SSM

LOA/Beam/Draft: 66x9.8x-- ft

Propulsion: Diesel electric

Missile Launchers: None

Torpedoes: No known capability

Maximum Speed: 11kts surfaced; 8kts submerged
A-195

THE NAVAL MINE THREAT TO

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Naval mines include the following types:

Deep Water: +200 ft; rising mines, moored mines, and 

some bottom mines.

Shallow Water: 200 to 40 ft; bottom mines, moored mines, and 

rising mines.

Very Shallow Water: 40 to 10 ft; bottom mines, moored mines,

controlled mines, and buried mines.

Surf Zone: 10 ft to high water mark; anti-invasion mines,

controlled mines.

Craft Landing Zone: Beach; buried mines, obstacles.
A-196

ALCM-82 SHALLOW WATER MINE

The ALCM-82 is a shallow water blast mine.

Mine Case: Steel

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: Unknown tilt rod

Actuation Force: 15-20kg

Explosive Type: Unknown

Explosive Weight: 14.5kg
A-197

PDM-1M SHALLOW WATER MINE

The PDM-1M is a shallow water blast mine.

Mine Case: Steel

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: VPDM-1M tilt rod

Actuation Force: 18-26kg

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: 10kg
A-198

PDM-2 SHALLOW WATER MINE

The PDM-2 is a shallow water blast mine.

Mine Case: Steel

Color: Olive drab

Fuze Type: VPDM-2 tilt rod

Actuation Force: 40-50kg

Explosive Type: TNT

Explosive Weight: 15kg
A-199

CSS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH

The CSS-N-1 is the Chinese version of the Russian-manufactured SS-N-2a

STYX naval antiship cruise missile.

Max Speed: 0.9 Mach

Cruise Altitude: 330, 660, or 1,000 ft

Maximum

 Effective Range: 25 nm

Warhead: HE 1,130 lbs

Fuze: Impact

Propulsion: Liquid rocket sustainer with expendable solid 

rocket booster
A-200

CSSC-2 SILKWORM

The CSSC-2 is a Chinese land-based coastal defense antiship cruise missile.

It is fired from a truck-towed launcher or tracked TEL.

Max Speed: 0.9 Mach

Cruise Altitude: 330, 660, or 1,000 ft

Maximum

 Effective Range: 45 nm

Warhead: HE 1,130 lbs

Fuze: Impact

Propulsion: Liquid rocket sustainer with expendable solid 

rocket booster
A-201

CSSC-3 SEERSUCKER

The Chinese SEERSUCKER is an extended-range version of the

SILKWORM coastal defense antiship cruise missile. It is fired from a

truck-towed launcher or tracked TEL.

Max Speed: 0.9 Mach

Cruise Altitude: 330, 660, or 1,000 ft

Maximum

 Effective Range: 45 nm

Warhead: HE 1,130 lbs

Fuze: Impact

Propulsion: Liquid rocket sustainer with expendable solid 

rocket booster
B-1

International Time Zones
C-1

APPENDIX C: 

Conversion Charts

When You Know

Units of Length Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 Inches

Centimeters 0.39 Inches

Meters 3.28 Feet

Meters 1.09 Yards

Kilometers 0.62 Miles

Inches 25.40 Millimeters

Inches 2.54 Centimeters

Feet 30.48 Centimeters

Yards 0.91 Meters

Miles 1.61 Kilometers

Units of Area

Sq. Centimeters 0.16 Sq. Inches

Sq. Meters 1.20 Sq. Yards

Sq. Kilometers 0.39 Sq. Miles

Hectares 2.47 Acres

Sq. Inches 6.45 Sq. Cm

Sq. Feet 0.09 Sq. Meters

Sq. Yards 0.84 Sq. Meters

Sq. Miles 2.60 Sq. Km

Acres 0.40 Hectares

Units of Mass and Weight

Grams 0.035 Ounces

Kilograms 2.21 Pounds

Tons (100kg) 1.10 Short Tons

Ounces 28.35 Grams

Pounds 0.45 Kilograms

Short Tons 2.12 Tons
C-2

Units of Volume Multiply by To find

Milliliters 0.20 Teaspoons

Milliliters 0.06 Tablespoons

Milliliters 0.03 Fluid Ounces

Liters 4.23 Cups

Liters 2.12 Pints

Liters 1.06 Quarts

Liters 0.26 Gallons

Cubic Meters 35.32 Cubic Feet

Cubic Meters 1.35 Cubic Yards

Teaspoons 4.93 Milliliters

Tablespoons 14.78 Milliliters

Fluid Ounces 29.57 Milliliters

Cups 0.24 Liters

Pints 0.47 Liters

Quarts 0.95 Liters

Gallons 3.79 Liters

Cubic Feet 0.03 Cubic Meters

Cubic Yards 0.76 Cubic Meters

Units of Speed

Miles per Hour 1.61 Km per Hour

Km per Hour 0.62 Miles per Hour
C-3

Temperature Conversions

To convert Celsius to degrees Fahrenheit, multiply by 1.8 and add 32.

To convert Fahrenheit to degrees Celsius, subtract 32 and divide by 1.8.

30

— 5

— 10

— 15

— 20 0

10

20

➞

➞

➞

➞

➞ ➞

➞

32

40

50

60

70

80

25

20

15

10

5

0

100

40

36.9

35

30

oC

90

98.6

105

212

oF

Celsius Fahrenheit

Heat Wave

A Hot Summer Day

A Warm Winter Day

Freezing Point of Water

A Mild Spring Day

Normal Body Temperature

Boiling Point of Water
D-1

APPENDIX D: 

Korean Language

Pronunciation Guide

Consonants

k-keep <or> g-go

n-night

d-due <or> t-tone <or> t-cot

r-red <or> l-spell

m-mother

b-boy <or> m-calm

s-sue <or> sh-she <or> t-cot

silent before a vowel <or> like ng-ring after a vowel

j-jim <or> t-cot

ch-chip <or> t-cot

k-kilometer

t-top <or> t-cot

p-pa

h-hope

Note: all may make a t-cot sound. This occurs when 

they appear as the last consonant in a syllable. For example:

goat = PLACE

goat = IMMEDIATELY

goat = FLOWER

If the next syllable begins with a vowel you will hear the normal 

consonant sound there.
D-2

Vowels

a-father = a

a-had = ae

ya-yacht = ya

u-up = o

a-hate = e

yu-yup = yo

o-go = o

yo-yoyo = yo

u-blue = oo

u-you = yoo

o-good = u

e-be = ee <or> i-bid =i

wo-woe = wo

wa-wad = wa

NOTE: You must aquaint yourself with this guide or the book will be

useless. The words which sound like goat will be spelled “got.” A word

sounding like gut will also be spelled “got.” A word sounding like take

will be spelled “tek.” Practice as much as possible!

Hostile Situations

Confrontation

Stop. mom-cho-ee

Stop action. jong-jee

Don’t shoot. so-jee-ma

Don’t move. oom-jeek-ee-jee-ma

Don’t approach. jop-goon-ha-jee-ma

Don’t make a sound. so-ree-nae-jee-ma

Drop your weapons. moo-gee nae-ryo-no-wa

Hands up. son-du-ro

Come out. na-o-ra

Come forward. a-pu-ro na-wa

Come here. ee-dee-wa

Surrender. hang-bok-ha-ra
D-3

Turn around. twee-ro-do-ra

Lie face down. op-du-ryo

Hands behind your back. son-ul twee-ro

Obey orders. myong-ryong-dae-ro ha-ra

Do not resist. ban-hang-ha-jee-ma

You won’t be harmed. hae-chee-jee-an-gey-so

You are a prisoner. ja-nae-nun po-ro-ee-ya

Commands

Do it now. chee-goom-hae

Follow orders. myong-ryong-ul da-ra

Stand in line. joo-lo-so

Submit to search. tam-saek-e-ung-hae

Quickly. bal-loo

Don’t talk. mal-ha-jee-ma

Be still. ga-man-hee ee-so

Give me . . . . . . joo-o

Give me ID. shin-boon-chung joo-o

Give me papers. so-ryo joo-o

Give me your things. so-jee-poom joo-o

Empty your pockets. ho-joo-mo-nee to-ro-na

Move. oom-jeek-yo-ra

Get out of my way. pee-kyo-ra

Come here. ee-dee-wa

Stay here. yo-gee ee-so

Stay there. ko-gee ee-so

Lie down. noo-wo

Sit down. an-ja

Eat this. ee-go mo-go

Be quiet. cho-yong-hae

Get up. ee-ro-na

Follow me. da-ra-wa
D-4

Questions

What is your name? ee-rum moo-o-ya?

What is your rank? kye-goop moo-o-ya?

What is your specialty? tuk-gee-ga moo-o-ya?

What is your mission? im-moo-ga moo-o-ya?

Where is your unit? boo-dae o-dee ee-so?

Who is in charge? chee-we-gwan 

 noo-goo-jee-o?

What size unit? boo-dae gyoo-mo?

What weapons? moo-sun moo-gee?

Where is/are the . . .? . . . o-dee-ee-so-yo?

 Weapons moo-gee

 AAA go-sa-po

 SAMs chee-dae-kong-yoo-do-tan

 Rocket launchers ra-kaet bal-sa-gee

 Radar sites bang-yang-tam-je-gee

 Aircraft bee-haeng-gee

 Tanks jon-cha

 Mine fields chee-rey chee-dae

Show me on the map. chee-do-sang-e-so

 bo-yo-joo-se-yo

Draw a sketch map. yak-do gu-ryo-joo-se-yo

Give me the information. jong-bo joo-o

Friendly Situations

Meet/Approach

Hello. an-nyong-ha-se-yo

Nice to meet you. ban-gap-sum-nee-da

See you again. ta-shoe bop-shee-da

Thank you. kam-sa-ham-nee-da

Good bye. an-nyong-hee ka-se-yo

Don’t worry. kok-jong-ha-jee-ma-se-yo

Speak slowly. chon-chon-hee mal-ha-se-yo

Say/do again. da-shee han-bon
D-5

Request Help

Can you help me? do-wa-jool-soo-ee-so-yo?

Does anyone speak yong-o ha-nun sa-ram 

 English? ee-so-yo?

Have you seen in-min-goon bwa-so-yo?

 NK soldiers?

Have you seen communists? kong-san-goon bwa-so-yo?

How many people? myot-sa-ram?

Where did they go? o-dee-ro ka-so-yo?

Where did you come from? o-dee-so wa-so-yo?

Did you see any ...? ... bwa-so-yo?

Where is/are the ...? ... o-dee ee-so-yo?

Can you guide me? a-nae-hal-soo-ee-so-yo?

Please give me a ride. cha tae-wo-joo-se-yo

Please give me a map. chee-do joo-se-yo

Show me on the map. chee-do-sang-e-so

 bo-yo-joo-se-yo

Draw a sketch map. yak-do gu-ree-se-yo

Can you describe? myo-sa hal-soo-ee-so-yo?

Is he tall? kee-ga ko-yo?

Is he short? kee-ga jak-a-yo?

Is he fat? doong-doong-hae-yo?

How old? myot-sal-ee-e-yo?

Is it heavy? moo-go-wo-yo?

Is it light? ka-byo-wo-yo?

Is it big? ko-yo?

Is it small? jak-a-yo?

Do you have food? um-sheek ee-so-yo?

Is there water? mool-ee-so-yo?

Can you give me shelter? sook-so jool-soo-ee-so-yo?

Can we hide here? yo-gee-so soom-ul-soo-

 ee-so-yo?

Can we camp here? yo-gee-so ya-yong-hal-

 soo-ee-so-yo?

Do you have blankets? dam-yo ee-so-yo?

I need medical care. chee-ryo pee-lee-o-hae-yo?
D-6

Do you have weapons? moo-gee ee-so-yo?

Please give us ammo. tan-yak jo-se-yo

Is there POL? yon-yoo ee-so-yo?

My vehicle broke down. cha-ga go-jang-na-so-yo

Provide Help

We came to help. do-wa joo-ro-wa-so-yo

We won’t harm you. hae-chee-jee-an-ge-so-yo

Please come in. tu-ro-o-se-yo

Please come out. na-o-se-yo

Come this way. ee-ree o-se-yo

Don’t worry. kok-jong-ha-jee-ma-se-yo

You are safe here. yo-gee an-jon-hae-yo

We have plenty of food. um-sheek nok-hae-yo

We have potable water. sheek-soo ee-so-yo

Are you sick? a-pa-yo?

Does anyone need chee-ryo pee-lee-o-hae-yo?

 treatment?

We can treat you. chee-ryo-hal-soo-ee-so-yo

We can give you shelter. sook-so jool-soo-ee-so-yo

Be still. ga-man-hee ee-so

Form a line. jool-so-se-yo

It’s too dangerous here. yo-gee-ga no-moo 

 wee-hom-hae-yo

You must keep moving. kye-sok oom-jeek-ee-o-

 ya-hae-yo

We will give you a ride. cha tae-wo-joo-ge-so-yo

We can’t give you a ride. cha tae-wo-jool-soo-

 op-so-yo

Please go . . . . . . ka-se-yo

 North book-jok-u-ro

 South nam-jok-u-ro

 East dong-jok-u-ro

 West so-jok-u-ro
D-7

Ordinary Situations

Time

What time is it? myot-shee-e-yo?

At what time? myot-shee-e?

When? on-je?

What day? moo-sun-yo-il?

What date? nal-ja?

How long ago? ol-ma-na o-re-jon-e?

How many minutes? myot-boon?

How many hours? myot-shee-gan?

How many days? myot-chill?

How many weeks? myot-joo-il?

Directions

Where is ...? ... o-dee-ee-so-yo?

Is it nearby? ka-ka-wo-yo?

Can I walk there? ko-gee-ka-jee ko-ro-kal-

 soo-ee-so-yo?

How far is it? ol-ma-na mo-ro-yo?

Can you guide me? a-nae-hal-soo-ee-so-yo?

Is the road paved? do-ro-ga po-jang-two-

 o-so-yo?

How is the road? do-ro-ga o-te-yo?

Where is this . . . ? . . . o-dee-ga-jee ka-yo?

 train going ee-kee-cha

 bus going ee-bo-su

Where are you going? o-dee ka-se-yo?

Please load. jim-shil-ru-se-yo

Please unload. jim-nae-ree-se-yo

Please get on. ta-se-yo

Please get off. nae-re-se-yo

It’s too big. no-moo ko-yo

It’s too heavy. no-moo moo-go-wo-yo
D-8

Food/Shelter

What food is there? moo-sun um-sheek ee-so-yo?

Menu please? me-nyoo-joo-se-yo?

What do you have to moo-sun um-ryo-mool 

 drink? ee-so-yo?

How much is this ...? ... ee-go ol-ma-yo?

Is it ready? choon-bee ta tae-so-yo?

How long is the wait? ol-ma-na kee-ta-ryo-yo?

Can we eat here? yo-gee-so mok-ul-soo-

 ee-so-yo?

We will take it with us. ka-jee-go-ka-ge-so-yo

Where can we stay? o-dee-so soo-bak-hal-

 soo-ee-so-yo?

Do you have a room? bang ee-so-yo?

Signs

Stop jong-jee

Stop mom-choom

Checkpoint gom-moon-so

MPs hon-byong

Danger we-hom

Restricted area je-han-goo-yok

Warning kyong-bo

Watchout joo-shee-hal-got

No smoking kum-yon

Slow down sok-do na-choo-se-yo

Emergency exit bee-sang-goo

Lifeboat koo-myong-jong

Detour oo-hwe

Mine field chee-re chee-dae

Poison yoo-dok-mool

Military zone goon-sa chee-ok

Keep out choo-rip koom-jee

Don’t go beyond ee-son ee-sang-ga-gee-

 ma-se-yo

Do not enter tu-ro-ka-jee-ma-se-yo
D-9

Pictures forbidden chwall-yong koom-jee

Unpaved road bee-po-jang-do-ro

Medical

I am a medic. wee-saeng-byong im-nee-da

I will treat you here. yo-gee-so chee-ryo-hae-

 joo-ge-so-yo

I’ll take you to byong-won-e de-ree-go-

 the hospital. ka-ge-so-yo

I am a doctor. wee-sa im-nee-da

Are you sick? a-pa-yo?

Do you have a disease? chill-byong ee-so-yo?

Where is your injury? o-dee da-cho-so-yo?

Where does it hurt? o-dee-ga a-pa-yo?

Can you get up? e-ro-nal-soo-ee-so-yo?

Can you walk? ko-rul-soo-ee-so-yo?

I must give you a shot. joo-sa no-a-joo-o-ya-dae-yo

I will bandage the wound. sang-cho-e boong-dae

 gam-a-du-ree-ge-so-yo

The bone is broken. byo-ga boo-ro-cho-so-yo

I must stop the bleeding. jee-hyol-hae-ya-de-yo

What caused the injury? we boo-sang-dang-

 hae-so-yo?

Don’t tense up. kin-jang-ha-jee-ma-se-yo

It’ll be okay. kwaen-chan-ge-so-yo

Glossary

AAA go-sa-po

AAA sites dae-kong-po jin-jee

Above we-e

Afternoon o-hoo

Aircraft bee-haeng-gee

Aircraft carrier hang-kong-mo-ham

Airfield (civilian) kong-hang

Airfield (military) bee-haeng-jang
D-10

Air Force kong-goon

Alley gol-mok

Allies a-goon

American mee-gook-in

Ammo dump tan-yak-go

Ammunition tan-yak

Anti-communist ban-kong-san-joo-we-ja

Anti-government ban-jong-bu-pa

Antibiotics hang-saeng-je

Approach jop-gun

Area chee-dae

Army yook-koon

Army group jip-dan-goon

Arrive do-chak-hae-yo

Artillery po-byong

Asian person dong-yang sa-ram

At / In / On / To e

Bad na-pa-yo

Bad water o-yum-mool

Bandages boong-dae

Base kee-jee

Bathroom wa-jang-shil

Battalion dae-dae

Beef so-go-gee

Before jon-e

Behind twee-e

Belly bae

Below a-rae

Black person hook-in

Blister jong-gee

Blood pee

Boat bae

Bomber pok-kyok-kee

Border kyong-gye-son

Boulder ba-wee

Bowl ku-root
D-11

Bread bang

Bridge ta-ree

Brigade yo-dan

Bring kat-da-joo-se-yo

Building gun-mool

Bulgogi bool-go-gee

Burn hwa-sang

Butt ong-dong-ee

Camouflage wee-jang

Camp byong-yong

Can gang-tong

Car cha

Cave dang-gool

Checkpoint gom-moon-so

Checkpoint (NK) cha-dan-so

Chest ka-sum

Chicken dak-go-gee

Child a-ee

Cigarette tam-bae

City do-shee

Civilian min-gan-in

Clean kae-kut-han

Cliff jol-byok

Clothes ot

Coast ba-dat-ga

Coastline hae-an-son

Coffee ko-pee

Collision choong-dol-hae-yo

Come o-se-yo

Come back to-ra-o-se-yo

Commander chee-we-gwan

Communists kong-san-goon

Company joong-dae

Corps goon-dan

Countryside shee-qol

Courier tuk-byol jon-ryong
D-12

Crash (aircraft) choo-rak-hae-yo

Cup jan

Danger wee-hom

Date nal-cha

Dawn sae-byok

Day ill

Daytime na-je

Dead guy sa-mang-ja

Depart chool-bal-hae-yo

Depot chang-go

Diarrhea sol-sa

Diesel dee-jael

Direction bang-yang

Dirt road hook-kil

Dirty do-ro-wo-yo

Division sa-dan

DMZ bee-moo-jang chee-dae

Doctor wee-sa

Document so-ryu

Downtown shee-nae

Drink ma-shee-o

Driver oon-jon-sa

During dong-an

East dong-chok

Eat mo-go-yo

End kut

Enemy jok-koon

English yong-o

Enlisted sa-byong

Enter tu-ro-ka-yo

Equipment jang-bee

Evening cho-nyok

Exit bee-sang-goo

Explosive pok-yak

Eye noon
D-13

Face o-gool

Facility shee-sol

Factory kong-jang

Family ka-jok

Farmland nong-jee

Fast bal-lee

Fat doong-doong-hae

FEBA jon-too chee-ok jon-dan

Fighter plane jon-tu-gee

Finished kut-nae-so-yo

Fire bool/hwa

Fish mool-go-gee

Flower mil-ga-roo

Food um-sheek

Foot bal

Friend chin-goo

Fright kong-po

Front a-pe

Front line jon-son

Fruit kwa-il

Fuel yon-yoo

Garrison ju-dun-jee

Gasoline hwe-bal-yoo

Get off nae-ryo

Give jo-se-yo

Go ka-yo

Go back to-ra-ka-yo

Good cho-a-yo

Grenade soo-ryoo-tan

Ground dang/chee-sang

Group jo/dan

Guard bo-cho-byong

Gully gol-ja-gee

Hand son

Head mo-ree

Heavy moo-go-wo-yo
D-14

Height no-pee

Help do-oom

Here yo-gee

Highway go-sok-do-ro

Hill go-jee

Hospital byong-won

Hour shee-gan

House chip

How o-to-ke

ID shin-boon-chung

If man-il

Industrial area san-op-chee-dae

Infantry bo-byong

Infection o-yum

Inside an-nae

Inside the city shee-nae

Jeep jeep

Job jeek-op

JP4 hang-kong yol-yo

Kerosene sok-yoo

Kilometers kee-lo

Kimchee kim-chee

Knife kal

Know a-ra-yo

Korean Language han-gook-o

Lake ho-soo

Large ko-yo

Later hoo-e

Latrine byon-so

Leader chee-huee-ja

Left waen-chok

Leg ta-ree

Length kee-ree

Less dol

Lift du-ro-yu
D-15

Light ka-byo-wo-yo

Light jon-gee-bool

Location wee-chee

Look bo-se-yo

Look for cha-ja-bo-se-yo

Lost the way kil ee-ro-bo-ryo-so-yo

Machine gun kee-gwan-chong

Maintenance facility jong-bee-so

Malnutrition yong-yang-shil-jo

Man nam-ja

Mandu man-doo

Many man-ee

Marines hae-byong-dae

Market shee-jang

Meat go-gee

Mechanic jong-bee-won

Medic wee-saeng-byong

Medicine yak

Medium joong-hyong

Meeting hwe-wee

Military koon-dae

Milk oo-yoo

Mine chee-rey

Mine field chee-rey-chee-dae

Minute boon

Missile mee-sa-il

Mission im-moo

Month wol/dal

More do man-ee

Morning o-jon/a-chim

Motor pool soo-song-boo

Mountain san

Move oom-jeek-ee-o-yo

MP hon-byong

My che/oo-ree
D-16

Name ee-rum

Navy hae-goon

NCO ha-sa-gwan

Night bam

No a-nee-o

Noodles gook-soo

North buk-chok

North Korea ee-book

North Korean soldiers book-kwe-goon

Not know mo-la-yo

Now chee-goom

Ocean ba-da

Officer chang-gyo

Oil kee-rum

Old person nulk-un sa-ram

Old thing nalk-un got

Orders myong-ryong

Outside the city shee-we

Over there cho-gee

Pants ba-jee

Pass ho-ga-chung

Paved road po-jang-toen do-ro

Person sa-ram

Pill box tuk-hwa-jom

Pilot jo-jong-sa

Pistol goo-won-chong

Place jang-so

Plain pyong-ya

Plate jop-she

Platoon so-dae

Poison dok-yak

Pork twe-gee

Position wee-chee

Potable water shik-soo

Powdered milk boon-yoo

Power plant bal-jon-so
D-17

Preparation choon-bee

Pro-communist chin-kong-san-choo-we-ja

Pro-government chin-jong-boo-pa

Protection bang-o

Put in not-u-se-yo

Put on no-u-se-yo

Question chil-moon

Railroad yard/station chol-do-yok

Rear area hoo-bang-chee-ok

Refugee pee-nan-min

Regiment yon-dae

Relative chin-chok

Repeat ban-bok-ha-se-yo

Rice bap

Rice cake dok

Rice paddy non

Ride ta-yo

Ridge nung-son

Rifle so-chong

Right o-run-chok

River kang

Road kil/do-ro

Rocket ra-ke-tu

RTB kwee-dae-hae-yo

SAMs chee-dae-kong yoo-do-tan

SAM sites chee-dae-kong yoo-do-tan

 jin-jee

Seaport hang-man

Send bo-nae-yo

Shelter sook-so

Shoes shin-bal

Shoot sowat/sa-kyok-hae

Short kee-ga chak-un

Shortage boo-jok

Show bo-yo-joo-se-yo
D-18

Sign pyo-jee/gan-pan

Sink chim-mol-hae-yo

Slow chon-chon-hee

Small chak-un

Soldiers koon-in

Sorry mee-an-ham-nee-da

Soup gook

South nam-chok

South Korea ee-nam

Spy gan-chop

Squad boon-dae

Start shee-jak

Stone dol

Stop jong-jee

Story ee-ya-gee

Stronghold go-jom

Submarine cham-soo-ham

Supplies bo-gup-poom

Supply base bo-gup-so

Supply route bo-gup-no

Tall kee-ga-kun

Tank jon-cha

Tea cha

Tent chon-mak

Thank you kam-sa-ham-nee-da

There ko-gee

They ku-sa-ram-dul

Thin ma-run

Thing got/go/ge

Throw out bo-ryo-yo

Time shee-gan

Today o-nool

Tomorrow ne-il

Trail o-sol-kil

Train track chol-do

Transformer station byon-jon-so
D-19

Transport soo-song-hae-yo

Transport plane soo-song-gee

Travel permit choo-rip-jung

Treatment chee-ryo

Tree na-moo

Troop concentration byong-ryok-jip-kyol-jee

Troop strength byong-ryok

Truck tu-rok

Tuberculosis kyol-haek

Tunnel gaeng-do

Underground chee-ha

Underground faction chee-ha-jo-jeek-pa

Understand ee-hae-hae-yo

Uniform koon-bok

Unit boo-dae

Unleaded bee-nap yol-ryo

Valley kye-gok

Vegetable ya-chae

Vehicle cha-ryang

Vessel (civilian) son-bak

Vessel (military) goon-ham

Village ma-ul

Vitamins bee-ta-min

Walk ko-ro-ka-yo

Water mool

We oo-ree

Weapon moo-gee

Week joo-il

West so-chok

Westerner so-yang sa-ram

What moo-o

When on-je

Where o-dee

White person paek-in

Who noo-goo
D-20

Why we

Width nol-bee

Woman yo-ja

Yankee (racial slur) yang-kee

Yes ne

Yesterday o-je

You no/tang-shin

Young o-rin

Colors

Black ga-man

Blue pa-ran

Gray hwe-saek

Green pa-ran-saek

Red bal-gan

White ha-yan

Yellow no-ran

Days of the Week

Monday wol-yo-il

Tuesday hwa-yo-il

Wednesday soo-yo-il

Thursday mok-yo-il

Friday kum-yo-il

Saturday to-yo-il

Sunday ee-ryo-il
D-21

Numbers

1 il/ha na

2 ee/dul

3 sam/saet

4 sa/naet

5 o/da-sot

6 yook/yo-sot

7 chil/il-gop

8 pal/yo-dull

9 koo/a-hop

10 ship/yull

11 ship-il/yull-ha-na

12 ship-ee/yull-dool

20 ee-ship/soo-mool

30 sam-ship/so-roon

40 sa-ship/ma-hun

50 o-ship/shwee-un

60 yook-ship/ye-sun

70 chil-ship/ee-run

80 pal-ship/yo-dun

90 koo-ship/a-hun

100 paek

1,000 chon

10,000 man
E-1

APPENDIX E: 

Individual Protective Measures 

Individual protective measures are the conscious actions which people

take to guard themselves against physical harm. These measures can

involve simple acts, such as locking your car and avoiding areas where

crime is rampant. When physical protection measures are combined,

they form a personal security program, the object of which is to make

yourself a harder target. The following checklists contain basic individual protective measures that, if understood and followed, may significantly reduce your vulnerability towards the security threats overseas

(foreign intelligence, security services, and terrorist organizations). If

you are detained or taken hostage, following the measures listed in these

checklists may influence and improve your treatment.

■ Avoid any actions or activities that are illegal, improper, or indiscreet.

■ Guard your conversation, and keep sensitive papers in your custody

at all times. 

■ Take it for granted that you are under surveillance by both technical

and physical means, including: 

❏ Communications monitoring (telephone, telex, mail, and radio)

❏ Photography 

❏ Search 

❏ Eavesdropping in hotels, offices, and apartments 

■ Do not discuss sensitive matters: 

❏ On the telephone 

❏ In your room 

❏ In a car, particularly in front of an assigned driver 

 Protective Measures Against Foreign Intelligence

 and Security Services 
E-2

■ Do not leave sensitive personal or business papers: 

❏ In your room 

❏ In the hotel safe 

❏ In a locked suitcase or briefcase 

❏ In unattended cars, offices, trains, or planes 

❏ Open to photography from the ceiling 

❏ In wastebaskets as drafts or doodles 

■ Do not try to defeat surveillance by trying to slip away from followers or by trying to locate “bugs” in your room. These actions will

only generate more interest in you. If you feel you are under surveillance, act as natural as possible, get to the safest location possible

(your office, hotel, U.S. Embassy), and contact your superior. 

■ Avoid offers of sexual companionship. They may lead to a room raid,

photography, and blackmail. Prostitutes in many countries report to

the police, work for a criminal organization, or are sympathetic to

insurgent or terrorist organizations; in other words, anti-U.S. Others

may be employed by an intelligence service. 

■ Be suspicious of casual acquaintances and quick friendships with

local citizens in intelligence/terrorist threat countries. In many countries, people tend to stay away from foreigners and do not readily or

easily make contact. Many who actively seek out friendships with

Americans may do so as a result of government orders, or at the least,

for personal gain. 

In your personal contacts, follow these guidelines: 

■ Do not attempt to keep up with your hosts in social drinking. 

■ Do not engage in black market activity for money or goods. 

■ Do not sell your possessions. 

■ Do not bring in or purchase illegal drugs. 
E-3

■ Do not bring in pornography. 

■ Do not bring in religious literature for distribution. (You may bring

one Bible, Koran or other religious material for your own personal

use.) 

■ Do not seek out religious or political dissidents. 

■ Do not take ashtrays, towels, menus, glasses, or other mementos

from hotels or restaurants. 

■ Do not accept packages, letters, etc., from local citizens for delivery

to the U.S. 

■ Do not make political comments or engage in political activity. 

■ Do not be lured into clandestine meetings with would-be informants

or defectors. 

■ Be careful about taking pictures. In some countries it is unwise to

take photographs of scenes that could be used to make unfavorable

comparisons between U.S. and Latin standards of living or other cultural differences. Avoid taking any photographs from moving buses,

trains, or aircraft.

The following picture subjects are clearly prohibited in most countries where an intelligence or terrorist/insurgent threat is evident: 

❏ Police or military installations and personnel 

❏ Bridges 

❏ Fortifications 

❏ Railroad facilities 

❏ Tunnels 

❏ Elevated trains 

❏ Border areas 

❏ Industrial complexes 

❏ Port complexes 

❏ Airports 
E-4

Most intelligence and security services in threat countries detain persons

for a wide range of real or imagined wrongs. The best advice, of course,

is to do nothing that would give a foreign service the least reason to pick

you up. If you are arrested or detained by host nation intelligence or

security, however, remember the following: 

■ Always ask to contact the U.S. Embassy. You are entitled to do so

under international diplomatic and consular agreements, to which

most countries are signatories. 

■ Phrase your request appropriately. In Third World countries, however, making demands could lead to physical abuse. 

■ Do not admit to wrongdoing or sign anything. Part of the detention

ritual in some threat countries is a written report you will be asked or

told to sign. Decline to do so, and continue demanding to contact the

embassy or consulate. 

■ Do not agree to “help” your detainer. The foreign intelligence or security service may offer you the opportunity to “help” them in return for

releasing you, foregoing prosecution, or not informing your employer

or spouse of your indiscretion. If they will not take a simple “no,” delay

a firm commitment by saying that you have to think it over. 

■ Report to your supervisor immediately. Once your supervisor is

informed, the embassy or consulate security officer needs to be

informed. Depending on the circumstances and your status, the

embassy or consulate may have to provide you assistance in departing the country expeditiously. 

■ Report to your unit’s security officer and your service’s criminal investigative branch upon returning to the U.S. This is especially important

if you were unable to report to the embassy or consulate in country.

Remember, you will not be able to outwit a foreign intelligence organization. Do not compound your error by betraying your country. 

 What To Do If You Are Detained 
E-5

Terrorism may seem like mindless violence committed without logic or

purpose, but it isn’t. Terrorists attack soft and undefended targets, both

people and facilities, to gain political objectives they see as out of reach

by less violent means. Many of today’s terrorists view no one as innocent. Thus, injury and loss of life are justified as acceptable means to

gain the notoriety generated by a violent act in order to support their

cause. 

Because of their distinctive dress, speech patterns, and outgoing personalities, Americans are often highly visible and easily recognized when

they are abroad. The obvious association of U.S. military personnel with

their government enhances their potential media and political worth as

casualties or hostages. Other U.S. citizens are also at risk, including

political figures, police, intelligence personnel, and VIPs (such as businessmen and celebrities).

Therefore, you must develop a comprehensive personal security program to safeguard yourself while traveling abroad. An awareness of the

threat and the practice of security procedures like those advocated in

“Crime Prevention” programs are adequate precautions for the majority

of people. While total protection is impossible, basic common sense

precautions such as an awareness of any local threat, elimination of predictable travel and lifestyle routines, and security consciousness at your

quarters or work locations significantly reduce the probability of success

of terrorist attacks.

To realistically evaluat e your individual security program, you must

understand how terrorists select and identify their victims. Terrorists

generally classify targets in terms of accessibility, vulnerability, and

political worth (symbolic nature). These perceptions may not be based

on the person’s actual position, but rather the image of wealth or importance they represent to the public. For each potential target, a risk versus gain assessment is conducted to determine if a terrorist can victimize

 Protective Measures Against the Foreign Terrorist Threat 
E-6

a target without ramifications to the terrorist organization. It is during

this phase that the terrorist determines if a target is “hard or soft.” A

hard target is someone who is aware of the threat of terrorism and

adjusts his personal habits accordingly. Soft targets are oblivious to the

threat and their surroundings, making an easy target.

Identification by name is another targeting method gathered from aircraft manifests, unit/duty rosters, public documents (Who’s Who or the

Social Register), personnel files, discarded mail, or personal papers in

trash. Many targets are selected based upon their easily identifiable symbols or trademarks, such as uniforms, luggage (seabags or duffle bags),

blatant national symbols (currency, tatoos, and clothing), and decals and

bumper stickers. 

 Security While Traveling

Travel on temporary duty (TAD/TDY) abroad may require you to stay in

commercial hotels. Being away from your home duty station requires

increasing your security planning and awareness; this is especially

important when choosing and checking into a hotel and during your residence there. 

The recent experiences with airport bombings and airplane hijacking

suggest some simple precautions: 

■ You should not travel on commercial aircraft outside the continental

U.S. in uniform. 

■ Prior to traveling by commercial aircraft, you should screen your

wallet and other personal items, removing any documents (that is,

credit cards, club membership cards, etc.) which would reveal your

military affiliation. 

NOTE: Current USMC policy requires service members to wear two

I.D. tags with metal necklaces when on official business. Also, the
E-7

current I.D. card must be in possession at all times. These requirements include travel to or through terrorist areas. In view of these

requirements, the service member must be prepared to remove and

conceal these, and any other items which would identify them as military personnel, in the event of a skyjacking. 

■ You should stay alert to any suspicious activity when traveling and

keep in mind that the less time you spend in waiting areas and lobbies, the better. This means adjusting your schedule to reduce your

wait at these locations.

■ You should not discuss your military affiliation with anyone during

your travels because it increases your chances of being singled out as

a symbolic victim. 

■ In case of an incident, you should not confront a terrorist or present a

threatening image. The lower profile you present, the less likely you

will become a victim or bargaining chip for the terrorists, and your

survivability increases. 

 Surviving a Hostage Situation

The probability of anyone becoming a hostage is very remote. However,

as a member of the Armed Forces, you should always consider yourself

a potential hostage or terrorist victim and reflect this in planning your

affairs, both personal and professional. You should have an up-to-date

will, provide next of kin with an appropriate powers-of-attorney, and

take measures to ensure your dependents financial security if necessary.

Experience has shown that concern for the welfare of family members is

a source of great stress to kidnap victims. 

Do not be depressed if negotiation efforts appear to be taking a long

time. Remember, chance of survival actually increases with time. The

physical and psychological stress while a hostage could seem overpowering, but the key to your well-being is to approach captivity as a mis-
E-8

sion. Maintaining emotional control, alertness, and introducing order

into each day of captivity will ensure your success and survival with

honor. 

During interaction with captors, maintaining self-respect and dignity

can be keys to retaining status as a human being in the captor’s eyes.

Complying with instructions, avoiding provocative conversations (political, religious, etc.), and establishing a positive relationship will

increase survivability. Being polite and freely discussing insignificant

and nonessential matters can reinforce this relationship. Under no circumstance should classified information be divulged. If forced to

present terrorist demands to the media, make it clear that the demands

are those of the captors and that the plea is not made on your own

behalf. You must remember that you are an American service member;

conduct yourself with dignity and honor while maintaining your

bearing. 

Hostages sometimes are killed during rescue attempts; consequently,

you should take measures to protect yourself during such an action.

Drop to the floor immediately, remaining still and avoiding any sudden

movement; select a safe corner if it offers more security than the floor.

Do not attempt to assist the rescuing forces, but wait for instructions.

After the rescue, do not make any comment to the media until you have

been debriefed by appropriate U.S. authorities. 
F-1

APPENDIX F:

FIRST AID/HOT AND COLD WEATHER SURVIVAL

FIRST AID

First aid is the immediate treatment administered to a casualty before 

they can reach medical assistance. Prompt and correct first aid for 

wounds will not only speed healing, but will often save a life—and that 

life may be yours! The most important points are to remain calm and 

use common sense. This short guide is intended as an emergency reference. The tactical situation and the expertise of the personnel present 

may influence treatment decisions.

The four priority life-saving steps in first aid are:

Restore breathing and pulse. 

Stop bleeding.

Protect the wound.

Prevent or treat shock.

VITAL SIGNS 

To Feel for a Pulse

1. Place the tips of index and middle fingers on the thumb side of the 

casualty’s wrist to feel for a pulse. Do not use your thumb as this will 

confuse the casualty’s pulse with your own.

2. If a pulse cannot be felt at the wrist, check the carotid pulse gently 

with your fingertips (it is located in a groove next to the windpipe, deep 

in the neck) or the femoral pulse (deep in the groin).

3. Once a pulse has been located, count the number of beats in 15 seconds and multiply by 4 or if the pulse is very slow or irregular, count for 

60 seconds. A pulse rate may vary depending on the casualty’s 

condition.
F-2

The normal adult male heart rate is between 70 to 80 beats/ minute, for a 

female the rate is 75 to 80, and for a young child 82 to 180. However, 

excitement, exercise, or fever may increase the rate. Be sure to note 

whether the pulse is weak, full, bounding, or irregular.

Look and Listen for Breathing

Look for the rise and fall of the chest. If it is cold, there may be frost on 

the casualty’s breath.

Place your ear near their mouth and listen for breathing. Note whether 

the breathing is regular, rapid, shallow, or shows signs of difficulty. 

Check airway for obstructions.

Check for Wounds and Injuries

Look at the casualty from head to foot checking for bleeding, open 

wounds, external signs of internal injuries and other problems. Remember that many wounds, particularly bullet wounds, have both an entrance 

and exit hole; check for both. 

CPR

Artificial Respiration

If the casualty is not breathing check airway and remove any obstructions using hooked fingers.

Mouth-to-Mouth Method. With patient lying on back, hold jaw well 

open while bending head back to prevent tongue from falling and blocking airway. Hold nostrils closed with other hand. Place mouth over 

patient’s mouth and exhale. Watch for chest to rise as you blow gently 

into patient’s lungs. If chest does not rise, perform an abdominal thrust 

to remove any obstruction (the Heimlich maneuver). Take a breath 

while watching for fall of casualty’s exhale.

For a child: Do not blow. Exhale normally, or in the case of a baby, in 

gentle puffs. Blowing forcefully into a child’s mouth can damage delicate lungs.
F-3

Arm-Lift Method. If mouth to mouth technique is not possible due to 

facial injury or NBC contamination, use the arm-lift method. With 

casualty on back, check airway for obstructions and kneel behind the 

casualty’s head. Grasp the casualty’s hands and place them on the lower 

ribs, rock forward, pressing downward and forcing air out of the casualty’s lungs. When you meet firm resistance lift the arms upward and 

backward as far as possible. This process of lifting and stretching the 

arms increases the size of the chest cavity and draws air into the lungs. 

Repeat cycle of Press-Lift-Stretch.

REPEAT either method, as quickly as possible for first six inflations, 

then at 12 repetitions per minute until normal breathing is reestablished. 

DON’T GIVE UP!

 If no pulse, start alternating cardiac resuscitation and artificial respiration. Give 2 full breaths for each cycle of 15 compressions in single rescuer CPR.

Cardiac Resuscitation

Regardless of the method of artificial respiration, if there is no pulse 

and, after 10 to 15 seconds, there is no apparent improvement in the 

casualty’s condition, cardiac resuscitation (external heart massage) 

should be started. There is no time to lose! If the rescuer can’t feel a 

pulse he is going to have to circulate the blood as well as breathe for the 

casualty.

External Chest Compression. The casualty must be always in the horizontal and supine (lying on their back) position when external chest 

compression is performed. During cardiac arrest, even during properly 

performed chest compression, inadequate blood flow to the brain may 

exist when the body is in an upright position.

1. With the middle and index fingers of the lower hand, locate the lower 

margin of the casualty’s rib cage on the side next to the rescuer.

2. Run the fingers along the rib cage to the notch where the ribs meet 

the sternum in the center of the lower chest.
F-4

3. With the middle finger on the notch, place the index finger next to the 

middle finger on the lower end of the sternum.

4. Place the heel of the other hand (which had been used on the forehead to maintain head position) on the lower half of the sternum, and 

just next to the index finger which is next to the middle finger that 

located the notch. The long axis of the heel of your hand should be 

placed on the long axis of the breastbone. This will keep the main line 

of force of compression on the breastbone and decrease the chance of 

rib fracture.

5. Remove the first hand from the notch, and place it on top of the hand 

on the sternum so that hands are parallel and directed straight away from 

the rescuer.

6. The fingers may be either extended or interlaced but must be kept off 

the chest.

7. Straighten the elbows by locking them, and position your shoulders 

directly over your hands so that the thrust for external chest compression is straight down. If the thrust is other than straight down, the torso 

has a tendency to roll, part of the effort is lost, and the chest compression is less effective and requires an inefficient amount of effort.

8. To compress the sternum of a normal-size adult you must push with 

enough force to depress the breastbone 1 1/2 to 2 inches. With each 

compression you want to squeeze the heart or increase the pressure 

within the chest so that blood moves through the body. You must compress at a rate of 80 to 100 times per minute.

9. If you use the weight of your body, you do not depend on the strength 

of your arms and shoulders as much. Instead of having to push from 

your shoulders, you let the natural weight of your body falling forward 

provide the force to depress the casualty’s sternum. Keep arms straight.

10. Do not lift your hands off the chest, or change their position in any 

way, because correct hand position may be lost. Bouncing compressions must be avoided since they are less effective and are more likely to 

cause injury and additional problems.
F-5

BLEEDING

External bleeding falls into the following classifications:

Arterial. Blood vessels called arteries carry blood away from the heart 

and through the body. A cut artery issues bright red blood from the 

wound in distinct spurts or pulses. This is the most serious type of 

bleeding and needs to be controlled promptly.

Venous. Venous blood is blood that is returning to the heart through 

blood vessels called veins. A steady flow of dark red, maroon, or bluish 

blood characterizes bleeding from a vein.

Capillary. The capillaries are extremely small vessels that connect the 

arteries with the veins. Capillary bleeding most commonly occurs in 

minor cuts and scrapes.

Some methods for bleeding control are direct pressure, elevation, or 

tourniquet.

Direct Pressure. The most effective way to control external bleeding is 

by applying pressure directly over the wound. It has to be both firm 

enough to stop the bleeding and maintained long enough to “seal off” 

the damaged surface. If bleeding continues after having applied direct 

pressure for 30 minutes, apply a pressure dressing (a thick dressing of 

gauze or other suitable material applied directly over the wound and 

held in place with a tightly wrapped bandage).

Elevation. Raising an injured extremity as high as possible above the 

heart’s level slows blood loss by aiding the return of the blood to the 

heart and lowering the blood pressure at the wound. However, elevation 

alone will not control bleeding entirely; you must also apply direct pressure over the wound. 

Tourniquet. Use a tourniquet only when direct pressure over the bleeding point and all other methods failed to control the bleeding. If you 

leave a tourniquet in place too long, the damage to the tissues can lead to 

gangrene and loss of the limb later. An improperly applied tourniquet 

can also cause permanent damage to the nerves and other tissues at the 

site on the constriction.
F-6

If you must use a tourniquet, place it around the extremity between the 

wound and the heart, 5 to 10 cms about the wound site. Never place it 

directly over the wound or fracture. Use a stick as a handle to tighten it 

only enough to stop the blood flow. When you have tightened the tourniquet, bind the free end of the stick to the limb to prevent unwinding. 

After you secure the tourniquet, clean and bandage the wound. 

SUCKING CHEST WOUND

1. Examine casualty and expose a large area around the wound. 

Remember to check for exit wound on opposite side. Cut away clothing, if necessary.

2. All penetrating chest wounds will be treated as sucking chest 

wounds.

NOTE: The characteristic hissing, sucking, and fluttering noise that is 

produced as the patient breathes may not be present.

3. A sucking chest wound must be closed immediately by any means 

available. Use the palm of your hand initially to seal the wound and 

prevent additional air from entering the chest (thoracic) cavity. The 

wound should be sealed after the patient forcibly exhales. Treatment 

should not be delayed to prepare dressings.

4. Prepare an air tight (occlusive) dressing of plastic. Sterility should 

be maintained to prevent further wound contamination. The rescuer 

might consider using the inside of the plastic wrappers from trauma 

pads, IV bags, or other medical supplies as these are relatively sterile. 

The occlusive dressing should be at least 2 inches wider than the diameter of the wound.

5. Cut plastic to required size. Place in palm of hand (clean side up) 

and apply directly to the wound. Secure three sides of the plastic to the 

patient with 3-inch adhesive tape. Have the patient forcibly exhale. At 

the end of the exhalation, seal the remaining side with adhesive tape. 

When sweating prevents maintaining a seal (i.e., tape does not stick to 

the patient) or if the wound is massive, trauma pads should be placed 

with cravats.
F-7

6. Have the casualty lie on the injured side to allow the lung on the 

uninjured side to expand more freely. Treat for shock and evacuate.

7. Reassess patient’s vital signs frequently (respiration rate and quality, 

breath sounds, blood pressure, and pulse).

8. Should the patient develop increasing respiratory difficulty and 

extreme restlessness and anxiety, air trapped in the chest cavity (tension 

pneumothorax) must be suspected. The signs of tension pneumothorax 

are:

a. Blueness of skin (cyanosis)

b. Tracheal deviation

c. Weak, rapid pulse

d. Decreased or lowered blood pressure (hypotension)

If tension pneumothorax is suspected, immediately lift on corner of the 

occlusive dressing to break the seal and allow the release of excessive 

air pressure from the thoracic cavity. The patient’s condition should 

improve as the pressure is released. The occlusive dressing should then 

be resealed after the patient forcibly exhales.

OTHER WOUNDS

Head. Elevate head. Clean the airway and protect wounded. Position 

head to allow drainage from mouth. Do not give morphine.

Jaw. Clean and maintain airway, stop bleeding with direct pressure, do 

not bandage mouth shut, support jaw, position head to allow drainage 

from mouth.

Belly. Do not touch or replace organs. Use loose, dry sterile dressing. 

Give no food or liquids.

SHOCK

Signs/Symptoms. Pale, clammy weak skin, nervousness and thirst. 

They may pass out.
F-8

First Aid

1. Lay patient on back, elevate feet, loosen clothing, keep warm.

2. Feed hot liquids if conscious.

3. Turn head to side if unconscious. Remember, shock can kill.

SPRAINS, FRACTURES, AND DISLOCATIONS

Signs/Symptoms. Localized pain and swelling possibly accompanied 

by discoloration. If a fractured bone protrudes through the surface of 

the skin, it is considered a compound fracture and the wound should be 

treated accordingly. Dislocations and fractures may exhibit obvious 

deformity.

First Aid

1. Remove clothing around the site of the affected area or dislocation. If 

necessary, cut clothing rather than causing further injury or discomfort.

2. Prior to and following splinting, check blood circulation and for 

feeling.

3. Splint all fractures in a manner which immobilizes both the joint 

above and the joint below the fracture site.

4. Fracture joints should gently be returned to splinting position if this 

can be accomplished without using excessive force or causing the 

patient to experience extreme pain.

5. Joints that cannot be gently returned to splinting position should be 

splinted in their current position.

6. Straighten fracture of a long bone with gentle traction prior to 

splinting.

7. Cover all open wounds with sterile dressings prior to application of a 

splint.

8. Pad all splints to prevent excessive pressure.

9. Immobilize fractures prior to evacuating.
F-9

10. Splint fractures of the lower arm with the hand in position of function.

11. Apply gentle traction while splinting.

12. Leave fingers and toes exposed if possible.

13. Splint should not impair circulation.

14. Elevate the extremity following immobilization, where possible.

15. Elevate the injury, and for sprains apply ice to the affected area periodically for approximately 24 to 48 hours following the injury.

16. For dislocations immobilize and apply ice to the affected area periodically for approximately 24 to 48 hours following the injury.

HOT WEATHER SURVIVAL

A key factor in hot weather survival is understanding the relationship 

between physical activity, air temperature, and water consumption. Your 

body’s normal temperature is 36.9 °C (98.6 °F). Your body gets rid of 

excess heat (cools off) by sweating, the principle cause of water loss. If 

a person stops sweating during periods of high air temperature and 

heavy work or exercise, he will quickly develop heat stroke. This is a 

medical emergency that requires immediate medical attention. The figure on page F-10 shows daily water requirements for various work 

levels.

Understanding how the air temperature and your physical activity affect 

your water requirements allows you to take measures to get the most 

from your water supply. These measures are —

■ Find shade. Get out of the sun.

■ Place something between you and the hot ground.

■ Limit your movements.

■ Conserve your sweat. Wear your complete uniform, to include your

T-shirt. Your clothing will absorb your sweat, keeping it against your

skin so that you gain its cooling effect.
F-10

A

B

C

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

DAILY MEAN AIR TEMPERATURE, DEGREES C

WATER REQUIREMENTS, LITERS

A: Hard work in sun (creeping and crawling with equipment on).

B: Moderate work in the sun (cleaning weapons and equipment).

C: Rest in shade.

This graph shows water needs, in liters per day, for men at three activity levels in 

relation to the daily mean air temperature. For example, if one is doing eight hours of 

hard work in the sun (curve A) when the average temperature for the day is 50 

degrees C (horizontal scale) one's water requirement for the day will be 

approximately 25 liters (vertical scale).
F-11

■ Do not allow your thirst to be a guide for your need for water. You

are already 2 percent dehydrated by the time you crave fluids. Drinking water at regular intervals helps your body remain cool and

decreases sweating. Conserve your fluids by reducing activity during

the heat of the day. 

HEAT INJURIES

Dehydration

Dehydration results from inadequate replacement of lost body fluids. A 

1-5 percent fluid loss results in thirst, vague discomfort, lack of appetite, 

flushed skin, irritability, and nausea. A 6-10 percent loss results in dizziness, headache, labored breathing, no salivation, indistinct speech, and 

inability to walk. An 11-20 percent loss results in delirium, swollen 

tongue, inability to swallow, dim vision, painful urination, and numbness. A greater than 20 percent fluid loss is usually fatal. Always drink 

adequate amounts of fluid. At the first signs of dehydration, get in the 

shade, keep cool, loosen clothes, and rest. Consume water with a little 

dissolved salt (a pinch per pint).

Heat Cramps

The loss of salt due to excessive sweating causes heat cramps. Symptoms are moderate to severe muscle cramps in legs, arms, and/or abdomen. These symptoms may start as a mild muscular discomfort. You 

should now stop all activity, get in the shade, and drink water. If you fail 

to recognize the early symptoms and continue your physical activity, 

you will have severe muscle cramps and pain. Treat as for heat exhaustion, below.

Heat Exhaustion

A large loss of body water and salt causes heat exhaustion. Symptoms 

are headache, mental confusion, irritability, excessive sweating, weakness, dizziness, cramps, and pale, moist, cold (clammy) skin. Immediately get the casualty under shade. Make them lie on a stretcher or 

similar item about 45 cm off the ground. Loosen their clothing, sprinkle 
F-12

with water, and fan the casualty. Have them drink small amounts of 

water every 3 minutes. Ensure they stay quiet and rest.

Heat Stroke

This is a severe heat injury caused by extreme loss of water and salt and 

the body’s inability to cool itself. The casualty may die if not cooled 

immediately. Symptoms are a lack of sweat, hot and dry skin, headache, 

dizziness, fast pulse, nausea and vomiting, and mental confusion leading 

to unconsciousness. Immediately get the casualty to shade. Loosen 

clothing and lay them on a stretcher or similar item 45 cm off the 

ground. Pour water on and fan them. Massage their arms, legs, and 

body. If the casualty regains consciousness, let them drink small 

amounts of water every 3 minutes. 

COLD WEATHER SURVIVAL

EFFECTS OF COLD

In extreme cold, a soldier can become numb and indifferent to nonessential tasks. Essential tasks require more time and effort. It has been 

repeatedly demonstrated that at temperatures lower than -10° F, all other 

problems lose significance in the personal battle for survival. The 

human body must be protected. To remain functional, it must be kept 

clean, dry, and reasonably warm, and normal body processes must be 

maintained. Rest and nourishment are vital. Remember four basic rules:

■ Keep in shape.

■ Drink plenty of water.

■ Eat to keep fit.

■ Maintain a positive attitude.

WINDCHILL

When a high wind is blowing, we feel much colder than when it is calm. 

Windchill is a measure of the combined effects of wind and temperature. To effectively gauge it, some scale must be used; the most commonly used is the windchill chart. The windchill chart (shown on page 
F-13

F-13) is a simple and practical guide showing when cold weather is dangerous and when exposed flesh is likely to freeze.

COLD WEATHER CLOTHING

Cold weather clothing systems use the design principles of insulate, 

layer, and ventilate. 

Insulation reduces the amount of body heat lost to the environment. By 

regulating the amount of insulation, you can regulate the amount of 

body heat lost. 

Layering Several layers of clothing provide more insulation and flexibility than one heavy garment, even if the heavy garment is as thick as 

the combined layers. The secret is dead air space between layers. The 

more dead air space, the greater the insulating value. Layers can be 

WIND SPEED

KNOTS MPH

CALM CALM

3 - 6 5

7 - 10 10

11 - 15

16 - 19

15

20

20 - 23 25

24 - 28 30

29 - 32 35

33 - 36 40

-60

-90

-105

-115

-125

-130

-135

-140

-55

-55

-80

-100

-110

-120

-125

-130

-130

-50

-50

-75

-90

-100

-110

-115

-120

-125

-45

-40

-65

-80

-85

-95

-100

-105

-110

-35

-45

-70

-85

-95

-105

-110

-115

-115

-40

-35

-60

-70

-80

-90

-95

-100

-100

-30

-30

-50

-65

-75

-80

-85

-90

-95

-25

-25

-45

-60

-65

-75

-80

-80

-85

-20

-20

-40

-50

-60

-65

-70

-75

-75

-15

-15

-35

-45

-50

-60

-65

-65

-70

-10

-10

-25

-40

-45

-50

-55

-60

-60

-5

-5

-20

-30

-35

-45

-50

-50

-55

0

0

-15

-25

-30

-35

-40

-40

-45

5

5

-10

-20

-25

-30

-30

-35

-35

10

10

0

-10

-15

-20

-25

-30

-30

15

15

5

-5

-10

-15

-20

-20

-20

20

20

10

0

0

-5

-10

-10

-10

25

25

15

10

5

0

0

-5

-5

30

30

20

15

10

10

5

5

0

35

35

30

25

20

15

10

10

10

40 -60

-70

-95

-110

-120

-135

-140

-145

-150

COOLING POWER OF WIND EXPRESSED AS "EQUIVALENT CHILL TEMPERATURE"

TEMPERATURE (oF)

EQUIVALENT CHILL TEMPERATURE

Winds Above

40 MPH Have

Little Additional Effect

LITTLE DANGER INCREASING DANGER

Flesh may freeze within 1 minute

GREAT DANGER

Flesh may freeze within 30 seconds

Windchill Chart
F-14

added as it gets colder and taken away as it warms up or as work 

increases. 

Ventilation helps maintain a comfortable body temperature by allowing 

the wearer to get rid of excess heat and body moisture. Ventilate either 

by opening the clothing or by removing insulating layers before you 

start to sweat.

Remember the acronym COLD to quickly check your adherence to the 

cold weather clothing principles; keep it Clean, avoid Overheating, 

wear it Loose and in layers, and keep it Dry (removing snow and frost 

before entering a shelter is particularly important in keeping clothing 

dry).

EFFECTS OF COLD WEATHER ON NOURISHMENT

Caloric Intake. A basic fact of cold weather operations is that soldiers 

must eat more than usual to function. In cold weather, the greater part 

of what you eat and drink maintains body heat, while a small proportion 

produces energy for physical work. Approximately 4,500 calories per 

day are necessary to do hard, continuous work. 

Fluids. The body loses liquid at an exceptional rate in arctic conditions 

due to evaporation, exertion, and low humidity. However carefully you 

adjust clothing and ventilation, the heavy exertion of movement on foot 

and preparation of bivouacs and defenses exacts its toll in sweat and loss 

of moisture in the breath. These liquids must be regularly replaced, 

preferably by hot drinks which, if they contain sugar, have the additional 

advantage of providing extra calories.

COLD INJURIES

The destructive influence of cold on the human body falls into two categories; non-freezing and freezing injuries.

Non-freezing Injuries 

Chilbains. This is a superficial tissue injury of the hands, ears or nose, 

which occurs after prolonged exposure of the bare skin to temperatures 

above freezing. It appears most often when high winds and high humidity accompany low but non-freezing temperatures. Symptoms include 

an initial pallor of the exposed areas. There will be redness, swelling, 
F-15

increased warmth, and a sensation of itching after rewarming. Superficial blisters or ulcers may appear with repeated episodes.

Treatment

■ In the initial stages, gradually rewarm exposed area(s) at room 

temperature.

■ If the face is involved, you may simply hold a warm hand to the area.

■ If the hands are affected, place them in the armpits or crotch.

■ If blisters form, gently cleanse the area and protect it to avoid 

infection.

Prevention

■ Avoid prolonged exposure to the elements.

■ Protect the obvious exposed areas with adequate clothing and

covering.

Trench Foot/Immersion Foot. Trench foot and immersion foot are 

injuries caused by the prolonged exposure of skin to cold water or 

dampness at temperatures usually ranging from just above freezing to 

50°F. In the early stages, the feet and toes are cold, numb, and stiff, and 

walking becomes difficult. The feet smell, swell, and become painful.

Treatment

■ Gentle drying, elevation, and exposure to temperatures of 64° to

72°F.

■ Bed rest, cleanliness, and pain relief.

Prevention

■ Change to dry socks three times daily or as often as necessary.

■ Use foot powder.

■ Wear VB boots.

■ If leather boots are worn, dry them whenever possible.

Hypothermia. Simply stated, hypothermia is a lowering of the temperature of the body’s inner core. This happens when the body loses heat 

faster than it can produce it. The potential for this condition will be 
F-16

increased in the presence of fatigue, inadequate hydration, poor nutrition, inadequate protective clothing, and cold water immersion. It must 

be remembered that freezing temperatures are not necessary to produce 

hypothermia. Wind, rain, and cold temperatures also cause loss of body 

heat which can result in hypothermia. Symptoms include uncontrollable shivering, trouble walking and poor coordination, difficulty speaking, sluggish thinking, disorientation, and an almost total disinterest in 

the surroundings. In later stages, shivering stops and is replaced by 

strong muscular rigidity. Exposed skin may become blue and puffy. 

When the casualty’s temperature drops below 86°F, cardiac irregularities occur.

Treatment

■ Prevent any further heat loss.

■ Get the casualty out of the wind and into the best available shelter.

■ Replace wet clothing with dry. Wrap casualty in warm blankets or in

a sleeping bag if one is available.

■ Place as much insulation as possible between the casualty and the

ground.

■ Add heat by the best available means to the casualty’s neck, groin,

and sides of the chest. CAUTION: Do not apply heat to extremities.

■ If the casualty is conscious, give him warm fluids. If able to eat, give

candy or sweetened foods.

■ If casualty is unconscious, he should be remain on his back, with

head tilted back to ensure open airway.

■ Do not massage the casualty.

■ Do not give alcohol to the casualty.

■ Get the casualty to medical help as quickly as possible.

Prevention

■ Stay physically fit.

■ Keep active.

■ Use the uniform properly and keep it dry.

■ Eat properly and often.
F-17

■ Drink plenty of fluids, at least 3.5 quarts per day when performing

hard work.

■ Be prepared for and know how to deal with rapid changes in weather.

■ Bivouac early before fatigue impairs judgement.

Dehydration. Dehydration is often an overlooked cold weather injury. 

See page F-11.

Prevention

■ The minimum daily fluid requirement for persons doing hard 

physical work in the cold is 3.5 quarts per day.

■ By the time you feel thirsty, you are already dehydrated. Drink

whenever you have a chance, particularly at halts during movement

on foot.

■ All canteens should be full before any type of movement during

which resupply will be difficult.

■ Do not drink coffee when water is scarce. It will pass through you

almost as fast as you drink it. Water should be your first choice.

■ Check urine spots in the snow. Dark yellow or brown indicates 

dehydration.

Carbon Monoxide Poisoning. Carbon monoxide (CO) is a deadly, 

odorless, colorless poison given off by stoves, lanterns, and engine 

exhaust. There are various symptoms including headache, dizziness, 

impaired vision, confusion, nausea, palpitations, weakness, and/or muscle pain. Bright red color appears on lips and skin. A casualty may 

become drowsy and collapse without warning.

Treatment

■ Move casualty to open air.

■ Keep casualty still and warm.

■ Administer mouth-to-mouth resuscitation if casualty is not breathing

or is breathing irregularly.

■ Administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation, if necessary.
F-18

■ MEDEVAC as soon as possible.

Prevention

■ Ensure that stoves and lanterns are functioning properly.

■ Use stoves and lanterns in well-ventilated areas.

■ Ensure that tents are well-ventilated.

■ Make sure vent holes are used in snow shelters.

■ Do not warm yourself by engine exhaust.

Snow Blindness. Snow blindness is a temporary visual disturbance 

caused by ultraviolet radiation reflected from the snow into the eyes. 

The danger of snow blindness is greater on a cloudy day than it is on a 

clear day because one does not have brightness as a warning. Symptoms appear 2 to 12 hours after exposure and includes a gritty and painful feeling in the eyes, tears flow excessively, headache, blurred vision 

and objects develop pinkish tinge.

Treatment

■ Rest in darkness.

■ Cover eyes with cool bandage.

■ Analgesics or sedatives.

■ The injury will usually heal itself from 1 to 5 days.

Wounds. In cold weather, casualties should be given first aid treatment, 

protected from the cold and shock effects, and evacuated to an aid station without delay. They should be placed in a casualty bag, sleeping 

bag, or the best available substitute. Remember also that wounds bleed 

easily because the low temperature keeps blood from clotting. 

Increased bleeding increases the likelihood of shock.

Wounds open to weather freeze quickly. The body loses heat in the area 

around the injury, as blood soaks the skin around the wound, and clothing is usually torn. Therefore, early first aid treatment becomes even 

more important at low temperatures.

Shock. Shock is caused by reduction of the effective circulating blood 

volume. Shock can be caused by severe injuries, loss of blood, pain, and 
F-19

many other factors. The normal reaction of the body to severe cold is 

very similar to its reaction to shock. Therefore, shock usually develops 

more rapidly and progresses more deeply in extreme cold than in 

warmer temperatures. Symptoms include apprehension, sweating, pallor, rapid/faint pulse, cold/clammy skin, and thirst.

Treatment

■ Reassure the casualty. Pain can be reduced with proper positioning,

good bandaging, and splinting.

■ Position the stretcher so that the casualty’s head and chest is lower

than his lower body and legs. About a 1-foot difference is right. Do

not do this if it will cause discomfort to the casualty.

■ Keep the casualty warm. Normal temperature is best.

■ Do not move the casualty any more than necessary. This does not

mean movement over distance, but moving a casualty from one

stretcher to another, unnecessary lifting or turning over when bandaging or splinting, or moving a casualty from a sleeping bag into a

casualty bag, etc.

■ Loosen the clothing at the neck, chest, and waist, weather permitting.

■ If the casualty is conscious, give sips of warm soup, tea, cocoa, coffee, or another available liquid, but not alcohol.

■ The casualty should receive medical attention as soon as possible.

Freezing Injury (Frostbite)

Frostbite is the injury of tissue caused by exposure to freezing temperatures. Frostbite can cause the loss of limbs or other serious, permanent 

injury. It is the most common injury and is almost always preventable. 

It seldom occurs in individuals who maintain adequate heat production. 

Frostbite is most commonly associated with an overall body heat deficit 

resulting from inadequate equipment, lack of food, lack of water, 

exhaustion, injury, or a combination of such factors. The feet are most 

vulnerable to serious frostbite and must receive constant attention.

Superficial Frostbite. This injury involves only the skin or the tissue 

immediately beneath it. There is a certain amount of whiteness or a 

waxy appearance around the affected area. Frost nip, a superficial frost-
F-20

bite which usually affects the nose, face or ears, appears as a small patch 

of white on the skin.

After rewarming, the frostbitten area will first be numb, mottled blue or 

purple, and then will swell, sting, and burn for some time. In more 

severe cases, blisters will occur within 24 to 36 hours beneath the outer 

layer of the skin. These will slowly dry up and become hard and black 

in about 2 weeks. Generally, swelling of the injured area will subside if 

the casualty stays in bed or at complete rest. It will last much longer if 

the casualty refuses to cooperate. Throbbing, aching, and burning of the 

injured part may persist for several weeks, depending on the severity of 

the exposure. After the swelling finally disappears, the skin will peel 

and remain red, tender, and extremely sensitive to even mild cold, and it 

may perspire abnormally for a long time. 

Deep Frostbite. This is a much more serious injury. Its damage not 

only involves the skin and the tissue immediately beneath it, but also 

affects the deep tissue (including the bone). It is usually accompanied 

by large blisters. In marked contrast to superficial frostbite, these blisters take from 3 days to a week to develop. Swelling of the entire hand 

or foot will take place and may last for a month or more. During this 

period of swelling, there may be marked limitation of mobility of the 

injured area(s), and blue, violet, or gray (the worst) discoloration takes 

place after the first 2 days. Aching, throbbing, and shooting pains may 

be experienced for as long as 2 to 8 weeks.

Treatment

■ For frost nip on the face, place a hand or warm piece of clothing over

the affected area. DO NOT RUB.

■ Cold hands can be rewarmed by placing them in the casualty’s armpits or crotch. Cold feet can be placed against another person’s stomach.

■ Remove wet or constricting clothing, and protect the extremity from

further injury with blankets or any other dry material.

■ Smoking, drinking alcohol, and/or applying salves or ointments are

strictly forbidden.

■ For anything other than superficial frostbite, place the casualty in a

shelter to prevent further injury. No attempt should be made to thaw
F-21

the frozen part - MEDEVAC immediately. If thawing has occurred,

the casualty should be considered a litter patient.

■ Follow the 15-minute rule: If the extremities can not be rewarmed

within 15 minutes (i.e., capillaries refill, feeling returns, toes and fingers begin to move), the casualty must be treated as a deep frostbite

casualty. Evacuate the casualty, taking care to keep the affected

part(s) warm as warming was started during the 15-minute effort.
G-1

APPENDIX G: 

International Telephone Codes

International Telephone Codes

Algeria

Australia

Austria

Bahrain

Belgium

Brazil

Canada

China

Cyprus

Denmark

Djibouti

Egypt

Ethiopia

Finland

France

Gabon

Germany

Greece

Hawaii

Hong Kong

Iran

Iraq

Ireland

Israel

Ivory Coast

Japan

Jordan

Kenya

Kuwait

Libya

Madagascar

Malta

213

61

43

973

32

55

1

86

357

45

253

20

251

358

33

241

49

30

1

852

98

964

353

972

225

81

962

254

965

218

261

356

Mexico

Morocco

Netherlands

Nigeria

New Zealand

Norway

Oman

Portugal

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Seychelles

Somalia

South Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Syria

Taiwan

Tanzania

Tunisia

Turkey

UAE

United Kingdom

United States

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

AT&T

MCI

Sprint

52

212

31

234

64

47

968

351

974

966

221

248

252

27

34

46

41

963

886

255

216

90

971

44

1

967

260

263

1721011

1721022

172
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY