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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 17 5- CV Be lo Be njamin WRIG HT , Appellant
v . Susan Oliver WR

IG HT , Appellee Fr om the 81st J udicial District Court, Atascosa County , Texas Trial Court No. 07-04-0275- CVA Honora ble Donna S. Ray es, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Febr uary 11, 2009 AFF I RMED Th is i s an a

pp e a l f ro m a fi na l di vo rc e de c re e . O n a pp e a l, a pp e lla nt, B e lo B e nja

min Wri g ht, argues the trial c ourt erred in: (1) e nforc ing a settlement ag ree ment that was not prope rly filed pursuant to Rule 11; (2) e nteringan agree d judgme nt b ec au se B elo re pudiated the se ttlement ag ree ment prior to the re ndition of judgm en t ; and (3) signinga fina l divorce de cre e base d on a
se ttl e me n t a g r e e m e n t t h a t w a s i n d e f i n i t e an d d i d n o t f

i n a l l y d i s p o s e o f a l l th e i s s u e s . B e lo a lso
asser ts the evidenc e is leg ally

insufficient to support the division of proper ty . We affir

m.04
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND On April 12, 2007, Susan Oliver Wrig ht filed an orig inal petition f or divorce from B elo. On J une 28, 2007, B elo and Susan infor med the trial c ourt that they wer e conf

err ing to ne g otiate a settlement ag ree ment. After confe rring , both parties a ppear ed bef

ore the trial court. Susan testified that sh e and B e lo ha d en te re d into a se ttl e me nt agre e me nt, wh ic h wa s sig ne d an d exec ute d b y bo th parties a nd their re spective c ounsel. Susan prese nted the trial court with a copy of the ha ndwritten ag ree ment alongwith evidence relating to the se ttlement ag ree ment. Th e t rial cour t gr anted the d iv o r c e an d f

o u n d th a t th e s e tt le me n t a g r e e me n t c o n ta in e d a f a ir , ju s t, an d e qu it a

b le division of p ro p er t y . At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the trial court state d, “[t] he Court appr oves that ag ree ment and makes it the order of the C ourt.” Susan’s counsel then informed the trial court that he would re fer

to the settlement ag ree ment in the decr ee a nd submit a jointly

signe d decr ee. T he trial
c ourt g ave the pa

rt ie s a re se t date fo r the e ntr

y of the de c re e , but no te d n e ith e r p art y wo uld ne e d to appea r if the de cre e had a lrea dy been c irculate d and sig ned by the trial cour

t. On Octobe r 2, 2007, the pa rties re turned to court on Susan’s motion to enter a f inal divorce d e c r e e p u r s u an tt o t h e s e t t l e m e n ta g r e e m e n t
. B e l o , w h o w a s n o w r e p r e s e n t e d b y a n e w a t t o r

n e y, filed an objection to the entry of the decr ee, seeking to w ithdraw his c onsent to th e s et t lement
a g re e me nt. B e lo fu

rt he r ob je c te d to the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingtha t th e pr op e rt

y div isi on wa s f a ir , ju st, and rig ht , as s er t ing the trial court ha d hear d no evidenc e conc erningthe estate and the se ttlement ag ree ment left issues re g ardingcommunity reimburse ment and ec onomic contribution unresolved. The trial c ourt found that Be lo ha d not r epudiated the settlement ag ree ment prior to the re ndition of the divorce decr ee, the decr ee comported with the parties’ ag ree ment, and the se ttlement ag ree ment contained a

fair, just, and r ight division of prope rty . Th e trial c ourt then sig ned the f inal decr ee.04
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- 3- R U LE 11: F ILI N G O F A GR EEM ENT I n his first issue on appea l, Bel o ar gu es the trial cour t erre d by enfor cingthe settlement
a g re e me nt b e c a

us e the se ttl e men t agreement ha d n ot b e e n p ro pe rl y fi le d w iththe tr ia l c ourt in
acc ordanc e with Rule 11 of the Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure. T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 1. B e lo a sse rt s that althoug h the trial court approve d the settlement ag ree ment during the J une h ea ri n g, t he settlement ag ree ment was not f iled until seve ral months late r as an attachme nt to the divorce decr ee. To be enfor cea

ble, settlement ag ree ments must c omply with Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e. Padilla v. LaFrance , 907 S.W .2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995)
. The purpose of Rule 11 i s t o p revent future misunder standing s and controve rsies betwe en par ties reg ardinga settlement ag ree ment. Se e id . Under Rule 11, an agree ment betwee n parties must be in writing , signe d, and filed as pa rt of the r ecor d unless the s ettlement agr eeme nt is made in open court and e ntere d into the
rec ord. T EX . R. C IV . P. 11. Whil e Rule 11 require s settlement ag ree ments to be filed “as part of the
rec o rd , ” it does not specify when the se ttlement ag ree ment must be filed. Padilla, 907 S.W .2d at 461. “[S] o l o n g as the a g ree ment is filed befor e it is sought to be e nforc ed[,] ” the pur pose of the filing r equir em en t is satisfied. Id. (stating that the purpose of the filing require ment is to put t he parties’ ag ree ment befor e the tria l court so that it may judge the settlement agree ment’s meaningand p ar t i es ’ i n t en t i o n s an d s a f e l y a c t u p o nth e s et t l em en tagr ee m en t ) ( ci t i n g Birdwell v. Cox , 1 8 T e x. 535, 537 (1857))
. Her e, Susan met the purpose of Rule 11’s filing re q u i rement by filing the settlement ag ree ment with the final dec ree of divorce . Although B elo ar g ues that Susan was require d to file the settlement ag ree ment during the J une hea ring , the par

ties only soug ht approva l of the settlement ag ree ment at the June hearing , and neither party was see kin g to enforc e the se ttlement ag ree ment04
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- 4- by disputing its terms at that time. See A lcantar v. Oklahoma Nat’l Bank , 4 7 S. W. 3 d 8 1 5 , 8 1 9 ( T e x. App.—For

t Worth 2001, no pet.). Contrary to Be lo’s argument, Rule 11 does not require a wr iting to be filed with the trial c ourt befor e a pa rty withdraws consent; Rule 11 only require s a writingbe filed bef ore it is soug ht to be enfor ced. Pa dil la , 907 S.W .2d at 461-62
. By fi l i ng the settlement ag ree ment befor e she soug ht to enforc e it and while the trial court maintained plena ry power , Susan proper ly satisfied Rule 11’s filing require ment. See id. a t 46 1; se e als o In reMa rri age of R aff ae lli , 975 S.W .2d 660, 661 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana 1998, pet. denied)
. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule B elo’s first issue on appe al. W ITH D R A W A L O F C ONS E NT I n his se cond is sue, B elo ar g ues the trial c ourt err ed by enter ing a

judgme nt in accor dance with the settlement ag ree ment beca use he ha d repudiated the settlement a g reem en t prior to the court’s r endition of judgme nt. Be lo a rgues that while the trial court may have or ally

approve d the settlement ag ree ment at the end of the J une hear ing, mere approva l of the settlement agree ment does not constitute rendition of judg ment. Be lo al s o points out t hat the trial c ourt did not sign the settlement ag ree ment duringthe J une hea ring
. Acc ording ly , Be lo contends the court did not rende r judgme nt at the J une hear ing, and, there fore , the decr ee could not be enter ed in ac corda nce w ith the settlement ag ree ment at the Oc tober he aring because he ef fec tively withdrew his conse nt to the settlement ag ree ment prior to re ndition of judgment. “A judg ment routinely

g oes throug h three stag es: (1) r endition, (2) sig ning, a nd (3) e ntry .” W ittau v . S tor ie , 1 45 S.W. 3d

73 2, 73 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 4, no pe t.) . Ajud g me nt i s rende red when the tria l court off icially announce s its de ci s i o n i n open cour t or by written memorandum filed w ith the clerk. S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal , 892 S.W .2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995) (per04
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- 5- curiam). Whil e spec ific words of oral rendition are not require d by Texas law, the words st ated by the trial cour

t must clearly i n d icate the court’s intent to re nder judg ment at the time the cour t expresses the wor ds. Id. a t 85 8; Batchelor v. Batchelor , No. 04-06-00865- CV, 2007 WL 4320742,
a t *1 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio De c . 1 2, 20 07 , n o p e t.) (m e m. o p. ); GolodetzTrading Corp. v. Curland , 886 S.W .2d 503, 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). “O nce a judgme nt is render ed by

the trial cour

t, the entry

of judg ment is purely

a ministerial ac t.” Batchelor , 2 0 0 7 WL 43 20 74 2, a t *1 ; see also W ittau , 145 S.W .3d at 735; Golodetz Trading , 886 S.W .2d at 505. Ba sed on the languag e used by the trial cour

t, we hold the cour

t orally rende red judg ment at the e nd of the June he ari ng . T he re c or d s ho ws the c ourt no t on ly e xpressl y app ro ve d th e pa rt ie s’
se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, but a lso ma de the a pp ro va l of the se ttl e me nt agre e me nt the or de r o f t he c ourt
. When the trial court state d, “[t] he Cou rt ap p ro ves that agree ment and make s it the order of the Court[ ,]” the court cle arly articulated its intent to render judg ment on the sett l ement agr eeme nt at the time it ex presse d these wor ds. See S & A Rest. Corp. , 892 S.W .2d at 857-58. The trial court’ s word c hoice de monstrates its present intent to make a decision upon the issues before it, and constitutes a re ndition of judgment. See Batchelor , 2 0 0 7 W L4 3 2 0 7 4 2 , at* 1 (c i t i n g Re esev . P ipe ri , 53 4 S. W.2 d 3 29 , 3 30 (T e x. 19 76 )) ; see also W ittau , 1 45 S.W. 3d a t 73 5. On c e the tr ia l c ourt or a lly rende red judg ment, the judg ment beca me ef fec tive immediately , and the subseque nt signingand entry of the judg ment wer e only minist eria l acts. See W

ittau , 145 S.W .3d at 735. B e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u rte xp r e s s e d a c l e ar i n t e n t i o nt o r e n d e r

j u d g m e n to nth e p art i e s’ settlement ag ree ment at the conclusion of the J une hear ing, w e conc lude B elo’s attempt to withdraw his consent to the settlement ag ree ment in October was too late. O nce the trial court or ally rende red judgme nt on the settlement ag ree ment, Be lo could not revoke his co n s en t t o the settlement04
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- 6- ag ree ment. See S &

A Rest. Corp. , 892 S. W
. 2 d at 857. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule B elo’s sec ond issue. I NDE F I NI T E AND I N C OM PL ETE A GR EEM ENT I n his third issue on appea l, Be lo argues t he trial c ourt err ed by signinga fina l divorce de cre e based on the settlement ag ree ment beca use the s et t l em ent agr eeme nt was indefinite a nd did not finally dispose of all the i ssues. Be lo primarily relies on the foll owing notation on an exhibit to the
s e t t l e m e n ta g r e e m e n tc o n t a i n i n g a l i s to f p e r s o n a l p r o p e rty: “ [ R ] e m e mb e r , th i s i s a l l b y m e m o r y, may be more , but can’ t rec all at this tim e[
. ] 6-28-07 B elo Wright 3:30 Am.” B elo ar g ues the
no tatio n, sp e c if

ic a lly th e ph ra se “ may

be mor e ,” make s th e de sc ri pti on of the mari ta l pr op e rt

y
uncer tain and incomplete. A s a re sult, Belo conte nds the divorce decr ee inc orporates an ambiguous and uncle ar a g ree ment on t h e proper ty division which should have bee n disreg arde d by the trial court. We a

pply the rules of contra ct law whe n interpre ting the la ng uag e of a

proper ty settlement ag ree ment that is incorp o ra t ed i n t o a divorc e dec ree . Buys v. B uys , 9 2 4 S. W. 2 d 3 6 9 , 3 7 2 ( T e x. 1996). I n construing a contra ct to de termine the parties’ intentions, we examine the entire writing in order to harmonize and give effe ct t o eac h of its provisions. Coker v. Cok er , 650 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). I f an a g ree ment is “so worde d that it can be g iven a certa in or definite leg al meaning or interpr etation, then it is not ambig uous and the c ourt will construe the c ontrac t as a matter of law.” Id
. I n this case, the notation “may be more ” by

Be lo at the end of

Ex hibit B does not re nder the
se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt ambi g uo us or inc omp le te
. Whil e the se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt r e fe rs to E xhibi t B , w hic h c on ta ins the a lle g e d amb iguo us phra se , the a g re e me nt al so sp e c if ie s th a t, “ [e]a c h p art

y is04
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- 7- awa rded pro p e rty

in th e ir p o s s e s s io nw it

ha ll a tt e n d an t d e b t w it

hth e e xc e p ti o no f

th e u n c h e c k ed items on the list attached as Exhibit B, which ar e aw arde d to Wi fe.” After examining the settlement ag ree ment in its entirety , it is clear that the se t t l em en t agre ement unambiguously awa rds unlisted items to the party

in possession; therefor e, the se ttlement agree ment clea rly disposes of all the marital proper

ty , including proper

ty not spe cifica lly listed on Ex hibit B. See id. Acc ording ly , we
overr ule B elo’s third issue.

F A IR , J U ST , AND E QU I TABLE D IVISI O N O F P ROP E RT Y I n his final issue on appea l, Be lo argues the trial c ourt abused its discre tion beca use the evidenc e was leg ally insufficient to suppor t the court’s finding that the settlement ag ree ment was
a fair, just, a

nd equitable division of proper ty
. Acc ording to Be lo, during the J une hea ring , the trial court did not hea

r any testimo n y re gar d i n g whether the settlement ag ree ment was fa ir, just, or equitable. At the s econd hear ing, the trial court heard testimony from only

Be lo, who testified that the pr o p er t y d i v ision in t he settlement a g ree ment was ne ither fa ir nor just. Be lo argues the trial court’s e x press finding that the division of proper ty was fair, just, a

nd equitable is not supported by the evidenc e, and, the ref

ore, the trial court a

bused its discretion. Although B elo pre sents his argument as a le g al suffic iency challeng e, we revie w a tria l court’s c ommunity

proper ty division order under

an abuse of di scre tion standard. Moroch v . Colli ns , 17 4 S. W.3 d 849 , 857 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 200 5, pe t. d e nie d) . Wh ile the le g a l su ff ic ie nc y and a bu se of discre tion standards over lap, leg al suffic iency is not an independent ground for reve rsible er ror, but in ste a d c on sti tut e s a

re le va nt f a c tor in o ur de te rmin ati on of wheth e r t he tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s discretion. Id. (c i t i n g Boyd v . Boyd , 131 S.W .3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2004, no pet.)). A t rial court has wide discretion when dividing the community proper ty estate in a

manner that the04
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1 ... U nd er th e te rm s o f t he set t l em ent agreem ent , Susan was awarde d t he m ari t al res i d ence, a 1 9 9 8 Fo rd Expe di t i on , $5, 250. 00 f r om t h e s al e of a di s man t l er , on e ca l f , an d h er r et i r eme n t a cc ou n t , a n d B el o w as a wa r ded a 2001 C hevrolet pick- up t ruck, $2 0 , 0 0 0 f rom t wo C D acco unt s, $ 9 , 0 0 0 f rom t wo saf

es, a si xt een f

o o t t rai l er, t wo co ws and o ne cal f , and t he A b und ant P al l et C o m p any, i ncl ud i ng m achi nery such as a shop c o m p res sor, fl o o r j ack, and s ho p f an. I n i t ems f our t een an d f

i f t een , wh i ch r ef

er t o E xh i bi t s A and B , t he s et t l ement ag r eement al s o awar ds Sus an t he part i es ’ t ot al ma r i t a l c r e d i t c a r d , h o m e e q u i t y , a n d m e d i c a l i n d e b t e d n e s s , a n d a w a r d s Be l o a l l t h e c h e c k e d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i t e ms listed in E x h ib it B
.

- 8- trial court

d e e ms “ ju s t a n d r igh t, ” an d

w e w il l p r e s u me th e tr ia l c o urt e xe r c is e d it s d is c r e ti on proper ly
. Mu rff

v . M ur ff , 615 S.W .2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981). Wit h respe ct to a trial c ourt’s re solution of fa c tua l issu e s with in its dis c re tio n, we may no t subs tit ute our jud g me nt fo r t

hat of the tr ia l c ourt
. See W alker v . Pack

er , 8 27 S.W. 2d 83 3, 83 9 (T e x. 19 92 ). To pr e va il o n a pp e a l, t he a pp e lla nt m us t show that the trial court could have r easona bly rea ched only

one dec ision. Id . at 840. Even if w e might have decide d the issue diffe rently , we will not disturb the trial co u rt ’s decision on appe al unless it is shown to be arbitrar y and unre asonable
. Id
. After revie wi ng the evidenc e, we hold that the trial court’ s finding that the division of proper ty was fa ir, just, and equitable was not arbitrary or unre asonable
. Se e Mu rff , 615 S.W .2d at 699. Duringthe J une hea ring , Susan prese nted the trial c ourt with a copy of a sig ned settlement ag ree ment along with supporting exhi bits. In fiftee n listed points, the property settlement ag ree ment divides both community

proper ty assets and debts betwee n Susan and B elo. 1 Susan testified that the settlement ag ree ment was ne g otiated by the par ties’ attorne y s and eve ryone sig ned it. Be fore approvingthe settlement ag ree ment , the trial cour t specifica lly

a sked B elo’s attorne y

whether he had any questions reg ardingthe settlement agr eeme nt and divorce, and Be lo’s attorney stated he ha d no quest io n s an d

w a s “ [j ]u s t a s k in g f

o r e n tr y o f th e s e tt le me n t a g r e e me n t. ” B a s e d o nth e signe d
a g r e e m e n t , a c c o mp an yi n g e x h i b i t s , S u s an ’ s t e s t i m o n y, an d th e s t a t e m e n tm a d e b y B e l o ’ s a t t o r n e y,04
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- 9- we c annot conc lude that the trial court’s decision wa s arbitra ry or unre asonable
. Se e W

alk e r, 827 S.W .2d at 840. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule B elo’s fina l issue on appea l.

C ONCL US I ON Ba sed on the for eg oing r easons, we aff irm the trial cour

t’s judgme nt.
Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice