In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-14-00191-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF S.R., A CHILD 

 

 

07-14-00192-CV 

 

IN THE INTEREST OF Z.C., A CHILD 

 

 

07-14-00215-CV 

 

IN THE INTEREST OF Z.H., A CHILD 

 

On Appeal from the 108th District Court 

Potter County, Texas 

Trial Court Nos. 83,645-E, 83,829-E, 83,659-E, 

Honorable Douglas Woodburn, Presiding 

 

October 6, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

In this accelerated appeal, Natasha contests the trial court’s termination of her 

parental rights to her children, S.R., Z.C., and Z.H. Natasha contests the legal and 

factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s order for termination as to 
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any of the predicate events pleaded by the Texas Department of Family and Protective 

Services. See TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 161.001(1) (West 2014).1 The trial court 

terminated Natasha’s parental rights to S.R. and Z.H. under section 161.001(1)(D), (E), 

(N), and (O). See § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (N), & (O). The trial court terminated Natasha’s 

rights to Z.C. under section 161.001(1)(E), (N), and (O). See § 161.001(1)(E), (N), &

(O). Further, Natasha contests the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights as to each 

child was in that child’s best interest. See § 161.001(2). We will affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Department began its involvement with Natasha on March 11, 2013, when it 

removed her eleven-year-old daughter, S.R., from her care as a result of an incident 

involving a physical altercation between S.R. and Natasha. S.R. told investigators that 

Natasha punched her in the face. Natasha contended that S.R. suffered a bloody nose 

when Natasha attempted to hold S.R. down on the ground. As a result of the incident, 

law enforcement attempted to place S.R. in a psychiatric hospital, the Pavillion. 

However, Natasha refused to admit S.R. to the facility. Further, at that time, Natasha 

stated that she was not willing to take care of S.R.

Shortly after the incident with S.R., on March 13, 2013, Natasha was observed 

choking Z.H. and swinging her around by the neck. At the time of this incident, Z.H. 

 

1

Further reference to the Texas Family Code will be by reference to “§ ____” or “section ____.” 
3

was fifteen months old. After law enforcement got Z.H. away from her, Natasha was 

placed in the Pavillion and Z.H. was taken into protective custody by the Department.

Z.C. was born in an ambulance on the way to the hospital. Shortly thereafter, on 

April 29, 2013, the Department took custody of Z.C. According to the record, Natasha 

did not receive any prenatal care during her pregnancy with Z.C. and, subsequently, left 

the hospital without giving the child a name.

After the suits to terminate her parental rights were filed, Natasha had no contact 

with the children. The record reflects that she never exercised any visitation nor did she 

contact the Department in an effort to establish any visitation with the children. The 

record before this Court establishes that the Department had a family service plan in 

effect for each of the children. Testimony at trial established that Natasha’s former 

caseworker attempted to visit with Natasha about the family service plan while Natasha 

was incarcerated in the Potter County Jail, however; Natasha refused to meet with or 

see the caseworker. 

Further, since the filing of the suits to terminate her parental rights, Natasha has 

been incarcerated on one occasion, received residential treatment for a mental illness at 

the Pavillion, and was placed in the state psychiatric hospital due to her behavior while 

incarcerated at the Potter County Jail. When directly questioned about Natasha’s 

mental capabilities to take care of the children, the caseworker, Kimberly Soliz, stated 

that she did not think Natasha was mentally capable to take care of the children. 

Regarding the effort the Department made to work services with Natasha, Soliz testified 

as to all the attempts that had been made to contact her since her release from the 
4

state hospital. Despite the efforts of the Department, Soliz had never been able to 

contact or locate Natasha. Prior to the hearing beginning, Natasha’s appointed counsel 

listed all of the steps he had taken in an effort to contact Natasha. Like the Department, 

all efforts were unsuccessful. 

Two of the children, Z.H. and Z.C., are currently in foster care together. The 

testimony reflects that they have bonded with their foster parents, are happy, and that 

their individual conditions have markedly improved since they were placed in foster 

care. Soliz testified that the foster parents are interested in adopting Z.H. and Z.C. 

S.R. is currently in a residential treatment facility receiving treatment for mental 

health and behavioral issues. S.R. has not really improved according to the testimony 

of Soliz. The long-term plans for S.R. are to relocate her to a more appropriate 

residential treatment facility with the goal of making a fictive kin placement. 

Soliz testified that, after reviewing the files for all of the children, it was her 

opinion that termination of Natasha’s parental rights was in the best interest of each 

child. To support her conclusion, Soliz cited the court to the following: 1) in the year 

since termination, Natasha has completed no services; 2) Natasha has failed to even 

request visitation with the children during the entire period of the pendency of the cases; 

3) Natasha has failed to maintain contact with the Department; and 4) the children need 

to move forward with a goal toward a permanent placement. 

At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court ordered the parental rights of 

Natasha terminated as to each child. As pertains to S.R. and Z.H., the trial court 

terminated Natasha’s parental rights pursuant to subsections (D), (E), (N), and (O) of 
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section 161.001(1). See § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (N), & (O). As to Z.C., the trial court 

terminated Natasha’s parental rights pursuant to subsections (E), (N), and (O) of section 

161.001(1). See § 161.001(1)(E), (N), & (O). 

Natasha has perfected her appeal and, through multiple issues, attacks the legal 

and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of the trial court that 

Natasha committed a predicate event that would support termination of her parental 

rights. Further, Natasha contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient 

to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Natasha’s parental rights was in the 

best interest of each child. Disagreeing with Natasha, we will affirm the judgment of the 

trial court.

Standard of Review

The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional 

dimensions. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); see Santosky v. Kramer, 

455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). A decree terminating 

this natural right is complete, final, irrevocable, and divests for all time that natural right 

as well as all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers between the parent and child 

except for the child’s right to inherit. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. That being so, we are 

required to strictly scrutinize termination proceedings. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 

(Tex. 1980). However, parental rights are not absolute, and the emotional and physical 

interests of a child must not be sacrificed merely to preserve those rights. In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).
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The Texas Family Code permits a court to terminate the parent-child relationship 

if the petitioner establishes both: (1) one or more acts or omissions enumerated under 

section 161.001(1); and (2) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best 

interest of the child. § 161.001. Though evidence may be relevant to both elements, 

each element must be proved, and proof of one does not relieve the burden of proving 

the other. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. While both a statutory ground and best 

interest of the child must be proved, only one statutory ground is required to terminate 

parental rights under section 161.001. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 

2003). Therefore, we will affirm the trial court’s order of termination if legally and 

factually sufficient evidence supports any one of the grounds found in the termination 

order, provided the record shows that it was also in the best interest of the child for the 

parent’s rights to be terminated. See id.

Due process requires the application of the clear and convincing standard of 

proof in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. In re J.F.C., 96 

S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see § 161.206(a) (West 2014). “‘Clear and convincing 

evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the 

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be 

established.” § 101.007 (West 2014). This standard, which focuses on whether a 

reasonable jury could form a firm belief or conviction, retains the deference a reviewing 

court must have for the factfinder’s role. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order terminating 

parental rights, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to 

determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or 
7

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. See In re J.F.C.,

96 S.W.3d at 266. “To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and 

the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the 

factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could 

do so.” Id. In other words, we will disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder 

could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id.

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a termination 

order, we determine “whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably 

form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the [Department]’s allegations.” In re 

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. In conducting this review, we consider whether the disputed 

evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved the disputed 

evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “If, in light of the entire 

record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in 

favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a 

firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.

Analysis

Predicate Act or Omission

We first turn our attention to the allegation that Natasha knowingly placed or 

knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger 

the physical or emotional well-being of the child, § 161.001(1)(D), and that she engaged 

in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which 
8

endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children, § 161.001(1)(E). For 

purposes of analysis of the facts, “endanger” means to expose to loss or injury; to 

jeopardize. See In re B.P., No. 07-14-00037-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8127, at *11 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo July 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 

268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam)). It is not necessary that the conduct be directed at 

the children or that the children actually suffer injury, or even that the conduct 

constitutes a concrete threat of injury. See id. Further, subsection 161.001(1)(D) 

permits termination for a single act or omission. See A.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & 

Protective Servs., 394 S.W.3d 703, 713 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (citing In re 

R.D., 955 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. denied)). Subsection 

(E) requires evidence of more than a single act, instead there must be clear and 

convincing evidence of a deliberate or conscious course of conduct. See id. (citing In re 

K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.)). Abuse of a child by a 

parent can be used to support a finding of endangerment, even for a child not yet born 

at the time of the abuse. See In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d 763, 770 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

2012, no pet.). A parent’s mental state may be considered in determining whether a 

child is endangered if that mental state allows the parent to engage in conduct that 

jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of the child. In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 

732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). Further, the lack of visitation by a 

parent can emotionally endanger a child’s well-being, supporting termination under 

subsection 161.001(1)(E). See In re R.M., No. 07-12-00412-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 

10239, at *13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 11, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
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From the record we have learned that, on March 11, 2013, Natasha had a 

physical altercation with S.R., who was eleven years old at the time and, as a result of 

this altercation, S.R. suffered a bloody nose. S.R. told the police that her mother, 

Natasha, struck her in the face. When confronted with S.R.’s bloody nose, Natasha 

stated she did not strike S.R. but rather S.R.’s nose was bloodied when Natasha 

attempted to hold her down on the ground. However, at the same time, Natasha 

refused to allow S.R. to be placed in the Pavillion to treat any mental illness that she 

might be suffering. Additionally, at that same time, Natasha advised police and 

Department personnel that she no longer wanted to be responsible for S.R.’s care.

Two days following the incident with S.R., on March 13, 2013, Natasha was 

observed at Northwest Texas Hospital choking Z.H. and swinging her around. The 

record establishes that it took a number of police officers to get Natasha’s hands off the 

child’s neck and to subsequently restrain her. Natasha’s actions suggest she was 

under the influence of drugs at the time of the incident.

Z.C. was taken into custody by the Department upon birth. Natasha has had 

virtually no contact with the child since very shortly after his birth. At the time Natasha 

left the hospital, she had not bothered to name the child. Nor has she ever attempted to 

visit with the child. In short, Natasha has demonstrated a complete disregard for the 

child.

Since S.R., Z.H., and Z.C, have come into the custody of the Department, 

Natasha has not visited them. Neither has Natasha attempted to comply with any of the 

requirements for obtaining the children back into her custody. In fact, Natasha has not 
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maintained any contact with the Department. From these facts, we must determine if a 

reasonable juror could form a firm conviction or belief that the Department had proved 

the predicate acts alleged. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. It has been 

demonstrated that Natasha has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to 

remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional wellbeing of the child. See § 161.001(D). Natasha’s conduct toward her children as 

reflected by her actions directed toward S.R. and Z.H. provide the proof of this predicate 

event, more especially, when viewed in the light most favorable to the finding of the trier 

of fact, as we must in a review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See In re J.F.C.,

96 S.W.3d at 266. She engaged in assaultive conduct to two of the children, see In re 

I.G., 383 S.W.3d at 770, has refused services, has not visited with the children since 

these proceedings began, see In re R.M., 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10239, at *13, and has 

had a very unstable mental history and lifestyle, see In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739. 

This assaultive conduct supports the termination of her rights to the child born shortly 

after the incidents of assault. See In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d at 770. Further, our review of 

the evidence regarding the subsection (E) predicate events establishes, by clear and 

convincing evidence, a course of conduct engaged in by Natasha which endangers the 

physical or emotional well-being of the children. § 161.001(1)(E). Accordingly, the 

evidence is legally sufficient to support the factfinder’s determination that Natasha had 

committed the predicate events alleged. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

Further, when we review the evidence for factual sufficiency, we are to determine 

“whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the [Department]’s allegations.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 
11

25. The only evidence heard by the factfinder supports the Department’s proof that 

Natasha knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or 

surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child. See § 

161.001(1)(D). This evidence also supports that she engaged in conduct or knowingly 

placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical 

or emotional well-being of the children. See § 161.001(1)(E). All of which supports the 

factual sufficiency of the evidence. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. Accordingly, 

Natasha’s issues regarding the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence regarding 

application of subsections (D) and (E) are overruled as to each of the children.

Natasha contends that the trial court heard no evidence of the environment of the 

children. This contention is without merit and ignores case law that provides that the 

conduct of the parent can provide the environment from the perspective of subsection 

(D) and (E). See In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d at 770 (holding that assaultive conduct 

establishes an environment that can be dangerous to the physical and emotional wellbeing of a child); In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739 (holding that the mental state of a 

parent may provide an environment that is dangerous to the emotional or physical wellbeing of a child).

Remembering that it only requires proof of one statutory predicate ground to 

support a termination of parental rights, see In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361, we need not 

address Natasha’s other issues regarding predicate grounds under subsections (N) and 

(O). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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Best Interest of the Children

Natasha next contends that the evidence is not legally or factually sufficient to 

support the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights was in the 

best interest of the children. 

There is a strong presumption that a child’s interest is best served by preserving 

the conservatorship of the parents; however, clear and convincing evidence to the 

contrary may overcome that presumption. See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 

2006) (per curiam). The Texas Supreme Court has recognized a non-exhaustive list of 

factors that are pertinent to the inquiry whether termination of parental rights is in the 

best interest of the child: (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical 

needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the 

child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, 

(5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, 

(7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the 

parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, 

and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. See Holley v. Adams, 544 

S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see also § 263.307 (West 2014) (providing extensive 

list of factors that may be considered in determining child’s best interest). In examining 

the best interest of the child, we may consider evidence that was also probative of the 

predicate act or omission. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. The best interest 

determination may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence, subjective facts, and the 
13

totality of the evidence. In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, 

no pet.).

The Department need not prove all nine Holley factors, and the absence of 

evidence relevant to some of those factors does not bar a finding that termination is in 

the child’s best interest, especially in the face of undisputed evidence that the parental 

relationship endangered the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. No one Holley

factor is controlling, and evidence of one factor may be sufficient to support a finding 

that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re A.P., 184 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) The evidence supporting the predicate grounds for 

termination may also be used to support a finding that the best interest of the children 

warrants termination of the parent-child relationship. In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

As stated above, the evidence supports the finding by the trial court of the 

predicate events which supported the termination of Natasha’s parental rights. This 

evidence is likewise probative of the best interest of the children. See In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d at 28. 

The record further demonstrates that Z.H. and Z.C. are thriving in their foster 

parent relationship. This alone can lead the trial court to form an opinion that the young 

children desire to stay in that relationship. See In re J.M., 156 S.W.3d 696, 706 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). 

From the evidence heard by the trial court, Natasha has not been a factor in the 

children’s lives since the Department took custody. She has not participated in services 
14

nor has she attempted visitation. This bears directly on the question of Natasha’s 

abilities to be a proper caretaker for the children. See In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 

893 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) Additionally, the assaultive nature of 

Natasha’s conduct toward S.R. and Z.H. is a strong factor in assessing the best interest 

of the children. A parent’s inability to provide adequate care for her children, lack of 

parenting skills, and poor judgment may be considered when evaluating the best 

interest of the children. See id. All of this evidence goes directly to the question of the 

emotional and physical needs of the children, now and in the future. See Holley, 544 

S.W.2d at 371–72. Thus, this evidence supports the proposition that termination is in 

the best interest of the children. 

Natasha’s absence for the duration of this case demonstrates that she lacks the 

motivation or ability to acquire proper parenting skills. See Wilson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 

923, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). In connection with this analysis is the fact 

that Z.H. and Z.C. are thriving in foster care and that the foster parents desire to adopt. 

These facts weigh heavily in favor of termination being in the best interest of the 

children. 

That S.R. is not doing as well in her residential treatment program does nothing 

to defeat the best interest determination by the trial court. The evidence at trial 

demonstrated that Natasha had effectively given up on trying to cope with or handle the 

mental issues demonstrated by S.R. S.R. is now receiving treatment and has the 

chance to handle her mental illness issues that was not present while she was with 

Natasha. 
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While we have not addressed all of the Holley factors, those that have been 

addressed clearly demonstrate that the best interests of these children is served by 

terminating the parental relationship they have with Natasha. Accordingly, Natasha’s 

issue to the contrary is overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled Natasha’s issues pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support termination, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mackey K. Hancock

 Justice