U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61–364 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

S. HRG. 106–262

FINAL REVIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR

TEST BAN TREATY (Treaty Doc. 105–28)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 7, 1999

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director

EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

MORNING SESSION

Page

Kirkpatrick, Hon. Jeane J., senior fellow, American Enterprise Institute and

former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations ....................... 7

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 12

Ledogar, Hon. Stephen J., former Chief Negotiator of the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty ................................................................................................... 15

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 20

Weinberger, Hon. Caspar W., former Secretary of Defense ................................. 14

Prominent Individuals and National Groups in support of the CTBT ................ 3

Former Laboratory Directors oppose the CTBT .................................................... 27

Letter from Physics Nobel Laureates in support of CTBT ................................... 34

AFTERNOON SESSION

Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., Secretary of State .................................................. 72

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 75

Garwin, Dr. Richard L., senior fellow for science and technology, Council

on Foreign Relations, New York, NY ................................................................. 112

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 117

Nuclear Testing—Summary and Conclusion—JASON report ............... 131

Kerrey, Hon. J. Robert, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, vice chairman, Select

Committee on Intelligence ................................................................................... 60

Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., former director, Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, Palto Alto, CA ........................................................................................ 101

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 105

Levin, Hon. Carl, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, ranking minority member,

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 58

Shelby, Hon. Richard C., U.S. Senator from Alabama, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence .......................................................................................... 54

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 56

Wade, Troy E., chairman, Nevada Alliance for Defense, Energy and Business,

Las Vegas, NV ...................................................................................................... 109

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 111

Warner, Hon. John W., U.S. Senator from Virginia, chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 52

Letters from six former Secretaries of Defense and Henry Kissinger

opposing CTBT ....................................................................................... 63

Senate Consideration of Major Arms Control and Security Treaties—1972–

1999 ....................................................................................................................... 81

Letters from former Ambassadors Wisner and Oakley in support of CTBT ...... 82

Article from the Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1999, entitled ‘‘The Next President

Will Pay the Price’’ by George Perkovich ........................................................... 87

Response of Secretary Cohen to question asked before the Armed Services

Committee on October 6, 1999 ............................................................................ 134

(III)

(1)

FINAL REVIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (Treaty Doc. 105–

28)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1999

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

MORNING SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Thomas, Grams, Biden, Kerry, and Boxer. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. This is the

final hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We extend our sincere welcome to our

first panel, Hon. Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense

for President Reagan, Hon. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and Hon. Stephen Ledogar, former

chief negotiator of the CTBT. I have already welcomed Mr. Ledogar in person, and I welcomed Cap Weinberger, and Jeane Kirkpatrick is on her way. I am confident in any event following the testimony by these distinguished

witnesses this morning, the committee will convene a second session this afternoon in which we will hear from the distinguished

chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner.

We agreed to go back and forth to try to make our case, and also the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, Senator

Levin, as well as the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby, and the vice chairman of that committee, Bob Kerrey,

Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, and we will hear from the distinguished Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and finally from

the third panel of arms control experts, former acting director Ronald Lehman, chairman of the Nevada Alliance for Defense, Energy

and Business, Troy Wade, and from Dr. Richard Garwin of the

Council on Foreign Relations. So I suggest by the end of the day it will be difficult for anyone to credibly contend that the CTBT has not been thoroughly discussed and debated.

Now then, I have a feeling most people know where I stand on

the treaty, and so I am not going to engage in extended oratory

this morning except to say this. I sense a clear consensus is emergVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
2

ing in the foreign policy community against Senate ratification of

the CTBT. Here is why.

Four former Directors of Central Intelligence have weighed in

against the CTBT, including two of President Clinton’s CIA Directors, Jim Woolsey and John Derish. Two former chairmen of the

Joint Chiefs, Admiral Tom Moore and Admiral John Vessey are

likewise strongly opposed, and yesterday the Senate received a letter signed by six—count them, six—distinguished former Secretaries of Defense, Cap Weinberger, who is with us today, thank the

Lord, Frank Carlucci, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Jim Schlesinger, and Mel Laird.

And it occurs to me that such unanimity among the former Secretaries of Defense in opposition to an arms control treaty is almost

without precedent, and I might say that the present distinguished

Secretary of Defense, whom I admire greatly and enjoyed greatly,

served in the Senate with him, when he was a Senator he strongly

opposed this treaty.

In any case, perhaps we should be reminded that it’s not the Republicans who asked for this vote. It was forced upon us by the

President and all 45 Senators on the other side of the aisle. They

wrote me a letter. I have never had a letter from so many distinguished Americans in my life, 45 Senators on the other side of the

aisle, but the fact remains, if this treaty is brought up to a vote

next Tuesday, I believe it will be defeated.

Now, there is only one way that the President can call off that vote next Tuesday. He must formally request in writing that (a) the

treaty be withdrawn, and (b) that the CTBT not be considered for

the duration of his Presidency.

Now, if the President does that, then the CTBT will be effectively

dead, just as SALT II was effectively dead after President Carter

made a similar written request of the Senate, and if Mr. Clinton

does not submit a written request, we will proceed with the vote,

and I am confident that the CTBT will be defeated, so the President has the choice to make.

Perhaps your testimony today, Secretary Weinberger, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick, will serve to convince the President that the

time has come to make such a request and a commitment. If not,

I know your testimony will certainly be informative to many Senators as we proceed with the vote next Tuesday.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying I love you,

but I find your characterizations interesting. This is the final hearing that is true. I would argue it is the first hearing as well as the

final hearing, but that is not worth getting into right now.

And as it relates to a clear consensus of the foreign policy community, I would ask, rather than take the time now, to enter in the

record a list of prominent individuals including the present and

five former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as 32

Nobel laureates, et cetera, and so if we can duel on who supports

what, I am confident that there are more prominent Americans,

particularly scientists, who support this than oppose it, but at any

rate, I would ask unanimous consent that they be put in the

record.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. Without objection.

3

[The information referred to follows:]

PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS AND NATIONAL GROUPS IN SUPPORT OF THE CTBT

(September 20, 1999)

CURRENT CHAIRMAN AND FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Senator John C. Danforth

Senator J. James Exon

Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker

Senator Mark O. Hatfield

Senator John Glenn

Representative Bill Green

Representative Thomas J. Downey

Representative Michael J. Kopetski

Representative Anthony C. Bellenson

Representative Lee H. Hamilton

DIRECTORS OF THE THREE NATIONAL LABORATORIES

Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory

Dr. Paul Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratory

Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

OTHER PROMINENT NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze—arms control negotiator, Reagan Administration

Admiral Stansfield Turner—former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

Charles Curtis—former Deputy Secretary of Energy

OTHER PROMINENT MILITARY OFFICERS

General Eugene Habiger—former Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Command

General John R. Galvin—Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Admiral Noel Gayler—former Commander, Pacific

General Charles A. Horner—Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert Storm,

former Commander, U.S. Space Command

General Andrew O’Meara—former Commander U.S. Army Europe

General Bernard W. Rogers—former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander

General William Y. Smith—former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command, Europe

Lt. General Julius Becton

Lt. General John H. Cushman—former Commander, I Corps (ROK/US) Group

(Korea)

Lt. General Robert E. Pursley

Vice Admiral William L. Read—former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface Force, Atlantic Command

Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan—former Director, Center for Defense Information

Lt. General George M. Seignious, II—fomer Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Vice Admiral James B. Wilson—former Polaris Submarine Captain

Maj. General William F. Burns—JCS Representative, INF Negotiations, Special

Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Dismantlement

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.—Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information

Rear Admiral Robert G. James

OTHER SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS

Dr. Hans Bethe—Nobel Laureate; Emeritus Professor of Physics, Cornell University;

Head of the Manhattan Project’s theoretical division

Dr. Freeman Dyson—Emeritus Professor of Physics, Institute for Advanced Study,

Princeton University

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Dr. Richard Garwin—Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign

Relations; consultant to Sandia National Laboratory, former consultant to Los

Alamos National Laboratory

Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky—Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University

Dr. Jeremiah D. Sullivan—Professor of Physics, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign

Dr. Herbert York—Emeritus Professor of Physics, University of California, San

Diego; founding director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

Dr. Sidney D. Drell—Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University

NATIONAL GROUPS

Medical and Scientific Organizations

American Association for the Advancement of Science

American Medical Students Association/Foundation

American Physical Society

American Public Health Association

American Medical Association

Public Interest Groups

20/20 Vision National Project

Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

Alliance for Survival

Americans for Democratic Action

Arms Control Association

British American Security Information Council

Business Executives for National Security

Campaign for America’s Future

Campaign for U.N. Reform

Center for Defense Information

Center for War/Peace Studies (New York, NY)

Council for a Livable World

Council for a Livable World Education Fund

Council on Economic Priorities

Defenders of Wildlife

Demilitarization for Democracy

Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (ECAAR)

Environmental Defense Fund

Environmental Working Group

Federation of American Scientists

Fourth Freedom Forum

Friends of the Earth

Fund for New Priorities in America

Fund for Peace

Global Greens, USA

Global Resource Action Center for the Environment

Greenpeace, USA

The Henry L. Stimson Center

Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (Saugus, MA)

Institute for Science and International Security

International Association of Educators for World Peace (Huntsville, AL)

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

International Center

Izaak Walton League of America

Lawyers Alliance for World Security

League of Women Voters of the United States

Manhattan Project II

Maryknoll Justice and Peace Office

National Environmental Coalition of Native Americans (NECONA)

National Environmental Trust

National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament

Natural Resources Defense Council

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Nuclear Control Institute

Nuclear Information & Resource Service

OMB Watch

5

Parliamentarians for Global Action

Peace Action

Peace Action Education Fund

Peace Links

PeacePAC

Physicians for Social Responsibility

Plutonium Challenge

Population Action Institute

Population Action International

Psychologists for Social Responsibility

Public Citizen

Public Education Center

Saferworld

Sierra Club

Union of Concerned Scientists

United States Servas, Inc.

Veterans for Peace

Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

Volunteers for Peace, Inc.

War and Peace Foundation

War Resistors League

Women Strike for Peace

Women’s Action for New Directions

Women’s Legislators’ Lobby of WAND

Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

World Federalist Association

Zero Population Growth

RELIGIOUS GROUPS

African Methodist Episcopal Church

American Baptist Churches, USA

American Baptist Churches, USA, National Ministries

American Friends Service Committee

American Jewish Congress

American Muslim Council

Associate General Secretary for Public Policy, National Council of Churches

Catholic Conference of Major Superiors of Men’s Institutes

Church Women United

Coalition for Peace and Justice

Columbian Fathers’ Justice and Peace Office

Commission for Women, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Covenant of Unitarian Universalist Pagans

Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in the United States and Canada

Christian Methodist Episcopal Church

Church of the Brethren, General Board

Division for Church in Society, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Division for Congregational Ministries, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Eastern Archdiocese, Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch

The Episcopal Church

Episcopal Peace Fellowship, National Executive Council

Evangelicals for Social Action

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Fellowship of Reconciliation

Friends Committee on National Legislation

Friends United Meeting

General Board Members, Church of the Brethren

General Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church

General Conference, Mennonite Church

General Conference of the Seventh Day Adventist Church

Jewish Peace Fellowship

Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Mennonite Central Committee

Mennonite Central Committee, U.S.

Mennonite Church

Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Missionaries of Africa

Mission Investment Fund of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

6

Moravian Church, Northern Province

National Council of Churches

National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA

National Council of Catholic Women

National Missionary Baptist Convention of America

NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby

New Call to Peacemaking

Office for Church in Society, United Church of Christ

Orthodox Church in America

Pax Christi

Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)

Presbyterian Peace Fellowship

Progressive National Baptist Convention, Inc.

Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism

The Shalom Center

Sojourners

Union of American Hebrew Congregations

United Church of Christ

United Methodist Church

United Methodist Council of Bishops

Unitarian Universalist Association

Washington Office, Mennonite Central Committee

Women of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to discuss the test ban treaty. This afternoon, when the Secretary of

State appears before us, I have a slightly longer statement as to

why I support the treaty and believe the Senate should give its

ratification to the treaty.

This morning I would like to briefly set the stage for the debate

that is about to commence. Thirty-six years ago last month, less

than a year after the United States and the Soviet Union came to

the brink of nuclear war, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, a pact banning nuclear tests

in the atmosphere. Only a handful of our Senate colleagues were

here at that time, long-serving legends like Strom Thurmond, and

Robert C. Byrd, and Dan Inouye, and possibly one or two others.

But although the geopolitical circumstances have changed, as

have the names and the faces of the United States Senators, in

some ways the debate today is very familiar. Then, as now, there

were questions about our ability to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent under the treaty. Then, as now, there were questions about

whether a country whose capital is Moscow would cheat.

Then, as now, there were concerns about the ability of the United

States to effectively verify the treaty. Then, as now, there were

concerns about American leadership if we failed to ratify the treaty. Then, as now, the Joint Chiefs and the administration of the

day devised safeguards to assure that the United States would adhere to the treaty and maintain a strong nuclear deterrent force.

The story since 1963 is one in which those whom I would call the

realistic optimists were in my view proved right, and those who I

call the visceral pessimists did not see their fears realized.

Our deterrent posture did not suffer, even though we gave up a

test that surely gave us more confidence in our weapons systems

than we could gain through underground tests alone. We gained

worldwide respect for reining in the nuclear arms race which 5

years later translated into the U.S. diplomatic success in negotiating a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the treaty banning

nuclear weapons in Latin America, treaties that have succeeded in

7

constraining our nuclear proliferation, and we gave our own people

hope that the cold war would not lead to the white heat of nuclear

holocaust.

Eight years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is great

disagreement in this country about our foreign policy objectives

and our role in the world, but surely there should be no disagreement that we should still pursue a strategy of containment, this

time directed not against an ideological foe, but against the spread

of dangerous weapons and technology.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits any nuclear test explosion, is a key component to that strategy. Thirty-six

years ago, Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirksen, for whom

this building is named, reached across the aisle and supported a

treaty negotiated by President Kennedy.

In his speech on the Senate floor, Dirksen quoted a famous Republican from his home State of Illinois, and I quote, it is the

true—quoting Abraham Lincoln—‘‘The true role in determining to

embrace or reject anything is not whether it have any evil in it, but

whether it have more evil than good. There are few things wholly

evil or wholly good. Almost everything, especially of Government

policy, is an inseparable compound of the two, so that our best

judgment of the preponderance between them is continuously demanded.’’

Lincoln’s words commend themselves to us now. This treaty is a

good treaty. It is not a perfect treaty. No treaty produced by over

100 nations will ever be, but it has a lot of good in it. The benefits

which I will discuss this afternoon and will debate today I believe

clearly outweigh the risks, and I hope my colleagues will study it

closely and come to the same conclusion.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to hearing from

our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. On the theory that

ladies go first, Ms. Kirkpatrick, if you will present your case.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND FORMER U.S.

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,

for inviting me to testify before this distinguished committee on

this vitally important subject.

I accepted your invitation, Mr. Chairman, because I believe it is

essential that this Nation’s defenses be adequate to cope with the

growing dangers we face from hostile powers possessing weapons

of mass destruction and effective means of delivery.

Mr. Chairman, I have had a good deal of intensive exposure to

this subject first, a consequence of having served on President Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Presidential Task Force on Nuclear Products in

1985, on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from

1985 to 1990, on the Defense Policy Review Board from 1985 to

1992, and then, after having been appointed by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 1991 and 1992, I chaired the Failsafe and

Risk Reduction Committee, generally referred to by its acronym as

8

the FARR committee, which was charged with reviewing the

United States nuclear command and control system.

This experience made a strong impression on me concerning the

dangers of proliferating nuclear and missile technology. As everyone who is interested in these matters knows, a number of countries are capable of producing and delivering nuclear weapons and

other weapons of mass destruction. The number has increased, and

is increasing as we speak, and it includes several of the world’s

most aggressive, repressive, destructive, and dangerous countries,

North Korea, Iran, Iraq, as well as a Russia less stable than we

would prefer, and a China less benign.

We know, moreover, that other regimes with little regard for the

rule of law or human rights work to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and that against these weapons the United States can

rely only on its nuclear deterrent. We have no other defenses

against weapons of mass destruction.

The current dangers have been documented and described in the

past year with great clarity by the Rumsfeld and the Cox Commissions. The Rumsfeld Commission, which had unprecedented—and I

quote now—‘‘unprecedented access to the most sensitive and highly

classified information,’’ concluded that, ‘‘The threat to the United

States posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than has been reported and that

several countries, including Iraq, will be able to inflict major damage on the United States within about 5 years,’’ and that was written in 1998, that is, they started counting in 1998.

The Cox Commission describes the shocking success of China in

buying and stealing the most advanced U.S. thermonuclear missile

and space technology, which was quickly made available to other

governments, enabling China to ‘‘pose a direct threat to the United

States, our friends and allies, or our forces.’’

We know from the work of the Rumsfeld and the Cox Commissions that at least two countries which already have nuclear weapons, North Korea and China, have recently engaged in intensive

successful efforts to upgrade the weapons and the missiles which

carry them.

It is disturbing to me, Mr. Chairman, that President Clinton has

not been mobilized to make the defense of the American people

against these proliferating threats a top priority. Instead, confronted with these dangers, President Clinton and his administration have placed one obstacle after another in the path of the development of an effective missile defense. They have imposed disabling requirements and unnecessary delays on the development

and deployment of effective national and theater missile defenses.

The President has urged that we give priority to preserving an

extended, outmoded ABM Treaty interpreted to be maximally constraining on us. Now he urges on us the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty, which would commit the U.S. Government to carrying out

no nuclear tests—ever.

The United States has already lived through the longest ever

moratorium on tests. Now, with the CTBT, he proposes to extend

that moratorium forever. There are several reasons why it would

be imprudent for the United States to make this commitment never

9

to conduct another explosive nuclear test. I will summarize briefly

those which seem to me most compelling.

First is the fact that our Government takes its commitments seriously. If we were to sign this treaty, we would feel bound by its

terms. We would not feel free to violate it, as many governments

will. We would not conduct explosive tests if we signed this treaty.

Second, as everyone knows, the treaty cannot be verified. The

CIA has recently publicly acknowledged that it cannot detect lowyield tests. It bothers me that we will not know when and if they

are cheating, and some will surely cheat us.

Third, I learned from my service on the Blue Ribbon and FARR

committees, Mr. Chairman, that the safety and reliability of our

nuclear stockpiles cannot be taken for granted, but must be monitored. Testing is a vital part of ascertaining and maintaining the

reliability and safety of our nuclear weapons. It is also a necessary

step in modernizing our nuclear weapons.

Testing is vital to maintaining the reliability and credibility of

our nuclear deterrent and our confidence in it. The authors of this

treaty understand how important testing is to maintaining the viability of nuclear weapons. The preamble to the treaty, which I

think everyone should read, states, and I quote, ‘‘Recognizing that

the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other

nuclear explosions by constraining the development and qualitative

improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of

advanced new types of nuclear weapons constitutes an effective

measure of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects.’’

That is pretty clear, and a second item in the preamble asserts,

and I quote, ‘‘Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear

explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization

of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.’’ That preamble makes interesting reading, and I recommend to the Senators

who will vote on this treaty that they should read the treaty and

they should read the expectations of its authors.

The fourth reason that I oppose the ratification of the treaty, is

that our deterrent—that nuclear deterrent which will be so weakened by the ratification of the CTBT—is more important to the security of Americans today, with rogue States developing the capacity to attack our cities and our populations, than it ever has been,

because Americans and their allies are more vulnerable today than

we ever have been.

Mr. Chairman, the threat to Americans, its cities and populations, is here and now. It has expanded dramatically, not only because of systematic Chinese theft of America’s most important military secrets, and because of the inadequate policies governing the

safekeeping and transfer of technology of this administration, but

also because several countries who are signatories to the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] have violated their commitments

under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

They signed the nonproliferation treaty, served in IAEA governing boards, and violated their commitments. They made a commitment in signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and I

quote now, they have already made a commitment quote, ‘‘not to

transfer or in any way assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear

10

weapons State to acquire nuclear weapons,’’ close quote, and also,

‘‘not to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons or other explosive

devices, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, not to receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear

explosive devices.’’

The system resembles an honor system at a university. You

promise neither to cheat nor to assist anyone else in cheating, and

to report anyone who does that comes to your attention. China is

not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Russia is,

so are Iran, Iraq, and Libya. These are all States that have been

seeking and alas, acquiring, nuclear capacities. India, North Korea

and Pakistan are not signatories, but Iran, Iraq, and Libya are.

China is not, Russia is. All are engaged in proliferation—either by

offering nuclear technology and weapons, or by seeking it and accepting it.

Obviously, whether or not a government has signed the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty has little impact on their behavior with regard to proliferation. Some who signed it, violate it. Some who have

not signed it are also engaged in the same activities.

That is, I think, the critical point concerning what I think of as

the arms control approach to national security. You just cannot

count on it. We cannot rely on this treaty to prevent countries that

are actually or potentially hostile to us from acquiring and testing

and sharing nuclear arsenals and ballistic missiles. The evidence is

clear. I think it is clear, anyway.

Why, then, does President Clinton, whose decisions have diminished, delayed, and denied us development and deployment of effective missile defenses, now urge on us a treaty which would endanger the reliability of the nuclear deterrent, which is our only defense, against a nuclear attack.

Mr. Chairman, the President and some of the supporters of the

treaties argue that the action of the Senate in ratifying or rejecting

this treaty will determine whether the world ends nuclear tests

and proliferation forever, and I have heard several Senators say

that in the last 48 hours, and you probably have, too. But that is

not true, Mr. Chairman.

China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, just to name those countries at

random almost, do not follow our lead. They are not waiting urgently to see what we are going to do so that they can do likewise.

I wish they were. The world would be safer if they did.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the committee’s attention to the governance of the organization which will administer

this treaty. This I might say is of particular concern to me. I note

that all State parties are members, will be members of the organization, not simply nuclear powers, but all, basically all those countries which signed the treaty, which is about 194—I think that is

the right figure. That is approximately right—will be members. No

State party can be excluded—under the organizing rules.

This organization will operate as the United Nations General Assembly does on the basis of one country, one vote, with an executive council which is based on geographical representation. Now,

think about this. On that executive council, which will be the most

important central governing body, Africa is allotted 10 seats. I do

not think there is yet a nuclear power in Africa. I hope there is not.

11

But they are allotted 10 seats, Eastern Europe, where there have

been two or three nuclear powers, are allotted 7 seats. Latin America is allotted 9, the Middle East and South Asia, 7 each, Western

Europe and North America, 10, Asia, 8.

I would like to note that no one is guaranteed a seat on this executive council. The United States has the same chance of being chosen to sit on the executive council as, shall we say, Jamaica.

Not only will this organization make policies for this vitally important issue about whose importance we have heard a great deal

in the last few days, but the countries making policy will not necessarily be world powers, as powers with nuclear weapons, or with

any experience with nuclear weapons. They will simply be member

States who have signed on the CTBT.

Not only that, there will be a technical support group, but that

technical support group will be chosen by the same executive council which I have just described, which is chosen by people the overwhelming majority of whom do not themselves have any experience

or competence with nuclear questions, much less nuclear weapons.

‘‘Each State party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data, and to have access to all data made

available to the International Data Center.’’ This is a very interesting provision, and it parallels a provision in the resolutions establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The International Atomic Energy Agency was itself, conceived

and founded for the purpose of preventing proliferation of nuclear

weapons, and it has been, through the years, staffed by a good

many men of great professional skill and of genuine expertise and

dedication, but not only has the IAEA not been able to stop proliferation, it has more than once served itself as a source of proliferation. This is the irony of the harm that good men do, and the

harm that good organizations conceived with the best of intentions

do.

The IAEA has more than once served as a source of proliferation,

as member States take from it technical information and reactors

‘‘for peaceful uses,’’ it is always said. The fact is, we know that several rogue States have managed to take from the IAEA and their

membership on the IAEA, under the rules of the IAEA, the reactors and the technology with which they have launched their own

projects for creating atoms not for peace, but for weapons.

I believe that the CTBT organization will also serve as a source

of technical expertise—in much the same way that the IAEA has

served as a source of technical expertise, and that those who today

claim the treaty will end nuclear testing once and for all will be

greatly shocked, but it should not surprise the rest of us.

I just might remind you, Mr. Chairman, that at the time that

Iraq was sitting on the governing board of the IAEA—at the very

same time that it was engaged in massive efforts to build its own

nuclear capacity and to make war on all of its neighbors.

Mr. Chairman, President Clinton and his administration are

once again urging Americans to take what amounts to a long step

toward unilateral nuclear disarmament at a time of unprecedented

vulnerability for the United States. I believe it is enormously important that the Senate reject this treaty.

Thank you.

12

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE K. KIRKPATRICK

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify before this distinguished Committee on this vitally important subject. I accepted your invitation, Mr. Chairman, because I believe it is essential that this nation’s defenses be adequate to cope with the growing dangers we face from

hostile powers possessing weapons of mass destruction and effective means of delivery. Mr. Chairman, I encountered this subject and became concerned about this issue, as a consequence of having served on President Reagan’s ‘‘Blue Ribbon Presidential

Task Force on Nuclear Products’’ in 1985; on the ‘‘President’s Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board (PFIAB)’’ from 1985 to 1990; on the Defense Policy Review Board

from 1985 to 1992. Then, after being appointed by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney

in 1991–1992, I chaired the ‘‘Fail Safe and Risk Reduction’’ Committee (generally

referred to by its acronym as the FARR Committee) charged with reviewing the

United States Nuclear Command and Control System. This experience made a strong impression on me concerning the dangers of pro- liferating nuclear and missile technology. As everyone who is interested in these

matters now knows, the number of countries capable of producing and delivering

nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, has increased and is increasing as we speak, and includes several of the world’s most aggressive, repressive, destructive countries—North Korea, Iran, Iraq—as well as a Russia less stable

than we would prefer and a China less benign. We know, moreover, that other regimes with little regard for the rule of law or human rights work to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and that against these

weapons the United States can rely only on its nuclear deterrent. We have no other

defense.

The current dangers have been documented and described in the past year by the Rumsfeld and Cox Commissions. The Rumsfeld Commission, which had ‘‘unprecedented access to the most sensitive and highly classified information’’ concluded:

• That, ‘‘the threat to the United States posed by these emerging capabilities is

broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than has been reported.’’

• That, ‘‘several countries, including Iraq, will be able to inflict major damage on

the United States within about five years.’’

The Cox Commission describes the shocking success of China in buying and stealing the most advanced U.S. thermonuclear missile and space technology (which they

quickly made available to other governments) enabling China to: ‘‘Pose a direct

threat to the United States, our friends, and allies or our forces.’’

We know from the work of the Rumsfeld Commission and the Cox Commission

that at least two countries which already have nuclear weapons—North Korea and

China—have recently been engaged in intensive, successful efforts to upgrade the

weapons, and the missiles which carry them.

It is disturbing to me, Mr. Chairman, that President Clinton has not been mobilized to make the defense of the American people against these proliferating threats

a top priority.

Instead, confronted with these dangers, President Clinton and his Administration

have placed one obstacle after another in the path of development of an effective

missile defense. They have imposed disabling requirements and unnecessary delays

on the development and deployment of effective national and theater missile defenses.

The President has urged that we give priority to preserving an extended, outmoded ABM Treaty interpreted to be maximally constraining. Now, he urges on us

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which would commit the U.S. government to

carrying out no nuclear tests—ever.

The United States has already lived through the longest-ever moratorium on nuclear tests. Now with the CTBT he proposes to extend the moratorium forever.

There are several reasons that it would be imprudent for the United States to

make this commitment never to conduct another explosive nuclear test. I will summarize briefly those which seem to me most compelling.

First is the fact that our government takes its commitments seriously. If we were

to sign this treaty, we would feel bound by its terms. We would not feel free to violate it at will as many governments will. We would not conduct explosive tests.

Second, as everyone knows, this treaty cannot be verified. The CIA has recently

publicly acknowledged that it cannot detect low-yield tests. It bothers me that we

will not know when they are cheating and some will cheat.

13

Third, I learned from my service on the Blue Ribbon and FARR Committees that the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpiles cannot be taken for granted, but

must be monitored. Testing (banned forever by this proposed treaty) is a vital part

of ascertaining and maintaining the reliability and safety of our nuclear weapons.

It is also a necessary step in modernizing our nuclear weapons. Testing is vital to maintaining the reliability and credibility of our nuclear deterrent.

The authors of this treaty understand how important testing is to maintaining the viability of nuclear weapons. The Preamble to the Treaty states, and I quote:

Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and

all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of

nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects,

Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus

constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to

achieve nuclear disarmament.

Fourth, that deterrent has never been as important to the security of Americans as it is today with rogue states developing the capacity to attack our cities and our

population. Americans and their allies are more vulnerable than we have ever been.

Mr. Chairman, the threat to Americans, its cities, and populations, is here and

now. It has expanded dramatically, not only because of systematic Chinese theft of

America’s most important military secrets and because of the inadequate U.S. policies governing the safekeeping and transfer of technology, but also because several

countries who are signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have violated

their commitments under the Treaty. Specifically, they have violated commitments:

‘‘not to transfer . . . or in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nu- clear weapon State to acquire nuclear weapons . . .’’[Article I]

‘‘not to receive the transfer . . . of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices . . ., not to manufacture or otherwise acquire . . . not to receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

. . .’’[Article II]

China is not a signatory of the NPT. Russia is. So are Iran, Iraq and Libya. North Korea, India, and Pakistan are not signatories. Obviously, whether or not a government has signed the NPT has little impact on their behavior with regard to proliferation.

That is the critical point concerning the arms control approach to national secu- rity. We cannot rely on this treaty to prevent the countries that are actually or potentially hostile to us from acquiring and testing nuclear arsenals and ballistic missiles. The evidence is clear.

Why then does President Clinton, whose decisions have diminished, delayed, and

denied us development and deployment of effective missile defenses, now urge on

us a treaty which would endanger the reliability of the nuclear deterrent—which is

our only ‘‘defense’’ against a nuclear attack?

Mr. Chairman, the President and some other supporters of the Treaties argue

that the action of the Senate in ratifying or rejecting the treaty will determine

whether we end nuclear tests and proliferation forever. But that is not true. China,

North Korea, Iraq, Iran do not follow our lead.

Finally, I should like to call the Committee’s attention to the governance of the

organization which will administer it. I note: ‘‘All State Parties are members. No

State Party can be excluded.’’ It will operate on the principle of one state, one vote,

with an executive council that based on geographical representation, comprising, Africa is allotted ten seats; Eastern Europe seven, Latin America nine, the Middle

East and South Asia seven; Western Europe and North America ten; Asia eight.

‘‘Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre.’’

Mr. Chairman, the International Atomic Energy Agency, conceived to prevent proliferation, and staffed with a good many first class professionals has not only been

unable to stop proliferation, it has more than once served as a source of proliferation

as member states take from it technical information and reactors—for peaceful uses

it is always said.

The CTBT organization will also serve as a source of technical expertise. Those

who today claim the Treaty will end nuclear testing once and for all will be greatly

shocked. But it should not be a surprise to the rest of us.

14

Mr. Chairman, President Clinton and his Administration are once again urging

Americans to take what amounts to a long step toward unilateral nuclear disarmament—at a time of unprecedented vulnerability. It is enormously important that

the Senate reject this Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. A very fine statement, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

I appreciate your coming so much.

Mr. Secretary Weinberger, we are delighted to have you here this

morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, FORMER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

committee. It is always a privilege for me to testify before a committee of such distinction. I am honored to be here. I have a very

short statement, and would be glad to try to take any questions

after that.

Mr. Chairman, the essence of this question seems to me to come

down to, if we need nuclear weapons, we have to know that they

work. That is the essence of their deterrence. If there is uncertainty about that, the deterrent capability is weakened.

The only assurance that you have that they will work is to test

them, and the only way to test them is the most effective way to

test them, and all of the discussion in other committees, and a

great deal of the discussion in the public, has been an attempt to

show that the stockpile stewardship program will be an effective

way of testing them all, although everyone agrees that it is not as

effective as testing them in the way that we have done in the past

with underground explosions, with all the precautions to prevent

any of the escape of the material into the atmosphere.

You will have all kinds of statements made that the stewardship

stockpile program will be tested by a computer model. We have had

some less than reassuring statements that the computers that can

do this best will be available in 2005, or 2008, which is a tacit admission that in the meantime the stockpile stewardship program as

it is presently constituted is not an effective way of testing, and the

only way to be sure that these weapons will work, and will be able

to do their unique task, is test them, and test them in the most

effective way possible.

The only way to test them is to do it by the means that we have

used before that we have now eschewed for the time being, so basically the question comes down, as Ms. Kirkpatrick said, whether

we are going to abstain from testing in perpetuity.

All of this discussion is about lesser means of testing, and it is

not a question of stopping testing. The treaty does not purport to

do that, and even when it purports to do that, as Ms. Kirkpatrick

points out, and I agree fully with her, we are not going to be able

to rely on many of the rogue countries that will do whatever is necessary to acquire this capability.

Nothing will encourage proliferation more than to tell these

countries that the big stockpiles in the United States have not been

tested, or that stockpiles of other countries have not been tested effectively, and if they think that is the case, they will be encouraged

to believe that the deterrent is not as effective as it should be, and

that they will be encouraged to try to acquire the kinds of weapons

15

which, through the testing that they can do, whether they promise

to or not, will make them effective.

There is an extraordinarily naive editorial, which I have to call

your attention to, in the New York Times. It says, the treaty’s main

effect would be to halt programs in other countries. It adds, that

since no new nuclear weapons can be reliably developed without

testing, ratification of the treaty by enough countries would freeze

the nuclear weapons race worldwide. That to my mind is a degree

of naivete that is extremely dangerous and is also, incidentally, not

very true.

You have countries that have tested. You have two countries in

the last year that have tested and demonstrated that they had nuclear capability in India and Pakistan. We have a number of weapons in our stockpile that have essentially been rebuilt, essentially

been inspected from time to time, and deterioration has been

found.

As is inevitable, the aging process affects weapons also, Mr.

Chairman, unfortunately, and when a new component is put in to

replace an old component, you do not know if it is going to work.

You do not know if they are going to mesh together.

There is something—I do not know how many, but close to, I

think it is safe to say, thousands of moving parts in these terrible

weapons, and you have no way of knowing that all of these things

are going to mesh by consulting a computer, particularly not if you

have to wait till 2008 to get the kind of computer that will be reasonably reliable. So the question really comes down to is the kind

of testing that is being done.

Other countries will test, other countries may be sure, or they

may not be sure that theirs will work. If they are sure we have not

received the absolute assurance that ours will work, we will not

have any idea of being able to stop the proliferation of those countries trying. Any uncertainty about the effectiveness of our deterrent weakens that deterrent.

The whole point of a deterrent is the ability to be able to let hostile nations know, and let the world know that should an attack

come, we have the capability of responding. Not a pleasant concept,

not a good idea, but we do not make the world in which we live.

We have to rely on the kinds of weapons we have to keep the

peace.

And so I think the important thing to bear in mind here, Mr.

Chairman, is really what the treaty means, and in the essence, the

treaty means we would be committing ourselves in perpetuity, forever, not to use the most effective means of being able to assure

us and the world that our stockpile works, and for that reason I

would very much oppose the treaty, and I would hope the Senate

would, too.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Ambassador, we would be

glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR, FORMER CHIEF

NEGOTIATOR OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of

the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you

16

about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which is before the committee for consideration.

First, a few things about my background, which I would mention

only because I think they are relevant to what I’ll say about the

treaty. After 4 years as an active duty Naval aviator and 5 years

in private industry as a lawyer, I joined the Foreign Service and

served for 38 years before retiring 2 years ago.

Most of my career I worked in political-military affairs and arms

control, including stints as deputy chief of mission to NATO, press

spokesman and member of the delegation to the Vietnam Paris

peace talks.

And I’d like to point out that I’m a strong believer in nuclear deterrence and I know how central nuclear deterrence is to NATO.

During my last 10 years of full time service, I was privileged to be

an ambassador under Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton, serving in turn as head of several U.S. delegations in Vienna and Geneva. I was chief U.S. negotiator from start to finish of the CTBT.

Currently, I’m a part-time consultant to the Department of State

on national security matters.

As I understand your invitation, Mr. Chairman, I’m not here to

give this committee the authoritative administration pitch on

CTBT. Secretary Albright and others will do that. Rather, I’m here

primarily as a resource to help recall and detail key elements of

the treaty as they were fought out in the negotiating trenches between 1993 and signature in September 1996.

I should say, however, that not surprisingly, I fully support the

treaty, believing that it is very much in the security interests of the

United States. It was carefully negotiated by me and my multiagency delegation throughout, always acting on fully cleared front

channel instructions. And I’m prepared to try to explain and defend

all of it’s key provisions and, if my memory serves, to try to give

you any background you might be interested in having.

In the short time I have in this opening statement, I’ll limit my

discussion to just three issues that I believe are sources of some

confusion. Over the course of the last few days, I have heard opinions expressed on the question of the CTBT’s scope, it’s verification

provisions, and it’s entry into force provisions. Some of the debate

suggests to me that aspects of the negotiations have not yet been

fully understood. I hope that I may help to shed some light on

these issues. Last, I would like to address the likely international

repercussions should the Senate fail to give its consent to ratification.

First of all on the scope. Let me address that issue as it develops

in the negotiation. As the name suggests, the treaty imposes a comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions, of any size, in any place.

I have heard some critics of the treaty seek to cast doubt on whether Russia, in the negotiating and signing of the treaty, committed

itself under treaty law to a truly comprehensive prohibition of any

nuclear explosion, including an explosion or experiment or event of

even the slightest nuclear yield. In other words, did Russia agree

that hydronuclear experiments which do produce a nuclear yield,

although usually very, very slight, would be banned and that hydrodynamic explosions, which have no yield because they do not

reach criticality, would not be banned.

17

The answer is a categoric ‘‘yes.’’ The Russians as well as the rest

of the P–5 did commit themselves. That answer is substantiated by

the record of the negotiations at almost any level of technicality

and national security classification that is desired and permitted.

More importantly, for the current debate, it is also substantiated

by the public record of statements by high level Russian officials

as their position on the question of thresholds evolved and fell into

line with the consensus that emerged.

It is important to recall that each of the five nuclear weapons

states began the CTBT negotiations desirous of a quiet understanding among themselves that some low level of nuclear explosions or experiments that did produce nuclear yield would be acceptable, at least among themselves, despite the broad treaty prohibition of ‘‘any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear

explosion.’’ Until August 1995, the beginning of the final year of negotiations, the U.S. pushed for agreement on a very low threshold

of nuclear yield.

Our position was not popular among the P–5. Because of our

greater test experience and technical capabilities, we could conceivably gain useful data from events of almost insignificant yield. The

other four argued that they needed a higher threshold in order to

gain any useful data. In some cases, the thresholds they pushed for

were politically impossible to square with the notion of a comprehensive test ban. Russia, for example, insisted that if there was

going to be any threshold among the five, it would have to allow

for so-called experiments with nuclear yields of up to 10 tons of

TNT equivalent.

The dispute among the five threatened to halt the negotiations,

as it became increasingly known to others that the five were squabbling with each other about how much wiggle room would be left

to them when they signed onto a text that said simply that nuclear

explosions would be banned.

And as the arcane and jargon filled complexities of the nuclear

testing communities in Novaya Zemyla, Lop Nor, Mururoa and Nevada became more widely understood, the non-nuclear states and

broad public opinion increasingly insisted that the five should be

allowed no tolerance, not even for the smallest possible nuclear

yields. A ban should be a ban. The answer to this dilemma should

be no threshold for anybody. In other words, zero should mean

zero.

On August 11, 1995 President Clinton announced that the

United States was revising its prior position on the threshold question and would henceforth argue to the other four nuclear weapons

states that no tests that produced a nuclear yield should be allowed

to anyone under the treaty. The Russians, who were miffed at

being taken by surprise, climbed down from their original positions

slowly and painfully. It took until April 1996 before they signed

onto the sweeping categoric prohibition that is found in the final

text. They never did like the word ‘‘zero’’ which was bandied about

in public and actually once used by Boris Yeltsin.

Instead, they announced that they embraced a treaty with no

thresholds whatsoever. In the confidential negotiations among the

five nuclear weapons states that went on the entire time the broader CTBT negotiations continued, it was clearly understood that the

18

boundary line, that is, the zero line, between what would be prohibited to all under the treaty and what would not be prohibited,

would be precisely defined by the question of nuclear yield or criticality. If what you did produced any nuclear yield whatsoever, it

would not be allowed. If it didn’t, it was allowed.

Another issue I would like to address is how the treaty’s

verification regime developed and how it benefits the United

States. I will leave it to others more expert than I to provide more

precise assessments of U.S. monitoring capabilities. The point I

would like to stress here is that the U.S. succeeded in the negotiations in getting virtually every thing the intelligence community

and other parts of the government wanted from the treaty, wanted

and were prepared to pay for, to strengthen our ability to detect

and deter cheating and to seek appropriate redress if cheating did

occur.

At the same time, we succeeded in getting virtually everything

the Defense Department and others wanted to insure the protection of sensitive national security information. Let me give you several examples.

Concerning the use of national technical means, the United

States fought like mad to win acceptance of a state’s rights to use

evidence acquired through national technical means as it saw fit

when requesting an onsite inspection. But we did not want to be

forced to reveal any information we believed would be better kept

private. Now, this was a ‘‘red line’’ issue for the United States.

Many of our negotiating partners were adamantly opposed to giving the U.S. what they considered was a clear advantage and a license to spy.

Yes, it is true that the U.S. has satellite surveillance and intercept capabilities that surpass anything others have, but is it logical

to penalize and ignore the evidence of the tall person with good

eyesight who can see the crime committed across the room? Eventually the U.S. position prevailed and is incorporated in the treaty.

This treaty provides for onsite inspections on request by any

treaty party with the approval of the executive council. No state

can refuse an inspection. The U.S. position from the start was that

onsite inspections were critical to provide us with added confidence

that we could detect violations. And, if inspections were to be effective, they had to be conducted absolutely as quickly as possible

after a suspicion arose, using a range of techniques with as few restrictions as possible.

However, the U.S. also had to be concerned with its defensive

posture as well as an offensive one. It was necessary to insure that

sensitive national security information would be protected in the

event of an inspection on U.S. territory. The U.S. crafted a complicated, highly detailed proposal that balanced our offensive and

defensive needs. There was resistance from some of our negotiating

partners. However, by the time we were through, the treaty read

pretty much like the original U.S. position paper that had been put

together jointly by the Departments of Defense, Energy and State,

the intelligence community and the then existing Arms Control

Agency.

I would like to touch on the composition of the International

Monitoring System, four networks of different types of remote senVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
19

sors encompassing 321 stations. I believe I have heard questions

about its value added. The intelligence community, working

through the larger interagency community, had a list of requirements. They wanted certain technologies and they wanted certain

stations that would fill gaps and complement existing national

monitoring capabilities.

The U.S. delegation delivered nearly everything requested. You

have only to look at the coverage that would be established if the

treaty enters into force, the coverage in Russia, China and the Middle East, to see the augmentation of U.S. capabilities and the range

of technologies to appreciate the potential value added of an International Monitoring System.

Some people have criticized the treaty because it does not provide for sanctions against the state, it has violated it. This criticism

strikes me as ill-informed. Consistent with traditional U.S. policy,

I was under strict instructions to object to the inclusion of sanctions. The U.S. view, which I believe this committee strongly endorses, is that we will not agree to appoint an international organization to be not just the investigator and special prosecutor, but

also the judge, jury and jailer. The U.S. reserves for itself the authority to make judgments about compliance. And, we reserve for

a body higher than the one established by this treaty, namely, the

United Nations Security Council, in which we have a veto, the authority to levy sanctions or other measures. This is U.S. policy and

this policy is reflected in the treaty.

Now a word on the treaty’s entry into force requirements. These

have been the topic of much discussion and have even been offered

as a reason for why the U.S. should postpone its ratification. As

you know, the treaty does not enter into force until 44 named

states have deposited their instruments of ratification. The named

states are those that have nuclear research or power reactors and

were at the same time members of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is true that this requirement erects a high barrier. It also, in

my opinion, reflects a core reality from which there is no escape.

The treaty would not work without the participation of all five nuclear weapons states and the three so-called threshold states,

India, Pakistan and Israel, who are not yet bound by the nonproliferation treaty.

The U.S. would not foreswear all future testing if China and

Russia were not similarly bound, and vice versa. China ties its adherence to India, India to Pakistan, and so forth. It’s an interlocking reality—a political reality among the eight. Israeli adherence is demanded by all. In my opinion, it did not much matter

what exact formulation was used. The reality was that all eight

were required.

It does not follow that the U.S. can afford to wait until the other

43 have ratified the treaty. I have always believed that if you want

something, you must get out in front. That is the American way.

We must lead, not follow meekly behind. It is our burden and our

advantage that other states will follow our lead. The day the

United States submitted its ratification of the Chemical Weapons

Convention, China and four other countries followed, the same day.

Cuba, Iran, Pakistan and Russia followed shortly thereafter.

20

What if the U.S. chooses not to ratify this treaty? I believe my experience in the CTBT negotiations and many years of representing the United States in multilateral diplomacy render me

competent to speculate on the international reaction to such a possibility. I am not given to hyperbole, but I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that there will be jubilation among our foes and despair among our allies and friends. Iran, Iraq, North Korea and other states that harbor nuclear aspirations surely will feel the constraints loosening. Our allies and

other friends will feel deserted and betrayed. The global nuclear

nonproliferation regime will be endangered. Some isolationists may

not believe this regime is worth protecting and that the U.S. can

take care of the problem itself. But we need cooperation in my

judgment from states like Russia and our European allies, if only

to help control exports if we are to prevent states from acquiring

nuclear weapons. France, for example, which has already ratified

the CTBT, will be even less responsive to U.S. pleas to contain Iraq

and Iran if the U.S. walks away from this treaty, whose successful

negotiation the United States led. I am not an expert on South Asian policy, but I believe that if the U.S. fails to ratify the CTBT, we should brace ourselves for

more Indian tests. Pakistan, of course, would match India test for

test.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, would you forgive me please? We have a vote on and I suggest that Senators go cast their votes

and I will stay here, then it may save time.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I just wondered, when we come back, we will have an opportunity to question, is that correct? The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Ambassador LEDOGAR. I only have about two more sentences. China will not ratify the test ban if the U.S. does not. We can expect China to put itself in a position to resume testing, especially

if India tests, and the chain reaction may not end there. Japan

could face pressure to reconsider its nuclear abstinence if China

and India buildup their nuclear forces. And Russia, of course, remains a wild card.

I trust you will have questions and I am prepared to respond.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ledogar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this oppor- tunity to speak to you about the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which

is before your committee for consideration. First, a few things about my background which I mention only because I think they are relevant to what I will say about the Treaty. After four years of active duty

as a Naval Aviator and five years in Private Industry as a lawyer, I joined the Foreign Service and served for 38 years before retiring two years ago. Most of my career, I worked in Political-Military Affairs and Arms Control including stints as

Deputy Chief of Mission to NATO, and press spokesman and member of the delegation to the Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris. I am a strong believer in nuclear deterrence and I know how central it is to NATO. During my last ten years of full time

service, I was privileged to be an Ambassador under Presidents Reagan, Bush and

Clinton, serving in turn as head of several U.S. delegations in Vienna and Geneva.

I was chief U.S. negotiator from start to finish of the CTBT. Currently, I’m a parttime consultant to the Department of State on national security matters.

As I understand your invitation, Mr. Chairman, I’m not here to give this committee the authoritative administration pitch on the CTBT. Secretary Albright and

others will do that. Rather, I’m here primarily as a resource to help recall and detail

21

key elements of the Treaty as they were fought out in the negotiating trenches between 1993 and signature in September 1996. I should say, however, that, not surprisingly, I fully support the Treaty believing that it is very much in the security

interests of the United States. It was carefully negotiated by me and my multiagency delegation throughout, always acting on fully cleared front channel instructions. I’m prepared to try to explain and defend all its key provisions, and if memory

serves to try to give you any background you might be interested in having.

In the short time I have in this opening statement, I will limit my discussion to

just three issues that I believe are sources of some confusion. Over the course of

the last few days, I have heard opinions expressed on the question of the CTBT’s

scope, its verification provisions, and its entry into force provisions. Some of the debate suggests to me that aspects of the negotiations have not yet been fully understood. I hope that I may help to shed some light on these issues. Lastly, I would

like to address the likely international repercussions should the Senate fail to give

its consent to ratification.

SCOPE OF THE CTBT

First, let me address the scope of the CTBT. As the name suggests, the Treaty

imposes a comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions, of any size, in any place.

I have heard some critics of the Treaty seek to cast doubt on whether Russia, in

the negotiation and signing of the Treaty, committed itself under treaty law to a

truly comprehensive prohibition of any nuclear explosion, including an explosion/experiment/event of even the slightest nuclear yield. In other words, did Russia agree

that hydronuclear experiments (which do produce a nuclear yield, although very,

very slight) would be banned, and that hydrodynamic explosions (which have no

yield because they do not reach criticality) would not be banned?

The answer is a categoric ‘‘yes.’’ The Russians, as well as the other weapon states,

did commit themselves. That answer is substantiated by the record of the negotiations at almost any level of technicality (and national security classification) that

is desired and permitted. More importantly for the current debate, it is also substantiated by the public record of statements by high level Russian officials as their

position on the question of thresholds evolved and fell into line with the consensus

that emerged.

It is important to recall that each of the five nuclear weapon states began the

CTBT negotiations desirous of a quiet understanding among themselves that some

low level nuclear explosions/experiments that did produce nuclear yield would be acceptable at least among themselves despite the broad treaty prohibition of ‘‘any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.’’ Until August of 1995,

the beginning of the final year of negotiations, the U.S. pushed for agreement on

a very low threshold of nuclear yield. Our position was not popular among the P–

5. Because of our greater test experience and technical capabilities, we could conceivably gain useful data from events of almost insignificant yield. The other four

argued that they needed a higher threshold in order to gain any useful data. In

some cases the thresholds they pushed for were politically impossible to square with

the notion of a comprehensive test ban. Russia for example insisted that if there

was going to be any threshold among the five it would have to allow for so-called

experiments with nuclear yields of up to ten tons of TNT equivalent.

The dispute among the five threatened to halt the negotiations as it became increasingly known to others that the five were squabbling with each other about how

much wiggle room would be left to them when they signed onto a text that said simply that nuclear explosions would be banned. As the arcane and jargon filled complexities of the nuclear testing communities in Novaya Zemyla, Lop Nor, Mururoa,

and Nevada became more widely understood, the nonnuclear states and broad public opinion increasingly insisted that the five should be allowed no tolerance—not

even for the smallest possible nuclear yields. A ban should be a ban. The answer

to this dilemma should be no threshold for anybody; i.e., zero means zero.

On August 11, 1995, President Clinton announced that the United States was revising its prior position on the threshold question and would henceforth argue to

the other four nuclear weapon states that no tests that produced a nuclear yield

should be allowed to anyone under the treaty. The Russians, who were miffed at

being taken by surprise, climbed down from their original position slowly and painfully. It took until April of 1996 before they signed onto the sweeping, categoric prohibition that is found in the final text. They never did like the ‘‘zero’’ word which

was bandied around in public (and actually used once by Boris Yeltsin). Instead,

they announced that they embraced a treaty with no threshold whatsoever. In the

confidential negotiations among the five nuclear weapon states that went on the entire time the broader CTBT negotiations continued, it was clearly understood and

22

that the boundary line—the ‘‘zero line’’ between what would be prohibited to all

under the treaty and what would not be prohibited—was precisely defined by the

question of nuclear yield or criticality. If what you did produced any yield whatsoever, it was not allowed. If it didn’t, it was allowed.

CTBT VERIFICATION REGIME

Another issue I would like to address is how the Treaty’s verification regime de- veloped and how it benefits the U.S. I will leave it to others more expert than I

to provide precise assessments of U.S. monitoring capabilities. The point I would

like to stress here is that the U.S. succeeded in the negotiations in getting virtually

everything the intelligence community and other parts of the government wanted

from the Treaty to strengthen our ability to detect and deter cheating and to seek

appropriate redress if cheating did occur. At the same time, we succeeded in getting

virtually everything the Defense Department and others wanted to ensure the protection of sensitive national security information. Let me give you several examples. Concerning the use of National Technical Means, the U.S. fought like mad to win acceptance of a state’s right to use evidence acquired through NTM, as it saw fit,

when requesting an on-site inspection. But we did not want to be forced to reveal

any information we believed would be better kept private. This was a ‘‘red line’’ position for the U.S. Many of our negotiating partners were adamantly opposed to giving the U.S. what they considered was a clear advantage and a license to spy. Yes,

it is true that the U.S. has satellite surveillance and intercept capabilities that surpass others’, but is it logical to penalize and ignore the evidence of the tall person

with good eyesight who can see the crime committed across the room? The U.S. position prevailed.

This Treaty provides for on-site inspections on request by any Treaty party and

with the approval of the Executive Council. No state can refuse an inspection. The

U.S. position from the start was that on-site inspections were critical to provide us

with added confidence that we could detect violations. And, if inspections were to

be effective, they had to be conducted absolutely as quickly as possible after a suspicion arose, using a range of techniques with as few restrictions as possible. However, the U.S. also had to be concerned with its defensive posture, as well as an

offensive one. It was necessary to ensure that sensitive national security information would be protected in the event of an inspection on U.S. territory. The U.S.

crafted a complicated, highly detailed, proposal that balanced our offensive and defensive needs. There was resistance from some of our negotiating partners. However, by the time we were through, the Treaty read pretty much like the original

U.S. paper put together jointly by the Departments of Defense, Energy and State,

the Intelligence Community, and the then-existing Arms Control Agency.

I would like to touch on the composition of the International Monitoring System—

four networks of different types of remote sensors encompassing 321 stations—because I have heard questions about its value added. The intelligence community,

working through the larger interagency community, had a list of requirements. They

wanted certain technologies and they wanted certain stations that would fill gaps

and complement existing national monitoring capabilities. The U.S. delegation delivered nearly everything requested. You have only to look at the coverage in Russia,

China and the Middle East, and the range of technologies, to appreciate the potential value added of the IMS.

Some people have criticized the Treaty because it does not provide for sanctions

against a state that has violated it. This criticism strikes me as ill informed. Consistent with traditional U.S. policy, I was under strict instructions to object to the

inclusion of sanctions. The U.S. view, which I believe this Committee strongly endorses, is that we will not agree to appoint an international organization to be not

just the investigator and special prosecutor, but also the judge, jury, and jailer. The

U.S. reserves for itself the authority to make judgements about compliance. And we

reserve for a higher body, the United Nations Security Council in which we have

a veto, the authority to levy sanctions or other measures. This is U.S. policy. This

is the Treaty’s policy.

ENTRY INTO FORCE REQUIREMENTS

The Treaty’s entry into force requirements have been the topic of much discussion

and even offered as a reason for why the U.S. should postpone its ratification. As

you know, the Treaty does not enter into force until 44 named states have deposited

their instruments of ratification. The named states are those that have nuclear research or reactor reactors and were members of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is true that this requirement erects a high barrier. It also, in my opinion, reflects a core reality from which there was no escape. The Treaty would not work

23

without the participation of the five nuclear weapon states and the three so-called

threshold states, India, Pakistan and Israel, who are not yet bound by the NPT. The

U.S. would not foreswear all future testing if China and Russia were not similarly

bound. China ties its adherence to India. India to Pakistan. And Israeli adherence

was demanded by all. In my opinion, it did not much matter what the exact formulation was. The reality stood that all eight were required. It does not follow that the U.S. can afford to wait until the other 43 have ratified

the Treaty. I have always believed that if you want something, you must get out

in front. This is the American way. We must lead, not follow meekly behind. It is

our burden and our advantage that other states will follow our lead. The day the

United States submitted its ratification to the Chemical Weapons Convention,

China and four other countries followed. Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia followed

shortly thereafter. What if the United States chooses not to ratify this treaty? I believe that my expe- rience in the CTBT negotiations and many years of representing the U.S. in multilateral diplomacy, render me competent to speculate on the international reaction

to such a possibility. I am not given to hyperbole, but I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that there will be jubilation among our foes and despair among our friends. Iran, Iraq,

North Korea and other states that harbor nuclear aspirations surely will feel the

constraints loosening. Our allies and friends will feel deserted and betrayed. The

global nuclear nonproliferation regime will be endangered. Some isolationists may

not believe this regime is worth protecting: that the U.S. can take care of the problem itself. But we need cooperation from states like Russia and our European allies

in controlling exports if we are to prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons.

France, for example, which has already ratified the CTBT, will be even less inclined

to heed U.S. pleas to contain Iraq and Iran if the U.S. walks away from the Treaty,

whose successful negotiations the U.S. led.

I am not an expert in South Asia policy, but I believe that if the U.S. fails to ratify the CTBT we should brace ourselves for more Indian tests. Pakistan, of course,

would match India test for test. China will not ratify the test ban if the U.S. does

not. We can expect China to ready itself to resume testing, especially if India tests.

And the chain reaction may not end there. Japan will face pressure to reconsider

its nuclear abstinence if China and India are developing nuclear forces. And Russia,

of course, remains a wild card.

I trust you have questions about the negotiating history or certain Treaty elements. I would be pleased to provide whatever information I can.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We are going to hopscotch on this. The

Senator from Minnesota will take his 5 minutes and then I will go

and Chuck Hagel has already gone and will come back. We have

to play a tag game here.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much. I will not be able to come

back, so I am going to stay and keep the hearing going until some

of the others come back so I have the opportunity to ask some

questions and again, I appreciate your being here and your testimony.

You know the original official negotiating position of the Clinton

administration in Geneva was to have a treaty which, one, had a

definite duration, 10 years; two, permitted low yield tests, 4

pounds, and was also verifiable. Those were some of the conditions

they set out with.

If the administration had negotiated a treaty along those lines,

I think it would have had a better chance of being ratified today.

Instead, I think we have ended up with a treaty of unlimited duration, zero yield, which is clearly unverifiable. So my question is,

and I’ll start with Ms. Kirkpatrick, do you think it was wise for the

Clinton administration to move so far from what was our original

position?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. No, Senator Grams, I do not. I think

the original position was a reasonable one, which provided—first of

all, it provided for verification and verifiability, but it also provided

24

for entering the treaty regime with the provision that it would not

last forever. We could see how it worked. We could see how other

nations behaved in that regime and if it didn’t work in 10 years,

it would self-destruct.

I think that was reasonable and workable, and I think this one

is not. It is too sweeping, it is too universal, it is binding for too

long, and it is unverifiable, as I said in my testimony.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Ledogar, maybe I would ask you to answer

the same question. Where the administration began with and

where we ended up with seems like a huge shift, and I know you

were a part of the negotiating. Maybe you could answer that question as well.

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Yes, I would be glad to. I agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick that it was a reasonable position. One problem was that it was totally non-negotiable. We had no support, not

a single country, not our best friends would support the so-called

‘‘10 year easy-out’’ proposal which was originally put on the table

by us. And that attitude sprang from a number of events, but I

would say that the then ongoing Nonproliferation Review and Extension Conference was very important in setting up a contrast

that was thrown back at the United States delegation. Critics said

that you are asking for the unlimited extension of the nonproliferation treaty and yet you will commit yourself only to 10 years’ duration of the test ban. And having charged up that hill many times

and taken quite a few hits, I was among those that asked Washington to reconsider. It was a tough decision but the interagency

finally decided that they could reconsider, with a set of safeguards,

and resort to the supreme national interest clause, which is very

important to the presentation, including to this committee, of the

whole package before it.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think it was a very unwise thing. It is a part

of the whole process that an agreement is far more important than

the content, that all you want is the agreement, and you’ll do anything to get the agreement, and this means that you have to

change a well-considered position because somebody else won’t

agree to it.

If we had adopted that philosophy and that practice during

President Reagan’s term, we would not have a treaty that bans all

intermediate range nuclear arms today, and longer range weapons,

the intermediate range. That was the—when we went in with the

zero option originally in October, I think it was, of 1981, we were

pretty well laughed off the international stage because we were

proposing something that everybody knew the Soviets would never

agree to, so it was clearly just a ploy by Mr. Reagan and on and

on and on and all the editorials poured out about what a terrible

thing it was to do. Seven years later, they agreed to it, word for

word, practically speaking. We held firm. We felt the content was

far more important than getting an agreement.

And here is exactly the opposite philosophy prevails. If you want

an agreement, you have to do what everybody else wants, regardless of how the content affects the United States or doesn’t affect

the United States. So I think it was a very unwise thing to do and

I think the results are before us.

25

Senator GRAMS. It seems I hear the same about the Kyoto treaty.

The agreement was worth more than the contents. Let me quote

what John Holliman—I think you know John Holliman, senior

Clinton arms controller, who criticized this. And some of the things

he had to say, and I quote, ‘‘the United States views on verification

are well known. We would have preferred stronger measures, especially in the decisionmaking process, for onsite inspections and in

numerous specific provisions affecting the practical implementation

of the inspection regime.

‘‘I feel no need to defend this view. The mission of the Conference

on Disarmament is not to erect political symbols, but to negotiate

enforceable agreements. That requires effective verification, not as

the preference of any party, but as the sine qua non of this body’s

work.

‘‘On verification overall, the treaty tilts toward the defense in a

way that has forced the United States to conclude reluctantly that

it can accept barely the balance that Ambassador Romaker has

crafted.’’ And I apologize, I don’t have my glasses on so it is hard

for me to see all this.

So there are some concerns there. Also, we have been discovering

defects within our own stockpiles right up until 1992 and I think,

Ms. Kirkpatrick, you have mentioned that we have been under a

ban for testing for many, many years now, so we are already far

behind in some of these areas. But finding defects up until 1992

in the test ban.

So one might wonder why since 1992 not a single warhead has

been relined, in other words, removed from the inventory because

of concerns over performance and safety. Is it because somehow by

magic our stockpile self-perfected in 1992, or is it that we cannot

discover defects without nuclear testing itself. Ms. Kirkpatrick?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Grams, I think it is uncertain, at best, how effective the various kinds of simulations are or

will be. The efforts that we make without testing, without explosive

testing, to verify the reliability and condition of our stockpiles yield

uncertain results and I think we cannot have confidence in them

at the level that we could previously have confidence.

Senator GRAMS. Again, without being able to verify all the testing, Mr. Weinberger, can we count on having a reliable stockpile

without testing?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No, we cannot, and even if we wait until 2007

or 2008 when these new computers come online, as the Secretary

of Defense testified yesterday and today, you will still not have the

kind of reliability that you get from explosive testing. It is a substitute for it. It is something less good. And that is what the treaty

does, it forces everybody to use, if they all complied with it, to use

something that is less effective than the most effective method of

testing for reliability so it doesn’t ban testing, it doesn’t ban proliferation, it doesn’t ban anything except the most effective means

of testing.

Senator GRAMS. But that is only for some of the most sophisticated. When you have some less sophisticated nuclear weapons you

wouldn’t need this type of testing, would you, so it still puts us at

a disadvantage.

26

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, yes, and it is the old story about an inaccurate nuclear weapon can still do an enormous amount of damage

and that is why you want to have them tested, to make sure that

they will do the job for which they are intended. It is a horrible

job, but our deterrence, our safety depends on it.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Ledogar, I read an article earlier this week

that Mr. Adamov, who heads up the nuclear programs in Russia,

and when Mr. Weinberger mentioned about the new computers

coming online, the most sophisticated computers, the report basically stated that somehow the administration had given him the

impression that the United States, if they would sign this treaty,

would provide them with these type of computers in order for them

to do similar type of tests on computers. Now, these are things,

computers we do not want to sell.

We have had many arguments on the floor of the Senate about,

worried about having this kind of technology stolen from us at the

labs, but yet are we willing to give this information to the Russians

in order for them to do computerized testing without doing actual

testing? Was that part of the plan at all, or is this report in error?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. The report is not in error insofar as it reflects what the Russian general said. It is in error insofar as it suggests that the United States would even consider giving those sophisticated computers to the Russians. Now, I have had that on the

authority of very senior officials at the Department of Energy. I

was not on the trip, and I only have personal knowledge of the

news stories.

Senator GRAMS. So you are saying this administration would not

commit and has not, behind closed doors, indicated to the Russians

that we would share this type of computer information with them.

We have not done that.

Ambassador LEDOGAR. That is correct. However, Senator, I must

say that I am not technically an administration spokesman. I am

a contractor now.

Senator GRAMS. Maybe we can ask Madeleine Albright this afternoon.

Ambassador LEDOGAR. This afternoon you have the opportunity.

If I may say so, with all due respect, if I believed, as Secretary

Weinberger does, that the stockpile is already or will quickly in the

future become unreliable, I certainly would not support the treaty,

but I believe the opposite, and I think that the bulk of the evidence—provided that the science-based stockpile stewardship program continues to be funded, and that the annual certifications

with the cooperation of the Congress continue to take place—gives

the assurance that, should there be any problem in the future, it

will be discovered, and that if it is discovered, the appropriate steps

will be taken, and it is on that basis that this administration and

the bulk of supporters of ratification believe that it is safe for us

to go forward without explosive testing.

The amount of other testing that goes on is stupendous, and very

expensive. This afternoon you will have Dr. Garwin, and I would

hope that you could put to a highly qualified nuclear physicist like

him the questions and get the assurances that are the basis for my

beliefs.

27

Senator GRAMS. Thank you. We have many experts on both

sides. That is what makes this debate so much harder to understand. I have to turn the gavel over to Senator Hagel, and also I

would like to ask to place statements by the current laboratory directors in support of testing into the record, if I could, at the same

time.

[The statements referred to follow:]

FORMER LABORATORY DIRECTORS OPPOSE THE CTBT

‘‘I urge you to oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). No previous

Administration, either Democrat or Republican, ever supported the unverifiable,

zero yield, indefinite duration CTBT now before the Senate. The reason for this is

simple. Under a long-duration test ban, confidence in the nuclear stockpile will

erode for a variety of reasons.’’

ROGER BATZEL, Director Emeritus, response to a request for views by

Chairman Helms, October 5, 1999.

‘‘Without nuclear testing, confidence in the stockpile will decline. The U.S. capability to develop weapons will be degraded by the eventual loss of all nuclear test

experienced weapons experts who developed the stockpile.’’

‘‘. . . For the U.S., the CTBT would be a ‘catch–22’: without nuclear testing, there

is a growing uncertainty in our estimates of stockpile reliability; without nuclear

testing, experts cannot quantify this uncertainty.’’

JOHN NUCKOLLS, Director Emeritus, response to a request for views

from Chairman Helms, September 29, 1999.

‘‘I have seen and studied a copy of your letter you wrote to President Clinton on

January 21. I was impressed by your statements, and I am happy you made them.’’

‘‘. . . The point I must make is that, in the long run, knowledge and ability to

produce nuclear weapons will be widely available. To believe that, in the long run,

proliferation of nuclear weapons is avoidable is wishful thinking and dangerous. It

is the more dangerous because it is a point of view that the public is eager to accept.

Thus politicians are tempted to gain popularity by supporting false hopes.’’

EDWARD TELLER, Director Emeritus, letter to Chairman Helms, February 4, 1998.

‘‘Of course, if nuclear testing were allowed, we would gain greater confidence in

the new tools. We could validate these tools more readily, as well as validate some

of the new remanufacturing techniques. One to two tests per year would serve such

a function quite well. Yields of 10 kt would be sufficient in most cases. Yields of

1 kt would be of substantial help.’’

S.S. HECKER, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, response

to Senator Kyl, September 24, 1997.

‘‘From a purely technical standpoint, some level of nuclear testing would be a useful addition to the SSMP to address the effects of aging-related changes on weapon

safety and reliability, and to validate the capabilities of the next generation of weapon scientists and their experimental and computational facilities, particularly in addressing hydrodynamic phenomena related to boosted primaries.’’

C. BRUCE TARTER, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, response to Senator Kyl, September 29, 1997.

‘‘A strong Stockpile Stewardship and Maintenance Program is necessary to underwrite confidence. A program of 500-ton experiments would significantly reduce the

technical risks.’’

Joint statement by Laboratory Directors, 1995.

Senator HAGEL. Senator, thank you. Let me add my welcome to

our three highly admired and distinguished witnesses. I would like

to ask each of you a question. Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Secretary Weinberger, you obviously have laid out a rather compelling

sense of why this treaty should be defeated, and with that compelling testimony I would ask each of you what, then, should we do?

28

What is the answer? Rewrite a treaty, start anew, do not pay attention to it?

You lay out the threats of this new borderless world we live in

rather directly, and in a compelling way. I think what we need to

do now is, as we deal with the immediacy of this issue, move forward. We must take this out of the political swamp that it has

found itself in and deal with the relevant issues, and that is, how

do we build a better world a safer world for mankind? I would be

most interested in your thoughts, Madam Ambassador.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Hagel, thank you very much.

Do you mean not simply with regard to nuclear weapons, but a better world, period?

Senator HAGEL. Well, any advice you can proffer, but I would

like you to stay focused on this, because we hear great debate

about how this is a bad treaty and we should defeat it and drive

a stake through its heart, but what, then, should we do?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think there is a kind of dynamic

that takes over in negotiations when they are underway, but

whether that dynamic is more helpful or more hurtful varies in different circumstances. I think that it would be useful, frankly, to go

back to the beginning. I think the negotiating positions which have

been described, the original positions of this administration, were

sound negotiating principles. They were sounder.

I have spent a good deal of time negotiating in the U.N. context,

in situations where you are seeking agreement of 185 countries, or

195 countries. What happens is that one gives more and more—if

one is not very alert, very determined, and frankly, ready to end

without an agreement, It is absolutely essential to be aware of this

in negotiations on a subject as important as this.

I think one must be prepared to end such a negotiation with no

agreement—on the CTBT, for example, and I think had the administration done that, had they entered the negotiation with that determination, and clarity about their bottom-line principles—the

three principles we heard described, we might not have gotten the

treaty, or we might have gotten a better one. I do not think it matters much whether there is a CTBT in which 190 countries have

signed on, because most of those countries are not ever going to be

players in the world of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Most of

those countries really have no stake in the subject, except the stake

of fallout and the pollution of the globe, that everyone has.

But they constitute a major influence in the negotiations themselves because all of the countries, or virtually all of the countries

who are member States of the U.N. are also state partners in the

treaty. The structure of the U.N. becomes important too, and so do

the various blocs, the nonaligned bloc, for example, the G–77 take

bloc positions, even though most of their members have no direct

involvement in these issues of these questions, but they exercise

significant influence in the negotiating process.

Senator HAGEL. Are you saying we should go back and renegotiate?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I would go back and renegotiate. I

would go back and renegotiate on the basis of some different principles, and one of those principles would be an understanding with

29

both parties that any treaty which we brought from the negotiation

might not have all the members as signatories.

What would be essential would be that the nuclear powers be

signatories, and maybe a few others. I am not saying only nuclear

powers should be able to participate, but they should be the principal participants in any negotiation. All the countries in the U.N.

really do not need to participate in such negotiations, I think you

have a better chance of getting a better product if you undertake

the negotiations on that basis, and in that spirit.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Secretary Weinberger.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, sir, if your goal is simply to get an agreement, then probably you would have to do what we did here, which

was to give up a soundly considered, carefully crafted position, give

it up easily, give every essential element of it, just so we can get

an agreement. This is the syndrome that bothers me, because the

agreement then becomes far more important than the context, and

I think that we did have a well-considered position we went in

with. If we could not get anybody to agree with it, well then, so

be it, we would not get an agreement, but you would have a lot better than a bad agreement which prevents us from doing the necessary things we have to do to give the greatest assurance we possibly can that this nuclear deterrent works. Your margin for error

here, Mr. Chairman, is extraordinarily small. You are not allowed

to be very wrong about a guess as to whether this works or not,

and that would lead me to conclude that we should have the most

effective means of testing available to us.

We are not preventing other countries from testing. We are simply preventing ourselves, and if they comply themselves with having a less effective method of testing, if you really want to see, I

think the most fundamental way to deal with this problem, then

I think what we should do is what we should have done and what

we started to do in 1983, and that is to develop an effective defense

against these weapons. The knowledge that there is absolutely no

defense, and that we remain committed to a treaty that forbids any

effective defense, the ABM Treaty—which incidentally the Soviets

started to violate within 2 weeks of the time they signed it—then

you have the greatest encouragement to other countries, rogue

countries, particularly, to feel that if they get this weapon and

there is not going to be any defense against them, they will then

be in a position to overcome their smallness, or their insignificance,

otherwise in order to have the kind of military capability that will

enable them to engage in nuclear blackmail.

So the best method of all to deal with this problem is to concentrate everything we have got on getting an effective defense

against it, not some half-hearted attempts to satisfy a few polls or

something of that kind, but a genuinely effective method of defending against these weapons.

It can be done. We finally had a test that demonstrates one

method of doing it. We lost 10 years between 1993 and the present

time, which we could have been working on all of these things and

which we have not done. We started in 1983, we got a program in

1983, and we remained fully committed to an ABM Treaty which

absolutely forbids any kind of effective defense. Defense is the answer to this kind of thing.

30

Senator HAGEL. My friend and colleague is up, and so if it is OK,

Mr. Ambassador, I will hold my questions.

Senator BIDEN. That is OK. Go ahead.

Senator HAGEL. Senator Biden, thank you very much. Just a

quick question to both Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Secretary

Weinberger. The consequences of the United States defeating this

treaty, as Ambassador Ledogar referenced, as we have heard an

awful lot about, which I think there is some relevancy attached to

that, the consequences around the world, would you give me a succinct answer? Is it real? Is it not real? Is it important if we defeat

this? If we go ahead on Tuesday, what consequences will there be

for the United States in the future of efforts to deal with proliferation?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Hagel, I truly believe that the

consequences would be very much less than almost all of the extravagant statements that I have heard in the last 48 hours about

what would happen if the U.S. did not ratify it.

Most countries are simply not that concerned about our policies.

That is just a fact. We do not have the kind of influence over the

policies and behavior of other countries that the comments are predicting, these dire consequences for U.S.-nonratification suggest.

I just think they are mistaken. They should go to the U.N. and

try influencing a few countries to support votes and policies on

highly worthy subjects, and you will find out very quickly how really impotent we often are in securing a large number of other countries’ support, and following our example.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Secretary.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, Senator, I agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick completely. I think that the consequences will be a certain

amount of editorial hand-wringing, but nothing that is in any sense

substantive. Does anybody believe, as it was said this morning,

that all these constraints that now bind people will be gone? What

constraints does Kim Song-il feel under, what constraints does Saddam Hussein feel under? If they can get nuclear weapons they are

going to get them.

They have some. They have some of the components. They are

not going to let anything like this stand in their way. The United

States reaction I think would be basically, if we defeated the treaty

on the grounds that have all been put forth over the course of the

debate, I think the basic reaction among people who are realistic

about such things would be that the United States has declined to

bind itself to having an ineffective deterrent.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Time is short. Maybe we will get a

second round here, but I thought one of the purposes, and it may

not meet, from your perspective, I say to you, Mr. Secretary, and

you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, was to not merely deal with the

North Koreas, but to make sure that—or not make sure, impact on

the ability of China, for example, to move to a MIRV system to be

able to effectively, as you worried about, deal with what stolen data

they have.

You referenced the Cox committee, Ms. Kirkpatrick, which I

think is perfectly legitimate, and you indicated that one of the reaVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
31

sons you were opposed to this treaty, among many—you named

many—was that what will happen here is that, look at what the

Chinese did, and you cited the Cox report.

Well, the Cox report says, and this is a quote, found that, quote,

‘‘the PRC does not likely need additional physical tests for its older

thermonuclear warhead designs, but since signing the CTBT in

1996, the PRC has faced a new challenge in maintaining its modern thermonuclear warheads without physically testing,’’ and they

go on to state that ‘‘given the limited number of nuclear tests the

PRC has conducted, the PRC likely needs additional empirical information about the advanced thermonuclear weapons performance.’’

And it goes on to point out that unless they can test well beyond

1 kiloton, which we are confident we can pick up, they cannot effectively use the stuff they stole, so it seems to me you are arguing

against your own interest here, if you are worried about the Chinese being able to use this technology, and every one in our intelligence community suggests we are able to detect the kind of yield

they would have to engage in to be able to use it.

Then one of two things happens. Either we observe, and they go

ahead and they sign—by the way, the treaty does not come into

force unless they sign, so unless they sign, and among others, it

does not come into force no matter what we do, but if they sign,

and if the only way the experts with whom I have spoken—and I,

like you, I have spent hundreds of hours on this.

I have spoken to the lab directors. I have spoken to all the folks

who know a lot more than all four of us, or all 15 of us, or all of

us in this room about the detail of this process. They all acknowledge in order to be able to use it, they have got to be able to test

it. The way they would have to test it, we can figure it out, so that

leaves them in the position of either signing and then violating, in

which case article 7 allows us, or safeguard 7 allows us to withdraw from the treaty, period, boom, withdraw from the treaty. We

do not have to do anything else. We do not have to ask anybody,

do anything.

And then on the issue of—and I am doing this because we only

have 6 minutes, and I will get to specific questions in the second

round if we have one.

On the issue you both raise of the inability to modernize, you

point out that this would limit our ability to modernize. Well, we

are—does anyone doubt that our sophistication is exponentially

greater than any other country in the world in terms of our ability

to make quantum leaps in modernization in the sophisticated field

of strategic weapons? I know of no one who ever has made that assertion, including the three of you.

Therefore, if we are constrained from modernizing, it is overwhelmingly the case every other nation is even more constrained

from modernizing.

Now, the one thing you have both educated me about in your testimony over the years is the degree to which a missile defense technology will function is in direct proportion to how sophisticated the

array of offensive weapons coming in is. There is no one I have

ever, ever, ever spoken to, including all the scientists out of your

administration, and continuing in this administration, who has

32

said that we are not better prepared if we do not have multiple

warhead reentry vehicles aimed at us to counter them with a missile defense.

That is one of the reasons why you did a brilliant job in START

in moving along and setting in process the idea that we would no

longer have multiple warheads on tops of missiles.

Now, you all are saying here, if we do not have this treaty we

acknowledge the ability of the sophisticated nations to MIRV their

systems increases, add a minimum increases, I would argue increases gigantically, but increases, and yet you are now saying

what you should be relying on is a missile defense.

It seems to me if you want a missile defense, and a missile defense that is likely to work in the relatively near term, the fewer

nations that are able to MIRV, the better off we all are.

And so my question is this. Do any of the three of you think that

the ability for the nuclear States to move to MIRV’ed capacity they

do not possess is harder or easier, under this treaty? Just that one

question, MIRV’ed capability.

Do you think it is harder or easier, because we all know, as you

know, most people do not know, to MIRV you have got to take

these big old ugly things, make them lighter, make them smaller,

make them more compact, make the yield of the plutonium package able to be boosted in a way as a consequence of the ignition

package, as most people in here would know it, and that is a very

sophisticated process that not a single scientist I have ever spoken

to says can be done without nuclear testing, and nuclear testing in

yields that are detectable.

And so explain to me how it makes sense, if you want a missile

defense system, to be against this treaty.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, that is a perfectly good argument, but

it overlooks one point and that is the sophisticated knowledge

which you speak of so correctly has been stolen.

Senator BIDEN. But it cannot be used if it cannot be tested.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes, it can be used. The new light warhead we

spent years and millions of dollars has now been given to China

one way or another, and they are able to use it perfectly well, so

for this treaty to have any effect of banning, to have any effect on

a country that wants to develop this kind of capability, the question is, it is irrelevant.

Senator BIDEN. For the record, if you could submit the name of

one scientist——

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go ahead, and you take 6 more minutes.

Senator BIDEN. I just want to—if I could just followup with 10

seconds, if for the record, and not now, you can name one scientist

of consequence who will tell the committee or you that they can use

the stolen package without testing it, if you can submit one serious

scientist who will tell me that, I would appreciate it very much,

and you have time. We are probably not going to vote soon.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Your assumption is they are prevented from

testing if we sign this treaty, and my assumption is that if they

want to develop—if they are going to use any method they have to

do it, and if we find out they have broken the treaty, Senator, we

pass resolutions, we say it is a terrible thing, editorials are written,

and they go right on doing what they want to do.

33

Senator BIDEN. So your primary concern is, we will not have the

will?

Mr. WEINBERGER. The primary concern is not to give them the

capability of doing that whether there is a treaty or not, and unfortunately a lot of that has already been done.

Senator BIDEN. I have great respect for you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I share the respect for you, but I think your

argument is totally full of holes where the security of the country

is concerned.

Senator BIDEN. I have not found a single scientist to take issue

with what I said. If you can produce them, I would be delighted.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to be fair to everybody, including the witnesses, and Secretary Weinberger, if you wish to add anything, you

go right ahead.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you to have adequate time to respond to

the various questions, so go right ahead.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you. That was the point that I wished

to make, that it is very imperative that we try to get a defense,

it is very imperative that we recognize that in the world in which

we live, rogue countries, countries like North Korea and Iraq and

others, are certainly going to try to get every capability they can,

and China, as we already know, has one way or another acquired

this extremely valuable technology, and will certainly make every

effort to use it, regardless of whether we do or do not sign this

treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I have got something I am going to say on

that, but the Senator from California has been waiting and waiting, so you proceed with your time.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I am glad

to be here in this committee on a very important issue, and I think

just following up on the last exchange between Senator Biden and

the Honorable Caspar Weinberger, I would say that listening to

Mr. Weinberger, my sense of it is he is saying, well, we sign the

treaty, and then China goes ahead and does these tests, and what

have we gained?

The bottom line is, if they sign the treaty and they break the

treaty, we can get out of the treaty, so I think what is important

for us, and it sort of gets back to what Senator Hagel was driving

at, is what do we really do to make our people safer from this

threat?

Now that we have won the cold war, proliferation is a very important issue. I am sure we all agree on that. But we have a disagreement on how we get to the place we want to get, where our

people are safer.

Now, after reading both sides, and I have to say as I look at this,

it is sort of a sad situation, it seems to me that Republicans are

lining up mostly opposed—there is a few exceptions, and there is

a bipartisan group who supports, and I am going to go into who

those people are.

I worry about our foreign policy becoming partisan, either side,

because the one thing I have noticed in all the years I have been

in Congress, it has been a very long time, and I would say to my

34

friend Caspar Weinberger, we remember each other from the days

I was on the Defense Committee over on the House side.

I always believed that military policy, foreign policy needed to be

bipartisan, and we were so strong when we were, and I worry that

this argument is taking another shape and form, and I am very

concerned about that, because I think it weakens us, and I want

to talk about what weakens us in the world. It is when we are divided, one from the other, and so I hope we can pull together at

some point, however we dispose of the matter that is before us.

But as I look at the people who are for this treaty, and I read

the comments of our President and our Vice President, but in addition to that, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General

Shelton, who says he supports it because he believes that those six

important conditions strengthen us, they make us—he says it

would reduce conflict and reduce tensions.

And former Joint Chief of Staff under Ronald Reagan, William

Crowe, supports the treaty and says that the safeguards will

strengthen U.S. intelligence, and John Shalikashvili supports it.

He signed a statement that said it would strengthen our ability to

verify.

Colin Powell, former chief of Staff under George Bush supports

it, and he signed a very powerful statement.

Thirty-two physics Nobel laureates support it from institutions

from all over this country: Princeton, Brown, University of Washington, UC-Berkeley, MIT, Illinois Institute of Technology, Cornell,

Columbia, Bell Labs, Gaithersburg, Florida State, University of

Texas, Harvard-Smithsonian, Ohio State—and I ask unanimous

consent to put this statement that they made into the record.

Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

A LETTER FROM PHYSICS NOBEL LAUREATES

TO SENATORS OF THE 106TH CONGRESS:

We urge you to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The United States signed and ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. In

the years since, the nation has played a leadership role in actions to reduce nuclear

risks, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty extension, the ABM Treaty, STARTs

I and II, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations. Fully informed technical studies have concluded that continued nuclear testing is not required to retain

confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of nuclear weapons in the

United States’ stockpile, provided science and technology programs necessary for

stockpile stewardship are maintained.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is central to future efforts to halt the spread

of nuclear weapons. Ratification of the Treaty will mark an important advance in

uniting the world in an effort to contain and reduce the dangers of nuclear arms.

It is imperative that the CTBT be ratified.

PHILIP W. ANDERSON—Princeton University—1977 Nobel Prize

HANS A. BETHE—Cornell University—1967 Nobel Prize

NICOLAAS BLOEMBERGEN—Harvard University—1981 Nobel Prize

OWEN CHAMBERLAIN—UC, Berkeley—1959 Nobel Prize

STEVEN CHU—Stanford University—1997 Nobel Prize

LEON N. COOPER—Brown University—1972 Nobel Prize

HANS DEHMELT—University of Washington—1989 Nobel Prize

VAL L. FITCH—Princeton University—1980 Nobel Prize

JEROME FRIEDMAN—MIT—1990 Nobel Prize

DONALD A. GLASER—UC, Berkeley—1960 Nobel Prize

SHELDON GLASHOW—Harvard University—1979 Nobel Prize

35

HENRY W. KENDALL—MIT—1990 Nobel Prize

LEON M. LEDERMAN—Illinois Institute of Technology—1988 Nobel Prize

DAVID M. LEE—Cornell University—1996 Nobel Prize

T. D. LEE—Columbia University—1957 Nobel Prize

DOUGLAS D. OSHEROFF—Stanford University—1996 Nobel Prize

ARNO PENZIAS—Bell Labs—1978 Nobel Prize

MARTIN L. PERL—Stanford University—1995 Nobel Prize

WILLIAM PHILLIPS—Gaithersburg—1997 Nobel Prize

NORMAN F. RAMSEY—Harvard University—1989 Nobel Prize

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON—Cornell University—1996 Nobel Prize

BURTON RICHTER—Stanford University—1976 Nobel Prize

ARTHUR L. SCHAWLOW—Stanford University—1981 Nobel Prize

J. ROBERT SCHRIEFFER—Florida State University—1972 Nobel Prize

MEL SCHWARTZ—Columbia University—1988 Nobel Prize

CLIFFORD G. SHULL—MIT—1994 Nobel Prize

JOSEPH H. TAYLOR, JR.—Princeton University—1993 Nobel Prize

DANIEL C. TSUI—Princeton University—1998 Nobel Prize

CHARIES TOWNES—UC, Berkeley—1964 Nobel Prize

STEVEN WEINBERG—Univ. of Texas, Austin—1979 Nobel Prize

ROBERT W. WILSON—Harvard-Smithsonian—1978 Nobel Prize

KENNETH G. WILSON—Ohio State University—1982 Nobel Prize

Senator BOXER. I think this is important. The labs all support it,

the current people in the labs, and the other thing I am trying to

search for as I look at who falls in each place, who has been really

influenced by the cold war, and who is ready to get beyond it into

where we are today, and I think we have to take the lessons of the

cold war and be very, very wise about what we learn, but also understand that it is a new day, and we have to look at things in,

therefore, I think a different way. I want to say a comment about Ms. Kirkpatrick’s statements on the President, because I support her right to her views, and she

has very eloquently stated those, and she is very strong on those,

but I also feel I want to put my strong views on the record when

she said, and I am trying to remember exactly. The record will

show. I believe she said the President is not defending the people

against the most important threat of nuclear weapons, and I think

that is a fairly safe repetition of what she said. Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. No, I did not, Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Well, we will go back to the record, but I would say that she said that his policies on nuclear weapons are not—because he is not doing enough on the missile defense, but we will

get back to the exact words, but it was something like that, and

I just want to say in the record that it was under this administration that we had the first successful test of a national missile defense, on October 2.

It is under this administration that we have the stockpile stewardship program, which we are spending $4.5 billion. I do not think

any President who did not believe we needed to retain our nuclear

deterrence would spend $4.5 billion in a time when we are so much

worried about expenditures, so that started 3 years ago.

We are spending $32 billion a year on our nuclear arsenal, and

so I really just wanted to take issue with that statement, and if I

am incorrect in your exact words, well, the clerk will get those

words back to us.

But I worry about that, because I think every President, Republican or Democrat, goes to sleep at night and the one worry on his,

and perhaps some day her mind will be the safety of the American

people. I think this President is no different.

36

Now, we may disagree on how we get from A to B, but I guess

my question to the opponents of our treaty, our distinguished panel

who oppose it, what do they take issue with John Shalikashvili,

what do they take issue with Colin Powell, what do they take specific issue with William Crowe, what do they take specific issue

with the lab directors, what do they take specific issue with the

Nobel laureates, because I think what I will do is take that critique

and send it back to these fine people, who I think reflect bipartisanship in their position and want to see if they feel your points

are valid and they would change their opinion on the treaty. That

is my question.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want somebody to answer it?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I would like to. I would like to begin

with a comment about the spirit of bipartisanship. Senator Boxer,

I might say that I have testified before the Senate several times,

and the House, repeatedly during these long years of President

Clinton’s tenure, and I have almost always done so in support of

some administration policy.

I, for example, strongly supported NATO enlargement, and took

a lead in the support of the administration’s policies on NATO enlargement. I supported the Dayton Accords again, and took a lead

in the support of the Dayton Accords, and the deployment of U.S

troops in support of the Dayton Accords. I very strongly supported

the administration’s decision to engage in Kosovo, and met repeatedly and testified repeatedly in the House and the Senate on that

issue.

And so I would first just like to say that I have personally engaged in more bipartisan, if you will, foreign policy in the last 6

years than almost anyone I know. I cannot support the administration’s policy with regard to the CTBT because I really very deeply

disagree.

Let me just state what I said.

Senator BOXER. I do have it in front of me.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. You know what I said was, it is disturbing to me that President Clinton has, after talking about the

fact that virtually everyone—and I cited the Rumsfeld and Cox

Commission reports, but there are others that agreed that there

has been really a serious proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and capacities, and of leakage of missiles, and missile technology, and that what I suggested was that President Clinton has

not given—in the face of all of these threats, the President has not

been mobilized to make the defense of the American people against

these proliferating threats a top priority.

Now, why do I say that? I say that because I believe if he made

it a top priority, he would have long since moved to the support of

an effective missile defense, because there is really only one way

to defend the American people against these proliferating threats,

and it is by an effective missile defense. This treaty will not defend

the American people.

Senator BOXER. Well, we just disagree on that.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair cannot tolerate a debate here. She

made her statement. You challenged part of it, and I thought she

was entitled to time to state what she says she really said, and I

think she is right about that.

37

Now, I will give you another minute.

Senator BOXER. That is very sweet. I will wait until my friend

finishes her statement.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I have completed.

Senator BOXER. Well, I think again, what is highly disturbing to

me is that obviously there are always other ways to defend a country.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. No, there are not.

Senator BOXER. Excuse me. There are differences in view. There

are some people who do believe you can defend this country if you

have this treaty. That is why the leaders of the military in this

country support it, because they say in their very own words in

their statements that it will, in fact, lessen the threat of war, so

to say that President Clinton has not put this as a top priority simply because he does not agree with your opinion on how to protect

the people, it seems to me to be a subjective statement that is unfair and I think is not good for this country, to have that kind of

personal attack. That is my view.

But we disagree, and I fully respect your right to your view on

that, as I am sure you respect my right to disagree with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Thank you.

Now, I have not had any time. Much has been said today, Mr.

Secretary, about the Cox report, and what the Cox report has said,

and what the Cox report did not say, and I think several liberties

have been taken with what the Cox report did not say, but let me

read what the Cox report did say, according to Christopher Cox,

the chairman of the Select Committee.

He said, ‘‘the Select Committee did, however, make findings that

may be relevant to the Senate’s consideration of arguments that

America’s long history of nuclear tests obviates the need for new

tests, and that preventing other Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

signatories from testing will cement America’s technological advantage.’’

Then he goes on to say, ‘‘in fact, because of the vulnerability of

U.S. nuclear test data to theft through espionage, the PRC may be

able to obviate or reduce the need for its own further testing, relying instead on the American data.’’ Now, that is what you were

saying.

Now, on October 5, Robert Bell, at a press conference—and I do

not know him, but he apparently is one of the spinmeisters down

at the White House. He cited the Select Committee’s report in support of the administration’s position that the Senate should ratify

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Now, I understand also that the administration officials have

cited the report in their briefings to Senate staff. Then he goes on

to say, the Select Committee—that is, the Cox report—‘‘the Select

Committee made no recommendation for or against ratification of

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.’’

Now, I am running into this all the time, who said this, and

everybody’s for the treaty, et cetera, et cetera, and those few who

are against it, well, I have got a list this long of people, great

Americans who have served this country well, and I do not like the

inference that there is something lacking in their patriotism.

38

Let me continue with the Christopher Cox letter about the Cox

report. He says, thus, ‘‘the relative technological advantages the

United States enjoyed by virtue of our extensive testing may be

lost as a result of our adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty regime in such circumstances.’’ Now, if that is an endorsement of the treaty, I fail to recognize it.

Then he goes on to say, ‘‘furthermore, if the PRC has acquired

U.S. nuclear weapons computer codes, it implicitly possesses the

ability to evaluate the limitations of U.S. nuclear weapons systems.

This information can be used to inform future PRC missile defenses. Without the ability to test, the United States will be unable

to modernize its own nuclear arsenal to avert such defenses, and

will be forced to rely on warhead designs whose limitations and

shortcomings are well-understood by potential adversaries that

may in the future not only include the PRC, but also other countries to which it may proliferate.’’

All right. Other findings of the Select Committee, and this is

Chris Cox, the Cox report, that has been referred to here so often.

He says, other findings of the Select Committee, that is, the Cox

report as it is popularly known, ‘‘other findings are relevant to the

question of whether the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is in the

case of the PRC verifiable.

‘‘The Select Committee found that the PRC has acquired classified information about nuclear testing using miniaturized fusion

explosions. This inertial confinement technique would be of special

usefulness to the PRC should it choose to violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.’’

And finally, he says the Select Committee found that ‘‘the PRC

could further accelerate its nuclear development violating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and testing surreptitiously.’’

Do you have any comment about that?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think there is no question as to the correctness of the Cox committee’s findings and conclusions with respect

to that. The problem, again, we keep going back to is, our nuclear

stockpile necessarily degrades, it necessarily has problems with it

as it ages, as do all weapons systems. Individual components can

be picked out, they can take them apart, they can find one that is

apparently visibly not in the kind of condition it should be. It is

replaced. Whether that replacement part is going to work with the

rest or not, we will not know, and you have the same changes that

have occurred.

There is also a great many more safety factors that can be put

into nuclear warheads that we do not have in our older systems,

and when they are added to the newer systems, or when they are

built in, they need to be tested, too.

All of this is an extraordinarily complex process, and it consists

of thousands, as I say, of moving parts, and it is not known whether many computers that are around now, and I do not think even

the ones we are waiting for in 2007 and 2008, will be able to tell

us whether it actually will work under these kinds of conditions.

So if we want to have a nuclear deterrent, and apparently everybody agrees we should have one, or at least most people, then we

have to know that it works, and if we want to know that it works,

we have to test it. We have to test it in the most effective means

39

possible, and this treaty denies us the right to test it in the most

effective means possible.

We have stopped testing. Prior to the time we stopped testing,

Dr. Barker, who served with me in the Defense Department, redlined—that is, he took offline a number of nuclear weapons six

times prior to the time we stopped testing because, he said, they

were no longer reliable, and they had to be repaired. They had to

be fixed as a result of the test.

Since the testing ended there have been no weapons redlined.

The assumption seems to be that since we stopped testing everything is fine. Well, I cannot share that assumption. I do not think

that is correct, and I do not want to take a chance.

You just are not allowed any margin for error in this business,

Mr. Chairman, and this treaty gives a very large margin for error,

not only to us, but to any other country that has the stockpile or

hopes to acquire them, and certainly when we deny ourselves the

right to defend against them, the very least we can do is to make

sure that our own offensive weapons are in working order.

The CHAIRMAN. One other point, and this is a point of personal

privilege. I have known Ambassador Kirkpatrick a long time. I

have never, never known her to shade the truth or to be less than

anything explicit in what she has said. If she is anything, she is

very, very clear in what she writes and what she says and I don’t

mean to offend anybody, but I have got to take up for Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, on a similar point of personal

privilege, I share that judgment. I disagree with her judgment. She

is straightforward, on point. I think she is wrong sometimes, but

I do not doubt for a moment her integrity. I do not doubt for a moment her clarity and I do not doubt for a moment that she means

what she says.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I disagree with her. I think she is wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do not think she is wrong.

Senator BIDEN. I know that. That is the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, since I have not had any time before, I

want to go one step further in a question and that would be for the

Ambassador, who after all, was, I believe you were the chief negotiator for this treaty, were you not?

Now, I have heard over and over, sir, repeated claims by the administration that the CTBT before the Senate is, and I quote, ‘‘the

longest sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control,’’

end of quote. Now, if there is anything expansive, that declaration

seems to me to fit, but that is neither here nor there. Then it goes

on to say, that it has been the negotiating objective of every President since Eisenhower, they say.

Now, sir, we both know that that really is not so. Why is the administration making such inaccurate statements when not a single

President before the current one ever sought a zero yielding definite duration CTBT? Can you explain it to me?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. I would like to begin by agreeing that

that is pretty colorful language and easy to pick apart. I think that

what the authors are trying to recall is that approaches to the

question of nuclear testing, and trying to curb it and to halt it,

40

have gone back many, many years. And the famous statements by

President Eisenhower at the end of his administration in connection with the passage of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the

Threshold Testing Treaty and so forth.

But I wonder if I could, while I have the floor, in the change of

the Senators during the voting I did not get a chance to respond

to Senator Hagel’s question, and I would like to be very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. You certainly can, but let me finish my line because I have a commitment I have got to go to and Chuck, I am

going to ask you to take the gavel when I finish here. But yes, sir,

I want everybody to have his or her say. We have established now

that this business about the longest sought, hardest fought prize in

the history of arms control is bull. Is that right?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. That is not my word. That is not my characterization, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how would you characterize it?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Hyperbole.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a fancy way of saying ‘‘bull.’’

Now, the truth of the matter is that even the current administration, the Clinton administration did not initially favor a permanent

zero yield test ban. You know that.

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Originally, that is true, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I refer you to the statement that John

Holum made in Geneva in 1996, just for the record. He said, among

many other things, and I am quoting him precisely, ‘‘Among many

other things, the treaty does not contain our original proposal for

an option to withdraw from the treaty at the 10-year mark without

citing reasons of supreme national interest and our proposal that

the treaty’s scope provide room for so-called hydronuclear experiments with very small nuclear yields.’’

Now, was John Holum’s characterizations and comments the

characterizations on your original negotiating instruction from the

administrations, was he saying what you were supposed to say?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Yes, but Mr. Chairman, as I think we all

know, these negotiations take a long period of time. Things change

during the course of the negotiations. Original instructions are

often modified for a variety of reasons including historical, technological, financial, political developments that occur. For example,

Secretary Weinberger alluded to the very successful negotiation on

intermediate range nuclear forces that spanned over about a half

a decade. I think he should also have pointed out that in the process many things changed, most importantly, at the expense of billions of dollars, we deployed hundreds of intermediate range nuclear weapons of our own. Also there was a change in the leadership in Moscow. And of course the zero zero thing which was considered difficult at the origin of the INF became a reality at the

end of that 5 year period. Similar things happened in this negotiation.

The CHAIRMAN. I respect you, sir, and I accept what you say, but

it is true the treaty proposed to the Senate is not what the Clinton

administration initially supported. Is that not true?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, sir, and I thank all three of you,

and I am going to turn the gavel over to the distinguished Senator

41

from Nebraska, and I apologize for having to leave, but I do appreciate your coming, and if you will stay further to respond to Senators who have arrived since we started this hearing.

Senator HAGEL [presiding]. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank

the panel for taking the time to be with us and share an obviously

deeply held point of view by a number of people who oppose the

treaty. I find myself a little bit baffled by some of the intensity of

the confidence and reliability questions, particularly given the way

the treaty has been structured.

One of the benefits of my years in the Navy was that I went to

nuclear chemical biological warfare school and got to learn a little

bit about some of this, and wear some of the protective clothing

and deal with it, and it was a fascinating, fascinating learning experience. What puzzles me about this debate is, based upon what

we know about the complexity of a warhead and how to put one

together, and particularly based on the experience of the United

States, and if you were to ask people at Hiroshima or Nagasaki

about confidence levels, even in an early model, they would be pretty blunt about the confidence level if the United States threatened

to drop even an early model nuclear weapon, let alone the sophistication we have today in our manufacturing processes.

Now, I would be amazed if 10 years from now I were to ask any

of you sitting at this table if we took at random 10 warheads from

our many thousands and I offered you a choice, I said I am going

to drop these 10 on your home town, I think each of you would say,

please do not do that. Am I correct? Would you not, Madam Ambassador?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Of course.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I would rather not have any.

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Of course.

Senator KERRY. And the reason is, you have a pretty good confidence level that 10 years from now one of them is going to go off,

if not all 10, is that not correct?

So what are we talking about here in terms of deterrence? There

is a 10-year review in this treaty. There is a series of safeguards

adopted by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that say that

if at any time confidence and reliability is insufficient, we pull out.

Are you saying to me that in a 10-year period of time you believe

the confidence level of those 3,000-plus that we might get to under

START, or the many thousands more, is somehow not going to

have the same confidence level that you just determined to any dictator, to anyone anywhere on the face of this planet that they want

to run the risk that if we fired 100 of them, 200 of them, it is not

the end of humankind as we understand it?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Some of them will work, some of them will not.

Senator KERRY. Wait a minute, do not dismiss it with some of

them will work, some of them will not. What I remember learning

in school 30-plus years ago was, it does not take more than the

number on my two hands, to pretty much take care of business.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, if you do not have any defense against

it.

Senator KERRY. I am game for defense, Mr. Secretary. That is a

moot issue now. We are going down the road of missile defense. We

42

just had a very successful test, most of us have adopted the notion

that we ought to have some reasonable——

Mr. WEINBERGER. I do hope so.

Senator KERRY. But let us come back to deterrence.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think, Senator, as you point out, some of

them will work, some of them will not, but your confidence in the

total package does degrade over time, and that is an important element of deterrence, the entire amount are going to work and do the

job.

Senator KERRY. Well, let us talk about that, too.

Mr. WEINBERGER. One thing I would like to talk about, if I

might, and that is, you talk about the idea that we have the right

to withdraw if our national interest is affected.

Senator KERRY. Supreme national interest is the word.

Mr. WEINBERGER. The fact of the matter is, we have that same

kind of provision in the antiballistic missile treaty, and this President has announced he will never use it. This President has said,

we based our entire defense on the ABM Treaty. That kind of a

clause, Senator, is only useful if you have an administration that

understands the importance of pulling out.

Senator KERRY. But they are very different. They are truly different. This safeguard says that if the President is informed by the

Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy, advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the directors of DOE’s nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command that

a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear

weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our

nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would withdraw from the CTBT under the

supreme national interest.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, do you have the President’s response

to that? Do you have his exact statement as to what he said? He

said, in the event I were informed by the Secretary of Defense and

Secretary of Energy and the Vice President of the Nuclear Weapons Council, the directors of the Energy Department’s nuclear

weapons labs, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command

that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapons deterrent, which the two Secretaries consider to be

critical to our nuclear deterrent, could no longer be certified, I

would be prepared, in consultation with the Congress, to exercise

our supreme national interest rights under the CTBT in order to

conduct whatever testing might be required.

That is something far less than a commitment, and that is the

kind of thing you get from this administration, if you pardon me.

Senator KERRY. It says right here that there is a requirement to

consult with us.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, he is not part of that requirement.

Senator KERRY. On the contrary, he said he would.

Mr. WEINBERGER. He said he would be prepared to——

Senator KERRY. I do not want to get sidetracked, because this is

very important. It seems to me that the President of the United

States, whoever it might be, he or she, would have a remarkably

hard time contravening all of the parties we have just named, as

well as facts.

43

I mean, we are all Americans. We are all sitting here with the

interests of the country’s national security in mind. I cannot imagine being informed by all of them, as responsible Members of Congress, and not breaking down the walls of the White House saying,

you folks better respond to this, if it is a legitimate threat.

What we are trying to do is establish sort of where we are today

in this context, Mr. Secretary. I do not want some willy nilly silly

treaty signed onto. I certainly do not want the interest that I wore

a uniform to protect negated. I do not want that. But I fail to see—

I mean, let me be more blunt about it. What is the component of

a nuclear warhead that you believe would deteriorate over 10, 15

or 20 years that could not be replaced, or ascertained as to its degradation sufficiently?

Mr. WEINBERGER. It could be replaced, but will a replacement

work in conjunction with the other parts?

Senator KERRY. Well, let us look at that in a practical——

Senator HAGEL. Senator Kerry, let us get to Senator Biden. We

have been keeping with a 10-minute rule here, and allow everybody

a chance to say something and respond, and we will come back

around.

Senator KERRY. Fair enough.

Senator BIDEN. Well, let me just pick up there.

Mr. Secretary, I thought you said in your statement that at

present the security stockpile is not effective. Is that what you

said?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I am sorry.

Senator BIDEN. I thought you said in your original statement—

please correct me if I am wrong—that at present the security stockpile safeguards are not effective.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Not as effective as they should be.

Senator BIDEN. Does that mean we should resume testing now?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think we should reserve to ourselves the

right to resume testing whenever we feel that it is essential to our

national interest. To deny ourselves that right I think is against

the national interest.

Senator BIDEN. What I am asking you is, do you think it is in

our national interest now to resume testing?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think I would feel more comfortable if more

testing were done than has been done since 1992. I think it is significant that up to that time we had four or five occasions in which

we were told that we could not use the weapons that we had in

the stockpile and they should be redlined, and that since we

stopped testing, there has been no similar statement made, no

similar request made. That, I think, is significant.

Senator BIDEN. The explanation I got for that when I asked the

lab directors was that technology has moved way on beyond when

you were Secretary of Defense.

Mr. WEINBERGER. I hope it has.

Senator BIDEN. That is what they say. I would point out that

what we had from 1953 there was a tri-lab study. The three laboratories studied our stockpile surveillance methods in 1996, and they

reported the following: there were 830 recorded findings of defects

in our nuclear stockpile from 1958 to 1993.

44

Less than 1 percent of these defects were found as a consequence

of nuclear testing. Nuclear testing was not required. In 1 percent

of the tests, which was 8.3 of them. Excuse me. That is not true.

Yes, that is right. All but one of those nuclear tests involved items

that were in the inventory before 1970 and are not in the inventory

any more.

So this idea—and Dr. Robinson, Director of Sandia, said, what I

can say is that the kinds of stockpile problems that would lead to

such an erosion in our confidence seems highly unlikely during the

next 5 to 10 years, and he is talking about when the computers

come on.

But my question is this. The whole idea of our inability to exchange warheads, for example, that we could not exchange warheads, I hear opponents constantly say that. We have done it twice

without nuclear tests. We have taken the B–61 and made it the B–

61 mod 11 earth-penetrating device, a new warhead. No tests. We

were able to do it. I mean, no nuclear tests.

And we also have done the same thing—well, I want to make

sure I am absolutely accurate. I will not repeat what I think is the

case, but I do know with regard to that single warhead we did that

without any tests, and so we did change the nature and capability

of a warhead in our arsenal with absolute confidence on the part

of the scientists at the three laboratories to certify it without any

tests.

Now, there is no question, I heard—I hear Senator Warner say,

because he has given me the privilege of attending all of the Armed

Services Committee hearings, and was kind enough to allow me to

question as well, he has said it is irrefutable that weapons systems

degrade. That is true, no question about it. It is irrefutable the

older we get, our memory degrades.

Now, maybe someone 90 years old has a better memory than the

average person who is 15 years old, but the person who is 90 years

old had a better memory when they were 12. That is irrefutable.

Irrefutable. I am still listening to your testimony. People are still

listening to mine after 27 years, and I am older. My memory is not

as good. Yours is not as good. That does not mean that we should

discount what you say, any more than this notion—it is a matter

of relative change.

And so the question I would get to, instead of these broad statements, no one that I have heard has indicated that the degradation

in weapons systems that may have occurred from the time we

stopped testing till now has had any impact upon our reliability,

or the reliability of either the safety and/or the reliability of the

weapons, meaning that they will explode when we shoot them off,

and so—and by the way, the Cox Commission report, let me quote

from it.

Cox himself said, quote, ‘‘the CTBT, if it were enforced, and that

is the big issue, would be a means of preventing the more rapid

weaponization and development of a new PLA nuclear weapons.’’

That was stated in the report May 25, 1999.

Now, I did not suggest and I do not imply that Mr. Cox is for

this. He is a loyal Republican in this case. I would be dumbfounded

if he was for this, dumbfounded if he would be for this treaty for

a lot of other reasons. He may have substantive reasons of being

45

against it, because it cannot be verified, but not because it puts us

at worse prospect of dealing with the Chinese.

A last point I will make, and my time I see is up, this notion,

Madam Secretary, or Madam Ambassador, of exchange of data, you

equate the IAEA with the sharing of data here. The only sharing

of data here are seismic readings and emissions. I have not heard

a single person suggest that any of the sharing of the information

that would be required to be had here relative to someone violating

the treaty has any utility for any upstart nation, like IAEA did,

any utility to allow them to develop any weapons.

Now, it may help them develop their seismic capabilities, their

meters to develop earthquake detection or something, but it has

zero—zero. The analogy, unless I am missing something, is absolutely inappropriate.

Now, did you mean to suggest they could learn from this data,

that they could learn, under page 17, section B, international monitoring system, paragraph 16 and 18, which is what we are talking

about here, do you mean to suggest that they could learn from the

data shared anything that could help them in developing nuclear

capability? Was that your assertion?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. My understanding, Senator Biden, is

that all member states will have access to the data from the monitoring.

Senator BIDEN. But let me explain what it says. It says, ‘‘international monitoring systems shall comprise facilities for seismological monitoring, radio nuclei monitoring, including certified laboratories, hydroacoustics monitoring, infrasound monitoring receptive means of communication, and that shall be supported by an

International Data Center and a technical secretariat.’’ That is the

monitoring. It is not monitoring of how they fly, or how they explode, or anything like that. It is if they exploded.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. My understanding is they would have

access to the data center, and the access to the data center could,

in my understanding be quite useful.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask, if I may, and I know my time is

up——

Senator HAGEL. Take one more minute, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Since you negotiated this, assume——

Ambassador LEDOGAR. First of all, you are right, Senator, that

the International Data Center has nothing but unclassified information. It is available to—all of it, which is an enormous amount,

available to all State parties. Each State party may say, I only

want some of it, and set up its own filtration system.

In a different part in the appendix, in the verification protocol to

the treaty, there are safeguards in there that refer to what I think

Ambassador Kirkpatrick might be referring to, namely that international inspectors onsite, whether or not they can or cannot profit

with roving eyes and sticky gumshoes and so forth, and we have

built into this treaty a series of measures that make that extremely

difficult.

Senator BIDEN. That is the onsite inspection?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. That is the onsite inspection, that is

right, and incidentally, onsite inspection is an essential difference

between what we are trying to install here and the IAEA regime.

46

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Let me roll it over onto my time,

Senator Biden, if Secretary Weinberger has anything to say about

this.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I think it is a little late to be worried

about what they might be able to see in the monitoring of a treaty

that is not yet in force, when they have already got the vital data.

They have got the warheads, and that is the critical point. They

already have them. They have tested, proven warheads. That

would have saved them at least 15 years of work on their own, the

Chinese, under the Cox report, and that is the critical factor here.

I think there is a possibility, with the monitoring regime that is

set up, that they might be able to learn a little bit more, but the

fact of the matter is that they have already got the vital data. They

have got the warhead itself.

Senator HAGEL. This afternoon, when we come back in about an

hour, we are going to have, as my colleagues know, the chairman

of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the ranking

member as well as the chairman of the Armed Services Committee

and the ranking member, and I suspect we will want to get into

some of this with them.

I would just add, before I move on to a couple of questions I

have, that it is my understanding that much of the data we are

talking about here is previously classified data, so the current data

we are not sure of, but I would hope that we will reengage this

with our intelligence brethren this afternoon.

Now, not so that you feel unloved and unrecognized, Ambassador

Ledogar, you still want to respond to a question that I had asked

earlier, and you did not have time to do that, and if you would still

like to respond, we would like very much to hear your response.

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Thank you, sir, and I recognize that I am

a treaty supporter, so my answer is not precisely to your question,

which was, as I recall, if you do not like this treaty, what do you

propose instead.

So with that caveat, let me say that I would like to make clear

my judgment that if you kill this treaty, you have killed an international treaty for as far into the future as I think we can see. It

is not so that you could begin for the P–5 an alternative arrangement. You could not, with the P–5 plus the 3. That just simply

would not work, and the international pressures are significant.

Now, a key question which I wish you had continued is, if this

treaty is killed, and we the United States resume nuclear testing,

then what? Or if the treaty is killed, and we continue the moratorium, then what? And then you get into two other important

hypotheses that I wish there were time to speculate about, but that

is the distinction I wanted to make, and I thank you.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, and I am grateful for your followup.

Let us stay on some of this same area. In Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s testimony—I am going to read a little bit of it back just

to familiarize all of us with what she said.

Quote, Ambassador Kirkpatrick said, ‘‘finally I should like to call

the committee’s attention to the governance of the organization

which will administer it. I note all state parties are members. No

state party can be excluded. It will operate on the principle of one

state, one vote, with an executive council that is based on geoVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
47

graphical representation comprising,’’ and so on and so on, and if

you recall that exchange in her testimony, that seems to me to be

a rather important element of this treaty for all the reasons that

I think we all vividly understand. Would you care to comment on

Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s point?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Yes, thank you very much, I would, because first of all the United States is guaranteed a seat on the executive council. So is Russia, so is China, so is Britain, and so is

France.

Now, those guarantees are not in the treaty text. Those guarantees are inside arrangements among our regional groups, informal

arrangements, but nevertheless, it was made quite clear by each of

the nuclear weapons states that everyone was equal except we, in

our respective groups, were more equal than others, so that we

have de facto permanent seats on the executive council.

Senator HAGEL. Does that work by election?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. The rotation is set, at least in the Western group. I do not know the details about how the other groups

settled their arrangements. In the Western group we have agreed

on a rotation out for at least the next 20 years after entry into

force.

Senator HAGEL. Does that concern you?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. It certainly concerned me, to be sure, and

I was under very strict instructions to be sure that in any circumstance the U.S. would always be on the executive council, and

we did that.

Senator HAGEL. And by virtue of how, by what would that be the

case, that we would be guaranteed a seat, if it is not written into

the treaty?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Because it is written into an informal side

document just among the Western groups. I am being referred to

page 131, but I do not have time to read it.

Senator HAGEL. What happens after 20 years?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. It would in essence rotate back to the beginning again, because all the countries in the groups are provided

for.

Senator HAGEL. Meaning that we may not have a seat?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. No. We will always have our permanent

seat.

Senator HAGEL. By virtue of the side agreement?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. By virtue of the side agreement.

Senator HAGEL. Let me ask Ambassador Kirkpatrick if she wishes to respond to any of that, because I think this is a very important part of what we are doing here, regardless of the technicality

of the importance of all these issues, and they are important, but

the governance of this is pretty key in my opinion.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think it is very key, which is why I

mentioned it. Usually——

Senator HAGEL. Excuse me, Madam Ambassador, would you pull

your microphone up just a little bit?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I said, I think it is very important,

which is why I mentioned it in my testimony. I think too often

these issues get ignored. I suppose when you said the side agreement, you mean an informal side agreement, however.

48

Senator HAGEL. Is that correct, an informal side agreement?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. It is not the members of the Western

group.

Ambassador LEDOGAR. That informal agreement provides for an

orderly change-over for at least the next 20 years, but the treaty

itself provides for a seat for—let me read it, if I may, and I am

reading from page 130 of the text before you.

‘‘At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled taking into account political and security interests by States parties that in that region are designated on the

basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the treaty, as determined by international data, as well as all or any of the following

indicative criteria in order of priority determined by each region.

‘‘First, number of monitoring facilities of the international monitoring system, second, expertise, experience in monitoring technology, third, contribution to the annual budget of the organization.’’

Now, that is a diplomatic way of saying we are more equal than

others, and so are other key countries.

Senator HAGEL. Let me ask Ambassador Kirkpatrick to respond

to that.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, I would only say that it can be

read that way, but it could also be read to guarantee the inclusion

of major nuclear powers.

Now, I think that in the Western group we deal in confidence for

the most part—I expect that that informal assurance would be honored by the Western group.

I would also add, however, that if it is—and I think it is desirable that the United States be guaranteed a seat, or effectively

guaranteed a seat. I would also point out, however, that we constitute a real minority, a rather small minority of a large executive

council, and it is unlikely that the decisions will be made on technical grounds.

U.N. bodies are very highly political bodies. Most people who

have not functioned in the U.N. do not understand this, and I wish

every one of you would spend a session at the United Nations. It

does not function as almost anyone expects that it does, and it is

chastening to be a minority in a body in which a large majority of

whom are united by other interests. It is my recommendation to

you that before you recommend another treaty to us which has

such a governing body, I hope you will go spend a session at the

United Nations, in the General Assembly.

Senator BIDEN. A point of clarification. The Western group gets

10 seats, and one-third of them get to sit on this executive committee? There is 10 seats on the council?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. No, there are 51 seats.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. The executive committee.

Senator BIDEN. There is 10 seats for North America on the council, right?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. No, North America and Western Europe.

Senator BIDEN. Well, if by that time, if there is 10 seats and we

do not get one, there is room for Britain and France, the other two

nuclear powers, then something has really gone wrong, and we will

49

be out of this treaty anyway. If that has gotten to the point where

with 10 seats the United States does not get one on the council,

I find that—I mean, if you all envision a world like that, I am with

you, man, let us bomb them now. Let us not wait.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. People in the United Nations, Senator

Biden, become irritated with the United States from time to time,

and they exclude us from important bodies, as we were excluded

from the Budget Committee for the last 2 or 3 years. We were

never excluded from an important committee while I was there, I

would like to say.

Senator HAGEL. Let me exercise the prerogative of the chair, because I know you all have to leave. You have been here for 21⁄2

hours, which we are grateful for two yes or no questions. Any other

side agreements we do not know about?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Considering the formal word ‘‘agreement,’’

I would have to say there are no other side agreements. There are

memoranda. There are, including some classified documents,

memoranda of understandings and letters that have been exchanged. They are summarized in the material that has been put

before you in unclassified fashion, particularly page 4 and page 5

of the article by article, about the scope explanation.

Senator HAGEL. So——

Ambassador LEDOGAR. The answer is no, there is no agreement

that you do not have before you.

Senator HAGEL. Are side agreements binding in this treaty?

Ambassador LEDOGAR. Well, they are very strong, but they do

not have the force of international law.

Senator HAGEL. But they are not binding.

Gentlemen, ladies, thank you. I am sorry to do this. I know our

colleagues have more questions and time, but I know at least two

of you have to be out of here by 1. You have been here for 21⁄2

hours. The committee stands in recess until 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at

2 p.m., the same day.]

(51)

FINAL REVIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (Treaty Doc. 105–

28)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1999

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m. in room SD– 419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman

of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Brownback, Ashcroft, Frist, Biden, Kerry, Feingold, and Boxer. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The Foreign Relations Committee now resumes its final hearing on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And what an array of colleagues we

have there, Mr. Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, that would scare any adversary

away. The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what the protocol is, but first we

are going to hear from the distinguished chairman of the Senate

Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, who will report on

the 3-days of extensive CTBT hearings the committee held this

week, and he is joined by the distinguished ranking member of the

Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin.

And then we will hear from the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby, who will report on his committee’s findings on this treaty, and from the vice chairman of that

committee, Senator Bob Kerrey. And on our second panel we will

hear from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who is in my office next door and I will wave to her, and she is coming to hear

you herself. And finally, we will hear from several distinguished arms control experts, former ACDA director Ron Lehman, chairman of the Nevada Alliance for Defense, Energy and Business, Mr. Troy Wade,

and Dr. Richard Garwin, senior fellow for Science and Technology

at the Council on Foreign Relations, and in the interest of time, I’m

going to forego any further comments. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would forego my opening statement until our colleagues have finished, but I would like to before

the Secretary speaks to make an opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet. You bet. Senator Warner.

52

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM

VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, colleagues, I

think this is a very wise opportunity for this group to provide for

this committee and for the public our individual views and those

views relating to what do we do now with regards to the procedural

situation confronting the U.S. Senate, a situation that was not of

your making, Mr. Chairman, or mine or others.

Mr. Chairman, first I have for some 30 years been involved in

national security issues beginning in 1969 when I went to the Department of Defense and now 21 years on the Senate side in the

Armed Services Committee, and the subject of this category of

weapons, the nuclear weapons, has been foremost in my work these

many, many years. I have looked at this treaty, I have studied this

treaty, and to the extent I could force my mind open, I have carefully evaluated superb testimony that the Armed Services Committee has received in the past 3 days.

I would vote today against this treaty. I would not recommend

that this President or, indeed, the successor President start testing.

And mind you, Mr. Chairman, given that the tests in Pakistan and

India occurred, the law which precluded testing is now vitiated.

That is a small footnote.

But, Mr. Chairman, the key to this thing is as follows: We have

had witnesses on both sides of every issue, conscientious persons,

persons who have dedicated 10, 15, 20 years of their life to providing America with a strong nuclear deterrent. They honestly differ. I say to you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee,

there are honest differences on both sides leaving clearly a reasonable doubt, and I come from the old school that it should be beyond

any reasonable doubt if we are going to take a step that affects our

vital security interests for decades to come, indeed possibly into

perpetuity as it relates to this cadre of weapons.

The United States today possesses the strongest conventional

force. Russia’s conventional force is dwindling. The NATO countries

are cutting back. Indeed, our allies, Great Britain and France, are

cutting back on conventional forces. The nuclear arsenals are taking on, particularly in Russia, a greater and greater significance

with regard to their military and strategic planning.

And at that very time we cannot take any step, most particularly

this treaty in its present form, that would weaken that deterrent.

It is that deterrent, Mr. Chairman, that prevented any confrontation of a significant nature on the continent of Europe for 50 years.

We celebrated here in the Nation’s capital just months ago the 50th

anniversary of NATO, NATO not having been involved in a major

conflict for those 50 years, and now, of course, we have had the

Bosnian conflict situation in Kosovo. But it was that nuclear deterrent that held at bay the Soviet Union, and now this treaty puts

that in jeopardy.

The witnesses that have come before our committee, the ones

that had the most difficult time, I believe, were the uniformed witnesses because they want to do what they can to support their

Commander in Chief, but they gave us their best professional advice. Others who have retired likewise submitted statements.

53

But, Mr. Chairman, the key to every single uniformed person

today supporting this treaty is the safeguard provision which says

you can pull out 5, 10, 15 years hence if the President cannot certify that that stockpile is credible and safe.

Now, Mr. Chairman, our committee under my guidance and that

of my colleague stayed very clearly to our jurisdiction, the military

implications. But I hope you will develop, particularly with the Secretary of State, the question that needs to be answered—what happens if we pull out of that treaty 5 or 10 years hence, what happens to those nations that placed in us full faith and credit as we

went ahead—that will not happen, but anyway if we went ahead

and ratified this treaty, what happens to those nations? We leave

them out there hanging naked 10 or 15 years from now. Naked in

the sense that they have not taken such steps as they may wish

to develop a nuclear deterrent, but more importantly, by taking

that action and pulling out, we have to signal to the world that we

have less than full faith and credit in the effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile as a deterrent and for safety.

Let me touch on safety a minute. I have seen these weapons. I

have actually gone up and touched them, just out of curiosity, and

I asked General Shelton the following question: In his career, had

he handled them, and he said of course he had, all of them.

And I said, put yourself in the uniform of a young sailor, an airman or marine today that has to deal with storing the weapons,

that has to deal with bringing them out from time to time and putting them in the various launch platforms, be it submarines, airplanes or whatever the case may be. And you cannot say to that

sailor, that airman, that marine that it is absolutely safe for you

to deal with those weapons. And there are many civilians that likewise have to work with them, and these weapons are stored and

collocated in various places in America, and indeed, Mr. Chairman,

beyond our shores. What do you say to nations as they are following this that are providing the host facilities for storage that

there could be a point in time when we do not have the degree of

confidence in the safety of these weapons?

Mr. Chairman, I hope and I have had the privilege of working

with my good friend Senator Levin, Senator Biden, some others

just as colleagues do, we have all been here two decades or more,

to see whether or not there is not—and I know the Chair has spoken to this—is not a means by which we can bring reasonable and

open and rational minds together to work what is in the best interests of not only our Nation, but indeed the world, and at this time

not to bring to finality by vote a decision on this treaty. I hope that

that is done, but if the committee is interested at some point, I

would be glad to give you the benefit of one Senator’s view as to

how it can be done, but I would be presumptuous at this point in

time.

I think I should yield to my other colleagues. I have covered the

principal points. I may have a point or two after I listen to them.

I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Senator Shelby.

54

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. SHELBY, U.S. SENATOR

FROM ALABAMA

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, col- leagues. It is a privilege for me to appear before this committee at

this time to present my views as the chairman of the Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence. I am and I want to be very specific

here. I am speaking in my capacity as chairman of the Intelligence

Committee, but I should make it clear that I am not, Mr. Chairman, speaking for the entire committee. I think that is important. Due to the limited time available, the Intelligence Committee has not, Mr. Chairman, prepared a full committee report on the capability of the United States to monitor compliance with the CTBT.

Furthermore, members of the committee have differing opinions on

this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I intend at the proper time to vote against the resolution on ratification. I will do so for a number of reasons, but

primarily because it is my considered judgment as chairman of the

Intelligence Committee based upon a review of the intelligence

analysis and on testimony this week from the intelligence community’s senior arms control analysts that it is impossible to monitor

compliance with this treaty with the confidence that the Senate

should demand before providing its advice and consent for ratification.

Mr. Chairman, simply put, at this point I am not confident that we can now or can in the foreseeable future detect any and all nuclear explosions prohibited under the treaty. While I have a greater

degree of confidence in our ability to monitor higher yield explosions in known test sites, I have markedly less confidence in our

capabilities to monitor lower yield and/or evasively conducted tests,

including, Mr. Chairman, tests that may enable states to develop

new nuclear weapons or improve existing weapons.

At this point I should point out that while the proponents of the

treaty have argued that it will prevent nuclear proliferation, the

fact is that some of the countries of most concern to us—North

Korea, Iran, and Iraq—can develop, Mr. Chairman, as you know,

and deploy nuclear weapons without any nuclear tests whatsoever.

With respect to monitoring, in July 1997, the intelligence community issued a national intelligence estimate entitled ‘‘Monitoring

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Over the Next 10 Years.’’

While I cannot go into the classified details here this afternoon, I

can say that the NIE was not encouraging about our ability to

monitor compliance with the treaty or about the likely utility of the

treaty in preventing countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq

from developing and fielding nuclear weapons. The NIE identified

numerous challenges, difficulties, and credible evasion scenarios

that affect the intelligence community’s confidence in its ability to

monitor compliance.

Mr. Chairman, because the details are classified and because of

the inherent difficulty of summarizing a very highly technical analysis covering a number of different countries and a multitude of

variables, I recommend that members, including the members of

this committee, review this document with the following caution:

Based on testimony before the committee this week, I believe that

newly acquired information requires reevaluation of the 1997 estiVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
55

mates, assumptions, and underlying analysis on certain key issues.

The revised assumptions and analysis appear certain to lead to

even more pessimistic conclusions.

While the intelligence community has not yet provided the committee with a written analysis of those issues, the transcript from

Tuesday’s hearings in the Senate Intelligence Committee is available to Members. Many proponents of the treaty place their faith,

Mr. Chairman, in monitoring aids provided under the treaty such

as the international monitoring system, IMS, a multinational seismic detection system, and the CTBT’s onsite inspection regime,

OSI. Based on a review of the structures, likely capabilities, and

procedures of these international mechanisms, Mr. Chairman, neither of which will be ready to function for a number of years, and

based on the intelligence community’s own analysis and statement,

I am concerned that these organizations will be of at best limited

if not marginal value. I believe that the IMS will be technically inadequate. For example, Mr. Chairman, it was not designed to detect evasively conducted tests which, if you are Iraq or North

Korea, are precisely the kind you are going to conduct. It was designed, as you know, Mr. Chairman, with diplomatic sensitivities

rather than effective monitoring in mind, and it will be 8 to 10

years before the system is complete.

Because of these factors and for other technical reasons, I am

afraid that the IMS is more likely to muddy the waters by injecting

questionable data into what will inevitably be highly charged political debates over possible noncompliance. As a result, the value of

more accurate, independently obtained U.S. information will be undermined, making it more difficult for the U.S. to make a case for

noncompliance if it were to become necessary.

And with respect to OSI, I believe that the onsite inspection regime invites delay and confusion. For example, while U.S. negotiators originally sought an automatic green light for onsite inspections as a result of the opposition of the People’s Republic of China,

now, the regime that was adopted allows inspections, as you know,

Mr. Chairman, only with the approval of 30 of the 51 countries on

the executive committee. Members of the committee will appreciate

the difficulty of rounding up the votes for such a supermajority.

Mr. Chairman, I am also deeply troubled by the fact that the inspected party has a veto, a veto over including U.S. inspectors on

an inspection team and the right of the inspected party to declare

areas up to 50 kilometers off limits to inspection. I understand

these provisions are mere limitations sought by Saddam Hussein

on the UNSCOM inspectors, which leads me to believe that some

of the OSI standards could be what is cut out for Iraq.

As a result of these and other hurdles, Mr. Chairman, even if inspectors do eventually get near the scene of a suspicious event, the

evidence, which is highly perishable, may well have vanished.

One final but critical matter that raises questions both as to Russian intentions under the CTBT as to our monitoring capabilities

is the recently reported activity at Russia’s Arctic test site. The

Washington Post, as all of you know, last weekend reported that

Russia continues to conduct possible low-yield nuclear tests at its

Arctic test site reportedly in order to develop a low-yield weapon,

56

new low-yield weapon that will be the linchpin of a new Russian

military doctrine.

The Washington Post also reported that the CIA cannot monitor

such tests with enough precision to determine whether they are nuclear or conventional explosions. Such activities, Mr. Chairman,

will be of particular concern because there is evidence, including

public statements from the Russian First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy that Russia intends to continue to conduct low-yield

hydronuclear tests and does not believe that these constitute nuclear tests prohibited by the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I have tried to convey some

very serious concerns with the practicality of this treaty and that

is extremely difficult to do in an unclassified forum such as this in

a short time.

I urge my colleagues as they consider their position on this treaty that they immerse themselves in the details because it is in the

details where the fatal flaws of the document lie. For further information on this, I urge Members to review the transcript of this

week’s Senate Intelligence Committee, and we will have it available in a secure place. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence.

[The prepared statement of Senator Shelby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden: It is a privilege to appear before you as Chairman

of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to present my views on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

I am speaking in my capacity as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, but I

should make it clear that I am not speaking for the entire Committee. Due to the

limited time available, the Committee has not prepared a full Committee report on

the capability of the United States to monitor compliance with the CTBT. Furthermore, Members of the Committee have differing opinions on this issue.

I intend to vote against the Resolution of Ratification. I will do so for a number

of reasons, but primarily because it is my considered judgment as Chairman of the

Intelligence Committee, based on a review of the intelligence analysis and on testimony this week from the Intelligence Community’s senior arms control analysts,

that it is impossible to monitor compliance with this Treaty with the confidence that

the Senate should demand before providing its advice and consent to ratification.

I shall leave it to another day to elaborate on my concern that the Treaty may

be a stalking horse for de-nuclearization. Its operative sentence, after all, on its face

bans any nuclear explosion. This prohibition raises a question about the viability

of any nuclear deterrent. There may be an explanation. But it is not in the Treaty

text.

Simply put, I am not confident that we can now, or in the foreseeable future, detect any and all nuclear explosions prohibited under the Treaty.

While I have a greater degree of confidence in our ability to monitor higher-yield

explosions in known test sites, I have markedly less confidence in our capabilities

to monitor lower-yield and/or evasively conducted tests, including tests that may enable states to develop new nuclear weapons, or improve existing weapons.

I should also point out that while proponents of the Treaty have argued that it

will prevent nuclear proliferation, the fact is that some of the countries of most concern—for example, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq—can develop and deploy nuclear

weapons without any nuclear tests at all.

With respect to monitoring, in July 1997, the Intelligence Community issued a

National Intelligence Estimate entitled ‘‘Monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty Over the Next 10 Years.’’

While I cannot go into classified details, I can say that the NIE was not encouraging about our ability to monitor compliance with the Treaty or about the likely

utility of the Treaty in preventing countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq from

developing and fielding nuclear weapons.

57

The NIE identified numerous challenges, difficulties, and credible evasion scenarios that affect the Intelligence Community’s confidence in its ability to monitor

compliance.

Because the details are classified, and because of the inherent difficulty of summarizing a highly technical analysis covering a number of different countries and

a multitude of variables, I recommend that Members review this document, with the

following caution:

Based on testimony before the Committee this week, I believe that newly acquired

information requires a re-evaluation of the 1997 Estimate’s assumptions and underlying analysis on certain key issues.

These revised assumptions and analysis appear certain to lead, to even more pessimistic conclusions. While the Intelligence Community has not yet provided the

Committee with a written analysis of those issues, the transcript from Tuesday’s

hearing is available to Members.

Many proponents of the Treaty place their faith in monitoring aids provided under

the Treaty: the International Monitoring System (IMS), a multinational seismic detection system, and the CTBT’s On-site Inspection regime (OSI).

Based on a review of the structure, likely capabilities, and procedures of these

international mechanisms—neither of which will be ready to function for a number

of years—and based on the Intelligence Community’s own analysis and statement,

I am concerned that these organizations will be of, at best, limited or marginal

value.

I believe that the IMS will be technically inadequate. For example, it was not designed to detect ‘‘evasively’’ conducted tests, which, if you are Iraq or North Korea,

are precisely the kind you are going to conduct.

• It was designed with diplomatic sensitivities rather than effective monitoring in

mind; and

• It will be eight to 10 years before the system is complete.

Because of these factors and for other technical reasons, I am afraid that the IMS

is more likely to muddy the waters by injecting questionable data into what will inevitably be highly charged political debates over possible noncompliance.

As a result, the value of more accurate, independently-obtained U.S. information,

would be undermined, making it more difficult for the United States to make a case

for non-compliance if it were to become necessary.

With respect to OSI, I believe that the Onsite Inspection regime invites delay and

obfuscation. For example, while U.S. negotiators originally sought an ‘‘automatic

green light’’ for on-site inspections, as a result of the opposition of the People’s Republic of China, the regime that was adopted allows inspections only with the approval of 30 of the 51 countries on the Executive Committee. Members of the Committee will appreciate the difficulty of rounding up the votes for such a super-majority.

I am deeply troubled by the fact that if the U.S. requested an inspection, no U.S.

inspectors could participate in the inspection, and we could send an observer only

if the Inspected Party approved.

I am also disturbed by the right of the inspected party to declare areas up to fifty

kilometers off-limits to inspection.

I understand that these provisions mirror limitations sought by Saddam Hussein

on UNSCOM inspectors, which leads me to believe that OSI stands for ‘‘Option Selected by Iraq.’’

As a result of these and other hurdles, even if inspectors do eventually get near

the scene of a suspicious event, the evidence—which is highly perishable—may well

have vanished.

One final, but critical, matter that raises questions both as to Russian intentions

under CTBT and as to our monitoring capabilities is the recently-reported activity

at Russia’s Arctic test site.

The Washington Post last weekend reported that Russia continues to conduct possible low-yield nuclear tests at its Arctic test site, reportedly in order to develop a

new low-yield weapon that will be the linchpin of a new Russian military doctrine.

The Washington Post also reported that the CIA cannot monitor such tests with

enough precision to determine whether they are nuclear or conventional explosions.

Such activities would be of particular concern because there is evidence, including

public statements from the Russian First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, that

Russia intends to continue to conduct low-yield hydro-nuclear tests, and does not

believe that these constitute nuclear tests prohibited by the Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I have tried to convey some very serious concerns with the practicality of this Treaty and that is extremely difficult to do in an unclassified forum

and in such a short time.

58

I urge my colleagues, as they consider their position on this Treaty that they im- merse themselves in the details, because it is in the details where the fatal flaws

of document lie.

For further information on this topic, I urge Members to review the transcript of this week’s testimony before the Intelligence Committee. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this distinguished committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. I thank you, sir. Carl, Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MICHIGAN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Biden, and colleagues. Thank you for inviting us to testify about our own

beliefs, but perhaps even more importantly, what we have heard in

our hearings in our own committees. President Eisenhower stated almost 40 years ago that the failure to achieve a nuclear test ban would, in his words, ‘‘have to be

classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration, of

any decade, of any time, and of any party.’’ The central question that we face, however, every one of us as Senators, is whether or not this treaty will make us safer or less

safe; whether it will make us more secure or less secure as a Nation.

The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our top military

leadership, civilian and uniformed, support this treaty. That is the

testimony that we heard. It was strong testimony. It was not testimony which was qualified by any personal reservation that they

are trying to support their Commander in Chief, or that they are

doing the best they can. It was their own personal view, directly

stated to us, looking us in the eye because we asked them, eyeball

to eyeball, do you, Chairman Shelton, do you, Secretary Cohen,

support the ratification of the treaty, and they said that they do.

General Shelton, who is our current chairman, of course, of the

Joint Chiefs said the following: That the test ban treaty ‘‘will help

limit the development of more advanced and destructive weapons

and inhibit the ability of more countries to acquire nuclear weapons. It is true,’’ he said, ‘‘that the treaty cannot prevent proliferation or reduce current inventories. But it can restrict nuclear weapons progress and reduce the risk of proliferation.’’

In short, our top uniformed military leader, General Shelton,

said the following: ‘‘The world will be a safer place with the treaty

than without it, and it is in our national security interest to ratify

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.’’

The whole world, including nuclear weapons powers and countries that might want to become nuclear weapons powers, is going

to be watching what the Senate does with this treaty. And our action will affect the willingness of other nations to refrain from future nuclear testing.

Rejection of this treaty will have a profound negative impact in

the battle against proliferation of nuclear weapons. India tests,

Pakistan tests, and we tell them, stop testing, you are endangering

yourselves, you are endangering the world. For heaven’s sake, stop

your testing. If we are not willing to ratify the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty, what standing do we have to urge India, Pakistan, or

59

any country to stop testing? Over 150 nations have signed this

treaty, including all of our allies, by the way.

There has been reference made to the fact that our allies depend

upon our nuclear deterrent, and they do and have, and that our allies who store these weapons depend upon their being safe, and

they do. Our allies recommend that we support this treaty, those

very same allies that depend on our deterrence and rely upon our

nuclear weapons to be safe because they frequently are being

stored on their land. Every one of our NATO allies, plus South

Korea and Japan—over150 nations in all—have signed this treaty.

Now, the question has been raised whether or not somebody

could cheat, and this is what Secretary Cohen’s statement relating

to that is: ‘‘Is it possible for states to cheat on the CTBT without

being detected?’’ And here I am quoting him. ‘‘The answer is ‘yes.’

We would not be able to detect every evasively conducted nuclear

test and from a national security perspective, we do not need to.

The U.S. will be able to detect a level of testing, the yield and number of tests by which a state could undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent.’’

So although you cannot be certain that nobody can conduct a test

with a very small yield, what Secretary Cohen is telling us and has

told us is that any militarily significant test can be detected, that

they cannot gain military advantage over us by cheating at those

low levels. That is his position. That is the Joint Chiefs’ position,

not just my position, but their position. It also happens to be mine,

but that is obviously not as important.

In addition, both Secretary Cohen and General Shelton have

pointed out that this treaty, if it comes into effect, will increase our

ability to observe and monitor tests because it will create an international monitoring system of 320 monitoring stations in 90 countries.

They also have testified to us that they have looked at the full

range of intelligence information, including the up-to-date current

information which has been referred to by our good friends who

have already testified. So that both Secretary Cohen and General

Shelton have looked at the same intelligence information that they

have referred to in their testimony and that we have looked at, and

they have reached the exact same conclusion that they reached before, namely that this treaty is in our national interest and can be

adequately effectively verified, although you cannot perfectly verify

a low-yield test.

Finally, we had the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons lab

directors in front of us today. The lab directors say that with two

things they are, quote, ‘‘onboard.’’ Now, that’s the term that they

used this morning. Their testimony varied. It was not one statement for three directors. And there was a variation between their

testimony. But when I asked them, point-blank, are you onboard

under two conditions, their answer was yes, that they are onboard

with the treaty. One is that the safeguards, all six, be incorporated

formally in the resolution of ratification, and second that there be

robust funding of our stockpile stewardship program by the Congress. Those are critically important conditions to them and, as our

good friend Senator Warner said, it is important also to General

Shelton and to Secretary Cohen.

60

I believe the defeat of this treaty would be disastrous to our effort to reduce proliferation, but let me just close with one suggestion. There are many of us who have not yet either reached a conclusion or feel that we have enough of a record to reach a conclusion. There are many of us that feel this is the wrong time to vote

on ratification for many different reasons. Some of us because there

is that national intelligence estimate which Senator Shelby or Senator Warner made reference to. In fact, I think the chairman made

reference to it, an ongoing national intelligence estimate.

There are many reasons that our colleagues, at least many of our

colleagues, think it is best not to vote at this time on this treaty.

There is precedent for a delay in voting on the treaty. There was

a vote scheduled on the Chemical Weapons Convention when our

good friend Bob Dole came out against the treaty, just as the current leading Republican candidate for President has come out

against this treaty. And what we did as a Senate was that we delayed the vote on the Chemical Weapons Treaty in order to try to

keep it out of politics to the extent we possibly could. We delayed

that vote until after the Presidential election. And then we took the

time to add some reservations and add some conditions to the resolution of ratification. We took that deliberative time to do that.

We cannot do that under this unanimous consent agreement.

This unanimous consent agreement binds us to one amendment by

the majority leader and one amendment by the Democratic leader.

That is it. No reservations, conditions, declarations, statements,

understandings, motions, things that you folks on this committee

are experts at.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, others on this committee, over the

years you have lent your efforts to adding reservations, conditions,

qualifications to treaties, and you have improved treaties in the

process. We cannot do that under the current unanimous-consent

agreement under which we are operating. We are restricted. That

inhibits the deliberative process of this body. It is not in keeping

with what the Senate should be and historically has been, which

is a body that deliberates carefully on treaties, and then lends or

doesn’t lend its advice and consent to those treaties.

So I would hope that, for many reasons, we would consider delaying the vote on this treaty next week. I think that significant

progress has been made through these hearings, but for many of

us there is much more information that is needed, and I think for

all of us from an institutional point of view, it would set a very bad

precedent not to be able to offer reservations and other qualifications and amendments to a treaty that is being considered by the

U.S. Senate.

I have taken a bit too long, and I again thank our Chair and

Senator Biden. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Kerrey.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT KERREY, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NEBRASKA

Senator KERREY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I thank you for your invitation to testify and discuss the issues of verification and monitoring

on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

61

As Senator Shelby, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence has just testified, under normal circumstances our

committee would call witnesses, collect data, and then submit a

very detailed report to the Senate on this matter. However, given

the condensed nature of the debate, like the chairman, I also regret

that we have only had opportunity to hold a single 2 hour hearing

and that the committee has not prepared a full report.

I come before this committee in my capacity as vice chairman of

the committee and as Senator Shelby as well has said earlier, I

speak for myself, and have not polled Democratic members of the

committee to determine their views.

The key phrase that I make in declaring that my estimate is that

we can effectively monitor and verify compliance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is the phrase effectively monitor and verify.

This declaration, Mr. Chairman, is made instead of an absolute

declaration of verification. I believe, I say with great respect to

members of this committee, that absolute verification is an unattainable standard, though it is a standard some have applied to establish as a benchmark for ratification, no treaty from the Convention on Literary and Artistic Copyrights to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the one that we are considering today, the CTBT, is absolutely verifiable.

The central question, I believe, should be, using existing assets,

can the United States of America effectively monitor and verify this

treaty, and my answer is, yes. This conclusion, Mr. Chairman, and

members of the committee, is supported by testimony that was offered yesterday by General John Gordon, the Deputy Director of

Central Intelligence. It is also based on briefings that we have received on the topics, this committee has received over the years,

and most importantly, Mr. Chairman, it is based upon an assessment of our current capability to monitor as well as our plans to

modernize and improve our capability to do MASINT and to collect

the data needed to monitor anything that we are concerned about

in this world. We are the world’s best at monitoring what is going

on in the world. And if the United States of America says that we

cannot effectively verify, I would suggest it will be difficult for any

nation to reach the conclusion that they can effectively verify this

treaty or any modification of this treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I have heard some argument on last Sunday’s

Washington Post article on which it was reported that the CIA

found that the data from the seismic sensors and other sources

were insufficient to confirm the source of recent seismic activity in

the Russian Arctic region of Novaya Zemlya, that this is reason

enough to oppose this treaty.

Mr. Chairman, again, there are not nor will there ever be enough

seismic sensors in the world to catch a country that is cheating at

the margins. The important fact is this: We do have the capability

today and we will continue in the future to catch any country

whose activity would threaten our ability to defend U.S. national

security interests. We are today not only highly capable, we are the

most capable nation at the detection of nuclear detonations. The

United States has today the capability to detect any test that could

threaten our nuclear deterrence. The type of test that could be conVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
62

ducted without our knowledge could only be marginally useful and

would not cause a shift in the existing strategic nuclear balance.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, the United States has the capability

to detect the level of testing that would be required for another

country to develop and weaponize and advance thermonuclear warheads. These are existing national capabilities. These key capabilities will continue without Senate action on the CTBT, but with

Senate action and the action of 16 other named nuclear nations, we

will be able to increase our detection assets.

Our ability to monitor the treaty will be enhanced by access to

the more than 300 monitoring stations that will make up the

CTBT’s international monitoring system, and the CTBT requirement for installation of 17 monitoring stations in the Middle East,

Lebanon, and China, 31 in Russia will improve our ability to verify

this treaty.

Mr. Chairman, in the coming decades our intelligence agencies

are going to be increasingly tasked with monitoring global nuclear

testing. The creation of additional tools and resources that will

come as a result of the CTBT will not decrease the safety of the

American people. It will increase security.

We also discussed, Mr. Chairman, two additional ways in which

I believe the CTBT will enhance U.S. national security. First, a

fully implemented CTBT will all but halt the ability of threshold

states from establishing an effective and reliable strategic nuclear

force. The inability of nations like Iran and North Korea to conduct

nuclear tests will make it much less likely for them to become nuclear powers, and our ability to go to the United Nations Security

Council to obtain multilateral resolutions of sanctions will minimize the go-it-alone U.S. efforts we are far too often forced to use.

Along the same lines, the inability of existing nuclear states to

conduct further nuclear tests will impede if not cease their efforts

to make technological advances and yields in miniaturization, advances already achieved by the United States.

As my friend and our former colleague, Senator Jim Exon said

after returning from the Nevada Test Site, ‘‘No American general

would trade our nuclear forces for another nation’s. Given the overwhelming capability of the United States, I recognize the test ban

would clearly be in our national interest.’’

Bluntly speaking, Mr. Chairman, we have the most effective and

deadly nuclear force in the world. Therefore, to maintain our existing edge, it is in our interests to ratify the CTBT and to halt the

nuclear development advancement of other nations.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the greatest threat to the safety of

the American people is the nuclear legacy of the cold war. To confront this threat we need to employ a wide array of tools. We need

to work with Russia to achieve further reductions in our nuclear

arsenals, we need to fund the cooperative threat reduction program

which assists the Russians with eliminating their nuclear weapons,

we need a strong intelligence capability, we need to continue to

pursue national missile defense, we need to maintain a rigorous

military and the will to use it when our national interests are

threatened, and finally, Mr. Chairman, we need the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty.

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The CTBT alone, however, will not protect the American people,

but used in conjunction with these other resources, it will help

check the proliferation of nuclear weapons, improve our national

capabilities to detect global nuclear activity and enhance the

United States’ national security. Again, I thank the chairman and I thank the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for inviting me to testify.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I just add a fact? My dis- tinguished colleague quoted extensively from Secretary Cohen and

General Shelton. I would like—I would like to have the opportunity

to provide as a part of my statement the statements by six Secretaries of Defense, former, led by Secretary Schlesinger, who presented strong points that we should take into consideration as well

as Dr. Kissinger by letters. The chairman talked about the intelligence which we cannot discuss here factually, but it will be before

all Senators in S–407 as a part of your record and our record. [The information referred to follows:]

The Honorable TRENT LOTT

Majority Leader,

United States Senate,

Washington, DC.

The Honorable TOM DASCHLE

Democratic Leader,

United States Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATORS LOTT AND DASCHLE: As the Senate weighs whether to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), we believe Senators will be obliged to focus on one dominant, inescapable

result were it to be ratified: over the decades ahead, confidence in the reliability of

our nuclear weapons stockpile would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the credibility of America’s nuclear deterrent. Unlike previous efforts at a CTBT, this Treaty

is intended to be of unlimited duration, and though ‘‘nuclear weapon test explosion’’

is undefined in the Treaty, by America’s unilateral declaration the accord is ‘‘zeroyield,’’ meaning that all nuclear tests, even of the lowest yield, are permanently prohibited.

The nuclear weapons in our nation’s arsenal are sophisticated devices, whose

thousands of components must function together with split-second timing and scant

margin for error. A nuclear weapon contains radioactive material, which in itself decays, and also changes the properties of other materials within the weapon. Over

time, the components of our weapons corrode and deteriorate, and we lack experience predicting the effects of such aging on the safety and reliability of the weapons.

The shelf life of U.S. nuclear weapons was expected to be some 20 years. In the

past, the constant process of replacement and testing of new designs gave some assurance that weapons in the arsenal would be both new and reliable. But under the

CTBT, we would be vulnerable to the effects of aging because we could not test

‘‘fixes’’ of problems with existing warheads.

Remanufacturing components of existing weapons that have deteriorated also

poses significant problems. Manufacturers go out of business, materials and production processes change, certain chemicals previously used in production are now forbidden under new environmental regulations, and so on. It is a certainty that new

processes and materials—untested—will be used. Even more important, ultimately

the nuclear ‘‘pits’’ will need to be replaced—and we will not be able to test those

replacements. The upshot is that new defects may be introduced into the stockpile

through remanufacture, and without testing we can never be certain that these replacement components will work as their predecessors did.

Another implication of a CTBT of unlimited duration is that over time we would

gradually lose our pool of knowledgeable people with experience in nuclear weapons

design and testing. Consider what would occur if the United States halted nuclear

testing for 30 years. We would then be dependent on the judgement of personnel

with no personal experience either in designing or testing nuclear weapons. In place

of a learning curve, we would experience an extended unlearning curve.

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Furthermore, major gaps exist in our scientific understanding of nuclear explosives. As President Bush noted in a report to Congress in January 1993, ‘‘Of all U.S.

nuclear weapons designs fielded since 1958, approximately one-third have required

nuclear testing to resolve problems arising after deployment.’’ We were discovering

defects in our arsenal up until the moment when the current moratorium on U.S.

testing was imposed in 1992. While we have uncovered similar defects since 1992,

which in the past would have led to testing, in the absence of testing, we are not

able to test whether the ‘‘fixes’’ indeed work.

Indeed, the history of maintaining complex military hardware without testing

demonstrates the pitfalls of such an approach. Prior to World War II, the Navy’s

torpedoes had not been adequately tested because of insufficient funds. It took nearly two years of war before we fully solved the problems that caused our torpedoes

to routinely pass harmlessly under the target or to fail to explode on contact. For

example, at the Battle of Midway, the U.S. launched 47 torpedo aircraft, without

damaging a single Japanese ship. If not for our dive bombers, the U.S. would have

lost the crucial naval battle of the Pacific war.

The Department of Energy has structured a program of experiments and computer simulations called the Stockpile Stewardship Program, that it hopes will allow

our weapons to be maintained without testing. This program, which will not be mature for at least 10 years, will improve our scientific understanding of nuclear weapons and would likely mitigate the decline in our confidence in the safety and reliability of our arsenal. We will never know whether we should trust Stockpile Stewardship if we cannot conduct nuclear tests to calibrate the unproven new techniques. Mitigation is, of course, not the same as prevention. Over the decades, the

erosion of confidence inevitably would be substantial.

The decline in confidence in our nuclear deterrent is particularly troublesome in

light of the unique geopolitical role of the United States. The U.S. has a far-reaching

foreign policy agenda and our forces are stationed around the globe. In addition, we

have pledged to hold a nuclear umbrella over our NATO allies and Japan. Though

we have abandoned chemical and biological weapons, we have threatened to retaliate with nuclear weapons to such an attack. In the Gulf War, such a threat was

apparently sufficient to deter Iraq from using chemical weapons against American

troops.

We also do not believe the CTBT will do much to prevent the spread of nuclear

weapons. The motivation of rogue nations like North Korea and Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons will not be affected by whether the U.S. tests. Similarly, the possession of nuclear weapons by nations like India, Pakistan, and Israel depends on the

security environment in their region, not by whether or not the U.S. tests. If confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent were to decline, countries that have relied on

our protection could well feel compelled to seek nuclear capabilities of their own.

Thus, ironically, the CTBT might cause additional nations to seek nuclear weapons.

Finally, it is impossible to verify a ban that extends to very low yields. The likelihood of cheating is high. ‘‘Trust but verify’’ should remain our guide. Tests with

yields below 1 kiloton can both go undetected and be militarily useful to the testing

state. Furthermore, a significantly larger explosion can go undetected—or be mistaken for a conventional explosion used for mining or an earthquake—if the test is

‘‘decoupled.’’ Decoupling involves conducting the test in a large underground cavity

and has been shown to dampen an explosion’s seismic signature by a factor of up

to 70. The U.S. demonstrated this capability in 1966 in two tests conducted in salt

domes at Chilton, Mississippi.

We believe that these considerations render a permanent, zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty incompatible with the Nation’s international commitments and

vital security interests and believe it does not deserve the Senate’s advice and consent. Accordingly, we respectfully urge you and your colleagues to preserve the right

of this nation to conduct nuclear tests necessary to the future viability of our nuclear deterrent by rejecting approval of the present CTBT.

Respectfully,

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.

FRANK C. CARLUCCI.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD

RICHARD B. CHENEY.

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER.

MELVIN R. LAIRD.

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HENRY A. KISSINGER,

October 13, 1999.

The Honorable JESSE HELMS

Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,

United States Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know, I—together with former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch—had recommended in a letter dated October 5th to Senators Lott and Daschle and in an

op-ed in the October 6th Washington Post that a vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty be postponed to permit a further discussion

and clarification of the issues now too controversial. This having proved

unachievable, I am obliged to state my position. As a former Secretary of State, I find the prospect that a major treaty might fail to be ratified extremely painful. But the subject of this treaty concerns the future

security of the United States and involves risks that make it impossible for me to

recommend voting for the treaty as it now stands. My concerns are as follows.

Importance of Nuclear Weapons

For the entire postwar period, the American nuclear arsenal has been America’s

ultimate shield and that of our allies. Though we no longer face the same massive

threat that we did during the Cold War, new dangers have arisen. Our nuclear arsenal is our principal deterrent to the possible use of biological and chemical warfare

against America, our military, and our allies.

Verification

Almost all experts agree that nuclear tests below some yield threshold remain un- verifiable and that this threshold can be raised by technical means. It seems to me

highly dangerous to leave such a vacuum regarding a matter fundamentally affecting the security of the United States. And the fact that this treaty is of indefinite

duration compounds the problem. The CIA’s concerns about recent ambiguous activities by Russia, as reported in the media, illustrate difficulties that will only be

compounded by the passage of time. Supporters of the treaty argue that, because of their small yield, these tests can- not be significant and that the treaty would therefore ‘‘lock in’’ our advantages visa

`

-vis other nuclear powers and aspirants. I do not know how they can be so sure

of this in an age of rapidly exploding technology and whether, on the contrary, this

may not work to the advantage of nations seeking to close this gap. After all, victory

in the Cold War was achieved in part because we kept increasing, and not freezing,

our technological edge.

Nuclear Stockpile

I am not a technical expert on such issues as proof testing, aging of nuclear mate- rial, and reworking existing warheads. But I find it impossible to ignore the concern

about the treaty expressed by six former Secretaries of Defense and several former

CIA Directors and National Security Advisers. I am aware that experts from the

weapons laboratories have argued that there are ingenious ways to mitigate these

concerns. On the other hand, there is a difference between the opinion of experts

from laboratories and policy-makers’ confidence in the reliability of these weapons

as our existing stockpile ages. When national security is involved, one should not

proceed in the face of such doubts.

Sanctions

Another fundamental problem is the weakness of the enforcement mechanism. In

theory, we have a right to abrogate the treaty when the ‘‘supreme national survival’’

is involved. But this option is more theoretical than practical. In a bilateral treaty,

the reluctance to resort to abrogation is powerful enough; in a multilateral treaty

of indefinite duration, this reluctance would be even more acute. It is not clear how

we would respond to a set of violations by an individual country or, indeed, what

response would be meaningful or whether, say, an Iranian test could be said to

threaten the supreme national survival.

Non-proliferation

I am not persuaded that the proposed treaty would inhibit nuclear proliferation.

Restraint by the major powers has never been a significant factor in the decisions

of other nuclear aspirants, which are driven by local rivalries, and security needs.

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Nor is the behavior of rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea likely to be

affected by this treaty. They either will not sign or, if they sign, will cheat. And

countries relying on our nuclear umbrella might be induced by declining confidence

in our arsenal—and the general impression of denuclearization—to accelerate their

own efforts.

For all these reasons, I cannot recommend a vote for a comprehensive test ban

of unlimited duration.

I hope this is helpful.

Sincerely,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Senator WARNER. The key thing, Mr. Chairman, is that on their

own initiative the intelligence community decided they had to update this NIE as it regards to detecting illegal tests on their own

initiative. They informed our committee they would not be finished

with that until early next year. That concerns me greatly, and

every Senator should examine to the extent they have conducted

that investigation what they have found.

Last, we are substituting 50 years of proven capability of testing

with actual tests underground by and large, certainly in the last

two decades, for a system which is barely on the blueprint design

boards, and it is going to take in the testimony of the lab directors

today anywhere of from 10 to 20 years to put in place that computer, largely computer system to give this great Nation of ours the

confidence to some degree in the credibility of the system and the

safety of the system.

Also, much has been said about monitoring. I hope this committee looks in very carefully to the fine print of this treaty which

says that 30 nations must concur in the right of this Nation of ours

or another nation to go and do an onsite inspection, and that group

of 30 nations could consist of voting members like Iraq, Iran or you

name them.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we have just finished an operation in

Kosovo where with 19 other nations bonded together by a protocol

treaty called NATO had some difficulties among themselves dealing with the operation that proved to be completed here after 74

days. What is the chance that 30 disparate nations in what period

of time are going to agree on an onsite inspection?

Last, this treaty, Mr. Chairman, is designed to prevent this Nation of ours to modernize. It does not stop other nations from doing

whatever they wish if they do not want to be a part of it, and in

no way does this treaty lay a finger on terrorists or rogue nations

that want to gain access and use these weapons in an antithetical

way to the interests of our security and our allies.

Senator BIDEN. But, Senator, is it not true that there is no treaty

if these other nations do not sign it?

Senator WARNER. Beg pardon?

Senator BIDEN. Is it not true there is no treaty if these other nations which have nuclear capacity do not sign?

Senator WARNER. That is all part of the ratification I think is

your point——

Senator BIDEN. Yeah, right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with

the remarks of the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services

Committee, Senator Warner. He said it well. But I would ask again

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that every member of this committee and the Senate come to S–

407 in their time and look at some classified information that I believe that you owe it to yourself before you vote.

Senator KERREY. Mr. Chairman, if I could disassociate myself

with the comments made by both my friends, first of all, as to the

Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies producing a new

NIE, there is no definitive end date here. We are constantly evaluating our capacity to monitor and the risk to the United States of

America, so no one should presume, well, we have the definitive,

final, end-of-the-game report that is going to come due next year.

This is a constant process.

Again, I underscore for emphasis, nobody on the face of the

Earth is better at monitoring risk to the Nation and the people in

that nation than the United States of America. We have the best

monitoring capability of anybody right now, and the central question is not can I monitor something bad that is going on out there,

but can I monitor something that will shift the strategic balance

and put us at risk.

If it does not shift the strategic balance and put at risk, it is not

something that should cause us, it seems to me, to fly off and say

that the Nation is imperiled.

Senator LEVIN. May I just have one moment. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman. First we currently have a safe and secure nuclear stockpile without testing, and we have not tested for about 7 years. The

program, the stockpile stewardship program which we are relying

on is not 10 or 20 years off. It is being utilized right now to certify

to every one of us that our weapons stockpile is safe and secure.

Those lab directors, when asked point-blank by me whether or not,

while this stockpile stewardship program is being enhanced,

whether or not they can give us that stockpile certification if given

the resources by this Congress, and if those other safeguards are

in place, their answer is they believe they can. And if they cannot

certify, they will not, and under the specific safeguards provisions

that the President has proposed and that we would adopt, we are

giving notice to everybody in advance that we would consider it our

supreme national interest to resume testing if needed, if those lab

directors and the Secretaries of Defense and Energy cannot give us

a certification that our inventory is safe and reliable. So this is not

like some rinky-dink system that is far off. We are investing billions of dollars each year and have for many years. We rely on the

stockpile stewardship program right now. There have been three

certifications under that system. And it is a fact that it would take

30 of 50 nations in order that we could have inspection, that is

true.

Most of those nations, thank God, are not like Iraq and Iran.

Most of those nations are our allies, and just because a few of those

50 nations might be some we could not rely on, when you go down

that list, you will see that the vast majority of those nations are

nations that we would rely on, and do rely on every day as allies,

and have an abhorrence and a fear of nuclear weapons that is such

that they would be highly supportive of an inspection in order to

see whether somebody had cheated on this treaty.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, I hope we will all do the right

thing, but I trust that we will be careful in what we do.

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The CHAIRMAN. So do I. John, do you have a comment or a question?

Senator KERRY. I have a bunch.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator BIDEN. Go ahead, John, but I have a couple for my

friends.

The CHAIRMAN. We gave him short shrift this morning.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, sir. Let me

just, if I can begin, I really find this debate somewhat extraordinary to some degree because there are reasonable people who are

thinking about their nation. I personally would really hope we do

not have a vote, and I have expressed that to the chairman of the

Armed Services Committee and to the leadership, and that is not

because I am trying to save the Republican Party from itself. That

is because in my judgment, it would deal us a really enormous

long-term injury for a lot of different reasons that I do not have

time to lay out now, but in the debate we may.

But, you know, it is extraordinary to me to hear some of these

arguments. Thanks to you, when you were Secretary of the Navy,

I got to go to nuclear chemical biological warfare school, and I

learned then you can drop these weapons, and they do not go off.

I learned about one point detonation, I learned about some of the

mechanical and electrical safety measures that are involved, and I

know and you know as former Secretary of the Navy and as chairman of the committee that the notion that somehow Americans are

unsafe with a weapon that is sitting there, some component of

which may deteriorate is simply extraordinarily inaccurate and, in

fact, scary to people in a way that it should not be.

Senator WARNER. I do not wish to scare them, but I respectfully

disagree.

Senator KERRY. The fact is that every electrical and mechanical

component can be inspected and replaced. In point of fact, if that

were our fear, we could rebuild each warhead. In fact, we have rebuilt. We have the B–61 that was changed in 1988 and certified

without any nuclear test. Safety is not dependent on a nuclear explosion. Safety is dependent on the safety mechanisms working,

and all of them can be tested without a nuclear explosion.

So no one should say to the American people that deterioration

over the years somehow puts them at risk for a matter of safety.

Now, second, I asked the question earlier this morning of Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Secretary Weinberger, and they answered it,

I thought, correctly and honestly. And the chairman was not here.

We have 6,000 or so warheads today we hope under START II to

get them down to 3,500. We hope if we ever get to START III we

will get them down to 2,225. If you were offered the option 10 years

from now or 20 years from now with our current safety mechanisms and verification capacities to take 20, 30 of those warheads

out of our entire arsenal and we offered you the option of dropping

them on North Carolina or Virginia, I guarantee you you would say

please do not do that because you know as well as I do the better

percentage of them are going to go off, if not all of them.

Now, deterrence is built on a perception of threat. It is built on

somebody’s supposition that something might happen. That was

the entire mutual assured destruction theory that took us through

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50 years successfully, and to suggest that in a mere 15 or 20 years

with the current level of inspection, the current level of computerization, the current level of technological capacity of this country,

the odds on 100 or 500 or a thousand of those multiple thousands

not being able to explode and provide deterrence is extraordinary.

Why, otherwise, I ask the chairman would Japan and all these

other countries that depend on us for their deterrent umbrella, why

would they be the signatories and why would they be saying

please, United States of America, sign this? Have they lost their

senses about their own national security? No. I believe they are

tuned in to the reality of deterrence in a way I do not completely

understand. I know this, that if you do not have this verification

process in place and monitoring of the other systems, you guarantee that every nation in the world is in a free-for-all, but if you

have it, you have the best opportunity of all to try to create a regimen, a protocol under which we rein in what we have fought for

50 years to rein in. It is incomprehensible to me that people would

want to reject that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, who wants to answer that?

Senator WARNER. Quickly, I respectfully disagree with your hypothesis. I think time could take its toll and could affect safety.

Senator KERRY. Even if you replace them every 5 years?

Senator WARNER. Senator, we have dismantled so much of our

infrastructure to do exactly what you speak of. There is only one

nation now building new weapons, and that is Russia, a new tactical weapon, and we have got to be cautious about that.

And second, with all due respect to my distinguished ranking

member, I have to tell you that the stockpile is safe today and tomorrow and for the foreseeable future predicated on test data that

was done in the past 50-plus years by actual test.

The system coming on line, the SSP, as we call it, is heavily dependent on computers and unequivocally in our testimony in response to my questions and others’, that system will not be up and

fully ready for 5 to 20 years, depending on the lab director you ask.

So I think that is imperative that the Senate understand that.

Senator KERRY. The only response I make, Mr. Chairman, in

fairness is, under the safeguards that I believe any President

would wisely adopt, you can pull out of this treaty.

Senator WARNER. And what is the consequences to the world

when you do that?

Senator KERRY. It is better to have been in it and gone down the

process because the only reason you would pull out is because it

is falling apart, because you cannot safeguard your future, and that

is why you would make that decision. The consequences of that are

no different from the consequences that you are proposing we adopt

today.

The CHAIRMAN. Please, please. Our staff is already fussing at me.

Of course, I am enjoying this, but we have got Madeleine Albright,

and whereas I would like to hear you folks, I would rather hear

her.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden has an opening statement, and

then we will hear from the distinguished Secretary of State. Welcome.

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Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Welcome, Madam Secretary. At the outset, I

want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. It

has been over 2 years since the President submitted this Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and since that date it has not

gotten the attention it should, but I welcome today’s hearing. I

think it is better than us not having done it, but I am not sure it

is what we should have done.

I believe very strongly, Mr. Chairman, the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty is manifestly in the security interests of the United

States, and I believe that the Senate should give its advice and

consent. As the chairman will recall, we have met from the time

he has been chairman on a regular basis, and he always asks me

what my priorities are, and he will recall I have indicated to him

consistently the single most important thing I think this committee

can do is attend to this treaty.

Ratification of the test ban treaty is in our national security interests because the treaty is going to help reduce the ability of nations to join the nuclear club or to field sophisticated nuclear weapons they do not now have.

Madam Secretary and Mr. Chairman, no treaty is perfect. No

treaty can guarantee perfect security, but the example of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is illustrative. Three decades ago

when the NPT was signed it was commonly believed that dozens

of nations would soon possess nuclear weapons. Today there are

just seven nations that acknowledge having the weapons and one

or two more that may have constructed a nuclear device. Undeniably the nuclear test ban treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty in my view has been successful in containing proliferation.

We always hear how it has failed. Remember, before it was signed,

everyone was talking about a couple dozen nations having the capacity, the nuclear capacity. Similarly, the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty, I believe, will constrain nuclear proliferation because

it will be difficult for countries who have never tested to be sure

that the weapons they have tested will work and for those who

have tested to make any significant change in their arsenal.

The United States having conducted over 1,000 tests in five decades or about one every 2 weeks has an extensive data base of

knowledge and breathtaking stockpile stewardship program to ensure the reliability of our nuclear stockpile without further testing.

I would note parenthetically here that I have spoken at length with

the two gentlemen who designed the stockpile stewardship program. I have listened to all the directors of the laboratories including former lab directors, and I do not hear anybody, anybody, anybody, anybody, anybody saying what is implied, and that is that

our stewardship stockpile program now has put our stockpile in

jeopardy or there is any reasonable prospect of that happening anytime in the future.

Additionally, the CTBT will make it harder for other nations who

have not conducted many tests to modernize their nuclear arsenals.

For the last two decades—excuse me, for the last 2 years extensive

investigations have focused on whether the People’s Republic of

China may have stolen key secrets from U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. Such espionage, of course, is a matter of grave concern.

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But I challenge everyone to consider this: China can make far more

progress in modernizing its nuclear arsenal by testing than it can

from a mere analysis of whether the nuclear secrets they have stolen from us can be used.

If we fail to certify or ratify the CTBT, China will be free to stay

out of the treaty, and it may feel free to resume testing. The result

would be that China, with a far more advanced arsenal than it possesses today, could obtain—would have a far more advanced arsenal than it possesses today than it could possibly obtain under the

treaty.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is in our interests because

it can contain the advances of nuclear arms in South Asia as well.

Seventeen months ago India and Pakistan each conducted a series

of nuclear tests. Aggressive diplomacy on the part of the administration has so far prevented these countries from testing further or

deploying those devices on ballistic missiles. They will probably join

the treaty and have indicated that they will do so, but our failure

to join I predict would result in a destructive and costly nuclear

arms race in which the people of both those nations and indeed the

world will be losers. The CTBT is in our interests because it will

enhance our ability to determine if other nations have tested by establishing a global network of monitoring stations, well over 300

stations, in fact, many of which complement our own vast monitoring capabilities now.

The treaty requires installation or upgrades of dozens of stations

in key areas of interest to us, including 31 stations in Russia, 11

in China, 17 in the Middle East. These are obviously not places

where we can just go and set up shop, so they will make a considerable contribution to overall monitoring.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the CTBT is in our interest because it

will cap the nuclear programs of the existing nuclear powers, thus

giving our military planners greater certainty about the arsenals of

possible adversaries. There is much more to say, and over the coming days we will debate many of the fine points of this treaty.

These points are important, and the reason why we should conduct

several hearings to review this treaty, several more than we have

had, but I urge everyone to stay focused on the central question,

will we be better off in a world without nuclear testing than we

will be in one with nuclear testing?

We have not tested a nuclear device since 1992. We have established a 10-year $45 billion program to ensure that we do not need

to test again. No other nation with nuclear weapons can match

this. We have the financial resources, the existing nuclear knowhow, the scientific community second to none, and a strong bipartisan commitment to nuclear deterrence, and no rogue state can develop a nuclear weapon without conducting tests that will almost

certainly be detected and will prompt a swift and strong international reaction. I think that is a decidedly one-sided deal in our

favor.

The world is watching the Senate. Will we choose to enhance our

security and increase stability with a treaty that will constrain or

will we allow the expansion of nuclear capability and destroy a 40-

year foundation that has been underway of moving away from the

use of nuclear weapons, a reduction in the nuclear weapons and

72

arms control or will we set out on a path of proliferation? It is almost that simple and it is that complicated, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you again for having this hearing. I hope that better

heads prevail and we are able to continue this process, but if we

have to vote on Tuesday, which I am prepared to do, and will vote

for the treaty, it will be the single most important vote anybody on

this committee will cast and will have cast in my view, and it will

set the path for this Nation and determine the circumstances under

which my granddaughters will live more than any other thing that

we do. I welcome you, Madam Secretary, and thank you, Mr.

Chairman, for allowing me to make an opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are certainly welcome. We have a decision to make, this being a very active Senate these days. I see the

one light, meaning a vote is on. I dislike Senators going and coming

while the Secretary is speaking. Would you prefer that we all go

and come back quickly? I think I would rather.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess and go vote and then

come right back.

[Recess.]

Senator HAGEL. Madame Secretary, if you are prepared, I have

been empowered by the chairman, scary thought as that is, to welcome you officially and get you started. We know you have other

things to do. And we are again grateful for you being here. We look

forward to your testimony. So tally ho.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I am ready to vote.

Senator HAGEL. I was not given that much power.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY

OF STATE

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel, and

other Senators. I really thank you for the opportunity to testify

today on behalf of a treaty that will make the world safer and

America more secure. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or

CTBT is not a panacea. It will not guarantee that nuclear weapons

spread no further. No pact or policy can ensure that. But the treaty

will make it more difficult and dangerous for countries to develop

and modernize nuclear weapons. That is, without question, in the

national security interests of the United States.

Under the treaty, America would retain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent, but by preventing testing, the treaty will inhibit

the development of more advanced weapons by other nuclear weapons states and make it harder for countries that do not now have

such weapons to build them.

Our Nation has the world’s most advanced nuclear capabilities.

In the past we conducted more than 1,000 nuclear explosive tests.

Our most experienced and eminent nuclear scientists and the

heads of our testing labs agree that we do not need to continue

these tests in order to maintain an effective deterrent. We can keep

our weapons fully safe and reliable under the provisions of the

treaty and the special safeguards President Clinton has proposed.

This view is echoed by our senior military leaders, including General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and four of his

73

predecessors, and has been supported consistently by the chiefs of

all our Armed Services.

America’s ability to protect its security without testing is not

new. We stopped conducting nuclear explosive tests in 1992. In recent years such a moratorium has been broadly observed around

the world, but as the exceptions in South Asia last year indicate,

restraint depends now almost entirely upon goodwill.

Since America has no need and does not plan to conduct nuclear

explosive tests, the essence of the debate over the CTBT should be

clear. It is not about preventing America from conducting tests. It

is about preventing and dissuading others from doing so. It is

about establishing the principle on a global basis that it is not

smart, not safe, not right and not legal to conduct explosive tests

in order to develop or modernize nuclear weapons.

By banning such tests, the treaty removes a key tool that a modernizer or a proliferator would need to develop with confidence

small advanced nuclear warheads. These are the weapons that can

most readily be concealed and that can be delivered by ballistic

missiles. They are the most threatening to others and to us. No

country could be confident of developing them under the CTBT.

Some say the treaty is too risky because countries might cheat,

but by approving the treaty what exactly would we be risking?

With no treaty, other countries can test without cheating and without limit. The CTBT would improve our ability to deter and detect

clandestine nuclear weapons activity in three ways. First, every

signatory would be required to accept intrusive monitoring. Second,

the treaty establishes a comprehensive international verification

regime with more than 320 data gathering stations of four different

types that can register nuclear explosions anywhere in the world.

A great deal of information collected by these sensor stations would

not otherwise be available to our intelligence community.

Third, the treaty would give us the right to call for onsite inspections when we have evidence a test has occurred. Obviously we will

continue to make full use of our own national technical means, but

we will have more extensive access in more countries of interest

under the treaty than we would ever have without it. And the more

countries that support and participate in the treaty, the harder it

will be for others to cheat and the higher the price they will pay

if they do.

Mr. Chairman, some have suggested that the treaty is not

verifiable because we cannot be absolutely certain of detecting very

low yield tests. Strictly speaking, that is true with or without the

treaty, but by improving our capacity to monitor, we are much

more likely under the treaty to detect such tests and consequently

to deter them.

The CTBT prohibits all explosive tests, and we would take any

sign of cheating very seriously, but our citizens should know that

low-yield explosions would be of little use in developing new or

more advanced weapons systems, and we are confident that we

would detect and deter any tests that could damage U.S. security

interests.

Another criticism I have heard of the treaty is that it is premature. We should wait, some say, both until our ability to detect

even the smallest test is 100 percent, which may never happen, or

74

until every country about which we are concerned has ratified the

treaty first.

I can only reply that that is a recipe for followership, not leadership. The purpose of our national security policy should be to help

shape events, not simply observe them. We want other countries,

including Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to ratify this treaty

and undertake a binding commitment to refrain from nuclear explosive tests.

But how can we convince them to do so if we will not? If we wait,

why should not they? Waiting is not a strategy. Waiting is the absence of a strategy. If we believe nuclear restraint is the right approach, we should ratify this treaty and mark a path for others to

follow. After all, we heard the same arguments during the debate

on the chemical weapons convention. Opponents said we should

wait, but once we decided to move ahead, five countries, including

China, chose to submit their ratifications on the same day we did.

Cuba ratified a week later, and Iran, Pakistan, and Russia followed

within 8 months.

Over the past 2 days I have been asked whether I would prefer

to see a vote on this treaty delayed rather than have it voted down.

I have only one real preference, and that is to see the treaty approved as soon as possible. The reason is not sentiment but sense.

This treaty would help America. I hope that Senators who now oppose the CTBT or who are undecided will think very carefully

about what the consequences would be if the treaty were not approved. Because it would be a national security tragedy if the

world’s greatest deliberative body killed a treaty that our Nation

has sought for 40 years by failing properly to deliberate on and appreciate its merits.

Under those circumstances, we would have preserved the right

to do something we have no need and no intention of doing, while

giving a free pass to those who may want to conduct nuclear explosive tests and could one day do us harm. We would have ignored

the best national security advice of our top military leaders. We

would have missed a priceless chance to improve our ability to detect and deter nuclear tests. We would have denied the vision and

betrayed the dream of the two Presidents who first proposed and

pursued the comprehensive test ban—Dwight Eisenhower and

John Kennedy—and we would have done damage to American interests in every region.

In Asia, by throwing away a valuable tool for slowing the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal and by sending a very confusing signal to North Korea. In South Asia by cutting the legs out

from under our efforts to persuade India and Pakistan to sign and

ratify the CTBT. In Russia by reducing our credibility on nonproliferation issues with a government we have continually urged

to take proliferation seriously. In the Gulf by easing worldwide

pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions. And in Europe, the

Americas, and around the globe by disappointing our allies and

friends, many of whom have ratified the treaty and are without exception urging us to do the same.

Senators, in recent years I have traveled to every corner of the

world. I have met with senior officials from most nations. In that

time I have not heard a single expression of doubt about the overVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
75

whelming power and reliability of our nuclear deterrent or about

our ability and resolve to defend America’s vital interests. What I have heard are questions about whether America would

continue to lead in reducing the threat that nuclear proliferation

poses to every citizen in every country. I have heard the concern

that we would insist on reserving the right to conduct nuclear explosive tests and thereby give every country with a potential to develop nuclear weapons a green light to do so. Let us be clear. It is potential proliferators who need to test. We

do not. It is those who might wish to modernize. We set the standard for modernization. By approving the CTBT, we can go far to

lock in a technological status quo that protects us without threatening others. At the same time, we would strike an historic blow against the spread of nuclear weapons. But if we send this treaty down to defeat, we will fuel ambitions and fears that could multiply the number and danger of nuclear weapons even as the new century dawns. In recent days I have heard opponents refer to this treaty to ban nuclear explosive tests as dangerous. Call me illogical, but I believe

that given where the United States now stands in the world, it is

unrestrained nuclear explosive tests that are dangerous. I know this treaty cannot eliminate all the risks that we and our families face, but like President Clinton, Secretary Cohen, American military leaders past and present, and our Nation’s allies from

Ottawa to Paris and London to Tokyo, I am convinced this landmark agreement will reduce those risks. I urge each Senator to

think carefully before voting to put partisan considerations aside

and to cast your vote in support of American leadership on behalf

of a safer world and in favor of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.Twenty years from now when my grandchildren are living in a

world where there are more nuclear powers, they might look at me

and say, Maddy, which is what they call me, and they might say,

weren’t you Secretary of State in 1999 when people considered

whether we should test or not? How come the testing went on? Did

you not do something about it?

And I am going to say to them, I did my damnedest for them to

make sure that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty passed, and I

hope that when you look at your grandchildren you will be able to

say the same thing. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

Mr. Chairman and Senators, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of a Treaty that will make the world safer and America more secure.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT, is not a panacea. It will not guarantee that nuclear weapons spread no further. No pact or policy can ensure that.

But the Treaty will make it more difficult and dangerous for countries to develop

and modernize nuclear weapons. That is, without question, in the national security

interests of the United States.

Under the Treaty, America would retain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. But

by preventing testing, the Treaty will inhibit the development of more advanced

weapons by other nuclear weapons states, and make it harder for countries that do

not now have such weapons to build them.

Our nation has the world’s most advanced nuclear capabilities. In the past, we

conducted more than 1,000 nuclear explosive tests. Our most experienced and eminent nuclear scientists, and the heads of our testing labs, agree that we do not need

76

to continue these tests in order to maintain an effective deterrent. We can keep our

weapons fully safe and reliable under the provisions of the Treaty and the special

safeguards President Clinton has proposed.

This view is echoed by our senior military leaders, including General Hugh

Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and four of his predecessors. And

has been supported consistently by the chiefs of all our armed services.

America’s ability to protect its security without testing is not new. We stopped

conducting nuclear explosive tests in 1992. In recent years, such a moratorium has

been broadly observed around the world, but—as the exceptions in South Asia last

year indicate—restraint depends now almost entirely upon good will.

Since America has no need and does not plan to conduct nuclear explosive tests,

the essence of the debate over CTBT should be clear. It is not about preventing

America from conducting tests; it is about preventing and dissuading others from

doing so. It is about establishing the principle on a global basis that it is not smart,

not safe, not right and not legal to conduct explosive tests in order to develop or

modernize nuclear weapons.

By banning such tests, the Treaty removes a key tool that a modernizer or a

proliferator would need to develop with confidence small, advanced nuclear warheads. These are the weapons that can most readily be concealed; and that can be

delivered by ballistic missiles. They are the most threatening to others and to us.

No country could be confident of developing them under the CTBT.

Some say the Treaty is too risky because countries might cheat. But by approving

the Treaty, what exactly would we be risking? With no treaty, other countries can

test without cheating, and without limit.

The CTBT would improve our ability to deter and detect clandestine nuclear

weapons activity in three ways.

First, every signatory would be required to accept intrusive monitoring.

Second, the Treaty establishes a comprehensive international verification regime,

with more than 320 data gathering stations of four different types that can register

nuclear explosions anywhere in the world. A great deal of the information collected

by these sensor stations would not otherwise be available to our intelligence community.

And third, the Treaty would give us the right to call for on-site inspections when

we have evidence a test has occurred.

Obviously, we will continue to make full use of our own national technical means.

But we will have more extensive access in more countries of interest under the

Treaty than we would ever have without it. And the more countries that support

and participate in the Treaty, the harder it will be for others to cheat, and the higher the price they will pay if they do.

Mr. Chairman, some have suggested that the Treaty is not verifiable because we

cannot be absolutely certain of detecting very low-yield tests. Strictly speaking, that

is true with or without the Treaty. But by improving our capacity to monitor, we

are much more likely under the Treaty to detect such tests and consequently to

deter them.

The CTBT prohibits all explosive tests; and we would take any sign of cheating

very seriously.

But our citizens should know that low-yield explosions would be of little use in

developing new or more advanced weapons systems. And we are confident that we

could detect and deter any tests that could damage U.S. security interests.

Another criticism I have heard of the Treaty is that it is premature. We should

wait, some say, both until our ability to detect even the smallest tests is 100 percent, which may never happen; or until every country about which we are concerned

has ratified the Treaty first. I can only reply that this is a recipe for followership,

not leadership.

The purpose of our national security policy should be to help shape events, not

simply observe them. We want other countries, including Russia, China, India and

Pakistan to ratify this Treaty and undertake a binding commitment to refrain from

nuclear explosive tests.

But how can we convince them to do so if we will not? If we wait, why shouldn’t

they? Waiting is not a strategy; waiting is the absence of a strategy. If we believe

nuclear restraint is the right approach, we should ratify this Treaty and, mark a

path for others to follow.

After all, we heard the same arguments during the debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Opponents said we should wait.

But once we decided to move ahead, five countries, including China, chose to submit their ratifications on the same day we did. Cuba ratified a week later, and Iran,

Pakistan and Russia followed within eight months.

77

Over the past two days, I have been asked whether I would prefer to see a vote

on this Treaty delayed, rather than have it voted down. I have only one preference,

and that is to see the Treaty approved as soon as possible. The reason is not sentiment, but sense. This Treaty would help America.

And I hope that Senators who now oppose the CTBT, or who are undecided, will

think very carefully about what the consequences would be if the Treaty were not

approved. Because it would be a national security tragedy if the world’s greatest deliberative body killed a Treaty that our nation has sought for forty years by failing

properly to deliberate on and appreciate its merits.

Under those circumstances, we would have preserved the right to do something

we have no need and no intention of doing, while giving a free pass to those who

may want to conduct nuclear explosive tests and could one day do us harm.

We would have ignored the best national security advice of our top military leaders.

We would have missed a priceless chance to improve our ability to detect and

deter nuclear tests.

We would have denied the vision and betrayed the dream of the two Presidents

who first proposed and pursued the—comprehensive test ban—Dwight Eisenhower

and John Kennedy.

And we would have done damage to American interests in every region.

In Asia, by throwing away a valuable tool for slowing the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal; and by sending a very confusing signal to North Korea.

In South Asia, by cutting the legs out from under our efforts to persuade India

and Pakistan to sign and ratify the CTBT.

In Russia, by reducing our credibility on nonproliferation issues with a government we have continually urged to take proliferation seriously.

In the Gulf, by easing worldwide pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions.

And in Europe, the Americas and around the globe, by disappointing our allies

and friends, many of whom have ratified the Treaty and are—without exception—

urging us to do the same.

Senators, in recent years, I have traveled to every corner of the world. I have met

with senior officials from most nations. In that time, I have not heard a single expression of doubt about the overwhelming power and reliability of our nuclear deterrent, or about our ability and resolve to defend America’s vital interests.

What I have heard are questions about whether America would continue to lead

in reducing the threat that nuclear proliferation poses to citizens in every country.

I have heard the concern that we would insist on reserving the right to conduct nuclear explosive tests, and thereby give every country with the potential to develop

nuclear weapons a green light to do so.

Let us be clear. It is potential proliferators who need to test; we do not. It is those

who might wish to modernize; we set the standard for modernization. By approving

the CTBT, we can go far to lock in a technological status quo that protects us without threatening others. At the same time, we would strike an historic blow against

the spread of nuclear weapons.

But if we send this Treaty down to defeat, we will fuel ambitions and fears that

could multiply the number and danger of nuclear weapons even as the new century

dawns.

Mr. Chairman, it just so happens that about three weeks ago, I was blessed with

my fourth grandchild, and first granddaughter. Her name is Madeleine.

I hope I am not being selfish when I say that I want Madeleine and others her

age to grow up like those of us on both sides of this table in one respect could not.

I want her to grow up free from the fear of nuclear attack. I believe that the CTBT

will give her and her generation a better chance. I fear that without the Treaty,

the spread of nuclear dangers could create risks even graver than those we faced.

In recent days, I have heard opponents refer to this Treaty to ban nuclear explosive tests as dangerous. Call me illogical, but I believe that, given where the United

States now stands in the world, it is unrestrained nuclear explosive tests that are

dangerous.

I know this Treaty can’t eliminate all the risks that we and our families will face.

But like President Clinton, Secretary Cohen, American military leaders past and

present, and our nation’s allies from Ottawa to Paris and London to Tokyo, I am

convinced this landmark agreement will reduce those risks.

I urge each Senator to think carefully before voting, to put partisan considerations

aside; and to cast your vote in support of American leadership, on behalf of a safer

world, and in favor of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Thank you.

78

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, I apologize for being so late,

but three people grabbed me on another matter.

Before we routinely turn to our first round of questions, I feel

obliged to ask you a question about a matter that was brought to

the committee’s attention this morning by the administration’s

CTBT negotiator, Ambassador Ledogar.

When asked, the ambassador confirmed the existence of a previously undisclosed side agreement relating to U.S. membership in

the CTBT Executive Council. I did not even know that existed,

which shows what I know. He also confirmed the existence of other

side deals contained in memoranda and jointly agreed notes.

Now, I do not get hot and bothered about things of this sort, but

it does concern me when I learn about secret deals on the side.

Maybe they are perfectly innocent, but do you want to talk about

why these exist and how they exist and how it began?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, let me just say in terms

of what you were asking about the creation of the Council, that is

part of how this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is going to work,

and we can give you more information on that, but let me just say

that during the negotiation of the CTBT, the nuclear weapons

states did consult regularly including on questions related to the

scope of the treaty, and these consultations led to the achievement

of a shared understanding that all nuclear explosions, however

small, including low-yield hydronuclear tests, are prohibited and

subcritical experiments are not prohibited.

A shared understanding was also achieved that the treaty does

not prohibit a range of activities, none of which would involve nuclear explosions. I think there are no secret agreements attached

to this, but whatever documentation we have we obviously will be

glad to share with you.

The CHAIRMAN. That was going to be my next suggestion. If you

furnished us information probably it would just go in the file and

never matter, but you know how it is.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Obviously. No, we would be pleased to.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us see. I asked the Ambassador about the

White House’s claim that CTBT is, quote, and this expression or

this phrase has been used time and time again, ‘‘the longest

sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control,’’ and

that it has been the negotiating objective of every President since

Eisenhower. He stated that that was hyperbole and admitted that

not a single President before the current one has ever sought a

zero yield indefinite duration CTBT. I just wonder if that does not

carry the hype a little bit far, and maybe it happens on the side

I happen to be on, and it is one of the rare occasions when you and

I are on opposite sides, but do we have to do that sort of thing or

do you know some hyperbole? I called it bull, but he said, well, I

prefer to call it hyperbole.

Do you agree with your chief negotiator that the treaty proposed

to the Senate is not what the Clinton administration initially proposed?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I do not know what you

want to call it, but the truth of the matter is that it was President

Eisenhower who first put forward the idea that there be a ban on

testing of nuclear weapons, and then President Kennedy had a limVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
79

ited test ban, and really it is an issue that has been out there ever

since the beginning of nuclear testing because I think those Presidents and subsequent ones have been very concerned about the

dangers created to everybody by nuclear testing and have tried to

limit it, and I think that—so I think that—I try not to use hyperbole, but I do believe that this is a much sought after treaty that

has been sought after for a long time by many, many Presidents.

It also is very much a part of an overall proliferation strategy or

nonproliferation strategy. We are not the only country in the world

that has nuclear weapons, and we are also a part of the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty, and what happened as a result of that

was that, first of all, when there was the moratorium that passed

in 1992, there was a push that there should also be a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty along with a unilateral moratorium. Then

when we were reviewing the NPT in 1995, we made a good faith

commitment to the nonnuclear countries that we would do everything we could to work on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That

has been the push.

Those negotiations have all been taking place—not bilaterally as

our treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia have, but multilaterally, and in that kind of a negotiation, there is always a lot of give

and take. We did not get everything that was our maximum position, but we did get everything that we needed, and I think, sir,

you appear as all of you that are legislators know that as you are

coming forward with something that you really want, you have an

ability to negotiate down to your bottom line and get what you

really need, and in the meantime clearly in the negotiating process

you put down your maximum demands, and we, as I said, we did

not get everything we wanted, but we got everything we needed.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, my impression is that Eisenhower and everybody else insisted on low-yield testing and a time limit for the

treaty. Am I mistaken?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Excuse me, and a time?

The CHAIRMAN. And a time limit on the treaty.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that what they wanted was to

get what they could. Their dream was to be able to have a treaty

that made sure that we were safe and that we would be able to

maintain our superiority, and at the same time make sure that

there would not be problems in terms of others being able to develop their nuclear weapons.

We believed, and there has been a lot of discussion about the

zero yield, there were discussions about whether there should be

higher levels, and ultimately after the discussions in committees,

it was decided that it was better to have a zero yield rather than

a low yield because it is easier, frankly, to measure, and we got

agreement from the Chinese and the Russians that it was appropriate to have a zero yield in this treaty, and this treaty is permanent, but it does permit for a 10-year review.

The CHAIRMAN. Good. If I might ask Mr. Holum, he is not testifying, but he could possibly nod yea or nay if he is familiar with

this statement. Among many other things, the treaty does not contain our original proposal for an option to withdraw from the treaty

at the 10-year mark without citing reasons of supreme national inVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
80

terest, and our proposal that the treaty’s scope provides room for

so-called hydronuclear experiments and very small nuclear yields.

Is that a statement that you are familiar with?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, you made it, did you not?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wonder if it is a fair characterization of

your original negotiating instructions from the administration.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I can. If you want, let me give you a fuller

answer here. During the initial phase of the negotiations, the

United States did seek to make a small exclusion for itself to allow

for very low-yield hydronuclear tests. However, others asked for exclusions also on a much larger scale which would have been contrary to our nonproliferation objectives.

In principle, we were not able to oppose others’ exclusions unless

we decided to move to a zero yield treaty that would be equal for

all. In 1995 the report of the JASON group of distinguished scientists concluded that we did not need hydronuclear tests to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile which removed reservations about zero and allowed us to propose the zero

as a solution, and getting others to reassess downward and eventually to accept zero was a victory for the United States. And zero,

moreover, was recognized as better for us because it is easier to

verify, as I said, the difference between zero and some limited level

of activity than between one level of activity and a higher level. So

we were pleased with that, and I think that the fact also exists as

one of the aspects of the treaty as it was transmitted to you that

we can withdraw, it does not matter whether 10 years or any years

if the President on advice from the Department of Defense—Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy thinks that the reliability of the stockpile is not there or other reasons for supreme national interest. So that exists. It is not within a timeframe. It is

available to us at any time that we feel our national security is

threatened.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for that. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Again, welcome, Madam

Secretary. There is a lot of things I would like to explore with you

here. Let me begin by saying that I, along with a number of my

Republican colleagues with whom I have been asked by the Democratic leadership to confer about the scheduling of this vote, are

concerned about the possible consequences of rejection. Speaking

only for myself, I think the prospects for rejection are in direct proportion to how little discussion there is. My view is the greater the

discussion, the greater the debate, the more time we have to discuss it, the more it will become apparent why this is so important.

I would like to ask permission, Mr. Chairman to enter in the

record a list of the duration of time that we took to hold hearings

and also debate on the floor of the Senate the last five major arms

control treaties we have had.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, of course.

[The information referred to follows:]

81

SENATE CONSIDERATION OF MAJOR ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY TREATIES—1972–

1999

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty/SALT I (approved 1972)

• 8 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings

• 18 days of Senate floor consideration

Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1988)

• 23 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings

• 9 days of Senate floor consideration

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1991)

• 5 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings

• 2 days of Senate floor consideration

START I Treaty (1992)

• 19 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings

• 5 days of Senate floor consideration

START II Treaty (1996)

• 8 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings

• 3 days of Senate floor consideration

Chemical Weapons Convention (1997)

• 14 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings

• 3 days of floor consideration

NATO Enlargement (1998)

• 7 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings

• 8 days of floor consideration

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (submitted 1997)

• 1 day of Foreign Relations Committee hearings (scheduled)

Senator BIDEN. Now, I asked Frank Wisner and Robert Oakley

to advise me on the impact of a negative vote on India and Pakistan in particular. Wisner was Ambassador to Egypt under President Bush and Ambassador to India under President Clinton, and

Oakley was Ambassador to Pakistan under Presidents Reagan and

Bush, and their letters are short and to the point, and with your

permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read them, and then

maybe the Secretary could respond.

This is from Mr. Oakley—Ambassador Oakley:

‘‘Dear Senator Biden, you asked my views on the effects of action

by the U.S. Senate to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

In my judgment, the effects would be dangerously negative for the

United States security interests.

‘‘First, in the long term, there would be a significant erosion of

constraints upon further development of nuclear capacities and capabilities around the world. The United States has been the leader

in seeking limitations upon current capabilities as well as convincing other countries not to develop such capabilities. There

would be important political downside effects upon this effort since

the United States would be seen as turning away from its basic

policy of restraint. Second, in the near term, the climate and freedom for nuclear testing created by reversal of U.S. basic position

would be an incentive for new countries such as Iran to test when

they are ready. Russia and China might well conclude they have

the freedom to test. The most troubling in the immediate future

would be the virtual invitation to India to start implementing a

new nuclear doctrine recently proposed by its national security advisory board. This doctrine calls for a major increase in India’s nuclear capabilities which could only be achieved by more testing.

Pakistan has already made it clear that it would follow India in

more testing, and given the prevailing tensions in the subcontinent,

82

the nuclear arms race which could well ensue would be extremely

dangerous.’’

Senator BIDEN. Signed Robert B. Oakley.

And the following from Ambassador Wisner.

‘‘Dear Senator Biden, I understand that Members of the Senate

are currently debating the issue of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I regard early passing of this treaty as America’s highest national importance and hope that your arguments in support of its

passing can result in the right and necessary outcome.

‘‘As Ambassador to India from 1994 to 1997 I was intimately involved in matters related to CTBT and India’s willingness to sign

the treaty. Since my departure from government, I have also followed closely the negotiations with New Delhi and Islamabad

which are aimed at convincing those governments to accept CTBT.

If the United States delays the decision and rejects the treaty, I am

confident the United States runs a serious risk of India abandoning

the treaty and Pakistan will follow suit. Consensus in favor of treaty signature in India is not yet fully formed, and if it is, the consensus will be weak. Many thoughtful Indians with a voice in national defense policy believe India needs to test further its nuclear

capacity. What India does, Pakistan surely will do.

‘‘In the event that India and Pakistan walk away from the CTBT,

the United States will face an even more complicated nuclear proliferation problem, in the world at large.’’

Senator BIDEN. And it goes on from there. Sincerely, ‘‘in closing,

let me repeat my hope that the U.S. Senate will ratify . . .’’.

That, coupled with a—well, let me just ask you to respond. Do

you share their concern about the impact of a negative vote on

India and Pakistan restraining or failing to restrain their move toward further reliance upon nuclear weapons?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I do not want to engage in hyperbole,

but in spades I agree with what they have said because I think

that we are very concerned about the possibility here that we have

two countries side by side that have very serious differences and

have now the potential of nuclear weapons, and we believe that the

U.S. ratification remains critical in order to get them on board.

[The full text of the letters referred to follows:]

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.,

70 PINE STREET,

New York, NY, September 30, 1999.

The Honorable JOSEPH R. BIDEN

United States Senate,

439 Dirksen Bldg., Washington, DC.

DEAR SEN. BIDEN: I understand that members of the Senate are currently debating the issue of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I regard the early passage of

this Treaty as a matter of the highest national importance and hope that your arguments and support of its passage will result in the right and necessary outcome.

As Ambassador to India from 1994 through 1997, I was intimately involved in

matters related to CTBT and India’s unwillingness to sign that Treaty. Since my

departure from government I have also followed closely our negotiations with New

Delhi and Islamabad which are aimed at convincing those two governments to accept CTBT. If the United States Senate delays a decision or rejects the Treaty, I

am confident that the United States will run a serious risk of India abandoning the

Treaty. Pakistan will follow suit. A consensus in favor of a Treaty signature in India

is not yet fully formed and if it is, the consensus will be weak. Many thoughtful

83

Indians with a voice in national defense policy believe India needs to test further

its nuclear capability. What India does, Pakistan will surely do. In the event that India and Pakistan walk away from CTBT, the United States will face an even more complicated nuclear proliferation problem in the world at

large. The signal will be visible to all that the Treaty has been grievously weakened

and the international community is unable to control weapons testing. This state

of affairs cannot be helpful to the United States and to the hopes all of us have

to reduce the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in the world. Put differently, I

do not wish to contemplate treaty failure here followed by a breakdown with India

and Pakistan and the effect these moves will have on rogue states like Iraq, Libya,

Iran and North Korea.

In closing, let me repeat my hope that the United States Senate will ratify CTBT and do so very soon. With best wishes,

Sincerely,

FRANK G. WISNER,

Vice Chairman, External Affairs.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES,

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,

Washington, DC, October 1, 1999.

Senator JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

United States Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: You asked my views on the effects of action by the United States Senate to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In my judgement, the

effects would be dangerously negative for the United States security interests. First, in the long term, there would be a significant erosion of constraints upon the futher development of nuclear capabilities around the world. The United States

has been the leader in seeking limitations upon current capabilities as well as convincing other countries not to develop such capabilities. There would be an important political downside effect upon this effort since the U.S. would be seen as turning away from its basic policy of restraint. Second, in the nearer term, the climate

of freedom for nuclear testing created by the reversal of the basic U.S. position

would be an incentive for new countries such as Iran to test when they are ready.

China and Russia might well conclude that they have freedom to test. Most troubling, in the immediate future, it would be a virtual invitation for India to start implementing the new nuclear doctrine recently proposed by its National Security Advisor Board. This doctrine calls for a major increase in Indian nuclear capabilities,

which can only be achieved by more testing. Pakistan has already made clear that

it would follow India in more testing. Given the prevailing tension in the sub-continent, the nuclear arms race which could well ensue would be extremely dangerous.

Sincerely,

Ambassador ROBERT B. OAKLEY (Ret.),

Distinguished Visiting Fellow.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask you one more question before my

time is up. I am sorry to interrupt you, but my time is about to

expire. You have more than anyone else that I am aware of in the

last—in the recent past, the last several years met with, spoken

with our allies—Japan, Germany, nonnuclear powers, Britain,

France, et cetera. It has been asserted by the Senator from Virginia and some others that they, if we sign this treaty, they will

lose faith in our nuclear deterrence, and they, in turn, will be inclined to either upgrade their own—proliferate their own nuclear

capability, that is upgrade it, and/or become nuclear powers in the

case of Japan and Germany.

Would you be willing to comment on that assertion?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I believe that they are all

counting on us to lead the nonproliferation fight and to make sure

that they—that our deterrent is strong as a result of the fact that

others cannot test. Therefore, they are counting on us to keep the

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lead in nuclear nonproliferation. Otherwise they might, in fact, be

put in a position where they do have to do other things to strengthen themselves. We are providing them the ability to make sure

that they do not have to get into a position of strengthening.

Senator BIDEN. Have they all signed?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. Well, the ones that—France and the

United Kingdom have ratified. Germany and Japan have. All

NATO allies have signed and 15 have ratified.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you.

Senator HAGEL. John, thank you, and welcome Madam Secretary, nice to have you here, and we are grateful that you are giving us a sense of the dynamics of the importance of what we are

discussing.

On a serious note but maybe a lighter side of that, I appreciated

very much your comments regarding your grandchildren. A couple

of weeks ago I was in Nebraska with my 6-year-old and my 8-yearold, and we were at a Dairy Queen, which is a very popular place

in Nebraska. I was in the Dairy Queen, and we were buying Dilly

Bars, I am not sure what flavor, but one of my many enlightened,

insightful constituents began to shower me with praise on the kind

of effective representation I was bringing to Nebraska, which I allowed to go on for as long as we could all stand it.

Whereupon this enlightened gentleman said, and, Senator, nice

to have you back in the State, I know you always appreciate spending time with your grandchildren. I took your grandchildren issue

rather seriously.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. It just goes to show you how much older I

am than you are.

Senator HAGEL. No, I think it is the job. But you have really cut

to the essence of what this is all about. The objective is to make

the world safer for mankind, and I think we all tend to miss that

occasionally when we get consumed with technical issues and details.

But with that said, I have stated, Madam Secretary, that I am

undecided, and I am undecided because, Senator Biden and others

have said it rather clearly, I think we need more time to understand what the consequences are, what the issues are, what the details are. With that in mind, I have worked my way along through

this. I am sorry our friend Senator Kerry is not here because he

had dazzled us with his technical brilliance, and he attributed that

all to being in the Navy.

Well, I am just an old Army man, so I did not have the benefit

of that brilliant technical background, but I do have a couple of

questions on the governance of this treaty. I think when we define

it down, no matter what we have, how it is governed and how we

live by the conditions is pretty critical. You noted in your testimony

that of the three issues that you felt were important, in your

words, the CTBT would improve our ability to deter and detect

clandestine nuclear weapons activity. The treaty would give us the

right to call for onsite inspections when we have evidence a test

has occurred.

I would very much appreciate you enlightening the committee on

how that works. This morning one of your predecessors at the

United Nations, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, got into this in some deVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
85

tail, laying out the representation of the governance committee, the

executive council, who gets votes. There were some, I thought,

rather disturbing aspects of that as to who would we be guaranteed

a seat on the executive council. That is when it came up, by Ambassador Ledogar, that in fact that was a side deal, that wasn’t in

the language. I would appreciate it if you could take us through

that because we heard from some of the chairmen of the committees this afternoon preceding your testimony that it would take a

30-nation concurrence in order to get an onsite inspection.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, let me describe a little bit

how the onsite inspection would work. It is designed to permit

timely and effective inspections, while guarding against abuses,

and the treaty’s Executive Council must vote on whether to approve a request for an onsite inspection within 96 hours from the

time of request, and as stated, such decisions have to be taken by

30 of the Executive Council’s 51 members, and we can bring whatever evidence we choose, including what is gathered by national

technical means to the table to get the vote.

The countries that will be on this council are selected by region,

and clearly there is no question in my mind that the United States

would be one of the countries that would be a part of this. Now,

you do have to get the vote of the other countries in order to have

this happen, and we believe that they will be selected by random

from regions that, given the evidence that would be brought to the

table, that it would be very difficult for any country to stop onsite

inspection taking place.

We also have the possibility that if we see that there has been

a questionable event, is ultimately we can bring questions to the

Security Council as we did, for instance, when we were concerned

about what was going on in North Korea. So I do think that we

have a way to get our case in a timely way to the Executive Council of the organization as it is set up. I do not have concerns about

that.

Senator HAGEL. You do not? Ambassador Kirkpatrick did, and

she regaled us a little bit on real life at the United Nations, which

you know a little something about. So you do not think that is a

concern?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. No. And I think some of the things we did

was to have protection ourselves, is in terms of making sure that

countries that we did not like or had problems with would not be

able to have open access to our sites, and so we are able to have

special procedures which would allow to us not have every aspect

of our own sites inspected in every way.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer, do you not want to come up here?

You are sitting down in San Diego.

Senator BOXER. It is OK. It is all right. I have a good bird’s eye

view of everybody, and it works just fine.

The CHAIRMAN. I recognize you.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for your

courtesy and, again, for having this debate. I do agree with Senator

Biden, I feel the more we debate it, the more the case is made, but

then, you know, I have a prejudice in favor of it. I know a couple

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of our colleagues are against it and a couple are undecided. I would

like perhaps to hear from them afterwards.

But let me just put this into my perspective, as everybody does.

When I was a child in grammar school and risking letting everyone

know my age, although it is public information, those were the

days of the real threat of a nuclear war, and in my public school,

in my grammar school, we had to go underneath the desk, we had

drills, and we were taught if we went underneath the desk and covered our eyes like this, we could survive a nuclear strike. We also

had dog tags, like the Army, like they had in the Army. We were

so proud to wear those. We felt so important. We did not realize

the purpose of it was if we were annihilated, someone would know

who we were.

So the kids in my generation really did not know that much. The

kids in later generations after me started to realize what this was

all about. When I got to the House in 1982, Congressman George

Miller and his Republican allies set up—he is a Democrat. His Republican friends set up a bipartisan Select Committee on Children,

Youth, and Families, and one of the first hearings we had was on

the threat of nuclear war and what it was doing to our kids, and

I will never forget sitting in that room listening to the young people express their fears of going to bed at night not knowing if the

Soviet Union and America were going to just explode these bombs.

So they really knew what was happening. And then when the cold

war ended and we all thought the threat was over, it was an incredible sigh of relief I think across this land from all sides.

Now here we sit at a moment in time that I think is absolutely

a turning point, and I think as we have looked at the problems of

the treaty, which I think is very important that we do that, as I

see it, the main problems are the verifiability and the assurance

that our stockpile stewardship program is working well, and each

member is going to decide for himself or herself whether they feel

comfortable with it, but I think the important thing here is that

any President in the future, as the Secretary of State has clearly

told us, can get out of this if they feel we have taken too much of

a risk with this treaty. They do not need a Senate vote, it is not

going to get bogged down in some of our rules. If there is a supreme national interest, we can get out of it, and I think it is important for us to look at the risks of this treaty and then the risks

of not going forward with it. And I think what Senator Biden has

tried to do, if I could get his attention for a minute—Senator Biden,

I think what you have tried to do, it is important because I want

to ask you about something if the Chairman will allow, is talk to

us about the threat of us not going forward, and he has raised

some issues in certain parts of the world, and so has the Secretary

of State in my home State yesterday raised those issues, particularly in the India, Pakistan region.

The reason I wanted to catch my friend’s attention is I thought

there was a phenomenal article. It was today in the Washington

Post by someone who you know very well, George Perkovich, who

worked with you for a long time.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, we do not want to ruin his reputation by letting everyone know that.

87

Senator BOXER. The reason I bring it up is I feel that in this

very, very brief article, which I would ask unanimous consent that

we may place in the record, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, may we

place this in the record?

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1999]

THE NEXT PRESIDENT WILL PAY THE PRICE

(By George Perkovich)

If the Senate eventually fails to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there

will be another victim besides the one Senate Republicans intended. For it is not

only President Clinton who will be harmed by the action but the person who takes

office as president—and many Republicans presume it will be one of their own—

in 2001. The new president will face nuclear shock waves around the world, bereft

of bipartisan support when he most needs it.

Here are some likely scenarios:

• India will probably conduct more nuclear weapons tests. India’s nuclear scientists and hawkish strategists want a sophisticated arsenal, ranging from small

tactical weapons to huge hydrogen bombs. They also wish to overcome doubts about

the technical performance of the weapons tested in May 1998. More tests would satisfy them and their potential military ‘‘customers’’ that they can mimic the great

powers.

Conversely, ratifying the test ban treaty would tether the nuclear hawks and

allow India to concentrate on the economic route to major powerdom. India’s leading

statesmen, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Foreign Minister Jaswant

Singh, recognize this and want to avoid a costly and dangerous arms race. A Senate

rejection of the test ban treaty would undermine these statesmen and badly complicate increasingly vital U.S.-Indian relations.

• Pakistan would match India test for test. This would lead to the kind of arms

race that Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton have sought to block in the subcontinent. Lest an arms race seem inconsequential, it should be recalled that India and

Pakistan just battled in Kashmir. The fighting came closer to erupting into an allout war and possible nuclear escalation than was reported. If more testing occurs

and hawks in both countries are unleashed, defense spending will increase. Pakistan will move closer to bankruptcy. This will heighten the risk of Taliban-like

groups gaining power in Pakistan, metastasizing cells of intolerance, aggression and

anti-American terrorism that would bedevil the next American president.

• While China has signed the test ban treaty, it will not ratify it if the United

States doesn’t. China assumes that rejection means Republicans want to conduct

more nuclear tests; otherwise, why wouldn’t they ratify? In this case, China will

make preparations to resume nuclear testing, especially if India conducts more

tests. China possesses only some 20 long-range, single-warhead missiles capable of

striking America. This poses no serious threat to the U.S. deterrent. China has conducted some 45 nuclear explosive tests, the United States 1,030. The test ban is valuable precisely because it constrains the kind of weaponry advances that the Chinese military might otherwise wish to make with purloined American design information.

• Japan will face pressure to reconsider its nuclear abstinence if China and India

build up nuclear forces. Test ban opponents in Washington argue that American ballistic missile defenses should reassure Japan that it does not need to hedge its bets.

However, the Japanese, like U.S. allies in Europe, recognize the technical and strategic problems posed by inevitably less-than-perfect defenses. Indeed, Senate rejection of the test ban paired with aggressive promotion of ballistic missile defenses

will prompt China and Russia to feel that the United States is bolstering its capacity for nuclear coercion and possible first use. Moscow and Beijing will augment

their nuclear offenses to counter defenses. In this context, Japan (and NATO allies)

will feel more rather than less threatened. The next American president could then

confront a crisis in alliance relations.

• Globally, rejection of the test ban will endanger the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In 1995 the international community agreed to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the promise that the nuclear weapon states would

complete a test ban treaty by 1996. This was the minimal disarmament condition

that the world would accept from the United States and the other nuclear states.

The 187 parties to the nonproliferation treaty will meet next April to review the staVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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tus of the treaty. If the Senate rejects the test ban, we can be sure that measures

to tighten nonproliferation controls and maintain sanctions on Iraq will be opposed

by an outraged international community. Instead of being the champion of nonproliferation, the United States will be seen as the rogue state of proliferation. Again, isolationists may say, ‘‘Who needs the nonproliferation regime? If we feel threatened by proliferation, we can take care of it ourselves.’’ But the U.S. interest

in keeping countries such as Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons requires cooperation from states such as Russia and our European allies in controlling exports.

Washington’s persuasive powers will be seriously undermined by roguish behavior

on the test ban treaty. Republicans in the Senate who want both to defeat the test ban and elect a Republican president should be careful what they wish for. If they reject this treaty

they will create conditions that no new president could welcome. Given that the

United States could ratify the treaty and still legally escape from it if a threat to

national security emerged, the next president would likely wonder, ‘‘Whose idea was

this?’’

Senator BOXER. The scenarios that he talks about, and I will put

them, I will say them because the powerful words that he uses and

the way he does it is so amazing. He says if we do not do this treaty, and I say this especially to my friends that are undecided on

it, India will probably conduct more nuclear weapons tests. India’s

nuclear scientists and hawkish strategists want a sophisticated arsenal, and then Pakistan would match—and as Senator Biden said,

the good voices in India would be overwhelmed by this. Then Pakistan would match India test for test, and this would lead to the

kind of arms race that Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have

sought to block in this area. Then he goes over to China, and he says, while China has signed the test ban treaty, it will not ratify it if the U.S. does not. China

assumes that rejection means the U.S. would want to conduct more

nuclear tests. Otherwise, why would they not ratify, and in this

case they will make preparation to resume the testing. Then he talks about Japan, I will not go into that. And our allies, and how crushed they would be and how they would lose confidence in us, and then I think a very crucial issue, Mr. Chairman,

that we all care about, both sides of the aisle, Iran, how can we

go to our friends and say, do not give Iran the technology, so it

seems to me all of these things that are outlined here in this article

are very, very important for us to consider as we answer the question, what are the risks of going into the treaty and what are the

risks of staying out? What I do not want to see happen is future

generations of kids, whether it is my grandchild or anybody else’s

children or grandchildren to have to go back to going under the

desk to have to go back to that fear that they articulated, and so

I have a brief question. I know my time is up.

Do you think that what is stated here in this article is a possibility, that it would have this type of nuclear, if you will, in quotes,

‘‘chain reaction throughout the world’’ where we are now going to

see the tests and all the rest?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, I read the article myself this morning

with great interest, and I was very pleased to see that it tracked

very much with my own thoughts and a great part of my testimony. I do think that we would open up the gates again of potential testing.

For me, there are several ways to look at this treaty, and I know

that there are many legitimate scientifically based questions that

the lab people have answered or the Secretary of Energy has anVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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swered. I have looked very carefully at the stewardship program

and how it works and what things are coming on line. I have obviously been very concerned about verification, and I have said to

myself that every arms control treaty that we have ever signed is

not perfectly verifiable, but what we make is the assessment that

whatever cheating takes place is nothing that can really hurt our

overwhelming nuclear power, so we have to be realistic about that.

So there are many ways to look at this from the technical aspect

and the scientific aspect and all the language in these documents,

and I hope that every Senator actually will look very carefully at

that. But there is the other argument, which I think is just plain

logic, which is, if we do not want to test, and we have said that

we will not test, why would we not take the step of having a treaty

that would prevent others from testing? It is not as if we are asking ourselves to do something we would not do otherwise. We are

asking others to do what we have already done in order to prevent

this kind of chain reaction that you have described that is so evident, and I can tell you from having spoken now, I think I spoke

to 84 ministers in New York during the General Assembly. CTBT

was in all my talking points. They all agreed that we need to have

a nuclear nonproliferation regime, that the proliferation of nuclear

weapons is the single greatest danger that faces our planet, and so

for me I can go either technical on you and do all this or logical,

and logical here is why, why would we want to give others the

right to test or the ability to test if we have decided not to? That

is the answer for me.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, I

appreciate you being with us. I come to this hearing truly as one

of those Senators undecided and with an open mind. I also come

to this hearing with a predicate of a cruel reality, a terrible truth

that nuclear weapons have kept wars, since Nagasaki, have kept

wars regional in their expanse and conventional in the ways in

which they have been fought. And so while I hate the thought of

nuclear war, I realize nuclear weapons have kept us from a worldwide conflagration.

I guess with that in mind I am anxious to know, and I guess I

am appealing to your technical knowledge, if our stockpile stewardship, we are betting so much on that because what is at stake is

the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, it seems to me.

Now, I know what I am about to say is not a very good hypothetical, but I have an old car at home I really like and I have a

computerized trickle charger on it, and even if the battery works

when I want to drive it every few times a year, it does not run very

well because machinery needs to be operated. I am not suggesting

we go firing nuclear missiles around, but I am concerned if we

are—if the stockpile stewardship program is adequate to provide

the verification, to provide the credibility that we need in order to

prevent nuclear holocaust in the future.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me say this, obviously I think we all

have questions about, you know, our nuclear stockpile as our crown

jewels, I guess, if you want to put it that way in terms of our ability to defend ourselves. In the reading that I have done and the

testimony I have heard from those who really are experts in this,

90

the heads of the labs, they have, as was said to you previously by

the Senators who were here, they may disagree about some timing,

but they do not disagree about the fact that they can do the job.

We have also now said that they would have $45 billion over a

10-year period to be able to update and keep going all of the various parts of the stewardship program, and I think that I have confidence in the way that it has been described to me about how various components of that stewardship program, first those that are

on line already and those that are being brought on line in order

to make sure that the stewardship program can carry out everything that it is supposed to do.

Now, there is no question that deterrence, per se, will continue

because I agree with you that deterrence has kept, certainly for the

United States, has kept us safe. What it does really, this treaty,

it bans the bang but not the bomb. We will continue to have that.

Also, all parts of our nuclear arsenal are constantly being tested.

They just will not be being exploded. I think that, again, in the testimony that Secretary Richardson provided and others, to me I feel

that we do have the know-how to keep updating it and rebuilding

it, and it is not quite like your car. Paying a little bit more attention to it, maybe——

Senator SMITH. I am sure you do, and that is a very poor analogy. But I just know that machinery does not work very well if you

do not use it. That is true of all kinds of machinery that I have

ever known. And so I am hoping that as you and I bet the future

security of our grandchildren upon this program that you, as one

of our political leaders, have the confidence that it is worth that.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. And I do, Senator, I do. Let me just say

this, if at any stage we believe that we do not, and that something

has gone wrong in terms of the stewardship program, the President, any President will have the right to withdraw on the basis

of supreme national interest.

Senator SMITH. And how difficult a decision will that be? I mean,

if technology takes a quantum leap and renders a lot of this obsolete, at that point do you think the President of the United States,

whoever he or she may be, has the ability under this treaty to say

we abrogate it and we are going on to another level?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I think that obviously this would be done

after careful thought and on advice from the Secretary of Defense

and Secretary of Energy, I would hope actually on the side the Secretary of State might be asked, but I think that, yes, I do believe

that if there is a question of supreme national interest, I think it

would be irresponsible of any President not to withdraw if there

was a question.

Senator SMITH. Flexibility has been one of my questions, and I

appreciate your answer. While I have a little bit of time remaining,

from what I have learned today about the inspection regime, onsite

inspections that I am not going to be able to put much confidence

in our ability to actually go and inspect something if 30 members

of this organization, of this convention will have to approve United

States’ inspectors going in, and having seen the way Saddam Hussein runs our inspectors around, I frankly do not have much confidence in onsite inspection being, frankly, worth risking our

grandkids on.

91

So I guess my question is, is it your view that such explosions

as could be a threat to us we have the ability to detect them independent of any international committee?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. The scientific information that I have

been given would indicate that those explosions that in any way

would harm us or would undercut our ability to have that deterrent are detectable, and that we are confident that we can detect

tests that would permit the development of new high-yield weapons

that could have an impact on our deterrent, and we would have

sufficient notice to respond.

At lower yields I think it is very important, if I may continue,

that we think that Russia, for instance there have been some activities at their test sites, as at ours, frankly, but there is no conclusion that Russia has tested above the zero yield.

Senator SMITH. As you talk about that, do you think Russia has

the same interpretation of zero yield as we?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Yes. We went through a negotiating process

on this. That is correct, yes.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to be fair in the time of Senators in

the recognition of them. We have two Senators, one of whom has

not had one bite at the apple today, Sam Brownback, and I think

you had one brief period. If it is all right with you, I am going to

let them. Is that OK? The reason I bring this up is because we generally go from side to side. So, Sam, you have not had a bite at the

apple, you go first.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do

not refer to you, Madam Secretary, as an apple. But the Chairman

is very kind, and I know he does not refer to you in that way, either.

Senator KERRY. Does that mean you are going to bite anyway?

Senator BROWNBACK. No, not at all. Thanks for coming to the

committee. Always appreciate you coming here. I want to look

back, and you talked about going on the technical basis or just a

reasoning basis, and look at it in a reasoning basis. The problem

I am having with this treaty at this point in time is this point in

time. It appears to me that we are talking about taking an irreversible step. Now, some might say there are ways that you could

reverse your field here, but we are in essence taking an irreversible

step at a time that the world is in great flux on nuclear weapons

issues.

We have all noted India-Pakistan testing in recent times. Whether they will continue to or whether they will not, testing taking

place in Russia has been brought up by the chairman of the Armed

Services Committee. We have Iran, Iraq that we all know about of

desiring to be nuclear capable countries that have not—that have

signed but not ratified the treaty, and I just—I look at that universe, Madam Secretary, and I get real concerned that we are taking a step that we are going to sign a major treaty that puts our—

puts it in blood for us that we are not going to do this at a time

you have so many other places in play and desirous of doing things,

and I really question the thought process that says that if the U.S.

does this, then they will follow or they will come along with it.

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I look at that list of nations that I have just listed, and I cannot

within them think to myself that, OK, if we would just ratify this,

that is going to make the Iranians or the Iraqis ratify. I just have

a real question about that. If we would just ratify this, that is

going to make the Chinese step forward and do that, if we would

just ratify this, that is going to make the Russians step forward,

even though they have announced a new doctrine in their nuclear

weaponry that they are pursuing. If we would just ratify this, that

they will come along. As I rationalize and I think rationally, look

at this, I do not see that.

And then you can go to the South Asia area where we have been

most concerned recently on India and Pakistan, and I think for

good, legitimate purposes where you have got two nations that

have been at war previously and then developing nuclear capacity

which I think there is some other issues we ought to actually be

discussing there other than just nuclear. I think we ought to be

talking conventional weaponry and building better and broader relationships with both nations, and we were just sending you some

broader authority that sanctions can be waived, that I have worked

on and members of the committee here swallowed pretty hard to

do that. But it is to build a broader relationship.

I question that this is not a good time for us to be making this

what I would perceive, and I think many would, an irreversible

step with so many countries in play still, with so many countries

not really given to following U.S. leadership that are doing these

things, and I think we are not at a proper moment, and I have appreciated your testimony and I would appreciate your thoughts in

response to that rationale.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, actually, first of all, let me thank you

on the waivers that we now have for India and Pakistan. I think

that that is very important, and that they will help us move forward in being able to have a better relationship with both countries, and I met with both foreign ministers while I was in New

York. We can talk more about this some other time, but I would

like to thank you on that.

Let me just say, I kind of look at this from a different angle,

which is I think this is exactly the time because, first of all, I will

keep repeating this because I think it is worth repeating. We have

no intention of testing because we have no need to test, and there

has been a moratorium in place put in by President Bush—there

was a decision that we made that we had done enough testing and

that through our various—the stockpile stewardship program, we

have a way of making sure that our nuclear deterrent is safe, and

if I might say among the six safeguards here that we have is the

maintenance of the nuclear labs at a level to guarantee continued

progress in nuclear technology, to maintain the capability to test

again should the need ever arise. So we are not going into

Rumplestiltskin mode here. We are ready to go, and basically we

have decided not to test.

So the question is why do this now, and it is in order to prevent

exactly the countries that you are talking about from taking the

next step that they might be willing to take. I have already talked

about Russia. China, for instance. I think they could not probably

develop their MIRV warheads for existing systems, and they could

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not exploit the information that they might have obtained. Everybody has been concerned about what it is they could have obtained

through espionage. They cannot use that unless they can test. This

would prevent that from happening.

For India and Pakistan, it is an opportunity here to constrain a

potential arms race and to limit lighter and smaller, more efficient

warheads. As far as North Korea and Iran are concerned, this treaty would sharply limit their ability to develop small, efficient warheads that could be mounted on longer range missiles, including

the North Korean Taepo Dong–2, which is what we have been

working to try to get a moratorium on that. And it constrains their

ability to exploit the missile that is the potential threat to the

United States.

So I think here, this is why this is the exact moment to do this.

Now, the other point, we have found previously, and I mentioned

this, when we finally ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention it

brought along the other countries because they do look to us for

leadership. The other point I think as a safety feature, if you are

interested in this, this cannot go into effect unless all 44 of those

designated countries do, in fact, ratify. So if we ratify and those

others do not, it does not go into effect. It is a safety feature of that

kind.

So for me this is basically we lose nothing because we do not

want to test, we prevent them from testing, and doing the kinds

of things that I listed. We have a way out if we find that we have

a problem because we can do supreme national interest, and meanwhile, our labs have been directed to keep us in tip top shape via

virtue of other methods which, short of testing which we do not

need, will make our nuclear deterrent reliable.

Senator BROWNBACK. I thank you for comments, and, Mr. Chairman, for your holding of the hearing. I think you are willing to step

out a little further in faith and presumption that they are going to

follow our lead than I would or that by us signing that we are

going to be willing to reverse field later if they do not verify. I

think we put very high stock in the fact that if we ratify, well, that

is it, even if they do not come along. I think you are going out in

steps of faith that I am not quite willing to assume at this point.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Could I ask a question here, which is the

following: Why do we think, you think that we lose anything by

getting them to stop testing? That is the question. Because we are

not limiting ourselves in any form. And if they do not ratify, if

those countries that you mentioned do not ratify, this treaty does

not go into effect.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, I disagree with your presumption

that we do not limit ourselves. I think this is a very big step for

a Senate to ratify a treaty like this, saying that this is what we

believe should be the case when you have so many other players

out there that are still looking, testing, and not really willing to follow the United States’ lead. The countries I listed I do not think

will be following our lead. Iran and Iraq I know for certain will not

be following our lead. I highly question the other countries that we

list. To me, voting on this, and you have got a treaty that you are

doing this with, that is taking a step that I do not think you back

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away lightly. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience in holding

the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grams.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Madam

Secretary, again, I also add my thanks for you taking the time to

be before the committee today. I have gone through all my questions. I can tell maybe when the hearing has gone on long enough

that every question or good question has already been asked, so I

am going to try to ask one of the old questions and just do it in

a different way so I have something to say here. But I appreciate

it.

I know we could line up experts on both sides of this argument.

We have heard people say this is the right time, this is not the

right time, we can verify, we cannot verify. It seems like there is

people on both sides of the argument.

We are taking, as I think Senator Brownback just said, a leap

of faith here in some concerns, I know like the lab directors who

Senator Levin said today when he asked them point blank, are you

onboard, they said yes, but also we have got statements from lab

directors that say in order to contribute to a long-term confidence

in the U.S. stockpile, testing of nuclear weapons should be done.

Of course, if nuclear testing were allowed, we would gain greater

confidence in the new tools, another quote from a purely technical

standpoint, ‘‘some level of nuclear testing would be useful.’’ Another

quote, ‘‘a strong stockpile stewardship and management program is

necessary to underwrite confidence.’’ So I think even some of the

experts have been able to be on both sides of this issue, so I think

you see how tough of an issue it is, I think, for some of us to come

to a conclusion.

You have said this is the right time. We are being asked to vote

basically up or down on a treaty, you know, there has been questions of whether the administration negotiated a position on the

treaty different from what where we started, of having a definite

duration, permitting low-yield tests, it was a verifiable treaty, we

are now doing something different than that. Article 15 dealing

with reservations that says the articles out in the annexes to this

treaty shall not be subject to reservations. The UC that we have

on the floor if we take a vote is basically unamendable, so we are

being asked to vote up or down on a treaty.

Do you think this is the best time to vote on this treaty or would

you go along with maybe some of the suggestions that have been

made that this vote not happen for maybe another 2 years?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, let me say that I am very

glad that this hearing has taken place, and I think that I respect

all the questions that have been asked and have been very pleased

to answer them. I also do think that the kinds of questions that

you have asked of a technical nature all need to be answered in

a way that satisfy you.

Just briefly, I can say that on some of the issues that have been

raised by the labs, work is in progress on this, and they have been

given not an inconsequential amount of money, $45 billion to work

on it, which presumably is in order to be able to carry through on

this kind of work to make sure that it can be done. I would hope

very much that this conversation would not lead to our saying that

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we want to resume testing. I think that would be a U-turn of such

major proportions that it would undercut our entire proliferation,

our nonproliferation policy, and I think would be a very, very serious consequence for this country if we were to even contemplate

that when we do not need to.

In order to answer your question, let me just say that I do believe that this is an important treaty, that it deserves careful consideration. It is one of the, you know, landmark huge treaties that

we have been—we have negotiated and you have been asked to ratify. I think that the process has been artificially constrained, and

it does not give time to reach a careful judgment, and I think that

the leadership ought to work out some kind of a serious process to

give this treaty the careful attention it deserves at a later date.

Senator GRAMS. One other question I wanted to ask and I had

asked it of the earlier panel, but a lot of faith would be put in computerized testing and not actual testing of weapons. And there was

an article this week in the New York Times, I think it was, Mr.

Adamov, who is the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, talking

about having those supercomputers and the article included, Russia has long sought to acquire powerful American computers able

to do this. And he said in the article, ‘‘the United States should

share some of its computer techniques so that other nations can

better assess the reliability of the nuclear arsenal without testing.’’

He went on to say, ‘‘conditions should be established that all nations who possess nuclear weapons would have the same opportunity to engage in computer simulations.’’ The Russians have long

asserted the Clinton administration promised to provide such advanced abilities to Russia if the Kremlin agreed to the test ban.

Does that mean under this negotiation, or has the administration

given any indications that it would somehow share this generation

or the next generation of our computer abilities with the Russians?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me say that we have made no such

promise, and we will not do that.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. Let me make a

couple of points while my colleagues, all of whom, the two gentlemen who are still here, who I respect greatly, and they raise questions that I think warrant further exploration, and I won’t take the

full time now, but I asked my staff while you were testifying, Madame Secretary, to get the makeup of the executive council.

You know, you need 30 votes on the executive council to be able

to have an onsite inspection, and the question has been raised by

many would we actually really get 30 votes, and the analogy that

is used by Ms. Kirkpatrick before you testified was the United Nations, and you can’t do anything in the United Nations, et cetera.

I actually went down the list, or I did and my staff did, and Africa

gets 10 seats, Eastern Europe 7, Latin America 9 and the Middle

East and South Asia 7, North America and Western Europe 10,

East Asia 20. If you add these up and you look at each of the nations, we get right away to 23 or 24 certain votes.

And then the states, even the states that are not certain, let us

take Eastern Europe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the

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Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary—Georgia because they

are afraid of Russia, they are afraid of Iran and Iraq. Hungary,

Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,

these are all votes. These are all votes, because in their naked selfinterest they are going to want to make sure that Iran and Iraq,

the people they view as their enemies to be, they are potential

threats unrelated to us.

So if you go down the list here, I just say to my colleagues, and

I will put this in the record, it seems to me pretty darned easy to

get to 30 votes, not because 30 nations love us, but because it is

in their naked self-interest. In the Middle East section they get 7

seats, 26 eligible folks, right? What do you think Turkmenistan or

the Arab Emirates, Uzebekistan and Yemen, do you think they are

going to say, Nah, we do not want them to check whether or not

Iraq and Iran are blowing up nuclear weapons? Do not worry about

it; it is OK by us, because we do not like the Ugly Americans? I

mean, I just think people should look at the list and look at other

countries’ self interests. Again, obviously, you cannot guarantee

anything.

[The information referred to follows:]

BIDEN STAFF ANALYSIS OF LIKELY CTBTO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL VOTING

• A quick review of the candidates for seats indicates that we should expect, in

almost all instances, to get all the votes of the West Europe/North America

group. So we start with 10.

• Aside from Yugoslavia, Russia, and one or two others, the Eastern Europe

group comprises strong U.S. allies. So that’s another 5–7 votes.

• Similarly, many of the Latin American states either: (1) are strong allies; or (2)

strongly favor the Test Ban. So we should usually get most of those 9 votes.

• That gets us very quickly to the low-to-mid-20’s, in most instances (even being

conservative and assuming that we don’t get all the votes in the above 3

groups).

• That leaves the Africa group (10 seats), the Middle East/South Asia group (7

seats), and the East Asia group (8 seats). There our work, depending on the

makeup of the Executive Council at the particular time, could get a little harder.

• But even there the rosters have U.S. allies, or proponents of nonproliferation.

• Thus, it is hard to see how we won’t get to 30 in most instances.

• In truth, it is more likely that most U.S. inspection requests, based on our intelligence and the data from the International Monitoring System, will be easily

approved.

Senator BIDEN. With regard to this issue of the United States

will not test, I find it kind of fascinating that the Senator just indicated, which is legitimate, that we have got these supercomputers

and the Russians are saying, and every other nation, everybody forgets, because we focus on the trees instead of the forest here, everybody else we hear from today.

From the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, we heard

from Mr. Schlesinger yesterday. The chairman was kind enough to

give me an opportunity to participate as an ad hoc member of that

committee, about how our allies and our enemies are going to lose

confidence in our ability to verify that our stockpile is reliable and

that it is safe.

Now with regard to our enemies, quote, unquote, ‘‘That is how

they view it.’’ Russia and China—I do not consider Russia my

enemy, but that is how it is considered, right? They are going to—

so the argument went yesterday, and we will hear on the floor,

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they are going to say, You know, those Americans, you cannot rely

on those 6,000 weapons because they are not testing anymore, so

now is our chance.

That is the implication of it. When in fact the Russians are saying, Hey, this ain’t fair, you have got these supercomputers; you

guys are going to know your weapon system is reliable; we are not

going to know. Give us the computer system. I mean, Mr. Chairman, the way we argue in the alternative here, we say, Hey, our

system is not reliable, but look at those Russians. They are trying

to get hold of our system. How to deal unreliably without testing?

Then we say, Well, we are not going to—we will not be allowed

to modernize, but you know what, if this goes forward, those other

nations will modernize.

Well, give me a break. We by far and away are more sophisticated than any other nation in the world, and if we cannot modernize, how the heck are they going to modernize?

And so my point, the thing I would like you to speak with me

about a second, Madame Secretary, and I will end this, is that we

are in a position where we have decided not to test. I do not know,

have you heard, has anybody from the foreign policy establishment

on the center right, where you would find those who do oppose—

and a lot there do not oppose—but who do oppose the treaty, has

anyone suggested publicly, and is anyone on this committee suggesting we should resume testing?

I mean, that is a legitimate question. I sincerely mean it. Has

any significant name in the foreign policy establishment said to you

publicly or privately that we should resume testing?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. No, no one has. And I think the question

here is where do these questions lead to, because that is the problem. It leads to the supposition that you might want to test when

we do not want to test, when we have been the lead in not testing.

Senator BIDEN. My time is up. But I am sorry to do this to you

and I will end, because there is another panel, but the second point

I would make is, if you cut through the concern of the people I

most respect, and I respect some of the very same people my Chairman does, people like Schlesinger, people like Ms. Kirkpatrick, people like Caspar Weinberger, you cut through it all and here is the

real objection and it is legitimate. (a), even though we can get out,

we will not have the will to get out; (b), we do not have the political

will.

No. 2, that even though the circumstance would not allow any

President, this or the next one, to unilaterally begin testing, because the political climate would be so counterproductive if they

did that, even though that is the case, and we will not be testing,

it is better to not sign on to a treaty, because we want to hold off

that possibility to test.

The third thing you hear is, the third legitimate argument I

think is, You know, if you stop testing you lose an entire generation of nuclear scientists who learned a lot about nuclear weapons

by the testing. That is an argument Schlesinger and others make.

It is legitimate. It is legitimate, but I do not understand how they

do not understand, if you are going to spend $45 billion in those

laboratories, how you are not going to attract an entire new generation who are going to be even more sophisticated.

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So, Mr. Chairman, I have gone beyond my time as usual. But you

are kind to let me do it. There are legitimate arguments against

this treaty. I respectfully suggest none of them have to do with

verification, with our ability, our stockpile not being reliable, et

cetera. I think they go to deeper fundamental questions, which is

always the case, why my friend says, as—I forget who he always

quotes, but he quotes somebody and says, ‘‘We have never lost a

war or won a treaty.’’ I think that is something that is the fundamental dividing line here on this, and it is a legitimate one, but

I think we should argue it up front, talk about the forest, not just

the little, tiny trees in the forest. But I thank you for being here.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you. Let me just say two words here,

one on the list that you read. A lot of those countries were the

countries—were the countries that were in the NPT review who

were the ones who said go for a comprehensive test ban treaty. So

that is part of our faith with them, so why would they not, in fact,

want us to be able to have those kinds of onsite inspections? It is

for their benefit.

Let me say on the last point you make about the treaties, I,

along with all of you, have spent a major portion of my adult life

looking at arms control treaties and there always are these questions. What do we do then? They are not perfect. They can cheat,

and as Ronald Reagan said, ‘‘Verify’’—here, I think, ‘‘Do not trust;

verify.’’ I think we, in the end, all based on that, everything that

is important can be verified. The problem here is we have to understand—that I happen to believe that we are better off because of

the arms control treaties we have had. They are not perfect; neither is this one. But it is beyond my understanding as to why,

when we are not going to test, and in my belief should not test,

and have the best scientists in the world with the state-of-the-art,

that they have $45 billion now to even improve, why would we give

a license to those countries that want to test the ability to do so

with impunity when we can actually get our arms around the nuclear arms race and strangle it.

The CHAIRMAN. Madame Secretary, I am one of the culprits in

thinking that we could cover more territory than we have been able

to cover today, and I am so apologetic to the third panel, but if they

will persevere, I will. But I do have one question that bothers me,

and I must ask it.

We, when we questioned John Holum as to why the treaty fails

to define what it purports to ban, he gave me a very confusing response. He said, and I quote him, ‘‘The course of negotiations confirmed our judgment that it would have been difficult and possibly

counterproductive to specify in technical terms what is prohibited

by the treaty.’’

Now my question is, one of them, is the reason that it would

have been difficult and counterproductive to pursue such a definition because other countries interpret the treaty to permit low-yield

testing? Do you feel it does?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. I believe that this treaty is zero-yield. And

that is the basis on which it has been presented to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is not a yes or no.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Undersecretary Holum?

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The CHAIRMAN. We are all friends here. We are just trying to get

to the truth.

Mr. HOLUM. The basic answer is that there was a history going

back to the threshold test ban treaty and other treaties that no

yield—that zero means no testing at all. It was discussed extensively as Ambassador Ledogar went into, I believe, earlier today in

his testimony. Among the nuclear weapons states, the only ones

having any capability to do something very small, they had a long

history of negotiations among themselves back and forth and came

to an agreement, as Ambassador Ledogar described, that zero

means no yield. And all other countries understand it that way, as

do the five nuclear weapons states.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he handed me a note, which is correct. The

treaty does not say zero; it does not define its terms at all. That

is the point I am making.

Mr. HOLUM. But it does ban any nuclear test explosion or any

other nuclear explosion, and in the negotiating record it is very

clear that that means there cannot be any critical yield from a nuclear event. You can do things that do not go critical; you cannot

do things that do.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am getting at, of course, is the Russian

Government has clearly stated the view that hydronuclear testing

is permitted. Now, there is a chart somewhere over there that contains a quote from the Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy stating

this view. Now, this is a senior Russian Government official, and

I am sure there are plenty of other Russians claiming that they

will adhere to a zero-yield ban, but the fact of the matter is Russia

has stated a need to develop a new low-yield tactical nuclear weapon and has stated the intent to conduct nuclear testing despite

CTBT. That is correct, is it not?

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Let me state here, Mr. Chairman, some

Russian officials that have not been involved in the negotiations

appear to be confused about its limits. The negotiating record that

Ambassador Ledogar described said that zero means no nuclear

yield, however small, and that is the standard we will apply. The

Russians described their test site activities as subcritical. That is

the same thing we are doing. That is, those that do not have a

chain reaction.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I understand that. But Russia has a clear

pattern of activity at its nuclear test site and this is the bottom

line. How is it possible to reach any conclusion other than that

Russia does not interpret the test ban in the way the United States

of America does?

Mr. HOLUM. I just encourage you to look closely at what Ambassador Ledogar has produced, and the record of the negotiations, it

is the same as the legislation here. You rely first of all on the

terms of the law and then on the legislative history to identify

what the agreement means, what the legislation means. And it is,

although Victor Mikhaylov would very much like to have the treaty

say something other than it does and have it mean something

other than what it does.

The CHAIRMAN. I get more confused as we get into this thing,

and I am almost sorry I did it. Are you saying that the Deputy

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Minister of Atomic Energy does not know his Government’s position on nuclear testing? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. HOLUM. It appears to be that that is the case, because he

is saying something that is inconsistent with what his Government

agreed to in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, why does he not answer the rest

of your question? I do not think he did, in all due respect. The

chairman said that how can you interpret based upon what is going

on in Russia now, not verbally, but in terms of quote, ‘‘the alleged

testing’’? How can you interpret that they mean anything other

than something less than zero? Is there any evidence, conclusive

evidence, that they are testing nuclear weapons now?

Mr. HOLUM. No, there is not. There is activity at the test site,

as the Secretary said, and I am sure most of you or many of you

have had the briefing that the CIA has generated on that subject.

There is no conclusion in that, and I cannot go into it in detail

here, but there is no conclusion in that that they are doing anything that would violate the threshold or the level of permitted activity in this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what is the activity at the test site? Are

they playing poker or something?

Mr. HOLUM. Well, we are doing the same thing, Mr. Chairman,

at our test site that they claim to be doing at theirs. We are doing

subcritical experiments; we are setting off high explosive devices

with material that serves the function of fissile material to see that

it works. We are going that close. But as soon as it becomes critical, it violates the treaty. If it produces a nuclear yield, then it violates the treaty threshold.

Senator BIDEN. In other words, Mr. Chairman, you can have an

explosion that can be detected that is not a nuclear explosion. It

can be an explosion for the stuff that blows off the nuclear explosion. And I understand the way a nuclear weapon works, there is

an explosion, a high explosive that is not a nuclear device that in

effect detonates the nuclear device.

Mr. HOLUM. That is right.

Senator BIDEN. And you can test that to determine whether that

works, right?

Mr. HOLUM. That is right. You can test all the way up, but I feel

as a lawyer, I feel very uncomfortable answering questions on that

when you have Dick Garwin on the next panel, who knows everything there is to know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe we can get an answer that clears up my

confusion from that panel. But seriously, I thank both of you, Madame Secretary, I know this has been a grueling experience for

you, particularly since you came across the country to do this. And

I appreciate it very much.

Secretary ALBRIGHT. Thank you. Actually, it has been quite enjoyable. I appreciate the fact that you had the hearing, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We have a vote on, and

we would invite the third panel to come to the table if they are still

waiting.

[Pause.]

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The CHAIRMAN. Let us see. We have two out of three, and there

in a moment will be our good friend Ron Lehman, who is former

Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Mr.

Troy Wade is seated in the middle chair, the chairman of the Nevada Alliance for Defense, Energy and Business from Las Vegas.

And last, but not least, Dr. Richard L. Garwin, senior fellow for

Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations in New

York City.

Now, I am sorry we are so late getting started, but we did the

best we could, and we tried to do too much in one day, and you

are paying for it. Back when I was a boy in grade school, we used

to say, that will learn you, darn you. But why do we not start with

you, Ron? And you can begin your statements, and I will go as far

as I can until one of the other Senators gets back. And you understand the predicament we are in. And I welcome all of you, and I

am grateful to all of you, and the next time we will not treat you

this bad.

STATEMENT BY HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, PALO

ALTO, CA

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I know the hour is late,

but I am prepared to stay and help as best I can. I was asked to

prepare a statement but I did not get the invitation until 2 days

ago, so if I had had more time, it would have been much shorter.

But I was asked also to try to address many of the issues that—

but there are so many that there is no way that I could. Nevertheless, given the hour, perhaps I should submit the longer statement

for the record. Or would you prefer that I go through it in some

detail?

The CHAIRMAN. Please submit the statement, but that does not

eliminate my desire for you to discuss the issue.

Mr. LEHMAN. All right, then let me try to capture some of the

issues that are a bit different than others than have been raised,

perhaps. I focused on this issue, as you know, for many years and

have been before this and other committees many times, but I want

to emphasize today that I am here solely in my personal capacity

and that none of my views are the views of any administration or

organization or institution with which I am now or have been associated.

Having said that, I think you will find a tremendous consistency

between what I say today and what I have said in the past. But

of course, there is some modification to reflect changes on the international scene.

I think what I want to highlight is the difference between my

testimony this time and the tone of my testimony in the past. In

the past, I have really been fortunate to come before this committee and stress accomplishments, but today I think what I would

really like to talk more about is what it is we are failing to do. And

when I say ‘‘we,’’ I mean the entire foreign policy establishment of

the United States, and frankly I mean both the legislative and executive branches and I mean concerned citizens and individuals

such as myself.

102

What the United States has failed to do at the end of the cold

war is to articulate a strategy that sustains the momentum that

we had achieved at the end of the cold war in building a better and

safer peace. And I would like to highlight some of the reasons why

that is so. Despite the best of intentions of talented people in and

out of government, we as a Nation have not been able to deal with

powerful trends such as globalization and technological advance

which have created new difficulties as well as new opportunities.

In part, we have failed to deal with the legacies of the past, such

as regional instabilities, ethnic conflicts, economic resentments,

geopolitical ambitions and domestic political divisions overseas and

at home.

I think that we have also forgotten some of the basic principles

that led to the success of the arms control revolution at the end of

the 1980’s and in the early 1990’s. Those basic principles placed an

emphasis on high standards of military merit, pressing the

verification envelope, and creating the geo-strategic conditions for

progress. The current debate over the ‘‘zero-yield’’ Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty reflects all of those factors—new forces, painful

legacies and neglect of the basics.

To put the current discussion in perspective, it might be useful

to remember how we got to where we are. The history of nuclear

testing arms control is complex and sometimes colorful, not always

dignified, but always an important reflection of broader forces in

play. The history is too lengthy even to summarize here, yet a clear

American approach to the question of nuclear testing had emerged

over the years. The primary contribution of nuclear testing limitations had been achieved by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty

which banned tests everwhere but underground and thus dealt

with health and environmental dangers associated with large nuclear tests in the atmosphere. These dangers were reduced somewhat further by the 150-kiloton restraint on underground testing

of the 1974 TTBT, although dissatisfaction with its verification provisions (and those of the PNET of 1976) delayed ratification for 16

years.

Concerns about compliance with the TTBT while the U.S. continued a moratorium, however, ultimately led to the ‘‘fly-before-buy’’

Joint Verification Experiment and subsequently the Verification

Protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in the PNET. These

protocols were negotiated with the very closest consultation with

this committee and the rest of the Senate. The resulting process

and protocols radically transformed onsite inspection, set a new

standard of effective verification, and resulted in the Senate giving

consent to ratification unanimously by a vote of 98 to 0.

Although the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Carter administrations

had explored more comprehensive negotiated and codified limitations on nuclear testing, none was able to achieve them, even given

the easier standards of verification and military merit which had

been developed in those earlier periods. All ultimately were compelled to explore more limited approaches to test bans in terms of

less binding moratoria, or reduced yields, or partial bans, or time

limitations, or combinations of these.

By the end of the cold war, U.S. policy had evolved a step-by-step

approach to nuclear limitations that was cautious, and for good

103

reason. Nuclear testing limitations were of increasingly limited

arms control value in the superpower context. More useful approaches to arms control than nuclear test limitations were now

possible, and increasingly we were exploring ever more cooperative

and intrusive threat reductions.And frankly, the nuclear testing

issue also had a greater potential to be divisive at home and

abroad, thus diverting resources from more valuable nonproliferation efforts such as regional peace processes, ‘‘loose nukes,’’ a timely cutoff of unsafeguarded fissile material production, and the

growing concern about biological weapons and terrorism.

If arms control is narrowly defined, the arms control merit of nuclear testing limitations was seen as of increasing utility and increasing danger to the U.S., the lower the limit. It was not a

straight line, but generally that was the case. Why? Because the

wrong nuclear testing limitations could put at risk the nuclear deterrent of the United States and undermine security guarantees

and relationships under which other nations felt it possible to forgo

nuclear options of their own.

The impact of nuclear testing limitations on the U.S. nuclear deterrent is a lengthy discussion of its own. I am prepared to address

these issues, but in the interest of brevity let me simply highlight

several points related to arms control. The United States has never

been fond of qualitative arms control measures because so often

they work against advanced industrial democracies. The democracies look to technology to compensate for manpower and to free

resources for other public goods. Limits on science and technology

are difficult to define and frequently harder to verify than quantitative limits, so qualitative contraints here again tend to favor

closed, authoritarian societies, all other things being equal (which,

of course, they actually never are).

But more importantly, democracy as we practice it demands accountability. To maintain our nuclear deterrent we must be able to

demonstrate to the American people and their elected officials that

the weapons in the stockpile are safe, secure, reliable, and appropriate to their missions. When two physicists differ dramatically in

their assessments, responsible officials want to know the truth. Nuclear testing has often been the only way certain disputes could be

resolved with the necessary finality. Inherent in the debates over

the ‘‘spirit of the CTB’’ are pressures to codify ignorance and police

thinking in ways that create tensions with U.S. interests, democratic responsiblity, and even the scientific method.

The most compelling reason that the United States never walked

away from the CTBT as a long-term goal was nonproliferation. Yet

even here, there were serious concerns about the impact of the

CTBT. All but a handful of states (Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan

primarily) are already parties to the nonproliferation treaty. Except

for the five nuclear weapons states, these parties are obligated not

to have nuclear weapons programs and thus should not have nuclear weapons to test. The main thrust of the CTBT actually involves very few states. Often the CTBT was seen in the West as

a halfway house for those states outside the NPT into the NPT.

The problem is that some in those states saw the CTBT as an alternative regime to the nonproliferation treaty, one based on a

104

more egalitarian principle under which all parties would be free to

have nuclear weapons. They just could not test them.

The danger is the CTBT then becomes a halfway house out of the

NPT, or at least a less restrictive alternative approach to nonproliferation. This need not happen, but it could if we are not careful. Already it has become common in public discussion to speak of

proliferation as having occurred only after a state has tested its nuclear weapons. This erosion of standards is very dangerous and

again reflects the mistaken belief that proliferators must always

test their weapons to have confidence in them. This involves more

mirror imaging than is warranted. The proliferators’ needs are not

the same as ours.

Also, as technology such as supercomputing advances and

spreads, more and more states will be able to have confidence in

more and more nuclear weapons capability without testing. To address these problems, the United States and like-minded states

must work to address fundamental regional security concerns.

Above all, it must avoid the neo-Kellogg-Brandism that would have

us substitute grandiose global pledges for the hard work of creating

the conditions for a safer world by engaging states and regions of

concern. Already we have seen in the context of the CTB a worsening of the situation in South Asia.

Still, it would be wrong to say that the CTBT only relates to a

few. Many of the parties to the nonproliferation treaty have said

their commitment to remain in the treaty is realted to the implementation by the nuclear weapons states of article VI of the treaty.

The NPT commits the nuclear weapons states to a cessation of the

nuclear arms race and commits all parties to work toward general

and complete disarmament. Most of these states have taken the position that the achievement of a CTBT is required under article VI,

but most have also said that article VI also requires the ultimate

elimination of all nuclear weapons themselves. And the official policy of the United States remains that this, too, is an ultimate goal.

How does the United States reconcile this view with its view that

the nuclear umbrella and security guarantee it provides to key allies also is necessary for nonproliferation? The answer always has

been that the United States will not give up its nuclear weapons

until the conditions have actually been created in which they are

no longer necessary. To do otherwise would result in powerful pressures for nuclear proliferation. Half the world’s population lives in

countries that have nuclear weapons, and if we do not deal with

the legitimate security concerns of the others, more states will seek

their own weapons of mass destruction programs.

If a CTBT were to shatter confidence in safety, security and reliability of the American nuclear umbrella, they may do the same.

If we invoke safeguard F, involving the supreme national interest

clause, we may provoke or legitimize similar acts by proliferators.

This safeguard carries almost the entire weight of the argument for

this CTBT, yet it puts the United States in a ‘‘damned if you do,

damned if you do not’’ situation with respect to nonproliferation,

especially if there are states simply looking for a pretext to test.

Mr. Chairman, it is my personal view that the arms control arguments for a zero-yield CTBT are not compelling and that the nonproliferation impact of any CTBT can be very uncertain and involve

105

foreseeable dangers as well as unintended consequences. A better

way to proceed is a step-by-step process in which constraints are

related to advances in verification, advances in a validated stockpile stewardship program, development of an appropriate weapons

stockpile for a post-cold war and testing limited environment, and

advances in global and regional security. Unfortuantely, all of this

is about why we did not want to be where we are now. But we are here now. What should be done now? Without this

treaty or with it, we should continue to work with other nations,

but most particularly with countries of concern to advance a more

cooperative, but realistic security relationship. With or without this

treaty, we should continue to address verification and compliance

challenges, and I believe that should also include those associated

with nuclear testing restraints. With or without this treaty, we

should exploit a vigorous stockpile stewardship program so that we

can have confidence in our deterrent while also demonstrating the

maximum restraint possible. With or without this treaty, we must

continue to develop and implement a more coherent, bipartisan

strategy for building a safer world. If this treaty were time limited, were not zero yield, provided re- straints at more verifiable levels, provided more clearly for the legitimacy of further testing (if and when it is needed), were not so

prone to ever more restrictive interpretation down the road, and if

conditions were such that the stated nonproliferation objectives

could actually be achieved, then the debate would not be so intense. Unfortunately, this treaty, signed already by the United

States, is none of these things, and there is no easy way to fix it. To approve this treaty may undermine years of accomplishment in arms control and nonproliferation. Yet expectations about this

treaty have been built up around the world and here at home. The

case for this treaty is weak, but unfortunately, the explanations for

why the conditions for this treaty do not exist have also not been

made even to our allies. These explanations are only now finally

being made to our own citizens. It is one thing to say we never

should have gotten into this position. It is another thing to make

a worse hash of it. The challenge to this committee and executive

branch is to find a way to get American nonproliferation strategy

back on a sound footing such that it earns bipartisan support and

provides the U.S. leadership necessary in the global arena.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lehman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Foreign Relations Committee:

On numerous occasions, I have appeared before this distinguished panel to discuss the policy of the United States on arms control and nonproliferation. From the

perspective of various positions I then held in government, I addressed the nuclear

testing question. More recently, you have asked me to testify as a private citizen.

It is in that personal capacity that I testify today, and only in that capacity. Thus,

you should not assume that these are necessarily the views of any administration,

organization, or institution with which I am now or have been associated. Please

take that admonition to heart. The ability of individual citizens to keep their professional responsibilities and their private views in their proper place is the key to harnessing the diverse skills of this nation. I did not ask to testify, but I would never

turn down your request. Given the burdens you shoulder, I recognize the importance

of working together in a candid, nonpartisan way on behalf of the nation’s greater

good.

106

The views I express today are entirely my own. At the same time, this committee will recognize a consistency in my presentations over the years, although some of

the details have evolved with changes on the international scene. There is one important difference, however. The theme of my previous presentations has been to

emphasize what we are accomplishing. Sadly, my theme today emphasizes what we

are failing to do. And by ‘‘we’’ I mean the aggregate foreign policy community of the

United States including both executive and legislative branches of governments as

well as concerned individuals such as myself. Despite the best of intentions of talented people in and out of government, we as a nation have failed to articulate and implement a strategy that sustains the momentum toward a better, safer world achieved at the end of the Cold War. Indeed,

many past accomplishments in arms control and nonproliferation have begun to unravel. In part, powerful trends such as globalization and technological advance have

created new difficulties even as they offer new opportunities. In part, dealing with

legacies of the past such as regional instabilities, ethnic conflicts, economic

resentments, geopolitical ambitions, and domestic political divisions overseas and at

home has been a larger challenge than expected. And in part, we have all forgotten some of the basic principles that brought suc- cess in the arms control revolution at the end of the ’80s and into the early ’90s.

These basic principles placed an emphasis on high standards of military merit,

pressing the verification envelope, and creating the geo-strategic conditions for

progress. They put a premium on solving problems, not on declaring them solved.

These sound negotiating principles led to the two START treaties, the INF Treaty,

the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) at nuclear test sites, the

Verification Protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), and many other important agreements. These

agreements were important and valuable, not because of signing ceremonies, but because they were part of a comprehensive national security strategy which very

clearly served the interest of the United States and its friends and allies. Because

these agreements were negotiated tenaciously, but directly and in detail with the

relevant parties, they also had the effect of reducing tensions with potential adversaries. Because they were negotiated in the closest of bipartisan consultations, they

were all approved by the Senate and supported by the Congress as appropriate. The current debate over the ‘‘zero-yield’’ Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) reflects all of these factors—new forces, painful legacies, and neglect of the basics.

To put the current discussion in perspective, it might be useful to remember how

we got to where we are. The history of nuclear testing arms control is complex,

sometimes colorful, not always dignified, but always an important reflection of

broader forces in play. This history is too lengthy even to summarize here. Yet, a

clear American approach to the question of nuclear testing had emerged over the

years.

The primary contribution of nuclear testing limitations had been achieved by the

1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty which banned tests everywhere but underground and

thus dealt with health and environmental dangers associated with large nuclear

tests in the atmosphere. These dangers were reduced somewhat further by the 150

kiloton restraint on underground testing of the 1974 TTBT, although dissatisfaction

with its verification provisions (and those of the PNET of 1976) delayed ratification

for sixteen years.

Concerns about compliance with the TTBT while the U.S. continued a moratorium, however, ultimately led to the ‘‘fly-before-buy’’ Joint Verification Experiment

and subsequently the Verification Protocols to the TTBT and PNET. These Protocols

were negotiated with the very closest consultation with this Committee and the rest

of the Senate. The resulting process and protocols radically transformed on-site inspection, set a new standard of effective verification, and resulted in the Senate giving consent to ratification unanimously by a vote of 98–0.

Although the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Carter Administrations had explored

more comprehensive negotiated and codified limitations on nuclear testing, none

was able to achieve them, even given the easier standards of verification and military merit which had been developed in those earlier periods. All ultimately were

compelled to explore more limited approaches to test bans in terms of less binding

moratoria, or reduced thresholds, or partial bans, or time limitations, or combinations of these.

By the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy had evolved a step by step approach to

nuclear limitations that was cautious, and for good reason. Nuclear testing limitations were of increasingly limited arms control value in the superpower context.

More useful approaches to arms control than nuclear test limitations were now possible, and increasingly we were exploring ever more cooperative and intrusive threat

107

reduction. And frankly, the nuclear testing issue also had a greater potential to be

divisive at home and abroad, thus diverting resources from more valuable nonproliferation efforts such as regional peace processes, ‘‘loose nukes,’’ a timely cut-off

of unsafeguarded fissile material production, and the growing concern about biological weapons and terrorism.

For a number of reasons, no next step after the TTBT was formalized at the end

of the Cold War because at the substantive level, the nuclear testing issue had been

overtaken by events. Implementation of the TTBT was to have provided technical

experience for the next step, but this was overtaken by momentous events such as

the breakup of the Soviet Union (including achieving START II and the adherence

of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT)

under the Lisbon Agreement), and by domestic legislation. The TTBT itself, however, with its lower inspection thresholds suggested that some ratcheting down of

permitted yields might be explored cooperatively. The end of the Cold War and improvements in testing instrumentation and science offered the possibility also that

the number of tests could be reduced. Some thought was given to limiting the number of tests above a verifiable threshold. The Executive Branch found no new

subtantive reasons then to pursue immediately a near zero-yield CTB, much less a

zero yield CTB, because the conditions under which they would be in the interest

of the U.S. and its allies were not seen on any horizon. Generally, arms control is best defined broadly to include nonproliferation, con- fidence building, and the like. But one can define arms control more narrowly, as

is often done, as meaning the negotiation of limits on weapons and forces and as

something distinct from nonproliferation. From the perspective of that more narrow

definition, the arms control merit of nuclear testing limitations was seen as of decreasing utility and increasing danger to the U.S. the lower the limit. It was not

a straight line, but generally that was the case. Why? Because the wrong nuclear

testing limitations could put at risk the nuclear deterrent of the United States and

undermine security guarantees and relationships under which other nations felt it

possible to forgo nuclear options of their own. The impact of testing limitations on the U.S. nuclear deterrent is a lengthy dis- cussion on its own. I am prepared to address these issues, but in the interest of

brevity, let me simply highlight several points related to arms control. The United

States has never been fond of qualitative arms control measures because so often

they work against advanced industrial democracies. The democracies look to technology to compensate for manpower and to free resources for other public goods.

Limits on science and technology are difficult to define and frequently harder to

verify than quantitative limits, so qualitative constraints here again tend to favor

closed, authoritarian societies, all other things being equal (which of course they

never are). Often, an undesirable tension is created between quantitative arms control goals and qualitative measures. In the case of nuclear weapons reductions, the

inability to test makes it more dangerous to reduce the size of the nuclear weapons

stockpile. To hedge against uncertainty, larger numbers, greater variety, and more

spares are required to maintain the same confidence.

But more importantly, democracy as we practice it demands accountability. To

maintain our nuclear deterrent we must be able to demonstrate to the American

people and their elected officials that the weapons in the stockpile are safe, secure,

reliable, and appropriate to their missions. When two physicists differ dramatically

in their assessments, responsible officials want to know the truth. Nuclear testing

has often been the only way certain disputes could be resolved with the necessary

finality. Inherent in the debates over the ‘‘spirit of the CTB’’ are pressures to codify

ignorance and police thinking in ways that create tensions with U.S. interests,

democratic responsibility, and the scientific method.

If, from a narrow arms control point of view, the CTBT has been so unattractive

to the United States, why did the United States continue to refer to it as a long

term goal to be pursued when necessary conditions were achieved? The answer has

two parts. First, not everyone at home or abroad agreed with this assessment, and

certainly the industrial democracies did not always lead in all areas of advanced

weaponry. Second, some actually do put a premium on limiting the U.S. American

technological prowess was a target not only of the Soviet Union during the Cold

War, but also of some other states that feared or resented the United States and/

or the other nuclear weapons states. In some other cases, states appeared to be exploiting American reluctance to finalize a CTB as pretext to justify their own lack

of restraint, and one frequently hears the argument that a CTBT will call their

bluff. Unfortunately, I fear these states can create pretexts faster than we can negotiate them away or buy them off. Still others do see American technological advances as the source of most arms races. I should note that all of the arguments

against the American nuclear deterrent that one has heard over the years are now

108

being made about American advanced conventional capability and even so-called

non-lethal weapons.

The more compelling reason that the United States never walked away from the CTBT as a long term goal, however, was nonproliferation. Yet, even here, there

were serious concerns about the impact of the CTBT. All but a handful of states

(Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan primarily) are already parties to the Nonproliferation

Treaty. Except for the five nuclear weapons states these parties are obligated not

to have nuclear weapons programs and thus should not have nuclear weapons to

test. The main thrust of the CTBT actually involves very few states. Often, the CTB

was seen in the West as a half way house for those states into the NPT. The problem is that some in those states saw the CTBT as an alternative regime to the NPT,

one based on a more egalitarian principle under which all parties would be free to

have nuclear weapons. They just couldn’t test them. The danger is that the CTBT then becomes a halfway house out of the NPT, or at least a less restrictive alternative approach to nonproliferation. This need not

happen, but it could if we are not careful. Already it has become common in public

discussion to speak of proliferation as having occurred only after a state has tested

its nuclear weapons. This erosion of standards is very dangerous and again reflects

the mistaken belief that proliferators must always test their weapons to have confidence in them. This involves more mirror imaging than is warranted. Their needs

are not the same as ours. Also, as technology such as supercomputing advances and

spreads, more and more states will be able to have confidence in more and more

nuclear weapons capability without testing. To address these problems, the United

States and like-minded states must work to address fundamental regional security

concerns. Above all, it must avoid the neo-Kellogg-Briandism that would have us

substitute grandiose, global pledges for the hard work of creating the conditions for

a safer world by directly engaging states and regions of concern. Already we have

seen in the context of the CTB, a worsening of the situation in South Asia. Still, it would be wrong to say that the CTBT only relates to a few. Many of the parties to the NPT have said that their commitment to remain in the treaty is related to the implementation by the nuclear weapons states of Article VI of the treaty. The NPT commits the nuclear weapons states to a cessation of the nuclear arms

race and commits all parties to work toward general and complete disarmament.

Most of these states have taken the position that achievement of a CTBT is required

under Article VI, but most have said that Article VI also requires the ultimate

elimination of all nuclear weapons themselves. And the official policy of the United

States remains that this too is an ultimate goal. How does the United States reconcile this view with its view that the nuclear umbrella and security guarantee it provides to key allies also is necessary for nonproliferation. The answer always has been that the United States will not give up

its nuclear weapons until the conditions have actually been created in which they

are no longer necessary. To do otherwise, would result in powerful pressures for nuclear proliferation. Half the world’s population lives in countries that have nuclear

weapons, and if we do not deal the legitimate security concerns of the others, more

states will seek their own WMD programs. If a CTBT were to shatter confidence

in safety, security, or reliability of the American nuclear umbrella, they may do the

same. Yet if we invoke Safeguard F, involving the supreme national interest clause,

we may provoke or legitimize similar acts. This safeguard carries almost the entire

weight of the argument for this CTBT, yet it puts the United States in a ‘‘Damned

if you do; damned if you don’t’’ situation with respect to nonproliferation, especially

if there are states simply looking for a pretext.

Mr. Chairman, it is my personal view that the arms control arguments for a zeroyield CTBT are not compelling, and that the nonproliferation impact of any CTBT

can be very uncertain and involve foreseeable dangers as well as unintended consequences. A better way to proceed is a step by step process in which constraints

are related to advances in verification, advances in a validated stockpile stewardship program, development of an appropriate weapons stockpile for a post-Cold War

and testing limited environment, and advances in global and regional security. All

of this is about why we didn’t want to be where we are now.

But we are here now. What should be done now? With or without this treaty, we

should continue to work with other nations, but most particularly with countries of

concern to advance a more cooperative, but realistic security relationship. With or

without this treaty, we should continue to address verification and compliance challenges, including those associated with nuclear testing restraints. With or without

this treaty, we should exploit a vigorous stockpile stewardship program so that we

can have confidence in our deterrent while also demonstrating the maximum restraint possible. With or without this treaty, we must continue to develop and implement a more coherent, bipartisan strategy for building a safer word.

109

If this treaty were time limited, were not zero yield, provided restraints at more verifiable levels, provided more clearly for the legitimacy of further testing (if and

when it is needed), were not so prone to ever more restrictive interpretation down

the road, and if conditions were such that the stated nonproliferation objectives will

actually be achieved, then the debate would not be so intense. Unfortunately, this

treaty, signed already by the United States is none of these things, and there is no

easy way to fix it. To approve this treaty may undermine years of accomplishments in arms control and nonproliferation. Yet, expectations about this very treaty have been built up

around the world and here at home. The case for this treaty is weak, but, unfortunately, the explanations for why the conditions for this treaty do not exist have also

not been made even to our allies. These explanations are only now finally being

made to our own citizens. It is one thing to say we never should have gotten into

this position. It is another thing to make a worse hash of it. The challenge to this

Committee, and to the Executive Branch, is to find a way to get American nonproliferation strategy back on sound footing such that it earns bipartisan support

and provides the U.S. leadership necessary in the global arena.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. I just came in. Mr. Wade, are you up? Thank you very much, and thank you all for hanging in

here through a long hearing. It is a very important hearing, and

we want to hear your testimony. I would hope you would put it forward actually in a summary fashion and really get to the heart of

what you are about on it. And we will have your full statement in

the record. I just think that might be better for all of us. You have

heard a lot of testimony here today. Just get right at what you

think the key points are. Mr. Wade.

STATEMENT OF TROY E. WADE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

(RETIRED), NEVADA ALLIANCE FOR DEFENSE, ENERGY AND

BUSINESS, LAS VEGAS, NV

Mr. WADE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to summarize. By way of background, I have spent more than 30 years

directly involved in the nuclear weapons programs of this country,

with most of my career associated with nuclear testing. My last official assignment was as the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs at the end of the Reagan administration. Since my

retirement in 1989, I have continued to support the defense interest of this country and have worked to assure that the issues with

which I am familiar are properly considered.

I am part of a rapidly diminishing number of people who have

witnessed the awesome force of an atmospheric nuclear test. And

therefore I can comfortably categorize myself as one who has spent

his entire career working on a program that would bring strength

to the U.S. deterrent, but at the same time I am a perfect example

of the aging, not only of the nuclear weapons themselves, but much

more importantly, the people who have designed and tested and

manufactured them.

Given my background in testing, I am particularly concerned

about several things. For example, I know from firsthand experience that nuclear weapons are not like artillery shells. You can not

store them in a Butler building and then get them whenever the

exigencies of the situation prompt you to do so. Nuclear weapons

are very complicated assemblies that require continued vigilance to

assure reliability and safety. It is, therefore, a first order principle

that nuclear weapons that are now expected to be available in the

enduring stockpile for much longer than was contemplated by the

designers will require enhanced vigilance to continue to ensure

110

safety and reliability. I have been, and will continue to be, a supporter of stockpile stewardship, but I am a supporter only because

I believe it is a way to develop the computational capability to assure the annual certification process for warheads that have not

changed or for which there is no apparent change. For nuclear

weapons that do not fit that category, stockpile stewardship is

merely, as we say in Nevada, a crap shoot.

Nuclear testing has always been the tool necessary to maintain

with high confidence the reliability and safety of the stockpile. I believe this treaty would remove the principal tool from the toolchest

of those responsible for assuring safety and reliability. We have

heard many analogies today about the effects of this treaty on warhead safety and reliability. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to use my

own analogy. Maintaining the nuclear deterrent of the United

States without permitting needed testing is like requiring the local

ambulance service to guarantee 99 percent reliability anytime the

ambulance is requested, but with a provision that the ambulance

is never to be started until the call comes. I believe this is a patently absurd premise.

I believe there are at least three reasons that the U.S. might

need to conduct a nuclear test. First, a requirement to do a test

that would respond in a political sense to a test conducted by another country, and I do not believe this to be a high probability

event at all. Second, a requirement to do a test, or two, or three,

that would need to be conducted to respond to a new, clear, military requirement, such as deeply buried hard targets. I believe this

to be likely over the next couple of decades. Third, a requirement

to do a test, or two, or three, that would be necessary to assure

that a problem discovered in the enduring stockpile had been successfully resolved, and that the safety and reliability of the subject

warhead was again deemed satisfactory. I believe, based on my

personal experience, that this is a very high probability event. Are

we prepared to conduct a nuclear test should we develop a problem

in the enduring stockpile? Are we prepared to comply with proposed safeguard F? I am distressed to have to report to this committee that in my opinion, our capability to conduct a test is eroding rapidly. Let me give you my views for the reasons.

First, there is no agreement between Congress and the administration about what constitutes the capability to resume nuclear

testing. Congress views the plans presented by the administration

as if they were plans developed by a fire station waiting for a very

low probability fire and, therefore, prohibitively expensive. The administration exacerbates this view by being unable to define the

most basic requirements needed to conduct a nuclear test.

The result is an impasse. Congress is seeking the cheapest option, while the administration and the national laboratories quibble

over what must be done, and in what priority it must be done. As

a result, we are losing the people, both weapons designers and field

operations people, that are trained to safely conduct a nuclear test,

and we are also losing the certification and maintenance of the instrumentation and equipment that is necessary to conduct a nuclear test.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, my years of experience and dedication to this progran tell me that this treaty, as it is now presented

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to this committee, is dangerous. It is unverifiable, it may or may

not further the nonproliferation goals of the U.S., and most important to me, it has an adverse effect on assuring the continued safety and reliability of the nuclear deterrent. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. My full statement will be submitted for the

record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wade follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TROY E. WADE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on behalf of my opposition to the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as it is currently written. As submitted,

it is my opinion that it presents to this committee and to the full body of the Senate

a flawed set of logic.

By way of background, I have spent more than thirty years directly involved in

the nuclear weapons programs of this country, with most of my career associated

with nuclear testing. Since my retirement in 1989, I have continued to support the

defense interests of the country and have worked to assure that the issues with

which I am familiar are properly considered.

I am part of a rapidly diminishing number of people who have witnessed the awesome force of an atmospheric nuclear test and, therefore, I can comfortably categorize myself as one who has spent his entire career working on a program that

would bring strength to the U.S. defense but, at the same time, one who has also

prayed that a nuclear weapon would never need to be used again.

Treaties have always been a part of the nuclear weapons program, and I have

participated in all of them, noting that all have been driven by international pressures. Among the most important to the nation are the Limited Test Ban Treaty

in 1963, followed in 1974 by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Both of those treaties were ratified because there was reasonable assurance that

the treaties could be verified.

As the national commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty moved forward during the Reagan years, this nation participated in a joint program with the

Soviet Union, called the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE), to determine each nation’s capability to monitor a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The JVE’s were very

successful in that they demonstrated to both nuclear powers that one could successfully instrument a test to assure that it did not exceed the nuclear yields specified

by the treaty requirements. Lost in the rhetoric is the fact that the JVE’s did nothing to assure anyone that low yield nuclear tests could be routinely and accurately

detected. Given the technical facts known at the time, it is remarkable that the U.S.

or any of its close allies would agree to a zero-yield provision in the proposed treaty.

As the committee knows, recent reports from the CIA continue to highlight our inability to verify whether or not low-yield nuclear tests have been conducted by Russia.

Given my background in testing, I am particularly concerned about several things.

For example, I know from firsthand experience that nuclear weapons are not like

artillery shells. You cannot store them in a Butler building on the back forty and

go get them whenever the exigencies of the situation prompt you to do so. Nuclear

weapons are very complicated assemblies that require continued vigilance to assure

reliability and safety. It is a first order principal that nuclear weapons that are now

expected to be available in the enduring stockpile for much longer than was contemplated by the designers will require enhanced vigilance to continue to assure

safety and reliability. I have been, and will continue to be, a supporter of stockpile

stewardship, but I am a supporter only because I believe it is a way to develop the

computational capability to assure the annual certification process for warheads

that have not changed, or for which there is no apparent change. For nuclear weapons that do not fit that category, stockpile stewardship is merely a crap shoot. Nuclear testing has always been the tool necessary to maintain, with high confidence,

the reliability and safety of the stockpile. In fact, President George Bush must have

believed as I do when he said, and I quote, ‘‘the requirement to maintain and improve the safety of U.S. forces necessitates continued nuclear testing for these purposes, albeit at a modest level, for the foreseeable future.’’

This treaty would remove the principal ‘‘tool’’ from the tool chest of those responsible for assuring stockpile safety and reliability. To use a simple analogy, if the

chair permits, maintaining the nuclear deterrent of the U.S. without permitting

needed testing is like requiring the local ambulance service to guarantee 99% reliVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
112

ability anytime the ambulance is requested, but with a provision that the ambulance is never to be started until the call comes. This is a patently absurd premise.

Allow me to get very specific about nuclear testing. When President Clinton forwarded the current CTBT to Congress, he assured the Congress that he had mandated that the capability to resume nuclear testing would be maintained. It is my

opinion that is currently not the case.

I believe that there are at least three reasons that the U.S. might need to conduct

a nuclear test.

• First, a requirement to do a test that would respond, in a political sense, to a

test conducted by another country. I do not believe this is a high probability

event at all.

• Second, a requirement to do a test (or two or three) that would need to be conducted to respond to a new, clear military requirement, such as deeply-buried

hard targets. I believe this to be likely over the next couple of decades.

• Third, a requirement to do a test (or two or three) that would be necessary to

assure that a problem discovered in the enduring stockpile had been successfully resolved and that the safety and reliability of the subject warhead was

again deemed satisfactory. I believe, based upon my personal experience, that

this is a very high probability event.

Are we prepared to conduct a nuclear test should we develop a problem in the

enduring stockpile, or for any other reason? I am distressed to have to report to this

committee that our capability to conduct a test is eroding rapidly. Let me give you

my view of the reasons that this is the case.

First, there is no agreement between Congress and the administration about what

constitutes the ‘‘capability to resume nuclear testing.’’ Congress views the plans presented by the administration as if they were plans developed by a fire station waiting for a very low probability fire and, therefore, are prohibitively expensive. The

administration exacerbates this view by being unable to define the most basic requirements needed to conduct a nuclear test.

The result is an impasse. Congress is seeking the cheapest option while the administration and the national laboratories quibble over what must be done and in

what priority it must be done. As a result, we are losing the people (both weapons

designers and field operations personnel) that are trained to safely conduct a nuclear test, and we are also losing the certification and maintenance of the instrumentation and equipment that is necessary to conduct a nuclear test.

Until issues like these are resolved, ratification of a treaty that prevents nuclear

testing puts our system and our nation at unnecessary risk.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, my 31 years of service and dedication to this program tell me that this treaty, as it is now presented to this committee and to the

Senate of the United States, is dangerous. It is unverifiable, it clearly does nothing

concrete to further the non-proliferation goals of the U.S., and most important to

me, it has an adverse effect on assuring the continued safety and reliability of the

nuclear deterrent.

I urge this committee and the full body of the Senate to reject this treaty as it

has been submitted and to require that the administration move expeditiously to develop a new Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that will lead to the desired goals of

verification while also protecting all of our options in the event of a national emergency.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I appreciate the opportunity to testify

before this prestigious committee and stand ready to respond to any questions you

or the committee may deem appropriate.

Thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Garwin, we will hear your statement now. And then we will

have questions for all of you.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. GARWIN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW

FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY

Dr. GARWIN. Good evening. Thanks for the opportunity to testify

in support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that has been before the Senate for 2 years.

I will abbreviate and submit my full statement for the record.

113

Since 1950, I have been involved in the Nation’s nuclear weapons

establishment, contributing to the development and testing of fission weapons and to the creation of the first thermonuclear weapons. I speak for myself alone.

Last year I was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission to assess

the ballistic missile threat to the United States. In 1996, I received

the Foreign Intelligence Community Award for Scientific Intelligence. And that same year, from the President and the Department of Energy, the Enrico Fermi Award for my work with nuclear

weapons.

Complex technical issues should not be allowed to obscure the

important conclusions that I state here up front and that I believe

follow from a balanced assessment. First, in assessing the merits

of the CTBT, it is essential to bear the difference in mind between

fission weapons of the Hiroshima/Nagasaki variety and thermonuclear weapons which are used on all deployed U.S., Russian and

Chinese strategic nuclear weapons.

The CTBT can be verified with sufficient confidence to prevent

any proliferator from developing thermonuclear weapons, whether

he already possesses fission weapons or develops such weapons

clandestinely.

Third, while tests with yields vastly smaller than Hiroshima may

evade detection, such tests would be useless to Russia and China,

and very difficult to use for confirming the validity of clandestinely

developed fission weapons.

Fourth, if secret information regarding thermonuclear weapons

has been acquired by others or may be so acquired in the future,

as has been alleged in regard to China, this information cannot be

turned into a deployable weapon without tests forbidden by the

CTBT.

Fifth, the U.S. does not need tests banned by the CTBT to maintain full confidence in its weapons stockpile. The vast majority of

components in a nuclear weapon can be examined and tested and

upgraded without nuclear explosions. The nuclear, so-called, physics package itself can be remanufactured to original specifications

should surveillance reveal deterioration. The stockpile stewardship

program will further enhance our high confidence in our stockpile,

which is now certified each year by the weapon builders, together

with the military who will have to use the weapons.

Sixth, given that nuclear proliferation is probably the most serious threat to the national security, and given the confidence that

our own deterrent will be fully maintained under the CTBT, it is

totally clear that the United States will run fewer dangers with the

CTBT in force than without it.

The costs to the United States of a CTBT include constraining

the United States from testing nuclear weapons. We must frankly

face that as a cost. The benefits come from constraining other countries from testing nuclear weapons. So let us first look at the benefits.

The greatest benefit arises from the contribution to preventing

proliferation of nuclear weapons, both directly, by preventing nuclear tests and indirectly, by keeping nations on board the nonproliferation treaty. The United States does not want additional

states to have nuclear weapons, and the members of the NPT do

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not either. We will not have these nations enthusiastically supporting the NPT if we go on with testing.

It is possible to build simple nuclear weapons without nuclear explosion tests. But there will always be a nagging doubt whether or

how well they perform. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs each

weighed about 9,000 pounds, with a yield of 15 to 20 kilotons. The

Hiroshima bomb was not tested before its use. It used a gun assembly of 60 kilograms of enriched uranium. The Nagasaki bomb

was tested 3 weeks beforehand in the New Mexico desert. It contained 6 kilograms of plutonium.

But the point is that these must be compared with a two-stage

thermonuclear bomb, tested in 1957, 12 years later, that weighed

some 400 pounds, with a yield of 74 kilotons. Its diameter was a

mere 12 inches, with a length of some 42 inches. That is what you

can do by testing. That is what other people cannot do without

testing.

A CTBT that was respected would make a big difference in the

threat that could face the United States or our allies, even if nations overtly or clandestinely pursue nuclear weaponry without explosive tests. The two-stage 1957 weapons would greatly increase

the destructive power that can be wielded by new nuclear states

such as India and Pakistan. And I take Ambassadors Oakley’s and

Wisner’s comments about the likelihood of testing and further expansion of the nuclear arsenals in India and Pakistan if a CTBT

is not ratified.

The CTBT bans a nuclear explosion of any size. It is a zero

threshold agreement. Can we be certain that a nation has not tested in this vast range between zero and the magnitude of tests that

would be required to gain a significant confidence in an approach

to thermonuclear weaponry, say 10 kilotons? No, we cannot be

sure. But the utility of such tests, the minimal tests, in a weapons

program has been thoroughly explored and found to be just that—

minimal.

I recall the August 1995 report of the JASON group, chaired by

Dr. Sidney Drell, of which I was a coauthor. Conclusion 6 of that

study refers specifically to a nuclear weapon test that would involve full yield of a fission primary and some ignition of the thermonuclear secondary, and states that such tests, to be useful,

would generate nuclear yields in excess of approximately 10 kilotons. That is clearly verifiable by the CTBT’s International Monitoring System, with its seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound sensors and its detectors of radioactive gases and particles.

Those conclusions resulted from a detailed classified analysis of

the more than 1,000 U.S. nuclear tests. And the conclusions were

supported unanimously by the authors of the study, which included

four experienced nuclear weapon designers from the nuclear weapon laboratories.

Now, a proliferant country might well want to acquire fission

weapons of 5 kiloton yields, a third the size of the Hiroshima bomb.

But the chance of detonating such a weapon undetected is small.

The IMS would have a good probability of detecting a nuclear explosion anywhere in the world at a level of 1 kiloton. And in many

portions of the world, the detectability is much better. For example,

on September 23, 1999, the background noise in seismic arrays in

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the Scandinavian region were such that a test on the order of 1

ton, not 1 kiloton, could have been detected at Novaya Zemlya.

Hydronuclear tests are banned under the CTBT. The U.S. conducted dozens of them with an intended energy release less than

4 pounds of high explosives, not 1 ton, or 1 kiloton, but a thousandth of a ton—4 pounds. It is clearly impossible seismically to

distinguish a test that may have had 200 pounds of high explosive

from a test with 200 pounds of high explosive and 1 pound of nuclear yield.

The 1995 JASON nuclear testing study judged that there was little to be learned from such a test of a yield 10 million times lower

than that of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Such major changes would need to be made in a full-scale nuclear

explosive to produce such a small yield that information available

from a hydronuclear test would be of minor value in the development of a substantial fission weapon. And that laid the basis for

a zero yield, zero threshold, CTBT. We just found no utility for

hydronuclear tests.

Russian nuclear weapon experts have expressed interest in fission weapons with yields no bigger than a few tons, slightly bigger

than the 2-ton bombs that we routinely dropped from our aircraft.

These might be built without testing, or might be tested

unobserved by U.S. sensors with or without a CTBT. In no case

would the U.S. react by testing its own nuclear weapons. And the

inhibition posed by a CTBT on a Russia that wishes to remain engaged with the rest of the world would be substantial. The possibility of Russian programs of this type is not a valid argument

against the CTBT.

Not having a CTBT would give a green light to Russia to develop

those weapons and fully test them, and many others. In other

words, one can cheat on the CTBT without being discovered by the

International Monitoring System, but to what purpose? Useful national security information would not be acquired, and the bragging

rights are not worth much if you cannot tell anyone.

For instance, a clandestine test cannot be used to intimidate

other states. Beyond the International Monitoring System, the

United States maintains national means, ranging from human

agents to communications intelligence to sensors other than those

included in the IMS. I am confident that the CTBT can be adequately verified. This means that experimental validation by nuclear explosion testing cannot be accomplished by a state that is

party to the CTBT.

Now, can we maintain our nuclear weapons safe and reliable

under a CTBT? Yes. Our review of U.S. nuclear tests and of defects

developed in stockpiled weapons revealed many defects detected in

the routine surveillance process—not by nuclear explosion tests.

Defects observed by nuclear explosion tests were associated with

weapons that have been put into the stockpile without the normal

development testing and without a production verification test.

Today we have no such weapons, and we will have none in the future.

Senator BIDEN. None in the stockpile today?

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Dr. GARWIN. None in the stockpile today have not been fully tested. They have all been fully tested. All weapons in the enduring

stockpile have been fully tested.

Some deficiencies identified by surveillance were actually eliminated by substituting a different warhead or design that required

nuclear testing. But that was an option, not a necessity.

At present, and for the foreseeable future, a reliable and safe

U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is essential to the security of the

United States, its allies and to peaceful nations of the world. We

need to understand whether U.S. nuclear weapons can be maintained reliable and safe for 10 years or 20 years or 50 years without nuclear testing. That is the $45 billion 10-year program, to provide assessment and understanding of the state of the stockpile

and to remedy deficiencies as they are detected.

The analogy with the automobile is that of the 4,000 or so individual parts of a modern U.S. nuclear weapon. Most can be thoroughly tested without nuclear explosions, and many are not even

involved in a test explosion. Thus, batteries, timing and fusing systems and most of the weapon itself can be assessed and improved

to the state-of-the-art using modern technology when warranted by

the reduction in cost in the long run to compensate the investment

in the short run. That is no different from any other modernization

program.

But under a CTBT, the explosive-driven plutonium primary cannot be tested to nuclear yield, and neither can the secondary explosive that is ignited by the flood of x rays from the primary explosion. Instead, the United States has an assessment program in

which each year 11 examples of each type of warhead in the inventory are dismantled and exhaustively monitored. Of the 11, one is

totally disassembled, and the interior of the primary and secondary

inspected for aging, corrosion and the like.

Signs of aging may eventually force the remanufacture of these

parts. If they are remanufactured to the same specifications as

they were initially produced, they will be as good as the day they

were first made. This can be done any number of times, and is the

basis for my confidence in the future stockpile.

We now have a much better understanding of the aging of plutonium than we did previously. It seems to be benign. And this

knowledge has led to a belief that the plutonium pit will survive

50 years or more. But if it does not, remanufacture will make it

good as new.

We need not only reassessment, but the remanufacturing facility.

The need for the facility has nothing to do with the CTBT. It is neither more nor less necessary under a CTBT than in a regime in

which the United States will still test occasionally.

It is interesting that whether we test or we do not test, no missile that will be fired in war, no nuclear weapon that would be used

in extremis would have been tested. Its brother would have been

tested. Its sister would have been tested. It would not have been

tested.

The U.S. laboratories, under the CTBT, will maintain weapons

safe and reliable by the stockpile stewardship program, but they

will also maintain and improve the capability to design and build

nuclear weapons. It is clear that this capability could not be exerVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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cised in the form of newly produced weapons under a CTBT, but

should the test ban regime ever collapse, it would avoid the delay

of many years before new designed nuclear weapons could be produced.

Now, let me give you what I believe is a balanced assessment,

a summary. The nonproliferation arms control benefits to the U.S.

of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are substantial. The adherence of other nations to the NPT and to the CTBT is fundamentally

influenced by U.S. ratification of the CTBT.

A party could conduct tiny nuclear tests without being detected

by the treaty monitoring system. But tests in the hydronuclear

range, releasing a millionth of the energy of a Hiroshima bomb will

provide little useful knowledge. Tests releasing 100 tons—that is,

1 percent of the Hiroshima yield—might sometimes be missed by

the monitoring system, but would often be detected and located by

other means. They, too, would have little value in the development

of nuclear weapons.

U.S. nuclear weapons will be maintained reliable and safe under

a CTBT thanks to the stockpile stewardship programs for assessment and remanufacture.

Last but not least among the six safeguards the administration

has announced is the explicit readiness to invoke the supreme national interest clause should the need arise as a result of unanticipated technical problems in the enduring stockpile of nuclear weapons that affect a key portion of that stockpile.

On the basis of my experience in the nuclear weapons program,

I agree with those U.S. military leaders who have reviewed the

benefits and costs to U.S. security from a CTBT and strongly support the treaty. Our national security will be improved by ratification and impaired by further delay.

These military leaders had access to all the facts, took the time,

and used a formal process to ensure that all views were considered.

I feel it is thus greatly in our national security interest to ratify

the CTBT now. And I would be pleased to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Garwin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD L. GARWIN

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

I am Richard L. Garwin, Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology

at the Council on Foreign Relations. I am also IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas

J. Watson Research Center of the IBM Corporation. I chair the Arms Control and

Nonproliferation Advisory Board to the Secretary of State. In addition, I am a member of the JASON group of consultants to the U.S. government, and have participated in several of the JASON studies for the Department of Energy on stockpile

stewardship. Since 1950 I have been involved with the nation’s nuclear weapons establishment, having contributed to the development and testing of fission weapons

and to the creation of the first thermonuclear weapons. Most of this involvement

has been at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. I am currently a consultant to

Sandia National Laboratories. Nevertheless, in my testimony I speak only for myself. In 1998 I was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic

Missile Threat to the United States. In 1996 I received from the U.S. foreign intelligence community the R.V. Jones Award for Scientific Intelligence; and also in 1996

I received from the President and the Department of Energy the Enrico Fermi

Award for my work with nuclear weapons.

118

THE BOTTOM LINE.

Complex technical issues should not be allowed to obscure the important conclusions that I state here, up front, and that I believe follow from a balanced assessment:

1. In assessing the merits of the CTBT it is essential to bear the difference in mind

between fission weapons of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki variety and thermonuclear

weapons which are used on all deployed U.S., Russian and Chinese strategic

nuclear weapons.

2. The CTBT can be verified with sufficient confidence to prevent any proliferator

from developing thermonuclear weapons whether he already possesses fission

weapons or develops such weapons clandestinely.

3. While tests with yields vastly smaller than Hiroshima may evade detection, such

tests would be useless to Russia and China, and very difficult to use for confirming the validity of a clandestinely devloped fission weapon.

4. If secret information regarding thermonuclear weapons has been acquired by others, or may be so acquired in the future, as has been alleged in regard to China,

this information cannot be turned into a deployable weapon without tests forbidden by the CTBT.

5. The U.S. does not need tests banned by the CTBT to maintain full confidence in

its weapons stockpile. The vast majority of components in a nuclear weapon can

be examined and tested and upgraded without nuclear explosions. The nuclear

(or physics) package itself can be remanufactured to original specifications

should surveillance reveal deterioration. The stockpile stewardship program will

further enhance our high confidence in our stockpile, which is now certified

each year by the weapon builders, together with the military who will have to

use the weapons.

6. Given that nuclear proliferation is probably the most serious threat to the national security, and given the confidence that our own deterrent will be fully

maintained under the CTBT, it is clear—totally clear—that the United States

will run fewer dangers with the CTBT in force than without it.

WHY A TREATY?

We are better off with a test ban than without it. Of that there can be no doubt.

Naturally, any treaty or contract will have both benefits and costs to any of the

parties. Here we are concerned with the benefits and costs to the United States. If

one looked only at the costs, and imagined them as the total effect of the Treaty,

one would never consider such a deal.

The costs to the United States include constraining the United States from testing

nuclear weapons. The benefits come from constraining other countries from testing

nuclear weapons. So let’s look first at the benefits. The greatest benefit of the CTBT

arises from its contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It

does this directly by preventing nuclear tests and indirectly by keeping nations on

board the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States does not want additional states to have nuclear weapons, and the members of the NPT don’t either.

It is possible to build simple nuclear weapons without nuclear explosion tests, but

there will always be a nagging doubt whether or how well they will perform. The

Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs each weighed about 9000 pounds, with a yield of

15 to 20 kilotons. The Hiroshima bomb used artillery-gun assembly of 60 kilograms

of enriched uranium, which was not tested before its use. The Nagasaki bomb, tested three weeks beforehand in the New Mexico desert, contained some 6 kilograms

of plutonium. Compare these weapons with a two-stage thermonuclear bomb tested

in 1957 that weighed some 400 lbs with a yield of 74 kilotons; its diameter was a

mere 12 inches, with a length of some 42 inches.

Without nuclear tests of substantial yield, it is difficult to build compact and light

fission weapons and essentially impossible to have any confidence in a large-yield

two-stage thermonuclear weapon or hydrogen bomb, which can readily be made in

the megaton class. Furthermore, even in the yield range accessible to fission weapons, thermonuclear weapons are attractive because of their economy of fissile material, their compact size, and their improved safety. Just for example, a pure fission

weapon, which is the best a sophisticated proliferator could do without verifiable

testing, of 200 kilotons yield would require some 60 kg of plutonium or U–235. And

the chemical explosive might weigh 4000 to 8000 lbs. That amount of fissile material would suffice for 10 thermonuclear weapons, each of which could be in the megaton class and weigh less than 1000 lbs. However, such H-bomb type weapons would

require testing that would be readily detected and would therefore be prevented by

119

the CTBT. This limits greatly the destructive power that can be wielded by newly

nuclear states such as India and Pakistan.

So a CTBT that was respected would make a big difference in the threat that could face the United States or our allies, even if nations overtly or clandestinely

pursue nuclear weaponry without explosive tests. The CTBT bans any nuclear explosion of any size—it is a ‘‘zero threshold’’ agree- ment. Can one be certain that a nation has not tested in the vast range between

zero and the magnitude of test that would be required to gain significant confidence

in an approach to thermonuclear weaponry—say, 10 kilotons? No, but the utility of

such tests to a weapons program has been thoroughly explored and found to be

minimal.

First, I recall the August 3, 1995 report of JASON chaired by Dr. Sidney Drell, of which I was a co-author. Conclusion 6 of that study refers to a nuclear weapon

test that would involve full yield of the fission primary and some ignition of the

thermonuclear secondary, and that such tests, to be useful, would ‘‘generate nuclear

yields in excess of approximately 10 kilotons.’’ That is clearly verifiable by the

CTBT’s International Monitoring System (IMS), with its seismic, hydroacoustic, and

infrasound sensors, and its detectors of radioactive gases and particles. These Conclusions resulted from a detailed classified analysis of the more than 1000 nuclear tests, and they were supported unanimously by the authors of the

study, including four experienced nuclear weapon designers from U.S. nuclear weapon laboratories.

A proliferant country might well want to acquire fission weapons of 5 kiloton

yield, but the chance of detonating such a weapon undetected is small. The International Monitoring System (IMS) will have a good probability of detecting a nuclear explosion anywhere in the world—underground, underwater, or in the atmosphere at a level of 1 kiloton. And in many portions of the world the detectability

is much better. For example, on September 23, 1999, the background noise in seismic arrays in the Scandinavian region was such that a test on the order of 1 ton

(not 1 kiloton) could have been detected at Novaya Zemlya.

The CTBT bans explosive tests that release any amount of nuclear energy. The

United States conducted some scores of so-called hydronuclear tests with an intended energy release less than 4 lbs. of high explosive equivalent. These are

banned under the CTBT; they would very likely not be detected by the International

Monitoring System. It is clearly impossible seismically to distinguish a test that

may have had 200 lbs. of high explosive from a test with 200 lbs. of high explosive

and 1 lb. of nuclear yield. The 1995 JASON Nuclear Testing study judged that there

was little to be learned from such a test of yield 10 million times lower than that

of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Such major changes would

need to be made in a full-scale nuclear explosive to produce such a small yield that

information available from the hydronuclear test would be of minor value in the development of a substantial fission weapon.

Russian nuclear weapons experts have expressed interest in fission weapons with

yields no bigger than a few tons. These might be built without testing, or might be

tested unobserved by U.S. sensors, with or without a CTBT. In no case would the

U.S. react by testing its own nuclear weapons, and the inhibition posed by a CTBT

on a Russia that wishes to remain engaged with the rest of the world would be substantial. The possibility of Russian programs of this type is not a valid argument

against the CTBT.

In other words, one can cheat on the CTBT without being discovered by the International Monitoring System, but to what end? Useful national security information

would not be acquired, and the bragging rights are not worth much if one can’t tell

anyone. For instance, a clandestine test cannot be used to intimidate other states.

ADDITIONAL MEANS TO DETECT VIOLATIONS

In addition to the International Monitoring System, the United States will maintain national means ranging from human agents to communications intelligence to

sensors other than those included in the IMS. Furthermore, there are completely

open and unclassified sensors such as research seismometers that can augment and

in many cases greatly improve the sensitivity of the IMS.

I am confident that the CTBT can be adequately verified; this means that experimental validation by nuclear explosion testing cannot be accomplished by a state

that is party to the CTBT.

CAN THE U.S. MAINTAIN ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFE AND RELIABLE UNDER A CTBT?

Our review of the U.S. nuclear tests and of defects discovered in stockpile weapons revealed many defects that were detected in the routine surveillance process—

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i.e., not by nuclear explosion tests. Defects observed by nuclear explosion tests were

associated with weapons that had been put into the stockpile without the normal

development testing and a production verification test. Today we have no such

weapons; and we will have none in the future. All weapons in the enduring stockpile

have been fully tested.

Some deficiencies identified by surveillance were eliminated by substituting a different warhead or design that required nuclear testing, but that was an option—

not a necessity.

This analysis of our own stockpile and test record underscores the importance of

explosive testing at an assuredly detectable level to a proliferator.

At present and for the foreseeable future, a reliable and safe U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is essential to the security of the United States, its allies, and to

peaceful nations of the world. It is important to understand whether U.S. nuclear

weapons can be maintained reliable and safe for 10 years or 20 years or 50 years,

without nuclear testing. To this end, the Department of Energy is spending $4.5 billion annually on the Stockpile Stewardship Program, to provide assessment and understanding of the state of the stockpile and to remedy deficiencies as they are detected. Of the 4000 or so individual parts of a modern U.S. nuclear weapon, most

can be thoroughly tested without nuclear explosions and many are not even involved

in a test explosion. Thus, batteries, timing and fuzing systems, and most of the

weapon itself can be assessed and improved to the state-of-the-art, using modern

technology when it is warranted by the reduction in cost in the long run to compensate the investment in the short run. This is no different from any other modernization program. But under a CTBT, the explosive-driven plutonium primary

cannot be tested to nuclear yield, and neither can the secondary explosive that is

ignited by the flood of x rays from the primary explosion.

Instead, the United States has an assessment program, in which each year 11 examples of each type of warhead in the inventory are dismantled and exhaustively

monitored. Of the 11, one is totally disassembled and the interior of the primary

and secondary inspected for aging, corrosion, and the like.

Eventually, signs of aging may force the remanufacture of these parts; if they are

remanufactured to the same specifications as they were initially produced, they will

be as good as the day they were first made. This can be done any number of times,

and is the basis for my confidence in the future stockpile. As a result of the Stockpile Stewardship Program over the last four years or so, we have a much better understanding of the aging of plutonium than we did previously. It seems to be benign,

and this knowledge has led to a belief that the plutonium pit will survive for 50

years or more. But if it doesn’t, remanufacture will make it ‘‘good as new.’’

We need to have not only the assessment but the remanufacturing facility; the

need for that facility has nothing to do with the CTBT. It is neither more nor less

necessary under a CTBT than in a regime in which the United States might still

test occasionally.

The U.S. laboratories under the CTBT will maintain weapons safe and reliable

by the Stockpile Stewardship Program, but they will also maintain and improve the

capability to design and build nuclear weapons. It is clear that this capability could

not be exercised under a CTBT in the form of newly produced weapons, but should

the CTBT regime ever collapse, it would avoid a delay of many years before newdesign nuclear weapons could be produced.

A BALANCED ASSESSMENT

The nonproliferation and arms control benefits to the U.S. of a CTBT are substantial; the adherence of other nations to the Nonproliferation Treaty and to the CTBT

is fundamentally influenced by U.S. ratification of the CTBT. A Party could conduct

tiny nuclear tests without being detected by the Treaty’s monitoring system, but

tests in the hydronuclear range releasing a millionth of the energy of a Hiroshima

bomb will provide little useful knowledge; tests releasing 100 tons—that is, 1% of

the Hiroshima yield—might sometimes be missed by the monitoring system, but

would often be detected and located by other means. They, too, would have little

value in the development of nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear weapons will be maintained reliable and safe under a CTBT, thanks to the Stockpile Stewardship programs for assessment and remanufacture. Last but not least among the six safeguards that the Administration has announced is the explicit readiness to invoke

the supreme national interest clause should the need arise as a result of unanticipated technical problems in the enduring stockpile of nuclear weapons, that affect

a key portion of that stockpile.

On the basis of my experience in the nuclear weapons program, I agree with those

U.S. military leaders who have reviewed the benefits and costs to U.S. security from

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a CTBT and strongly support the Treaty. Our national security will be improved by

ratification and impaired by further delay.

It is thus greatly in our interest to ratify the CTBT now.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Dr. Garwin, for your testimony.

I thank the entire panel for its testimony.

Due to the hour being late, I want to just ask really one quick

line of questioning, and then turn it over to Senator Biden to ask

a question or two. And then we will probably all move on.

The key area that I have been concerned about has been this

issue of entering into a treaty, ratifying it on behalf of the United

States, and then something changes and we decide we want to test,

or some of the other parties do not get into the treaty. And I look

at this as being a big step if we enter into this and we ratify this

treaty, if the United States does that. And I really question if other

countries would follow.

Director Lehman, specifically, I would like to ask you this. President Clinton has said, in his safeguard F, that he would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT to conduct underground testing

if a high level of confidence in a weapon type critical to the U.S.

nuclear deterrent could not otherwise be maintained. He said, we

will do it, pull out.

When was the last time the United States withdrew from an

arms control treaty using the supreme national interest clause?

Mr. LEHMAN. I am not sure that we ever had, but I would check

that for the record.

But I think there are several bigger issues here that I think are

very important, not just for the CTBT debate, but for the whole future of arms control and international law, and the question of the

dynamics of how this plays out in years when this Congress is

going to have a lot of new Members and there will definitely be

new Presidents. And that is the following:

The supreme national interest clause is something that we have

never taken lightly. To invoke it is a major step. And to invoke it

sends a major signal to other nations around the world. We have

already had a country like Iran state that if the United States or

others were to invoke the supreme national interest clause for the

purpose of testing, that they would then feel free to invoke it for

their own purposes, as well.

We run into a danger here, because, first of all, Iran is already

a party to the NPT and should not have nuclear weapons and

should not be sitting around planning to test in case we use the

safeguard F. But in the history of arms control, we really sought

other measures. If you had a problem that you thought you were

going to face, you tried to negotiate a provision.

This administration also sought that. They were not able to get

it, but they saw the wisdom of something other than using the supreme national interest clause. When I was Director of ACDA,

there was a tremendous interest among neutral and nonaligned

diplomats for some movement on nuclear testing. And I worked

something called the VOTA mandate, to help move that along.

But many of them would come to me and say, well, look, on the

CTBT, all right, we hear you have got a problem that you might

need to test for safety. Well, maybe we could negotiate something

where you could test for safety if you needed to. It would be OK.

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We could understand that. Well, of course, the climate changed, the

negotiating positions changed.

Now, we did not like that either, because we are not exactly anxious to signal we have got a problem in the stockpile by having to

invoke an extraordinary measure. But we certainly would have preferred to have a measure that legitimized doing that better than

having to invoke this supreme national interest clause.

Senator BROWNBACK. Is not that the case, Secretary Wade, that

if you did withdraw from the CTBT, it advertises to the world that

there is a problem with the U.S. deterrence, really thus undermining some of the real value of the U.S. nuclear deterrence?

Mr. WADE. Yes, Senator Brownback, I think that is a very serious consideration that the Senate must visit in the next several

days, and that is, assuming that there is a problem in the enduring

stockpile, and history will demonstrate that that certainly is possible, one way to announce to your enemies that you have developed a major problem is by invoking the national interest clause.

I think that requires very serious consideration.

I would like to go one step further by saying that safeguards

such as safeguard F have also not ever proven to be a satisfactory

way to deal with the treaty. A perfect example of that is safeguard

C of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which said that the United

States would maintain the ability to return to atmospheric testing

should it be in the national interest. Maintaining that capability is

a very expensive thing, and it does not take very many years for

this body or the administration to decide that that is no longer necessary and the safeguard disappears.

Senator BROWNBACK. I appreciate the comments each of you

made, and Mr. Lehman, I would say we have done the check on

this, and the United States has never withdrawn from an arms

control treaty using the supreme national interest, and some would

say, well, we are not quite at that point in entering into this at this

point.

My point with that is that when the United States takes these

sort of steps, we mean it. When the U.S. Senate ratifies a treaty,

it sets it in stone. This is what we mean, and with the flux that

is around the world today, and the back-and-forth testimony we

have had from key people at very high and senior levels who have

been in on these negotiations, I think that is not something that

one, we want to take and set in stone at this point in time.

Dr. GARWIN. Excuse me. You asked all three of us that question.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, Mr. Secretary, you can answer. I am

going to pitch it to Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I would ask the question you want to answer.

Dr. GARWIN. Thank you. I think, Mr. Chairman, your question

had two parts, and one was, you are not sure that the other states

will ratify, and that we will be bound by our ratification, and they

will not. Well, we are no more bound. The treaty will not have entered into force. We already have a moratorium and a treaty we

have already signed. We are not about to test, except for good reason.

The second is the supreme national interest. Well, this is not the

only condition under which the United States supreme national inVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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terest would be involved. We could give supreme national interest

for any good reason which involved our supreme national interest.

Senator BROWNBACK. We have just never used it before, Dr.

Garwin.

Dr. GARWIN. The supreme national interest does not seem to

have been jeopardized thus far.

Senator BROWNBACK. But I would also submit we just are not

going to do that.

Dr. GARWIN. We would not be shy with regards to our supreme

national interest in this treaty, and I would suggest the President

would exercise that right.

Senator BIDEN. I am fascinated by this non sequitur we have imposed the supreme national interest. Name me a time we should

have imposed our supreme national interest that we did not. Have

you got one for me? And you ought to be able to come up with one,

Mr. Secretary.

Mr. LEHMAN. I think we are headed in that direction on the ABM

Treaty.

Senator BIDEN. Have we gotten there yet, and would you, if you

were the Secretary of State or Defense, would you say to the President, a Republican President, invoke the supreme national interest

now to get out of the ABM Treaty?

Mr. LEHMAN. Do you know what the consequences are of invoking the supreme national interest?

Senator BIDEN. I sure as hell do, better than you do. But would

you recommend it? Your job is not to make a policy judgment about

the consequences. Your job is to determine whether our supreme

national interest—this is crazy. Nobody has suggested to me, ever,

including any Senator, where we should have invoked our supreme

national interest in any treaty.

Mr. LEHMAN. Then, Senator, I think you have gotten to the heart

of the matter, and if I could have just a second to raise an issue

that is related to this.

Senator BIDEN. The chairman is going to tell me my time is up,

but hold the thought, and I would like to hear, because I think we

should keep going on, because you guys are the most important

witnesses we have had here, because we have got you all together.

Now, one of the things I have heard repeatedly, which I find to

be—and I will not say what I find it to be. Yesterday, the former

Secretary of everything, Mr. Schlesinger, indicated that there is no

way to take a physics package, Dr. Garwin, and replace it. It was

not possible to do that.

Do any of you take issue with what Dr. Garwin said, that there

is an ability to remanufacture the physics package and replace an

entire physics package without testing? Do any of you doubt that?

Mr. WADE. I would like to comment, Senator Biden, if I may. I

think that first of all you have to remember that the weapons to

which Dr. Garwin referred were not designed to be remanufactured. They were designed to be replaced at the end of what was

then predicted to be their useful life.

Senator BIDEN. That is not the question.

Mr. WADE. Manufacturing techniques and materials have certainly changed in the last 20 or 25 years, and I submit it would

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be very difficult to remanufacture something to 25 or 20-year-old,

or 15-year-old standards.

Senator BIDEN. Doctor, what is your response to that?

Dr. GARWIN. Well, we have looked at that thoroughly, and the

laboratories are pretty confident that they can do it. I would be

happier had we already built a pit manufacturing capability and

were turning out 200 pits a year. I think we have been too slow.

That is true whether we have a CTBT or not.

But I have no doubt that we could make the plutonium. We have

the stock of high explosives. We test the high explosive, there is no

problem with that, until we get it right, and the secondary is much

more forgiving than is the primary, so it is the primary.

We could test these things, incidentally, at half-scale, where

there is no nuclear yield at all, very little discussed, but everything

behaves the same, we have the flash radiography, which we have

used in the past. No, it is too soon to say that our stockpile stewardship and remanufacturing effort is a failure when those in

charge of doing it and those depending on its success, the military,

say it can be done.

Senator BIDEN. We are going to learn more by you all debating.

Tell me why he is wrong.

Mr. LEHMAN. Let me make a couple of general comments.

Senator BIDEN. I do not want you to make general comments. I

really want this to be a little like a debate. Tell me if he is wrong.

Mr. LEHMAN. The statement that it is too early to say that it will

not work is not the same thing as saying that it is time to say it

will work. That is the problem. But yes, I think we ought to be

very optimistic on what can be done in a number of these areas.

The problem is that in the end, if we are faced with a failure,

with a debate, with a problem, when we have had this before, the

political system wants answers and it wants bold action to be

taken. Pit remanufacture requires infrastructure, it requires funding over a period of time.

When the debate over this treaty is over, is that going to be

there?

Senator BIDEN. I think the question is this: Does anybody—and

you obviously are well-versed in the politics of this place. Ask anyone. Does anyone believe that if we defeat this treaty the U.S. Congress for the next 4 years is going to spend $4.5 billion per year

on a stockpile stewardship program that relies upon computers to

do the job which you say, Mr. Wade, can be done by testing?

Do you honestly think you are going to convince any Congress?

Get a life, as my daughter would say. Not a possibility. I will stake

my career on that one, zero, and you know it. Zero. We cannot even

get the Republican House, as Pete Domenici says, to fund it fully

now, the Republican House. Ask Pete Domenici, who has been begging for the dollars, and you think we are going to get that, or we

are going to get the remanufacture—what is the term of art for the

pits?

Dr. GARWIN. Remanufacture.

Senator BIDEN. Come on, guys. There is no possibility, so you

will have your ability to test, and then answer the question. Does

anybody think there is a political will of the next President of the

United States to engage in the kind of testing that I am told—unVerDate 11-SEP-98 14:35 Feb 14, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 61364 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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less you disagree, now. Dr. Garwin says the only test that will have

any real relevance for us are tests that are in a megatonnage that

will provide, that will be detectable by the whole world. Now, do

you think anybody is going to go out there?

And the third question I would ask, and respond to all three, if

all three of you would do this, does anybody truly believe that any

nation in the world in the foreseeable future with a total of nine

separate systems we have, eight deployed, is going to believe that

with 6,000 of these armed and aimed, that we are not capable of

inflicting annihilation on anyone, that the deterrent does not work?

Do you honestly—and I wish you all were under oath. Do you

honestly believe any nation in the world would doubt, not our use

of them, because they doubt that now, or not, but doubt their reliability as a deterrent? And I would like you to respond.

Mr. WADE. Well, let me try, Senator Biden. No, I do not believe

any nation, or any other nation would be concerned about whether

or not one of our—pick a number, 6,000 weapons did not work.

Senator BIDEN. What if half of them did not work?

Mr. WADE. I submit you have to state the question the other

way. If you are the Commander in Chief of this country, are you

comfortable if some number, or any portion of some number may

not work? I submit the answer is probably you would not be very

comfortable.

Senator BIDEN. I submit to you, sir, that is not what deterrence

is. Deterrence is what he thinks I am capable of doing, and if he

thinks I am capable of blowing him into next Wednesday, and he

believes that, and I know he believes that, then my deterrence is

in place. That is what deterrence means. Let us not redefine deterrence.

Now, you may talk about whether we believe there is a sufficient

capability to do everything we think we would like to do in terms

of first strike capability, in terms of hard target kill, et cetera. That

is a different deal. That is a different deal.

But gentlemen, I have been hearing for the last 2 days from people otherwise very, very, very well-informed, that they believe that

the stockpile stewardship program will throw into question in the

minds of the Japanese, specifically named, the Germans, the Russians, the Chinese, our deterrent capability. Now, do any of you

want to go on the record and say you believe that to be true?

Mr. LEHMAN. Senator, I do not think you have got the question

right.

Senator BIDEN. I am asking the question. You may not like it.

Mr. LEHMAN. I understand. Let me try to address it. First of all,

the question of the deterrent depends upon the ability to deploy the

forces.

Senator BIDEN. No, the question of a deterrent depends upon the

ability of the other side to conclude whether or not you can do them

great harm.

Mr. LEHMAN. If nuclear forces that were committed to an alliance

or to an ally would have to be withdrawn because we had an uncertainty, for example, about the safety, or they did not need our——

Senator BIDEN. Do you think that is a realistic possibility any

time in your lifetime?

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Mr. LEHMAN. I have already faced it. It is important that when

we plan with our allies and deploy forces on the high seas, overseas, or even in our own country, that those commitments can be

maintained, and if problems emerge we have a way to address

them, and with confidence. The failure to do that could have very

adverse implications on the long-term security relationship.

Let me give you an analogy that I can talk about. It is a little

different, but it was the question of what happened in the INF negotiations when we were trying for the goal of zero, and then because that seemed so hard to get, we floated the idea of zero in Europe but some deployments east of the Urals. Despite all of the assurances from our interactions with the Japanese Government at

an official level that that was good because they supported getting

a treaty, once it became public, the backlash in Japan was severe.

Now, the antinuclear allergy in Japan is still very strong, but it

is a society that can get polarized over issues like this. I mean, this

was once and still is to some degree a Samurai society. It was

amazing to see the public articles calling for increased Japanese

military, the prospect of nuclearization. It was important that we

went back and got global zero.

The ability for these things to become unraveled over issues that

seem small to us because we think we have got a lot of nuclear

weapons should not be underestimated.

Senator BROWNBACK. Can we wrap this on up?

Senator BIDEN. I do not know why we should wrap it up.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well then, let us run the time clock so we

can bounce back and forth. Why don’t you let me get in a couple

of questions here if I could. We will let you rest for a little bit.

Senator BIDEN. I have been waiting 2 years for this.

Senator BROWNBACK. Let us put the clock on 5 minutes so we

can bounce back and forth. I mean, I appreciate, Joe, you raising

this, because I think you crystallized for me the reason I have real

problems with the treaty, is that you have got a stockpile there

that apparently, then, we are just going to be willing to kind of go

off into the future, never testing and just presume it will always

work.

Senator BIDEN. That is not true. We have tested extensively.

Senator BROWNBACK. But you are saying we are not going to

have the will to do it, and this treaty is going to enter us into a

position that we are going to further erode any sort of will to do

that.

Senator BIDEN. I am saying the exact opposite.

Senator BROWNBACK. But the argument you make leads this

way, and that is why I look at it and say we probably are going

to further deteriorate our will to test something. We are going to

get down the road 5 years, 10 years—it will have been since 1992

that we will have tested, so we have got 7, now we are 12 years

down the road, and my kids are getting a little bit older now, and

I have got more of them, at that point in time, and now we are all

of a sudden we are feeling like we need to have this deterrent, and

we need to have the rest of the world believe it is going to work,

and we are now 12 years on out.

I appreciate Dr. Garwin’s statement about, we are pretty confident they could do it after testing the different parts but not the

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whole. I do not want it to be pretty confident. I want it to be sure

that we are going to be able to make it at that point in time, when

we are 12 years out, and having not done the complete testing, but

we are going to test each individual part.

You are asking me to go on pretty confident, and you are asking

me to go against my own senses on this as well, which say to me

that any machine not tested for a long period of time in total is

going to work, and I have got to have the rest of the world believing it is going to work as well for it to be an effective deterrent at

that point in time.

So we are 12 years out, we have tested the parts individually,

they all seem to work, and I have got to now be sure that the Russians and the Chinese and the Iraqis and the Iranians believe this

is going to work for it to be an effective deterrent. I think you are

stretching us on that point.

Now, correct me where I am wrong, Dr. Garwin.

Dr. GARWIN. I think it would be useful for you to look at some

of the testimony of the Department of Energy over the years on the

joint test vehicles, the joint verification vehicles. We have these

precision devices where you test not parts, you test the whole

thing, but the ultimate nuclear explosive you do not have. You

have uranium instead of plutonium. It goes through the flight, it

fires, you have telemetry, you see the whole thing works or it does

not, and I can assure you that we conduct these flights and we

learn a lot from them.

Senator BROWNBACK. Not the whole thing. The end of the test

does not happen.

Dr. GARWIN. When you do that you find problems, but the problems are not going to be from the lighting of the high explosive to

the carrying out of the nuclear explosion; and if you don’t believe

that, you need to get a whole new set of people not only in the Department of Energy, but in the Department of Defense and in the

military services.

Senator BROWNBACK. Dr. Garwin, how far down the road can we

run that type of operation and have our people who seek to do us

harm around the world believe our deterrent is still there, and it

works? How many years can we go?

Dr. GARWIN. We can go 30, 50, 100 years, because every year you

have——

Senator BROWNBACK. Being pretty confident?

Dr. GARWIN. Every year you have these people in the business

put their reputations, their lives and our lives on the line in their

certification process.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well then, here are some of the people, the

laboratory directors—these are former ones. Roger Batzel, do you

know him?

Dr. GARWIN. I know him well, sure.

Senator BROWNBACK. ‘‘I urge you to oppose the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty. No previous administration, either Democrat or

Republican, ever supported the unverifiable zero yield, indefinite

duration CTBT now before the Senate. The reason for this is simple. Under a long duration test ban, confidence in the nuclear

stockpile will erode for a variety of reasons.’’

Now, I presume you think he is a pretty good guy, pretty sharp.

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Dr. GARWIN. I have argued with Roger Batzel on exactly this

point long ago.

Senator BROWNBACK. You can argue with him again.

Dr. GARWIN. I do not know how current he is. I would like to

have him here where we could discuss it, but I do not believe it,

and the current people who have the responsibility and who have

the knowledge are not of that view.

Senator BROWNBACK. What about John Nuckolls?

Dr. GARWIN. I know him well, too.

Senator BROWNBACK. Is he a good guy?

Dr. GARWIN. He is OK. I could go into details, plus and minus.

On balance, like the CTBT, he is a good guy.

Senator BROWNBACK. ‘‘Without nuclear testing, confidence in the

stockpile will decline. The U.S. capability to develop weapons will

be degraded by the eventual loss of all nuclear tests, experienced

weapons experts who develop the stockpile.’’ That is what he says

about it. How about Edward Teller? Is he OK?

Dr. GARWIN. In my testimony, I address that. That is looking at

the bad side, the down side of the CTBT. If you look at the upside,

it much outweighs that.

Senator BROWNBACK. Is there a downside, then, to this?

Dr. GARWIN. Absolutely.

Senator BIDEN. Explain what you mean by the downside.

Senator BROWNBACK. You get your questions quickly. I am getting off here, Joe. We are going to have fun here. Let us share.

Dr. GARWIN. In my testimony I list it. It is our inability to test.

It is the inability to bring in people and have them verify things

by test. But we have work-arounds, and I am confident these will

be good, and we have the benefit.

You know there is nobody—Tom Watson, Sr., who founded the

IBM Company, for which I worked for 40 years, used to say that

there is nobody who is so good that if you have a piece of paper

with all of his advantages and all of his bad points, and you just

pick the bad points, that person ought to go straight to hell, and

there is nobody who is so bad that if you just put the paper with

his good points on the table that he ought to go to Heaven, and any

of these contracts or treaties is like that. You have to look at the

balanced assessment, and not just at the downside.

Senator BROWNBACK. I think Joe and I both think we all need

grace to get to Heaven, because we have all got problems here. Joe.

Senator BIDEN. By the way, I am confident of that and if my

mother is listening, she would look at the three of you and say no

purgatory for you, straight to Heaven, for enduring this, this long.

But let me suggest that I would like to followup on a few other

points here.

I have heard, and this has been stated, that this notion that, and

maybe you can explain this to me, Dr. Garwin, in a tri-lab study

of stockpile surveillance done in 1996 by the three laboratories,

they said since 1958 through 1993, 830 recorded findings of defects

in the stockpile. They said that less than 1 percent were determined as a consequence of a nuclear test. And they said all but one

of these nuclear tests involved items that were in the inventory before 1970. What does that mean?

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Dr. GARWIN. Well several of those bombs had not been thoroughly tested. They were put into the stockpile during the moratorium from 1958 to 1961, whenever that was. And I have always opposed doing that. I opposed modifying our nuclear weapons under

the moratorium or under the CTBT.

The one case which was discovered, as I recall, by testing, was

an end-of-life tritium condition. We tested something beyond where

it had previously been tested. And we propose in our JASON study,

which looked at all of these things, that the margins of the existing

nuclear weapons should be improved. They are believed by the establishment to be adequate, but they should be improved by putting in more tritium or changing the tritium gas more frequently.

That is a cheap thing to do and something that can be readily done

without any downside. So we ought to do that. But perhaps my

colleages know of some other points.

Mr. WADE. Well, Senator Biden, thank goodness we have the surveillance programs to which you referred. And, yes, you are correct

in that all of those defects were discovered as part of the surveillance program and not by a test. But there certainly are circumstances in which I have personally participated where a defect

that was discovered could only be resolved by a test. Now we may

get to a point through stockpile stewardship where we will not

have to do that, where we can assure that the resolution of the

problem is satisfactory by three-dimensional computational codes.

I hope we get there. But my point is I do not think we are there

yet and, therefore, I think we are at risk.

Dr. GARWIN. Let me be very specific in addressing that point.

You find something. A beam—in a building—that has a crack in it.

You do a lot of analysis because it might be costly to replace that

beam and you say it is OK. We can wait until the crack goes a little bit further. But this is serious. This is the national deterrent.

I do not want to do that. I want to replace it before I get to the

point where there is any uncertainty. I find a crack; it is beyond

the level of cracks, or crevices, or whatever, in the newly manufactured item; I want to replace that piece. That is what I would do.

That is why I do not need to push this surveillance program and

analysis program as far as people hope it will go.

What will happen as the years go on, Mr. Chairman, is that we

will be able to tolerate bigger cracks and less frequent manufacturing. We will not save any significant amount of money beacuse

we do not have all that many weapons in the inventory anymore.

In fact, it might be cheaper to go on with frequent remanufacture,

rather than push the surveillance program, the stockpile stewardship program. But I am willing to go with what the labs and the

military think are the best.

Senator BIDEN. Now, Mr. Wade, you have indicated that we may

get to the point, and we have not yet, where through very sophisticated stockpile testing techniques we might be able to have confidence not to test, but we are not there yet.

Mr. WADE. I do not believe we are.

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting we are either. But, now the

chairman and many others say even if you get there, that will not

matter because unless you can actually test it and watch it blow

up, and see it work, it is not reliable. So we are kind of in a little

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bit of a Catch–22 here. The people who were arguing about the

stockpile testing not being sufficient. If you take off the second

layer of the onion here, they say even if—well, I should not say the

chairman said, but the chairman of the Armed Services Committee

said, even if you can get to that point, it is still not good enough

because the only way you can test is to watch it blow up. That is

the only way you have any certainty. Do you agree with that? Even

theoretically, if you get to the point——

Mr. WADE. Being an experimentalist I always like to watch

things blow up, because that is, in fact, the final proof that it

works. But I do believe that we will get to the kinds of computational techniques where you will not have to do that? I hope we do.

Senator BIDEN. If we were there now, and we are not, I acknowledge. My time is up. I am sorry, go ahead.

Senator BROWNBACK. I appreciate the honesty of all of you and

I do hope we get to that point in time, too. The point that I would

have here is that we are not there yet, according to this list of witnesses. And according to Dr. Garwin, we are not there yet either.

You were on the JASON report group that issued a report on nuclear testing, August 4, 1995?

Dr. GARWIN. Right. That is what I was referring to. You can find

it. It’s unclassified, summary and conclusions. I have them with

me.

Senator BROWNBACK. You have a quote in there. Maybe you disagree with it now. ‘‘In order to contribute to long-term confidence

in the U.S. stockpile, testing of nuclear weapons under a 500-ton

yield limit would have to be done on a continuing basis. Such ongoing testing can add to long-term stockpile’s confidence.’’

Dr. GARWIN. I think that is a misreading of the statement. I have

not changed my mind. It really means that if any testing at 500-

tons were to contribute to the confidence then it would have to be

continued. It is saying that testing at 500-tons for a few years

would not be of any help. And it does not contribue much anyhow.

But that statement does not mean that a CTBT would lead to lack

of confidence in the stockpile.

Senator BROWNBACK. It seems to read pretty clear to me. What

you were saying, or what your report was in 1995——

Dr. GARWIN. It was addressing the proposal. It says, for the U.S.

stockpile testing under a 500-ton yield limit would allow studies of

boost and ignition and initial burn and so on. The primary argument that we heard was this and that and so on. And it follows

from this argument, so that is not saying we believe it, that this

utility depends on such tests being performed on a continuing basis

and yielding reproducible results. If you will read the whole couple

of paragraphs I think it will say quite the opposite of what you

imply.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, let us get that and we will have that

there as well.

[The correct quotation from the report follows:]

Conclusion 4:

In order to contribute to long term confidence in the U.S. stockpile, testing of nuclear weapons under a 500 ton yield limit would have to be done on a continuing

basis, which is tantamount to remaking a CTBT into a threshold test ban treaty.

While such ongoing testing can add to long term stockpile confidence, it does not

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1Defined as the difference between the minimum expected and the minimum needed yields of the primary.

have the same priority as the essential stockpile stewardship program endorsed in

Conclusion 2, nor does it merit the same priority as the measures to enhance performance margins in Conclusion 3. In the last analysis the technical contribution

of such a testing program must be weighed against its costs and its political impact

on the non-proliferation goals of the United States.

Dr. GARWIN. I would like to put into the record this nuclear testing summary.

Senator BROWNBACK. So ordered. Without objection. [The information referred to follows:]

NUCLEAR TESTING—SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS—JASON—AUGUST 4, 1995 (JSR95-320)

(Sidney Drell, Chairman, John Cornwall, Freeman Dyson, Douglas Eardley, Richard

Garwin, David Hammer, John Kammerdiener, Robert LeLevier, Robert Puerifoy,

John Richter, Marshall Rosenbluth, Seymour Sack, Jeremiah Sullivan, and Fredrik

Zachariasen)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(U) We have examined the experimental and analytic bases for understanding the performance of each of the weapon types that are currently planned to remain in

the U.S. enduring nuclear stockpile. We have also examined whether continued underground tests at various nuclear yield thresholds would add significantly to our

confidence in this stockpile in the years ahead. (U) Our starting point for this examination was a detailed review of past experi- ence in developing and testing modern nuclear weapons, their certification and recertification processes, their performance margins,1 and evidence of aging or other trends overtime for each weapon type in the enduring stockpile.

Conclusion 1:

(U) The United States can, today, have high confidence in the safety, reli- ability, and performance margins of the nuclear weapons that are designated to remain in the enduring stockpile. This confidence is based on understanding gained from 50 years experience and analysis of more than

1000 nuclear tests, including the results of approximately 150 nuclear tests

of modern weapon types in the past 20 years.

(U) Looking to future prospects of achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a stated goal of the United States Government, we have studied a range

of activities that could be of importance to extending our present confidence in the

stockpile into the future. We include among these activities underground experiments producing sub-kiloton levels of nuclear yield that might be permitted among

the treaty-consistent activities under a CTBT. (U) Three key assumptions underlie our study:

1. (U) The U.S. intends to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.

2. (U) The U.S. remains committed to the support of world-wide nonproliferation

efforts.

3. (U) The U.S. will not encounter new military or political circumstances in the future that cause it to abandon the current policy—first announced by President

Bush in 1992—of not developing any new nuclear weapon designs.

Conclusion 2:

(U) In order to maintain high confidence in the safety, reliability, and per- formance of the individual types of weapons in the enduring stockpile for several decades under a CTBT, whether or not sub-kiloton tests are permitted, the

United States must provide continuing and steady support for a focused, multifaceted program to increase understanding of the enduring stockpile; to detect,

anticipate and evaluate potential aging problems; and to plan for refurbishment

and remanufacture, as required. In addition the U.S. must maintain a significant industrial infrastructure in the nuclear program to do the required replenishing, refurbishing, or remanufacturing of age-affected components, and to

evaluate the resulting product; for example the high explosive, the boost gas

system, the tritium loading, etc. Important activities in a stockpile stewardship

program that will sustain a strong scientific and technical base, including an

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2See the 1994 JASON Report JSR-94-345 on ‘‘Science Based Stockpile Stewardship.’’

experienced cadre ́ of capable scientists and engineers, are described in the body of this study.

(U) The proposed program will generate a large body of technically valuable new data and challenging opportunities capable of attracting and retaining experienced

nuclear weapons scientists and engineers in the program. This is the intent of

DOE’s currently planned stockpile stewardship program.2 For the success of this

program, the management of the three weapons laboratories (LANL, LLNL, SNL)

must motivate, support, and reward effort in an area that has lost some of its glamor and excitement in the absence of new nuclear design and test opportunities. (U) Nevertheless, over the longer term, we may face concerns about whether accu- mulated changes in age-affected weapons components, whose replacements might

have to be manufactured by changed processes, could lead to inadequate performance margins and reduced confidence in the stockpile. (U) Enhancements of performance margins will add substantially to long-term stockpile confidence with or without underground tests. To cite one example, we can

adjust the boost gas fill or shorten the time interval between fills. (This is discussed

more fully in the classified text.)

Conclusion 3:

(U) The individual weapon types in the enduring stockpile have a range of

performance margins, all of which we judge to be adequate at this time. In each

case we have identified opportunities for further enhancing their performance

margins by means that are straightforward and can be incorporated with deliberate speed during scheduled maintenance or remanufacturing activities. However greatest care in the form of self-discipline will be required to avoid system

modifications, even if aimed at ‘‘improvements,’’ which may compromise reliability.

(U) This brings us to the issue of the usefulness, importance, or necessity of reduced yield (less than 1 kiloton) underground tests for maintaining confidence in the

weapon types in the U.S. stockpile over a long period of time.

(U) For the U.S. stockpile, testing under a 500 ton yield limit would allow studies

of boost gas ignition and initial burn, which is a critical step in achieving full primary design yield. The primary argument that we heard in support of the importance of such testing by the U.S. is the following: the evidence in several cases and

theoretical analyses indicate that results of a sub-kiloton (∼ 500 tons) test of a given

primary that achieves boost gas ignition and initial burn can be extrapolated to give

some confidence in the yield of an identical primary with full boosting. Therefore,

if a modified or remanufactured primary is introduced into the stockpile in the future to correct some aging problem, such tests on the modified system would add

to confidence that the performance of the new primary is still adequate.

(U) It follows from this argument that the utility to the U.S. of testing at yields

of up to approximately 500 tons depends on such tests being performed on a continuing basis and yielding reproducible results. If they are permitted only for a few

years, such tests could add to the theoretical understanding of the boosting process

and the reliability of the computer codes that attempt to describe it, but would not

contribute directly to the reliability of the weapon in the enduring stockpile in view

of the possible manufacturing changes made at a later date. To gain evidence as

to whether long-term changes in age-affected weapons components have any impact

on boost-performance the tests would have to be made with the remanufactured

weapons themselves.

Conclusion 4:

(U) In order to contribute to long term confidence in the U.S. stockpile, testing

of nuclear weapons under a 500 ton yield limit would have to be done on a continuing basis, which is tantamount to remaking a CTBT into a threshold test ban

treaty. While such ongoing testing can add to long term stockpile confidence, it does

not have the same priority as the essential stockpile stewardship program endorsed

in Conclusion 2, nor does it merit the same priority as the measures to enhance performance margins in Conclusion 3. In the last analysis the technical contribution

of such a testing program must be weighed against its costs and its political impact

on the non-proliferation goals of the United States.

Conclusion 5:

(U) Underground testing of nuclear weapons at any yield level below that required

to initiate boosting is of limited value to the United States. However experiments

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involving high explosives and fissionable material that do not reach criticality are

useful in improving our understanding of the behavior of weapons materials under

relevant physical conditions. They should be included among treaty consistent activities that are discussed more fully in the text.

(U) This conclusion is based on the following two observations.

• (U) [a)] So-called hydronuclear tests, defined as limited to a nuclear yield of less

than 4 lbs TNT equivalent, can be performed only after making changes that

drastically alter the primary implosion. A persuasive case has not been made

for the utility of hydronuclear tests for detecting small changes in the performance margins for current U.S. weapons. At best, such tests could confirm the

safety of a device against producing detectable nuclear yield if its high explosive

is detonated accidentally at one point. We find that the U.S. arsenal has neither

a present nor anticipated need for such re-confirmation. The existing large nuclear test data base can serve to validate two- and three-dimensional computational techniques for evaluating any new one-point safety scenarios, and it

should be fully exploited for this purpose.

• (U) [b)] Testing with nominal yields up to a 100-ton limit permits examination

of aspects of the pre-boost fission process. However, this is at best a partial and

possibly misleading performance indicator.

(U) As agreement to limit testing to very low yields raises the issue of monitoring

compliance. We have not made a detailed study of this issue, but note the following:

Cooperative, on-site monitoring would be necessary, and relevant measurements, including for example neutron yields, could be made without compromising classified

information on bomb designs.

(U) We have reviewed the device problems which occurred in the past and which

either relied on, or required, nuclear yield tests to resolve.

Conclusion 6:

(U) For the weapon types planned to remain in the enduring stockpile we find

that the device problems which occurred in the past, and, which either relied

on, or required, nuclear yield tests to resolve, were primarily the result of incomplete or inadequate design activities. In part, these were due to the more

limited knowledge and computational capabilities of a decade, or more, ago. We

are persuaded that those problems have been corrected and that the weapon

types in the enduring stockpile are safe and reliable in the context of explicit

military requirements.

(U) Should the U.S., in the future, encounter problems in an existing stockpile design (which we do not anticipate at present) that are so serious as to lead to unacceptable of confidence in the safety, effectiveness, or reliability of a weapon type,

it is possible that testing of the primary at full yield, and ignition of the secondary,

would be required to certify a specified fix. Useful tests to address such problems

generate nuclear yields in excess of approximately 10 kT. DOE’s currently planned

enhanced surveillance and maintenance program is intended to alert us to any such

need that may arise. A ‘‘supreme national interest’’ withdrawal clause that is standard in any treaty to which this nation is a signatory would permit the U.S. to respond appropriately should a need arise.

Conclusion 7:

(U) The above findings, as summarized in Conclusions 1 through 6, are consistent with U.S. agreement to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT) of unending duration, that includes a standard ‘‘supreme national interest’’ clause. Recognizing that the challenge of maintaining an effective nuclear

stockpile for an indefinite period without benefit of underground tests is an important and also a new one, the U.S. should affirm its readiness to invoke the

supreme national interest clause should the need arise as a result of unanticipated technical problems in the enduring stockpile.

Senator BROWNBACK. But it adds to my question when I look at

this, when I think of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen’s

statements earlier in his career, when he was a Senator. Questions

and shift now and maybe people just grow in their difference of

opinion, but I appreciate your candor. I appreciate Dr. Wade’s comments about ‘‘he hopes we get there.’’ But that we are not there

yet. Do you have a parting comment, Joe? Then let us shut it down.

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Senator BIDEN. I think when you put the whole summary in, you will see on page eight, it says, ‘‘We have reviewed the device problems which occurred in the past and which either relied on, or required, nuclear yield tests to resolve. Conclusion 6. For the weapon

types planned to remain in the enduring stockpile we find that the

device problems which occurred in the past and which either relied

on, or required, nuclear yield tests to resolve, were primarily the

result of incomplete or inadequate design activities. In part, these

were due to the more limited knowledge and computational capabilities of a decade, or more, ago. We are persuaded that these

problems have been corrected and that the weapons types in the

enduring stockpile are safe and reliable in the context of explicit

military requirements.’’

And, Secretary Cohen, I ask unanimous consent that his response to that question in the Armed Services Committee hearing

be able to be entered into the record, if I may, Mr. Chairman, so

that nothing is left—well, I know his arguments. I don’t want to

take the time now. But if we could have Secretary Cohen’s response because the same issue was raised in the Armed Services

Committee in my presence and he gave an answer that explained

why he said what he said then and why he is where he is now, and

it related to safety issues. But if we could put that in the record.

Senator BROWNBACK. His statement to the Armed Services Committee on that section.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, not my characterization but his statement.

Senator BROWNBACK. Without objection. That will be put in the

record.

[The information referred to follows:]

RESPONSE OF SECRETARY COHEN TO QUESTION ASKED BEFORE THE ARMED SERVICES

COMMITTEE ON OCTOBER 6, 1999

Secretary COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude with just a couple of

comments. You pointed this fact out. And some of the members who are sitting here

today also were sitting here back in 1992. There are some new members who were

not here.

And you may recall, and I am sure that several on the committee will recall, that

as a Senator, I had considerable doubts about the wisdom of prematurely halting

nuclear testing, because many of the weapons in the stockpile lacked modern safety

features. But a lot has changed in the last 7 years, much more so than my simply

moving my desk over to the Pentagon.

As we have reduced our arsenal, these older weapons in the stockpile have been

retired. And they have eased my concerns. The threat of nuclear missile proliferation is more significant today than it was in 1992. There was no CTBT in 1992. And

today there is.

You have 154 nations who have signed the Treaty. You have 47 who have ratified

it, including a majority of the 44 required before it can enter into force. And, finally,

all five nuclear powers who were testing in 1992 today, all five have declared testing

moratoriums.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, you have been very gracious. I

will not take any more of your time beyond saying that, gentlemen,

I really do think you have been the best witnesses in the last 4

days I have heard, even though you disagree.

Senator BROWNBACK. Certainly the most fun.

Senator BIDEN. Well, because for the first time you have been the

ones given a chance to actually have an exchange here. I love this

new process. I wish this man were running all the hearings I have

been involved in. You know, it used to be when we were trying to

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figure out what a Supreme Court Justice thought and I was chairman of a committee, I gave every Republican a half hour of questioning, because the best of all things to do when you want to defeat something, if I do not want the press to know what is on my

mind, I invite 50 of them to show up. All 50. Then I am guaranteed

they all come with the one question they want to know, and none

of them will followup on the other guy’s question, out of ego, which

means I never have to give a complete answer. And that is exactly

what happens in these hearings when we limit things to 6 minutes.

How any intelligent person, let alone uninformed people like us,

relative to your collective, intellectual, and professional capability

can in 6 minutes question you in a way that can elicit any intelligent response or enter into a debate and dialog is nonexistent, in

my humble opinion. And I do not think I am particularly slow. I

am at least no slower than the average Senator, I do not think. I

am pretty good at this stuff and to get 6 minutes with you guys

who have been doing this all your life, that is why I want to thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACK. Gentlemen, thank you very much. You

have been good and patient with us and we deeply appreciate that

and we appreciate also your thoughtfulness because I know none

of you come at your opinions, however we may disagree, lightly.

Nor do any of you come at them with a malevolence toward this

country or a will for anything ill to come to the United States. We

have just got a serious issue and we need serious thought, and you

have provided that. With that the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 7 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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