Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Thursday, November 20, 2003 AVIATION SECURITY 

Efforts to Measure 

Effectiveness and 

Strengthen Security 

Programs 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice 

GAO-04-285T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-285T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-8777 or 

Berrickc@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-285T, a report to the 

Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

November 2003 

AVIATION SECURITY 

Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and 

Strengthen Security Programs 

TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation 

security, but has collected limited information on the effectiveness of these 

initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft. Our recent work on passenger 

screening found that little testing or other data exist that measure the 

performance of screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA is taking 

steps to collect additional data, including developing a 5-year performance 

plan detailing numerous performance measures, as well as fielding the 

Threat Image Projection system and increasing screener testing. 

In addition to collecting performance data, TSA could further strengthen 

passenger screening by fully deploying recurrent and supervisory training 

programs, determining the appropriate levels of screeners at the nation’s 

airports, and improving oversight of the contract screener pilot program. 

Although TSA has developed and deployed basic and remedial training 

programs, it has not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory 

training programs. In addition, TSA acknowledged that its initial staffing 

efforts created imbalances at the nation’s airports, and that it has taken 

limited action to assess the performance of the pilot airports using private, 

versus federal, screeners. TSA is undertaking a number of actions to address 

these concerns, including strengthening its training program and awarding 

contracts to assess its staffing model and the performance of the contract 

pilot airports. 

TSA faces a number of other challenges as it continues to enhance aviation 

security. Significant challenges include implementing the Computer-Assisted 

Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), as well as strengthening 

baggage screening, airport perimeter and access controls, and air cargo and 

general aviation security. In implementing CAPPS II, TSA must ensure it 

addresses concerns surrounding travelers’ privacy rights, the accuracy of 

databases used by CAPPS II, and obtaining international cooperation needed 

for the system to be fully operational. Additional challenges include 

integrating explosive detection systems into airport’s in-line baggage 

handling systems, identifying cost-effective perimeter security technologies, 

effectively targeting air cargo for screening, and improving security at 

general aviation airports. Further, TSA faces challenges in funding increased 

aviation security measures and ensuring that these costs are controlled. 

Security Screeners Checking Passengers with a Hand-Held Metal Detector 

Source: FAA. 

Commercial aviation has been a 

long-standing target for terrorists. 

Since the tragic attacts of 

September 11, 2001, substantial 

changes have been made to 

enhance security—including the 

creation of the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) and 

the federalization of the passenger 

screener workforce. However, 

despite these changes, 

vulnerabilities in aviation security 

continue to exist. Accordingly, 

GAO was asked to describe TSA’s 

efforts to (1) measure the 

effectiveness of its aviation 

security initiatives, (2) strengthen 

its passenger screening program, 

and (3) address additional 

challenges in further enhancing 

aviation security. 

In prior reports and testimonies, 

GAO has made numerous 

recommendations to strengthen 

aviation security. We also have 

ongoing reviews assessing many of 

the issues addressed in this 

testimony and will issue separate 

reports on these areas at a later 

date. 
Page 1 GAO-04-285T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing to discuss our 

recent work on the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts 

to assess its performance and strengthen its security programs, to include 

passenger screening. Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task—

with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and tens of thousands of 

flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of baggage and 

cargo. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, billions of dollars have 

been spent, and a wide variety of programs and initiatives have been 

implemented to enhance aviation security. However, recent reviews and 

covert testing conducted by GAO and the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Office of Inspector General, as well as recent media reports, 

indicate that weaknesses and vulnerabilities in commercial aviation 

continue to exist. For example, the incident involving a college student 

who placed box cutters, clay resembling plastic explosives, and bleach on 

commercial aircraft show that aviation security can still be compromised. 

My testimony today highlights three key areas that TSA must focus on to 

enhance aviation security. These areas include (1) measuring the 

effectiveness of TSA’s aviation security initiatives that have already been 

implemented, (2) strengthening its passenger screening program, and 

(3) addressing key programmatic and management challenges to further 

enhance aviation security. My testimony is based on our prior work, 

reviews of TSA documentation, and interviews with TSA officials. 

In summary: 

Although TSA has implemented numerous programs and initiatives to 

enhance aviation security, it has collected limited information on the 

effectiveness of these programs and initiatives. Our recent work on TSA’s 

passenger screening program showed that although TSA has made 

enhancements in passenger screening, it has collected limited data on 

screeners’ ability to detect threat objects. The Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act (ATSA), which was established with the primary goal of 

strengthening aviation security, requires that TSA establish acceptable 

levels of performance for security initiatives and develop annual 

performance plans and reports to measure and document the effectiveness 

of those initiatives.1

 Although TSA has developed an annual performance 

 1

P.L. 107-71. 
Page 2 GAO-04-285T 

plan and report as required by ATSA, to date these tools have focused on 

TSA’s progress in meeting deadlines to implement programs and initiatives 

mandated by ATSA rather than on the effectiveness of these programs and 

initiatives. TSA has recognized that it has collected limited performance 

data on its security initiatives, and is taking steps to collect additional 

data, including developing a 5-year performance plan, and increasing 

passenger screener testing. 

Our recent work on TSA’s passenger screening program showed that the 

program can be strengthened in the areas of training, staffing, and the 

contract screener pilot program.2

 Although TSA has developed and 

deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has not fully developed 

or deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs to ensure that 

screeners are effectively trained and supervised. In addition, TSA has 

acknowledged that its initial screener staffing levels created imbalances at 

the nation’s airports—a situation that it is attempting to address. TSA also 

has not yet determined how to evaluate and measure the performance of 

its contract screening pilot program. Since we issued our preliminary 

report on TSA’s passenger screening program in September 2003, TSA has 

taken a number of actions to address these concerns, including enhancing 

its recurrent and supervisory training programs, and awarding a contract 

to assess the contract screening pilot program. However, TSA has 

recognized that assessing the performance of the pilot airports will be 

difficult because of a lack of performance data. 

TSA faces a number of other challenges as it continues to address threats 

to our nation’s aviation system. Significant challenges include 

implementing various aviation security programs, such as the ComputerAssisted Passenger Prescreening System3

 (CAPPS II), and addressing 

broader security concerns related to the security of air cargo and general 

aviation.4

 TSA also faces challenges in managing the costs of aviation 

security and in strategically managing its workforce of about 60,000 

people, most of whom are deployed at airports to detect weapons and 

explosives. TSA has been addressing these and other challenges through a 

 2

ATSA required TSA to implement a pilot program using contract screeners at five 

commercial airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot program is to determine the feasibility 

of using private screening companies rather than federal screeners. 

3

CAPPS II is a system intended to perform a risk assessment of all airline passengers to 

identify those requiring additional security attention. 

4

General aviation consists of all civil aircraft and excludes commercial and military aircraft. 
Page 3 GAO-04-285T 

variety of efforts. We have work in progress that is examining TSA’s 

efforts in addressing many of these challenges. 

The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a longstanding concern. As demonstrated by the 1988 bombing of a U.S. airliner 

over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the 1995 plot to blow up 12 U.S. aircraft in 

the Pacific region discovered by Philippine authorities, U.S. commercial 

aircraft have long been a target for terrorist attacks. Over the years, 

numerous initiatives have been undertaken to improve aviation security. 

However, as we and others have documented in numerous reports and 

studies, weaknesses continue to exist. It was because of these weaknesses 

that terrorists were able to hijack four commercial aircraft on September 

11, 2001, with tragic results. 

In an effort to strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the 

President signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

(ATSA) on November 19, 2001. ATSA created TSA as an agency within the 

Department of Transportation with the responsibility for securing all 

modes of transportation, including aviation. ATSA mandated specific 

improvements to aviation security and established deadlines for 

completing many of these initiatives. Consequently, TSA’s main focus 

during its first year of operation was on meeting these deadlines, 

particularly federalizing the screener workforce at commercial airports 

nationwide by November 19, 2002, while at the same time establishing a 

new federal organization from the ground up. On March 1, 2003, pursuant 

to the Homeland Security Act, TSA was transferred from the Department 

of Transportation to the new Department of Homeland Security.5

Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA. One of 

the most substantial of these is passenger screening. Passenger screening 

involves the use of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive trace 

detection machines, and physical searches to examine passengers and 

their baggage to identify threat objects. Passenger screening has 

historically been an area of concern. As we reported in 1987, and again in 

2000, passenger screeners who conducted these examinations have had 

difficultly in detecting weapons and other dangerous objects. At the time 

we issued these reports, air carriers were responsible for performing 

passenger screening. With the passage of ATSA, this responsibility has 

 5

P.L. 107-296. 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-285T 

now become the responsibility of TSA. TSA is also responsible for 

ensuring the security of air cargo, limiting access to restricted areas of 

airports to authorized personnel, securing airport perimeters, and 

conducting background checks for airport personnel, among other 

responsibilities. 

TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation 

security, but it has collected limited information on the effectiveness of 

these initiatives, particularly its passenger screening program. ATSA 

requires that TSA establish acceptable levels of performance and develop 

annual performance plans and reports to measure and document the 

effectiveness of its security initiatives.6

 Although TSA has developed these 

performance tools as required by ATSA, the tools currently focus on TSA’s 

progress toward meeting ATSA deadlines, rather than on the effectiveness 

of its programs and initiatives. Although TSA has collected limited data on 

the effectiveness of its initiatives, it is taking several steps to collect 

objective data to assess its performance. 

Although there are a number of methods that TSA can use to measure the 

effectiveness of its passenger screening program, none are being fully 

utilized. As we reported in September 2003,7

 the primary source of 

information collected on screeners’ ability to detect threat objects is 

covert testing conducted by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program 

Review. However, TSA does not consider the results of these covert tests 

as a measure of performance, but rather a “snapshot” of a screener’s 

ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time and as a systemwide performance indicator. At the time we issued our report, the Office of 

Internal Affairs and Program Review had conducted 733 covert tests of 

 6

An annual performance plan is to provide the direct linkage between the strategic goals 

outlined in the agency’s strategic plan and the day-to-day activities of managers and staff. 

Additionally, annual performance plans are to include performance goals for an agency’s 

program activities as listed in the budget, a summary of the necessary resources that will 

be used to measure performance, and a discussion of how the performance information 

will be verified. An annual performance report is to review and discuss an agency’s 

performance compared with the performance goals it established in its annual performance 

plan. 

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations 

on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 

2003). 

Limited Information 

Exists on the 

Effectiveness of 

Aviation Security 

Initiatives 

Evaluation of Program 

Effectiveness 
Page 5 GAO-04-285T 

passenger screeners at 92 airports. As a result, only a small percentage of 

TSA’s passenger screeners had been subject to a covert test. 

In addition to conducting covert tests at screening checkpoints, TSA 

conducts tests to determine whether the current Computer-Assisted 

Passenger Screening System is working as designed; threat objects are 

detected during the screening of checked baggage; and access to restricted 

areas of the airport is limited only to authorized personnel.8

 While the 

Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review has conducted about 2,000 

access tests, it has conducted only 168 Computer-Assisted Passenger 

Screening System and checked baggage tests. Based on an anticipated 

increase in staff from about 100 in fiscal year 2003 to 200 in fiscal year 

2004, the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review plans to conduct 

twice as many covert tests next year.9

Another key source of data on screener performance in detecting threat 

objects is the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system, which places images 

of threat objects on the X-ray screen during actual operations and records 

whether screeners identify the threat object.10 The Federal Aviation 

Administration began deploying TIP in late 1999 to continually measure 

screener performance and to train screeners in becoming more adept at 

detecting hard-to-spot threat objects. However, TIP was shut down 

immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks because of 

concerns that it would result in screening delays and panic, as screeners 

might have thought that they were actually viewing a threat object. 

Although TSA officials recognized that TIP is a key tool in measuring, 

maintaining, and enhancing screener performance, they only recently 

began reactivating TIP on a wide-scale basis because of competing 

 8

The original Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System is a stand-alone application 

residing in an air carrier’s reservation system that analyzes certain behavioral patterns to 

score and calculate each passenger’s need for additional screening. 

9

Currently, the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review has 7 team leaders assigned 

full-time to covert testing, and plans to have a total of 14 full-time team leaders by the end 

of fiscal year 2004. The team leaders draw from the remaining staff within the office, such 

as auditors and analysts, to perform the testing. According to TSA officials, overall, 

95 percent of the staff in the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review participates in 

covert testing as a collateral responsibility. 

10TIP is designed to test screeners’ detection capabilities by projecting threat images, 

including guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened. Screeners are responsible 

for positively identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once 

prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records the 

screener’s performance in a database that could be analyzed for performance trends. 
Page 6 GAO-04-285T 

priorities, a lack of training, and a lack of resources needed to deploy TIP 

activation teams. As TIP becomes operational at each airport, TSA 

headquarters and federal security directors11 will have the capability to 

query and analyze performance data in a number of ways, including by 

individual screeners, checkpoints, terminals, and airports. TIP is expected 

to be fully deployed and operational by April 2004. 

When fully deployed, the annual screener recertification test results will 

provide another source of data on screener performance. ATSA requires 

that TSA collect performance information on each screener through 

conducting an annual proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to 

meet all qualifications and standards required to perform the screening 

function. Although TSA began deploying federal screeners to airports in 

April 2002, TSA only recently began implementing the annual 

recertification program and does not expect to complete testing at all 

airports until March 2004. The recertification testing is comprised of three 

components: (1) image recognition; (2) knowledge of standard operating 

procedures; and (3) practical demonstration of skills, to be administered 

by a contractor. TSA officials consider 28,000 screeners as having 

completed the first two components because they successfully passed 

competency tests TSA administered at many airports as part of a screener 

workforce reduction effort. However, these competency tests did not 

include the third component of TSA’s planned annual screener 

recertification program—the practical demonstration of skills. TSA 

officials awarded a contract for this component of the annual proficiency 

reviews in September 2003. 

TSA’s Performance Management Information System for passenger and 

baggage screening operations is also designed to collect performance data, 

but currently it contains limited information on screener performance in 

detecting threat objects. The Performance Management Information 

System collects a wide variety of metrics on workload, staffing, and 

equipment and is used to identify some performance indicators, such as 

the level of absenteeism, the average time for equipment repairs, and the 

status of TSA’s efforts to meet goals for 100 percent electronic baggage 

screening.12 However, the system does not contain any performance 

metrics related to the effectiveness of passenger screening. TSA is 

 11Federal security directors oversee security at each of the nation’s commercial airports. 

12The Performance Management Information System also contains metrics on human 

resources, sizing, checkpoint, feedback, and incidents. 
Page 7 GAO-04-285T 

planning to integrate performance information from various systems into 

the Performance Management Information System to assist the agency in 

making strategic decisions. TSA further plans to continuously enhance the 

system as it learns what data are needed to best manage the agency. In 

addition to making improvements to the Performance Management 

Information System, TSA is currently developing performance indexes for 

both individual screeners and the screening system as a whole. The 

screener performance index will be based on data such as the results of 

training and recertification tests, and the index for the screening system 

will be based on information such as TIP results. TSA has not yet fully 

established its methodology for developing the indexes, but it expects to 

have them developed by the end of fiscal year 2004. 

TSA has recognized the need to strengthen the assessment of its 

performance, and it has initiated efforts to develop and implement 

strategic and performance plans to clarify goals, establish performance 

measures, and evaluate the performance of its security initiatives. 

Strategic plans are the starting point for an agency’s planning and 

performance measurement efforts. Strategic plans include a 

comprehensive mission statement based on the agency’s statutory 

requirements, a set of outcome-related strategic goals, and a description of 

how the agency intends to achieve these goals. The Government 

Performance and Results Act (GPRA)13 establishes a framework for 

strategic plans that requires agencies to: 

• clearly establish results-oriented performance goals in strategic and 

annual performance plans for which they will be held accountable, 

• measure progress toward achieving those goals, 

• determine the strategies and resources needed to effectively accomplish 

the goals, 

 13The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 shifts the focus of government 

operations from process to results by establishing a foundation for examining agency 

mission, performance goals and objectives, and results. Under the act, agencies are to 

prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general direction for their efforts, and annual 

performance plans that establish connections between the long-term strategic goals 

outlined in the strategic plans and the day-to-day activities of managers and staff. Finally, 

the act requires that each agency report annually on the extent to which it is meeting its 

annual performance goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify those goals that 

have not been met. 

Performance Evaluation 

Tools under Development 
Page 8 GAO-04-285T 

• use performance information to make programmatic decisions necessary 

to improve performance, and 

• formally communicate results in performance reports. 

Although the Department of Homeland Security plans to issue one 

strategic plan for the department, it plans to incorporate strategic planning 

efforts from each of its component agencies. TSA recently completed a 

draft of its input into the Department of Homeland Security’s strategic 

plan. TSA officials stated that the draft is designed to ensure their security 

initiatives are aligned with the agency’s goals and objectives and that these 

initiatives represent the most efficient use of their resources. TSA officials 

submitted the draft plan to stakeholders in September 2003 for their 

review and comment. The Department of Homeland Security plans to 

issue its strategic plan by the end of the year.14

In addition to developing a strategic plan, TSA is developing a 

performance plan to help it evaluate the current effectiveness and levels of 

improvement in its programs, based on established performance 

measures. TSA submitted to the Congress a short-term performance plan 

in May 2003, as required by ATSA, that included performance goals and 

objectives. The plan also included an initial set of 32 performance 

measures, including the percentage of bags screened by explosive 

detection systems and the percentage of screeners in compliance with 

training standards. However, these measures were primarily output-based 

(measuring whether specific activities were achieved) and did not 

measure the effectiveness of TSA’s security initiatives. TSA officials 

acknowledge that the goals and measures included in the report were 

narrowly focused and that in moving forward additional performancebased measures are needed. 

 14TSA is also developing a National Transportation Security System Plan, a draft of which is 

currently under review within TSA. TSA plans to promote consistent and mutually 

supporting intermodal planning in cooperation with administrators and in collaboration 

with key stakeholders from all modes of transportation. TSA designed the plan for use by 

agencies, owners, and operators of the transportation system to guide them as they develop 

their individual security plans. Accordingly, the National Transportation System Security 

Plan will include national modal plans to capture and tailor transportation security 

requirements for each mode of transportation, with particular emphasis on intermodal 

connections. Each modal plan will focus on security for people (workforce and 

passengers), cargo (baggage and shipments), infrastructure (vehicles, facilities, and right of 

ways), and response preparedness. 
Page 9 GAO-04-285T 

In addition to developing a short-term performance plan, ATSA also 

requires that TSA develop a 5-year performance plan and annual 

performance report, including an evaluation of the extent to which its 

goals and objectives were met. TSA is currently developing performance 

goals and measures as part of its annual planning process and will collect 

baseline data throughout fiscal year 2004 to serve as a foundation for its 

performance targets. TSA also plans to increase its focus on measuring the 

effectiveness of various aspects of the aviation security system in its 

5-year performance plan. According to TSA’s current draft strategic plan, 

which outlines its overall goals and strategies for fiscal years 2003 through 

2008, its efforts to measure the effectiveness of the aviation security 

system will include: 

• random and scheduled reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of 

security processes; 

• oversight of compliance with security standards and approved programs 

through a combination of inspections, testing, interviews, and record 

reviews—to include TIP; 

• measurement of performance against standards to ensure expected 

standards are met to drive process improvements; and 

• collection and communication of performance data using a state-of-the-art 

data collection and reporting system. 

In our January 2003 report on TSA’s actions and plans to build a resultsoriented culture, we recommended next steps that TSA should take to 

strengthen its strategic planning efforts.15 These steps include establishing 

security performance goals and measures for all modes of transportation 

that involves stakeholders, and applying practices that have been shown to 

provide useful information in agency performance plans. We also 

identified practices that TSA can apply to ensure the usefulness of its 

required 5-year performance plan to TSA managers, the Congress, and 

other decision makers or interested parties. Table 1 outlines the practices 

we identified for TSA. 

 15U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and 

Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003). 
Page 10 GAO-04-285T 

Table 1: Summary of Opportunities to Help Ensure Useful Annual Plans and Applied Practices 

Opportunities to help ensure useful annual 

plans Applied practices 

Articulate a results orientation 1. Create a set of performance goals and measures that addresses important 

dimensions of program performance and balances competing priorities. 

2. Use intermediate goals and measures to show progress or contribution to 

intended results. 

3. Include explanatory information on the goals and measures. 

4. Develop performance goals to address mission-critical management problems. 

5. Show baseline and trend data for past performance. 

6. Identify projected target levels of performance for multiyear goals. 

7. Link the goals of component organizations to departmental strategic goals. 

Coordinate cross-cutting programs 8. Identify programs that contribute to the same or similar results. 

9. Set complementary performance goals to show how differing program 

strategies are mutually reinforcing and establish common or complementary 

performance measures, as appropriate. 

10. Describe—briefly or refer to a separate document—planned coordination 

strategies. 

Show how strategies will be used to achieve 

goals 

11. Link strategies and programs to specific performance goals and describe how 

they will contribute to the achievement of those goals. 

12. Describe strategies to leverage or mitigate the effects of external factors on the 

accomplishment of performance goals. 

13. Discuss strategies to resolve mission-critical management problems. 

14. Discuss—briefly or refer to a separate plan—plans to ensure that missioncritical processes and information systems function properly and are secure. 

Show performance consequences of budget and 

other resource decisions 

15. Show how budgetary resources relate to the achievement of performance 

goals. 

16. Discuss—briefly and refer to the agency capital plan—how proposed capital 

assets (specifically information technology investments) will contribute to 

achieving performance goals. 

17. Discuss—briefly or refer to a separate plan—how the agency will use its 

human capital. 

Build the capacity to gather and use performance 

information 

18. Identify internal and external sources of data. 

19. Describe efforts to verify and validate performance data. 

20. Identify actions to compensate for unavailable or low-quality data. 

21. Discuss implications of data limitations for assessing performance. 

Source: GAO. 

TSA agreed with our recommendations and plans to incorporate these 

principles into its 5-year performance plan and annual performance report. 

TSA plans to complete its 5-year performance plan and annual 

performance report by February 2004, as required by GPRA. 
Page 11 GAO-04-285T 

The Congress has also recognized the need for TSA to measure the 

effectiveness of its security initiatives and, as part of the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s (FAA) reauthorization act—Vision 100: Century of 

Aviation Reauthorization Act—is currently considering a provision that 

would require the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to 

conduct a study of the effectiveness of the aviation security system. 

In addition to collecting performance data on the effectiveness of its 

passenger screening program, TSA can strengthen other areas of the 

program to help improve screeners’ ability to detect threat objects. In our 

September 2003 report that discussed our preliminary observations on 

TSA’s passenger screening program, we noted that TSA can strengthen 

recurrent and supervisory training, staffing of screeners, and oversight of 

its contract screener pilot program. Since that report was issued, TSA has 

identified a number of actions it has taken or plans to take to address 

these concerns. We will be reviewing TSA’s efforts to address these 

challenges as part of our ongoing review of this program. 

In fulfilling its passenger screening mandate, TSA must ensure that 

screeners are adequately trained and sufficiently skilled in identifying 

threat or dangerous objects at screening checkpoints. To help accomplish 

this, TSA has developed and deployed basic and remedial screener training 

programs. Basic screener training consists of 40 hours of classroom 

instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training that screeners must 

successfully complete prior to making independent screening decisions. 

Additionally, TSA requires remedial training for any screener who fails an 

operational test and prohibits screeners from performing the screening 

function related to the test they failed until they successfully complete 

remedial training. TSA screening supervisors may also require remedial 

training for screeners they observe needing strengthening of their skills. 

Although TSA has deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has 

not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training 

programs to ensure that screeners are effectively trained and supervised. 

Recurrent training—the ongoing training of screeners on a frequent 

basis—is critical in maintaining and enhancing screener skills. Although 

TSA has not fully developed a recurrent training program, it is in the 

process of deploying six recurrent training modules and is pilot testing an 

Online Learning Management System for recurrent training comprised of 

about 360 components. TSA officials said that budget limitations had 

Challenges in 

Strengthening TSA’s 

Passenger Screening 

Program 

Recurrent and Supervisory 

Training Programs Not 

Fully Developed 
Page 12 GAO-04-285T 

delayed implementation of the recurrent training modules and the online 

learning system. 

Similarly, TSA has not fully developed or deployed a supervisory training 

program, even though it describes its screening supervisors as the key to a 

strong defense in detecting threat objects. However, TSA is taking steps in 

developing such a program, including working with the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture’s Graduate School to tailor its off-the-shelf supervisory course 

to meet the specific training needs of TSA’s screening supervisors. TSA 

reported that it is sending supervisors to the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture off-the-shelf supervisory course until the customized course is 

fielded in 2004. TSA also plans to establish a technical supervisor training 

component for recurrent training. 

To conduct passenger and baggage screening functions at the nation’s 

airports, TSA hired about 56,000 screeners. Initially, screener staff levels 

for all airports was developed by TSA headquarters without active input 

from the agency’s federal security directors who are responsible for 

overseeing security at each of the nation’s commercial airports. This has 

led to staffing imbalances, and concern by federal security directors that 

they had limited authority to respond to airport-specific staffing needs, 

such as reacting to fluctuations in daily and seasonal passenger flow. TSA 

officials acknowledged that their initial staffing efforts created imbalances 

in the screener workforce, and reported that as they work to further 

reduce the screener workforce,16 they will solicit input from the Federal 

Security Directors as well as airport and air carrier officials. TSA has also 

taken steps such as authorizing the hiring of part-time screeners at over 

200 airports—the first of whom began working in September 2003. 

 16TSA’s screener workforce totaled 55,600 on March 31, 2003. The agency cut 3,000 

positions for a screener workforce of 52,600 by June 1, 2003. An additional 3,000 positions 

were cut for a workforce of 49,600 full-time equivalents (FTE) by September 30, 2003, the 

end of the fiscal year. TSA officials predicted that the screener staffing level will be down 

to 45,000 by the end of fiscal year 2004. Beginning with the enactment of the 2002 

Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist 

Attacks on the United States, Public Law 107-206 (August 2, 2002), and in subsequent 

appropriations acts, there have been restrictions on TSA impacting staffing levels. The 

current fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Public Law 

108-90, contains a provision requiring that none of the funds in the act be used to recruit or 

hire personnel into TSA, which would cause the agency to exceed a screener staffing level 

of 45,000 full-time equivalents. 

TSA Continues to Work to 

Identify Appropriate 

Staffing Levels at Airports 
Page 13 GAO-04-285T 

To better address airport-specific staffing needs and accomplish 

workforce reduction goals, TSA developed its current screener staffing 

levels using a computer-based modeling process that took into account the 

number of screening checkpoints and lanes at an airport; originating 

passengers; the number of airport workers requiring screening; projected 

air carrier service increases and decreases during the year; and hours 

needed to accommodate screener training, leave, and breaks. TSA recently 

hired an outside consultant to conduct a study of screener staffing levels 

at various airports. TSA officials stated that they will continue to review 

the staffing allocation process through the modeling efforts to assess air 

carrier and airport growth patterns, and adjustments will be made as 

appropriate. We will continue to review TSA’s staffing efforts as part of 

our ongoing review. 

Consistent with ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract 

screeners at five commercial airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot 

program is to determine the feasibility of using private screening 

companies rather than federal screeners. TSA initially required private 

screening companies to adhere to all of the procedures and protocols used 

by federal screeners. As a result, these airports had limited flexibility in 

running screening operations. However, TSA recently provided the 

contractors with some flexibility, such as allowing them to determine and 

maintain their own staffing levels and to make independent hiring 

decisions. ATSA gives all airport operators the option of applying to 

change from using federal screeners to using private screeners beginning 

in November 2004. 

TSA has not yet determined how to evaluate and measure the performance 

of the pilot program airports or determine the feasibility of using contract 

screening companies. TSA recently awarded a contract to BearingPoint, 

Inc., to compare the performance of pilot screening with federal screening, 

including the overall strengths and weaknesses of both systems, and 

determine the reasons for any differences.17 The evaluation is scheduled to 

be completed by March 31, 2004.18 TSA has acknowledged that designing 

 17According to the August 8, 2003, request for quotation for the evaluation of the contract 

screening pilot program, BearingPoint must include informed performance comparisons, 

both quantitative and qualitative, of private versus federal screeners overall and within 

different sizes and categories of airports. 

18Based on the time frames established in the request for quotation, BearingPoint, Inc. is 

required to develop a project plan and evaluation model no later than December 12, 2003. 

Assessment of Contract 

Screening Pilot Program 
Page 14 GAO-04-285T 

an effective evaluation of the screeners at the pilot airports will be 

challenging because key operational areas, including training, assessment, 

compensation, and equipment, have to a large extent been held constant 

across all airports, and therefore are not within the control of the private 

screening companies.19 In its request for proposal for the pilot airport 

evaluation, TSA identified several data sources for the evaluation, 

including the Performance Management Information System and the 

Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review’s covert testing of passenger 

screeners. However, as we recently reported, data from these systems in 

measuring the effectiveness of screening operations is limited. As a result, 

it will be a challenge for TSA to effectively compare the performance of 

the contract pilot airports with that of airports using federal screeners. 

In conjunction with this evaluation, TSA will need to plan for the possible 

transition of airports from a federal system to a private screening 

company. Numerous airport operators have expressed an interest in 

obtaining more information to assist in their decision regarding using 

private screeners. Specifically, airport operators stated that they would 

like to determine who would bear responsibility for funding the screening 

contract, airport liability in the event of an incident linked to a screener 

failure, how well the current pilot program airports are performing, 

performance standards to which contract screeners would be held, and 

TSA’s role in overseeing contracted screening. If airports are permitted to 

opt out of using federal screeners, this could have a significant impact on 

TSA’s role in overseeing the screening function as well as the number of 

federal screeners needed. 

In addition to the challenges it faces in conducting its passenger screening 

program and assessing program effectiveness, TSA faces a number of 

other programmatic and management challenges in strengthening aviation 

security. These challenges include implementing the new ComputerAssisted Passenger Prescreening System; strengthening baggage 

screening, airport perimeter and access controls, air cargo, and general 

aviation security; managing the costs of aviation security initiatives; and 

managing human capital. TSA has been addressing these challenges 

through a variety of efforts. We have work in progress that is examining 

 19TSA’s request for proposal for the pilot program evaluation notes that there are a 

significant number of operational and managerial elements at the discretion of the private 

screening companies that should be considered in the evaluation, including supervision, 

overhead, materials, recruiting, and scheduling. 

TSA Faces Additional 

Programmatic and 

Management 

Challenges 
Page 15 GAO-04-285T 

TSA’s efforts in most of these areas, and we will be reporting on TSA’s 

progress in the future. 

TSA is developing a new Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening 

System, or CAPPS II. This system is intended to replace the current 

Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening program, which was developed in 

the mid-1990s by the Federal Aviation Administration to enable air carriers 

to identify passengers requiring additional security attention. The current 

system is maintained as a part of the airlines’ reservation systems and, 

operating under federal guidelines, uses a number of behavioral 

characteristics to select passengers for additional screening. 

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a number of 

weaknesses in the current prescreening program were exposed. For 

example, although the characteristics used to identify passengers for 

additional screening are classified, several have become public knowledge 

through the press or on the Internet. Although enhancements have been 

made to address some of these weaknesses, the behavioral traits used in 

the system may not reflect current intelligence information. It is also 

difficult to quickly modify the system to respond to real-time changes in 

threats. Additionally, because the current system operates independently 

within each air carrier reservation system, changes to each air carrier’s 

system to modify the prescreening system can be costly and timeconsuming. 

In contrast, CAPPS II is planned to be a government-run program that will 

provide real-time risk assessment for all airline passengers. Unlike the 

current system, TSA is designing CAPPS II to identify and compare 

personal information with commercially available data to confirm a 

passenger’s identity. The system will then run the identifying information 

against government databases and generate a “risk” score for the 

passenger. The risk score will determine the level of screening that the 

passenger will undergo before boarding. TSA currently estimates that 

initial implementation of CAPPS II will occur during the fall of 2004, with 

full implementation expected by the fall of 2005. 

TSA faces a number of challenges that could impede its ability to 

implement CAPPS II. Among the most significant are the following: 

• concerns about travelers’ privacy rights and the safeguards established to 

protect passenger data; 

Computer-Assisted 

Passenger Prescreening 

System (CAPPS II) 
Page 16 GAO-04-285T 

• the accuracy of the databases being used by the CAPPS II system and 

whether inaccuracies could generate a high number of false positives and 

erroneously prevent or delay passengers from boarding their flights; 

• the length of time that data will be retained by TSA; 

• the availability of a redress process through which passengers could get 

erroneous information corrected; 

• concerns that identify theft, in which someone steals relevant data and 

impersonates another individual to obtain that person’s low risk score, 

may not be detected and thereby negate the security benefits of the 

system; and 

• obtaining the international cooperation needed for CAPPS II to be fully 

effective, as some countries consider the passenger information required 

by CAPPS II as a potential violation of their privacy laws. 

We are currently assessing these and other challenges in the development 

and implementation of the CAPPS II system and expect to issue a final 

report on our work in early 2004. 

Checked baggage represents a significant security concern, as explosive 

devices in baggage can, and have, been placed in aircraft holds. ATSA 

required screening of all checked baggage on commercial aircraft by 

December 31, 2002, using explosive detection systems to electronically 

scan baggage for explosives. According to TSA, electronic screening can 

be accomplished by bulk explosives detection systems (EDS)20 or 

explosives trace detection (ETD) systems.21 However, TSA faced 

challenges in meeting the mandated implementation date. First, the 

production capabilities of EDS manufacturers were insufficient to produce 

the number of units needed. Additionally, according to TSA, it was not 

possible to undertake all of the airport modifications necessary to 

accommodate the EDS equipment in each airport’s baggage-handling area. 

 20Explosives detection systems use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage 

and identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. EDS equipment operates in 

an automated mode. 

21Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human 

operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to 

identify any traces of explosive materials. 

Checked Baggage 

Screening 
Page 17 GAO-04-285T 

In order to ensure that all checked baggage is screened, TSA established a 

program that uses alternative measures, including explosives-sniffing 

dogs, positive passenger bag match,22 and physical hand searches at 

airports where sufficient EDS or ETD technology was not available. 

Section 425 of the Homeland Security Act allowed the Under Secretary for 

Transportation Security to grant airports unable to meet the December 31, 

2002, 100 percent screening deadline an extension until December 31, 

2003. Although TSA has made progress in implementing EDS technology at 

more airports, it has reported that it will not meet the revised mandate for 

100 percent electronic screening of all checked baggage. Specifically, as of 

October 2003, TSA reported that it will not meet the deadline for 

electronic screening by December 31, 2003, at five airports. Airport 

representatives with whom we spoke expressed concern that there has not 

been enough time to produce, install, and integrate all of the systems 

required to meet the deadline. 

In addition to fielding the EDS systems at airports, difficulties exist in 

integrating these systems into airport baggage-handling systems. For those 

airports that have installed EDS equipment, many have been located in 

airport lobbies as stand-alone systems. The chief drawback of stand-alone 

systems is that because of their size and weight there is a limit to the 

number of units that can be placed in airport lobbies, and numerous 

screeners are required to handle the checked bags because each bag must 

be physically conveyed to the EDS machines and then moved back to the 

conveyor system for transport to the baggage-handling room in the air 

terminal. Some airports are in the process of integrating the EDS 

equipment inline with the conveyor belts that transport baggage from the 

ticket counter to the baggage-handling area. However, the reconfiguring of 

airports for in-line checked baggage screening can be extensive and 

costly.23 TSA has reported that in-line EDS equipment installation costs 

range from $1 million to $3 million per piece of equipment. In February 

2003, we identified letters of intent24 as a funding option that has been 

 22Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening checked baggage, 

which requires that the passenger be on the same aircraft as the checked baggage. 

23In-line screening involves incorporating EDS machines into airport baggage handling 

systems to improve throughput of baggage and to streamline airport operations. 

24A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from an agency to provide 

multiyear funding to an entity beyond the current authorization period. Thus, that letter 

allows an airport to proceed with a project without waiting for future federal funds 

because the airport and investors know that allowable costs are likely to be reimbursed. 
Page 18 GAO-04-285T 

successfully used to leverage private sources of funding.25 TSA has since 

written letters of intent covering seven airports promising multiyear 

financial support totaling over $770 million for in-line integration of EDS 

equipment.26 Further, TSA officials have stated that they have identified 25 

to 35 airports as candidates for further letters of intent pending 

Congressional authorization of funding. We are examining TSA’s baggage 

screening program, including its issuance of letters of intent, in an ongoing 

assignment. 

Prior to September 2001, work performed by GAO and others highlighted 

the vulnerabilities in controls for limiting access to secure airport areas. In 

one report, we noted that GAO special agents were able to use fictitious 

law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas, 

bypass security checkpoints, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure 

gates.27 The agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes, 

could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto 

aircraft. Concerns over the adequacy of the vetting process for airport 

workers who have unescorted access to secure airport areas have also 

arisen, in part as a result of federal agency airport security sweeps that 

uncovered hundreds of instances in which airport workers lied about their 

criminal history, or immigration status, or provided false or inaccurate 

Social Security numbers on their application for security clearances to 

obtain employment. 

ATSA contains provisions to improve perimeter access security at the 

nation’s airports and strengthen background checks for employees 

working in secure airport areas, and TSA has made some progress in this 

area. For example, federal mandates were issued to strengthen airport 

perimeter security by limiting the number of airport access points, and 

 25U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be 

Sufficient to Cover Airports’ Planned Capital Development, GAO-03-497T (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 25, 2003). 

26The seven airports include Denver International Airport, Las Vegas McCarran 

International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, Ontario International Airport, 

Seattle/Tacoma International Airport, Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, and Boston 

Logan International Airport. The purpose is to help defray the costs of installing permanent 

explosive detection systems that are integrated with airports’ checked baggage conveyor 

systems. 

27U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports, 

GAO/T-OSI-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000).

Perimeter and Access 

Controls 
Page 19 GAO-04-285T 

they require random screening of individuals, vehicles, and property 

before entry at the remaining perimeter access points. Further, TSA made 

criminal history checks mandatory for employees with access to secure or 

sterile airport areas. To date, criminal history checks have been conducted 

on approximately 1 million of these employees. TSA also has plans to 

develop a pilot airport security program and is reviewing security 

technologies in the areas of biometrics access control identification 

systems (i.e., fingerprints or iris scans), anti-piggybacking technologies (to 

prevent more than one employee from entering a secure area at a time), 

and video monitoring systems for perimeter security. TSA solicited 

commercial airport participation in the program. It is currently reviewing 

information from interested airports and plans to select 20 airports for the 

program. 

Although progress has been made, challenges remain with perimeter 

security and access controls at commercial airports. Specifically, ATSA 

contains numerous requirements for strengthening perimeter security and 

access controls, some of which contained deadlines, which TSA is 

working to meet. In addition, a significant concern is the possibility of 

terrorists using shoulder-fired portable missiles from locations near the 

airport. We reported in June 2003 that airport operators have increased 

their patrols of airport perimeters since September 2001, but industry 

officials stated that they do not have enough resources to completely 

protect against missile attacks.28 A number of technologies could be used 

to secure and monitor airport perimeters, including barriers, motion 

sensors, and closed-circuit television. Airport representatives have 

cautioned that as security enhancements are made to airport perimeters, it 

will be important for TSA to coordinate with the Federal Aviation 

Administration and the airport operators to ensure that any enhancements 

do not pose safety risks for aircraft. To further examine these threats and 

challenges, we have ongoing work assessing TSA’s progress in meeting 

ATSA provisions related to improving perimeter security, access controls, 

and background checks for airport employees and other individuals with 

access to secure areas of the airport, as well as the nature and extent of 

the threat from shoulder-fired missiles. 

 28U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help 

Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). 
Page 20 GAO-04-285T 

As we and the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General have 

reported, vulnerabilities exist in ensuring the security of cargo carried 

aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. TSA has reported that 

an estimated 12.5 million tons of cargo are transported each year—9.7 

million tons on all-cargo planes and 2.8 million tons on passenger planes. 

Potential security risks are associated with the transport of air cargo—

including the introduction of undetected explosive and incendiary devices 

in cargo placed aboard aircraft. To reduce these risks, ATSA requires that 

all cargo carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft be screened and 

that TSA have a system in place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, 

or otherwise ensure the security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. Despite 

these requirements, it has been reported that less than 5 percent of cargo 

placed on passenger airplanes is physically screened.29 TSA’s primary 

approach to ensuring air cargo security and safety is to ensure compliance 

with the “known shipper” program—which allows shippers that have 

established business histories with air carriers or freight forwarders to 

ship cargo on planes. However, we and the Department of 

Transportation’s Inspector General have identified weaknesses in the 

known shipper program and in TSA’s procedures for approving freight 

forwarders, such as possible tampering with freight at various handoff 

points before it is loaded into an aircraft.30

Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance 

cargo security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in 

October 2002. The database is the first phase in developing a cargo 

profiling system similar to the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening 

System. However, in December 2002, we reported that additional 

operational and technological measures, such as checking the identity of 

individuals making cargo deliveries, have the potential to improve air 

cargo security in the near term.31 We further reported that TSA lacks a 

comprehensive plan with long-term goals and performance targets for 

cargo security, time frames for completing security improvements, and 

risk-based criteria for prioritizing actions to achieve those goals. 

Accordingly, we recommended that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for 

air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, includes 

 29Congressional Research Service, Air Cargo Security, September 11, 2003. 

30U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential 

Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 

31U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, 

and the Challenges Ahead, GAO-03-1150T (Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003). 

Air Cargo Security 
Page 21 GAO-04-285T 

a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing actions. TSA 

agreed with this recommendation and expects to develop such a plan by 

the end of 2003. It will be important that this plan include a timetable for 

implementation to help ensure that vulnerabilities in this area are reduced. 

Since September 2001, TSA has taken limited action to improve general 

aviation security, leaving general aviation far more open and potentially 

vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation is vulnerable 

because general aviation pilots and passengers are not screened before 

takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are not screened at any 

point. General aviation includes more than 200,000 privately owned 

airplanes, which are located in every state at more than 19,000 airports.32

More than 550 of these airports also provide commercial service. In the 

last 5 years, about 70 aircraft have been stolen from general aviation 

airports, indicating a potential weakness that could be exploited by 

terrorists. This vulnerability was demonstrated in January 2002, when a 

teenage flight student stole and crashed a single-engine airplane into a 

Tampa, Florida skyscraper. Moreover, general aviation aircraft could be 

used in other types of terrorist acts. It was reported that the September 

11th hijackers researched the use of crop dusters to spread biological or 

chemical agents. 

We reported in September 2003 that TSA had chartered a working group 

on general aviation within the existing Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee.33 The working group consists of industry stakeholders and is 

designed to identify and recommend actions to close potential security 

gaps in general aviation. On October 1, 2003, the working group issued a 

report that included a number of recommendations for general aviation 

airport operators’ voluntary use in evaluating airports’ security 

requirements. These recommendations are both broad in scope and 

generic in their application, with the intent that every general aviation 

airport and landing facility operators may use them to evaluate that 

facility’s physical security, procedures, infrastructure, and resources. TSA 

is taking some additional action to strengthen security at general aviation 

airports, including developing a risk-based self-assessment tool for general 

 32 Of the 19,000 general aviation airports, 5,400 are publicly owned. TSA is currently 

focusing its efforts on these publicly owned airports. TSA is still unclear about its role in 

inspecting privately owned general aviation airports. 

33GAO-03-1150T. 

General Aviation Security 
Page 22 GAO-04-285T 

aviation airports to use in identifying security concerns. We have ongoing 

work that is examining general aviation security in further detail. 

TSA faces two key funding and accountability challenges in securing the 

commercial aviation system: (1) paying for increased aviation security, 

and (2) ensuring that these costs are controlled. These challenges are 

particularly critical due to the government incurring large and increasing 

deficits. The rapid rise in needed funding for aviation security 

enhancements further exacerbates budget challenges. The costs 

associated with aviation security are huge. The Department of Homeland 

Security appropriation includes $3.7 billion for aviation security for fiscal 

year 2004. The passenger and baggage screening functions alone account 

for most of this funding, with about $1.8 billion appropriated for passenger 

screening and $1.3 billion for baggage screening. ATSA created passenger 

and air carrier security fees to pay for the costs of aviation security, but 

the fees have not generated enough money to do so. The Department of 

Transportation’s Inspector General reported that the security fees are 

estimated to generate only about $1.7 billion during fiscal year 2004. 

A major funding challenge is paying for the purchase and installation of 

the remaining explosives detection systems, including integration into 

airport baggage-handling systems. Integrating the equipment with the 

baggage-handling systems is expected to be costly because it will require 

major facility modifications. For example, modifications needed to 

integrate the equipment at Boston’s Logan International Airport are 

estimated to cost $146 million. Modifications for Dallas/Fort Worth 

International Airport are estimated to cost $193 million. According to TSA 

and the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General, the cost of 

integrating the equipment nationwide could be $3 billion. 

A key question that must be addressed is how to pay for these installation 

costs. The Federal Aviation Administration’s Airport Improvement 

Program (AIP) and passenger facility charges have been eligible sources 

for funding this work.34 During fiscal year 2002, AIP grant funds totaling 

$561 million were used for terminal modifications to enhance security. 

However, using these funds for security reduced the funding available for 

 34The Airport Improvement Program trust fund is used to fund capital improvements to 

airports, including some security enhancements, such as terminal modifications to 

accommodate explosive detection equipment. 

Aviation Security Funding 
Page 23 GAO-04-285T 

other airport development and rehabilitation projects. To provide financial 

assistance to airports for security-related capital investments, such as the 

installation of explosives detection equipment, proposed aviation 

reauthorization legislation would establish an aviation security capital 

fund that would authorize $2 billion over the next 4 years. 

In February 2003, we identified letters of intent as a funding option that 

has been successfully used to leverage private sources of funding.35 TSA 

has since signed letters of intent covering seven airports—Boston Logan, 

Dallas/Fort Worth, Denver, Los Angeles, McCarran (Las Vegas), Ontario 

(California), and Seattle/Tacoma international airports. Under the 

agreements, TSA will pay 75 percent of the cost of integrating the 

explosives detection equipment into the baggage-handling systems. The 

payments will stretch out over 3 to 4 years. TSA officials have identified 

more airports that would be candidates for similar agreements. 

Another challenge is ensuring continued investment in transportation 

research and development. For fiscal year 2003, TSA was appropriated 

about $110 million for research and development, of which $75 million 

was designated for the next-generation explosives detection systems. 

However, TSA proposed to reprogram $61.2 million of these funds to be 

used for other purposes, leaving about $12.7 million to be spent on 

research and development in that year. This proposed reprogramming 

could limit TSA’s ability to sustain and strengthen aviation security by 

continuing to invest in research and development for more effective 

equipment to screen passengers, their carry-on and checked baggage, and 

cargo. In ongoing work, we are examining the nature and scope of 

research and development work by TSA and the Department of Homeland 

Security, including their strategy for accelerating the development of 

transportation security technologies. 

As it organizes itself to protect the nation’s transportation system, TSA 

faces the challenge of strategically managing its workforce of about 60,000 

people—more than 80 percent of whom are passenger and baggage 

screeners. Additionally, over the next several years, TSA faces the 

challenge of sizing and managing this workforce as efficiency is improved 

with new security-enhancing technologies, processes, and procedures. For 

example, as explosives detection systems are integrated with baggage-

 35GAO-03-497T. 

Human Capital 

Management 
Page 24 GAO-04-285T 

handling systems, the use of more labor-intensive screening methods, such 

as trace detection techniques and manual bag searches, can be reduced. 

Other planned security enhancements, such as CAPPS II and a registered 

traveler program, also have the potential to make screening more efficient. 

Further, if airports opt out of the federal screener program and use their 

own or contract employees to provide screening instead of TSA screeners, 

a significant impact on TSA staffing could occur. 

To assist agencies in managing their human capital more strategically, we 

have developed a model that identifies cornerstones and related critical 

success factors that agencies should apply and steps they can take.36 Our 

model is designed to help agency leaders effectively lead and manage their 

people and integrate human capital considerations into daily decision 

making and the program results they seek to achieve. In January 2003, we 

reported that TSA was addressing some critical human capital success 

factors by using a wide range of tools available for hiring, and beginning to 

link individual performance to organizational goals.37 However, concerns 

remain about the size and training of that workforce, the adequacy of the 

initial background checks for screeners, and TSA’s progress in setting up a 

performance management system. TSA is currently developing a human 

capital strategy, which it expects to be completed by the end of this year. 

TSA has proposed cutting the screener workforce by an additional 3,000 

during fiscal year 2004. This planned reduction has raised concerns about 

passenger delays at airports and has led TSA to begin hiring part-time 

screeners to make more flexible and efficient use of its workforce. In 

addition, TSA used an abbreviated background check process to hire and 

deploy enough screeners to meet ATSA’s screening deadlines during 2002. 

After obtaining additional background information, TSA terminated the 

employment of some of these screeners. TSA reported 1,208 terminations 

as of May 31, 2003, that it ascribed to a variety of reasons, including 

criminal offenses and failures to pass alcohol and drug tests. Furthermore, 

the national media have reported allegations of operational and 

management control problems that emerged with the expansion of the 

Federal Air Marshal Service, including inadequate background checks and 

training, uneven scheduling, and inadequate policies and procedures. We 

 36 U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, 

GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002). 

37 U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: 

Department of Transportation, GAO-03-108 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
Page 25 GAO-04-285T 

reported in January 2003 that TSA had taken the initial steps in 

establishing a performance management system linked to organizational 

goals. Such a system will be critical for TSA to motivate and manage staff, 

ensure the quality of screeners’ performance, and, ultimately, restore 

public confidence in air travel. In ongoing work, we are examining the 

effectiveness of TSA’s efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger 

screeners, and we are assessing the effects of expansion on the Federal 

Air Marshal Service.38

TSA faces many challenges in strengthening its passenger screening and 

other security programs. To best address these challenges, it needs the 

information and tools necessary to ensure that its efforts are effective, are 

appropriately focused, and are achieving expected results. Without 

knowledge on the effectiveness of its programs, TSA and the public have 

little assurance regarding the level of security provided, and whether TSA 

is using its resources to maximize security benefits. As TSA implements 

new security initiatives and addresses associated challenges, measuring 

program effectiveness will help it best focus on the areas of greatest need. 

We are encouraged that TSA is undertaking efforts to develop the 

information and tools needed to measure its performance. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony include Mike Bollinger, Lisa Brown, Jack Schulze, and 

Maria Strudwick. 

 38 The Federal Air Marshal Service has been transferred out of TSA and into the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

Concluding 

Observations 

Contact Information 
Page 26 GAO-04-285T 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 

Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress 

Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: 

September 24, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the 

Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address 

Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot 

Certification Process. GAO-03-248NI. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003. 

(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-286NI. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by 

Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO-03-30C. Washington, D.C.: 

December 3, 2002 

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 

Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 

2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-03-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial 

Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Related GAO Products 
Page 27 GAO-04-285T 

Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection 

Equipment. GAO-02-713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002. (CLASSIFIED) 

Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation’s Air 

Transportation System. GAO-01-1164T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 

2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Information on the Nation’s Air Transportation 

System Vulnerabilities. GAO-01-1174T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 

2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access 

Security Improvements. GAO-01-1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 

2001. 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access 

Security Improvements. GAO-01-1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 

2001. (RESTRICTED) 

FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing 

Weaknesses. GAO-01-171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in 

Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED-00-181. Washington, D.C.: 

September 29, 2000. 
Page 28 GAO-04-285T 

FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses 

That Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-330. Washington, 

D.C.: September 27, 2000. 

FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other 

Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD-00-252. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 

2000. 

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ 

Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems 

Detecting Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED-00-159. Washington, D.C.: June 

22, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO-OSI-00-10. 

Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000. 

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