JULY 6, 2010

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 (ASSIGNMENT NO. A-09-005-01)

OFFICE OF AUDITS

NASA’S ASTRONAUT CORPS: STATUS OF 

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS RELATED TO 

HEALTH CARE ACTIVITIES

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

 
REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

Final report released by: 

Paul K. Martin

Inspector General

Acronyms

BHP Behavioral Health and Performance

GSA General Services Administration

ISS International Space Station

NODIS NASA Online Directives Information System

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements
JULY 6, 2010

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

OVERVIEW

NASA’S ASTRONAUT CORPS: STATUS OF CORRECTIVE 

ACTIONS RELATED TO HEALTH CARE ACTIVITIES

The Issue

NASA has established rigorous medical standards for the selection of new astronauts, 

space mission assignments, and medical and behavioral health to ensure that astronauts 

can adequately carry out missions in space. As of April 2010, NASA had 83 astronauts 

eligible to be assigned to a space mission and 9 astronaut candidates in training to 

become eligible for a mission. Prior to going into space, astronauts receive an average 

6 years of training for a Space Shuttle mission and an average 8 years of training for an 

International Space Station (ISS) mission. The Astronaut Corps is supported by 

21 medical and aerospace physicians, 2 psychiatrists, and 3 psychologists who provide 

routine health care, annual physical and behavioral health examinations, and support 

during training exercises and space flight missions. 

The arrest of a NASA astronaut in February 2007 for personal actions that were the 

subject of criminal charges led to a number of internal and external reviews related to 

health care services provided to members of the Astronaut Corps. The first review, 

performed by Johnson Space Center (Johnson review) between February and June 2007, 

focused on Johnson’s practice of behavioral medicine and included recommendations to 

improve Johnson’s behavioral health care services for NASA astronauts. 

A committee of Federal behavioral health care and aerospace medicine specialists 

commissioned by the NASA Administrator performed the second review, which focused 

on Johnson’s overall astronaut health care program. That committee issued a report in 

July 2007 (Committee review) with recommendations to improve medical and behavioral 

health care provided to astronauts and their dependents, communication and coordination 

between NASA’s medical providers and the behavioral health providers, and 

Astronaut Office operations. 

A third review by NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (Safety and Mission 

Assurance review) in July 2007 focused on allegations of alcohol misuse by astronauts. 

The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance issued a report in August 2007 concluding 

that allegations of alcohol impairment or misuse by NASA astronauts were not 

substantiated; however, the report contained recommendations pertaining to alcohol 

policies within the Astronaut Corps and at the Centers as well as suggested revisions to 

the disciplinary policy for the ISS code of conduct. 
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

We conducted this audit to assess NASA’s actions to implement the recommendations 

contained in these three reviews to improve the medical and behavioral health care 

provided to the Astronaut Corps. We assessed whether NASA Headquarters and Johnson 

had taken corrective actions that (1) met the intent of the recommendations in the reviews

and (2) whether the actions were implemented. We did not, however, test the 

effectiveness of NASA’s implementation efforts nor did we validate the reviewers’ 

findings. See Appendix A for details of the audit’s scope and methodology. 

Results

We determined that NASA had taken steps to implement 36 of the 39 recommendations 

contained in the three reviews. We also found that NASA had not completed or taken 

action on 2 recommendations because no NASA official had been assigned responsibility 

to address one of the issues and because the program addressed in the other 

recommendation had been suspended. Finally, NASA was unable to take action on 

1 recommendation because the recommendation requires determining whether changes to 

the astronaut selection process were useful, which cannot be done yet. 

NASA Took Actions to Address 36 Recommendations. We determined that all 3 of 

the recommendations from the Johnson review were addressed, all but 2 of the 

30 recommendations from the Committee review were addressed, and 5 of the 6 

recommendations from the Safety and Mission Assurance review were addressed. 

The three recommendations in the Johnson review sought to improve the behavioral 

health care provided to astronauts and astronaut candidates. We found that NASA 

officials took actions that met the intent of the three recommendations. Specifically, the 

Johnson Space Medicine Division Chief issued new guidance (SD-09-021, “Annual 

Astronaut Behavioral Health Exam,” March 23, 2009) to address the recommendation 

that a 30-minute behavioral health assessment be conducted in conjunction with annual 

medical flight physicals and the recommendation that behavioral medicine flight 

assessments be performed on Shuttle crewmembers. The guidance includes a 

requirement for the behavioral health providers to institute annual behavioral wellness 

evaluations for all astronauts regardless of flying status and a requirement for a 

psychiatrist to determine whether the astronaut is qualified for active flying status. In 

addition, NASA organized a working group that made recommendations to improve the 

astronaut selection process to address a recommendation that NASA enhance the 

assessment of an astronaut’s fitness for flying duty. 

Further, we determined that NASA took actions to meet the intent of 28 of the 

30 recommendations issued by the Committee commissioned by the NASA 

Administrator. Specifically, NASA established or revised 21 policies and procedures to 

address 14 Committee recommendations related to Privacy Act information, alcohol 

misuse, behavioral health care, independent reviews of the behavioral health clinic, 

medical records, credentials, standard operating procedures for the behavioral health 

clinic, attendance and structure of the Aerospace Medicine Board, an Astronaut Code of 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 iii

Professional Responsibility, and astronaut performance evaluations. NASA took 

additional actions to address 8 other Committee recommendations related to the 

psychological evaluation of applicants to the Astronaut Corps, medical testing of the 

Astronaut Corps, reporting safety concerns, continuity of health care, privacy of medical 

information, supervisory training, and surveying the Astronaut Corps regarding issues 

identified by the Committee. These actions included increasing behavioral health 

providers’ involvement during the astronaut hiring process, providing training on topics 

such as privacy of medical records and supervision, hiring additional behavioral health 

providers, improving the explanation for medical testing, encouraging the reporting of 

safety concerns, and surveying the Astronaut Corps and flight surgeons about their 

knowledge of policies and procedures, the relationship between astronauts and flight 

surgeons, and allegations regarding astronauts misusing alcohol. 

In addition, NASA provided us evidence of existing policies that satisfied the intent of an 

additional six recommendations. For example, NASA already had policies and 

procedures in place that addressed the Committee’s recommendations regarding selection 

of crewmembers and the need to identify and share human factor concerns among all 

organizations involved in astronaut activities. 

Finally, we found that NASA officials at Johnson and Kennedy Space Centers met the 

intent of five of the six recommendations made in the Safety and Mission Assurance 

report. The recommendations related to procedures on launch day, alcohol use by 

crewmembers, and conduct of crewmembers on the ISS. Specifically, Johnson revised an 

internal policy to include the risk of drinking to excess, finalized an internal policy on 

alcohol use in astronaut crew quarters, and provided NASA’s disciplinary policy to the 

Multilateral Crew Operations Panel, an international body that makes policy decisions 

about the ISS. In addition, Johnson uses a flight surgeon’s checklist, which includes a 

visual assessment of the astronauts up to 9 hours before launch, and an April 2008 policy 

that states that the mission-assigned flight surgeon, astronaut supervisor, and other 

managers are required to stay in Kennedy’s astronaut crew quarters prior to launch. 

These actions satisfied the intent of the report’s recommendation related to procedures on 

launch day. Finally, in response to the report, Kennedy officials issued a new policy on 

alcohol consumption in astronaut crew quarters. 

NASA Had Not Taken Actions to Address Two Recommendations. At the time of 

this review, NASA Headquarters had not addressed the recommendation from the Safety 

and Mission Assurance report to implement a NASA-wide alcohol testing program 

because no NASA official had been assigned responsibility to address the issue. 

In addition, NASA Headquarters had not addressed whether astronauts should be 

included in NASA’s Personnel Reliability Program, as recommended in the Committee 

report. The Committee found that NASA civil service and military astronauts were not 

required to report illnesses, injuries, or medication use so that the responsible NASA 

entity could determine whether the astronauts were fit to perform their assigned duties. 

Even though the NASA Office of Protective Services suspended NASA’s Personnel 

Reliability Program on June 10, 2009, we determined that including astronauts within 
OVERVIEW

iv REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

NASA’s Personnel Reliability Program would not address the Committee’s finding that 

astronauts were not required to report illnesses and non-NASA care. Therefore, to 

address the Committee’s finding, NASA should require astronauts to certify that they will 

report all health care, to include mental health care, they receive from providers not 

affiliated with NASA when assigned to a mission and continuously report such nonNASA care until the mission is completed. 

NASA Was Unable to Address One Recommendation. NASA was unable to address a 

Committee recommendation that it fully integrate behavioral health information derived 

from psychological testing evaluations into the final selection process of astronaut 

candidates if the information is found to be useful. Although NASA hired nine astronaut 

candidates in May 2009 using psychological testing evaluations in their selection, NASA 

officials said they cannot yet determine whether the behavioral health information they 

used was helpful, because the candidates have not yet successfully completed the training 

and evaluation period prior to becoming an astronaut. Additionally, it can take up to 

8 years from the time NASA hires an astronaut candidate to when the astronaut returns 

from his or her first long-duration mission. Therefore, to determine whether the 

behavioral health information collected during the hiring process was useful, NASA 

officials said they will need to observe the performance of the new astronauts for a period 

significantly longer than the year that has elapsed since their hiring.

Management Action

The Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management should issue policy 

establishing a NASA-wide program to test NASA astronauts and other employees for 

alcohol. We also recommended that Johnson’s Space Medicine Division Chief issue a 

policy requiring newly assigned mission crewmembers to update any medical and 

behavioral health conditions and treatments received from non-NASA sources since their 

last annual NASA examination. 

In response to a draft of this report, the Assistant Administrator for Human Capital 

Management nonconcurred with our recommendation to issue an Agency-wide alcohol 

policy. The Assistant Administrator said that given the press of other priorities, the 

Administrator and Deputy Administrator have not yet been briefed on the legal issues and 

complexities involved with establishing an alcohol-testing requirement for NASA civil 

service employees. However, the Assistant Administrator also said that NASA will 

“work toward staffing a final Agency decision on alcohol testing of civil service 

employees.” 

In light of the Assistant Administrator’s pledge to reach a final Agency decision 

regarding testing NASA employees for alcohol, we are resolving the recommendation. 

We will close the recommendation when management issues a final decision on the 

matter. 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 v 

The Assistant Administrator concurred with the intent of our recommendation to issue 

policy requiring astronauts to report all medical care received from non-NASA sources. 

However, rather than issue policy, the Space Medicine Division and Astronaut Office 

added a requirement to the annual family history form requiring astronauts to 

acknowledge that they must report to the Flight Medicine Clinic or Behavioral Health 

Clinic all instances of non-NASA health care that they receive. 

We obtained and reviewed the revised annual family history form and have determined 

that this action is responsive to our recommendation. Accordingly, the recommendation 

is closed. 

JULY 6, 2010

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background __________________________________________ 1 

Objectives ___________________________________________ 3 

RESULTS

NASA Took Actions to Address 36 of 39 Recommendations _____ 4 

NASA Had Not Completed or Taken Actions to Address 

Two Recommendations______________________________ 30

NASA Was Unable to Address One Recommendation _________ 34

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology _______________________________ 37

Review of Internal Controls_____________________________ 38

APPENDIX B 

Management Comments _______________________________ 39

APPENDIX C 

Report Distribution ___________________________________ 42

JULY 6, 2010

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 1 

INTRODUCTION

Background

Johnson Space Center is the lead Center for two NASA space missions – the Space 

Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS). Johnson’s Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate is responsible for providing trained astronauts for human space flight 

missions and experienced crewmembers to help resolve developmental and operational 

issues within the human space flight programs. The Astronaut Office, within the Flight 

Crew Operations Directorate, is responsible for selecting and training astronaut 

candidates1

Astronauts and their dependents receive health care services from 21 flight surgeons,

and civil service and military astronauts detailed from the Department of 

Defense. 

The Astronaut Office is supported by Johnson’s Space Life Sciences Directorate’s 

Human Adaptation and Countermeasures Division and its Space Medicine Division. The 

Human Adaptation and Countermeasures Division conducts biomedical research to 

(1) understand human responses to space flight and (2) develop and test countermeasures 

to problematic issues that may affect crew health, safety, or performance during or after 

space flight missions. The Space Medicine Division provides medical and behavioral 

health services to the Astronaut Corps, such as routine medical care and physicals, 

behavioral health assessments, and support during missions and training exercises. The 

Space Medicine Division’s Clinical Services Branch is responsible for six clinics: a 

behavioral health clinic off-site near Johnson; a flight medicine clinic at Johnson 

providing health care to astronauts and their dependents; a clinic for Johnson employees; 

two medical clinics in Russia, which provide health care to NASA astronauts when 

training in Russia; and a medical clinic at NASA’s White Sands Test Facility in New 

Mexico. 

2

 

1 Recent hires who need to successfully complete the training and evaluation period prior to becoming an 

astronaut.

2 A physician trained in aerospace (space aeronautics) medicine. Flight surgeons maintain the health of 

crewmembers, evaluate the impact of illness or injury on the ability of crewmembers to safely perform 

their duties, and develop countermeasures to the physiological effects of aviation and space flight. 

2 psychiatrists, and 3 psychologists (referred to in this report as providers). The Space 

Medicine Division receives medical oversight, including reviews of the services provided 

by the Space Medicine Division to the Astronaut Corps, from the NASA Chief Health 

and Medical Officer. The Chief Health and Medical Officer is also responsible for 

developing NASA medical policies and chairing the Medical Policy Board. The Medical 

Policy Board is a Headquarters board composed of NASA and Federal physicians with 

aerospace medicine expertise that is responsible for health care policy, medical policy, 

and oversight of medical activities related to space flight. 
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

On February 5, 2007, Lisa Nowak, an astronaut detailed from the military, was arrested 

in Orlando, Florida, for personal actions that were subject to felony criminal charges. 

According to the police report, Ms. Nowak was charged with attempted kidnapping, 

attempted vehicle burglary with battery, destruction of evidence, and battery. As a result

of the incident, the Johnson Director began an internal assessment of the Center’s 

behavioral medicine practices to determine whether Johnson personnel observed any 

behavior that might have indicated a situation existed prior to the incident and whether 

improvements could be made to the behavioral medicine program. Johnson concluded in 

a June 2007 report, “Johnson’s Internal Assessment of Medical Practices after Nowak 

Incident,” that there were no indications that something could have predicted the events 

that occurred or that anything could have been done to change them. However, the 

Johnson Director made three recommendations to improve the Center’s behavioral health 

assessment process for astronauts. 

On February 7, 2007, the NASA Administrator directed the Agency’s Chief Health and 

Medical Officer to coordinate a review of the Space Medicine Division’s medical and 

behavioral health services provided to NASA astronauts. The Chief Health and Medical 

Officer assembled seven physicians and one attorney with military or Federal 

employment experience in medical, behavioral health, and aerospace (space aeronautics) 

medicine expertise to form the Astronaut Health Care System Review Committee. The 

Committee interviewed the Chief Health and Medical Officer and various Johnson 

personnel, including Space Medicine Division management, flight surgeons, behavioral 

health providers, astronauts, and astronauts’ family members. The Committee also 

reviewed Headquarters and Johnson medical and behavioral health policies and related 

documentation. On July 16, 2007, the Committee issued “NASA Astronaut Health Care 

System Review Committee February–June 2007 Report to the Administrator,” which 

included findings and 29 recommendations related to medical and behavioral health care 

provided to astronauts and their dependents, employee perceptions, and Astronaut Office 

operations. During congressional testimony, the Committee Chair added one verbal 

recommendation – to survey NASA astronauts and flight surgeons – making a total of 

30 Committee recommendations. 

On July 26, 2007, the NASA Deputy Administrator directed the Chief of Safety and 

Mission Assurance to review allegations of astronauts’ misuse of alcohol raised in the 

Committee’s report. The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance interviewed flight 

surgeons, astronauts, and managers; reviewed Federal, NASA, and Johnson 

requirements; and analyzed safety reporting records. The resulting report, “Space Flight 

Safety Review (Alcohol Use in the Preflight Period),” August 28, 2007, stated: “There 

was no evidence of alcohol impairment by flight crew astronauts that occurred during the 

launch period or of alcohol misuse that was brought to management’s attention or 

disregarded by management.” However, the report included six recommendations related 

to NASA policies and procedures. 

On September 6, 2007, the NASA Administrator, the Chief Health and Medical Officer, 

the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, and the Flight Crew Operations Directorate
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 3 

Director testified before the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics regarding 

the Committee’s report and NASA’s medical and behavioral health care programs for 

NASA astronauts. The Administrator stated that the Committee’s recommendations 

would improve the medical and behavioral health care provided to the Astronaut Corps. 

In February, June, and October of 2008, NASA provided Congress with written 

documentation on its planned or completed actions to address the 30 Committee 

recommendations. In addition, Johnson reported to the Medical Policy Board from 

December 2007 through March 2009 on the status of its actions to address the 

Committee’s medical recommendations. 

Objectives

We assessed whether NASA Headquarters and Johnson had taken corrective actions that 

(1) met the intent of the recommendations in the three reviews related to the Astronaut 

Corps and (2) whether the actions were implemented. In this review, we did not test the 

effectiveness of NASA’s implementation efforts, nor did we validate the reviewers’ 

underlying findings that led to the recommendations in the first place. See Appendix A 

for details of the audit’s scope and methodology. 
RESULTS

4 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

NASA TOOK ACTIONS TO 

ADDRESS 36 OF 39

RECOMMENDATIONS

NASA took actions that met the intent of 36 of the 39 recommendations from 

the three separate reviews conducted as a result of the Nowak incident. 

Specifically, NASA officials stated that they implemented changes to address all 

3 recommendations from the Johnson review, 28 out of 30 recommendations from 

the Committee review, and 5 out of 6 recommendations from the Safety and Mission 

Assurance review. 

Three Johnson Recommendations Addressed

The June 2007 report, “Johnson’s Internal Assessment of Medical Practices after Nowak 

Incident,” included three recommendations to improve the Center’s behavioral health 

assessment process for astronauts. Specifically, the three recommendations made by the 

Johnson Director related to improving the behavioral health care provided to astronauts 

and astronaut candidates. We determined that actions taken by Johnson’s Space 

Medicine Division in response to recommendations 1ci and 3ci made in the Committee 

report satisfied the intent of the Johnson report’s recommendations. 

Johnson Recommendation 1. The Johnson Director recommended a 30-minute behavioral 

medicine assessment be conducted in conjunction with annual medical flight physicals. 

Johnson Recommendation 2. The Johnson Director recommended that behavioral 

medicine flight assessments be performed on Shuttle crewmembers. 

Audit Evaluation. Actions taken in response to Committee Recommendation 3ci (see 

page 14) met the intent of Johnson Recommendations 1 and 2. Although we did not 

review medical records to ensure that they included a psychiatrist’s determination of 

whether the astronaut was qualified for active flying status, we verified that the Space 

Medicine Division Chief issued guidance (SD-09-021, “Annual Astronaut Behavioral 

Health Exam,” March 23, 2009) to the behavioral health providers to institute annual 

behavioral wellness evaluations for all astronauts regardless of flying status. The 

guidance includes a requirement for a psychiatrist to determine whether the astronaut is 

qualified for active flying status. 

Johnson Recommendation 3. The Johnson Director recommended that NASA enhance the 

aeronautical adaptability ratings for astronaut medical selections. 

Audit Evaluation. Aeronautical adaptability is the assessment of an astronaut’s fitness 

for flying duty. The aeronautical adaptability rating covers motivational issues, such as 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 5 

how a family feels about the astronaut flying, anger, anger management, and 

achievements in their lives. The Army, Navy, and Coast Guard all use the aeronautical 

adaptability rating for assessing fitness for flying duty. 

Although the Space Medicine Division did not enhance the aeronautical adaptability 

ratings used for astronaut selections in response to this recommendation, the Johnson 

Deputy Director stated that the recommendation’s intent had been satisfied by changes 

made to address Committee Recommendation 1ci (see below). We verified that those 

changes had been implemented; therefore, we agree with the Johnson Deputy Director 

that NASA took corrective actions to meet the intent of this recommendation. 

Twenty-eight Committee Recommendations Addressed

The Committee’s report, “NASA Astronaut Health Care System Review Committee 

February–June 2007 Report to the Administrator,” contained 29 recommendations and 

during congressional testimony the Committee Chair added another recommendation. 

We determined that NASA took actions to satisfy 21 of the Committee’s 

30 recommendations and provided evidence of existing policies and procedures that 

satisfied the intent of 7 additional recommendations. These recommendations included 

behavioral health for astronauts and astronaut candidates; medical care for astronauts and 

their dependents; management, supervision, and training of astronauts; conduct of and 

alcohol use by astronauts; NASA’s safety reporting system; and the operation of the 

medical and behavioral health clinics. To date, NASA had not addressed one of the 

Committee’s remaining two recommendations (see page 30). Finally, NASA was unable 

to take action in response to the final recommendation for reasons explained on page 34. 

Committee Recommendation 1ci. The Committee found that while psychological testing 

and evaluation is conducted during the hiring of astronauts and is intended to identify 

applicants who can adapt most readily and perform effectively in the extreme environment 

of space flight, this information is rarely and inconsistently used. Further, details on the use 

of psychological testing methods, criteria used for evaluation, and optimal performance data 

either do not exist or were not made available to the Committee for review. The Committee 

recommended that NASA charter an expert panel to determine what, if any, psychological 

testing should be performed and how it should be used to select astronaut candidates suitable 

for space operations. 

Management Actions. To address this recommendation, the Space Medicine Division 

reviewed the current astronaut selection process. In addition, the Space Medicine 

Division formed an Astronaut Selection Working Group consisting of eight members 

selected from a list of credentialed psychologists and professionals with military 

operational, academic, or consultant experience. The Working Group made the following 

10 recommendations. 
RESULTS

6 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

1. Perform a job/work analysis to verify and modify the appropriateness of 10 

astronaut attributes. Ensure coverage of the full spectrum of astronaut training 

and duties, to include ground and flight performance. 

2. Develop a matrix of astronaut attributes by assessment techniques. The matrix 

should map assessment techniques, tools, and measures to astronaut attributes. 

Also, perform an evaluation of current assessment tools against the matrix to 

identify gaps, unnecessary redundancies, and irrelevance. 

3. Perform a criterion-related validation to evaluate the evidence base for the 

evaluation tools currently in use. This process would evaluate the astronauts’ 

scores from selection tools and tests and compare them to scores from training 

data. 

4. Review best practices to ensure optimal effectiveness of the astronaut selection 

program. 

5. Update the Astronaut Selection Board interview process to include an operational 

psychologist during the interview. 

6. Update the Astronaut Selection Board final deliberation process to include an 

operational psychologist during the deliberation. 

7. Analyze the presentation of available data to derive qualitative and quantitative 

combinations of information to present expected astronaut performance to the 

Astronaut Selection Board at critical points to assist in its decision making. 

8. Upgrade the current astronaut selection interview process to include two 

behavioral specialists who complete ratings on each applicant, creating anchors 

for ratings within each dimension. 

9. Establish ongoing behavioral science support to astronauts. 

10. Change the initial applicant screening process to benefit from best practices

within the behavioral health community. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that NASA chartered an expert panel and held a 

workshop at Johnson in May 2008 and that the Working Group made 10 

recommendations. In order to assess whether Johnson implemented the Committee’s

recommendation, we reviewed details of methods, criteria, and optimal performance data 

used to identify applicants who can adapt most readily and perform effectively in the 

extreme environment of space flight. We also reviewed records identifying behavioral 

health specialists in the interview and the group’s final deliberation process to determine 

that the Space Medicine Division had implemented Working Group Recommendations 

2–3 and 5–10. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 7 

According to the Space Medicine Division Chief, Recommendation 1 was not 

implemented because a work analysis must be done when there is a significant mission 

change affecting the work performed by astronauts. Because there was not a significant 

mission change prior to hiring the May 2009 astronaut class, the Space Medicine 

Division Chief said the time was not right to implement this recommendation. In 

addition, the Space Medicine Division did not implement Recommendation 4 prior to 

selecting the May 2009 astronaut class because the staff considered the efforts of the 

Working Group as a best practices review and, therefore, did not require a separate best 

practice assessment. We agree with the reasoning for not implementing 

Recommendations 1 and 4. Therefore, we determined that NASA implemented 

corrective actions that met the intent of the Committee recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 1cii. The Committee recommended that the extensive 

behavioral health data already collected be analyzed to determine whether the data can be 

applied to future candidate selection and potentially guide astronaut selection for flight. 

Management Actions. The Space Medicine Division behavioral health providers 

reviewed selection ratings on 53 astronauts from 1998, 2000, and 2003 and placed all 

selection scores into a database. In addition, they reviewed the need for analyses of 

different astronaut jobs and worked with Johnson’s Astronaut Office, Space Shuttle 

Program and ISS Program training offices, and Johnson’s Human Resources Office to 

determine whether other data was available for analysis. The Space Medicine Division 

also met with the Astronaut Office Chief and obtained verbal agreement for the 

behavioral health providers to spend more time with astronaut candidates to perform 

testing. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that the Space Medicine Division worked with the 

Astronaut Office to review the prior years’ internal selection ratings and computed 

correlations on the performance ratings. In addition, we verified that the behavioral 

health data collected was used to determine whether such data could be applied to future 

candidate selection and potentially guide astronaut selection for missions. We also 

confirmed that NASA used this data in the selection of the May 2009 astronaut candidate 

class. Therefore, we concluded that NASA had implemented corrective actions that met 

the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 1di. The Committee found the use of behavioral health 

selection and patient data to be a matter of concern for astronauts, family members, and 

medical health and behavioral health providers. The Committee recommended that NASA 

ensure that the use of all psychiatric and psychological data, both patient and research 

related, is explained to astronaut candidates, astronauts, and family members. In addition, 

appropriate privacy and human subject considerations should apply to use of the data. 
RESULTS

8 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

Management Actions. To address the behavioral health clinic’s Privacy Act 

requirements, the Space Medicine Division issued five Behavioral Health and 

Performance (BHP) policies and procedures on July 31, 2008: 

• “BHP Provider Rules and Regulations” 

• BHP 3.00, “BHP Patient Access to Clinical Records”

• BHP 4.00, “BHP Patient Rights and Responsibilities” 

• BHP 7.00, “BHP Privacy Act of 1974, as amended Operating Plan” 

• BHP 8.00, “BHP Release of Privacy Act Information”

Additionally, the Space Medicine Division developed “Protection, Privacy, and 

Confidentiality of Medical Data,” a training course on providers’ Privacy Act 

responsibilities, and all Space Life Sciences Directorate personnel completed this course 

by December 2007. In February 2009, the course was also made available to all Johnson 

employees through the Center’s online training system. Finally, the Space Medicine 

Division developed a brochure on the behavioral health clinic and patient privacy rights. 

The brochure was made available at the clinic and sent to every astronaut in the spring of 

2007. 

For the protection of human subjects during NASA research, NASA and Johnson already 

had policies and procedures in place for researchers’ use of an astronaut’s medical and 

Privacy Act data, as required by Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1230, 

“Protection of Human Subjects,” June 18, 1991. Specifically, NASA Policy 

Directive 7100.8E, “Protection of Human Research Subjects,” May 2002 (revalidated 

April 16, 2007), and NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7100.1, “Protection of 

Human Research Subjects,” March 2003 (revalidated July 7, 2008), require an astronaut’s 

written consent prior to a researcher accessing medical data. The requirements state that 

an astronaut’s informed consent and an assurance of confidentiality must be on file in 

order to prevent the inappropriate release or use of any medical data. Applicable privacy 

and confidentiality requirements are found in Johnson Policy Directive 1382.5B, 

“Maintaining the Privacy of Biomedical Research Data,” January 27, 2004. 

Audit Evaluation. We did not review day-to-day operations or medical records to 

ensure that NASA personnel followed the privacy requirements of the July 2008 BHP 

policies and procedures. However, we verified that the Space Medicine Division issued

the five BHP policies related to the Privacy Act requirements, as well as providing 

astronauts with the behavioral health clinic brochure that discusses privacy rights 

information. We also verified that the Space Medicine Division created a training course

on privacy, that Space Life Sciences Directorate personnel took the course, and that the 

course was available to Johnson employees through an online training system. In 

addition, we verified that Johnson had existing policies and procedures for use of 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 9 

employee privacy data for research purposes. Therefore, we determined that NASA took 

corrective actions that met the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 2ai. The Committee reported that several astronauts 

expressed concerns regarding the purpose of their medical testing. Therefore, the 

Committee recommended that NASA ensure that policies and procedures are in place and 

properly implemented to communicate the purpose of medical tests performed on astronauts 

prior to, during, and after flight. These policies should clearly indicate which tests are 

intended for medical or safety monitoring and which are for research purposes. The policies 

should also require an astronaut’s informed consent for gathering data for research. The 

Committee reported that including astronauts in this process would result in more complete 

information to enhance cooperation between the medical and astronaut community. 

Management Actions. The Space Life Sciences Directorate’s Human Adaptation and 

Countermeasures Division Deputy Chief stated that all research involving astronauts is 

approved through the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. The Space Life 

Sciences Directorate’s Work Instruction SA-WI-007, “Space and Life Science Flight 

Crew Informed Consent Briefings,” September 24, 2003, states that the Directorate 

conducts briefings to provide information on planned human testing that allow potential 

subjects to make an informed decision on participation. The briefings establish a 

nonprofessional’s level of understanding on the life science experiments, risks and 

benefits of obtaining medical and scientific data, and crewmember participation 

expectation. A consent form and a data-sharing release form are given to the 

crewmembers to review, sign, and return if they want to participate in the testing. 

However, crewmembers can elect not to participate in the testing if they later change 

their mind. The Space Life Sciences Directorate also provides the informed consent 

briefing package (including the agenda and presentations) before finalizing and 

presenting it to the Flight Crew Operations Directorate for review. 

In addition to this existing process, the Space Life Sciences Directorate’s Human 

Adaptation and Countermeasures Division Deputy Chief said the Directorate enhanced its 

procedures by implementing a color-coding system to further distinguish medical 

operational requirements from research. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that the Space Life Sciences Directorate already had 

procedures in place to communicate the purpose of medical tests performed prior to, 

during, and after flight, as well as to obtain agreement and consent forms from 

crewmembers prior to the tests. We reviewed the Work Instruction and verified that it 

also provides guidance for conducting the informed consent briefings, defines roles and 

responsibilities, and establishes the implementing authority for each briefing. We also 

verified that the Directorate uses a color-coded system to distinguish medical operational 

requirements from research. Therefore, we determined that NASA implemented 

corrective actions that met the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendations 2bi. The Committee identified alleged cases of 

inappropriate alcohol use by astronauts in the immediate preflight period. The Committee 
RESULTS

10 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

recommended that NASA ensure that specific policies, procedures, educational efforts, and 

disciplinary actions are in place to foster a culture that holds individuals and supervisors 

accountable for safe and responsible use of alcohol. 

Management Actions. The Flight Crew Operations Directorate Assistant Director stated

that Flight Crew Operations Directorate management could enforce NPR 3752.1, 

“Disciplinary and Adverse Actions,” May 7, 1999 (revalidated May 5, 2006), to address 

the improper use of alcohol by civil service astronauts and refer military astronauts to the 

respective military entity for disciplinary actions. The Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate Director stated that a flight surgeon has always been assigned to each mission 

and the mission-assigned flight surgeon and other NASA managers stay in the Johnson 

and Kennedy crew quarters during the prelaunch period. Additionally, the flight surgeon 

and NASA managers are with the crew from wake-up until launch on launch day. The 

Space Medicine Division Chief added that the mission-assigned flight surgeon performs a 

visual check of each astronaut prior to launch. 

The Flight Crew Operations Directorate created CA-07-28, “Space Flight Alcohol 

Policy,” on July 27, 2007, and updated the policy under CA-08-20 on June 25, 2008. The 

policy applies to any person launching on a NASA spacecraft and states that alcohol is 

prohibited within 16 hours of space flight. Johnson Policy Directive 8710.1, “Alcohol 

Consumption in the Astronaut Crew Quarters,” October 3, 2007, and Kennedy NASA 

Policy Directive 1600.4, “Alcohol Consumption in the Astronaut Crew Quarters,” 

October 18, 2007, identify policies for limited and responsible alcohol consumption in 

the astronaut crew quarters at Johnson and Kennedy, respectively. The Astronaut Office 

Chief briefed NASA astronauts in January 2008 to ensure awareness of the new policies 

and management’s expectations on alcohol use and abuse. In addition, the policies were 

provided to all astronauts.

Audit Evaluation. We did not visit crew quarters to determine whether the policies were 

followed. However, we verified that the above-mentioned policies address the safe and 

responsible use of alcohol within Johnson and Kennedy crew quarters and that the 

disciplinary policy is applicable to all civil service, military, contractor, or international 

partner personnel and their guests, to include astronauts. We also verified that the 

policies are available from the Astronaut Office or on Johnson’s Web site. Finally, we 

verified that the Space Medicine Division has a flight surgeon checklist that states a 

visual assessment of the astronauts should occur between 5 and 12 hours before launch. 

Therefore, we determined that NASA took corrective actions to meet the intent of the 

recommendation.

Committee Recommendation 2bii. The Committee identified alleged cases of 

inappropriate alcohol use by astronauts in the immediate preflight period. The Committee 

recommended that NASA ensure that specific policies regarding alcohol use, including but 

not limited to a mandatory alcohol-free period prior to flight and the availability and use of 

alcohol in crew quarters, are in place and enforced. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 11

Management Actions. See Management Actions in response to the previous 

recommendation (Committee Recommendation 2bi). 

Audit Evaluation. We did not visit crew quarters to determine whether the policies were 

followed. However, we verified that CA-08-20 states that alcohol is prohibited within 

16 hours of space flight and that Kennedy NASA Policy Directive 1600.4 and Johnson 

Policy Directive 8710.1 provide policies for limited and responsible alcohol consumption 

in the astronaut crew quarters at Johnson and Kennedy, respectively. Therefore, NASA 

took corrective actions to meet the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendations 2biii. The Committee recommended that NASA institute a 

mechanism to monitor and ensure that the concerns raised by crewmembers, flight surgeons, 

and other individuals are evaluated and acted upon. 

Management Actions. Both the Flight Crew Operations Directorate Director and 

Assistant Director stated that NASA has existing policies and procedures that address this 

recommendation. In February 2008, NASA reported to Congress that since the Columbia 

accident, NASA leadership has ensured that mechanisms were in place for employees to 

raise flight safety and mission-success concerns without the fear of retribution. In 1987, 

the NASA safety reporting system was established for NASA employees to anonymously 

report safety and hazard concerns to upper management without fear of reprisal. The 

reporting system has since been expanded to cover all NASA operations, including space 

flights. 

In addition, NASA established a technical authority for engineering, safety, and medical 

and health in NPR 7120.5D, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 

Requirements,” March 6, 2007, as another way for people to report safety and missionimpacting concerns. The Astronaut Office Chief briefed NASA astronauts in January 

2008 on management’s expectations that employees raise flight safety concerns to 

Johnson or NASA management. 

In addition, the Flight Crew Operations Directorate conducted an anonymous survey of 

astronauts and flight surgeons from August through December 2007. The survey showed 

that both astronauts and flight surgeons were aware of the process to raise safety concerns 

through the chain of command or the NASA anonymous reporting system. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that NASA has an anonymous safety reporting system 

and that employees have been informed through various means about how to report 

concerns. We verified that the survey indicated that prior concerns raised were addressed 

by management and the person raising the concern received feedback. We also verified 

that NPR 7120.5D requires that a project plan describe a project’s internal processes for 

handling dissenting opinions. Finally, we verified that the NASA safety reporting system 

requires an entry documenting the actions taken to address any concerns raised. 

Therefore, NASA met the intent of the recommendation even though NASA did not 

institute a new mechanism to monitor and ensure that concerns raised by crewmembers, 

flight surgeons, and other individuals are evaluated and acted upon. 
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

Committee Recommendation 2ci. The Committee recommended that NASA senior 

leadership must ensure and support policies and procedures that allow flight surgeons, 

trainers, astronaut peers, and others to raise concerns to leadership. 

Management Actions. As discussed in the previous recommendation’s Management 

Actions, NASA has an anonymous safety reporting system and created safety, 

engineering, and medical technical authority positions to whom employees can report 

safety and mission concerns. According to the Flight Crew Operations Directorate

Director and the Space Medicine Division Chief, senior Headquarters and Johnson 

management issued e-mails explaining the reporting process and the importance of 

employees timely raising safety concerns. Johnson management said they continue to 

hold periodic employee meetings to emphasize the importance of employees reporting 

safety concerns and supervisors soliciting employee input. In addition, Johnson hangs 

safety posters throughout its buildings and provides information on reporting safety 

issues and concerns on NASA internal Web sites.

Audit Evaluation. In addition to the Management Actions we evaluated in response to 

Committee Recommendation 2biii, we witnessed posters throughout NASA and reviewed 

letters from senior management encouraging employees to report safety issues without 

reprisal. Therefore, corrective actions implemented in response to Committee 

Recommendation 2biii as well as this recommendation met the intent of the 

recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 3bi. The Committee found that continuity of care over time 

with a single provider increases the quality of medical care. However, NASA’s health care 

system is highly fragmented and does not promote continuity of care due to the large 

number of flight surgeons who can potentially provide care to any one astronaut. The 

Committee recommended that NASA review flight surgeon assignments and restructure 

where possible to enhance continuity of care and consider assigning each astronaut to a team 

of two to three flight surgeons who are responsible for providing or overseeing every 

episode of care, whether or not they are the mission-assigned flight surgeon. 

Management Actions. The Space Medicine Division Chief reviewed the Department of 

Defense’s medical process for assigning pilots to a small team of doctors and reviewed 

the operations of three prominent non-NASA medical clinics. The Space Medicine 

Division Chief, who is also a retired military physician, concluded that NASA astronauts 

and medical personnel could not effectively operate under the Department of Defense’s 

model because NASA’s medical operations are not similar to the Department of 

Defense’s medical operations. However, the Space Medicine Division Chief identified 

opportunities for improvement during his review of the three prominent non-NASA 

medical clinics’ operations, to include identification of strategies to improve the quality 

of care and astronaut safety. To improve continuity, consistency, and quality of care to 

patients, each flight surgeon’s assignments were reviewed and flight surgeons were 

permanently assigned to the flight medicine clinic used by the astronaut versus having a 

rotational assignment through the clinics. This resulted in a smaller group of flight 

surgeons treating the astronauts. Additionally, a flight surgeon was assigned to review 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 13

each astronaut’s medical records whenever a medical action was performed. In May 

2008, the Space Medicine Division’s six clinics were reorganized under one branch to 

standardize care, improve communications between the providers, and improve the 

quality of treatment by enhancing primary care provided to astronauts. Five additional 

Space Medicine Division quality care committees were formed, along with the existing 

Space Medicine Division committees to assist managers with improving the Space 

Medicine Division operations.

Audit Evaluation. We verified that the Space Medicine Division reviewed the medical 

process for the Department of Defense and other external entities, and reorganized the 

clinics. We agree that organizationally placing all clinics under one branch results in a 

less fragmented structure. We also agree that continuity of care for an astronaut should 

be improved by reducing the number of flight surgeons who treat the astronaut and 

assigning a flight surgeon to each astronaut to review the medical record after each 

medical action. Therefore, we concluded that NASA implemented corrective actions that 

met the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 3bii. The Committee recommended that psychologists shift 

from only providing “patient” care for treatment of disease to assist astronauts in assessing 

areas of strength and weakness and provide skills to optimize mission success. 

Management Actions. Space Medicine Division management stated that behavioral 

health providers were already providing performance enhancement to all astronauts prior 

to the Committee’s recommendation. Specifically, Johnson’s “Behavioral Health 

Performance Program Plan, Definition and Implementation Guide” (JSC 27384, 

November 1999), states that behavioral health providers concentrate on enhancing 

employee performance versus identifying mental health problems (diseases). Behavioral 

health providers conduct operational psychology training of astronauts and their families 

on the psychological factors of long-duration missions. In October 1999, the providers 

developed a 3-day training course, “Expeditionary Workshop,” for astronauts assigned to 

long-duration missions. The training course included training on self-care and selfmanagement, conflict management, cross-cultural communication, and leadership. 

Behavioral health providers also debrief astronauts who participate in extensive training 

events. 

To address the recommendation, the Space Medicine Division assessed the behavioral 

health services it provides to the Astronaut Office and hired an additional psychologist 

and a psychiatrist. Additionally, the behavioral health providers reviewed best practices 

from non-NASA psychologists who work in industrial, organizational, and business 

industries. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that the behavioral health providers were already 

providing performance enhancement to all astronauts, according to the training and 

guidance described in Management Actions, prior to the Committee’s recommendation. 

In addition, the hiring of a psychologist and a psychiatrist should augment the behavioral 

health services provided to the astronauts. Therefore, NASA met the intent of the 
RESULTS

14 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

recommendation even though the Space Medicine Division did not change its 

performance enhancement processes as specifically recommended. 

Committee Recommendation 3ci. The Committee found that astronauts do not receive a 

periodic psychological evaluation after they become an astronaut candidate, unless selected 

for a long-duration mission. The Committee recommended that behavioral health 

evaluations be integrated into the annual flight physical for all astronauts, regardless of 

mission assignment status, whether long-duration, short-duration, or unassigned. These 

evaluations should include recognized screening instruments for issues such as depression, 

anxiety, relationship stress, substance use, and the cumulative effects of normal life events 

and should be conducted by the flight surgeon responsible for the continuity of the 

astronaut’s care in consultation with behavioral health. 

Management Actions. In August 2008, the Space Medicine Division Chief directed the 

behavioral health providers to include a 30-minute behavioral wellness evaluation as part 

of an astronaut’s annual medical examination beginning October 1, 2008. The Chief

stated that the behavioral wellness evaluation should encompass the astronaut’s NASA 

career status, professional training and workload, sleep and fatigue, peer and management 

relationships, social and family life, greatest professional and personal challenges, and 

primary goals for the coming year. 

On March 23, 2009, the Space Medicine Division Chief issued SD-09-021, “Annual 

Astronaut Behavioral Health Exam,” which states that a licensed and credentialed 

psychiatrist will perform annual exams to assess an astronaut’s behavioral health. The 

psychiatrist will document whether the astronaut is qualified or disqualified from active 

flying status, and those cases that are disqualified will be brought before the Aerospace 

Medicine Board. 

Audit Evaluation. We did not review medical records to ensure that they included a 

30-minute behavioral wellness evaluation as a part of the astronaut’s annual medical 

examination. However, we verified that the Space Medicine Division issued guidance to 

the behavioral health providers to institute the 30-minute behavioral wellness evaluations. 

We also reviewed the behavioral wellness evaluation interview questions and determined 

that the discussion topics should address the Committee’s concerns on issues such as 

depression, anxiety, relationship stress, substance use, and the cumulative effects of 

normal life events. Therefore, NASA has taken corrective actions to meet the intent of 

the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 3cii. The Committee recommended that behavioral health 

providers provide regular training to flight surgeons regarding behavioral health assessment 

and treatment. 

Management Actions. In response to this recommendation, behavioral health providers 

stated that flight surgeons have always received general space flight behavioral health 

prevention and support training even though there was no formal policy to do so. The 

behavioral health providers conducted behavioral health assessment and treatment 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 15

training for the flight surgeons in July 2008 and January 2009. On March 23, 2009, the 

Space Medicine Division Chief issued SD-09-020, “Flight Surgeon Training in 

Behavioral Health and Performance,” to formally require behavioral health providers to 

conduct an annual training session for flight surgeons. The training should include a 

description of the behavioral health services offered, specific stresses known and treated 

in the Astronaut Corps, and training that will help the flight surgeon identify behaviors 

that should be reported or addressed. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that the Space Medicine Division Chief issued a policy 

for annual behavioral health assessment and treatment training for flight surgeons and 

that the BHP providers conducted the aforementioned training in July 2008 and January 

2009. Therefore, NASA implemented actions that met the intent of the recommendation.

Committee Recommendation 4ai. The Committee recommended that the process and 

medical criteria used to select astronauts for flight be explicit, available to each astronaut, 

and made as far in advance as possible to decrease the anxiety, speculation, and uncertainty 

surrounding space flight selection. 

Management Actions. The Flight Crew Operations Directorate policy, “Crew 

Assignment Process,” October 2001, defines the Astronaut Office’s process for selecting 

astronaut crewmembers for a mission and informing astronauts of their flight eligibility 

and mission requirements. Specifically, the Astronaut Office Chief briefs the astronauts 

on NASA’s selection process and the specific criteria for each mission’s crew selection. 

A flight surgeon discusses health issues as well as medical certification for flight with 

each astronaut during the annual physical examination. In addition, the Flight Crew 

Operations Directorate had a formal process to inform the astronauts of their flight 

eligibility status and progress throughout the training process prior to the Committee’s 

recommendation. Specifically, Johnson’s Astronaut Evaluation Board reviews each 

astronaut’s flight status and performance after each training exercise and mission. The 

Astronaut Evaluation Board recommends to the Astronaut Office Chief whether the 

astronaut should be eligible, conditionally eligible, or ineligible for flight assignments 

based on the astronaut’s level of performance. The Astronaut Office Chief then verbally 

discusses the astronaut’s eligibility with the astronaut. According to Johnson officials, 

these processes are still in place. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that prior to the Committee’s recommendation, the 

Flight Crew Operations Directorate had formal, documented processes for notifying 

astronauts of the crew selection process and the medical and performance qualifications 

for flight. Therefore, NASA meets the intent of the recommendation even though the 

Flight Crew Operations Directorate did not change its selection and notification process. 

Committee Recommendation 4bi. The Committee stated the Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate is primarily responsible for providing National Outdoor Leadership School and 

NASA extreme environment mission operations exercises to astronauts that focus on group 

and interpersonal skills. The Committee recommended that these two programs be 

evaluated for their usefulness in astronaut selection, evaluation, and training. Behavioral 
RESULTS

16 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

health experts should be included as part of planning and the astronaut selection, training, 

and evaluation team for these and other related environment exercises. 

Management Actions. The Flight Crew Operations Directorate Assistant Director and 

the Space Medicine Division Chief stated that astronaut training and exercises, including 

the National Outdoor Leadership School and NASA extreme environment mission 

operations exercises, have always been used by Flight Crew Operations Directorate 

management to assess which astronauts will be selected as permanent astronauts and 

crewmembers. The Astronaut Office Chief commented that the astronauts enjoy and 

benefit from such training; however, funding and astronaut time constraints affect the 

frequency of these two specific courses. Further, behavioral health providers stated that 

they have always been involved and continue to be involved in the planning, training, and 

evaluating of analog courses for astronaut candidates and astronauts. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that Flight Crew Operations Directorate management has 

a process for using various criteria, including performance on training and exercises, to 

determine whether astronaut candidates will become permanent astronauts and which 

astronauts will become crewmembers. We reviewed documents that showed that 

National Outdoor Leadership School and NASA extreme environment mission operations 

exercises have been used in the past and that behavioral health providers provided 

briefings to the astronauts involved. Therefore, NASA met the intent of the 

recommendation even though the Flight Crew Operations Directorate did not change its 

processes related to analog training and exercises. 

Committee Recommendation 6ai. The Committee recommended that NASA develop 

privacy policies and procedures that ensure that individual astronaut electronic medical 

records are viewable only on a strict need-to-know basis by clinicians directly involved in 

relevant aspects of astronaut care. In addition, the Committee recommended that privacy 

policies related to astronaut medical records should be consistent with civilian standards of 

practice and Federal privacy laws. 

Management Actions. In response to this recommendation, on July 31, 2008, the Space 

Medicine Division Chief issued “BHP Provider Rules and Regulations” and BHP 1.00, 

“BHP Documentation Standards.” Among other things, these policies outlined 

safeguards to protect the privacy of astronaut electronic records. The BHP Provider 

Rules and Regulations state:

1. Electronic medical records must be filed in a secure area away from the view of 

non-medical personnel, including patients;

2. Computer screens must be turned so that patient information is not visible to 

others;

3. E-mails containing confidential patient medical information must be sent 

encrypted;
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 17

4. Each provider is responsible for ensuring privacy during patient appointments by 

keeping voices low and office doors closed; and

5. When behavioral health examinations of the opposite gender are conducted, an 

administrative assistant or another provider is recommended to remain elsewhere 

in the office suite.

In addition, BHP 1.00 states that behavioral health clinical records will be kept in a 

uniform, legible fashion; available to authorized behavioral health personnel on a timely 

basis; protected by prudent safeguards from unauthorized inspection; and maintained as a 

hard paper copy or as a component to a secure electronic medical record. The policy also 

states that behavioral health providers will transfer clinical information to outside 

physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and hospitals on a timely basis when properly 

authorized, per the Privacy Act of 1974, or when otherwise required to do so by law. 

Audit Evaluation. We did not review astronaut medical records to determine whether 

they were accessed only on a need-to-know basis. However, we verified that these two 

policies address the privacy concerns related to access to electronic medical records

raised by the recommendation. Therefore, we believe that NASA has taken corrective 

actions to meet the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 6di. The Committee found that the flight medicine clinic 

has received consultations from the Joint Commission responsible for the accreditation of 

health care organizations; however, no formal external review or accreditation has been 

performed. The Committee recommended that NASA establish a program of external peer 

review of its medical and behavioral health staff. 

Management Actions. The Chief Health and Medical Officer stated that NASA clinics 

are not required to be accredited. Nevertheless, the Space Medicine Division Chief stated 

that the flight medicine clinic had a procedure for quarterly internal peer reviews 

involving flight surgeons. However, a similar peer review procedure did not exist for the 

behavioral health providers. Therefore, in July 2008 the Space Medicine Division issued 

BHP 5.00, “BHP Peer Review Program,” to require quarterly internal peer reviews. The

first review was conducted in the second quarter of 2009. 

In addition, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer conducted biennial peer 

reviews of the medical clinics in 2005 and 2007; however, the behavioral health clinic’s 

operations were not reviewed. Therefore, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical 

Officer developed a checklist of behavioral health issues to be reviewed during the peer 

reviews. As part of the Chief Health and Medical Officer’s review of Johnson in May 

2009, an independent, non-NASA behavioral health provider conducted a review of the 

behavioral health program and provided a written assessment. The Chief Health and 

Medical Officer reported on September 29, 2009, that Johnson’s BHP Program was 

compliant with NASA requirements. 
RESULTS

18 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

The Space Medicine Division Chief stated that external (non-NASA) peer reviews will be 

conducted when needed. For example, prior to the Nowak incident, the Space Medicine 

Division was in the process of obtaining an external peer review of the behavioral health 

program. However, he said that a formal policy requiring regular peer reviews does not 

exist because the reviews are costly, physicians with an aeromedical background are not 

readily available, and the Space Medicine Division has concerns about the exposure of 

astronaut privacy information to the public. 

Audit Evaluation. We reviewed BHP 5.00 related to internal peer reviews, the results of 

the last three Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer reviews, and the written 

assessments of the last two behavioral health reviews conducted by independent, nonNASA behavioral health providers.. In addition, we reviewed two external reviews of the 

behavioral health clinic performed since the Nowak incident. We determined that the 

actions taken address the Committee’s concerns. Therefore, NASA implemented 

corrective actions that met the intent of the recommendation.

Committee Recommendation 6ei. The Committee found that dependents of astronauts 

have the choice of seeing community providers or NASA providers for medical, dental, and 

behavioral health care. The Committee recommended that NASA establish policies and 

procedures that ensure that dependents receive quality care if they see community providers. 

Management Actions. The Space Medicine Division Chief stated that NASA could 

only control the quality of care provided by NASA providers and cannot control the 

quality of care provided by a community provider that the patient selected. In addition, 

the Space Medicine Division said it had procedures for patient referrals for medical 

health issues (Medical Staff Rules and Regulations, February 22, 2006) prior to the 

Committee’s recommendation. A similar patient referral procedure for mental health was 

issued on July 31, 2008 (BHP Provider Rules and Regulations). The Space Medicine 

Division Chief stated that beyond the referral process, the Space Medicine Division does 

not have any control over which community provider a dependent may use. 

Audit Evaluation. We agree that NASA has no control over which non-NASA 

community health provider a dependent may see. We verified that the Space Medicine 

Division had medical and behavioral health procedures for referring patients to providers 

not affiliated with NASA. Therefore, NASA met the intent of the recommendation even 

though the Space Medicine Division did not establish new policies and procedures to 

address the Committee recommendation.

Committee Recommendation 6fi. The Committee recommended that all behavioral health 

providers have access to the patient’s electronic medical records. A patient in the behavioral 

health clinic should have the visit recorded in the electronic medical record, and a 

disposition should be made by a flight surgeon. The full behavioral health note does not 

need to be included in the electronic medical record. The behavioral health provider can 

discuss the case by phone or in person with the flight surgeon. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 19

Management Actions. The Space Medicine Division Chief developed “BHP Provider 

Rules and Regulations” to ensure that astronaut visits are recorded in the electronic 

medical record and that all medical and behavioral health care providers have access to 

appropriate medical records. BHP 1.00, “BHP Documentation Standards,” requires that 

the flight surgeon record every patient contact and any aeromedical disposition in the 

electronic medical record; however, the specifics on the behavioral health condition and 

services provided do not need to be detailed in the electronic record. The Division Chief 

said that when needed, the behavioral health provider can discuss specific cases that 

affect the mission with the responsible flight surgeon. The Space Medicine Division

Chief stated that all behavioral health providers have been briefed on this process. In 

addition, access to medical records by providers is managed through the established flight 

medicine clinic’s records access application process.

Audit Evaluation. We did not review medical records to ensure that behavioral health 

visits were recorded or that they included a disposition by a flight surgeon. However, we 

verified that “BHP Provider Rules and Regulations” addresses electronic record privacy 

and confidentiality. We also verified that BHP 1.00 requires that flight surgeons record 

every patient contact and any disposition in the electronic medical record; however, as 

indicated above, specifics on the patient’s behavioral health do not need to be detailed in 

the electronic record. Therefore, NASA has taken corrective actions to meet the intent of 

the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 7aii(1). The Committee found that Johnson had welldefined procedures for the flight medicine clinic; however, a documented credentialing and 

privileging process did not exist for the behavioral health clinic. Primary source verification 

occurs during the hiring process for flight surgeons, when the original source is contacted to 

verify the accuracy of the provider’s qualifications. The Committee recommended that 

NASA establish one credentialing and privileging authority for both flight surgeons and 

behavioral health providers, with documented processes for accountability, primary source 

verification, and peer review. 

Management Actions. The Space Medicine Division Chief stated that all NASA health 

care providers are licensed by a Government agency to practice medicine by the 

applicable medical association (American Medical Association or American Psychiatric 

Association). In addition, the State of Texas requires licenses for health care providers. 

Therefore, all NASA providers have a medical or psychiatric license. 

On July 31, 2008, the Space Medicine Division issued BHP 2.00, “BHP Initial 

Appointment to Medical Staff”; BHP 5.00, “BHP Peer Review Program”; BHP 6.00, 

“BHP Psychiatrists and Psychologists Primary Source Verifications”; and BHP 9.00, 

“BHP Clinical Staff Reappointment,” that address hiring, credentialing, and privileging 

of health care staff. In addition, since October 1, 2007, all Space Medicine Division 

behavioral health providers have had their credentialing and privileging authority 

updated. 
RESULTS

20 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

Audit Evaluation. We did not review the credentialing and privileging authority for the 

behavioral health providers. However, we verified that these four procedures are in place 

to ensure that behavioral health providers’ licenses, training, and qualifications are 

authenticated prior to hiring; clinical privileges are determined and reassessed 

periodically; and other Johnson providers randomly review behavioral health providers’ 

records each quarter. Therefore, NASA has taken actions to meet the intent of the 

recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 7bi(1). The Committee stated that there are no standard 

operating procedures for the behavioral health clinic and no standard operating procedures 

for the flow of information regarding astronaut care or how information is used. In addition, 

the Committee stated that no written procedures exist to explain how mission readiness is 

determined or how it is communicated to the clinic. The Committee recommended that 

NASA develop written procedures in these areas. 

Management Actions. The Space Medicine Division used the existing flight medicine 

clinic’s procedures to develop 10 standard operating procedures for the behavioral health 

clinic that were issued on July 31, 2008. The specific procedures are “BHP Provider 

Rules and Regulations”; BHP 1.00, “BHP Documentation Standards”; BHP 2.00, 

“BHP Initial Appointment to Medical Staff”; BHP 3.00, “BHP Patient Access to Clinical 

Records”; BHP 4.00, “BHP Patient Rights and Responsibilities”; BHP 7.00, 

“BHP Privacy Act of 1974, as amended Operating Plan”; BHP 8.00, “BHP Release of 

Privacy Act Information”; BHP 9.00, “BHP Clinical Staff Reappointment”; BHP 10.00, 

“BHP Suspected Family Violence Management”; and BHP 11.00, “BHP Suspected 

Abuse and Neglect or Exploitation Management.” 

Audit Evaluation. We did not review medical records or day-to-day operations to 

ensure implementation of the standard operating procedures. However, we verified that 

these 10 procedures provide documented guidance for the behavioral health clinic’s 

operations as well as the flow of information regarding astronaut care and how 

information is used. In addition, BHP 1.00 documents how mission readiness is 

determined and communicated to the clinic. Therefore, NASA has taken corrective 

actions to meet the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 7di. The Committee found inconsistent attendance at 

Johnson’s Aerospace Medicine Board meetings by its members, which may result in 

members making decisions without considering all applicable information. Therefore, the 

Committee recommended that NASA restructure Board membership to ensure depth of 

experience and consistent attendance. 

Management Actions. During the Committee’s review, the only NASA guidance 

applicable to Board operations was NASA Charter 1000-12, “NASA Medical Policy 

Board and Aerospace Medicine Board,” July 25, 2007. NASA Charter 1000-12 stated 

that the Board, a clinical and implementation body at Johnson for addressing crew 

medical qualifications, was composed of five flight surgeons (a chair and four members), 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 21

with one having an aerospace medicine certification. Under the charter, the chair and 

three members constituted a meeting quorum. 

To address the Committee recommendation, the Space Medicine Division Chief 

developed “Johnson’s Aerospace Medicine Board Policies and Procedures Manual,” 

which outlines the process for ensuring that astronaut program applicants and astronauts 

are medically fit for assigned training and flight duties, referred to as fitness for duty. 

The Manual defines the Board’s authority, responsibilities, membership, meeting 

quorum, reporting, decision making, and waiver requirements. Board membership now 

consists of a chair, alternative chair, an executive secretary, and four additional members 

for a total of seven members. At least two of the seven members must have an aerospace 

medicine certification and all seven must attend every Board meeting or send a 

replacement. All members in attendance have input on agenda issues; however, the chair 

makes the final determination on all actions. The chair implemented the changes to the 

Board’s organization and attendance, as stated in the Manual, on December 17, 2009. 

In addition, the Chief Health and Medical Officer revised NASA Charter 1000-12 to 

ensure the requirements in the Manual and charter did not conflict. The Chief Health and 

Medical Officer made changes to the charter related to Board operations and issued the 

revision, Charter 1000-26, “NASA Medical Policy Board and Aerospace Medicine 

Board,” on December 15, 2009. 

Audit Evaluation. We reviewed and compared the old policy to the revised NASA 

Charter and Johnson’s policies and procedures manual. In addition, we compared the 

new and revised documents. Both documents addressed the Board membership’s 

restructuring, expertise required, and meeting attendance rules. We also confirmed that 

at least two of the current members had certifications in aerospace medicine and that four 

physicians were appointed as members and a permanent alternative chair was designated. 

Therefore, NASA implemented actions that met the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 7ei(1). The Committee stated that the astronauts’ concern 

about the protection of their privacy prevents effective communication regarding patient 

status between behavioral health and other medical providers and limits the ability of the 

flight surgeons to appropriately assess an astronaut’s medical eligibility. The Committee 

recommended open and regular communication between flight surgeons and behavioral 

health officials. While appropriate confidentiality must be maintained, the Committee stated 

that collaboration between all health care providers must take place to ensure the highest 

quality of care, optimum mission support, and consistent astronaut performance. 

Management Actions. The Space Medicine Division Chief found that the behavioral 

health clinic lacked operational procedures; therefore, his office issued five BHP 

procedural documents on July 31, 2008, to address privacy, confidentiality, and patient 

and provider rights requirements. Specifically, “BHP Provider Rules and Regulations” 

requires that behavioral health providers complete a medical record for all visits or 

encounters to improve the continuity of care provided by the medical and behavioral 

health providers. In addition, BHP 3.00, BHP 4.00, BHP 7.00, and BHP 8.00 address 
RESULTS

22 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

patient rights to (1) have an explanation of the diagnosis and treatment plan, (2) process a 

complaint regarding their care, (3) appeal a behavioral health decision, (4) have their 

medical records safeguarded from those without a need to review, and (5) obtain their 

medical records. Additionally, the behavioral health clinic and the five medical health 

clinics were reorganized under the Clinical Services Branch (within the Space Medicine 

Division) to provide consistent management and improved communications between 

providers. Branch personnel attend monthly meetings where operations and policies are 

discussed. In addition, the Space Medicine Division Chief stated that medical and 

behavioral health providers meet as needed to discuss specific patient information that is 

pertinent for patient care or NASA’s mission (see the discussion of Recommendation 6fi, 

page 18). 

Audit Evaluation. We did not review astronaut medical records to ensure 

implementation of the five BHP procedural documents. However, we verified that the 

Space Medicine Division Chief developed behavioral health clinic procedures that 

address patient privacy, provider’s roles, and the completion of medical records. We 

reviewed the Space Medicine Division’s Quality Committee’s meeting minutes, which 

documented attendance by both medical and behavioral health providers and discussions 

regarding various clinical issues. We believe that reorganizing the clinics into one branch 

should improve management oversight, consistency of operations for the clinics, and the 

ability of the medical and behavioral health providers to share pertinent patient 

information that would enhance quality of care and optimize mission support. Therefore, 

NASA has taken actions to meet the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 9ai. The Committee recommended that NASA establish and 

enforce a formal, written astronaut code of conduct. 

Management Action. In response to the Committee’s recommendation, the Astronaut 

Corps developed a code of conduct: “Astronaut Code of Professional Responsibility.” 

The code was posted on the Home Page of the Astronaut Office’s Web site on 

February 25, 2008, and is displayed in meeting areas throughout the office space of the 

Flight Crew Operations Directorate. The Astronaut Office Chief also conducted a 

briefing with the astronauts in January 2008 to discuss the Astronaut Code of 

Professional Responsibility. 

Audit Evaluation. We reviewed the code of conduct and verified that it is on the 

Astronaut Office’s Web site and displayed throughout the Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate office space. Therefore, NASA implemented actions that met the intent of 

the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 11ai. The Committee expressed a need to identify and share 

human factors concerns or issues among all organizations involved in astronaut activities. 

Human factors are personal and professional circumstances, such as low proficiency or 

stressors related to a medical condition, psychological or social adjustment, or professional 

problems, which may interfere with an individual’s ability to aviate effectively. The 

Committee recommended that NASA create a human factors council, patterned after the 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 23

Navy’s model, to identify and mitigate astronaut human factors concerns. This council 

could bring together the multidisciplinary representation from all organizations involved in 

astronaut activities and enhance leadership’s knowledge of how an astronaut is functioning 

in a variety of settings. 

Management Actions. The Flight Crew Operations Directorate Assistant Director said 

that it uses Johnson’s Astronaut Evaluation Board to address human factors issues. This 

Board was established in April 2000 to assist Flight Crew Operations Directorate 

management in providing competent and technically proficient astronauts who are ready 

for mission assignment. The Astronaut Office reviewed the Navy’s human factors 

council model as suggested by the Committee. In addition, the Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate examined incorporating the model into all crewmember evaluations and

operations within the Directorate and has an effort underway to incorporate the model

into normal operations within other Flight Crew Operations Directorate divisions, as 

appropriate. 

In addition, behavioral, conduct, and other personal issues are addressed by the Astronaut 

Office Chief and the Flight Crew Operations Directorate Director. Astronaut medical 

issues affecting flight status are addressed during biweekly meetings between the Space 

Medicine Division Chief and the Astronaut Office Chief. The Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate also performs a Crew Resource Management Review to summarize the 

current state of crew resource management training across the aviation community. This 

includes a review of NASA’s status compared to the Navy, Air Force, and Continental 

Airlines with regard to training. Based on the review, the Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate developed a Crew Resource Management Implementation Plan for 

developing standards and simulations.

Audit Evaluation. We obtained a copy of the policy and procedures document for the 

Navy’s human factors council,3

We determined that the Navy Board operates similarly to the Astronaut Evaluation 

Board. Specifically, Johnson’s Astronaut Evaluation Board determines the flight status 

of each astronaut as eligible, ineligible, or conditionally eligible; decides upon corrective 

action, if necessary; and passes recommendations of flight status and corrective actions to 

the Astronaut Office Chief for final disposition. The Astronaut Office Chief or the Flight 

Crew Operations Directorate Director may convene an Astronaut Evaluation Board at 

any time to review cases. In addition, an Astronaut Evaluation Board will normally 

 which provides a formal process for communicating 

human factors issues to the commanding officer. The Navy’s Human Factors Board is 

convened whenever a crewmember’s or pilot’s ability to perform flight duties safely is in 

question. The Navy Board provides an individual plan of action to mitigate identified 

problems and reintegrate the individual to full performance of assigned duties. The 

commanding officer can then use the information for risk assessment and subsequent 

decisions regarding safety of flight issues. 

 

3

 “Human Factors Council and Human Factors Board Policy and Procedures,” available online at 

https://www.netc.navy.mil/nascweb/sas/files/5420-2.pdf (accessed May 14, 2010).
RESULTS

24 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

convene to review astronauts completing flight assignments and astronaut candidate 

training or other astronauts recommended for review by their branch chief. Because the 

purpose of Johnson’s Astronaut Evaluation Board is similar to the Navy Board, we 

concluded that NASA met the intent of the recommendation even though the Flight Crew 

Operations Directorate did not change its processes. 

Committee Recommendation 11bi. The Committee recommended that NASA ensure that 

the Astronaut Office is structurally and functionally organized to provide enduring 

supervisory relationships that extend over years and are not limited to technical or mission 

assignments. Supervisors should be senior astronauts, and each should have a manageable 

number of astronauts to supervise. These supervisors should report to the Astronaut Office 

Chief. 

Management Actions. Flight Crew Operations Directorate management stated that the 

current structure of the Astronaut Office is optimized to provide quality supervisory 

relationships while meeting mission requirements of the Space Shuttle and ISS programs. 

The Astronaut Office is organized into branches by technical and operational areas of 

expertise with experienced astronauts as branch chiefs. The branch chiefs are not formal 

supervisory positions in the NASA human resources system due to the astronaut mix 

(civilian, military, and international) and the rotation between technical and flight 

assignments that are expected during an astronaut’s career. In the traditional role, formal 

supervisors usually stay in their positions for several years. Designating astronauts in 

supervisory positions limits an astronaut’s ability to receive future flight assignments. In 

addition, military astronauts cannot be permanently placed in a position that is not 

actively involved in training for flight missions. The branch chiefs are rotated every 

2 years to assist the Flight Crew Operations Directorate in training the astronauts for 

leadership positions. To ensure continuity, the Flight Crew Operations Directorate 

maintains a civil service chief engineer’s position in each branch. 

Audit Evaluation. We believe that Johnson management’s decision to have 

nonsupervisory astronaut branch chiefs is justified, because permanently assigning 

astronauts to supervisory positions would limit an astronaut’s availability to train for 

future missions. In addition, we agree that necessary continuity can be provided through 

a chief engineer’s position. Therefore, we concluded that NASA met the intent of the 

recommendation even though the Flight Crew Operations Directorate did not change the 

management structure. 

Committee Recommendation 11ci. The Committee recommended that Astronaut Office 

supervisors be trained in the same or similar manner as other NASA supervisors, with added 

training and support for issues specific to astronaut functions. 

Management Actions. The Flight Crew Operations Directorate reviewed the training 

completed by each Astronaut Office supervisor and determined whether additional 

training was needed on a case-by-case basis. The Flight Crew Operations Directorate had 

the “Human Resource Management for Leaders in the Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate” course developed based on an existing Johnson human resources 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 25

management class offered to supervisors. This course was offered on May 7, 2007. The 

Flight Crew Operations Directorate Assistant Director stated that additional training of 

the leadership team will be provided as needed and new astronaut supervisors will be 

given appropriate leadership and management training. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that leadership and communication training courses were 

provided to astronauts, including those in supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. 

Therefore, NASA implemented actions that met the intent of the recommendation. 

Committee Recommendation 11di. The Committee recommended that NASA ensure that 

all astronauts undergo comprehensive annual and mid-year evaluations by line supervisors 

that integrate all available work-related information in addition to task-specific technical 

assignment evaluations. 

Management Actions. NPR 3430.1C, “Employee Performance Communication 

System,” May 1, 2007, requires that performance planning discussions, mid-term, and 

year-end appraisals be conducted for all employees, including astronauts. The Flight 

Crew Operations Directorate branch chiefs have face-to-face performance discussions 

with astronauts in their respective branch, and the Astronaut Office Chief is responsible 

for ensuring the discussions have occurred.

The Flight Crew Operations Directorate surveyed the Astronaut Corps in January 2008 

and found that the civilian astronauts were satisfied with the performance evaluations and 

feedback received; however, the military astronauts wanted more performance feedback 

from the Astronaut Office. The Astronaut Office Chief stated that he subsequently 

implemented the same performance feedback process for the military astronauts; 

however, the formal performance evaluation is not completed by the Astronaut Office, 

but rather the military. 

Audit Evaluation. We did not review performance records to ensure that Flight Crew 

Operations Directorate supervisors conducted mid-year and year-end appraisals. 

However, we reviewed NASA’s process for astronaut evaluations and verified that the 

Astronaut Office Chief requires comprehensive annual and mid-year evaluations. In 

addition, NASA developed a task-specific assessment tool, the Astronaut Personal 

Feedback form, to address the recommendation. Therefore, NASA has taken actions to 

meet the intent of the recommendation. 

Verbal Recommendation. During congressional testimony, the Committee Chair

recommended that NASA conduct a thorough, anonymous survey on the relevant issues in 

the Committee’s report. 

Management Actions. The Flight Crew Operations Directorate management used 

NASA and academic specialists to develop, conduct, and analyze results of a survey of 

Astronaut Office personnel and flight surgeons in January 2008. The survey focused on 

four areas: the relationship between astronauts and flight surgeons; raising and 

responding to issues of flight safety and crew suitability for flight; astronaut 
RESULTS

26 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

understanding of performance expectations, crew assignments, and space flight alcohol 

use policies and procedures; and astronaut understanding of how to report a flight safety 

risk due to alcohol use on launch day. NASA collected data anonymously from flight 

surgeons and astronauts to determine whether current policies and procedures should be 

changed. Survey results identified organizational strengths, such as the ability to raise 

safety concerns to managers, as well as areas for improvement related to astronaut 

performance evaluations and transparency of crew selection. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that NASA conducted a survey of Astronaut Office 

personnel and flight surgeons. We reviewed the survey results to identify whether the 

survey results affected any of the Committee recommendations and determined that 

NASA made changes in policies and procedures in response to areas identified as 

needing improvement. We also verified that the Astronaut Office Chief briefed the 

astronauts on the survey results. Therefore, we concluded that NASA implemented 

actions that met the intent of the recommendation. 

Five Safety and Mission Assurance Recommendations Addressed

The report issued by the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, “Space Flight Safety 

Review (Alcohol Use in the Preflight Period),” August 28, 2007, included six 

recommendations. We determined that Johnson and Kennedy either took actions or had 

processes in place that satisfied the intent of five of the six recommendations related to 

procedures on launch day, alcohol use by crewmembers, and conduct of crewmembers on 

the ISS. NASA did not take action to address the remaining recommendation related to 

alcohol testing of its employees (see page 30). 

First Recommendation. The Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance recommended that a 

flight surgeon be located in the suit room during suit-up to allow more direct contact with 

the crewmembers on launch day and to reduce the reliance on a suit technician (nonclinician) to identify any last-minute medical issue. 

Management Actions. Both the Flight Crew Operations Directorate and Space 

Medicine Division management stated that NASA already had processes in place that 

address this recommendation. The Assistant Director of the Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate stated that the mission-assigned flight surgeon and astronaut supervisor are 

with the crew on launch day from wake-up in the crew quarters until launch. Further, 

NASA documents the suit technicians assisting the astronauts with their space suits 

during each launch via video recording and displays the video on NASA television. 

Since the suit-up room can only accommodate the crew and suit technicians, a flight 

surgeon cannot be located in the room. However, the flight surgeon and astronaut 

supervisor can view the activity from outside the room or on monitors that record the 

activity. The Space Medicine Division Chief added that a visual check of each astronaut 

is on the flight surgeon’s checklist. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 27

Audit Evaluation. We verified that the flight surgeon’s checklist includes a visual 

assessment of the astronauts up to 9 hours before launch. We found that CA-08-14, 

“Kennedy Astronaut Crew Quarters Policy,” April 14, 2008, states that the missionassigned flight surgeon, astronaut supervisor, and other managers stay in Kennedy’s 

astronaut crew quarters prior to launch. Therefore, NASA has met the intent of the 

recommendation, even though it does not intend to locate a flight surgeon in the suit 

room during suit-up. 

Second Recommendation. The Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance recommended that 

NASA expand the existing NASA policy, CB-91-111, “High/Medium Risk Activity Policy,” 

June 1991, to include drinking to excess as one example of a high-risk activity. 

Management Action. The Flight Crew Operations Directorate Director revised the 

policy and issued CA-07-43, “High/Medium Risk Activity Policy,” on August 31, 2007, 

to state that astronauts should use good judgment and that even low-risk recreational 

activities, when combined with too much alcohol, can be a high risk that could affect the 

mission. The policy was distributed to all astronauts and Astronaut Office management 

and is posted on the Astronaut Office Web site. 

Audit Evaluation. We verified that the policy included the risk of drinking to excess 

and that the revised policy was distributed to the astronauts and available on the 

Astronaut Office Web site. Therefore, NASA implemented actions that met the intent of 

the recommendation. 

Third Recommendation. The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance found that the 

General Services Administration (GSA) had regulations governing alcohol use but that nonGSA NASA facilities had no similar regulations. Therefore, the Chief of Safety and 

Mission Assurance recommended that Johnson finalize its draft policy, “Alcohol Use in the 

Astronaut Crew Quarters.” Further, once completed and approved by the Johnson Director, 

this document should be filed with the highest-ranking law enforcement organization at the 

Center. 

Management Actions. Johnson Policy Directive 8710.1, “Alcohol Consumption in the 

Astronaut Crew Quarters,” finalized on October 3, 2007, states that astronauts can use 

alcohol in the crew quarters when off duty and that any NASA employee in the crew 

quarters should act responsibly when using alcohol. In addition, the assigned supervisor 

is responsible for monitoring alcohol use within the crew quarters. The policy also states 

that persons violating this policy can be subject to disciplinary action. The directive was 

published in the NASA Online Directives Information System (NODIS) and on the 

Astronaut Office Web site. According to Johnson’s Protective Services Chief, once a 

directive is online, Johnson’s highest-ranking law enforcement official is responsible for 

complying with and enforcing the directive. 

Audit Evaluation. We determined that Johnson Policy Directive 8710.1 defines the 

responsibilities for crewmembers’ alcohol use while in the crew quarters and the fact that 

violating this policy can result in disciplinary action. We confirmed that the policy is 
RESULTS

28 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

available to all Johnson employees from NODIS and through the Astronaut Office Web

site. Therefore, NASA implemented actions that met the intent of the recommendation. 

Fourth Recommendation. The Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance recommended that 

Kennedy complete a policy document on alcohol use in the astronaut crew quarters and the 

astronauts’ recreational activities at the beach house4

 

4 A Kennedy facility located on the beach but within the Center’s grounds that is used for training and 

business-related functions. 

similar to Johnson’s policy. Once 

approved by the Kennedy Director, this document should be filed with the highest-ranking 

law enforcement organization at Kennedy. 

Management Action. Kennedy NASA Policy Directive 1600.4, “Alcohol Consumption 

in the Astronaut Crew Quarters,” was revised on October 18, 2007, to mirror Johnson’s 

policy. The revised policy states that astronauts can use alcohol responsibly in crew 

quarters and the beach house when off duty, astronauts and employees should act 

responsibility when using alcohol, the supervisor should monitor the use of alcohol, and 

violating the policy can result in disciplinary action. The directive was published in 

NODIS and on the Astronaut Office Web site. 

Audit Evaluation. We determined that Kennedy NASA Policy Directive 1600.4 defines 

the responsibilities for alcohol use while in the crew quarters and the beach house and 

that violating this policy can result in disciplinary action. We verified that the policy was 

available to NASA employees and accessible from the Astronaut Office Web site. Based 

on the Johnson Protective Service’s Chief’s response to the previous recommendation, 

we determined that Kennedy’s highest-ranking law enforcement official would be 

responsible for enforcing the directive. Therefore, we concluded that NASA had 

implemented actions that met the intent of the recommendation. 

Fifth Recommendation. The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance found that the ISS 

Multilateral Crew Operations Panel (the Panel) had not developed the details of the 

disciplinary policy as stated in the “Code of Conduct for the ISS Crew,” issued in September 

2000. The Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance recommended that NASA work with the 

Panel to assess and document the need for additional details in the disciplinary policy. 

Management Actions. The Panel is composed of representatives from ISS international 

partners, including the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and participating European 

countries who make international policy decisions for the ISS. The Flight Crew 

Operations Directorate Assistant Director stated that NASA provided its disciplinary 

policy to the Panel; however, all ISS partners must agree to the final policy. He added 

that NASA has input on the ISS disciplinary policy for crewmembers and can always 

take disciplinary actions against NASA crewmembers. Therefore, as an ISS partner and 

member of the Panel, NASA officials said they will continue to work toward finalizing a 

disciplinary policy for ISS crewmembers. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 29

Audit Evaluation. We reviewed the Panel’s meeting minutes from October 2007 

through October 2008, which verified that the disciplinary policy is in development. We 

also reviewed NASA’s charts used to brief the Panel on NASA’s disciplinary policy and 

determined that NASA has worked with the Panel to finalize a disciplinary policy. 

Therefore, we determined that NASA took steps to meet the intent of the 

recommendation. 
RESULTS

30 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

NASA HAD NOT COMPLETED OR 

TAKEN ACTIONS TO ADDRESS 

TWO RECOMMENDATIONS

We found that NASA had not addressed 2 of the 39 recommendations made by 

Johnson, the Committee, and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. First, 

NASA Headquarters had not issued a NASA-wide policy to test NASA astronauts 

and other employees for alcohol. Second, NASA had not addressed whether 

astronauts should be included in NASA’s Personnel Reliability Program, nor had 

NASA addressed the finding that NASA civil service and military astronauts are not 

required to report all illness, injuries, or medication use so that the responsible 

NASA entity can determine whether the astronauts are fit to perform their assigned 

duties. 

NASA Had Not Addressed the Recommendation on Alcohol 

Testing

In August 2007, the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance reported to the NASA 

Deputy Administrator that NASA has the authority under Title 42, United States Code, 

Section 2473c (42 U.S.C. 2473c), “Drug and Alcohol Testing,” December 1991, to test 

civil service employees in safety-sensitive, security, or national security functions for 

alcohol. According to 42 U.S.C. 2473c, the testing program should provide for preemployment, reasonable suspicion, random, and post-incident testing for use of alcohol 

or a controlled substance. The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance found that the 

NASA Administrator, when implementing this authority, had established a drug-testing 

program but not an alcohol-testing program. In “Space Flight Safety Review (Alcohol 

Use in the Preflight Period),” August 28, 2007, the Chief of Safety and Mission 

Assurance recommended that NASA evaluate the implications of implementing the 

authority to test employees, including astronauts, for alcohol and make a decision. The 

Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance added that post-mishap testing and testing based 

on reasonable suspicion would be prudent for all flight safety critical employees, 

including astronauts, but he did not specifically recommend that NASA take this action. 

The Office of Human Capital Management began drafting a policy addressing alcohol 

testing of NASA employees in the second quarter of FY 2008 in response to a 

recommendation issued to NASA in the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (Panel) 

Annual Report for 2006, dated June 19, 2007. This report was issued prior to the 

initiation of the Safety and Mission Assurance review. The Panel found that there was 

not a NASA-wide requirement for random drug and alcohol testing of contractors and 

recommended that NASA expand testing to contractors, as well as to employees. When 

we met with the Office of Human Capital Management in July 2009, they were unaware 

of the recommendation made by the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance regarding 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 31

alcohol testing. Based on our review of the proposed policy, we believe that the new 

policy will address the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance’s recommendation. 

However, since the Office of Human Capital Management has not finalized the draft 

policy for issuance, the Safety and Mission Assurance review recommendation remains 

open. 

NASA Had Not Taken Action to Ensure Astronauts Report All 

Health Care Issues

The Committee found that NASA civil service and military astronauts were not required 

to report illness, injuries, or medication use unless the astronaut determines the 

information to be significant. The Committee stated that this practice is a major 

deviation from the military’s Personnel Reliability Program, where the military 

physician, who is qualified to make a determination as to whether an individual is fit for 

duty, must evaluate every episode of illness, injury, or medication. Therefore, the 

Committee recommended that NASA astronauts be included in NASA’s formal 

Personnel Reliability Program. 

According to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 1214.5, “Mission 

Critical Space System Personnel Reliability Program,” December 1990, NASA’s 

Personnel Reliability Program is designed to ensure that civil service personnel assigned 

to mission-critical positions or duties meet the screening requirements for background 

checks. However, NASA’s Personnel Reliability Program did not require employees to 

provide information on their illnesses, injuries, or medications. Even though the NASA 

Office of Protective Services suspended NASA’s Personnel Reliability Program on June 

10, 2009, we determined that including astronauts within NASA’s Personnel Reliability 

Program would not have addressed the Committee’s finding that astronauts were not 

required to report illnesses and non-NASA care. The Assistant Director of the Flight 

Crew Operations Directorate and Johnson’s Space Medicine Division Chief concurred 

with our analysis. 

NASA requires that astronauts receive an annual physical examination from a NASA 

flight surgeon. During this examination, the astronaut is required to report all medical 

and behavioral health conditions and treatment provided by non-NASA providers. 

Moreover, the astronaut is required to sign a form certifying that the information 

provided is complete and accurate. However, an astronaut assigned to a flight mission 

could receive medical and behavioral health care services from providers not affiliated 

with NASA without NASA’s knowledge in the period between annual certifications. 

Therefore, to fully address the Committee’s finding, NASA should establish a 

requirement that astronauts, upon assignment to a mission, certify that all episodes of

health care received from providers not affiliated with NASA have been reported and that 

they will continue to report such care until the mission is completed. We discussed this 

revised recommendation with the Assistant Director of the Flight Crew Operations 

Directorate and the Space Medicine Division Chief, who both agreed that this type of 
RESULTS

32 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

action would better address the Committee’s finding and could be implemented by 

NASA. As of April 2010, however, NASA had not taken actions to address the 

Committee’s finding. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.

Recommendations, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of 

Management’s Response

In order to close outstanding recommendations, we recommend the following: 

Recommendation 1. The Assistant Administrator, Human Capital Management should 

issue policy establishing a NASA-wide program to test employees, including astronauts, for 

alcohol. 

Management’s Response. The Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management 

nonconcurred with the recommendation. She stated that while an Agency-wide team has 

worked hard since late 2006 in response to the Panel recommendation, changes in 

Administration and the Agency’s senior leadership and subsequent changes in direction 

to the Agency’s mission and budget, as well as various new initiatives of the new 

Administration that significantly impact the incoming, current, and outgoing workforce, 

has prevented the current Administrator and Deputy Administrator from being briefed on 

the various legal issues and complexities relative to the establishment and 

implementation of a requirement to conduct alcohol testing of civil service employees. 

However, she stated that the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the Office of 

Human Capital Management, and the Office of General Counsel will work toward 

staffing a final Agency decision on alcohol testing of civil service employees. 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. In light of the Assistant Administrator’s 

pledge to reach a final Agency decision regarding testing NASA employees for alcohol, 

we are resolving the recommendation. We will close the recommendation when 

management issues a final decision on the matter. 

Recommendation 2. Johnson’s Space Medicine Division Chief should develop and 

implement a policy that requires newly assigned mission crewmembers to provide an update 

on any medical and behavioral health conditions and treatment received since their last 

annual examination. The policy should also require the crewmember to certify in writing

that (1) the information provided on the form is true and accurate, (2) every instance of 

medical and behavioral health care received by non-NASA providers has been reported, and 

(3) every medical and behavioral health care condition and treatment received from nonNASA providers will be reported until the mission is complete. 

Management’s Response. The Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management 

concurred with the intent of the recommendation. She stated that having astronauts sign 

an agreement upon assignment to a mission does not satisfy the intent of the Committee’s 

original recommendation, as astronauts are assigned years before flight, not between the 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 33

annual physical and the actual mission. The astronauts currently sign a standard form 

(SF-93, Report of Medical History) during their annual physical. The SF-93 contains a 

certification that the information provided is true and complete to the best of the signor’s 

knowledge. In addition to the SF-93, the Space Medicine Division and Astronaut Office 

have added a statement to the annual family history form that states: “I understand that I 

am required to report all medical and behavioral health care received outside of NASA in 

the interim period between annual physicals to the flight Medicine Clinic or Behavioral 

Health Clinic as soon as possible.” 

Evaluation of Management’s Response. We obtained and reviewed the revised annual 

family history form. Management’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

Accordingly, the recommendation is closed. 
RESULTS

34 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

NASA WAS UNABLE TO ADDRESS 

ONE RECOMMENDATION

NASA was unable to address one Committee recommendation concerning 

psychological testing evaluations. The Committee recommended that NASA fully 

integrate behavioral health information derived from psychological testing 

evaluations into the final selection process of astronaut candidates if the information 

is found to be useful. Although NASA hired nine astronaut candidates in May 2009 

using psychological testing evaluations in their selection, NASA cannot yet 

determine whether the behavioral health information was helpful. Specifically, it can 

take up to 8 years from the time NASA hires an astronaut candidate to the time the 

astronaut returns from his or her first long-duration mission. Therefore, to determine 

whether the behavioral health information collected during the hiring process was 

useful, NASA will need to observe the performance of the new astronauts for a 

period of time greater than the year that has elapsed since their hiring. 

Committee Recommendation

The Committee found that while psychological testing evaluation is conducted during the 

hiring of astronauts and is intended to identify applicants who can adapt most readily and 

perform effectively in the extreme environment of space flight, this information is rarely 

and inconsistently used in the hiring of astronauts. Further, details of methods, criteria 

used, and optimal performance data for psychological testing either do not exist or were 

not made available to the Committee for review. Therefore, the Committee 

recommended that NASA make the use of this information in the astronaut hiring process 

(see Recommendation 1ci, page 5). 

The Committee also recommended that if the behavioral health information is found to be 

useful, it should be fully integrated into the final selection of astronaut candidates. 

Although NASA addressed and implemented recommendations to use psychological 

testing evaluations during the hiring process for the May 2009 astronaut candidate class, 

NASA concluded that it cannot yet determine whether that information was useful. 

Specifically, the Space Medicine Division Chief stated that although the recommended 

psychological testing was implemented, it would be some period of years before NASA 

will know whether the testing was successful or whether changes are needed. NASA 

officials said it can take up to 8 years from the time NASA hires an astronaut candidate to 

the time the astronaut returns from his or her first long-duration mission. The officials 

said that they will measure the outcomes from the data collected in the years ahead. 

Further, the Space Medicine Deputy Chief stated that progress made toward

implementing this recommendation would be included in the reviews performed by the 

Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer every 2 years. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 35

We reviewed the report of the most recent review, performed in May 2009. The report 

stated that those responsible for behavioral health were in full compliance with the tool 

used to determine implementation of the Committee’s recommendation. However, we 

found that the tool does not yet include a specific determination of whether behavioral 

health information used to identify applicants who can adapt most readily and perform 

effectively in the extreme environment of space flight was useful. Therefore, NASA 

needs additional time to assess its progress in implementing this recommendation, and we 

are not making a recommendation at this time. 

APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 37

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology

We performed this audit from February 2009 through May 2010 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. 

Scope Limitation. Our fieldwork was limited to the review of NASA’s actions to 

address the recommendations. Therefore, we did not attempt to validate the findings 

made by Johnson, the Committee, or the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. In 

addition, verifying implementation of the recommendations in some instances would 

have required entering the astronauts’ preflight quarantined environment, reviewing 

documentation containing personally identifiable information, or reviewing medical 

records, which are subject to the privacy rules of the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act of 1996. Finally, we did not test the effectiveness of NASA’s actions 

taken to implement the recommendations. 

Work Performed. To identify the 39 recommendations, we reviewed congressional 

testimony and the three reports of the reviews performed by Johnson, the Committee, and 

the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance: 

• “Johnson’s Internal Assessment of Medical Practices after Nowak Incident,” June 

2007. 

• “NASA Astronaut Health Care System Review Committee February–June 2007 

Report to the Administrator,” July 16, 2007. 

• “Space Flight Safety Review (Alcohol Use in the Preflight Period),” 

August 28, 2007. 

We performed fieldwork at NASA Headquarters and Johnson. We conducted interviews 

with managers and personnel located at Headquarters in the Office of the Chief Health 

and Medical Officer, the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the Office of Human 

Capital Management, and the Space Operations Mission Directorate. In addition, we 

conducted interviews at Johnson with Flight Crew Operations Directorate managers, the 

Director of the Space Life Sciences Directorate, Space Medicine Division managers and 

behavioral health professionals, and the Human Adaptation and Countermeasures 

Division manager. We analyzed Headquarters, Johnson, and Kennedy documentation to 
APPENDIX A 

38 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

determine whether NASA had taken actions or had processes already in place that met 

the intent of the recommendations. Additional details on the work we performed are 

included in the finding discussions. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform 

this audit.

Review of Internal Controls 

Our review of internal controls consisted of a review of Headquarters, Johnson, and 

Kennedy policies and procedures that existed, were developed, or were revised as a result 

of the three reviews. We identified a need for additional controls related to an alcohol 

testing policy and the reporting of health care services provided to astronauts by 

providers not affiliated with NASA. See page 30 for a discussion of these issues. 

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the NASA Office of Inspector General and the Government 

Accountability Office have not issued any reports of particular relevance to the subject of 

this report. The reports from the three NASA reviews are listed earlier in this appendix.
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 39

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX B 

40 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-10-016 41
APPENDIX C 

42 REPORT NO. IG-10-016 

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Administrator

Deputy Administrator 

Chief of Staff

Chief Health and Medical Officer

Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management 

Director, Johnson Space Center

Director, Space Life Sciences Directorate, Johnson Space Center

Director, Flight Crew Operation Directorate, Johnson Space Center

Chief, Space Medicine Division, Johnson Space Center 

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget 

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division 

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch

Government Accountability Office 

Director, Defense, State, and NASA Financial Management, Office of Financial 

Management and Assurance

Director, NASA Issues, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Subcommittee on Science and Space

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement 

House Committee on Science and Technology 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 
REPORT NO. IG-10-016 43

Major Contributors to the Report: 

Mark Jenson, Director, Financial Management Directorate

Nicole Frish, Project Manager, Space Operations Directorate

Bobbie Wells, Auditor, Mission Support Directorate

Lynette Westfall, Auditor, Mission Support Directorate
JULY 6, 2010

REPORT No. IG-10-016 

OFFICE OF AUDITS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

ADDITIONAL COPIES

Visit http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY10/ to obtain additional copies of this report, or contact the 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits at 202-358-1232.

COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT

In order to help us improve the quality of our products, if you wish to comment on the quality or 

usefulness of this report, please send your comments to Mr. Laurence Hawkins, Audit Operations 

and Quality Assurance Director, at Laurence.B.Hawkins@nasa.gov or call 202-358-1543. 

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE AUDITS

To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Assistant Inspector General for Audits. 

Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC 20546-0001

NASA HOTLINE

To report fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement, contact the NASA OIG Hotline at 800-424-9183 or 

800-535-8134 (TDD). You may also write to the NASA Inspector General, P.O. Box 23089, L’Enfant 

Plaza Station, Washington, DC 20026, or use http://oig.nasa.gov/hotline.html#form. The identity of 

each writer and caller can be kept confidential, upon request, to the extent permitted by law.