(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 06–1431. Argued February 20, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008 

Claiming that petitioner CBOCS West, Inc., dismissed him because he 

is black and because he complained to managers that a black coemployee was also dismissed for race-based reasons, respondent 

Humphries filed suit charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U. S. C. §1981, the latter of which gives “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and 

enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The District 

Court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to timely pay filing

fees and granted CBOCS summary judgment on the §1981 claims.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the direct discrimination claim, but 

remanded for a trial on Humphries’ §1981 retaliation claim, rejecting

CBOCS’ argument that §1981 did not encompass such a claim. 

Held: Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. Pp. 2–14. 

(a) Because this conclusion rests in significant part upon stare decisis principles, the Court examines the pertinent interpretive history. (1) In 1969, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 

237, as later interpreted and relied on by Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. 

of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 176, recognized that retaliation actions are encompassed by 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens . . . 

shall have the same right, . . . , as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to 

inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal

property.” (2) This Court has long interpreted §§1981 and 1982 alike

because they were enacted together, have common language, and

serve the same purpose of providing black citizens the same legal

rights as enjoyed by other citizens. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 

U. S. 160, 183, 197, 190. (3) In 1989, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 177, without mention of retaliation, narrowed 

§1981 by excluding from its scope conduct occurring after formation 
 

 

2 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

Syllabus 

of the employment contract, where retaliation would most likely be

found. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

which was designed to supersede Patterson, see Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 383, by explicitly defining §1981’s

scope to include post-contract-formation conduct, §1981(b). (4) Since 

1991, the Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted 

§1981 as encompassing retaliation actions. Sullivan, as interpreted 

by Jackson, as well as a long line of related cases where the Court 

construes §§1981 and 1982 similarly, lead to the conclusion that the

view that §1981 encompasses retaliation claims is well embedded in

the law. Stare decisis considerations strongly support the Court’s 

adherence to that view. Such considerations impose a considerable

burden on those who would seek a different interpretation that would

necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. Pp. 2–8.

(b) CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from this well-embedded interpretation of

§1981. First, while CBOCS is correct that §1981’s plain text does not

expressly refer to retaliation, that alone is not sufficient to carry the

day, given this Court’s long recognition that §1982 provides protection against retaliation; Jackson’s recent holding that Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972 includes an antiretaliation remedy,

despite Title IX’s failure to use the word “retaliation,” 544 U. S., at 

173–174, 176; and Sullivan’s refusal to embrace a similar argument, 

see 396 U. S., at 241. Second, contrary to CBOCS’ assertion, Congress’ failure to include an explicit antiretaliation provision in its

1991 amendment of §1981 does not demonstrate an intention not to

cover retaliation, but is more plausibly explained by the fact that,

given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying Patterson, 

there was no need to include explicit retaliation language. Third, the 

argument that applying §1981 to employment-related retaliation actions would create an overlap with Title VII, allegedly allowing a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent Title VII’s detailed administrative

and procedural mechanisms and thereby undermine their effectiveness, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title VII/§1981 

“overlap” and potential circumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct discrimination, yet Congress explicitly and intentionally created that overlap, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 

U. S. 36, 48–49. Fourth, contrary to its arguments, CBOCS cannot 

find support in Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 

63, and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U. S. 470. While Burlington distinguished discrimination based on status (e.g., as women 

or black persons) from discrimination based on conduct (e.g., whistleblowing that leads to retaliation), it did not suggest that Congress

must separate the two in all events. Moreover, while Domino’s Pizza 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Syllabus 

and other more recent cases may place greater emphasis on statutory

language than did Sullivan, any arguable change in interpretive approach would not justify reexamination of well-established prior law 

under stare decisis principles. Pp. 9–14. 

474 F. 3d 387, affirmed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined. 

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–1431 

CBOCS WEST, INC., PETITIONER v. HEDRICK G. 

HUMPHRIES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 27, 2008] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

A longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after

the Civil War, provides that “[a]ll persons within the

jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right

in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts 

. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Rev. Stat. §1977, 42

U. S. C. §1981(a). The basic question before us is whether 

the provision encompasses a complaint of retaliation

against a person who has complained about a violation of 

another person’s contract-related “right.” We conclude 

that it does. 

I 

The case before us arises out of a claim by respondent,

Hedrick G. Humphries, a former assistant manager of a 

Cracker Barrel restaurant, that CBOCS West, Inc. 

(Cracker Barrel’s owner) dismissed him (1) because of

racial bias (Humphries is a black man) and (2) because he 

had complained to managers that a fellow assistant manager had dismissed another black employee, Venus Green,

for race-based reasons. Humphries timely filed a charge 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
 

 

2 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

Opinion of the Court 

(EEOC), pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5, and received a 

“right to sue” letter. He then filed a complaint in Federal

District Court charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as

amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and the older “equal

contract rights” provision here at issue, §1981. The District Court dismissed Humphries’ Title VII claims for 

failure to pay necessary filing fees on a timely basis. It 

then granted CBOCS’ motion for summary judgment on

Humphries’ two §1981 claims. Humphries appealed.

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled 

against Humphries and upheld the District Court’s grant

of summary judgment in respect to his direct discrimination claim. But it ruled in Humphries’ favor and remanded for a trial in respect to his §1981 retaliation

claim. In doing so, the Court of Appeals rejected CBOCS’ 

argument that §1981 did not encompass a claim of retaliation. 474 F. 3d 387 (2007). CBOCS sought certiorari,

asking us to consider this last-mentioned legal question.

And we agreed to do so. See 551 U. S.___ (2007). 

II 

The question before us is whether §1981 encompasses 

retaliation claims. We conclude that it does. And because 

our conclusion rests in significant part upon principles of 

stare decisis, we begin by examining the pertinent interpretive history. 

A 

The Court first considered a comparable question in

1969, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 

229. The case arose under 42 U. S. C. §1982, a statutory 

provision that Congress enacted just after the Civil War, 

along with §1981, to protect the rights of black citizens.

The provision was similar to §1981 except that it focused,

not upon rights to make and to enforce contracts, but 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

rights related to the ownership of property. The statute 

provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have 

the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed

by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,

hold, and convey real and personal property.” §1982.

Paul E. Sullivan, a white man, had rented his house to 

T. R. Freeman, Jr., a black man. He had also assigned 

Freeman a membership share in a corporation, which

permitted the owner to use a private park that the corporation controlled. Because of Freeman’s race, the corporation, Little Hunting Park, Inc., refused to approve the 

share assignment. And, when Sullivan protested, the 

association expelled Sullivan and took away his membership shares.

Sullivan sued Little Hunting Park, claiming that its

actions violated §1982. The Court upheld Sullivan’s claim. 

It found that the corporation’s refusal “to approve the 

assignment of the membership share . . . was clearly an

interference with Freeman’s [the black lessee’s] right to

‘lease.’” 396 U. S., at 237. It added that Sullivan, the 

white lessor, “has standing to maintain this action,” ibid., 

because, as the Court had previously said, “the white 

owner is at times ‘the only effective adversary’ of the 

unlawful restrictive covenant.” Ibid. (quoting Barrows v. 

Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953)). The Court noted that to 

permit the corporation to punish Sullivan “for trying to 

vindicate the rights of minorities protected by §1982” 

would give “impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property.” 396 U. S., at 237. And this Court has 

made clear that Sullivan stands for the proposition that 

§1982 encompasses retaliation claims. See Jackson v. 

Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 176 (2005) (“[I]n 

Sullivan we interpreted a general prohibition on racial 

discrimination [in §1982] to cover retaliation against 

those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that

prohibition”). 
 

4 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

Opinion of the Court 

While the Sullivan decision interpreted §1982, our 

precedents have long construed §§1981 and 1982 similarly. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 173 (1976), 

the Court considered whether §1981 prohibits private acts

of discrimination. Citing Sullivan, along with Jones v. 

Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968) and Tillman v. 

Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U. S. 431 

(1973), the Court reasoned that this case law “necessarily 

requires the conclusion that §1981, like §1982, reaches 

private conduct.” 427 U. S., at 173. See also id., at 187 

(Powell, J., concurring) (“Although [Sullivan and Jones]

involved §1982, rather than §1981, I agree that their 

considered holdings with respect to the purpose and meaning of §1982 necessarily apply to both statutes in view of 

their common derivation”); id., at 190 (STEVENS, J., concurring) (“[I]t would be most incongruous to give those two 

sections [§§1981 and 1982] a fundamentally different 

construction”). See also Shaare Tefila Congregation v. 

Cobb, 481 U. S. 615, 617–618 (1987) (applying to §1982

the discussion and holding of Saint Francis College v. AlKhazraji, 481 U. S. 604, 609–613 (1987), a case interpreting §1981).

As indicated in Runyon, the Court has construed §§1981

and 1982 alike because it has recognized the sister statutes’ common language, origin, and purposes. Like §1981, 

§1982 traces its origin to §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 

14 Stat. 27. See General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. 

v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 383–384 (1982) (noting 

shared historical roots of the two provisions); Tillman, 

supra, at 439–440 (same). Like §1981, §1982 represents

an immediately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that 

other citizens enjoy. See General Building Contractors 

Assn., supra, at 388 (noting strong purposive connection 

between the two provisions). Like §1981, §1982 uses

broad language that says “[a]ll citizens of the United 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” Compare 

§1981’s language set forth above, supra, at 1. See Jones, 

supra, at 441, n. 78 (noting the close parallel language of 

the two provisions). Indeed, §1982 differs from §1981 only 

in that it refers, not to the “right . . . to make and enforce 

contracts,” 42 U. S. C. §1981(a), but to the “right . . . to

inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 

personal property,” §1982.

In light of these precedents, it is not surprising that

following Sullivan, federal appeals courts concluded, on

the basis of Sullivan or its reasoning, that §1981 encompassed retaliation claims. See, e.g., Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst. of N. Y., 735 F. 2d 38, 42–43 (CA2 1984); Goff 

v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F. 2d 593, 598–599 (CA5 1982), 

overruled, Carter v. South Central Bell, 912 F. 2d 832 

(CA5 1990); Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1266, 

1270 (CA6 1977). 

B 

In 1989, 20 years after Sullivan, this Court in Patterson 

v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, significantly limited the scope of §1981. The Court focused upon §1981’s 

words “to make and enforce contracts” and interpreted the

phrase narrowly. It wrote that the statutory phrase did

not apply to “conduct by the employer after the contract 

relation has been established, including breach of the

terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions.” Id., at 177 (emphasis added). The Court 

added that the word “enforce” does not apply to postcontract-formation conduct unless the discrimination at 

issue “infects the legal process in ways that prevent one 

from enforcing contract rights.” Ibid. (emphasis added).

Thus §1981 did not encompass the claim of a black employee who charged that her employer had violated her 

employment contract by harassing her and failing to 
 

 

 

6 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

Opinion of the Court 

promote her, all because of her race. Ibid. 

Since victims of an employer’s retaliation will often have 

opposed discriminatory conduct taking place after the 

formation of the employment contract, Patterson’s holding,

for a brief time, seems in practice to have foreclosed retaliation claims. With one exception, we have found no

federal court of appeals decision between the time we 

decided Patterson and 1991 that permitted a §1981 retaliation claim to proceed. See, e.g., Walker v. South 

Central Bell Tel. Co., 904 F. 2d 275, 276 (CA5 1990) (per 

curiam); Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F. 2d 470, 473 

(CA9 1989); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F. 2d 

1527, 1534–1535 (CA11 1990) (per curiam). See also 

Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F. 2d 1305, 1312–1314 (CA7 

1989) (questioning without deciding the viability of retaliation claims under §1981 after Patterson). But see 

Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F. 2d 630, 635–638 (CA8

1990) (allowing a claim for discriminatory discharge to

proceed under §1981), vacated and remanded, 499 U. S.

914 (1991) (ordering reconsideration in light of what became the Eighth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Taggart v. 

Jefferson Cty. Child Support Enforcement Unit, 935 F. 2d 

947 (1991), which held that racially discriminatory discharge claims under §1981 are barred). 

In 1991, however, Congress weighed in on the matter.

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, §101, 105 

Stat. 1071, with the design to supersede Patterson. Jones 

v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 383 (2004).

Insofar as is relevant here, the new law changed 42

U. S. C. §1981 by reenacting the former provision, designating it as §1981(a), and adding a new subsection, (b), 

which, says: 

“‘Make and enforce contracts’ defined 

“For purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

modification, and termination of contracts, and the 

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 

An accompanying Senate Report pointed out that the

amendment superseded Patterson by adding a new subsection (b) that would “reaffirm that the right ‘to make and

enforce contracts’ includes the enjoyment of all benefits, 

privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.” S. Rep. No. 101–315, p. 6 (1990). Among other

things, it would “ensure that Americans may not be harassed, fired or otherwise discriminated against in contracts because of their race.” Ibid. (emphasis added). An 

accompanying House Report said that in “cutting back the

scope of the rights to ‘make’ and ‘enforce’ contracts[,] 

Patterson . . . has been interpreted to eliminate retaliation

claims that the courts had previously recognized under

section 1981.” H. R. Rep. No. 102–40, pt. 1, pp. 92–93, n. 

92 (1991). It added that the protections that subsection

(b) provided, in “the context of employment discrimination . . . would include, but not be limited to, claims of 

harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer, 

retaliation, and hiring.” Id., at 92 (emphasis added). It 

also said that the new law “would restore rights to sue for

such retaliatory conduct.” Id., at 93, n. 92. 

After enactment of the new law, the Federal Courts of 

Appeals again reached a broad consensus that §1981, as 

amended, encompasses retaliation claims. See, e.g., Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 F. 3d 684, 693 (CA2 

1998); Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F. 3d 

206, 213–214 (CA4 2007); Foley v. University of Houston 

System, 355 F. 3d 333, 338–339 (CA5 2003); Johnson v. 

University of Cincinnati, 215 F. 3d 561, 575–576 (CA6

2000); 474 F. 3d, at 403 (case below); Manatt v. Bank of 

America, NA, 339 F. 3d 792, 800–801, and n. 11 (CA9 

2003); Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehabilitation Hospital, 140 
 

 

8 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

Opinion of the Court 

F. 3d 1405, 1411–1413 (CA11 1998). 

The upshot is this: (1) in 1969, Sullivan, as interpreted 

by Jackson, recognized that §1982 encompasses a retaliation action; (2) this Court has long interpreted §§1981 and 

1982 alike; (3) in 1989, Patterson, without mention of 

retaliation, narrowed §1981 by excluding from its scope

conduct, namely post-contract-formation conduct, where

retaliation would most likely be found; but in 1991, Congress enacted legislation that superseded Patterson and 

explicitly defined the scope of §1981 to include postcontract-formation conduct; and (4) since 1991, the lower 

courts have uniformly interpreted §1981 as encompassing 

retaliation actions. 

C 

Sullivan, as interpreted and relied upon by Jackson, as 

well as the long line of related cases where we construe

§§1981 and 1982 similarly, lead us to conclude that the

view that §1981 encompasses retaliation claims is indeed 

well embedded in the law. That being so, considerations of 

stare decisis strongly support our adherence to that view.

And those considerations impose a considerable burden

upon those who would seek a different interpretation that 

would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. See, 

e.g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 

483 U. S. 468, 494–495 (1987) (plurality opinion) (describing importance of stare decisis); Patterson, 491 U. S., at 

172 (considerations of stare decisis “have special force in 

the area of statutory interpretation”); John R. Sand & 

Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip 

op., at 8–9) (same). 

III 

In our view, CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from what

we have just described as the well-embedded interpreta-
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

tion of §1981. First, CBOCS points to the plain text of 

§1981—a text that says that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have 

the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is 

enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U. S. C. §1981(a) (emphasis 

added). CBOCS adds that, insofar as Humphries complains of retaliation, he is complaining of a retaliatory

action that the employer would have taken against him 

whether he was black or white, and there is no way to 

construe this text to cover that kind of deprivation. Thus 

the text’s language, CBOCS concludes, simply “does not 

provide for a cause of action based on retaliation.” Brief 

for Petitioner 8. 

We agree with CBOCS that the statute’s language does 

not expressly refer to the claim of an individual (black or 

white) who suffers retaliation because he has tried to help 

a different individual, suffering direct racial discrimination, secure his §1981 rights. But that fact alone is not 

sufficient to carry the day. After all, this Court has long

held that the statutory text of §1981’s sister statute, 

§1982, provides protection from retaliation for reasons 

related to the enforcement of the express statutory right. 

See supra, at 3. 

Moreover, the Court has recently read another broadly

worded civil rights statute, namely, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 

U. S. C. §1681 et seq., as including an antiretaliation 

remedy. In 2005 in Jackson, the Court considered 

whether statutory language prohibiting “discrimination 

[on the basis of sex] under any education program or 

activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” §1681(a), 

encompassed claims of retaliation for complaints about sex

discrimination. 544 U. S., at 173–174. Despite the fact

that Title IX does not use the word “retaliation,” the Court 

held in Jackson that the statute’s language encompassed

such a claim, in part because: (1) “Congress enacted Title 

IX just three years after Sullivan was decided”; (2) it is 
 

 

10 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

Opinion of the Court 

“‘realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar’” with Sullivan; and (3) Congress consequently “‘expected its enactment’” of Title IX “‘to be interpreted in 

conformity with’” Sullivan. Jackson, supra, at 176. The 

Court in Jackson explicitly rejected the arguments the 

dissent advances here—that Sullivan was merely a standing case, see post, at 8–11 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Compare Jackson, 544 U. S., at 176, n. 1 (“Sullivan’s holding

was not so limited. It plainly held that the white owner 

could maintain his own private cause of action under 

§1982 if he could show that he was ‘punished for trying to

vindicate the rights of minorities’” (emphasis in original)),

with id., at 194 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). 

Regardless, the linguistic argument that CBOCS makes

was apparent at the time the Court decided Sullivan. See 

396 U. S., at 241 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the construction of §1982 in Jones, 392 U. S. 409 was “in no way 

required by [the statute’s] language,”—one of the bases of 

Justice Harlan’s dissent in Jones—and further contending

that the Court in Sullivan had gone “yet beyond” Jones).

And we believe it is too late in the day in effect to overturn

the holding in that case (nor does CBOCS ask us to do so) 

on the basis of a linguistic argument that was apparent, 

and which the Court did not embrace at that time. 

Second, CBOCS argues that Congress, in 1991 when it

reenacted §1981 with amendments, intended the reenacted statute not to cover retaliation. CBOCS rests this 

conclusion primarily upon the fact that Congress did not 

include an explicit antiretaliation provision or the word 

“retaliation” in the new statutory language—although 

Congress has included explicit antiretaliation language in

other civil rights statutes. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §158(a)(4); Fair Labor Standards Act 

of 1938, 29 U. S. C. §215(a)(3); Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–3(a); Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. §623(d); Ameri-
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U. S. C. §§12203(a)–

(b); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U. S. C.

§2615.

We believe, however, that the circumstances to which 

CBOCS points find a far more plausible explanation in the 

fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language

nullifying Patterson, there was no need for Congress to 

include explicit language about retaliation. After all, the 

1991 amendments themselves make clear that Congress 

intended to supersede the result in Patterson and embrace 

pre-Patterson law. And pre-Patterson law included Sullivan. See Part II, supra. Nothing in the statute’s text or in

the surrounding circumstances suggests any congressional

effort to supersede Sullivan or the interpretation that

courts have subsequently given that case. To the contrary, 

the amendments’ history indicates that Congress intended

to restore that interpretation. See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No.

102–40, at 92 (noting that §1981(b) in the “context of

employment discrimination . . . would include . . . claims of 

. . . retaliation”).

Third, CBOCS points out that §1981, if applied to employment-related retaliation actions, would overlap with 

Title VII. It adds that Title VII requires that those who

invoke its remedial powers satisfy certain procedural and

administrative requirements that §1981 does not contain.

See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(1) (charge of discrimination must be brought before EEOC within 180 days of the

discriminatory act); §2000e–5(f)(1) (suit must be filed 

within 90 days of obtaining an EEOC right-to-sue letter). 

And CBOCS says that permitting a §1981 retaliation 

action would allow a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent

Title VII’s “specific administrative and procedural mechanisms,” thereby undermining their effectiveness. Brief for 

Petitioner 25. 

This argument, however, proves too much. Precisely the

same kind of Title VII/§1981 “overlap” and potential cir-
 

 

12 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

Opinion of the Court 

cumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct

discrimination. Yet Congress explicitly created the overlap in respect to direct employment discrimination. Nor is 

it obvious how we can interpret §1981 to avoid employment-related overlap without eviscerating §1981 in respect 

to non-employment contracts where no such overlap 

exists. 

Regardless, we have previously acknowledged a “necessary overlap” between Title VII and §1981. Patterson, 491 

U. S., at 181. We have added that the “remedies available 

under Title VII and under §1981, although related, and 

although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, 

distinct, and independent.” Johnson v. Railway Express 

Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 461 (1975). We have pointed 

out that Title VII provides important administrative 

remedies and other benefits that §1981 lacks. See id., at 

457–458 (detailing the benefits of Title VII to those aggrieved by race-based employment discrimination). And 

we have concluded that “Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination.” Alexander 

v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 48–49 (1974). In a 

word, we have previously held that the “overlap” reflects

congressional design. See ibid. We have no reason to 

reach a different conclusion in this case. 

Fourth, CBOCS says it finds support for its position in

two of our recent cases, Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. 

White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006), and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. 

McDonald, 546 U. S. 470 (2006). In Burlington, a Title 

VII case, we distinguished between discrimination that

harms individuals because of “who they are, i.e., their 

status,” for example, as women or as black persons, and 

discrimination that harms “individuals based on what 

they do, i.e., their conduct,” for example, whistle-blowing

that leads to retaliation. 548 U. S., at 63. CBOCS says

that we should draw a similar distinction here and 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

conclude that §1981 only encompasses status-based discrimination. In Burlington, however, we used the 

status/conduct distinction to help explain why Congress

might have wanted its explicit Title VII antiretaliation 

provision to sweep more broadly (i.e., to include conduct 

outside the workplace) than its substantive Title VII 

(status-based) antidiscrimination provision. Burlington

did not suggest that Congress must separate the two in all 

events. 

The dissent argues that the distinction made in Burlington is meaningful here because it purportedly “underscores the fact that status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation are distinct harms that call for 

tailored legislative treatment.” Post, at 5. The Court’s 

construction of a general ban on discrimination such as 

that contained in §1981 to cover retaliation claims, the

dissent continues, would somehow render the separate

antiretaliation provisions in other statutes “superfluous.” 

Ibid. But the Court in Burlington did not find that Title 

VII’s antiretaliation provision was redundant; it found 

that the provision had a broader reach than the statute’s

substantive provision. And in any case, we have held that 

“legislative enactments in this area have long evinced a

general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies

against discrimination.” Alexander, supra, at 47. See 

Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 

U. S. 366, 377 (1979) (“[S]ubstantive rights conferred in

the 19th century [civil rights acts] were not withdrawn, 

sub silentio, by the subsequent passage of the modern 

statutes”). Accordingly, the Court has accepted overlap

between a number of civil rights statutes. See ibid. (discussing interrelation of fair housing provisions of the Civil

Rights Act of 1968 and §1982; between §1981 and Title 

VII). See also supra, at 11–12 (any overlap in reach between §1981 and Title VII, the statute at issue in Burlington, is by congressional design). 
 

 

14 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

Opinion of the Court 

CBOCS highlights the second case, Domino’s Pizza, 

along with Patterson, and cites Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 

(1975) and Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522 

(1987) (per curiam), to show that this Court now follows 

an approach to statutory interpretation that emphasizes 

text. And that newer approach, CBOCS claims, should 

lead us to revisit the holding in Sullivan, an older case, 

where the Court placed less weight upon the textual language itself. But even were we to posit for argument’s 

sake that changes in interpretive approach take place 

from time to time, we could not agree that the existence of

such a change would justify reexamination of wellestablished prior law. Principles of stare decisis, after all, 

demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of 

interpretation change or stay the same. Were that not so, 

those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability 

that they seek and upon which the rule of law depends.

See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U. S., at ___ 

(slip op., at 8–9). 

IV 

We conclude that considerations of stare decisis strongly 

support our adherence to Sullivan and the long line of 

related cases where we interpret §§1981 and 1982 similarly. CBOCS’ arguments do not convince us to the contrary. We consequently hold that 42 U. S. C. §1981 encompasses claims of retaliation. The judgment of the 

Court of Appeals is affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–1431 

CBOCS WEST, INC., PETITIONER v. HEDRICK G. 

HUMPHRIES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 27, 2008] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins,

dissenting. 

The Court holds that the private right of action it has

implied under Rev. Stat. §1977, 42 U. S. C. §1981, encompasses claims of retaliation. Because the Court’s holding

has no basis in the text of §1981 and is not justified by 

principles of stare decisis, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

It is unexceptional in our case law that “‘[s]tatutory

construction must begin with the language employed by 

Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning 

of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’” Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality 

Management Dist., 541 U. S. 246, 252 (2004) (quoting Park 

’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194 

(1985)). Today, that rule is honored in the breach: The 

Court’s analysis of the statutory text does not appear until

Part III of its opinion, and then only as a potential reason

to depart from the interpretation the Court has already

concluded, on other grounds, must “carry the day.” Ante, 

at 9. Unlike the Court, I think it best to begin, as we

usually do, with the text of the statute. Section 1981(a)

provides: 

“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
 

 

 

2 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

States shall have the same right in every State and

Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and

shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,

taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 

other.” 

Section 1981(a) thus guarantees “[a]ll persons . . . the 

same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is 

enjoyed by white citizens.” It is difficult to see where one 

finds a cause of action for retaliation in this language. On 

its face, §1981(a) is a straightforward ban on racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts.

Not surprisingly, that is how the Court has always construed it. See, e.g., Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 

U. S. 470, 476 (2006) (“Section 1981 offers relief when

racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual 

relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs 

an existing contractual relationship”); Patterson v. 

McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 171 (1989) (“[Section] 

1981 ‘prohibits racial discrimination in the making and 

enforcement of private contracts’” (quoting Runyon v. 

McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168 (1976))); Johnson v. Railway 

Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 459 (1975) (Section

1981 “on its face relates primarily to racial discrimination 

in the making and enforcement of contracts”).

Respondent nonetheless contends that “[t]he terms of

section 1981 are significantly different, and broader, than 

a simple prohibition against discrimination.” Brief for 

Respondent 15. It is true that §1981(a), which was enacted shortly after the Civil War, does not use the modern

statutory formulation prohibiting “discrimination on the

basis of race.” But that is the clear import of its terms.

Contrary to respondent’s contention, nothing in §1981 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

evinces a “concer[n] with protecting individuals ‘based on

what they do,’” as opposed to “‘prevent[ing] injury to 

individuals based on who they are.’” Ibid. (quoting Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 63 (2006)). 

Nor does §1981 “affirmatively guarante[e]” freestanding

“rights to engage in particular conduct.” Brief for Respondent 16. Rather, §1981 is an equal-rights provision. See 

Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, 791 (1966) (“Congress

intended to protect a limited category of rights, specifically 

defined in terms of racial equality”). The statute assumes 

that “white citizens” enjoy certain rights and requires that

those rights be extended equally to “[a]ll persons,” regardless of their race. That is to say, it prohibits discrimination based on race.1 

—————— 

1The United States, appearing as amicus curiae in support of respondent, contends that §1981 prohibits not only racial discrimination, but 

also any other kind of “discrimination” that “impair[s]” the rights

guaranteed by §1981(a). Brief for United States 17. In support of this 

argument, the United States points to §1981(c), which provides that

“[t]he rights protected by this section are protected against impairment

by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of

State law.” Thus, the argument goes, retaliation is prohibited because 

it is discrimination (differential treatment for those who complain) and

it impairs the right granted in §1981(a) to be free from racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts (by penalizing 

assertion of that right).

Although I commend the United States for at least attempting to

ground its position in the statutory text, its argument is unconvincing. 

Section 1981(c) simply codifies the Court’s holding in Runyon v. 

McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976), that §1981 applies to private, as well as

governmental, discrimination. Nothing in §1981(c) indicates that

Congress otherwise intended to expand the scope of §1981. To the 

contrary, §1981(c) refers to “[t]he rights protected by this section,” i.e., 

the rights enumerated in §1981(a) to make and enforce contracts on the 

same terms as white citizens. Moreover, the word “discrimination” in 

§1981(c) does not refer to “all discrimination,” as the United States

would have it. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 4. 

Rather, it refers back to the type of discrimination prohibited by 

§1981(a), i.e., discrimination based on race. Thus, §1981 is violated 
 

 

4 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Retaliation is not discrimination based on race. When 

an individual is subjected to reprisal because he has complained about racial discrimination, the injury he suffers 

is not on account of his race; rather, it is the result of his 

conduct. The Court recognized this commonsense distinction just two years ago in Burlington when it explained

that Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision “seeks to

prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., 

their status,” whereas its “antiretaliation provision seeks

to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., 

their conduct.” 548 U. S., at 63. This distinction is sound, 

and it reflects the fact that a claim of retaliation is both 

logically and factually distinct from a claim of discrimination—logically because retaliation based on conduct and 

discrimination based on status are mutually exclusive

categories, and factually because a claim of retaliation

does not depend on proof that any status-based discrimination actually occurred. Consider, for example, an employer who fires any employee who complains of race

discrimination, regardless of the employee’s race. Such an 

employer is undoubtedly guilty of retaliation, but he has

not discriminated on the basis of anyone’s race. Because 

the employer treats all employees—black and white—the 

same, he does not deny any employee “the same right . . . 

to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white

citizens.”2 

—————— 

only when racial discrimination impairs the right to make and enforce 

contracts. 2Of course, if an employer had a different retaliation policy for blacks

and whites—firing black employees who complain of race discrimination but not firing similarly situated white employees—a black employee who was fired for complaining of race discrimination would have 

a promising §1981 claim. But his claim would not sound in retaliation; 

rather, it would be a straightforward claim of racial discrimination. In 

his briefs before this Court, respondent attempts to shoehorn his claim

into this category, asserting that petitioner “retaliated against [him]

because he was a black worker who exercised his right” to lodge a 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

The Court apparently believes that the status/conduct 

distinction is not relevant here because this case, unlike 

Burlington, does not require us to determine whether 

§1981’s supposed prohibition on retaliation “sweep[s] more

broadly” than its antidiscrimination prohibition. Ante, at 

13. That is nonsense. Although, as the Court notes, we

used the status/conduct distinction in Burlington to explain why Title VII’s antiretaliation provision must sweep 

more broadly than its antidiscrimination provision in 

order to achieve its purpose, 548 U. S., at 63–64, it does

not follow that the distinction between status and conduct 

is irrelevant here. To the contrary, Burlington underscores the fact that status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation are distinct harms that call for 

tailored legislative treatment. That is why Congress, in

Title VII and a host of other statutes, has enacted separate provisions prohibiting discrimination and retaliation. 

See Brief for Petitioner 17–18 (citing statutes); see also 

ante, at 10–11 (same). Construing a general ban on discrimination such as that contained in §1981 to cover retaliation would render these separate antiretaliation 

provisions superfluous, contrary to the normal rules of

statutory interpretation. 

Of course, this is not the first time I have made these 

—————— 

grievance under petitioner’s open-door policy. Brief for Respondent 27; 

see also id., at 33 (“[S]ection 1981 forbids an employer from having one

dismissal policy for blacks who complain about race discrimination, and

another for whites who complain about such discrimination”). But 

respondent cites no record evidence to support his assertion that 

petitioner treated him differently than it would have treated a similarly 

situated white complainant. And while the Court of Appeals found that

respondent had established a prima facie case of retaliation, 474 F. 3d

387, 406–407 (CA7 2007), it did not identify any evidence that would 

permit a jury to conclude that the alleged retaliation was race based.

Indeed, the Court of Appeals held that respondent had “waived . . . his 

discrimination claim by devoting only a skeletal argument [to it] in

response to [petitioner’s] motion for summary judgment.” Id., at 407. 
 

 

6 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

points. Three Terms ago in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of 

Ed., 544 U. S. 167 (2005), the Court held that Title IX of 

the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §1681 et 

seq., which prohibits recipients of federal education funding from discriminating “on the basis of sex,” §1681(a),

affords an implied cause of action for retaliation against

those who complain of sex discrimination. In so doing, the 

Court disregarded the fundamental distinction between

status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation, 

asserting that retaliation against those who complain of 

sex discrimination “is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ 

because it is an intentional response to the nature of the 

complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.” 544 U. S., 

at 174. But as I explained in my dissenting opinion in 

Jackson, “the sex-based topic of the complaint cannot 

overcome the fact that the retaliation is not based on 

anyone’s sex, much less the complainer’s sex.” Id., at 188. 

Likewise here, the race-based topic of the complaint

cannot overcome the fact that the retaliation is not based 

on anyone’s race. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the

fact that “protection from retaliation is separate from

direct protection of the primary right [against discrimination] and serves as a prophylactic measure to guard the 

primary right.” Id., at 189; see also Burlington, supra, at 

63 (explaining that Title VII’s “antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status,” whereas its “antiretaliation 

provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) 

with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees”). In other words, “[t]o

describe retaliation as discrimination on the basis of [race]

is to conflate the enforcement mechanism with the right 

itself, something for which the statute’s text provides no

warrant.” Jackson, supra, at 189 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Notably, the Court does not repeat Jackson’s textual 

analysis in this case, perhaps because no amount of repetition could make it any more plausible today than it was

three years ago. Instead, the Court acknowledges that 

“the statute’s language does not expressly refer to the 

claim of an individual (black or white) who suffers retaliation.” Ante, at 9. The Court concludes, however, that the 

statute’s failure expressly to provide a cause of action for 

retaliation “is not sufficient to carry the day,” ibid., despite

our usual rule that “affirmative evidence of congressional

intent must be provided for an implied remedy . . . for 

without such intent the essential predicate for implication

of a private remedy simply does not exist,” Alexander v. 

Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 293, n. 8 (2001) (internal quotation marks and emphasis deleted); see also id., at 286–287 

(emphasizing that, absent evidence of Congress’ intent to

create a cause of action, the “cause of action does not exist 

and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable

that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with

the statute”).

Section 1981’s silence regarding retaliation is not dispositive, the Court says, because “it is too late in the day” to

resort to “a linguistic argument” that was supposedly

rejected in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 

229 (1969). Ante, at 10. As I explain below, the Court’s 

reliance on Sullivan is entirely misplaced. But it also 

bears emphasis that the Court does not even purport to 

identify any basis in the statutory text for the “wellembedded interpretation of §1981,” ante, at 8–9, it adopts 

for the first time today. Unlike the Court, I find the statute’s text dispositive. Because §1981 by its terms prohibits only discrimination based on race, and because retaliation is not discrimination based on race, §1981 does not 

provide an implied cause of action for retaliation. 
 

 

8 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

II 

Unable to justify its holding as a matter of statutory 

interpretation, the Court today retreats behind the figleaf 

of ersatz stare decisis. The Court’s invocation of stare 

decisis appears to rest on three considerations: (1) Sullivan’s purported recognition of a cause of action for retaliation under §1982; (2) Jackson’s (re)interpretation of Sullivan; and (3) the Courts of Appeals’ view that §1981

provides a cause of action for retaliation. None of these 

considerations, separately or together, justifies implying a 

cause of action that Congress did not include in the statute. And none can conceal the irony in the Court’s novel

use of stare decisis to decide a question of first impression.

I turn first to Sullivan, as it bears most of the weight in 

the Court’s analysis. As I explained in my dissent in 

Jackson, Sullivan did not “hol[d] that a general prohibition against discrimination permitted a claim of retaliation,” but rather “that a white lessor had standing to

assert the right of a black lessee to be free from racial

discrimination.” 544 U. S., at 194. Thus, “[t]o make out

his third-party claim on behalf of the black lessee, the 

white lessor would necessarily be required to demonstrate 

that the defendant had discriminated against the black

lessee on the basis of race.” Ibid. Here, by contrast, respondent “need not show that the [race] discrimination

forming the basis of his complaints actually occurred.” 

Ibid. Accordingly, as it did in Jackson, the Court “creates 

an entirely new cause of action for a secondary rights

holder, beyond the claim of the original rights holder, and 

well beyond Sullivan.” Id., at 194–195. 

 Having reexamined Sullivan, I remain convinced that it 

was a third-party standing case. Sullivan did not argue

that his expulsion from the corporation—as opposed to the 

corporation’s refusal to approve the assignment—violated

§1982. Instead, he argued that his expulsion was “contrary to public policy” because it was the “direct result of 
 

 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

his having dealt with Freeman, as the statute requires, on 

a non-discriminatory basis.” Brief for Petitioners in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., O. T. 1969, No. 33, p. 32.

Sullivan further contended not that his own rights under 

§1982 had been violated, but that he “ha[d] standing to 

rely on the rights of the Negro, Freeman,” since he was

best situated to vindicate those rights.3 Id., at 33; see also 

Pet. for Cert. in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., O. T. 

1969, No. 33, p. 17, n. 13 (“Although the statute declares

the rights of Negroes not to be discriminated against,

Sullivan, a Caucasian, has standing to rely on the invasion

of the rights of others, since he is the only effective adversary capable of vindicating them in litigation arising from

his expulsion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, the United States, appearing as amicus curiae in 

support of Sullivan, argued that because “the private 

action involved in refusing to honor the assignment was

itself illegal,” “relief should be available to all persons

injured by it, or as a consequence of their efforts to resist 

it.” Brief for United States, O. T. 1969, No. 33, p. 34.

Thus, both Sullivan and the United States argued that 

Sullivan had standing to seek relief for injuries he suffered as a result of the corporation’s violation of Freeman’s 

rights—not that Sullivan’s own rights under §1982 were 

violated. And that is the best interpretation of what the 

—————— 

3 In contrast to his argument based on §1982, which he consistently

tied to the violation of Freeman’s rights, Sullivan also argued that his 

own First Amendment rights were violated: 

“Since Sullivan’s expulsion was in retaliation for his having obeyed

the dictate of the law the expulsion was against public policy, and he 

should be reinstated. For the law to sanction punishment of a person

such as Sullivan for refusing to discriminate against Negroes would be

to render nugatory the rights guaranteed to Negroes by 42 U. S. C.

§§1981, 1982 . . . . Furthermore, by giving sanction to Sullivan’s expulsion, the state court deprived Sullivan of his rights, guaranteed by the 

First Amendment to criticize the conduct of the association’s directors.” 

Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1969, No. 33, p. 14 (emphasis added). 
 

 

 

10 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Court subsequently held. Tracking the parties’ arguments, the Court first concluded that that the corporation’s “refus[al] to approve the assignment of the membership share . . . was clearly an interference with Freeman’s 

right to ‘lease’” under §1982. 396 U. S., at 237. Only then

did it conclude—based on Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 

249 (1953), a third-party standing case in which another 

white litigant was permitted to “rely on the invasion of the 

rights of others,” id., at 255—that Sullivan “ha[d] standing 

to maintain this action.” Sullivan, 396 U. S., at 237. The 

word “retaliation” does not appear in the Court’s opinion.

Nor is there any suggestion that Sullivan would have had

“standing” absent the violation of Freeman’s rights. 

 Of course, Sullivan is not a model of clarity, and Justice

Harlan, writing in dissent, was correct to criticize the 

“undiscriminating manner” in which the Court dealt with

Sullivan’s claims. Id., at 251. Sullivan had sought relief 

both for the corporation’s refusal to approve the assignment and for his expulsion. Id., at 253. But in stating

that Sullivan had standing to maintain “this action,” id., 

at 237, the Court did not specify what relief Sullivan was

entitled to pursue on remand. Lamenting the Court’s

“failure to provide any guidance as to the legal standards

that should govern Sullivan’s right to recovery on remand,” id., at 252 (dissenting opinion), Justice Harlan

provided an instructive summary of the ambiguities in the 

Court’s opinion: 

“One can imagine a variety of standards, each based 

on different legal conclusions as to the ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ created by §1982, and each having very different 

remedial consequences. For example, does §1982 give 

Sullivan a right to relief only for injuries resulting 

from Little Hunting Park’s interference with his 

statutory duty to Freeman under §1982? If so, what is 

Sullivan’s duty to Freeman under §1982? Unless 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 11 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

§1982 is read to impose a duty on Sullivan to protest

Freeman’s exclusion, he would be entitled to reinstatement under this standard only if the Board had 

expelled him for the simple act of assigning his share 

to Freeman. 

“As an alternative, Sullivan might be thought to be 

entitled to relief from those injuries that flowed from 

the Board’s violation of its ‘duty’ to Freeman under 

§1982. Such a standard might suggest that Sullivan 

is entitled to damages that resulted from Little Hunting Park’s initial refusal to accept the assignment to 

Freeman but again not to reinstatement. Or does the 

Court think that §1982 gives Sullivan a right to relief

from injuries that result from his ‘legitimate’ protest 

aimed at convincing the Board to accept Freeman?” 

Id., at 254–255. 

It is noteworthy that of the three possible standards

Justice Harlan outlined, the first two clearly depend on a

showing that Freeman’s §1982 rights were violated. Only

the third—“Or does the Court think that §1982 gives 

Sullivan a right to relief from injuries that result from his

‘legitimate’ protest”—resembles a traditional retaliation

claim and, in context, even it is probably best read to 

presuppose that Sullivan was protesting an actual violation of Freeman’s rights. Id., at 255. Which, if any, of 

these standards the Court had in mind is anybody’s guess.

It did not say.

I thus adhere to my view that Sullivan is best read as a 

third-party standing case. That is how the parties argued

the case, and that is the most natural reading of the 

Court’s opinion. But even if Sullivan could fairly be read

as having inferred a freestanding cause of action for retaliation—which I doubt it can, at least not without superimposing an anachronistic outlook on a Court that was not 

as familiar with retaliation claims as we are today—the 
 

12 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Court’s one-paragraph discussion of the issue was, at best, 

both cursory and ambiguous. This is hardly the stuff of

which stare decisis is made. 

Steadfastly refusing to acknowledge any ambiguity, the

Court asserts that it is “not surprising that following 

Sullivan, federal appeals courts concluded, on the basis of 

Sullivan or its reasoning, that §1981 encompassed retaliation claims.” Ante, at 5. But given Sullivan’s use of the 

word “standing” and its reliance on a third-party standing

case, what is unsurprising is that each of the cases the

Court cites either characterized the issue as one of standing, Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1266, 1270 

(CA6 1977) (characterizing the issue as “whether or not 

the white plaintiff in this action has standing to sue his 

former employer under 42 U. S. C. §1981 for discharging 

him in alleged retaliation for plaintiff’s protesting the 

alleged discriminatory firing of a black co-worker”), or

recognized that it was taking a step beyond Sullivan in 

inferring a cause of action for retaliation, Choudhury v. 

Polytechnic Inst. of N. Y., 735 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA2 1984) 

(stating that the Second Circuit “ha[d] never decided

whether §1981 creates a cause of action for retaliation,” 

even though it had previously held, based on Sullivan, 

“that a white person who claimed to have suffered reprisals as a result of his efforts to vindicate the rights of nonwhites had standing to sue under §1981”); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F. 2d 593, 598, n. 7 (CA5 1982) (recognizing that Sullivan and a previous Fifth Circuit decision 

relying on Sullivan were “essentially standing cases holding that white people can assert civil rights claims when

they are harmed by someone’s discrimination against 

blacks,” which is distinct from holding that “a particular 

type of conduct—retaliation for the filing of a §1981 law 

suit—is actionable in the first place”). 

Moreover, even if Sullivan had squarely and unambiguously held that §1982 provides an implied cause of action 
 

 

 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 13 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

for retaliation, it would have been wrong to do so because

§1982, like §1981, prohibits only discrimination based on

race, and retaliation is not discrimination based on race.4 

The question, then, would be whether to extend Sullivan’s 

erroneous interpretation of §1982 to §1981. The Court 

treats this as a foregone conclusion because “our precedents have long construed §§1981 and 1982 similarly.” 

Ante, at 4. But erroneous precedents need not be extended

to their logical end, even when dealing with related provisions that normally would be interpreted in lockstep.5 

—————— 

4The majority claims that Sullivan “did not embrace” this “linguistic 

argument.” Ante, at 10. That is because the argument was not before 

the Court. The corporation did not argue that §1982’s text could not 

reasonably be construed to create a cause of action for retaliation; nor 

did Justice Harlan in dissent. No one made this argument because that

was not how the issue was framed, either by Sullivan or by the Court. 

The majority suggests that the argument was “apparent at the time the

Court decided Sullivan.” Ibid. But the only evidence it cites is Justice 

Harlan’s observation that the Court’s holding in Jones v. Alfred H. 

Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968), that §1982 prohibits private as well as

governmental discrimination was “in no way required by [§1982’s] 

language.” Sullivan, 396 U. S., at 241. I fail to see how that observation—or Justice Harlan’s further observation that the Court in Sullivan 

had gone “yet beyond Jones,” ibid.—shows that the Court considered 

and rejected the entirely different argument that §1982’s text does not

provide a cause of action for retaliation. 5For example, we have refused to extend the holding of J. I. Case Co. 

v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964), which inferred a private right of action

for violations of §14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to other

sections of the Act. Borak applied the understanding—later abandoned 

in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975)—that “it is the duty of the courts

to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective

the congressional purpose” expressed by a statute. 377 U. S., at 433. 

As Chief Judge Easterbrook explained in dissent below, the analogy to

the present case is obvious: 

“The argument goes that, because Sullivan ignored the language of 

§1982 and drafted an ‘improved’ version of the statute, we are free to do

the same today for §1981, its neighbor. The Supreme Court requires us 

to proceed otherwise. Borak dealt with §14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78n(a). It was as freewheeling in 
 

 

 

14 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Otherwise, stare decisis, designed to be a principle of 

stability and repose, would become a vehicle of change

whereby an error in one area metastasizes into others, 

thereby distorting the law. Two wrongs do not make a 

right, and an aesthetic preference for symmetry should not

prevent us from recognizing the true meaning of an Act of 

Congress.

The Court’s remaining reasons for invoking stare decisis 

require little discussion. First, the Court relies on the fact 

that Jackson interpreted Sullivan as having recognized a

cause of action for retaliation under §1982. See ante, at 3, 

9–10. That is true but irrelevant. It was only through

loose language and creative use of brackets that Jackson 

was able to assert that Sullivan “upheld Sullivan’s cause

of action under 42 U. S. C. §1982 for ‘[retaliation] for the

advocacy of [the black person’s] cause.’” 544 U. S., at 176 

(quoting Sullivan, 396 U. S., at 237; brackets in original). 

Of course, Sullivan did not use the word “retaliation,” did 

not say anything about a “cause of action,” and did not 

state that Sullivan had rights under §1982. It most certainly did not “interpre[t] a general prohibition on racial

discrimination to cover retaliation against those who

advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition.” Jackson, 544 U. S., at 176. Jackson’s assertion that 

—————— 

‘interpreting’ that law as Sullivan was with §1982. Yet the Court has 

held that the change of interpretive method announced in Cort applies

to all other sections of the Securities Exchange Act. See Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 (1977) (§14(e)); Touche Ross & Co. v. 

Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979) (§17(a)). Borak and similar decisions 

from the 1960s have not been overruled, but we have been told in no 

uncertain terms that they must not be extended. Indeed, in Virginia 

Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U. S. 1083 (1991), the Court declined 

to apply Borak to a portion of §14(a) that had not been involved in 

Borak. So that case has been limited to a single sentence of one subsection. Why, then, may the method of Sullivan be applied to other

sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 despite intervening precedent?” 

474 F. 3d, at 410–411 (citations omitted). 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 15 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Sullivan “plainly held that the white owner could maintain his own private cause of action under §1982,” id., at 

176, n. 1, misses the point entirely. While Sullivan held 

that “the white owner” had standing to maintain his own 

suit, it said nothing to suggest that he could sue to vindicate his own right to be free from retaliation under §1982. 

Rather, as I have explained, Sullivan’s “standing” was 

derivative of the violation of Freeman’s rights. In short, 

Jackson’s characterization of Sullivan was erroneous, and 

I am aware of no principle of stare decisis that requires us 

to give decisive weight to a precedent’s erroneous characterization of another precedent—particularly where, as

here, the cases involved different statutes, neither of 

which was the statute at issue in the case at bar. 

Second, the Court appears to give weight to the fact 

that, since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 

§101, 105 Stat. 1071, “the lower courts have uniformly 

interpreted §1981 as encompassing retaliation actions.” 

Ante, at 8. This rationale fares no better than the others. 

The Court has never suggested that rejection of a view 

uniformly held by the courts of appeals violates some

principle of stare decisis. To the contrary, we have not

hesitated to take a different view if convinced the lower 

courts were wrong. Indeed, it has become something of a 

dissenter’s tactic to point out that the Court has decided a

question differently than every court of appeals to have

considered it. See, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election 

Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 278, n. 11 (2003) (THOMAS, J., 

concurring in part, concurring in result in part, concurring

in judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Buckhannon 

Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health 

and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 643 (2001) 

(GINSBURG, J., dissenting); Sandoval, 532 U. S., at 294 

(STEVENS, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 

227, 254 (1999) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting); McNally v. 

United States, 483 U. S. 350, 365 (1987) (STEVENS, J., 
 

16 CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

dissenting). The Court does not explain what makes this 

particular line of lower court authority any more sacrosanct than those we have rejected in the past. 

Of course, lower court decisions may be persuasive, and 

when the Court rejects the unanimous position of the

courts of appeals, it is fair to point out that fact. But the 

point has traction only to the extent it tends to show that

the Court’s reasoning is flawed on the merits, as demonstrated by the number of judges who have reached the 

opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Buckhannon, supra, at 643– 

644 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (“When this Court rejects

the considered judgment prevailing in the Circuits, respect 

for our colleagues demands a cogent explanation”). Unlike 

decisions of this Court, decisions of the courts of appeals, 

even when unanimous, do not carry stare decisis weight, 

nor do they relieve us of our obligation independently to

decide the merits of the question presented. That is why,

when we have affirmed a view unanimously held by the

courts of appeals, we have done so (at least until today) 

not because we gave precedential weight to the lower 

courts’ decisions, but because we agreed with their resolution of the question on the merits. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. 

Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 531 (2005) (“Virtually every Court 

of Appeals to consider the question has held that such a 

pleading . . . is in substance a successive habeas petition 

. . . . We think those holdings are correct”); Lampf, Pleva, 

Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350, 

362 (1991) (“Thus, we agree with every Court of Appeals 

that has been called upon to apply a federal statute of 

limitations to a §10(b) claim”). 

III 

 As in Jackson, “[t]he question before us is only whether

[§1981] prohibits retaliation, not whether prohibiting it is

good policy.” 544 U. S., at 195 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). 

“By crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism, 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 17 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the majority returns this Court to the days in which it

created remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision 

of congressional purpose.” Ibid. That the Court does so 

under the guise of stare decisis does not make its decision 

any more justifiable. Because the text of §1981 provides

no basis for implying a private right of action for retaliation, and because no decision of this Court holds to the 

contrary, I would reverse the judgment below.