United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-2550

Non-Argument Calendar.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Brady Lavick ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

May 29, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Florida. (No. TCR 94-04045-01), William Stafford,

Judge.

Before ANDERSON, EDMONDSON and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant-appellant Brady Lavick Adams was convicted of

kidnapping his wife, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201, as well as

using and carrying a firearm during the kidnapping, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e), by a jury in

Federal court. He was sentenced to life in prison for the

kidnapping count, as well as five years to be served consecutively

for the § 924(c) violation and 30 years to be served concurrently

for the §§ 922(g) and 924(e) violation. Adams perfected this

appeal, alleging that (1) the indictment handed down by the Federal

grand jury in this case does not contain an essential element of

the § 1201 kidnapping offense, namely, that the kidnapper hold the

victim "for ransom or reward or otherwise," rendering the

indictment fatally defective, and (2) the evidence presented at

trial was insufficient to prove this same element. For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm his conviction.

The victim in this case, Sharee Lovett Adams, married the

defendant in 1991. According to the evidence presented by the

government, Mrs. Adams left her husband four or five times, and

each time Mr. Adams would find her and threaten her with physical

harm in order to force her to return to him. In early 1994, while

the couple was living in Brunswick, Georgia, Mrs. Adams left the

defendant again, first moving to a women's shelter and then to the

home of the defendant's sister, from which the defendant had been

banned. On this occasion as well, the defendant gained entry into

his sister's house by ruse, physically assaulted his wife and

forced her to return with him.

In July of 1994, Mrs. Adams left her husband and moved in with

her cousin, Delores Uwaezuoke, who resides in Atlanta. She left

the defendant a letter asking him to file for divorce, and said

that she would do so if he did not. Three to four weeks later, the

defendant found his wife. He went to Ms. Uwaezuoke's apartment,

but was refused entry on two occasions, first by Ms. Uwaezuoke, and

then by Mrs. Adams, who at that time was in possession of a rifle.

When Mr. Adams would not leave, Mrs. Adams grabbed the rifle, drove

to a telephone and called police. Mr. Adams refused to leave until

forced to do so by police. On the following day, a Sunday, a local

judge refused to grant Mrs. Adams a stalking warrant, and told her

to return on Monday.

On Monday morning, the defendant returned to Uwaezuoke's

apartment. He threw a brick through a sliding glass door, entered

the apartment, and held a handgun he had purchased in Atlanta to
 1

The indictment states:

Ms. Uwaezuoke's head. He ordered Mrs. Adams to come out of hiding.

When Mrs. Adams entered the room, the defendant took her and freed

Uwaezuoke. As he walked Mrs. Adams out to his car, the defendant

said, "Bitch you done fucked up now. You know what I told you I

was going to do if you left me." RII-43.

The defendant tried to force Mrs. Adams into his car, but she

fought to free herself. When she did break free and attempt to run

away, the defendant shot her in the abdomen, forced her into the

car, and sped away. He refused to take her to a hospital, going

instead to a hotel in Madison, Florida. There he twice attempted

to force Mrs. Adams to have sex with him. The F.B.I. eventually

convinced Mr. Adams to free his wife, and then took him into

custody. Mrs. Adams eventually underwent five operations to repair

the wound inflicted by the defendant.

The sufficiency of the indictment

 In the defendant-appellant's first assignment of error, he

insists that the Federal grand jury indictment handed down against

him does not include an essential element of the § 1201 kidnapping

offense. That section defines as kidnappers:

Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys,

kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or

reward or otherwise any person ... when— ... (1) the person is

willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce ...

18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994) (emphasis added). The defendant notes that

his indictment does not contain an allegation that he held his wife

"for ransom or reward or otherwise," and argues that the indictment

is therefore fatally defective.1
That between on or about August 1, 1994, and on or

about August 2, 1994, in the Northern District of

Florida and elsewhere, the defendant,

BRADY LAVICK ADAMS

did unlawfully seize, confine, kidnap, carry away and

hold against her will Sharee Lovett Adams, and did

transport Sharee Lovett Adams in interstate commerce

from the state of Georgia to Madison County, Florida;

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 1201. 

The original version of § 1201, enacted into law in 1932 and

known as the "Lindbergh Act," punished only those who kidnapped

another person "for ransom or reward." See 18 U.S.C. § 408a

(1932), quoted in Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 125-126, 56

S.Ct. 395, 395-396, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936). Section 408a was amended

on May 18, 1934, to include within its sweep those who kidnap "for

ransom or reward or otherwise." 18 U.S.C. § 408a (1934) (emphasis

added). The phrase "or otherwise" in the amended statute was

construed broadly in Gooch to "prevent transportation in interstate

... commerce of persons who were being unlawfully restrained in

order that the captor might secure some benefit to himself."

Gooch, 297 U.S. at 128, 56 S.Ct. at 397. The application of

ejusdem generis was rejected. The Senate Judiciary Committee

stated:

The object of the addition of the word "otherwise' is to

extend the jurisdiction of this act to persons who have been

kidnapped and held, not only for reward, but for any other

reason.

S.Rep. 534, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., quoted in Gooch, 297 U.S. at 127,

n. 1, 56 S.Ct. at 396-397, n. 1 (emphasis added); see also H.Rep.

1457, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., quoted in Gooch, 297 U.S. at 128, 56
S.Ct. at 397 (expression of identical intent by House Judiciary

Committee); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 850 (11th

Cir.1984) ("The statute broadly prohibits the interstate

transportation of a person against his will if the captor hopes to

obtain any benefit to himself from the abduction.").

The Supreme Court has subsequently held that § 1201 is not

limited to kidnappings committed for an otherwise illegal purpose.

United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 81-82, 84 S.Ct. 553, 557-558,

11 L.Ed.2d 527 (1964). In Healy, the defendants kidnapped a pilot

and forced him to fly them to Cuba. Id. at 76, 84 S.Ct. at 554.

The district court dismissed the indictment against the defendants

on the ground that the kidnapping was not committed for pecuniary

benefit. Id. at 76-77, 84 S.Ct. at 554-555. The Supreme Court

first stated that "the addition of "otherwise' was intended to make

clear that a nonpecuniary motive did not preclude prosecution under

the statute." Id. at 81, 84 S.Ct. at 557. The Court then disposed

of defendants' argument that § 1201 at a minimum requires that the

kidnapping be committed for an illegal purpose.

This contention is without support in the language of the

provision, its legislative history, judicial decisions and

reason. The wording certainly suggests no distinction based

on the ultimate purpose of a kidnapping ...

Id. at 82, 84 S.Ct. at 557. The Court noted that there were no

policy considerations supporting defendants' assertion that § 1201

requires an illegal purpose.

A murder committed to accelerate the accrual of one's rightful

inheritance is hardly less heinous than one committed to

facilitate a theft; by the same token, we find no compelling

correlation between the propriety of the ultimate purpose

sought to be furthered by a kidnapping and the undesirability

of the act of kidnapping itself.
 2

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th

Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all

of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

the close of business on September 30, 1981. Id. at 1209. 

Id. at 82, 84 S.Ct. at 557.

In Clinton v. United States, 260 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.1958),

cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948, 79 S.Ct. 731, 3 L.Ed.2d 681 (1959),

this Court's predecessor construed § 1201 in circumstances quite

similar to the case at bar. 2 The indictment in Clinton also

omitted the phrase "for ransom or reward or otherwise." The court

noted, "It is difficult to see how the addition of the words "for

ransom or reward or otherwise' would have added anything to the

indictment because obviously "otherwise' comprehends any purpose at

all." Id. at 825 (emphasis added). See also United States v.

Atchison, 524 F.2d 367, 370-371 (7th Cir.1975) ("[I]t now appears

to be well settled that purpose is not an element of the offense of

kidnapping and need not be charged or proved to support a

conviction under the kidnapping statute, a defect in the

indictment's allegation of purpose is collateral in nature.")

Adams argues that Clinton does not control the result here for

two reasons. First, he argues that the holding in Clinton stands

in contravention of the Supreme Court's holding in Chatwin v.

United States, 326 U.S. 455, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946).

However, the defendant misreads Chatwin. The Court in Chatwin held

that the statutory language "held for ransom or reward or

otherwise" in the Federal Kidnapping Act "implies an unlawful

physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against the

person's will and with a willful intent so to confine the victim."
Id. at 460, 66 S.Ct. at 235. The Court found that the person

allegedly kidnapped by the defendants in that case was not held

against her will, and was free to leave at any time. Id. The

Court reversed the defendants' convictions because the government

"failed to prove an act of unlawful restraint." Id.

Chatwin holds that, for an act of transporting a person across

state lines to constitute kidnapping under the predecessor to §

1201, the victim so transported must be held against his or her

will. In this regard, Chatwin is in no way inconsistent with the

holding of the court in Clinton. Further, the indictment handed

down against Adams clearly states that he "did unlawfully seize,

confine, kidnap, [and] carry away" Mrs. Adams and " hold [her]

against her will."

However, part of the dicta in Chatwin relates to Adams' second

argument that Clinton does not control our decision in this case.

Adams correctly notes that the court in Clinton upheld an

indictment that, although it lacked the words "for ransom or reward

or otherwise," did in fact charge the defendant with "unlawfully

and knowingly" transporting the victim in interstate commerce after

kidnapping her. The court found that indictment sufficient. Adams

argues, in essence, that the indictment handed down against him

contains no statement regarding his mens rea because there is no

language in it that could serve as a substitute for the purpose

requirement of § 1201.

 The Supreme Court stated as dicta in Chatwin that one of the

elements of the Federal kidnapping offense is that the kidnapper

act "with a willful intent so to confine the victim." Chatwin, 326
 3

Because the Court's primary concern and holding in Chatwin

was that the predecessor to § 1201 required that the restraint

applied by the kidnapper be exercised against the victim's will,

the Court did not elaborate on the dicta noted above. The logic

of this dicta is that § 1201 should not be construed to punish a

person who unknowingly and unintentionally transports across

state lines a restrained individual, against that individual's

will. For example, if a trash hauler locks a dumpster, which

unknown to him also holds an intoxicated reveler, picks it up and

moves it in interstate commerce, he should not be guilty of

kidnapping even though he restrained the individual and carried

him across state lines, because he did not form the necessary

intent to do so. 

U.S. at 460, 66 S.Ct. at 235.3 Adams argues that, in Clinton, the

intent element in that indictment served as a substitute for the

purpose of the kidnapping element. He insists that his indictment

contains no language that could serve as a substitute for "ransom

or reward or otherwise," and thus an essential element of the

offense is missing from it. However, Chatwin deals not with the

sufficiency of an indictment, but instead with the sufficiency of

the government's proof after trial. An indictment, on the other

hand, is sufficiently detailed if it: (1) contains the essential

facts underlying each element of the offense, such that the

defendant is properly informed of the proof he must meet, and (2)

is specific enough to permit the defendant to use it to protect

himself from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764, 82 S.Ct. 1038,

1046-1047, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). It cannot be disputed that the

indictment in this case, given its degree of factual and temporal

specificity, meets the second of these two criteria.

We also readily reject Adams' claim based on the first Russell

criterion. The factual specificity of the indictment more than

adequately made him aware of the proof against him and the
allegations to which he must answer. The incident at issue is

clearly defined, down to the date of the alleged offense. The only

arguable deficiency in the indictment is a failure to explicitly

charge willfulness. Our resolution of this issue is facilitated by

the posture in which Adams' assignment of error is brought to this

Court. Adams did not object to the indictment in the district

court, but instead makes this argument for the first time on

appeal.

 When the adequacy of an indictment is challenged for the

first time on appeal, this Court "must find the indictment

sufficient unless it is so defective that it does not, by any

reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant

is convicted." United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 734-35

(11th Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted). Hooshmand

explained, quoting from United States v. Chilcote, 724 F.2d 1498,

1505 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1218, 104 S.Ct. 2665, 81

L.Ed.2d 370 (1984):

[P]ractical, rather than technical, considerations govern the

validity of an indictment. Minor deficiencies that do not

prejudice the defendant will not prompt this court to reverse

a conviction.

Hooshmand, 931 F.2d at 735.

We readily conclude that Adams suffered no actual prejudice as

a result of this indictment. In addition to the factual

specificity noted above, the indictment specifically refers to §

1201. See Chilcote, 724 F.2d at 1505 ("Moreover, when the

indictment specifically refers to the statute on which the charge

was based, the statutory language may be used to determine whether

the defendant received adequate notice."). Therefore, the ruling
 4

Adams' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against

him is without merit and warrants no discussion. 

of the district court is affirmed.4

AFFIRMED.