# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 28, 2012

Decided March 28, 2012

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 11

‐ 2821

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellee,

v.

REGINALD COVERSON,

Defendant

‐ Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

Hammond Division.

No. 2:05

‐ CR

‐ 85

Rudy Lozano,

Judge

.

O R D E R

Reginald Coverson pleaded guilty in 2005 to five counts of distributing crack

cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of possessing crack with intent to distribute, id

. The district court found that Coverson was responsible for 223 grams of crack, set his base

offense level at 34, and added 2 levels for possessing a dangerous weapon in connection

with his drug offenses. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (b)(1), (c)(3) (2005). Coverson’s total offense

level of 36 combined with his criminal history category of V yielded an imprisonment range

of 292 to 365 months. The court sentenced Coverson in the middle of that range to 328

months. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 11

‐ 2821 Page 2

In 2007 the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowered the base offense levels for

crack offenses. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 706, 713. The following year Coverson moved

for a reduced sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on a revised imprisonment range of

235 to 293 months. His appointed lawyer requested a full resentencing and a prison term at

or below the low end of that range. In August 2011 the district court lowered Coverson’s

sentence to 264 months (the middle of the new range) but rejected his request for a full

resentencing. Coverson filed a notice of appeal.

Meanwhile, as Coverson pursued this appeal, his lawyer filed a second motion

under § 3582(c)(2) in November 2011. This time he relied on Amendments 748, 750, and 759,

which, effective that month, had retroactively implemented the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,

Pub. L. No. 111

‐ 220, 124 Stat. 2372

, by further reducing the base offense level for crimes

involving crack, see U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 748, 750, 759. In December the district court

granted the motion and reduced Coverson’s sentence to 211 months. This term falls in the

middle of the revised imprisonment range of 188 to 235 months, and is well below the

minimum of the range generated by his first motion under § 3582(c)(2). Coverson did not

file a notice of appeal to challenge the outcome of his second motion under § 3582(c)(2), nor

has he mentioned the further reduction in sentence in this appeal from the first reduction in

August 2011.

Coverson’s lawyer asserts that this appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under

Anders v. California

, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). But because there is no right to appointed

counsel in a proceeding under § 3582(c)(2), see United States v. Forman

, 553 F.3d 585, 590 (7th

Cir. 2009); United States v. Tidwell

, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999), counsel need not have

complied with the Anders safeguards before moving to withdraw, see Pennsylvania v. Finley

,

481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987); DiAngelo v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Aid

, 891 F.2d 1260, 1262 (7th Cir.

1989). Nevertheless, we invited Coverson to respond to his attorney’s motion, and he has

done so. See C IR

. R. 51(b).

Coverson argues that, when his sentence was reduced the first time, the district court

should have conducted a full resentencing and better explained its evaluation of the

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Yet § 3582(c)(2) authorizes “only a limited

adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.”

United States v. Dillon

, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010); see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3); United States v.

Neal

, 611 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2010). And Coverson’s argument concerning § 3553(a)

became moot when his sentence was reduced again, to 211 months, in December 2011.

The motion to withdraw is GRANTED

, and the appeal is DISMISSED

.