Filed 11/16/22 In re S.R. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re S.R., A Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B316021

 

 (Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP04919A)

 ORDER MODIFYING 

 OPINION

 [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November 15, 

2022, be modified as follows:
2

1. On page 1, the superior court number is corrected to 

read 19CCJP04919A.

[There is no change in the judgment.]

_____________________________________________________________________

RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.* LAVIN, Acting P.J. EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 11/15/22 In re S.R. CA2/3 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re S.R., A Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B316021

 

 (Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 Super. Ct. No. 19CJP04919A)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Affirmed.

Suzanne M. Nicholson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

B.S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order

terminating parental rights over her three-year-old daughter, 

S.R., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. 

Mother contends the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to 

comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child 

Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related

California law. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The Dependency Proceedings

On August 2, 2019, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on

behalf of then one-month-old S.R. The petition, as later 

amended, alleged that mother had a history of domestic violence 

with S.R.’s alleged father, J.F., and another male companion; 

that mother had a history of mental and emotional problems; 

that mother and J.F. had a history of substance abuse, including 

cocaine and marijuana; that S.R.’s older half-sibling was a prior 

dependent of the court and had received permanent placement 

services based on mother’s substance abuse; and that S.R. had a 

positive toxicology screen for marijuana at birth. On August 5, 

2019, S.R. was detained from mother and placed in foster care.

At the adjudication hearing held on October 15, 2020, the 

juvenile court sustained the amended petition under section 300, 

subdivisions (b) and (j) based on mother’s history of substance 

abuse, mental and emotional problems, and domestic violence 

with an unrelated male companion. The counts related to J.F. 

were dismissed following a paternity test that showed he was not 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references 

are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

S.R.’s biological father. At the disposition hearing held on 

November 16, 2020, the court declared S.R. a dependent of the 

court, removed the child from mother’s custody, and ordered the 

bypass of reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(10).

After several continuances, the section 366.26 permanency 

planning hearing for S.R. was held on October 26, 2021. The 

juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the 

child was adoptable, and that no exception to the termination of 

parental rights applied. The court terminated parental rights 

over S.R. and transferred care, custody and control of the child to 

DCFS for adoptive planning and placement. S.R.’s foster 

parents, with whom she had been placed since being detained

from mother, were identified as her prospective adoptive parents.

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the order 

terminating her parental rights.

II. The ICWA Investigation and Findings

At the August 5, 2019 detention hearing, mother filed a 

Parental Notification of Indian Status form (Judicial Council 

Form ICWA-020) indicating that she may have Indian ancestry 

through the “Blackfoot” tribe. Upon inquiry by the juvenile court, 

mother stated that her “Blackfoot” ancestry was on her father’s 

side of the family but she did not know if anyone was a registered 

tribal member. The court ordered DCFS to investigate mother’s 

claim. 

On October 7, 2019, DCFS mailed a first set of ICWA 

notices for S.R. to the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of the Interior. The social 

worker certified that she sent the notices via registered or 

certified mail with return receipt requested. However, no proofs 
4

of mailing or return receipts were filed with the court. The 

notices included mother’s married name, current and former 

addresses, and date and place of birth. The notices also listed the 

names, current addresses, dates of birth, and places of birth of 

S.R’s maternal grandparents, as well as the names, dates of 

birth, and places of birth of one set of S.R.’s maternal greatgrandparents. For each individual identified in the notices, the 

box for “Tribe or Band, and Location” was marked “Does not 

apply,” and the box for “Tribal membership or enrollment 

number” was marked “Unknown.” The section on “Other relative 

information” was left blank except for the boxes in that section 

labeled “Tribe[,] band and location,” which were marked “Does 

not apply.” On the section for “Indian Custodian Information,”

however, the “Tribe or Band, and Location” was identified 

as “Blackfeet Tribe of Montana.”

The Blackfeet Tribe responded in a letter dated December

10, 2019 that S.R. was not listed on the tribal rolls. The letter 

also stated, “As of August 30, 1962, our blood quantum 

requirement for enrollment is 1/4 Blackfeet blood. The above 

children is/are not eligible for enrollment, and the child(ren) 

is/are not domiciled on the Blackfeet Indian reservation.” The 

letter, however, added, “If you are able to gather more 

information on the ancestry of the parents, please contact me 

again and I will review the tribal rolls.” 

On December 18, 2019, DCFS spoke to S.R.’s maternal 

grandfather, G.R., who provided further information regarding 

the relatives on his side of the family with Indian ancestry. G.R. 

reported his family is from Honduras but his grandmother was 

affiliated with the “Blackfoot” tribe. G.R. also stated he had 

received documentation indicating that he “in fact is Blackfoot” 
5

but did not have such documentation in his possession. G.R. 

provided the names, dates of birth, and cities and states of 

residence for S.R.’s other set of maternal great-grandparents, 

As.R. and An.R. According to G.R., As.R. resided in Mandeville, 

Louisiana, and An.R. resided in Dallas, Texas. G.R. also 

provided the name, approximate date of birth, approximate date 

of death, and place of death for S.R.’s maternal great-greatgrandmother, and the name, approximate date of death, and 

place of death for the child’s maternal great-great-grandfather. 

On December 20, 2019, DCFS mailed a second set of ICWA 

notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the 

Interior. There is no indication in the record, however, that these

second notices were sent to any tribe. The second notices added 

mother’s maiden name, but otherwise included the same 

biographical information as the first notices regarding mother, 

the maternal grandparents, and one set of the maternal greatgrandparents. The second notices also added the name and date

of birth of S.R.’s other maternal great-grandmother, As.R., and 

the name, date of birth, and country of birth of the other 

maternal great-grandfather, An.R.. The notices did not, however, 

include the places of residence of As.R. and An.R. , even though 

G.R. had provided this information to DCFS. On the section 

for “Indian Custodian Information,” the “Tribe or Band, and 

Location” was again identified as “Blackfeet Tribe of Montana.” 

In a response dated January 7, 2020, the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs stated that it had received the ICWA notice for S.R., and 

that the notice contained insufficient information to determine 

tribal affiliation. 

On February 18, 2020, DCFS mailed a third set of ICWA 

notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the 
6

Interior, but not to any tribe. DCFS also filed certified mail 

receipts for the notices sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and 

the Secretary of Interior. The third notices contained the same 

biographical information as the second notices regarding mother, 

the maternal grandparents, and both sets of maternal greatgrandparents, again omitting the latter set of greatgrandparents’ places of residence as provided by G.R. The 

“Blackfeet Tribe of Montana” was again named as the relevant

tribe in the “Indian Custodian Information” section.

On July 22, 2020, DCFS mailed a fourth set of ICWA 

notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the 

Interior, but not to any tribe. Certified mail receipts for the 

notices sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of 

Interior were filed with the court. The fourth notices included 

the same biographical information as the second and third 

notices regarding mother, the maternal grandparents, and both 

sets of maternal great-grandparents. These notices, however,

added that the maternal grandmother denied any tribal 

membership, and that the maternal grandfather, G.R., claimed 

membership in the Blackfeet Tribe. The section on “Other 

relative information” was again left blank except for the boxes 

labeled “Tribe[,] band and location,” which were all marked “Does 

not apply.” Like the prior notices, the fourth notices identified 

the “Blackfeet Tribe of Montana” as the relevant tribe in the 

“Indian Custodian Information” section. 

In a last minute information report filed on July 30, 2020, 

DCFS indicated that, on July 24, 2020, the social worker sent an 

email to the ICWA coordinator for the Blackfeet Tribe regarding 

S.R.’s ICWA eligibility. According to DCFS, it had not received 

any further responses about the child’s ICWA status, and mother
7

had reported that she did not have any additional information 

about her family’s tribal affiliation apart from that provided by 

the maternal grandfather.

In a last minute information report filed on October 14, 

2020, DCFS informed the court that, due to an oversight, it 

had neglected to send the fourth set of notices to the Blackfeet 

Tribe. DCFS also stated that it had re-generated the notices 

to include the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, and had sent a fifth 

set of notices via certified mail on October 1, 2020. As further 

reported by DCFS, the notice to the tribe arrived at the post office 

in Browning, Montana on October 10, 2020, and was available for 

pick up as of that date. On October 8, 2020, the social worker 

attempted to call the tribe’s ICWA coordinator, but the call went 

unanswered and the social worker was unable to leave a 

voicemail message. On October 13, 2020, the social worker also

emailed the tribe’s ICWA coordinator to further inquire about 

S.R.’s eligibility status, but had not received a response. 

Certified mail receipts were filed for the notices sent to the 

Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the 

Secretary of Interior, which confirmed that these notices were 

mailed on October 1, 2020.

At the October 15, 2020 adjudication hearing, the juvenile 

court found that ICWA did not apply to this case.2 At the 

2 At the adjudication hearing, the court granted J.F.’s 

request to be dismissed from the case based on the paternity 

test results showing that he was not S.R.’s biological father.

Although DCFS conducted due diligence as to other alleged 

fathers identified by mother, none of them appeared in

the proceedings, and therefore, no inquiry could be made as to 

S.R.’s possible Indian ancestry on her paternal side. 
8

November 16, 2020 disposition hearing, counsel for DCFS noted 

the court previously had found that ICWA did not apply, and that

the alleged father, J.F., was no longer a part of the case. In 

response, the court stated it “agree[d] with all those previous 

prior findings that the court made on ICWA notice and 

paternity.”

DISCUSSION

On appeal, mother argues that both the juvenile court and 

DCFS failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements 

of ICWA and related California law. Mother specifically asserts 

that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding 

that ICWA did not apply because DCFS failed to conduct an 

adequate further inquiry into mother’s claim of Indian ancestry, 

and failed to properly notice the relevant tribe. In response, 

DCFS contends that it satisfied its duty of further inquiry by

interviewing the maternal grandfather and sending multiple sets 

of ICWA notices, and that any defects in notice were harmless 

because there was no reason to know S.R. was an Indian child.

We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the 

juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply because DCFS 

fulfilled its duty of inquiry, and based on such inquiry, there was 

no reason to know S.R. was an Indian child. We further conclude 

mother cannot show error in DCFS’s alleged failure to properly 

notice the tribe because there was no reason to know S.R. was 

an Indian child, and thus, ICWA notice was not required.

I. ICWA Inquiry and Notice Requirements

ICWA provides that “[i]n any involuntary proceeding in 

a [s]tate court, where the court knows or has reason to know 

that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care 

placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child 
9

shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s 

tribe” of the pending proceedings and the right to intervene. (25 

U.S.C. § 1912(a).) Similarly, California law requires notice to 

the child’s parent or Indian custodian and the child’s tribe if

there is reason to know that an Indian child is involved in the 

proceeding. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is defined as 

“any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either 

(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership 

in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an 

Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (a).)

Both juvenile courts and child protective agencies “have 

an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for 

whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, 

is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah 

W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14 [“juvenile court has an affirmative and 

continuing duty in all dependency proceedings to inquire into a 

child’s Indian status”].) Such duty generally “ ‘can be divided 

into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further 

inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’ ” (In re 

Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552.)

California law provides that the duty to inquire “begins 

with the initial contact” (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and requires the 

juvenile court and child protective agency to ask all relevant 

involved individuals whether the child is or may be an Indian 

child (§ 224.2, subds. (a)-(c)). If a child is placed in the agency’s

temporary custody, the agency must inquire whether the child is 

an Indian child by asking a nonexclusive group that includes the 

child, the parents, and extended family members. (§ 224.2, subd. 

(b)). At the first appearance of each party, the court must inquire

whether the appearing party knows or has reason to know that 
10

the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) The court also 

must instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently 

receive information that provides reason to know the child is 

an Indian child. (Ibid.)

3 

If the juvenile court or the child protective agency “has 

reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, 

but does not have sufficient information to determine that there 

is reason to know that the child is an Indian child,” the court or 

social worker “shall make further inquiry regarding the possible 

Indian status of the child . . . as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (e).) “[R]eason to believe” means the court or social worker 

has information “suggesting that either the parent of the child or 

the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an 

Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) “Further inquiry includes, 

but is not limited to . . . [i]nterviewing the parents, Indian 

custodian, and extended family members,” and “[c]ontacting 

the tribe or tribes and any other person that reasonably can be 

expected to have information regarding the child’s membership, 

citizenship status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A),(C).) 

3 There is “reason to know” a child is an Indian child when: 

a person having an interest in the child informs the juvenile court 

the child is an Indian child; the residence of the child, the child’s 

parents, or the child’s Indian custodian, is on a reservation or in 

an Alaskan Native village; a participant in the proceeding, officer 

of the court, Indian tribe or organization, or agency informs the 

court it has discovered information indicating the child is an 

Indian child; the child gives the court reason to know that the 

child is an Indian child; the court is informed that the child is or 

has been a ward of a tribal court; or the court is informed either 

the parent or the child possesses an identification card indicating 

membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (d).)
11

Both federal and state law set forth specific requirements 

for providing ICWA notice once there is reason to know that an 

Indian child is involved in the proceeding. Under the applicable 

federal regulations, the juvenile court must ensure that the party 

seeking a foster care placement or termination of parental rights 

promptly send notice to the child’s tribe, the child’s parents, and 

if applicable, the child’s Indian custodian. (25 C.F.R. § 23.111(a)-

(c) (2022).) California law likewise requires that ICWA notice be 

sent to the child’s parents or legal guardian, the Indian 

custodian, if any, and the child’s tribe. (§ 224.3, subd. (a); see 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(c)(1) [“[i]f it is known or there is 

reason to know that an Indian child is involved . . ., the social 

worker . . . must send Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for 

Indian Child (form ICWA-030) to the parent or legal guardian 

and Indian custodian of an Indian child, and the Indian child’s 

tribe”].) Both federal and state law further require that the

notices be sent by registered or certified mail with return receipt 

requested (25 C.F.R. § 23.111(c); § 224.3, subd. (a)(1)), and that 

copies of the notices, along with any return receipts or other 

proofs of services, be filed with the court (25 C.F.R. § 23.111(a)(2); 

§ 224.3, subd. (c)).

“If the [juvenile] court makes a finding that proper and 

adequate further inquiry and due diligence . . . have been 

conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an 

Indian child, the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not 

apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency 

of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) A finding that ICWA does 

not apply thus “ ‘ “implies that . . . social workers and the court

did not know or have a reason to know the children were Indian 

children and that social workers had fulfilled their duty of 
12

inquiry.” ’ ” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.) We 

generally review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the 

substantial evidence test, “ ‘ “which requires us to determine if 

reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s 

order.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “[W]e do not consider whether there is 

evidence from which the [juvenile] court could have drawn a 

different conclusion but whether there is substantial evidence to 

support the conclusion that the court did draw.” ’ ” (In re Q.M.

(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1080.)

II. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s 

finding that ICWA did not apply to the proceedings

In this case, mother’s statements in her ICWA-20 form

and at her first court appearance, indicating that she may have 

“Blackfoot”4 ancestry on the paternal side of her family, triggered 

DCFS’s duty to conduct further inquiry into S.R.’s possible Indian 

ancestry. DCFS does not contend otherwise, nor could it since 

the juvenile court ordered it to investigate mother’s claim at the 

August 5, 2019 detention hearing. (See, e.g., In re T.G. (2020) 

58 Cal.App.5th 275, 292 [mother’s ICWA-20 form declaring her 

belief she had Cherokee ancestry “unquestionably provided 

4 “[T]here is frequently confusion between the Blackfeet 

tribe, which is federally recognized, and the related Blackfoot 

tribe, which is found in Canada and thus not entitled to notice of 

dependency proceedings. When Blackfoot heritage is claimed, 

part of the [a]gency’s duty of inquiry is to clarify whether the 

parent is actually claiming Blackfoot or Blackfeet heritage so 

that it can discharge its additional duty to notice the relevant 

tribes.” (In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198.) Here,

it appears DCFS believed ancestry was claimed through the 

Blackfeet tribe because the agency identified the Blackfeet Tribe 

of Montana as the relevant tribe in the ICWA notices it sent. 
13

reason to believe Indian children might be involved in these 

dependency proceedings and triggered the Department’s duty 

to make further inquiry”]; In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 

322 [mother’s statement that she believed she may have Indian 

ancestry with the Blackfeet and Cherokee tribes but was not 

registered “was sufficient to require further inquiry, as the 

juvenile court ordered”].)

Rather, the parties dispute whether the evidence was 

sufficient to support a finding by the juvenile court that DCFS 

adequately discharged its duty to further inquire into S.R.’s 

possible Indian ancestry. DCFS argues that it satisfied its 

duty of further inquiry because it interviewed the maternal 

grandfather, G.R., about his Indian heritage and sent a total of 

five sets of ICWA notices, each of which included the maternal 

grandfather’s name, current address, date of birth, and country 

of birth. Mother asserts, however, that DCFS’s inquiry was 

insufficient because there were several other known extended 

family members of whom no inquiry was ever made. Mother 

specifically identifies the maternal grandmother, a maternal 

aunt, and the maternal great-grandparents, As.R. and An.R.,

as additional relatives that DCFS should have interviewed. 

Based on the record before us, we conclude the juvenile court 

reasonably could find that DCFS conducted an adequate further 

inquiry into S.R.’s possible Indian ancestry, and that, based on 

such inquiry, there was no reason to know S.R. was an Indian 

child. The court’s finding that ICWA did not apply accordingly 

was supported by substantial evidence. 

In response to the information provided by mother about 

her family’s “Blackfoot” ancestry, DCFS conducted an adequate 

further inquiry by interviewing the maternal grandfather, G.R.,
14

and by contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Secretary of 

the Interior, and the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana to investigate 

mother’s claim. In his interview with DCFS, G.R. reported that 

his now-deceased grandmother, the child’s maternal great-greatgrandmother, was affiliated with the “Blackfoot Tribe,” and that 

G.R. previously had documentation indicating that he “in fact is 

Blackfoot.” G.R. provided biographical information about the 

child’s maternal great-grandparents, As.R. and An.R., including 

their names, dates of birth, and cities and states of residence. 

G.R. also provided biographical information about the child’s 

maternal great-great-grandparents, including the great-greatgrandmother’s married name, approximate date of birth, 

approximate date of death, and city and state of death.

The fifth set of ICWA notices that DCFS prepared and sent

to the Blackfeet Tribe on October 1, 2020 included identifying 

information about mother, the maternal grandparents, and both 

sets of maternal great-grandparents. The notices also indicated 

that the maternal grandfather, G.R., was claiming membership 

in the Blackfeet Tribe. In addition, the social worker reported 

that she emailed the Blackfeet Tribe’s ICWA coordinator on two 

separate occasions to further inquire about S.R.’s eligibility for 

membership in the tribe. Apart from its initial letter indicating 

that S.R. was not listed on the tribal rolls, the Blackfeet Tribe 

did not respond to any of DCFS’s further inquiries.

Mother contends that DCFS did not satisfy its duty of 

further inquiry because it failed to make any inquiry of either 

the maternal grandmother or a maternal aunt, both of whom 

were known to DCFS during the proceedings. The record reflects, 

however, that DCFS must have asked the maternal grandmother 

about her Indian ancestry because the ICWA notices specifically 
15

stated that the maternal grandmother had denied any tribal 

membership. The record further reflects that mother solely 

had identified her father’s side of the family as having Indian 

ancestry, and as discussed, DCFS interviewed the maternal 

grandfather, G.R., about his tribal affiliation. While it appears 

DCFS did not make any inquiry of the maternal aunt, there is no 

indication that this relative might have possessed information 

about the maternal grandparents’ Indian ancestry that was 

different from, or in addition to, that provided by the maternal 

grandparents themselves. Rather, based on the ICWA-related 

inquiries made to both the maternal grandmother and the 

maternal grandfather, DCFS reasonably could have concluded 

that no further meaningful information about S.R.’s Indian 

ancestry could be obtained from the maternal aunt. (See In re 

Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502, 510 [where parents and 

paternal aunt denied Indian ancestry, record did not support 

“unvarnished contention” that additional interviews of extended 

family members would have “meaningfully elucidated the 

children’s Indian ancestry”]; In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 

1041, 1053 [even if child’s great-grandmother was person 

reasonably expected to have information regarding the child’s 

Indian status, social services agency could reasonably conclude 

from its contact with child’s aunt “that no further inquiry was 

needed because there was no further information of value to 

obtain from this third party”].)

Mother also claims DCFS failed to conduct an adequate 

further inquiry because it did not make any effort to contact the 

maternal great-grandparents, As.R. and An.R., even though it 

had information about where they lived. The record reflects, 

however, that the maternal grandfather, G.R., solely provided 
16

DCFS with each great-grandparent’s name, date of birth, and city

and state of residence. There is no indication that G.R. gave a 

current address, telephone number, or other contact information

for these individuals. Rather, the juvenile court reasonably could

have inferred from the record that, if G.R. had an available

means of contacting either of the maternal great-grandparents, 

DCFS would have obtained such information from him and 

included it in its reports. As this court has observed, “[w]hile we 

believe it reasonable in many cases to require DCFS to follow up 

on leads provided by the parents, we cannot ask the agency to 

. . . interview individuals for whom no contact information has 

been provided.” (In re Q.M., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082; 

see In re A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 323 [“ICWA does not 

obligate the court or [child protective agency] ‘to cast about’ for 

investigative leads”]; In re Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 

58 [speculative to assume that relatives interviewed by child 

protective agency had detailed information about direct lineal 

ancestors because they “were very forthcoming about [the child’s]

Indian ancestry” and “[p]resumably, they would have provided 

that information if it was known”].) 

Moreover, based on the information provided by G.R. about 

the family’s tribal affiliation, the juvenile court reasonably could 

have found that DCFS fulfilled its duty of inquiry, and that there 

was no reason to know S.R. was an Indian child. While G.R. 

stated that he previously had received documentation showing 

that he “in fact is Blackfoot,” he did not indicate whether he was 

a registered member of the tribe. He also did not provide any 

information suggesting that either S.R. or the child’s mother was

a member of the tribe or was eligible for membership in the tribe. 

(§ 224.1, subd. (e)(1).) Further inquiry is necessary to help the 
17

juvenile court or the child protective agency “determine whether 

there is reason to know a child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. 

(e)(2).) However, there is reason to know a child is an Indian 

child only when one of six statutory criteria is met —e.g., (1) the 

court has been advised that the child is an Indian child, (2) the 

child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, (3) any 

participant in the proceeding informs the court that it has

discovered information indicating the child is an Indian child, 

(4) the child gives the court reason to know that he or she is an 

Indian child, (5) the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, 

or (6) either parent or the child possess an identification card 

indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, 

subd. (d).) Here, none of the information provided by G.R. gave 

DCFS or the juvenile court a reason to know S.R. was an Indian

child. Accordingly, on this record, there was sufficient evidence 

for the court to conclude that an adequate further inquiry had 

been made.

III. DCFS was not required to provide notice to the tribe

In addition to arguing that DCFS failed to satisfy its duty

of inquiry, Mother also asserts that DCFS did not properly notice 

the relevant tribe because the ICWA notices that it sent to the 

Blackfeet Tribe omitted certain biographical information about 

S.R.’s maternal family. Mother further argues that the ICWA 

notices were defective because DCFS did not file return receipts 

for the notices as required by section 224.3, subdivision (c), and 

the juvenile court did not wait 10 days after the tribe’s receipt of 

the fifth set of notices to determine whether ICWA applied as 

required by section 224.3, subdivision (d). Mother’s arguments 

regarding notice lack merit, however, because notice to the tribe 

was not required in this case. 
18

ICWA notice is required only if, after initial and further 

inquiries, there is “reason to know” that an Indian child is 

involved in the proceeding. (§§ 224.2, subd. (f), 224.3, subd. (a).) 

As we have described, there is “reason to know” a child is an 

Indian child if any one of six statutory criteria is met. (§ 224.2

subd. (d).) In this case, because none of the criteria were met, 

the duty to provide ICWA notice was never triggered. (See In re 

Q.M., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084 [rejecting mother’s claim 

that notices to tribes failed to provide complete information for 

direct lineal ancestors because there was no reason to know the 

child was an Indian child, and thus, ICWA notice was not 

required]; In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 887 [juvenile 

court did not err in failing to ensure notice was provided in 

accordance with ICWA because statements by maternal family 

that children may have Cherokee ancestry did not provide reason 

to know an Indian child was involved in the proceeding].) Any 

deficiencies in the notices sent by DCFS, therefore, were legally 

irrelevant. (In re Q.M., at p. 1084.) 
19

DISPOSITION

The section 366.26 order terminating parental rights over 

S.R. is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.