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75–562PDF 2001

AL-QAEDA AND THE GLOBAL REACH OF

TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 3, 2001

Serial No. 107–50

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

RON PAUL, Texas

NICK SMITH, Michigan

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

JIM DAVIS, Florida

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

DIANE E. WATSON, California

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN MACKEY, Investigative Counsel

LIBERTY DUNN, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

WITNESSES

Vincent Cannistraro, Former Chief of Counterterrorism Operations, Central

Intelligence Agency .............................................................................................. 16

Charles Santos, Former Special Assistant to The Undersecretary for Political

Military Affairs, United Nations ......................................................................... 20

Oliver ‘‘Buck’’ Revell, Former Associate Director in Charge of Investigative

and Counter-Intelligence Operations, Federal Bureau of Investigation ......... 25

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations: Prepared

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Tom Lantos, a Representative in Congress from the State

of California: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 6

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 13

Vincent Cannistraro: Prepared statement ............................................................. 18

Charles Santos: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 23

Oliver ‘‘Buck’’ Revell: Prepared statement ............................................................ 27

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 56

The Honorable Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from the

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 66

APPENDIX

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 69

The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement ................................................................. 69

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in Congress from the State

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 70

(1)

AL-QAEDA AND THE GLOBAL REACH OF

TERRORISM

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m. In Room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.

With the September 11 attacks on the United States, the oncedistant prospect of terrorism has become an inescapable reality for

all Americans. The impact of this assault is greater than the tally

of physical destruction, greater even than the tragic loss of life. The

images forced into our lives are permanent ones. The realization

that human beings are capable of performing such deeds forces us

to accept that evil still exists among us, especially in our modern

era when many had hoped it might be abolished altogether.

We understand that the challenge before us is a deeply entrenched one, that we face more than a simple emergency. Many

have said that we are at the beginning of a new era, one in which

our daily lives and routines will be altered significantly.

But what does this mean? Are we now to live in permanent fear

in our own country and adopt a defensive crouch as part of our national character? Do we remake our country and communities into

fortresses? Must we sacrifice our entire foreign policy agenda in

order to address this suddenly urgent problem?

Clearly, such responses are unacceptable to a free people. Even

more, they are unnecessary. Without doubt, we are faced with a

malevolent and implacable enemy, but we should not let its sudden

emergence or its embrace of horror distort our deliberations. We

must remember that we have overcome far more powerful enemies

in the past, from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to the Soviet

Union. Thus, it seems to me this latest challenge is well within our

capacity to overcome, but only if we are fully committed to the

struggle that lies ahead.

As President Bush has correctly stated, terrorism is not a problem that will be solved easily or quickly. We cannot eliminate this

threat overnight because it didn’t arise overnight. It has taken root

in many places, growing steadily as our attention was focused elsewhere, drawing strength from a bottomless reservoir of hatred.

Given the nature of the threat, we should not expect quick victories

or even a final victory. I have no doubt we will eliminate Osama

2

bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network, but we should not make the

mistake of believing that our battle will then be won.

Let us begin by accepting there is no single enemy to be defeated, no one network to be eliminated. Al-Qaeda is but our most

prominent opponent, but its outlook is shared by many others who

are equally committed to our destruction. If we believe that our

safety can be secured by destroying any one organization or any

single person, we will only ensure that we will remain unsafe and

unprepared once again. For we know now that we have permanent,

mortal enemies who will seize upon our vulnerabilities to bloody

us, to murder our citizens, to commit horror for the purpose of forcing horror upon us.

There can be no dispute that we were unprepared for the assault

upon us. In retrospect, the warning signs may seem obvious, but

there is no person or organization we can saddle with the blame.

We as a Nation did not heed them.

We are now moving to correct our failings and to prepare ourselves for the task ahead. Our hopes and prayers are with our men

and women in uniform on whose strength and dedication to duty

the safety of our country rests, but we cannot place this burden entirely on their shoulders. If we are to be successful, our enemy

must be engaged in many areas far from any battlefield, and our

efforts must draw upon the energies and resources of the entire

country. Our strategy, plans, and actions must be comprehensive,

deliberate and formulated for the long-term. We must be prepared

not only to protect ourselves from new assaults, not only to intercept and frustrate them, but to eliminate new threats at their

source. This must be a permanent campaign, similar to the ancient

one humanity has waged against disease and its never-ending assault upon our defenses.

The optimism that is so integral a part the American outlook

often leads some to assume an image of the world that is at odds

with reality, one that is peaceful and welcoming without effort. I

hope that illusion is now gone. In its place should be a new recognition that peace and security exists for us only because we have created them. We have wrested them from an often hostile world, and

they will continue only so long as we are prepared to defend them.

The world will be safe for us only if we are prepared to make it

safe.

America has always triumphed over her enemies, and I have no

doubt we will do so again. But to do so, we must cast aside any

illusions of an easy victory. We must take up our responsibilities

and commit ourselves to fully and completely prosecuting the conflict ahead.

We did not seek this conflict, and we cannot run from it. We

have no choice but to take it up and to prevail. We have more at

stake than even our own safety and that of our children and grandchildren. For this is a battle for our future and the future of our

country.

I would now like to recognize Mr. Lantos for an opening statement. Because of time constraints, I would ask that other Members

place their opening statements in the record, except Mr. Gilman

who has a statement and anybody who else has a statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]

3

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTER- NATIONAL RELATIONS

With the September 11 attacks on the United States, the once-distant prospect

of terrorism has become an inescapable reality for all Americans. The impact of this

assault is greater than the tally of physical destruction, greater even than the tragic

loss of life. The images forced into our lives are permanent ones. The realization

that human beings are capable of performing such deeds forces us to accept that

evil still exists among us, especially in our modern era when many had hoped it

might be abolished altogether.

We understand that the challenge before us is a deeply entrenched one, that we

face more than a simple emergency. Many have said that we are at the beginning

of a new era, one in which our daily lives and routines may be altered significantly.

But what does this mean? Are we now to live in permanent fear in our own country and adopt a defensive crouch as part of our national character? Do we remake

our country and our communities into fortresses? Must we sacrifice our entire foreign policy agenda in order to address this suddenly urgent problem?

Clearly, such responses are unacceptable to a free people. Even more, they are

unnecessary. Without doubt, we are faced with a malevolent and implacable enemy,

but we should not let its sudden emergence or its embrace of horror distort our deliberations. We must remember that we have overcome far more powerful enemies

in the past, from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to the Soviet Union. Thus, it

seems to me that this latest challenge is well within our capacity to overcome, but

only if we are fully committed to the struggle that lies before us.

As President Bush has correctly stated, terrorism is not a problem that will be

solved easily or quickly. We cannot eliminate this threat overnight because it did

not arise overnight. It has taken root in many places, growing steadily as our attention was focused elsewhere, drawing strength from a bottomless reservoir of hatred.

Given the nature of the threat, we should not expect quick victories or even a final

victory. I have no doubt that we will eliminate Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda

network, but we should not make the mistake of believing that our battle would

then be won.

Let us begin by accepting that there is no single enemy to be defeated, no one

network to be eliminated. Al-Qaeda is but our most prominent opponent, but its outlook is shared by many others who are equally committed to our destruction. If we

believe that our safety can be secured by destroying any one organization or any

single person, we will only ensure that we will remain unsafe and unprepared once

again. For we now know that we have permanent, mortal enemies who will seize

upon our vulnerabilities to bloody us, to murder our citizens, to commit horror for

the purpose of forcing horror upon us.

There can be no dispute that we were unprepared for the assault upon us. In retrospect, the warning signs may seem obvious, but there is no person or organization

we can saddle with the blame. We as a nation did not heed them.

We are now moving to correct our failings and to prepare ourselves for the task

ahead. Our hopes and prayers are with our men and women in uniform on whose

strength and dedication to duty the safety of our country rests, but we cannot place

this burden entirely on their shoulders. If we are to be successful, our enemy must

be engaged in many areas far from any battlefield, and our efforts must draw upon

the energies and resources of our entire country. Our strategy, plans, and actions

must be comprehensive, deliberate, and formulated for the long-term. We must be

prepared not only to protect ourselves from new assaults, not only to intercept and

frustrate them, but to eliminate new threats at their source. This must be a permanent campaign, similar to the ancient one humanity has waged against disease and

its neverending assault on our defenses.

The optimism that is so integral a part of the American outlook often leads some

to assume an image of the world that is at odds with reality, one that is peaceful

and welcoming without effort. I hope that illusion is now gone. In its place should

be a new recognition that peace and security exist for us only because we have created them. We have wrested them from an often hostile world, and they will continue only so long as we are prepared to defend them. The world will be safe for

us only if we are prepared to make it safe.

America has always triumphed over her enemies. I have no doubt that we will

do so again. But to do so, we must cast aside any illusions of an easy victory, we

must take up our responsibilities, and commit ourselves to fully and completely

prosecuting the conflict ahead.

We did not seek this conflict, and we cannot run from it. We have no choice but

to take it up and to prevail. We have more at stake than even our own safety and

4

that of our children and grandchildren. For this is a battle for our future and for

the future of our country.

I would now like to recognize Mr. Lantos for an opening statement. [Because of

time constraints, I would ask that other members place their opening statements

in the record]. And then we will turn to our witnesses and what I expect will be

their very enlightening testimony.

Ms. MCKINNEY. I have a statement, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Of course. We will hear all statements.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first identify myself with your excellent opening statement. In the last 3 weeks, bipartisanship has permeated this city.

Let the record show that on the House International Relations

Committee bipartisanship was the order of the day since the very

first day of this congressional session, and it will continue to be.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing.

Winning the war on terrorism requires that we in Congress devote

our full and undivided attention to this daunting endeavor. To this

end, I believe that our Committee must play a key role and I urge

you to follow this hearing up with a series of others devoted to this

topic.

Mr. Chairman, the war on terrorism will be nasty, brutish and

anything but short. It has already involved some 6,000 American

casualties, and it will involve many more. It attacks our strength,

our intelligence, our patience and our commitment. But, in the end,

I have no doubt that the American people are prepared to bear the

costs of this campaign; and I am supremely confident that the

United States, joined by our true friends, will prevail.

I declare, Mr. Chairman, that we must wage the war against terrorism in a sequential fashion. First, we must find and destroy the

terrorists that perpetrated September 11; and, in this regard, I

urge the Administration not only to target Osama bin Laden and

his al-Qaeda organization but the Taliban as well. The Taliban has

chosen to be on the side of the terrorists, and they have chosen to

share their fate.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that defeating all terrorist organizations of global reach is an indispensable

component of the struggle. As the President said in his address to

our joint session 2 weeks ago, and I quote,

‘‘Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end

there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach

has been found, stopped and defeated.’’

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to place in the

record from The Washington Post this morning an excellent article

by Jim Hoagland on terrorism. This article, among others, points

out the risk of building what appear like coalitions.

Let me quote:

‘‘The first risk of building a broad strategic coalition is that the

construction becomes an end in itself, that photos of parades

of foreign ministers shaking hands and expressing sympathy

get defined as success and overtake effective action as the ultimate goal.’’

He goes on to say that,

5

‘‘American policy will now drift into incoherence if it continues

to aim at assembling the broadest possible coalition and cooperating seriously with regimes that are broken beyond repair. With us or against us, the American President warned

the world 2 weeks ago. Others will believe those words only if

Mr. Bush shows he meant them.’’

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to place in the

record a letter to Secretary Powell by our former Speaker Newt

Gingrich.

Newt Gingrich calls on Mr. Powell and the President to include

both Hamas and Hezbollah in the list of international terrorist organizations, since, I quote, ‘‘both groups publicly embrace and exalt

suicide bombers who kill innocent civilians and are symbols of terrorist violence.’’

Now a great deal has been made of the fact that during the Second World War we made common cause with Stalin against Hitler.

We did that, Mr. Chairman, but not as long as Stalin was in cooperation with Hitler. And I think it is extremely important that

organizations which have engaged in terrorist activities must cease

and desist all of these activities before they can be considered as

part of an effort to engage in this global struggle.

The Congress and the American people are prepared to trust the

President with extraordinary powers during these extraordinary

times. I urge the Administration to remain true to the principles

it has set forth in the President’s address to our joint session and

not falter in this fight. We cannot compromise our principles. We

cannot pretend that we do not see terrorist organizations for what

they are. We must not sweep the ugly truth under the rug. There

are no good terrorists and bad terrorists. There are terrorist organizations and in a sequential fashion they must and will all be defeated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the

Chairman for conducting this hearing in a timely manner and for

your very erudite statement at the opening of the hearing.

The panel that has been assembled here cannot be more distinguished and more——

Chairman HYDE. Excuse me, Mr. Gilman.

Without objection, the article by Mr. Hoagland and the letter referred to by Mr. Lantos will be made a part of the record.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

6

7

8

9

Mr. GILMAN. This panel that we have assembled cannot be more

distinguished and more expert in their appropriate areas. Of

course, there is no way to turn the clock back at this time. We can

rebuild buildings, but the nearly 6,000 who lost their lives in the

September 11 attacks cannot be brought back to life. Their families

cannot be put back together. In my congressional district, I have

98 families who have lost close members of their family, creating

a devastating impact upon them.

The September 11 barbaric attacks demonstrate clearly that terrorism is not just a part of modern life. It is just not a cost of doing

business for the world’s only remaining superpower. It cannot be

just factored into our foreign policy as just another problem. Terrorism is indeed a threat to our Nation’s security and to the security of nations throughout the world.

September 11 and other attacks similar to it affect our way of

life, our economy, our perceptions of safety, our collective national

psyche and our whole national fabric. Certainly we should have

been able to have seen this attack coming. With all the resources

that our Government has, looking at Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network, especially since the August, 1998, bombings of our

two embassies in Africa, the former bombing in the World Trade

Center, it is almost beyond belief how this plot could have been

missed.

Clearly, some in the Government believe that bin Laden was in

a box, unable to communicate with his followers in over 60 countries. Those assertions were sadly mistaken, and on September 11

that was demonstrated. At some point, we will need to consider

why anyone in our Government ever believed those assertions.

Of course, we cannot turn the clock back, but we can ourselves

work to make certain that nothing of this nature ever happens

again. I welcome the comments of our witnesses of what can and

should be done to this threat. It is hoped that at this hearing they

can bring some clarity to what should be the objectives of our U.S.

response to the September 11 attacks.

I ask our panelists to consider some of the following questions:

Should our objective be narrow, to decapitate the bin Laden network leadership network in Afghanistan, while avoiding being punitive toward the Afghan people? Or should the objective be broader, to take down the Taliban regime itself as a signal to other state

sponsors that they will lose their regimes if they harbor such

groups as bin Laden’s? And would that signal be appropriately understood or is the Taliban regime so weak that the lesson will not

be absorbed by other regimes such as Iran?

Is one name contingent on the other? Can we get bin Laden and

his top lieutenants without first changing the regime in Afghanistan? Alternatively, is there some combination of U.S. military or

covert action that might compel the Taliban to hand over bin

Laden?

Perhaps an even broader question is whether the dismantling of

bin Laden’s top echelons will result in the kind of response we are

seeking. Does the answer not lie in better law enforcement cooperation among the 60 or so countries where these networks operate?

Will going to the source in Afghanistan eliminate the threat for the

network? And then what other states are harboring al-Qaeda?

10

Let me also say something about rewarding terror. Especially

where democratic governments and our friends are under pressure,

we cannot take any actions or begin to contemplate any actions

which would give the impression of rewarding terror or encouraging others to reward terror. If someone must make peace with

the terrorists, if they can trust the change in someone else’s heart,

that must be for them to decide, not for us.

So let me be explicit.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. GILMAN. I am about to close. With your indulgence, Mr.

Chairman, just 30 seconds.

As to Mr. Arafat, who used violence against innocents, terror to

advance his political goals, only the Government of Israel, which is

politically responsible in a democratic way to the potential victims

of terror, can decide if he is worthy of trust.

Accordingly, we face a set of difficult issues as we try to determine how to respond to the September 11 disasters, and we look

forward to the assessments by our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will pass, unless provoked.

Chairman HYDE. Please don’t provoke Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. Royce?

Mr. ROYCE. I will pass.

Chairman HYDE. God love you, Mr. Royce.

Ms. McKinney from Georgia.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask if I could

have Mr. Ackerman’s and Mr. Royce’s time.

Mr. ROYCE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman. I am afraid I

have been provoked.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to congratulate you for having this important hearing on the global reach of terrorism.

I also would like to take this opportunity to make a recommendation that we have another hearing on a topic that I feel is vitally

important. That is the issue of domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism is probably a more widespread worldwide phenomenon than

international terrorism. But because international terrorism has

had a direct impact on U.S. interests, it is the primary focus of intelligence and defense agencies.

As we all learned to our horror on September 11th, no nation is

immune from the manifestations of hatred and rage that comes

from other parts of the world. But what about the terror that originates from sources that are purely domestic in nature? In the last

decade or so, we have seen a rise in anti-U.S. Government sentiments, anti-Government from the standpoint of militia groups, the

Aryan Nation, white supremists, skinheads, the KKK. In the Oklahoma City bombing in which 169 died, the two who were responsible for the crime, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were both

affiliated with right-wing militia movements.

In 1996, a pipe bomb exploded at Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, Georgia, killing two people and injuring more than 100 others. The FBI said that the pipe bomb looked homemade, with nails

11

and screws attached. They suspected domestic terrorists. Even

after a $500,000 reward was offered, there still has been no breakthrough in the Atlanta Olympic bombing case.

Violent protests in the form of arson, fire bombing and vandalism

against abortion clinics started in the early 1970s in the United

States. Recent cases involving the assassination and attempted

murder of abortion providers in both the U.S. and Canada have

shown that perpetrators may be sheltered by a network of sympathizers.

What about the victimization of gays and lesbians based upon

their sexual orientation, which includes harassment, vandalism,

robbery, assault, rape and even murder? Shouldn’t this be considered terrorism as well?

Well, according to Title 22 of the U.S. Code, it is considered terrorism. That statute contains the following definitions: The term

terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or

clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience. The

term terrorist group means any group practicing or that has significant subgroups that practice international terrorism.

The U.S. Government has employed this definition since 1983.

COINTELPRO was the FBI’s secret program and arguably would

fall under Article 22 of this definition of terrorism.

The FBI and other Federal agencies set out to eliminate political

opposition inside the United States. When traditional modes of repression, exposure, blatant harassment and prosecution for political crimes failed to counter the growing insurgency and even

helped to fuel it, the Bureau of Investigation took the law into its

own hands and secretly used fraud and force to sabotage constitutionally protected political activity.

It is our patriotic duty to continue to examine our own history

and search for improvements in our policies even in this difficult

time. We will win the battle against terrorism all the more quickly

for doing so and establish development of justice with a global

reach.

I have offered a bill to allow victims of the September 11 attacks

to seek compensation through U.S. courts from whatever nations

may have sponsored these attacks. Victims and their families already have the right to seek restitution from nations on the State

Department’s countries of concern list, namely Cuba, Iraq, Iran,

Syria, North Korea, Libya and Sudan. However, if a terrorist activity is sponsored by a state that is not on this list, as appears to

be the case with regard to September 11, the victims have no opportunity to seek compensation through U.S. courts. H.R. 2947

would correct that by permitting U.S. citizens to seek justice from

any country that propagates or sponsors terrorist activity.

We cannot selectively use the term terrorism nor can we or

should we protect nations that harm or support terrorism. Tragically, experience has shown us that American citizens are in great

danger in many parts of the world. The current list of seven nations as state sponsors of terrorism is proving inadequate and

needs to be expanded to include the right for U.S. citizens to seek

redress against any and all nations that harm them.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

12

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We need to study terrorism and understand it and eliminate it

from the face of the earth.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I, too, will put my statement in the

record [no statement submitted for the record]; and I hope other

Members—there are at least an hour’s worth of opening statements

still remaining. We have three very distinguished witnesses that I

am looking forward to hearing from, and I would hope that other

Members would take your admonition in the beginning and put

their statements into the record.

Chairman HYDE. The Chair thanks Mr. Smith.

Mr. Sherman of California.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.

There are 6 billion people on this planet and a few will want to

kill Americans because, as the National Review states, we are resented for our power, envied for our wealth and hated for our liberty. Since we cannot control all 6 billion people, we must instead

focus on a foreign policy that puts the responsibility on the roughly

200 governments on this planet that we can hold responsible.

Homeland security is important. But just as no hockey goalie can

stop every shot, if we had a perfect homeland security system but

we still allowed terrorist groups to organize these attacks, some of

those attacks would be successful. It is also not enough to go after

just the terrorist groups, because new terrorist groups can spring

up.

As I mentioned, there are 6 billion people on the planet and a

tiny percentage hate us. Therefore, we must go after the Taliban

not only because of justice—they have been coconspirators in the

death of 7,000 Americans—but also to set example for other regimes.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we cannot and dare not change our foreign policy, because to placate Mr. bin Laden and his gang is impossible. They want nothing less than to turn the entire world into

a giant Afghanistan. To placate them is dishonorable. Because

when Pearl Harbor was attacked, we sought not peace but victory.

And, in this case, we have faced three times as many American

casualties.

But finally, Mr. Chairman, if we change our policy in this instance, we simply whet the appetite of those who want to change

the policies of the world’s only superpower toward Kosovo or Sri

Lanka, Taiwan or Sumatra. The list goes on and on. If it ever becomes known that by killing Americans one can change the policy

of the world’s only superpower, then this is just the beginning.

I look forward to this Committee working toward an effective

way of setting an example with the Taliban regime. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It has been repeatedly said that the United States lost our innocence on Tuesday, September 11. The sense of security and stability that stemmed from being the Cold War victor and global superpower was destroyed in less than an hour—the span of time between the attack on the first tower of the World Trade Center and

that on the second tower and then later the Pentagon.

13

In this brief moment in history, the United States and the American people realize that anything and everything is possible. We

now fully understand that terrorists have no boundaries and no

sense of remorse. Terrorists place no value on human life. As the

September 11 attacks taught us, no country or no target is immune

from this cancer.

To terrorists, any means is justifiable. Suddenly, the warnings

and analysis by experts on the potential use of chemical and biological weapons and potential for nuclear terrorism were no longer

viewed as abstract arguments or action film plots. Suddenly, nuclear-related terrorism became a vivid and very real threat.

The Subcommittee which I chair will be holding a hearing at 1

o’clock today in this same room on nuclear terrorism and on the

International Atomic Energy Agency. We will work to ensure that

the physical protection of nuclear materials and countering the illicit trafficking in these radioactive elements is underscored.

Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham said we know that our security and that of nations around the world largely depends upon

what this agency does to prevent the proliferation and misuse of

nuclear materials. We cannot assume that tomorrow’s terrorists’

acts will mirror those we have just experienced, and that is why

the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency is so pivotal.

How real or imminent is the threat of nuclear-related terrorism?

We will be discussing these topics today, and I hope that some of

the audience will be with us later on today at 1 o’clock.

I thank the Chair.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Jim Davis of Florida.

Mr. DAVIS. I pass.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Mr. Schiff of California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of getting to our witnesses, I will pass as well.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Schiff.

Mr. Meeks of New York. Not here.

Mr. Berman of California.

Mr. BERMAN. Pass.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my statement for the record. I pass.

Chairman HYDE. The Chair thanks you. Without objection, it

shall be received.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Watson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Lantos, for holding this important and timely hearing. The events of September 11 have

forever demonstrated that our homeland is not invulnerable to attack from the outside. More direct attacks on American citizens on American soil are, sadly, likely

in the future. We now must prepare ourselves to deal with this reality.

In the face of this new threat, our nation does not have a comprehensive, integrated plan and government structures in place to respond effectively to homeland

terrorist attacks. The President has recommended the creation of a cabinet level Office of Homeland Security. The effectiveness of this new office will be predicated on

the power and authority that the Congress and President vest in it. Perhaps most

14

critical to the success or failure of a comprehensive homeland security policy is our

willingness to engage in an honest reexamination of the role and effectiveness of our

government structures and military doctrine in the post Cold War world.

It is therefore my hope that this hearing, besides providing us with important information on Al Qaeda and international terrorism, will commence the public dialog

on how our nation can best begin to reallocate its resources to meet the new challenges.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Tancredo is not here.

Mr. Kerns is not here.

Mr. Burton of Indiana.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Burton passes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

Mr. Nick Smith of Michigan.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly. I and

10 other Members of a congressional delegation just returned from

a trip to Moscow, Russia and to Turkey and Rome, to meet with

the former King Shah.

One issue that concerns me is that one of the chief sources of terrorism is the radical religious schools in Pakistan and in Afghanistan that often take on orphans and young boys to indoctrinate

and, if you will, brainwash over several years. So I hope we can

get the comments from the witnesses today on that issue.

Certainly, the CIA and other intelligence agencies seem to have

adopted an excessively defensive attitude toward terrorist activity,

and I hope we learn today what is being done to improve our operations and focus more on disrupting terrorist activities in addition

to simply attempting to defend our country.

I hope that you will relate to where we go from here on the

Church Commission and the CIA’s evident decision not to get information from those individuals that have or might conduct human

rights.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Kerns.

Mr. KERNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for calling

this important hearing. I am looking forward to hearing from our

panelists and the important information.

Also, I would like to say I was one of those travelling to Turkey,

Italy and to Russia recently. We learned very valuable information,

meeting with the King of Afghanistan and the leaders of the

United Front and actually going over a map of some of the things

where the United States can be helpful.

I am also happy to report we are not in this fight against terrorism alone, and we also recognize it is going to take our friends

and help from many.

But, with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our

witnesses; and thank you again for calling this hearing.

Chairman HYDE. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Cooksey, you have been passed over. Do you want an opening statement?

Mr. COOKSEY. No, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be

brief.

15

America has witnessed a ruthless slaughter of our fellow citizens,

and we need—and I say we—we in Congress and this Committee— need to hold those who are responsible for this slaughter accountable. And of course bin Laden is responsible. Of course, the Taliban

have their fingerprints all over this crime. But we also need to

make sure that we hold accountable those people in our State Department and our intelligence agencies who did not do their job in

providing policies and providing information that were necessary

for the protection of our citizens.

We cannot just sit back and blame the terrorists for being terrorists but not hold accountable those people in our Government who

were incompetent in fulfilling their responsibilities. They, too, must

share the burden of blame for this horrible atrocity that has been

committed against honest American citizens who were just going

about their lives.

Now I understand that some of the people, who I believe had advocated incompetent policies over these last 5 years in relationship

to the Taliban, are suggesting that we have a policy that in some

way might leave the Taliban in power. Well, I would hope that our

President has more common sense than this. Because some of these

very same folks were the ones who suggested to his father that we

keep Saddam Hussein alive and that he would crumble on his own

after we left that last conflict in Iraq so many years ago. Well, of

course, we know what their advice is worth when it came to Saddam Hussein. If we leave the Taliban in power now, it will be a

horrible signal to any government around this world that may or

may not choose to give aid or to harbor terrorists in the future.

This is a very serious issue. The Taliban must go. Bin Laden

must die. We are saying this not because we seek revenge but because we want to deter people in the future, terrorists and governments, from doing things that will result in the slaughter of innocent people, especially Americans.

So today I am looking forward to hearing the testimony. I know

two of the witnesses very well. Vince and I worked in the White

House together when he was deeply involved in the Afghan issue—

and Vince, I remember going to your office on many occasions talking about this. And Mr. Santos and I have worked in recent years

very often.

I want to thank you for holding this hearing. We do have some

very expert witnesses today. But let us not heed the advice of people who in some way have to bear some responsibility, whose incompetence caused this slaughter in the first place, who are suggesting now that we hold back and that we in some way don’t finish this job in the first stage. The first stage of fighting terrorism,

if we are going to have the rest of the stage successful, is bin

Laden dead and the Taliban out.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield some of my

5 minutes to one of the witnesses. I don’t know if that is appropriate.

Chairman HYDE. It certainly is. We thank the gentleman.

That will conclude the statements, and I appreciate the cooperation of the Committee. I would like to welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses.

16

Mr. Vincent Cannistraro is a former Chief of Operations and

Analysis at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center from October 1988

to November 1990. Prior to this, he worked at the Department of

Defense where he was Special Assistant for Intelligence in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and from November 1984 to January 1987, he was Director of Intelligence Programs at the National

Security Council under President Reagan. Mr. Cannistraro is also

a consultant on intelligence and international security affairs for

ABC World News with Peter Jennings.

Charles Santos was a special assistant to Diego Cordovez, United

Nations Under Secretary General for Special Political Military Affairs in the late 1980s, who negotiated the Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan. He was responsible for Afghan internal political

issues dealing with the different Afghan factions, and in the mid1990s he helped to establish the United Nations Special Mission to

Afghanistan and was its first Political Advisor and Deputy to its

head. He is currently a partner at SBS Associates, LLC, an energy

consulting and marketing firm in New York.

Mr. Oliver Revell is the Founder and President of Revell Group

International, a global business and security consulting firm based

in Dallas County, Texas. On November 16, 1964, Mr. Revell was

appointed a Special Agent of the FBI. In January 1975, he was promoted to Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Division

and later served as Acting Special Agent in Charge. In June 1980,

he was promoted to Assistant Director and placed in charge of the

Criminal Investigative Division, making him responsible for the

criminal investigative and counter-terrorism programs and operations of the FBI. He served as the Director’s deputy in charge of

the FBI’s Criminal Investigative, Counter-Terrorism and CounterIntelligence programs. He has been interviewed or served as a commentator on numerous national television and commentary programs.

We are very honored to have you three appear before the Committee today. If we could request gently a 5-minute summary of

your statement, we promise to insert your statement in full in the

record, and that will leave time for some questions.

So we will begin with you, Mr. Cannistraro.

STATEMENT OF VINCENT CANNISTRARO, FORMER CHIEF OF

COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. CANNISTRARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is very difficult for Americans to understand the nature of extremist organizations with the religious orientation such as alQaeda, but we have to understand and comprehend it if we are to

confront the threat itself.

Religious fundamentalists are domestic as well as international.

An analogy might be Christian Identity, a white supremist group

that has carried out killings and assassinations in the United

States. Unless we know what drives these religious extremists, who

are willing to kill themselves in the performance of their violent

acts, we will see other days like September 11, perhaps with even

greater casualties.

17

It is worth studying the evolution of the al-Qaeda group. Bin

Laden, who opposes the American influence in the Middle East,

was outraged by the Persian Gulf War which saw American and

other western troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, his home country.

He considers that country, ruled by the al-Sau’d family, as the

guardian of the Islamic holy places. King Abd’al aziz al-Sau’d, who

founded the kingdom, had the support of the Wahabis, a fundamentalist Islamic sect that prevails in Saudi Arabia itself. The

monarchy drives its authority from the Wahabis. In return, the

monarchy guarantees the sanctity of the holy places.

In bin Laden’s view, the Saudi monarchy betrayed that sacred

pact by allowing Christian and Jewish soldiers to be stationed on

the soil of this country during the Gulf War. Bin Laden opposed

the monarchy in 1991 and was expelled from the country by Saudi

intelligence. He then moved to the Sudan where he began organized training camps for Islamic activists from almost every major

Islamic country.

The mission was to train these fighters and to send them back

to their native lands to fight and promote insurgency against the

secular Arab regimes and replace them with religious governments

based on Sharia, Islamic law. The targets were countries such as

Egypt and Algeria and Muslim dominated provinces such as

Chechnya and Dagestan in Russia, and in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Even movements in Libya against Khadafi were promoted by Islamic activists trained in bin Laden’s camps in the Sudan.

We have to understand what bin Laden is trying to do. He believes in the restoration of an Ottoman Empire, but this time based

opon Islam. An ‘‘Islamic Caliphate’’ to be re-established under the

leadership of the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Osama sees the

United States and its world influence as the principal obstacle to

achieving his vision.

In 1996, he moved lock, stock and barrel to Afghanistan after

pressure by the Governments of Saudi Arabia, the United States

and Egypt. He aligned himself with the Taliban, a group of religious students who were trained in Pakistani schools. They were

then sent back into Afghanistan by the Pakistani government’s

military intelligence service, Interservices Directorate (ISI), in

order to promote ethnic Pashtun control over Afghanistan, which

had been suffering tribal conflict among various groups, particularly Tajik and Uzbek.

The Pashtuns—we say Pathuns in common American usage—

designates about a dozen separate tribes on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. The Taliban, as we know, is almost medieval in its concept of governance. Rulers from the Taliban have mismanaged the country and promoted starvation and human rights

abuses against their own population. Pakistan has allowed bin

Laden really to exist in Afghanistan by contributing to the defense

of some of his training camps, which are used as schools to train

Kashmiri terrorists who then go back into Kashmir and fight that

war there.

They don’t have clean hands here. The Northern Alliance, of

course, which had up until a few weeks ago 7 percent of the territory, is dominated by ethnic Tajik and Uzbek, which the Pakistanis, of course, opposed. About 3 weeks ago, the leader of the

18

Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Massud, was assassinated by bin

Laden’s operatives. He did it for Mullah Omar.

The bonds between Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are

bonds of blood. Bin Laden has offered ‘‘bayat,’’ an Arabic word

meaning an offering of submission to his will and his leadership.

Bin Laden recently declared Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as the ‘‘new

Mecca’’ and Mullah Omar as the new caliph. Bin Laden’s fighters

are intertwined with the Taliban, and any effort to remove bin

Laden from Afghanistan by necessity means the removal of Mullah

Omar in the inner core of the Taliban leadership.

What is al-Qaeda? Al-Qaeda means the ‘‘base,’’ or the ‘‘foundation.’’ Bin Laden doesn’t talk about all of his networks around the

world as al-Qaeda. He uses that to refer to his inner circle.

Mr. Chairman, I see I have gone over my 5 minutes, so I will

sum up very quickly.

For the past 4 years, bin Laden has fought, with the Taliban

military, against the Northern Alliance. He lost his own son in

fighting against the Northern Alliance. So it is clear that, without

the Taliban, bin Laden could not exist. Removing him means removing the Taliban.

I will conclude here, Mr. Chairman, because I will go on for a

couple of hours if you let me.

Chairman HYDE. Well, perhaps during the questioning these

other points will come out.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cannistraro follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VINCENT CANNISTRARO, FORMER CHIEF OF

COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I am pleased to appear before this committee to provide my views on al-Qaeda,

its structure and its objectives. It is important to note that Americans have a difficult time in understanding extremist organizations with a religious orientation like

al-Qaeda. It is essential that the agencies of our government involved in law enforcement and intelligence become intimately familiar with the culture of religious

zealots whether of foreign or domestic origin. We must understand the nature of the

threat before we can successfully confront it. In America, we also have fundamentalists such as Christian Identity, and other religious extremists who kill or maim in

the name of God. Comprehending the danger and the mind-set of these groups is

a first step to deterring the violence executed by the Osama Bin Laden’s of the

world. Unless we know what drives these religious extremists, who are willing to

kill themselves in the performance of their violent acts, we will see days like September 11, 2001, repeated, perhaps with even greater casualties.

It is worth studying the evolution of the al-Qaeda group. Bin Laden, who opposes

the American influence in the Middle East, was outraged by the 1990 Persian Gulf

War which saw American and other western troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. Bin

Laden considers the country, ruled by the Al-Sau’d family, as the guardian of the

Islamic holy places. King Abd’al aziz al-Sau’d, who founded the monarchy, had the

support of the Wahabis, the fundamentalist Islamic sect. The al-Sau’d monarchy derives its authority from the Wahabis, who allied with Abd’al aziz, in creating modern Saudi Arabia. In return, the monarchy serves to guarantee the sanctity of

Mecca and Medina, the site and magnetic pole for pilgrimages by the world’s Muslims. In Bin Laden’s view, the Saudi monarchy betrayed that sacred pact by allowing Christian and Jewish soldiers to be stationed on the soil of this Islamic country

which had been entrusted with a special protectorate mission for the holy places.

Bin Laden’s opposition to the monarch resulted in his expulsion from the Kingdom.

Shortly after, Bin Laden used his personal fortune and continuing contributions

from wealthy Islamic businessmen in Saudi and the Gulf to organize training camps

in the Sudan for Islamic activists from every major Islamic country. These contributions, plus revenues from Islamic Charity fronts, such as the International Islamic

Relief Organization, headed by Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, as well as numerous

other charitable fronts, continue to fuel his group today

19

The international cadres that comprise many of the networks associated with alQaeda, were trained by so-called ‘‘Arab-Afghans’’ with fighting experience from the

Soviet-Afghan war, although many of these ‘‘mujahedin’’ did not reach Afghanistan

until after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The main mission for Bin Laden was to

disperse trained fighters to their native lands to fight against the secular Arab regimes and replace them with religious governments based on the Sharia-Islamic

rather than civil law. The targets were secular Muslim countries such as Egypt and

Algeria, and Muslim dominated provinces such as Chechnya and Dagestan in Russia and in Bosnia and Kosovo. Anti-government movements were also promoted in

Libya and Tunisia as well. Indeed, Bin Laden’s vision is to re-establish the ‘‘Islamic

Caliphate’’ across every Muslim country, a religious restoration of the old Ottoman

Empire, this time under the leadership of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. Usama

sees the United States and its world influence as the principal obstacle to achieving

his vision.

Bin Laden relocated his operations to Afghanistan following pressure on the

Sudan exerted by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. The Taliban, a group of religious students from Pakistani schools, were successful in establishing control over Afghanistan with the active military support of Pakistan’s military intelligence service, the

Inter Services Directorate (ISI). Pakistan’s concern was to promote ethnic Pashtun

control over the country, which was being run by Afghans hostile to Pashtun rule

and Pakistani influence. The Pashtuns, or Pathans in common western usage, designates several dozen separate tribes on both sides of the Afghan/Pakistani border.

The Taliban, lacking a secular education, is almost medieval in its concept of governance. The Taliban rulers have mismanaged the country, but have been amenable

to Pakistani political influence although not totally subservient to it. Pakistan has

also used its position and support to the Taliban to establish within Afghanistan

a series of training camps for Kashmiri terrorists. ISI personnel are present, in

mufti, to conduct the training. This arrangement allowed Pakistan ‘‘plausible denial’’ that it is promoting insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan also provisioned the

Taliban with weapons to fight the ‘‘Northern Alliance’’ which contests Taliban control over the country and had until recently about 7% of Afghan territory, mostly

north of Kabul and in the Panshir. The Northern Alliance, while including some

Pashtuns, has been commanded by Ahmad Shah Massud, an ethnic Tajik. About

three weeks ago, Massud was assassinated by suicide bombers identified as part of

Bin Laden’s group.

The bonds between Mullah Omar, and Usama Bin Laden, are bonds of blood and

Bin Laden has offered ‘‘bayat’’ to Mullah Omar, an offering of submission to his will

and his leadership. Bin Laden recently declared Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as the

‘‘new Mecca’’ and Mullah Omar as the new caliph. It is therefore all but impossible

for Mullah Omar to turn over Bin Laden to the U.S. for prosecution as the U.S. has

demanded. The Taliban and Bin Laden’s estimated 4,000 to 5,000 fighters are intertwined with the Taliban military and Mullah Omar considers Bin Laden as his right

hand.

What is Al-Qaeda? The Arabic word means the ‘‘Base,’’ or ‘‘foundation.’’ Bin Laden

does not refer to his international network as al-Qaeda. This word refers to his companion in arms at his headquarters in Southern Afghanistan. In his camps perhaps

10,000 Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Tunisian, Moroccan, Algerian, Egyptian and ethnic

Chechens, Dagestanis, Kosovars and dozens of other nationalities have been trained.

Some of them are provided specialized intelligence training, some schooled in the

arts of making improvised explosive devices, and others given instruction in the production and use of chemical weapons. Those not chosen for specialized tasks are

given combat training and either sent back to their native countries to foment insurgency against their secular regimes or enlisted in his combat brigade that fights

alongside the Taliban against the Northern opposition. For the past four years, Bin

Laden’s men have fought with the Taliban against Massud, and have suffered the

losses of at least seven hundred to a thousand men in the fighting, including one

of Bin Laden’s own sons about seven months ago.

It is important to distinguish between the so-called ‘‘loose networks’’ of affiliated

groups, and the tightly controlled inner circle of al-Qaeda that conceives and implements their strategic operations. The bombing of the USS Cole, for example, was

a tightly controlled al-Qaeda operation that had some local support, drawn from the

Islamic Army of Aden, a radical Islamic group in the Yemen set up by Bin Laden’s

brother-in-law and funded by Usama. The operation was apparently directed by Muhammad Atef, an Egyptian who serves as Bin Laden’s Chief of Operations. It was

Atef’s daughter who married one of Bin Laden’s sons last May, a marriage that also

symbolized the merger of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad into al-Qaeda, and a new

name for the inner circle: ‘‘Jidad al-Qaeda.’’

20

The Ahmad Ressam case, was an example of the use of affiliated groups by alQaeda to promote violence against America. This was the ‘‘millennium’’ plot frustrated when Ressam panicked at the Canadian/US border while transporting materials for five bombs. Ressam, a member of an Algerian terrorist faction funded and

supported by Bin Laden, was trained at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan and given

$12,000 seed money. He was told to raise the rest of the monies needed through

criminal activity in Canada, organize his cell, and choose targets in America to destroy. Ressam planned to plant bombs at Los Angeles International Airport, to kill

as many people as possible. At the same time, a more centrally controlled and sensitive al-Qaeda operation was being implemented in the port of Aden, against the

USS Sullivans, the sister ship of the Cole. The explosives laden boat sank in the

harbor while being piloted by the two would-be suicide bombers. They swam back

to shore, and went to ground, certain that their abortive operation would be discovered. It was not. About 8 months later, the same operation, using more sophisticated and lighter explosives, was carried out against the Cole. The devastating results are well known.

How does the al-Qaeda organization fund its worldwide network of cells and affiliated groups? Several businessmen in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf contribute monies. Many of these contributions are given out of a sense of Islamic solidarity. But

much of the money is paid as ‘‘protection’’ to avoid having the enterprises run by

these men attacked. There is little doubt that a financial conduit to Bin Laden was

handled through the National Commercial Bank, until the Saudi government finally

arrested a number of persons and closed down the channel. It was evident that several wealthy Saudis were funneling contributions to Bin Laden through this mechanism. Now, it appears, that these wealthy individuals are siphoning off funds from

their worldwide enterprises in creative and imaginative ways. For example, orders

may be given to liquidate a stock portfolio in New York, and have those funds deposited in a Gulf, African or Hong Kong bank controlled by a Bin Laden associate.

Other channels exist for the flow of monies to Bin Laden, through financial entities

in the UAE and Qatar. Cash, carried to intermediaries, is also a source of funding.

There are some female members of Bin Laden’s own family who have been sending

cash from Saudi Arabia to his ‘‘front’’ accounts in the Gulf.

I will stop my remarks here, and I am prepared to address any questions you may

have.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Santos.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES SANTOS, FORMER SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL MILITARY

AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS

Mr. SANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Taliban leadership has refused to turn over bin Laden, citing

their obligation, supposedly under tribal norms, to provide hospitality. Make no mistake, their relationship has nothing to do with

hospitality. Mullah Omar and his Taliban provide sanctuary to bin

Laden because he has helped the Taliban as much or even more

than they have helped him. Both are part of the same extremist

reality: dogmatically committed to a wider, Islamic struggle to

expel western and secular influences which they view as corrupt,

replacing it with their vision of a purified Islamic control over the

Muslim world. In this sense, they are not so much looking to the

past but using it to create a future—one particularly intolerant,

narrow-minded and alarming. They are also both united in a willingness to pursue these ends by all means necessary.

Early on, Mullah Omar publicly demonstrated his closeness to

bin Laden. One significant occasion occurred in March 1997 during

the Eid prayers after the Haj, when Omar pulled bin Laden from

a large crowd in Kandahar, announcing in front of them that bin

Laden was a friend, a brother and a great holy warrior. The two

then led prayers for the tens of thousands gathered in an open

field.

21

For Omar, the Saudi exile was a powerful symbol of Islamic

struggle and defiance, built on their common triumph over Soviet

occupation. Mullah Omar’s rise to power came as the Taliban successfully identified themselves not in fractious political terms but

in extremist, ethnic and religious terms. Their vision fused ethnic

Pashtun hegemony with Sunni fundamentalism. The Taliban were

able to promote themselves as Afghanistan’s true rulers among the

Pashtuns with an historic and divine mandate. They effectively

consolidated power by masking their political intentions and minimizing talk of power or their political ambitions.

Bin Laden and his extremist links thus not only provided political legitimacy to his Taliban allies, but also important resources

in a contest that was otherwise waged with meager means. These

resources were not simply monetary. Communications, training,

technical expertise and crucial recruits were also provided in those

campaigns reaching beyond the traditional Pashtun lands now into

areas dominated by the other Afghan ethnic minorities. This is a

crucial point—the extremist international networks fed an ethnic

war machine to further their own purposes.

As the Taliban consolidated their control with these resources,

their movement began to expunge the more traditionalist elements,

leaving Mullah Omar and his more radical allies in the Taliban unchallenged. At the same time, links to extremist Sunni fundamentalists in Pakistan and the Gulf deepened and expanded, which in

turn provided yet more recruits and resources. International

Islamicists, including crucial Pakistani support, in turn came to

champion the Taliban as the true representative of a pure Islamic

State built upon Islam’s victory over the Communist infidels. The

Taliban thus have become an integral and important part of Sunni

fundamentalist mythology and its international networks, connecting them well beyond Afghanistan to Islamicists all over the

world. Afghanistan became not only a place where extremists from

around the world could meet safely, share ideas, develop strategies,

and receive training—a physical base of terror—it also became a

symbol to extremists of the possibilities of their mission.

Throughout, the Taliban have continued to receive support from

the Government of Pakistan, whose policies have led to a growing

wave of extremism as well. It is important to note that the growing

Islamic extremism in Pakistani society is not only the result of corruption, growing poverty, disconnected elite and a government policy that has actively encouraged Islamicist ideology as a means of

holding together a diverse society. That policy is now out of control,

producing a stronger, more virulent anti-western view and a much

less reliable Pakistan.

Pakistani support of the Taliban also allowed them to strengthen

their control and expand their influence into the Pashtun areas of

Afghanistan. It enabled Pakistan to relocate its training camps for

Kashmiri separatists to Afghanistan. Those camps benefitted from

the extremist networks in Afghanistan and provided Pakistan with

plausible deniability. Moreover, Pakistani extremist groups have

functioned as umbrella organizations for other international terror

groups that sought shelter in Afghanistan.

We should be clear: The Taliban see the West through their

ethno-nationalist and fundamentalist eyes as being both corrupt

22

and potentially hostile to their campaign to impose their extremist

vision, precisely as bin Laden and his ideological allies see America

as an obstacle to a ‘‘pure’’ Islamic region, untainted by westernization. Bin Laden is neither a guest nor a foreigner in Afghanistan. He is one of them ideologically, politically, and pragmatically.

Nonetheless, bin Laden’s alliance with the Taliban has significant vulnerabilities. He has taken sides in a civil war which is ethnic much more than it is religious. The Taliban are Pashtuns, a

group that represents less than 40 percent of Afghanistan’s population. They are still the largest minority in a country of minorities—including the Shi’a Hazara, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks, to

name the largest of the nine or so ethnic groups that live within

the borders of Afghanistan.

The ugly truth is that the Pakistani supported Taliban-Bin

Laden extremist alliance is built on religious, cultural and ethnic

domination in Afghanistan. Bin Laden and his extremist network

are vulnerable in the same way that the Taliban are vulnerable— their brutal actions have completely antagonized those that live in

the North and Central parts of the country, and beyond as well.

There are capable leaders currently on the ground in Afghanistan such as General Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek leader with

significant forces in northern Afghanistan; Karim Khalili, leader of

the Hazara of Central Afghanistan; Ismael Khan, an ethnic Tajik

leader and a former governor of western Afghanistan; Commander

Fahim, the man who replaced Massud, an ethnic Tajik leading

forces in Panshir and in northeast Afghanistan. All are fighting to

protect their people and rid their areas of Taliban and extremist

supporters.

In the end, Osama bin Laden must depend on the Taliban’s ability to maintain dominance over the other ethnic communities in Afghanistan. If Pashtun chauvinism buckles, bin Laden and his extremist networks and, most importantly, the symbol of a true and

pure Islamic state that serves as an ideological as well as a physical base for extremism and terror, will collapse.

To ensure that Afghanistan will no longer be a base of terror requires not only eliminating the Taliban, but crucially eliminating

the idea of ethnic dominance and religious extremism in that country. This can only happen if a system of government emerges that

is democratic and provides protection and rights to all the country’s

ethnic communities, allowing the links of goodwill to be rebuilt

among the various people.

I believe that the alliance between the north and the former King

can assist in this regard, but we should make no mistake: This will

not come from any one individual. It will require a change in thinking of many Pashtuns and a decentralized political system of government—a federal system or confederation—that accurately reflects the political aspirations of the diverse communities of Afghanistan.

To summarize, there are five important points to keep in mind.

The extremism of the Taliban and bin Laden may be religious, but

in Afghanistan it is built on ethnic domination. Break the ethnic

domination and you break the Taliban, bin Laden and his extremists. Give full support to all the elements in the Northern Alliance

in their struggle. Focus political efforts mainly on building a new

23

political structure, not short-term power-sharing agreements. This

was the failure of the U.N. in the past. The new political structure

must be decentralized and modeled on a federal or confederated

system.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Santos.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Santos follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES SANTOS, FORMER SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE

UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS

The Taliban leadership has refused to turn over Bin Ladin, citing their obligations, supposedly under tribal norms, to provide hospitality. But their relationship

has nothing to do with hospitality. Mullah Omar and his Taliban provide sanctuary

to Bin Ladin because he has helped the Taliban as much—or even more—than they

have helped him. Both are part of the same extremist reality: dogmatically committed to a wider, Islamic struggle to expel western and secular influences which

they view as corrupt, replacing it with their vision of purified Islamic control over

the Muslim world. In this sense they are not so much looking to the past but using

it to create a future—one particularly intolerant, narrow-minded and alarming.

They are also both united by a willingness to pursue these ends by all means necessary.

This was not always the case. When I was the Political Advisor to the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, I was the first member of the Mission to meet

the Taliban Council in January 1995, two months after they emerged in Kandahar.

The Taliban, as a new movement, was weak and thus inclined to allow certain less

extremist, elements within its ruling Council. At that time, Bin Ladin was nowhere

to be found in Taliban areas. Instead he had established a base in Eastern Afghanistan not far from Jalalabad. He started living there more permanently in the summer of 1995 under the protection of Islamicist Jihadi commanders who were opposing the Taliban.

During this period, Bin Ladin’s low profile and relatively constrained situation

were due to civil strife, particularly in Kabul. However, when the Taliban took control of Jalalabad and Kabul in September 1996, instead of expelling Bin Ladin, a

logical conclusion given his relationship with their enemies, he was immediately

moved south to Kandahar for his safety.

Bin Ladin, his family and some followers lived in Kandahar for several months

in a building across from the Taliban foreign ministry offices. He clearly was given

the full support and protection of the Taliban, and traveled freely around the city

in an easily recognized caravan of approximately eight Toyota Hiluxes and

Landcruisers. My residence was located near a complex of houses in central

Kandahar, which, he was building for himself. In fact, he next moved to Kandahar

Airport where he lived for more than a year. He gave the newly constructed complex

in Kandahar to Mullah Omar and his Taliban leadership.

Mullah Omar publicly demonstrated his closeness to Bin Ladin on several occasions. One important occasion occurred in March 1997 during the Eid prayers after

the Haj, when Omar pulled Bin Ladin from the large crowd, announcing in front

of them that Bin Ladin was a friend, a brother and great holy warrior. The two then

led the prayers for the tens of thousands gathered in an open field.

Why did he show such support for Bin Ladin? For Omar, the Saudi exile is first

and foremost a powerful symbol of Islamic struggle and defiance, built on their common triumph over Soviet occupation. As the various mujahideen political parties

were contesting Kabul, the Taliban rose to power by successfully identifying themselves not in fractious political terms, but in extremist national and religious terms.

Their vision fused ethnic Pashtun hegemony with Sunni fundamentalism. The

Taliban were able to promote themselves as Afghanistan’s true rulers among the

Pashtuns with an historic and divine mandate. They effectively consolidated power

by masking their political intentions and minimizing talk of power of their political

ambitions.

Bin Ladin and extremist links thus not only provided political legitimacy to his

Taliban allies, but also important resources in a contest which was otherwise waged

with meager means. These resources were not simply monetary: communications,

training, technical expertise and crucial recruits were also provided in those campaigns reaching beyond the traditional Pashtun lands, now into areas dominated by

the other Afghan ethnic minorities—This is a crucial point, the extremist international networks fed an ethnic war machine to further their own purposes.

24

As the Taliban consolidated their control with these resources, their movement

began to expunge the more traditionalist elements, leaving Mullah Omar and his

more radical allies in the Taliban unchallenged. At the same time, links to extremist

Sunni fundamentalists in Pakistan and the Gulf deepened and expanded, which in

turn provided yet more recruits and resources. International Islamicists, including

crucial Pakistani support, in turn came to champion the Taliban as the true representative of a pure Islamic State built upon Islam’s victory over the Communist

infidels. The Taliban thus have become an integral and important part of Sunni fundamentalist mythology and its international networks, connecting them well beyond

Afghanistan to Islamicists in Pakistan, the Gulf, Kashmir, Chechnya and Central

Asia. Afghanistan became not only a place where extremists from around the world

could meet safely, share ideas, develop strategies, and receive training—a physical

base of terror—it also became a symbol to extremists of the possibilities of their mission.

Throughout, the Taliban have continued to receive support from the Government

of Pakistan, whose policies have led to a growing wave of ‘‘extremism’’ within Pakistan as well. What was Pakistan’s interest in Taliban domination of its neighbor?

Often it is mentioned that Pakistan sought strategic depth as a counterweight to

India as well as reconnecting Pakistan to transit routes and energy resources in

Central Asia. I believe that these are valid reasons but not sufficient in explaining

Pakistan’s actions, which have isolated the country significantly. Most important is

the growing Islamic extremism in Pakistan society, resulting from a combination of

corruption, growing poverty, a disconnected elite and a government which has actively encouraged Islamicists as a means of holding together a diverse society. That

policy is now out of control, producing a stronger more virulent anti-western view

and a much less reliable Pakistan.

Pakistani support of the Taliban also allowed them to strengthen their control

and expand their influence into the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, which presented

a historic reversal in their favor. It enabled Pakistan to relocate its training camps

for Kashmiri separatists to Afghanistan, benefiting from extremist networks in Afghanistan and providing Pakistan with plausible deniability. Pakistani extremist

groups have functioned as umbrella organizations for other international terror

groups that sought shelter in Afghanistan.

We should be clear: The Taliban see the West through their ethno-nationalist and

fundamentalist eyes as being both corrupt and potentially hostile to their campaign

to impose their extremist vision, precisely as Bin Ladin and his ideological allies see

America as an obstacle to a ‘‘pure’’ Islamic region, untainted by westernization. Bin

Ladin is neither a guest nor a foreigner in Afghanistan: he is one of them, ideologically, politically, and pragmatically.

The Taliban war machine has also benefited significantly from the trade in opium,

levying a thirty percent tax and providing security for the illicit shipments.

Nonetheless, Bin Ladin’s alliance with the Taliban has significant vulnerabilities:

he has taken sides in a civil war in Afghanistan which is ethnic more than it is

religious. The Taliban are for all intents and purposes Pashtun, a group that represents less than 40 percent of Afghanistan’s population. They are still the largest

minority in a country of minorities—including the Shi’a Hazara, Uzbeks, Turkmens

and Tajiks, to name the largest of the nine or so ethnic groups that live within the

borders of Afghanistan.

The ugly truth is that the Pakistani supported Taliban-Bin Ladin extremist alliance is built on religious, cultural and ethnic domination in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin

and his extremist network are vulnerable in the same way the Taliban are vulnerable—their brutal actions have completely antagonized those that live in the North

and Central part of the country, and beyond as well.

There are capable leaders currently on the ground such as General Rashid

Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek leader with significant forces in Northern Afghanistan;

Karim Khalili, leader of the Hazara of Central Afghanitsan; Ismael Khan, an ethnic

Tajik leader and former Governor of Western Afghanistan; and Commander Fahim,

an ethnic Tajik, leading forces in the Panshir Valley and Northeast Afghanistan. All

are fighting to protect their people and rid their areas of the Taliban and their extremist supporters.

In the end, Osama Bin Ladin must depend on the Taliban’s ability to maintain

dominance over the other ethnic communities of Afghanistan. If Pashtun chauvinism however buckles, Bin Ladin and his extremist network, and most importantly, the symbol of a true and pure Islamic State that serves as an ideological as

well as physical base for extremism and terror, will collapse.

To ensure that Afghanistan will no longer be a base of terror requires not only

eliminating the Taliban, but crucially eliminating the idea of ethnic dominance and

religious extremism. This can only happen if a system of government emerges that

25

is democratic and provides protection and rights to all the country’s ethnic communities, allowing the links of goodwill to be rebuilt among the various peoples. I believe the Alliance between the North and the former king can assist in this regard,

but we should make no mistake: this will not come from any one individual. It will

require a change in the thinking of many Pashtuns and a decentralized political system of government—a federal system or confederation—that accurately reflects the

political aspirations of the diverse communities of Afghanistan.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Revell.

STATEMENT OF OLIVER ‘‘BUCK’’ REVELL, FORMER ASSOCIATE

DIRECTOR IN CHARGE OF INVESTIGATIVE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. REVELL. I thank you and the Members of the Committee for

holding these hearings. It is an extremely important responsibility

that you bear; and I know that you and your colleagues want to

provide the very best support that you can to our President and

those in our Government, including the military, intelligence, diplomatic and law enforcement agencies that must face this challenge.

I will try and provide you with my honest and forthright assessment and opinions based on some 40 years now that I have been

involved in this arena.

The terrible events of September 11 shall ever remain in our collective memories. I, like so many Americans, lost friends in those

attacks. I wish I could tell you that they could not have been anticipated and that we are unlikely to face such devastation again.

I cannot. It is very clear that we have been the targets of a sustained campaign of terrorism since at least 1979. The fall of the

Shah of Iran and the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic

state in Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, both in 1979, were the direct predicates in my mind to the tragedy that we suffered on September 11.

In Iran, the Islamic extremists found that they could take and

hold Americans hostage without serious repercussions. Out of that

experience, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria

bombed our embassies in Beirut twice, Kuwait once, as well as killing over 200 Marines in a suicide bomb attack. The Hezbollah took

Americans hostage and highjacked our airliners and yet we seemed

impotent to respond.

Before we even knew of Osama bin Laden, Imad Mugniyah of the

Hezbollah was the leading terrorist against America. He was directly responsible for the attacks against our personnel and facilities in Lebanon, and yet he and his organization have never been

punished for their crimes against our Nation. This example was

not lost on the founders of al-Qaeda, primarily members of the Afghan mujahidin from Arab countries. Osama bin Laden and his associates experienced firsthand that guerilla warfare and terrorist

tactics could defeat a superpower. He learned from Mugniyah that

America was not likely to fight back.

Since the attack on Americans Special Forces on a humanitarian

mission in Somalia in 1992, bin Laden and his associates have carried out a steady and increasingly deadly campaign against America and Americans. The following are publicly known events that

have occurred in his campaign beginning with Somalia in 1992; the

first World Trade Center bombing in 1993; the planned attacks

26

against the Lincoln-Holland Tunnels and George Washington

Bridge and other sites in New York in July 1993 that was thwarted; the planned assassination of Pope John Paul in the Philippines,

including the Americans and his entourage; the planned assassination of President Clinton in the Philippines; the planned bombing

of 11 to 13 American jumbo jets over the Pacific in January 1995;

the car bombing of the U.S. military mission in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1995; truck bombing of the U.S. housing area Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 1996; the truck bombing of the U.S.

Embassy in Kenya in 1998; and the simultaneous bombing of the

U.S. Embassy in Tanzania; the plot to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport, Y2K, coming out of Canada and another apparent

attempt coming out of eastern Canada in the New England area;

the plot to attack a U.S. Naval ship in Yemen in January of 2000;

the actual suicide boat attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in October of 2000.

If that is not a campaign, I have never seen or heard of one. It

has been consistent and has been increasingly violent.

By September 11, we should have known that we were the principal targets of a terrorist campaign unlike any that we had ever

faced, and yet we totally failed to recognize the impending disaster

that stalked our Nation. Some of us in the counterterrorist business have tried to warn over the years that we were in danger and

the danger was increasing, but we generally have been thought to

be alarmists. For the purpose of lessons learned, I am going to cite

just briefly some remarks I made at a conference on terrorism

sponsored by the U.S. Justice Department in 1999.

I pointed out that the rather abrupt end to the Cold War had

been expected to bring about a substantial improvement in international cooperation and a concordant change in the manner in

which governments dealt with transnational issues such as terrorism and organized crime. However, the expected improvements

in overall safety and security of U.S. citizens and interests have

not materialized except at the strategic level.

I went on to point out that terrorism remains a constant and viable threat to American interests on a global basis, even though the

sources of the threat may be evolving into heretofore unknown and/

or undetected elements and organizations.

The threat is changing and increasing due to the following factors:

The philosophy, motivation, objectives and modus operandi of

terrorist groups, both domestic and international, has changed.

The new terrorist groups are not concerned with and in many instances are trying to inflict mass casualties. I have to admit, Mr.

Chairman, I never thought it would be 7,000 simultaneously.

Terrorist groups now have ready access to massive data bases

concerning the entire United States infrastructure, including key

personnel, facilities and networks, including, of course, our air

transportation network.

Aided by state sponsors or international organized crime groups,

terrorists can now obtain weapons of mass destruction.

The Internet now allows even small or regional terrorist groups

to have a worldwide C3I—Command, Control, Communication and

Intelligence—system and propaganda dissemination capabilities.

27

Domestic anti-government reactionary extremists have proliferated and now pose a significant threat to the Federal Government and law enforcement at all levels.

Militia organizations have targeted the Federal Government for

hostile actions and could target any element of our society that is

deemed to be their adversary, and Islamic extremism has spread

to the point where it now has a global infrastructure, including a

substantial network in the United States.

I will cut my statement off there, but I will simply state that, in

addition to the terrorist organizations—and certainly the al-Qaeda

is a network that has many terrorist associations—we also have

seen indications of significant drug trafficking and organized crime

involvement with terrorist organizations; and, in fact, there have

been some substantial reports that a great deal of the money and

proceeds for al-Qaeda has come from heroin trafficking from Afghanistan and their support of other types of criminal activities, including supporting their operatives by various fraudulent schemes

both in Europe and in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, we have to take these very serious events, this

tragedy that faced us on September 11, we have to learn the lessons because we will again be attacked and they will change their

tactics next time, so we can’t just prepare for the last event.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Revell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF OLIVER ‘‘BUCK’’ REVELL, FORMER ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR IN

CHARGE OF INVESTIGATIVE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, FEDERAL

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chairman Hyde, I thank you and members of your Committee for the opportunity

to testify during these hearings. Yours is an extremely important responsibility and

I know that you and your colleagues want to provide the very best support that you

can to our President and those in our Government, military, intelligence, diplomatic

and law enforcement that must face this challenge. I will try and provide you with

my honest and forthright assessment and opinions based upon the forty years that

I have now been involved in this arena.

The terrible events of September 11, 2001 shall ever remain in our collective

memories. I like so many other Americans lost friends in the attacks. I wish that

I could tell you that the attacks could not have been anticipated and that we are

unlikely to face such devastation again. I cannot. For it is very clear that we have

been the targets of a sustained campaign of terrorism since 1979. The fall of the

Shah of Iran and the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic State in Iran under

the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in

1979 were the predicates of the tragedy that we suffered on September 11th. In Iran

the Islamic extremists found that they could take and hold Americans hostage without serious repercussions. Out of that experience the Iranian back Hezbollah

bombed our Embassies in Beirut twice and Kuwait once, as well as killing over two

hundred Marines in a suicide truck bombing. The Hezbollah took American’s hostage and hijacked our airliners and yet we seemed impotent to respond. Before we

even knew of Osama bin Laden, Imad Mugniyah of the Hezbollah was the leading

terrorist against America. He was directly responsible for the attacks against our

personnel and facilities in Lebanon and yet he and his organization have never been

punished for their crimes against our nation.

This example was not lost on the founders of al Qaida, primarily members of the

Afghan mujahidin from Arab countries. Osama bin Laden and his associates’ experienced first hand that guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics could defeat a ‘‘Super

Power’’. He learned from Mugniyah that America was not likely to fight back.

Since the attack on the American Special Forces on a humanitarian mission in

Somalia in 1992 bin Laden and his associates have carried out a steady and increasingly deadly campaign against America and Americans. The following are but the

publicly known events:

1. Somalia 1992

28

2. World Trade Center, New York, 1993

3. Planned attacks against multiple targets in New York in July 1993

4. Planned assassination of Pope John Paul in the Philippines 1994 (Americans were in the Pope’s entourage)

5. Planned assassination of President Clinton in the Philippines 1995

6. Planned bombings of 11–13 American Airliners over Pacific Ocean 1995

7. Car bombing of U.S. military mission in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1995

8. Truck bombing of U.S. Air Force housing area Khubar Towers, Dhahran,

Saudi Arabia 1996

9. Truck Bombing U.S. Embassy, Kenya 1998

10. Truck Bombing U.S. Embassy, Tanzania 1998

11. Plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport, Y2K, New Year 2000

12. Plot to bomb East Coast target, Y2K, New Year, 2000

13. Plot to attack U.S. Naval Ship in Yemen, January 2000

14. Suicide boat attack on USS Cole, Yemen October 2000

By September 11th we certainly should have known that we were the principal

targets of a terrorist campaign unlike any we had ever faced. And yet we totally

failed to recognize the impending disaster that stalked our nation. Some of us in

the Counter-terrorist business tried to warn of the danger, but we were generally

thought of as alarmists. For the purpose of lessons learned I am citing the concerns

I, among others, expressed about our lack of preparedness for the struggle we now

face as a war.

In a speech to a conference held by the National Institute of Justice in May of

1999 on ‘‘Terrorism & Technology: Threat and Challenge in the 21st Century’’ I

pointed out my concerns for our lack of readiness to deal with the growing threat

of terrorism. Some of these remarks are set forth below.

‘‘The rather abrupt end to the Cold War was expected to bring about a substantial

improvement in international cooperation, and a concordant change in the manner

in which governments dealt with transnational issues such as terrorism and organized crime. However, the expected improvements in overall safety and security of

U.S. citizens and interests have not materialized except at the strategic level.

Terrorism remains a constant and viable threat to American interests on a global

basis even though the sources of the threat may be evolving into heretofore unknown or undetected elements/organizations.

The threat is changing and increasing due to the following factors:

1.) The philosophy, motivation, objectives and modus operandi of terrorists

groups both domestic and international has changed.

2.) The new terrorist groups are not concerned with and in many instances are

trying to inflict mass causalities.

3.) Terrorist groups now have ready access to massive databases concerning the

entire United States infrastructure including key personnel, facilities, and

networks.

4.) Aided by state sponsors or international organized crime groups, terrorist

can obtain weapons of mass destruction.

5.) The Internet now allows even small or regional terrorist groups to have a

worldwide C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) system, and propaganda dissemination capability.

6.) Domestic anti-government reactionary extremists have proliferated, and

now pose a significant threat to the Federal Government and to law enforcement at all levels. Militia organizations have targeted the Federal Government for hostile actions, and could target any element of our society that

is deemed to be their adversary.

7.) Islamic extremism has spread to the point where it now has a global infrastructure, including a substantial network in the United States.

Terrorism has been a tough political, analytical and operational target for years.

Nonetheless, twenty years ago, analysts could agree on several ‘‘tenets of terrorism.’’

First, terrorists were viewed as falling into one of three categories: those that were

politically motivated, and used violence as a means to achieve legitimacy, such as

the IRA or PLO, or; those that used violence as a means of uprising, or finally; those

that were state-sponsored whose violence was manipulated by foreign powers to

achieve political leverage. Second, terrorists were generally thought to calculate

29

thresholds of pain and tolerance, so that their cause was not irrevocably compromised by their actions.

While U.S. officials worried about terrorists ‘‘graduating’’ to the use of weapons

of mass destruction, especially nuclear, we believed that most terrorist groups

thought mass casualties were counterproductive. This was because mass casualties

seemed to de-legitimize the terrorists’ cause, would certainly generate strong governmental responses, and erode terrorist group cohesion. In essence, we thought a

certain logic and morality line existed beyond which terrorist dared not go.

The different types of terrorist groups had a wide range of motives. The extreme

left’s motivation for violence has been significantly diminished by the disenchantment with communism on a global scale. These groups find that their message is

out-of-fashion, and they can no longer mobilize the public to their causes. This loss

of motivation is a major reason for the recent downward trend in international terrorist incidents, as documented in the State Department’s report, ‘‘Patterns in Global Terrorism.’’ The threat level of all leftist groups globally, once rated high, is now

considered moderate. Of the twenty-two known groups, three have denounced violence altogether. Indeed, high collateral casualties are inconsistent with the fundamental message of leftist terrorists who profess their goal to be the betterment of

the masses.

State-sponsored terror has seen a notable decline in the last several years for

three primary reasons. First, the Middle East peace process has given previously

violent groups and states a motive to refrain from terrorism in order to gain leverage and bargaining power at the table. Second, post Cold-War geopolitical realities

have brought about many new agreements and growing cooperation among nations

in countering terrorism. One of the largest sponsors of terrorism in the past—the

former communist East European countries—are now aggressively supporting

counter-terrorism initiatives.

However, several state sponsors remain who continue to fund, motivate, support,

and train terrorists. Iran is by far the most active of these state sponsors, with the

greatest long-term commitment and worldwide reach. Iraq remains of concern, but

has a more limited transnational capability. However, attacks within Iraq’s own backyard, such as the attempted assassination of former President George Bush in

1993 during his Kuwaiti trip, and the assassinations of dissidents in Jordan, are

more likely to threaten the peace and stability of the region. Syria is a more pragmatic sponsor, by providing supplies in transit, but has refrained more recently

from terrorism in order to enhance its negotiating position in the peace talks. Its

loss of USSR patronage has meant a decline in financial and logistical support, but

it nevertheless allows some rejectionists to maintain headquarters in Syria.

Hezbollah still receives supplies through the Damascus airport and operates openly

in parts of Syria and Syrian controlled territory. The newest sponsor on the list is

Sudan, which was added in 1993 because of its provision of safe haven and training

for a variety of terrorist groups. Sudan has hosted Osama Bin Laden’s facilities.

Libya, a notorious state sponsor, has also refrained lately from terrorism in order

to obtain some sanctions relief. It continues, however, to target dissidents, fund extremist Palestinians, and provide safe haven for Abu Nidal, all while attempting to

avoid accountability for the PanAm 103 bombing. The recent surrender of the

PanAm 103 suspects came only after crippling sanctions by the United Nations. For

state-sponsored terrorism, the value of deterrence retains credibility, and America

should not relinquish this capability.

Radical Islamic groups are now the most active in terms of the rate of incidents.

Many of these groups are considered separatists, and desire a seat at the recognition and negotiation table. Others, considered extreme Islamic zealots, operate as

loosely affiliated groups, as in the World Trade Center and East African bombings.

For these groups deterrence has less effect. And in fact many have stated that they

wanted to maximize casualties to punish the United States, which they have demonized as the Great Satan.

Ethnic separatist terrorism, as old as mankind, can be temporarily sidetracked by

a few contemporary geopolitical developments, but generally, it is impervious to

such developments because its root-cause is invariable long-lived. Most of these

groups seek world recognition and endorsement; to date, they have not resorted to

the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The ‘‘New’’ Terrorist, the argument has been made that while traditional terrorism—in terms of motivations—is still a large segment of the terrorist population,

there is a new breed of terrorist for which the old paradigms either do not apply

at all or have limited application. These groups—cults, religious extremists, anarchists, or serial killers—must be regarded as serious threats, and perhaps the most

serious of the terrorist groups operating today. These ‘‘new’’ terrorists are driven by

a different set of motivations: they seek an immediate reward for their act, and

30

their motivations and objectives may range from rage, revenge, hatred, mass murder, extortion, or embarrassment, or any combination of these. They may desire

mass casualties, or at least not care about how many people are killed in their attacks. As such, they do not make traditional calculations of thresholds of pain or

tolerance within a society. These groups tend to be loosely affiliated both internationally and domestically, and may have no ties at all to state sponsorship. They

change affiliations and identities as needed, and are extremely difficult to detect.

Where traditional groups want publicity to further their cause, many ‘‘new’’ terrorists do not desire attribution; this is particularly true of the religious extremists,

God knows, and will reward. Religious extremism is growing in numbers, and is not

limited to the Islamic faith. While the ‘‘new’’ terrorist may have a variety of motivations, some single issue groups, such as, extremists in the animal rights, environmental, and anti-abortion movements, may also pose a significant threat, and can

not be overlooked. Additionally, the new millennium is an important apocalyptic

milestone for many religious or extremist cults. Many terrorist groups, both traditional and ‘‘new,’’ have privatized their practices through a few standard business

techniques (fund-raising, use of technology, etc.)

Also new today is the proliferation of knowledge and technology among many

criminal, terrorist, and narcotics groups. Many of these groups are building skills

in state-of-the-art communications, and weaponry. They are achieving new global

links and support from one another in cooperative ways. While inflicting mass casualties have never been prohibitive, the barriers to their use seem to be falling.

Twenty years ago, intelligence specialists viewed proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction primarily through the lens of nation states seeking the ultimate weapon. Chemical and biological weaponry was only a minuscule afterthought of the

whole nuclear problem.

One of the outcomes of the globalization of economies and technologies, the phenomenon that President Bush termed the ‘‘New World Order’’ is the relatively new

linking and intermingling of disparate crime and narcotics organizations with terrorists. Analysts have been dismayed to find that even the most notorious crime

groups with global reach, such as the Italian Mafia, the Russian Mafias, the Nigerian criminal enterprises, the Chinese triads, the Colombian and Mexican cartels,

and the Japanese Yakuza, are developing new working relationships. They are developing cooperative arrangements, and networking with one another and with insurgent and terrorist organizations to take advantage of one another’s strengths and

to make inroads into previously denied regions.

This has allowed terrorists a new means to raise money as well as provide them

with a marketplace to purchase sophisticated weaponry and other high tech equipment. This cooperation, for example, has long been seen among Colombian drug

lords and Italian crime groups in exploiting the West European drug market, but

now is seen in New York City and in Eastern Europe with drug and financial crime

networks linking Russian and Italian groups.

As organized crime groups become increasingly international in the scope of their

activities, they are also less constrained by national boundaries. The new lowering

of political and economic barriers allows them to establish new operational bases in

commercial and banking centers around the globe. The willingness and capability

of these groups to move into new areas and cooperate with local groups is unprecedented, magnifying the threats to stability and even governability.

All of these transnational groups are becoming more professional criminals, both

in their business and financial practices and in the application of technology. Many

of them use state-of-the-art communications security that is better than some nation’s security forces can crack.

The Challenge of Cyber-terrorism:

While a number of excellent studies—both classified and unclassified—have been

produced on the information warfare threat, popular journalism has also produced

a great deal of hyperbole on this subject. That the National Information Infrastructure is vulnerable to an Information Warfare attack is unarguable. A recent National Intelligence Estimate verified this threat. The challenge comes in providing

context and a proper appreciation of the nature of the vulnerabilities and the extent

of the threat.

Traditionally, the information warfare threat has been associated with the telecommunications infrastructure and the ability to communicate. This remains a primary area of concern. But the government is also growing more and more dependent

upon the commercial power, transportation, energy, and finance communities, and

these communities are also vulnerable to attack. All of these major national infrastructures share a common dependency on computer driven management and control systems. With the passage of time, technical and economic imperatives have

31

driven these infrastructures to more and more dependence on networked computer

driven systems. Indeed, the complexity of the software involved in the ‘‘system-ofsystems’’ that drive some of the major infrastructures is a significant concern.

By virtue of this increasing dependence on networked computer driven systems,

all of these infrastructures possess some degree of vulnerability to infowar attack.

The question is how vulnerable?

Some of the critical infrastructures (e.g., the Public Switched Telephone Network—PSTN) have been the subject of hacker attacks for years. A number of the

major companies operating networks that comprise the PSTN have very robust programs to defeat toll fraud and ensure network continuity. Others have placed less

emphasis on this problem and, while a structure exists to facilitate cooperation

among the various companies, the level and quality of the cooperation is mixed. The

continued globalization of the economy, information, and technology will provide significant new opportunities for those seeking to terrorize or intimidate. This is because the interdependencies created by such networking provide a broader base for

greater destruction, especially in the areas of infowar. Concurrently, these very

trends may also provide new and better means of tracking, capturing, preventing

or deterring these same criminal elements. However, our own growing dependency

on computer-driven systems in government, within industry, and throughout the

Nation’s infrastructures of oil and gas, finance, communications, power, and transportation undoubtedly increases our vulnerability. The President’s Commission on

Infrastructure Protection has vigorously studied the vulnerabilities of our infrastructure, however it remains to be seen if our society can effectively organize itself

to protect these key assets of our nation. (The denial of service attacks launched

against several major Internet sites in February of 2000 graphically demonstrates

this growing threat to our National security and well being ).

Whatever tools terrorists select, the fact of increasing cooperation between crime,

narcotics and terrorist groups will provide terrorists with new, more creative ways

to raise money and a marketplace to shop for weaponry and high tech equipment.

Weapons of mass destruction are not the only highly destructive tools that terrorists may use. As the government becomes more and more dependent upon commercial-off-the-shelf information technologies, products, and networks, it will become

more vulnerable to the infowar threat. This vulnerability will not be limited to potential IW attack on the operation of support infrastructures, but also will include

potential ‘‘time bomb’’ attack via pre-programmed imbedded software in operating

systems, much, of which software is written abroad.

In addition to foreign nations placing more emphasis on developing infowar capabilities, there is growing evidence that drug cartels and other transnational

groups—to include some terrorist groups—have recognized the potential for infowar

and are developing capabilities. In fact, some groups, like the FARC, ELN, Provisional IRA, and the Sendero Luminoso, already target information infrastructures

today for the purposes of collecting intelligence, targeting data, and monitoring of

law enforcement and other government activities. In time, with the increasing availability of infowar attack information on the Internet and in other public media,

transnational groups will establish some modicum of capability in this arena.

It is the American character to believe we can solve all problems with our ingenuity and hard work. But even if the United States intelligence and law enforcement communities were given the means to correct these gaps, there still would remain a significant portion of terrorist planning, preparation, operations and attacks

that will be unpredictable. Just as better defenses have turned some terrorists away

from harder targets, the amorphous nature of the ‘‘new’’ terrorism, combined with

the uncertainty inherent in predictive analysis of chaotic behaviors, means that

some events will remain unforeseen.

We as a nation may not be able to prevent all acts of terrorism given the nature

of our democratic society. However, the new vehemence of terrorist groups and their

access to both high technology and weapons of mass destruction make it imperative

that we do our utmost to prevent terrorist acts and prepare for the dire consequences if we fail.’’

Not long after I retired from Federal service I was asked to participate in a conference on Terrorism, hosted by the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington.

On October 11, 1996 I made a presentation to the conference entitled, ‘‘Counter-terrorism and Democratic Values: An American Practitioners Experience’’ This presentation outlined some of the many difficulties that we have in balancing our need

for security and our desire to maintain our Constitutional protections. I have edited

the remarks for brevity but believe that what I said has relevance to our current

situation.

‘‘In 1980, I became an Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

and was placed in charge of the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI, which

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had responsibility for all criminal investigative programs, including Terrorism. At

that time, the U.S. was suffering approximately 100–120 terrorist incidents per

year. People think the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City, were the first acts

of terrorism in the U.S., however, we have a very short collective memory. During

this period when we were still attempting to deal with violence associated with

Black power, the uproar in the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, and

so forth. We still had a very active level of terrorism by many groups in the U.S.

There were a number of Puerto Rican organizations that were carrying out the most

acts of terrorism. We also had the remnants of the Weather Underground that was

still very active in committing acts of terrorism, including murder, assassination

and bombings. We had groups that were committing terrorist acts right here in

Washington—placing a bomb in the Capitol building and at the Naval base in the

Potomac Basin. We had groups that were targeting the infrastructure of the U.S.,

carrying out bombings against power stations and communication centers. And we

also had groups that were aiming at the military structure, recruit centers, depots,

and so forth in the United States. In the FBI we were trying to cope with the aftermath of one of the frequent purges that goes on in our Government.

There had been no consensus in our Nation in the 60s and 70s on how to deal

with major national issues, particularly the Vietnam War and anti-war movement,

and to some degree the more radical elements of the civil rights movement, and

therefore the Executive branch of our Government had taken certain actions, and

those actions had not been by consensus. They had been essentially Presidential decisions. Some of these governmental actions included tactics that today would be

considered illegal—at the time were not illegal, but were very unwise. The FBI and

military intelligence as well as the CIA, engaged in activities, which sought to determine who was behind certain movements, causes and groups that carried out violent

acts. Improper activities by these agencies included wiretaps and surreptitious entries into locations seeking intelligence. In most of the world today, including Britain, France, and Germany, these types of activities are still authorized by executive

order of their government. In the U.S. they are not. In my view they should not

be. But at the time they were.

In the mid-70s, our Nation had gone through Watergate and the turmoil that

brought to our political system, and coming out of the Watergate milieu was a series

of Congressional hearings called the Church and Pike Committee hearings. In these

hearings the intelligence components of the U.S. Government were highly criticized

for their activities during this period of time. Particularly, their spying upon elements in our society that were considered radical, but not necessarily a threat to

our existence as a Nation. Of course, they never became that. So, there was no consensus in our body-politic as to the degree and extent to which the domestic law

enforcement and intelligence services could and should be utilized to determine the

root causes, the structure organization, membership and participants in groups, that

in fact, descended into the use of systemic violence.

The Church and Pike hearings resulted in a great deal of criticism, it was primarily directed at the CIA, but the FBI got its share, including for a very misconstrued and ill-considered program called COINTELPRO. COINTELPRO was the

adoption of counterintelligence methods used against a foreign power for use against

domestic groups. In COINTELPRO the FBI used extralegal tactics to determine who

was behind certain movements and what they were involved in and so forth. As a

result, the Bureau was quite traumatized and not certain of its proper role and the

legal use of executive authority in the pursuit of terrorism, although it was not even

called that at the time. Terrorism was still considered a domestic security issue.

Terrorism was not en vogue as a description for a program that the government

would use, today ‘‘terrorism’’ or ‘‘anti-terrorism.’’

In the late 1970s, the FBI practically shut down its entire domestic security operation. It was dealing with specific criminal acts after the fact and had virtually no

collection, analysis, or utilization of intelligence prior to the commission of any sort

of violent action by a politically motivated organization. In 1980, the level of these

incidents had climbed to the point where we simply believed that we had to become

pro-active again, but to do so very carefully and under a set of guidelines which we

had participated in designing called the Attorney General Guidelines. These guidelines were intended not only to tell us the limitations of our authority, but also to

sanction those actions that we did take, and to make sure that people understood

that this was a legitimate exercise of the legal authority of the President, the Attorney General, and those charged with carrying out their responsibilities. So under

the Attorney General Guidelines, we began to build a more pro-active program during the early 80s. In 1982, I recommended and Director Bill Webster, who had been

appointed Director of FBI in 1978, agreed to designate Terrorism as a national priVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:29 Jan 22, 2002 Jkt 075562 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\100301\75562 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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ority of the FBI, thereby joining counterintelligence, organized crime and white-collar crime as the principal national priorities of the FBI.

In 1982, we incurred 51 terrorist incidents, 7 people being killed and 26 being injured. There were still a number of very active groups. From 1982 until 1988, we

were able to reduce terrorism in the U.S. down to the point where we were incurring only 5 to 10 incidents a year, and only three or four groups were actually still

functioning. We had been able, through the use of the law, through the use of prosecution, through the use of the legal procedures, to preempt and neutralize organizations both domestic and foreign that were operating and committing acts of terrorism in the U.S.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in addition to domestic groups operating in the

United States, we had groups that had their cause, and their base overseas. We had

Sikh terrorism, Armenian terrorism, Croatian terrorism; we had terrorism from virtually every continent, but with some of their violent acts being perpetrated in the

U.S. There were groups carrying out attacks against the Soviet Union, Turkey, and

India, all functioning and operating in the U.S. It was a precursor to what we have

today.

But because of the renewed vigor of the Counter-Terrorism program and the emphasis we had given it, we were able to prevent 56 terrorist incidents that if they

had occurred, would have resulted in massive loss of life in the U.S., including assassination of foreign leaders while they visited the U.S.

Other incidents similar to PanAm 103 were prevented because of our ability to

collect and utilize information under the Attorney General Guidelines.

Of course, this was also the time President Reagan’s policy in Central America

had become very controversial. We had another situation develop that again set

back the development of a totally effective counter-terrorism program. That was a

case or series of cases called CISPES—the Committee in Solidarity with the People

of El Salvador was the organization. In 1982 or 1983, intelligence had been received

from the CIA that this entity in the U.S. was actually a front organization for the

terrorist apparatus in El Salvador and was largely funded by Cuba and the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The FBI developed an informant who was Salvadoran

and there was a substantial amount of information coming in that indicated that

CISPES was formed to support of the revolutionary element in El Salvador, which

directly supported the terrorist organizations in El Salvador, particularly the

‘‘Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front’’ (FMLN). Information was also received that indicated CISPES was using the U.S. for fundraising, arming and even

recruiting people to go to El Salvador—all in violation of U.S. law, and was otherwise engaged in activities that were illegal in the U.S. An investigation began within the Terrorism Section, utilizing FBI field offices in several locations—Dallas, New

Orleans, and so forth. This case was one of several hundred pending cases in the

Terrorism Section at the time. It never reached the level of the Assistant Director

in charge of Criminal Investigations, which I was when the case began, or later the

Executive Assistant Director for Investigations, which I was at the time that the

difficulties developed. The reason it didn’t is because no extraordinary investigative

techniques were used—there were no wiretaps, there were no undercover operations, the information was gathered from attending public meetings, from physical

surveillance, from the use of informants, all of which were authorized under the Attorney General Guidelines. But, because of the heightened political dichotomy and

the disagreement between the President and the Congress, we had a Democratic

Congress and a Republican President (this became a focal point for a clash of philosophies, and particularly strategies in dealing with Central America), it became

very much a cause celebe.

While not denying that there had been mistakes made in the investigation and

some violations of our own regulations, the charges against the FBI were that: 1)

it was involved in a political investigation; 2) that it was using illegal tactics; and

3) it was violating the Constitutional rights of those involved in this movement. In

fact the investigations by the FBI, by the Justice Department, and by the Senate

Intelligence Committee, found that none of those allegations were true. There was

no political involvement whatsoever on the part of the Reagan Administration—they

were not even cognizant that we were involved in this investigation when it was

opened. The investigation had been reviewed by the Justice Department’s Office of

Intelligence Policy and Oversight early on and had been sanctioned as a legitimate

investigation. There had been no violation of anyone’s Constitutional rights. No one

had been prohibited from attending meetings, from speaking their piece or from carrying out their activities, from engaging in all of the protected activities. No one had

been impeded, obstructed, or in any way intimidated into not engaging in those activities. Nor had any FBI agent committed any violation of law other than the case

34

agent who was involved in a financial fraud in dealing with informant payments.

But that had nothing to do with the members of the CISPES organization.

Then The New York Times and The Washington Post said, ‘‘The FBI admits that

it was engaged in illegal actives as they did during COINTELPRO,’’ which was nonsense. I testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee although I had not been

personally involved in the CISPES investigation; it had never risen to my level for

approval. But in looking at case, I felt there was substantial justification for at least

part of the investigation and I was extremely worried that we would suffer again

what we had gone through in the late 70s and early 80s. In that the Senate inquiry

would jeopardize careers of people who were honestly trying to do their very best

to prevent acts of terrorism in the U.S., and who had no ulterior motive except to

defend their Country. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what happened. In 1988 again

we almost went down to ground zero in carrying out our counter-terrorism responsibilities. And that’s what led us, in my view, to what happened at the 1993 World

Trade Center bombing. Before the World Trade Center, there was an assassination

in New York of an individual who was known to most of you, Rabbi Meir Kahane.

Rabbi Kahane was himself an extremist. He created an organization—the Jew Defense League (JDL)—, which also engaged in acts of terrorism in the U.S. He engendered a group in Israel that ultimately, I think, committed acts of terrorism, or at

least facilitated acts of terrorism, including by an American Jewish doctor who had

moved to Israel—Dr. Goldstein. And some of his more active followers fled from the

U.S. while under investigation for assassinating a Palestinian-American in Los Angeles and were essentially given sanctuary in Israel—which was one of the difficulties that we had at the time. The New York City Police Department carried out the

investigation of the assassination of Meir Kahane with the FBI looking over their

shoulder to see if there was anything of interest for the Bureau. I was in charge

of Bureau operations at the time and I never received any information that the assassin of Meir Kahane was connected with any sort of organization that might have

a terrorist agenda.

As it turns out later, as we see after the World Trade Center, there was substantial information available that if it had been properly translated, processed, authenticated and analyzed, would have led to a direct association between the assassin

of Meir Kahane and the group that conspired and eventually did bomb the World

Trade Center, and was conspiring to carry out a number of other heinous acts of

terrorism. A proper analysis of the Kahane assassination was not conducted. Byand-large the reason it didn’t get done was because of the political climate and the

fact that FBI agents were loathe to undertake anything that had any appearance

of being involved in the political process. That includes religious activity, free

speech, etc., that are obviously protected under our Constitution. It had become very

difficult to assess how to deal with those issues.

When I left Washington in May 1991, we were feeling pretty good. The Cold War

had ended, we believed our side had won, Communism in the U.S. and the affiliated

organizations were largely defunct. Communism as a global movement was essentially discredited. Terrorism was held in check in the U.S. and was descending on

an international scale, at least the international acts of terrorism, although terrorism still was very evident in certain countries—Algeria, Israel, India, Northern

Ireland, etc. But as far as the U.S., we were becoming less and less a victim. We

had defeated Saddam Hussein in an unprecedented alliance and in doing so had

countered his threat of global terrorism without any serious losses.

All in all we had done a good job in dealing with the threat of terrorism in spite

of a lot problems along the way. Of course, the Iran-Contra controversy arose and

there were new allegations that we had again been manipulated and used by the

Reagan Administration, which were also untrue. But it took a while to sort this out.

However by 1991, I felt very good about leaving Washington, finishing my career

in Texas and moving on into another life after government.

Then in 1993 the World Trade Center bombing occurred. Although I was in Texas

at the time, we started seeing a nexus between certain people in Texas, particularly

in the Dallas/Richardson area, and those directly involved in the World Trade Center. This heightened my interest as to what was really involved. Was this the act

of a very small group that was independent and now defunct because of the investigation? Or did it really indicate a much larger and perhaps more global conspiracy?

Unfortunately, perhaps the most informative trial, or series of trials, in the history of the United States, as it relates to the issue of international terrorism, was

overshadowed. During the entire course of the New York trials for the WTC bombing, some of the most important testimony, some of the most important revelations

about an international movement, which had targeted the U.S. for vicious acts of

terrorism on a global basis, was almost totally ignored. The Terrorism trial of the

35

Century was totally overshadowed by a tragic soap opera (The O.J. Simpson trial)

from Los Angles. It would have been very instructive to academia, to the media, to

our Congress, to have paid attention to what was going on in that trial. The trial

revealed a global conspiracy not necessarily of a huge magnitude, but with a very

sophisticated capability. One of the individuals who escaped the initial arrests,

Ramzi Yousef, went on to plan a whole series of additional acts of terrorism, including the simultaneous bombings of between 11 and 13 U.S. airliners flying from Asia

to the U.S., which was planned to occur in January 1995. They had already developed the technology, they had tested it, it had in fact worked—it killed a Japanese

citizen aboard a Philippine airliner, they had tested it in a theater, it had worked,

they had developed the techniques to put explosive devices on board aircraft, and

were fully engaged in the plot to carry out these simultaneous bombings of the U.S.

air fleet.

Growing out of the investigation into the World Trade Center, the Bureau through

the Joint Terrorism Task Force detected a continuing conspiracy, that had not even

slowed down because of the arrests, to carry out bombings on July 4, 1993, of the

Lincoln and Holland tunnels, the George Washington bridge, the UN building, and

the Federal building housing the FBI. This group also planned a number of political

assassinations, including the president of Egypt and a senator from New York. If

they had been successful these attacks would have cost several thousand lives. The

conspirators were already present in the U.S. and were actively utilizing the protections of our Constitution to aid and facilitate their ability to operate and conspire

to carry out these terrorist acts. We also saw certain potentially connected activities

overseas, the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, followed up by a terrible bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, an attempted

bombing in Bangkok, and a bombing in London, by an organization that was functioning and operating that neither the U.S. government nor Allied governments had

come to grips with as of yet.

We started to get a handle on this group. The investigations were and are being

conducted under the Foreign Counterintelligence Guidelines, which gives somewhat

more latitude than the domestic guidelines do, and through the help of some people

like Yigal Carmon and Steve Emerson, the Bureau started to understand and appreciate that it was dealing with a much wider conspiracy than just those involved in

the World Trade Center bombing.

However, the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19,

1995, again demonstrated that our government was not properly prepared to address the specter of domestic Terrorism. The FBI was ill prepared to deal with this

phenomenon because it was not investigating the growth of the anti-government militias and similar organizations at the time. Oklahoma City occurred on Wednesday.

On Sunday morning I was asked to appear on Face the Nation, immediately prior

to my appearance was Leon Panetta, the President’s Chief of Staff. Mr. Panetta

comes on and says, ‘‘Not to worry. The FBI knows all about these organizations and

it has things in hand.’’ I’m the next person and my comment is, ‘‘It isn’t so’’. ‘‘The

FBI does not have it in hand, the FBI has not been investigating these organizations, the FBI is not even aware of the totality of the militia movement.’’ In fact,

if it hadn’t been for the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law

Center, I don’t think many people in the U.S., including the FBI, would have known

much about the militia movement at all. The reason is because under the Attorney

General Guidelines as interpreted at the time—and still—the FBI did not believe

nor did the Justice Department believe that the FBI had the authority to collect information on groups that openly espouse the use of force and violence unless and

until there is a criminal predicate. In other words, that there has been an action

taken that would be an indication of a criminal offense in progress, or had that already occurred. The espousal of violence, the collections of arms, as long as the arms

were not illegal, and organizing to commit violence, these things would not necessarily have predicated an investigation, and in fact with the militias they had not.

We were faced with a situation in that not only did we have evidence of a growing

militant, extremist element from overseas based on a misinterpretation of Islam, but

we also had within our own country a growing network of groups and individuals

who misperceived the entire rationale for our Constitutional form of government

and blamed the government for all of the ills that they and our society were subject

to. So, we had these twin concerns, one totally domestic, one primarily international,

both coming to bear upon the safety and the security of the people of the United

States.

No government can totally protect all the people, all the locations, all of the activities in their nation, no matter how high the level of security at any given time, if

a person or group is prepared to carry out a terrorist act no matter the risks involved and whatever the consequences might be. In the United States today, we’re

36

faced with a dilemma, we do not as a people trust our government entirely to protect us from acts of terrorism, particularly if they are motivated by political or religious beliefs, and at the same time, we expect our government to protect us from

terrorism and political violence. We have not reached a level of comfort with what

authority we should grant to the counter-terrorism agencies and entities of our government with that responsibility. But at the same time we expect them to be effective. And we’ve had a very strange coalition develop over the last two to three years

in our Congress where elements of the left and the elements of the right have coalesced and come together to oppose a President of the Democratic Party and the

leadership of the Republican Party in Congress, in putting together anti-terrorism

legislation that has been supported through three Administrations. Which would

withstand Constitutional scrutiny, most elements of which have already been ruled

on by the Supreme Court in other forms, such as the roving wiretap issue, which

has already been adjudicated in organized crime and drug cases as being Constitutional.

There is no consensus in our society as to how far we will allow the counter-terrorism forces to proceed. Under the guidelines as they are today, the FBI is in the

very unusual position of being perhaps the only people in our society who cannot

take official cognizance of what people say, of what people do, of what people pronounce and promulgate that they will do until they do it. A professor, an institute,

a newsman, can collect this information, can analyze it, collate it, can make pronouncements on it, can issue statements of concern, can say the government ought

to be doing something or ought not to be doing something, but the FBI cannot. It

is prohibited under the current guidelines and a provision of the Privacy Act, from

collecting public information even from groups who directly espouse the use of violence to accomplish their objectives. We have already seen a terrorist organization,

which was in actuality both a political movement and a religious cult, called the

Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, turn to the use of a very dangerous gas—Sarin—developed

by the Nazi regime before World War II, with the potential loss of life in its use

of thousands. A dozen Japanese citizens were killed and thousands were injured,

but that was fortunate. They hadn’t really perfected their delivery system as yet,

but they intended to kill thousands of people of people. The Aum specifically targeted the Japanese National Police in these attacks and tried to assassinate the

Commissioner General of the Police. Their ultimate goal was to bring down the Government of Japan.

We’ve seen chemical weapons used by outlaw regimes; we’ve seen the capability

of use of chemical weapons obtained by terrorist organizations. In the United States

we have people that support and are involved in the militia movement, collect

biologicals, including anthrax, which is probably one of the most lethal diseases that

could ever be released, and yet it is easily obtainable. We have botulism that can

be cultured and proliferated by obtaining a small amount of the toxin. We’ve already

seen terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism utilize these types of

weapons of mass destruction, and we have a continuing, growing proliferation of nuclear materials coming out of the former Soviet Union that may not lead to the development of a nuclear device but could certainly lead to contamination through

spreading nuclear materials by the use of a conventional explosive device.

As the threat escalates, and we’ve already seen terrorists utilize weapons of mass

destruction, we as a society have not yet as even determined how we’re going to utilize and authorize our counter-terrorist forces to prevent acts of terrorism. In a discussion with Senator Specter, during the CISPES inquiry, I asked him, ‘‘Senator,

do you want us to wait until there’s blood on the streets to act? Or are you going

to authorize us to act on information that any reasonable person would assume to

be true?’’ And he said, ‘‘In a democratic society, you may have to wait until there’s

blood on the street.’’ If that’s one person, maybe society can accept it. If 50,000 people are killed in the World Trade Center bombing, which was the intent of the terrorists, will we as a society accept that? 168 people were killed in Oklahoma City

and it traumatized our society. What would the death of 50,000 have done? What

would the blowing up of 12 or 13 PanAm 103s do to our society? What would be

the reaction of our Congress? Do you think they would stop with the FBI being able

to collect public information? Or would we see internments, would we see mass expulsions, would we see the writ of habeas corpus suspended? Would we see Draconian measures? I’m concerned that our society would overreact.

As a person that has dealt with enforcing the law for thirty years, that concerns

me greatly. In the United Kingdom, from which our legal system was developed,

they have suspended the right of trial by jury, they’ve suspended the writ of habeas

corpus, they’ve allowed investigative detention without charge, they’ve engaged in

wiretaps and electronic surveillance without court order, and this is in a society that

is civil and democratic and certainly is one that we look to as one of the founding

37

nations of democracy. The British, the French, the Germans, all use extralegal

means to combat terrorists. We do not, we should not, and we don’t have to. But

we have to reach a reasonable balance to allow those elements of our society

charged with preventing terrorism an opportunity to carry out their duties and do

their jobs.

Right now the balance is not there.

I wish that I could tell you it is my belief that we won’t have additional World

Trade Centers, PanAm 103s, and Oklahoma Citys—I have no such expectation.

There have been some improvements, but they are not what they should be to put

us in a position to have a reasonable chance to prevent the kind of events and terrible incidents that I’ve described. As the potential use of even more devastating

weapons increases, we have not increased our capabilities.

Do I think that we ought to impose Draconian measures on our society to prevent

terrorism? Absolutely not, that would allow the terrorists to win. But we must find

a reasonable balance. We can find a reasonable balance under the Constitution.

There’s no question that we can. We need the political will and we need public attention for more than 24 hours. In our society, that is very difficult to achieve. But

this is a battle we must win to protect our nation from the scourge of terrorism.’’ Chairman Hyde I am certain that you and your Committee will determine that

we need better tools to deal with the problems that increase our vulnerabilities. I

only ask that we learn from our past mistakes and oversights. I sincerely believe

that we must restructure our Intelligence and Federal law enforcement agencies if

we are to come to grips with this most elusive and insidious enemy. Our Nation

must be able to protect itself from those who come here to attack our citizens and

attempt to destroy our Country and our way of life.

Thank you,

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Revell, I understand that you have a video

that you want to play.

Mr. REVELL. Yes, sir. In 1994, when I retired from the FBI, I was

approached by an investigative reporter by the name of Steve

Emerson who was working on an issue that was of concern to him

and that he had in fact brought to my attention while I was still

in the FBI and we were investigating the first World Trade Center

bombing and that was the existence in the United States of certain

groups and organizations that were in support of terrorist organizations overseas, particularly Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic jihad.

I reviewed his material. I looked at the documentation and the

video. I saw the translations and I, along with Ambassador Bremer

and some others, reacted to what we saw. This documentary, which

was produced by Public Broadcasting, was actually broadcast I believe in 1995 and it is called Jihad in America.

Chairman HYDE. Well, I understand it takes about 13 minutes.

Mr. REVELL. Well, the entire video is 60 minutes, but I think the

excerpt has been edited to 13 minutes.

Chairman HYDE. Our Committee staff has reviewed an earlier

version of this tape. Like the producers, narrators and several

former U.S. officials that are featured on the tape, we do not believe Islam or the overwhelming vast majority of Muslims in the

U.S. support the use of violence and hatred as portrayed in this

video. I want to make that clear.

Mr. REVELL. I think if you saw the entire video you will see that

that statement is made over and over again. I made it personally,

and Ambassador Bremer made it, and the narrator made it. There

is no indication of belief on our part that the 6 million Muslims in

the United States are uniformly in favor of terrorism or violence,

but there are within this community, just like there are within the

Christian community the Christian Identity movement and other

radical elements that have used our very protections, our civil

38

rights, our constitutional guarantees to protect their ability to support and function in support of terrorist organizations overseas.

That was the issue.

Chairman HYDE. Very well. That is fine. Can we play the video?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I think this is

very ill-advised, after thousands of our people have been slaughtered, to play something about domestic Muslims in our country

that may make them look like they are part of a terrorist network.

We have to get the truth out, but this may not be the moment to

play this at a congressional hearing. I have never seen this tape,

but if it is dealing with what is going on in our mosques and to

our fellow citizens, this may not be a good moment to be doing this.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to lend some

words in support of my colleague Dana. I have not seen it either.

If the Chairman himself felt he had to provide some characterization that this in no way suggests that all Muslims in America are

terrorists, then maybe this information is something we should

view before it is just put out there for the entire country on these

television cameras that are here to see.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Chairman, I have watched the

entire video. It has been sent to every one of our offices. I have

watched it not once but twice. As Mr. Revell pointed out, it has

made it very clear that these are people coming in under the guise

of doing humanitarian work in New Jersey and Kansas and elsewhere who are openly and actively talking about killing, using the

sword, and I think it is very appropriate and—since it has been

drawn down to a concise fashion—for this Committee to see it.

I have watched it twice, and I would admonish every Member to

watch it. Because the threat is very real, and most of these people

come into this country using all of our openness to our own disadvantage, and we need to be much more aware of what is going

on.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the gentleman yield for a question?

You have seen this video several times in its entirety, you said.

Are you sure that the editing that has been done provides the safeguards that we are talking about so this wouldn’t lead to attacks

on——

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Throughout that video that point is

made, that the overwhelming majority of Muslim belief decries the

use of violence. These are extremists, and it is in their own words,

and we need to hear it from their own words.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Would the gentleman yield, please?

I would like to ask if the 13-minute edited version has this language about not blaming all Muslim Americans or suspecting all

Muslim Americans. Is that included in the 13-minute clip?

Mr. REVELL. The video never blames Muslim Americans or

makes that leap that Muslims are——

Ms. MCKINNEY. The question is, even you say that all Muslim

Americans should not be characterized as believers in terrorism

and violence.

Mr. REVELL. What do you mean by ‘‘even I say?’’ I have spent

40 years protecting Muslim Americans.

39

Ms. MCKINNEY. I am just quoting what you said. I wrote it down

here. So the question I have is, does the 13-minute clip have that

kind of language in it as well?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Yes, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I confess to having sent this to Members’ offices

quite some time ago—435 copies. It is replete with continuous disclaimers. And if anybody would like, maybe the Chair could lead

us all at once in saying that nobody blames Muslim American—— Mr. ROHRABACHER. Does the 13-minute version we are going to

see have those disclaimers—— Mr. ACKERMAN. I don’t think there is any 13-minute section that

doesn’t say it.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Maybe it has a 15-minute clip that at least has

a 2-minute clip saying——

Chairman HYDE. Would the gentlelady yield?

Ms. MCKINNEY. Yes, I will, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The Chair will make a decision. This is part of

Mr. Revell’s testimony. I don’t believe in censoring the testimony

of a witness or forbidding something because it might offend somebody’s sensibilities. I think the point has been made again and

again that this is not to demonstrate a tendency on the part of the

majority of Muslims in our country to violence or to terrorism.

With that, the Chair will direct the staff to show the video.

[Video shown.]

Chairman HYDE. We will now entertain questions. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend all three of our very able witnesses. With everything else having become globalized, we ought not to be surprised that terrorism has become globalized as well. I would like

each of you to comment on the extent to which Hamas and

Hezbollah, typically associated with the Middle East, are connected

or related to or associated with or cooperating with al-Qaeda and

this network in Afghanistan. Mr. Cannistraro.

Mr. CANNISTRARO. Congressman Lantos, in this investigation,

both from the law enforcement point of view and intelligence point

of view, there have been no indications that Hamas is connected or

Hezbollah is connected. Al-Qaeda has the resources, the zealotry,

and the willingness of its followers to commit suicide to conduct

this operation. What we saw in that film is alarming, but it has

nothing to do with al-Qaeda.

Abdullah Azam, who is shown in that film, was assassinated by

bin Laden. There was a disagreement between them about the objectives—about how to carry out the objectives. Bin Laden wanted

to carry it around the world and he wanted to focus on the establishment of an Islamic crusade in the Muslim world and Azam did

not. So when we look at what happened on September 11, we have

to be very careful to avoid connecting groups that may not be connected to it.

People talked about Iraqi involvement. Certainly Iraq operates

on the principle of the enemy of my enemy is my friend, but there

are no Iraqi assets used in this operation.

Iran has wished us harm in the past, and they conducted the operation at El Khobar in Saudi Arabia in 1996, killing several of our

40

young service people, but they were not involved with this operation.

We have to focus on the immediate objective, which is the nerve

center in Afghanistan and its connections around the world. The

problem is, if we lose this focus, we will not be able to root out this

evil—and that has to be our immediate focus. Whether or not we

want to make a reckoning with Iraq at some future point, that decision should be made down the road. In the immediate aftermath

of September 11, we have to concentrate on rooting out the Taliban

and bin Laden.

Mr. LANTOS. So you agree with my initial comments that we

should view this war against terrorism as a sequential war and the

focus for the immediate future needs to be on Afghanistan and on

this group?

Mr. CANNISTRARO. I do, sir. I think there is no question that we

should go after, as the President said, terrorists with a global

reach. I think we have to attend to the immediate business at

hand.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Santos.

Mr. SANTOS. I also agree with his testimony, and I would also

mention that Afghanistan is a symbol. It is part of a myth of Sunni

extremism right now, and that is a particularly important reason

why that needs to be the first place that we would go after. The

Taliban and bin Laden have been building that symbolism and that

mythology, and I think it is time to take that back.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Revell.

Mr. REVELL. I don’t know of any information that would indicate

that either Hamas or Hezbollah was directly involved. However,

the Hezbollah has been named in the indictment for the east African bombings as being involved in those bombings; and there has

been substantial intelligence of at least cooperation with al-Qaeda

by Hezbollah and Hamas. Certainly I don’t think the extent to

which other terrorist organizations were involved in this organization and supported it is known yet, and I think we need to remain

focused. Certainly I think the evidence is that al-Qaeda led this

and was the principal entity responsible, but we should not ignore

the possible participation of other groups. They have participated

and supported terrorist actions in the past.

Mr. LANTOS. Assuming that bin Laden and al-Qaeda are destroyed, what is the danger of repeating the mistake at the end of

the Persian Gulf War where we left Saddam Hussein in power, in

this case leaving other international terrorist organizations in

power? Is it your view that once this task is completed we have to

move on and destroy other international terrorist networks? Mr.

Cannistraro.

Mr. CANNISTRARO. I believe that, as the President said, we

should go after every terrorist group that targets Americans. If

they carry out terrorist operations against Americans, I think we

have the responsibility to our fellow citizens to go after the source

and deter future acts of terrorism. We are talking about human life

here, so I don’t think there is any question that we should go after

those groups that target Americans.

Mr. LANTOS. Is the record clear that Hezbollah has killed Americans?

41

Mr. CANNISTRARO. The record is very clear that the Hezbollah

carried out operations against the United States, that the infamous

Imad Mugniyah has carried out operations against the United

States. It may have trained the people who actually did the bombing of Al Khobar at the behest of the Iranian government.

Mugniyah has become an instrument of Iranian intelligence. We

haven’t seen his hand or footprint here, and I wouldn’t expect to,

given the pattern of the suicide bombers themselves and the methodologies that they employ. It doesn’t have Mognea’s footprint on

it. We know that the resources can be traced back to al-Qaeda from

the personnel, the majority of whom were Saudis, to the money and

the command and control apparatus. That all goes back to Afghanistan.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Santos.

Mr. SANTOS. I don’t feel like I am able to comment particularly

on Hamas or Hezbollah, but I will say this in terms of what you

have to do in Afghanistan. I think it is not just a question of eliminating the Taliban. That is a prerequisite. But one needs to deal

with the other dimension of extremism that has fused together

with these Sunni extremists—that is a hypernationalist notion that

we have seen in other places like Serbia that has to somehow be

addressed. So extremism is extreme ethnic notions and extreme religious notions that are often different sides of the same coin, and

I think that needs to be understood in terms of approaching these

problems.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Revell.

Mr. REVELL. If we were able to completely eradicate the bin

Laden network, we would still face terrorism. We faced it before.

It existed, particularly the radical teachings of some of the extremists. As I indicated, the Ayatollah Khomeini was the first one who

really started this, and his movement is Shia. The radical Sunni

elements have now taken the vanguard. I am not a religious expert, but I have seen for the first time in my knowledge the cooperation of various extremist elements that are both Shia and

Sunni and common objectives which have been very unique.

Certainly Hezbollah continues to be a threat to the United

States. It has shown its ability to operate oversees in Southeast

Asia, in South America. It has an infrastructure in the United

States.

Hamas has a tremendous support structure. It has not carried

out any terrorist operations in the United States, but it has a tremendous apparatus here for fund raising, for support of other types

of activities. Hamas also has a unique footprint in Israel in that

it does carry out humanitarian activities, giving it a rationale for

fund-raising in the United States, much like NORAID and the IRA

did in the United States early on when we did not have the ability

to go after those type of activities.

So the short—the long answer, Mr. Lantos, is even if we are 100

percent successful in going after Osama bin Laden, even if the

Taliban falls, we still will have perhaps an invigorated group of

people against us of like-minded people who believe that the

United States is the great Satan.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. [Presiding.] Mr. Gilman.

42

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Revell, I want to commend you for bringing the

film here. I think it is very important for our Committee to learn

more about the network within our own Nation. What more should

we be doing to address the radical jihad movement in our own

country?

Mr. REVELL. Mr. Gilman, that is probably the most difficult issue

that any of us in law enforcement and Congress and the courts

face. Because, as I pointed out in the film, it is our very protections

that afford these individuals to come to the United States and

sometimes have domestic support but are largely an overseas apparatus and they operate here under our constitutional protections.

We cannot give up our constitutional rights, and I would never

make that suggestion. We do have to be somewhat smarter in how

we control our borders, who we let in, our visa process, our clearance process and more alert to those who would come in to abuse

our hospitality and the atmosphere of our civil rights that exist in

this society. I don’t mean we should shut down our border, but we

have to be more astute in how we clear people and what we allow

them to do once they are here.

Mr. GILMAN. What about the network of people that we have already identified? What can we do about them?

Mr. REVELL. The President has taken action to freeze assets. We

can look at the tax free 501(c)(3) status of many of these groups

that are supposedly formed for educational and humanitarian purposes but whose purpose has proven to be or at least been alleged

to be for direct support of terrorist organizations.

I think it should be clear that there is a right of people that are

of the Muslim faith, people that come from the Middle East, to

raise funds to support humanitarian purposes. That should be

clear. But we also should have a mechanism to ensure that that

is what those funds are being used for.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Revell.

Mr. Santos, today’s Washington Post notes the Taliban’s penetration of the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI). Could you give us

more details of Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban and how

reliable is Pakistan as an ally in our war against terrorism?

Mr. SANTOS. Pakistan has been a sponsor and backer of the

Taliban since the very beginning, which goes back to the Bhutto

government, in fact. It has been a consistent policy of Pakistan. I

think one of the reasons they did this was dealing with their own

campaign in Kashmir, and so it allowed them to shift their training

facilities into Afghanistan. Those facilities were able to benefit from

the very networks being developed by the Taliban.

So I would say that Pakistan’s involvement is significant. Many

of the ethnic connections are within the Pakistani army and many

of them are Pakistani Pashtuns. So you have links by family and

clan that cross over the border. So you would expect that within

the Pakistan military there would be significant connections from

family to business with the Taliban and ultimately with bin

Laden’s network. So I think in terms of reliability one just needs

to keep that in mind, and I think the issue of Pakistan being a dependable ally may be a bit more problematic than it was 10 years

ago.

43

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Cannistraro, would you like to comment on

Pakistan?

Mr. CANNISTRARO. No. I would just like to support what Charlie

said.

I think it is correct that the ISI, which has increasingly become

controlled by fundamentalist leaders over the years, has promoted

not only the Taliban but training in bin Laden’s camps, which

leaves them with complicit hands. We are relying on them for information about locating bin Laden and at the same time they have

been in some way a supporter of him.

It is clear that President Musharraf of Pakistan has finally made

the calculation that the Taliban has to go and that he is willing

to support an alliance comprised of other Pashtun leaders. He is

supporting the political process in Rome, for example, the one that

ex-King Zahir Shah is trying to organize. So I think they have

made a decision here to support us. I think they have decided to

change horses.

But, nevertheless, there is a legacy here, and it will continue in

the future because of their promotion of terrorism in Kashmir, and

that makes them at all times an uncertain ally.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Santos, the U.N. states, and I quote,

‘‘Funds raised from the production and trading of opium and

heroin are used by the Taliban to buy arms and other war material and to finance the training of terrorists and support the

operations of these extremists in the neighboring countries and

beyond.’’

Shouldn’t we be doing more with UNDCP and our own DEA to

take the drug profits away from the Taliban and Osama bin

Laden—profits that finance the terrorism?

Mr. SANTOS. Absolutely. In fact, initially the Taliban was just

collecting a 30 percent tax on the opium, but by 1997 they were

transporting it. They were buying it from the refining facilities and

then selling it—so they made additional money on all that, and

that was used to basically keep their war machine going. It basically financed their efforts to take the northern part of Afghanistan

initially in 1997 and then back again in 1998. It is not a far

stretch, since bin Laden and his people—as well as other extremists—were involved in those military efforts to create a link. This

has gone on pretty significantly overseas as well.

Mr. GILMAN. One last question. Let me ask the entire panel. How

can we improve the ability to try to penetrate the close-knit terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, where many of them fought together

and know each other personally from fighting in Afghanistan? How

do we penetrate groups of that nature?

Mr. CANNISTRARO. We need better intelligence. Intelligence is our

first line of defense, and I think in this case it has failed us. We

should do a retrospective. Why did it fail us? What do we need to

do? What has the Central Intelligence Agency done or failed to do?

We have had a task force on bin Laden both at the FBI and at

the CIA, yet neither service had any inkling that this was going

to happen on September 11. We need a refocus and definition,

which means we have to recruit people who by definition have

44

blood on their hands because they are terrorists. We have to get

agents within the group. That means recruiting people already

within al-Qaeda, or other people in the area who are likely to be

recruited by al-Qaeda but who are responsible to us.

To do that, we are going to have to get our hands dirty. We have

not been willing to do that. We have had a wave of political correctness that has affected our intelligence agencies over the last 10

years, sometimes for understandable reasons. I mean, there were

human rights abusers on the payroll. So when Congress points this

out and is critical, bureaucracy’s reaction is to pull its horns in— to withdraw and to just do the safe thing and become risk averse.

Well, that might be all right in Central America. It is not all right

with terrorist groups. We have to take risks because they are the

only way, taking risks, to prevent the taking of human life.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cannistraro. We hear that more

and more these days.

Mr. Revell.

Mr. REVELL. Yes, sir. I want to go back to the point you made

about the opium smuggling. If I am not mistaken, the United

States provided something like $47 million to the Taliban for an

eradication program. You talk about naivete. I think we need to reexamine that process.

Certainly Vince is correct. Our human intelligence needs to be

vastly improved. You cannot determine a terrorist organization’s

activities by technical means.

We have been—I could never understand why it was all right domestically for the FBI to recruit members of the Mafia, La Cosa

Nostra, known killers who were the only ones that could penetrate

La Cosa Nostra and give us that information, but the CIA could

not use individuals of this type.

Now that doesn’t mean that you in any way support or facilitate

or accept those kinds of actions on their part; and, if they do, then

you have to take action. But you cannot get some—a choir boy inside of these organizations. You have got to understand that the

only people that can give you information on these kind of groups

and structures are the people that will be acceptable to them, and

we have to accept that as part of the responsibility we have in collecting intelligence.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you.

Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel.

I would like to address a point that is conspicuous by its absence

in the testimony of all three of our distinguished panelists today.

I think a lot of us have heard from some constituents some misguided notions and we have also heard the same on some of the

call-in radio shows that tie this in with America’s relationship to

Israel and our policy in regard to the Middle East, an area to

which none of you refer in your testimony. As a matter of fact, I

think it is only Mr. Revell who even uses the word Israel one time

in all of his testimony, as I have read all three prepared statements; and it is not mentioned with regard to this particular issue.

It has been my contention and response to these who say, well,

America should reevaluate its policies in the Middle East because

45

we are favoring one side or the wrong side, some say, and if this

keeps up the conclusion to which they would lead us would be just

to cut our relationship with Israel off and take a different perspective and change our view as was referred to as a mistake by one

of our colleagues here in an opening statement.

From my vantage point, and I would like you to respond to this,

they are not mad at us because we support Israel. They are mad

at Israel because Israel represents the bulkhead of freedom and democracy that they see us as representing as the big Satan, represents that as a bulkhead within their immediate part of the

world under certainly insufficient yet Islamic control from their

point of view. And that while some of the other leaders in the area,

whether it is Saddam Hussein or Arafat or whoever compared to

bin Laden, that these individuals are a bunch of Mini Me’s that

have a very limited agenda, which is to kill all the Jews and get

rid of Israel. Bin Laden seems to have a much larger perspective

and that is to attack all of western values, and any change in respect to Israel would not really affect their view of us.

How would you respond to that?

Mr. CANNISTRARO. Mr. Ackerman, it is clear that bin Laden

would do what he is doing regardless of what happened in Israel

or the occupied territories. It is not the number one item on his

agenda. He wants to overthrow the monarchy in Saudi Arabia,

which is a U.S. ally. He wants to overthrow the government in

Egypt. He wants to replace these regimes with a religious regime,

a theological regime. So he started his campaign against us way

back in 1992. It wasn’t the chief objective. He wanted to drive the

U.S. presence out of the Middle East. He wanted to drive it out of

the Gulf. He wanted to drive it out of Saudi Arabia.

Now, certainly he adds fuel to his zealotry by focusing on what

is happening in Israel, but that is not what drives him.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Santos.

Mr. SANTOS. Yes, I would agree, and I would just add that this

is about Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in fact are about a purified notion of Islamic control over the so-called corrupted Muslim

world. What they are seeking to do is throw out any American or

western influence and push it out. So in that context, if Israel is

even a base of western values, then of course that is part of it. The

real threat I think is the United States, because it is the sole superpower and the leader of the free world.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Revell, I thank you very much for editing that down and

bringing it to the Committee.

I do want to point out that Mr. Emerson is in the audience with

us, and we thank him.

Mr. REVELL. He actually brought it.

Mr. ACKERMAN. We thank him for the public service he has done

in putting this together.

In your statements and in your testimony you have been fairly

critical of the FBI in several aspects. I want to ask you specifically,

toward the end of your written statement you referred to tying in

the assassination of Meir Kahane, the militant, some would say

racist, American Israeli rabbi who was assassinated by a terrorist

46

in New York, and you tie that in with the bombing of the World

Trade Center in 1991 and are critical of the FBI in not tying them

together. And indeed I could tell you a lot more of that but not in

an open hearing. And you say that that is because the FBI lacked

the—loathed to undertake—I am quoting you, anything that had

the appearance of being involved in the political process. The FBI

was absolutely dead wrong then in saying that the people that

were involved in the assassination were acting on their own, et

cetera. You think—— Mr. REVELL. It is critical of myself.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, I know; and I think that is courageous of

you to historically note that at this time. But is that still the FBI’s

viewpoint?

Mr. REVELL. No, I don’t think so. The difficulty—we were coming

off in that period of time one of these periods of criticism for us

being overactive in so-called political issues. So throughout the

field the agents felt I am not going to get involved in this kind of

thing unless I just have to. So in the Kahane assassination, the

FBI didn’t have primary jurisdiction. It was a local homicide, but

the Bureau was looking over the shoulders of the NYPD to see if

in fact there was any radical involvement. They missed and I

missed, because I was in charge of FBI operations at the time, and

it never came to my attention that there was this connection that

ultimately led to the same group that was involved in the first

World Trade Center bombing in 1993.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am trying to understand this from an operational point of view. At the time of Kahane’s assassination, I will

assure you that it was pointed out to the agents at the time who

were doing the investigation that indeed the person who was the

assassin, who was apprehended on the scene, had an involvement

with certain people who indeed now appear on this video who have

a connection with that shooting range in Connecticut that also appeared on the video. And the FBI’s assertion at the time was that

this assassin acted completely on his own and had nothing to do

with any other group. Subsequently, of course, he was convicted of

the World Trade Center bombing in 1991.

Mr. REVELL. That was totally—— Mr. ACKERMAN. How would they conclude that after 3 days that

this assassin was not connected when other very amateurish investigators—and I am not referring to Mr. Emerson at all here, I am

referring to others—were able to come up and point this out to

these agents who completely denied this as a possibility?

Mr. REVELL. Congressman, I don’t know. If I was still there, I

would have found out. I left after the Gulf War and went to Texas

and wasn’t there when the first World Trade Center bombing occurred, but it was clear to me, even from Texas, that we had

missed it, missed it badly. And I did not know why that had occurred and it certainly had to be something that was reexamined

as the way that the Bureau was processing information that related to the radical elements. Whether they be Jewish radicals or

Islamic radicals or Christian radicals, it doesn’t make any difference. If they espouse and contribute and directly support violence, they certainly should have been subject to serious scrutiny

from the Bureau.

47

Mr. ACKERMAN. I appreciate the Chair’s indulgence, and I would

like to speak with you separately, privately.

Mr. REVELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you.

First of all, and again I encourage all Members and really the

American public to view that excellent journalistic piece by Steve

Emerson. It lays out in their own words what many of these characters have planned, perhaps have even carried out, and it raises

some questions.

I, as a Member of Congress now for 21 years, have been a very

staunch advocate of refugees. When I chaired the Human Rights

Subcommittee, especially because of the work that Committee does

on refugee protection, we were able to enhance many of our refugee

programs. We tried with some success to increase the amount of

money for refugees over and above what the Clinton Administration had asked for.

So I say that as a backdrop, and I am joined by Members of both

sides of the aisle on this who believe passionately in refugees.

All the more reason why, when we see an organization like alQaeda—and I would ask you to comment on that if you would—

that apparently uses as a front a legitimate humanitarian concern

while simultaneously acting as a cover for the bringing in of terrorists or those involved in terrorist activities. It is like taking a Red

Cross truck and using it as a car bomb. All of the defenses are

down. People are more likely to give it safe passageway. A 501(c)(3)

organization which is doing ostensibly humanitarian work and may

even do some but meanwhile has another agenda seems to me to

be the most despicable act of all, to use it for anti-humanitarian

work.

I would like you to comment on that individual organization.

What was done with some of those individuals who made that kind

of hate speech? Did that trigger any kind of investigation? Did they

break any laws when they talked about making widows and orphans and using the sword and AK–47s and the like in order to

kill people? That takes hate speech, it seems to me, to new dimensions.

Mr. REVELL. They have not been prosecuted for it. It is a difficult

dilemma in our society. There has long been the principle that you

can’t cry fire in a theatre, but we haven’t quite defined that when

it comes to political rhetoric espousing a religious or political cause.

Many of them have since been banned from entering the United

States. Hopefully, we have somewhat more control. These were not

necessarily refugees. These were people coming in and out of the

United States, and some of them probably could have been prosecuted on false documentations and passport violations. We did not

have the best enforcement effort at this time through INS and certainly not the State Department’s visa process. All of them have to

be corrected.

Certainly we are a Nation of refugees. We continue to allow refugees. We have seen refugee status used to import entire organized

crime elements in our society. It doesn’t mean we should stop allowing refugees, but we certainly have to be smarter about it and

48

realize that not everybody who comes here believes in American

values and is not a threat to us.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Can you or any other panelist tell

us where does free speech end and the commission of a crime

begin? Did those individuals on that tape commit a crime?

Mr. REVELL. That is a judicial question. In my view, it becomes

a matter of at least investigation when they specifically directly advocate violence and do so not in a general term but in a specific

term. I think at that point they become at least a legitimate target

for investigation.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me just ask with regards to jihad

networks. Since the production of that video, have the number of

jihad networks increased, or stayed the same in America?

Mr. REVELL. Mr. Smith, I do not know. I have not been focused

on this. You will have to ask other experts, including Mr. Emerson

who in his investigative project has investigated this. But my focus

has been the security of American business internationally, and I

haven’t followed this locally.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Santos, you in your testimony—

and Mr. Gilman did make some mention of this. You talked about

the use of opium as a means of garnering revenues in order to

spread their terrorist activities. Now that the world has been mobilized, and hopefully it will be on a sustainable basis, is it likely

that opium revenues will be choked off?

Mr. SANTOS. I think one of the problems that the Taliban has

had recently has been a massive drought in Afghanistan the past

year or two. That has made real serious inroads in their ability to

produce the kind of opium they would like. Also, they flooded the

market to such an extent that I think they depressed prices. So

they basically pulled back and stored what they had, waiting for

the price to go back up. So they still have I think significant stores

of opium, but they haven’t been able to utilize it as effectively as

they were in 1997 and 1998.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me just ask Mr. Santos one question again. How does one measure the performance of the Government of Pakistan in the fight against terrorism? Is it by the capture of bin Laden, or are there some other measurement gauges

that we might use to say whether or not they are acting in a truly

responsible way?

Mr. SANTOS. I think it goes all the way to Taliban and are they

really willing to sever the links that they have established, significant links; and if they are not, then I think you set the stage for

others to utilize Afghanistan as a base of terror. So I think the test

really is how far they really are willing to go to sever those links.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me just finally say again—and

Mr. Gejdenson, our former Ranking Member, and I and others, Ms.

McKinney worked on legislation. And I went back and re-read the

record from when we heard from the Administration. After the two

bombings in Africa, Admiral Crowell convened a commission that

looked into what would be needed to strengthen our diplomatic security, to follow up on Admiral Inman’s ideas on how to strengthen

and fortify without isolating our embassies missions abroad. And

for the first year $1.4 billion was his recommendation each year for

10 years.

49

For the first year everybody was gangbusters, let us do it.

Second year, up came the recommendation from the Administration, there was no new security money, which we in Congress did

reverse. And it was done in a bipartisan way, I am happy to say.

Clinton did finally sign our bill, the Embassy Security Act, which

went under a number of names, but that was one of the titles we

had given it.

But there was a sense of everybody was gung ho for a year and

then it slacked off precipitously and put, I believe, our people at

risk. Is it your belief that the fight against terrorism will be sustainable? Have we really learned our lesson?

My time is running out. I do want to say Steve Emerson deserves

whatever the highest prize, Pulitzer, whatever it may be, for investigative journalism. He asked some of the most pointed questions

and got back very feeble responses from people during the course

of those interviews. I encourage every Member of the House and

Senate and hopefully every American who can get access to it to

view that. It is the most concise and succinct and troubling bit of

journalism that I have ever seen.

Mr. SANTOS. In terms of the American foreign policy establishment, I think there are two points here that I noted when I was

traveling through Afghanistan. One was I was the only American

there. There were some people involved with humanitarian operations, but there was a very little cross-border travel on the part

of various diplomats, and it seemed to me there was a tendency to

depend a lot on Pakistan and that possibly was due to the relationship that evolved during the jihad. But it seems to me the United

States has to have its own links and connections and sources of information.

And the interesting thing is, as an American walking and going

through Afghanistan, everybody wanted to talk to me. They always

thought an American, this person might be able to convey their

ideas or their concerns. So I think there is a natural desire and interest on the part of many of these people, particularly in Afghanistan, to have those kinds of links. We have tended to use intermediaries, and maybe we need to take a few more risks in terms

of establishing those direct contacts in dangerous places.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have two questions, I think.

The first question pertains to an article published by the Heritage Foundation and basically it says—I will read it. It says,

‘‘When the United States helped the Afghan resistance defeat

the Soviet army in a brutal guerrilla war, it scored one of its

biggest Cold War victories. However, shortly after Soviet troops

withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States withdrew from active involvement in Afghan affairs. As a result,

Washington squandered the residual influence that it had acquired through its $3 billion aid program for the Afghan resistance in the 1980s. One former U.S. official intimately involved

in Afghanistan policy lamented Afghanistan has gone from one

of Washington’s greatest foreign policy triumphs to one of its

most profound failures.’’

50

The question I have there is, how can we turn this around in Afghanistan and in other places where this might be the case?

My second question pertains to intelligence failures.

We had two trials that gave us information about the financial

and operational network of the bin Laden organization, the trials

from the first World Trade Center bombing and the second trial

from the U.S. Embassy bombings.

There also have been some newspaper reports. The Los Angeles

Times reported on September 20 that Mossad had warned FBI and

CIA officials that a major terrorist force of some 200 individuals

was entering the U.S. and planning a major assault on the United

States.

Secondly, a newspaper from the Murdoch group reported on Monday, September 17, 2001, that a man in the Cayman Islands wrote

to U.S. authorities on August 29 and warned them that he had just

overheard three Afghan men in a bar talking about impending attacks on U.S. targets.

It is also reported that a week later an Iranian in Hamburg, Germany, contacted the police and warned them of an impending terrorist attack against the United States using highjacked planes.

Apparently his warning specifically mentioned the World Trade

Center.

This same newspaper also reports of FBI agents tracking some

of the alleged terrorists at their flight schools in the U.S. Also,

there were reports that the CIA was told, as long as 2 years ago,

that a suspicious group of Middle Eastern men were gathering in

Florida.

The first question is, how can we turn around the situation in

Afghanistan and other places where we might have foreign policy

failures? And the second question is, how can we explain this abhorrent lack of intelligence failure when there were these leads

that have reportedly come in? Mr. Cannistraro first.

Mr. CANNISTRARO. Yes, Congresswoman. I would like to take the

second one first.

The alleged Israeli warning is nonexistent. The CIA made an unusual public declaration that there was no such report. In the

aftermath of a great disaster, there are always these reports come

up saying someone knew this, someone knew that. In every case

that was investigated after September 11, they were proved to be

untrue. So there was no warning. There was no warning at all.

There was not a warning that was ignored.

Were there signs? Yes, of course, there were signs. We knew that

Ramzi Yousef, as Buck mentioned, had planned to attack at least

11 aircraft out of the Far East. We knew that Ramzi Yousef also

was the author of the first World Trade Center attack. We know

that one of his subordinates was asked to pilot a plane into CIA

headquarters. So there is a pattern there.

Should we have known or should we have had a better analytical

grasp of the risks? Certainly. I couldn’t agree with you more. But

there was no specific warning. Those stories are not true.

Secondly, on Afghanistan, I agree that that was an amazing

American policy failure. The previous Administrations—the Carter

and Reagan Administrations—had as their objectives to bloody the

Soviets and then drive them out of Afghanistan. There was a presiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:29 Jan 22, 2002 Jkt 075562 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\100301\75562 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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dential security decision made that our goal was to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. We were successful.

But then we turned and left the field. We left even though we

had a moral obligation caused by our involvement to begin with.

We had an obligation to assist the Mujahedin, to stay the course

and to help reconstruct that country which had been bombed into

the Stone Age by the Soviets. We didn’t. And we left the field.

What happened was a return to the tribal rivalry, infighting and

ethnic hatreds that had been evident in that country for hundreds

of years. And we left it to the Pakistani government, which as we

know, was responsible for the creation of the Taliban. So certainly

we had a great policy success, and then we had a great policy failure. I agree.

This time, to avoid that, we have to be a lot smarter on how we

act. I don’t think we can choose a new government for Afghanistan,

but we can certainly promote a federation. We can certainly promote a process which includes every tribe and every minority in

that country.

Charlie mentioned the Shi’a Hazaras. Yet the Tajiks, the Uzbeks

and, yes, the Pashtuns are the majority compared to the other

groups. But we have to have a representative government. We have

to promote a process, but the Afghans have to do it themselves. We

can’t pick and choose. We are not very good at that.

Mr. SANTOS. I would fully agree on the Afghan question.

I would add that one of the failures of U.N. efforts which I have

been intimately involved with over the years has been a focus on

power sharing—with a more immediate focus on trying to come up

with a transitional government and with very little attention paid

to the very structure of the Afghan state, which is part of the problem. Afghanistan historically, the only way it has been able to survive is in a more decentralized way. But there has always been an

extremist element within the largest of the minority groups, the

Pashtun, to impose a powerful central authority that would control

all the other areas where these ethnic minorities are. And I think

that idea is a failed idea and what we should try to do is promote

and encourage a federated or confederated system where ethnic

rights are protected, where people feel that their culture will not

be smashed in the way the Taliban has smashed it.

One of the things that the Taliban did was destroy these Buddhist statutes, and people were arguing that this was somehow related to some notion of Islamic sense of idolatry. The Taliban knew

what they were doing. They were smashing the Buddhist statutes

because they were identified with a community. That community

was the Hazaras population who lived in the central part of the

country. And we ignored what happened. This kind of extremism

has been at play.

So to do it right, I think, is to focus not on individuals but to

focus in the longer term on creating a truly representative democratic and multi-ethnic Afghanistan. Immediately we would have to

get rid of the Taliban. That is essential. The Taliban are an obstacle to Afghanistan on all kinds of levels, not only in the way that

we have been talking about in terms of terrorism, but also the way

they have been terrorizing the people of Afghanistan, particularly

these ethnic minorities.

52

So I would suggest also to immediately help those fighting—— Ms. MCKINNEY. And women, too. They have been terrorizing

women, too.

Mr. SANTOS. On the intelligence failure, I mean, all I can say is

what I saw. And I just saw so few American officials going to Afghanistan and so much dependence on other countries for information. I can imagine that these countries have their own interests

and they pursue them. And if we don’t understand that and we

don’t have our own lines of not only intelligence—it is not just in

terms of the intelligence agencies but diplomats and others involved in this, then of course we are going to have a distorted view.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Chair recognizes Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to go right to a point that is before us in Congress.

Why did the FBI and the CIA not have access to information that

they needed? And to do that—I think the best way to do it, Mr.

Revell, is to quote from some of the comments in your report.

In relation to the Oklahoma City bombing, you say, I don’t think

many people in the United States, including the FBI, would have

known much about the militia movement at all. The reason is because that, under the Attorney General’s guidelines as interpreted

at that time and still today, the FBI nor the Justice Department

did not believe that the FBI had the authority to collect information on groups that openly espouse the use of force and violence unless and until there is a criminal predicate.

You go on to say, the espousal of violence, the collection of arms,

organizing to commit violence—these things would not necessarily

have predicated an investigation and in fact, with the militias, they

had not.

Then, as Former Deputy Director of Investigation of the FBI, you

make some observations. You say, we have had a very strange coalition develop over the last 2 or 3 years in our Congress. Elements

of the left and elements of the right have coalesced and come together to oppose a President of the Democratic party and the leadership of the Republican party in Congress in putting together

anti-terrorism legislation that has been supported through three

Administrations.

You go on to say, legislation which would withstand constitutional scrutiny, most elements of which have already been ruled on

by the Supreme Court in other forms, such as roving wiretaps—

which have already been adjudicated in organized crime—and drug

cases as being constitutional.

You know, while the silent majority are not paying attention,

forces on the left and forces on the right in Congress—admittedly

they are very well-intentioned—but every day they are working to

water down the bill the Attorney General has put before the Congress. They are working to water down what the FBI has asked for,

removing things that the CIA has asked for. I think we need to

contemplate that as Members of Congress.

I think we need to think about the fact that, as you said in your

testimony, under the guidelines as they are today, the FBI is in the

very unusual position of being perhaps the only organization that

cannot take official cognizance of what people say, of what people

do, of what people pronounce and promulgate until they do it. The

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FBI is prohibited under the current guidelines and a provision of

the Privacy Act from collecting public information even from groups

who directly espouse the use of violence to accomplish their objective.

And to take the point home, you quoted a discussion with a Senator some years ago where you said,

‘‘Senator, do you want us to wait until there is blood on the

streets to act or are you going to authorize us to act on information that any reasonable person would assume to be true?’’

And he said,

‘‘In a democratic society, you may have to wait until there is

blood on the streets.’’

Well, there is blood on the streets. And, as you concluded in your

remarks, we have to reach a reasonable balance to allow those elements of our society charged with preventing terrorism an opportunity to carry out their duties and do their jobs. Right now, the

balance is not there.

Well, we have a bill before us that is being watered down as we

speak. I just wanted to ask you if you would give us your thoughts

on what some of the tools are that we need? I also ask some of the

other members on the panel as well.

Mr. REVELL. Mr. Royce, I made those comments, which were

later printed in a book in 1996. I think they are even more true

and relevant today. Now the Attorney General guidelines had nothing to do with the failure to detect the tragic events of September

11. If any information had come to the attention of the FBI, it

would have been under the foreign intelligence guidelines and they

give more latitude. If this had been carried out by a domestic

group, then, of course, the guidelines would have been a problem.

I helped write the guidelines. I believe in the guidelines. I think

they are very important because it tells agents what they can do

and under what circumstances. But in putting together and in conjunction with the Privacy Act, the Privacy Act says you cannot

maintain a file unless you have an investigation. The guidelines

say you cannot have an investigation unless you have a criminal

predicate. Well, if that criminal predicate is the blowing up of a

Federal building, that is a very high price to pay; and I think it

is reasonable to believe that if the Bureau had somewhat broader

authority to pay attention to what is being said publicly and openly

by groups espousing violence, that there is at least a chance the

Oklahoma City bombing could have been prevented.

Now as far as the circumstance involving September 11, there,

I think, we are talking about a matter of better analysis of information we might have had—and I don’t know—Vince is probably

correct. There have probably been a thousand reports since the fact

and maybe two bits of information that can now be tied it. It is like

having a 100-piece puzzle and you have two bits and you don’t

know what the picture is.

Well, the coming to the United States of Saudi Arabian nationals

to take flight training is not an ominous act. They are an ally of

the United States. Saudi Arabians coming here to take flight training probably has occurred hundreds of times. We recognize it by

54

giving student visas for vocational purposes as well. So, you know,

in hindsight, we may go back and say that should have been an

indication.

Mr. ROYCE. Let us say this. If we had been able to match that

up with the fact that some of them had been accused of terrorism,

then you could have put it together. I am a little chagrined when

the Attorney General of the United States asks for certain tools

that we have such a rush to judgment. Some are trying to water

down the very provisions that our authorities are asking for in

order to allow us to put together the analysis that would allow us

to apprehend those involved in terrorism.

Mr. REVELL. As I indicated, it has been somewhat—as a citizen

sitting out in Texas looking at the situation, I have been somewhat

aghast at the fact that tools that we can use against organized

crime and drug traffickers, we cannot use against terrorists, and

that makes no sense to me whatsoever. The constitutionality of

those tools has already been established, and certainly terrorism

poses an imminent danger to us as much as drugs and organized

crime.

Mr. ROYCE. I hope Members will all read your report here. But

it is very, very helpful. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

I appreciate your testimony, and I just have a question regarding

the new allies in this war on global terrorism, this global coalition.

I heard, as it occurred several days ago, that the Government of

Sudan is now going to be cooperating and that we are very happy

that they said they are going to give us information.

As you know, bin Laden lived between Sudan and Somalia from

1991 to 1996. The bombing of the two African embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were done by themselves and people being

trained in both Sudan and Somalia. The Khartoum government

still has continuing aerial raids where they are bombing the people

of the south. They have got a new bomb that has nails in it because

the people are barefooted and then the nails are spread all over the

ground so these people cannot walk or, when they walk, it is just

very painful and infections come in and they become very ill.

The Sudan government is still allowing abductions by bandits

who then take women and children and sell them back and forth.

They condone slavery.

The Sudan government still is not allowing adequate food into

the Nuba Mountains where there is starvation in large numbers.

The Governor of Sudan still says—whether you are Christian or

atheist—that you must adhere to Sharia government, Sharia laws,

their law of Islam. The Sudan government has kept terrorists there

for all along.

All of a sudden—and these things are still going on—we now say

that, one, we have taken off sanctions on travel of Sudan and Sudanese government officials. We have legislation which is going to

require that anyone doing oil exploration in Sudan could not enter

the capital markets in our country—that there would be sanctions

against them. For the first time, we had the Sudanese government

starting to shake a little bit because the oil companies were saying

that they may have to pull out. Of course, the Sudanese are using

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the oil money to buy more planes that are more accurate so that

they can shoot down food planes that are coming in unauthorized.

Now we say that they are all right, and we are going to allow

them to continue to do all these things. There was a meeting last

week with the Government of Sudan with the SPLA, the Southern

Liberation Movement, and they just bothered not to come because

they are now our allies and our friends supposedly.

Do you actually believe that the Sudanese government is going

to turn over all of its top information on bin Laden when he lived

there for 5 or 6 years? Do you think it is as naive as our giving

money for crop rotation to the Taliban to stop growing opium?

Maybe all three of you might be able to answer.

Mr. REVELL. I am not an expert on the Sudan. But I think it

does indicate a somewhat naive position on our part to think overnight that they have changed from a state—we have them listed

as a state that sponsors terrorism and that they have automatically changed over. I think we ought to be very circumspect in dealing with a regime that has been as ruthless and has been as supportive as it has of terrorist activities, not just Osama bin Laden

but other groups as well.

Mr. SANTOS. I would agree with those comments.

Mr. CANNISTRARO. I don’t think we ought to overlook any of those

abuses that you cited, Congressman.

I would point out, though, under the Sudanese sanctions regime

there are exceptions made for the import of certain foodstuffs from

Sudan, including gum arabic. And that was done at the request of

certain lobbies in the United States—mainly the confectioneries,

because Sudan is the producer of gum arabic. So we have made

tactical concessions in the past.

There is no excuse for any of the behavior that you cited by the

Sudanese government. There is, however, a reason for the State

Department to try and engage the Sudanese government to correct

those abuses using the leverage of our pressure on them as a state

sponsor of terrorism and list it as such to try and get them to correct those procedures.

They are very eager to get out from under U.S. scrutiny. Clearly,

that is why they have enlisted themselves in the so-called war on

terrorism. And they do have some information. Bin Laden does

have a root in the Sudan. He has a network of companies. He has

agricultural products that he has invested in, possibly including

the gum arabic that we allow to be imported into the United

States. So I think a process of forceful engagement is better than

just completely ignoring the Sudan, because we do have an opportunity, through this crisis, to condition their behavior and behavior

which is abhorrent to us.

Mr. PAYNE. I agree. The gum arabic was something that our

Committee put restrictions on, also. But the White House overrode

our sanctions. I moved the motion myself, and it was written into

law. But it was overturned in the White House and the gum

arabic—— And, like I said, the whole question of this horrific, unbelievable

government still exists. There are close to 2 million people dead in

the Sudan. I really don’t think, you know, that there will be very

much changes made there. I think they have had opportunities beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:29 Jan 22, 2002 Jkt 075562 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\100301\75562 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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fore. But I hope that we don’t get back into the situation we were

in during the Cold War where anybody that gives us a hand we say

they are okay.

So we have got the former Zaire—which is the Congo now—

where Mabuto reigned for 30 years and robbed the country of everything it had as we continued to give them World Bank money

and as we continued to support them. Now we have seven countries

fighting in the Congo over 30 years later. The fighting has been

going on for 2 or 3 years with several million people dead—as a result of our saying, as long as Mabuto helped us, the rest doesn’t

matter.

I think we have to certainly wipe out terrorism and so forth.

However, if we are going to go to bed with the devil, we are going

to put ourselves in the same boat as those people who are doing

the terrorist bombing and so forth.

I would like, Mr. Chairman, for Mr. Meeks, to ask unanimous

consent to have his remarks entered into the record.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meeks follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

I want to thank Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos for their strong

leadership and clear bipartisan efforts in calling today’s hearing.

As we learned on September 11th, when it comes acts of terrorism we are not Republicans and Democrats we are all just Americans. I would dare say that September 11th also demonstrated that for us to wage a global war against terrorism

and win it, we can not be Americans against terrorism, we must be human beings

against terrorism.

If we want the world the feel our pain and sense of loss as many have demonstrated, then we in this country can not afford to believe that can we isolate ourselves from the world, ignore our responsibilities in the world and not expect that

sooner or later we will also be affected.

Let me say first and foremost I want to fight and win the war against terrorism,

not just today or tomorrow, but in a manner which is sustainable over time. This

means I want our government to fight this war the right way.

I believe that fighting terrorism the right way requires a multi-faceted approach.

It involves law enforcement, security, defense and diplomacy on national, regional

and global levels.

I’ve called for our government to not only think about how we wage the war, but

to also think about how we engage those societies after the conflict. We must have

a strategy, the political will and a demonstrated level of commitment to ensure that

societies are not left in conditions of poverty, degradation, and humiliation which

makes it easy for authoritarian governments, dictators, and future terrorists to

flourish.

Fighting terrorism the right way in the future requires that we have learned lessons from previous policy actions and approaches to waging a war which have clearly blown back against us.

It is my belief that for America to win the battle in ways which won’t lay the

seeds to losing the war, there are two errors we can not repeat.

1. We cannot continue to conceptualize our short term strategic and security interests in the region, in ways which exclude, minimize or disregard the legitimate long

term strategic and security interests of the societies in the region;

2. We cannot continue to pursue our foreign policy interests in the region with

approaches and means which contradict the values, principles and morals which the

American people expect their government to stand for.

This latter lesson is of critical importance for a number of reasons.

A. There have been calls for changes in certain types of actions and procedures

by our intelligence and security forces as justifiable responses to September 11th.

Yes, we must be careful and clear to address areas which the events of September

11th revealed where our security and intelligence agencies face challenges or have

deficiencies.

57

However, I am concerned by those who would suggest that our security and intelligence agencies have been overly hindered or burdened by civil liberty protections

and rights to privacy and hence such rights and protections must be weakened.

B. There have also been calls for removing restrictions on our security and intelligence related agencies on being able to work with individuals and groups involved

in human rights violations. Some have even suggested that relaxing the prohibition

on government sanctioned assassinations should be adopted to fight terrorism.

While no one denies that extreme measures to respond to extreme actions should

be explored, state sanctioned assassinations, restrictions on civil liberties, use of

force to extract confessions, and arrests and detentions without charge have not

been proven as solutions to solve the problem. Israel uses such measures and terrorism still exists. Great Britain used such measures in Ireland without much success. While I don’t seek to judge others, I also have a sense of caution about such measures based on our own long history of domestic and international actions, both of

a covert and overt nature which not only crossed the legal lines, codes of conduct

and international norms, but which often flew in the face of the principles, morals,

values and rights which the American people expect their government to uphold.

I’m sure that my colleagues would agree that if our approaches to waging a war

on terrorism involves getting involved in foreign civil wars, providing covert military

assistance to non-state rebels, forming alliances with organizations that engage in

drug trafficking, and formally supporting governments with known human rights

violations all in the name of defending Americans, then we had better be sure that

the American people are informed and support such actions. If we become like our

enemy in fighting terrorism, then our enemy has won!

In the case of Afghanistan, I am concerned that as a means of fighting the Al

Qaeda network and those who harbor them the Taliban, we would seek alliances

with other groups which may be equally intolerant, undemocratic, and hated by

many people in Afghanistan.

In addition, there are reports that some of the groups which make up the Northern Alliance forces fighting against the Taliban have been actively involved in the

production of opium and international heroin trafficking in Northern Afghanistan.

I’ve also read reports that earlier this year, in the May 22nd Los Angeles Times, the Bush Administration provided $43 million in assistance to the Taliban government to support their efforts to eradicate opium production and encourage farmers

to grow food crops as opposed to poppies in Afghanistan.

Where do we draw the line? Are we going to tell the American people that attacking Al Qaeda in the war against terrorism, requires working with drug dealers that

I thought we were attacking as part of our war against drugs?

In a sense, it is my strong hope that we would learn from our policy actions in

how we fought the cold war in Afghanistan, and apply such lessons in how we fight

the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.

Some argue that our policy of providing or coordination with the help of China,

Britain, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan the provision several billion in weapons to the

Mujahadeen (including the Taliban) including US made Stinger surface to air missiles, is now blowing back in our face today.

Other arguments are dis-engagement from Afghanistan after the Russians were

defeated, because we are not in the nation building business, is partially to blame

for the conditions which materialized to cause the civil war and the Taliban government.

Regardless which side you side you take, lets make sure that our previous policy

approaches which are a factor in what Afghanistan is today, a shattered society,

with a failed state, and millions of internally displaced and external refugees.

As we look forward, it behooves us to contemplate the ramifications of our approach to waging war against Al Qaeda, other international terrorist networks and

states which support those networks. We can’t simply adopt a highly militarized approach to a highly militarized society like Afghanistan which is in the midst of a

political civil war.

I urge my colleagues to ensure that we give the same level of support for the

international law enforcement, diplomatic, financial security and socioeconomic development components of this war, given to the military.

Given the complexity of the war on terrorism, the humanitarian situation brewing

in Afghanistan, and the implications for regional stability vis a vis, India, Pakistan

and the central Asian nations of the former Soviet Union, let us ensure that all of

our policy actions reflect careful, deliberate and prudent approaches.

I want to win this war and there is little doubt in my mind that we will win it.

But I also want to win it in a way that is sustainable over time. Hence as with

all wars, how we win the peace is just as important. None of us want to win this

58

war, in a way which creates new problems and sows the seeds for events like September 11th to revisit America’s shores again one day.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. The gentlelady—the Chairwoman of

the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee,

the gentlelady from Florida.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I had announced, the Subcommittee which I chair will be

holding a hearing after our’s on nuclear-related terrorism. I would

like to ask you a question about that and also about the recent arrest of a senior analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency related

to Cuba and what connection there could be related to terrorism

worldwide.

A study conducted by the U.S. Department of State noted that

as many as 130 terrorist groups worldwide have expressed an interest in obtaining nuclear capabilities, among them, of course,

Osama bin Laden. And earlier this year it was reported that the

CIA had identified 12 terrorist groups that had attempted to actually buy enriched uranium and plutonium in order to make a nuclear bomb, groups including Chechnyan separatists, Palestinian

extremists and Islamic militants, such as Osama bin Laden. Further, information coming out of the trial of New York of bin Laden

and others for the U.S. Embassy bombings also reveals bin Laden’s

interest in securing such nuclear materials.

In your expert opinions, what is the time frame for the terrorist

groups to employ any nuclear-related terrorism against the U.S.?

And what form would you predict that it would take? Would you

agree with some that the threat would come from a combination of

nuclear materials and conventional weapons and could orphan

sources be used for nuclear-related terrorism? And orphan sources

are those used in nonweapons military applications, such as medical, industrial and research.

And an additional question, it was reported in the front page of

The Washington Post on September 28, just a few weeks ago, that

Ana Belen Montes, the most senior defense intelligence for matters

pertaining to Cuba, was arrested for spying for the Castro regime

and its intelligence sources. In this Washington Post article, U.S.

Government sources are quoted as saying that the investigation

ended because Cuban intelligence could pass along information provided by this DIA spy to other countries. And Government sources

stated that the Castro regime has been noted to share information

with Libya, Iran and others and other regimes who might be sympathetic to Osama bin Laden.

We know that Montes had access to the most sensitive U.S. military and security information. How much and what type of intelligence could have been compromised by this DIA analyst spying

for Cuba? And how much intelligence could have been provided by

the Castro regime to those states which have support for attacks

such as the ones on September 11?

Mr. CANNISTRARO. Congresswoman, let me take the first part of

that and defer to Buck for the second part of it, because it really

is counterintelligence methods to which he is better schooled than

I am.

There is no question that there is an alarm about the use of

chemicals and biologicals as a possible terrorist weapon. What we

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saw on September 11 was neither. However, we saw almost 7,000

deaths. That means that terrorists will tend to use conventional

methods because they are easier to use. If they can inflict mass

casualties, they will choose to do that.

Now if they can acquire uranium 235, for example, which we

know bin Laden has attempted to acquire, is he trying to make a

bomb or is he really trying to make a dirty conventional bomb? In

other words, to add uranium 235 to a conventional explosive would,

when it is detonated, disseminate the radiation from that uranium

over a wide area, thereby contaminating that area and making it

unusable and unlivable for untold numbers of years. That seems to

me more likely as an immediate threat.

Terrorists will tend to use the conventionals. We spend a lot of

money worrying about biologicals and about nuclear weapons and

nuclear weapons in a suitcase that can be put on a ship, et cetera.

Those tend to be more like Hollywood scenarios. Not that they

wouldn’t do it if they could. They would. But why invest in that

kind of skill level and that kind of money that you need to develop

that weapon when you can use conventional explosives to inflict

mass casualties?

So I see it as a threat, but I don’t see it as the immediate threat.

I see it as something for us to be concerned and worried about.

In terms of chemical weapons, we know that a person in custody

was interested in acquiring crop dusters. Perhaps it was to be used

to spray chlorine gas, which is deadly. Now that could have been

an instrument to inflict a lot of casualties. How many we don’t

know, because wind currents play such a large part—there is a lot

of chance in the dissemination of a gas, as we saw during World

War I. It is better utilized in an enclosed area rather than an aerial spray. Inserted in a building that uses recirculating air, it can

be quite deadly. Sprayed over a mountain top in West Virginia,

perhaps it will have no effect whatsoever on humans.

I defer to Buck for the other part of that.

Mr. REVELL. The first World Trade Center bombing, the participants actually contemplated and tried to find radiological materials

to spike the bomb so that the scene of the devastation would be

contaminated and rescue operations and even a return to any type

of use would be very difficult. They could not obtain the quantity

and quality of radiological materials in the time frame they were

concerned with, but that certainly was one of their plans.

As Vincent said, Osama bin Laden has been in contact with various sources, including Russian Mafia groups, in an attempt to obtain radiological materials, perhaps even tactical nuclear weapons.

There appears to be—and this was a question much better answered by people in active service—no indication they have been

able to do that yet. But if they kill and intend to kill 6 or 7,000

people and intend to kill 50 or 60,000 people, there is no reason

why they wouldn’t deploy and utilize tactical nuclear weapons if

they could obtain them. And unfortunately there were many, many

at the time of the demise of the Soviet Union that were in less than

secure circumstances that we still have to be concerned about.

Again, they can, with just using conventional explosives and conventional methods, can wreak havoc on our society. They can deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:29 Jan 22, 2002 Jkt 075562 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\100301\75562 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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stroy our infrastructure. You don’t need to use chemical, biological

or nuclear weapons to do tremendous damage to our society.

Another element of this is the potential of cyberterrorism, which

can, again, once we are so connected system-wise, that that offers

tremendous potential. There are many, many ways to create tremendous mischief worldwide and damage to our society without

turning to the weapons of mass destruction.

However, we have seen the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan were in fact

experimenting with all three forms of weapons of mass destruction.

That is a precedent that others have looked at. We cannot ignore

that.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies has done an

excellent study on the potential use of or potential access to nuclear materials by organized crime and terrorist groups. I participated in that study, and I would refer that study to you. I think

it is a very sound study on that issue.

On the issue of the Cuban intelligence, Cuba, for many, many

years has just beat us up something fierce on their intelligence operations. We had a number of Cuban double agents who were actually triple agents and had been working against us while we

thought they were working for us. Our counterintelligence program, both within the Agency and the Bureau, failed to detect

them.

Of course, there is a very large Cuban population in south Florida, 99.9 percent of which are loyal to the United States but, within

that, there is that 1⁄10 of 1 percent that are still in favor of supporting Castro. And that provides access to a lot of information.

Any intelligence analyst in a position of authority or access in

the DIA, CIA, the National Security Agency and the FBI can do

tremendous harm to our national security by providing access to

highly classified information. We have certainly seen that in every

agency over the past 10 years.

So I will have to wait and see what the public reports are as far

as the amount of damage done, but I would expect it to be substantial. And indeed Cuba does provide a great deal of intelligence to

third world countries that are also supportive of Cuba.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Gentlelady from California.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your candid testimony today. Let me ask you a

couple of questions.

First, given the number of terrorist organizations and cells in

several countries, including the United States, what type of military actions do any of you see as appropriate to accomplish the goal

of stamping out terrorism?

Secondly, let me just ask you, following up on the gentlelady’s

question with regard to chemical weapons and nuclear weapons

and access by terrorist organizations, do you think or do you believe that our intelligence community is up to snuff on the status

of that?

Also, I would like to hear what your assessment is in terms of

the links to Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and how those links to

Osama bin Laden relate to Saudi Arabia.

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Mr. REVELL. The military operations are not going to be appropriate under all circumstances, even to go after al-Qaeda and

Osama bin Laden. There are places, for instance, in the United

States, Canada, Germany, France, where there are elements that

are very much in support where you would not use military operations. You would use law enforcement cooperation, as we have

seen with the trials that have already occurred.

There are five ways to deal with terrorism, and they are not mutually exclusive. You have diplomatic initiatives, economic sanctions, covert operations, military operations and law enforcement

activities. In this battle we are going to need to use them all, and

we are going to use them in coordination and concert. But some activities are going to apply in certain areas and others at other locations.

We certainly wouldn’t send the military in, you know, to an allied country where there may be a support apparatus. On the other

hand, we may send a covert operation into an area where we don’t

want there to be public acknowledgment of our activities and even

the government there may look the other way while we go in and

carry out a covert operation.

Military operation should be in those areas where we do not have

access otherwise, and that is the only way in which we can reach

the terrorists. So I think that that is important, to remember that

we have multiple ways to deal with terrorism and need to use all

of them.

Abu Sayyaf was directly involved with Ramzi Yousef. It is a Muslim extremist organization. It has attacked Americans and killed

Americans. Even though it doesn’t have a global reach, it has access to the global network and should be one of the organizations

on our target list that needs to be dealt with.

Mr. CANNISTRARO. I would just add to what Buck said about Abu

Sayyaf. That group was funded by the brother-in-law of Osama bin

Laden, a man named Mohammad Khalifa. He also helped set up

the Islamic Army of Aydin in the mid 1990s in Yemen, and that

was a group that supported the attack by bin Laden’s organization

against the USS Cole. But Abu Sayyaf’s group has kind of degenerated into a bunch of criminals and thugs. They do a lot of beheading and kidnapping for ransom but kind of lost their objective,

direction sometime in the late 1990s. I don’t think that they have

a lot of support from bin Laden, at least financial support, at the

present time.

In the use of the military, clearly we are not going to be using

the military in any conventional sense. If the primary objective is

to get bin Laden and the nerve center in Afghanistan, then we are

going to have to use unconventional warfare. We are going to have

to use special forces. We are going to have to use covert action. We

are going to have to try and peel away the support that the Taliban

has in Afghanistan because they are the protector of bin Laden.

And that means peeling away some of the tribal leaders in provinces such as is in Paktia and Vardak.

I think that process is already under way. I think there is probably already some success there. You need to be able to limit any

kind of a direct military confrontation because it is going to be

bloody and there will be a lot of casualties.

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Ms. LEE. Do you foresee any time when actual bombing would be

necessary as a military strategy in any of these countries?

Mr. CANNISTRARO. I think if some of the actions under way right

now are not successful, there will have to be bombing of the airfields, particularly of the Taliban air-force. They have been able to

put together several aircraft left over from the Soviet war and the

old Kabul regime and may be able to put 30 MiGs up in the air

at any given time. And they have helicopters for troop carrying.

Those would have to be destroyed before any action takes place to

avoid the Taliban being able to use that against U.S., British and

whatever forces may be in Afghanistan.

But bombing of civilian areas, Kandahar and Kabul, would be

worthless. All you are going to do is kill a lot of civilians. There

is nothing there to bomb. There is nothing of an infrastructure that

supports terrorism that you can destroy with cruise missiles. You

may want to bomb the terrorist training camps themselves. But,

again, there is not a lot of infrastructure to destroy.

The only significant bombing—and I am not running the war,

that is for sure—would be the mountain redoubts where bin Laden

is believed to be holed up with some support apparatus. Once he

can be located, perhaps that is a fit target for limited bombing but

certainly not of urban areas or cities.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Chair recognizes the gentleman from

Michigan, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Seems to be one target might be the opium warehouses. We

talked a little bit of drugs and opium and other drugs doing a lot

of the financing for the Taliban and certainly a lot of the other terrorist organizations. This morning’s news column has a report from

the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency that the amount of opium flooding out of the Taliban warehouses in Afghanistan has increased

400 percent since the September 11 bombing. It seems like, for several reasons, because of the damage that it causes and because of

the fact that it is one of the main financing tools of the Taliban and

some of these terrorist organizations, why hasn’t action been taken

thus far to destroy the centers of production and warehouses of

these drugs?

Mr. SANTOS. I mean, I think that there had been a policy before

the events of the 11th of September, at least at some level, to look

at potentially engaging the Taliban. And as other witnesses here

have said, that was, you know, kind of farfetched, but, nonetheless,

maybe that is what was going on, a hope that they could convince

the Taliban to stop production.

But I completely agree that at this stage—and this should have

been done long before, but the Taliban have been using drugs to

fund their war machine.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Well, at this stage, obviously, they are

probably doing it for a couple of reasons. One is to bring in more

money now to better protect themselves in some way, and the other

is to disburse those drugs out of those centrally located warehouses

so it becomes more impossible to destroy those drugs. It seems like

it is a mistake not to have gone farther.

Let me follow up with a second question. Does the Administration—are they preparing a plan to eradicate opium production in

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Afghanistan, assuming that the Taliban and bin Laden are going

to be overcome?

Mr. SANTOS. You would hope so. What I would say is that the

first step is to get rid of the Taliban. They are the ones who control

the drug trade in the beginning, and they increased—as they consolidated their power, they massively increased drug production. So

a number of the northern groups were much less involved. More of

the fertile fields are in the south, in Helmand and in Pashtun

areas, in Jalalabad or outside of Jalalabad, in Nangarhar Province.

But I would say the first step to doing that would be supporting

the Northern Alliance.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. I think the first step probably would

have been—as I understand it from CNN and other television reports, they have been stockpiling huge quantities of opium, trying

to make sure the demand would be high enough to make their

greatest profit on that opium. And now it seems to me we can conclude—at least on Monday morning quarterbacks—that that was a

mistake. Some of those opium warehouses have a tremendous volume of opium that is now disbursed and probably going to be much

more difficult——

Mr. SANTOS. They are going to have a problem to disburse that

if they are engaged in battles with Northern Alliance forces. They

are using their military equipment, their transport equipment, to

move some of that stuff. So if they are now in a situation where

they have to defend themselves against these kinds of attacks as

well as potential hits against those warehouses—— Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Since September 11, the Taliban have

increased the dispersion by 400 percent, and that is significant.

And 400 percent times the 31⁄2 weeks since then wherever we are—

do they have other sources of export revenue besides drugs?

Mr. SANTOS. I think they are benefitting from bin Laden’s network. So they are getting money from bin Laden and also getting

money from Pakistani authorities as well as money they were getting in the transport trade. So goods would come into Afghanistan

and then be smuggled across to Pakistan. So they were able to

make money that way as well. Since the border has been shut

down, that should constrain that somewhat, but they still have access to——

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Can I ask about what seems to be a

very difficult solution to a difficult problem? That is, as I understand it, most of the terrorists are orphans, young boys, that have

been taken in and put in these strict religious schools—indoctrination if you will, brainwashing, if you will. So it is just not an

instanteous—here is a guy that looks like a good terrorist. It is

over-the-years indoctrination of these young boys that are abused— sometimes sexually abused—so that their only goal is to kill themselves or die in such a way that they think Allah approves in order

to have a good eternity.

If that is the case—and to the extent that it is not the case and

I am not right, tell me—but what do we do with all of these thousands of young terrorists that now have been schooled over the

years with that kind of philosophy?

Mr. SANTOS. That is a very big problem. These madrasas have

been built over the last 10 to 15 years. This is one of the things

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that were an outgrowth of the jihad period. They have been funded,

and often people are funding these maybe not knowing completely

what they are being used for. There are thousands of them in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, and this is a training area.

I think the way that you would approach this, though, is, once

again, you have got to break the Taliban and their ability to maintain these facilities and——

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Is it correct that most of the facilities

are in Pakistan and Afghanistan but mostly funded by the Saudis?

Mr. SANTOS. I think there has been a fair amount of funding

coming from Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia. Absolutely.

But you found an increase in the number of these madrasas in Afghanistan. You are right. Originally, they were multiplying very,

very fast in Pakistan—still are. But as the consolidation of power

occurred under the Taliban, the Taliban was inviting that money

to come in and help establish those same types of schools.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. An interesting answer to a question

that was asked to some—when we met with the exiled King Shah

in Rome—was how much would terrorism be reduced if bin Laden

was captured or killed? Their estimate was 4 to 5 percent. Would

that be consistent with your evaluation?

Mr. SANTOS. I mean, if you are talking about just bin Laden and

not the Taliban and the other networks that are really part of

that—I mean, it is all interrelated. They are not separate things.

I mean, if you were just to take out bin Laden, I am sure that

would have some effect. But you have got to root out all of those

people. There are thousands of these extremists in Afghanistan

right now and have close links with the Taliban. So I think you

would have much more of an effect if you were able to do that.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. I think the Chairman is going to say

my time has expired.

Since the Church Commission, the CIA has been discouraged

under executive order from getting information on these nasty kind

of individuals. Should we change that?

Mr. CANNISTRARO. I just want to add one thing to what your

question was addressing about the source of the people. Certainly

a lot of them do come from the madrasas, and that is a failure of

education in Pakistan, because these are almost religious educations, and there are very few secular subjects that are taught in

these madrasas. The Minister of Education—the Taliban, for example, doesn’t have a high school education. So that is kind of representative of the mindset of those people.

But in terms of the terrorism being—terrorists being drawn from

poor families—and that certainly was the paradigm we saw for a

long time—but it has changed now. We saw that a number of the

Saudis who were suicide bombers, for example, on September 11,

don’t come from that kind of environment. They come from elites—

not all of them but many of them did. They come from privileged

families. They don’t necessarily come from poor, desperate families.

So that speaks of something else. We have to understand what motivates people like that. What kind of religious orientation is it that

they can grow up with the idea that they can go to paradise by killing people?

65

So that is something for the intelligence community to address

and to understand, and that is one of the major failures, both in

our law enforcement and in our intelligence agencies. We don’t understand the nature of this kind of terrorism.

We have to do a better job. We need linguists, obviously. We

need area specialists, obviously. We need them both in law enforcement and at the intelligence agencies as well. But we need a better

focus on understanding what the nature of this threat is if we are

to have any success of defeating it.

If you kill bin Laden—even if you kill Ayman Al-Zawahiri, his

number two, terrorism and al-Qaeda will not disappear. There is

a whole network that does depend on the nerve center for its motivation, for its leadership, but it won’t disappear just by the eradication of the people in Afghanistan. That has to be addressed.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. I would like to offer my thanks for the

witnesses and for their knowledge and testimony.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Mr. Smith. If you have

additional questions——

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. My other question, of course, is the intelligence agencies seem to have adopted sort of a defensive attitude toward terrorism. What is being done so we can protect and

add to the security on sort of a defensive way? But it seems to me

that there has got to be a little more aggressiveness in terms of

being on the offense. And I think I have heard you sort of suggest

that, but it is easy for us politically to lean toward the defensive

side with Tom Ridge and the defensive effort. But if we are not

going to have a good defense without a good offense, how do we

improve——

Mr. REVELL. The only offense that we have had have been the

ones I have talked about, political, economic. We haven’t used covert operations, and we haven’t used the military. So we have had

limitations. Certain places you cannot reach with law enforcement.

I mean, you have lawless areas and areas where there will not be

cooperation. So law enforcement actions are not going to work. It

is difficult to mount an assault until you have the tools to carry

out an assault. And certainly in the limited areas where you could

not go in with a law enforcement operation and you had no political

or economic clout, then covert operations probably primarily and

military operations lastly would be the only way to reach; and we

haven’t been willing to do that.

I talked earlier in my testimony about the Hezbollah and the

campaign they have carried out against the United States since

1982, and we never scratched them. We know where they are, we

know where they have been and their camps and locations, and we

have never done anything to them. So it doesn’t take a stretch of

the imagination for them to believe that we are probably not going

to do that in the future.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. What do you suggest for changes, more

legislative authority or legislative action?

Mr. CANNISTRARO. I think I hinted at this earlier on. I mean, our

intelligence agencies have been become risk averse. They have become bureaucracies. They are responding to the threat as bureaucracies do. They answer the mail, and they are very efficient, but

66

they don’t take proactive measures, and they don’t go after the nature of the problem with all of the resources at hand.

Covert action certainly is part of it, and all the tools in our arsenal are part of it. But unless we know how to apply those tools,

we are not going to have the right effect.

We need supporting legislation. I think that is true. I think we

have to have a focus on anti-terrorism that recognizes that international terrorism has transparent borders. We have artificial distinctions between where we collect our intelligence and how law

enforcement is perceived.

Buck referred to the problems of law enforcement not being able

to get at the sources of some of these things because they are beyond the reach of law enforcement. In many cases, they are beyond

the reach of intelligence resources as well.

But when we prosecuted the people for the East African bombing, we did a good job. We prosecuted those, and they have been

sentenced, and then we declared a great victory. But it was no victory. What we did was put in jail and put away secondary players,

soldiers, not the generals. The generals remain beyond our reach

in Afghanistan and some other places.

So we need to have a new definition of what terrorism policy

should be. We need to have a more articulate policy, and hopefully

we will under the spur of these events of September 11.

Mr. REVELL. We have to have the political will, Mr. Smith. We

have never had it, and we have to have it. And the only way is to

go forth and do it with our allies if possible.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Chairman, through you to the witnesses would it be possible or would you consider just each of you

making a list of three or four or five areas where you think you

should have more legislative action or support in some way or the

laws should be changed in some way? Would you consider, Mr.

Chairman, with your permission, if they would submit that to the

Committee?

The SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. That is an excellent idea. And if you

could get that to us hopefully in a timely fashion.

Mr. REVELL. I hope you know that none of us speak for the Government.

Mr. CANNISTRARO. If we did, we would have been fired today.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. We do appreciate your candor.

Thank you, Mr. Smith, for your questions. Your expertise and

professionalism is certainly highly apparent and will help this

Committee and, by extension, the Congress and the American people to further combat terrorism.

I do have one final one question. But before I do that, without

objection, a statement by Mr. Menendez will be made a part of the

record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Menendez follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT MENENDEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

September 11th changed America forever. Not one American in this great land

will again view security as it was before September 11th. Not one American can

view security as it was before September 11th. This truly is a new world order.

As a Member of this distinguished Committee, and as the chair of the House

Democratic Task Force on Homeland Security, I want to lay out principles that I

67

believe are vitally important as we undertake what may be the most important

work of our generation.

First and foremost, we must protect our people. Our children, our brothers and

sisters, mothers and fathers; grandmothers and grandfathers; friends and neighbors.

Second, we must protect our homeland. We must use every single tool available

to us in this great democracy, and in this great institution—the House of the people—to secure our physical infrastructure: electric power grids, nuclear plants, food

and water supply, information and communications systems.

Third, while leaving nothing out, we must preserve our Constitution because it

is the precious foundation of all those privileges of freedom that we hold so dearly

in our hearts.

Next, allow me to address the situation at hand.

Perhaps the greatest challenge before us is that the nature of the threat does not

allow for much margin of error. Adequate preparedness and response to biological

and chemical attacks, for example, is not something we can get wrong. It will require highly effective and unprecedented cooperation and coordination among federal, state and local authorities. The announcement by the President of a new cabinet-level Homeland Security chief acknowledges the seriousness of the threat. This

challenge is fundamentally different than, say, ensuring that we do not repeat the

errors of last year’s presidential election.

As America and her coalition partners take the first concrete steps to confront the

terrorists of the al Qaeda network, let us consider that the world has entered a new

national security paradigm: the international fight against terror represents a new

but different kind of Cold War. We face new strategic choices on multiple fronts to

address challenges of unprecedented urgency, complexity and risk.

Like the Cold War, the new struggle has many fronts, many layers and is a longterm undertaking. We will have to fight hundreds of battles large and small, overt

and covert, in a war that will take decades and a united international coalition to

win. Conventional armed forces and conventional warfare will be either supplemented or supplanted by new unconventional combat methods that target terrorist

groups and networks such as al Qaeda, and will be assisted by intelligence and law

enforcement agencies that bring unique assets to the new battlefield.

We have to tread very carefully—and discreetly—as a nation and as coalition

partners. Sooner or later, we will strike at the forces of terror. After that first strike,

we can expect coalition support may slip a bit and become more difficult to maintain. Just maintaining support for sanctions on Iraq has been very difficult.

If we want to target terrorist groups within other nations, we will not have an

easy time in obtaining the support in particular of Islamic nations. Thus, we must

be mindful that poverty, powerlessness and hopelessness throughout the Islamic

Middle East and South Asia only aggravates the problem and supplies the youth

lost to extremist organizations such as al Qaeda.

As with the Cold War, broadening economic development, expanding democracy

and increasing educational opportunities will be critical to securing victory. We and

our coalition partners may well have to rethink our approach toward international

operations. An annual US Foreign Operations budget that is equivalent to the aviation bailout bill of $15 billion may not be adequate.

But if assistance efforts are to succeed, they will have to be linked to economic,

financial, democratic and justice-sector reforms throughout the Islamic world. Even

as we seek their support in a coalition against terror, our Islamic friends will have

to undertake domestic reforms if we are to really arrive at workable solutions in

the international struggle against terror.

It is important to point out that in addition to pure evil, the root of the problem

that we must address here is not our policy toward Israel. The root of the problem

is the utter desolation and despair of millions in the Islamic world that enables a

megalomaniac like Usama bin Laden to lure disillusioned and alienated youth in

the Islamic world to their deaths through unspeakable evil deeds while he lives on.

Autocratic regimes, in most cases corrupt and repressive, run most Islamic nations today. Many of them are now willing to work with us against the terrorists.

In turn, we will have to work with them to develop viable economic opportunities,

political freedoms and hope for their people.

Like the Cold War, this is a battle of ideas. To win, the international coalition

against terror will have to use effectively the tools of information and public diplomacy and deny the terrorists success in their use of those same tools. Despite our

anger, we must avoid engaging in inflammatory rhetoric that would validate the desire of the terrorists to frame this as a struggle between religious and secular

forces—Islam versus the West, in this case.

In conclusion, in times of tragedy, America pulls together and America gets

stronger. We have some serious and difficult challenges ahead. But we defeated the

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forces of evil in World War II. We turned economic crisis into economic opportunities

and beat the Great Depression. We can and will defeat these forces, too.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. The extensiveness and the worldwide

reach of al-Qaeda is impressive. How does bin Laden communicate

now? Is it by cell phone, courier, e-mail? How is he getting the message out to his fellow terrorists?

Mr. REVELL. There was a very unfortunate circumstance not long

ago where we had been able or our intelligence community had

been able to track and trace a satellite phone that was being used.

And our news media felt they had to disclose that, and of course

that source immediately dried up. Now almost all of their communications are by personal dead-drop and traditional intelligence

means, which makes it very difficult to intercept.

Now some of the players—you still get some telephone calls and

some e-mails, but the core is really much more circumspect now

than they were in the past because of the knowledge that we are

looking and listening and very possibly will intercept their communications.

Mr. CANNISTRARO. They have become very sophisticated. They

understood that we were using technical means and they didn’t get

off the air as a result of that, but they used those means to use

this information to mislead us. Before September 11, all eyes in the

U.S. were on the foreign threat that bin Laden was going to attack

embassies, bases in the Far East, Middle East, Southeast Asia. We

had no inkling he was coming here. He has been able to use deception to his advantage.

Another way he communicates is by courier. He does use e-mail,

but his field generals, not him himself.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me just again thank you—there

will be some additional questions sent—if you could respond for the

record, we would appreciate it.

I just want to make note that immediately following—it should

have been under way right now in this room, which is why we do

have to conclude—Chairman Ros-Lehtinen will be holding a hearing, a very important follow-up to this hearing, the role of the

International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, in safeguarding

against nuclear terrorism. Representatives from State, Energy and

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be testifying. So the full

court effort to get every bit of information as to how to go from

here is under way, and we hope the Congress can be responsive

and the Administration, to try to mitigate this threat.

We thank you for your testimony. It was very, very educational

and again will help us do a better job. And please stay in touch.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

As we will hear today, we’re facing a threat that is new to the American people:

networks of sophisticated terrorists who are willing to die for their despicable cause,

and terrorists who are seeking, if they don’t already have, weapons of mass destruction. In fighting this terrorism, we as a nation have little room for error.

The American people want their government to respond to this crisis. The American people are now focused on what is the prime responsibility of the federal government: the defense of the nation. The work of this Committee, always important,

will be ever more important.

President Bush is undertaking a very complex war against terrorism. So far, so

good, but this undertaking has really only begun. The American people need to take

the President’s words seriously: this will be a long campaign.

We also need to act at home. The real world has hit us in the face. The peoples’

representatives in Washington can’t be prisoner to ideologies which would deny our

law enforcement agencies the tools they will need to combat this new style of terrorism at home. That is the debate the House will soon have.

Unfortunately, we’re seeing an upsurge of hate crimes associated with the terrorist attack. I’ve had some in my District. Those Americans who would be an unwitting tool of the terrorists seeking to destroy American freedom must be deterred,

and apprehended if they act.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this important hearing and gathering

these experienced professionals to inform us regarding the Al Qaeda and equip us

to combat the global reach of terrorism. While the topic of this morning’s hearing

has been on the Unites States’ agenda for some time, the September 11th attacks

have transformed the campaign against bin Laden and his network of followers into

a moral imperative.

I want to begin by saying that, as we examine this enemy we are confronting,

it is important to realize that a war against terrorism will be one unlike any we

have fought before. This is not a war that can be contained by borders. It is not

one in which success can be measured in battles won or territory conquered.

It is also important to recognize that our enemy is made up of individuals motivated by extreme ideology wrapped ion religious garb. And ideological resolve has

proven to be stronger than any political campaign or quest for power. This ideology

does not square with Islam’s recognition of transcendence, but tries to create a heaven—though a very twisted one—on earth, here and now. In the last century, we confronted and defeated Marxist and Fascist attempts to recreate reality after their totalitarian visions. And we will succeed again against international terrorism.

We need to realize today that we are combating not only bin Laden but his ability

to awaken a religious passion and deep determination in his followers. This makes

the challenge of combating international terrorism even more difficult. We are not

merely fighting a move for power or territory. We are up against an organization

with deep-seeded, though misguided and distorted, beliefs that are motivating their

actions—the lunatic fringe that uses outlaw tactics.

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The United States is equipped with military might that has been a vital asset in

defending and protecting ourselves and our allies in many battles. But this war is

one unlike any battle fought before. As long as we lack an understanding of the AlQaeda and other terrorist groups, we are empty handed in our fight against the horror and injustice of terrorism.

It is essential that we be proactive about learning as much as we can about our

enemy. We need to learn about the financial means used by the organizations so

that we may deprive them of their resources and their ability to remain functional.

We need to become educated about previous attacks by these organizations and look

for a pattern to their campaign of destruction.

President Bush has already started gathering a coalition of allies in this war on

terrorism. It is essential that we gather cooperation of our foreign allies in combating these terrorist organizations on many fronts. I have been thankful for the

many calls from Muslim friends in Muslim countries that are offering their condolences and commitment to help. We must help these allies realize that the help we

need is much more than military and technical assistance. We need them to join

with us in identifying and freezing assets. We need their support in combating the

drug trafficking that has sometimes financed these organizations. It will also include working diplomatically to isolate the Taliban and demand they hand over bin

Laden. We need them to help us gain access to information regarding these terrorist

enemies and their methods.

We are gathered for this hearing today to learn additional information about the

enemy. As we proceed into this war it is essential that we remember who that

enemy is. The enemy is not the innocent civilians of Afghanistan. It is essential that

we respond to these terrorists and those that harbor them, offering sanctuary with

precise and deliberate retribution. We will make it clear that America is a land of

hope and freedom that does not tolerate evil and the destruction of innocents. We

must be careful, however to respond in a way that targets the enemy and makes

every attempt to avoid harming the innocent people of Afghanistan that have already suffered for years under the tyrannical rule of the Taliban. While ferocious

response is necessary, it is vital that we make it a priority to protect as many innocent lives as possible. To properly target our enemy we must make every effort to

become educated on their ways, their methods, and their resources.

It is only through education about this network of bin Laden’s that we will gain

the ability to combat it. So, thank you distinguished guests for coming to inform us

today. And thank you, Chairman, for convening a hearing on this matter.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DARRELL E. ISSA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

I thank the Chairman for yielding and for calling this hearing on such a crucial

issue facing our nation.

Future generations will undoubtedly view the attacks on September 11, 2001 as

the most horrific act of terrorism on American soil and as a time when our people

bore the burden of freedom in the most demanding way. However, they will also

view this as the age that saw true courage and answered the noble call to fight global terrorism. If we do what is right and seek to leave the world a safer and more

peaceful place, it will be remembered as the beginning of the end of extremist

groups who twist their faith into an outlet for hatred. It will be thought of as the

time when a global coalition, made up of western, eastern, Christian, and Islamic

countries came together to thwart global terrorists, who pervert truth and promulgate their evil around the world.

The struggle may be long, but we will be victorious because the enemy is clear.

Our enemies are those who will not come to the table to negotiate their grievances.

They are those who take a direct route to violence in order to achieve their vague

and unattainable goals, rather than to world bodies for mediation. They are those

who hate freedom and will never conceive the notion of peace. They are the members of the al Qaeda network, whose global reach wreaks havoc around the world.

With the al Qaeda, there are no negotiations because they have already chosen their

path—and their goal of death, destruction, and terror is clear.

We cannot lose hope for those conflicts around the world that do have momentum

for peace. We must thoughtfully engage those peoples who have come to the negotiating table and hold hope for a final resolution through continued negotiations. I

agree with the President who recently recognized that there is a framework for a

negotiated peace in the Middle East. Both Palestinian and Israeli leaders are struggling to exit the circle of violence that has consumed them for decades. Both parties

should be encouraged and aided in their efforts to return to the negotiating table.

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I urge my colleagues not to give up on this region because, as the President has

rightfully stated, the process is available for peace.

Again, I thank the Chairman for calling this important hearing and I look forward

to the testimony of our witnesses.

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