AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed December 3, 2019 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01306-CR No. 05-18-01307-CR No. 05-18-01308-CR GARY LEE CHAPPELL, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F16-53354-N, F16-60423-N, F17-76639-N 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Whitehill, Schenck, and Richter 1 Opinion by Justice Whitehill A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault with a dead ly weapon and assessed punishment, enhanced, at fort y-eight years in prison. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He also argues the trial court erred by (i) denying his motion for mist rial when the State’s witness testified to hearsay; (ii) denying his objection to a record of jail call s; (iii) granting the State’s motion in limine; (iv) overruling his objection to the State’s jury argum ent; (v) overruling his objection to the State’s expert and denying hi m the opportunity to cross-exa mine the witness; (vi) overruling his objection to four exhibits because they contained hearsay w ithin hearsay and were inadmissible

1 The Hon. Martin Richter, Justice, Assigned–2– under the Confrontation Clause; (vi) sustaining the State’s obj ection to his cross-examination of the State’s fingerprint expert; and (vii) denying his punishmen t phase mistrial motion concerning the State’s allegedly imprope r questioning of a probation offic er. In a cross-point, the State requests that we modify the judgmen t to reflect that appellant pled “not true” to the enhancemen t paragraphs and the jury foun d them true. We conclude that (i) the victim’s testimony about the assault s upported the verdict and it was the jury’s role to resolve any conflicts in the testimony a nd weigh the evidence; (ii) the trial court’s instructions were sufficient to cure any error regardin g hearsay and probation; (iii) there was sufficient authenticating evidence that appellant made the jail calls; (iv) appellant’s limine motion preserved nothing for our r eview; (v) the State’s jury a rgument about appellant’s pre-arrest false identifications did not ref er to his decision not to test ify; (iv) appellant did not preserve his arguments regarding the admissib ility of State’s fingerprint ex pert testimony; (vii) appellant did not preserve a Confrontation Clau se objection regarding the pen packets, which were properly authenticated and admitted; and (viii) the trial court could re asonably have concluded that the excluded cross-examination regarding finger-print comparison te chniques was cumulative. Notwithstanding the judgment, the record reflects that appellan t pled “not true” to the enhancement paragraphs and t he jury found them true. For these reasons, we modify the trial court’s judgment and as modified, affirm. I. Background One evening, appellant, Flowers, Flowers’s girlfriend Brown, an d appellant were sitting around with others in front of an apartment building drinking b eer. At some point, Flowers overheard Brown tell appellant that Flowers wanted appellant ou t of the way so he could have Brown. Flowers approached appell ant, denied what Brown said, a nd left for a friend’s house.–3– Later, Flowers met appellant in a parking lot to talk to him ab out what Brown had said. That discussion led to appellant hitting Flowers with a gun, Fl owers running away with appellant chasing and yelling at him, appe llant twice shooting at Flowers during the ensuing chase. Edward Calhoun, the lead detective, investigated the offense. Appellant was eventually arrested and charged with aggrav ated assault by threat with a d eadly weapon. The case was tried to a jury. Flowers testified about the offe nse and appellant’s subsequent attempts to persuade him to file an affidavit of non-prosecutio n. The State’s witnesses also included (i) the patrol officer w ho interviewed Flowers and cal led the paramedics, (ii) the crimescene analyst who collected the shell casing at the scene, (iii ) Detective Calhoun, (iv) the manager of the Dallas County inmate phone system, and (v) an investigat or who obtained appellant’s recorded telephone calls from jail. The defense did not present witn esses. Instead, the defense fo cused on criticizing the investigation and arguing that Fl owers’s testimony was not cred ible. The jury found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment. Although the State asked for a life sentence, the jury assesse d punishment at forty-eight ye ars in prison. II. Analysis A. First Issue: Is the evidence sufficient to support appellan t’s conviction? Yes. Flowers’s testimony alone supported the verdict and there was additional evidence against appellant. 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a convicti on by viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorab le to the verdict to determin e whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a r easonable doubt. Jackson v

. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).–4– This standard gives full play t o the factfinder’s responsibilit y to resolve testimonial conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences f rom basic facts to ultimate facts.
Id . at 319; Murray v. State , 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). And the factfind er is the sole judge of the evidence’s weight and credibility. See T EX

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. art. 38.04;
Dobbs v. State , 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Thus, when performing an evidentiary sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the ev idence and substitute our judgm ent for that of the factfinder’s. See Montgomery v. State , 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Instead, we dete rmine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Murra y, 457 S.W.3d at 448. We must presume that the factfinder res olved any conflicting inferences in the verdict’s favor and defer to that resolution. Id. at 448–49. The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases; circumstantial evidence is as probative as dire ct evidence in establishing guilt.
Dobbs , 434 S.W.3d at 170; Acosta v. State , 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. C rim. App. 2014). A person commits assault if he in tentionally or knowingly threa tens another with imminent bodily injury. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE § 22.01(a)(2). The gist of assault by threat is that the defendant “acts with intent to cause a reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily injury.” Fagan
v. State , 362 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. App.—T exarkana 2012, pet. ref’d). A person commits aggravated assault if he uses or exhibits a deadly weapon while committing the assault. See P ENAL C ODE § 22.02(a)(2) “A perception of ‘ some threat of imminent bodil y injury,’ coupled with the use of a deadly weapon, supports a conviction for aggravated as sault.” Olivas v. State , 203 S.W.3d 341, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).–5– 2. Application of Law to Facts Here, the indictment alleged that appellant intentionally and k nowingly threatened Flowers with imminent bodily injury and used and exhibited a deadly wea pon—a firearm—during the commission of the offense. Flowers testified about meeting appellant in the parking lot to talk about what Brown had said. Appellant had a gun in his lap when Flowers arrived. Wh en Flowers got up and started walking, appellant hit Flowers on his left ear with the gun. W hen appellant hit him again, Flowers started to run. Flowers could hear appellant runni ng behind him and “hollering. ” When Flowers had run about a half a block, appellant fired the gun in Flowers’s dire ction. Flowers saw the gun and felt threatened. Flowers hid, and came out after a bout a minute and a half. Whe n he did so, the chase resumed, and Flowers heard another gunshot. Flowers hid again and called the police. Officer Brandon Helms testified th at he received a dispatch abo ut an active shooter and arrived in the area within two t o three minutes. He saw Flower s when he arrived. A lot of blood was flowing from Flowers’s ear, which was red an d swollen. Photos of Flower’s bloody ear were admitted into evidence and published t o the jury. Helms said that he obtained Flowers’s statement and called the paramedics. He als o found a shell casing nearby. Later that night, Flowe rs received a text me ssage from Brown’s phone that appeared to be from appellant. The message threatened that “this” was not ove r. The next day, Flowers went to the police station and told Det ective Calhoun about the case an d the text message. Flowers also testified that, fo llowing appellant’s arrest, appe llant tried to persuade him to help get the aggravated assault charge dismissed. On one occas ion, Brown approached, handed him her phone, and tried to get Flowers to talk to appellant. On another occasion, Flowers was–6– approached by a man who offered Flowers money for dropping the charge against appellant. The man said that appellant had sent him. Flowers said he did not a ccept the offer because he did not want appellant to hurt anyone else. Appellant relies on testimony fr om the officer who found the sh ell casing to argue that the casing could have been from another incident and the remaining physical evidence does nothing to incriminate appellant. He also argues that Flowers’s testim ony was not consistent with the statements he gave and Flowers’ s ear injury is not consistent w ith being hit with the butt of a handgun. But it was the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in the testimon y and weigh the evidence. See Zuniga v. State , 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App 2018). When the record s upports conflicting reasonable inferences , we presume that the factfind er resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. Id. And if a victim’s testimony is believed, that testimony alone is sufficient to support a guilty verdict. Padilla v. State , 254 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). Considering the record as a whole, and applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude the evidence is suffi cient to support appellant’s conv iction for aggravated assault. Appellant’s first issue is resolved against him. B. Second and Ninth Issues: Did the trial court err by denying appellant’s motion for mistrial? No. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s instructions to disregard were sufficient to cure any harm from th e testimony at issue. Appellant moved for a mistrial twice; once during the guilt/inn ocence phase of trial and once during the punishment phase. Appellant’s second issue arg ues that the trial court erred by overruling his mistrial motion wh en the State’s witness testifi ed to hearsay during the guilt/innocence phase. According to appellant, the trial court ’s instruction that the jury disregard–7– the testimony was insufficient to cure the error. Appellant’s ninth issue argues that the mistrial motion was erroneously overruled when a probation officer testi fied about probation practices she personally observed. We review the denial of a mistrial motion for abuse of discreti on. Hawkins v. State , 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A mistrial is the trial court’s remedy for error that is “so prejudicial that expend iture of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile,” and is required only in extreme circumstances where the prejudice is i ncurable. Id. A prompt instruction to disregard will ordinarily cure error associated with an impr oper question and answer . See Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2000). “We generally presu me the jury follows the trial court’s instructions in the manner presented.” Thrift v. State , 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We begin with the hearsay testimony. The complained-of testimo ny occurred when Flowers was testifying about Brown trying to get him to talk to appellant on her cell phone. Flowers had already testified about two other things Brown had said and the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections. The prosecutor then cautioned Fl owers not to go into what Brown said and asked if he knew whether appellant was on the other en d of the phone. Appellant objected based on speculation and the tria l court overruled the objectio n, adding “If he knows.” Flowers then said “I really didn’t know if he was on the phone or what she—that’s what she told me, he was on the phone.” The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection, and upon request, instructed the jury to disregard Flowers’ s last statement. The defense then moved for a mistrial, which was denied. During the punishment phase, the evidence showed that appellant had two prior murder convictions from 1982 and 1990 that were alleged for enhancemen t purposes. He was also placed–8– on probation in two drug cases, and had been on probation for a bout three months when he committed the current offense. Appellant’s probation officer, Dee Pedigo, testified about her experience with probation. When the State asked her, “Do you see prosecutors often put som eone on probation - - even if they have violent history if the new offenses are not violent offens es,” the trial court sustained appellant’s objection that the question called for speculation or called for the witness “to make an opinion.” After an intervening question, the prosecutor asked the question again. Appellant asserted the same objection and moved for an instruction to dis regard. The trial court sustained the objection and gave the instruction. Appellant’s mistrial m otion was denied. Appellant now argues that the trial court erre d by denying the mistrial becau se “the State kept pursuing speculative testimony from the probation offi cer that was irrelevant to app ellant’s case.” But appellant does not explain, nor is there evidence from whic h to conclude that any of the complained-of testimony was so extreme under the circumstan ces as to render ineffective an instruction to disregard. See Moore v. State , 999 S.W.2d 385, 405–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Significantly, Flowers did not t estify about what appellant sai d—all he said was that Brown told him appellant was on the phone. Moreover, the jury knew that a ppellant was talking to Brown on her cell phone at the time because the jail call records were a dmitted into evidence. Pedigo merely testified about her personal observations in her interactions w ith prosecutors. And even if the Pedigo question was improper, app ellant does not explain how th e testimony caused him harm. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s i nstructions to disregard Flowers’s and Pedigo’s statements cured any harm and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s mistrial motions. We resolve appellant’ s second and ninth issues against him.–9– C. Third Issue: Did the trial court err by denying appellant’s objection to the jail calls? No. There was sufficient eviden ce showing that appellant made the calls. 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abu se of discretion. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence if th e court reasonably believes a reasonable factfinder could find the evidence was authenticated or identified. Druery v. State , 225 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 07). We will not reverse a trial court’s ruling unless it “is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonabl e persons might disagree.” McDonald v. State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)). Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility. See T EX

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. 901(a). The proponent carries its burden to e stablish the evidence’s authen ticity by producing “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Id ; see Fowler v. State , 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2018). Rule 901(b) prov ides a list of nonexclusive methods for aut henticating evidence. T EX . R. E VID . 901(b). Regardless, “Evidence prematurely admitted in error may become admissible or be rendered harmless by subsequent evidence.” Mitchell v. State , No. 05-16-00070-CR, 2016 WL 7163947, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2016, pet. ref’d) (me m. op.); see also Davis v. State , 687 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, pet. ref’d) (any erro r in admitting photograph without proper authentication was “cured” when witness later testified that she was present when photograph was taken).–10– 2. Application of Law to Facts Scott Seacat, an employee of the company that runs the Dallas C ounty inmate phone system testified about Exhibit 14, a CD recording of appellant’s jail calls. 2 Seacat explained that every inmate is assigned a unique PIN that the inmate uses to make ph one calls from jail. That PIN consists of the last five digits of the inmate’s book-in number and the last four digits of the inmate’s social security number. When an inmate makes a call, a recorde d announcement advises that the call may be monitored or recorded. Seacat listened to Exhibit 14 and heard the advisory message. Seancory Patton, an investigator, said he pulled appellant’s ca lls from the system and linked the calls to appellant the book-in number used to place the calls. On defense counsel’s subsequent voir dire, Patton acknowledged that there were times when the machine cut off a call or did not otherwise function p roperly. He also said there were instances of inmates using anot her inmate’s PIN. Defense couns el objected that Exhibit 14 was not properly authenticated. The trial court overruled the obje ction and admitted the exhibit into evidence. Here, there was evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that the recordings were what they purported to be. (And there was no i ndication that there was an equipment malfunction or misidentification in this case). But even if Patton’s and Seacat’s testimony did not meet this threshold, the recording was subseq uently authenticated with additional evidence. After State’s Exhibit 14 was admitted, three recorded jail call s from the exhibit were published to the jury. The first call was from November 5, 201 7, and the second and third calls were from December 4, 2017. Each recording begins with the inm ate identifying himself as Gary

2 At a later time, Exhibit 14 wa s readmitted for record purposes only. The recorded jails calls were re-offered and admitted in to evidence for all purposes as State’s exhibit 14A.–11– Chappell. The woman on the other line is referred to as “Brown, ” and she calls appellant “Chappell.” In the November 5 recording, Brown tells appellant that a warra nt was issued for his arrest because the detective tried to contact him but appellant would not speak to him. At one point, Brown says it is Flowers’s word over appellant’s. The same two voices are on the December 4 calls. In the first call, Brown tries to get Flowers take the phone to talk t o appellant and tells appellant that Flowers does not want to talk to him. Appellant tells Brown to tell Flowers how much he want s an affidavit of non-prosecution. In the second call, Brown says Flowers is lying about not press ing charges, and tells appellant that Flowers is near by if appellant wants to talk to him. Detective Calhoun testified that he tried to contact appellant to hear his side of the story but was unable to do so. Conse quently, Calhoun filed the warra nt. And Flowers testified that Brown approached him on the street and tried to get him to talk to appellant on the phone. Taken as a whole, from this evidence a jury could reasonable de termine that the recorded calls were authentic. See T EX

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. 901(b)(4); see also Patton v. State , 03-03-00279-CR, 2004 WL 1403679, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 24, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We thus resolve a ppellant’s third issue against him.
D. Fourth Issue: Did the trial c ourt err by granting the State ’s motion in limine? No. A motion in limine ruling p reserves nothing for review. During Detective Calhoun’s testimony the trial court heard the State’s motion in limine. The prosecutor told the court that the State had told appellant about two incidents related to Calhoun: (i) a 2002 improper/unnecessary force allegation and ( ii) a 2017 improper investigation allegation. The State argued th at both incidents should be exc luded under rule 403. Appellant’s–12– counsel responded that he had no interest in the 2002 incident but the 2017 incident would be relevant on cross-examination. T he trial court granted the mot ion in limine. Appellant’s fourth issue argues the trial court erred by granti ng the motion. This issue, however, presents nothing for our review. See T EX

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. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). A motion in limine, whether it is granted or denied, does not p reserve error. See Wilson v.
State , 7 S.W.3d 136, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A ruling on a limi ne motion is not constitute a ruling on the merits, but merely requires the parties to approa ch the court for a definitive ruling before attempting to introduce evidence within the scope of the motion. See Taylor v State , 555 S.W.3d 765, 780 (Tex. App.—Amari llo 2018, pet. ref’d). Here, there is no indication that appellant ever requested or o btained a ruling on the merits after the limine motion was gran ted. Accordingly, there is no error to review. See Davis v. State , No.03-01-00619-CR, 2003 WL 21939477, at *20 (Tex. App.—Austin A ug. 14, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for public ation). Appellant’s fourth issue is resolved against him. E. Fifth Issue: Was it error to overrule appellant’s objection to the State’s jury argument? No. The State’s argument concerning appellant’s pre-arrest use of false names did not refer to appellant’s decision to not testify. Appellant’s fifth issue argues that the trial court erred by ov erruling his objection to the State’s improper jury argument. Specifically, appellant claims that the argument concerned his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. We review a trial court’s ruli ng on an objection to improper ju ry argument for an abuse of discretion. See Garcia v. State , 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Permissible jury argument must generally be (i) a summation of the evidence, (ii ) reasonable deductions from the evidence, (iii) an answer to th e argument of opposing counsel, or (iv) a plea for law enforcement. Bigby v. State , 892 S.W.2d 864, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).–13– Prosecutorial comment that refers to an accused’s failure to te stify violates the accused’s Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. See Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Bustamante v. State , 48 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). But such a comment must clearly refer to the accused’s failure to testify; it is not sufficient if it “might be construed as an implied or indirect allusion.” Bustamante , 48 S.W.3d at 765. The “test is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a char acter that the jury would necessarily and naturally take it as a comment on the defendant 's failure to testify.” Id. Thus, the comment must be ana lyzed in context. See id

. During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor reminded th e jury that appellant initially lied to the police about his name: That’s exactly it. Why would you lie? Why would you lie? Unless you had something to hide, right? Why would you give a fake name? Why w ould they - - Why would they search four diffe rent databases, four different names that are provided - - Defense counsel’s objection that the argument “invad[ed] the pr ovince of the Fifth Amendment” was overruled. The evidence showed that on the n ight at issue, an officer stop ped a vehicle in which appellant was a passenger, but the officer was unable to confir m appellant’s identity because appellant gave several false names. The prosecutor’s comment referre d to this evidence and, rhetori cally asked the jury to reasonably deduce that appellant exhibited consciousness of gui lt by hiding his identity. A rhetorical question based on the evidence is permissible as lon g as it does not point to a defendant’s lack of explanation. See Wolfe v. State , 917 S.W.2d 270, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The question here did not do so. Nothing in the argument about app ellant’s pre-arrest behavior refers to appellant’s failure to testif y, explain, or present evidence

. See Myers v. State , 573 S.W.2d 19,–14– 20–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (improper argument when prosecutor said there had been no explanation because only the defe ndant or co-defendant could ha ve given an explanation). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its disc retion by overruling appellant’s objection and resolve appellant’s fifth issue again st him. F. Sixth Issue: Was it error to overrule appellant’s objection to the State’s fingerprint expert? No. The record does not reflect the nature of appellant’s obje ctions or the trial court’s rulings. Appellant’s sixth issue argues that: (i) the trial court erred by overruling his objection to Daren Hodge “being submitted as an expert witness” and (ii) the trial court erred by denying his request to voir dire Hodge under rule 705(b). We review the trial court’s decision to allow expert testimony for an abuse of discretion.
Gallo v. State , 239 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We will uphold a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of an expert witness as long as it falls w ithin the zone of reasonable disagreement. Taylor v. State , 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Expert testimony is generally sub ject to three requirements: (i ) the expert must be qualified; (ii) the expert testimony must be reliable; and (iii) the exper t testimony must be relevant. See Vela
v. State , 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Qualification is distinct from reliability and relevance and is therefore evaluated independently. Id. Appellant, however, does not say which of the above requirement s was not met and where the trial court specifically ruled otherwise. The applicable H odge objection and ruling occurred when the State asked Hodge for his opinion on the comparisons b etween appellant’s fingerprints and the fingerprints in appellant’s pen packets 3 . When the State began that line of questioning,

3 A “pen packet” is a document compiled by a prison official base d on other primary documentation received from the clerk of the convicting court. See Flowers v. State , 220 S.W.3d 919, 923, n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).–15– defense counsel objected that the “witness has not been submitt ed as an expert before this Court.” The trial court overruled the objection. Defense counsel then asked: “Well, may I take him on voir dire? I was waiting for him to be submitted as an expert.” An off-the-record bench conference ensued, after which the trial court said, “All right. Your objection is overruled, Counsel.” But t he bench conference was not recorded. Although defense counsel may have wanted to voir dire the witne ss on his qualifications, we cannot speculate about the bas is for the request or the tria l court’s ruling. Thus, appellant’s complaint that the trial court erroneously allowed Hodge to be “submitted as an expert” preserves nothing for our review. See Shaw v. State , 329 S.W.3d 645, 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (failure to iden tify whether objection pertai ns to qualification, reliability, or relevance preserves nothing for review). Likewise, we cannot conclude the trial court erroneously denied appellant a rule 705(b) hearing. Indeed, the record does not reflect that such a hearin g was affirmativel y requested. Rule 705(b) concerns an expert’s reliability, and requires that an a dverse party be permitted to examine the expert about underlying facts and data outside the jury’s p resence. See T EX

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. 705(b). “Because Rule 705(b) is mandatory, a trial judge’s denial of a timely and proper motion for such hearing would constitute error.” Alba v. State , 905 S.W.2d 581, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). But a general request to voir dire a witness does not constitute a proper request for a rule 705(b) hearing. See Jenkins v State , 912 S.W.2d 793, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Thus, because the record does not reflect that a rule 705(b) he aring was requested and denied, we resolve appellant’s sixth issue against him.–16– G. Seventh Issue: Were appellants’ pen packets improperly admi tted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Authentication Rule? No. Appellant did not assert a Confrontation Clause objection and the pen packets were properly admitted as official government records. Appellant’s seventh issue argues that the trial court erroneous ly admitted his pen packets, Exhibits 15-19, during the trial’s punishment phase. According to appellant, “the reports” in the exhibits contained hearsay within hearsay and “testimonial stat ements that were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.” See generally, Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 51, 68 (2004) (Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial he arsay). Appellant objected to exhibits 15, 16, and 17 based on hearsay and improper authentication. He similarly objected to exhibits 18 and 19. However, there was no Confrontation Clause objection or argument in either instance, and a general hearsay objection does not preserve a Confrontation Clause complaint. Reya v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We therefore limit our review t o appellant’s hearsay argument. Regarding exhibits 18 and 19, the document s containing hearsay were removed before the exhibits were introduced into ev idence. Appellant does not ide ntify anything further that he claims is hearsay. Thus, there is nothing for us to review. See T EX

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. P. 33.1; see also Barnes v.
State , 876 S.W.2d 316, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (global hearsay ob jection to entire pen packet insufficient to preserve error as to specific subset of documen ts within the packet). 4 Regarding exhibits 15, 16, and 17, appellant also does not expl ain which part of the “reports” allegedly include hearsay. See T EX R. A PP

. P. 33.1; Barnes , 876 S.W.2d at 329. Moreover, even had the issue been preserved for review, the Sta te introduced certified copies of

4 In the court below, appellant’s c ounsel complained that the co urt should have ruled on his h earsay objection before removing the hearsay from the documents. When the tr ial judge explained that the ex hibits had been admitted without the hearsay, defense counsel r eplied, “So my objection is overruled?” The C ourt replied affirmatively.–17– the pen packets. Therefore, the exhibits were self-authenticat ed public records. See T EX

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. art. 42.09 §8(b); see also Reed v. State , 811 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 5 Public records are excepted from the hearsay exclusion if they set forth matters observed under a legal duty to report such matters, excluding, in criminal cases , matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel. See R. E VID

. 801(d). Pen packets fall w ithin this definition.
See Jones v. State , 572 S.W.3d 841, 849 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Thus, the trial court did not err when it overruled appellant’s hears ay objection. Appellant’s seventh issue is resolved against him. H. Eighth Issue: Was it error to sustain the State’s objection to appellant’s crossexamination of the State ’s fingerprint expert? No. The trial court has the discretion to limit cross-examinat ion and the decision here was not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement because the tri al court could have reasonably concluded that the subject had already been exhausted. While cross-examining the State’s fingerprint expert, Hodge, ap pellant’s counsel tried to suggest that the 12 point standard the FBI used to compare fing erprints was outda ted and had been recently replaced with a new standard. Then on re-cross, couns el continued:
Defense : Now, Officer, did - - you said that you were comfortable with the 12 points. What standard woul d you base - - base that on? Hodge : That was the FBI standard. Defense : But I thought you jus t said the FBI didn’t have a standard? Hodge : They do not set the standard.

5 Specifically, section 8(b) of article 42.09 of the Code of Cri minal Procedure provides: The Texas Department of Criminal Justice shall not take a defen dant into custody under this article until the designated officer receives the documents r equired by Subsections (a) and (c) of this section. The desi gnated officer shall certify under the seal of the department the documents received under Subsect ions (a) and (c) of this secti on. A document certified under this subsection is self-authenticated for the purposes of Rules 901 and 902, Texas Rules of Evidence.

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. art. 42.09 §8(b).–18– Defense : So . . . again, it goes back to my question. If the FBI has increased that standard, then you would be using an outdated standard; is that correct? Hodge : No, sir. They do not set the standard. Defense : Well, why did you use the FBI standard? Hodge : That was a standard that they used back when I went through t he school, and that’s what I felt comfortable with. Defense : And so if they updated because of . . . misidentification of . . . a fingerprint, then you would be using an outdated standard; is that correct? Hodge : No, sir. Defense : Now, do you remember the - - the Moroccan bomber bombing that gentleman and his fingerprints was found . . . by the FBI? They checked his fingerprints, and they said he w as the person. And they later found out using that 12 point of comparison he had never been to Morocco. Are you fa miliar with that? The State objected based on rele vance, and appellant’s counsel responded, “It’s relevant. Judge, it is relevant in the FBI standard that he’s using that has bee n approved.” The trial court sustained the objection. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by sustaining this objection. Appellant generally argues that the trial court impermissibly limited his cross-exa mination and that such limitation violated the Confrontation Clause thereby denying him of his ri ght to a fair trial. Most of appellant’s complaint, however , has not been preserved for our review. To preserve an issue for appellat e review, a party must make a timely objection or request to the trial court, sufficien tly stating the specific grounds f or the requested ruling, unless apparent from the context, and obtain an adverse ruling. See T EX

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. P. 33.1(a); Wilson v. State , 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Moreover, the objectio n or request at trial must comport with the complaint presented on appeal. Wilson , 71 S.W.3d at 349. Even constitutional errors may be forfeited by failure to object at trial. Broxton v. State , 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). When a party’s argument for admitting evidence cou ld refer to either the Rules of Evidence or the Confrontation Clause, he must specifically arti culate that the Confrontation Clause–19– demands admission of the evidence to preserve error on this gro und. See Reyna v. State , 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Appellant’s only trial objecti on concerned the testimony’s alle ged relevance. Thus, the Confrontation Clause argument wa s not preserved for review, and we consider only whether the trial court erred by sustaining t he State’s objection to the te stimony. The right of cross-examination is not unlimited and the trial c ourt retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limitations. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). In determining such limitations, the court must balance probative value against prejudicial risks, including confusion of t he issues and undue delay. See Chambers v. State , 866 S.W.2d 9, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court’ s ruling is not reversible u nless the appellant shows a clear abuse of discretion. Id. Rule 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has any tende ncy to make a fact of consequence more or less probabl e than it would be without the evidence. T EX . R. E VID

. 401. Thus, there must be a direct or logi cal connection between the actual evidence and the proposition sought to be proved. See Layton v. State , 280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. Crim . App. 2009). Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. Id .; see also T EX . R. E VID 402. Here, before the objection was sustained, defense counsel had a lready cross-examined Hodge extensively about the 12 point system’s reliability. Thu s, the trial judge could well have concluded that the question adde d nothing new to this line of q uestioning or that the subject had been exhausted. See Carroll v. State , 916 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court’s ruling was not out side the zone of reasonable disagreement and resolve appellan t’s eighth issue against him.–20– J. State’s Cross-point: Should the judgment be modified? The State asks us to modify the judgment to reflect that appell ant pled “not true” to the enhancement paragraphs and the jury found them true. We are au thorized to reform a judgment to make the record speak the truth when we have the necessary i nformation to do so. Bigley v.
State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Here, the record reflects that that appellant pled “not true” t o the enhancement paragraphs and the jury found them true. We thus sustain the State’s cros s-point and modify the judgment accordingly.

K. Cause Numbers 05-18-01306-CR and 05-18-01307-CR—Anders Brief an d Motion Following appellant’s aggravated assault conviction discussed a bove, the State moved to adjudicate guilt and revoke comm unity supervision in cause numb er 05-18-01306-CR (delivery of a controlled substance enhanced with a prior conviction) and a motion to revoke community supervision in cause number 05-18-01307-CR (delivery of a contr olled substance enhanced with two prior convictions ). Appellant pled guilty to both offenses and true to the enhancement paragraphs. The trial court deferred adjudication and placed h im on community supervision for one offense, and assessed punishment at ten years in prison, su spended, with appellant placed on community supervision for the other offense. Appellant’s counsel has filed an Anders motion to withdraw in the above causes. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and concludes that this appeal is fri volous and without merit. Counsel provided appellant with a copy of the brief and the motion to w ithdraw. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). It presents a professional evaluat ion of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to–21– advance. See High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (deter mining whether brief meets requirements of Anders ). We advised appellant of his right to file a pro se response, bu t he did not file a pro se
response. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (appellant has right to file pro se response to Anders brief filed by counsel). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s dut y in Anders cases). We agree the appeals are frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in th e record that might arguably support the appeals. We therefore grant counsel’s motion to withdraw in cause number s 05-18-01306-CR and 05-18-01307-CR and affirm the tr ial court’s judgments.
III. C ONCLUSION The trial court’s judgments in all three cause numbers are affi rmed.

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
GARY LEE CHAPPELL, Appellant
No. 05-18-01306-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1653354-N. Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Schenck and Ric hter participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of t his date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED To reflect that appellant pled “ not true” to the enhancement pa ragraphs and the jury found them “true.” As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered December 3, 2019–23– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
GARY LEE CHAPPELL, Appellant
No. 05-18-01307-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F16-60423-N. Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Schenck and Ric hter participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of t his date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED To reflect that appellant pled “ not true” to the enhancement pa ragraphs and the jury found them “true.” As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered December 3, 2019–24– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
GARY LEE CHAPPELL, Appellant
No. 05-18-01308-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F17-76639-N. Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Schenck and Ric hter participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of t his date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED To reflect that appellant pled “ not true” to the enhancement pa ragraphs and the jury found them “true.” As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered December 3, 2019