* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The Honorable Jack J. Camp, SeniorUnited States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. COREY DAVID BROWN, Defendant - Appellee. No. 09-50397 D.C. No. 09-cr-00059-MMM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted July 15, 2010 Pasadena, California Before: FARRIS and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges, and CAMP, Senior District Judge. ** 

# FILED

AUG 09 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS-2- The Government appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant Corey Brown’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his home and car. The district court determined that the emergency excep tion to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment did not apply. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. We reverse. We review de novo the lawfulness of a search under the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Snipe , 515 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2008), but review for clear error the district court’s factual dete rminations, United States v. Martinez , 406 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2005). Neither party, however, disputes the factual findings of the district court. “The emergency doctrine allows la w enforcement officers to enter and secure premises without a warrant wh en they are responding to a perceived emergency.” United States v. Stafford , 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occ upant from imminent injury.”). For the emergency exception to apply, the Governme nt must show that: “(1) considering the totality of the circumstances, law en forcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or-3- themselves from serious harm; and (2 ) the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need.” Snipe , 515 F.3d at 952; see also United States v. Reyes-Bosque , 596 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2010). “In determining whether such an entry is objectively reasonabl e, the Supreme Court has ‘consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead empha sizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry,’ and looked to the totality of the circumstances.” Snipe , 515 F.3d at 953 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette , 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). The undisputed facts show that, as a result of two 911 calls, the Garden Grove Police Department dispatched offi cers to investigate a domestic dispute at 4:40 a.m. The first 911 call was from the victim, and the individual taking the call heard in the background a large disturban ce, including a man screaming threats and profanities. The second 911 call was from a neighbor who reported that he heard two males and a female fighting in the c ourtyard area of the apartment complex. Responding officers saw a male and female exit the gate when they arrived at the apartment complex, but there was no indi cation at the time that the male and female were involved in the domestic dis pute. Upon entering the courtyard, the officers found Defendant shirtless, intoxicat ed, and aggressively approaching them screaming profanities. The officers then saw the victim exit the front door of one of the apartments. She was crying and upset. Through the apartment’s open front-4- door, the officers could see a shattered gla ss table with glass scattered across the living room floor. Under the totality of the circumstances , it was objectively reasonable for the officers to enter the open apartment to make sure that no one seriously injured or potentially dangerous remained inside the apartment. See Snipe , 515 F.3d at 952. The officers need not have assumed thatthe couple seen leaving the apartment complex were the other individuals reported by the second 911 caller, and, thus, that all of the individuals reportedly i nvolved in the dispute were accounted for. Moreover, the scope and manner of the search was reasonable under the circumstances to meet the n eeds of the situation, see Snipe , 515 F.3d at 952; Defendant does not dispute this on appeal. In sum, because the first search fell within the emergency exception to the F ourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the search was lawful. The district court therefore erred by suppressing the gun found in the apartment, as well as other evidence uncovered as a result of the gun’s discovery. Likewise, the evidence discovered as a result of Officer Kovacs’s subsequent entry and search of the apartm ent is admissible becau se that search was also lawful under the emergency excepti on. A reasonable officer in Officer Kovacs’s shoes would have had an objectiv ely reasonable basis to believe that two-5- minor children were inside the apartmen t and potentially in danger, in light of Defendant Brown’s statements to that e ffect. The officers who first entered the apartment did not know of the possible pres ence of children, nor could they verify that they had searched every possible locati on for potential victims. It is irrelevant that Officer Kovacs said he did not ente r the apartment out of concern that two minors might be inside. See Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 404 (“An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind. . . .”) REVERSED.