In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 17-205C

Filed: June 14, 2019

CURTIS P. REID,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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Civilian Pay; RCFC 56; Civilian Marine 

Personnel Instructions; 5 U.S.C. § 5348; 

46 U.S.C. § 10313. 

Cain Denny, Counsel of Record, Cain Denny, PA, Charleston, SC, for plaintiff.

Sean L. King, Trial Attorney, Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director, Robert E. 

Kirschman, Jr., Director, Joseph A. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC; Patricia ReddyParkinson, Of Counsel, United States Military Sealift Command, Washington, DC, for 

defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRIGGSBY, Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this civilian pay action, plaintiff, Curtis P. Reid, seeks to recover alleged unpaid wages 

and monetary damages from the government in connection with his employment as a federal 

civilian employee serving aboard a public vessel of the United States. See generally Am. Compl. 

The government has moved to dismiss Counts II and IV of the amended complaint upon the 

grounds that: (1) the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s 

quantum meruit claim and (2) the Tucker Act’s waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity 

does not extend to the punitive damages provided for pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 10313(g). Id. at 

28-29, 32-33. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues of: (1) 

whether plaintiff was assigned to the position of a Wiper and, thus, entitled to receive pay as a 

Wiper; (2) whether plaintiff is entitled to recover unpaid wages pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5348(a); 

and (3) whether plaintiff is entitled to recover unpaid wages pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 10313. See 
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generally Pl. Mot.; Def. Mot. Lastly, the government has also moved for summary judgment in 

its favor on the issue of whether the government’s involuntary deductions of plaintiff’s pay 

constitute a takings in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Def. 

Mot. at 33-34. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS-IN-PART the government’s 

motion to dismiss; (2) DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; (3) GRANTS the 

government’s cross-motion for summary judgment with regards to Counts I, II, III, and V of the 

amended complaint; and (4) DISMISSES the amended complaint. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff, Curtis P. Reid, served as a federal civilian employee aboard the United States 

Naval Ship Charles Drew (the “USNS Drew”)—a public vessel of the United States under the 

control of the United States Navy (“Navy”), Military Sealift Command (the “MSC”). Am. 

Compl. at ¶ 2. In this civilian pay action, plaintiff seeks to recover alleged unpaid wages and 

monetary damages from the government in connection with his deployment aboard the USNS 

Drew. Id. at ¶ 8. It is undisputed that plaintiff performed the duties of a Wiper during this 

deployment.

2

Id.; Def. Mot. at 4. 

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the MSC improperly compensated him at the prevailing 

rate of pay for the position of a Supply Utilityman, rather than at the prevailing rate of pay for 

the position of a Wiper, during this deployment. Am. Compl. at ¶ 16; see also id. at ¶ 13. 

Plaintiff also alleges that the MSC’s cause to involuntarily deduct his pay—due to an 

overpayment of overtime pay—was insufficient. Id. at ¶ 16. And so, plaintiff contends that he is 

entitled to recover, among other things, unpaid wages and punitive damages from the 

government. Id. at ¶ 21; see also id. at Prayer for Relief. 

 

1 The facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from the amended complaint (“Am. 

Compl.”); plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (“Pl. Mot.”); the government’s motion to dismiss, 

cross-motion for summary judgment, and response and opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (“Def. Mot.”); and the Appendix attached thereto (“Def. App’x.”). Except where otherwise 

noted, all facts recited herein are undisputed.

2

In Counts VI and VII of the amended complaint, plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees and costs. Am. Compl. 

at ¶¶ 35-39.
3

1. Plaintiff’s Deployment On The USNS Drew

As background, the MSC is the leading provider of ocean transportation for the Navy and 

the Department of Defense. Def. Mot. at 3. The MSC workforce consists of approximately 

5,600 personnel, known as civil service mariners (“CIVMAR”), who are federal civilian 

employees that serve primarily at sea aboard non-combatant Navy ships. Def. App’x at 1

(Declaration of Andrew Kallgren); see also Def. Mot. at 3.

On October 12, 2010, the MSC appointed plaintiff to a CIVMAR position as a C848 

Supply Utilityman assigned to the East Coast, with a base salary of $24,188. Def. App’x at 14 

(SF-50, dated Oct. 12, 2010). A Supply Utilityman is an entry-level position in a ship’s steward 

or supply department that involves hotel services work, food handling, and sanitation of the ship. 

Id. at 15-16 (Supply Utilityman Job Description); see also Def. Mot. at 3.

On April 30, 2012, a senior marine placement specialist recommended that plaintiff be 

assigned to the USNS Drew “as relief to fill [the] vacant WIPER BILLET” position. Pl. Mot. at 

Ex. 1 (MSC E-Mail, dated April 30, 2012). The e-mail regarding this assignment states that 

“WIPER Reid is on a TEMP PROM to WIPER (363) for this assignment.” Id. 

On May 3, 2012, plaintiff was assigned to the USNS Drew. Def. App’x at 19 (SF-50, 

dated May 3, 2012). Plaintiff’s assignment to the USNS Drew is recorded in a Standard Form 50 

(“SF-50”), dated May 3, 2012, which states that the nature of the action is a “reassignment” and 

that the “CIVMAR [is] performing duties of 8363 Wiper.” Id. The SF-50 also states that the 

specified amounts of plaintiff’s basic pay and locality adjustment “reflect permanent salary 

which is higher than ship’s salary.” Id.

The basic pay for a Wiper on a ship like the USNS Drew is $34,858.00, with an overtime 

pay rate of $25.98 per hour. Id. at 25 (Pacific Schedule of Wages). In contrast, the basic pay for 

a Supply Utilityman on the same ship is $35,719.00, with an overtime pay rate of $12.20 per 

hour. Id. at 27 (Pacific Schedule of Wages). And so, while a Supply Utilityman receives a 

higher base rate of pay than a Wiper, the overtime rate of pay for a Supply Utilityman is lower 

than the overtime rate of pay for a Wiper. 

On May 6, 2012, plaintiff reported to the USNS Drew for deployment. Id. at 30 (OPA, 

dated May 6, 2012). Upon his arrival, the ship generated an Outport Personnel Action (“OPA”)

message, stating that plaintiff’s duty status is the position of a Wiper, effective May 3, 2012. Id. 
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This message was sent to the MSC’s payroll department for processing. Id. at 30, 32-33

(Declaration of Dorothy Abreu). 

When plaintiff returned from this deployment on September 4, 2012, the USNS Drew 

generated another OPA message stating that plaintiff’s duty status was the position of Wiper 

while deployed aboard the ship. Id. at 34 (OPA, dated Sept. 4, 2012). This message was also 

sent to the MSC’s payroll department. Id. On March 29, 2013, the master of the USNS Drew 

sent a sea service letter that confirmed plaintiff’s deployment dates and that stated that plaintiff

was a Wiper while serving on the USNS Drew. Pl. Mot. at Ex. 6 (Sea Service Letter, dated 

March 29, 2013). 

2. The Civilian Marine Personnel Instructions 

A CIVMAR’s terms and conditions of employment are governed by the Civilian Marine 

Personnel Instructions (“CMPI”) and the Navy’s personnel policies. Def. App’x at 6

(Declaration of James Shine). The CMPI implements 5 U.S.C. § 301 and 5 U.S.C. § 302. Id. at 

100 (CMPI 1.1-1). Specifically, Section 301 provides that:

The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe 

regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the 

distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation 

of its records, papers, and property.

5 U.S.C. § 301. Section 302 further provides that: 

(b) In addition to the authority to delegate conferred by other law, the head of an 

agency may delegate to subordinate officials the authority vested in him—

(1) by law to take final action on matters pertaining to the employment, 

direction, and general administration of personnel under his agency

5 U.S.C. § 302(b)(1). And so, the CMPI applies to all CIVMARs and these regulations define 

and regulate the terms and conditions of employment for CIVMARs. Def. App’x at 100 (CMPI 

1.1-.2). 

Specifically relevant to this case, CMPI 330 “governs the recruitment, evaluation and 

selection of civil service marine employees for appointment, conversion to an appointment, 

promotion and reassignment.” Id. at 216 (CMPI 330.1-1). This regulation defines “base rate of 

pay” as “[t]he authorized minimum cash compensation without special pay benefits, expressed as 

an annual rate of pay for MSC civil service marine positions.” Id. at 217 (CMPI 330.1-5). 
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CMPI 330 also defines a “reassignment” as a “[p]ersonnel action taken to place an employee in a 

different position (rating) without a change to the base rate of pay.” Id. at 219 (CMPI 330.1-5).

CMPI 531, entitled Wage Administration, implements 5 U.S.C. § 5348(a), which 

provides that the compensation of officers and crews of vessels shall be fixed and adjusted from 

time to time, as nearly as is consistent with the public interest. Id. at 107 (CMPI 531.1-2). This 

regulation provides that “[t]he base rate of pay for mariner positions is provided in the wage 

schedules. Each position has a single, unique rate of base pay.” Id. at 110 (CMPI 531.3-1(d)). 

The regulation also provides that authorized pay rates are available to all CIVMAR positions 

including: (1) permanent positions, (2) one-voyage only positions, (3) interim positions, and (4) 

temporary positions. Id. at 111 (CMPI 531.4-1(a)). In addition, CMPI 531 provides that “[t]he 

marine employee officially assigned to an authorized position is entitled to only the 

corresponding wages for that position found in the appropriate schedule of wages, except as 

indicated in CMPI 610.1-8.c.” Id. at 112 (CMPI 531.4-3(b)). 

CMPI 610, entitled Hours of Work and Premium Pay, also implements 5 U.S.C. § 5348 

and this regulation “regulates the hours of work and premium pay for all civilian mariners. The 

regulation applies to all civilian mariners (CIVMARs) employed by Military Sealift Command . . 

. .” Id. at 118 (CMPI 610.1-1, 1-2). In this regard, CMPI 610 provides that:

It is the policy of Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC) that 

CIVMARs will be given just compensation for their services. CIVMARs will not 

be required to perform work for which premium pay is authorized, and then denied 

such pay. 

Id. (CMPI 610.1-3). The regulation also defines “premium pay” as “compensation over and 

above base pay” and provides that “overtime” is “premium pay payable for work outside of 

normal working hours and certain types of work outside of regularly prescribed duties.” Id. at 

118 (CMPI 610.1-4(a), (b)). 

It is the MSC’s policy that when a CIVMAR is assigned to a position that is not a 

permanent position—and the permanent position carries a higher base rate of pay—the MSC will 

manually override the payroll record to ensure that the CIVMAR is paid the higher base rate of

pay, and the associated overtime rate of pay. See id. at 19 (SF-50, dated May 3, 2012); see also 

id. at 3 (Declaration of Andrew Kallgren); id. at 32 (Declaration of Dorothy Abreu); id. at 244 

(CMPI 512.4-1 Clarification). In this case, the government acknowledges that the manual 
6

override of plaintiff’s payroll record did not occur due to an administrative oversight, despite the 

fact that the base rate of pay for a Supply Utilityman is higher than the base rate of pay for a 

Wiper. Id. at 32-33 (Declaration of Dorothy Abreu). And so, the MSC paid plaintiff at the rate 

of pay for a Wiper, instead of a Supply Utilityman, during his deployment aboard the USNS 

Drew. Id. at 33 (Declaration of Dorothy Abreu). The MSC subsequently determined that it had 

overpaid plaintiff in the amount of $5,536.36 during this deployment. Id. at 38 (Letter, dated 

June 19, 2013).

3. Recoupment Efforts

In 2013, the MSC commenced recoupment efforts to recover this overpayment, but the 

MSC later determined that it had incorrectly initiated the involuntary debt collection process 

against plaintiff and repaid the money that had been recouped. Id. at 41 (E-Mail, dated Nov. 19, 

2013). 

After the Defense Finance and Accounting Services (“DFAS”) assumed all payroll 

responsibilities for the MSC, the MSC recalculated plaintiff’s debt to the government to be 

$4,861.18 and provided that information to DFAS in October 2014. Id. at 31 (Declaration of 

Dorothy Abreu); id. at 43 (Memorandum from Chris Jones, dated Oct. 1, 2014). The MSC’s 

calculation of plaintiff’s debt is based upon the difference between the hours initially paid to 

plaintiff using the Wiper rate of pay, with those same hours recalculated using the Supply 

Utilityman’s rate of pay. Id. at 43-64 (Pay Tables). And so, the MSC notified plaintiff of his 

debt on January 23, 2015. Id. at 65-72 (E-Mail from Bonnie Fisher, dated Jan. 25, 2015).

On February 18, 2015, plaintiff timely filed a petition to dispute the debt that he owed to 

the MSC. Id. at 75 (Letter from Plaintiff’s Counsel, dated Feb. 18, 2015). On November 24, 

2014, DFAS issued a memorandum upholding the validity of the debt. Id. at 78-84, 95 (DFAS 

Hearing Findings and Report). In the memorandum, DFAS determined that: 

A review of Mr. Reid’s account determined that he received an erroneous 

overpayment while he was sailing as a WIPER on board the USNS Charles Drew, 

in which Mr. Reid should have remained as a Utilityman. Since the annual salary 

of a Utilityman is ($35,719) is [sic] higher than a WIPER’S salary of ($34,850), 

Mr. Reid should have received the Utilityman’s premium earnings associated with 

that position.
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Id. at 83 (DFAS Hearing Findings). And so, DFAS restarted the involuntary deductions of 

plaintiff’s pay, and the final payment towards the debt was deducted from plaintiff’s pay on 

April 2, 2016. Id. at 96-97 (DFAS Debt Case Report). 

4. Plaintiff’s District Court Litigation 

Plaintiff originally commenced this action on June 10, 2016, in the United States District

Court for the District of South Carolina. See generally Reid v. United States, 2:16-cv-01902-

RMG (D.S.C. filed June 10, 2016). After the parties completed discovery, plaintiff moved to 

transfer this case to the United States Court of Federal Claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1491. See generally Pl. Mot. to Transfer, dated Jan. 6, 2017. On January 23, 

2017, the District Court granted plaintiff’s motion to transfer upon the ground that, “[w]hen a 

wage claim by a government employee abroad a government vessel exceeds $10,000, venue is 

only appropriate in the United States Court of Federal Claims . . . .” See generally Order to 

Transfer, dated Jan. 23, 2017. 

B. Procedural History 

After this matter was transferred from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 4, 2017. See generally Am. 

Compl. On June 5, 2017, the government filed an answer to the amended complaint. See 

generally Answer. 

After the parties completed discovery, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on 

September 1, 2018. See generally Pl. Mot. On October 19, 2018, the government filed a motion 

to dismiss, cross-motion for summary judgment, and response and opposition to plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment. See generally Def. Mot. 

On November 16, 2018, plaintiff filed a response and opposition to the government’s 

motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment, and a reply in support of his motion 

for summary judgment. See generally Pl. Resp. On February 15, 2019, the government filed a 

reply in support of its motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment. See generally 

Def. Reply. 

These matters having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending motions. 
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III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. RCFC 12(b)(1) and Jurisdiction 

When deciding a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the Court does not possess 

subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), this Court must assume that all 

undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the 

non-movant’s favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); RCFC 12(b)(1). But, plaintiff 

bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, and he must do so by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 

(Fed. Cir. 1988). Should the Court determine that “it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it 

must dismiss the claim.” Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006).

In this regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction 

and “possess[es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Tucker Act grants the Court 

jurisdiction over:

[A]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any 

Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express 

or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated 

damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 

The Tucker Act is, however, a jurisdictional statute; “it does not create any substantive 

right enforceable against the United States for money damages. . . . [T]he Act merely confers 

jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal Claims] whenever the substantive right 

exists.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (alterations in original). And so, to 

pursue a substantive right against the United States under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must 

identify and plead a money-mandating constitutional provision, statute, or regulation; an express 

or implied contract with the United States; or an illegal exaction of money by the United States. 

Cabral v. United States, 317 F. App’x 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Fisher v. United States, 

402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1302 

(Fed. Cir. 2003). “[A] statute or regulation is money-mandating for jurisdictional purposes if it 

‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of the 
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breach of the duties [it] impose[s].’” Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1173 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 

463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)).

B. Fifth Amendment Takings 

The Court possess exclusive jurisdiction over Fifth Amendment takings claims in excess 

of $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); see also Acceptance Ins. Cos. v. United States, 503 F.3d 1328, 

1336 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees just 

compensation whenever private property is “taken for public use.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. And 

so, the purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent the “[g]overnment from forcing some people 

alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 

whole.” Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (quoting 

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); see also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United 

States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 

To have a cause of action for a Fifth Amendment takings, a plaintiff must, among other 

things, point to a protectable property interest that is asserted to be the subject of the takings. See 

Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (citation omitted) (“Because the 

Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is 

determined by reference to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 

source such as state law.’”). In takings matters, a protectable property interest must be a 

“legally-recognized property interest such as one in real estate, personal property, or intellectual 

property.” Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2004). And so, the Federal 

Circuit has held that “a statutory right to be paid money, at least in the context of federal 

employee compensation . . . is not a property interest for purposes of the Takings Clause.” Id. at 

1225. 

C. RCFC 56

Pursuant to RCFC 56, a party is entitled to summary judgment when there is “no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 

56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Biery v. United 

States, 753 F.3d 1279, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A dispute is “genuine” when “the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248. A fact is “material” if it could “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.
10

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). And so, ‘“the inferences to be 

drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion.”’ Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-

88, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 

654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962)). 

In making a summary judgment determination, the Court does not weigh the evidence 

presented, but instead must “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 249; see also Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 151, 154 (2004); Agosto v. INS, 

436 U.S. 748, 756, 98 S. Ct. 2081, 56 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1978) (“[A trial] court generally cannot 

grant summary judgment based on its assessment of the credibility of the evidence presented 

. . . .”) (citations omitted). The Court may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. The above standard applies when the Court considers cross-motions 

for summary judgment. Principal Life Ins. Co. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 82, 

89 (2014); see also Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010). And so, 

when both parties move for summary judgment, “‘the court must evaluate each party’s motion 

on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party 

whose motion is under consideration.’” Abbey v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 430, 436 (2011) 

(quoting Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).

D. 5 U.S.C. § 5348

The statutory provision for prevailing rate employees of certain Federal agencies, 

including the Military Sealift Command, is found in Title 5, Chapter 53, Subchapter IV of the

United States Code. 5 U.S.C. § 5341-49. Section 5341 sets forth the policy of the Congress for 

the fixing and adjustment of rates of pay of prevailing rate employees. 5 U.S.C. § 5341; see also 

Nat’l Mar. Union of Am., AFL-CIO v. United States, 682 F.2d 944, 947-48 (Ct. Cl. 1982). That 

policy includes four enumerated and specific principles, namely that:

It is the policy of Congress that rates of pay of prevailing rate employees be fixed 

and adjusted from time to time as nearly as is consistent with the public interest in 

accordance with prevailing rates and be based on principles that—
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(1) there will be equal pay for substantially equal work for all prevailing 

rate employees who are working under similar conditions of employment 

in all agencies within the same local wage area;

(2) there will be relative differences in pay within a local wage area when 

there are substantial or recognizable differences in duties, responsibilities, 

and qualification requirements among positions; 

(3) the level of rates of pay will be maintained in line with prevailing levels 

for comparable work within a local wage area; and

(4) the level of rates of pay will be maintained so as to attract and retain 

qualified prevailing rate employees.

5 U.S.C. § 5341. 

Specifically relevant to this dispute, Title 5, United States Code, Section 5348(a)

provides the authority for setting the wages for federal mariners. 5 U.S.C. § 5348(a). In this 

regard, Section 5348(a) provides that:

(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, the pay of officers and 

members of crews of vessels excepted from chapter 51 of this title by section 

5102(c)(8) of this title shall be fixed and adjusted from time to time as nearly as is 

consistent with the public interest in accordance with prevailing rates and practices 

in the maritime industry. 

Id. The sole source of the right to pay for civilian seamen—including entitlement to overtime or 

premium pay—is Section 5348(a). Daigle v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 376, 384 (1978); Blaha

v. United States, 511 F.2d 1165, 1166-67 (Ct. Cl. 1975).

This Court has long recognized that the government has broad discretion in fixing and 

adjusting pay under Section 5348. See Nat’l Mar. Union of Am., 682 F.2d at 949; see also 

Blaha, 511 F.2d at 1167; Benevento v. United States, 461 F.2d 1316, 1320 (Ct. Cl. 1972); 

Daniels v. United States, 407 F.2d 1345, 1347 (Ct. Cl. 1969). When reviewing an agency’s pay 

policy under Section 5348, this Court’s role is to determine whether plaintiff has met his “heavy 

burden of showing that the Government’s action was arbitrary or clearly wrong.” Nat’l Mar. 

Union of Am., 682 F.2d at 955 (citing Daniels, 407 F.2d at 1347). And so, “[t]o have a court set 

aside the determinations of federal agencies in prevailing rates disputes, a plaintiff must show 

that there has been an abuse of discretion, or that such a determination is so arbitrary as to be 

clearly wrong.” Best v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 720, 725 (1988) (upholding the Agency’s action 
12

where the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing an abuse of discretion or arbitrary 

action); see e.g., Daigle, 217 Ct. Cl. at 386 (“Unless the abuse of discretion is flagrant . . . it 

appears better not to see it in every decision that we ourselves would not make.”).

E. 46 U.S.C. § 10313

A seaman is entitled to wages pursuant to Title 46, United States Code, Section 10313. 

46 U.S.C. § 10313. Section 10313 provides that:

A seaman’s entitlement to wages and provisions begins when the seaman begins 

work or when specified in the agreement required by section 10302 of this title for 

the seaman to begin work or be present on broad, whichever is earlier.

46 U.S.C. § 10313(a). This provision also provides that a seaman is entitled to “one-half of the 

balance of wages earned and unpaid at each port at which the vessel loads or delivers cargo 

during the voyage,” and to the balance of wages due to the seaman at “the end of a voyage.” 46 

U.S.C. § 10313(e), (f). If the seaman is not paid, Section 10313 imposes a penalty on the nonpaying employer. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(g). In this regard, the statute provides that: 

When payment is not made as provided under subsection (f) of this section without 

sufficient cause, the master or owner shall pay to the seaman 2 days’ wages for each 

day payment is delayed.

Id. 

The portion of Title 46 that contains Section 10313 is found in Subtitle II, chapter 103. 

Subtitle II addresses the wages for a seaman and this subtitle applies to “a vessel of the United 

States.” 46 U.S.C. § 10301. Except as otherwise provided in the United States Code, Subtitle II

does not apply to a public vessel of the United States, which is defined as: 

[A] vessel that— (A) is owned, or demise chartered, and operated by the United 

States Government or a government of a foreign country; and (B) is not engaged in 

commercial service. 

46 U.S.C. § 2109; 46 U.S.C. § 2101(33).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The government has moved to dismiss Counts II and IV of the amended complaint upon 

the grounds that the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s 
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quantum meruit claim and plaintiff’s claim to recover double wages pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 

10313(g). Def. Mot. at 28-29, 32-33.

The parties have also filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues of: (1) 

whether plaintiff was assigned to the position of a Wiper and, thus, entitled to receive pay as a 

Wiper; (2) whether plaintiff is entitled to recover unpaid wages, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5348(a); 

and (3) whether plaintiff is entitled to recover unpaid wages, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 10313. See 

generally Pl. Mot.; Def. Mot. 

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues that the undisputed material facts in 

this case show that he was assigned to the position of Wiper while serving aboard the USNS 

Drew and that he should have been compensated at the rate of pay for a Wiper. Pl. Mot. at 19-

24. Plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to receive twice the amount of his unpaid wages, 

pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 10313, because the MSC’s failure to pay his wages was without 

sufficient cause. Id. at 18-19. In addition, plaintiff argues that judicial estoppel and law of the 

case prevent the government from arguing that Section 10313 is inapplicable to his claims for 

unpaid wages.

3

 Id. at 16-17. And so, plaintiff requests that the Court enter summary judgment 

in his favor with respect to Counts I, II and III of the amended complaint and deny the 

government’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 26; see also Am. Compl.

In its motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment, the government argues 

that plaintiff has not established that the MSC abused its discretion by recouping his pay,

because the MSC has broad discretion to administer CIVMAR pay pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5348. 

Def. Mot. at 11-20. The government also argues that plaintiff is not entitled to recover unpaid

wages pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 10313, because that statute is inapplicable to plaintiff. Id. at 25-

28. Lastly, the government argues that plaintiff fails to allege a plausible Fifth Amendment 

takings claim, because he does not have a protectable property interest in receiving unpaid 

wages. Id. at 33-34. And so, the government requests that the Court dismiss Counts II and IV of 

the amended complaint and grant summary judgment in its favor on the remaining counts of the 

amended complaint. Id. at 1. 

 

3

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff raises three new arguments that are not raised in the 

amended complaint namely, that: (1) his SF-50 incorrectly identifies his position; (2) the Budget Control 

Act of 2011 affected the MSC’s ability to pay CIVMARs; and (3) he was assigned to the MSC for a “onevoyage position.” Pl. Mot. at 3, 6, 8, 20-21. 
14

For the reasons set forth below, the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to 

consider plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim. A careful reading of the amended complaint also 

makes clear that plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a takings claim in Count V of the amended 

complaint. The undisputed material facts in this case also show that plaintiff is not entitled to 

recover unpaid wages pursuant to Section 10313, because that statute is not applicable to this 

case. In addition, plaintiff has not shown that the MSC abused its discretion by fixing and

recouping his pay pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5348. And so, the Court: (1) GRANTS-IN-PART the 

government’s motion to dismiss; (2) DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; (3) 

GRANTS the government’s cross-motion for summary judgment with regards to Counts I, II, 

III, and V of the amended complaint; and (4) DISMISSES the amended complaint. 

A. The Court Must Dismiss Plaintiff’s Quantum Meruit Claim

As an initial matter, the Court must dismiss plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim because this 

claim is jurisdictionally precluded under the Tucker Act. In the amended complaint, plaintiff 

alleges that he “worked as a Wiper and, in equity, was entitled to be paid as a Wiper.” Am. 

Compl. at ¶ 32. And so, plaintiff maintains that he may recover pay in this action under quantum 

meruit. Id. 

The Federal Circuit has held, however, that “[a] recovery under quantum meruit is based 

on an implied-in-law contract.” Int’l Data Prods. Corp. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1317, 1325

(Fed. Cir. 2007); see also United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1325, 1329-30 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006). It is also well-established that this Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction 

to consider claims based upon an implied-in-law contract under the Tucker Act. Hercules Inc. v. 

United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996). Given this, plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim falls 

beyond the reach of the Court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction. See id. And so, the Court must dismiss 

plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. RCFC 12(b)(1). 

B. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged A Plausible Takings Claim

The government also persuasively argues that the Court should deny plaintiff’s takings 

claim, because plaintiff fails to allege a plausible takings claim in the amended complaint. To 

have a viable cause of action for a Fifth Amendment takings, plaintiff must, among other things, 

point to a protectable property interest that is asserted to be the subject of the takings. See 

Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998); Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 
15

1212, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that under the Takings Clause, “property” is a “legallyrecognized property interest such as one in real estate, personal property, or intellectual 

property.”). In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that the MSC’s involuntary deductions 

of his pay “constitute takings without just compensation.” Am. Compl. at ¶ 34. And so, 

plaintiff’s takings claim appears to be based upon an alleged statutory right to receive pay 

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5348(a) and 46 U.S.C. § 10313. Id. at ¶ 5. 

The Federal Circuit has held, however, that a “statutory right to be paid money . . . is not 

a property interest for purposes of the Takings Clause.” Adams, 391 F.3d at 1225. Given this, 

plaintiff has not shown that he has a protectable property interest in recovering unpaid wages in 

this case. And so, the Court must grant the government’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

with respect to Count V of the amended complaint and deny plaintiff’s takings claim. 

C. Plaintiff Cannot Pursue A Claim Under Section 10313

The Court must also deny plaintiff’s claims for unpaid wages pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 

10313, because Section 10313 is not applicable to the facts of this case. It is undisputed that the 

USNS Drew is a public vessel of the United States—namely, a vessel that is owned and operated 

by the United States Government and not engaged in commercial service. Def. Mot. at 26; Pl. 

Mot. at 14-22; see also 46 U.S.C. § 2101(33). And so, to recover unpaid wages pursuant to 

Section 10313, plaintiff must show that Section 10313 applies to public vessels of the United 

States. 

Plaintiff cannot make such a showing in this case. A careful reading of the portion of 

Title 46 that governs vessels and seamen and contains Section 10313 (“Subtitle II”) makes clear 

that Section 10313 does not apply to public vessels of the United States. Specifically, Subtitle II 

applies to “a vessel of the United States” that is on a foreign voyage or of a certain size. 46 

U.S.C. § 10301(a); see also 46 U.S.C. § 116.4 But, Subtitle II also makes clear that a public

vessel of the United States is not subject to this subtitle. 46 U.S.C. § 2109 (emphasis supplied). 

 

4 A vessel of the United States is defined as any “vessel documented under chapter 121 of [Title 46].” 46 

U.S.C. § 116. By comparison, a public vessel of the United States is defined as “a vessel that—(A) is 

owned, or demise chartered, and operated by the United States Government or a government of a foreign 

country; and (B) is not engaged in commercial service.” 46 U.S.C. § 2101(33). In addition, Section 2109 

provides in relevant part that: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided, this subtitle does not apply to a public 
16

In this regard, Title 46, United States Code, Section 2109 provides that “this subtitle does 

not apply to a public vessel of the United States.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Because Section 

10313 is contained in Subtitle II, the Court agrees with the government that this statute does not 

apply to a public vessel like the USNS Drew. And so, plaintiff cannot rely upon Section 10313 

to pursue claims for unpaid wages in this case.

D. Plaintiff Has Not Shown That The MSC Abused Its 

Discretion Regarding The Administration Of His Pay 

The government also persuasively argues that the MSC did not abuse its discretion in 

fixing and recouping plaintiff’s pay. This Court has long recognized that the government has 

broad discretion in fixing pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5348. See Nat’l Mar. Union of Am., AFL-CIO v. 

United States, 682 F.2d 944, 949 (Ct. Cl. 1982); see also Blaha v. United States, 511 F.2d 1165, 

1167 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Benevento v. United States, 461 F.2d 1316, 1320 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Daniels v. 

United States, 407 F.2d 1345, 1347 (Ct. Cl. 1969). When reviewing an agency’s pay policy 

under Section 5348, this Court’s role is to determine whether plaintiff has met his heavy burden 

of showing that the government’s action was arbitrary or clearly wrong. Nat’l Mar. Union of 

Am., 682 F.2d at 955 (citing Daniels, 407 F.2d at 1347). And so, plaintiff must show that there 

has been an abuse of discretion, or that the MSC’s determination is so arbitrary as to be clearly 

wrong, in order to prevail on a challenge to the government’s decision regarding fixing pay. Best 

v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 720, 725 (1988).

For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff has not met his burden of proof in this case. 

And so, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTS the 

government’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this final issue.

1. The Undisputed Material Facts Show That Plaintiff 

Was Temporarily Reassigned To Perform Wiper Duties

As an initial matter, the undisputed material facts in this case show that plaintiff was 

temporarily reassigned to perform the duties of a Wiper while deployed aboard the USNS Drew. 

Plaintiff’s deployment to the USNS Drew is recorded in his SF-50, dated May 3, 2012, which 

provides that the nature of the employment action taken is a “reassignment.” Def. App’x at 19 

 

vessel of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 2109. Plaintiff has not identified an exception to this limitation.

Pl. Resp. at 14-23. 
17

(SF-50, dated May 3, 2012). The SF-50 also provides that plaintiff would be “performing duties 

of 8363 Wiper” during his deployment aboard the USNS Drew. Id.

Plaintiff’s SF-50 and the applicable MSC pay regulations make clear that the MSC did 

not change plaintiff’s rate of pay from a Supply Utilityman to a Wiper during this deployment. 

Id.; see also id. at 25-27 (Pacific Schedule of Wages). Notably, the MSC’s pay regulations 

provide that a “reassignment” is a “[p]ersonnel action taken to place an employee in a different 

position (rating) without a change to the base rate of pay.” Id. at 219 (CMPI 330.1-5) (emphasis 

supplied). Consistent with this regulation, plaintiff’s SF-50 provides that the specified amounts 

of plaintiff’s basic pay and locality adjustment “reflect permanent salary which is higher than 

ship’s salary.” Id. at 19 (SF-50, dated May 3, 2012). And so, the undisputed material facts in 

this case show that the MSC temporarily reassigned plaintiff to the position of a Wiper without 

making any change to plaintiff’s rate of pay.

5

 

Plaintiff’s argument that the totality of the circumstances in this case show that he was 

assigned to the position of a Wiper—and thus entitled to receive Wiper pay—is also belied by 

the factual record in this case. Plaintiff correctly observes that his SF-50 is not necessarily 

determinative of his employment status and that the Court may consider evidence that 

demonstrates that a ministerial error occurred regarding the execution of this form in determining 

his employment status. Grigsby v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 729 F.2d 772, 775-76 

(Fed. Cir. 1984). But, plaintiff puts forward no evidence to show that his SF-50 “incorrectly 

[identified his] position as a ‘C848 Utilityman.’” Pl. Mot. at 6, 20-21. 

Plaintiff also does not show that the totality of the circumstances in this case establish 

that the MSC changed his rate of pay while deployed aboard the USNS Drew. In this regard, 

plaintiff points to three documents to show that he was assigned to the position of Wiper while 

aboard the USNS Drew, namely: (1) the OPA message generated at the outset of his deployment 

on the USNS Drew, which states that plaintiff’s duty status was the position of a Wiper effective 

May 3, 2012; (2) the OPA message generated upon his return from deployment, dated September 

 

5 The Court’s conclusion that plaintiff was temporarily reassigned to the position of a Wiper while 

deployed aboard the USNS Drew is reinforced by an April 30, 2012, email, which provides a 

recommendation that plaintiff be assigned to the USNS Drew “as relief to fill [the] vacant WIPER 

BILLET” position. Pl. Mot. at Ex. 1 (MSC E-Mail, dated April 30, 2012). This e-mail also makes clear 

that “WIPER Reid is on a TEMP PROM to WIPER (363) for this assignment.” Id. 
18

4, 2012, which states that plaintiff’s duty status was the position of Wiper while deployed; and 

(3) a sea service letter from the master of the USNS Drew, dated March 29, 2013, which states 

that plaintiff was a Wiper while deployed aboard the USNS Drew. Pl. Mot. at 5-6; see also Def. 

App’x at 30 (OPA, dated May 6, 2012); id. at 34 (OPA, dated Sept. 4, 2012); Pl. Mot. at Ex. 6

(Sea Service Letter, dated March 29, 2013). But, a review of these documents makes clear that 

the documents simply confirm that plaintiff performed the duties of a Wiper while deployed 

aboard the USNS Drew. Id. These documents also do not address any change in plaintiff’s 

permanent assignment, nor do they state that plaintiff should be compensated at the rate of pay 

for a Wiper. Def. App’x at 30 (OPA, dated May 6, 2012); id. at 34 (OPA, dated Sept. 4, 2012). 

Indeed, it is undisputed that plaintiff resumed performing the duties of his permanent 

assignment as a Supply Utilityman—and received pay at the rate of pay for a Supply 

Utilityman—after his deployment aboard the USNS Drew concluded. Id. at 35 (SF-50, dated 

September 5, 2012). Given these undisputed facts, the factual record in this case shows that 

plaintiff was temporarily reassigned to perform the duties of a Wiper and that he had no right to 

receive pay as a Wiper. And so, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 

grants the government’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this issue. 

2. The MSC’s Policy To Pay Plaintiff At 

The Supply Utilityman Rate Was Reasonable

The undisputed material facts in this matter also show that the MSC did not abuse its 

discretion in fixing plaintiff’s rate of pay and recouping the overpayment of plaintiff’s wages. It 

is undisputed that, after initially paying plaintiff at the rate of pay for a Wiper, the MSC 

determined that it should have compensated plaintiff at the rate of pay for a Supply Utilityman 

for all regular and overtime work performed while aboard the USNS Drew. See id. at 32-33

(Declaration of Dorothy Abreu). While plaintiff disagrees with the MSC’s decision, the 

undisputed facts in this case make clear that this decision is consistent with Section 5348, the 

CMPI, and the MSC’s pay policy. See id. at 19 (SF-50, dated May 3, 2012); see also id. at 3 

(Declaration of Andrew Kallgren); id. at 32 (Declaration of Dorothy Abreu); id. at 244 (CMPI 

512.4-1 Clarification).6 

 

6 As the government acknowledges, MSC was at times unsure of its position regarding the amount of 

plaintiff’s pay. Initially, the MSC paid plaintiff at the rate of pay for a Wiper during his deployment on 

the USNS Drew. Def. App’x at 33 (Declaration of Dorothy Abreu). In 2013, the MSC commenced 
19

As the government correctly argues in its cross-motion for summary judgment, the 

MSC’s decision to compensate plaintiff at the rate of pay for a Supply Utilityman while 

deployed aboard the USNS Drew is consistent with the Congress’s intent regarding the 

compensation of prevailing rate employees. See Def. Mot. at 19-20. Congress has set forth the 

policy for fixing and adjusting the rates of pay of prevailing rate employees, like plaintiff, in 

Title 5, United States Code, Section 5341. 5 U.S.C. § 5341. Section 5341 enumerates four 

guiding principles for prevailing rate pay, including that:

It is the policy of Congress that rates of pay of prevailing rate employees be fixed 

and adjusted from time to time as nearly as is consistent with the public interest in 

accordance with prevailing rates and be based on principles that—

(1) there will be equal pay for substantially equal work for all prevailing rate 

employees who are working under similar conditions of employment in all 

agencies within the same local wage area.

Id.; see also Nat’l Mar. Union of Am., 682 F.2d at 947. 

While Section 5341 generally requires that the government provide equal pay for 

substantially equal work for prevailing rate employees, Congress has also made clear that the 

government has broad discretion to establish such pay “consistent with the public interest.” 5 

U.S.C. § 5341. In this regard, 5 U.S.C. § 5348(a) provides that:

(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, the pay of officers and 

members of crews of vessels excepted from chapter 51 of this title by section 

5102(c)(8) of this title shall be fixed and adjusted from time to time as nearly as is 

consistent with the public interest in accordance with prevailing rates and practices 

in the maritime industry. 

5 U.S.C. § 5348(a) (emphasis supplied). The principles enumerated in Section 5341 “do not 

exhaust the meaning of—and hence the range of discretion by—the public interest.” Nat’l Mar. 

Union of Am., 682 F.2d at 952-53. Given this, the “public interest is a consideration placed in 

opposition to equality of pay. . . . [And so,] equality of pay may not always be entirely consistent 

 

recoupment efforts to recover an overpayment of plaintiff’s pay, but the MSC later determined that it had 

incorrectly initiated the involuntary debt collection process against plaintiff. Id. at 41 (E-Mail, dated Nov. 

19, 2013). In 2014, the MSC again determined that plaintiff had been overpaid. Id. at 43 (Memorandum 

from Chris Jones, dated Oct. 1, 2014). And so, the MSC notified plaintiff of this debt on January 23, 

2015, and later recouped these funds. Id. at 65-72 (E-Mail from Bonnie Fisher, dated Jan. 25, 2015); id. 

at 96-97 (DFAS Debt Case Report).
20

with the public interest,” when the government fixes and adjusts pay for members and crews of 

vessels under Section 5348. Id. at 949. 

The undisputed material facts in this case show that the MSC appropriately exercised the 

discretion afforded under Sections 5341 and 5348 to fix plaintiff’s pay, consistent with the public 

interest. The undisputed material facts show that the MSC compensated plaintiff at the rate of 

pay for his permanent position as a Supply Utilityman, based upon its policy to pay CIVMARs 

that have been temporarily reassigned to a position that has a lower base rate of pay at the rate of 

pay for their permanent position. See Def. App’x at 19 (SF-50, dated May 3, 2012); see also id. 

at 3 (Declaration of Andrew Kallgren); id. at 32 (Declaration of Dorothy Abreu); id. at 244 

(CMPI 512.4-1 Clarification). Plaintiff correctly observes that he received a different amount of 

pay—including less overtime pay—than a CIVMAR employee who was permanently assigned 

to the position of Wiper would have received for performing similar work under this policy. Pl. 

Mot. at 12-13. But, this difference in pay is due to the MSC’s need to vary the compensation for 

CIVMAR employees, based upon the needs of a particular ship and the ship’s coast, horsepower 

ratings, tonnage and engine category. Def. Mot. at 12; see also Def. App’x at 2 (Declaration of 

Andrew Kallgren). 

Given this, the Court agrees with the government that the MSC’s policy to vary the pay 

of CIVMAR employees is consistent with the public interest in ensuring that the needs of the 

MSC are met when managing its fleet. The MSC appropriately exercised its discretion to fix 

plaintiff’s pay consistent with Section 5348 and the MSC’s pay policy. And so, the Court does 

not find the MSC’s actions to be clearly wrong or run afoul of the requirements of Section 5348, 

as plaintiff suggests. 

The undisputed material facts in this case also show that the MSC compensated plaintiff

in accordance with the CMPI applicable to his pay. In his motion for summary judgment, 

plaintiff incorrectly argues that the MSC violated CMPI 610 by recouping his pay, because this

regulation requires that CIVMARs “must be given just compensation for the premium pay work 

they perform.” Pl. Mot. at 14. CMPI 610 provides that: 

It is the policy of Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC) that 

CIVMARs will be given just compensation for their services. CIVMARs will not 

be required to perform work for which premium pay is authorized, and then denied 

such pay. 
21

Def. App’x at 118 (CMPI 610.1-3). And so, this regulation requires that the MSC compensate 

CIVMARs for any overtime work performed.

While it is undisputed that plaintiff received less overtime pay than a Wiper would have 

received for performing the same duties aboard the USNS Drew, the undisputed material facts 

show that the MSC compensated plaintiff for all overtime performed. See id. at 27 (Pacific 

Schedule of Wages) (showing that the overtime rate of pay for a Wiper is higher than the 

overtime pay rate of pay for a Supply Utilityman). Given this, plaintiff has not shown that the 

MSC violated CMPI 610 in connection with his pay. 

Plaintiff’s argument that the MSC violated CMPI 330, because a reassignment to a lower 

rate of base pay is only appropriate if requested by the mariner, is similarly misguided. Pl. Mot. 

at 23-24. As discussed above, CMPI 330 defines a “reassignment” as a “[p]ersonnel action taken 

to place an employee in a different position (rating) without a change to the base rate of pay.” 

Def. App’x at 219 (CMPI 330.1-5). That is precisely what occurred in this case. The MSC 

temporarily reassigned plaintiff to perform the duties of a Wiper, and compensated plaintiff at 

the higher base rate of pay for a Supply Utilityman, during his deployment aboard the USNS 

Drew. See id. at 33 (Declaration of Dorothy Abreu). Because there was no change in plaintiff’s 

rate of pay, plaintiff has not shown that the MSC violated the requirements of CMPI 330. See id. 

Plaintiff also has not shown that the MSC violated CMPI 531. Pl. Mot. at 13. CMPI 531 

provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he marine employee officially assigned to an authorized 

position is entitled to only the corresponding wages for that position found in the appropriate 

schedule of wages.” Def. App’x at 112 (CMPI 531.4-3(b)). As discussed above, the undisputed 

material facts show that plaintiff was officially assigned to the position of a Supply Utilityman 

during his deployment aboard the USNS Drew, and that the MSC appropriately compensated 

plaintiff at the base rate of pay and overtime rate of pay for his authorized position as a Supply 

Utilityman. See id. at 219 (CMPI 330.1-5); id. at 19 (SF-50, dated May 3, 2012); see also id. at 

3 (Declaration of Andrew Kallgren); id. at 32 (Declaration of Dorothy Abreu); id. App’x at 244 

(CMPI 512.4-1 Clarification). And so, plaintiff simply has not shown that the MSC violated any 

of the pay regulations applicable to this case.

Indeed, at bottom, plaintiff’s dispute with the MSC appears to be that the amount of his

overtime pay while deployed abroad the USNS Drew was less than the overtime pay that a 
22

Wiper would have received for similar work. While plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with this outcome

is understandable, the Court does not believe that the MSC’s pay policy is arbitrary, or beyond 

the boundaries of the broad discretion afforded to the MSC to fix and adjust plaintiff’s pay under 

Section 5348. And so, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grants the 

government’s cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to Count III of the amended 

complaint. 

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, plaintiff has not established that the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to 

consider his quantum meruit claim, and he has not alleged a plausible takings claim in the 

amended complaint. Plaintiff also fails to show that Section 10313 is applicable to his claims for 

unpaid wages. 

In addition, the undisputed material facts in this case make clear that the MSC 

appropriately compensated plaintiff and recouped the overpayment of plaintiff’s wages,

consistent with Section 5348 and the MSC’s pay regulations. And so, for the foregoing reasons, 

the Court:

1. GRANTS-IN-PART the government’s motion to dismiss; 

2. DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; 

3. GRANTS the government’s cross-motion for summary judgment with 

regards to Counts I, II, III, and V of the amended complaint; and

4. DISMISSES the amended complaint.

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

Each party shall bear their own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Lydia Kay Griggsby 

LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY

Judge