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89–837 PDF 2003

S. HRG. 108–178

A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF

DEMOCRACY IN BURMA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 18, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas ............................................... 1

Burke, Kevin, President and CEO, American Apparel and Footwear Association ........................................................................................................................ 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34

Craner, Hon. Lorne W., Assistant Secretary, Democracy, Human Rights and

Labor, Department of State ................................................................................ 6

Din, U Aung, Policy Director, Free Burma Coalition ........................................... 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16

Joseph, Brian, Program Officer, Asia, National Endowment for Democracy ..... 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25

Martin, Veronika, Advocate, Refugees International ........................................... 38

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41

McConnell, Hon. Mitch, U.S. Senator from Kentucky .......................................... 3

Rogers, Kenneth, Associate Dean of International Programs and Director

of International Services (emeritus), Indiana University ................................. 36

(III)

(1)

A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF

DEMOCRACY IN BURMA

Wednesday, June 18, 2003

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in Room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback,

chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senator Brownback.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,

U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

Senator BROWNBACK. The hearing will come to order. This is a

hearing of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. We

will be hearing about recent developments in the Southeast Asian

country of Burma. This is a result of actions taken by the Congress

in light of the recent crackdown in Burma, and in light of broader

discussion of the United States toward the military regime in

Burma. We have the author of this major bill, Senator McConnell,

who will be first to testify. Before I go on with my statement, I

want to say how appreciative I am of his great work to focus intensity and ability to move this legislation on forward. I appreciate

that, and I know the people of Burma deeply appreciate that.

During some ominous twilight hour on May 30 a band of brutes

under the banner of the Union Solidarity and Development Association launched into an attack on a caravan transporting Aung

San Suu Kyi and supporters of a goodwill tour. The resulting melee

ended in an unknown number of people killed and injured and

Aung San Suu Kyi imprisoned, along with 19 of her supporters in

a nationwide crackdown on her National League for Democracy,

the NLD, and the country’s universities, which have proven to be

a fount of democratic activism.

Last week, the New York Times quoted a noted expert as saying

if they can get away with it, this is the end of Aung San Suu Kyi,

if not as a mythical figure, then as a real threat to them. If people

accept that she can be locked away and nobody can see her, and

that other leaders can be silenced and that the party can be silenced, then they’ve won the day.

I am confident when I say that they have already lost. As Secretary Powell’s comments in the Wall Street Journal stated, simply

put, the attack on Ms. Suu Kyi, her convoy, and the utter failure

of the junta to accept efforts at peaceful change cannot be the last

2

word on the matter. I applaud the efforts of Secretary Powell in

Cambodia addressing this and other important issues at the

ASEAN Regional Forum, who has clearly asserted the United

States’ policy. The message is clear to the regime. Time is up for

your tyranny.

I am not asserting that our policies have come simply as a response to this latest crackdown. By contrast, as early as March,

during a House International Relations Committee hearing, Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Daley stated, ‘‘absent

progress, we will be forced to consider, in conjunction with the

international community, sanctions and/or other measures.’’ Ostensibly, the Secretary of State made a reversal of policy because of a steady buildup of egregious violations by the regime. The

window for dialogue and engagement withered before our eyes.

However, questions remain about the direction and commitment

the U.S. has to executing this new policy. Upon what equities will

we need to trade? Will there be strategic issues the U.S. would

need to transcend if it were to pursue this policy? Can we expect

adequate cooperation from our allies, regional partners, and other

key players? Our witnesses have answers to most of these questions, and I look forward to hearing from them.

My own view is that engagement with the regime, whether or

not it was bearing fruit, has shamelessly failed. Systems of government matter. Unlike some of the other erstwhile communist states,

fledgling democracies in the former Soviet Union, Burma does not

operate under any pretense or suggestion that it is a democraticoriented state. Not only does it not get it, the junta does not want

to get it. For the U.S. to have the moral authority to move forward,

we must impose sanctions, namely, import bans, sacrificing our

own economic self-interest in this particular case; I think it can be

very, very successful.

The other measures which extend the visa ban for the regime’s

thugs, freeze and seize assets, ban remittances, and ban travel for

U.S. citizens, are all measures to put the squeeze on the Generals.

I’m hopeful that we’re going to be able to work in an international

coalition in this effort. Just last week, the Senate passed a resolution on Burma that allows the use of sanctions. Normally, I am

strongly opposed to the use of sanctions, but in this particular case

I think it is something that we have to look at very aggressively

to send any type of message at all to this brutal regime.

Let me conclude my comments by simply saying that, one personal note, a couple of years ago I traveled to the Thai-Burmese

border. It was on an issue regarding trafficking in persons. It was

actually sex trafficking, and one of the premier places where that

was happening in the world was along the Burmese-Thai border.

The reason it was happening there was because the Burmese Government was running its citizens out of its country along that border, and a number of young girls were becoming prey to traffickers

into brothels in Thailand and other places.

This was a direct result of what the Burmese regime was doing

to its own people, leading to this increase in trafficking in one of

the biggest areas in the world. Burma is a tier three country; it

just came out in the Trafficking in Persons Report. They don’t care

about the trafficking in persons, and it continues to happen

3

unabated. This is a shameful situation that’s happening as a result

of the policies of the Burmese Government.

I now have the pleasure of introducing the lead author of the resolution that passed the United States Senate last week, Senator

Mitch McConnell, who has worked aggressively on the topic of our

relations with Burma and putting pressure on the Burmese Government. Senator McConnell, I’m delighted to have you here, and

the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. MITCH McCONNELL,

U.S. SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and

thank you for your interest. The timeliness of this hearing could

not be more obvious. I appreciate your support as well as Chairman Lugar’s and Ranking Member Biden’s support for the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, which we passed out of the Senate, as you indicated, just last week. That 97-to-1 vote underscores

the Senate’s support for the struggle for freedom in Burma. We

sent a very powerful message to Rangoon, that the freest nation on

earth is leading the charge to defend Burma’s courageous democrats, including Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

As Burma’s history informs its future, a cursory examination of

the past should discourage us from believing that strong words

from Senators alone will cause the thugs in Rangoon to change

their ways. The illegitimate Burmese junta was born in blood, and

the leaders of the regime have maintained their grip on power

through violence and intimidation ever since. For over 40 years,

from the military coup led by General New Win in 1962, until the

murder of democratic dissidents just this last month, the generals

who run things in Rangoon have brutalized their political opponents, terrorized the Burmese people, and driven the Burmese

economy right into the ground.

Every time the junta has been threatened by the forces of freedom and democracy, it has violently lashed out against its critics.

We saw this during the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations in

Burma, again in the 1990 elections won by the NLD, and most recently on May 30 when, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, the ambush on Suu Kyi’s convoy occurred that killed and injured scores

of democrats.

Despite the murder and the mayhem, the SPDC has yet to extinguish the flames of freedom in Burma. What has been most impressive is the courage and determination of Suu Kyi and all Burmese democrats in the face of this incredible repression. They simply refuse—simply refuse—to surrender the principles of freedom,

human rights, and the rule of law to this abusive regime.

United States sanctions on Burma are a good first step, and will

be watched. Indeed they are being watched around the globe. But

our actions will not be truly effective until our European allies and

Burma’s neighbors also place pressure on the junta. There are

many reasons why they should do this. First, the world’s democracies have an inherent obligation to assist other freedom-loving

peoples to achieve their aspirations for democracy and the rule of

law. This is even more true when freedom is under attack, as is

happening in Burma.

4

Second, Mr. Chairman, the SPDC poses a clear and present danger to Burma’s neighbors. Burma is a major exporter of narcotics,

small arms, HIV/AIDS, instability, and disease, to say nothing of

the forced trafficking of women and children as indentured sex

workers, which the Chairman has already referenced. China and

Thailand already recognize the growing HIV/AIDS and narcotics

problems spilling over Burma’s borders into their own countries.

As the recent SARS epidemic has illustrated, disease knows no

borders, and it is apparent that all transnational issues that stem

from the SPDC pose long-term threats to the region and beyond

the region.

Finally, the junta’s brutal attack on democracy in Burma received swift condemnation from foreign capitals. Even ASEAN, the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, now meeting in Cambodia,

can no longer ignore this crisis festering in its own backyard. U.N.

Special Envoy Razali Ismail lashed out at ASEAN, saying, ‘‘constructive engagement is just an excuse for perpetuating the status

quo. ASEAN should be very embarrassed at what is happening in

Burma.’’

Maybe ASEAN is embarrassed. The comments of nine members

earlier this week for Suu Kyi’s release is a welcome departure from

ASEAN’s policy of noninterference in other member states’ affairs,

but words must be backed up by concrete actions. ASEAN members

collectively and independently should consider similar measures

proposed in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, including

travel restrictions and freezing assets of the SPDC.

On this latter point, Mr. Chairman, Razali indicated that a portion of the junta’s assets may be in Singapore. Perhaps the Senate

should discuss this matter when the Singapore Free Trade Act

comes to the floor for consideration. Some of Burma’s regional

neighbors have been more aggressive in seeking to curry favor with

the military junta. Bidding for despots is never a safe bet, and I

would encourage those countries, including Japan, India, Malaysia,

China, and Thailand to rethink the dangers inherent to cooperating

with an illegitimate regime.

Further unrestrained competition between China, Japan, and

India for greater relations with Rangoon may create unintended

and unproductive demands of its own. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Independent Task Force on Burma released its report just

this morning. It contains numerous policy recommendations that

the administration and the U.N. should consider and implement.

I am pleased to have served on that task force, along with Senators Lugar and Feinstein, and want to encourage the State Department to move quickly on one particularly timely suggestion.

America should press the U.N. to convene an emergency Security

Council meeting to sanction Burma.

Let me add one recommendation not included in the task force

report. Diplomatic relations with Burma should be downgraded by

sending Burma’s Ambassador in Washington back to Rangoon until

such time that Suu Kyi and all political prisoners are freed. I sent

a letter to Secretary Powell this very morning suggesting a downgrade in relations, and encourage other interested Members to do

the same.

5

If the international community has the political will to stand for

freedom in Burma, change can come to that beleaguered country.

America can lead in that effort, but we cannot do it alone. It is in

the interests of the United States, Europe, and all of Asia that a

solution to Burma be achieved. Absent such a resolution, the major

exports from Burma to the region will continue to be drugs, disease, and refugees. Those are the major exports from Burma right

now, drugs, disease, and refugees.

Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that the full range of

sanctions cannot be imposed against Burma soon enough. However,

there must be concrete progress and a meaningful dialogue between the SPDC, the NLD, and ethnic minorities before any pressure is lifted. It’s not enough simply to free Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. This game that the junta plays of catch and release has gotten old. Pressure should only be lifted when a dialogue

leads to a successful conclusion of Burma’s struggle for freedom.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be

here today.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator McConnell, for your

statement and the power of it, and I appreciated all the specifics

that you put in it as well. It’s a very complete statement and a very

good one. It strikes me anywhere around the world that when you

see evil as concentrated as what we have in the leadership in

Burma, the thing you do with it is not to negotiate with it. You

confront it and you deal with it, and you face it; you’ve put forward

a number of very specific items here.

Let me ask you, in your review of actions taken by other countries to date, have the Europeans been stepping forward on dealing

with Burma? Is there any indication that they will be putting additional pressure on Burma?

Senator MCCONNELL. Not to the extent that I would like, and I

think the Europeans ought to join us. We have had some differences recently over Iraq policy. This ought to be something that

we can all agree on.

And I, like you, am typically skeptical of sanctions, but there is

one good example in recent history where a multilateral sanctions

regime worked and actually brought about regime change, which is

what we are seeking here. That was South Africa where the entire

world literally treated the South Africa Government as a pariah.

It was so isolated from the rest of the world as a result of its own

internal policies, very similar to this, that it did indeed hasten the

end of the apartheid regime.

So there’s every reason to believe that an effective international

sanctions regime could well get the job done in Burma, and I’m

hoping that the United States is going to lead and the Europeans

will follow. Of course it’s very important for the ASEAN countries

to do a good deal more than they did just the day before yesterday—they called for the release of Suu Kyi. Maybe they thought

that was a big deal, because they typically don’t comment on internal affairs in ASEAN countries; but the release of Suu Kyi is not

enough, and letting Razali in to see her for 15 minutes is not

enough.

Seeing is not freeing. First, she needs to be out, free to go about

the country, and that needs to lead to an orderly transition to recVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:15 Nov 14, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 89837 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
6

ognize the outcome of the election in 1990. I believe that with the

U.S. in the lead, with our prestige at an all-time high throughout

the world, this is the time to get multilateral sanctions regimes in

place around the world, and I think it will make a difference.

Senator BROWNBACK. The Thais have been a good ally of the

United States for a long period of time, and yet have been slow to

move forward on addressing the issue of Burma. Lately, they have

made some stronger statements here, but are we seeing enough

progress being made, or push made by Thailand?

Senator MCCONNELL. No. The Thai Prime Minister met with the

President a week ago Tuesday. I met with him as well. They have

had, as the Senator knows, a policy of constructive engagement,

which basically means they’re doing business with the thugs. I

think the Thais need to reverse that policy. The President himself

mentioned that to the Thai Prime Minister in their meeting. I and

others certainly mentioned it up here. I think that is a policy that

clearly won’t work.

The Thais could potentially have the greatest impact on the Burmese regime, because they’re right next door. I hope the constructive engagement policy will change and that they will join us in an

international sanctions regime that can actually squeeze the junta

right out of power.

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator, thank you very much for your testimony, and I appreciate all of your suggestions.

We will next call up Hon. Lorne W. Craner. He is the Assistant

Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the State

Department, and he will be the next panel presentation.

Mr. Craner, thank you very much for joining us. Your full statement will be made a part of the record. You’re welcome to summarize or to deliver off that statement, however you would choose.

We’re delighted to have you here.

STATEMENT OF HON. LORNE W. CRANER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CRANER. Thank you very much, Senator. Normally I actually

don’t read statements at length, but I would like to read this one;

because the administration has a few things to say, and we would

like to say them publicly.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important and timely

hearing. It is with a feeling of outrage and disgust that I appear

here today, because tomorrow a courageous champion of democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, will be spending yet another birthday, her

58th, in detention. The Burmese junta must release Aung San Suu

Kyi immediately and resume a dialogue with the opposition to formulate with them a plan for democratization in Burma.

In light of the recent outrageous events in Burma, I will be updating you on the State Department’s current strategy to respond

to those events and reiterating this administration’s unwavering

commitment to support the long-suffering people of Burma as they

battle for democracy, human rights, and freedom. Both the President and Secretary of State have taken a personal interest in

Burma, and many of my comments echo those of the Secretary in

his recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal.

7

Our worst fears for democracy in Burma have been realized. We

have always doubted the sincerity of the junta’s claim to desire a

peaceful transition to democracy. Now we know our doubts were

justified. The orchestration of the ambush of Aung San Suu Kyi

and her supporters on May 30 and the refusal to account for what

has happened leave no room for debate.

The junta, calling itself the State Peace and Development Council, rules through fear and brutality, and with complete disregard

for the rule of law, basic human rights, and the hopes and welfare

of the Burmese people. The junta’s recent actions make clear the

depths to which these thugs will sink to retain power. Our response must be equally clear.

We commend the bipartisan efforts of Members of Congress to

shine a spotlight on human rights in Burma. We also commend the

Senate for passing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act sponsored by Senator Mitch McConnell, who has always been a great

advocate for liberty in Burma for now over a decade.

The State Department supports the goals and intent of this bill,

and we are working on several actions to increase pressure on the

SPDC. Already, we have extended our visa restrictions to include

all officials of the puppet organization of the junta: the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), and the managers of

state-run enterprises, so that they and their families can be banned

as well.

The United States already votes against loans to Burma from

IFUs like the World Bank. In addition to our existing sanctions, we

are now working on freezing the financial assets of members of the

SPDC and banning remittances to Burma. We are also considering

an import ban. Finally, we hope to place restrictions on travel to

Burma.

As we strengthen our own set of sanctions, we do so in conjunction with the E.U. Earlier this week, the E.U. began implementing

its own strengthened common position which will also extend an

asset freeze and visa restrictions to leaders of the USDA and managers of state-owned companies. To be truly effective, however,

Burma’s neighbors must join us in increasing pressure on the

SPDC. It is time that Asian countries take responsibility for the actions of their Burmese neighbor, the junta that destabilizes the region and smears the reputation of a regional institution like

ASEAN.

As we speak, the Secretary is currently having frank discussions

at the ASEAN Regional Forum about Burma with both members

of ASEAN and other countries in attendance, including China.

ASEAN loses credibility when it allows one of its members to flout

its previous commitments to the organization. It is time that

ASEAN members act decisively and firmly to address the problems

in Burma that affect their region. We recognize their recent statement in favor of national reconciliation as a first step. We also support their plans to send a troika delegation to Rangoon, but we

need to see more.

The SPDC’s renewed campaign of violence and repression

against the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi shows the junta’s blatant

disregard for the basic rights of the Burmese people and the desire

of the international community to see those rights protected. The

8

most recent crackdown is just one link in a long chain of appalling

behavior against the people and the nation that the military regime claims to represent.

The SPDC’s disregard for human rights and democracy extends

to every conceivable category of violation. The junta suppresses political dissent by censorship, persecution, beatings, disappearances,

and imprisonment. It harasses ethnic minorities through brutal

campaigns against civilians. It sharply curtails religious freedom.

It subjects its people to forced labor. It recruits children to serve

in the military, and then brutalizes them.

The litany of abuses in ethnic minority regions is especially deplorable: widespread and brutal rapes, tortures, murders, forced relocations, forced labor, confiscation of property, and suppression of

religious freedom in villages in the Shan, Karen, Kayah, Mon,

Rakhine, and Tenasserim Divisions. The violations of the basic

human rights of these minority peoples have devastating consequences that extend from individuals and their families and communities, to the region and the world.

The widespread use of forced labor by the SPDC, including the

forced conscription of children into the army, has been an ongoing

concern to the U.S. and the International Labor Organization.

Forced labor is one of the most egregious violations of worker

rights. Since the ILO’s request to its constituents in December

2000 that they review their relations with Burma in light of the

system of forced labor, it has been trying to work with the SPDC

to eliminate forced labor. As the ILO liaison officer in Rangoon said

recently, forced labor continues to be a serious problem, especially

in border areas controlled by the military.

Our recent report on trafficking in persons, released just last

week, sheds further light on the problem and the Burmese regime’s

insufficient response. The SPDC has tried to appease the ILO with

slow increases in the level of their cooperation with them, but this

has yet to lead to any serious actions to combat the problem.

In May, the SPDC and the ILO agreed on a plan of action which,

if implemented, would have begun to produce some substantive

progress. The ILO decided this month, however, that the climate

of uncertainty and intimidation created by the events of May 30

did not provide an environment in which the plan could be implemented credibly.

Forced labor is yet another area in which the SPDC continues to

evade its responsibility to protect the basic rights of the people of

Burma and show its disdain for the rule of law.

Throughout Burma, there is no freedom of association, no freedom of expression, and no freedom of the press. Well over 1,000 political prisoners languish in Burma’s jails, and the arrests and unlawful detentions continue. In addition to Aung San Suu Kyi, at

least 100 NLD supporters were detained or are missing or dead

after the incident in late May. NLD leaders, both young and old,

were targeted in this assault. Today, we fear for the welfare of senior leader U Tin Oo, who reportedly was injured, and whose whereabouts remain unknown.

We have not forgotten, nor will we forget, any of these brave individuals who put their lives on the line over the past two decades

to stand, as others have before them, for justice, democracy, freeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:15 Nov 14, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 89837 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
9

dom, the rule of law, and the right to be heard. Together with the

international community, we have pressed for the immediate and

unconditional release of all political prisoners at every opportunity.

We will continue to do so until every prisoner is released to live

a life in freedom and peace.

We will also continue to report honestly and accurately on the

crimes of the SPDC in our reports on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons and drugs. The truth will not be

hidden. The oppression of an entire nation must not stand. The

international community should pull together as never before to

put an end to the unchecked abuses perpetrated by this illegitimate

and brutal junta. The Generals must learn that such appalling behavior will deny them any of the benefits of participation in the

global community, and eventually will deny them the ability to

maintain the power they stole from the legitimate democratic leadership of Burma in 1990.

Thank you, sir.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much.

Let me ask you a couple of things, starting off with countries in

the region and how they’re doing on dealing with the government

in Rangoon. What’s been the communication you’ve had with China

on its relationship with Burma, its support for the military government, and what’s been the Chinese response?

Mr. CRANER. Insufficient for what we would like. There is no evidence that they’re willing to change their attitude on Burma neither in international fora nor bilaterally.

Senator BROWNBACK. This, in spite of the things that have happened here, the ambush that happened on Suu Kyi, the ongoing

problem? The Chinese have not changed their position towards

Burma?

Mr. CRANER. No, they have not.

Senator BROWNBACK. China is a major supplier, a major military

supplier to the Government of Burma. Does that continue to be the

case?

Mr. CRANER. That continues to be the case.

Senator BROWNBACK. How do they justify this position given this

takeover by a military government, the trafficking, narcotics trafficking, sex trafficking that is taking place right next door to them?

They can’t deny that it occurs, or do they?

Mr. CRANER. No, they don’t deny that it occurs, but you have to

remember that, given the nature of the Chinese regime, the way

they would view the regime in Burma, they are obviously affected

by some of these problems. There is a drug problem, a big drug

problem in southern China along those borders, and they recognize

that trafficking in China needs to be cleaned up. They have taken

some acts over the years, but they are not yet ready, at this moment at least, to increase their pressure on the Burmese junta.

Senator BROWNBACK. What about Thailand? What has the Thai

response been?

Mr. CRANER. The best way to look at this is to look at the region

and decide as a group, are they moving? I think as Senator McConnell noted, they have moved in terms of statements. They are talking about sending a group to Rangoon to push the regime to release

10

Suu Kyi and open up. I don’t think that is enough, but I also don’t

think we should underestimate that movement.

My experience in watching regimes around the world is that the

most useful pressure can come from the United States and Europe,

but it is at least as important to have the neighbors involved in

pressuring a regime to change. It need not include economic sanctions against a regime in their neighborhood. The regime in their

neighborhood has to get the sense that their neighbors have tired

of them before they look at changing.

Senator BROWNBACK. Is that message being convened by

ASEAN?

Mr. CRANER. I think the Burmese regime was shocked by the

change, the statement that was made by ASEAN. I don’t think it

expected that at all. I think that was an important thing, though

it looks insufficient to us, but I think the Burmese regime has

begun to get the message, as it should, that it is an embarrassment

to the other countries in the region and that the other countries

are tiring of having this kind of mess in their neighborhood.

Senator BROWNBACK. I would think they would at least convey

that, or grow weary of the trafficking, drug trafficking, trafficking

in persons, the sex trafficking. Do you get comments from any of

the ASEAN countries about that?

Mr. CRANER. We do, but as you know well, in many of the countries in ASEAN, Burma is not the only country with these kinds

of problems. In fact, it’s not the only tier three country in Asia. I

think what is more important is the kind of pressure that we and

others are putting on Burma’s neighbors in the region to say, we’ve

had enough, and you have got to get past this policy of constructive

engagement and have a more useful and forceful policy towards the

regime in Burma. I think that is what will cause them to change,

to become embarrassed, like I said, by the mess in their neighborhood.

Senator BROWNBACK. What about the Europeans? What has been

the response by the Europeans to Suu Kyi’s arrest and the attack

on her caravan?

Mr. CRANER. Earlier this year, they said that they were going to

wait until October to see if anything changed in Burma, and on

Monday they announced that they weren’t going to wait until October to see if anything changed. Instead, they were going to impose

the sanctions, which are very similar to ours, that they had originally agreed to withhold until November. That’s why, in this case,

nobody should be mistaken that these are unilateral penalties by

the United States against Burma. The E.U. added to its arms embargo, and similarly to our actions, added to its visa bans and assets on more than 150 officers in the junta.

Senator BROWNBACK. So is it fair to say that the United States

and Europe are walking very closely together on dealing with

Burma?

Mr. CRANER. Yes. I have to tell you, I think we were leading. I

think we moved much more quickly both here in the Congress and

in the administration than was the case in Europe, but we have

always for some years tried to walk beside Europe on these issues

to make sure that the maximum pressure possible is brought

against Burma.

11

Senator BROWNBACK. What about Senator McConnell’s series of

suggestions that he has put forward that are very, very strong positions, the lead one being downgrading relations, a letter to Secretary Powell that he was sending, and then also an emergency

U.N. meeting to discuss sanctioning Burma. What’s your view on

the part of the administration of those two items?

Mr. CRANER. I’m gong to let the Secretary answer the letter on

downgrading relations, because that just came in this morning. On

the U.N. meeting, it is a good idea; but one needs to consider what

happens at the end of the day when the meeting is over, and I

think the suggestion was in particular for a Security Council meeting. If one or more of the members of the Security Council, especially the permanent members, were to not want to see sanctions,

that would not be a good end of the day at the U.N.

Senator BROWNBACK. But let’s play that out. Let’s say that China

does not want to see sanctions. Doesn’t that expose right there the

major problem, or one of the major problems, in the Chinese support for this military dictatorship that is treating its people so

poorly? Wouldn’t that even of itself be constructive and instructive?

Mr. CRANER. I think it would be instructive, but I don’t think it

would add to our knowledge of Chinese policy. What I would hate

to see is the Burmese regime trumpeting a failure by the U.N. to

bring sanctions as a victory for them; that they, the SPDC, evaded

sanctions by the U.N.; and for them to tell people at home that nobody outside cares about them.

Senator BROWNBACK. Do you have any initial review of where

the U.N. members would be, the Security Council members would

be on a series of sanctions against Burma?

Mr. CRANER. If you looked at the slate, most of them would be

interested in that; but again you have the issue of the permanent

Security Council members having a veto, and of exactly how many

votes you would get for that. It is definitely an attractive idea for

the beginning of the day when it happens. I’m not sure it would

look so good at the end of the day.

Senator BROWNBACK. So what you’re saying to me is that we’re

going to need to build, bilaterally, pressure around the world with

a number of different countries in building up the pressure on

Burma.

Mr. CRANER. Yes. That is something we are doing, and we want

to do, including with China already, not necessarily aimed at a

U.N. Council session. In general, that is something in which we are

redoubling our efforts as we speak.

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to ask about drug production and

movement out of Burma. There have been press reports earlier this

year indicating some question and discussion about heroin production, and other illicit drugs, closely being linked to top-ranking

Burmese officials and the Burmese armed forces.

I’d like to know, is that accurate from the administration’s perspective, and is the United States taking a position that Burma is

not cooperating in the war against drugs, narcotic movement, production, and is indeed a state runner of drugs? Could you inform

me of the administration’s view and position on drug production

and drug movement in and out of Burma?

12

Mr. CRANER. I think the most instructive thing is that earlier

this year we refused to certify them as cooperating in the war on

drugs. They had tried to persuade us in Rangoon and elsewhere

that they were cooperating, but we found the evidence insufficient

to be able to certify them in our report to Congress that we put

forth every year. That is the bottom line. There are just a handful

of countries where we’re unable to do that in the world, and Burma

is one of them.

Senator BROWNBACK. A handful of countries——

Mr. CRANER. That we were unable to certify as cooperating in the

war on drugs.

Senator BROWNBACK. Okay, so indeed that there is drug movement out of Burma and into the region——

Mr. CRANER. Absolutely.

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing].——and globally as well. Mr.

Craner, thank you very much for being here to testify. The administration has taken a strong stance, and I do hope and pray for the

future of Burma and the Burmese people that we are successful in

putting pressure on this military dictatorship that has caused so

much suffering amongst its own people and throughout that region

and throughout the world.

Mr. CRANER. First of all, let me thank you for having the hearing. Second, on behalf of the administration, I want to thank the

Senate and the House. We have been able to walk with the Europeans on this, but we have also, I think, been very united as a

United States Government on this. I think that is very, very important. The third thing I would say is that if these penalties don’t

work, we may be coming back to you, as Secretary Powell indicated

in the Wall Street Journal, to put more and more pressure on the

regime and we look forward to working with you on that.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Craner.

Now, I’d like to call the next panel.

U Aung Din is policy director of Free Burma Coalition here in

Washington D.C.; Mr. Brian Joseph, program officer for Asia, the

National Endowment for Democracy, also in Washington; Mr.

Kevin Burke, President and CEO of American Apparel and Footwear Association; and Mr. Kenneth Rogers, Associate Dean of

International Programs and Director of International Services

(Emeritus) Indiana University; and finally, Ms. Veronika Martin.

She’s an advocate for Refugees International.

I want to advise the panel and the hearing room that there was

previously scheduled a vote for 3:15. It has not been called yet. We

will start the panel, but we may have to take a brief recess while

I go over to vote, but rather than wait and see whether we’re voting, I thought we would go ahead and get started.

Mr. U Aung Din. Let me say to the whole panel as well, we will

receive your entire statement into the record. If you care to summarize, because it is a large panel, that would probably be best,

and your full statement will be in the record.

Mr. Din.

13

STATEMENT OF U AUNG DIN, POLICY DIRECTOR,

FREE BURMA COALITION

Mr. DIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for giving me the

opportunity to speak on behalf of 50 million Burmese who are

locked in a battle with an illegitimate military regime to bring

peace, democracy, and human rights to our country. My name is

Aung Din. I sit as a director of policy for the Free Burma Coalition,

an organization based in the United States with national and international chapters.

I would like to thank you, Senator Brownback and Senators

Mitch McConnell and Feinstein and the members of the United

States Senate for the overwhelming bipartisan vote to approve the

Burma Freedom and Democracy Act last week. By supporting this

legislation, you’ve sent a clear message to the people of Burma that

you support our struggle for freedom. I ask the House to act on this

legislation soon.

Since you have already heard much about the events surrounding May 30, 2003, I would like to tell you about my personal

account and discuss the many different ways that the people of

Burma are working to get rid of our country’s dictatorship.

In 1988, I was a student at the Rangoon Institute of Technology

when I and many of my fellow students helped to organize a nationwide demonstration that almost overthrew the military government. We marched proudly in front of the American embassy and

waved our banners, because we knew that Americans believed in

freedom and democracy. We avoided the Soviet embassy for the

same reason.

Tragically, as millions of people marched on the streets the military regime fired on us. Up to 10,000 people were murdered in a

matter of weeks, including students, women, and even infant children. Those who survived were jailed and suffered daily torture

sessions.

Mr. Chairman, this was one year before the fall of the Berlin

Wall. Unfortunately, because the military refused to let any international news media inside the country, no one knew what happened to us. After seeing my colleagues gunned down on the

streets, I was very scared; but I knew I could not give up. I continued to organize demonstrations and protests, and eventually I was

captured by the regime.

When they arrested me, they handcuffed me, threw a hood over

my head and pulled me off the bus I was riding. I was taken to

a military interrogation center where I was held with no food, no

drink, no toilet, no sleep for one week. My hood was never removed. Successive shifts of interrogation officers beat, kicked, and

hit me. When I asked for the water, they laughed at me. When I

asked to use the bathroom, they beat me even more. Many times

I almost passed out, but they poured cold water on my head to

wake me up so my beatings could continue.

A month later, I was put in the solitary confinement, where I

stayed for over a year. In Burma, solitary confinement means no

human contact. I was sent to military court and given a sentence

of 4 years in prison. My trial only took 15 minutes, and I had no

lawyer. I spent these 4 years of my life behind bars.

Senator BROWNBACK. Excuse me, this was in a prison?

14

Mr. DIN. Yes. I was in a prison for 4 years and 3 months. If there

is a hell on earth, it must be Burma’s Insein Prison, where I was

jailed. For political prisoners such as myself, each day centered on

interrogations, beatings, and mental torture. When the guards noticed I had written a calendar on my wall with a small piece of

brick, I was thrown into pitch-black solitary confinement. When I

forgot to stand at attention, I was forced to crawl on sharp, pointed

stones for 100 yards while the prison guards beat me with sticks

and belts.

Many of my fellow prisoners were tortured even more. They were

tortured for dropping a cup of water. They were tortured for teaching English. They were tortured for anything. Often, when I tried

to sleep, I could hear the screams of those being tortured. Those

screams haunt me to this day. They are the voices of my friends,

many of whom were killed by the violence inflicted upon their bodies. It is for them that I have dedicated my life to freeing my country from the evil darkness that is the ruling military junta.

I would like to tell you about the other brave people of Burma.

There are over 1,600 men and women political prisoners in Burma,

and many have been behind bars for over 10 years. We talk so

many times about numbers that it can be easy to forget their

names and their stories. My friend, Min Ko Naing, has been in

prison since 1989.

For the Burmese people, Aung San Suu Kyi is like George Washington. Min Ko Naing is like Sam Adams. He is a true hero. We

were both arrested at the same time. He was also severely tortured. Unlike me, however, he has been held in solitary confinement for 14 years in an 8-by-10 foot cell, never leaving for more

than 15 minutes per day.

The regime has offered to release Min Ko Naing if he would sign

a document forswearing any political activity and condemning the

democracy movement. He has refused. In the face of such brutal

tyranny, he continues to fight back against the regime. His courage

should inspire us.

Now, I would like to discuss the many different ways people are

resisting the military regime in Burma. One way that we are working to bring change to Burma is through information. The National

Endowment for Democracy gives money to organizations along the

Thailand-Burma border that help to get information inside the

country, including this newspaper, The New Era Journal. Every

month, we distribute thousands of copies inside Burma throughout

our courier network. Keep in mind that possession of this newspaper is an automatic 7-year jail sentence.

We are also very grateful for services from the Voice of America

and Radio Free Asia. Even though many people have been sentenced to long prison terms for listening to the radio, the people of

Burma listen to these radio programs almost every night in order

to find out what’s going on in the world and in our own country.

My people also continue to organize protests around the country.

Last August, two of my colleagues were arrested for organizing a

protest in downtown Rangoon. In September, 30 more people were

arrested for protesting. In November, a man was arrested for making an NLD symbol, and in January, two Buddhist nuns were arrested for organizing a demonstration. In February, one dozen peoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:15 Nov 14, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 89837 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
15

ple were arrested for planning a demonstration, and in May another man was arrested.

I know that it does not make it in the news very often, but not

a month goes by that the people of Burma are not trying to organize a nationwide uprising. There are also many actions taking

place in a coordinated manner that are directed at fostering support for the democracy movement within Burma’s armed forces.

The effort is aimed at convincing military leaders and soldiers that

the future of the country lies with the democracy movement, and

not with the regime.

Other actions by underground groups inside the country allow

freedom activists to travel and conduct organizational work with

key groups such as monks and rice farmers. Aung San Suu Kyi’s

speeches are copied and distributed by the thousands on audio tape

in Burma. The Burmese people are also defying the military regime

by attending speeches of Aung San Suu Kyi. These are really more

than just speeches, they are democracy rallies.

In December, 20,000 people came to see her speak in Arakan

state. In March, 30,000 people came to watch her speak in Chin

state, and on this latest trip tens of thousands of Burmese people

risked their lives and their livelihoods to participate. Even when

the regime has threatened them with weapons and guns, they

refuse to turn back.

I would like to close my testimony by making a few recommendations. First and foremost, we need regime change in Burma. The

United Nations has attempted to foster a dialogue that can lead to

a political transition, and events have shown this to be a failure.

Sanctions will serve to cut the regime’s access to hard currency

that it uses to finance its instruments of terror.

In order to accomplish regime change, we must do three things

in addition to increasing sanctions. Firstly, we need to increase resources to fund the struggle inside Burma. Sanctions will help us

very much, but they should be seen as a first step. The people of

Burma need to be given the tools to effect change, including money,

communications equipment, food, and humanitarian support to refugees internally displaced, and in Thailand and India.

Second, the United States needs to pressure ASEAN, Japan and

India to end their political support for the military regime. China

will enjoy tremendous economic benefits from a free market, politically stable Burma, and this will be in their strategic national interest. Clearly a democratic Burma will be better for the entire region.

Third, the United Nations Security Council must act now on

Burma. So far, the United Nations has been worthless in helping

my country. The Burmese regime has played the United Nations

like a dancing marionette.

A Security Council resolution should seek to duplicate the actions contained in the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act. We

know that freedom is not free. Its cost is measured in the bodies

of dead democracy activists, broken families, and years stolen from

the lives of political prisoners. We are willing to pay the price, and

we do so every day. We want people around the world to know this.

We are freedom fighters, not victims.

16

Mr. Chairman, this regime will not last. I look forward to the day

when I am able to join my family and friends in Burma, about telling them that during our darkest hour, when our fight was far

from certain, when despair had almost overcome hope, that it was

the people of the United States and their representatives sitting in

this Congress that lifted the torch of democracy and lit our path

to freedom.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. U Aung Din follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AUNG DIN

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak on behalf of 50 million Burmese

who are locked in a battle with an illegitimate military regime to bring peace, democracy and human rights to our country. My name is Aung Din, and as you mentioned I serve as the director of policy for the Free Burma Coalition, an organization

based in the United States with national and international chapters.

I’d like to thank you Senator Brownback and Senators McConnell and Feinstein,

and the members of the United States Senate for the overwhelming bipartisan vote

to approve the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act last week. By supporting this

legislation, you sent a clear message to the people of Burma that you support our

struggle for freedom. I urge the House to act on this legislation soon.

Since you have already heard much about the events surrounding May 30th,

2003, I want to tell you about myself and discuss the many different ways that the

people of Burma are working to get rid of our country’s dictatorship. I know that

Aung San Suu Kyi is the most recognized person from Burma, but it is important

for the Committee to know that there are thousands of others in Burma who are

committed to nonviolence and working for the removal of the regime and the institution of a democratic Burma.

In 1988, I was a student at the Rangoon Institute of Technology when I and many

of my fellow students helped to organize a nationwide demonstration that almost

overthrew the military government. We marched proudly in front of the American

Embassy and waved our banners, because we knew that Americans believe in freedom and democracy. We avoided the Soviet embassy for the same reason.

Tragically, as millions of people marched on the streets, the military regime

opened fire on me and my fellow students. Up to 10,000 people were murdered in

a matter of weeks, including students, women and infant children. Those who survived were jailed and suffered daily torture sessions.

Mr. Chairman, this was one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Unfortunately, because the military refused to let any international news media

inside the country, no one knew what happened to us. After seeing my colleagues

gunned down on the streets, I was very scared; but I knew I couldn’t give up. I continued to organize demonstrations and protests, and eventually, I was captured by

the regime.

When they arrested me, they handcuffed me, threw a hood over my head, and

pulled me off the bus I was riding. I was taken to a military interrogation center,

where I was held with no food, no drink, no toilet, and no sleep for one week. My

hood was never removed. Successive shifts of interrogation officers beat, kicked, and

hit me. When I asked for water, they laughed at me. When I asked to use the bathroom, they beat me even more. Many times I almost passed out, but they poured

cold water onto my head to wake me up so my beatings could continue.

A month later, I was put in solitary confinement, where I stayed for over a year.

In Burma, solitary confinement means no human contact. I was sent to military

court and given a sentence of four years in prison. My trial took only fifteen minutes, and I had no lawyer. I spent the next four years of my life behind bars.

If there is a hell on earth, it must be Burma’s Insein prison where I was jailed.

For political prisoners such as myself, each day centered on interrogations, beatings,

and mental torture. When the guards noticed I had written a calendar on my wall,

I was thrown in pitch-black solitary confinement. When I forgot to stand at attention, I was forced to crawl on sharp, pointed stones for 100 yards while the prison

guards beat me with sticks and belts. Many of my fellow prisoners were tortured

even more. They were tortured for dropping a cup of water. They were tortured for

teaching English; they were tortured for anything. Often, when I tried to sleep, I

could hear the screams of those being tortured. Those screams haunt me to this day.

17

They are the voices of my friends, many of whom were killed by the violence inflicted upon their bodies. It is for them that I have dedicated my life to freeing my

country from the evil darkness that is the ruling military junta.

Our families did not escape either. My brother was also arrested for his participation in the freedom struggle. Many parents and families were forced out of their jobs

by the regime. The regime, through the military intelligence (MI) apparatus, conducts a scorched earth campaign against anyone associated with the democracy

movement.

OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS

I want to tell you about the other brave people of Burma. There are over 1,600

men and women political prisoners in Burma and many have been behind bars for

over a decade. We talk so many times about numbers that it can be easy to forget

their names and their stories.

My friend Min Ko Naing has been in prison since 1989. For the Burmese people,

Aung San Suu Kyi is like George Washington. Min Ko Naing is like Sam Adams— he is a true hero.

Just as much as Aung San Suu Kyi, he was the main leader of our revolution.

He spoke at rallies across the country and called on the people to believe in freedom.

I think that he understood freedom and democracy at its roots, far before many of

the rest of us.

We were both arrested at the same time. He was also severely tortured. Unlike

me, however, he has been held in solitary confinement for 14 years. It might be that

the military regime will never release him.

In 1994, U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson met Min Ko Naing in prison. He told

the Congressman to continue the struggle for freedom and democracy. The military

punished Min Ko Naing by transferring him 500 miles away from his family. Now,

his family can only visit him once a year. He has never been permitted to leave his

8 x 10 foot cell for more than 15 minutes per day.

The regime has offered to release Min Ko Naing if he will sign a document forswearing any political activity and condemning the democracy movement. He has

refused. In the face of such brutal tyranny, he continues to fight back against the

regime. His courage should inspire us.

I would now like to discuss the many different ways people are resisting the military regime in Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi is one person in a democracy movement

that is broad and deep. There are hundreds of activists that are jailed and killed

each year who never receive any attention. Most of my people struggle, suffer, and

die without a word being raised by the international community.

INFORMATION

One way that we are working to bring change to Burma is through information.

The National Endowment for Democracy gives money to organizations along the

Thailand-Burma border that help to get information inside the country, including

this newspaper, The New Era Journal. Every month, we distribute thousands of

copies inside Burma through a courier network. Keep in mind that possession of

this newspaper is an automatic seven-year jail sentence.

We are also very grateful for services from the Voice of America and Radio Free

Asia. Even though many people have been sentenced to long prison terms for listening to the radio, the people of Burma listen to these radio programs almost every

night in order to find out what’s going on in the world and in our own country.

PROTESTS AND POLITICAL DEFIANCE

My people also continue to organize protests around the country. Last August, two

of my colleagues were arrested for organizing a protest in downtown Rangoon. In

September, 30 more people were arrested for protesting. In November, a man was

arrested for making an NLD symbol, and in January, two Buddhist nuns were arrested for organizing a demonstration. In February, one dozen people were arrested

for planning a demonstration, and in May another man was arrested.

I know that it doesn’t make it in the news very often, but not a month goes by

that the people of Burma aren’t trying to organize a nationwide uprising. There are

also many actions taking place in a coordinated manner that are directed at fostering support for the democracy movement within Burma’s armed forces. The

Burma military is a force that is kept together through fear and terror. In the 1990

elections, voting precincts in major military areas delivered overwhelming majorities

for the NLD. It is a military that has no ideological commitment to the ruling regime. The outreach effort is aimed at convincing military leaders that the future of

the country lies with the democracy movement, and not with the regime.

18

Other actions by underground groups inside the country allow freedom activists

to travel and conduct organization work with key groups such as monks and rice

farmers. Aung San Suu Kyi’s speeches are copied and distributed by the thousands

on audiotape in Burma. I would be happy to talk about these efforts with you in

a more private setting. I also want to point out that the Open Society Institute,

Norweigen-Burma Committee, and several other organizations—some government

sponsored—are assisting our movement.

ATTENDING PRO-DEMOCRACY SPEECHES

The Burmese people are also defying the military regime by attending speeches

of Aung San Suu Kyi. These are really more than just speeches—they are democracy rallies.

In December 20,000 people came to see her speak in Arakan state. In March

30,000 people came to watch her speak in Chin State. And on this latest trip, tens

of thousands of Burmese people risked their lives and their livelihoods to participate. Even when the regime has threated them with weapons and guns, they refused to turn back.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I would like to close my testimony by making a few recommendations for future

policy on Burma. First and foremost, we must make it clear that, as Senator

McConnell has said, we need regime change in Burma. The United Nations has attempted to foster a dialogue that can lead to a political transition, and events have

shown this to be a failure. Sanctions will serve to cut the regime’s access to hard

currency that it uses to finance its instruments of repression. We must now work

on empowering activists inside the country to allow them to bring maximum internal pressure against the regime. Either way, they must be removed. The United

States is in a unique position to help bring about change in the world because

Americans believe in freedom and democracy.

In order to accomplish regime change, we must do three things:

(1) Increase Resources to the Struggle Inside Burma

We need increased resources to fund the struggle inside Burma. Sanctions will

help us very much, but they should be seen as a first step. The people of Burma

need to be given the tools to effect change, including money, communications equipment, food and humanitarian support to refugees internally displaced and in Thailand and India.

(2) Pressure Other Countries to Stop Supporting Burma’s Regime With Military

Sales and Business Investment

The United States needs to pressure ASEAN, Japan, and India to end their political support for the military regime. China will enjoy economic benefits from a freemarket, politically stable Burma. Clearly, a democratic Burma will be better for the

entire region.

(3) Push the United Nations Security Council to Act on Burma

The United Nations Security Council must act now on Burma. So far, the United

Nations has been worthless in helping my country. The Burmese regime has played

the United Nations like a dancing marionette. A Security Council resolution should

seek to duplicate the actions contained in the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act.

If the Security Council refuses to act, the United States must help the Burmese

people overthrow the illegitimate junta through the use of a nonviolent, mass mobilization campaign. I want to stress that we are not asking for military intervention,

but we are asking for political and moral support directed to activists inside the

country.

The regime has been given 21⁄2 years to bring change to Burma. Now, it is time

to change the regime. We must bring unremitting pressure against these thugs. The

same economic and political conditions that led to the 1988 uprising are still present

in Burma. The regime is hated by the people and, if enough political space can open,

I can envision another people power mobilization that can sweep this regime from

Rangoon and condemn it to the ash heap of history.

We know that freedom isn’t free. It’s cost is measured in the bodies of dead democracy activists, broken families and years stolen from the lives of political prisoners. We are willing to pay the price and we do so every day. We want people

around the world to know that we are freedom fighters, not victims.

Mr. Chairman, this regime will not last. I look forward to the day when I am able

to rejoin my family and friends in Burma about telling them that during our darkest hour, when our fight was far from certain, when despair had almost overcome

19

hope, that it was the people of the U.S. and their representatives sitting in this Congress that lifted the torch of democracy and lit our path to freedom.

Thank You.

[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY U AUNG DIN]

I. MEN AND WOMEN WHO WERE ARRESTED OR DISAPPEARED

DURING THE MAY 30, 2003 ATTACK

1. Aung Aung, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

2. Aung Aung Latt, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

3. Aung Htoo, (M) NLD, Bohtahtaung Township, Rangoon

4. Aung Khin, (M) NLD, Mandalay Division

5. Aung Ko, (M) NLD, Northwest Township, Mandalay

6. Aung Kyaw Kyaw Oo (aka) Aung Kyaw Myint, (M), NLD youth in-charge, Mandalay (Age 32) (Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)

7. Aung Kyaw Myint, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township

8. Aung Kyaw Soe, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township

9. Aung Naing, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

10. Chit Yin, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township

11. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, (Female) General Secretary, NLD (Age 58) (Confirmed

in Yemon Military Camp)

12. Dr. Hla Myint, (M) NLD, Amarapura Township

13. Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, (M), NLD, Mandalay, Divisional Organizer

14. Dr. Win Aung (M), NLD, Amarapura Township

15. Hla Oo, (M) NLD, Amarapura Township

16. Hla Soe Win, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

17. Hla Than, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

18. Hsann Lwin, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

19. Htut Soe, (M) NLD youth, Rangoon Division

20. Khin Aung Htwe, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township

21. Khin Aye Myint, (F) NLD, Mandalay Northwest Township

22. Khin Maung Oo, (M) Photographer, Mandalay

23. Khin Ma Ma Tun, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

24. Khin Maung Thaung, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township

25. Khin Mya Win, (F) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township

26. Khin Oo, (M) NLD youth, Sagaing Division

27. Ko Lay, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township

28. Kyaw Aun, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northwest Township

29. Kyaw Htike, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

30. Kyaw Kyaw, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

31. Kyaw Myo Thu, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

32. Kyaw Myo Oo, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

33. Kyaw Soe, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

34. Kyaw Soe Lin, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay (Age 25)

35. Kyaw Than, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

36. Kyaw Tin Win, (M) NLD youth, Rangoon Division

37. Kyaw Zwar Win, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

38. Kyi Kyi Myint, (F) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township

39. Lin Htut Soe, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

40. Myo Zaw Aung, (M) NLD youth, Kawlin Township

41. Minn Lwin, (M) NLD youth in-charge, Mandalay Division, (Age 34)

42. Min Lwin, (M) NLD youth, Rangoon, (Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin

State)

43. Min Thein, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

44. Min Zaw Oo, (M) Student, Government Technical College, Monywa—(Confirmed

dead)

20

45. Moe Thaw (aka) Pho Thaw, (M) NLD youth, Rangoon (Age 32) (Confirmed in

the Khantee prison, Chin State)

46. Myint Kyaw, (M) NLD youth in-charge, Rangoon (Age 37) (Confirmed in the

Khantee prison, Chin State)

47. Myint Ngwe, (M) NLD youth, Yenanchaung Township, Magway Division (Age

38)

48. Myint Oo, (M) NLD, Mandalay South East Township

49. Myint Wai, (M) NLD youth, Yenanchaung Township, Magway Division

50. Myint Myint Kyi, (F), NLD, Mandalay Division

51. Myo Min (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township (Age 31)

52. Myo Naing, (M) NLD, Mandalay Division Organizer

53. Myo Nyunt, (M) NLD, secretary, Ahlone Township, Rangoon Division, (age 37)

54. Myo Tint, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

55. Myo Zaw Aung, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township, (Confirmed in the

Khantee prison, Chin State)

56. Nay Myo Lin, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

57. Naing Naing, (M) Democratic Party for a New Society

58. Nyunt Nyunt, (F), NLD, Mandalay Northwest Township

59. Soe Soe, (M) NLD youth, Htuntone Myothit Township

60. Soe Win, (M) Driver

61. Thander Soe, (F) Mandalay Northwest Township

62. Than Tun, (M) NLD, Kamaryut Township, Rangoon Division

63. Than Htay, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township

64. Than Htun, (M) NLD, Mandalay Division Organizing Committee, (Confirmed in

the Khantee prison, Chin State)

65. Than Tun Oo, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

66. Than Win, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township

67. Thein Aung Lay, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

68. Thein Soe, (M) Photographer, Sagaing

69. Thein Toe Aye, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

70. Thein Tun, (M) NLD youth, Yankin Township, Rangoon

71. Thein Zan, (M)

72. Thet Zaw (aka) Thet Tun, (M) NLD youth in-charge, Rangoon, (Age 30) (Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)

73. Thura (aka) Thi Ha, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay, (Age 29) (Confirmed in the

Khantee prison, Chin State)

74. Tin Lin, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

75. Tin Maung Oo, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township

76. Toe, (F) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township

77. Toe Lwin, (M) NLD youth, Bahan Township, Rangoon Division (Age 32) (Confirmed dead)

78. Tin Tin Myint, (F), NLD, Mandalay Division

79. Tun Tun, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

80. Tun Win, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township

81. Tin Tun Oo, (M) NLD, Mandalay Division

82. Tun Tun Win, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township

83. Tin Maung Aye, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

84. Tun Myint, (M) NLD, secretary, Bahan Township, Rangoon Division, (Age 36)

(Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)

85. Tun Myaing, (M) Joint-secretary, Sagaing Division

86. Tun Naing Oo, (M) Mon Ywar Township

87. Tun Zaw Zaw, (M) NLD youth in-charge, Rangoon (Age 38) (Confirmed in the

Khantee prison, Chin State)

88. U Aung Soe, (M) NLD, Organizer of Mandalay Division

89. U Chit Tin, (Male), Secretary, NLD, Mandalay Division

90. U Hla Mi (M) NLD, MP Elect, Kawthaung Township

21

91. U Htwe, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township

92. U Myint Kyi, (M) MP Elect, NLD, Kathar Township

93. U Paw Khin, (M) MP Elect, Myingyan Township

94. U Par Pa, (M) Vice-chairman, Sagaing Division

95. U Piimya Thin, (M) Buddhist Monk, Okkan Tawya Monastery, Monywar—(Confirmed dead)

96. U Saw Hlaing, (M) MP elect, NLD, Inn Daw Township

97. U Tin Aung Aung, (M) MP elect, NLD, Mandalay Northwest Township, (Age 59)

(Presumed dead)

98. U Tin Oo, (Male) Vice-Chairman, NLD (Age 75) (Confirmed in the Kalay prison,

Sagaing Division)

99. U Tin Tun Oo, (M) NLD, MP elect, Lewe Township, Mandalay Division, (Age

40)

100. U Thwae, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

101. Wanna, (F) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township

102. Wanna Maung, (M) NLD youth, Htuntone Myothit Township

103. Win Aung, (M) NLD, Divisional Organizer, Sagaing Division

104. Win Khaine, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township

105. Win Ko, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township

106. Win Mya Mya, (F) NLD, Mandalay Divisional Organizer (Confirmed in the

Northwestern Military Command headquarters, Monywar)

107. Win Myint Oo, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township

108. Win Phyu Ei, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

109. Win Thiha Aung, (M) Student, Monywar Institute of Economy (Presumed dead)

110. Yan Naung Soe, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

111. Yee Yee Lin, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township

112. Ye Min Zaw, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

113. Ye Myint Aung, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township

114. Zaw Lay, (M) NLD, son of Hla Myint, Amarapura Township

115. Zaw Win Tun, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township, (Age 27) (Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)

116. Zaw Zaw Aung, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

117. Zayar Tun, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township

118–124. 7 Buddhist Monks, From Yankin Monastery, MonYwar

125–138. 14 drivers, (M) names not known yet

139–144. 6 Divisional Executive members, Sagaing Division, names not known yet

145–158. 14 NLD youth members from Sagaing Division, names not known yet

II. MEN AND WOMEN WHO WERE ARRESTED OR DISAPPEARED

AFTER THE MAY 30, 2003 ATTACK

1. U Aung Shwe, (M) Chairman, NLD, MP elect, Mayangone Township (House arrest—May 31, 2003) (Age 85)

2. U Lwin, Secretary, (M) NLD, MP elect, Thongwa Township (House arrest—May

31, 2003) (Age 79)

3. U Than Tun, (M) CEC, NLD, MP elect, Taungtha Township, Secretary, CRPP

(House arrest—May 31, 2003) (Age 82)

4. U Nyunt Wai, (M) CEC, NLD, MP elect, Taungoo Township (House arrest—May

31, 2003) (Age 77)

5. U Lun Tin, (M) CEC, NLD, MP elect, Mawlamyine Township (House arrest—May

31, 2003) (Age 82)

6. U Hla Pe, (M), CEC, NLD, MP elect, Mawlamyine Gyun Township (House arrest—May 31, 2003) (Age 76)

7. Thakin Soe Myint, (M) CEC, NLD, MP elect, South Okkalapa Township (House

arrest—May 31, 2003) (Age 79)

8. U Kyi Maung (M), Former Chairman of the NLD, MP elect, Mayangon Township

(House arrest—May 31, 2003) (Age 80)

9. U San Linn, (M) Chairman, NLD Mogot Township (June 3, 2003)

22

10. U Kyaw Htin, (M) Vice-chairman, NLD Mogot Township (June 3, 2003)

11. U Ko, (M) Vice-chairman, NLD, Mogot Township (June 3, 2003)

12. Ko Myo, (M) NLD, Yankin Township (June 4, 2003)

13. Thein Oo, (M) Officer in-charge, NLD headquarters, Rangoon (June 4, 2003)

14. Soe Win, (M) Officer in-charge, NLD headquarters, Rangoon (June 4, 2003)

15. U Andastiya, Buddhist monk, Kayah State (June 4, 2003)

16. U Soe Win, (M) MP elect from Bago Township, National Party for Democracy,

member of CRPP (June 5, 2003)

17. U Ne Win, (M) Vice-chair, NLD, Kachin State (June 5, 2003)

18. U Naing Zaw Win, (M) Joint secretary, NLD, Kachin State (June 5, 2003)

19. U Maran Po Thar, (M) NLD, Kachin State (June 5, 2003)

20. U Hla Maung, (M) MP elect, Kyar Inn Seikkyi Township, CRPP member (June

5, 2003)

21. U Aye Win, (M) NLD, Bassein Township (June 6, 2003)

22–26. Another 5 persons from Bassein Township, were arrested together with U

Aye Win on June 6, 2003.

27. U Thein Oo, (M) MP elect, Oak Twin Township, Bago Division, member of the

National Party for Democracy, a new member of the CRPP (June 6, 2003)

28. U Saw Tun, (M) NLD Organizer, Monywar Township (May 30) (Sentenced two

years imprisonment from a summary court)

29. U Myint Hlaing (M), Father of political prisoner San San Maw (F) (June 10,

2003)

30. Tin Hla (M), Husband of a political prisoner San San Maw (F) (June 10, 2003)

31. Maung Maung Lay, (M) NLD, Kyimyingdaing Township (June 10, 2003)

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much; thank you for your

courageous struggle; thank you for continuing in that until the people of Burma are free. We will be standing with you.

We have a vote on now. I will go over and vote and be back

shortly. We will take a brief recess, probably about a 10-minutes;

and then we will reconvene. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Senator BROWNBACK. I call the hearing back to order. I’m sorry,

that took much longer than I thought it would. I was caught on the

floor, then I had to take a call as well; so, my apologies for doing

that.

Mr. Joseph, it’s good to have you here. Just to reintroduce you

quickly, you are a program officer for Asia, National Endowment

for Democracy. We’re delighted to have you here, and please, the

microphone is yours.

STATEMENT OF BRIAN JOSEPH, PROGRAM OFFICER, ASIA,

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

Mr. JOSEPH. Thank you very much. I want to thank the committee and Senator Brownback for inviting me to testify today on

this important and timely issue. I’m a program officer for Asia at

the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). I’ve managed the

NED’s Burma project since 1996.

The NED has been deeply involved in supporting democracy and

human rights in Burma since 1990, when we made our first Burma

grant. Today, thanks in large part to the strong interest that Congress has taken in Burma, the NED now awards over $2.4 million

per year in grants to 35 different Burmese groups dedicated to

bringing democracy to their country. This support has been instrumental in sustaining and empowering the democratic opposition in

Burma, and increasing pressure on the military regime.

23

Attached to my written testimony is a list of the Endowment’s

fiscal year 2002 Burma grants. Please note that because the Burmese junta has targeted the NED in the past for its support of the

pro-democracy movement in Burma, the NED no longer publishes

the names of recipient organizations.

The situation inside Burma today is arguably more explosive

than at any time since the 1988–1990 period when the State Law

and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, unleashed a violent

crackdown that left thousands dead, in prison, or in exile. When

military-backed thugs attacked pro-democracy leader Aung San

Suu Kyi and her convoy on a dark road outside of Monywa on May

30 of this year, all hope for a quick and peaceful negotiated settlement to Burma’s longstanding political crisis evaporated.

With Suu Kyi once again in detention, NLD offices shuttered,

and scores of pro-democracy activists dead or missing, the regime

looks to be firmly in control. But for as long as Suu Kyi and her

supporters continue to fight for democracy, the regime’s grasp will

be conditional on its willingness to use brute force to stay in power.

The junta is not a partner for peace and national reconciliation in

Burma. It is an obstacle that must be overcome.

In short, the May 30 attack on the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi

demonstrated three things: one, Senior General Than Shwe and the

army hardliners are calling the shots; two, the regime is willing to

do whatever it deems necessary to hold onto power; and three, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the SPDC, or the State Peace and

Development Council, the successor military junta to the SLORC,

understands full well that if given the opportunity the people of

Burma would once again come out en masse in support of Aung

San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

In a country where the balance of power is so uneven, and where

the military regime maintains absolute control over all facets of

life, it is essential that efforts to promote a transition to democracy

address this imbalance directly.

Sanctions alone are not enough to effect change in Burma, but

as part of a larger strategy to promote democracy they are an essential ingredient. Coupled with continuing support for the democracy movement and humanitarian support for the hundreds of

thousands of displaced Burmese, the United States is a leader in

supporting the struggle for democracy in Burma.

During the year between Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house

arrest in May 2002 and the attack on her and her convoy in May

2003, there was a marginal expansion of political space in Burma.

Small as this opening was, it presented democracy activists with

new opportunities. For example, the NLD was able to reopen nearly 100 district- and township-level offices, and visit six of the seven

ethnic states, drawing large and energetic crowds wherever it went.

The regime has now shut those offices and closed those channels.

Citizens again have no way to contribute openly to the political life

of their country. However, pro-democracy activist groups based

within Burma and abroad have well-established underground channels of communication that allow for effective work inside Burma

even under extremely trying circumstances.

I now want to provide you with a glimpse of the type of work

being done by the pro-democracy movement with support from the

24

NED. One of the priority areas of concentration for the NED is

support for independent news and information.

In Burma, radio, print media, and television are state-controlled.

Internet access is limited to all but a handful of SPDC generals

and their cronies. Listeners or readers of banned material, as U

Aung Din mentioned, are subjected routinely to intimidation and

sometimes harsh prison terms.

Pro-democracy organizations based in Thailand, India and further abroad work to counteract the SPDC-controlled media and

propaganda through radio, print media, and human rights reports.

As the only Burmese-run independent media outlets in the world,

these organizations also serve as a training ground for Burmese

journalists who will be called upon to establish a free press in

Burma after the transition to democracy.

Radio continues to be the most efficient and effective means of

reaching sizeable audiences in Burma. The BBC, Radio Free Asia,

the Voice of America, and the Democratic Voice of Burma, a Burmese-run short-wave radio station, provide the people of Burma

with independent and accurate Burmese language news and information. The NED-funded DVB also broadcasts in a number of

major ethnic languages, reaching important yet isolated communities.

Newspapers and magazines published in Thailand and distributed through underground networks inside Burma and along its

borders reach tens of thousands of readers. Even in the face of

harsh measures to curb the circulation of these papers, demand

continues to grow.

Other groups are working to inform the international community

of the human rights conditions in Burma and to empower people

to fight to protect their rights. Recent reports by NED grantees

have documented the use of rape as a weapon of war in the Shan

state, religious persecution of Christians in the Chin state, forced

labor in Mon state, displacement in Karen state, and violation of

women’s rights throughout Burma.

The second priority area of funding for the NED is institutionbuilding. Since General Ne Win seized power in 1962, Burma has

been ruled by military regimes that have decimated the country’s

civil society and destroyed its educational system. It is essential to

develop and support alternative networks and organizations that

can operate outside military control and begin to reconstruct basic

elements of civil society. At present, this work must be supported

through exile-based organizations with well-established links to the

democracy movement inside Burma.

In line with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s repeated calls for unity in

the ranks of the pro-democracy movement, support should be directed at efforts that strengthen cooperation, coordination, and

unity among the various ethnic, student, and pro-democracy

groups.

Because of time limitations, let me now skip very quickly to the

end of my remarks—you can find my full remarks in my written

testimony—and say where does this leave us, and what do we do

about Burma? Although Burma experts often discuss splits in the

military and divisions between the intelligence and army branches

of the junta, the military seems fairly united. Absent some crushVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:15 Nov 14, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 89837 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
25

ing event, the regime seems unlikely to turn on itself, but if the

regime is so secure in its position, why has it not been able to rid

itself once and for all of the democracy movement?

The simple answer is because the democracy movement derives

its strength from the people of Burma and is led by one of the

world’s most courageous, committed, and principled leaders. The

democracy movement also draws strength from the international

community. When international organizations such as the ILO take

unprecedented steps to address forced labor abuses in Burma, or

when the United States passes tough sanctions legislation, the effect is twofold. It punishes the regime for its behavior, and bolsters

the democracy movement, which has consistently urged governments around the world to avoid doing anything that will prop up

the regime.

There is no easy answer to the challenge presented by Burma,

yet in one significant way the situation is very promising, for there

is a peaceful and legitimate alternative to the regime. That alternative is Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues in the NLD. They

deserve our full and open support.

The United States should continue to pursue a strategy in

Burma that combines punitive measures that target the regime

while simultaneously supporting efforts to build a strong democratic alternative.

I have a number of other recommendations, but because I’m out

of time I refer you to my written testimony for those. Thank you

very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN JOSEPH

INTRODUCTION

I want to thank the Committee and Senator Brownback for inviting me to testify

today on this important and timely issue. My name is Brian Joseph and I am a program officer for Asia at the National Endowment for Democracy. I have managed

the NED’s Burma project since 1996. The NED has been deeply involved in supporting democracy and human rights in Burma since 1990 when we made our first

Burma grant. Today, thanks in large part to the strong interest the Congress has

taken in Burma, the NED now awards over $2.5 million per year in grants to 35

different Burmese groups dedicated to bringing democracy to their country. This

support has been instrumental in sustaining and empowering the democratic opposition in Burma and increasing pressure on the military regime. Attached to my written testimony is a list of the Endowment’s FY 2002 Burma grants. In the past, the

Burmese junta has targeted the NED for its support of the pro-democracy movement in Burma. To protect the security of our Burma grantees, the NED does not

publish the names of recipient organizations.

POLITICAL SITUATION

The situation inside Burma today is arguably more explosive than at any time

since the 1988–1990 period when the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or

SLORC, unleashed a violent crackdown that left thousands dead, in prison or in

exile. When military-backed thugs attacked pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu

Kyi and her convoy on a dark road outside of Monywa on May 30 of this year, all

hope for a quick and peaceful negotiated settlement to Burma’s long-standing political crisis evaporated.

In the short term, the regime has stopped democratic development dead in its

tracks. With Suu Kyi once again in detention, National League for Democracy

(NLD) offices shuttered, and scores of pro-democracy activists dead or missing, the

regime looks to be firmly in control. But as long as Suu Kyi and her supporters continue to fight for democracy, the regime’s grasp will be conditional on its willingness

26

to use brute force to stay in power. The Burmese population’s rejection of strongman rule and its support for democracy are undiminished.

In October 2001, when the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the successor regime to SLORC, announced that it was holding talks with the National

League for Democracy, the international community supported efforts to build trust

and understanding between the regime and the NLD. For better or worse, the international community at that time gave the regime yet another opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to national reconciliation. Although there have been indications for the past few months that the negotiations between the two parties had

been stalled for quite some time, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD continued to operate as if dialogue was still possible.

Since her release from house arrest on May 6, 2002, Aung San Suu Kyi and the

NLD have worked to rebuild their decimated party and to reconnect with the people

of Burma. After re-opening their office in Rangoon, Suu Kyi and various NLD members began to travel the country. In less than a year, Suu Kyi made nine trips outside of Rangoon, visiting six of the seven ethnic states and drawing increasingly

large and energetic crowds as her travels progressed. Although it is impossible to

know exactly what precipitated the government’s decision to attack her party on

May 30, the positive reception the NLD received wherever it went punctured one

of the SPDC’s most important self-held myths. That is, that the military alone could

guarantee the territorial integrity of a united Burma.

The regime had to find a way to put Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD back in

a box. A democratic opposition with widespread support from all corners of the country posed a direct threat to the military government and had to be neutralized. The

May 30 nighttime attack did more than result in the re-arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi

and the death of at least four, and potentially as many as 70, of her supporters.

It also reconfirmed that the regime is willing to train its guns, once again, on unarmed civilians.

Prior to the May 30 attack, many Burmese dissidents and observers believed that

progress, if not imminent, was at least a possibility. This perception was fueled in

part by Razali Ismail, the UN special envoy to Burma. Although it is impossible to

know for certain given the severe restrictions on speech and information in the

country, reports indicated that the people of Burma were more or less willing to

defer to the NLD and Suu Kyi and to trust their judgment that the Razali-backed

dialogue, along with nonviolent protest, might eventually lead to a negotiated transition. The hope that the regime was sincere in its commitment to dialogue has now

been smashed.

By carefully planning and ruthlessly executing a brazen, thuggish attack on the

NLD, the regime exposed its true nature to the world. The junta is not a partner

for peace and national reconciliation in Burma. It is an obstacle that must be overcome.

The regime made the cold calculation that there would be no serious repercussions, international or domestic, for its treatment of the nonviolent democracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The United States and the European Union have

already proven them wrong on the first score. The people of Burma will prove them

wrong on the second.

In short, the May 30 attack on the National League for Democracy and Daw Aung

San Suu Kyi demonstrated three things:

• One, Senior General Than Shwe and the army hardliners are calling the shots.

• Two, the regime is willing to do whatever it deems necessary to hold on to

power.

• Three, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the SPDC understands full well that

if given the opportunity the people of Burma would once again come out in

mass in support of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

In a country where the balance of power is so warped and where the military regime maintains absolute control over all facets of life, it is essential that efforts to

promote a transition to democracy address this imbalance directly. As long as the

regime continues to believe that its actions will be met with little more than perfunctory rhetoric from governments around the world, it will not change.

Sanctions alone are not enough to effect change in Burma, but as part of a larger

strategy to promote democracy, they are an essential ingredient. Coupled with continuing support for the democracy movement and humanitarian support for the hundreds of thousands of displaced Burmese, the US is a leader in supporting the struggle for democracy in Burma.

The only way the suffering of the Burmese can be relieved is through the achievement of a genuine transition to democracy. For forty years, military governments

27

in Burma have looted and bankrupted the country, systemically hunted down and

decimated ethnic minority populations, and endorsed the use of rape against citizens

as a tool of war. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD offer a credible and democratic

alternative. We should support them in their efforts.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN BURMA

During the year between Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest in May

2002 and the attack on her and her convoy in May 2003, there was a marginal expansion of political space in Burma. Small as this opening was, it presented democracy activists with new opportunities. For example, the NLD was able to reopen

nearly one hundred district- and township-level offices and the regime allowed for

greater communication between ethnic political leaders and their NLD counterparts.

The regime has now shut those offices and closed those channels. Citizens again

now have no way to contribute openly to the political life of their country. However,

pro-democracy activist groups, based within Burma and abroad, have well-established underground channels of communications that allow for effective work inside

Burma even under extremely trying circumstances.

Burma’s borders with Thailand, India, China, and Bangladesh are long and porous. The geographic periphery of Burma itself is a ring of ethnic nationality states

that are ruled by ethno-military organizations, the vast majority of which are either

openly hostile to or at the very least weary of the regime. These conditions make

it virtually impossible for the junta to shut off all channels of communication between activists in exile and the people of Burma.

As of one the principal organizations supporting democracy in Burma, the National Endowment for Democracy has provided timely, critical financial assistance

to Burmese democrats since 1990. The Endowment’s Burma project has grown each year and now provides more than $2.5 million to roughly 35 groups working to advance the goals of Burma’s elected representatives; to strengthen unity and self-reliance among Burma’s pro-democracy and ethnic groups; and to provide independent

news and information.

Independent News and Information

Objective, accurate, and timely information is essential to combat the military

junta’s relentless disinformation campaign to discredit the pro-democracy movement, to sow distrust among the ethnic and pro-democracy groups, and to cover up

its abysmal human rights record. The only newspapers legally available in Burma

are the military junta-controlled official newspapers—Kyay Mon (The Mirror) and

Nay Pyidaw (The Guardian) in Burmese, and MyanmarAhlin (The New Light of

Myanmar) in English and Burmese—and the relatively new government-sanctioned

Myanmar Times, published by an Australian national and reportedly close to Lt.

General Khin Nyunt. All radio and television is state-controlled. Magazines, including business and economics magazines, are highly censored. Internet access is limited to all but a handful of SPDC generals and their cronies. Listeners or readers

of banned material are subjected routinely to intimidation and sometimes harsh

prison terms. Ethnic groups face particularly severe restrictions in the use of their

own languages in public life.

Pro-democracy organizations based in Thailand, India and further abroad work to

counteract the SPDC-controlled media and propaganda through radio, print media,

and human rights reports. As the only Burmese-run independent media outlets in

the world, these newspapers, radio stations and magazines also serve as a training

ground for Burmese journalists who will be called upon to establish a free press in

Burma after the transition to democracy.

Radio continues to be the most efficient and effective means of reaching sizeable

audiences in Burma. The BBC, Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), a Burmese-run shortwave radio station, provide the

people of Burma with independent and accurate Burmese-language news and information. The NED-funded DVB also broadcasts in a number of major ethnic languages, reaching important yet isolated communities.

Newspapers and magazines published in Thailand and distributed through underground networks inside Burma and along its borders reach tens of thousands of

readers. The NED supports a number of print outlets, including a Burmese-language newspaper and an English-language monthly magazine that seek out and

print a diversity of opinion and commentary about democracy as well as news about

Burma. Even in the face of harsh measures to curb the circulation of the paper and

magazine, demand continues to grow.

Burma is a human rights catastrophe. Recent reports by NED grantees have documented the use of rape as a weapon of war in the Shan States, religious persecution of Christians in the Chin State, forced labor in Mon State, displacement in

28

Karen State, and violation of women’s rights throughout Burma. These groups work

to inform the international community of the human rights conditions in Burma and

to empower people in Burma to fight to protect their rights.

Institution Building Programs

Since 1962 when General Ne Win seized power, Burma has been ruled by military

regimes that have decimated the country’s civil society and destroyed its educational

system. It is essential to develop and support alternative networks and organizations that can operate outside military control and begin to reconstruct basic elements of civil society. At present, this work must be supported through exile-based

organizations with well-established links to the democracy movement inside Burma.

In line with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s repeated calls for unity in the ranks of the

pro-democracy movement, support should be directed at efforts that strengthen cooperation, coordination, and unity among the various ethnic, student, and pro-democracy groups. An expanded base of support for Aung San Suu Kyi will make it

harder for the military to consolidate its control while continuing to ignore her repeated calls for national reconciliation and tripartite dialogue between the NLD, the

military regime, and the ethnic forces.

Women’s groups based in countries that border Burma have carried out a variety

of training and education programs in recent years to increase awareness of democratic values and women’s human rights, to address public health concerns such as

HIV/AIDS awareness and maternal and child health practices, and to provide skills

training in handicrafts and agriculture as a means to increase opportunities for income-generation and self-reliance among refugees and internally displaced women.

In 1999, a coalition of these border-based women’s groups joined forces to work to

increase the participation of women in the struggle for democracy and human

rights, build mutual understanding among all nationalities, actively participate in

the national reconciliation and development process, and elevate the role of the

women of Burma both at national and international levels.

The Endowment believes it is a priority to support the development of ethnic organizations so that they are better able to participate as equals in the discussions

regarding the future political structure of Burma. Grants to ethnic nationality-based

organizations allow them to solidify their core operations, reach more people

through increased training programs, and distribute their literature to a wider audience. Assistance to ethnic groups will also complement the pro-democracy movement’s efforts to build solidarity between the pro-democracy groups, most of whose

members are ethnic Burmans, and the ethnic nationality forces.

Assistance should also be directed to border-based student and youth groups that

work with counterparts inside the country to increase awareness of and respect for

human rights and democracy through education workshops, foreign affairs training

programs, and production and dissemination of materials. These dedicated students

and other young peoples, who run great risks to remain in touch with and assist

networks of democracy supporters throughout Burma, also disseminate the pro-democracy material of the larger movement.

Over the course of the past two years, Burmese pro-democracy organizations in

exile, working in consultation with democrats inside the country, have dedicated

greater attention and resources to researching and planning for a future democratic

Burma. The Endowment has supported work in developing federal and state constitutions for a democratic Burma, drafting proposed labor laws, and drawing up

plans for a transition to a market-based economy. Despite such efforts, transition

planning is still in its infancy. Increased effort should be directed at a broad range

of initiatives designed to address pressing issues that Burma will face following the

transition to a democratic government. In collaboration with NGOs, think tanks,

universities, and researchers, Burmese groups can develop policy alternatives with

implementation plans that address issues such as education; health; the rule of law

and reform of the judiciary; human rights and transitional justice; economics and

public finance; agriculture; federal, state and municipal roles; energy, the environment, and natural resources; reconciliation and ethnic rights; peace building and

civil society; and humanitarian needs.

Over the past 15 years, more than 10,000 university and secondary school students have left everything behind and fled Burma in order to carry on the struggle

for democracy and human rights in their homeland. Those who remained in Burma,

and those too young to have participated in the democracy uprising of 1988, have

few opportunities: school supplies are scarce and out-of-date; teachers are poorly

trained and paid; schools have been closed for extended periods on a seemingly regular basis; and students are seen as a threat to stability, not an asset to the country. Those students and pro-democracy activists whose educations were cut short

when they went into exile have had few opportunities for education and training.

29

The more than 100,000 Burmese refugees in Thailand have little or no access to secondary education or skills-training opportunities.

The Endowment places a high priority on expanding opportunities for Burmese

to receive training opportunities, whether as interns or as part of structured

projects. The Endowment looks to support ethnic organizations as they work to improve their ability to resist the junta’s efforts to destroy ethnic cultural cohesion by

harshly punishing any use indigenous languages in local schools—a blatant violation of international human rights standards protecting indigenous cultures and

languages. Ethnic leaders are painfully aware that primary education, even in Burmese, much less in ethnic languages, is severely inadequate in their enclaves. These

leaders know that the current generation of youth must receive better educations

if the leadership is to hold out any hope for a more prosperous life.

Despite the cease-fire agreements between ethnic groups and the government in

the mid-1990s, people and groups inside Burma are as vulnerable as ever to the regime’s abuses. Recent estimates put the number of internally displaced persons at

more than 500,000. It may even exceed 1,200,000 out of a total population of about

46 million people. Efforts should be made to provide humanitarian relief through

pro-democracy activist groups to non-combatant opponents of the military junta, especially ethnic minorities, women, and students, in order to encourage greater unity

among those struggling for democracy, relieve the hardships suffered by displaced

persons and victims of political repression, and strengthen self-reliance as a means

of staving off exploitation.

CONCLUSION

The State Peace and Development Council rules Burma with an iron fist. The regime believes that it alone is responsible for maintaining unity and securing the

peace in Burma. Although Burma experts often discuss splits in the military and

divisions between the intelligence and army branches of the junta, the military

seems fairly united. Absent some crushing event, the regime seems unlikely to turn

on itself. But, if the regime is so secure in its position, why has it not been able

to rid itself once and for all of the democracy movement?

The simple answer is because the democracy movement derives its strength from

the people of Burma and is led by one of the world’s most courageous, committed,

and principled leaders. The democracy movement also draws strength from the

international community. When international organizations such as the ILO take

unprecedented steps to address forced labor abuses in Burma or when the US

passes tough sanctions legislation, the effect is twofold—it punishes the regime for

its behavior and bolsters the democracy movement, which has consistently urged

governments around the world to avoid doing anything that will prop up the regime.

The organizations and projects that the Endowment supports have also made a

significant contribution to the struggle for democracy and human rights in Burma.

Through our grants program, we have supported a range of Burmese-, English- and

ethnic-language independent media projects; internal labor- and student-organizing

efforts; human rights education, advocacy and research; and coalition building

among the various pro-democracy and ethnic forces. These groups are the lifeline

to their colleagues inside Burma.

The regime is unlikely to negotiate in good faith with a partner whose principles

and popularity makes it inherently a threat to the regime, but whom the regime

believes lacks actual power. The NLD represents a real threat to the regime. The

challenge is to continue to strengthen the NLD while weakening the regime so that

any future dialogue will be between equals. Clearly, that is easier said than done.

There is no easy answer to the challenge presented by Burma. Yet in one significant

way the situation is very promising, for there is a peaceful and legitimate alternative to the regime. That alternative is Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues in

the NLD—to this day the clear winner in the last free election to be held in this

shackled land. They deserve our full and open support.

The United States should continue to pursue a strategy in Burma that combines

punitive measures that target the regime while simultaneously supporting efforts to

build a strong democratic alternative. Specifically, the United States Government

should:

(1) Continue to take a leading role in the international community to hold

the Burmese generals responsible for their conduct.

(2) Work with our allies in Asia—Japan and Thailand in particular—to

ensure that their Burma policies reflect a strongly pro-democratic agenda.

(3) Encourage the UN secretary general to become engaged on a sustained and personal basis. Specifically, the U.S. should work with the

30

United Nations to introduce democratic benchmarks, including the right of

the NLD to open and staff offices, and to publish a newspaper. These

benchmarks must include a specific timeframe for their implementation.

The current UN-backed process, which has no enforcement mechanism, has

run its course and should be scrapped.

(4) Work with our ally Thailand to ensure that it provides a safe and secure environment for nonviolent Burmese pro-democracy activists working

in exile.

Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to testify here today about

this important topic and, more importantly, for your ongoing support of the work

the NED does to promote democracy in Burma.

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED) FISCAL YEAR 2002 BURMA GRANTS,

FROM THE NED ANNUAL REPORT 2002

(*INDICATES FUNDING SOURCE OTHER THAN ANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION)

Because the Burmese junta has targeted the NED in the past for its support of

the pro-democracy movement in Burma, the NED no longer publishes the names of

recipent organizations in Burma.

(A) Capacity and Institution Building

$60,000* To undertake a multifaceted legal research and education program to

promote respect for human rights arid the rule of law in Burma.

$16,000 To support a capacity-building and leadership-training program for ethnicnationality youth from Burma.

$15,000 To support the third meeting of the Chin State Constitution Drafting

Working Group and consultation with an international constitutional expert

about the draft document.

$80,000* To distribute human rights and democracy materials inside Burma; to

train party activists in effective techniques of nonviolent political action; and to

provide humanitarian support for party activists and others along the ThaiBurma border and inside Burma.

$45,000 To be used towards core support and to support its national reconciliation

and political solidarity program, which promotes unity among prodemocracy

and ethnic forces in Burma; and to conduct basic political education training for

grassroots activists from Burma.

International Republican Institute $200,000 To provide partial core funding and

technical and strategic support for prodemocracy political organizations in exile

and to increase cooperation with Burmese ethnic nationality groups.

International Republican Institute $260,000* To provide specialized training to

exiled Burmese political organizations and to provide support to prodemocracy

organizations in exile that disseminate information in Burma about democracy

and nonviolent political action.

(B) Education and Outreach

$15,000 To distribute material on human rights and democracy, monitor the

human rights situation in Burma, and educate monks and Buddhist laypeople

about the nonviolent struggle for democracy in Burma.

$68,307* To research, document, and publicize the treatment and status of political prisoners in Burma and to provide basic humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families in Burma.

$380,000* To support the implementation of the Burmese prodemocracy movement’s comprehensive strategic plan aimed at creating a political environment

in Burma that is conducive to dialogue between the National League for Democracy and the Burmese military junta.

$40,000* To conduct a series of leadership workshops for members; to hold capacity-building workshops for women along the Thai-Burma border; to publish a bimonthly Burmese-language newsletter; and to maintain three small reading

rooms.

$40,000* To conduct an intensive training-of-trainers course; to implement human

rights education and training courses for grassroots participants, including

women and ethnic activists; to publish a Burmese-language human rights manual; and for core support.

31

$50,000* To support a Bangkok-based foreign affairs office to conduct diplomatic

activities in Southeast and East Asia in order to build international support for

the democracy movement in Burma.

$10,000 To educate, train, and empower Burmese women in exile in India to take

a more active role in the prodemocracy struggle and to promote women’s rights

in Burma and among the exile community.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs $112,502 To provide technical assistance to Burma’s elected democratic leadership for a campaign to

build international support for democracy in Burma among parliamentarians,

governments, and political-party leaders worldwide.

(C) Humanitarian Assistance

$10,000 To support training courses and workshops and to publish a bimonthly

newsletter that highlights the plight of the internally displaced population.

$40,000* To be used towards core support for an umbrella organization comprised

of representatives from major prodemocracy and ethnic organizations, to enable

it to coordinate health and education programs for refugee populations in Thailand and India and ethnic populations inside Burma.

(D) Information and Media

$25,000* To publish and distribute an English-language bimonthly newsletter on

the human rights situation in western Burma and to organize a two-week capacity-building training for forty human rights activists.

$160,000* To support a twice-daily Burmese- and ethnic-language shortwave radio

broadcast of independent news and opinion into Burma, and to strengthen the

station’s ethnic-language programming.

$12,000* To publish and distribute two monthly human rights newsletters—one in

English and one in an ethnic language—for the international community and

for audiences in Burma and in exile in Thailand.

$10,000 To conduct women’s empowerment and capacity-building workshops for

displaced women; to document and report on the situation of women in eastern

Burma; and to provide basic social services for displaced women in Thailand

and inside Burma.

$40,000* To produce English-language human rights reports on conditions in

southern Burma; to educate Mon inside Mon State about democracy and human

rights; and to publish a bimonthly Mon-language newsletter and a monthly

Mon-language newspaper for citizens in Mon State and for Mon refugees along

the Thai-Burma border.

$80,000* To publish a monthly English-language news magazine providing independent news and information about Burma and events in Southeast Asia, and

to maintain a Burmese- and English-language Web site.

$30,000* To conduct a series of women’s rights and empowerment training workshops in Thailand and India for Burmese women of various ethnic groups.

$12,000* To publish a twenty-eight-page monthly trilingual newsletter that serves

as an alternative news source for readers in Burma, in refugee camps along the

Thai-Burma border, and in exile in Thailand.

$14O,000* To publish and distribute inside Burma an independent monthly Burmese-language newspaper focusing on the struggle for human rights and democracy.

$25,000 To write, edit, publish, and distribute a quadri-lingual monthly journal focusing on eastern Burma.

American Center for International Labor Solidarity $425,033* To work from its

Washington, DC, office to support the program of the independent labor movement in exile to educate workers and other citizens, both exiled and inside

Burma, about labor rights and democracy, and to document violations of internationally recognized labor rights.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Joseph. I appreciate that testimony. We’ll go to the next witness.

I would note to the people watching that the two pictures we

have on the side are given to us by the Free Burma Coalition and

the International Republican Institute, and one is of Suu Kyi at a

rally, and the other is of a young man that was caught in the

32

crackdown. I think they show some of the scenes that were taking

place in Burma.

Next is Mr. Kevin Burke; he is president and CEO of the American Apparel and Footwear Association. Thank you very much for

joining us today.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN BURKE, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

AMERICAN APPAREL AND FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having us here today

and for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on what

I consider a very, very crucial matter.

I am the president and chief executive officer of the American

Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA), the national trade association in the apparel and nonrubber footwear industries. Our association represents nearly 700 large and small companies who

produce and market clothing and shoes in the United States and

throughout the world. We also represent many of the suppliers to

our industry.

First and foremost, the members of AAFA strongly support trade

sanctions against the ruling military junta in Burma and, in particular, applaud the Senate’s actions last week in approving 97-to1 the legislation introduced by Senators McConnell and Feinstein

and joined by 60 of their colleagues. This legislation will ban all

United States imports from Burma until the President of the

United States can certify that Burma has taken significant and

positive steps toward democracy and improved human rights for all

of its people.

AAFA hopes that this legislation will be part of a multilateral

process that will ultimately involve more pressure from the United

Nations and others in the international community.

Now, you might ask why our association and its members would

support a ban on United States imports from Burma. Now, there

are many reasons for this, but I will speak of only two today. Our

association cares very deeply about labor and human rights. These

issues are some of the most important factors our member companies consider when choosing a company or a factory to make their

shoes or garments. If a country or factory has the ability to make

high quality garments or footwear, but we are not satisfied with

the labor or human rights situation, we will avoid these countries

and we will avoid these factories.

At the request of our members, AAFA has embraced labor rights,

human rights, and social responsibility not only in principle, Mr.

Chairman, but also in practice. Corporate social responsibility represents one of the central tenets of AAFA’s mission statement and

its trade policy.

Now, AAFA has followed through on this commitment with concrete actions, of which our stand on Burma is just one of many. For

example, AAFA has strongly supported the Worldwide Responsible

Apparel Production program, otherwise known as WRAP. WRAP

promotes a code of conduct that ensures that core labor concepts,

including a minimum age and a prohibition against forced labor,

are understood and practiced in the shop room floor and also by

management. WRAP relies upon independent third-party monitors

to certify that individual overseas factories are in compliance with

33

WRAP’s code of conduct. Many AAFA members subscribe to WRAP

and other similar codes of conduct that are certified by independent

organizations.

We have also created a forum for our members so our members

can discuss best practices in corporate social responsibilities

through our Social Responsibility Committee. I had the honor of

presenting this past week our Excellence in Social Responsibility

awards, which I’m holding here today—I brought this as an example—to members of our association who in our view and an independent view have excelled in this area, demonstrating their support of labor and human rights in the workforce. We do this every

year, and we are certainly hopeful that our members will increase

their participation in this program.

This brings me to my second point. Our association felt it was

time to take one step further our commitment to corporate social

responsibility with respect to Burma. Two years ago, due to persistent and egregious violations of ILO conventions on forced labor,

child labor, and the overall abhorrent labor situation in Burma, the

ILO took the unprecedented step of calling for its member countries to take concrete actions, including economic sanctions against

the military regime in Burma.

Most countries failed to heed this call. Many of our members,

however, did heed the call and publicly pledged to stop sourcing

from Burma. Since the ILO took this position, little, if any,

progress has been made in Burma. Abuses of labor and human

rights are still rife throughout the country.

According to the United States Government’s own report on this

subject, the recently released 2002 Country Report on Human

Rights Practices in Burma, the Burmese Government has, and I

quote, continued to restrict workers’ rights, ban unions, and use

forced labor for public works and for the support of military garrisons. Other forced labor, including child labor, remains a serious

problem despite recent ordinances outlawing the practices, unquote. In fact, the situation has deteriorated, with the economy in

ruins and human rights abuses rampant, due largely to the inept

and corrupt policies and practices of Burma’s military rulers.

Thanks in large part to the efforts of AAFA’s members and other

responsible companies in this industry, United States apparel imports have declined significantly from Burma in the last couple of

years.

Now, despite this decline, United States total imports from

Burma still reached $360 million last year, with United States imports of Burmese apparel, textiles, and footwear accounting for 85

percent of that total. This money helps prop up the military regime

because, in our understanding, many of the apparel and footwear

factories are owned by supporters of the military junta who have

directly benefited from the junta’s forced labor infrastructure

projects and its nonexistent enforcement of labor laws. The military

junta would not exist without the support of these thugs and their

cronies.

Our association and its members realize that the only way to implement effective change at the factory level in Burma is to effectively change the government at the national level. Without effective democratic reform and protection of basic human rights at the

34

national level, flagrant labor rights violations will continue to run

rampant at the factory level.

AAFA and its members cannot make this change alone. We feel

that it is time not only for our association but for the United States

Government to take a stand that it will no longer tolerate or support the actions of the military regime in Burma. The most effective and the only way to do this is to impose an outright ban on

all United States imports from Burma.

As the events of the last few weeks have proven, words alone

have failed to effect positive change in Burma. Decisive actions

through the imposition of new sanctions is the only route available.

This is the right thing for our association, this is the right thing

for our Government, and for all other governments around the

world who hold dearly the dignity and respect of all human beings.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here this afternoon, and I look forward to any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN M. BURKE

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today on this

important matter. I am the President and Chief Executive Officer of the American

Apparel & Footwear Association—the national trade association of the apparel and

non-rubber footwear industries. Our association represents nearly 700 large and

small companies who produce and market clothing and shoes in the United States

and throughout the world. We also represent many of the suppliers to these industries.

First and foremost, the members of AAFA strongly support trade sanctions

against the ruling military junta in Burma and, in particular, applaud the Senate’s

action last week in approving 97 to 1 the legislation introduced by Senators McConnell and Feinstein and joined by 60 of their colleagues.

This legislation will ban all United States imports from Burma until the President

of the United States can certify that Burma has taken significant and positive steps

toward democracy and improved human rights for its people. AAFA hopes that this

legislation will be part of a multilateral process that will ultimately involve more

pressure from the United Nations and others in the international community.

You might ask why our association and its members would support a ban on

United States imports from Burma. There are many reasons, but I will speak of

only two.

Our association cares very deeply about labor and human rights. These issues are

some of the most important factors our member companies consider when choosing

a country or factory to make their shoes or garments. If a country or factory has

the ability to make a high quality piece of apparel or footwear, but we are not satisfied with the labor or human rights situation, we will avoid those countries or factories.

At the request of our members, AAFA has embraced labor rights, human rights,

and social responsibility not only in principle, but in practice. Corporate social responsibility represents one of the central tenets in AAFA’s mission statement and

its trade policy.

AAFA has followed through on this commitment with concrete actions, of which

our stand on Burma is just one of many. For example, AAFA has strongly supported

the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production program or ‘‘WRAP.’’ WRAP promotes a code of conduct that ensures that core labor concepts—including a minimum

age and a prohibition on forced labor—are understood and practiced on the shop

room floor and by management. WRAP relies upon independent, third-party monitors to certify that individual overseas factories are in compliance with wrap’s code

of conduct. Many AAFA members subscribe to wrap and other similar codes of conduct that are certified by independent organizations.

We have also created a forum where our members can discuss ‘‘best practices’’ in

corporate social responsibility, through AAFA’s Social Responsibility Committee. I

had the honor of presenting last week our ‘‘Excellence in Social Responsibility’’

awards, which I am holding here today, to members of our association who have

35

excelled in this area, demonstrating their support of labor and human rights in the

workplace.

This brings me to my second point. Our association felt it was time to take one

step further our commitment to corporate social responsibility with respect to

Burma. Two years ago, due to persistent and egregious violations of ILO conventions on forced labor, child labor and the overall abhorrent labor situation in Burma,

the ILO took the unprecedented step of calling for its member countries to take concrete actions, including economic sanctions, against the military regime in Burma.

Most countries failed to heed this call. Many of our members, however, did heed the

call and publicly pledged to stop sourcing from Burma.

Since the ILO took this position, little, if any, progress has been made in Burma.

Abuses of labor and human rights are still rife throughout the country. According

to the United States Government’s own report on the subject, the recently released

2002 Country Report On Human Rights Practices on Burma, the Burmese government has, and I quote ‘‘. . . continued to restrict worker rights, ban unions, and used

forced labor for public works and for the support of military garrisons. Other forced

labor, including child labor, remained a serious problem despite recent ordinances

outlawing the practice.’’ In fact, the situation has deteriorated with the economy in

ruins and human rights abuses rampant due largely to the inept and corrupt policies of Burma’s military rulers.

Thanks in large part to the efforts of AAFA’s members and other responsible companies in this industry, United States apparel imports have declined significantly

from Burma over the last couple of years. Despite this decline, United States total

imports from Burma still reached $360 million last year with United States imports

of Burmese apparel, textiles, and footwear accounting for 85 percent of the total.

This money helps prop up the military regime because, in our understanding, many

of the apparel and footwear factories are owned by supporters of the military junta

who have directly benefited from the junta’s forced labor infrastructure projects and

its non-existent enforcement of labor laws. The military junta would not exist without the support of these cronies.

Our association and its members realized that the only way to implement effective

change at the factory level in Burma is to effectively change the government at the

national level. Without effective democratic reform and protection of basic human

rights at the national level, flagrant labor rights violations will continue to run

rampant at the factory level.

AAFA and its members cannot make this change alone. We feel that it is time

not only for our association, but for the United States Government to take a stand

that it will no longer tolerate or support the actions of the military regime in

Burma. The most effective and only way to do this is to impose an outright ban on

all United States imports from Burma. As the events of the last few weeks have

proven, words alone have failed to effect positive change in Burma. Decisive action,

through the imposition of new sanctions, is the only route available. This is the

right thing for our association, for our government, and for all other governments

around the world who hold dearly the dignity and respect of all citizens.

Thank you.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, and thank you for the testimony. With your association being so opposed to exports or imports

from Burma to the United States, why are we still importing so

much from Burma, footwear and clothing?

Mr. BURKE. These are unfortunately contractors who make garments, and hopefully they’re not my members, and I believe most

of my members have pulled out already. These are what I would

call black marketeers. I would certainly hope that if there are any

of my members that are over there, they would be out right away,

but we as an association have made a very, very strong stand

against the import of these products. It is the right thing for us to

do.

Senator BROWNBACK. You’re talking about, if I’ve got your numbers right, about $288 million worth of clothing and footwear coming into this country from Burma?

Mr. BURKE. That is correct.

Senator BROWNBACK. By black marketeers?

36

Mr. BURKE. And contractors that have no respect for human

rights.

Now, our association, Senator, made a statement that said that

we will not support any companies or contractors who produce in

Burma. Now, we can’t control what these companies do. We can

only insist that we take the right stand on this. As an association

we really have no legal control on what they do. We can simply

make a statement on behalf of the industry that you ought to be

out.

Senator BROWNBACK. I appreciate the push, and I appreciate

your stance on behalf of your industry. I just did not realize the

number was quite that high.

Mr. BURKE. I wish it wasn’t that high. I wish it was at zero.

Senator BROWNBACK. I do, too, or that the regime would change.

Mr. Rogers, good to have you here, Kenneth Rogers, Associate

Dean of International Programs, Director of International Services

(Emeritus), Indiana University. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH ROGERS, ASSOCIATE DEAN OF

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS AND DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICES (EMERITUS), INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, it’s an honor to have been invited

to offer an international educator’s perspective on the current situation in Burma, and to suggest several ways in which both the

United States and other nations which share a common concern

about Burma’s future might help to ensure that some of the country’s most important needs in democratic institution-building,

health and human services, especially education, and economic development, might be addressed early on and with optimum results.

Very briefly, in my testimony I propose to focus on the roles that

exiles, and more particularly Burmese students in the United

States and elsewhere abroad, might play in helping to rehabilitate

their beloved homeland. As a preface on student involvement in

popular political reform movements in Burma, I would just mention that college and university students have long been at the

forefront of popular movements in Burma.

During the final decades of British rule, Rangoon University students came of age, advocating first self-government, then independence for Burma. The heroic leadership of former Rangoon University student leader Aung San—whose astute efforts won the promise of independence and of a bright future for his country, only to

be halted by an assassin’s bullet in 1947—has been an inspiration

to generations of young Burmese ever since. Among them his example has galvanized opposition and resistance to the brutal repression of military regimes that have ruled the country for the

last 41 years.

College and university students are therefore proudly regarded

by Burmese at-large not only as champions of freedom and democracy, but also as a precious resource for restoring democracy and

the nation’s economic health.

My own personal and professional involvement with Burma and

with Burmese students dates from 1962, the year in which I began

a 4-year assignment with the United States Information Service as

a Foreign Service Officer in Burma. My involvement with Burmese

37

students again came to the fore in the early 1990s, when I was contacted by colleagues in the city of Fort Wayne, Indiana, to work

with them in assisting newly-arrived refugee students from Burma.

I will quickly jump to the present to say that there are now in the

State of Indiana alone more than 3,000 refugees from Burma, most

of them former students, pro-democracy activists. Happily, some

have been able to go forward with their education, but I will come

back to that.

I am especially pleased, too, that in the same period since 1993,

Indiana University has administered the State Department-funded

Burmese refugee scholarship program for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. This program has made possible the

completion of higher education degrees for more than 60 scholars

and professionals from Burma, and has placed them at institutions

throughout the United States.

Ten years of working with Burmese student exiles have led me

to the conclusion that, individually and as a group, they are capable of contributing vitally important knowledge and experience to

the process of moving their homeland toward democracy, as well as

to the economic and social advancement of their fellow countrymen

and women. But the extent to which they will be able to do so with

maximum success is going to depend, in my opinion, upon adequate

preparation in advance of their return home and, in particular, a

grounding in practical Burma-specific methods or strategies for

bringing about needed changes or reforms of existing structures,

policies, and practices in the Burmese educational system.

In attempting to determine the kinds of advanced preparation

that Burmese students who have been educated abroad will need

in order to avoid pitfalls and problems that, once they return to

their homeland could easily frustrate or even defeat their efforts to

revitalize the educational system and other elements of the nation’s

infrastructure, we should not only heed realities of the current situation in Burma, but also those that foreign-educated students

from developing countries beyond Burma have encountered.

Let me briefly elaborate. Within Burma, the system of education,

long-impoverished and in disrepair, has become practically dysfunctional. United Nations’ statistics indicate that the Burmese military government spends only 1.1 percent of gross domestic product

on education. Education at the tertiary level has been totally and

systematically emasculated by the military regime, which regards

university students with suspicion, if not hostility, as enemies of

the government.

To deter dissident students from organizing anti-government

demonstrations, Burma’s military rulers have ruthlessly shut down

institutions of higher education for years at a time, and have even

relocated the campuses of some of them to remote areas away from

population centers. On the other hand, they have shortened the

academic year to 4 months in some fields of study.

As of the year 2001, the nation’s universities had been open for

only 3 of the previous 12 years, thereby creating enormous backlogs

of waiting students, including an estimated 5 million high school

graduates kept in limbo for years waiting for admission to universities, while on the other hand tens of thousands of university

38

matriculants were waiting for institutions to reopen so that they

could get on with completing their degrees.

The situation is pretty grim. I think, in conclusion, what we need

to do is take note of the situation that returnees have faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Saddam

Iraq, and take steps to help the Burmese students who are abroad

now who have acquired knowledge and have skills that can be used

in the rehabilitation of their home country, to give them the opportunity to organize and prepare to help make that transition as

smooth as possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Rogers, and

that’s a very thoughtful point. I did not realize that they had completely shut down higher education, although it almost stands to

reason that this regime would do something like that, as deplorable

as it is, and as much as it absolutely mortgages your future if you

don’t have students coming forward that are well-trained to be able

to serve the people and serve society.

Ms. Veronika Martin is an advocate for Refugees International.

We’re delighted to have you here with us today.

STATEMENT OF VERONIKA MARTIN, ADVOCATE,

REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

Ms. MARTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank

Senator Brownback and Senator Lugar also for organizing this

hearing, and I would like to thank the Senate for its overwhelming

support for the people of Burma by passing the Burma Freedom

and Democracy Act. Having worked with ethnic Burmese for more

than 10 years, I’m honored to offer testimony on behalf of Refugees

International.

Over the last 8 months, RI has conducted two assessment missions focused on the human rights and humanitarian situation of

Burma’s ethnic minorities. My testimony will focus on two issues,

first, the prevalence of rape by Burma’s army against ethnic minority women, and second, protection problems facing Burmese refugees before and after their flight to neighboring Thailand or to

Bangladesh.

Refugees International’s investigation on human rights violations

against women and girls documented the widespread use of rape

by Burmese soldiers to brutalize women from five different ethnic

nationalities on Burma’s eastern border. Additional informal research completed on RI’s recent visit to the western border points

to a similar pattern.

RI conducted interviews with women from the Karen, Karenni,

Mon, Shan, and Tavoyan ethnicities. In the course of 26 individual

interviews with women and men and two focus groups, RI learned

of 43 cases of rape or attempted rape, with 23 of those confirmed

through eyewitness testimony or physical evidence. In about onethird of the cases, the confirmed cases, the abusers raped the

women on military property, and in over one-third of the confirmed

cases he was an officer in Burma’s army.

Rape happened in a variety of circumstances, during forced labor

assignments, while foraging and farming, during incarceration in

military camps, and by intrusion into families’ homes.

39

The specific rapes RI documented are but a fraction of those perpetrated by Burma’s army. Of the 45 ethnic women who participated in RI focus groups, 75 percent said they knew someone who

had been raped. It is clear that rape and increased militarization

go hand in hand. There is also a direct connection between rape

and migration. Many women flee Burma either because they have

been raped, or because they fear being raped.

Rape also occurs while women are in flight. As an example, I

want to share with you the story of Thay Yu. Thay Yu is Karen

mother in her forties who was fleeing to Thailand because of oppression by the military in her village.

Near the border of Thailand, a group of six Burmese soldiers

caught one of the families traveling with her. It was a family of

four composed of parents, a nursing baby, and a 6-year-old girl.

Thay Yu hid in a nearby bush while soldiers killed the baby with

a blow to the back of the neck. They then raped the mother, while

forcing the husband to watch. After killing the mother by stabbing

her through her vagina with a bamboo pole, they shot the husband.

The 6-year-old daughter ran away and hid in a tree, where Thay

Yu collected her and brought her to Thailand after burying the

bodies of her parents. This gruesome story is one of many we documented.

Widespread rape and human rights abuses against ethnic minorities are committed with impunity. The culture of impunity contributes to a military atmosphere in which rape is permissible. In

only two of the 43 cases RI documented were the perpetrators punished. These punishments were extremely lenient.

Because the SPDC and, by extension, its army view the ethnic

minority groups as insurgents, their rape of ethnic women is a way

of waging war on the civilian populations. By engaging in a widespread practice of rape against ethnic minority women, Burma’s

army is violating customary international law as well as both national laws and international obligations under the multilateral

treaties it has ratified.

The SPDC has denounced reports about rape issued by local

human rights groups, the U.S. Department of State, and RI. They

have concluded that such reports were fabricated. RI’s research

tells a different story. These rapes are not a deviation committed

by rebel soldiers. They are part of a pattern of abuse designed to

control, terrorize, and harm ethnic populations through their

women.

RI recommends that the SPDC stop military buildup and begin

demilitarizing the ethnic areas. The SPDC should further fulfill its

obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention on the

Rights of the Child, both of which it ratified.

The support of 33 United States Senators in signing a letter to

Kofi Annan last year calling for an investigation into the rapes, as

well as the United States Department of State’s own verification of

the problem of rape in Burma, have demonstrated significant support. The U.S. Congress, and particularly the Senate, can continue

to play a leading role by publicizing human rights abuses committed by the regime and continuing to put pressure on the SPDC.

40

I would now like to move the focus of this testimony on protection problems faced by Burmese refugees and internally displaced

persons in ethnic minority areas. I have divided this testimony into

two parts. Each part reviews the situation of ethnic Burmese before and after their flight to Thailand or to Bangladesh.

RI has interviewed refugees who fled Burma’s eastern and western borders from the following eight ethnic groups. These include

the Karen, Karenni, Shan, Mon, Tavoyan, Rohingya, Rakhaing,

and Chin. These groups represent Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim

individuals.

To discuss the human rights situation in eastern Burma, I’d like

to share with you a remark made by an older man from the Mon

ethnic group. He told me, they, referring to the SPDC, treated me

like an animal, like a dog. They broke my head until blood

streamed out. My jaws, cheeks, and ribs were broken. The SPDC

can do what they like. They can kill and rape. We are weaker than

they.

Refugees in Thailand indicated they had fled from their homes

because they could no longer endure abuses such as forced labor,

torture, forced relocation, rape, property and crop confiscation, and

summary executions. One Burmese army defector interviewed by

RI described the instructions given to him by his superior, who told

him, in the front line, everything in the village of the ethnic groups

is yours, women, domestic animals, you are free to do anything you

want. You can even do so if you have a wife at home.

Forced relocation is another form of abuse affecting hundreds of

thousands of Burmese. Villages are evacuated or destroyed, its people forced to move to an area overseen by the army. Relocation

sites are devoid of schools and health care.

There are 176 sites that house 350,000 people and an estimated

300,000 are on the run or in hiding in Thailand. It is estimated

there are a million internally displaced persons living in eastern

Burma. They have practically no access to humanitarian assistance. What little information is available from these areas indicates that malnutrition, starvation, and death from preventable

diseases are common.

The SPDC denies their existence. No U.N. agency or international organization has come to their aid. The internally displaced of Burma have for the most part been abandoned by the

United Nations and by the international community, who insist on

the permission of an illegitimate regime to access this population

in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance.

In conclusion, I want to refer to our recommendations. To address the needs of these forgotten people, RI recommends that

international organizations push for independent access to these

IDPs for emergency assistance, that the Royal Thai Government

allow Burmese fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution entry into

Thailand and access to humanitarian assistance, and that the

Royal Thai Government should also allow the UNHCR to carry out

its refugee protection mandate.

The United States Government can play a leading role in encouraging the cooperation of Thailand, Burma, and the United Nations

in meeting these objectives by confirming publicly the scope of Burma’s IDP problem, advocating for independent humanitarian access

41

to ethnic minority areas, and providing resources for emergency assistance to IDPs. I will refer you to our written testimony on more

information about abuses of Burmese refugees in Thailand, as well

as the situation of the Muslim Rohingya from Burma who have fled

to Bangladesh.

Thank you for the opportunity to share our findings.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Martin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VERONIKA A. MARTIN

I would like to thank Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Sam Brownback for organizing this hearing on the development of democracy in Burma. I would also like

to thank the Senate for its overwhelming support for the people of Burma by passing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

Having worked with ethnic Burmese for more than 10 years, I am honored to offer

testimony on behalf of Refugees International (RI). Over the last eight months, RI

has conducted two assessment missions focused on the human rights and humanitarian situation of Burmese ethnic minorities. My testimony will focus on two

issues: first, the prevalence of rape by Burma’s army against ethnic minority women

in Burma; second, protection problems facing Burmese refugees before and after

their flight to neighboring Thailand and Bangladesh.

Rape of Ethnic Minority Women

According to Burma’s ruling military regime, the State Peace and Development

Council (SPDC), Burma’s army ‘‘safeguards national solidarity and peace.’’ According to women and men from Burma’s ethnic minority groups, particularly those living in the ethnic States along Burma’s eastern and western borders, the army does

the opposite. Rather than look to the army for protection, ethnic people flee in fear

at the sight of a soldier. Refugees International’s investigation on human rights violations against women and girls documented the widespread use of rape by Burma’s

soldiers to brutalize women from five different ethnic nationalities on Burma’s eastern border. Additional informal research completed on RI’s recent visit to the western border points to a similar pattern.

Although rape by soldiers in Burma has been a well-known, well-documented

problem for at least a decade, a report by the Shan Women’s Action Network

(SWAN) and Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), License to Rape, inspired an

unprecedented level of international interest and outrage regarding the rapes of

women from only one ethnic group. RI’s research crossed ethnic boundaries to confirm that Burma’s military frequently rapes women from various ethnic nationalities.

RI conducted interviews with individuals and focus groups of people living in refugee camps, in villages in Thailand and with people still living inside Burma. RI

interviewed women, men, indigenous NGOs and local leaders about sexual violence

committed by Burma’s armed forces against women from the Karen, Karenni, Mon,

Shan and Tavoyan ethnicities. In the course of 26 individual interviews with women

and men and two focus groups composed of 45 women, RI learned about numerous

instances of rape against ethnic women: specifically, 43 cases of rape or attempted

rape against women from these ethnic groups, with 23 of those confirmed through

eyewitness testimony or physical evidence. In about one-third of the confirmed

cases, the abuser raped the women on military property, and in over one-third of

the confirmed cases, he was an officer in Burma’s army. Rape happened in a variety

of circumstances: during incarceration in military camps, during forced labor assignments, while foraging and farming and by intrusions into families’ homes.

The specific rapes RI documented are but a fraction of those perpetrated by Burma’s army. Every one of the 45 ethnic women who participated in the RI focus

groups said she had heard about rapes occurring in her area of origin, and 75 percent said they knew someone who had been raped. It is clear that rape and increased militarization go hand-in-hand; when more soldiers are sent to an area,

typically more rape occurs. It is significant that rape occurs on military property because even in those cases where the officer wasn’t the one to commit the rape, he

knew or should have known about it. In the vast majority of the cases, the rapes

occurred in conjunction with other human rights abuses, such as forced labor, forced

relocation, forced portering, torture, and extrajudicial executions. Furthermore,

there is a direct connection between rape and migration. Many women flee Burma

either because they have been raped, or because they fear being raped. Rape also

occurs while women are in flight.

42

As an example of the dangers women face while trying to reach safety in Thailand, I want to share with you the story of Thay Yu. Thay Yu is a Karen mother

in her forties who was fleeing to Thailand because of oppression by the military in

her village. Near the border of Thailand, a group of six Burmese soldiers caught one

of the families traveling with her. It was a family of four, composed of parents, a

nursing baby and a six-year-old girl. Thay Yu hid in a nearby bush and while soldiers killed the baby with a blow to the back of the neck, then raped the mother

while forcing the husband to watch. After killing the mother by stabbing her

through her vagina with a bamboo pole, they shot the husband. The six-year-old

daughter ran away and hid in a tree, where Thay Yu collected her and brought her

to Thailand after burying the bodies of her parents. This gruesome story is one of

many we documented. The treatment of ethnic minorities by SPDC soldiers is inhumane beyond description.

Widespread rape and human rights abuses against ethnic minorities are committed with impunity, both by officers and lower ranking soldiers. Officers committed the majority of rapes documented in which the rank of the perpetrator was

known. The culture of impunity contributes to the military atmosphere in which

rape is permissible. It also leads to the conclusion that the system for protecting

civilians is faulty, which in turn suggests the rape is systematic. Due to the wellknown impunity for rape, survivors and families are extremely reluctant to complain about rape. In the rare cases where victims or their families actually do complain to military officials, army personnel often respond with violence. In only two

of the 43 cases RI documented were the perpetrators punished—these punishments

were extremely lenient, such as the payment of 1000 Kyat or the equivalent of one

US dollar.

As an example of the impunity granted soldiers I want to share the story of Naw

Mu Doh who told us she saw soldiers take her sister away from their home and

transport her to their military camp. She heard her sister calling for her brother

and father to help her because ‘‘they are raping me.’’ They could do nothing to help

her. A day after her sister was taken, the soldiers brought her body back for the

family to bury. Her wounds indicated clearly that she had been raped, perhaps to

death. Despite the fact that the soldiers continued to return to their village after

the murder, Naw Mu Doh and her family were too afraid to complain. One month

later, her father was killed by the army.

According to RI’s conversations with more than 150 people along the Thai/Burmese border over the period of one month, RI’s research indicates that women from

ethnic groups along Burma’s eastern border experience rape at the hands of Burma’s army on a consistent and frequent basis. Because the SPDC, and by extension,

its army, view the ethnic minority groups as ‘‘insurgents,’’ their rape of ethnic

women is a way of waging war on civilian populations. By engaging in the widespread practice of rape against ethnic minority women, Burma’s army, (an arm of

the State), is violating customary international law as well as both national laws

and international obligations under multilateral treaties. These treaties include the

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and

the Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which the SPDC has ratified.

In doing so, the SPDC agreed not only to ensure that their activities did not contravene the letter or spirit of the treaty; they also agreed to take affirmative steps

to realize the commitments enumerated in the treaty. By permitting—either actively

or tacitly—Burma’s army to rape ethnic women with impunity, the SPDC violates

these agreements.

The SPDC has denounced reports about rape issued by ethnic women’s and local

human rights groups, the US Department of State and RI. They have conducted

their own investigation in Shan State (with the active participation of SPDC general

Khin Nyunt’s wife), which has led them to conclude that such reports were fabricated. RI’s research tells a different story. These rapes are not a deviation committed by rebel soldiers; they are part of a pattern of brutal abuse designed to control, terrorize, and harm ethnic nationality populations through their women.

On November 19, 2002, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution on the human rights situation in Burma, ‘‘express[ing] grave

concern at . . . rapes and other forms of sexual violence carried out by members of

the armed forces’’ and the ‘‘disproportionate suffering of members of ethnic minorities, women and children from such violations.’’ It is clear these abuses are directly

linked to the internal war the SPDC is waging upon its own citizens. Until the violence ceases, and until the SPDC establishes and enforces adequate laws prohibiting

rape and ends the culture of impunity for these horrific crimes, freedom from rape

for ethnic women from Burma is impossible.

43

Recommendations

For there to be any change, the SPDC must first acknowledge the epidemic of

rape perpetrated by its army before this can change. RI further recommends that

SPDC stop all military buildup and begin demilitarizing the ethnic areas promptly.

The SPDC should further fulfill its obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). This includes ceasing all practices and policies, which discriminate against women, including violence

against women. Furthermore, the SPDC should fulfill its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits gender-based violence against

girl children.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights should ensure that if any investigation of rape inside Burma should be conducted by UN officials, it is done by experts on sexual violence, with guarantees of full access and complete, ongoing security for all witnesses and victims. Any restrictions on these terms could endanger

the very women the investigation is designed to protect and should result in the investigation not taking place, or being aborted.

The support of 33 U.S. Senators in signing a letter to Kofi Annan calling for an

investigation into the rapes, as well as the United States Department of State’s own verification of the problem of rape in Burma, have demonstrated significant support.

The U.S. Congress, and in particular the Senate, can continue to play a leading role

by publicizing human rights abuses committed by the regime and continuing to put

pressure on the SPDC and the United Nations to meet the aforementioned objectives.

Protection problems facing Burmese refugees before and after their flight to neighboring Thailand and Bangladesh

I would now like to focus this testimony on protection problems faced by Burmese

refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in ethnic minority areas. I have

divided this testimony into two parts. Each part reviews the situation of ethnic Burmese before and after their flight to Thailand and to Bangladesh.

RI has interviewed refugees who have fled the eastern and western borders of

Burma for reasons of abuse or because of a well-founded fear of persecution by the

government from the following eight ethnic groups: Karen, Karenni, Shan, Mon,

Tavoyan, Rohingya, Rakhaing and Chin. These groups represent Buddhist, Christian and Muslim individuals.

Human Rights Situation in Eastern Burma Prior to Flight to Thailand

‘‘They treated me like an animal, like a dog. They broke my head until blood

streamed out. My jaw, cheeks and ribs were broken—the SPDC can do what they

like—they can kill and rape. We are weaker than they.’’ These are the words of an

older man from the Mon ethnic group whom we interviewed.

Refugees interviewed by RI in Thailand indicated they had fled from their homes

because they could no longer endure the human rights abuses by the army. Among

those consistently listed were forced labor, beatings and torture, forced relocation,

rape, property and crop confiscation and summary execution. One Burmese army

defector interviewed by RI described the instructions given to him by his superiors:

‘‘In the frontline, everything in the village of the ethnic groups is yours—women,

domestic animals. You are free to do anything you want. . . . you can do so even if

you have a wife at home in your village.’’

Other forms of abuse consistently levied against ethnic Burmese fleeing to Thailand are a result of Burma’s worsening economy and 50 percent inflation. These include forced labor, land confiscation, taxation, extortion and rice quotas that interfere with people’s ability to provide for themselves.

Some of the most common forms of abuses occurring in eastern Burma are forced

relocation and its attendant forced labor. Forced relocation involves the often-sudden evacuation or destruction of a village and forced move of all available villagers

to a relocation site overseen by the army. Evacuated areas are considered ‘‘free fire

zones’’ where individuals found there may be shot on site. Individuals are then

moved to relocation sites, settlements devoid of basic infrastructure that hold ethnic

people hostage to forced labor and abuse. Relocation sites have been likened to concentration camps. Since 1996, when the government began to implement a stronger

counter-insurgency plan, 176 relocation sites have been documented, housing more

than 350,000 people. An estimated additional 300,000 individuals have chosen to

live on the run and in hiding, rather than move to these sites.

In total, it is estimated that there are one million Internally Displaced Persons

(IDPs) living in eastern Burma. Most are unable to plant and harvest. With practically no access to humanitarian assistance, reports of malnutrition, starvation and

death from preventable diseases—to the extent any information is available at all—

44

abound. Yet despite documentation of their existence and circumstances, no UN

agency and no international NGO has come to the aid of this population. They have

in effect been abandoned by the United Nations and by the international community. Only small covert efforts conducted over the border have been able to address

some of the emergency needs of these populations.

The complete lack of security and access to fundamental goods and services, including healthcare and education, as well as the frequent subjection to violent

human rights abuses, have caused many ethnic people from these areas to undergo

the dangerous journey across militarized and mined areas to enter Thailand. Despite the risk of denial of entry at the border by some authorities—an act in violation of customary international law—Burmese continue to flee to neighboring countries at the rate of three to four thousand per month. Many do so only as a last

resort, having heard that Thailand may deny them entry at the border, deny entrance into refugee camps or subject them to abuses as so called ‘‘illegal migrants.’’

Despite Thailand’s attempts to deter Burmese from entering, there continues to be

an increase in asylum seekers over the past year suggesting that human rights

abuses, if not increasing, are certainly continuing, as the military struggles for total

control of ethnic areas.

Recommendations

To address the needs of these forgotten people RI recommends that international

organizations push for independent access to these IDPs for emergency assistance.

To ensure that those fleeing human rights abuses or a well-founded fear of them

can reach safety RI recommends that the Royal Thai Government allow Burmese

fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution, not ‘‘fighting’’ as the current criteria define, entry into Thailand and access to humanitarian assistance. The Royal Thai

Government should also allow the UNHCR to carry out its refugee protection mandate, which it has been unable to implement appropriately.

The United States Government can play a leading role in encouraging the cooperation of Thailand, Burma and the United Nations in meeting these objectives

by confirming publicly the scope of Burma’s IDP problem, advocating for humanitarian access to ethnic minority areas and providing resources for emergency assistance to affected populations.

Protection of Burmese Refugees in Thailand—The Role of the Royal Thai Government and the UNHCR

Only a tiny fraction of Burmese who have entered Thailand since 1984, approximately 120,000 people, have been permitted to live in refugee camps. Burmese seeking refuge in Thailand, primarily ethnic minorities from eastern Burma, have had

no access to a status determination process for almost two years, and thus, no access to refugee camps or protection and care. As a result, Burmese enter Thailand

as part of the growing ‘‘illegal migrant’’ population. Their presence marks the largest migration flow in Southeast Asia, burdening neighboring Thailand with an estimated two million Burmese seeking either a safe haven from human rights abuses

and persecution or the opportunity to survive and earn a living, or both. The Royal

Thai Government classifies all Burmese now entering Thailand as ‘‘illegal migrants.’’ This misnomer leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and forced relocation

back to Burma. Legitimate asylum seekers are forced to live in limbo on the margins of Thai society either along the border or in urban centers.

Life as an illegal migrant often exposes Burmese to abuse and exploitation. This

is especially true for women who are trafficked or sexually exploited at the hands

of Thai authorities. Vulnerable individuals such as single mothers, elderly, handicapped or the ill have little option but to live on construction sites, in fruit orchards,

or to work as domestic help with limited or no access to healthcare or education for

themselves or their children and practically no legal redress should they suffer

abuses. Abuses by Thais against Burmese are common. In one recent incident in

May, six ‘‘illegal migrants’’ were shot and burned with the involvement of Thai officials. To date, no one has been held accountable.

The Royal Thai Government has invited United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) to have an extremely limited role in Thailand. This limits the

UNHCR’s ability to protect Burmese refugees from classic refugee rights violations

such as refoulement, denial of entry at the border and unscreened deportations of

Burmese who are not in camps, but have legitimate asylum claims. UNHCR has

also been unable to advocate for guarantees that incoming Burmese be allowed to

enter camps, leaving new arrivals unprotected. Third country resettlement is virtually non-existent, at the request of the Royal Thai Government.

An example of UNHCR’s inability to protect legitimate refugees is reflected in the

case of the Shan people. Since 1996, the Burmese army has forcibly relocated over

45

300,000 villagers in Shan State, resulting in a mass exodus to Thailand. Furthermore, the Burmese army’s use of forced relocation, forced labor and its accompanying human rights abuses including rape, have resulted in over 1,000 new Shan

arrivals per month to only one district in Thailand. Credible estimates place the

number of Shan refuge seekers in Thailand at well over 150,000. The Royal Thai

Government, however, has not organized refugee camps for the Shan, and UNHCR

has been unable to push for any protection or assistance for this group.

To make matters worse, rather than advocate for the Shan as legitimate refugees,

UNHCR classifies Shan people and other non-camp based Burmese as illegal migrants without conducting any status determinations. Because there is no admissions process for them to undergo and no camps to house them, they have no choice

but to live as illegal migrants. No schools are available for the children and health

care is difficult to obtain. Shan women, many of whom have suffered from rape and

other gender-based abuses, are particularly at risk of further exploitation. As one

Shan refugee stated, ‘‘It is worse for the woman because she has no protection, and

this is especially true if she has mental or physical problems; generally, there is

more problem for her survival.’’ Interviews which I conducted while living in Thailand previously, with individuals

who were forced back to Burma and subsequently escaped detention indicate that

persecution is common not only for those accused of links to resistance groups (such

as refugees) but those accused of having engaged in labor union activities in factories in Thailand. This makes it imperative that UNHCR have a presence at deportation sites so that individuals with legitimate claims of persecution if they are returned to Burma, can be entitled to certain basic protections in Thailand. It is critical that the distinction be made between those fleeing a well founded fear of persecution or human rights violations, including those violations that cause extreme

poverty and people motivated only by economic opportunity in Thailand.

Recommendations

In order to ensure the protection of Burmese in Thailand, RI recommends that

the Royal Thai Government (RTG) establish a legitimate status determination process for Burmese ‘‘illegal migrants’’ and allow protection and assistance to Burmese

fleeing a fear of persecution and human rights abuses. Burmese identified as fleeing

a fear of persecution would be protected by international human rights principles

and international customary law. This should also apply to the Shan people. Furthermore, it is also critical that Burmese about to be deported for being ‘‘illegal migrants’’ have the opportunity to make a claim for asylum as internationally accepted

principles of non-refoulement would prescribe. The UNHCR should work with the

Royal Thai Government to put in place a procedure to assess the eligibility of potential deportees for protection prior to their deportation.

The United States Government can play a leading role in encouraging the cooperation of Thailand, and of the UNHCR in meeting these objectives. The U.S.

Government can also assist by providing resources for basic assistance to vulnerable

non-camp-based populations.

Human Rights Situation in Western Burma—prior to flight to Bangladesh

On Burma’s western border RI documented the flight of the Rohingya from northern Arakan State as a direct result of Burmese government policies. These policies

deny them citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law, limit their religious practice,

facilitate land confiscations for army camps or settlement by Buddhist settlers and

prohibit them from leaving their villages. Restrictions on Freedom of movement

limit their ability to access markets, employment, education and medical care. Unlike the Buddhist Rakhine who also live in Arakan state, or the ethnically dominant

Burmans, the Rohingya must pay a significant fee in order to register for marriage

or birth. As with most ethnic groups, RI interviewed Rohingya who were subject to

persecution and human rights abuses for being accused of links with resistance

groups. Such discrimination has contributed to a continuing influx of Rohingya into

Bangladesh, estimated at more than 10,000 in 2002. This adds to the existing caseload of 21,000 ‘‘prima facie’’ Rohingya refugees and an estimated 200,000 unofficial

Rohingya currently living in Bangladesh.

Protection of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh—The role of the Government of Bangladesh and the UNHCR

Despite a clear record of discrimination by the Government of Burma against

Muslim Rohingya, the UNHCR has stepped up repatriation efforts in an attempt

to phase out its responsibilities to the 21,000 refugees residing in camps in Bangladesh. This group remains from the mass exodus of 250,000 Rohingya who sought

refuge in Bangladesh in the early 90s. These refugees received ‘‘prima facie’’ refugee

status, obliging UNHCR to protect and assist them. Refugees fleeing similar condiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:15 Nov 14, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 89837 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tions following the mass repatriations in 1994 and 1995, however, were less fortunate, having been labeled economic migrants who have no legal right to UNHCR’s protection and assistance. While conditions for Rohingya inside Burma have hardly

changed in the last decade, what appears to have changed is UNHCR’s policy towards Rohingya concerning rights to UNHCR protection and support. In less than

two weeks, the UNHCR is planning to end its role in repatriations of Burmese

Rohingya to Bangladesh. By the end of the year, they plan to phase out assistance

with a final pull out anticipated by the end of next year.

By stepping up repatriation efforts and reducing assistance to refugees, UNHCR

has created an environment in which protection for the Rohingya is virtually untenable. In the course of an assessment mission to Cox’s Bazaar district in April, where

Rohingya refugees live in camps and illegally among the local population, RI found

clear evidence of attempts by camp officials to coerce refugees to return to Burma.

Methods of coercion which refugees reported to RI include a reduction in certain

basic entitlements, including food, withholding of medical services or pharmaceuticals, forced relocation within the camps to poorer housing, beatings, and, most

commonly, threats of and actual jail sentences.

Mohammad, a father of six in his thirties, was asked to agree to repatriate by

camp officials in the presence of UNHCR. When he dared to tell UNHCR he did

not want to return, he alleges that the camp authorities later beat and tortured him

until he fell unconscious. He was then sent to jail on false charges for more than

two years. UNHCR, aware of his situation, was unable to help him. Now that Mohammad is out of jail, he faces the same predicament. Already the camp leader has

threatened him with another jail sentence if he does not agree to repatriate. ‘‘I have

only two choices: I go to jail, or I go back to Burma. Going to jail is better than

going to Burma,’’ he stated.

A local Government representative, concerned over UNHCR’s premature withdrawal from its repatriation role, has admitted that, ‘‘UNHCR’s decision to withdraw from the camps has caused us to try to speed up repatriations. The refugees

who do not want to return cannot stay here. The Government will send them back

even if they do not want to go. Bangladesh is a poor country and cannot take care

of this situation.’’

UNHCR has been unable to ensure that returns are voluntary. UNHCR has received dozens of reports of coercion from refugees and other concerned sources, but

repatriations continue to scale up with no clear response to allegations of involuntary returns. Some refugees have chosen to leave the camps and live illegally in hiding in surrounding towns.

UNHCR claims that once it disengages from the repatriations, it still plans to perform its protection duties. UNHCR’s poor record monitoring repatriations to date,

and the fact that by its own admission it is under-staffed, give cause for concern

about the future of protection for the Rohingya. With responsibility for the camps

being handed over to the Government of Bangladesh, it is unclear how UNHCR will

be able to uphold its protection mandate.

UNHCR insists that refugees have the option of integrating into the community

once it disengages. As a challenge to this assumption, however, one has only to look

as far as the slum settlement of 4,000 in Teknaf. Government authorities evicted

this group of illegal Rohingya from their homes in late 2002. They now live in horrendous conditions with mortality rates near emergency levels and no means of obtaining basic services and protection. As illegal immigrants they are not allowed to

own land, have access to education and public health care, or enjoy the basic rights

granted to citizens of Bangladesh. As one local authority stated, ‘‘Refugees cannot

integrate with the local people. They will have to take care of everything for themselves. This is difficult in this region when you don’t own property.’’ Cox’s Bazaar

is one of Bangladesh’s poorest and most depressed areas. Further ‘‘disengagement’’

of UNHCR from the Rohingya caseload amounts to disengagement from their legal

obligation to provide assistance and protection to these refugees. The proposed

phase out plan is likely to leave the Rohingya with limited redress for assistance

or protection from refoulement or abuse by local authorities.

Recommendations

In order to give these Rohingya the protection from non-refoulement that is their

right, RI, recommends that the Government of Bangladesh honor the principle of

non-refoulement and UNHCR continue its camp-based assistance and protection

role. It is imperative that repatriation activities cease until an independent investigation has been conducted into the voluntary nature of repatriations. UNHCR

must strengthen, not weaken its protection activities by increasing its presence in

the camps and increasing expatriate staff who are not subject to local pressures.

Donor governments should continue to fund humanitarian and protection programs

47

for the Rohingya. Meanwhile, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human

Rights and independent human rights monitors should conduct an investigation into

the discriminatory policies and human rights abuses of the Government of Burma

against the Rohingya.

Thank you for the opportunity to share RI’s findings with the Subcommittee on

East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Ms. Martin, for that testimony.

Why do you think the Thai Government has been hesitant in

something that seems such a clear situation? Why have they not

been more helpful towards the refugees, more condemning towards

the Burmese Government?

Ms. MARTIN. My sense is that they are very afraid of a magnet

effect, a so-called pull factor, that if they are more hospitable to

Burmese who want to enter Thailand, that a great percentage of

the country of Burma would come into Thailand. I think there is

great concern that an Indochinese-type refugee situation would

occur again.

Nonetheless, there are 2 million Burmese already in Thailand,

and because Thailand has not allowed them access to refugee

camps, they’re now living illegally, as illegal migrants. They don’t

have access to health care, education, or any legal redress, and

they are routinely, or they’re often abused by Thai individuals and

authorities as well, so we have an underground or illegal population who don’t have access to assistance, and in their own way

are then creating a problem with Thailand.

Senator BROWNBACK. That was my experience at the border. I

mean, you’ve got population, and they’re going to flee. If they’re

being persecuted, pursued, killed in their own communities, they’re

going to flee, you’re going to have that situation, and you just create a pool of very vulnerable people that Thailand is going to deal

with anyway.

Ms. MARTIN. Exactly, and I think a perfect example of a vulnerable group are the Shan people. This is an ethnic minority that has

not been allowed any access to refugee camps. It’s estimated that

there are 150,000 in Thailand, and they have fled well-documented

abuses in Burma, including rape.

Thailand has not allowed them any sort of assistance, so one way

that the United States Government could support this is to actually

have some financial resources for these displaced populations in

Thailand that are not in camps, particularly vulnerable populations

such as women and children who are forced to live on construction

sites and have no access to any assistance or protection.

Senator BROWNBACK. So the United States could provide more

funds for the refugees in Thailand, and I doubt we’re taking very

many refugees into the United States from Burma, but we should.

Ms. MARTIN. Right. I think that Thailand is not permitting Burmese to leave Thailand, to give them exit permits to enter the

United States.

Senator BROWNBACK. So we could press the Thai Government

about that issue as well.

Ms. MARTIN. That’s right.

Senator BROWNBACK. Would that be correct?

Ms. MARTIN. That’s right, and I think also in terms of providing

more resources for Burmese in Thailand, that would have to go

hand in hand with advocacy with the Thais to allow that to hapVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:15 Nov 14, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 89837 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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pen, because at this time, they are not allowing international organizations to assist Burmese who are so-called illegal migrants. We

would argue that many of them are legitimate refugees, but at this

time Thailand does not allow assistance to them.

Senator BROWNBACK. Because of the lateness of the hour, I’m not

going to be able to ask many questions, but Mr. Aung, I particularly appreciated your testimony and your perseverance; I wanted

to note that, to be here, and your continued advocacy on behalf of

the people that continue to suffer. Do you have any further policy

recommendations? You have put forward some, but in reaction to

either Senator McConnell’s or other recommendations that you

heard on this panel, or from Lorne Craner? Do you have any other

thoughts on their policy recommendations?

Mr. DIN. We expect the United States Government will bring our

issues to the United Nations Security Council to take more action.

We expect the United Nations Security Council will adopt a similar

resolution like the Burma Freedom Democracy Act, so we would

like to ask the United States administration to work more actively

organizing China and other countries who may oppose the idea to

bring the situation to the United Nations Security Council.

Senator BROWNBACK. Would anybody on the panel oppose tighter

United States and global sanctions on Burma? There are differing

points of view sometimes on this that you hurt the people more

than you help, but the democracy advocates inside Burma have all

advocated no, keep the pressure on the regime, and I wondered if

there was any difference of opinion on that in the panel.

[No response.]

Senator BROWNBACK. Okay. I wanted to make sure of that.

Mr. DIN. Mr. Chairman, the most important thing is that sanctions is called by Burmese democracy leadership, sanction is called

by people of Burma inside. The people argue that sanctions will

hurt some people. Yes, we agree, sanctions will hurt some ordinary

people, but with a minimum impact, but it will be far less than the

whole country suffering under the military regime. It will be small

sacrifice, and then the sanctions worked for South Africa. We have

seen that, so we believe sanctions will work for my country, too.

And my country has a very unique situation. We have a strong

political party which won a landslide victory in 1990 general election. We have Members of Parliament elected by the people, who

are ready to rule the country. We have strong democratic leaders,

including Aung San Suu Kyi. We have strong people who are ready

to sacrifice their life to have freedom and democracy, so we believe

that sanctions will work for our people of Burma.

Senator BROWNBACK. I think they will, and they will particularly

be successful if we could get a broader coalition internationally to

support us with that. I know the administration is committed to

making that happen as well, because these are best if they’re done

in a large press push internationally, for us to push these on forward.

Yes, Mr. Rogers?

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that, assuming that

the sanctions have the desired effect and bring about a change, I

think it’s terribly important for us to be prepared, for the Burmese

to be prepared for the transition to a democratic government and

49

so on, and so I would advocate strongly that our Government take

the lead in helping to organize for the change-over, the transition,

if you will, to avoid a chaotic, perhaps even a very violent situation

that could follow.

And to the extent that Burmese students returning to their home

country can play a role in helping a kind of domestic Peace Corps,

if you will, to get out to all parts of the country and help begin the

transition peacefully I think would be very important.

Senator BROWNBACK. That’s a good suggestion. I want to thank

very much the panel for being here. Thank you for your patience

during the recess that we had. Thank you for your expertise and

your commitment to a free Burma.

I tell you, I look at these situations around the world, and I get

to see a fair number of them, but it is really my hope and prayer

and my belief that dictators around the world are on the run, and

we’re going to keep them on the run. People deserve to be free, and

if there’s anybody anywhere in the world that is not free, it takes

away from the freedom of all of us.

We should advocate for that, and we should press that, and I am

hopeful we can get a broad coalition to continue to press for the

freedom of the Burmese people. They’ve certainly suffered long

enough, and it is time they were able to live free. Thank you very

much for your commitment, and for being here.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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