### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JA N U A RY 23, 200 4 S es sio n LERO Y MOSBY, ET AL 

### . v. MEM PHIS AR EA TRA NS IT

AUTHORI TY, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. 305930-8 T.D. D’ Arm y Bailey, Jud ge

No. W2003-00451-C OA-R3-C V - F iled May 19, 2004

This case arises out of a

motor vehicle a ccide nt, which re sul t ed i n t h e d eath of Dec ease d, a fa

repay ing pa sseng er of

a bus. Plaintiffs, Dec ease d’s heirs, br oug ht a wrong ful death action against the drive r o f the Ca dil la c in the bu s/c ar co lli sio n an d De fe nd a nts , the drive r of the bu s andthe Me mph is Are a Transit Authority . At the close of P laintiffs’ proof, the trial court gr anted De fenda nts’ motion for involuntary

dismiss al pursuant to Rule 41.02(2) of t he Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure. F or the re a so ns state d b e low , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3.; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Irw in I . Ca nto r, Me mph is, TN , f or Ap pe lla nts
J ohn M. Moore, Memphis, TN, f or Appe llees

OP IN ION
F acts and P roce dural Hi story On the morning of Oc tober 22, 1999, Katie L ee Mosby (“D ece ased” or “Mosby ”) pa id the far e and boa

rded a bus operated by the Memphis A rea Transit Authority (“MAT A”) and drive n by Emmett E. Mill er ( “Miller” or collectively

with MATA, “De fenda nts”), who he ld a commer cial driver’ s license at the time. On that day , the weat h er wa s clea r and the roads we re dry . The bus tr avel ed so ut hb ou ndon Mil lbr a nc h Ro a d, a fi ve la ne str e e t, i n th e c ur b lane a ndhe a de d d ow nh ill a ft e r a hil l c re st, wh e re it a

pp ro a c he d a

“ T” int e rs e c tio n w ith F inl e y Roa d, a tw o lane street. Millbranch Road ha s a spee d limit of 40 miles per hour and F inley

Road has a spe ed li m i t o f 35 miles per hour.I t i s not cl ear wh y pl ai nt i f f s to o k a d efaul t j udgment ag ai ns t M at t hew s on Ju ne 21 , 200 2, an d l at er 1

en t er ed a v ol u n t ar y n on - s u i t on D ec embe r 26, 2002. -2- As the bus appr oache d the intersec tion, Deon M atthews (“ Matthews”) , who did not have a driver’ s license at the time, was driving a Cadillac e astbound on Finl ey Road towards Millbranc h Road. Matthews ha d borrowe d the ca r fr om a fa milyfriend, Velbsy Campbell, and beg an to have difficulty with the brake s. When Matthews attempted to br ake at the intersec tion of Finley and Millbranch, the brakes c ease d to function and Matthew s drove onto Millbranch Roa d, disreg arding the stop sig n on Finley Road. Matthews attempted to ve er rig ht on Millbranch Ro ad t o av o i d the bus, but the bus collided with the Cadillac, hitting the c ar on the driver’ s side do o r. The Cadillac veer ed aw ay

from the bus a fter the impact and ran into a utilitypole. Miller testified that whe n he saw the Cadillac, it was approxi mately forty -five fee t away and that he wa s very close to the impac t po int wh e n h e re ali z ed a

c oll isi on wa s im min e nt. Th e bu s c ha ng e d d ir e c tio ns fr om s ou th t o so uth e a st b e c a us e , a ft e r c he c kin g his re ar v ie w m ir ro r, Mil le r turne d le ft ju st b e fo re the imp a c t in a n a tte mp t t o a v o i d a c o l l i s i o n
. I n a d d i t i o n , M i l l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e p r e s s e d o n t h e b u s ’ s br a ke s. After the impact, the bus c rossed ove r t he other side of Millbranch Roa d, knocked ove r a utility pole, went throug h a wr oug ht iron fenc e, and c ollided with a day car e ce nter whe re it ca me to rest. During the ac cident, Mosby , who was se ated be hind Miller in the driver’s s eat, wa s thrown to the fl oo r right ne xt to M ill e r. Th ou g h th e ra dio on the bu s w a s in op e rativ e , M ill e r w a s a ble to contac t e merg ency service s using his mobile phone. Mosby was taken f or medica l treatment to The Med, and w as later

found by her daug hter, B ettie J ean F aulkner . Mosby , who exhibit ed fa cial expressions of pain thoug h never reg aining consciousness, was visited by her f our childre n and r e main e d a t T h e M e d u n ti l s h e d ie d o n O c to b e r 3 1 , 1 9 9 9 , f r o m th e in

ju r ie s s h e s u s ta ined in the bus/car c ollisi on. On Dec ember

14, 1999, Mosby ’s four c hildren, L eroy Mo s b y , J oann Mosby

Diffay , Clarenc e Mosb y , a n d B e tt ie Je a n F a u lkn e r ( c o ll e c ti v e ly

th e “ Pl a in ti f

f s ” ) , f il e d a c o mp lain t a g a in s t M A T A, Miller, Matthews, and V elbsy Campbell, for the wrong ful death of Mosby . Def endants a nswere d, deny ing the alleg ations of neg lige nce in Plaintiffs’ c omplaint and praying the complaint be dismiss ed. Matthews, though se rved w ith Pl aintiffs’ c omplaint, never a nswere d or appe are d, and the trial court gr anted Plaintiffs’ motion fo r def ault judgme nt ag ainst Matthews. Plaintiffs su bs e qu e ntl y

too k a vo lun tary

no ns uit fo r M a tth e ws a ndCa mpb e ll andpr oc e e de d to tr ia l a g a ins t Def endants. After

hearing the Plaintiffs’ proof, De fenda nts moved for directed verdict, which the 1 trial court tre ated a s a motion for involuntary dismiss al p u rsuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2), be c a us e the he ari ng wa s not b e fo re a jury . T he tr ia l c ou rt

c on c lud e d th e Pla int if

fs faile d to e sta

bli sh that the Def

endants we re g uiltyof any “proximate fault causing or contributing to the injuries and da ma g e s” of

De c e a se d a nde nt e re d a

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f D e fe nd a nts . Pl a int if fs app e a le d to thi s Court and pre sent the following issues for our r eview:
I

. Whe the r thetr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it ex c lud e d a po rt ion of

the MA TA sa fe ty manag er’ s acc ident report and discovery deposition where in he conc luded th at Miller did not apply

the bus’s bra

kes; and-3-

I I

. Whether the trial c ourt err ed whe n it gr anted Defe ndants’ mot ion for dismissal based upon Plaintiffs’ failure to e stablish a prima fac ie case of neg lige nce on the part of the De fe nd a nts

. F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Stand ard of Review
Whe n a tr ia l c ou rt

sit s w ith ou t a

jury , w e re vie w i ts f

ind ing s o f f

a c t de novo upon the re cord acc ompanied by

a pre sumption of co rr ectness for the f inding, unless the pr eponder ance of the evidenc e is othe rwise. Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13( d). We a re mindful that a trial court has wide discr etion in the matter of the qualifications of an expert witness and will not be reve rsed unless it abuses that discretion. B la lo c k

v . Cl a iborne , 7 7 5 S

. W

. 2 d 3 6 3 , 3 6 6 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Stokes v

. Leung , 6 51 S.W. 2d70 4, 70 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 2) ); see also Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire I ns. Co. , 850 S.W .2d 439, 443-44 (Te nn. 1992). F or questions of whe ther or not a tr i al co u rt s h o u ld have allowed or

excluded evidenc e pursua nt to the r ules of evidenc e conce rning hear say , we revie w such qu e sti on s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Ru sse ll v . Cr utc hfi e ld , 988 S.W .2d 168, 170 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Cityof T ull ah om a v . B e dfo rd

Cou nty , 938 S.W .2d 408 (Tenn. 1997) ). I n addition, “in the case of a motion for involuntary dismiss al pursuant to Te nn. R. Civ. P . 41.02(2), the trial court must i mpartially weig h and eva luate the evidence as it would after the pre sentation of all the evidenc e and must de ny the motion if the plaintiff has ma de out a prima fac ie ca se.” Sm ith v. Inm an Realty Co. , 8 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d 8 1 9 , 8 2 2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g C i t y o f C o l u m b i a v . C

. F

. W. Constr. C o. , 557 S.W .2d 734, 740 (Tenn. 1977) ). Ther efor e, whe n we r eview the trial court’s ruling on Def endants’ motion for involuntary dismiss al, “we need only determine whethe r the e vidence makes out a prima fac ie ca se of liability on [t he Plaintiffs’] part.” Id

. Expe r t W it ne ss Q ual ific at ion s Plaintiffs arg ue that the tria l court er red w hen it ref

used t o allow into evidence the conc lusion of MATA’ s safe ty

manag er , J u d d Killebrew (“Killebrew” ), either in his accide nt report or deposition, that Mill er ne ver a pplied the brakes of the bus. Specifica lly , Plaintiffs arg ue that such statements constitute an e x ception to the hea rsay rule pursua nt to Tenn. R. Evid. 8 0 3 (1

. 2 ) as an admission by

a party opponent. Such rule a llows the admi s s i o n o f st atements off ere d ag ainst the party that is “a stateme nt b y a p er s o n au t horized by the party to make a statement conc erning the subje ct

. ” Tenn. R. Evid. 803 (1.2). I n addition, the rule provide s that “[a]n admiss ion is not excluded mere ly

beca use the stateme nt is in t he form of an opinion.” Te nn. R. Evi d

. 803 (1.2). Plaintiffs arg ue that, bec ause Killebrew is an a g ent for MA TA, his s tatement that Miller neve r app lie d h is b ra

ke s sh ou ld h a ve be e n ad mit te d into e vid e nc e
. Pla int if fs ha ve inc or

re c tly arg ue d th is issue.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

de te rm ine d th a t K ill e br e w’ s c onclu si on abo ut M ill e r’ s f a ilu re to a

pp ly his b ra k es was inadmissible, not because it did not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule, but be c a us e Ki lle br e w w a s n ot q ua lif ie d t o make s uc h a

c on c lus ion a s th e re wa s n o f ou nd a tio n to establish Killebrew ’s expertise in the field o f ac cident reconstruc tion. As this C ourt has noted-4-

befor e, “[n]o asserti o n o f a party , if offe red in e vidence by a party -opponent, may

be excluded as hear say
. It may be exc luded on the ground t h a t i t i s i r relev ant, or privileged, or for many other re as on s, bu t n ev er b ecause it is hear say .” Curtis v. Van Duse n , 7 23 S.W. 2d64 8, 65 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 8 6 ) ( q u o t i n g D a v i d F

. B i n d e r , H e ar s a y H a n d b o o k

( 2 n d e d

. 1 9 8 3 ) ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. In addition, Rule 803 states, befor e enumera t i ng numerous exceptions, that “[t] he following are not e xc lude d by the he ar

sa y ru le . . . .” Te nn. R. Evid. 803 (emphasis adde d). Thoug h Killebrew ’s c on c lus ion ma y

no t be e xclu de d on the ba sis that it is h e ars a y , it

ma y sti ll b e e xclu de d o n th e ba sis that Killebrew was not qualified in t he fie ld of ac cident re construction to make suc h a conc lusion. There fore , we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that Killebre w was not qualified a s an expert in the ar ea of acc ident rec onstruction to make such a conclusion.
I n this case, at the time of trial, Killebre w had be en an e mploy ee w ith MATA for ove r twenty -seve n y ear s, he held his commer cial driver’s li cense , and he ha d been the safe ty manag er f

or MATA for

over three y ear s, beg inning in July 1999. Howeve r, he had c ompleted only one tra ining course befor e the a ccide n t on October 22, 1999, and had ta

ken a total of

only three , forty -hour training course s by the time of trial. Thoug h Killebrew admitted that he had little training in acc ident rec onstruction, he conc luded that the tire marks ma de by the bus wer e not skid marks and indicated that Miller never applied the bus’s brakes. We c annot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it re fused to admit Killebre w’s conc lusions and opinions about t he accident on the ba sis that Killebrew was not a qualified expert in the field of acc ident rec onstruction. There fore , we aff irm the trial court’s ruling on this iss ue. Involu ntary Dism issal Thoug h Def

endants moved f

or a dire cted ve rdict af

ter the Pl ai n t i ff s ’ proof

, the trial court c or re c tly tr e a te d D e fe nd a nts ’ m oti on a s a mot ion fo r i nv olu nta

ry dis mis sa l un de r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 41.02(2). As state d above, w hen such motion is made, the trial court must weig h and eva luate the Plaintiffs’ evidenc e and determine if the P laintiffs established a prima fac ie ca se. Inman Re alty Co. , 8 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d at 8 2 2 (c i t i n g C.F.W . Constr. C o. , 5 57 S.W. 2da t 74 0) . Af ter hear in g th e pa

rt ie s’ arg ume nts on the mot ion , it app e ars the tr ia l c ou rt dis mis se d Pla int if fs ’ a c tio n a g a ins t D e fe nd a nts for a lack of ev i d ence that Def endants we re the proxi mate ca use of De cea sed’s de ath. Afte r our revie w of the r ecor d, we ag ree that the Plaintiffs f ailed to e stablish a prima fa cie c ase of neg lige nce on the pa rt of the De fe nd a nts

. To establish an action for ne g lige nce, a complainant must prove the f ollowing e lements: (1) a duty of car e owed by defe ndant to plaintiff; (2) c onduct fa lling below the applicable standard of c are re su lti ng in a

br e a c h o f that du ty ; ( 3) a n in jury or los s; ( 4) c a us a tio n in fa c t; a nd (5 ) p ro xima te causation. McClenahan v. Cooley , 8 0 6 S

. W

. 2 d 7 6 7 , 7 7 4 (T en n
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g Lindsey v. Miami De v. Corp. , 6 89 S.W. 2d

85 6, 85 8 ( Te nn . 1 98 5); Sh ou se v . O tis , 4 48 S.W. 2d67 3 ( Te nn . 1 96 9) ; Ruth v. Ru th , 37 2 S.W. 2d 28 5 (T e nn . 1 96 3) ); Anthony v. H olland , No. W2001-00745-COA-R3-CV, 2001 T en n
. Ap p
. LE XIS 9 0 0 , at * 4 -5 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. No v . 2 9 , 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g W aste Mgmt. Inc . of Tenn.-5-

v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. , 1 5 S. W.3 d 4 25 , 4 30 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) ). “ I n T e nn e sse e , p ro xima te cause has bee n described as that a ct or omission which i m m ed i at el y cause s or fa ils to prevent the injury ; an ac t or omission occurring or conc urring with anoth er wh ich, if it had not happe ned, the injury would not have be en inflicted.” Te nn . Tr ail way s, In c . v . E rv in , 438 S.W .2d 733, 735 (Tenn. 1 9 6 9 ) ( ci t i n g Deming & Co. v. Merc hants’ Cotton-Press & Storage Co. , 17 S.W . 89 (Tenn. 1891) ; Southeastern Grey hound Lines, I nc. v. Grov es , 136 S.W .2d 512 (Tenn. 1940) ). We note that neither the violation of a statute nor a bre ach of duty by a common car rier to a far e-pay ing passeng er is of any conseque nce unle ss a defen d an t ’s ac ts are show n to be the proximate cause of the injury sustained. Garrett v. Mc Conkey , 4 6 6 S

. W

. 2 d 4 9 8 , 5 0 1 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 7 0 ) ( ci t i n g Tenn. Tra ilwa y s, In c v . E rv in , 438 S.W. 2d73 3 ( Te nn . 1 96 9) ; Biggert v. Me mphis Power & Light C o. , 80 S.W .2d 90 (Tenn. 1935) ).
I n this case, the Plaintiffs put on littl e proof of how fast the bus was trave ling at the point of collision. The only

testimonyin the rec ord off ere d to show the speed of the bus was the te stimony of Matthews, w ho stated that the bus was trave ling approximately fifty miles pe r hour. As the tria l court be low noted, no scientific or expert testimonywas prese nted to de termine how fast the bus wa s tr a ve lin g . In a dd iti on , th e tr ia l c ou rt se e me d to qu e sti on Ma tth e ws ’ c re dib ili ty given that , in his orig ina l st a te me nt t o th e po lic e , M a tth e ws state d he wa s n ot the drive r o f the Ca dil la c . We no te that: Where the tria l judge has se en and heard witnesse s, espec ially wher e issues of c re dib ili ty

a ndwe ig ht o f o ral testimo ny are inv olv e d, on re vie w c on sid e ra ble defe renc e must still be acc orded to those circ umstances. Where the issue for de cision de pe nd s o n th e de te rm inatio n of the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, the tr ia l c ou rt

is the be st jud g e of the c re dib ili ty

a ndits fi nd ing s o f c re dib ili ty are e nti tle d to g re a t w e ig ht. This is true beca

use the trial c ourt al one has the opportunity to observe the app e aranc e a ndde me a no r o f w itn e sse s.
Pa y ne v . Ci ty of M

e mp his , 1993 Tenn. App. L EXI S 755, at *7-8 (Te nn. Ct. Ap p
. De c. 9, 1993) (q u o t i n g Tenn-Tex Props. v . Brownell-Electro, Inc

. , 77 8 S.W. 2d 42 3, 42 5 ( Te nn . 1 98 9) ); se e als o McCaleb v . Saturn Corp. , 910 S.W .2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1995)

. Next, Mi ller testified that, when he saw the Cadillac at the intersec tion a nd knew a collision wa s im min e nt, he re mov e d h is f oo t f ro m th e a c c e le rator

a ndpr e sse d o n th e br ake pe da l. H e a lso stated that he swe rved to the le ft in order to a void an impact. Given our dispositi on of the fir st issue that the t rial court was corre ct when it excluded the conc lusions of Killebrew c oncerning w hether Mil le r pr e sse d on the bu s’ br ake s, the on ly e vid e nc e that Pla int if fs of fe re d that Mi lle r d id n ot p re ss on the brakes wa s Miller’s statement to the pol ice that he swerved to the l eft. Plaintiffs arg ue that the abse nce of

any positive statement establishes that Miller did not press t h e brakes to avoid an impact with the Cadillac. Even if the Plaintiffs ha d eff ectively established that Miller neve r pre ssed the bra kes, there was no e x pert testimony offe red by

Pla intiffs to sugg est that pressing the bra kes would have pr evente d Dec ease d from sust aining any injuries. I n addition, one of the passenge rs of the bus testified that, prior to the c ollisi on with the Cadillac, there was no indication that Miller was operating the bus in a n unsafe manner
.-6-

Finally , th ete stimonyestablished that Matthew s was driving the Cadillac on F inley Road and that he lost control of his ca r whe n the b ra k es ce ased to func tion. This resulted in the Cadillac running throug h a stop sign and colliding with the MATAbus, sending the bus throug h a utilitypole, a wr oug ht iron fenc e, and into the side of a day car e cente r. Given the c ircumstance s of this case, we cannot s ay that the t rial court erre d when it weig hed and e valuated the evidenc e and de termined that th e Pla int if

fs faile d to e sta

bli sh a prima fa c ie c a se fo r n e g lig e nc e ba se d on a la c k o f p ro xima te cause . There fore , we a ffirm the de cision of the trial c ourt g ranting De fe n d an t s ’ motion for inv olu nta ry dis mis sa l.
Conclusion
For the foreg oing rea sons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Costs of this appeal a re taxed to Appellants, L eroy Mosby , J oann Mosby Diffay , Clarenc e Mosby , and B ettie J ean F aulkner , a n d t h e i r s u r e t y f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE