U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

Promising

Strategies

To Reduce

Gun Violence
Research and Program Development Division

develops knowledge on national trends in juvenile

delinquency; supports a program for data collection

and information sharing that incorporates elements

of statistical and systems development; identifies

how delinquency develops and the best methods

for its prevention, intervention, and treatment; and

analyzes practices and trends in the juvenile justice

system.

Training and Technical Assistance Division provides juvenile justice training and technical assistance to Federal, State, and local governments; law

enforcement, judiciary, and corrections personnel;

and private agencies, educational institutions, and

community organizations.

Special Emphasis Division provides discretionary

funds to public and private agencies, organizations,

and individuals to replicate tested approaches to

delinquency prevention, treatment, and control in

such pertinent areas as chronic juvenile offenders,

community-based sanctions, and the disproportionate

representation of minorities in the juvenile justice

system.

State Relations and Assistance Division supports

collaborative efforts by States to carry out the mandates of the JJDP Act by providing formula grant

funds to States; furnishing technical assistance to

States, local governments, and private agencies;

and monitoring State compliance with the JJDP Act.

Information Dissemination Unit informs individuals

and organizations of OJJDP initiatives; disseminates

information on juvenile justice, delinquency prevention, and missing children; and coordinates program

planning efforts within OJJDP. The unit’s activities

include publishing research and statistical reports,

bulletins, and other documents, as well as overseeing

the operations of the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse.

Concentration of Federal Efforts Program promotes interagency cooperation and coordination

among Federal agencies with responsibilities in the

area of juvenile justice. The program primarily carries

out this responsibility through the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, an

independent body within the executive branch that

was established by Congress through the JJDP Act.

Missing and Exploited Children’s Program seeks to

promote effective policies and procedures for addressing the problem of missing and exploited children.

Established by the Missing Children’s Assistance Act

of 1984, the program provides funds for a variety of

activities to support and coordinate a network of resources such as the National Center for Missing and

Exploited Children; training and technical assistance

to a network of 47 State clearinghouses, nonprofit

organizations, law enforcement personnel, and attorneys; and research and demonstration programs.

Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) was established by the President and Congress through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974, Public Law 93–415, as

amended. Located within the Office of Justice Programs of the U.S. Department of Justice, OJJDP’s goal is to

provide national leadership in addressing the issues of juvenile delinquency and improving juvenile justice.

OJJDP sponsors a broad array of research, program, and training initiatives to improve the juvenile justice

system as a whole, as well as to benefit individual youth-serving agencies. These initiatives are carried out by

seven components within OJJDP, described below.

The mission of OJJDP is to provide national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent juvenile victimization

and respond appropriately to juvenile delinquency. This is accomplished through developing and implementing prevention programs and a juvenile justice system that protects the public safety, holds juvenile offenders accountable,

and provides treatment and rehabilitative services based on the needs of each individual juvenile.
i

Promising

Strategies

d

To Reduce

Gun Violence

Report

Shay Bilchik, Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

February 1999
ii Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is a component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the

National Institute of Justice, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

Raymond C. Fisher

Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson

Assistant Attorney General

Shay Bilchik

Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Cover photographs clockwise from top left: copyright © 1995 PhotoDisc, Inc.; copyright © 1997 PhotoDisc,

Inc.; copyright © 1997 Digital Stock Corporation; copyright © 1998 Digital Stock Corporation.
iii

All of us should be able to feel safe and secure on streets, in our schools, at work, and in our homes. Yet too

many Americans are threatened by violence every day.

Gun-related violence, in particular, represents a major threat to the health and safety of all Americans. Every

day in America, 93 people die from gunshot wounds, and approximately 240 sustain gunshot injuries. In addition to the human suffering caused by these injuries and fatalities, gunshot wounds cost approximately $40

billion in medical care, public service, and work-loss costs each year.

Reducing the number of gun-related injuries and deaths must become a national priority. At the Federal level,

and especially at the State and local level, we must implement comprehensive strategies that address not just

the consequences of violence, but also its underlying causes.

Since 1993, as I have traveled the country as Attorney General, I have had the privilege of observing many

innovative, local responses to gun violence that have been developed by police, prosecutors, judges, probation

officers, mayors, school officials, and other leaders who recognized a problem, devised a solution in collaboration with other members of their community, and worked to see it implemented.

At the same time, many other communities are still looking for effective solutions to their own gun violence

problems. It is my hope that this Report, Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence, will provide useful answers

and solutions for these communities by profiling the successful approaches that some cities and towns have

already implemented.

Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence is designed as a “toolbox” to provide law enforcement, State and local

elected officials, prosecutors, judges, community organizations, and other policymakers with practical information about a range of strategies to reduce gun violence. Although particular programs and strategies will need

to be tailored to suit local needs, I hope that the programs profiled here will provide inspiration and guidance

as communities take action to create safe and healthy neighborhoods.

Ending the tragedy of gun violence will require a sustained effort at all levels of our government and society.

Together, however, we will make a difference, and bring greater security and peace to America’s communities.

Janet Reno

Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

Foreword
v

Acknowledgments

In the spring of 1998, Attorney General Reno asked that a U.S. Department of Justice Work Group review

existing efforts to reduce gun violence to identify key programs and strategies. This Work Group—consisting

of representatives of the Offices of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Associate Attorney

General, the Executive Office of United States Attorneys; the Criminal Division; the Office of Policy Development; the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs; the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; the Office

of Justice Programs; the Bureau of Justice Assistance; the National Institute of Justice; and the Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)—has worked with COSMOS Corporation to identify, review, and describe promising and demonstrated strategies to reduce gun violence.

Under a grant from OJJDP, COSMOS Corporation, a research firm specializing in criminal justice policy

issues, was tasked with building on an initial assessment of youth gun programs OJJDP published in 1996

and surveying the country to identify additional promising practices and strategies to reduce gun violence.

This Report is the culmination of this survey and followup site visits to several communities. It could not have

been completed without the dedication of COSMOS Corporation staff who worked tirelessly on this Report.

A special thanks to David Sheppard, the primary author and project director at COSMOS. Others at COSMOS assisting Dr. Sheppard include Darci Terrell, the Project Coordinator, Michael Cannon, Elizabeth Earl,

Heath Grant, Patricia Kelly, Joe Randolph, Ann Reese, Wendy Rowe, Pamela Schaal, Pat Thibeaux, Emily

Warner, Alicia Williams, and Patricia Zangrillo.

A special note of appreciation is offered to Paul Kingery and Lisa Murphy from Hamilton Fish National

Institute on School and Community Violence, The George Washington University; Glenn Pierce from the

Center of Criminal Justice Policy, Northeastern University; Jeffrey Roth from The Urban Institute; Edmund

McGarrell from the Hudson Institute, Indiana University; and Arthur Kellermann from the Center for Injury

Control, Emory University; all of whom contributed to the writing and editing of this Report.

Gratitude must also be expressed to the many communities that have cooperated with us throughout this process and greeted our site visit teams with enthusiasm. Many sites completed extensive telephone surveys, and

several hosted site visit teams for several days. Although more than 400 programs and strategies were identified, we have selected only 60 promising programs and strategies for inclusion in this Report. Without a doubt,

there are many others throughout the country that are attacking the gun violence problem. The fact that they

are not listed here should not be considered a negative reflection on these programs.

Finally, I must acknowledge the invaluable input from national experts who came to Washington, D.C., in

July 1998 to participate in a Focus Group on Gun Violence Reduction Strategies. More than 40 criminologists, public health experts, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, mayors, and foundation representatives came together to review the first drafts of the Report and to discuss a variety of strategies to reduce gun

violence. Their thoughtful discussions and recommendations were vital to the success of this Report.

Shay Bilchik

Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
vii

Table of Contents

Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................. iii

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................ v

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... xiii

Section I. Gun Violence in the United States ........................................................................................ 1

The Nature of the Problem and Current Trends ........................................................................................ 3

Section II. Solving the Problem of Gun Violence ................................................................................ 9

Developing a Comprehensive Strategy ...................................................................................................... 11

Section III. Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies ............................................... 15

Overview ........................................................................................................................................................ 17

Profile No.

1. Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program—Baltimore, MD ............................................. 19

2. Boston Strategy To Prevent Youth Violence—Boston, MA ........................................................... 26

3. Buffalo Weed and Seed Initiative—Buffalo, NY ............................................................................. 34

4. Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond, CA .................................................................... 41

5. East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland, CA ....................................................... 45

6. Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN ............................................................. 50

7. Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and Safety)—Minneapolis and

St. Paul, MN ..................................................................................................................................... 56

8. Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA ............................ 63

Section IV. Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns .......................................................... 69

Overview ........................................................................................................................................................ 71

Gun Tracing ................................................................................................................................................... 71

Inspection and Investigation of Federal Firearms Licensees .................................................................. 72

Profile No.

9. Baltimore County Police Gun Squad—Baltimore, MD ................................................................. 74

10. Boston Gun Project—Boston, MA .................................................................................................. 75

11. Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement (CAGE) Program—Chicago, IL ............................................... 77

12. Oakland Firearms Licensee Compliance Program—Oakland, CA ............................................... 79
viii Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

13. Violent Crime Task Force—Charlotte, NC ..................................................................................... 81

14. West Virginia Firearms Violations Task Force—Charleston, WV ................................................ 83

Section V. Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying ........................................ 85

Deterring Illegal Gun Possession ............................................................................................................... 87

Profile No.

15. Consent to Search and Seize Firearms—St. Louis, MO ................................................................ 88

16. Municipal Firearms Ordinances, East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—

Oakland, CA ..................................................................................................................................... 91

17. Weapon Watch—Memphis, TN ...................................................................................................... 93

Deterring Gun Carrying in High Crime Hotspot Areas ......................................................................... 95

Profile No.

18. Baltimore Police Violent Crimes Division and Youth Violence Strike Force—

Baltimore, MD .................................................................................................................................. 98

19. Getting Guns Off the Streets, New York City Police Department—New York, NY ................ 100

20. Kansas City Gun Experiment—Kansas City, MO ....................................................................... 103

21. Operation Ceasefire—Boston, MA ................................................................................................ 104

22. Operation Safe Streets Gang Prevention Initiative—Phoenix, AZ ............................................. 106

23. Targeted Enforcement Program, Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—

Indianapolis, IN .............................................................................................................................. 108

24. Youth, Firearms, and Violence—Atlanta, GA ............................................................................... 110

25. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Birmingham, AL ................................................................ 113

26. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Bridgeport, CT ................................................................... 115

27. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Inglewood, CA ................................................................... 117

28. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Milwaukee, WI .................................................................. 119

29. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Salinas, CA ......................................................................... 121

30. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Seattle, WA ........................................................................ 123

Surveillance of Probationers ..................................................................................................................... 125

Profile No.

31. Minnesota Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI), Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis, MN ............. 127

32. Operation Eiger, Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile

Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA .................................................................................................. 129

33. Operation Night Light—Boston, MA ........................................................................................... 131

School-Based Enforcement Programs ..................................................................................................... 133

Profile No.

34. Bibb County, GA, Department of Education, Violence and Weapons

Prevention and Intervention Program—Macon, GA ................................................................... 135

35. Suffolk County Community-Based Juvenile Justice Program—Boston MA ............................ 137
ix

Section VI. Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use .................................................................. 139

Overview ...................................................................................................................................................... 141

Focused Prosecution Strategies ................................................................................................................ 141

Profile No.

36. DISARM, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Baltimore, MD .................................................................... 142

37. Gun Court—Providence, RI .......................................................................................................... 144

38. Project Exile, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Eastern District of Virginia ............................................ 145

39. U.S. Attorney’s Office Anti-Violence Crime Task Force—Memphis, TN .................................. 148

40. U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiatives—Rochester, NY ...................................................................... 150

Court-Related Programs ............................................................................................................................ 153

Profile No.

41. Handgun Intervention Program—Detroit, MI ............................................................................. 154

42. Juvenile Firearms Prosecution—Seattle, WA .............................................................................. 156

43. Juvenile Gun Court—Birmingham, AL ........................................................................................ 158

44. Juvenile Gun Program—Minneapolis, MN ................................................................................. 163

45. Project LIFE—Indianapolis, IN .................................................................................................... 165

Section VII. Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies .............................. 167

Overview ...................................................................................................................................................... 169

Prevention Education—Changing Attitudes Toward Guns and Violence ........................................... 169

Profile No.

46. Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006—Boston, MA ...................................................... 173

47. Calling the Shots—St. Paul, MN ................................................................................................... 174

48. Child Development-Community Policing (CD–CP) Program—New Haven, CT ..................... 176

49. Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety Education Program—Fairfax, VA .................................... 178

50. Hands Without Guns—Washington, DC ...................................................................................... 179

51. The Living Classroom Foundation—Baltimore, MD ................................................................... 181

52. Safe Gun Storage Campaign—Seattle, WA .................................................................................. 183

53. Shock Mentor Program—Prince George’s County, MD ............................................................. 185

54. Straight Talk About Risks (STAR), Center to Prevent Handgun Violence—

Washington, DC ............................................................................................................................. 187

55. Teens on Target—Oakland, CA ..................................................................................................... 189

56. Weapons Are Removed Now (W.A.R.N.) Program—Los Angeles, CA ..................................... 191

57. West Contra Costa Unified School District Truancy Enforcement Program—

Richmond, CA ................................................................................................................................. 192

Youth Violence and Gang Prevention Programs .................................................................................... 195

Profile No.

58. Boston Community Centers’ Streetworkers Program—Boston, MA .......................................... 196
x Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

59. Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office and the Gang Task Force—Houston, TX ......................................... 197

60. Se Puede—San Juan, TX .............................................................................................................. 199

Section VIII. Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs ............................... 201

Overview ...................................................................................................................................................... 203

Federal Programs ....................................................................................................................................... 203

Comprehensive Communities Program—U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of

Justice Assistance .................................................................................................................................. 203

Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders—

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention .................... 203

Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative—International Association of Chiefs of Police

and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance ......................................................... 204

Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence—U.S. Department

of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, The George Washington

University .............................................................................................................................................. 205

National Weed and Seed Program—U.S. Department of Justice,

Executive Office for Weed and Seed ................................................................................................... 205

National Youth Gang Center—U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention ................................................................................................... 206

Operation Safe Home—U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Office of the Inspector General ............................................................................................................ 206

Partnerships To Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence—U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention .................................................................... 207

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act—U.S. Department of Education ..................... 208

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms .................................. 209

Non-Federal Programs .............................................................................................................................. 211

Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach—Boys & Girls Clubs of America ............................ 211

Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research ......................................................................... 211

National School Safety Center ............................................................................................................. 211

Youth Violence Project .......................................................................................................................... 212

Section IX. References .............................................................................................................................. 213

Section X. Appendixes ............................................................................................................................... 219

Appendix A. Geographical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies ............................ 221

Appendix B. Alphabetical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies .............................. 225

Appendix C. Matrix of Participating Key Agencies and Organizations ................................................. 227

Appendix D. Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory .............................................................. 235

Appendix E. Organizations and Sources Contacted for the Inventory ................................................... 245

Appendix F. Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies ............................................. 249
xi

Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 1 Homicides in Boston .................................................................................................................... 32

Table 2 Homicide Within the East Bay Public Safety Corridor ............................................................. 49

Figures

Figure 1 The Chain of Causation for Gun Violence ................................................................................. xiv

Figure 2 1996 Firearm Deaths by Intent ..................................................................................................... 3

Figure 3 Murders, Robberies, and Aggravated Assaults in Which Firearms Were Used ......................... 4

Figure 4 Firearm and Nonfirearm Homicide Deaths for Ages 15–24 and 25 and Above ......................... 5
xiii

Introduction

Gun violence represents a major threat to the health and safety of all Americans. Every day in the United States,

93 people die from gunshot wounds,1

 and an additional 240 sustain gunshot injuries.2 The fatality rate is roughly

equivalent to that associated with HIV infection—a disease that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

has recognized as an epidemic. In addition to the human suffering caused by these injuries and fatalities, gunshot

wounds account for approximately $40 billion in medical, public service, and work-loss costs each year.3

 In short,

gun violence is a significant criminal justice problem and a public health problem.

In recent years, communities across the country have struggled to develop effective solutions to the problem

of gun violence. Many have approached the U.S. Department of Justice for help in identifying such solutions.

The Department has developed this publication, Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence, in response to those

requests.

As its name suggests, Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence is designed to provide law enforcement, State

and local elected officials, prosecutors, judges, school administrators, community organizations, and other local

stakeholders with the tools for fighting firearm violence in their communities. It includes a blueprint for communities to develop their own comprehensive, strategic violence reduction plan and a wealth of practical information on demonstrated and promising gun violence reduction strategies and programs.

This “toolbox” approach is intended to provide inspiration and guidance as communities take action against

violent crime and, in particular, gun violence. It also is intended to help communities learn from each other’s

successes. To promote and facilitate this exchange of ideas, contact information is provided for each of the

programs profiled.

Development of This Report

To develop this Report, the U.S. Department of Justice first identified more than 400 gun violence programs

from around the country (see appendix D) by soliciting input from a wide variety of sources (see appendix E).

Having cast a wide net to identify candidate programs, the Department then conducted a two-phase telephone

survey. The preliminary survey (see appendix F) allowed the Department to classify each candidate program

according to its level of development and to select 89 programs for further study.

These 89 programs were the topic of a July 1998 focus group on gun violence reduction strategies, attended

by more than 40 national experts representing a range of disciplines from criminology to public health. These

programs were then subjected to further study in the form of a followup telephone screening and document

review. This second-phase review yielded the 60 individual programs and comprehensive strategies included in

this Report, each of which was designated as “promising” or “demonstrated”; the 10 most promising programs

and strategies were also identified (see appendix F). Finally, site visits were made to eight communities that

have implemented comprehensive plans to reduce gun violence.

Introduction
xiv Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Notwithstanding the Department’s best efforts to conduct a comprehensive and thorough inventory of gun

violence reduction programs, it is possible that some programs that would have met the criteria for designation

as “promising” or “demonstrated” have been inadvertently overlooked.

Organization of This Report

Gun violence can be considered as a three-phase continuum comprising (1) the illegal acquisition of firearms,

(2) the illegal possession and carrying of firearms, and (3) the illegal, improper, or careless use of firearms.

This continuum is illustrated in figure 1. To be effective, any strategy to reduce gun violence must focus on

one or more of these three points of intervention; however, a comprehensive plan will incorporate strategies

and programs that focus on each of the three points of intervention.

Buying

Renting

Stealing

Borrowing

Possessing Carrying Pointing Shooting Sources

Use

Figure 1. The Chain of Causation for Gun Violence

Each of the gun violence reduction strategies (profiles) presented in this Report is designated as either

“demonstrated” or “promising” as follows:

◆ Demonstrated. Identifies those strategies that have been formally evaluated using either internal resources

or external evaluators. These evaluations have shown positive impacts on one or more aspects of gun violence: reducing the sources of illegal guns, reducing the possession and carrying of illegal guns, and reducing the illegal use of guns. Demonstrated also designates those strategies where, although a final evaluation

report has not been published, preliminary results have shown positive impacts on gun violence outcomes.

◆ Promising. Identifies those strategies that have not been evaluated formally, but where outcomes are being captured as part of effective program management. Promising also includes those strategies employing

innovative gun violence reduction models based on prior research findings, and where problem-solving

technologies were employed to design the strategy. Promising strategies require further testing with stronger evaluation designs before they can demonstrate their effectiveness.
xv

Sections I and II provide current data on the nature of gun violence and a blueprint for addressing the problem at the community level. Section III profiles several successful examples of comprehensive gun violence

reduction plans. Sections IV through VII describe programs that are grouped according to the point of intervention along the three-phase continuum that each seeks to address. Section VIII provides a range of program

resources and contacts for communities seeking to reduce gun violence. Sections IX and X consist of references and appendixes. Summaries of the contents of sections I through VIII follow.

I. Gun Violence in the United States

To provide the critical context for thinking about solutions to this problem, section I presents key data on the

nature of gun violence from a national perspective, together with current trends. This section examines the

problem of gun violence as an element of violence more broadly defined: Gun ownership, possession, and

carrying; gun violence in schools; guns and drugs; and guns and gangs.

II. Solving the Problem of Gun Violence

Section II describes a blueprint for communities to develop a comprehensive solution to gun violence. A meaningful response to gun violence requires a strategy that takes into account the specific elements of the problem

as experienced by an individual community and then identifies an appropriate solution. This problem-solving

approach is most effective if the various stakeholders in a community collaborate to develop and implement a

comprehensive violence reduction plan. Such a plan reflects the needs and resources of the community and

employs the best programs and strategies to meet those needs.

III. Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Section III profiles the comprehensive gun violence reduction plans that have been successfully implemented

in eight different communities. To develop their comprehensive plans, these communities employed variations

of the problem-solving process described in section II, including a process of forming partnerships, measuring

problems, setting goals, evaluating strategies, and implementing, evaluating, and revising the plan. Their comprehensive plans address each of the three phases in the continuum of gun violence—access to, possession of,

and use of firearms—and draw on many of the programs presented in sections IV through VII.

IV. Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns

The first phase of the gun violence continuum—the illegal acquisition of firearms—is addressed in section IV,

which describes programs that seek to limit access to sources of illegal guns and thereby to reduce the number

of illegally acquired guns in communities. These programs include law enforcement initiatives that disrupt the

illegal flow of firearms by using intelligence gathered through crime gun tracing and regulatory inspections or

undercover operations involving suspected illegal gun dealers. Comprehensive crime gun tracing facilitates

both the reconstruction of the sales history of firearms associated with crime and the identification of patterns

of illegal gun trafficking. Similarly, focusing criminal and regulatory enforcement on suspect dealers allows law

Each institution in a community brings a unique perspective, expertise, and sphere of influence to a crime

prevention partnership. Partners may include the U.S. Attorney, chief of police, sheriff, Federal law enforcement agencies (FBI, ATF, DEA, and others as applicable), district attorney, State attorney general, mayor/city

manager, probation and parole officers, juvenile corrections officials, judges, public defenders, school superintendents, social services officials, leaders in the faith community, and business leaders.

Introduction
xvi Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

enforcement to efficiently focus limited resources. Suspect dealers include, for example, those at the highest

risk of selling firearms to “straw purchasers”—purchasers fronting for people linked to illegal gun trafficking

and firearm violence.

V. Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying

The illegal possession and carrying of firearms—the second phase in the continuum—is the unifying theme for

section V. This section describes a range of innovative approaches to deter illegal gun possession and carrying,

such as municipal gun ordinances, weapons hotlines, directed police patrols, and the specific deterrence approach known as “pulling levers.” It also describes programs that focus on individuals who are most likely

to possess and carry firearms illegally, including gang members and probationers. School-based enforcement

programs also are highlighted in section V.

VI. Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use

The programs profiled in section VI target illegal gun use—the third phase in the continuum—through identification, prosecution, and aggressive punishment of people who have committed multiple violent crimes, are

armed drug traffickers, or have used a firearm in a crime (or possessed an illegally acquired gun); intensive

education; and strict monitoring of offenders. For example, U.S. Attorneys in several States have used focused

prosecution and enhanced Federal sanctions in cases against certain gun offenders. Among the court-based

programs included in this section are “fast-tracking” (forwarding all gun cases to a single docket and disposing

of them in a limited timeframe) and juvenile diversion programs.

VII. Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies

Section VII profiles programs that cut across the three phases of gun violence. In recent years, many communities have recognized that gun violence is a public health and criminal justice problem. Accordingly, these

communities have developed education programs that address the underlying reasons that individuals carry

and use guns. These programs promote gun safety, inform youth and adults about the dangers of gun use, and

seek to reduce gang membership (because gang members are so much more likely than nonmembers to carry

guns). These programs also seek to prevent at-risk youth from becoming involved in criminal activity by providing them with specialized education, training, and alternative prevention programs.

VIII. Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs

Section VIII presents programs that provide research, technical assistance, and educational resources to communities that are seeking to address gun violence. These resources include Federal, university, and private

programs that support the development and implementation of effective firearm violence reduction strategies.

The programs include law enforcement strategies to reduce the sources of illegal guns and intervention strategies to prevent the possession, carrying, and use of illegal firearms.

For ease of reference, the programs profiled in sections III through VII are indexed geographically (appendix

A), alphabetically (appendix B), and according to key collaborating agencies (appendix C).
xvii

Notes

1. Office of Analysis, Epidemiology, and Health, Firearm Deaths and Death Rates by Intent, United States, 1996,

Washington, DC: National Center for Health Statistics, Office of Analysis, Epidemiology, and Health, 1996.

2. J.K. Annest, J.A. Mercy, D.R. Gibson, and G.W. Ryan, “National estimates of nonfatal firearm-related

injuries: Beyond the tip of the iceberg,” Journal of the American Medical Association 273:1749–1754, 1995.

3. T.R. Miller and M.A. Cohen, “Costs of gunshot and cut/stab wounds in the United States, with some Canadian comparisons,” Accident Analysis and Prevention 29(3):329–341, 1997.

Introduction
Gun Violence in the United States

Section I

Section I: Gun Violence in the United States 3

The Nature of the Problem

and Current Trends

In 1996 (the most recent year for which data are

available), 34,040 people died from gunfire in the

United States. Of these deaths, approximately 54

percent resulted from suicide, 41 percent resulted

from homicide, and 3 percent were unintentional

(see figure 2). Firearm injuries are the eighth leading cause of death in the United States. In addition,

for every fatal shooting, there are roughly three

nonfatal shootings.1

Gun-related crime peaked in the late 1980’s and

early 1990’s. Since that time, the United States has

made steady improvement in reducing gun-related

violence (see figure 3). Gun-related homicides have

declined by 33 percent since 1993, including a 35-

percent drop in handgun homicides. Meanwhile,

from 1992 to 1996, murder rates declined by 20

percent, aggravated assaults by 12 percent, and the

overall violent crime rate by 16 percent.2

 The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform Crime

Report data for 1997 show that these trends are continuing, with murder and robbery totals declining by

7 percent over the previous year and the total of all

violent crimes declining by 3 percent.3

 Nonetheless,

gun violence remains a serious national problem.

The impact of gun violence is especially pronounced

among juveniles and adolescents. The firearm homicide rate for children under 15 years of age is 16

times higher in the United States than in 25 other

industrialized countries combined. Among those

ages 15 to 24, the U.S. firearm homicide rate is

5 times higher than in neighboring Canada and

30 times higher than in Japan, and the firearm

homicide rate for the 15- to 24-year-old age group

increased 158 percent during the 10-year period

from 1984 to 1993 (see figure 4). This contrasts with

a 19-percent decline in gun-related homicides for

those 25 and older. A teenager in the United States

today is more likely to die of a gunshot wound than

from all the “natural” causes of death combined.4

Young African-American males have the most elevated homicide victimization rate of any race or gender group. Homicides involving firearms have been

the leading cause of death for African-American

males ages 15 to 19 since 1969.5

Total Deaths for All Ages

N=34,040

Total Deaths Ages 15–19

N=3,950

Total Deaths Ages 14 and Under

N=693

41% 54%

3% 2%

55%

23%

20%

2%

62% 29%

6% 3%

Suicide Homicide

Unintentional Other

Figure 2. 1996 Firearm Deaths by Intent
4 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Gun ownership, possession,

and carrying

There are approximately 44 million gun owners in

the United States.6

 This means that 25 percent of all

adults, and 40 percent of American households, own

at least one firearm. These owners possess 192 million

firearms, of which 65 million are handguns. Among

legal gun owners, the reasons given for owning or

carrying a weapon include hunting, sports-related

activities, and home protection. Among those who

own handguns, 75 percent reported in a national

survey that self-protection is the primary reason for

owning a firearm.7

Approximately 37,500 gun sales, including 17,800

handgun sales, are completed every day in the

United States. The increasing number of gun

owners has elevated the danger of guns being acquired illegally through robberies and burglaries.

In 1994, more than a quarter-million households

experienced the theft of one or more firearms;

nearly 600,000 guns were stolen during these

burglaries.8

The number of youth who report that they carry

weapons is significant. In 1997, 14 percent, or 1 in 7

male juveniles, reported carrying a gun outside the

home in the previous 30-day period.9

 In the inner

city, the problem is more severe. One study involving 800 inner-city high school students reported that

22 percent said they carried weapons.10 An even

greater number of convicted juvenile offenders reported carrying guns—88 percent, according to

another study.11

Firearms are readily available on the illegal gun market, and those who are most likely to possess guns are

drug sellers and gang members—overwhelmingly

young and male.12 More than two-thirds of the

respondents in one study of urban arrestees stated

that the primary reason for owning and carrying a

weapon is self-protection—a small number also reported using the weapon for drug trafficking or other

1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1996

250

200

150

100

50

0

Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports. Rates calculated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Number of Offenses per 100,000 Population

Figure 3. Murders, Robberies, and Aggravated Assaults in Which Firearms Were Used
Section I: Gun Violence in the United States 5

illegal activities. Among arrestees overall, 23 percent

of those who owned a gun said they had used one to

commit a crime. Among juvenile drug sellers who

owned a firearm, 42 percent reported using a gun in a

crime; among gang members, 50 percent reported

using a gun.

Although no national data base contains detailed

information about all the guns used in crimes, police

records and surveys of offenders provide some insights on the types of firearms used in criminal

offenses. In 1994, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms received more than 85,000 requests

from police departments for traces of guns used in

crime.13 More than three-fourths of the guns traced

were handguns, and almost one-third were less than

3 years old. In 1994, the most frequent types of guns

used in homicides were large caliber revolvers, but

the number of large caliber semiautomatic guns is

increasing.14

In an early survey of incarcerated felons, 32 percent

reported that they had acquired their most recent

handgun by theft.15 A more recent survey reported

that guns had been stolen by 13 percent of all

arrestees, 25 percent of all juvenile arrestees, 29

percent of the gang members, and 30 percent of the

drug sellers.16

Firearm Homicide Deaths, Ages 15–24

Firearm Homicide Deaths, Ages 25 and Above

Nonfirearm Homicide Deaths, All Ages

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

Rate per 100,000 Population

Sources: National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Figure 4. Firearm and Nonfirearm Homicide Deaths for Ages 15–24 and 25 and Above

Copyright © TSM / Robert Essel, 1998.
6 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Gun violence in schools

During the 1997–98 school year, the public was

riveted by extensive media coverage of school

shootings in Jonesboro, AR; West Paducah, KY;

Pearl, MS; Springfield, OR; and Edinboro, PA. This

spate of multiple shootings increased parental concerns about school safety. However, the 40 school

shooting deaths in the 1997–98 school year fall

within the midrange of total annual incidents since

1992.17 According to the National School Safety

Center, violent deaths in school settings (suicides

and homicides) declined 27.3 percent between the

1992–93 school year and the 1997–98 school year.

The high-profile multiple shootings also have fueled

public perceptions that children are in danger while

attending school. In fact, youth (in particular those

who live in high-crime neighborhoods) are safest

while in school. A 2-year study by the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention found that the incidence of school-associated violent death was less

than one in a million.18

Even if actual shootings at school are rare, the

presence of guns in schools is not. One leading

survey reveals that between 1994 and 1996, the

percentage of 12th grade males that reported

carrying a gun to school in the previous 4 weeks

increased from 4.8 to 6.3, or roughly 1 in 17.19

Another survey tells us that 12.7 percent of students ages 12 to 19 reported knowing a student

who brought a gun to school.20

Guns and drugs

The drug market is a major contributor to the

Nation’s homicide rate. Indeed, the peak in homicides during the mid-1980’s was directly related to

the saturation of urban areas with the crack cocaine

drug trade. Methamphetamine—more powerful,

more addictive, and easier to produce than crack

cocaine—is becoming a major drug of choice in

urban, suburban, and rural communities. If the

methamphetamine trade results in drug wars on the

same scale as those of the 1980’s, it is possible that

homicide rates will begin to climb once more, as

drug dealers are among those most likely to carry

weapons.21

Guns and gangs

Gangs have proliferated rapidly since 1980, when

there were about 2,000 gangs with 100,000 members

in 286 cities.22 By 1996, there were 31,000 gangs

with 846,000 members in 4,800 cities and towns.23

Gangs are more likely to recruit adolescents who

own firearms, and gang members (who are twice

as likely to own guns for protection than nongang

members) are more likely to carry guns outside their

homes.24 The risk of being killed is 60 times greater

among young gang members than in the general

population25 and in some cities, far higher. For example, the St. Louis youth gang homicide rate is

1,000 times higher than the U.S. homicide rate.26

Although not all gangs are drug organizations, gang

membership appears to increase individual participation in drug use and trafficking, gun carrying,

violence, and prolonged involvement in drug sales.27

Furthermore, gang activity is no longer a problem

that is unique to urban communities. From 1989 to

1995, the percentage of students who reported that

street gangs were present at school increased by 186

percent in suburban schools and 250 percent in rural schools. Gangs reportedly operate in 41 percent

of urban schools, 26 percent of suburban schools,

and 20 percent of rural schools. Long-term solutions

to address the problem of gun violence must include

a comprehensive approach to reducing the number

of youth involved in gangs. Copyright © 1998 Weststock.
Section I: Gun Violence in the United States 7

Notes

1. L.A. Fingerhut, Firearm Mortality Among Children, Youth,

and Young Adults 1–34 Years of Age, Trends and Current Status:

United States, 1985–1990, Advance data from Vital and

Health Statistics, No. 231, Washington, DC: National

Center for Health Statistics, 1993.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United

States 1996, Uniform Crime Reports, Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.

3. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997.

4. Fingerhut, 1993.

5. H. Snyder and M. Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and

Victims: A National Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1995.

6. P.J. Cook and J. Ludwig, Guns in America: Results of a

Comprehensive National Survey on Firearms Ownership and Use,

Summary Report, Washington, DC: Police Foundation,

1997.

7. Cook and Ludwig, 1997.

8. Cook and Ludwig, 1997.

9. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Youth

Risk Behavior Study, 1997.

10. J.F. Sheley and J.D. Wright, Gun Acquisition and

Possession in Selected Juvenile Samples, Research in Brief,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National

Institute of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, 1993.

11. Sheley and Wright, 1993.

12. S.H. Decker, S. Pennel, and A. Caldwell, Illegal Firearms: Access and Use by Arrestees, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

National Institute of Justice, 1997.

13. M. Zawitz, Guns Used in Crime, Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1995.

14. Zawitz, 1995.

15. J.D. Wright and P. Rossi, Armed and Considered Dangerous, Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, Inc., 1986.

16. Decker, Pennel, and Caldwell, 1997.

17. E. Donohue, V. Schiraldi, and J. Ziedenberg, School

House Hype: School Shootings and the Real Risks Kids Face in

America, Policy Report, San Francisco, CA: Justice Policy

Institute, National School Safety Center, 1998.

18. P. Kaufman, K. Chandler, and M. Rand, Indicators of

School Crime and Safety, Washington, DC: National Association for Education Statistics and the U.S. Department

of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, 1998.

19. Institute for Social Research, Monitoring the Future,

Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1997.

20. School Crime Supplement, National Crime Victimization Survey, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, 1995.

21. Decker, Pennel, and Caldwell, 1997.

22. W.B. Miller, Crime by Youth Gangs and Groups in the

United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1992 (Revised from

1982).

23. J.P. Moore and C.P. Terrett, Highlights of the 1996

National Youth Gang Survey, Fact Sheet, Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,

1996.

24. B. Bjerregaard and A.J. Lizotte, “Gun ownership and

gang membership,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

86:37–58, 1995.

25. A. Morales, “A clinical model for the prevention of

gang violence and homicide,” in Substance Abuse and Gang

Violence, edited by R.C. Cervantes, Newbury Park, CA:

Sage Publications, Inc., 1992, pp. 105–118.

26. S.H. Decker and B. Van Winkle, Life in the Gang:

Family, Friends, and Violence, New York, NY: Cambridge

University Press, 1996.

27. J.C. Howell and S.H. Decker, The Gangs, Drugs, and

Violence Connection, Bulletin, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, in

press.
Solving the Problem of

Gun Violence

Section II

Section II: Solving the Problem of Gun Violence 11

Developing a Comprehensive

Strategy

To protect their citizens’ health and safety, and to

address fear of gun violence, many communities are

successfully combating such violence by adopting a

strategy that takes into account the specific gun

violence problem experienced by their community

and then identifies an appropriate solution. This

problem-solving approach requires that stakeholders

in the community collaborate to develop and implement a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan.

Although one stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, a

public official, or a community group) may initiate

the process and the same stakeholder (or another)

may spearhead it, consultation and collaboration

are essential.

This section outlines the steps for developing and

implementing a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan. These are: (1) establish appropriate stakeholder partnerships, (2) identify and measure the

problem, (3) set measurable goals and objectives,

(4) identify appropriate programs and strategies,

(5) implement the comprehensive plan, (6) evaluate

the plan, and (7) revise the plan on the basis of the

evaluation.

Establish stakeholder

partnerships

Gun violence does not discriminate. It strikes purposefully and randomly, in inner cities and rural

towns, wounding rich and poor, blind to differences

in skin color and religion. In short, gun violence

operates throughout the community. As a result,

participation from Federal, State, and local law

enforcement; juvenile justice authorities; businesses;

families; faith communities; civic organizations;

and health and social service agencies is necessary

to successfully prevent gun violence. Harnessing

the resources of these stakeholders and creating a

successful partnership frequently requires strong

leadership from law enforcement. However, a successful partnership invites multiple perspectives

and allows for the sharing of responsibilities and

accomplishments.

Identify and measure the problem

Different stakeholders have different perceptions

of gun violence. These different perceptions may

make it difficult to agree on the primary gun violence issues that need to be addressed. Because

perceptions of problems are not always accurate, it

is important to know which problems are real and

to act on them. In developing a comprehensive gun

violence reduction plan, communities should seek

consensus on the primary issues. Consensus is possible when stakeholders examine information from

several sources and share it widely. As has been

proven in New York City and elsewhere, local

crime analysis—including thorough crime mapping—to identify and predict emerging crime patterns is an effective tool in designing crime

reduction interventions.

Set measurable goals

and objectives

Goals describe broad purposes of anticipated measurable accomplishments. Objectives are the sequential,

measurable steps needed to achieve each goal. Setting

an unrealistic goal, such as eliminating violence, increases the likelihood of failure and invites criticism.

A goal is more useful when it is reasonably specific

and is supported by a fairly short list of objectives.

Goals and objectives are based on accurate data and

the identification of community-specific problems.

Realistic and attainable goals lead to greater commitment and, ultimately, long-term success.

Objectives describe “who will do how much of what

by when.” Often the objectives are written in sequential order, but multiple objectives are generally addressed in overlapping periods of time. Measurable

objectives allow for determinations of when, and

whether, they have been achieved. However, they

do not need to be so specific that every minor action

is included. Stating the primary objectives is sufficient

to allow accountability and to monitor progress.

Goals and objectives need to be revised over time as

an affected community gains wisdom and experience.

Communicating the goals to all stakeholders throughout the course of an intervention is vital.
12 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Identify appropriate programs

and strategies

Although some programs and strategies are more

effective than others, no single program or strategy

is effective in combating all three phases of the

continuum of gun violence. The best approach for

a community seeking a comprehensive response to

gun violence typically calls for a mix of programs

and strategies based on the goals, objectives, needs,

and resources identified in the community’s comprehensive plan.

When selecting programs and strategies, communities should consider these factors:

◆ The availability of personnel and administrative,

technological, and other resources.

◆ Any evidence of past effectiveness.

◆ The match between the program or strategy and

the goals and objectives of the comprehensive

plan.

◆ The appropriateness of the techniques and images

employed by the program or strategy to the racial,

ethnic, and religious makeup of the community.

Section III describes model programs that have

proven effective or appear promising. A community

may choose to implement several programs and

strategies simultaneously or sequentially. Communities should bear in mind that many innovative strategies and programs (including those listed in section

III) work because they were designed to solve a

problem driven by specific local dynamics and will

not necessarily be effective in other circumstances.

Communities should consider carefully whether

selected strategies and programs need to be adapted

to meet local conditions. In considering different

programs and strategies, communities will want to

consider existing local and Federal gun laws that

govern how guns are legally possessed, who may

possess them, and what the comparative penalties

are for criminal possession and use of guns.

Finally, it makes sense to balance programs and

strategies that impact all three phases of the gun

violence continuum and emphasize prevention in

addition to punishment. Having selected a mix of

programs and strategies, a community should carefully develop a plan to assess the effectiveness of

their particular combination as applied.

Implement the

comprehensive plan

Communities differ in the way they implement

their comprehensive plans. All communities should,

however, take certain basic steps. Gearing up for

implementation, stakeholders will likely want to

seek broad community support through a public

awareness campaign. Participants also will need

to be trained in implementation of the program or

strategy.

Continuous monitoring and assessment are critical

steps in the actual implementation of the plan. The

following questions should be asked before and during implementation in order to determine the efficacy of the implementation:

◆ Have you developed procedures for monitoring

the implementation of the plan?

◆ Is there consistency between actual implementation events and the plan?

◆ Do budgeted costs match actual costs?

◆ What is the response of community members to

the plan?

◆ Are there unforeseen barriers to implementation?

Copyright © 1998 PhotoDisc, Inc.
Section II: Solving the Problem of Gun Violence 13

◆ Are there unintended negative consequences of

the selected programs or strategies?

◆ What adjustments need to be made?

Communities should anticipate problems (barriers,

unintended consequences, unforeseen changes, need

for adjustments) and view them as opportunities for

collaborative resolution.

Evaluate the plan

Evaluation is a critical component of a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan. It serves several

purposes:

◆ Increases the effectiveness of management and

administration of the plan.

◆ Documents that objectives have or have not been

met.

◆ Determines the overall efficacy of the plan and its

component programs and strategies.

Conducting an evaluation or a series of evaluations

helps to ensure accountability, establishes whether

the plan is making a difference, and provides important feedback for improving the plan.

Revise the plan on the basis of

the evaluation

A well-designed evaluation yields vital information.

Evaluation results may suggest that changes should

be made in the selection or implementation of programs and strategies, that additional training is

warranted, or that other stakeholders need to be

involved. Recommendations for improvement may

come from the original partnership of stakeholders

or from individual stakeholder groups. Assessments

by the stakeholder partnership and by individual

stakeholders will reveal which activities were most

and least effective, which materials worked best and

worst, and how barriers were overcome or proved

insurmountable. If a community administers a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan for a substantial period of time with little or no progress

toward identified objectives, an entirely new plan

may need to be implemented.

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Anti-Violent

Crime Initiative (AVCI)—introduced in 1994—

serves as one valuable model of the strategic

planning process. To implement the AVCI, every

U.S. Attorney met with all pertinent Federal,

State, and local law enforcement agencies and

formed a new, or newly strengthened, violent

crime working group. These working groups

identified and prioritized the critical violent

crime problems that are susceptible to a

coordinated Federal/State/local approach.

They also developed short- and long-range

objectives and implemented programs and

strategies to address the relevant local crime

problems. More information is available from

your local U.S. Attorney’s office.
Comprehensive Gun Violence

Reduction Strategies

Section III
Section III. Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Overview ........................................................................................................................................................ 17

Profile No.

1. Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program—Baltimore, MD ............................................. 19

2. Boston Strategy To Prevent Youth Violence—Boston, MA ........................................................... 26

3. Buffalo Weed and Seed Initiative—Buffalo, NY ............................................................................. 34

4. Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond, CA .................................................................... 41

5. East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland, CA ....................................................... 45

6. Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN ............................................................. 50

7. Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and Safety)—Minneapolis and

St. Paul, MN ..................................................................................................................................... 56

8. Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA ............................ 63
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 17

Overview

During the past decade, the epidemic of gun violence

has led residents and law enforcement agencies in

each of the communities profiled in this section to

form a collaborative to find new solutions to this

problem. In some cases, these efforts have been

driven by neighborhood residents determined to

address the problem of gun violence and to take

back their streets. In other communities, crime reduction efforts have been spearheaded by police,

prosecutors, the courts, schools, health departments,

public and private social service organizations, or

members of the faith and business communities.

Regardless of who initiated the various crime prevention efforts, however, these communities have

learned that each of these institutions contributes to

the collaborative’s ability to mobilize resources and

implement strategies that produce desired outcomes.1

 In particular, citizen participation in crime

prevention efforts has been critical to their success

and sustainability. Police can do their job more effectively when the community’s priorities shape

their actions. The subsequent development of trust

enhances this partnership and results in greater

police-community cooperation and mutual support.

These communities have also learned that their efforts must be long-term in order to be effective, and

that capacity building in different sectors of the

community is needed.

The communities profiled in this section have also

successfully engaged in the process of forming partnerships; measuring problems; setting goals; evaluating

strategies; and implementing, evaluating, and revising

plans described in section II. As such, these successful

communities share the following characteristics:

◆ The community recognizes its gun violence

problems. Support for a collaborative increases if

a broad range of community residents and law

enforcement representatives recognizes the prevalence and incidence of the gun violence problem

and participates in planning and implementing

appropriate suppression, intervention, and prevention strategies. A fundamental challenge that

many partnerships face in reducing illegal firearm

possession, carrying, and use is to convince those

who carry guns that they can survive in their

neighborhoods without being armed. Programs in

these communities must work to dispel the perception of many residents that the authorities can

neither protect them nor maintain order in their

neighborhoods.2

◆ Law enforcement and other key institutional

administrators are enlisted as key partners. The

active participation of administrators of key agencies that have primary responsibility for the

program’s participants—the victims, offenders,

and families associated with gun violence—is

instrumental for accessing agency staff resources

and identifying other agencies that can provide

services to the targeted participants.

◆ The collaborative has access to resources. Developing a community partnership requires access

to certain resources, including professional staff

who are experienced and knowledgeable about

delivery of social services to the target populations, volunteers who can maintain the prevention

and intervention strategies, and funding from

sources within and outside the community.

◆ The collaborative develops a comprehensive

vision and plan. The partnership must have a

core group of members who engage in strategic

planning that will produce a comprehensive plan

of action. A shared community vision can provide

the foundation for engaging in a process that links

the vision with measurable goals and strategies. A

comprehensive plan requires a series of strategies

that are grounded in an understanding of the risk

and protective factors associated with gun violence.3

 The plan needs to be comprehensive and

integrated, using a number of strategies to address gun violence from both a supply and a demand perspective.

◆ The collaborative mobilizes and sustains gun

violence reduction activities. Productive capacity includes the energy of a core group of partnership members to plan and implement effective

strategies. It is important to involve those persons

who have a direct stake in the well-being of the

community prior to mobilizing residents who live

in the affected neighborhoods.

◆ The collaborative develops a leadership structure.

A productive partnership does not depend on
18 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

personal charisma but relies on quality leadership

and management to build a productive team. This

team is the vision-setting, standard-setting core of

the partnership and combines talents to help the

partnership meet the challenges of structure,

strategy, growth, and innovation.

The comprehensive gun violence reduction programs described in this section incorporate multiple

suppression and prevention strategies to address

risk factors that are associated with violent criminal

behavior, including aggressive behaviors at an early

age, conflicts with authority, gun possession and

carrying, gang membership, substance abuse, depression, exposure to violence, poor parental supervision, low academic achievement, truancy,

delinquent peers, drug trafficking, and unemployment. Rather than targeting one or two risk factors

associated with gun violence, these collaboratives

recognize that their efforts are likely to be more

successful if they incorporate strategies that address

both the supply and demand side of the illegal firearm market. They have therefore developed comprehensive, multiple-component programs that

address the identified risk factors in multiple ways.

Such program strategies include targeted police

responses, surveillance of probationers, situational

crime prevention using problem-solving strategies,

parental supervision, peer mediation and conflict

resolution, school-based interventions, community

mobilization, legislation restricting youth access to

guns, and tough sentences for crimes involving firearms. Because gang membership is associated with

violent behaviors, many of these comprehensive

programs also include intervention strategies to

reduce gang-related violence, including the development of geographically coded information systems

to track gang violence, restricting gang members’

access to firearms, enhancing prosecution of gang

crimes, and punishing and monitoring offenders.

Lastly, the communities profiled here have incorporated most of the productive capacity characteristics

in their collaborative structures. They have involved

community residents, law enforcement, and other

public and private agencies in developing a comprehensive plan and have created a strong collaborative

structure to mobilize and sustain their gun violence

reduction strategies. While these programs may

vary in the degree to which the community is an

integral part of their collaboratives, each of them

has involved the community in assessing its gun

violence problems or in implementing effective violence reduction strategies.

Notes

1. K. Kumpfer, H.O. Whiteside, A. Wandersman, and E.

Cardenas, Community Readiness for Drug Abuse Prevention:

Issues, Tips, and Tools, Bethesda, MD: National Institute on

Drug Abuse, 1997.

2. S. Greenbaum, “Kids and guns: From playgrounds to

battlegrounds,” Juvenile Justice 3(2):3–11, 1997.

3. D. Sheppard, “Developing community partnerships to

reduce juvenile gun violence,” paper presented at the 50th

Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology,

Washington, DC, 1998.
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 19

Profile No. 1

Promising

Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program—

Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

A program of comprehensive gun violence

reduction strategies; Bureau of Justice

Assistance.

Program Goal:

To reduce violent crime by building the

community’s capacity to implement a comprehensive strategy to address the factors

that contribute to violent crime—guns and

drugs.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

None.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

High-crime areas of Baltimore, MD.

Evaluated by:

Urban Institute, Washington, DC; BOTEC,

Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

A. Elizabeth Griffith

Mayor’s Coordinating Council on

Criminal Justice

10 South Street, Suite 400

Baltimore, MD 21202

Phone: 410–396–4370

George Kelling

BOTEC Analysis Corporation

767 Concord Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

In 1991, the problem of gun violence, drugs,

and crime had reached crisis levels in many

Baltimore neighborhoods. The Boyd Booth

area, for example, had one of the largest openair drug markets and accounted for many of

the city’s homicides. The residential population was dwindling, and entire blocks of

homes had been abandoned by their owners, had fallen into disrepair, and had been

appropriated by drug dealers and addicts.

Two local nonprofit organizations, the

Community Law Center (CLC) and the

Citizens Planning and Housing Association

(CPHA), began working with local residents to address neighborhood problems

and help restore safety and a sense of

community. CLC helped neighborhood

associations and other community groups

file civil litigation based on the Drug Nuisance

Abatement Law, the Community Bill of

Rights, vacant house receivership law, and

the Self-Help Abatement of Nuisances Law

(a common law dating back to the 16th

century) to address drug and crime problems.

At the same time that CLC was providing

representation, technical assistance, and

legal education to community groups,

CPHA was helping community residents

organize to address drug, crime, and housing problems. CPHA showed residents how

to gradually reclaim their neighborhoods

using a variety of tactics, such as holding

vigils on drug corners, hosting community

fairs on abandoned lots, painting murals on

newly boarded houses, and launching other

“street actions.”
20 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 1 (continued)

Comprehensive Communities

Program

By the spring of 1995, the Mayor’s Coordinating

Council on Criminal Justice had received a

grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance

to become 1 of 16 national sites participating

in the Comprehensive Communities Program

(CCP). The work being done by CLC and

CPHA was well known, and the mayor’s

office asked the groups to expand and implement Baltimore’s CCP initiative in several

core communities: Boyd Booth, Carrollton

Ridge, Fayette Street, Franklin Square,

Harlem Park, and New Southwest. Dozens

of other areas were identified as apprentice

sites that would receive more limited

assistance (e.g., training and the services of

a pro bono attorney) to develop their own

comprehensive crime prevention strategies.

Building community capacity is absolutely

key. You have to begin by identifying

the people and institutions in the local

neighborhoods who have a stake in the

community and really want to address the

neighborhood’s problems. And then you

have to give them the resources that they

need to be successful—and that’s where

the Mayor’s Coordinating Council on

Criminal Justice comes in. We are able to

bring together all the key agencies—law

enforcement, housing, community

organizers, youth, legal advisers—and

marshall their resources in a focused way

to have the biggest impact on solving the

neighborhood’s problems. We then build

the relationships between these groups to

sustain the effort over the long haul.

—Betsi Griffith

Baltimore, MD, Mayor’s Coordinating

Council on Criminal Justice

The first-year planning grant allowed the

partners to establish a solid foundation for

the initiative by recruiting and training

local leadership, working with residents to

identify priority problems, mapping out

strategies, and establishing relationships

with key groups such as law enforcement

and nearby schools. The nonprofit Neighborhood Design Center was brought on as a

partner to help residents reduce drug

dealing and other criminal activities by

changing the physical environment. The

center’s approach, entitled Crime Prevention

Through Environmental Design (CPTED),

encourages residents to reclaim public

spaces such as parks and playgrounds that

have been taken over by drug dealers,

prostitutes, and others because they are

poorly maintained or are not used by lawabiding citizens. Typical CPTED activities

include the establishment of community

gardens on vacant lots or staking “ownership” of street corners by having vigils.

Full implementation of Baltimore’s CCP

initiative began in 1995. Implementation

funding was provided not only through a

Bureau of Justice Assistance discretionary

grant, but also through grants from the

Merck Foundation, the Abell Foundation,

two Federal block grant programs (Byrne

Memorial Block Grant Funds and Local

Law Enforcement Block Grants), and inkind contributions from the city’s Department of Public Works and the police. The

CCP initiative has a number of critical

program elements, which follow.

Community-based anticrime

strategies

CCP sites use six strategies to reduce crime

in target areas:

◆ Denying the drug trade and other criminal

activities the space in which to operate by

using CPTED and other measures to turn

these spaces into viable community assets.
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 21

Profile No. 1 (continued)

Copyright © 1998 PhotoDisc, Inc.

◆ Maximizing the accountability and participation of all stakeholders in the community by building public support for

crime reduction and increasing stakeholder responsibility for and participation

in efforts to reduce crime.

◆ Removing the sense of impunity by working with the criminal justice system to

increase the likelihood of arrest, prosecution, and sanctions and providing for

community input at all stages of the criminal justice process.

◆ Expressing community intolerance for

drug dealing and reclaiming public

spaces, establishing citizen patrol groups,

and holding street actions such as

marches or vigils.

◆ Providing positive alternatives for children and adults (particularly recovering

addicts) through youth programs, employment, and other alternatives to drugrelated activities and developing support

systems for recovering addicts.

◆ Developing community capacity to sustain

the effort by organizing the community,

developing local leaders, and strengthening

community organizations. Community

capacity includes the following:

❖ A committed core of residents. Community change and improvement efforts

can be successful only if there is resident

involvement and leadership. Indeed, one

of the criteria for selecting CCP sites was

the existence of local organizations

whose members were willing to play an

active role in identifying problems and

implementing solutions.

❖ Community organizing. Neighborhoods in crisis face enormous obstacles

and need high levels of support, especially during the early stages, to launch

and sustain effective community campaigns. A paid community organizer is

crucial in order to maximize the effectiveness of community efforts.

❖ Community policing. In the CCP

sites, full-time community foot patrol

officers were freed from responding to

calls for service and were assigned to

work closely with residents to solve

local problems. These officers attended

meetings, became acquainted with residents, and targeted their law enforcement to resident-identified problems.

❖ Legal assistance. CLC gave residents

access to a number of civil legal remedies in their battles against crime,

drugs, and social decay. Laws regarding drug nuisances, house receivership,

self-help nuisance abatement, and

housing and building code violations

became part of the community’s legal
22 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 1 (continued)

arsenal. CLC also provided legal assistance with organizational development

issues such as drafting bylaws and articles of incorporation.

❖ Capacity to address physical problems and to provide communitybased alternatives to incarceration.

Small-scale, physical improvements to

a neighborhood—for example, turning

a local dumping ground into a community garden in the course of a weekend—are enormously important to

communities in crisis. In addition to

adding to the area’s visible community

assets, these incremental neighborhood

improvements increase community

spirit and build support for future residential action. Recovering addicts and

other nonviolent ex-offenders can become important resources for this effort,

performing community service as members of work crews that build communities ravaged by the kinds of activities

in which they were once engaged.

❖ Other support services. Each CCP

site has developed additional programs

and services that are considered necessary to the success of the initiative. For

example, four sites have worked with

the Alternative Sentencing Unit to

establish formal and informal systems

to support recovering addicts. Other

CCP sites have tried to secure additional resources for youth and have

either established links with existing

agencies or developed afterschool and

summer programs of their own. Faith

organizations like the Union Methodist

Memorial Church also have been active in some CCP areas, providing

meeting space, transportation, and

support services for recovering substance abusers.

By the end of 1996, dramatic decreases in

crime were being reported in CCP areas. In

Boyd Booth, the pilot site, violent crimes

were reduced by more than 50 percent between 1993 and 1996. There also was evidence

of increased law enforcement activity: the

number of arrests doubled or tripled in many

core communities during that same period.

HotSpot Communities

In March 1997, in large part because of the

success of the CCP effort, the Governor of

Maryland launched the HotSpot Communities (HSC) Initiative as the next generation

of community-based crime prevention. HSC

incorporated all the main features of CCP

and added several others. HSC sites had to

include the following core elements:

◆ Community mobilization.

◆ Community policing.

◆ Community probation (including intensive supervision of adult and juvenile

probationers and parolees through Operation Spotlight).

◆ Community maintenance (use of city code

enforcement, offender work crews, civil

legal remedies, and rapid response to

“broken windows”).

◆ Youth prevention (afterschool programs,

truancy and curfew enforcement, partnerships with schools and law-enforcement

agencies).

◆ Local coordination of the Baltimore CCP/

HSC program by The Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice.

In addition, HSC areas could adopt six enhancing elements: community prosecution,

juvenile intervention, CPTED measures,

victim outreach and assistance, community

support for addiction recovery, or housing

and business revitalization.
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 23

Profile No. 1 (continued)

The Governor’s Office on Crime Control

and Prevention, which partially funds the

CCP/HSC program, invited every county

and municipality in the State to apply for

HSC funding. Two criteria were used to

select the 36 communities that are now part

of HSC: a concentration of fear and crime,

based on police statistics for the targeted

areas, and a community with a core group of

committed residents and the capacity to

launch and sustain the effort. Six hotspot

communities were designated in the city of

Baltimore, including several CCP sites.

The six hotspot communities in Baltimore

are coordinated by The Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice. An Oversight Committee comprising agency heads

and high-level representatives of all the

institutions involved in HSC (i.e., the

Department of Public Works, the Police

Commissioner, and the Department of

Parole and Probation) is responsible for

overall program monitoring. A Sustainment/

Evaluation Committee, composed of all the

members of the Supervisory Teams discussed

below, assesses the effectiveness of CCP/

HSC programs and continually reviews and

modifies goals and objectives.

A Supervisory Team, including senior staff

from each of the agencies directly involved

in HSC activities, meets quarterly and

“creates a forum where the policies and

goals of each agency, nonprofit, and service

provider are integrated with the strategy in

each area targeted for programming.” The

Supervisory Team is composed of work

groups that focus on the core HSC elements:

community policing/community probation,

community organizing, legal issues, community maintenance, and youth.

Finally, Neighborhood Safety Teams established in each of the HSC areas meet at

least monthly to make specific decisions

affecting communities. For example, Neighborhood Safety Teams decide which corners

or streets will be targeted by community

policing patrols, which houses should be the

focus of a Drug Nuisance Abatement case,

and what kinds of programs should be

developed for youth to keep them free of

drugs and crime. Each Neighborhood Safety

Team has a community organizer, a police

officer, a parole/probation agent, a community

attorney, one or more community residents,

and other representatives as needed.

The progression from the Comprehensive

Communities Program to HotSpots

represents the realization that long-term

community change requires a systemwide

approach. The work of separate agencies—arresting lawbreakers, prosecuting

criminals, cleaning up neighborhoods,

monitoring probationers—should coalesce

under the single goal of creating a safe

community. The police department must

work with parole and probation officers to

target career criminals, the housing

department must work with the State’s

Attorney to prosecute absentee slumlords,

and all agencies must work with the community residents—who know best what their

problems are and how to solve them.

The philosophy of comprehensiveness has

influenced the way CCP/HSC is funded and

managed. The $10.5 million that funds the

statewide, 3-year initiative comes from

many sources, including the Bureau of

Justice Assistance’s Byrne Memorial Block

Grants and the Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention. However,

HSC sites do not submit separate applications for each part of the funding mosaic

that is relevant to their work, nor do they

have to prepare separate progress and

evaluation reports to meet the varying

requirements of the funding agencies.

Instead, The Governor’s Office on Crime
24 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 1 (continued)

Control and Prevention has developed a

unified reporting form for HSC sites, which

disaggregates the information provided by

the target communities and presents relevant data to the array of funders. The

Governor’s Office on Crime Control and

Prevention also has changed its own internal operations in response to this initiative.

CCP/HSC coordination

The goal of CCP/HSC is institutionalization

of its work. The group has established

partnerships with 24 Federal, State, and

local agencies, and it is hoped that the

activities initiated under this special funding

project will become part of the core functions of the participating groups. There is

some evidence that this has begun to take

place. For example, the Baltimore Police

Department has implemented a system for

the exchange of intelligence between the

community foot patrol officers and members

of other specialized units, and each now

supports the work of the other. The State’s

Attorney’s Office established the Firearms

Investigation/Violence Division in 1997 to

allow for vertical prosecution of cases

involving nonfatal shootings where the

defendant had a history of firearm violence

and handgun violations. Individuals from

HSC’s are one of the offender groups being

targeted through this division. In addition,

the division targets individuals who are

eligible for DISARM, a project of the U.S.

Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland (see profile 36).

Law enforcement activities in CCP/HSC

sites also are coordinated through Baltimore’s Violent Crimes Division and its

Youth Violence Strike Force (see profile

18). The two law enforcement programs

work to reduce firearm-related offenses and

may target specific individuals (such as

gang members), geographic areas (highcrime corners and other hotspots), crimes

(drug-related shootings), or weapons.

Representatives from probation and parole

departments, the courts, school police

forces, and each of HSC’s Neighborhood

Safety Teams serve as liaisons to the Violent

Crimes Division and the Youth Violence

Strike Force, helping them to determine

enforcement priorities.

Another CCP/HSC partner is the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), which has supported the

work of CCP/HSC by tripling the number

of code violations issued by housing inspectors to close down buildings suspected of

drug or gang activity. The Mayor also

has established nine Neighborhood Service

Centers (one in each police district) as a

way to bring city services to the local level

and make them more responsive to neighborhood needs. The Neighborhood Service

Centers contain branch offices of all city

government agencies—from housing and

health inspectors, to human service workers, to business assistance coordinators. Two

public elementary schools and a local

recreation center also are CCP/HSC partners, providing youth programs in some of

the targeted neighborhoods.

Maryland’s Department of Parole and

Probation and the Department of Juvenile

Justice have hired several parole and

probation officers to target medium- and

high-risk offenders in CCP/HSC neighborhoods, and the Federal Probation Office

also has assigned one agent to each site.

Among the initiative’s 10 nonprofit partners

is Bon Secours Hospital, the largest employer

in one of the CCP/HSC communities. The

hospital has played an important role in

economic and housing development—first

building a multimillion-dollar Community
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 25

Support Center for local families and then

launching a housing development initiative

to renovate many vacant homes in the area.

CCP evaluation

Evaluation data on CCP/HSC is being

collected in several ways. The Mayor’s

Coordinating Council for Criminal Justice is

conducting an internal evaluation, which will

provide process and outcome data on improvements in physical conditions, youth

programs and services, community attitudes,

and changes in community capacity. In

addition, BOTEC is conducting a process

evaluation for the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the University of Maryland and the

Urban Institute are collecting and analyzing

data on crime, violence, and drug dealing in

the targeted areas, to include analysis of

displacement of crime. These evaluation

reports will be available in 1999.

Profile No. 1 (continued)
26 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 2

Promising

Boston Strategy To Prevent Youth Violence—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

A research and action project of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies;

National Institute of Justice.

Program Goal:

To reduce serious youth violence in Boston.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Youth 8-18 years old.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University, Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

James Jordan and Gary French

Boston Police Department

1 Schroeder Plaza

Boston, MA 02120

Phone: 617–343–5096

David Kennedy

Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

79 John F. Kennedy Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

Phone: 617–495–5188

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

Starting in the early to mid-1990’s, Boston

embarked on a series of innovative public

safety strategies that focused on violent

youth and illicit gun markets. Using a

problem-solving approach, a broad coalition

of Federal, State, and local governmental

agencies, nonprofit community service

organizations, businesses, religious leaders,

parents, and resident stakeholders developed several programs to address the escalating number of juvenile homicides. Its

enforcement strategy largely consisted of

Operation Ceasefire (a gang violence abatement strategy; see profile 21), the Boston

Gun Project (a gun suppression and interdiction strategy; see profile 10), and Operation Night Light (a police-probation

partnership; see profile 33), each of which is

described in detail below. In addition to

enforcement efforts, and in keeping with its

new neighborhood policing strategy, Boston

also employed numerous prevention and

intervention initiatives. Working with community partners, the city built on existing

services in the communities to create a more

extensive and effective continuum of services.

It took approximately 2 years (from 1994 to

1996) for Boston to develop its strategic

plan, with hundreds of neighborhoods,

community-based programs, and neighborhood groups mobilized and brought into the

process. During this same period, the Boston

Police Department was undergoing great

change in its neighborhood policing initiatives. More than 400 participants in 16 teams

(roughly half police and half other stakeholders) worked on the planning phases.

In July 1996, at about the same time that

Operation Ceasefire began to be implemented,
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 27

Profile No. 2 (continued)

the police department published a Citywide

Strategic Plan, which examined neighborhood policing goals across districts, identified players, and provided the standards and

principles to guide the strategic effort. The

strategic plan laid out several key components of neighborhood policing, including

increasing ownership and accountability

among command and patrol staff, incorporating prevention and problem-solving approaches at every level of operation, and

building partnerships with stakeholders on

planning and tactical issues. To accomplish

these objectives, the police commissioner

decentralized the department and instituted

a “Same Cop, Same Neighborhood” patrol

organization strategy, which assigned officers to certain blocks in neighborhoods so

that they would become familiar with local

issues and take a problem-solving approach

in cooperation with the residents.

Also in 1996, the State enacted two laws

to address violent juvenile offenders. First,

the Youthful Offender statute, passed in

October 1996, allowed prosecutors to indict violent youthful offenders between

the ages of 14 and 17 on felony charges.

Upon conviction, these juveniles can receive increased penalties in the form of

adult sentences or Department of Youth

Services (DYS) commitments until the

age of 21, with or without a suspended

adult sentence. Second, the Brett-Martin

law, passed in early 1996, required that

juveniles convicted of firearm possession

be committed to DYS for a minimum of

6 months. In addition, the Suffolk County

District Attorney’s Office began to prosecute certain juveniles on a priority basis.

These juveniles were considered threats

to community safety yet could not be prosecuted under the Youthful Offender statute

because of their age, lack of a previous

record, or because they were charged with

misdemeanors rather than felonies.

Problem-solving research for

Operation Ceasefire and the

Boston Gun Project

Researchers from the John F. Kennedy

School of Government (KSG) at Harvard

University received funding from the National Institute of Justice to apply problemsolving techniques to youth gun violence in

Boston and to evaluate the effort. The research was divided into demand-side (focus

on youth) and supply-side (focus on guns)

components. In the demand-side research,

KSG researchers looked at youth homicide

data from 1990 to 1994 in Boston and found

that crime was confined almost entirely to

Boston’s poor, African-American neighborhoods and was committed primarily by 15-

to 21-year-old African-American males.

Researchers also found that firearms were

overwhelmingly the weapons of choice.

KSG also looked at youth emergency room

visits for nonfatal gunshot and sharp instrument wounds. Researchers then studied

data on 155 youth murder victims and 125

known youth offenders who committed gun

or knife homicides. They found that both

victims and offenders had a high degree of

prior criminal involvement that included

court actions ranging from arraignments to

sentences of probation.

From the outset, researchers worked closely

with a team of police officers from the

department’s Youth Violence Strike Force

(YVSF), with probation officers covering

high-risk youth gun violence neighborhoods

(especially those engaged in the Night Light

program), and with city-employed youth

gang outreach workers, known as “streetworkers.” Practitioners believed that the

youth violence problem was mainly a problem of gangs and that only a handful of dangerous gang offenders—maybe no more

than one-tenth of all gang members—were

driving the cycle of fear and gun crimes in
28 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 2 (continued)

neighborhoods. Probation officers introduced researchers to a sample of young

probationers who were interviewed in focus

groups or individually in winter 1994 and

summer 1995. Many of the juveniles said

they had guns for self-defense and joined

gangs for protection.

The main thrust of the KSG analysis consisted of geographical mapping over the

summer of 1995. The working group of

practitioners pooled their knowledge and

provided the researchers with information

on gang size, turf, alliances, and conflicts.

They also classified 5 years of youth homicide victimization data and tied it to gangs.

Boston had 61 gangs with about 1,300 members from 4 neighborhoods; these groups

committed 60 percent or more of the youth

homicides in the city. Based on this information, researchers constructed a territorial

map of the identified gangs, containing

practitioners’ estimates of membership size

and sociograms of alliances and antagonisms. This territorial map identified which

gangs should be targeted in order to disrupt

key sources of conflict. Network analysis

also led to strategies to communicate a deterrence message to targeted gangs by identifying cliques that would, in turn, be most

efficient at getting that message out to the

largest number of gang members.

The researchers were fortunate in having

access to a very rich gun data set from the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF). Every gun that had been used in a

crime and which had come into police hands

since 1991 had been traced and included in

the ATF data set. Out of 1,550 records of

guns from youth ages 21 and under, 809

were traceable to Federal firearm licensees,

first retail purchases, or both. ATF analyzed

the type, caliber, make, geographic origin,

and “time-to-crime” age for each gun; the

proportion of guns with obliterated serial

numbers; the number of guns that had been

used in substantive crimes versus those

seized by police on possession charges; and

adult versus youth gun patterns. In addition, ATF determined that at least half of the

guns came from very small and infrequent

purchases by straw purchasers and that

these purchasers rarely received law enforcement attention. Interviews with youth

confirmed the belief that guns were readily

available to them—through illegal purchase

or borrowing. A gang might have only a few

guns, but they were available to all members. Contrary to common belief, youth

shunned guns that had been used in burglaries because they knew that the weapons

had been used in other crimes and did not

want to be held responsible.

The supply-side research dispelled the generally held belief that Boston youth gangs

obtained their guns from southern States

with lax gun laws. Contrary to expectations,

34 percent of traceable guns were first sold

at retail in Massachusetts and close to 15

percent were from nearby New England

States. Most of the guns recovered were

handguns and semiautomatic pistols. Semiautomatic weapons had the shortest “timeto-crime”: more than 40 percent were less

than 2 years old. Serious crimes typically

involved more shotguns, more in-State

guns, and fewer obliterated serial numbers

than guns associated with the possession

charges of less serious youth offenders. In

summary, the supply-side analyses indicated

that new guns were coming into the youth

illicit market at close to first retail sale.

Law enforcement strategies

Operation Ceasefire

Operation Ceasefire is a coordinated

citywide strategy established in May 1996

to deter youth firearm violence. Ceasefire

operates as a system, focusing interventions
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 29

Profile No. 2 (continued)

through the coordination and knowledge of

all of the city’s law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The working group

devised an overall strategy based on the

problem-solving research of KSG and ATF,

described above, and the success of tactics

that had worked against gangs in the past.

The goal was to communicate warnings to

gangs that, if violence occurred, there would

be a swift, predictable response with weighty

consequences. Ceasefire has the leadership

and support of the current mayor and police

commissioner.

YVSF led the development of the strategy

working with the U.S. Attorney, State probation, ATF, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, DYS, the county district attorney, the clergy, streetworkers (see profile

58), and at times local community-based

service providers. Prior to Operation

Ceasefire, law enforcement and criminal

justice agencies operated not as a system but

as a disparate group of agencies, each following its own mandate and mission except

when necessity dictated otherwise.

The strategy began with focused communications. Probation and gang unit police officers who knew the youth, streetworkers,

clergy (see profile 46), and communitybased organizations met informally and

formally with gang youth in schools, homes,

neighborhoods, courthouses, and other locations. Probationers were required to attend

these meetings. The message was emphatically delivered to them that violence would

no longer be tolerated in Boston—it had to

stop or the full weight of the law enforcement and criminal justice systems would be

brought to bear on the perpetrators. The

working group wanted youth to realize that

this zero tolerance message was not a bluff,

but a serious interagency effort. True to its

word, when its message was ignored and

gang violence erupted, YVSF used intensive

order maintenance and enforcement tactics

to quickly suppress flareups of firearm violence in emerging gang hotspots. YVSF

targeted noncomplying gangs with aggressive enforcement of public drinking and

motor vehicle violations, outstanding warrants, and probation surrenders and made

numerous arrests. Street enforcement resulted in two dozen Federal indictments and

arrests in August 1996. News of these activities quickly spread to other gangs in

Boston whose members saw what could

happen if they did not comply.

Boston Gun Project

Based on the analysis conducted on the ATF

tracing data set, the working group decided

to flag for investigation every trace that

showed guns with a time-to-crime of less

than 30 months, more popular gun types,

guns with restored serial numbers, those in

high-risk neighborhoods, and those associated with gang members or territories. Another tactic was to link the trace data set

with the gang membership and turf data,

which allowed for identification of gun owners who also were gang members.

Disruption of gun markets, swift Federal

prosecution for gun possession or dealing,

and the zero tolerance message and enforcement measures of Operation Ceasefire were

all used to reduce gun violence. The major

partners in gun trafficking interdiction efforts

were the ATF Field Office in Boston, the

Boston Police Department, the Suffolk

County District Attorney’s Office, and the

U.S. Attorney’s Office, all of whom worked

together to direct the investigations of firearm

trafficking and armed career criminals in the

city of Boston. The Boston ATF supervisor

claims the key to their success has been the

close working relationship and genuine cooperation between ATF and local police.
30 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 2 (continued)

Cooperation between ATF and the police

department took many forms. A seasoned

Violent Crime Coordinator was assigned by

ATF to investigate Federal firearm arrests.

ATF attempted to trace every gun recovered

by the Boston Police Department through

ATF’s National Tracing Center in order to

discover sources of illegal weapons and guntrafficking patterns. For their part, YVSF

officers tried to extract gun market information from offenders charged with serious

nongun charges. The Boston Police Department and ATF also conducted joint inspections of all Federal firearms licensees

(FFL’s) in Boston. As a result of these inspections, 65 license holders (80 percent)

decided either not to renew their licenses or

to surrender them.

Swift Federal prosecution for gun trafficking also took some traffickers off the streets

and resulted in the investigation and prosecution of several interstate gun trafficking

rings. These actions were thought to have a

deterrent effect because Federal crimes

carry longer sentences than most State gun

crimes, and gang members fear being in a

Federal correctional facility—away from

home and visitors and without the security

of knowing other prisoners.

Operation Night Light

Operation Night Light began in November

1992 as a partnership between probation

officers in the Dorchester District Court

and Boston police officers in the Anti-Gang

Violence Unit, which later became YVSF.

Operation Night Light pairs one probation

officer with two police officers to make unannounced visits to the homes, schools, and

workplaces of high-risk youth probationers

during the nontraditional hours of 7 p.m. to

midnight rather than between 8:30 a.m. and

4:30 p.m., which was previously the norm.

The probation officer decides which of 10 to

15 probationers to visit each evening based

on which youth were defaulting on compliance. The team wears plain clothes and uses

an unmarked car. The terms of probation—

which commonly include curfews, geographic restrictions, and other constraints

designed to keep youth from reoffending—

are strictly enforced. Probation officers also

have been instrumental in convincing judges

to impose expanded conditions.

This teaming has enhanced the safety of the

probation officers and given police an opportunity to meet people in the community

in a nonconfrontational manner in accordance with their community policing role.

Officers are expected to conduct themselves

during these home visits in a courteous and

professional manner, encouraging parents to

keep their children out of trouble. The officers discuss substance abuse prevention and

treatment options with the probationers and

their families. Some parents welcome these

interactions, as they want to protect their

children from becoming victims of violence.

These unannounced home visits also give

borderline juveniles an excuse for staying in

at night and putting off their gang leaders or

associates with the argument that they

would face sanctions for violating curfew.

The best intervention and enforcement

efforts are also preventive. In the same way,

the best prevention programs produce

intervention effects. While the prevention/

intervention/enforcement strategy is seen as

providing a continuum of services, effects

overlap. The strategy has evolved in this way

because of the complexity of the overall

problem.

—Commissioner Paul F. Evans

Boston, MA, Police Commissioner
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 31

Profile No. 2 (continued)

Intervention and prevention

programs and initiatives in

Boston

Below are some examples of intervention

and prevention programs aimed at adjudicated and at-risk youth that were implemented simultaneously with Operation

Ceasefire.

Boston Community Centers’

Streetworkers Program

Boston has Community Centers located

throughout the city, including facilities in

middle and high schools. The Streetworkers

Program operates from these centers with

30 college-educated staff members available

24 hours a day to conduct gang and youth

outreach. The streetworkers are ages 25 to

55 and work closely with gang members to

mediate disputes (student/student, student/

teacher, gang/gang) and gang truces in

schools and throughout the community. The

streetworkers also help gang members and

their families gain access to much-needed

social services. Each streetworker is assigned to 5 to 10 gangs, with a caseload of

roughly 25 active and 25 less active cases.

They work closely with the police department, probation, clergy, courts, and schools.

When the city’s homicide rate skyrocketed

in 1990, the mayor sought the help of the

streetworkers in the hope that their nontraditional outreach approaches could help

reduce crime. For example, the streetworkers played an important role in Operation Ceasefire, personally inviting gang

members to meetings with Federal, State,

and local law enforcement agencies. The

streetworkers informed gang members of

the consequences of continued violence.

They also referred youth to agencies that

could provide social services, job training,

and employment opportunities. Finally,

streetworkers provided training for the police on how to develop relationships with

youth and gangs.

Youth Services Providers Network

(YSPN)

To achieve the comprehensive services,

partnerships, coalition building, and resource sharing required of youth programs

under the Comprehensive Communities

Program grant, a network of services was

formed in three of Boston’s most troubled

neighborhoods. The network is a partnership of many of Boston’s youth service organizations and city agencies to address

teenage runaways, dropout prevention,

mentoring, job training and placement, tutoring, and building leadership skills. A

police officer who comes across a youth in

need of services calls the social worker or a

District Community Service Officer, who

then makes the appropriate referral to the

network provider agency. From YSPN’s

implementation in June 1996 until September 1998, more than 500 youth had been

referred by officers.

Alternatives to Incarceration

Network (ATIN)

The network links various State and local

criminal justice agencies, including the district courts, to Boston service providers.

This network is supported by the Comprehensive Communities Program grant. Individuals enter ATIN as a condition for their

sentence deferment or as a condition for

parole or probation. Youth offenders receive

counseling, substance abuse treatment, job

skills training, and monitoring services.

Safe Neighborhood Initiative (SNI)

This initiative offers community residents the

opportunity to work with law enforcement
32 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 2 (continued)

Table 1. Homicides in Boston

Year 24 and 16 and Younger Total

Younger (Firearm-Related)

1990 62 10 152

1995 40 2 96

1996 26 0 61

1997 15 1 43

1998* 10 2 23

and government officials to identify and

address neighborhood issues using SNI

advisory councils and subcontracted programs. The Office of the Attorney General

administers the program, which began in

1993, in cooperation with the Suffolk

County District Attorney’s Office, the

mayor’s office, and the police department.

SNI targets four high-crime, low-income

neighborhoods. Its revitalization efforts

include the organization and education of

local merchants, job training programs, expedited city services, and a municipal priority to rehabilitate abandoned property. SNI

also supports expanded hours for communitybased youth centers, counseling services for

children in domestic violence situations, a

Child Witness to Violence Project, a Vietnamese police liaison who mediates gang

disputes and conducts school presentations,

gang dispute mediation by the Dorchester

Youth Collaborative, small business training, an SNI prosecution team, voluntary

business closures to avoid late-night crowds,

a drug education program for youth, and a

law student project that recommends ways

to reduce drugs, prostitution, and crime.

Funding comes from the Bureau of Justice

Assistance, which recently approved a new

4-year grant.

Summer of Opportunity

In 1994, the Boston-based John Hancock

Mutual Life Insurance Company began providing financial support to an 8-week summer

program that pays urban youth a weekly stipend while providing them with classes, field

trips, and a real-world internship at Northeastern University or John Hancock. The

internships teach youth leadership and life

skills, including conflict resolution and time

management, and also assign mentors. Youth

are referred by the antiviolence unit of the

police department. Many program graduates

complete high school and go on to college or

obtain employment.

Outcomes

Since Operation Ceasefire, the Boston Gun

Project, Operation Night Light, neighborhood policing, tougher youth offender laws,

and expanded prevention and intervention

programs went into effect, there has been a

dramatic decrease in the number of homicides in the city of Boston. The table presented below illustrates these results. This

reduction in homicides and youth homicides

cannot directly be attributed to any one of

these programs but more likely is due to the

*(first 8 months)

Age of Offender
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 33

Profile No. 2 (continued)

cumulative impact of this comprehensive,

multipronged approach.

Other outcomes also resulted from these

programs. First, citywide collaboration has

now been institutionalized. For example, in

reaction to the threat of recruitment of

young Bostonians by the Crips and Bloods

gangs, a group of police, probation officers,

religious leaders, and streetworkers visited

middle school students in their schools and

homes before school ended in June 1998.

Second, as a result of these efforts, communities are now regularly consulted by public

agencies in setting agendas for their neighborhoods. Finally, Boston has become a

national model for youth gun violence reduction, and the Boston Police Department

won an Innovations in American Government

award from the Ford Foundation and KSG

in 1997. Operation Ceasefire recently won

the Herman Goldstein award for best program employing problem-solving strategies.
34 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 3

Promising

Buffalo Weed and Seed Initiative—Buffalo, NY

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

A program of comprehensive gun violence

reduction strategies; Executive Office for

Weed and Seed.

Program Goal:

To reduce crime, to improve economic and

housing development.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Violent perpetrators.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Weed and Seed area in Buffalo, NY.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Oswaldo Mestre

Director of Weed and Seed

Department of Community Development

City Hall, Room 920

Buffalo, NY 14202

Phone: 716–851–4281

Years of Operation:

1997–present.

By 1994, the dramatically increasing violent

crime rate that took place throughout the late

1980’s and early 1990’s had earned the city of

Buffalo, NY, a reputation as one of the highest

homicide centers in the country for a population base of its size. A declining infrastructure

and subsequent rise in drug- and gang-related

violence contributed to the city’s significant

crime problems. Since 1954, Buffalo has witnessed a population decrease from approximately 600,000 to 328,000 residents, leaving

many communities with a proliferation of

abandoned houses that would eventually become “drug dens” supporting the storage,

trafficking, and marketing of illegal narcotics.

Similar to many other urban centers, gun- and

gang-related violence in the city are intricately

tied to the drug trade. The rise in the number

of these drug dens not only brought drugs and

criminal elements into many Buffalo neighborhoods, but also created a downward spiral in

the quality of life for residents, paralyzing

many in fear.

Violent crimes reached their peak in Buffalo

in 1994. Between 1993 and 1994, homicides

in the city increased 19 percent (from 79 to

94). Since 1994, Buffalo has followed the

national trend of steadily decreasing violent

crime. Violent crime decreased 38 percent

between 1993 and 1997 (from 6,041 to

4,052). Between 1994 and 1997, Part II

weapons offenses witnessed a 12-percent

decrease (from 430 to 384). Similarly, a

review of gun-related calls for service demonstrates an overall decline in gun activity

in Buffalo: calls about assault with a deadly

weapon declined 33 percent between 1994

and 1997 (from 1,146 to 892), reports of a

subject with a gun declined 38 percent

(from 3,149 to 1,972), and reports of shots

fired declined 26 percent (from 2,515 to

1,860). One of the major factors contributing to this decrease in Buffalo was the targeting of key gangs in the high-crime areas

of the city, resulting in the removal of four

of the most violent groups.

Recognizing that its declining crime rates

could not be sustained without a coordinated approach that targets serious offenders in its neighborhoods while the areas are
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 35

Profile No. 3 (continued)

being revitalized and restored through economic and housing development activities,

the city applied for and received a U.S. Department of Justice Weed and Seed grant,

which was initiated in April 1997. Underlying Buffalo’s Weed and Seed strategies are

two assumptions:

◆ Neighborhood residents must directly

participate in recommending solutions to

reduce and prevent crime and to redevelop their neighborhoods.

◆ The Buffalo Police Department will work

with the City of Buffalo Community Development Department, schools, business

associations, block clubs, social service

agencies, and other community-based

organizations in the targeted areas to

implement a coordinated Weed and Seed

program.

The Buffalo Weed and Seed program targets the core of the inner city, encompassing

portions of four councilmatic districts in one

of the city’s most socioeconomically distressed areas. The target area comprises

36,231 residents, representing 11 percent of

the city population, of whom 95 percent are

African-American. In addition to consistently being a major source of the city’s homicides and other violent crimes (in 1995,

there were 17 homicides in the area—more

than 25 percent of the citywide total of 62),

the target area also has the city’s highest

rates of teenage pregnancy, unemployment,

and infant mortality.

Comprehensiveness and

integration of the strategies

The Buffalo Weed and Seed program represents a comprehensive strategy covering

enforcement-based prevention and intervention strategies. The Buffalo Police Department and Community Development Office

have sought ways to involve community

feedback and partnership at all levels of the

program, although it was primarily driven

by law enforcement in its first year.

The underlying philosophy of the program

is that while law enforcement activities are

necessary to rid communities of criminal

aspects, sustainable change will occur only

if a stable community infrastructure is built

at the same time. To this end, the seeding

activities involve a strong community

capacity-building element that provides

residents with the necessary skills to be informed participants in both law enforcement

and community restoration activities.

Although there is a formal structure to the

program consisting of a Steering Committee, a

Weed Subcommittee, and a Seed Subcommittee, overall coordination remains informal but

effective. Collaboration occurs across all levels

of government with each agency/organization

knowing whom to contact to accomplish the

Weed and Seed objectives.

Enforcement-based strategies:

The Weed component

The Buffalo Police Department developed a

coordinated approach to gun suppression

that involves collaboration across Federal,

State, and local levels. In addition to a gun

detail that engages in targeted activities

against gun-involved offenders and locations, the U.S. Attorney’s Office works with

local prosecutors to ensure that a zero tolerance policy is carried through all levels of

the criminal justice system.

Gun Abatement Program

At the core of the Weed component is the

Gun Abatement Program, which is designed

to reduce the availability of guns on the

streets by targeting drug and weapon
36 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 3 (continued)

dealers and high-crime locations. A gun

hotline was developed for citizens to report

gun locations or offenders, but it had fewer

calls than expected. Officers of the precinct

went door-to-door to area residents, businesses, and churches to hand out material

related to the program including magnetized

cards and coffee mugs with the hotline number on them. Although the hotline itself did

not produce many tips, a surprising benefit

of the door-to-door interviewing was the

confiscation of 30 weapons by the officers

canvassing the neighborhood. These guns

were retrieved by parental consent to search

children’s bedrooms and attics or basements

where the children hang out with their

friends. Because the police department’s

focus is on both arrests and removing guns

from circulation, informants whom the officers met on the streets also relinquished several guns. These activities also served as a

public relations tool by promoting the efforts of the department and sending a message to potential violators.

The identification and targeting of drug

dealers also is a central strategy of the gun

abatement strategy. Operating on the assumption that wherever gangs or drug dealers congregate, a gun is nearby, gun

abatement officers searched abandoned

houses in these locations and confiscated 47

weapons, more than 3,300 rounds of ammunition, and 2 bulletproof vests. Drug dealers

were stopped, and on several occasions this

tactic resulted in arrests for gun possession.

Once any individual is arrested for weapons

possession, his or her mug shot is put on

display in the precinct to allow other officers to become familiar with him or her.

Coordinated drug raids with several Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies resulted in the seizure of 30 additional

weapons. To date, a total of 262 weapons

have been confiscated as a result of these

gun abatement program activities.

Every gun seized by officers is subjected to

a point-of-origin trace by an ATF special

agent, who works closely with both the gun

abatement officers and Federal prosecutors.

These traces have resulted in 15 criminal

investigations and identification of 2 major

gun traffickers. Gun abatement officers

refer trace data to ATF for further investigation and to the lieutenant in charge of the

Gun Abatement Program to enhance the

development of targeted strategies.

Collaboration with the district

attorney’s office

The appointment of a special prosecutor to

work specifically with the gun abatement

officers is an important complement to the

street-based enforcement strategies. Having

one prosecutor concentrate on gun-related

offenses develops a skill base and resources

in the manner that is common for many

other crimes (e.g., sexual assault prosecutor

and domestic violence prosecutor). Six convictions have been achieved in the last year.

Collaboration with the district attorney’s

office also has included training gun abatement officers on gun frisks, profiling gun

carriers on the streets, teaching witnesses to

articulate suspicions in court, and promoting safety on the street.

Operation Save Our Streets

Save Our Streets, a program initiated in

1993, recently has been revitalized and incorporated into the Weed and Seed Program through the hiring of a coordinator.

Fifteen agencies are a part of the Save Our

Streets Task Force, including members from

the Narcotics Division of the Buffalo Police

Department, City Hall’s Department of

Community Development, the Mayor’s Task

Force on Housing, the District Attorney’s

Office, Erie County Probation Department,

Erie County Department of Social Services,
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 37

Profile No. 3 (continued)

New York State Division of Parole, United

States Marshals Service, and the U.S.

Attorney’s Office. The task force targets

houses in the Weed and Seed area suspected

of involvement in drug use and facilitating

criminal activity. Using Federal asset forfeiture laws to gain access to a property, each

agency or department on the task force is

responsible for a particular problem facing

the individual property. A response team

is set up for each agency to enforce its respective ordinances and to ensure that the

owner and tenants of the property are properly held accountable for violations. Where

problems persist, the city chooses from a

wide range of program-oriented missions

to reclaim the property and to place it back

into productive use in the community. Many

properties have been demolished and turned

into community gardens and parks.

Flex Unit: Zero tolerance

enforcement

The Buffalo Police Department also has

hired 20 officers under the COPS Distressed Neighborhood Program and has

initiated a “Flex Unit” in an economically

distressed, high-crime community close to

the Weed and Seed target area. The Flex

Unit ultimately will be deployed in target

areas throughout the city. Based on traditional crime analysis techniques (e.g., mapping data of robberies, murders, and gangs)

and a review of the availability of community assets (e.g., community leadership and

community block clubs), the target area was

selected and broken down into low-, medium-, and high-risk areas. An essential

ingredient of target area selection was the

presence of a hub area, such as a park or

community house, which could serve as the

physical, community locus for the project.

The Flex Unit seeks to saturate the area

with a zero tolerance policy that targets

habitual offenders, eliminates crack and

vacant houses, and works with the community to improve the quality of life. The Unit

focuses its efforts in the low-risk area, before gradually moving into the designated

medium- and high-risk areas. Activities are

continued in the target area until both council members and the community indicate

that enough of an infrastructure has been

established to sustain outcomes in the absence of the Unit. Within the first 2 months

of the program, the Flex Unit had made a

total of 105 arrests, enforced 43 city ordinances, and served 19 warrants.

Community mobilization and

restoration: The link

between the Weed and

Seed components

A central focus of the Weed and Seed program involves the mobilization of community input and support to develop specific

strategies and activities. Although the firstyear Weed efforts were primarily driven by

law enforcement, planning is well underway

to make community residents a key ingredient in both the Weed and Seed components

of the program. Plans include working with

existing block clubs, working to establish

community groups where none currently

exist, and building on the Buffalo Police

Department’s community policing stations

located throughout the city.

The Weed and Seed coordinator works directly with a coalition of block clubs that

involves community leaders from the target

area. By collaborating with this group, the

Weed and Seed program receives tips and

information that contribute to enforcement

activities. Year 2 objectives include collaborating with the coalition in the development

of an overall strategic plan to enhance the

quality of life in the target area, including

the identification of new Seed strategies.
38 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 3 (continued)

Training will be provided to police officers

and community groups within the target

area in group facilitation methods, resource

identification, and problem solving using the

Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment model. To complement its work with

the block clubs, the Weed and Seed program also has developed junior block clubs

in the target area, which may ultimately be

linked to the Youth Police Academy offered

by the BPD’s Citizen Advisory Group.

Community police stations

Weed and Seed community mobilization

activities are integrated with the Buffalo

Police Department’s efforts to implement

community policing throughout the city.

Community policing stations have been or

will be established in each of the city’s districts, staffed by a combination of VISTA

volunteer workers and citizens committed to

improving the quality of life in their neighborhoods. The Buffalo Police Department

developed the V.I.A.B.L.E. (Volunteers

Assisting in Buffalo Law Enforcement) program to train residents in community policing and develop the necessary skills to

volunteer at the community policing stations. The stations enable residents to bring

their quality-of-life concerns to community

police officers and to provide tips and other

information to the police department. The

stations also serve as meeting places for

community groups and block clubs throughout the city. The Weed and Seed coordinator uses these resources to enhance

community input into Weed and Seed.

Neighborhood improvement

Through the formation of the Mayor’s Impact Team (MIT), the city has created a coordinated force involving all city departments

to clean up Buffalo’s neglected neighborhoods and to encourage residents to take an

active role in maintaining the integrity of

their neighborhoods by expanding existing

block clubs or forming new clubs where none

exist. In response to input received from

block club and council members, the MIT

goes into neighborhoods and takes care of a

variety of quality-of-life issues by removing

debris produced by illegal dumping, boarding up abandoned properties, carrying out

building inspections, enforcing codes, landscaping, and addressing any other necessary

issues. Of particular interest, much of the

work carried out by the MIT is done by

people required to perform community service (e.g., probationers and people cited for

DWI). Members of the MIT work closely

with the Operation Save Our Streets program to combat the existence of abandoned

houses throughout the city.

Resident street patrols

Weed and Seed also collaborates with a

local chapter of the national organization

MAD DADS (Men Against Destruction—

Defending Against Drugs and Social Disorder). MAD DADS is currently training

volunteers to participate effectively in street

patrols within the Weed and Seed target area.

The street patrols are viewed as an instrument

for providing a positive presence of community residents on the street as a complement

to the Weed and Seed program. In addition

to the street patrols, MAD DADS offers

mentoring and surrogate father support programs to those youth they contact on the

street. The Masten Block Club Coalition also

has developed a Neighborhood Crime Watch

program to develop street patrols on particular

blocks within the target area.

Buffalo has witnessed a positive change in

police-community relations, through both the

above strategies and other police-community

partnerships across the city, such as the

Neighborhood Initiatives (police-community
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 39

Profile No. 3 (continued)

partnerships) that the department has initiated in four neighborhoods in addition to the

Weed and Seed target area.

High-risk youth intervention

and prevention activities:

The Seed component

The Seed Subcommittee of the Weed and

Seed program works through block clubs to

organize and support the efforts of each block

club in the target area, offer training programs

for the block clubs within the target area, and

regularly meet with the three Safe Haven sites

to develop integrated strategies.

Safe Haven

The focal point of the Seed component is its

Safe Haven program, with three Safe Haven sites now operating in the three corners

of the target area boundaries. Each Safe

Haven offers a range of services to the target area including job skills training, family

services referrals, adult literacy programs,

tutoring, firearm prevention education, and

recreational programming. At all three Safe

Haven sites, parents are encouraged to participate in the children’s educational and

recreational activities.

One of the Safe Haven sites is located in a

former church that was scheduled for demolition, but was renovated to become the

King Urban Life Center. As a part of the

Buffalo Board of Education, the site offers

state-of-the-art distance learning and multimedia portfolios that not only enhance the

parent and child’s learning experience, but

also expose them to the new advances in

technology. In addition to educational programs for youth within the target area, the

King Urban Life Center offers adult literacy

programs to develop the skills of area parents.

Another Safe Haven site, located in a community school in the heart of the target area,

offers extended hours and provides a meeting area for youth, adult residents, block

clubs, and local community groups. A wide

variety of educational and recreational programming is offered at the site. In addition,

it offers a Family Support Center designed

to link comprehensive community-based

services to the student population and their

families. Providers linked to the Center

through referrals include Child and Family

Services, Child and Adolescent Treatment

Services, the Erie County Department of

Social Services, a community health care

center, and the Greater Buffalo Council on

Alcoholism and Substance Abuse. Although

the school once suffered from the violence

and drug problems characteristic of many

urban centers, it has become a truly safe

space for community youth and adults. The

community school reports no significant

problems with weapons violations or drug

and gang activity.

Alternatives for youthful offenders

The Buffalo Police Department also works

with the First Time/Last Time program, an

alternative to incarceration for first-time

youth offenders throughout Erie County.

All youth entering the program receive intake counseling and are then referred to one

of numerous resource agencies in the area

participating in the program. Throughout its

first year of operation, the program served

493 youth, with 96 drug/alcohol referrals,

220 education referrals, 79 employment

referrals, 13 residential referrals, 25 mental

health referrals, 94 community service

placements, and 18 other referrals.

Truancy abatement

The attendance improvement model (AIM)

involves a collaboration between Buffalo
40 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 3 (continued)

police officers and the schools to bring truant

youth back into the school system. Officers

work with parents and educators to deal with

individuals who are not reporting to school.

AIM officers also work with students who

have been identified as at risk in areas such as

conflict management, peer disputes, antiviolence training, and trouble-spot monitoring

near city schools. To date, 78 truants have

been returned to school, 44 home investigations have taken place, 19 adults and 17 juveniles have been arrested, and 64 presentations

have been given by AIM officers.

Curfew enforcement

A Curfew Ordinance Enforcement project

also has been implemented by the Buffalo

Police Department in collaboration with

the Erie County Department of Social

Services/Child and Family Services and

Compass Houses. In its first 50 nights of

operation, 471 citations were issued, 1,626

noncurfew violations contacts with youth

older than 17 were made, and 22 arrests

were made. Rather than simply returning

youth to problem environments, the Buffalo Police Department referred cases to

the Department of Social Services for case

management where necessary.

The Weed and Seed program has recently

received funding from AmeriCorps to hire

32 youth and young adults to engage in designated seeding projects throughout the

target area.

In addition to the above program highlights, a

wide variety of seeding activities were implemented in year 1, including those listed below:

◆ A book drive benefiting the Erie County

Youth Detention Center.

◆ The establishment of a community garden

on the site of a former drug house across

from one of the Safe Havens.

◆ The hiring of 30 youth (ages 13 to 17)

through the Mayor’s Summer Youth Opportunities and Internship program, who

were placed with various communitybased organizations and area businesses

in the target area.

◆ Provision of Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) and Gang Resistance

Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.)

programs in area schools.

Impacts of the Buffalo Weed

and Seed Initiative

Part I crimes within the target area have

decreased 31 percent since 1996, comparing

the 9-month period of January to September.

Within this total, homicides have decreased

38 percent, rapes have decreased 14 percent,

and aggravated assaults have decreased 36

percent. While the target area used to average 15 to 20 shooting deaths per year, only 1

such death has occurred within the first 12

months. The dramatic drop in homicides and

aggravated assaults cannot be directly attributed to any of these strategies in isolation,

but more likely is the result of the cumulative

impact of all these strategies.

In the first 9 months of 1997, Part I crimes

within the target area decreased 31 percent

compared with the same timeframe in 1996.

Weed and Seed has provided the City of

Buffalo an opportunity to show the power of

police and the community working together

and focusing our efforts toward common

problems, and to once again prove the

maxim that the whole is greater than the sum

of its parts.

—Rocco J. Diina

Commissioner of Police, Buffalo, NY
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 41

Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond, CA

Profile No. 4

Promising

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

A program of comprehensive gun violence

reduction strategies; Bureau of Justice

Assistance.

Program Goal:

To provide a coordinated focus for all programs and practices designed to address

homicide in Richmond through communitybased intervention strategies and targeted

enforcement strategies.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Youth and adults who commit violent crime.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Richmond, CA, and western Contra Costa

County.

Evaluated by:

Department of Criminal Justice, Temple

University.

Contact Information:

Captain Doug Seiberling

Richmond Police Department

401 27th Street

Richmond, CA 94804

Phone: 510–620–6611

James J. Fyfe

Temple University

Department of Criminal Justice

Philadelphia, PA 19122

Phone: 215–204–1670

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

One of the communities of the East Bay

Public Safety Corridor Partnership

(EBPSCP), Richmond, CA, has implemented a comprehensive approach to reducing violent crime both in collaboration with

the other EBPSCP communities and on its

own (see profile 5). The results of its efforts

dramatically illustrate the impact that a

comprehensive, multijurisdiction strategy

can make on crime reduction.

Drug- and gang-related violence in Richmond,

CA, increased markedly throughout the 1980’s.

By 1991, the city’s all-time high of 62 homicides,

among a population of 98,000, was 7 times

the national average. The portion of these

homicides that were drug- or gang-related

increased from 5 percent to 55 percent between 1989 and 1991. Shots fired increased 51

percent, from 1,687 calls in 1990 to 2,640 calls

by 1992. In 1992, Richmond Police responded

to a 911 emergency call every 7 minutes.

To combat the problem, Richmond implemented a communitywide murder reduction

strategy, based on the recommendations of

the 1992 International Association of Chiefs

of Police Murder in America Summit Study.

Elements of this strategy included (1) intervening against all forms of violence as early

as possible; (2) using technology to improve

clearances; (3) intensifying community policing and murder-specific problem-solving

strategies; (4) creating an advisory committee to assist with murder reduction; (5) involving all segments of the community in

violence prevention and control; (6) intensifying alcohol consumption reduction programs; (7) providing cash and other

incentives to citizens for information on

violent crimes and crimes involving guns;

(8) providing safe havens for youth after

normal school hours; (9) training police

officers to recognize and respond to different
42 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 4 (continued)

kinds of violence, including domestic violence;

and (10) becoming involved in schools to

reduce violence and violent behaviors.

Richmond received support in implementing

these strategies from EBPSCP (see profile

5). Financial support for Richmond’s initiatives came from a State of California policehiring supplement, a Bureau of Justice

Assistance (BJA) grant to implement the

Comprehensive Homicide Initiative Project,

an Office of Community Oriented Policing

(COPS) grant, and a number of other

smaller grants. Over the 5-year period

1993–98, the grants totaled $1.7 million.

Enforcement-based strategies

The Richmond Police Department adopted

the following investigative and enforcement

strategies: (1) developed an intensified team

approach to obtain information on highprofile homicides; (2) obtained FBI assistance in reviewing old and unsolved (“cold”)

homicide cases; (3) obtained DEA, FBI,

and California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement assistance in targeting violenceprone members of the drug culture; (4)

assigned an evidence specialist to the Richmond Police Department’s detective bureau;

and (5) improved information sharing and

technology within the department.

Homicide cases that can be closed through

quick and intensive information-gathering

efforts are systematically identified. However, different protocols are used to gather

intelligence in cases involving “set-on-set”

gang or turf-related murders (in which retaliatory violence is likely and possibly preventable) and in cases that have drawn

extraordinary public attention. To investigate gang-related homicides and prevent or

interrupt reciprocal violence, the department maintains extensive up-to-date information on gang members, their activities,

and their disputes. Increased surveillance of

gang members can lead to seizures of guns

and drugs and to arrests prior to outbreaks

of firearm violence. Seizures of vehicles on

traffic or license violations also have been

useful in preventing retaliatory drive-by

shootings, because vehicle seizures decrease

the mobility of gang members.

In its efforts to respond faster and more

proactively to homicides and other gangand drug-related crime in the city, police

also have participated in a number of interagency task forces. The Metro DEA Team

is a combined force of uniformed police

officers and DEA agents who target drug

dealers in hotspot areas. Using its information resources, the U.S. Marshals Task

Force helps the Richmond police to identify

fugitives. WestNet (the West Contra Costa

Narcotics Enforcement Team), which is

headed by the State’s Bureau of Narcotics

Enforcement, also assists Richmond police

in targeting drug trafficking in the city.

Public housing initiative

In cooperation with the Richmond Housing

Authority, a model lease agreement was

created requiring tenants to avoid involvement with drugs and crime or risk eviction.

Housing code enforcement and restraining

orders have been used to prevent drug dealers and gang members from frequenting

various housing developments. Renovations

of buildings, removal of abandoned vehicles,

and tenant evictions also are used. As of

December 1997, Richmond Police Department drug elimination officers had issued

139 citations, made 74 arrests, towed 33

vehicles, written 71 reports, and evicted 1

drug dealer from a notorious public housing

development.
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 43

Profile No. 4 (continued)

Community-based collaboration

and mobilization strategies

The police department sought to develop

new relationships with the community

through use of the 30 neighborhood councils that have been in existence since the

1960’s. Not only have police taken steps to

keep community citizens better informed,

they have turned to the community to find

innovative solutions to crime and violence.

Activities include a communitywide survey

of residents living in an area targeted for

violence-reduction efforts. Seventy-two

percent of residents in the area said that

they, or someone they knew, had been a

victim of violent crime. When working with

adults and juveniles in collaborative efforts

to reduce violence, these residents called for

a higher police presence.

High-risk youth intervention

and prevention strategies

A major focus of Richmond’s efforts is to

target high-risk youth through several prevention and intervention programs. Twentythree police officers have been assigned to

the Richmond Police Department’s Adopta-School Program. Officers meet with children, faculty, and parents on a monthly

basis to discuss school safety issues and to

plan solutions and strategies. Police have

worked closely with school officials to

change school classroom environments that

exacerbate the formation of racially based

gangs. In addition, officers have provided

mentoring and tutoring to high-risk youth

identified in the school.

Through the Probation Officers-OnCampus Program, the Contra Costa County

Probation Department assigns resident juvenile probation officers to two Richmond

high schools. Richmond police work with

these probation officers on a regular basis to

address crimes that may occur on school

property. The probation officers check daily

on probationers’ school attendance and

monitor their activities to keep them in

school. Probation/parole officers also go out

on patrol with police officers to provide

closer surveillance of identified offenders.

Truancy reduction

Operation “Stay in School” Truancy Recovery Program, is a cooperative effort with the

Contra Costa Unified School District. In

1995, more than 16 percent of the school

population was recorded as chronically truant. A truancy study in 1997 revealed that

much of the crime being committed in the

neighborhoods surrounding schools was

being caused by chronic truants. To combat

the problem, officers conduct truancy

roundups, returning youth to school or to a

specialized SWAT (School Welfare and

Attendance Team) office. Between 1996 and

1998, more than 1,000 youth were returned

to school or referred to other specialized

services. For a more detailed description of

this program, see profile 57.

Summer youth academy

In October 1996, the Richmond Police Department joined with the San Pablo Police

Department and the El Cerrito Police Department to establish and operate a youth

academy. The youth academy provides a

constructive, educational experience for local

youth, teaching them alternatives to life on the

street while increasing their interest in police

and community service careers. Among the

issues covered during the academy’s 12-week

program are community oriented policing,

criminal law, firearm safety, defensive tactics,

crime scene investigations, hostage situations,

and drug and alcohol awareness.
44 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 4 (continued)

Impact of the comprehensive

homicide initiative

The city of Richmond has experienced spectacular reductions in serious crime as a

result of their comprehensive homicide

reduction initiatives. Aggravated assaults

dropped 40 percent from 1,763 incidences

in 1993 to 1,056 incidences in 1997 and robberies dropped from 990 incidences in 1993

to 735 in 1994 and continue to decline.

There were 525 incidences in 1997, a drop

of 47 percent from 1993. The number of

homicides also dropped from a high of 62

in 1992 and 52 in 1993 to 26 in 1995, a drop

of 58 percent. This dramatic decrease in

violent crime cannot be directly attributed

to any single strategy; it is likely the cumulative result of Richmond’s comprehensive

approach to crime.
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 45

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—

Oakland, CA

Profile No. 5

Promising

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

A program of comprehensive gun violence

reduction strategies.

Program Goal:

To reduce crime and violence in order to

create a safer, healthier, and more economically viable community.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Residents and youth.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

26 communities in Alameda and Contra Costa

counties, along the East Bay Corridor.

Evaluated by:

Resource Development Associates,

Oakland, CA; COSMOS Corporation,

Bethesda, MD.

Contact Information:

Maria Theresa Viramontes

Executive Director

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership

1222 Preservation Parkway

Oakland, CA 94612

Phone: 510–832–7071

Years of Operation:

1993–present.

Serious violence among youth gangs in

Richmond, CA, during the summer of 1993

precipitated the formation of what was

initially a three-city collaborative involving

the mayors, administration, and police of

Richmond, Oakland, and Berkeley—the

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership (EBPSCP). These three cities were

experiencing high rates of homicides

(214 murders in 1993 and 200 in 1994).

Initial funding for this collaborative effort

came from the National Funding Collaborative on Violence Prevention, which

awarded planning grants to community

foundations to develop local collaboratives

for violence prevention.

During 1994, as crime and violence continued to escalate, the collaborative grew as

new cities were added within Alameda and

Contra Costa Counties. By the end of

1995, the collaborative included 16 jurisdictions. An independent nonprofit organization, the East Bay Community Foundation,

was selected as the facilitator and fiscal

agent. The governing board, the Corridor

Council, includes three city mayors, three

police chiefs, three school superintendents, three city managers, two elected

supervisors, two county administrators,

two county school superintendents, youth

members, and several members of the

community at large. A comprehensive

needs assessment was completed in 1996,

detailing patterns of crime, social conditions, and resources across the corridor’s

cities.

Youth Violence Prevention

Work Plan

A 12-point Youth Violence Prevention

Work Plan was finalized in October 1996,

although many of the strategies were initiated earlier. Strategy areas identified in the

work plan follow.
46 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 5 (continued)

Municipal gun ordinances

Participating jurisdictions have worked to

enact community-friendly gun ordinances

that ban the sale and manufacture of junk

guns, require triggerlocks at the point of

sale, limit the number of gun dealers (particularly those in home-based businesses),

require background checks on gun dealers,

and impose a gross receipts tax on retailers

that sell guns. To date, junk gun bans have

been passed by all 16 towns within the

EBPSCP, plus 5 neighboring jurisdictions

and the 2 counties. In all, 48 local gun ordinances have been adopted by partnership

members and other localities.

EBPSCP has provided considerable resources to localities trying to pass these gun

laws, including free legal assistance and representation. In addition to retaining a lawyer,

the partnership has access to pro bono legal

services to help any jurisdiction respond to

lawsuits against proposed gun legislation.

EBPSCP also provides sample legislation on

request and has hosted workshops on the

issue. Additional information on EBPSCP’s

efforts to pass local ordinances restricting

firearm sales can be found in profile 16.

Gun abatement

The gun abatement strategy aims to reduce

the illegal accessibility of guns through gun

suppression efforts in corridor cities. Activities include technical support for police departments to fully adopt community policing

practices, gun buyback programs, and a

domestic violence protocol for law enforcement (adopted by 23 law enforcement agencies in the corridor).

In addition, in 1996 the Richmond Police

Department implemented the Neighborhood

Gun Suppression Program. This program

was designed to encourage citizens to report

anonymously on illegal gun activity and provide information about illegal guns by calling

a Silent Witness Hotline. If the information

results in an arrest and seizure of weapons,

the citizen providing the information is eligible for a $100 reward. A total of $4,000 has

been paid as of September 1998. In one celebrated case, citizen information led to the

arrest of suspects lying on the roof of a

school with high-powered weapons. Brochures and public service announcements

help publicize the hotline number. Because

of the success of this program, a similar

hotline recently was established in Oakland

as part of the East Oakland Partnership to

Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence. EBPSCP is

working with this OJJDP-funded program

to reduce youth’s access to guns, address the

reasons why youth possess and carry guns,

and reduce the level of juvenile gun-related

violence in the community.

This is about building new connections across

cultures and institutions—exposing children

to the full range of learning opportunities. It’s

about saving lives, not just enriching them.

Extended Day is not rocket science. It’s simple

and logical. The first step is establishing

teacher exchanges and coordination of

curricula within the school, then in-school

performance and afterschool classes. From

there, you take art and focus it on all of life,

with involvement in events like holidays.

There’s a spiraling effect of meaning and fun.

Then you can connect with other agencies for

counseling, tutoring, mentoring, growth. The

purpose as it relates to stemming violence is

to expand the understanding of the quality

and content of the human potential, and to

mobilize the family, school, and communitybased organizations into a committed

partnership that encourages alternatives.

—Jordan Simons

East Bay Center for Performing Arts, Lead

Agency for Extended Day School Program,

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 47

Profile No. 5 (continued)

EBPSCP also is developing a computerized

information system that will centralize law

enforcement data from police departments

throughout the Corridor. Known as

CopNET, this system will provide timely

and accurate information about perpetrators, vehicles, and crimes to officers in the

field from multiple jurisdictions. This system

is expected to be online in 1999.

Truancy abatement

Through crime data analysis, Richmond

police learned that truant youth were responsible for much of the crime that occurred during school hours. Accordingly,

in 1997, the West Contra Costa County

Unified School District and the Richmond

Police Department developed a Truancy

Enforcement Program in which law enforcement officers pick up truants and take

them to a specialized school program that

identifies problems interfering with school

attendance and implements remedial actions

(see profile 57). Because of this program’s

success in reducing truancy, addressing

the needs of chronic truants, and reducing

crime during school hours, EBPSCP coordinated a truancy assessment in other school

districts and negotiated funding sources to

implement a comprehensive truancy reduction program across all school districts in

the Corridor.

Safe Passage Program

Richmond police also learned that children

and youth were frequently threatened or

victimized on their way to and from school.

In response, a Safe Passage Program was

implemented in 1996 in selected neighborhoods in Richmond. The program coordinated the efforts of police and community

residents to establish “safe havens,” houses

where children can go if they feel threatened; to train community residents and

community centers on how to help children

seek refuge from the streets; and to deploy

more police on foot, on bicycles, and in

squad cars around schools in the morning

and afterschool hours. This program is being

replicated in Oakland in coordination with

the East Oakland juvenile gun violence reduction partnership. As a member of the

partnership’s Steering Committee, EBPSCP

participates in the development and implementation of strategies that focus on suppression, intervention, and prevention of

firearm violence among high-risk juveniles

in East Oakland.

Conflict resolution

EBPSCP has supported two programs to

develop and implement model programs

for conflict resolution: the Youth Together

Program and the Communities and Schools

Copyright © 1998 Corbis Corporation.
48 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 5 (continued)

Program. Youth Together seeks to reduce

and prevent racially related violence among

students in five high schools by developing

multicultural teams to prevent cross-cultural

conflicts. Teams engage in several structured

activities together, including classroom

activities to educate peers about conflict

resolution, ethnic studies, and violence prevention; mentoring junior high students;

and field trips to places that demonstrate

the consequences of violence. The Communities and Schools Program provides a comprehensive case management and conflict

resolution training program for students

involved in conflict. The program is housed

at Richmond High School and involves

many interagency partners.

Domestic violence protocol

A domestic violence protocol has been developed based on research showing that the

cycle of domestic violence is perpetuated

when children see violence as an acceptable

means of resolving family conflicts. In addition, domestic violence creates high-risk

conditions for gun violence. Under California State law, police called to the scene of a

domestic altercation are authorized to seize

any firearm for up to 72 hours if they believe

that its presence in the household represents

a threat to safety; this protocol assists police

in making that determination. The guns are

stored at the police station and may be retrieved by the owner once the domestic situation has been stabilized. Police may also

destroy the gun under the auspices of a

State gun nuisance law. In addition, police

at the scene of a domestic dispute can use

digital mobile units to determine whether

a restraining order is on file and, if one is,

take the individual into custody for the

protection of both parties.

Aftercare education/employment/

mentorship for juveniles leaving

the justice system

EBPSCP also has coordinated the development of aftercare programs in Contra Costa

and Alameda Counties for youth who are

released from juvenile correctional centers.

These programs provide education, employment, and mentorship. An evaluation of the

Alameda County Camp Sweeny aftercare

program, for juvenile males 14–18 years of

age with less than 8 weeks left in their residential phase, demonstrated that compared

with a control group aftercare participants

retained their jobs for 3 months longer and

were less likely to be arrested and convicted

for felonies.

Transferability and

sustainability

EBPSCP seeks to strategically coordinate

the human and fiscal resources within the

Corridor to sustain those efforts that have

proven effective in curbing crime and drug

abuse, especially among families and youth.

To accomplish this goal, EBPSCP takes

on new initiatives using a problem-solving

approach; once these initiatives prove effective, it then engages in a process of transferability and sustainability. Strategies

and intervention actions undertaken by

EBPSCP are developed only after there has

been a thorough analysis of the crime, social

issues, and resources present in a targeted

jurisdiction. A work plan is then developed

and implemented by EBPSCP partners

through a memorandum of understanding

and service agreements. An interagency

technical staff team is created to implement

the work plan, and a lead agency is designated. Federal or State demonstration funds
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 49

Profile No. 5 (continued)

are often drawn down through grants to

pilot test the program work plan.

The Corridor Partnership’s gun violence

victories were not a pinnacle we have to

come down from; they were a starting point

for progress on other issues like truancy.

—Shirley Dean

Mayor of Berkeley, CA

Chair of East Bay Public Safety

Corridor Partnership

Once an initiative has been demonstrated

to be effective, the program model is shared

with other jurisdictions. Local or State longterm sources of funding are sought to sustain

the initiative as a permanent institutionalized

program. In many cases, existing resources

allocated to local or State agencies can be

redistributed or new laws enacted with accompanying funds for implementation. This

process was used with the Truancy Enforcement Program, which now receives funding

through local school districts in the East Bay

Corridor. Reducing truancy and unexcused

absences has led to increased enrollment,

which in turn has increased the enrollment

revenues available to the school districts—

funds that can now be used to help these

youth stay in school.

Critical to this process of research and development, followed by transfer to other

jurisdictions and building sustainability, is

the formulation of interagency agreements

and the sharing of resources among the

public and private agencies in the jurisdiction. A Joint Powers Agreement provides

legal authority for the partner agencies

to share common resources dedicated to

the purposes outlined in the agreement.

EBPSCP remains involved in providing

coordination, support, and technical assistance to the local partnership initiatives

while simultaneously maintaining regional

and cross-jurisdictional communication and

linkages.

Gun violence impacts

Gun violence has decreased dramatically

throughout the Corridor. From 1993 to

1997, homicides fell by 28.9 percent across

all jurisdictions in the Corridor. As shown in

the following table, Oakland experienced a

35.7-percent drop in homicide rates and

Richmond saw a 36.5-percent decline.

The dramatic reduction in the number of homicides cannot be attributed directly to any

one of the programs described above, but is

more likely due to the cumulative effect of a

comprehensive, multipronged approach involving intensified law enforcement efforts,

the development of many community-based

prevention and intervention activities, and

the coordinating efforts of EBPSCP.

Oakland Homicides 154 140 138 93 99

Richmond Homicides 52 52 26 34 33

Total Homicides Across 17 Jurisdictions 252 238 215 177 179

Table 2. Homicide Within the East Bay Public Safety Corridor

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
50 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 6

Promising

Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

A program of comprehensive gun violence

reduction strategies; Office of Weed and Seed.

Program Goal:

To reduce gun trafficking, gang-related violence, and gun crimes, and to improve the

quality of life and the socioeconomies of

targeted communities.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Drug traffickers, gangs, straw gun purchasers, violent criminals.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

West District with expansion to North District and East District in Indianapolis.

Evaluated by:

Hudson Institute, Indiana University; Abt

Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

Tyrone Chandler

2447 West 14th Street

Room 217

Indianapolis, IN 46222

Phone: 317–327–7901

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

Indianapolis, IN, has received Federal Weed

and Seed grants since 1995 to target three

neighborhoods in the West District of the

city: Haughville, a predominantly AfricanAmerican area that was plagued by drug

trafficking and associated violence and

Hawthorne and Stringtown, predominantly

white areas with high levels of property crime,

prostitution, and domestic violence. The

neighborhoods were selected because of high

crime rates but also because there was a community organization, the Westside Cooperative Organization (WESCO), that was able to

bring together these disparate groups.

WESCO is a nonprofit umbrella organization

for civic associations and other community

groups. It serves as a conduit for Federal,

State, and local funding for community-based

programming and coordinates much of the

social, political, and economic activity in the

western area of the city.

In 1998, Weed and Seed was expanded to

include an area contiguous to the WESCO

community and two neighborhoods in the

North and East Districts of the city. Officers assigned to the WESCO initiative are

serving as trainers in the new target areas.

Each site has a steering committee that

oversees committees on law enforcement,

social services, and economic development.

Requests for action can move from the

steering committee directly to the mayor,

chief of police, or a government agency. The

current goals of the Weed and Seed effort

are elimination of open-air drug trafficking

(drug-related firearm incidents drive

Indianapolis’ homicide rate), reduction of

alcohol-related incidents, reduction of nuisance properties through code enforcement,

elimination of street prostitution, reduction

of gang-related violence (particularly incidences involving firearms), and reduction of

crimes committed with guns.

Effective leadership, both in the community

and in the police department, has been

critical to the success of this law enforcement
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 51

Profile No. 6 (continued)

effort. Many of those involved feel that the

achievements of Weed and Seed in the West

District are due in large part to the skills of

the community leader who managed the

project. He was able to get the community’s

racially diverse groups to agree that what

they had in common—a desire for safe communities, better schools, economic development—was more important than what made

them different (e.g., race, politics, and religion). The community became a public ally

of the police department—if there was police misconduct or other problems, residents

agreed to resolve the issues privately rather

than airing their grievances on the front

page of the newspaper. In return, the police

became more open about sharing information and explaining the rationale for some of

their actions. Over time, mutual trust began

to develop between the two groups, which

allowed for effective community policing.

As residents began to provide more tips, the

number of arrests increased and crime decreased. As crime decreased, residents became

ever more willing to report criminal activity,

resulting in more arrests—a self-reinforcing

cycle of police-community cooperation.

Community policing

A change in leadership at the police department has also been key to the success of

Weed and Seed in the West District. A retired Indianapolis Police Department (IPD)

deputy chief, who had been working in the

private sector, was hired in 1997 as the new

chief of police. Empowered by a 3-year contract that would give him the freedom to

experiment, he set two priorities: a “return

to basics” that concentrated on quality-oflife issues, which were a major concern of

citizens, and the setting of high standards of

professionalism and productivity for police

officers. The new comprehensive strategy

targets violent criminal activity and less

pressing but nonetheless important issues

such as graffiti, loitering, abandoned vehicles and properties, and prostitution.

“Professionalization” of the force means that

officers treat citizens as customers and are

judged on how well citizens are served.

Only officers who exhibit model behaviors

(e.g., officers who receive few citizen complaints) and high productivity (e.g., officers

who make a large number of arrests) are

assigned to Weed and Seed activities and

are eligible for overtime. Furthermore, command officers are encouraged to apply

problem-solving and crime-analysis principles in developing new approaches for

combating crime. The police chief encourages innovation and strives to create an atmosphere where new approaches can be

tried and then modified or discarded, if necessary, without fear of negative repercussions.

Weed and Seed has become the impetus for

building relationships with residents, and it

allows for true community policing—with

residents telling police which crimes should

be the focus of law enforcement activities

and which techniques should be used (e.g.,

bike patrols and directed patrols). Improved

communication has even caused a change in

IPD investigative policy. In response to

citizen concerns about retaliation, the police

chief has directed officers to knock on “200

doors” after a shooting or other crime, to

make it more difficult for the perpetrators to

trace the information back to any single

individual. The new procedure makes it

possible for officers to build better cases and

to collect information on other issues from

residents, share information on police activities, and further build community support

and trust.

Community residents and law enforcement

officers believe that the early and sustained

investment in community relations has begun to pay off. In 1997, the clearance rate

for homicide cases was 79 percent, which is

10 percentage points higher than the national
52 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 6 (continued)

average, although the Indianapolis police

force is about one-half the size of departments in comparable cities. Perhaps the

strongest evidence of the change in policecommunity relations came in September

1998, when a drug dealer under surveillance

emerged from his residence firing an AK–47

at police officers and was wounded by return fire. Almost immediately, rumors

spread among those at the crime scene that

white police officers had shot a young black

man in the back five times. A local minister

who was a community leader arrived at the

scene, was recognized by the IPD officers

because they had been working together on

other issues, and was invited behind the

police crime-scene tape for an explanation

of what happened and a visual examination

of the bullet-riddled patrol car. He shared

these facts with the crowd, which then dispersed without incident. Building on this

positive experience, the chief plans to implement an IPD/WESCO chaplaincy program

proposed by the community that would

train a pool of ministers from each neighborhood to interact with police at crime

scenes. The ministers would be identifiable

by a special badge, would assist IPD in

communicating with local residents about

sensitive and high-visibility incidents, and

would encourage those with any information to come forward.

Law enforcement strategies

Most project resources during the early

years were devoted to “seeding” activities

that helped build the community’s capacity

and infrastructure. This included coordinating the social services provided in the target

neighborhood, putting together a strong

staff, and strengthening police-community

relations. Over time, the city began to put

more resources into “weeding” activities,

largely by cotargeting the Weed and Seed

areas with officers and resources from other

Federal programs. For example, the additional officers assigned to the area through

grants from COPS were freed from having

to respond to 911 calls and other “runs” from

central dispatch. The Weed and Seed area

also benefited from Federal Asset Sharing of

Forfeiture (FASF) funds.

Crime data analysis

Collection and analysis of data drive decisions about which policing tactics should be

used and which crimes and areas will be

targeted. IPD has several evaluation contracts with a research firm affiliated with

Indiana University. In March 1998, a researcher there completed a review of every

1997 homicide in the city of Indianapolis

and discovered that most murders were

committed by chronic offenders, most of

these offenders were in some way linked to

the city’s drug trade, and in three-fourths of

the cases victims and perpetrators knew

each other. The researcher also noted that

both victims and suspects had come in contact with the juvenile justice system at an

early age and had been abused as children.

Such information is important in helping

communities to determine the kinds of early

intervention and treatment services that are

needed by children and families during the

early stages of contact with the criminal

justice system.

The Indianapolis Violence Reduction partnership uses the Indianapolis Management

Accountability Program (IMAP) data as the

basis for a multiagency project that develops

strategies based on crime patterns tracked

by officer reports and displayed bimonthly

on Geographic Information System maps by

IPD district. The partnership includes representatives from police, prosecution, probation and parole, ATF, DEA, and other

agencies. Partnership members meet every 2

weeks to analyze crime data and to develop
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 53

Profile No. 6 (continued)

joint crime reduction strategies. Monthly

community meetings provide an opportunity

for community input.

In IPD’s Violence Impact Program for Enhanced Response (VIPER), police identify the

youth with the highest arrest rates and target

them for enhanced surveillance, probationary

supervision, and State or Federal prosecution.

In 1997, for example, three-quarters of the

homicide suspects had adult records as juveniles and averaged 3.7 arrests; almost 49 percent had prior felony convictions.

Crime data also helped IPD identify areas

with the highest level of narcotics trafficking,

which led to the creation of the Highway Interdiction Program. Signs that announce a fictitious “Narcotics Checkpoint” ahead are

strategically placed on an interstate highway.

Cars that attempt to avoid the checkpoint by

exiting at the next off-ramp are searched. Protocols provide for a routine of stopping five

consecutive vehicles, then passing the subsequent five. The procedure has withstood a

recent court challenge for discrimination. A

command van or undercover vehicle is positioned to observe drivers who attempt to dispose of contraband. Since the strategy was first

employed in August 1998, there have been six

operations resulting in 1,161 vehicles stopped

and 109 arrests (55 for narcotics violations).

Multijurisdictional task forces

In addition to the Indianapolis Violence

Reduction Partnership mentioned above,

several multijurisdictional task forces have

been created to address violent crime. The

Metro Gang Task Force (MGTF) began

quietly as a speakers bureau but has since

evolved into a unit of highly trained officers

who target gang-related drug trafficking.

The task force members (all crossdesignated as U.S. Marshals) include six

IPD investigators, an officer from the

Sheriff’s office, and two FBI agents. The

U.S. Department of Agriculture is a task

force member because of extensive use of

food stamps as currency in the drug trade,

and INS provides leverage in cases where

immigrants or nonnaturalized citizens are

involved in criminal activity. State law enforcement personnel, IPD homicide and

tactical units, and prosecutors also sit on the

task force.

IPD participates in ATF’s Project LEAD,

which analyzes information gathered by

the ATF National Tracking Center in order

to identify straw gun purchases. IPD also

works with the FBI’s Drugfire program,

through which all seized weapons are testfired and the ballistics data entered into a

computerized data base. In the last 3 years,

there have been 19 “hits” on the Drugfire

data base that have tied together 43 open

cases in the State of Indiana. Analysis of

gun-related arrests showed a need for collaboration between the police, prosecutors,

and courts to ensure that individuals

caught with weapons are not simply released, but receive appropriately swift and

certain consequences. As a result, in February 1998, a Firearms Unit was created

within the police department, with one

sergeant put in charge of all gun cases. The

unit also designated a specific State prosecutor who would have responsibility for

getting the case on the docket and ensuring

that it was not pleaded out.

Directed patrols

Indianapolis has used directed patrols, a

replication of the Kansas City Gun Experiment, in different neighborhoods with

mixed success. In some areas, there were no

attempts to educate the public about the

initiative, and consequently, there was little

community involvement or support. The

impact was further muted because directed
54 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 6 (continued)

patrols were not fully integrated into a comprehensive law enforcement strategy. In

1997, IPD tested different protocols within

the directed patrol strategy. In the East District, the police stopped vehicles for any

infraction, but then typically issued warnings rather than citations. In the North District, which was more faithful to the Kansas

City model, the police targeted suspicious

vehicles and operators.

Results in the two areas differed markedly.

In the East District, where 3,836 vehicles

were stopped, for every 100 stops there

were 60.7 warning tickets, 24.5 citations,

14.5 arrests, 1.1 felony arrests, and 0.34

seizures of illegal guns. In the North District, where there were many fewer stops

(1,417), for every 100 stops there were

higher rates for most police actions: 36

warning tickets, 49.2 citations, 30.6 arrests,

2.9 felony arrests, and 0.085 seizures of

illegal guns. Crime in the North District

also was significantly lower: homicides

dropped from 11 to 1, while the city was

experiencing a 53-percent increase. Aggravated assaults and armed robberies declined

by 40 percent in the North District, and

total gun crime reduction was 29 percent.

By comparison, violent and property crimes

increased in the East District, where directed patrols had been in use since late

1995 as part of a Safe Streets project.

Better performance in the North may have

been influenced by several factors. First,

police in the North District were more selective about which vehicles were stopped,

while officers in the East District cast a

much wider net that included many people

who were unlikely to be lawbreakers. Second, by issuing citations rather than warnings, the North District may have more

effectively communicated a zero tolerance

approach that ultimately influenced criminal

behavior and reduced crime. Finally, part of

the reason for the poor performance in the

East District may have been that the strategy had been in use there for 2 years, and a

“decay effect” (i.e., reduced effectiveness,

again because of adaptive criminal behavior) may have occurred. K–9 patrols and

probation sweeps for guns also were employed in the North District and may have

affected criminal behavior.

The police department concluded that these

directed patrols were an important factor in

reducing homicides from 11 to 1 in the target

areas, even though the homicide rate increased

citywide during the same period. Drawing on

lessons learned from the Kansas City Gun

Experiment and from the city’s North and

East Districts, directed patrols are now part of

an ongoing strategy in the West District Weed

and Seed area, where they are coordinated

with the Metro Gang Task Force.

Police/probation collaboration

Probation sweeps in conjunction with

Marion County Probation Adult Services

(Operation Probationer Accountability) are

considered a cost-effective method of identifying and seizing illegal guns and have led

to Federal triggerlock prosecutions of drug

dealers in the target area. The sweeps found

34 percent of 243 probationers visited were

in violation (two-thirds for reporting incorrect addresses), and 19 firearms were confiscated. The sweeps initially targeted the

North District but are now being used in

other areas. Police officers believe these

unannounced visits are effective because

parole and probation officers have sanctions

available to them and authority that is not

vested with IPD. For example, providing a

bogus address is a violation of probation

that can lead to reincarceration. In addition,

while probation officers may enter a

probationer’s home, a police officer needs a

search warrant. With multiple visits done on
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 55

Profile No. 6 (continued)

1 or 2 nights, the program is extremely costeffective. (Both police and probation officers are paid overtime through various

grants.) Probation officers also are more

willing to make visits into dangerous neighborhoods when they are accompanied by

police officers.

Home detention checks with the cooperation of juvenile probation officers are credited with significantly reducing the number

of daytime crimes (particularly burglaries),

and curfew enforcement has significantly

decreased evening crime rates. A recent

home detention project targeted 72 juveniles

who received 816 checks for compliance

over 3 months. This resulted in 101 affidavits filed on 26 juveniles, 17 of which were

subsequently found in violation by the juvenile court. Curfew violators are processed at

Weed and Seed “safe houses,” their parents

are called to pick them up, and social service

interventions are arranged as necessary.

IPD believes the sweeps would be even

more effective if local truancy laws were

revised, and if a better network of social

services existed for troubled juveniles. (At

present, students who are picked up and

returned to school may be expelled—which

sends them back onto the streets.)

Program outcomes

Since 1995, crimes in Weed and Seed neighborhoods have dropped significantly. For

example, total crime has fallen by 18 percent,

property crime by 35 percent, burglary by

32 percent, and larceny by 27 percent. IPD

case reports suggest that violence, weapons

offenses, and gang- and narcotics-related

activity decreased 8 percent, while arrests

in these categories increased 12 percent.

Citywide, total crime decreased 6 percent

from 1996 to 1997. Homicides in the West

District have decreased more than 50 percent, from 33 to 16, while homicides in the

rest of the city have increased by 19 percent,

from 85 to 117 through October 1998.

Although Weed and Seed clearly has played

an important role in crime reduction in Indianapolis, it is difficult to show a causal

relationship between crime reduction and

any single Federal or local program, because each strategy is made more effective

by the presence of the others. The reduction

in Indianapolis’ gun-related crimes is likely

the cumulative product of the city’s comprehensive multipronged program rather than

the direct result of any single strategy.
56 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 7

Promising

Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and

Safety)—Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

A program of comprehensive gun violence

reduction strategies.

Program Goal:

To decrease violent crime in the Twin Cities

metropolitan area through the active involvement of a committed group of business, government, and community leaders.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Gangs, homicide suspects, and victims.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN; statewide.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Inspector Sharon Lubinski

Minneapolis Police Department

29 South Fifth Street

Minneapolis, MN 55406

Phone: 612–673–2776

Patricia Hoven

Vice President for Social Responsibility

Honeywell, Inc.

Honeywell Plaza

P.O. Box 524

Minneapolis, MN 55440–0524

Phone: 612–951–0430

Years of Operation:

1997–present.

Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and

Law and Safety) is a unique public-private

partnership that has developed a comprehensive violence reduction strategy. The

program is characterized by corporate

commitments and public agency collaborations to reduce violent crime. The catalyst

for HEALS was Honeywell, Inc., which

has a long history of active involvement in

philanthropic activities. Honeywell reacted

to a New York Times article that dubbed

Minneapolis “Murderapolis,” reflecting a

sharp rise in homicides—a jump from approximately 60 per year in 1994 to 97 in

1995 and 86 in 1996. With its world headquarters in one of the most crime-ridden

neighborhoods in Minneapolis, Honeywell

was concerned for the safety of its employees and property and for the quality of life

in the surrounding neighborhood. Honeywell decided that in order to remain in the

inner city, it had to do something about

violent crime.

Honeywell’s chief executive officer enlisted

fellow CEO’s from other socially responsible private corporations—Allina Health

Systems, 3M, General Mills, and the staff

of the Minnesota Business Partnership—to

meet with the Governor to share their concerns about the escalating local and statewide crime rates. After the Governor

pledged his support, Honeywell arranged a

series of planning meetings. The business

community, including a core group of local

corporations and the Minnesota Business
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 57

Profile No. 7 (continued)

Partnership, contributed financial support,

influence, and human resources to implement the program. Honeywell then sought

an independent consultant to bring all the

needed partners to the planning table. The

executive director of the Police Executive

Research Forum (PERF) in Washington,

D.C., was selected to provide knowledge

about criminal justice innovations and to

facilitate collaboration among the Federal,

State, and local criminal justice agencies.

Having an outside consultant proved to be

very helpful, as he was familiar with successful crime reduction strategies and had

no vested interest in the project or the community. Therefore, the consultant could

make unbiased assessments and hold local

stakeholders accountable. Furthermore, he

was known and supported by both the Republican Commissioner of the Minnesota

Department of Public Safety and the

Democrat-appointed Minneapolis Chief of

Police.

Minnesota HEALS is a collaboration of

government, community, law enforcement,

and business, all of whom are working toward

the goal of reducing crime and violence.

Through a two-track system of law

enforcement strategies and community 

long-term initiatives, Minnesota HEALS has

achieved long-term results.

—Pat Hoven

Vice President for Social Responsibility

Honeywell, Inc.

In an initial brainstorming meeting held in

December 1996, the Minneapolis Chief of

Police, the State’s Commissioner of Public

Safety, the PERF consultant, and representatives from Honeywell and General

Mills hammered out a list of initial objectives focusing both on law enforcement and

on community prevention efforts.

Organizational structure of

Minnesota HEALS

Minnesota HEALS members first met as a

group in early 1997. Soon after, two task

forces were created. The Law Enforcement

Task Force consisted of the key criminal

justice agencies in the city and State. Its

purpose was to analyze and develop a strategic response to the recent rash of homicides and shootings, and the current gang

activities. The Community Task Force,

chaired by the director of a local business

association, also was to develop long-range,

local crime prevention activities funded

wholly or in part by corporations.

In addition to these two groups, Forum and

Support committees were created. The Forum Committee is open to all members and

shares information through presentations

and discussions. This committee also makes

recommendations to the other committees.

The Support Committee approves final

actions and makes decisions on matters

such as fundraising and key objectives. It

consists of 19 members, including key corporate, community, and criminal justice

agency representatives. The Forum and

Support Committee meetings are held

monthly, usually at Honeywell, while the

Law Enforcement and Community Task

Forces meet as often as necessary. The Vice

President for Social Responsibility at

Honeywell serves as the primary resource

to coordinate discussion topics and share

information among members. A newsletter

for members has recently been published to

facilitate communication.

Today, Minnesota HEALS has 61 member

organizations. Corporate members include

Honeywell, General Mills, 3M, Allina

Health Systems, and Medtronic. Local government agencies include the chiefs of police

and mayors’ offices of Minneapolis and St.
58 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 7 (continued)

Paul; the Minneapolis City Council; the

sheriff’s offices, attorney’s offices, and

commissioners from Hennepin and Ramsey

Counties; Metro Transit Police; Minneapolis

Department of Health and Family Support;

and the public schools. State-level participants include the Minnesota Department of

Public Safety, the Minnesota Department of

Corrections, the University of Minnesota,

and the Attorney General’s Office. The Law

Enforcement Task Force currently consists

of 25–30 law enforcement representatives

from the Minneapolis and St. Paul police

departments’ gang, homicide, and narcotics

units; the sheriff’s office; the probation department; and Federal agencies such as the

FBI, DEA, ATF, and the U.S. Attorney’s

Office. The Community Task Force consists

of nonprofit members that represent various

neighborhood coalitions and service providers and private business partnerships.

The law enforcement

strategy

The Law Enforcement Task Force commissioned researchers from Harvard’s KSG to

conduct a study of homicide patterns in

Minneapolis. The homicide study analyzed

data from January 1994 through May 1997

and revealed an important link between

gangs and violent crime. Nearly 45 percent

of all homicides appeared to be gang related.

African-American youth tended to be disproportionately represented as both homicide suspects and victims. More than 40

percent of gang members who were homicide victims or suspects had been on probation and 76.8 percent had arrest histories

prior to the homicide incidents, with an

average of 9.5 arrests. Significantly, the

similarity between perpetrator and victim

profiles influenced subsequent police strategies; it was learned that suspects and

arrestees had 7.4 prior arrests and victims

had 7.5 prior arrests. Firearms were used in

two-thirds of homicides. The task force used

these data to focus their 1997 strategies on

gangs and guns. The gang unit of the Minneapolis Police Department then used its

data base to identify gangs and to target

specific youth. It first charted and linked all

homicide suspects, victims, and witnesses

for 1994 and 1995 and found that certain

individuals showed up repeatedly. Looking

further, the unit surmised that certain

shootings and murders were probably retaliatory. Based on this analysis, it decided to

concentrate on 50 multiple offenders within

the gangs. The gang unit was doubled in

size with emphasis on including more racially and ethnically diverse officers.

Rapid response team

One important strategic intervention initiated in summer 1997 was to respond

quickly and decisively to those shootings

that had the potential of provoking gang

retaliations. This response was based on

Boston’s Operation Ceasefire model, which

was adopted by the Law Enforcement Task

Force (see profile 21). Immediately after a

shooting, a rapid response team consisting

of police, probation officers, Federal and

local prosecutors, and Federal law enforcement personnel met and located not only

suspects, but also the victims’ associates.

The message sent to all involved was that

any hint of retaliation would evoke an aggressive response from law enforcement.

Probation officers also checked to see if

these associates were under the authority

of the Department of Probation and could

be targeted for special attention to discourage violent acts. In one instance in June

1997, a retaliation occurred after a victim’s

associates were warned against this by the

response team. As a result, the associates’

car was searched and four guns and two

Molotov cocktails were found. These

individuals were referred for Federal
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 59

Profile No. 7 (continued)

prosecution. This incident was covered

extensively by the media, thereby reinforcing the warning to gang members of the

consequences of their retaliatory actions.

The coordinated action of the response

team and the subsequent swift action of

prosecutors was a major turning point in

stemming the violence in Minneapolis in

summer 1997.

Until recently, Federal prosecutions were rare

for non-Federal crimes, but the U.S. Attorney

promised the police that under certain circumstances those crimes would be prosecuted

under Federal statutes. A similar commitment was made by the county attorney’s

office, which established a gang prosecution

unit with vertical prosecutions. A number of

tough, new State laws also helped. In August 1996, a new law went into effect that

mandated a minimum 18-month disposition

of incarceration for juveniles who commit

delinquent offenses that, if committed by an

adult, would be considered felonies; prior to

this date, these juveniles could be sentenced

for only 15 to 25 days.

Minneapolis Anti-Violence

Initiative (MAVI)

MAVI, which is modeled after Boston’s Operation Night Light program (see profile

33), pairs Minneapolis police officers (including all officers in the gang unit) and

Hennepin County sheriff’s deputies with

probation officers from the Hennepin

County Department of Community Corrections.

Police officers and deputies cotrain with

probation officers for 2 days. These police

and probation officer teams make regular,

unannounced visits to the homes of probationers during the evening hours to monitor

their adherence to the terms of their probation. From June 1997 through September

1998, MAVI teams visited 331 juveniles and

398 adults in Minneapolis, including the 50

violent gang members who were previously

identified and warned not to cause trouble.

The commander of the gang unit believes

MAVI has had a deterrent effect because

probationers do not like being personally

known by probation and police officers.

Another benefit of the program was to bring

together two agencies that had not previously worked together. Further, MAVI participants worked with the courts to place more

stringent conditions on pretrial release, such as

curfews, restrictions on visiting certain geographic areas, and associating with undesirable persons (see profile 31).

A number of strategies relating specifically

to guns also were initiated or expanded.

Beginning in August 1996, ATF agents were

partnered with members of the Minneapolis

police department gang unit and homicide

unit to immediately investigate every gun

homicide. ATF traced every firearm recovered by police within 1 day after it was confiscated. If a suspicious trace resulted, an

ATF special agent accompanied police on an

investigation. As a result of these joint investigations, police were able to develop

cases for illegal firearm use and trafficking

for prosecution.

Saturation patrols

Patrol and gang unit police officers, together with ATF agents, also conducted

saturation patrols 2 nights per week in

small, targeted areas. These areas were

identified by the police crime analysis unit

focusing on locations with the highest number of shots fired and shooting calls. The

goal was to remove as many firearms from

the streets as possible through aggressive

inspection and consent searches. The program also targeted residential gun dealers.

Drivers involved in traffic violations were

asked if they would consent to a search of

their vehicles. If permission was granted,
60 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 7 (continued)

these vehicles were searched for guns. Police

also teamed with ATF agents in investigating

residential firearm dealers and gun shops as

part of their criminal investigations.

The presence of ATF agents riding along

with police, and being seen on the streets,

seemed to have had an impact on gang

members. Police and ATF agents noticed

that gang members stopped carrying their

weapons in their waistbands. Instead they

had acquaintances carry them or had them

hidden somewhere nearby. Police and ATF

believe that creating this distance between

gang members and their guns probably cut

down on spontaneous shootings, such as

those that had occurred in summer 1996.

State gang task force

In response to the ever-increasing mobility

of gangs, and the infiltration of gangs into

suburban and rural communities, a statewide gang task force was created. This task

force, which has 40 members from local,

county, and State police agencies, has enabled law enforcement to collaborate across

jurisdictions and respond more efficiently to

statewide gang activities. Members are

deputized and have power statewide, and

they conduct long-term investigations using

a gang data base.

As a means of gaining public support for

their law enforcement strategies, key Minnesota HEALS partners—notably the Law

Enforcement Task Force consultant from

PERF, the U.S. Attorney, the Minneapolis

Chief of Police and coordinator, and the

probation supervisor—spoke to community

groups in the targeted neighborhoods about

the new tactics to reduce violent crimes and

the rationale behind them. HEALS representatives were sometimes met with small

but vocal criticism at these meetings. However, recent community surveys show that

residents have accepted HEALS tactics and

are pleased to have safer neighborhoods.

Outcomes and new directions

for law enforcement strategies

Since the Minnesota HEALS initiatives

began, homicides declined 30 percent in

Minneapolis (from 83 in 1996 to 58 in 1997)

and the number of murders dropped from

40 in summer 1996 to 8 in summer 1997—

the lowest number of summer homicides in

12 years. Gang-related homicides dropped

from 52 percent of all homicides to 23 percent

from May 1997 to March 1998. Part 1

crimes also have fallen; in the first 8 months

of 1998 versus 1997, Part 1 crimes declined

14 percent. This reduction in homicides and

other Part 1 crimes cannot be directly attributed to any one of these enforcement strategies

but more likely is the result of a cumulative

impact of a comprehensive approach.

With such success, many of the 1997 strategies implemented by Minnesota HEALS

have been institutionalized, such as the interagency collaborations, MAVI, saturation

patrols, rapid response teams to prevent

retaliation, total gun tracing, and Federal

gun prosecutions. Minnesota HEALS also

has led to many new and useful criminal

justice collaborations—among police, ATF,

probation, and Federal partners; between

the Minneapolis and St. Paul police departments; and between prosecutors and police.

As an evolution of the HEALS program,

CODEFOR has been initiated by the Minneapolis Police Department, fashioned after

the New York City Police Department’s

COMPSTAT program (see profile 19).

CODEFOR has provided the police with

rapidly available crime pattern information

and the ability to deploy personnel accordingly. This has led to greater commander
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 61

Profile No. 7 (continued)

accountability for police operations linked

to crime outcomes. In addition, a second

study, Violent Crime in the Twin Cities: An

Analysis of Violent Crime and Illegal Drugs in

Minneapolis and St. Paul, conducted by

PERF, concluded that narcotics and its relationship with violent crime should be Minnesota HEALS’ next focus. Another of

Minnesota HEALS’ goals for 1999 is to

improve and make more compatible the

area’s criminal justice information systems.

The community prevention

and intervention strategies

Many of the corporations involved in Minnesota HEALS have long helped communities through their philanthropic foundations

and employee volunteers. For instance, part

of Honeywell’s mission is “to strengthen

communities where we operate and trade so

that our neighbors, our employees, our

shareholders and our company can grow,

prosper and experience an enhanced quality

of life.” Honeywell provided not only financial resources, but also hands-on assistance

and expertise to nearby Minneapolis communities with high crime, poverty, and social problems.

In addition to Honeywell, General Mills,

and Allina Foundation, other companies

consulted and partnered with existing community organizations on a regular basis by

attending community meetings, by working

hand-in-hand with community members on

revitalization and community development

programs, and by inviting community

organizations to HEALS meetings. These

corporations believe that working with

communities is as important as giving them

financial support.

Below are some brief examples of the many

forms of community prevention and intervention programs and initiatives credited to

the members of Minnesota HEALS.

Trust can get things done that money can

never get done. Trust is absolutely essential

for effective work in inner-city communities.

While the philanthropic dollars help do small

projects and help to catalyze change,

sustaining good results happens as people

are willing to trust us and are willing to

become involved in solving the problems. The

more they can trust the people they work

with, the more they are willing to share their

ideas and persist in solving the problems.

—Reatha C. King

President and Executive Director

General Mills Foundation

◆ Honeywell Corporation is developing two

square blocks (52 residential units) from

substandard rental housing to mixedincome, owner-occupied, single-family

homes. Some of the demolished housing

had previously been the scenes of prostitution and drug dealing and use.

◆ With underwriting from corporations, the

city’s Park Board extended summer hours

for neighborhood park programs.

◆ The Health Care Coalition on Violence,

led by the Allina Foundation, is asking

healthcare organizations throughout the

State to voluntarily maintain “E-Codes,” or

data on external causes of injury. These

data will be useful in identifying patterns of

injuries (including intentional injuries such

as homicides or firearm injuries purposely

inflicted). An ultimate goal is to share these

data with law enforcement agencies and to

develop prevention programs.

◆ The Minneapolis Public Schools partnered

with Honeywell and others to sponsor the

New Vistas School for pregnant and

parenting teens and their children. The
62 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 7 (continued)

school, housed in Honeywell’s corporate

headquarters, provides academic instruction leading to a high school diploma,

employment training, parenting classes,

early childhood care, and onsite health

and social services. Honeywell provides

volunteer mentors and opportunities for

internships and summer jobs.

◆ General Mills Corporation, in partnership

with two minority-owned food-processing

companies, helped launch a North Minneapolis frozen soul-food company.

Siyeza, meaning “We’re coming,” opened

its doors in January and will provide an

estimated 175 local jobs.

◆ The president of the General Mills Foundation formed the “Hawthorne Huddle,”

a monthly gathering of residents, neighborhood leaders, business people, church

members, and public agencies in the lowincome, high-crime Hawthorne neighborhood of North Minneapolis. Participants

discuss community problems and devise

solutions, such as planning for the area’s

first elementary school, creating a neighborhood safe house for children, undertaking neighborhood cleanups and crime

reduction initiatives, and closing down

crack houses.

◆ Minnesota HEALS is starting a program

whereby a select group of law enforcement personnel will go to classrooms to

talk to children about guns. In the pilot

stage, the supervising ATF agent and a

police inspector will visit two middle

schools and one high school.

◆ Abbott Northwestern Hospital has developed a paid employment training program,

Train to Work, funded by Allina Foundation, Honeywell, and others. The program

gives welfare recipients 120 hours of entrylevel and life skills training and 18 months

of mentoring to obtain jobs at Abbott or

Children’s Hospital, with average starting

wages of $8.75 per hour plus full benefits.

In its first 8 months of operation, Train to

Work placed 50 of 59 graduates, 33 of

whom retained their jobs at the end of the

8-month period. Similarly, 3M Corporation created a jobs program in which lowincome participants are matched with

“coaches” to help them make the transition

to the workforce.
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 63

Profile No. 8

Promising

Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun

Violence—Baton Rouge, LA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

A program of comprehensive gun violence

reduction strategies; Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

Program Goal:

To reduce gun violence among youth and

increase community safety.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Youth ages 12 to 24.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Two ZIP code areas in Baton Rouge, LA.

Evaluated by:

COSMOS Corporation, Bethesda, MD.

Contact Information:

Yvonne L. Day

Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention

 of Juvenile Gun Violence/

 Anti-Drug Task Force

222 St. Louis Street, Ninth Floor, Room 936

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

Phone: 504–389–7871

Years of Operation:

1997–present.

In recent years, Baton Rouge experienced

dramatic increases in the number of youth

involved in violent crimes. Between 1992

and 1996, the number of juveniles (under 16

years of age) arrested annually in East Baton

Rouge Parish increased 61 percent, from

2,931 to 4,716. In 1996, one-fourth of the

1,179 juveniles arrested were multiple offenders. Sixteen percent of these juveniles

had committed a total of 940 violent crimes,

including 14 homicides, 51 armed robberies,

and 132 aggravated assaults; and 122 juveniles committed 192 weapons violations. Of

the 71 homicides in Baton Rouge in 1996,

13 were committed by youth under the age

of 21, and 18 involved a young victim. More

than two-thirds of the city’s homicides occurred in two ZIP code areas.

In response, law enforcement, city officials,

community agencies, and grassroots volunteers joined together, with funding from the

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention (OJJDP), to form the Baton

Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of

Juvenile Gun Violence. The partnership

targeted multiple-offender youth up to age

21 from two high-crime ZIP code areas.

Because the effects of juvenile violence are

felt by the entire community, the partnership felt that solutions to the problem must

involve a communitywide effort by a collaboration of agency and community stakeholders. No single organization or agency

could address all the risk factors associated

with juvenile violence. The partnership thus

designed a comprehensive strategy with

four specific goals:

◆ Implement a multiagency law enforcement (suppression) strategy to reduce

gun-related and other violent crimes by

juveniles and older youth (ages 17–20).

◆ Implement an intensive intervention program to reduce the risk factors for the

highest risk youth, their families, and the

community.
64 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 8 (continued)

◆ Mobilize the community at the grassroots

level to address the problems of hard-toreach families and the highest risk youth.

◆ Implement a long-range prevention program that identifies, links, and strengthens existing resources to serve youth who

may be at risk.

The organizational structure of the Baton

Rouge partnership emerged from the

project strategies that were developed during several program development workshops involving law enforcement, the

courts, the juvenile justice system, community service providers, and the faith community. The structure of the partnership is

simple and informal, consisting of two

standing committees with specified

decisionmaking responsibilities: the Executive Committee (program policy or planning) and the Judicial Advisory Committee

(legal advice and planning). The program

also has several task forces—Enforcement,

Intervention, and Prevention—which are

responsible for operational decisions in carrying out the comprehensive plan. A fourth

community mobilization task force, ACT

NOW, is a new grassroots organization

chaired by a pastor who represents the

African-American Baptist churches in the

target areas. The Baton Rouge Chief of Police chairs the partnership.

The gun violence

suppression strategies

The partnership seeks to reduce juvenile

gun-related and other violent crimes through a

three-pronged suppression strategy: (1) identify and monitor, through intensive probation and law enforcement surveillance, the

small group of serious, violent, and chronic

young offenders who have committed multiple felony offenses; (2) reduce access to

illegal guns and the incidence of juveniles

carrying illegal guns by identifying and closing gun distribution sources; and (3) expedite the judicial response to those offenders

involved in gun-related offenses, including

expedited prosecution in Federal court

when possible. The partnership has implemented the following suppression activities.

Operation Eiger

The Eiger strategy is a high-intensity probation and parole effort that targets an identified group of chronic young violent offenders

identified as Eigers. (Eiger is a reference to a

mountain of the same name, which is one of

the most difficult mountains in the world to

climb.) Three-member police/probation pilot

teams make regular and intensive contacts

with the Eigers and their parents. Additionally, Operation Eiger teams contact an identified group of non-Eiger youth who are at risk

of becoming serious, habitual offenders. The

strategy facilitates an immediate response to

delinquent behavior when it occurs. As of

September 1998, 311 Eigers have been identified, 198 juveniles and 113 young adults. A

total of 9,570 home visits were made by Operation Eiger teams during their first year

with the monthly average number of contacts

per Eiger ranging from 3.3 in the first month

of implementation to more than 6 during the

last 3 months of the reporting period. The

percentage of Eiger contacts in which no

violations were reported increased from 56

percent in September 1997 to 71 percent in

September 1998.

Although Operation Eiger does not aggregate data by type of violation, it is estimated

that 80 percent of violations were for curfew

violation, disobeying parents, failure to notify a parent of whereabouts, and truancy.

The remaining 20 percent were for more

serious infractions such as failing a drug

screening, associating with prohibited persons, and committing a new offense.
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 65

Profile No. 8 (continued)

Through the first quarter of 1998, 14 Eigers

(9.5 percent) have been incarcerated on

new adult offenses—a figure considerably

less than the expected recidivism for this

group of repeat violent offenders.

Gun Tracing Initiative

Every gun acquired at the scene of a crime

or otherwise seized is submitted to ATF,

which—in partnership with the Baton

Rouge Police Department (BRPD)—ascertains where the gun came from and who

purchased it. BRPD completes the tracing

forms and submits them to ATF. During the

first year of the partnership, from July 1,

1997, to June 30, 1998, 1,291 guns were

seized. All of the gun seizures were mapped

by street location, showing that 620 (54.5

percent) came from within the target areas.

Guns were linked to 790 known offenders in

Baton Rouge. The gun seizure data also

revealed the following information:

◆ Seventy-one of these offenders were convicted felons.

◆ Thirty-eight (53.5 percent of the convicted felons) resided within the

partnership’s target areas.

◆ Seventeen (43.6 percent of those from the

target areas) were referred to the U.S.

Attorney for prosecution, and four were

convicted.

◆ Sixty-one juvenile offenders were identified through the gun seizures; 42 (68.9

percent) resided within the target areas.

◆ Fifty-four (6.8 percent of known offenders) were from outside Baton Rouge.

◆ Seventy-six percent of the offenders had

their guns recovered within the ZIP code

areas where they reside, and the remaining had guns recovered outside their

neighborhood.

Gun Permits Application Initiative

Partnership staff and the Sheriff’s Office

review all applications for gun permits, providing information to Federal, State, and

local agencies on persons known to have

felony records or known to be associating

with felons. Between January 1 and September 1, 1998, the partnership collected

data on the 329 denied applications for gun

permits and found that 34.2 percent of these

denied applications were for residents in the

target areas. These data were correlated

with ATF offender indices to provide additional profiles on violent offenders.

Like many American cities, Baton Rouge has

seen an increase in violent crimes among

juveniles in recent years. Though law

enforcement has had some success in dealing

with the problem, we know that the police

alone cannot address all the underlying

issues and causes. To do that, we need to

involve a broad coalition of intervention and

prevention services, grassroots groups,

residents, and the youth themselves. These

interests came together with local, State, and

Federal law enforcement in 1997 as equal

partners in shaping a plan of action. The

result was a multifaceted approach that

already is showing some positive results in

addressing juvenile gun violence in our city.

Though our Partnership continues to grow in

strength and number, our goals and our

comprehensive approach to achieving them

remain the same. Our comprehensive

approach—and our ability to stay focused on

it—is one reason, I think, for our success.

—Greg Phares

Chief of Police and Partnership Chair

Baton Rouge, LA

School Drug Task Force

This special unit of the Police Department

implements the school system’s newly

enacted zero tolerance policy in 99 public
66 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 8 (continued)

schools with a 1997–98 enrollment of nearly

56,000 students. During that school year,

the task force arrested 202 students for

weapons, drugs, or violent offenses on

school grounds and conducted 16 schoolbased, antidrug, antiviolence prevention

programs. About 30 percent of the 202 students arrested were girls. The increasing

number of female delinquents (24.7 percent

of all juveniles arrested by city police in

1997) is the focus of several planned intervention and prevention strategies.

Operation Takedown

Operation Takedown’s primary focus is on

street-level narcotic sales in the target areas,

thereby reducing the incidence of drugrelated gun violence. Forty-three Baton

Rouge police officers were assigned to the

program starting August 15, 1997. Eight of

these officers also were assigned to Operation Eiger to work with adult and juvenile

probation officers in the target area. During

the 13-month period from April 1, 1997,

through April 30, 1998, 1,158 arrests were

made under Operation Takedown; 796 (68.7

percent) were from the partnership’s target

areas. During this period, 117 guns were

confiscated, with 61.5 percent of them from

the target areas. In addition, $26,329 in cash

was seized during the period along with

drugs with a street value of $120,411.

Judicial advisory committee

The partnership has formed a judicial advisory

committee, including the District Attorney

and three judges, to collaborate with the law

enforcement, intervention, and prevention

task forces, and to advise on issues relating to

firearm and drug offenses. The committee also

advises on issues related to jail space, increased workload, and justice system reform.

The committee has prepared draft reformed

juvenile court procedures and a position paper

on a court-based mentoring program called

Reclaiming Our Youth. The committee also

has prepared a grant application to establish a

juvenile drug court in Baton Rouge. More

important, the juvenile judges have instituted a

practice of writing probation orders using

suspended jail sentences so that any violation

of the terms of probation can result in a rearrest

and immediate incarceration. While this zero

tolerance policy is creating an overcrowding

problem in the 55-bed juvenile detention facility and in the adult jail, talks are under way to

contract with the private sector for additional

detention and jail facilities. A committee established by the metro council is developing plans

for more specialized group homes.

Intervention and

prevention strategies

The partnership’s gun violence intervention

strategies seek to address risk factors that

contribute to the violent behaviors of the

identified Eigers through a three-pronged

approach: (1) provide intensive intervention

services for the Eigers to address their alienation and rebelliousness, propensity for violence, association with peers who engage in

high-risk behaviors, academic failure, unemployment, and lack of social and interpersonal skills; (2) strengthen the Eiger families

to instill moral values and support their children by intervening in family conflicts and

dysfunctional relationships and alcohol and

drug abuse; and (3) build resiliency in the

community by intervening to address risk

factors that include attitudes and conditions

favorable to drug use, gun violence, community

disorganization, low neighborhood attachment, and economic deprivation. The following specific strategies have been implemented.

Case management and

intervention services

Case management services were initially designed to facilitate the reintegration of Eigers
Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 67

Profile No. 8 (continued)

into the community. However, during the first

year only a small number of Eigers were targeted for prerelease strategies because so few

of them were incarcerated in local facilities.

(Most were incarcerated elsewhere in the

State.) A decision was made to shift the focus

from prerelease/aftercare to intervention services for the entire Eiger population. The partnership thus sought to identify specific risk

factors for all of the 205 Eigers. A case management specialist developed individual service plans (ISP’s) that address factors

identified in the risk and needs assessments.

Individual needs assessments were completed

for 138 juvenile Eigers and 106 young adult

Eigers ages 17 to 21. Seventy-two ISP’s have

been completed to date. In addition, interviews and periodic meetings were held with

51 Eigers and their parents. Intervention services in the first year included substance abuse

evaluations and treatment, a chemical awareness clinic, an anger management clinic, a

crime prevention clinic, psychological evaluations and counseling, family counseling,

preemployment job skills training, and job

training and placement. These programs

included the following:

◆ Mentoring program. Seeks to provide atrisk youth with positive messages on how

they can turn their lives around. Mentors

are largely drawn from the faith community and the 100 Black Men organization.

Twenty Eigers have been paired with

neighborhood-based spiritual mentors.

◆ Job training/placement program. Identifies existing employment training and job

skills programs suitable for the Eigers and

formalizes a strategy for involving neighborhood businesses to provide jobs.

◆ Family education program. Enables family members to deal more effectively with

the Eigers and other central family issues.

The initiative also identifies specific needs

and gaps in family services. There is a

minimum of one contact per week by

probation officers with 58 Eiger parents.

◆ I–CARE: School-based services. As

part of the prevention initiative, the partnership identified younger siblings of

Eiger youth to be referred to school-based

services and other relevant service programs. By the end of the first year, 87

siblings had been identified and referred

to the I–CARE program for coordination

of access to school-based services.

◆ Juvenile diversion program. A 40-week

program, run by the Boy Scouts of

America, one of the partnership’s member agencies, provides an alternative to

incarceration for first-time offenders to

facilitate positive character development

and prevent recidivism. Two groups of

about 20 youth participated in the first

cycle of the program, which began in

January 1998.

◆ Youth Services Resource Directory. A

comprehensive directory has been created listing programs, organizations, and

services throughout the city for targeted

youth, their siblings, and other at-risk

youth. This compilation includes 1,578

businesses, 183 churches, 67 schools,

family service agencies in 69 categories,

health services groups in 74 categories,

and more than 400 other programs and

services.

The community mobilization

strategy

The partnership seeks to mobilize the community at the grassroots level as part of an

overall strategy to address the problems of

hard-to-reach families and highest risk

youth by (1) involving youth and families in

identifying and helping resolve gun violence
68 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 8 (continued)

issues in their neighborhoods and encouraging accountability at the street level; (2)

identifying organizations and resources that

individuals and families in the target area

can turn to for help in dealing with their

respective risk factors; (3) addressing residents’ negative attitudes about what they

perceive as law enforcement’s lack of interest and involvement in solving neighborhood crime; and (4) implementing a public

information strategy that will garner community support and publicize positive outcomes of grassroots initiatives. Activities

include community forums, community surveys, community help/hotspot identification

phone line, media coverage on program

activities, and school presentations.

The partnership members have increased

their visibility in the target communities and

have collaborated with local civic groups to

sponsor community forums and respond to

community-defined problems. The Baton

Rouge Chief of Police has attended many

community forums, and several police officers maintain a presence in the targeted communities. In addition, community members

have been encouraged to identify hotspots

and individuals engaged in criminal activities as part of the suppression efforts.

ACT NOW

The partnership has established a relationship with ACT NOW, whose principal leaders also are members in the partnership.

Fifty-four grassroots leaders and more than

400 residents from the community and faith

groups have joined together to form ACT

NOW, following the January 1998 Rev. Dr.

Martin Luther King Day parade shootings

at which an 8-year-old girl died and several

others were injured. This is a significant

organizational outcome for the partnership.

Several members of the partnership are

chairs of or active participants in the ACT

NOW committees. Although ACT NOW

is broader and reaches out to more neighborhoods and families than the partnership’s target areas, they have agreed to focus

their primary attention on the Eiger youth,

their families, and siblings.

Anti-gun violence public

information campaign

As part of an overall public awareness

program, the partnership has established

strong relationships with local newspaper

and radio stations and has cooperated to

provide information for a number of articles and announcements about violencerelated issues.

Outcomes

The number of homicides in Baton Rouge

dropped 17 percent from 1996 to 1997,

from 71 murders in 1996 to 59 in 1997. Of

these, 10 (17 percent) involved a suspect

under the age of 21, and 14 (24 percent)

involved a victim under the age of 21. The

number of aggravated assaults dropped 43

percent (to 1,135 incidents), with 995 involving firearms. One hundred sixty-nine

youth (under 21) were involved in these

firearm-related aggravated assaults, down

30 percent from the previous year. Preliminary data for 1998 suggest significant reduction in firearm-related crimes. There

were 34 homicides and 399 firearminvolved aggravated assaults through September 1998. Only 50 youth (under 21)

were involved in these firearm-related

assaults. These reductions in homicides,

aggravated assaults, and other firearmrelated crimes cannot be directly attributed to any one of these programs, but are

more likely related to the cumulative impact of a comprehensive, multipronged

approach.
Strategies To Interrupt

Sources of Illegal Guns

Section IV
Section IV. Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns

Overview ........................................................................................................................................................ 71

Gun Tracing ................................................................................................................................................... 71

Inspection and Investigation of Federal Firearms Licensees .................................................................. 72

Profile No.

9. Baltimore County Police Gun Squad—Baltimore, MD ................................................................. 74

10. Boston Gun Project—Boston, MA .................................................................................................. 75

11. Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement (CAGE) Program—Chicago, IL ............................................... 77

12. Oakland Firearms Licensee Compliance Program—Oakland, CA ............................................... 79

13. Violent Crime Task Force—Charlotte, NC ..................................................................................... 81

14. West Virginia Firearms Violations Task Force—Charleston, WV ................................................ 83
Section IV: Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns 71

Overview

Through analysis of their gun violence problems,

communities have found that limiting the sources of

both illegal and legal guns enables them to reduce

the number of illegal guns in their neighborhoods,

thereby reducing criminal access to weapons and the

related assaults, injuries, and deaths. Important to

their efforts is comprehensive tracing of the guns

through the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)

National Tracing Center (NTC). Crime gun tracing

and trace analysis can link crime gun sellers, purchasers, and possessors across jurisdictions, including

identifying suspects who may be serving as “straw

purchasers” for those who are linked to gun trafficking and firearm violence. Purchasers and dealers of

large numbers of crime guns over extended periods

of time can be tracked through gun crime data bases.

Gun Tracing

ATF established NTC to trace firearms used in

crimes and recovered at crime scenes.1

 Crime gun

tracing is the “systematic tracking of firearms from

manufacturer to purchaser for the purpose of aiding

law enforcement officials in identifying suspects

involved in criminal violations, establishing stolen

status, and proving ownership.”2

 The volume and

efficiency of NTC trace operations have significantly

increased since 1993, when it responded to 55,000

requests for traces with a response time of 13 days.

During 1996, NTC responded to 133,000 trace

requests in an average response time of 9 days. In

1997, NTC traced 194,000 crime guns.3

To initiate a trace on a gun used in a crime, the requesting agency, typically a local police department,

furnishes firearm, possession, and incident description information to NTC. Firearms without at least

a partial serial number cannot be traced, although

ATF and many police laboratories have the capacity

to restore obliterated serial numbers. NTC communicates the trace request to the gun manufacturer, who

is required to provide the name of the wholesale/retail

distributor and the date of transfer. The chain of

wholesale/retail transactions is then followed to the

extent possible from point of sale to the first retail

purchaser. Further investigative tracing of crime guns

is at the discretion of NTC and dependent on the

significance of the individual investigation and the

availability of special agent resources.

Two functions of gun tracing

Firearm tracing serves two primary functions.

First, tracing enables law enforcement officials

to reconstruct the history of a firearm associated

with a crime. This traditional, incident-driven trace

may lead to the apprehension of suspects, the identification of potential witnesses, and the discovery

of other persons who may be associated with the

crime under investigation. The trace may also

reveal evidence for other cases and disclose

crimes that previously had been undetected.

The second emerging function of firearm tracing

is the identification of patterns of illegal gun trafficking. Gun tracing can facilitate development of

predictive indicators for trafficking schemes at an

early stage in their life cycles. For example, patterns of partially or completely obliterated serial

numbers of firearms, multiple sales of firearms to

purchasers and subsequent short time to crime,

patterns of thefts from Federal firearm licensees

(FFL’s), and multiple traces to the same FFL’s or

purchaser are highly significant predictors of gunrelated crime. By examining patterns in aggregates

of traces, gun tracing can help identify opportunities for intervention on the supply side of illegal

firearm markets. Such intervention can then

reduce further trafficking and associated violent

crime. Already, ATF’s Project LEAD, an automated data system that tracks illegal firearms, is

identifying recurring patterns of illegal firearm

A 1998 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(1)

requires Federal firearms licensees to make

triggerlocks or lockboxes available for sale on

their premises. Failure to comply can result in

revocation of the dealer’s license (see 144 Cong.

Rec. H11044–03; 1998 WL732765).
72 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

suppliers both in the United States and across

international borders and providing evidence for

prosecution.

Integrated Ballistics

Indentification System

The Integrated Ballistics Identification System

(IBIS) has also been implemented by NTC. IBIS

is the first computer identification system that correlates and matches projectile and shell casing ballistic

evidence in a national data base. Now local law enforcement can fire recovered weapons and enter

digitized information from the bullet that will provide

“fingerprint” evidence for all other bullets fired from

it. When a suspect is linked to a gun, IBIS can

quickly determine if bullets fired from that gun can

be linked to other crimes. With every recovered gun,

projectile, or shell casing, the data base—and the

potential for individual criminal prosecution—grows.

The programs described in this section incorporate

crime gun tracing as a valuable crime-fighting tool,

whether as the primary violence suppression activity

or as part of a broader strategy. In some of these efforts, ATF agents take the lead in increasing local

crime gun-tracing initiatives; in others, they provide

technology and resources as part of a team that is

spearheaded by State, county, or local enforcement

agencies.

Inspection and Investigation

of Federal Firearms Licensees

Because only a few high-risk licensed firearms dealers and pawnbrokers are associated with multiple

crime guns, law enforcement has an opportunity to

allocate its resources most efficiently and fairly by

focusing on the few suspects who may be involved

with the systematic illegal transfer of guns to felons

and minors.

A major obstacle to these “firm and fair” enforcement strategies lies in obtaining and analyzing the

information needed to distinguish the lawbreakers

from law-abiding dealers who happen to turn up

frequently in purchase histories of crime guns. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies have

found that, by sharing information with one another,

they can more effectively distinguish the unlucky

from the unlawful, and target unlawful activity at

the point of retail sale.

One information-sharing strategy, reflected in profile 10, occurs when local agencies ask ATF to trace

the purchase history of every crime gun they recover

and then use Project LEAD output to target problem areas. Project LEAD is a national gun-tracing

initiative to identify straw purchasers. Sometimes,

however, the missing puzzle piece lies in a State or

local data base, not in ATF trace results. Therefore,

potentially high-risk dealers who show up frequently in ATF crime gun trace records but are absent from their States’ and localities’ records of sales

tax receipts or business licenses may warrant a preliminary check by local law enforcement authorities.

Active dealers’ addresses that lie in residentially

zoned neighborhoods may signal an illegal business.

Federal licensees who turn up in the trace of a crime

handgun but are missing from a State data base of

licensed handgun dealers may signal promising

leads.

Joint Federal and local task forces may find other

strategies helpful in locating people who channel

guns to criminals or use them in crimes. In more

BRASSCATCHER, one element of the IBIS system, stores images of cartridge cases. and more localities, local police are using geographic
Section IV: Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns 73

information systems to locate drug markets, places

where “shots fired” 911 calls cluster, and other

hotspots for gun crime. Under appropriate safeguards, the task forces can then use a variety of interdiction tactics in identified areas to confiscate illegally

carried guns, make arrests, or deter future violence

by direct contact with gang leaders, drug dealers, and

other participants in violent social networks.

To date, the successes of these information-sharing

strategies have largely been measured in terms of

licenses confiscated from FFL’s involved with criminal activity, prosecutions referred, or convictions

obtained—they have not been evaluated by gun

crimes prevented. Measuring prevention effects

presents a difficult challenge in evaluation, but a

necessary one because of the risk that the dealers,

straw purchasers, and guns removed are simply

replaced by others. Recognizing this limitation, the

following profiles describe some promising, current

programs.

Notes

1. J.W. Magaw, “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on

Crime and Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary,” U.S. House of Representatives, April 25, 1994.

2. L. Bentsen, The National Tracing Center, Washington,

DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1994.

3. R.W. Kelly, Gun Dealer Licensing and Illegal Gun Trafficking—A Progress Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of the Treasury, Office of the Undersecretary for

Enforcement, January 1997.
74 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 9

Promising

Baltimore County Police Gun Squad—Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to monitor Federal firearms

licensees.

Program Goal:

To reduce the number of illegal guns in

homes and on the streets.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Illegal FFL’s.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Baltimore County, MD.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Sergeant Mark Cowley

Baltimore County Police Department

700 East Joppa Road

Towson, MD 21286

Phone: 410–887–6287

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

The chief of the Baltimore County Police

Department established the department’s Gun

Squad as a pilot project in 1995 to respond to

an increase in the number of crimes involving

firearms. Members of the Gun Squad completed 6 months of training with ATF to learn

firearm investigation techniques.

The Gun Squad began by focusing on residential FFL’s because home burglaries were a

major source of illegal guns. The 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill included a provision that if a

person holding an FFL was in violation of

any local laws, the Federal license would not

be renewed. Gun Squad officers, therefore,

reviewed local laws and discovered a county

ordinance prohibiting the operation of a business from the home. The Gun Squad asked

county zoning officials to prepare a list of all

FFL’s operating in areas that were not zoned

for business use; letters were sent to these

individuals informing them that they were in

violation of a county law and that their FFL’s

would not be renewed. Because of the group’s

work, the number of FFL’s has been reduced

from 404 in 1995 to about 75 dealers and 50

collectors in 1998.

The Gun Squad also has developed rapid response procedures to investigate suspected

straw purchasers, many of whom have been

identified from information given to police by

gun dealers. The Gun Squad has spent years

building a strong rapport with dealers. When

a tip is received, the officers are able to conduct a background check and execute a search

warrant within hours, making it more likely

that the suspect will still have the weapons in

his or her possession at the time of arrest.

Finally, when uniformed officers respond to

a domestic violence call, they contact the

Gun Squad if one of the parties has been

threatened with a gun (even if the weapon

is not visible at the time). The Gun Squad

will run a profile on the suspect to determine

whether there are legal reasons why the

person may not own a gun (a prior felony

conviction, for example) and, if there are,

will come to the premises and seize the gun.

In 1996, the Gun Squad seized more than

300 weapons—25 percent of all weapons

seized by county law enforcement; 260

weapons were seized in 1997.
Section IV: Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns 75

Profile No. 10

Demonstrated

Boston Gun Project—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Project to target violent crime and criminals;

ATF; U.S. Attorney’s Office.

Program Goal:

To investigate firearm trafficking and armed

career criminals.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Illegal gun traffickers and violent perpetrators who use guns.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University, Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

Phil Tortorella, Group Supervisor

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Boston Field Office

O’Neil Federal Building

10 Causeway Street, Room 701

Boston, MA 02222

Phone: 617–565–7054

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

Gun trafficking interdiction is one component of a broad strategy implemented by law

enforcement officials to stop gun violence in

Boston, described more fully in profile 2.

Major partners in the city’s efforts are ATF,

the Boston Police Department (BPD), the

Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office,

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. These partners have worked together to direct the investigations of firearm trafficking and armed

career criminals. The Boston ATF supervisor finds that the key to the program’s success has been the close working relationship

and genuine cooperation between ATF and

local police.

This cooperation has taken many forms.

Within both BPD and ATF, organizational

resources were made available exclusively to

investigate firearm-trafficking cases. A seasoned violent crime coordinator was assigned by ATF to pursue Federal firearm

arrests. ATF also assigned six agents to collaborate with the ballistics and crime laboratories at BPD to trace recovered handguns

and match them to other crimes. The police

and ATF followed a protocol that guided

this process. ATF attempted to trace every

gun recovered by BPD through ATF’s National Tracing Center to discover sources of

illegal weapons and gun-trafficking patterns.

For their part, the Youth Violence Strike

Force officers extracted gun market information from offenders charged with serious,

nongun charges. BPD and ATF also conducted joint inspections of all federally licensed firearm dealers in Boston, checking

to ensure that they were in compliance with

Federal, State, and local laws and regulations. As a result of these inspections, 65

license holders (80 percent) decided not to

renew their licences or to surrender them,

leaving only 17 licensed dealers in Boston.

ATF also developed a local tracing data set,

consisting of police information and trace

data, that was helpful in the development

of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire strategies

(see profile 21) and Boston’s strategy to

prevent youth violence (see profile 2).
76 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Based on the ATF tracing data set, members in the working group established priorities for disrupting the illegal gun market,

realizing that they would never totally

eliminate it. First, the working group prioritized investigating every trace that

showed a gun with a time-to-crime of less

than 30 months. Investigative priority also

was given to certain types of guns popular

with youth (e.g., semiautomatic handguns),

those with restored obliterated serial numbers, those found in high-risk neighborhoods, and those associated with gang

members or territories. Investigations of

illegal traffickers focused on guns involved

in multiple crimes and for which specific

FFL’s or first purchasers could be identified. Another tactic was to link the trace

data set with gang membership data to

identify gun possessors who also were

gang members.

The working group also prioritized, through

the U.S. Attorney’s Office, swift Federal

prosecution for gun trafficking. Federal prosecution is believed to deter gun usage by

gangs because it carries longer sentences

than those for most State gun crimes, and

because gang members fear being in a Federal correctional facility away from home and

family and without the security of knowing

other prisoners. The joint efforts of ATF,

BPD, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office also

resulted in the investigation and prosecution

of several interstate gun-trafficking rings in

Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Mississippi.

Based on the success of the Boston Gun

Project, ATF launched the Youth Crime

Gun Interdiction Initiative in 17 demonstration cities in 1996. (See section VIII for

more details.)

Profile No. 10 (continued)
Section IV: Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns 77

Profile No. 11

Promising

Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement (CAGE) Program—

Chicago, IL

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to target violent criminals.

Program Goal:

To investigate the illegal purchase and transfer of firearms.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Illegal handgun purchasers.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Chicago, IL.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Sergeant Ken Barnas

Chicago Police Department

3340 West Fillmore Street

Chicago, IL 60624

Phone: 312–746–5884

Years of Operation:

Mid-1990’s–present.

The Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement (CAGE)

team was established in the mid-1990’s in

response to an increase in the number of gunrelated crimes. The Chicago Police Department believed that a more proactive approach

was needed: Instead of focusing exclusively

on the crime itself, gun violence could be

reduced by investigating individuals who

purchased guns that were used in crimes and

arresting and prosecuting the straw purchasers who were the sources of many of these

illegal weapons. At the start of the program,

only two officers were assigned to the CAGE

team; by 1998, when police data suggested

that additional resources could cause significant reductions in illegal gun purchases, the

team was increased to eight Chicago police

gang specialists and two special agents from

ATF who are detailed to the unit.

Any firearm recovered at the scene of the

crime is investigated by this special unit.

First, investigators obtain the serial number

of the gun and forward it to the ATF’s National Tracing Center, which will reveal information about the manufacturer, the FFL

that sold the firearm, the purchaser, and the

purchaser’s State-mandated Firearms

Owner Identification (FOID) card, if any.

The CAGE team then contacts the Illinois

Copyright © 1998 Weststock.
78 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

State Police and requests information on

how many times that person has been “queried”—that is, how many times a gun dealer

has informed the State police that a FOID

holder has tried to purchase firearms or

ammunition. Not only does State law require that the FFL report each transaction,

but the FFL is not even allowed to show

weapons or ammunition to anyone who

does not have a FOID card. (FFL’s are also

required to notify ATF when someone is

buying more than two guns in 1 week.) The

law also requires that the purchaser retain

records on the gun for 10 years. In the event

that the weapon is sold to someone else, the

original purchaser must ensure that the new

purchaser has a FOID card and meets the

same State and Federal requirements for

firearm purchases.

Using information obtained from the State

police, the CAGE team initiates an investigation, beginning with the weapon that was

recovered from the crime scene. The unit

also works with its two ATF agents to obtain

information on all the guns that have ever

been purchased by a particular individual,

based on information from ATF. When sufficient evidence is obtained, an arrest is made;

if the case warrants Federal prosecution, the

CAGE team works with the U.S. Attorney’s

Office to have the case prosecuted in Federal court (where penalties are more severe)

rather than in State court.

Profile No. 11 (continued)

One of the strengths of the CAGE team is

its ability to complete a weapons trace

quickly—in about 24 hours, compared with

the 2 weeks that are normally required.

There has been no independent evaluation

of the program, although the unit has collected evidence suggesting that the CAGE

team has been successful in identifying

straw purchasers and preventing guns from

being transferred to the illegal market. During the period January 1–October 8, 1998,

for example, the CAGE team made a total of

61 arrests, both felony (e.g., gun running

and unlawful sales) and misdemeanor (e.g.,

failure to maintain records).

During the period January 1–September

30, 1998, CAGE team requests for ATF

tracing documented 874 firearms. Of that

number, 154 weapons were recovered from

crime scenes by the Chicago Police Department or other local law enforcement agencies, and 131 were recovered by the CAGE

team during its investigations of suspected

straw purchasers or gun runners. The remaining weapons were reported missing,

stolen, or otherwise unaccounted for. The

CAGE team launched 123 investigations

during that same period, resulting in the 61

arrests noted above. So far, 27 case dispositions have resulted in 23 convictions with

jail time or probation; approximately 30

cases are still pending.
Section IV: Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns 79

Profile No. 12

Promising

Oakland Firearms Licensee Compliance Program—

Oakland, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to monitor Federal firearms

licensees; Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Program Goal:

To reduce violent crime by decreasing the

availability of illegal firearms.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Federal firearm licensees.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Oakland, CA.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection; Police Executive

Research Forum, Washington, DC.

Contact Information:

Sergeant Gary Tollifson

Oakland Police Department

455 Seventh Street

Oakland, CA 94607

Phone: 510–238–3728

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

The use of firearms in violent crime in

Oakland, CA, increased steadily during the

period from the late 1980’s through the

early 1990’s. City officials were concerned

about the increase in the proportion of aggravated assaults involving firearms (from

40 percent in 1992 to 44 percent in 1993)

and in homicides (from 60 percent to 80

percent during the same period). The city

also had a large number of Federal firearms

licensees, many of whom were selling out

of their cars and homes.

To respond to these concerns, the Oakland

Police Department (OPD) joined with

ATF to create the Firearms Licensee Compliance Program. This program aims to

enhance the ability of OPD to conduct

more complete and comprehensive background investigations on applicants for

new or renewed Federal firearms licenses

and to ensure that gun dealers comply with

Federal, State, and local laws. Oakland also

initiated a Firearms Trafficking Program

to reduce the number of illegally purchased

firearms and illicit dealers. Both initiatives

were implemented in the department’s

Weapons Unit with funding from the

Bureau of Justice Assistance.

The goals of the initiatives are to reduce

violent crime by reducing the availability of

firearms, reducing the number of illegally

purchased firearms, eliminating firearms

businesses that operate in residential neighborhoods, and reducing the number of firearm dealers. These goals are achieved by

conducting comprehensive background investigations of applicants for FFL’s and by

ensuring that all licensees have OPD permits. The Weapons Unit also maintains a

data base to identify multiple gun sales and

determines if certain individuals are operating as independent dealers or completing

questionable sales (straw purchases). The

Weapons Unit also traces all guns confiscated by a police officer. Patrol officers

bring between 20 and 25 gun cases a month

to the unit’s attention. The investigators in

the unit conduct all work on each firearm

violation case—from initial interview of the

arrestee to preparation of the case for the
80 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 12 (continued)

district attorney. Investigators also work

with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to prepare

cases for Federal prosecution under Operation Triggerlock, an ATF initiative.

Oakland’s firearm licensee compliance initiatives, together with the new municipal

ordinances governing firearm sales (see

profile 16), reduced the number of FFL’s

from 57 to 6 during the 2-year period from

1994 to 1996. The unit completed more than

3,000 firearm traces and investigated 28

straw purchasers—leading to prosecution of

suspects in 5 of these straw purchase cases.

Because of its recognized success, this initiative is continuing with ATF staff support

and OPD officers.
Section IV: Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns 81

Profile No. 13

Promising

Violent Crime Task Force—Charlotte, NC

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Task force to target violent crime and

criminals.

Program Goal:

To investigate crimes involving guns, violent

career criminals, and violent organizations

or gangs.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Violent career criminals, including both

adults and juveniles.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Charlotte, NC.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Jack Davis

North Carolina State Bureau of

Investigation

P.O. Box 1042

Huntersville, NC 28078

Phone: 704–522–1491

Years of Operation:

1990–present.

The Violent Crime Task Force in Charlotte,

NC, comprises 25 Federal, State, and local

agents. The task force’s goal is to investigate crimes involving violent organizations

or gangs, guns, and violent career criminals. The member agencies of the task force

include ATF, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Police Department (CMPD), the North

Carolina State Bureau of Investigation

(SBI), the U.S. Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the

U.S. Attorney’s Office.

A set of standard operating procedures details the roles and responsibilities of the task

force members and establishes the screening

criteria by which the task force reviews

cases and decides whether to assume lead

investigative responsibility, thereby making

use of its limited assets. Two criteria are

applied for gun cases: first, the target organization must be using or stockpiling guns

or weapons of mass destruction (i.e., explosives); and second, there must be a pattern

of violent crimes, including shootings. These

cases may be referred by any law enforcement agency within the task force’s corresponding Federal judicial district.

CMPD, ATF, and SBI contribute supervisory personnel to coordinate activities and

assignment of cases. The special agents in

charge of ATF and SBI and the Deputy

Chief for CMPD retain overall command of

the task force and serve as an advisory

board with other participating agencies.

Because we have limited resources, we have

learned to be strategic about how to use

them. By creating the Violent Crime Task

Force, we have been able to combine the

resources from 25 local, State, and Federal

agents to investigate crimes involving violent

organizations, gangs, and violent career

criminals. The task force has developed two

criteria for deciding which crimes will be

targeted: first, we target organizations that

are using or stockpiling guns or weapons of

mass destruction (like explosives); second,

we target individuals and groups that show a

pattern of violent crimes.

—Jack Davis

North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation
82 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 13 (continued)

From early 1990 through July 1996, the

task force initiated 220 firearm-related investigations, targeting 1,290 individuals,

which resulted in 650 Federal indictments

and 170 State indictments. As a result of the

task force’s efforts, 29 life sentences were

issued; 385 weapons were seized (195 semiautomatic pistols, 80 revolvers, 49 shotguns,

44 rifles, 10 machine guns, and 7 fire

bombs); 23 vehicles and 9 properties were

seized; large quantities of crack cocaine,

cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine were confiscated; and $712 in

U.S. currency was recovered. Additionally,

the task force has identified 122 gangrelated organizations.
Section IV: Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns 83

Profile No. 14

Promising

West Virginia Firearms Violations Task Force—

Charleston, WV

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Task force to monitor Federal firearms licensees; Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Program Goal:

To reduce the number of illegal weapons and

gun violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Illegal gun traffickers.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

West Virginia.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection; Police Executive

Research Forum, Washington, DC.

Contact Information:

Trooper Barrington Gore

West Virginia State Police

900 One Valley Square

Charleston, WV 25301

Phone: 304–558–2600

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

In South Charleston, WV, the West Virginia

State Police formed the Firearms Violations

Task Force (FVTF) in response to a significant rise in violent crime and illegal firearm

trafficking in West Virginia. FVTF is made

up of personnel from ATF and full-time investigators from the West Virginia State

Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation.

The mission of the task force is to reduce

firearm trafficking and firearm-related violent crime. FVTF collects, analyzes, and

disseminates criminal intelligence information relating to firearm violations in West

Virginia and other jurisdictions and investigates individuals who traffic illegally in firearms and who commit violent crimes with

firearms. In addition, the task force conducts comprehensive background investigations on applicants for new or renewal FFL’s

to ensure dealer compliance with Federal,

State, and local laws. The investigations help

screen out applicants with a prior criminal

record, ethical breaches, or history of mental

illness. Onsite inspections are conducted to

ensure that the building where the dealer

operates meets security requirements. The

task force also educates applicants and licensees regarding the illegal sale or purchase

of firearms.

From April 1994 through December 1996,

FVTF made 55 arrests for firearm-related

offenses and obtained the convictions of 34

individuals, 23 of whom were incarcerated

for their crimes. Prior to the creation of the

task force, these offenders likely would not

have been prosecuted because of staffing

shortages, ignorance of Federal statutes, and

other factors.
Strategies To Deter Illegal

Gun Possession and Carrying

Section V
Section V. Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying

Deterring Illegal Gun Possession ............................................................................................................... 87

Profile No.

15. Consent to Search and Seize Firearms—St. Louis, MO ................................................................ 88

16. Municipal Firearms Ordinances, East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—

Oakland, CA ..................................................................................................................................... 91

17. Weapon Watch—Memphis, TN ...................................................................................................... 93

Deterring Gun Carrying in High Crime Hotspot Areas ......................................................................... 95

Profile No.

18. Baltimore Police Violent Crimes Division and Youth Violence Strike Force—

Baltimore, MD .................................................................................................................................. 98

19. Getting Guns Off the Streets, New York City Police Department—New York, NY ................ 100

20. Kansas City Gun Experiment—Kansas City, MO ....................................................................... 103

21. Operation Ceasefire—Boston, MA ................................................................................................ 104

22. Operation Safe Streets Gang Prevention Initiative—Phoenix, AZ ............................................. 106

23. Targeted Enforcement Program, Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—

Indianapolis, IN .............................................................................................................................. 108

24. Youth, Firearms, and Violence—Atlanta, GA ............................................................................... 110

25. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Birmingham, AL ................................................................ 113

26. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Bridgeport, CT ................................................................... 115

27. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Inglewood, CA ................................................................... 117

28. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Milwaukee, WI .................................................................. 119

29. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Salinas, CA ......................................................................... 121

30. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Seattle, WA ........................................................................ 123

Surveillance of Probationers ..................................................................................................................... 125

Profile No.

31. Minnesota Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI), Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis, MN ............. 127

32. Operation Eiger, Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile

Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA .................................................................................................. 129

33. Operation Night Light—Boston, MA ........................................................................................... 131

School-Based Enforcement Programs ..................................................................................................... 133

Profile No.

34. Bibb County, GA, Department of Education, Violence and Weapons

Prevention and Intervention Program—Macon, GA ................................................................... 135

35. Suffolk County Community-Based Juvenile Justice Program—Boston MA ............................ 137
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 87

Deterring Illegal Gun

Possession

Data from recent criminal justice research tell a

straightforward but daunting story: Across the

country, more and more youth are acquiring and

carrying guns illegally. They are doing so to protect

themselves, to engage in gang- and drug-related

criminal activity, and to gain respect. Research also

shows that gaining access to a gun—from home,

family members, or friends, or by theft or street

purchase—is easy.

The programs profiled in this chapter seek to reduce

firearm possession and carrying by juveniles and

others who are not legally entitled to own or carry

guns. These programs focus largely on making it

harder for youth to gain access to guns, including

reducing the number of guns in a community.

To accomplish this goal, some communities have

limited the number of Federal firearms licensees

(FFL’s) that are allowed to sell firearms. Zoning

and other municipal ordinances that restrict permissible gun sale locations (e.g., in residential and

school zones) and impose conditions on gun sales

are effective strategies used by many jurisdictions

to reduce the degree to which communities are

saturated with guns.

Another approach to restricting juveniles’ access to

guns has been the development of “silent witness” or

“weapons hotline” initiatives. In many cities, people

are encouraged, through the promise of anonymity

and a cash reward, to call a special toll-free telephone number to report persons in possession of

guns. A related approach is the “Consent to Search

and Seize” initiative of the St. Louis Police Department, which has enabled police to remove guns from

the homes of many youth in that city.

Other strategies profiled in this section make effective use of scarce law enforcement and community

resources by focusing on crime “hotspots” where

disproportionate amounts of crime and violence

are occurring. Still others monitor probationers

and parolees (groups likely to be involved in gun

crimes) through unannounced home visits and

searches. Finally, this section includes a description

of several programs that combine prevention education, searches, and sanctions to keep guns out of

schools.

Intentionally not included in this section, but worthy

of discussion, are the gun buyback programs that

were implemented in many communities in the early

1990’s. Evaluations of these programs suggested that

they did not meaningfully reduce juvenile access to

guns since many of the guns turned in were either

old or defective and individuals sometimes used

their buyback payments to buy better guns.1

 Nevertheless, when implemented in concert with a public

media campaign about safe gun storage, gun buyback programs may serve to mobilize the community

and alert parents to the dangers of their children’s

access to guns.

Note

1. R. Rosenfeld, “Gun buy-back: Crime control or

community mobilization,” in Under Fire: Gun BuyBacks, Exchanges and Amnesty Programs, edited by

A. Platkin, Washington, DC: Police Executive

Research Forum, 1996.
88 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 15

Demonstrated

Consent to Search and Seize Firearms—St. Louis, MO

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter illegal gun possession.

Program Goal:

To reduce juvenile possession and carrying

of guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juveniles engaged in gun violence.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

St. Louis, MO.

Evaluated by:

Department of Criminology

University of Missouri

St. Louis, MO 63103

Phone: 314–516–5031

Contact Information:

Sergeant Robert Heimberger

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

1200 Clark Boulevard

St. Louis, MO 63103

Phone: 314–444–5681

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

Through the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, St.

Louis experienced a greater increase in homicides and other violent crimes than most

other U.S. cities of comparable demographics. Homicides increased dramatically (68

percent) from 1988 to 1989, rising from 130

murders to 219. The percentage of homicide

suspects who were juveniles also increased

from 4.9 percent in the early 1980’s to 15.1

percent in the early 1990’s. A profile of victims and suspects revealed that the vast

majority of both offenders and victims were

young black males and, in nearly all cases,

homicides involved the use of a handgun.

Firearm Suppression

Program (FSP)

The St. Louis Police Department implemented FSP in 1994 in an effort to reduce

the level of gun violence in the community.

The overall goal of this initiative was to develop a community-based, problem-solving

approach that would encourage greater

community input and assistance in addressing gun violence and that would involve

community residents in a process of identifying and confiscating illegal guns. The specific strategy was to remove firearms from

juveniles by obtaining parents’ consent to

search for and seize firearms from their

children and others living with them.

FSP was initiated by the St. Louis Mobile

Reserve Unit, a police squad that responds

to pockets of crime and violence throughout

the city. The search of a home by the FSP

can be initiated by citizen requests for police

service, reports from other police units, or

by information gained from other investigations. Once the unit receives a report, two

officers visit the residence in question, speak

with an adult resident, and request permission to search the home for illegal weapons.

An innovative feature of this program is the

use of a “Consent to Search and Seize” form

to secure legal access to the residence. Officers inform the adult resident (typically a

mother) that the purpose of the program is

to confiscate illegal firearms, particularly

those belonging to juveniles, without seeking
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 89

criminal prosecution. Residents are informed that they will not be charged with

the illegal possession of a firearm if they sign

the consent form. By agreeing not to file

criminal charges, the police can focus their

attention on getting guns out of the hands of

juveniles and send a clear message that juvenile firearm possession is not tolerated by

police or the community.

The program has been criticized as depriving citizens of the right to protect themselves

against crime. Furthermore, some senior

police officers have stated that they prefer to

use legal search warrants as they allow them

both to arrest juvenile suspects and other

persons engaged in criminal activity and to

seize the guns.

Despite this criticism, however, evaluation

of the program indicated a favorable response by families of juveniles who had guns

confiscated and by the broader community.

According to anecdotal reports, one parent

even wanted to presign consent forms so

that the officers could return any time. Another parent wanted to give officers a key to

her house so that they could come in while

she was at work.

According to the officers of the Mobile Reserve Unit, the program’s success depended

on their scrupulous adherence to the promise not to arrest the consenting adult. Several officers reported that they were willing

to ignore evidence of all but the most serious

crimes in return for access to homes of juveniles with firearms. This reflected the officers’ view that the community was better

served by removing guns from juvenile

hands than by using evidence discovered in

the search as a basis for making an arrest.

Over the 3-year demonstration period from

1994 to 1997, a total of more than 1,300 guns

Profile No. 15 (continued)

were seized. FSP officers reported that they

conducted approximately 260 searches per

year, finding guns in about half the houses.

An outcome evaluation of the program is

being considered.

Cease Fire program

In 1997, FSP was incorporated into a broader

law enforcement initiative called Cease Fire

(modeled after Operation Ceasefire in Boston—see profile 21), which is a coordinated

effort across several law enforcement agencies to reduce youth violence. This program

is being spearheaded by the U.S. Attorney’s

Offices in the Eastern District of Missouri

and the Southern District of Illinois, but includes partners from the FBI; DEA; ATF; St.

Louis Metropolitan Police Department; St.

Louis City Sheriff’s Department; St. Louis

County Police Department; Missouri Highway Patrol; St. Louis County Prosecutor’s

Office; Illinois State Police; U.S. Marshals’

Office; Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office;

Regional Anti-Violence Initiative; OJJDP

SafeFutures program; St. Louis Family

Court; Missouri Probation and Parole; St.

Louis Public Schools; University of Missouri,

St. Louis; and St. Louis City Neighborhood

Stabilization Team.

Cease Fire’s three-part strategy includes a

crackdown on illicit gun trafficking through

ATF’s gun-tracing program; a swift response

to acts of gang violence through intensive

surveillance, youth outreach streetworkers,

and social service interventions (a Ten-Point

Coalition of religious leaders is taking a key

role in gang intervention efforts—see profile

46); and Operation Night Light which sends

police and probation teams out together on

nightly visits to the homes of youth on probation to ensure compliance with the terms

of their probation.
90 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Gang Outreach

One Cease Fire component, the Gang Outreach program, was launched in 1998 by

the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department and targets youth from neighborhoods that have either a high level of gang

violence or few social service resources.

When a gang-involved youth is shot, police

contact a team of counseling professionals

from Central Baptist Family Services, who

meet with the youth. The goal of this counseling is to prevent victims or their friends

from retaliating and to encourage them to

leave gangs. While the counselor is working with the victim, police make contact

Profile No. 15 (continued)

with the parent and, using the “consent to

search and seize” protocols, obtain permission to search the youth’s home for weapons and other contraband.

These initiatives have resulted in youth moving their weapons from their family homes

to abandoned buildings in the neighborhood.

In response, police initiated the Demolition

Project. Under this program, when police

identify high-profile houses that are linked to

gang activity, they have the authority to secure them (board them up) or raze them.

Police now find that 40 percent of the abandoned buildings they search contain firearms

or other contraband.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 91

Profile No. 16

Demonstrated

Municipal Firearms Ordinances, East Bay Public Safety

Corridor Partnership—Oakland, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter illegal gun possession.

Program Goal:

To pass municipal ordinances that reduce

the availability of and access to illegal and

unsafe guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Federal firearm dealers.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

16 communities in Alameda and Contra

Costa Counties.

Evaluated by:

Resource Development Associates,

Oakland, CA.

Contact Information:

Maria Theresa Viramontes, Executive 

 Director

East Bay Public Safety Corridor

Partnership

1222 Preservation Parkway

Oakland, CA 94612

Phone: 510–832–7071

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

The East Bay Gun Violence Prevention

Project was initiated by the East Bay Public

Safety Corridor Partnership (EBPSCP), a

regional coordinating body formed to reduce

crime and violence in response to an alarming level of gun violence among cities in the

East Bay Corridor. Among the 16 communities of the East Bay Corridor, there had been

252 homicides in 1993, 238 in 1994, and 215

in 1995. There was a general belief that Federal and State legislators were not doing

enough to control the flow of guns into the

area. In 1994, faced with the presence of

more than 400 gun dealers in Alameda

County and 700 in Contra Costa County, the

Corridor cities of Oakland, Richmond, and

San Pablo began working to pass municipal

ordinances to better regulate gun sales and

eliminate residential gun dealers (i.e., dealers who sell guns out of their homes or cars)

as part of a public health approach to violence prevention.

Participating municipalities attempted to

implement the following policies: banning

the manufacture and sale of “junk guns”;

requiring triggerlocks at the point of sale;

restricting the number of licensed gun dealers and the areas in which they can operate;

and placing a gross receipts tax on merchandise sold by gun dealers. To date, 16 Corridor communities, including the cities of

Oakland, Richmond, and Berkeley, have

banned junk guns; triggerlock ordinances

were passed in 11 communities; restrictions

on gun dealers were passed in 8 other Corridor communities; and the gross receipts

sales tax proposal went on the ballot in 3

communities in 1998. It is still too early to

measure the impact of these new ordinances.

However, as a result of the gun dealer ordinances passed in Oakland, the number of

gun dealers in the city dropped from 115 to

7 within 1 year. Similarly, the number of gun

dealers in Richmond declined from 15 to 2.
92 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 16 (continued)

Moreover, as a result of these ordinances,

ATF and local police were able to increase

monitoring of the smaller number of remaining dealers to ensure their compliance with

applicable laws and regulations.

The passage of municipal firearm ordinances

is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy that was implemented in

the East Bay Corridor to address escalating

violent crime rates. For a more detailed description of this effort and a discussion of

how the program fits into the Corridor’s

overall crime-reduction strategy, see profile

5 (East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership) and profile 4 (Comprehensive Homicide Initiative, Richmond, CA).
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 93

Profile No. 17

Promising

Weapon Watch—Memphis, TN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to change attitudes about guns and

violence.

Program Goal:

To reduce weapons in the schools through

the use of a weapons hotline.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

All students in the city and county schools.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Memphis City Schools and Shelby County

Schools.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Bob Raby, Director of Security

Memphis City School District

2597 Avery Avenue, Room 145

Memphis, TN 38112

Phone: 901–325–5773

Charles H. Branch

Executive Director

Crime Stoppers of Memphis, Inc.

3340 Poplar Avenue, #223

Memphis, TN 38111

Phone: 901–327–7822

Years of Operation:

1993–present.

Weapon Watch is a hotline program that

was created to address the growing number

of weapons in the Memphis City and Shelby

County School Districts. The goals of the

program are to create a safe learning environment by removing guns and other weapons from the schools and to serve as a

deterrent to children who consider bringing

weapons to school. The program is a joint

venture involving Memphis City Schools,

Shelby County Schools, Memphis Police

Department, Shelby County Sheriff’s Department, and Crime Stoppers of Memphis.

The Weapon Watch hotline allows students

to anonymously report fellow students who

have guns or other weapons on school property. If a student sees an individual with a

gun or other weapon, or knows about a

crime that occurred on or around school

property, he or she can contact the confidential hotline (which is operated by Crime

Stoppers). The Memphis Police Department

or the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department

is then contacted by Crime Stoppers, and a

police officer is dispatched to the school.

Cash rewards of $50 to $1,000 are given to

the caller, depending on whether an arrest is

made and the type of weapon or the severity

of the crime.

The program is advertised to the student

population through fliers that are distributed

to every student and by signs posted in the

schools. Due to extensive advertising about

the program, many reports of weapons also

have been received from adults outside the

school system.

This hotline is unique in that it is operated

by a confidential third party; the students

actually speak to Crime Stoppers, rather

than to a school official or a police officer.

The students’ desire for safety and the
94 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 17 (continued)

anonymity of the program are believed to be

more important factors in its success than

the offer of a cash reward. This is evidenced

by the fact that only 50 percent of award

funds have been collected.

Since the inception of the program, more

than 400 weapons, including several handmade bombs, have been seized. In 1993,

during the first 100 days of the program,

police removed 100 guns from the schools.

During the 1994–95 school year, 60 arrests

resulted in the recovery of 24 firearms.

During the 1995–96 school year, the hotline

received 117 calls; 44 calls were related to

firearms and 15 firearms were confiscated

from school grounds. During the 1996–97

school year, 12 guns and 27 other weapons

were reported to the hotline and seized.

During the first 2 months of the 1997–98

school year, six guns were reported to the

hotline. Crime Stoppers officials believe the

program places students at a high level of

risk for bringing weapons onto school property or committing crimes at school; students

do not know who is going to turn them in,

and, thus, the potential for being caught has

increased dramatically.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 95

Deterring Gun Carrying in

High-Crime Hotspot Areas

One of the key research findings of the last 10 to 15

years has been the discovery of the importance of

hotspots of crime. Researchers have recently discovered that even within high-crime areas there are

specific locales that generate the majority of calls for

police service and response to crime.1

 This discovery

informs important theoretical work on problemoriented policing,2

 the community policing movement,3

 and situational crime prevention.4 Hotspot

analyses also have become increasingly important

for police departments as they seek to move from a

reactive to a proactive model of policing.5

 Perhaps

most reflective of this orientation is the New York

City Police Department’s COMPSTAT program,

which systematically utilizes hotspot analyses in

regular crime analysis meetings involving strategic

planning and managerial benchmarking.6

Applying a hotspot perspective to firearm crime

suggests a focus on both places and people. Research in Indianapolis found that only 3 percent of

the city’s addresses accounted for 100 percent of the

gun crimes.7

 Further, a small number of the city’s

blocks accounted for a disproportionate number of

firearm calls for service. Another study in Washington, D.C., found that a small and select group of

youth were arrested repeatedly on gun charges. This

is consistent with research in Boston, which showed

that approximately 1,300 gang members, representing less than 1 percent of the city’s youth, were responsible for at least 60 percent of the city’s youth

homicides.8

 Youth involved in homicides in Boston,

both as victims and suspects, had long histories of

involvement in the justice system, leading to the

conclusion that “youth homicide was concentrated

among a small number of serially offending, ganginvolved youths.”9

The fact that firearm-related violence is concentrated in select locations within a city also provides

opportunities for prevention. As indicated in the

program summaries described in this chapter, these

opportunities may be based on interventions at specific locales, among certain groups of potential offenders, or may involve a combination of place and

person. Two promising approaches that rest on these

principles involve directed police patrol and the

specific deterrence approach developed in Boston

referred to as “pulling levers.”

Directed police patrol

In 1992, the Kansas City Police Department, as part

of its Weed and Seed program, implemented a directed patrol initiative in a police beat with very

high levels of homicide and firearm-related violent

crime.10 This was a beat that included a number of

gun crime hotspots. For 6 months, a group of officers patrolled the beat, free from the responsibility

of responding to calls for service. The directed patrol officers provided more than 1,200 additional

hours of police presence in this beat, issued nearly

1,100 traffic warrants, and made approximately 600

arrests. Primarily relying upon vehicle stops, the

police increased the number of firearm seizures by

65 percent during the project period. This activity,

in turn, was associated with a 49-percent decrease

in gun crimes.

Given the success of the Kansas City Gun Experiment and facing an escalating homicide problem, the

Indianapolis Police Department implemented a similar directed patrol project in the summer of 1997.

The Indianapolis project focused on two areas for a

3-month period. The areas chosen in Indianapolis

were two police beats selected for their high levels of

violent crime. Two slightly different strategies were

employed in each area. The officers working in the

east target area utilized a “general deterrence strategy” maximizing the number of police vehicle stops

to create a sense of significantly increased police

presence. The North District used a “specific deterrence strategy” in which officers focused on stopping individuals suspected of being involved in

criminal activity. Essentially, in the East District

any type of traffic violation resulted in a stop,

whereas in the North District officers were looking

for additional bases for suspicion.

Examination of officer activity and output data suggested that the two strategies were implemented in a

serious fashion.11 More than 4,800 officer hours resulted in more than 5,200 vehicle stops and just under

1,000 arrests. Homicides in the target areas dropped

from 11 in the same 90-day period in 1996 to 1 during
96 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

the project period. Upon closer inspection, the project

appeared to have an effect in the north target area

(total gun crimes dropped 29 percent; aggravated

assaults with a gun and armed robbery each declined

40 percent) but not in the east target area (these offenses actually increased there). Surprisingly, given

the Kansas City findings, it was the east target area

that witnessed the largest increase in gun seizures.

The east target area showed a 50-percent increase

and the north target area only an 8-percent increase.

Thus, the Indianapolis findings raise the question of

whether the Kansas City and the Indianapolis north

target area effects on firearm crime were due to seizing and removing illegal weapons from hotspot areas

or from the increased police attention given to highrisk individuals within these areas.

Pulling levers

The notion that increased law enforcement attention

to high-risk individuals may be effective in reducing

crime receives additional support from the Boston

“pulling levers” approach. Having found that in

particular neighborhoods a small group of youth

with extensive involvement in the justice system

accounted for a majority of youth homicides, Boston

officials sought to deliver a specific deterrence message to these youth. The result was the two-pronged

“pulling levers” program.12 A multiagency law enforcement team convened a series of meetings with

chronic gang offenders in which law enforcement

communicated new standards for behavior (violence

will no longer be tolerated). When the standards

were violated, the multiagency law enforcement

team responded by imposing all available sanctions

(pulling levers). The initial examples of pulling levers with gang members then became the source of

discussion in continued meetings with potential offenders. Since Boston implemented the strategy in

1996, youth homicides have fallen by two-thirds.

Firearm-related violence has often been considered

largely impervious to law enforcement intervention.

The Kansas City, Indianapolis, and Boston projects,

and those implemented in other jurisdictions reported in this Report, suggest that this assumption

may simply be erroneous. Certain questions do,

however, remain. For example, is it the removal of

guns from the streets or the direct communication of

a deterrence message that has had an impact? Are

youth no longer carrying weapons or have they temporarily ceased using them? Although these and

related issues must be addressed, these studies indicate that significant reductions in violent crime may

be possible. It appears that interventions based on a

more precise understanding of the problem, as in

those targeting high-risk individuals in high-risk

areas, offer important prevention opportunities.

The following initiatives, including directed patrols,

community policing, and other “hotspot” programs,

use a common set of strategies to target individuals

most likely to carry weapons. Several involve the

creation of task forces or other steering committees

to coordinate law enforcement efforts and some were

funded through national initiatives such as the U.S.

Department of Justice Weed and Seed initiative.

Notes

1. L.W. Sherman, “Hotspots of crime and criminal

careers of places,” in Crime and Place, edited by J.

Eck and D. Weisburd, Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1995.

2. H. Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing, New York,

NY: McGraw-Hill, 1990.

3. D.H. Bayley, Police for the Future, New York, NY:

Oxford University Press, 1994.

4. R.V. Clarke, “Situational crime prevention,” in

Building a Safer Society, edited by M. Tonry and D.

Farrington, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago

Press, 1995; and D. Weisburd, Reorienting Crime

Prevention Research and Policy: From the Causes of Criminality to the Context of Crime, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

National Institute of Justice, 1997.

5. M.K. Sparrow, M.H. Moore, and D.M. Kennedy,

Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing, New York, NY:

Basic Books, 1990.

6. W. Bratton and P. Knobler, Turnaround: How

America’s Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic, New

York, NY: Random House, 1998.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 97

7. L.W. Sherman and D.P. Rogan, “Effects of gun

seizure on gun violence: ‘Hotspots’ patrol in Kansas

City,” Justice Quarterly 12(4):673–693, 1995.

8. D. Kennedy, “Pulling levers: Getting deterrence

right,” National Institute of Justice Journal (July):2–8,

1998.

9. Kennedy, 1998.

10. Sherman and Rogan, 1995.

11. E.F. McGarrell and S. Chermak, Summary of

Results of JPD’s 1997 Directed Patrol Initiative, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1998.

12. Kennedy, 1998.
98 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 18

Promising

Baltimore Police Violent Crimes Division and Youth

Violence Strike Force—Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter gun carrying in high crime

hotspot areas.

Program Goal:

To target gang members and violent offenders under age 24.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Violent gang members.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Areas of Baltimore where violent gangs

operate.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Sergeant William Marcus and

Lieutenant Jon Foster

Baltimore City Police Department

Violent Crimes Division

601 East Fayette Street, Mezzanine

Baltimore, MD 21202

Phone: 410–396–2246

Years of Operation:

1991–present.

In 1991, in response to unacceptably high

levels of violence, the Baltimore City Police

Department created a Violent Crime Task

Force. The Task Force, now called the Violent Crimes Division, has several units: the

Handgun Recovery Squad; the Operations

Unit; the Shooting Squad; the Cold-Case

Squad (which works closely with the Shooting Squad); and the newest addition to the

group, the Youth Violence Strike Force

(which now oversees the Intelligence Unit).

Handgun Recovery Squad

During the early 1990’s, Baltimore police

believed that most of the area’s violent and

criminal activity centered on the drug trade.

Police therefore concentrated their efforts

on buy-bust operations, search-and-seizure

activities, and undercover drug buys. This

approach was effective for a time and the

violent crime rate decreased. However, in

1995, the number of shootings again began

to climb, so the Handgun Recovery Squad

was created as a special program of the Violent Crime Task Force. At first, the Squad

spent most of its time simply seizing guns all

over the city—four to five handguns each

night. This proved ineffective, however,

since seizing large numbers of guns had no

noticeable impact on crime. The Department

therefore decided that the Squad would limit

its activities to the highest crime areas: posts

326 and 333 in Baltimore’s Eastern Police

District (two of the city’s hotspot areas).

After targeting gangs in these two posts,

there was a marked decrease in handgunrelated violence.

Firearms seizures by the Handgun Recovery

Squad again began to dwindle, for two primary reasons. First, criminals realized that

guns were being targeted in Baltimore and

stopped carrying weapons. Second, every

tactical unit in the Baltimore Police Department began to target guns in their investigations, so more arrests were being made by

nonsquad units. The Handgun Recovery
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 99

Squad therefore changed its focus to undercover surveillance, working closely with ATF

on Project LEAD, a national gun-tracing

initiative to identify straw purchasers. The

Handgun Recovery Squad also coordinated

its efforts with the U.S. Attorney’s Office

DISARM program, the Baltimore County

Gun Squad, and the State Attorney’s FIVE

program (the Firearms Investigation/Violence

Division), which allows vertical prosecution

of nonfatal shooting cases. These city and

county agencies share intelligence and serve

warrants together when one agency seeks a

suspect in the other’s jurisdiction.

During September and October 1998, the

Handgun Recovery Squad seized almost 40

guns. Although squad members are “aggressive,” they are trained to be respectful toward all members of the public, including

arrestees. As a result, they have been able to

maintain a positive relationship with community members and have not generated

significant resident complaints.

Youth Violence Strike Force

In 1997, when the Baltimore City Police Department analyzed internal data on shootings,

it found that more than 50 percent of victims

and suspects were age 24 and younger. It also

found that most violence was caused by violent drug “crews” that were using handguns

to settle disputes. This led to the creation of

Profile No. 18 (continued)

the Youth Violence Task Force (now called

the Strike Force), whose mission is to identify

and target gang members and violent offenders and aggressively seek their apprehension

and incarceration. Once the Youth Violence

Strike Force has linked a particular gang to

homicides, shootings, and other violent activities, the gang is targeted for investigation and,

if possible, Federal prosecution. In the

Cherry Hill section of the city, for example,

police found that one gang was responsible

for seven shootings, all of which involved

youthful offenders. The Strike Force worked

with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in that case

to identify defendants for prosecution in

Federal court.

The Strike Force has strong partnerships

with other criminal justice agencies, including

the U.S. Attorney, ATF, FBI, school police,

and State Department of Juvenile Justice.

The Task Force also works closely with parole officers, probation officers, and judges,

holding “Gang Call-In” meetings with youth

who are on parole and probation. Police officers also accompany parole and probation

staff during home visits.

Although the Violent Crimes Division and

Youth Violence Strike Force are not formally linked with Baltimore’s Comprehensive Communities Program (see profile 1),

many of their enforcement activities are

focused in the same hotspot neighborhoods

identified by that program.
100 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 19

Demonstrated

Getting Guns Off the Streets, New York City Police

Department—New York, NY

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter gun carrying in high-crime

hotspot areas.

Program Goal:

To get guns off the streets through targeted

law enforcement activities and FFL enforcement monitoring.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Illegal firearm dealers and at-risk youth,

adults, and juveniles in possession of illegal

guns.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

New York, NY.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Michael J. Farrell

Deputy Commissioner for Policy and

Planning

New York City Police Department

Office of Management

Analysis and Planning

1 Police Plaza, Room 1403

New York, NY 10038

Phone: 212–374–5390

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

It is estimated that as many as 2 million illegal

guns were in circulation in New York City in

1993. During that year, there were roughly

1,500 gun deaths (20 times the number in

1960) and 5,000 people were wounded in

shootings. Ninety percent of the guns seized

in New York City that year were originally

purchased in other States. In an effort to

combat the serious crime plaguing the city,

the New York City Police Department

(NYPD) developed several crime-fighting

strategies. The strategies are based on aggressive policing tactics, with a tough new

managerial style that emphasizes both empowerment and accountability at the precinct

level.

The NYPD gun strategy uses felony arrests

and summonses to target gun trafficking and

gun-related crime in the city. NYPD pursues all perpetrators and accomplices in gun

crimes cases and interrogates them about

how their guns were acquired. In a proactive effort to get guns off the streets, the

NYPD’s Street Crime Units aggressively

enforce all gun laws. In 1996, the Street

Crime Units made up one-half of 1 percent

of the NYPD, but made 20 percent of all

gun arrests. In 1997, their ability to enforce

gun laws and make firearm arrests was enhanced by a quadrupling of the number

of officers assigned to the program.

COMPSTAT

The collection and analysis of crime statistics,

and the conducting of weekly crime control

strategy meetings to disseminate crime data

to top-level management and unit commanders are major components of NYPD’s gun

strategy. These briefings are referred to as

COMPSTAT (Computerized Statistics)

meetings. The meetings are a central element
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 101

Profile No. 19 (continued)

of a comprehensive management strategy that

emphasizes accountability, proper allocation

of resources, and evaluation of crime reduction tactics. Data are collected by officers and

entered into an automated system, which

includes information about the crime, victim,

time of day, weapons involved, and location.

The result is a computer-generated map illustrating where and when crime is occurring

in the city. This approach allows police to

identify hotspots and strategically target resources. The power of the crime data is evident during NYPD’s weekly meetings, each

of which focuses on a particular borough.

Commanders from each precinct are required

to attend one meeting per month. They are

held accountable for the activities in their

precincts and must report on specific steps

their precincts are taking to prevent and solve

crimes. The questioning is tough and excuses

are not tolerated; from 1994 to 1997, 80 percent of NYPD precinct commanders were

reassigned.

FFL enforcement

New York City has some of the most restrictive local licensing requirements for Federal

firearm dealers in the country. NYPD works

with ATF to monitor federally licensed gun

dealers in the city and to combat interstate

gun trafficking. Thorough background investigations are conducted on all applicants

seeking new or renewed Federal firearms

licenses (FFL’s) to ensure that individuals

who obtain licenses have a legitimate reason

for doing so and that individuals with a history of criminal involvement be denied

FFL’s. If applicants do not meet the licensing requirements, officers meet with them to

explain the policy, sometimes while conducting unannounced inspections. Applicants are

then given 30 days within which to comply

with the requirements. This regulatory function of the police department was originally

funded under the Bureau of Justice

Assistance’s Firearms Trafficking Program

and has been continued by NYPD’s licensing division.

School crime and truancy

Schools in New York City also have become

a locus of crime, with frequent reports of

armed students. Moreover, 15 percent of the

student body (150,000 students) were absent from school each day in 1993. These

students are as likely to be victims as perpetrators of gun violence. In response to the

high absentee rate, the department has increased the number of youth officers in the

precinct commands, providing much more

followup ability in individual cases and better program oversight. School security plans

have been prepared for every school, and

typically include safe corridor posts that

protect kids on their way to and from

school. The Transit Bureau has established

safe passage cars on more than 100 subway

trains, serving 80 key schools and allowing

children to ride home free from harassment

and fear. In the 1994–95 school year, truant

squads active throughout the city returned

nearly 42,000 truants to the school system,

made more than 5,000 arrests, and confiscated 97 firearms.

In 1997, there were 3,600 fewer nonfatal

shootings than in 1993, the year before

implementation of NYPD’s strategy for getting guns off the streets (a reduction of 62

percent). From 1994 to 1997, 46,198 gun

arrests were made and 56,081 guns were

taken off the streets. For the first time since

1968, the annual number of murders in the

city dropped below 1,000.

FFL enforcement also has been effective in

discouraging unqualified applicants from

applying for gun licenses and in denying

licenses to unqualified dealers. Since the
102 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 19 (continued)

inception of the program, more than 92 percent of the applicants for new or renewed

gun licenses have been denied or have withdrawn their applications. More than 200 gun

dealers have been arrested and their weapons caches confiscated. The number of

FFL’s in the city dropped from 952 in 1991

to 259 in 1996, a 73-percent reduction.

Police departments from across the country

and around the world have begun to apply

some of the crime-fighting strategies used

by NYPD, including its gun strategy and

data collection and analysis techniques.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 103

Profile No. 20

Demonstrated

Kansas City Gun Experiment—Kansas City, MO

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter gun carrying in high crime

hotspot areas; Office of Weed and Seed.

Program Goal:

To reduce crime by seizures of illegal guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Violent perpetrators carrying guns.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

80-block area of Kansas City, MO.

Evaluated by:

Department of Criminology, University of

Maryland; Department of Criminal Justice,

University of Texas.

Contact Information:

Captain Mike Sola

Kansas City Police Department

1201 Walnut Street, Suite 2300

Kansas City, MO 64106

Phone: 816–234–5550

Years of Operation:

1992–1993.

The Kansas City Gun Experiment used intensive police patrols directed to an 80-block

hotspot area where the homicide rate was 20

times the national average. Patrol officers

seized guns by frisking individuals who were

arrested and by making plain view sightings

of firearms during routine traffic violation or

safety stops. Traffic stops were most effective in locating illegal guns, with 1 gun

found per 28 stops. Gun crimes, including

drive-by shootings and homicides, declined

significantly during the 29-week experimental period between July 1992 and January

1993. Drive-by shootings dropped from 7 to

1 in the target area, while increasing from 6

to 12 in a comparison area. Overall gun

crimes dropped 49 percent (169 to 86) and

criminal homicide declined 67 percent (30 to

10) from the 29 weeks before the patrols to

the 29-week experiment period. However,

there was no effect on other crime indicators, including calls for police service, calls

about violence, property or disorder crimes,

and total offense reports within the target

area. Significantly, there did not appear to

be a displacement effect (i.e., gun crimes did

not increase in any of the seven surrounding

patrol beats).

Based on a statistical comparison with a

control area, directed patrols were three

times more cost effective than traditional

patrols in removing firearms from the streets

in hotspot areas. Active involvement of community and religious leaders in developing

the program resulted in broad community

support, even among those who had objected to previous police crackdowns on

guns. However, the program was not institutionalized within the city budget after Federal funding ended. The program was

replicated in Indianapolis between April

1995 and September 1997. Directed patrols

are now used in Indianapolis as the front

end of a more comprehensive Weed and

Seed effort directed at reducing crime and

stabilizing the community (see profile 6).
104 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 21

Demonstrated

Operation Ceasefire—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter gun carrying in high-crime

hotspot areas; National Institute of Justice.

Program Goal:

To reduce serious juvenile and gang violence

in Boston.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Youth ages 8 to 18.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University, Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

James Jordan

Gary French

Boston Police Department

1 Schroeder Plaza

Boston, MA 02120

Phone: 617–343–5096 or 617–343–4444

David Kennedy

Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

79 JFK Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

Phone: 617–495–5188

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

Operation Ceasefire was first implemented in

May 1996 as a coordinated, citywide strategy

aimed at deterring juvenile and gang firearm

violence. Ceasefire operates as a system that

implements interventions that include the

knowledge and coordination of all of the

city’s law enforcement and criminal justice

agencies. The strategy was developed by the

Boston Police Department’s Youth Violence

Strike Force (YVSF), a multiagency task

force composed of approximately 62 sworn

officers, in collaboration with the Attorney

for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and

representatives from numerous agencies and

institutions, including Federal, State, and

local law enforcement; parole and probation

officers; the mayor’s office; city agencies;

clergy; and several universities.

YVSF devised a core strategy based on previous research and successful antigang tactics: Law enforcement would communicate

to gangs that there would be swift, sure, and

severe consequences for violence.

Operation Ceasefire is being evaluated by a

research team from Harvard University’s

Kennedy School of Government. Preliminary data suggest that this strategy has had

a dramatic impact on reducing gang violence. After two focused interagency interventions with violent gangs, matched with

the communications strategy, violent gang

offending dropped markedly, sometimes

appearing almost to have stopped. For the

second full year of operation, through May

31, 1998, there was a 71-percent decrease in
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 105

homicides by persons ages 24 and under and

a 70-percent reduction in gun assaults (for

all ages).

Operation Ceasefire is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy implemented in Boston to address the community’s

Profile No. 21 (continued)

escalating violent crime rates. For a more

detailed description of Operation Ceasefire,

and a discussion of how this program fits into

Boston’s overall crime reduction strategy, see

profile 2.
106 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 22

Promising

Operation Safe Streets Gang Prevention Initiative—

Phoenix, AZ

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter gun carrying in high-crime

hotspot areas.

Program Goal:

To apply a proactive, community-based policing approach to suppress criminal street

gang violence and youth-related crimes during the summer months.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Gang members.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Phoenix, AZ.

Operation Safe Streets (OSS) was launched

in 1990, a year when there were 580 gangrelated violent incidents in the city of Phoenix.

Of these, 377 were gang-related aggravated

assaults; 171 were drive-by shootings; and 3

were homicides directly linked to gangs. In

response, the Phoenix Police Department

established OSS to suppress criminal street

gang violence and youth-related crimes during

the summer months. From the outset, community participation in the initiative has been

critical; police rely on local residents to help

them identify gang members through a gang

hotline; and OSS attends public meetings to

inform residents of police activities and build

community support.

OSS’s four main objectives are to: (1) reduce

gang-related violent offenses by 5 percent

during the summer months; (2) investigate

95 percent of the violent crimes involving

criminal street gangs; (3) respond within

5 days to 100 percent of citizens’ complaints

of criminal street gang activity within their

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Lieutenant Joe Klima

Phoenix Police Department

620 West Washington Street

Phoenix, AZ 85003

Phone: 602–262–7311

Years of Operation:

1990–present.

neighborhoods; and (4) maximize the enforcement of weapons violations through

the use of appropriate Federal and State

prosecutorial venues.

In the summer of 1998, a budget of $150,000

was set aside to cover overtime pay for more

than 70 law enforcement officers assigned to

OSS. Officers included personnel from the

Organized Crime Bureau’s Gang Enforcement Unit, the Patrol Division, the Traffic

Enforcement Unit, and the statewide Gang

Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission (a

special task force of the Department of Public Safety). An ATF agent also is assigned to

OSS and is responsible for reviewing weapons violations cases to see if they qualify for

Federal prosecution and then sending letters

to the county prosecutor when cases have

been transferred to Federal court.

Crime statistics on the achievement of the

program’s four objectives are tallied each

week. In 1997, OSS seized 213 guns; made
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 107

2,647 arrests; identified 439 gang members;

interrogated 1,511 people; processed 681

curfew violations; attended 28 block watch

meetings; received 13 citizen referrals and

15 precinct referrals for gang problems; and

issued 10,177 traffic citations.

Police statistics for OSS in 1998 (OSS98)

indicate that gang-related violent crimes

were reduced by one-third compared to the

previous summer (there were 57 violent

incidents in the summer of 1998, compared

with 86 in the summer of 1997). Other data

from OSS98 show that: (1) officers logged

close to 19,000 overtime hours; (2) there

were a total 1,501 arrests (424 adult felonies,

723 adult misdemeanors, 125 juvenile felonies, and 229 juvenile misdemeanors); (3)

6,745 traffic citations were issued; (4) OSS

Profile No. 22 (continued)

officers conducted 575 interrogations;

(5) 992 new gang members were identified;

(6) updated information was collected on

959 existing gang members; and (7) 110

weapons were seized.

Representatives from the unit also attended

9 block watch or community meetings, and

the 24 residents who filed gang complaints

were contacted within 5 days of their

complaints.

The public continues to perceive a high rate of

gang violence despite data showing that the

problem has considerably abated. In 1997,

there were 357 violent incidents (compared

with 918 cases in the peak year of 1992), 226

aggravated assaults, 86 drive-by shootings,

and 11 homicides attributable to gangs.
108 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter gun carrying in highcrime hotspot areas; Office of Weed

and Seed.

Program Goal:

To reduce drug trafficking and property

crime, seize illegal guns, and show strong

police presence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

All motor vehicle operators (East Side);

suspicious profile vehicle operators (North

Side).

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

High-crime areas in North and East

Indianapolis, IN.

Evaluated by:

The Hudson Institute, Indiana University.

Contact Information:

Liz Allison

Indianapolis Police Department

50 North Alabama Street

Indianapolis, IN 46204

Phone: 317–327–3452

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

The Targeted Enforcement Program uses

“directed patrols” to identify firearm offenders. First implemented in 1994 as a

modified replication of the Kansas City

Gun Experiment, Indianapolis police stop

vehicles for traffic violations and, when

probable cause exists, search the vehicles

for weapons or other contraband. In 1997,

the Indianapolis Police Department tested

different protocols within the directed patrols strategy. On the East side, officers

stopped vehicles for any infraction and

issued warnings rather than citations in the

majority of instances. On the North Side,

the police department replicated the Kansas

City model with more fidelity, stopping

only those vehicles that were “suspicious”

based on a profile and issuing a greater

number of citations per 100 stops.

Profile No. 23

Demonstrated

Targeted Enforcement Program, Indianapolis Weed

and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN

There were 3,836 stops on the East Side

resulting on average in 60.7 warning tickets,

24.5 citations, 14.5 arrests, 1.1 felony arrests, and 0.34 illegal gun seizures per 100

Copyright © 1998 PhotoDisc, Inc.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 109

Profile No. 23 (continued)

stops. With only 1,417 stops, the North Side

produced a lower rate of warning tickets

(36.0 per 100 stops) but notably higher rates

for citations (49.2); arrests (30.6); felony

arrests (2.9); and illegal gun seizures (.85).

Gun-related assaults and robberies declined

by 40 percent on the North Side while both

violent crimes and property crimes increased

on the East Side. Because directed patrols

had been used for 2 years on the East Side,

adaptive behavior by violators may explain

this increase. On the North Side, probation

sweeps and K–9 patrols also were active

during the study period for directed patrols.

The Targeted Enforcement Program is one

element of a collaborative, comprehensive

strategy implemented in Indianapolis to

address escalating violent crime rates. For a

more detailed description of targeted patrols

and a discussion of how this program fits

into the city’s overall crime reduction strategy, please see profile 6.
110 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 24

Promising

Youth, Firearms, and Violence—Atlanta, GA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter gun carrying in targeted

police hotspot areas.

Program Goal:

To reduce the level of juvenile gun violence

in Atlanta.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juveniles and young adults.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Atlanta, GA.

Evaluated by:

Emory University Center for Injury

Control, Atlanta, GA.

Contact Information:

Beverly Harvard

Chief of Police

Atlanta Police Department

675 Ponce de Leon Avenue

Atlanta, GA 30308

Phone: 404–817–6900

Dr. Arthur Kellermann

Emory University

1518 Clifton Road NE.

Atlanta, GA 30322

Phone: 404–727–9977

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

In Fulton County, GA (which includes

most of the city of Atlanta), firearm-related

homicide rates for 15- to 24-year-olds increased dramatically from the early 1980’s

to the early 1990’s. Nonfirearm-related

homicides, on the other hand, remained

relatively stable. Firearm-related homicides

during this time period accounted for

nearly all of the murders in the city. Guns

are readily available to juveniles in Atlanta,

where it is reported that handguns can be

purchased on the street for as little as $5.

In 1994, Atlanta’s Project PACT (Pulling

America’s Communities Together) was funded

by the U.S. Department of Justice. Project

PACT is a consortium of Federal, State, and

local agencies, and community groups designed to organize diverse community institutions and to empower them, individually and

collectively, to use problem-solving strategies

and tactics to create safer communities. Juvenile gun violence emerged as the top priority

of this consortium. With funding from the

National Institute of Justice, Emory University Center for Injury Control initiated a formal evaluation of PACT’s efforts by obtaining

baseline measures of the magnitude of juvenile gun violence in metropolitan Atlanta.

In addition to the collection of quantitative

data showing juvenile and adult firearmrelated morbidity and mortality, a telephone

survey of adults was conducted, and focus

groups with high-risk and incarcerated youth

were held to collect information about

weapon-carrying behavior. Baseline data were

shared with community groups, law enforcement officials, and juvenile justice officials

and were used to develop the targeted

interventions.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 111

As a result of Project PACT, several Federal,

State, and local agencies joined forces in a

coordinated effort to reduce overall gun

violence, with a particular emphasis on juveniles and young adults. The agencies involved in this initiative include the Atlanta

Police Department (APD), ATF, the U.S.

Attorney’s Office, the Georgia State Board

of Pardons and Paroles, the Fulton County

Juvenile Court, the Fulton County District

Attorney, the Georgia State Department of

Corrections (Fulton County Probation), the

Georgia Bureau of Investigation, and Emory

University Center for Injury Control.

I can ask an adult to put a gun down, and 75

percent of them will do it, but a juvenile will

not. The juvenile will fire it at me, or in the air,

or flee with the weapon. His actions are much

more fearless.

—Thay Humes

Atlanta, GA, Police Officer

The strategies for preventing gun violence

among Atlanta’s youth are centered on addressing each point of intervention in the

“chain of events” that begins with the demand

for a firearm and ends with commission of a

violent crime. Three strategies were proposed

to address the chain of events that lead to gun

violence: (1) a reduction in the demand for

guns through community education and enforcement of laws prohibiting gun-carrying

by youth; (2) a reduction in the supply of

guns through aggressive enforcement of laws

that prohibit sale or transfer of firearms to

youth and systematic tracing of guns used by

juvenile offenders; and (3) effective rehabilitation to decrease recidivism by juveniles

caught with weapons.

Identification of

high crime hotspots

To identify the city’s gun violence hotspots,

researchers at the Center for Injury Control

Profile No. 24 (continued)

developed the Georgia Firearm Injury Notification System. This system, known as

“Cops and Docs,” collects data on firearmrelated morbidity and mortality in specific

police patrol beats and census tracts within

the Atlanta metropolitan area. Firearm assault data are reported by 34 law enforcement agencies, 21 metro emergency medical

centers, and 5 medical examiners in the Atlanta area and forwarded to the Georgia

Bureau of Investigation (GBI). GBI organizes the data, which include fatal and nonfatal injuries by age, race, sex, weapon type,

location, and circumstance. The data are

then forwarded to the Center for Injury

Control where they are linked with firearmrelated data from the Atlanta 911 System.

All of this information is then analyzed using

a Geographic Information System. The Center identifies hotspots of gun violence activity at the street-block level and shares these

data with Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials. These officials then use

these data to allocate resources, target intervention neighborhoods, and evaluate results.

The researchers note that obtaining dual

reporting of firearm assault data from emergency medical centers and law enforcement

to the Cops and Docs system is a challenging task. For example, although Georgia

State law requires healthcare providers to

notify local authorities when they treat a

gunshot injury, incomplete reporting of such

injuries to Cops and Docs remains a problem. Only 60 percent of medically documented shootings have been matched by

Cops and Docs to corresponding police reports. Efforts are made to relate and match

records to create a complete picture of firearm injury and violence throughout the city.

To meet the needs of law enforcement, the

firearm assault data are collected, analyzed,

and disseminated in a very short timeframe.

Data are updated for weekly meetings and

compiled in reports that are disseminated

monthly.
112 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Directed police patrol

APD’s Guns and Violent Crime Suppression

Unit (Gun Unit) was deployed in the fall of

1997 to take guns off the streets. The Gun

Unit is a group of 12 officers that utilizes a

nontraditional, problem-solving approach of

locating and seizing illegal guns before they

are used. The Gun Unit targets illegal gun

carrying in the city’s hotspot neighborhoods

that have been identified by the Cops and

Docs data base. The Gun Unit has focused its

operations on three hotspot areas, one of

which has shown a decline in firearm-related

911 calls. The Unit recently expanded to four

additional hotspot areas. The officers in the

Gun Unit watch for persons who appear to

be carrying firearms. Although the officers

perform investigative functions, they also

confiscate guns in routine traffic stops, roadblocks, and other proactive interactions

within the hotspot neighborhoods. Approximately one in seven traffic stops results in the

confiscation of a firearm. APD is also

partnering with Atlanta’s schools to locate

truants and bring them back to school and

implementing a probation-police partnership

to conduct probation sweeps in crime hotspot

neighborhoods.

A small minority of people are responsible

for a disproportionate amount of crime. We

want to put an end to that, or at least raise

the stakes for those who want to continue

on the violent path. Were it not for the

quality of doctors and emergency personnel,

we would have a lot more deaths in this city.

—Carter B. Jackson

Atlanta, GA, Deputy Police Chief

Profile No. 24 (continued)

ATF’s participation

The Atlanta office of ATF receives data

compiled by the Center for Injury Control

and the Cops and Docs notification system

and works in partnership with APD and

GBI to identify illegal gun traffickers. State

and local law enforcement agencies recover

the majority of crime guns and arrest the

majority of juveniles and violent criminals in

possession of firearms. The initiation of Federal investigations is based on the information obtained from debriefing the suspects

and subsequently tracing firearms.

ATF’s Regulatory Enforcement Unit is responsible for investigating and regulating

firearm dealers and developing cases against

illegal firearm traffickers involved in the

transfer or sale of firearms to juveniles. This

unit conducts investigations and surveillance

of gun shows, which are a common source of

illegal firearms for juveniles and criminals.

The Pawn Desk Detail conducts surveillance and investigation of all pawned weapons. Convicted felons attempting to pawn

weapons are apprehended, their weapons

are seized, and they are prosecuted under

Federal statutes. Unintended byproducts of

requiring background checks for handgun

purchases have been an increase in robberies and “smash and grab” thefts from gun

stores and an increase in theft from shippers.

ATF is actively involved in educating gun

dealers and shippers about how to increase

store and employee security.

The Center for Injury Control, as the academic partner for Atlanta’s program, provides monthly reports on firearm crime and

injury to the Gun Unit, all project partners,

and law enforcement leadership. Researchers at the Center are conducting an impact

evaluation of the program.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 113

Profile No. 25

Promising

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Birmingham, AL

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to deter gun carrying in hotspot

areas; Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services.

Program Goal:

To reduce youth firearm violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juveniles in all middle and high schools.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Birmingham, AL.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection; Abt Associates Inc.,

Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

Barbara Eaddy

Birmingham Police Department

1710 First Avenue North

Birmingham, AL 35203

Phone: 205–254–1710

Years of Operation:

1996–present.

The Birmingham Police Department set two

important goals for this COPS office-funded

initiative: to establish school-based community policing, crime prevention education,

and training for police officers, students, and

teachers; and to develop a computer system

to collect, monitor, and analyze crime statistics regarding youth firearm violence. To

meet these goals, the police department

implemented several strategies.

School resource officers

The police department assigned 18 officers

to serve as School Resource Officers

(SRO’s) whose primary focus was to reduce

occurrences of youth firearm crime in the

Birmingham Public School System through

education and intervention. Special programs such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.®), Gang Resistance

Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.), Problem Oriented Policing (POP), and the Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment

(SARA) model were introduced into the

school system curriculum. School officials

and officers worked collaboratively to detect

firearms in schools by conducting searches

of lockers and vehicles and by using

handheld metal detectors during random

checks of students. The officers also worked

to prevent trespassing on school grounds

and to take control of other disruptive quality-of-life problems to maintain a secure and

safe environment for the students and teachers within the schools. Additionally, SRO’s

assigned to schools were trained to teach

and counsel students, teachers, and parents

on gun violence prevention using the STAR

(Straight Talk About Risk) Program (see

profile 54).

Computerized crime

tracking system

In order to monitor encounters with juveniles and develop statistical trends, the police department developed a computer

tracking system.

Part I offenses involving juveniles declined

28 percent from 1997–98, falling from 1,045

to 752. During the same period, firearm

charges declined 69 percent (from 108 to
114 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

33). The total number of firearm-related

incidents involving one or more juveniles fell

39 percent (from 266 to 162).

As a result of the programs implemented in

the Birmingham Public School System, ofProfile No. 25 (continued)

ficers have become positive role models for

students, introduced effective school-based

antiviolence programs, taught handgun

safety, and served as a liaison between the

school and the police department.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 115

Profile No. 26

Promising

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Bridgeport, CT

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Initiative to deter gun carrying in crime

hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:

To reduce youth firearm violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juveniles and youth under age 25.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

High-crime areas in Bridgeport, CT.

Evaluated by:

John Jay College of Criminal Justice,

New York, NY; Abt Associates Inc.,

Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

Thomas Sweeney, Chief of Police

Bridgeport Police Department

300 Congress Street

Bridgeport, CT 06604

Phone: 203–576–7611

Years of Operation:

1995–present

The Bridgeport Police Department (BPD)

used support from COPS to develop a multifaceted gun violence reduction initiative

that incorporated five distinct but interrelated components: warrant enforcement;

ballistics identification; crime mapping; gun

suppression; and prevention. The initiative

received DOJ COPS’ Youth Firearms Violence Initiative support for 18 months

(through June 1997) and much of the demonstration effort is now institutionalized.

An enhanced warrant enforcement program

provided for employment of two warrant

administrative aides who were assigned to

review all outstanding warrants with a priority for identifying firearm-related charges.

Of 3,138 warrants researched during the

program period, 833 were for narcotics

offenses, 696 for probation violations, 652

for assaults, 260 for larcenies, and 172 for

firearm charges.

Ballistics identification capacity was created

internally through enhancements that included acquisition of a comparison microscope for ballistics examinations. Firearm

evidence had previously been sent to an

outside laboratory, delaying investigations

by days; inhouse ballistics examinations

permitted a 24-hour turnaround. The BPD

is now part of the Drugfire Program, the

FBI’s automated computer technology that

links firearm evidence across jurisdictions.

A crime-mapping system was developed

to provide rapid identification of crime

hotspots, with an emphasis on targeting gun

incidents throughout the city. That system

has been upgraded to provide immediate

tracking of crime trends and appropriate

deployment.

Gun Suppression Details were developed by

training a special pool of officers that could

be made available during all of their shifts

for assignment to gun violence hotspots.

During the program’s operation, 174 details

were deployed resulting in 43 gun seizures

(22 of which were from juveniles).

Prevention education also was integrated

into the initiative. “Character Counts,” a

national initiative developed through the
116 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Josephson Institute of Ethics, was brought

in by BPD to train a pool of educators and

counselors to present a curriculum to students of all grade levels on the concepts of

trustworthiness, respect, fairness, caring,

responsibility, and citizenship. The extent of

the curriculum’s infusion into the school

Profile No. 26 (continued)

system or community social programs has

not been evaluated; however, BPD has become the first local law enforcement agency

to be part of the Character Counts Coalition,

a national organization of more than 60

community-related groups.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 117

Profile No. 27

Promising

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Inglewood, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Initiative to deter gun carrying in high crime

hotspot areas; Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:

To reduce handgun violence through

disruption of gang activities.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Crenshaw Mafia Gang and Family Gangster

Bloods.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Darby-Dixon public housing area of

Inglewood known as “the Bottoms.”

Evaluated by:

Abt Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

Lieutenant Hampton Cantrell

Inglewood Police Department

1 Manchester Boulevard

Inglewood, CA 90301

Phone: 310–412–5206

Fax: 310–412–8798

Years of Operation:

1995–1996.

Through the Inglewood Community

Oriented Policing and Problem Solving

(ICOPPS) unit, the Inglewood Police

Department implemented handgun violence

enforcement and prevention programs that

targeted major youth gangs in West Central

Los Angeles. Unique to the initiative was

enforcement through civil injunction and

restraining orders against the Crenshaw

Mafia Gang and the Family Gangster

Bloods that operated in and around the

Darby-Dixon section of Inglewood, particularly in a drug-driven, crime-infested six

block area of public housing known as “the

Bottoms.” The primary prevention component

was a Rights of Passage (ROP) mentoring

program designed to fill a gap in afterschool

activities from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.

Inglewood, previously a predominantly lowincome, African-American community, was

rapidly becoming a majority Hispanic population, thereby creating a fertile environment

for gang affinity, turf conflict, and violence.

One building containing Morningside High,

Monroe Junior High, and Woodworth

Elementary serves one-half of the DarbyDixon student population and was a focal

point for juvenile gang recruitment and

criminal activity. Also in Inglewood are

Centinella Park and a large cemetery that

attracts spillover gang and criminal activity

from Los Angeles. The unemployment rate

for the target area is 42 percent.

Enforcement activities were directed through

Strategies Against Gang Environments

(SAGE)—a unit funded by the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative (YFVI)—which

comprises one full-time and six overtime officers that worked closely with a deputy district attorney and a deputy probation officer

dedicated to the initiative. Through saturation patrols in the target area, SAGE officers

gathered evidence that would establish specific gangs and gang members as a public

nuisance. The deputy district attorney then

requested a restraining order that would
118 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

allow the Inglewood Police Department to

take gang members into custody for violation

of a civil court injunction (e.g., loitering)

rather than waiting until the police observed

criminal activity by gang members. Part of

the strategy also included “knock and talk”

investigations conducted by the deputy probation officer who visited probationers at

their residences and searched for guns.

Initially the deputy probation officer,

a lifelong Inglewood resident, rode with

SAGE officers; however, as the role became

institutionalized, and with the support of the

police department, he was issued his own

car, granted an exemption to allow carrying

a gun, and empowered to work alone. Initial

fears that the civil injunction strategy might

not stand judicial scrutiny were diminished

when the California Supreme Court ruled

favorably in a related case (People ex re.

Gallo v. Carlos Acuna, 97 Cal. Daily op.

Service 724).

The prevention component used volunteer

police officers, firefighters, and community

leaders as role models and mentors in

curriculum that included components on

Profile No. 27 (continued)

civic values, self-esteem, conflict mediation,

aesthetic art, martial arts, violence prevention, academic support, and healthy male/

female relationships. The school district

referred the youth and provided facilities for

the ROP program, which graduated 87 of

the first class of 120 students in the 3-month

program. The ROP program has been continued beyond the federally funded project

by business and community donations.

The SAGE unit was disbanded after YFVI

funding was exhausted; however, the injunction against the Crenshaw Mafia Gang

remains in place with enforcement through

routine patrols and the police department’s

gang component. The department reports

that the Crenshaw Mafia Gang has ceased

to exist as an organized entity as a direct

result of the civil action. As 1998 ended,

public defenders were positioning to represent individual gang members in challenging the strategy that the Inglewood Police

Department regards as one of its most effective weapons for combating juvenile

gang violence.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 119

Profile No. 28

Demonstrated

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Milwaukee, WI

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Initiative to deter gun carrying in high-crime

hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:

To break the connection between youth and

guns through a combination of enforcement

and prevention strategies.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Youth involved in less serious offenses involving firearms and gangs.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Milwaukee, WI.

Evaluated by:

Department of Emergency Medicine,

Medical College of Wisconsin; Abt

Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

Lieutenant James Galezewski

Milwaukee Police Department

749 West State Street

Milwaukee, WI 53233

Phone: 414–935–7825

Years of Operation:

1995–96.

The Milwaukee Police Department’s

(MPD’s) Youth Firearms Violence Initiative

focused enforcement and prevention efforts,

supported by enhanced technology, on reducing the number of violent firearm-related

crimes committed by youth. Components

included the addition of officers to the Gang

Crimes/Intelligence Unit, enhancement of

curfew activities, and deployment of saturation patrols in high-crime areas. Prevention

activities were linked to a youth survey administered by the health department regarding gun-related attitudes and behaviors and

to a “Hang Tough” program that combined

peer persuasion, public messages, and direct

contact with youth and was designed to stigmatize firearm violence. Target areas were

determined by Geographic Information

System data that indicated a high incidence

of juvenile handgun violence. CommunityMPD coalitions that included health department and public school collaboration were

key elements for both the prevention and

intervention strategies.

An earlier survey of 694 youth ages 15 to 24

years old in the same target area revealed

that 71 percent resided with their mothers in

single-parent households. During the preceding year, 27 percent had been threatened

and/or attacked by someone with a gun; 83

percent had heard gunshots in their neighborhood; 86 percent knew someone who had

been shot with a handgun; 42 percent had

been suspended from school; 35 percent had

used drugs; 35 percent had been drunk before; and 20 percent had carried a concealed

handgun (54 percent of those had first carried when they were younger than 15 years

old). School was the site of the handgun

threat in 14 percent of responses and the site

of attack in 10 percent. In the survey, “on

the street” was the most frequently identified

site of both threats (49 percent) and attacks

(54 percent). Although 48 percent of youth

had friends who carried concealed handguns

and 51 percent thought there were times

when it was necessary to carry, only 34 percent had ever fired a handgun for any reason
120 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 28 (continued)

(including target practice). Twenty-two percent, however, indicated that they had fired

in anger.

From January to September 1996, MPD

recovered 2,350 firearms, 70 percent of

which were from people under 25 years old.

Of those recovered from youth, 30 percent

were .22 or .25 caliber, and 32 percent were

manufactured by “Ring of Fire” manufacturers, a small group of gun manufacturers in

southern California that produces the majority of Saturday night specials.

During the project, the number of firearms recovered increased 58 percent and

curfew violation citations increased 64

percent. Firearm-related offenses, however, decreased 7 percent and violent

firearm offenses decreased 13 percent.

Firearm injuries for those under age 25

decreased 27 percent. From 1995 to 1996,

death rates for those 20–24 years old decreased by 11.4 percent; however, death

rates for those 15–19 years old increased

11.8 percent.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 121

Profile No. 29

Promising

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Salinas, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Initiative to deter gun carrying in high-crime

hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:

To reduce youth firearm violence through

proactive enforcement.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Youth gang members under age 25.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Salinas, CA.

Evaluated by:

Criminal Justice Department,

Sacramento State University,

Sacramento, CA.; Abt Associates Inc.,

Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

Sergeant Tracy Molfino

Salinas Police Department

222 Lincoln Avenue

Salinas, CA 93901–2639

Phone: 831–758–7348

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

Between 1984 and 1994, the Salinas community witnessed a dramatic increase in the

number of gangs and the amount of gangrelated violence. The Salinas Police Department identified 14 street gangs with more

than 400 certified and active gang members.

Moreover, during this time period, the annual number of homicides in Salinas tripled

(75 percent of these were gang related).

Notably, 90 percent of the gun-related violent offenses that occurred in the community

involved perpetrators under the age of 25

years.

YFVI sought to respond to these problems

by addressing the community conditions associated with gang violence and gang-related

activities through proactive enforcement

strategies. Prior to the development of this

initiative, the Salinas Police Department had

been involved in several antigang efforts,

created a Gang Task Force, and had participated in several community partnerships

including a violent injury prevention program. YFVI, however, was an independent

venture of the Salinas Police Department.

The primary component of the YFVI strategy was the creation of a Violence Suppression Unit (VSU)—which is an expansion of

the previous Gang Task Force. The VSU

consists of 15 police officers and utilizes a

series of aggressive patrol strategies. These

strategies include periodic surveillance,

probation/parole searches, traffic stops, the

use of raids and search warrants to recover

illegal firearms and firearms used in crimes,

the use of informants, and the development

of criteria for determining gang membership. In addition, YFVI developed a Geographic Information System data base that

geographically tracks gang-related activity

and firearm use. This system allows Salinas

police officers to respond to inquiries regarding the location of firearm seizures,

violent crimes, and gang incidents near

school zones.

This initiative has had several successful

outcomes. Data show that there has been an

increase in the number of violent crime arrests in the Salinas area since the initiative

began. Gun-related crimes and violent
122 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

offenses committed by youth under the age

of 25 years dropped considerably during the

first 2 years of the initiative (34 percent and

21 percent, respectively). Similar decreases

were found for all gun crimes and violent

offenses (regardless of the perpetrator’s age)

occurring in the community, resulting in a

Profile No. 29 (continued)

communitywide reduction in gun-related

and violent crimes. There also is consensus

among VSU officers that gang members no

longer hang out on the streets. Moreover,

anecdotal evidence suggests that the sense

of fear among community members has

decreased.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 123

Profile No. 30

Demonstrated

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Seattle, WA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Initiative to deter gun carrying in high-crime

hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:

To reduce youth firearm violence through

targeted and focused enforcement efforts.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Chronic youth weapons offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Seattle, WA.

Evaluated by:

University of Washington; Abt Associates

Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:

Julie Baker, Grant Coordinator

Community Information and

Services Bureau

Seattle Police Department

610 Third Avenue

Seattle, WA 98104

Phone: 206–233–5133

Years of Operation:

1995–97.

Seattle experienced an increase in juvenile

violence through the late 1980’s and early

1990’s. In 1994, there were a total of 77 juvenile firearm-related crime incidents, and

the total jumped to 151 incidents by 1995.

As in most cities, a small number of serious

and chronic juvenile offenders in Seattle

were responsible for the majority of serious

juvenile crimes. In response to this increase

in violence, the Seattle Police Department

(SPD) instituted departmentwide community policing and launched the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative which was funded

by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and awarded to SPD

in October 1995.

Violence prevention and

intervention strategies

Prior to 1996, SPD had initiated a variety of

intervention and prevention initiatives, including the Seattle Team for Youth (STFY),

which provides intensive services for youth

who are in gangs or are otherwise “at risk.”

The program emphasizes family involvement

and linking youth and families to social

services, counseling, and other support

services. SPD also began developing the

Options, Choices and Consequences program which involved a 2-day presentation

to eighth and ninth grade students by police

officers and medical and legal professionals

on the consequences of gun use. In schools,

COPS office-funded community policing

officers worked full time as School Emphasis Patrol Officers in various prevention,

intervention, and school safety projects. The

Community Safety Workgroup was formed

to integrate the city’s efforts to support

youth, control firearms, change negative

community attitudes that foster violence,

and raise community awareness of and

involvement in violence prevention.

Enforcement strategies

The Seattle Police Department focused its

enforcement efforts in schools by establishing

School Enforcement Teams (SET’s) in each
124 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 30 (continued)

of Seattle’s four precincts. SET’s were made

up of officers working in the schools. Each

SET was headed by an STFY detective and

augmented by patrol officers who provided

an additional police presence. These teams

coordinated with school administrators on

various enforcement and problem-solving

projects and worked closely with crime

analysts assigned to precinct stations.

Monthly team meetings were critical in identifying special problems related to incidences

of violence in particular schools and improving the level of communication and problem

solving among police, schools, and other

agencies.

A new computer-mapping crime analysis

system was created with the long-term goal

of providing precinct officers access to a

data base that would help them identify

problems occurring in their neighborhoods

or around their area schools. Information

from this system was deemed essential to

full implementation of the problem-solving

or identification and response model.

To target chronic juvenile gun offenders, a

system was established for tracking violent

offenders and disseminating information

through the department and other social

service agencies to reduce the anonymity

of the juveniles and refer the offenders to

intervention services. A list of the 50 most

violent juveniles was developed, and a notebook index system was created containing

information on the juveniles’ characteristics, offense histories, gang affiliations, and

probation orders and conditions. In addition, conditions of probation imposed by

the courts for the 50 targeted juveniles

were added to the SPD information system.

This information, in turn, could be accessed

through Mobile Data Terminals in patrol

cars.

Increased communication between police

and probation resulted in police and probation teams being able to increase surveillance on the most serious violent offenders

and enforce conditions of probation. A pilot

program was implemented pairing probation

officers with police officers.

Enhanced prosecution for serious violent

juvenile offenders was instituted through the

addition of a new full-time position in the

King County Prosecutor’s Office, which

resulted in changes to procedures for filing

and handling cases (to speed up processing)

and increases in conviction rates. The prosecutor also provided training to police officers on how to successfully prepare firearm

reports on juveniles by identifying essential

elements of offenses that need to be in police

reports (such as age of offender, weapon

operability, and issues related to establishing

possession) (see profile 42).

During the 1995 to 1997 period, when efforts

of the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative

were most intensive, SPD reported 139

weapons violations and 77 arrests made specifically through the program. In a comparison of the first 4 months of the 1997 school

year with the same 4-month period of the

previous year, it was reported that weapons

violations in the Seattle schools had declined

by 23 percent (falling from 47 to 36).
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 125

Surveillance of Probationers

Individuals on probation are responsible for a significant portion of all violent crime. In fact, probationers commit 30 percent of all homicides. Yet,

probation agencies traditionally have not collaborated with police departments. This lack of coordination has evolved over the years, reflecting the

apparently divergent missions of the two organizations—the police “lock them up,” and probation

officers “let them go.”1

 However, the differences

between probation and policing are being addressed

as new forms of cooperation are explored. Police

and probation officers alike recognize that both

groups play important roles in reducing the explosion of violent and firearm-related crime. They see

their collaboration as a logical outgrowth of the

community policing models influencing today’s law

enforcement practices. Moreover, probation officers

are increasingly at risk of more violence-prone probationers, and they recognize that probationer surveillance can be greatly enhanced by working with

police.

Nationally, 60 percent of all offenders under corrections supervision are on probation.2

 Offenders

placed on probation have conditional rights to remain in the community provided they comply with

the terms of probation set by the sentencing judge,

such as avoiding additional arrests, reporting to a

probation officer, paying restitution, and obtaining

substance abuse treatment. Juvenile probationers

are often subject to curfews.

Joint surveillance model

In November 1992, Operation Night Light began

operations in Boston, MA, as a demonstration of the

joint surveillance of probationers. Police and probation officers in the Dorchester area of the city began

to leave their desks and approach probationers on

the streets, after hours, and on their home turf. District judges were encouraged to impose new probation restrictions on their most violent, gang-involved

defendants. In this manner, the police and probation

teams could intensify probation supervision and

keep the high-risk offenders, who were likely to take

any advantage of perceived laxity, on a “short

leash.”3

 Police and probation officers expected that

this escalation in the intensity of supervision would

lower the number of violations for new arrests as

compliance with curfews and other restrictive conditions increased.

Joint probationer surveillance programs generally

involve establishing two- or three-person police and

probation officer teams to identify active probationers who may not have been complying with courtimposed conditions. During visits with probationers,

the police officers take responsibility for safety

issues and the probation officers meet with the

probationer and family members to reinforce the

importance of meeting all court requirements, and

to determine if the probationer or family needs other

social services that can help the offender successfully complete his or her sentence. The policeprobation officer team also meets with groups of

juveniles and young adults on the streets to send a

message to other probationers that both agencies are

cooperating to monitor their activities.

Initial outcomes

Although these joint surveillance programs have not

been formally evaluated, the use of these policeprobation officer teams in the Dorchester area of

Boston, MA, resulted in a 9-percent decline in the

number of violations for new arrests as compliance

with curfews and other conditions of probation increased during the first 3 years of the program.4

Moreover, with more than 6,000 probationer contacts during the 5-year period from 1992 to 1997,

the number of all firearm-related homicides declined

more than 50 percent.5

 The program administrators

in Boston recognize that the reduction of the homicide rate cannot be attributed exclusively to the

Operation Night Light program; however, they suggest that probation sentences have gained a new and

enhanced credibility due to stricter enforcement of

key conditions, and that people on probation must

take their requirements seriously or endure the consequences. Probationers came to realize that their

actions were known to either probation officers or

the police, who were pooling their intelligence. This

deterrence strategy made many more probationers

amenable to “going straight” than was typical under

previous conditions.6
126 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Operation Night Light has served as the model for

the other probation surveillance strategies described

in this chapter, and for a number of similar programs in other cities.

Notes

1. R.P. Corbett, “The promise (and perils) of

probation-police partnerships,” Corrections Management Quarterly 2(Summer):3, 1998.

2. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Populations in the United States, 1995, Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1997.

3. Corbett, 1998.

4. R.P. Corbett, B.L. Fitzgerald, and J. Jordan,

“Operation Night Light: An emerging model for

police-probation partnerships,” in Invitation to

Change: Better Government Competition on Public Safety,

Boston, MA: Pioneer Institute for Public Policy

Research, 1996.

5. Corbett, 1998.

6. J. Petersilia, Community Corrections: Probation, Parole, and Intermediate Sanctions, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 127

Profile No. 31

Promising

Minnesota Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI), Minnesota

HEALS—Minneapolis, MN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program for surveillance of probationers.

Program Goal:

To monitor probationers’ adherence to the

terms of their probation and reduce violent

crimes.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Adults and juveniles in pretrial and sentence

status, on parole, or on probation.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Hennepin County, MN.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Jim Robertson, Corrections Unit

Supervisor

Hennepin County Department of

Community Corrections

Adult Field Services—Investigation

Division

A–302 Government Center

300 South Sixth Street

Minneapolis, MN 55487

Phone: 612–348–9215

Years of Operation:

1997–present.

The Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative

(MAVI) is a collaborative of the Hennepin

County Department of Community Corrections, the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office,

and the Minneapolis Police Department, and

is modeled after Boston’s Operation Night

Light program. For the first time, probation

and police officers work together to monitor

both adults and juveniles who are in pretrial

or sentencing status. The MAVI teams also

respond to referrals from judges, probation

officers, and pretrial and posttrial sources.

Priority is given to cases involving violence,

weapons possession, and gang affiliation.

MAVI teams make unannounced “soft entry” visits (where consent is obtained) to the

homes of selected probationers during the

evening hours to monitor adherence to the

terms of their probation. The most common

violations found during these visits are

possession of drugs or weapons and probationers under the influence of drugs. About

40 such visits are made each week by 50

probation and police officers. Police and

deputies train with probation officers for

2 days to learn about their respective roles

in this operation.

The Minneapolis police chief believes the

MAVI program is largely responsible for the

drop in the city’s homicides during the summer of 1997, which fell to 8 from 40 the previous summer. The former commander of

the gang unit also believes MAVI has had a

deterrent effect because probationers do not

like being known on a personal level by probation officers and the police. In addition, as

a result of MAVI the courts now place more

stringent conditions on pretrial release, such

as curfews and restrictions on visiting certain neighborhoods and associates. From
128 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

June 1997 through September 1998, 1,644

MAVI visits were conducted, and from

January through September 1998, 49 arrests were made as a result of the surveillance activities.

MAVI is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy that was implemented in

Profile No. 31 (continued)

Hennepin County to address escalating crime

rates. For more information and a discussion

of how MAVI fits into the county’s overall

crime reduction strategy, please see profile 7,

Minnesota HEALS.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 129

Profile No. 32

Promising

Operation Eiger, Baton Rouge Partnership for the

Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Initiative for surveillance of probationers.

Program Goal:

To reduce gun violence among youth and

increase community safety.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juveniles and youth ages 12 to 24.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Two ZIP code areas in the city.

Evaluated by:

COSMOS Corporation, Bethesda, MD.

Contact Information:

Yvonne Day

Baton Rouge Partnership to Reduce

Juvenile Gun Violence

222 St. Louis Street, Ninth Floor, Room 936

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

Phone: 504–389–7871

Years of Operation:

1997–present.

Operation Eiger is a high-intensity, policeprobation partnership, operating in Baton

Rouge, LA. This initiative targets a group of

repeat violent youth offenders identified by

the Partnership as “Eigers.” Eiger is a metaphorical reference to the Swiss mountain of

the same name. Though not the world’s

highest mountain, it is known as one of the

most difficult to climb. Three-member,

police-probation teams have implemented

intensive and regular home visits with the

Eigers, their parents, and their siblings to

monitor probation compliance, record information for intervention services, and establish an ongoing dialog with the families. In

addition, Operation Eiger teams monitor

identified youth (non-Eigers) who are at

risk of becoming serious habitual offenders.

The strategy facilitates an immediate response to delinquent behavior when it

occurs.

In the initiative’s first 13 months, a total of

311 Eigers had been identified—198 juveniles and 113 young adults (17–21 years of

age). These probationers reside in two target

ZIP code areas in North Baton Rouge. In

addition, the teams monitor 247 other highrisk youth. Intensive case management and

intervention services are provided to the

Eiger population. Need and risk assessments

have been completed for 205 Eigers, individual service plans have been developed for

72 juvenile Eigers, and case management

intervention services (using program partners and other community resources) have

been delivered to 51 youth. These intervention services included substance abuse treatment, mentoring, job training/placement,

and many other forms of counseling and

support to both youth and families.

Over the past year, Eiger teams have made

9,570 home visits, with the average number

of monthly contacts per juvenile Eiger (ages

16 and under) ranging from 3.3 during the

first month of implementation to 6.2 during

the last 3 months of the reporting period.

The average number of monthly contacts for

older youth (ages 17 to 21) remained constant at 3.4 contacts per month throughout

the period, largely because the number of
130 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

violations for individuals in this group remained consistently low (at less than 2 percent). The most dramatic difference was

found in the juvenile Eiger population. In

this group, the percentage of contacts for

whom no violations were reported increased

from 56 percent in September 1997 to 71

percent in September 1998.

Profile No. 32 (continued)

Operation Eiger is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy, funded by

the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, that was implemented in

Baton Rouge to address escalating violent

crime rates. For a more detailed description,

and discussion of how the program fits into

the city’s overall crime reduction strategy,

please see profile 8.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 131

Profile No. 33

Promising

Operation Night Light—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program for surveillance of probationers.

Program Goal:

To effectively enforce the terms and conditions of probation with an eye on public

safety, protecting the safety and rehabilitation of the offender.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juveniles and youth on probation.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Bernard Fitzgerald, Chief Probation Officer

Dorchester District Court

510 Washington Street

Dorchester, MA 02124

Phone: 617–288–9500

Years of Operation:

1992–present.

Operation Night Light began in November 1992 as a partnership between probation officers in the Dorchester, MA,

District Court and Boston, MA, police

officers in the Anti-Gang Violence Unit

(which later became the Youth Violence

Strike Force). This alliance was created at

a time when Boston was experiencing

heightened gang violence, a rise in homicide victims under the age of 17, public

alarm, increasingly bold behavior of gang

members in courthouses, and criticism by

minority community leaders and judges of

police “stop and search” tactics. Probation

officers worked independently of police,

and curfews were not commonly imposed

by the court and were difficult to enforce.

In response to those problems, a few probation officers met informally with a few

police officers to develop the Operation

Night Light model as a more effective way

of deterring juvenile violence.

Operation Night Light pairs one probation

officer with two police officers to make

surprise visits to the homes, schools, and

worksites of high-risk youth probationers

during the nontraditional hours of 7 p.m.

to midnight, rather than from 8:30 a.m. to

4:30 p.m., which was previously the norm.

In Dorchester, where Operation Night

Light started, probationer surrenders based

on new arrests declined 9.2 percent between

January 1994 and June 1996, compared

with a statewide increase of 14 percent during the same period.

Operation Night Light is one element of a

collaborative, comprehensive strategy that

was implemented in Boston to address escalating violent crime rates. For a more detailed description and a discussion of how

this program fits into Boston’s overall crime

reduction strategy, please see profile 2.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 133

School-Based Enforcement

Programs

Several recent high-profile cases of school shootings

have led schools and communities to increase the

security of students and staff while on campus.

Deterring gun carrying in schools is essential for

both safety and education. Even if actual shootings

at school are rare, the presence of guns in schools is

not rare and the threatening environment guns create makes teaching and learning difficult. Between

1994 and 1996, the percentage of 12th grade males

reporting carrying a gun to school in the past 4

weeks increased from 4.8 percent to 6.3 percent or

approximately 1 in 16.1

 In addition, 12.7 percent of

students ages 12 to 19 reported knowing a student

who brought a gun to school. When the sample is

restricted to students who reported street gangs in

their schools, 24.8 percent reported knowing a

student who brought a gun to school.2

Having learned that no school is immune to serious

and sudden violence, administrators are choosing

quickly to adopt new policies, discipline codes, technologies, and security strategies. Many of these

approaches are expensive in terms of startup costs,

external technical assistance expertise, and maintenance, and are more effective when updated periodically. The investment appears warranted where

schools have carefully considered their actual or

potential local gun violence problems and based

their approaches on these analyses. Rigorously selected security approaches can deter gun carrying

and reduce school violence. Even if school administrators believe gun violence is unlikely, they may

want to examine their approach to creating a safe

school.

When dealing with students who bring firearms to

school, the local chief educational officer should

refer to the Gun Free Schools Act (GFSA) of 1994.

Under GFSA, every State receiving funds under the

Elementary and Secondary Education Act must

have a law that requires any student who brings a

firearm to school to be expelled for not less than

1 year, and allows the expulsion requirement to be

modified on a case-by-case basis by the local chief

administering officer. Many States and communities

have expanded on GFSA and created policies of

zero tolerance for all weapons, including toys. The

U.S. Department of Education reports that more

than 6,000 students were expelled for bringing firearms to public schools during the 1996–97 school

year. Approximately 58 percent of these firearms

were handguns.

There are several key points to consider in deterring

gun carrying in schools:

◆ Treating staff and students with dignity and

respect, principals can create an environment

conducive to learning, school attachment, and

nonviolent behavior. Providing engaging academic programs that recognize multiple forms of

student achievement channels students’ energy

into constructive learning activities. Students’

respect for authority can be increased by ensuring

that punishments are appropriate to the severity

of infractions, the disciplinary code is consistently

and impartially enforced, due process is followed

(using witnesses, gathering evidence, involving

multiple staff members in deciding how to react),

and positive behavior is rewarded as vigorously

as negative behavior is punished.

◆ Assigning an appropriate level of responsibility to

every person in the school for maintaining a secure environment increases the likelihood that the

presence of guns will be reported. Students can

be prepared to take responsibility through social

skills training and education about the dangers of

carrying guns. Staff can learn the early warning

signs for violence, visual screening techniques for

spotting concealed weapons, and appropriate

procedures for responding to a student with a

gun. Gun carrying also can be deterred by providing an anonymous hotline and making everyone responsible for reporting weapons and other

offenses.

◆ Keeping the school facility clean, in good repair,

and attractive to students increases student respect for the school and for school officials, and

may decrease gun carrying, vandalism, and violent behavior. Immediately painting over graffiti

(after taking photographs for investigators) decreases the recognition received by the vandal

and may deter gun carrying by minimizing gangs’

opportunities to demonstrate their presence.
134 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

◆ Monitoring all areas of the school building and

grounds increases the opportunities for detecting

students carrying weapons and increases their

fear of being caught. Monitoring can be enhanced

by ensuring that entrances and administrative

offices are visible from the street; drop tile ceilings where weapons can be hidden are eliminated;

exterior lights are break-resistant; areas where

students congregate are supervised; playground

equipment is located where school staff, neighbors, and police patrols have good visual surveillance; blind spots are limited by the use of

low-level landscaping; and the facility and

grounds have sufficient lighting.

◆ Restricting access to the building makes it more

difficult for students to bring guns into the school.

Methods of restricting access may include enforcing a policy against loitering on campus by nonstudents, requiring identification cards for all

students and staff, limiting handles on exterior

doors with the exception of major entry doors and

places where firefighters must be able to enter,

and requiring that visitors sign in and be escorted.

◆ Involving professional security personnel, security devices, and police effectively can help prevent guns from entering the school and make

students feel safer, so that they no longer feel

a need to bring weapons to school. Security personnel provide both environmental protection

and extra staff who can build relationships with

the students. Metal detectors are not entirely effective, but they can be used to limit the presence

of guns at school. Alarm systems, surveillance

cameras, and student uniforms draw attention to

unauthorized entries. Police patrols increase the

risk of being arrested for behaving violently and

for carrying concealed weapons.

Students who have carried weapons to school pose

a grave threat to other students and are likely to

repeat their offenses. To be in compliance with the

GFSA, the local chief educational officer must consider expulsion. However, gun-carrying students

can, and should, continue to receive educational

services. Alternative education programs for

weapon-carrying students are likely to succeed if

they contain the following elements: administrators

with vision and commitment, extensive contact with

motivated and specially trained school staff, needsbased individualized instruction, focused classes

with low student-to-staff ratios, innovative presentations of materials related to real life, caring and supportive environments, intensive counseling for

students and their families, and frequent student

progress reports.

The strategies profiled on the following pages were

developed by communities in response to increasing

concern about the safety of children in school settings and to research indicating that a large number

of children report that they either carry guns or

other weapons to school, or know that their peers

are doing so. Some of the strategies focus on youth

education; others include a system of warnings, parent notification, and sanctions to create a safer educational environment. Police and probation officers

in these communities are now working together for

the first time, each bringing special skills and resources to keep probationers from reoffending.

Notes

1. Institute for Social Research, Monitoring the Future,

Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Survey

Research Center, 1997.

2. Institute for Social Research, 1997.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 135

Profile No. 34

Promising

Bibb County, GA, Department of Education, Violence

and Weapons Prevention and Intervention Program—

Macon, GA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

School-based enforcement program.

Program Goal:

To reduce violence and weapons in schools.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

School-age youth and gang members.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Bibb County, GA, school campuses and

surrounding areas.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Michael Dorn

Bibb County Campus Police

2444 Ross Avenue

Macon, GA 31204

Phone: 912–752–5236

Years of Operation:

1988–present.

The Bibb County, GA, Department of Education has adopted a comprehensive prevention and intervention initiative to

reduce the number of weapons in schools.

The initiative’s five components are: (1) a

policy that defines, prohibits students from

carrying, and establishes consequences for

being caught with an impermissible weapon

at school; (2) constant education of students to reinforce the policy; (3) policies

designed to make it difficult to bring weapons to school; (4) weapon-screening programs; and (5) consistent sanctions for

violations.

In addition to firearms and explosives, two

dozen other types of weapons are prohibited,

including switchblades, pocket knives, box

cutters, razors, ice picks, blackjacks, and

chains. Students sign a behavioral contract

pledging not to bring weapons to school or to

handle another student’s weapon, and parents

and school administrators sign in support of

the students. The contract specifies that violators will be arrested and disciplined and

explains that random searches of lockers,

cars, and students will occur. A male and

female police team participates in random

searches of entire classrooms, and a “gun

dog” assists in searching lockers. All public

areas where weapons might be hidden are

routinely checked. Zero tolerance for weapons violations mandates prosecution by the

schools for every incident. Students are removed from the classroom, examined by a

psychologist, and may complete the year in

an alternative school. Other intervention

Copyright © 1998 PhotoDisc, Inc.
136 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

methods include strictly enforced policies

against fighting, gang paraphernalia, gang

signs, and graffiti.

Community policing techniques such as

high-visibility officers on dirt bikes on

school campuses, analysis of overall crime

reports to identify schools at risk, and zero

tolerance of motor vehicle violations in

school areas contribute to a communitywide

effort. Stopping cars in school areas for suspicious behavior, minor violations, and

searches is believed to reduce gang drive-by

incidents and keep nonstudents out of the

area. Gun suppression strategies target gang

members and students at random.

Campus police speak regularly at community organizations and churches as part of

Profile No. 34 (continued)

Bibb County’s violence prevention and education strategy. They also teach an American

Bar Association law and individual responsibility curriculum to eighth graders and a

National Rifle Association gun accident

prevention curriculum to third graders.

Teachers are now being trained to recognize

body movements that are indicative of gun

possession.

Bibb County is reported to be the only urban school system in Georgia that has not

had a student shot while at school. The relationship between students and law enforcement is said to be very good. Students are

even said to have applauded when the police

arrived to search their class for weapons.
Section V: Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying 137

Profile No. 35

Promising

Suffolk County Community-Based Juvenile Justice

Program—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

School-based enforcement program.

Program Goal:

To identify and provide services for juveniles who commit acts of violence or are at

risk of gun violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

At-risk and offending juveniles in middle

and high schools.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Suffolk County, MA.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Jim Borghesani

External Affairs and Communications

Director

Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office

One Bulfinch Place

Boston, MA 02114

Phone: 617–619–4189

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

The Community-Based Juvenile Justice

(CBJJ) Program was established in 1995.

Its goal is to reduce juvenile crime and violence in the schools and the community

through increased communication and better sharing of information and resources.

The program is operated out of the Suffolk

County District Attorney’s (D.A.’s) Office.

In 1997, more than half of the middle

schools and one-third of the high schools in

Boston, MA, hosted CBJJ roundtable meetings, which were led by representatives from

the D.A.’s office, Boston Police Department,

Boston Schools, Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority, juvenile probation services,

Department of Youth Services, and Department of Social Services.

The CBJJ Program takes advantage of

three Federal grants from the U.S. Department of Justice (SafeFutures provides funding for services to youth in a geographical

corridor where many court-involved and atrisk youth live), the U.S. Department of

Labor (the Youth Opportunity Area Grant

funds educational and job opportunities for

youth), and the U.S. Department of Education, which supports the truancy initiative.

The team meets twice each month to prescribe interventions for juveniles at risk and

those involved in violence. The roundtable

meeting is a forum for school principals to

brief police about students who bring weapons to school, to refer troubled kids to social

services, or to inform counselors of youth

situations in legal proceedings. At the meeting, one agency is designated as responsible

for followup planning on a particular juvenile. Interventions may include indictment

as a youthful offender; recommitment to the

Department of Youth Services based on a

juvenile’s violation of his or her terms of

release; revocation of probation based on

a juvenile’s noncompliance with courtimposed conditions; requests for the court

to impose specific conditions both before

trial and at disposition; prosecution on a

priority basis; filing a Child in Need of Supervision (CHINS) petition; or referral of a
138 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 35 (continued)

juvenile for services in one of the involved

grants or in school- or community-based

agencies.

The roundtable meetings are said to result in

more efficient prosecution of violent juveniles, more coordinated response among

agencies dealing with court-involved youth,

and more coordinated intervention initiatives

for at-risk youth. They also create greater

accountability and more predictable consequences for delinquent behavior. During the

period from September 1996 to December

1997, 552 cases were discussed at CBJJ

roundtables; of these, 44 percent were court

involved. The three major reasons for referrals were negative behavior, truancy, and

recent arrests. The roundtables also have

helped draw attention to other important

issues—the lack of alternative education

placements, the need for more tutorial services, the lack of appropriate placements for

juveniles over the age of 18 who have few

academic credits due to past incarcerations,

and a lack of coordination between schools

and probation officers for CHINS cases.

Other initiatives of the program have

included expanded truancy sweeps by

Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority

(MBTA) police, local police, and school

attendance officers; interventions by the

CBJJ staff and Boston Police Department

in a rapid and coordinated manner when

violent episodes occur at schools; and collaboration with the MBTA to reduce youth

violence on the transit system after school.

The county district attorney believes that

effective truancy intervention and prevention measures at the middle school level will

reduce the heavy court involvement of juveniles at the high school level.

For cases completed in 1997, 32.9 percent

of students exhibited an increase in positive

behavior, 15.6 percent of the students were

transferred to other schools, and 8.0 percent

were brought into custody. Although the

Community-Based Juvenile Justice Program is not formally linked to other gun

violence reduction strategies in Boston,

many of the schools involved in the program

are in neighborhoods targeted by the city’s

Operation Ceasefire (see profile 21), and the

Police Department’s Strategy to Prevent

Youth Violence (see profile 2).
Strategies To Respond To

Illegal Gun Use

Section VI
Section VI. Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use

Overview ...................................................................................................................................................... 141

Focused Prosecution Strategies ................................................................................................................ 141

Profile No.

36. DISARM, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Baltimore, MD .................................................................... 142

37. Gun Court—Providence, RI .......................................................................................................... 144

38. Project Exile, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Eastern District of Virginia ............................................ 145

39. U.S. Attorney’s Office Anti-Violence Crime Task Force—Memphis, TN .................................. 148

40. U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiatives—Rochester, NY ...................................................................... 150

Court-Related Programs ............................................................................................................................ 153

Profile No.

41. Handgun Intervention Program—Detroit, MI ............................................................................. 154

42. Juvenile Firearms Prosecution—Seattle, WA .............................................................................. 156

43. Juvenile Gun Court—Birmingham, AL ........................................................................................ 158

44. Juvenile Gun Program—Minneapolis, MN ................................................................................. 163

45. Project LIFE—Indianapolis, IN .................................................................................................... 165
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 141

Overview

This section addresses the third phase of the gun

violence continuum—gun use—and describes the

ways in which the criminal justice system has responded to those who are charged with possessing

and using firearms.

Focused Prosecution

Strategies

Both prosecutors and the courts have developed

new strategies to target illegal use of firearms by

adults. U.S. Attorneys in several States have used

enhanced Federal sanctions in cases against certain

groups of gun offenders. In addition, U.S. Attorneys

and local prosecutors have joined forces to find the

best prosecutory forum for gun offenders. In many

cases, special task forces have been created that

include representatives from Federal, State, county,

and local law enforcement agencies.

The courts have also developed programs to deter

gun use with swift, sure, and severe penalties. The

Nation’s first adult gun court was established in the

Providence, RI, Superior Court in 1994 by a State

statute that created a separate gun court calendar

with concurrent jurisdiction with all other Superior

Court calendars. It is anticipated that increasing the

likelihood of imprisonment and lengthening its

duration will have a deterrent effect on those who

engage in gun violence.

Federal and State prosecutors have not only acquired increased discretion in juvenile cases, but

also, in many jurisdictions, initiated their own programs to target violent juveniles.

Although recent crime data show that juvenile arrests

for murder and other violent crimes have been

declining, public perceptions to the contrary have

led to new legislation targeting juvenile offenders.

—Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, Juvenile Court Statistics, 1995, 1998
142 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 36

Promising

DISARM, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program of focused prosecution strategies;

High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area; and

U.S. Attorney’s Office.

Program Goal:

To identify repeat felons with UCR Part 1

offenses who are arrested while in possession of a gun and target them for Federal

prosecution.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Repeat violent offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Montgomery County, Prince Georges County.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Martin Clarke

Assistant U.S. Attorney

U.S. Attorney’s Office

101 West Lombard Street

Baltimore, MD 21201

Phone: 410–209–4840

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

DISARM targets gun-related violence in

Maryland by seeking Federal prosecution

for individuals arrested while in possession

of a gun who have a substantial record of

convictions for violent crime or drug trafficking. In Federal court, these felons face

up to life imprisonment and mandatory

minimums for gun possession, including a

minimum sentence of 15 years for gun possession associated with three prior felonies.

The program began as a cooperative effort of

the U.S. Attorney’s Office; the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); the

Baltimore City Police; and the State’s

Attorney’s Office. It has been expanded to

include Baltimore, Montgomery, and Prince

Georges Counties and all parts of the HighIntensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)

program, which now funds it. The program

also is available to any jurisdiction in Maryland that contacts the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

While the DISARM initiative is not linked

to Baltimore’s Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) (see profile 1), some of

the individuals targeted reside in CCP

neighborhoods.

The procedure for authorizing DISARM

cases is as follows. Any individual with at

least one prior violent crime or narcotics

felony conviction who is arrested with a

firearm in his or her possession will be considered a DISARM target, although normally a defendant must have two prior

qualifying felonies before a Federal prosecution will be authorized. Federal prosecution

of a defendant with one prior qualifying

felony can be authorized if the police department or State’s Attorney’s Office believes

that special circumstances justify a Federal

prosecution. The cases are initially screened

by personnel assigned to the ATF’s HIDTA

program and then referred to the U.S.

Attorney’s Office and the State’s Attorney’s

Office for review.
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 143

Profile No. 36 (continued)

Between May 1994 and June 1998, 173

locally arrested defendants were referred

to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for Federal

prosecution. Those convicted received an

average sentence of 8.3 years without the

possibility of parole. In contrast, a defendant

prosecuted in State court for handgun

possession faces a maximum of 3 years’

incarceration, subject to parole, and defendants often simply receive probation. The

cumulative criminal histories of the convicted DISARM defendants include 1,158

prior arrests and 395 prior convictions.
144 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 37

Promising

Gun Court—Providence, RI

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Court-related program.

Program Goal:

To prosecute and sentence violent adults

who use guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Persons charged with gun offenses.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

City of Providence, RI, and surrounding

counties.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection/legislative review.

Contact Information:

Susan Revens

Superior Court

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

Phone: 401–222–3288

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

The Nation’s first Gun Court was established in the Providence, RI, Superior Court

in September 1994. After gaining the support of both the National Rifle Association

(NRA) and gun control groups, enabling

legislation passed with only one negative

vote. A 1989 law had provided for minimum

sentencing for carrying a gun in committing

a crime of violence: first offense, 3–10 years;

second offense, 10–20 years; and third offense, 15 years to life. Nevertheless, gun

crimes continued to escalate. Before the Gun

Court, sentences were imposed in only 67

percent of cases (sentences include terms of

probation). The average time to disposition

was 518 days.

The new legislation created a separate Gun

Court calendar concurrent with all other

Superior Court calendars and required that

any case involving a gun be scheduled for

trial within 60 days of completion of discovery. Automatic referral of such cases to the

Gun Court calendar is part of an administrative routine and does not require a hearing.

No evaluation has been conducted to assess

the effect on reducing gun-related crime or

charges; however, the speed of disposition

and level and certainty of punishment have

been enhanced.

Of 866 cases assigned to the Gun Court

calendar between September 1994 and

October 1998, 794 have been concluded,

82 percent of which have resulted in sentences. Of those cases that resulted in sentences, 19 percent have completed their

sentences, 25 percent have less than 2 years

left to serve, 11 percent have 2 to 5 years left

to serve, 4 percent have 5 to 10 years left to

serve, and 6 percent have more than 10

years left to serve. Thirty-five percent received a suspended or deferred sentence

or probation. Only 3 percent were found

not guilty; 10 percent were dismissed. Case

disposition time has been reduced by 311

percent to 126 days.

Officials believe the Gun Court sends the

message that, if you use a gun in Providence,

you are going to jail. NRA augmented this

message by paying for billboards that stated,

“Gun Court is now in session.”
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 145

Profile No. 38

Promising

Project Exile, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Eastern District

of Virginia

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Collaborative initiative of the U.S.

Attorney’s Office; Richmond Commonwealth Attorney’s Office; Richmond Police

Department; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms; Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Virginia State Police.

Program Goal:

To reduce Richmond’s homicide rate by

detaining dangerous armed felons prior to

trial and prosecuting them in Federal court.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Previously convicted felons who possess

guns and/or armed persons involved in drug

or violent crimes.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Richmond, VA, metropolitan area, including

the City of Richmond and Chesterfield and

Henrico Counties.

Evaluated by:

No formal evaluation is being conducted.

Contact Information:

David Schiller

Assistant U.S. Attorney

U.S. Attorney’s Office

600 East Main Street, Suite 1800

Richmond, VA 23219

Phone: 804–771–2186

Years of Operation:

1997–present.

Project Exile is a coordinated approach to

gun violence in the Richmond metropolitan

area led by the Richmond U.S. Attorney’s

Office in coordination with the Richmond

Commonwealth’s Attorney; Richmond Police Department; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); Federal Bureau

of Investigation; and Virginia State Police.

During the 1990’s, Richmond’s homicide

rate—which is driven primarily by gun

violence—has been among the highest in

the Nation for cities with populations exceeding 100,000. In the past few years,

Virginia has enacted new State laws (onegun-a-month and truth-in-sentencing), while

implementing several Federal, State, and

local law enforcement initiatives to address

violent crime in Richmond. Project Exile

specifically targets previously convicted

felons carrying guns and armed persons

involved in drug or violent crimes. Approximately 85 percent of Richmond’s homicides

in 1997 were committed with guns, more

than 40 percent were drug-related, and more

than 60 percent involved offenders with

prior criminal records. During the first 10

months of 1998, compared with the same

period of the previous year, the total number

of homicides committed in Richmond was

down 36 percent and the number of firearm

homicides was down 41 percent.
146 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 38 (continued)

Project Exile was formally initiated in February 1997 when indictments of the first

group of Project Exile defendants for Federal firearm offenses were announced.

Project Exile is based on the principle that,

if police catch a criminal in Richmond with

a gun, the criminal has forfeited his or her

right to remain in the community and, as

such, will face immediate Federal prosecution and stiff mandatory Federal prison

sentences.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office, along with a

Richmond Assistant Commonwealth’s

Attorney who is cross-designated as a special Assistant U.S. Attorney, reviews cases

involving felons with guns, drug users

with guns, guns used in drug trafficking,

and gun/domestic violence referrals and

prosecutes these cases in Federal court

when a Federal nexus exists and State

prison sentences or pretrial detention is

insufficient. When a police officer finds a

gun while on duty, the officer can page an

ATF agent, who is available 24 hours a

day. ATF and the Richmond Police, in

consultation with the U.S. Attorney’s

Office, review the circumstances and determine if a Federal statute applies and

whether Federal prosecution would provide the most effective incapacitation for

the offender. Typically, Federal prison

sentences are longer than Virginia sentences for offenses involving previously

convicted felons possessing firearms and

armed drug traffickers, whereas State

sentences may equal or exceed Federal

sentences for repeat violent offenders.

As of November 1998, Project Exile had

achieved the following results:

◆ 372 persons indicted for Federal gun

violations.

◆ 440 guns seized.

◆ 300 persons arrested or held in State

custody.

◆ 222 arrestees (more than 74 percent) held

without bond.

◆ 247 persons convicted.

◆ 196 persons sentenced to an average of

55 months of imprisonment.

An extensive public outreach and media

campaign to educate citizens about lengthy

Federal prison sentences for gun crimes

and to maximize deterrence also is a critical

component of Project Exile. The Project

Exile Citizen Support Foundation was

formed in July 1997. The Foundation

raised more than $40,000 in 1997 and more

than $100,000 in financial and in-kind contributions in 1998 for advertising and for

dissemination of Project Exile’s media message. The message, “An illegal gun will get

you 5 years in Federal prison,” asks citizens

to report guns to the Metro Richmond

Crime Stoppers anonymous telephone

number. The media message was advertised

on 15 billboards throughout the city, a fully

painted city bus (which changes routes

daily so that it covers the entire city each

week), 15,000 business cards, a series of

radio and television promotional spots,

traffic reports aired by 24 local radio stations, and print advertising.

The Richmond Police Department, ATF,

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office also have

worked with numerous public and/or private

entities, such as the Richmond Boys & Girls

Club, Richmond Public Schools, Richmond

Metro Crime Stoppers, Fox Television’s

Black Achievers program, and the Richmond

Times-Dispatch newspaper, among others, to

publicize Project Exile and to enlist citizen

support and participation.
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 147

Profile No. 38 (continued)

In response to Project Exile, Virginia’s

Governor has announced specific proposals

to be introduced in the 1999 legislative session that would enhance State penalties for

gun offenders. The Virginia plan would

establish 3-year mandatory minimum

sentences for possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon, possession of an illegal

firearm in a school building, or possession

of both an illegal firearm and an illegal drug

such as cocaine or heroin.
148 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 39

Promising

U.S. Attorney’s Office Anti-Violence Crime Task

Force—Memphis, TN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program of Prevention Education–changing

attitudes toward guns and violence.

Program Goal:

To prosecute adults who provide guns to

juveniles.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Adults who are illegally transferring guns to

youth.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Western District of Tennessee.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Tony Arvin

Assistant U.S. Attorney

U.S. Attorney’s Office

800 Federal Building

Memphis, TN 38103

Phone: 901–544–4231

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

In 1995, Memphis and Shelby County experienced a 39-percent increase in weapons

possession on school campuses; a 50-percent

increase in the number of youth charged

with reckless endangerment with a weapon;

a 5.5-percent increase in misdemeanor gun

possession by juveniles; and a 9-percent

increase in felony possession. Forty juveniles

were charged with some form of homicide.

In response, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for

the Western District of Tennessee applied for

and received an Anti-Violent Crime Initiative

grant, which began in August 1995. This

grant formed the basis for the expansion of

the Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF) to

target juvenile offenders and to enforce the

Youth Handgun Safety Act. The language of

this Act states that it is unlawful for a person

to sell, deliver, or otherwise transfer a handgun and/or handgun ammunition to a person

whom the transferor knows is a juvenile. The

goals of the task force were to discover how

juveniles were obtaining guns, develop appropriate prevention policies, and develop

prosecutable cases against adults responsible

for the illegal supply of guns to children and

other juveniles.

VCTF operates under a memorandum of

understanding (MOU) involving eight

agencies: the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms (ATF), Memphis Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Shelby County Sheriff’s Department, in addition to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Juvenile

Court of Memphis and Shelby County, Memphis City Schools, and District Attorney’s

Office for the 30th District of Tennessee.

Under the terms of the MOU, the task force

has maintained a presence within the juvenile

court to compile statistics on firearm possession by juveniles and within the school

system to collect information on student

violence. With the assistance of ATF, the task

force also traces all confiscated guns and

interviews all juveniles arrested for firearm

possession in an attempt to locate the sources

of firearms. In addition, the task force has

developed a method of organizing and
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 149

Profile No. 39 (continued)

classifying all statistical information gathered

at the Juvenile Court to maximize intelligence. These data are reported to a Violent

Crimes Coordinator on a monthly basis. The

task force also has developed a method for

identifying related juvenile cases. The participation of the arresting officers has greatly

increased the task force’s effectiveness in

and awareness of potential cases.

The task force also has been involved in

analyzing all weapon-related information

obtained from the school system.

Interim findings, covering the period from

June 1995 to May 1996, reveal that 82 percent

of arrested children (ages 11 to 17) were interviewed by VCTF. VCTF traced 319 weapons.

The most popular guns recovered were the

.38 caliber revolver and the .38 caliber pistol.

Charges for these arrests included aggravated

robbery, property crimes, and drug and firearm violations. Most of the juveniles denied

having a weapon or refused to talk to VCTF,

although they were told it would have no

bearing on their cases. On average, the

youth’s first gun experience was at age 13,

although the incidence of gang involvement,

mentioned in the interviews, was believed

to be underestimated. The first prosecution

in the country under the Youth Handgun

Safety Act was attributed to this task force.
150 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 40

Promising

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiatives—Rochester, NY

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Focused prosecution strategies.

Program Goal:

To reduce the illegal possession, use, sale,

and trade of firearms by juveniles and

adults.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

High-risk youth, gang members, and criminals who use guns.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Rochester, NY.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Bradley Tyler, Assistant U.S. Attorney

U.S. Attorney’s Office

620 Keating Federal Building

Rochester, NY 14614

Phone: 716–263–5717

Chief Robert Duffy

Rochester Police Department

150 Plymouth Avenue

South Rochester, NY 14614

Phone: 716–428–7033

Years of Operation:

1996–present.

In 1993, the Attorney General requested

that all U.S. Attorneys in each district prepare a crime plan that would address gun

violence and related crimes in their local

areas. As a result of this mandate, the U.S.

Attorney for the Western District of New

York teamed up with several Federal, State,

and local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to form the Violent Crimes

Task Force (VCTF). The local office of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the

lead agency for VCTF. The mission of the

task force is to respond to and investigate

violent crimes. The group sets its priorities

in response to current crime trends.

VCTF endeavors to reduce crime by current

and former youth offenders through a carrotand-stick approach. Youth are encouraged

to take advantage of social services so they

can avoid criminal behavior, they are

warned of the consequences of further

criminal behavior, and they are closely

monitored by parole and probation officers

in the postincarceration period.

In 1997, VCTF created an Illegal Firearms

Suppression Unit (sometimes referred to as

the Gun Squad), under the leadership of the

Rochester Police Department. The unit’s

mission is to reduce the illegal sale and trade

of firearms, using prosecutorial discretion to

try cases through either the U.S. Attorney’s

Office (which has mandatory jail terms with

no parole and uses out-of-State prisons)

or the District Attorney’s Office. This initiative is funded by grants from the Carnegie

Mellon Foundation and the U.S. Department of Justice in partnership with the U.S.

Attorney’s Office for the Western District of

New York; Monroe County District Attorney; FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms; Monroe County Sheriff’s Department; New York State Police; and Rochester

Police Department. Although there is no

formal governing board, these agencies have
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 151

established a collegial working relationship

over the years, and launch multiagency initiatives when needed.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office is the lead

agency for both VCTF and the Suppression

Unit, and works closely with a local prosecutor to find the judicial forum that will

have the biggest impact. There are three

prosecutory options available in New York.

First, a case may be kept in a State court

because the penalties available are at least

equal to those that would apply in a Federal

case. Second, the U.S. Attorney and the

District Attorney may agree to forward the

Profile No. 40 (continued)

case to Federal court for prosecution. Third,

the U.S. Attorney may request a waiver

that would allow a defendant to be tried in

both Federal and State courts. The U.S.

Attorney’s Office may prosecute crimes by

juveniles as young as 13 years old in Federal

court.

The program has not been formally evaluated, but inhouse data show that the Illegal

Firearms Suppression Unit has been involved

in three major prosecutions of cross-State

gun-purchasing activities and currently has

30 to 40 open single-defendant felony gun

cases.
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 153

Court-Related Programs

A 1996 OJJDP report by the National Center for

Juvenile Justice, State Responses to Serious and Violent

Juvenile Crime, documented a “trend toward redefining the purpose of the juvenile justice system” so

that cases are increasingly handled “with the goal

of punishment as opposed to rehabilitation.”1

 The

report described statutory changes making it easier

for juveniles to be tried as adults; the imposition of

longer sentences; and the incarceration of juveniles

with adults. Notwithstanding this trend toward

tougher prosecution and incarceration of juvenile

offenders, many juvenile courts also have begun to

focus on rehabilitating offenders who it is believed

may benefit from such treatment. Leading this

movement have been juvenile and family drug

courts patterned after the adult drug court pioneered in Dade County, FL, in 1989. Since juvenile

cases represent a mixture of complex social issues

and criminal behavior, the juvenile drug courts were

designed to offer intensive, continuous judicial supervision of participants and coordination of treatment and rehabilitation services.2

 Such courts are

now active in more than 300 jurisdictions in the

country. In these programs the judge plays a pivotal

role, ensuring that youth, parents, and sometimes

the entire family are properly assessed and receive

necessary social services, especially since parental

involvement greatly increases the likelihood of

successful intervention.

A similar philosophy underlies the development of

juvenile gun courts. Selected youth (typically firsttime, nonviolent offenders) are eligible for these

special court programs, which usually mandate parent education. Several jurisdictions have established

diversion programs for youth charged with weapons

offenses. These initiatives may include firearm education courses and presentations by experts or

people who have been affected by firearm violence

(coroners, gunshot victims, police officers, parents

of those who died from firearm violence). Social

services for youth and their families are also a key

component in many of these programs.

Notes

1. National Center for Juvenile Justice, State

Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, 1996.

2. C.M. McGee, J. Parnham, T.T. Morrigan, and

M. Smith, Applying Drug Court Concepts in the Juvenile

and Family Court Environments: A Primer for Judges.

Prepared for the 1995 Drug Court Symposium at

The American University under the Sponsorship

of the State Justice Institute, 1998.
154 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 41

Promising

Handgun Intervention Program—Detroit, MI

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Court-related programs.

Program Goal:

To prevent young offenders from carrying

and using guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juveniles charged with first or second gun

offenses in Michigan’s 36th District Court.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Detroit, MI.

Evaluated by:

The Urban Institute, Washington, DC.

Contact Information:

Terrence Evelyn, Program Coordinator

Handgun Intervention Program

36th District Court, Madison Center

421 Madison Avenue, Suite 3017

Detroit, MI 48226

Phone: 313–965–3724

Jeffrey Roth

The Urban Institute

2100 M Street NW.

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202–833–7200

Years of Operation:

1993–present.

After a teenager whom he knew personally

died from a gunshot injury, Judge Willie

Lipscomb, Jr., launched a program to stop the

tide of gun-toting youth who pass through his

court. The Handgun Intervention Program

(HIP) was developed as a court-based education program for defendants, whose attendance at one 4-hour session is ordered as a

condition of their bond. At sentencing, the

judge also can order defendants to attend additional sessions if he feels that it would be beneficial to them. The program targets young

African-American men ages 12 to 28 who are

first- or second-time offenders charged with

carrying a concealed weapon and who currently have no other serious charges pending.

The goal of the program is to prevent these

defendants from committing gun violence or

from becoming homicide victims. The program

stresses the importance of consequences,

choices, responsibility, and nonviolence.

HIP is coordinated by the probation office

and staffed by volunteers from the court and

community. Community volunteers include

the clergy, police officers, probation officers,

ex-offenders, doctors, lawyers, and victims.

Judge Lipscomb and the other volunteers

implement the 4-hour gun education class,

which is held on Saturday mornings. The

program has five components: (1) images of

gun-murder victims are presented to remind

the offenders that they share much in common with victims and to appeal to their

sense of humanity; (2) information about

guns and gun-related violence is distributed,

leading to a discussion of these topics;

(3) presentations are given by other youth

about avoiding and neutralizing violent

street conflicts; (4) participants discuss their

responsibilities and heritage as AfricanAmerican men (this segment includes a presentation about historic figures and civil
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 155

rights leaders); and (5) an optional vow of

nonviolence is offered.

Changing participants’ attitudes toward

carrying guns has proved difficult. At one

session, even though all the defendants had

themselves chosen to carry guns, 39 out of

40 participants knew someone who had been

shot, and 8 had survived previous gunshot

wounds themselves.

The program recently has been expanded

and is now being offered to middle and high

school students in the Detroit metropolitan

area to reach high-risk youth before they

become defendants. More than 5,000 young

men have participated in the program since

its inception in 1993, and the program continues to grow.

According to preliminary findings of a

National Institute of Justice evaluation,

HIP favorably influenced offender attitudes

about the risks associated with guns. For

this evaluation, defendants were assigned to

Profile No. 41 (continued)

either a control or an intervention group,

and attitude measures were taken at initial

lockup and after participation in the program. Attitudes about situational avoidance,

status motivation, the inevitability of gun

violence, ethical considerations about gun

violence, personal responsibility, and knowledge about gun risks were measured. After

participating in the program, participants’

attitudes shifted favorably for 19 of 21 variables in the instrument. The researchers also

held focus groups to gather feedback. Participants emphasized that the government

failed to understand the problems of innercity neighborhoods and that the program

should be offered to a much younger audience through the schools. Researchers indicated that the long-term effects of the

program are unknown at this time. They

intend to examine the defendants’ rearrest

and revocation data and to analyze characteristics of program participants and their

neighborhoods.
156 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 42

Demonstrated

Juvenile Firearms Prosecution—Seattle, WA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Court-related programs; the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:

To prosecute juvenile firearm cases and coordinate efforts between the prosecutor’s

office and the Seattle Police Department.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juvenile weapons offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Seattle, WA.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Julie Baker

Grant Coordinator

Seattle Police Department

610 Third Avenue

Seattle, WA 98104

Phone: 206–233–5133

Years of Operation:

1996 and 1997.

Between January 1994 and May 1997, the

King County prosecutor’s office received

820 cases involving a juvenile charged with

a firearm-related crime. The number of firearm cases filed in juvenile court increased

by 27 percent between 1995 and 1996. This

increase was primarily made up of felony

gun possession cases. Filings were expected

to increase by 24 percent in 1997, because of

more aggressive enforcement efforts.

The prosecutor’s response to each case is

dictated by whether it is an “in-custody”

case (i.e., the juvenile is in detention) or an

“out-of-custody” case. In-custody cases require a 48-hour probable cause hearing, a

detention review, and a case review. Each

in-custody case must be filed within 72

hours of arrest to detain the juvenile. Once

a case is filed, there are a number of further

actions, including the arraignment, casesetting hearing, trial, disposition, and modification hearing.

Filings and actions taken on out-of-custody

cases are not prescribed, and thus normally

take much longer. In the 3 years preceding

the Juvenile Firearms Prosecution project,

it took an average of 50 days to file an outof-custody firearm case. Long delays in filing a case often would occur when cases

needed to be returned to police for more

information. Up to three Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys (DPA’s) normally handled a

juvenile case from filing to trial because they

did not specialize in any one type of crime.

Thus, juvenile firearm cases were handled

by a number of different DPA’s, which hampered communication with police and other

departments, contributing to the slowness of

the filing and court processes.

The Juvenile Firearms Prosecution project

was initiated in September 1996, under a

grant from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to the

Seattle Police Department, to facilitate the

processing of juvenile firearm offenses as

part of an overall law enforcement strategy

to crack down on firearm offenders. A new

full-time DPA position was created (for 1

year) to coordinate enforcement and prosecution efforts in juvenile firearm offenses

between the prosecutor’s office and the
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 157

Seattle Police Department’s Gang Unit. The

duties of the juvenile firearm DPA were to:

(1) develop a computerized tracking system

for pending juvenile firearm cases; (2) review and file out-of-custody juvenile firearm

cases and in-custody cases and assist and

advise other DPA’s in filing these cases;

(3) handle hearings on the most serious firearm offenders; (4) manage case-setting negotiations and advise other DPA’s on pretrial

hearings; (5) handle trials involving firearm

offenses; (6) handle the disposition hearings

on chronic or serious offenders; (7) become

knowledgeable about legal issues arising in

juvenile firearm cases and analyze the effects

of new legislation; (8) conduct periodic

training with other DPA’s and provide updates on new laws and legal briefs; and

(9) coordinate efforts with the Seattle Police

Department and other police agencies by

conducting training sessions for detectives

and patrol officers, assisting in initial police

investigations, and ensuring that cases are

filed in a timely manner.

The Juvenile Firearms Prosecution project

thus provided for a number of changes in

the handling of juvenile firearm cases. A

vertical prosecution process also was

adopted in which one DPA became a specialist in firearm prosecution, handling all

juvenile firearm offenses from the time the

case was received by the prosecutor’s office

until juvenile sentencing.

As a result of these efforts, juvenile firearm

cases were filed faster (in 17 days rather

than 53) and filing backlogs were eliminated; conviction rates increased (from

65.4 percent to 78.4 percent); the number of

cases going to trial increased (monthly trials

doubled to 5 on average); the adjudications

rate (i.e., pleaded guilty or found guilty)

increased (from 83.1 percent to 85.5 percent); the pretrial dismissal rate was reduced

(from 9.6 percent to 5.5 percent); more cases

were successfully rushed to trial (from 86

percent to 91.4 percent); more juveniles

were detained at first appearance (from 82.7

percent to 93.8 percent); more exceptional

sentences were imposed (from 10 percent to

18 percent); more juveniles were declined

for adult prosecution (from 1 to 5); and police investigation and incident reports were

improved. Information provided in this profile was obtained from an upcoming Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Bulletin. The juvenile firearm DPA

position ended in September 1997 when the

grant ended.

Profile No. 42 (continued)
158 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 43

Promising

Juvenile Gun Court—Birmingham, AL

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Court-related programs.

Program Goal:

To deliver swift, sure, and appropriate consequences to juveniles found in possession of

a gun.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juvenile gun offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Birmingham, AL.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Judge Sandra Storm

Family Court of Jefferson County

120 Second Court North

Birmingham, AL 35204

Phone: 205–325–5538

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

Birmingham’s Juvenile Gun Court was established in April 1995 by Sandra H. Storm,

a Circuit Court Judge in the Family Court

of Jefferson County. Juvenile deaths had

reached a peak in 1994 when there were 34

deaths of individuals ages 18 and younger, of

which 25 were murders or other acts resulting in the death of another person. After

reading an article in the Birmingham News

about an adult gun court in Rhode Island,

Judge Storm began planning for the development of a court to handle juvenile gun

cases, in the hope that early intervention

could reduce the number of homicides and

other serious gun crimes involving youth.

The judicial infrastructure for establishing

a juvenile gun court was already in place.

Family Court judges had the authority for

mandatory detention of juvenile offenders;

discretion as to whether juvenile cases were

eligible for diversion; a mandate to review

incoming cases within 72 hours of arrest; a

mandate to hold trials within 10 days; and

access to 30-day boot camps. In addition,

the judge had reviewed several research

articles (including studies from the Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention) that concluded that the most

effective boot camps were those that

included intensive followup and the involvement of parents. It was decided that

Birmingham’s initiative would include these

critical elements and would be designed to

ensure swift, sure, and fair consequences

for juvenile gun offenders.

In January 1995, the Family Court of

Jefferson County hosted a “town meeting” to

discuss the formation of the new Gun Court.

Among those represented were social service

providers; the Alabama Department of Youth

Services (DYS), which provides a range of

services to troubled and court-involved youth

Copyright © 1998 PhotoDisc, Inc.
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 159

and runs juvenile detention facilities; law

enforcement; criminal defense attorneys; and

many other public and private organizations.

Impact, Inc., a local nonprofit organization

providing services for children, adults, and

families involved in the criminal justice system, also attended these early meetings and

became a key partner. The organization was

already under contract to the Family Court to

conduct a 9-week family counseling program,

and the “family communication” curriculum

used in that program was adapted for use

with Gun Court parents. By April 1, 1995,

the core components of the Gun Court had

been developed, linkages with key agencies

had been established, Family Court had reallocated funds and other resources to support

the program, and the first docketed cases

were heard by a judge. In mid-May 1995, the

Parent Education Program (PEP) was implemented, and the court recently started juvenile education classes for youth whose

parents are in the PEP sessions.

The Family Court of Jefferson County is

located on a campuslike setting and is a centralized venue for handling all juvenile crime

and delinquency cases—from violent offenses such as murder to truancy, abuse, and

neglect cases. The Family Court oversees 20

programs (13 of them located on the premises), and a detention center abutting the

court building has the capacity to hold 80

youth. The average length of stay for detainees, who range in age from 10 through 19, is

30 days. Legal Aid, an Assistant District

Attorney, drug-testing services, a probation

office, child support personnel, and a family

therapist also are located in the complex.

This centralization of services is considered

one of the keys to the success of the Juvenile

Gun Court. Having most juvenile government agencies collocated in the Family Court

complex eliminates many of the logistical

barriers to obtaining services for youth with

ongoing needs. For example, a judge or

probation officer can request on-the-spot

assessment or mental health placement

through the onsite court liaison officer. If a

youth tells a probation officer that his or her

recent urine screen was negative, it is easy to

verify the results in person. Strong networks

and relationships with external agencies also

facilitate case management. With a mental

health liaison who is fully knowledgeable

about State and local agencies, a call to the

head of a private substance abuse treatment

center can be placed, and an opening for a

treatment bed can be quickly secured. However, mere physical proximity and strong

personal networks would be insufficient were

it not for the fact that staff caseloads, though

not ideal, are lower than in most localities.

The Department of Probation is a key partner and has two full-time staff and one parttime staff member assigned to the Gun

Court. Juvenile probation officers are responsible for the intensive monitoring of

high-risk youth once they complete the 30-

day boot camp. The officers have a caseload

of approximately 40 youth (the goal is a

ratio of 1 staff member to 15 probationers).

Other law enforcement agencies also have

extensive involvement with the Gun Court.

The County Sheriff’s Office and the Birmingham Police Department accompany

probation officers on home visits as part of

the Operation Nighttime Crime Eradicators

(ONCE) program, which is modeled on

Boston’s Operation Night Light program

(see profile 33). Since May 1996, ATF has

devoted resources from its Project LEAD

program (a national gun-tracing initiative)

to interview youth and to obtain information

on weapons recovered through Gun Court.

Between July 1, 1996, and April 30, 1997,

ATF has collected data from 693 gun traces.

Although the Gun Court prosecutes cases

from throughout Jefferson County, a large

proportion of gun cases are from the western part of the city, which has therefore

Profile No. 43 (continued)
160 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

become a target area for the ONCE program. The area is a designated Enterprise

Zone and also has communities being targeted through the U.S. Department of Justice Weed and Seed program. Birmingham

is one of the sites participating in ATF’s

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative,

and it has received two grants from the

Office of Community Oriented Policing

Services and Local Law Enforcement Block

Grants that were used primarily for mapping technology.

Cases are processed through the Juvenile

Gun Court as follows:

◆ Arrest. There are a number of gun offenses with which juveniles may be

charged:

❖ Gun found: A weapon is seized by

police officers as part of another primary charge (e.g., shoplifting).

❖ Gun possession: Having a gun is the

primary or only charge. The majority

of gun cases fall into this category

(59 percent of all cases in 1997). Most

of the weapons are recovered during

traffic stops by the police.

❖ Menacing: A gun was used to frighten

or harass someone.

❖ Gun used in a crime: A gun was used

in the commission of an armed robbery,

burglary, assault, or other serious

crime.

❖ Gun fired: A gun was fired near people

or into a home, building, or vehicle.

❖ Murder: A gun was fired at a person

(this category includes murder and

attempted murder).

In 1997 there were 398 gun complaints

filed on 302 individuals. Among those

individuals, 48 (16 percent) had prior gun

charges, and 7 (2 percent) were charged

with murder or attempted murder. The

data also show that 233 (77 percent) of

the arrestees had prior contact with Family Court, and 175 (58 percent) had prior

delinquency complaints filed against

them. Only first-time gun offenders are

eligible for Gun Court; youth with multiple gun charges or with violent or other

serious offenses are transferred to adult

court or DYS. Alabama State law allows

juveniles as young as 14 to be tried as

adults.

◆ Court intake. All juveniles arrested for

gun offenses are retained; there is no discretion to transfer cases from formal prosecution to diversion programs.

◆ Detention hearing. All Gun Court hearings are held within 72 hours. Youth may

request a trial or may plead “true” at this

point.

Profile No. 43 (continued)

We developed our program based on what

we learned from the research literature about

what was effective in changing juvenile

behavior. First, we knew that there had to

be swift, sure, and fair consequences so that

it was clear that if you committed a gun

offense it was going to be treated seriously.

Second, we knew that boot camps were

more likely to be effective if they included

services and intensive followup. We knew

that any intervention with a juvenile was

going to be much more effective if you

involved the parent. And finally, we knew

that you would have to deal with the

problem comprehensively, by linking the

juvenile and his or her family to other social

services and resources. We designed our

Juvenile Gun Court so that it included all of

these elements.

—Hon. Sandra H. Storm

Birmingham, AL, Juvenile Gun Court
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 161

◆ Trial. Trials must be held within 10 working days for all who request it.

◆ Boot camp. Male youth who plead

“true” are immediately dispatched to the

High Intensive Training (HIT) program

at the Autauga facility, a DYS boot camp

in Prattville, AL. (There are separate

boot camps for boys and girls with a long

waiting list for the latter since girls commit so few gun offenses. In 1997, for

example, only 6 percent of juvenile gun

offenders were female.) With a 78-bed

capacity, the boot camp includes other

DYS-referred youth, but the majority of

the residents are Gun Court referrals.

HIT is designed to instill self-discipline,

respect for authority, problem-solving

skills, and other appropriate social skills.

The highly regimented day begins at 5

a.m. with physical exercise, and throughout the day youth participate in group

counseling, team-building exercises, academic remediation, journal-writing, and

other activities that reinforce desired

skills, attitudes, and behaviors. Youth

are judged daily against a list of desired

traits and behaviors, and infractions can

result in extending the amount of time in

the boot camp by days or weeks.

Autauga is one of more than 30 facilities

run or supported by DYS. Referrals also

can be made to another 25 private providers (group homes, treatment centers,

hospitals, alternative schools, and other

facilities).

◆ Parent education program. Parents are

party to their children’s cases and are

mandated to attend a 7-week workshop

series; failure to comply can result in their

incarceration. The sessions, which are

held Tuesday evenings, use volunteers

and staff from Impact, Inc., to try to impress upon parents that a gun offense is a

serious matter, but that it is an opportunity for them and their children to address the underlying problems that led to

the offense. The Gun Court is in the midst

of its 24th PEP cycle. Court data from

1995 indicate an 87-percent completion

rate for PEP participants.

◆ Probation. After release from the HIT

program at Autauga, all youth are placed

on maximum supervision probation,

which may last from 30 days to 6 months.

Maximum supervision requires twicedaily telephone check-in with a probation

officer or unannounced visits from the

probation officer at least twice each week.

Limited resources affect the length of time

a youth remains under maximum supervision. During the initial period of probation, youth are under house arrest except

for school attendance or work. After

compliance during the initial probation

period, participants are allowed out of the

house from 6 to 8:30 p.m. Violations of

probation can result in a probationer being placed on an electronic monitoring

system or being monitored by a telephone

voice recognition system. During probation, youth must complete the Alabama

Substance Abuse Program, a preventionbased program.

Probation officers team up with law enforcement officials to make home visits

through the ONCE program. ONCE

targets juveniles age 17 and younger,

making visits on 2 randomly selected

nights per week, at random times during

the night. All probation officers are

trained by police before they take part in

ONCE visits and are required to wear

bulletproof vests. Between July 1997 and

August 1998, the ONCE team made more

than 1,152 curfew visits, executed 245

pickup orders, and served 67 summonses

(these data include all juvenile probation

cases, not just those from the Gun Court).

Profile No. 43 (continued)
162 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

The final component of the Gun Court is community outreach: staff make presentations to

local schools and community groups and

distribute brochures that explain the consequences for gun offenses. This is the least

developed court component, primarily because of a lack of resources. From the outset, the Juvenile Gun Court has had few

sources of outside support and has relied

on existing Family Court resources, agency

networks, and service providers to meet the

needs of youthful offenders. This may make

institutionalization of program elements more

likely since the work is considered part of core

work assignments, but it can become problematic if the court’s caseload continues to rise.

During the first year of operation, there was

an increase in the number of gun offenses

reported and handled by the new court: 323

offenses in 1995 compared with 273 offenses

in 1994 (pre-Gun Court). This paradoxical

outcome is believed to be the result of increased awareness among law enforcement

officers that there were now credible sanctions for juvenile gun charges. Since the

court was established in 1995, juvenile gun

offenses in general, and gun-related deaths

in particular, have been decreasing. Juvenile

gun offenses dropped from 323 cases in 1995

to 302 in 1997; gun-related deaths were almost cut in half, from 30 in 1995 to 18 in

1997. However, court data also show that

offenders are getting younger: in 1995, only

9 offenders were age 13 or younger, but by

1997 there were 24 Gun Court cases involving youth in this age range—including one

9-year-old and two 10-year-olds.

Based on police data, during the past 2

years, gun-related juvenile offenses have

declined 38.7 percent in Birmingham—from

266 offenses during the period from September 1996 through August 1997 to 170 offenses from September 1997 through August

1998. An inhouse review of recidivism rates

compared the first 100 Juvenile Gun Court

cases with the first 100 cases from 1994, the

year before the court was established. Gun

Court youth had an overall reoffense rate

of 41 percent, compared with 73 percent

among pre-Gun Court youth. In addition,

those adjudicated in the Gun Court were

less likely to reoffend on gun charges—11

percent had new gun offenses, compared

with a 32-percent gun reoffense rate among

juveniles whose cases were adjudicated prior

to the Gun Court.

Profile No. 43 (continued)
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 163

Profile No. 44

Demonstrated

Juvenile Gun Program—Minneapolis, MN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Court-related programs.

Program Goal:

To reduce the number of juveniles committing gun offenses through education about

gun violence and its consequences.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juveniles adjudicated on gun offenses.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Hennepin County, MN.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Michael Sandin, Coordinator/Probation

 Officer

Hennepin County Juvenile Probation

626 South Sixth Street

Minneapolis, MN 55415

Phone: 612–348–2407

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

Hennepin County initiated a Juvenile Gun

Program in November 1995 in response to

the rising number of juveniles coming into

the juvenile justice system on gun offenses.

Prior to the program’s inception, all juveniles adjudicated on gun offenses were required to complete 100 hours of community

service. However, these orders were not

consistently enforced and had little impact

on recidivism.

The Juvenile Gun Program was designed

by a Hennepin County Juvenile Court

judge in conjunction with the juvenile probation staff. The program, which is operated

by the juvenile probation office, combines

education and community service requirements. Juveniles adjudicated on charges

involving a gun are given a stayed commitment to an out-of-home placement and referral to a work program. If the juvenile fails to

follow the expectations of the program, his

stay is revoked immediately.

Juveniles meet for 40 hours over a 16-week

period for the educational component of the

gun program. Random urine testing is conducted at some meetings, and indicators of

drug use lead to referrals for treatment.

Juveniles are exposed to a variety of speakers, presentations, and experiences designed

to show them the negative consequences of

gun violence. They attend the Calling the

Shots program, where they witness a reenactment of a hospital emergency room scene

depicting the aftermath of a serious gunshot

incident. Speakers have included prisoners

convicted of gun charges, the judge who

founded the program, the mayor, a minister

who was on probation in his youth, investigators, a woman whose child was murdered,

a juvenile on death row, and a probation

staff member whose brother was convicted

of murder.

The goal of the Juvenile Gun Program is to

encourage youth to think about the effects of

gun violence on themselves, their families,

and their communities, as well as personal

responsibility, victimization, and community

responsibility. In addition, trained professionals discuss anger management alternatives with the youth and help them develop

plans to manage stressful situations. They

are given a tour of the workhouse, an old

and ominous short-term lockup run by the
164 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

county. They are asked to read and clip

newspaper articles on gun violence in the

Twin Cities area and bring them in for discussion. To satisfy their 60-hour community

service requirement, they perform park

maintenance and beautification, neighborhood clean sweeps, one-time activities like

planting a “victim’s garden,” and other jobs

that benefit the community.

The program continually adapts to the changing needs of its clients. Evaluations administered at the end of each presentation have

given program administrators insights into

how the program is affecting participants,

and the program has been modified accordingly. For example, the time of commitment

has been lengthened from 3 to 6 weeks, and

more aggressive substance abuse referrals

and treatment have been implemented.

From its inception in 1995 through July

1998, the program served more than 300

clients. In quarterly progress reports, the

probation department compares results for

program “completers” with “noncompleters.”

Seven-month outcomes for the first 7 groups

(51 completers and 56 noncompleters), which

included juveniles out of the program for at

least 6 months, showed that the completers

had slightly lower rates for new charges

than noncompleters (49 percent versus

55 percent). However, the new charges for

completers tended to be misdemeanors or

status offenses (88 percent) rather than felonies (12 percent), whereas for noncompleters

35 percent of new charges were misdemeanors and 65 percent were felonies. There was

one new weapons charge for the completers

group, which was subsequently dismissed,

while the noncompleter group had six new

weapons offenses.

In the latest report, revocations had declined

and a formal aftercare component for those

in need of probation supervision had been

added to the program. The Minneapolis

Anti-Violence Initiative (see profile 31) also

will be used as an additional resource to

supervise probationers. Of the 26 clients

who completed the program between December 1997 and March 1998, none had

committed a new offense by June 30, while

four noncompleters had reoffended with one

new weapons charge each.

Profile No. 44 (continued)
Section VI: Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use 165

Profile No. 45

Promising

Project LIFE—Indianapolis, IN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Court-related program.

Program Goal:

To educate juveniles about the impact that

guns have on human life.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juvenile and youth gun offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Marion County, IN.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Robyn Snyder

Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division

2451 North Keystone Avenue

Indianapolis, IN 46218

Phone: 317–924–7440

Years of Operation:

1991–present.

Project LIFE (Lasting Intense Firearms

Education) was initiated in 1991 by the

Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division,

in response to an alarming increase in the

number of youth carrying guns. In 1995,

amended criminal justice statutes stipulated

that 16- and 17-year-olds would enter the

adult system when charged with handgun

violations. The criteria also were expanded

to include youth who possess other dangerous weapons (e.g., knives, box cutters, and

blackjacks).

Project LIFE delivers directed messages

intended to disrupt the apathetic attitudes of

youth regarding gun experimentation. This

mandatory program targets youth who are

also on probation for committing a weapons

crime. The educational sessions are held

every 6 weeks, lasting 2 to 3 hours per meeting, and are limited to 10 youth offenders

and their parents. The objectives of Project

LIFE are to: (1) educate youth regarding

the impact of guns and other weapons,

(2) portray guns and other weapons as instruments that kill and injure people and

demonstrate that there is always a potential

victim when someone is armed with a

weapon, and (3) include parents and guardians in the learning process. As part of the

educational process, participants view

graphic police videos from homicide scenes

and other visual media. Throughout the

process, Project LIFE staff encourage each

juvenile to recount the circumstances that

led to his or her arrest, to accept responsibility for the crime, and to examine what he or

she might have done differently. The parents

of gun victims also recount the tragedy of

their children’s involvement with guns. To

date, 474 offenders have participated in this

program.

In 1998, 94 percent of the participants rated

the program good or excellent. In 1997 and

1998, 89 percent of the participants agreed

that the program provided substantial information on the dangers of gun use. Participants who felt that Project LIFE helped

them set positive goals and refrain from experimenting with guns increased from 72

percent in 1997 to 80 percent in 1998.
Education Initiatives and

Alternative Prevention Strategies

Section VII
Section VII. Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies

Overview ...................................................................................................................................................... 169

Prevention Education—Changing Attitudes Toward Guns and Violence ........................................... 169

Profile No.

46. Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006—Boston, MA ...................................................... 173

47. Calling the Shots—St. Paul, MN ................................................................................................... 174

48. Child Development-Community Policing (CD–CP) Program—New Haven, CT ..................... 176

49. Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety Education Program—Fairfax, VA .................................... 178

50. Hands Without Guns—Washington, DC ...................................................................................... 179

51. The Living Classroom Foundation—Baltimore, MD ................................................................... 181

52. Safe Gun Storage Campaign—Seattle, WA .................................................................................. 183

53. Shock Mentor Program—Prince George’s County, MD ............................................................. 185

54. Straight Talk About Risks (STAR), Center to Prevent Handgun Violence—

Washington, DC ............................................................................................................................. 187

55. Teens on Target—Oakland, CA ..................................................................................................... 189

56. Weapons Are Removed Now (W.A.R.N.) Program—Los Angeles, CA ..................................... 191

57. West Contra Costa Unified School District Truancy Enforcement Program—

Richmond, CA ................................................................................................................................. 192

Youth Violence and Gang Prevention Programs .................................................................................... 195

Profile No.

58. Boston Community Centers’ Streetworkers Program—Boston, MA .......................................... 196

59. Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office and the Gang Task Force—Houston, TX ......................................... 197

60. Se Puede—San Juan, TX .............................................................................................................. 199
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 169

Overview

The programs that are described in this chapter use

a variety of strategies to promote smart and responsible choices—about guns, about gangs, and about

violence. They employ a variety of methods to get

their message across, including eye-catching graphics, peer involvement, mentoring by caring adults,

and broad-based community involvement. Some of

these programs are being formally evaluated; others

are not. All show promise for reducing gun violence.

Prevention Education—

Changing Attitudes Toward

Guns and Violence

Gun violence is not only a criminal justice problem

but also a public health problem.1

 Firearm incidents

of all kinds (suicides, homicides, and unintentional

gunshot injuries) claim the lives of approximately

34,000 Americans each year. In fact, firearm injuries

are the eighth leading cause of death in the United

States and the fourth leading cause of years of

potential life lost before age 65.2

The impact of gun violence is even more pronounced

among teenagers and young adults. A teenager in the

United States today is more likely to die of a gunshot

wound than from all “natural” causes of disease combined.3

 More than one-half of all deaths of AfricanAmerican males 15 to 19 years of age are homicides.

More than 80 percent of these killings involve firearms. White teens face a lower risk of firearm-related

homicide than their African-American peers, but they

have a higher risk of committing suicide with a gun.4

Firearms also are a major cause of nonfatal injuries.

For every firearm fatality, there are 2.6 nonfatal

gunshot injuries.5

 The case-fatality ratio for

shootings varies widely by manner—approximately

1 in 5 victims of a firearm assault dies, but only 1

unintentional shooting out of every 16 results in

death. Suicide attempts with a firearm, on the other

hand, are completed approximately 85 to 90 percent

of the time.6

Some nonfatal firearm injuries are minor, but others

are devastating. Violence is the second leading cause

of spinal cord injuries, behind motor vehicle crashes.

The vast majority of these injuries are the result of

gunshot wounds. It has been estimated that the annual direct and indirect costs of fatal and nonfatal

firearm injuries exceed $20 billion per year.7

Health care professionals have traditionally used

reactive approaches to control death and disability

from gunshot wounds. Improvements in the provision

of prehospital care (an ambulance), trauma center

care, postoperative critical care, and rehabilitation

have greatly increased the chances that a gunshot

victim will survive his or her injury. There is a limit,

however, to the power of medicine and surgical techniques. Recently, researchers conducted a populationbased study of firearm injuries in three cities served

by sophisticated emergency services and level 1

trauma centers. They found that 80 percent of

fatalities were pronounced dead on the scene or immediately following arrival in an emergency department. Ninety-seven percent of deaths occurred

within 24 hours of injury.8

 In short, greater emphasis

must be placed on prevention to reduce the morbidity,

mortality, and costs of gunshot wounds.

The public health approach to reducing violence

includes: (1) emphasizing the prevention of violence

before it occurs; (2) making science integral to

identifying effective policies and programs; and

(3) integrating the efforts of diverse organizations,

communities, and disciplines.9

 By bringing a fresh

viewpoint, new allies, and different analytical methodologies to violence control, this public health approach can complement that of the criminal justice

community.

Education is a mainstay of public health.10 Education to prevent gun violence can take many forms,

including promotion of safe storage and other strategies to reduce access to firearms by children, youth,

and other unauthorized persons; teaching safe behavior around firearms; and a variety of programs

that are designed to prevent or reduce youth

violence.

Safe storage of firearms

Approximately 40 percent of American households

contain one or more firearms; the average gun-owning
170 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

household contains several.11 The total number of firearms in private hands in America is estimated to exceed 190 million, of which one-third (65 million) are

handguns. In general, firearm ownership is more common in rural areas and small towns, and less common

in urban areas, but urban gun owners are more likely

to own handguns.12

In up to 50 percent of gun-owning households,

firearms are kept loaded at least part of the time.

Roughly 30 percent of all handguns are kept loaded

and unlocked, and therefore easily accessible.13 This

violates a central tenet of gun safety. The National

Rifle Association’s (NRA’s) A Parent’s Guide to Gun

Safety advises owners to “Store guns so that they are

inaccessible to children and other unauthorized

users.”14 There is consensus on these points across

the political and professional spectrums.

Safe storage of firearms has multiple benefits. It

reduces the risk that firearms will be lost due to

burglary or theft, an event that occurs more than

350,000 times each year.15 Safe storage also reduces

the chances that a loaded gun will be reached by a

child.16 A home where guns are kept securely

stored is less likely to be the scene of a suicide than

a home where one or more guns are kept loaded

and unlocked.17

A number of devices are available that are capable

of rendering a firearm inoperative. These include

various types of triggerlocks, cable locks, lockboxes,

and gun safes. The price, performance, quality, and

reliability of these devices vary widely.

Placing a gun in a safe or lockbox or rendering it

inoperative with an add-on safety device is an “active” countermeasure that requires the conscious

cooperation of the user each and every time he or

she handles the gun.18 Gun owners who are fatigued,

distracted, or inattentive may forget to follow the

routine from time to time. In addition, some flatly

reject the idea of “safe storage.” This is especially

true of individuals who keep a gun primarily for

protection. However, the idea of keeping a gun

loaded and readily available for protection is misguided. Evidence suggests that the odds that a gun

in the home will kill or injure a member of the

household are substantially greater than the odds

that it will be used to injure or kill in self-defense.19

Potential avenues to promote safe storage of firearms include mass media and public education campaigns, distribution of brochures or pamphlets at the

point of sale, incorporation of information about safe

storage in gun safety training programs, and counseling by physicians and other health care providers.

At present, little is known about the relative effectiveness of these options. One study suggests that

child access-prevention laws that require adults to

store their firearms safely reduce unintentional

shooting deaths of children.20

Educational programs

Education is a fundamental element of many injury

prevention programs.21 The educational programs

described below seek to encourage kids to behave

responsibly around guns.

Traditional firearm safety instruction is based on

sound advice such as, “always keep the gun pointed

in a safe direction” and “always keep your finger off

the trigger until ready to shoot.” Firearm instructors

also teach shooters to assume that every firearm is

loaded unless they personally verify that it is not by

inspecting the firing chamber. For many, promoting

gun safety education is a matter of common sense.

Some believe that gun safety education, like driver’s

education, should be included in the curriculum of

public schools.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence that safety

training alters behavior around guns. One team of

researchers found that when young children are

unsupervised, they frequently touch and play with

real guns, even after receiving clear and specific

instructions not to do so.22 Another survey found

that gun owners who reported taking a gun safety

class were no more likely to store their firearms

safely than those who had not.23 On the other hand,

gun owners who received instruction from the National Safety Council were more likely to store their

guns unloaded and locked than individuals who took

other types of gun safety training programs.24

Whether this finding reflects differences in the design of these courses or differences in the temperament of those who took them is unknown.

The optimal role of gun safety education in communitybased programs to reduce gun violence has not yet
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 171

been defined. Carefully controlled evaluations that

examine both the content and the impact of various

curriculums and public education programs are

needed. When these evaluations are conducted, it

will be important to assess not only the proximate

outcome of the intervention (e.g., safer behavior

around firearms), but any unintended consequences

as well.

Notes

1. National Committee for Injury Prevention and Control, Firearm Injuries, Injury Prevention: Meeting the Challenge,

New York, NY: Oxford University Press, supplement to

the American Journal of Preventive Medicine 5(3), 1989; J.A.

Mercy, M.L. Rosenberg, K.E. Powell, C.V. Broome, and

W.L. Roper, “Public health policy for preventing violence,” Health Affairs 7–29, Winter 1993; M.L. Rosenberg

and M.A. Fenley (eds.), Violence in America: A Public Health

Approach, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991; and

A.L. Kellerman, R.K. Lee, J.A. Mercy, and J. Banton,

“The epidemiologic basis for the prevention of firearm

injuries,” Annual Review of Public Health 12:17–40, 1991.

2. R.M. Ikeda, R. Gorwitz, S.P. James, K.E. Powell, and

J.A. Mercy, Fatal Firearm Injuries in the United States, 1962–

1994, Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control,

Violence Surveillance Summary Series No. 3, 1997.

3. L.A. Fingerhut, Firearm Mortality Among Children, Youth,

and Young Adults 1–34 Years of Age, Trends and Current Status:

United States, 1985–1990, Advance data from Vital and

Health Statistics No. 231, Washington, DC: National

Center for Health Statistics, 1993.

4. Fingerhut, 1993.

5. J.L. Annest, J.A. Mercy, D.R. Gibson, and G.W.

Ryan, “National estimates of nonfatal firearm-related

injuries: Beyond the tip of the iceberg,” Journal of the

American Medical Association 273:1749–1754, 1995.

6. P.J. Cook, “The technology of interpersonal violence,”

in M. Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research,

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991; Annest et al.,

1995; and A.L. Kellerman, F.P. Rivara, R.K. Lee, J.G.

Banton, P. Cummings, B.B. Hackman, and G. Somes,

“Injuries due to firearms in three cities,” New England

Journal of Medicine 335:1438–1444, 1996.

7. W. Max and D.P. Rice, “Shooting in the dark:

Estimating the cost of firearm injuries,” Health Affairs

(Winter):171–185, 1993.

8. Kellerman et al., 1996.

9. K.E. Powell and D. Hawkins (eds.), Youth Violence

Prevention: Descriptions and Baseline Data from 13 Evaluation

Projects, New York: Oxford University Press, supplement

to the American Journal of Preventive Medicine 12(5), 1996.

10. National Committee for Injury Prevention and

Control, 1989.

11. P.J. Cook and J. Ludwig, Guns in America: Results of a

Comprehensive National Survey on Firearms Ownership and Use,

Summary Report, Washington, DC: Police Foundation,

1997.

12. Cook and Ludwig, 1997.

13. D.S. Weil and D. Hemenway, “Loaded guns in the

home: Analysis of a national random survey of gun owners,” Journal of the American Medical Association 267:3033–

3037, 1992.

14. National Rifle Association, A Parent’s Guide to Gun

Safety, Fairfax, VA: National Rifle Association, 1995.

15. M.R. Rand, Guns and Crime: Handgun Victimization,

Firearm Self-defense, and Firearm Theft, Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Justice, Crime Data Brief, 1994.

16. G.J. Wintemute, S.P. Teret, J.F. Kraus, M.A. Wright,

and G. Bradfield, “When children shoot children: 88

unintended deaths in California,” Journal of the American

Medical Association 257:3107–3109, 1987.

17. A.L. Kellerman, F.P. Rivara, G. Somes, D.T. Reay,

J. Francisco, J.G. Banton, J. Prodzinski, C. Flinger, and

B.B. Hackman, “Suicide in the home in relation to gun

ownership,” New England Journal of Medicine 327:467–472,

1992.

18. National Committee for Injury Prevention and

Control, 1989.

19. A.L. Kellerman, F.P. Rivara, N.B. Rushforth, J.G.

Banton, D.T. Reay, J.T. Francisco, A.B. Locci, B.B.

Hackman, and G. Somes, “Gun ownership as a risk factor

for homicide in the home,” New England Journal of Medicine

329:1084–1091, 1993; and A.L. Kellerman, D.S. FuquaWhitley, F.P. Rivara, and J.A. Mercy, “Preventing youth

violence: What works?” Annual Review of Public Health

19:271–292, 1998.

20. P. Cummings, D.C. Grossman, F.P. Rivara, and T.D.

Koepsell, “State gun safe storage laws and child mortality

due to firearms,” Journal of the American Medical Association

278:1041–1126, 1997.
172 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

21. National Committee for Injury Prevention and

Control, 1989.

22. M.S. Hardy, F.D. Armstrong, B.L. Martin, and

K.N. Strawn, “A firearm safety program for children:

They just can’t say no,” Developmental and Behavioral

Pediatrics 17(4):216–221, 1996.

23. Weil and Hemenway, 1992.

24. Cook and Ludwig, 1997.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 173

Profile No. 46

Promising

Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006—

Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to change attitudes about guns and

violence.

Program Goal:

To reach out to at-risk youth and gang members; to reduce violence in the community.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

At-risk youth, gang members.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Mark Scott, Executive Director

National Ten-Point Leadership Foundation

411 Washington Street

Boston, MA 02124

Phone: 617–282–6704

Years of Operation:

1992–present.

Prior to the development of a coordinated

effort to reduce gun violence in Boston, MA,

a few African-American churches in the city

had been working independently with atrisk youth in their neighborhoods. In 1992,

when violence escalated, some church clergy

and laity formed the Boston Ten-Point

Coalition—Operation 2006, which then

developed a collaboration with Boston police. This collaboration was based on the

belief that for every nine youngsters who

could be saved from violence by the clergy

or community-based organizations, there

was one who could not and would be better

off in the hands of the police.

In light of Boston’s long history of racial tensions, this type of collaboration between the

police department and the coalition was a milestone. The clergy supported selective, aggressive enforcement and helped to “deracialize”

policing in the African-American community.

Clergy members of the coalition have gone

into crack houses and gang-infested areas at

night to reclaim youth. Under the Adopt-aGang program, city churches have agreed

to keep their doors open and serve as dropin centers to provide sanctuary for troubled

youth. The Boston Ten-Point Coalition—

Operation 2006 participated in Boston’s

Operation Ceasefire neighborhood forums

(see profile 21), at which youth were given

zero tolerance messages and offered services. The Coalition also is linked to

Boston’s strategy to prevent youth violence

(see profile 2).

The Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation

2006 launched the National Ten-Point

Coalition to develop similar programs in other

cities, including Chester, PA; Gary, IN; Los

Angeles, CA; Louisville, KY; Plainfield, NJ;

and Tampa, FL.
174 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 47

Promising

Calling the Shots—St. Paul, MN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Education program to change attitudes

about guns and violence.

Program Goal:

To show the consequences of gun violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

At-risk youth.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN.

Evaluated by:

Health Partners Research Foundation,

St. Paul, MN.

Contact Information:

Valerie Miller, Program Coordinator

Region’s Hospital

640 Jackson Street

St. Paul, MN 55101

Phone: 651–228–2473

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

Region’s Hospital in St. Paul, MN, developed an antiviolence education program for

at-risk youth and youth already involved in

the criminal justice system. Participants are

referred through St. Paul’s juvenile probation and corrections departments, schools,

and mentoring organizations. The Juvenile

Gun Program in Minneapolis, which is operated by the Juvenile Probation Department

(see profile 44), regularly refers youth adjudicated on gun charges to this program.

The hospital uses actors and actual trauma

unit personnel to dramatize, in a 4-hour

program, a realistic emergency room situation involving a gunshot victim in a level 1

trauma center. Participants receive an introductory lecture on trauma resuscitation for

all types of trauma victims. While the group

is receiving training in trauma resuscitation

equipment, a gunshot victim (a teenage actor) is suddenly brought into the emergency

room by an ambulance and four paramedics

from the city of St. Paul Fire Emergency

Medical Services division. The youth are

recruited to work on the “patient” with a

real team of doctors. The team cuts his

clothing off and clears his airway, but the

victim dies because a second wound to the

back of the head is overlooked. The hospital

chaplain then announces that the victim’s

family is waiting in the family room, and the

participants have to accompany him to tell

the family the news. The youth then meet

with a counselor to discuss what they have

seen. They talk about their feelings and are

told that what they just witnessed was not

real, but a realistic portrayal of daily emergency room occurrences.

An internal evaluation of the program was

conducted by Health Partners Research

Foundation in September 1997. It used a

randomized, prospective study design with a

control group. The Attitudes Toward Guns

and Violence Questionnaire (AGVQ), developed by Applewood Centers, Inc., was

administered 2 weeks prior to and after the

program intervention. A total of 212 youth

were recruited for the study, but through

attrition and invalidations due to inconsistencies in subject answers, only 73 test pairs

were available for analysis. Of the four factors measured by the AGVQ (excitement,
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 175

power/safety, comfort with aggression, and

aggressive response to shame), one factor

(comfort with aggression) showed a marked

decrease, indicating the subjects became

more disturbed about violence in the environment, had less respect for violent individuals, and had more confidence in the

effectiveness of nonviolent problem-solving

Profile No. 47 (continued)

behaviors. The researchers believe that with

a larger number of subjects, statistical significance would have been achieved. According to the program, counselors and staff

from referring agencies have observed positive effects on the youth. The hospital is

planning to expand the program to other

major cities.
176 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 48

Demonstrated

Child Development-Community Policing (CD–CP)

Program—New Haven, CT

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to reduce the impact of violence on

children.

Program Goal:

To coordinate the efforts of the New Haven

Police Department and mental health clinicians by providing interdisciplinary intervention to children and families who are

victims, witnesses, or perpetrators of violent

crimes.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Children and families who are victims, witnesses, or perpetrators of violent crimes.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

New Haven, CT.

Evaluated by:

Child Study Center, Yale University, New

Haven, CT.

Contact Information:

Colleen Vadala

Child Development-Community Policing

Program

Yale Child Study Center

47 College Street

Suite 212

New Haven, CT 06510

Phone: 203–785–7047

Years of Operation:

1992–present.

The Child Development-Community Policing (CD–CP) Program—a collaborative

effort of the New Haven Department of

Police Services and the Child Study Center

at the Yale University School of Medicine—

was developed to address the tragic psychological impact of exposure to violence on

children. The CD–CP Program brings together police officers and mental health professionals for mutual training, consultation,

and support so that they may effectively

provide direct interdisciplinary intervention

to children and families who are victims,

witnesses, or perpetrators of violent crimes.

The CD–CP Program consists of interrelated training and consultation components

that focus on sharing knowledge and developing ongoing collegial relationships between police officers and mental health

professionals. Toward this end, CD–CP

sponsors fellowships for police supervisors

and clinicians to establish interdisciplinary

relationships. In the Child Development

Fellowship for Police Supervisors, fellows

spend 3 full days in training activities and

observations to become familiar with developmental concepts, patterns of psychological

disturbance, methods of clinical intervention, and settings for treatment and care.

Supervisors also provide basic knowledge

about police practices to their mental health

colleagues. In the Police Fellowship for

Clinicians, clinicians are given opportunities

to spend time with police participants in

squad cars, at police stations, and on the

streets learning directly from officers about

their day-to-day activities. This helps clinicians understand the roles that officers play

in the lives of children and families and prepares clinicians to intervene collaboratively

with police partners. Police officers and
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 177

clinical staff are either recruited into the

program via announcement of openings,

or those with especially needed skills are

specifically targeted by organization administrators for inclusion in the program.

The CD–CP Program also includes a seminar course on child development, human

functioning, and policing strategies for police officers, mental health clinicians, and

related professionals. The seminar, which

meets for 11

/2 hours for 10 weeks, is led by a

team of clinical faculty and a police supervisor experienced in the CD–CP approach.

The program also has established a 24-hour

consultation service. This service allows

police officers to make referrals and obtain

immediate clinical guidance, especially in

the aftermath of children’s traumatic experiences. In addition, once per week, police

officers and clinicians who staff the CD–CP

Program meet to discuss difficult cases that

they encounter in their direct experiences in

neighborhoods and from their consultations.

The CD–CP collaboration also has expanded

to include juvenile probation officers and juvenile detention center representatives. These

participants work with children and adolescents who may have experienced chronic exposure to violence and are becoming involved

in delinquent activities. Through the CD–CP

Gateway Offenders Program, CD–CP staff

provide coordinated, comprehensive, and

structured assessment and intervention for

juvenile offenders who are considered to be

at high risk of escalating criminal activities.

Since the CD–CP Program began formal

operation in January 1992, 260 officers have

Profile No. 48 (continued)

completed the 10-week CD–CP seminar, 50

police supervisors have completed the Child

Development Fellowship and continue to

attend the weekly program conference, and

19 Child Study Center faculty members

have completed the Police Fellowship.

Moreover, since its inception, the CD–CP

consultation service has received more than

700 referrals regarding more than 1,000

children. These consultations concerned

children of all ages who have been involved

in a variety of violent incidents as victims,

witnesses, or perpetrators. Numerous incidents demonstrate the impact that the program has had on children referred to

consultation services. In one case, a woman

was stabbed to death in the presence of her

eight children. CD–CP clinicians responded

to the scene, provided acute clinical assessments of the children, and consulted with

relatives and police. Intensive followup care

was conducted and continues for several

family members. All of the children are currently attending school, and symptoms of

depression, anxiety, and aggression have

subsided.

The CD–CP Program serves as a national

model for police-mental health partnerships

and is being replicated in several cities.

Similar programs have been established

in Baltimore, MD; Buffalo, NY; Charlotte,

NC; Framingham, MA; Nashville, TN;

Newark, NJ; Portland, OR; and Italy.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is providing training

and technical assistance to these new sites.
178 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 49

Promising

Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety Education

Program—Fairfax, VA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to educate children about gun

safety.

Program Goal:

To prevent firearm accidents.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Children in kindergarten through grade 6.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Kathleen Cassidy

National Rifle Association

11250 Waples Mill Road

Fairfax, VA 22030

Phones: 703–267–1574

800–231–0752

Years of Operation:

1988–present.

The Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety

Education Program was designed for use

by schools, law enforcement agencies, and

youth service organizations by Friends of

the National Rifle Association. The program

makes no value judgments about whether

guns are good or bad, but teaches children

that guns are not toys.

Children in preschool through grade 6 are

taught to remember the mantra “Stop! Don’t

Touch. Leave the Area. Tell an Adult.”

whenever they see a gun. The program has

been taught to more than 12 million children

in 10,000 schools by more than 6,000 law

enforcement agencies in every State,

Canada, and Puerto Rico. It is recognized

by the National Safety Council, Police

Athletic League, American Legion, and National School Public Relations Association.

Fourteen State legislatures have passed

resolutions encouraging the program’s use.

Local law enforcement provides officers

who speak in the schools. Coordination with

the faith community and United Way organizations is encouraged.

An educational video and music component

teaching the “Eddie Eagle Shuffle” targets

children. An inservice video and instructor

guides for grades K–1, 2–3, and 4–6 are

supported by a parent’s guide, comic books,

coloring books, stickers, and posters. All

printed materials are available in English

and Spanish.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 179

Profile No. 50

Promising

Hands Without Guns—Washington, DC

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to change attitudes about guns and

violence.

Program Goal:

To promote a public health and education

campaign to change attitudes about gun

violence and gun possession by highlighting

positive youth programs.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

12- to 18-year-old youth.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Nationwide.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Josh Horwitz

Educational Fund to End Handgun

Violence

1000 16th Street NW., Suite 603

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: 202–530–5888, ext. 28

Years of Operation:

1995–present.

Over the past three decades, gun-related

injuries and deaths have risen among youth.

Hands Without Guns, a public health and

education campaign, was developed by the

Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence, in partnership with a creative communications firm, to address this growing

problem. The goal of the initiative is to

change the attitudes of 12- to 18-year-old

youth about gun possession. To accomplish

this, the initiative seeks to reduce the public

acceptability of firearms by promoting and

stimulating positive grassroots initiatives

and by encouraging youth activism in the

fight against gun violence. These activities

include youth antiviolence programs and a

variety of afterschool projects not typically

associated with violence prevention, such as

theater groups, arts centers, and video clubs.

Hands Without Guns has three components.

One is an extensive media campaign using

television, radio, transportation advertisements, and music. Through this effort, youth

see that other youth are involved in positive

activities and that their efforts are supported

and praised by adults. A second component

is youth outreach through a series of workshops and activities. In the workshops,

youth are encouraged to develop their own

responses to gun violence. For example, in

the Boston program, the youth developed a

buyback program for toy guns. The third

component is an evaluation of program outcomes. A youth survey available in long or

short forms, developed by the Harvard University School of Public Health, is administered before the campaign starts and at

various times throughout the campaign to

determine its impact on youth. Specifically,

one of the questions asks youth whether

they have ever carried a handgun for protection. The results of the survey appear to

demonstrate a beneficial effect of the program. Youth who had never carried a gun

before were more likely to know about the

program (40 percent) than those who had

carried a gun before (10 percent).
180 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Over the past 3 years, the Hands Without

Guns program has been implemented in

four cities: Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Holland, MI; and Washington, DC. In 1999,

Profile No. 50 (continued)

the campaign will be implemented in Milwaukee, WI; Norfolk/Virginia Beach, VA;

Pittsburgh, PA; and Richmond, VA.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 181

Profile No. 51

Promising

The Living Classroom Foundation—Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to change attitudes about violence.

Program Goal:

To provide adjudicated youth with GED

classes and employment training to improve

future employment opportunities; to provide

students with a safe haven during afterschool hours.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Juvenile offenders, middle school students.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Baltimore City Empowerment Zone and

southeastern neighborhoods.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

John Dillow, Director of the Maritime

Institute

The Living Classrooms Foundation

802 South Caroline Street

Baltimore, MD 21231

Phone: 410–685–0295

Years of Operation:

1989–present.

Since 1989, the Living Classroom

Foundation’s Fresh Start Program has provided juveniles (ages 16 through 21) with

employment training and academic

remediation. These juveniles are typically

referred through the juvenile court system

or their probation or parole officers. Onehalf of the participants have been convicted

of a crime and are serving a sentence at a

juvenile lockdown facility. Most of the remainder are living in group homes, halfway

houses, or residential juvenile treatment

facilities, and a few are living with their

families. Typical students include juveniles

charged with drug- or gun-related offenses.

Through a rolling admissions process, students enter the program continuously; a

graduation ceremony is held every 8 weeks.

Twenty-five juveniles attend every day for

9 months and are divided into groups of five

(a 1:5 staff-to-student ratio). Students learn

carpentry, boat building, and construction

skills, and many earn their GED’s. The

chairs, sheds, and even custom-built canoes

that the students build are sold, and the profits are shared by all the youth in the program

according to a point system. This money is

put into a savings account for the student,

which is given to him or her on graduation

day; those who fail to graduate forfeit their

money. Following graduation, students also

may participate in an inhouse internship

(e.g., restoring and maintaining historic

wooden ships or serving as an office assistant) or an offsite internship (e.g., working

for a local development contractor restoring

a historic office building). These internships

are typically unpaid and are designed to provide real-world work experiences for the

youth.

Though the main purpose of this program is

employment training and GED preparation,

the program also focuses on improving the

students’ social, conflict resolution, and individual problem-solving skills. There are

frequent planned and unplanned lessons in

conflict and stress management because

“teachable moments” occur naturally in this
182 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 51 (continued)

hands-on environment in which teamwork is

necessary. The program also practices zero

tolerance for alcohol, drugs, or violence.

Students engaging in any of these behaviors

are asked to leave. The movie “First Time

Felon” is shown to the students; it portrays

a violent scene of a juvenile shot in a drug

dispute. The film is then discussed, personal

experiences with violence are shared, and

students discuss how to prevent violent

outcomes.

The juveniles are assessed at the outset of

the program on their academic abilities. The

daily curriculum may be remedial, including

GED preparation, computer training, and,

when appropriate, vocational training. To

prepare students for graduation and release

from the residential facility, placement staff

and counselors work with youth from the

beginning of the program to teach them jobseeking skills (interviewing, writing a resume, etc.) and budgeting. When graduation

nears, placement staff assist the students in

finding jobs and housing. A job bank of employers willing to hire motivated workers is

maintained for this purpose. Graduates can

receive guidance and help from the program

after graduation as well.

Graduates are tracked for 3 years after

completion of the program. Approximately

50 percent of the juveniles who enter the

program graduate. Juveniles are contacted

and asked about their current status and,

when possible, this information is verified

against data from the Maryland Department

of Juvenile Justice for youth 18 years of age

and under. As of the latest reporting period

(July 1998), 57 percent of graduates were

employed and 90 percent of these were earning more than the minimum wage; 43 percent

of graduates have earned their GED’s; 41

percent live independently; 38 percent have

been rearrested; and 11 percent are incarcerated. This incarceration rate compares favorably with the 32-percent recommitment or

reincarceration rate of two other State juvenile detention programs, as reported by

the Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice. The program was awarded a Promising

and Effective Practices for Youth award as

one of the U.S. Department of Labor’s and

National Youth Employment Coalition’s top

32 youth programs across the country.

The program is supported in part by the

Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice,

the Governor’s Office on Crime Control and

Prevention, the Baltimore County Office of

Employment and Training, and private donations. Private businesses and corporations

in the area also contribute to the program

through internships, donated materials,

Chief Executive Office orders for products,

and their willingness to hire motivated

graduates. The Living Classroom Program is

not formally linked with the Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP)

(see profile 1); however, the program targets

the same population of juvenile offenders

that is identified in the CCP.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 183

Profile No. 52

Promising

Safe Gun Storage Campaign—Seattle, WA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to promote safe gun storage.

Program Goal:

To reduce unintentional gun injuries among

children and suicides among adults and adolescents by promoting the sale and use of

handgun lockboxes.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Families with children and teens or homes

where children are frequent visitors.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

King County, WA (includes Seattle).

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Evan Simpson

Harborview Injury Prevention &

Research Center

325 Ninth Avenue, P.O. Box 359960

Seattle, WA 98104

Phone: 206–521–1520

Years of Operation:

1997–present.

From 1991 to 1995, there were 534 firearmrelated suicides, 278 firearm-related homicides, and 9 unintentional shooting deaths

in King County, WA. Twenty-six percent of

the suicides involved adolescents and youth

under 30 years of age. In addition, there

were 63 nonfatal, self-inflicted injuries, 500

assault-related injuries, and 191 injuries

caused by unintentional firearm discharges.

A total of 797 deaths and injuries in King

County (1991 to 1995) were due to suicide

or unintentional firearm discharges. A 1997

telephone survey of Seattle households revealed that more than 40 percent possessed

guns. The National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms (1994) indicates that 30

percent of handguns are stored loaded and

unlocked.

The Safe Gun Storage Campaign was developed to reduce the rate of nonhomicide

gun-related deaths and injuries in King

County. Harborview Injury Prevention &

Research Center, affiliated with the University of Washington, collaborated with primary care doctors, the police department,

and schools to promote the use of handgun

lockboxes to prevent access to firearms by

children and adolescents, and thereby

Copyright © 1998 Weststock.
184 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

reduce unintentional shootings and suicides

among this population. Harborview negotiated an arrangement with a major retailer,

which had several department stores in the

State, to sell a special lockbox for handguns

and offer it at a substantially reduced cost to

customers bearing coupons. The program

was publicized through public service announcements and presentations to groups by

the Safe Storage Coalition, which included

participating primary care physicians, health

care organizations, law enforcement, and

schools. By calling a hotline, the public

could receive coupons and a fact sheet on

safe gun storage practices.

While the first 6 months of the safe storage

campaign, January through June 1998,

were very successful—with more than 1,700

lockboxes sold—program organizers

discovered considerable reluctance on the

part of homeowners to acknowledge the real

risk of adolescent suicide. Consequently, the

second phase of the Safe Gun Storage Campaign, beginning in September 1998, emphasized the need to properly store firearms to

reduce the risk of any kind of firearm injury,

including the unintentional discharge of

guns by children, and to prevent guns from

being stolen and used in crimes that caused

injury or death.

The Seattle Safe Gun Storage Campaign is

part of a study in five western cities, coordinated by Harborview, which is investigating

gun storage attitudes and behaviors in a

cross-sectional, population-based sample of

households with children. Harborview will

soon release a report based on this study.

Profile No. 52 (continued)
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 185

Profile No. 53

Promising

Shock Mentor Program—Prince George’s County, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to change attitudes about guns and

violence.

Program Goal:

To reduce violence and high-risk behavior

through experiential learning and effective

mentoring.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

African-American and other minority youth

ages 13 to 24.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Prince George’s County, MD.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

George Linnell

Prince George’s Hospital Center

3001 Hospital Drive

Cheverly, MD 20785

Phone: 301–618–3858

Willis Mitchell, Chairperson

Washington, D.C., Chapter of

Concerned Black Men, Inc.

604 15th Street NE.

Washington, DC 20002

Phone: 202–783–5414

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

In response to the high numbers of young

African-American males being brought to

local hospitals with gunshot wounds and

other severe weapon-related injuries, the

Prince George’s Hospital Center, in collaboration with the Washington, D.C., Chapter

of Concerned Black Men, Inc. (a volunteer

mentoring group of professional AfricanAmerican males), and the Prince George’s

County School Board, developed the Shock

Mentor Program. The program incorporates

a proactive approach to preventing youth

violence by showing at-risk high school students the aftermath of gun violence and

other high-risk behaviors. A student is typically identified as at-risk by a teacher based

on the neighborhood environment in which

the student lives, past experiences of violence in the student’s family or community,

or his or her association with peers in acts

of violence. Some youth are placed in the

program by the court system or at their

parents’ request.

The students are brought to the shock

trauma center and emergency rooms of the

Prince George’s Hospital Center to witness

the efforts of doctors and nurses to treat

gunshot injuries and save lives. They also

have opportunities to ride along with police

Copyright © 1998 Corbis Corporation.
186 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 53 (continued)

officers and ambulance drivers in Prince

George’s County to witness the effects that

violence has on the community. Each student is matched with and accompanied by a

member of Concerned Black Men. When

the students return to school, they have an

opportunity to share their experiences and

impressions with their peers. These activities

are complemented by a larger conflict resolution program taught in the county’s high

schools. Participant roundtables at the

schools and a youth-developed conference

on violence culminate in youth recommendations to police, health departments, and hospital officials about strategies for preventing

or reducing gun violence.

More than 600 students from 19 of the 20

high schools in the public school system

have participated in the program over the

past 5 years. The majority of the students

who have participated indicate that they

have found the program to be of great

value and they have shared information

about their visits to the hospital’s emergency room with their peers. Mentors also

report that the youth are visibly affected by

their experiences in the program.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 187

Profile No. 54

Demonstrated

Straight Talk About Risks (STAR), Center to Prevent

Handgun Violence—Washington, DC

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to teach gun safety.

Program Goal:

To reduce unintentional childhood gun

traumas, injuries, and deaths.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Children and youth in prekindergarten

through grade 12.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Nationwide.

Evaluated by:

Education Development Center, Inc.,

Newton, MA.

Contact Information:

Alicia Horton

Center to Prevent Handgun Violence

Education Division

1225 Eye Street NW.

Washington, DC 20005

Phone: 202–289–7319

Years of Operation:

1992–present.

The Center to Prevent Handgun Violence

developed the STAR curriculum in response

to the escalating number of gun-related

deaths of children and teens. STAR is a

prekindergarten through grade 12 curriculum that educates students about the risks

of handling guns and enables them to recognize situations that may lead to gun-related

injuries, identify trusted adults, make safe

choices, combat negative peer pressure, and

resolve conflicts nonviolently. The goal of the

program is to reduce childhood gun trauma

and fatalities by providing the curriculum to

schools, youth agencies, and communitybased organizations. The curriculum is based

on focus group research conducted by the

Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, and on

a joint pilot program with the Dade County,

FL, public schools. The Center worked

closely with teachers, guidance counselors,

students, and parents to develop the curriculum. A team of national experts in child development, injury prevention, curriculum

design, crime prevention, and law enforcement provided a critical review prior to

STAR’s publication in 1992.

The activities presented in the curriculum

include: (1) learning and practicing gun safety

skills that can be used outside the classroom;

(2) self-reflection and role-playing using typical coping mechanisms for anger and fear;

(3) setting personal and societal goals for

change; and (4) developing competency and

leadership skills to address gun safety issues

with peers and the community. The STAR

program teaches younger children how to

behave safely when a gun is encountered, how

to resist peer pressure to play with or carry

guns, and how to distinguish real-life violence

from television violence. For older children,

the program offers activities that teach coping

skills, decisionmaking skills, refusal skills for

resisting peer pressure, and conflict management skills. In addition, STAR provides information to parents to ensure that guns and

other weapons are not accessible to their children. Parents are encouraged to talk to their
188 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 54 (continued)

children about the dangers of guns and consequences of gun violence. Currently, STAR is

being used in more than 90 school districts

nationwide as part of police-led crime prevention efforts and in conjunction with recreation

and health education programs.

An independent research firm, Education

Development Center, Inc., conducted a formative and preliminary impact evaluation of

STAR. The evaluation was designed to examine STAR implementation and student outcomes and included participant self-reports,

direct observation, teacher interviews, and

student group interviews. Educators found

STAR to be developmentally and culturally

sensitive, and the program has been well

received and generally rated positively by

younger students. However, student enthusiasm for the program declined with grade level.

The evaluators believe that this is not unique

to STAR and indicates only that innovative

methods for engaging older students need to

be incorporated. Additionally, educators indicated a need to enhance the program through

practice and reinforcement throughout the

school day and for all subject areas. Student

impacts were assessed using an evaluation

design involving pretesting and posttesting of

treatment and comparison groups. STAR was

found to be most effective for increasing gun

safety knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of

students in grades 3 to 5.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 189

Profile No. 55

Promising

Teens on Target—Oakland, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Initiative to change attitudes about guns and

violence.

Program Goal:

To reduce violent injuries to and deaths of

youth through peer education, peer intervention, leadership development, and peer

counseling.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

At-risk urban youth in East Oakland junior

and senior high schools.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

East Oakland, CA.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Deane Calhoun

YouthAlive!

3300 Elm Street

Oakland, CA 94609

Phone: 510–594–2588

Years of Operation:

1989–present.

The Teens on Target (TNT) teen advocacy

initiative is operated by YouthAlive!, a nonprofit youth development agency whose

mission is to reduce youth injuries and

deaths through peer education, peer intervention, mentoring, and leadership development. The goal of TNT is to train urban

youth who are at risk of violence, including

gun violence, to become advocates for violence prevention. TNT began operating in

Oakland, CA, in 1989 at a time when gun

violence in the city was on the rise.

Homicides continued to rise through the

mid-1990’s, reaching an all-time high of 154

murders in 1993. Juveniles were involved in

gun violence through gang activity, through

drug running, or as victims of gang-based or

racial conflicts in the schools and on the

streets.

In junior and senior high schools in East

Oakland, TNT members, many themselves

victims of violence, were enlisted and

trained to become leaders and advocates

of violence prevention. The teenagers

developed a training curriculum to address

issues of family violence, street and gang

violence, guns, and drugs and alcohol; the

causes and effects of this violence; and the

advocacy skills necessary to stop it. The

program provides positive roles for youth to

portray in schools, at conferences, at public

hearings, and in the media that show lowincome urban youth as leaders and spokespersons in preventing violence. The program

seeks to demonstrate that violence is not an

inevitable part of urban youth’s lives.

TNT leaders conduct weekly workshops on

finding alternatives to violence with students

suspended from school for carrying weapons

or engaging in destructive behavior. TNT

youth make about five presentations per

week on violence prevention to students in

high schools, junior high schools, and some

of the feeder elementary schools, and also

become involved as mentors and peer counselors to youth involved in conflict. It is estimated that TNT peer presenters reach more

than 2,000 youth each year. In 1998, 30 TNT
190 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

members were trained, bringing the current

active membership to 185 youth. In the same

year, these youth reached more than 3,000

people directly through their four-part

workshop in schools (each series was

presented to a classroom of about 30 students) and their presentations at public

hearings, press conferences, and community

workshops.

In the past 2 years, TNT members have become more proactively involved in mediating

conflict situations between rival racial groups

(Asian/Pacific Islanders and Latinos) on

school campuses, in addition to responding to

other conflict situations that occur on school

grounds. An internal pretest and posttest

survey among students who attended presentations determined there was an increase in

knowledge about gun violence facts, including who gets victimized and the role of alcohol in violence.

In a peer visitation program in Alameda

County, known as Caught in the Crossfire,

TNT provides adolescents recovering from

violent injuries in a county hospital trauma

center with information on homicide

Profile No. 55 (continued)

statistics, recidivism rates, and personal experiences to try to dissuade them and their

friends from retaliation. After patients are

discharged, a buddy system is set up to help

the injured youth develop and maintain

positive alternatives to violence when they

return to the community. Each year, TNT

members visit an average of 50 injured

youth and their families and friends.

In their advocacy role, TNT members become involved in making presentations and

giving expert testimonials before city councils, school boards, members of county

boards of supervisors, and the California

State Legislature. They advocated for the

Oakland City Council’s passage of a municipal ordinance banning residential gun

dealers in 1998 and for additional youth

services.

The TNT initiative has a sister program in

Los Angeles. Together, these communitybased programs have won many awards for

their work, including recognition by the U.S.

Department of Justice, the California Peace

Prize, and a Community Fellow Award from

the California Wellness Foundation.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 191

Profile No. 56

Promising

Weapons Are Removed Now (W.A.R.N.) Program—

Los Angeles, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

School-based intervention program.

Program Goal:

To reduce the number of weapons on school

campuses and encourage students to report

when they see a weapon on campus.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Elementary and middle school students

(grades 5 to 8).

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Los Angeles, CA.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Jay Schaffer, Director

18230 Kittredge Street

Reseda, CA 91335

Phone: 818–342–6186, ext. 355

Years of Operation:

1993–present.

In 1993, Reseda High School, which was

considered one of the county’s safest schools,

was shocked when a student was murdered

on campus by a fellow student. It was later

discovered that several students knew beforehand that the perpetrator was carrying

a handgun, but did not alert school officials.

In response, the W.A.R.N. program was

created to break the code of silence among

students and keep weapons of all kinds off

school campuses.

The program trains high school student

volunteers to visit area elementary and

middle schools and make presentations on

the dangers of weapons and violence on

campus. The students present the message

that violence is an improper method for

settling disputes; weapons on campus are

life-threatening; and breaking the code of

silence about those who bring weapons on

campus is the right and necessary thing to

do. The student volunteers visit the schools

alone or in groups. The method by which

the message is presented is left to the

students’ discretion. Students have used

several creative methods of presentation,

including performing skits, reading poetry,

and singing rap songs. School administrators assist the students by reviewing and

approving their presentations beforehand,

confirming contacts with local feeder

schools, and providing transportation for

the students, if needed.

The W.A.R.N. program has received positive feedback from elementary and middle

school students. Evaluation forms given to

these students show that the message is being heard. Moreover, the number of recovered weapons in Los Angeles County

schools has decreased since 1993, when the

W.A.R.N. program was initiated. While it is

difficult to directly link all of this reduction

to the W.A.R.N. program, the findings are

encouraging. In 1995, the W.A.R.N. program was recognized by the International

Association of Chiefs of Police as 1 of 15

promising programs for reducing gun and

other violence in the schools.
192 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 57

Demonstrated

West Contra Costa Unified School District Truancy

Enforcement Program—Richmond, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Program to change attitudes about guns and

violence.

Program Goal:

To decrease the truancy rate within the student population of the West Contra Costa

Unified School District and enhance the role

of the law enforcement community in the

overall battle against truancy.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

At-risk and truant youth ages 6 to 18.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

West Contra Costa Unified School

District, CA.

Evaluated by:

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership,

Oakland, CA.

Contact Information:

Officer Larry Lewis

Richmond Police Department

401 27th Street

Richmond, CA 94804

Phone: 510–620–6642

Years of Operation:

1996–present.

The West Contra Costa Unified School District (W.C.C.U.S.D.) has long experienced

problems of chronic school truancy and high

rates of juvenile delinquency. The district

encompasses 6 cities (the largest being Richmond, north of San Francisco) and serves

31,348 students, of whom 51 percent are

from low-income families (qualifying for free

or reduced-price lunches) and more than 75

percent are African-American, Latino, or

other minorities.

In 1995, more than 16 percent of the total

student body was designated chronically

truant as a result of three or more consecutive unexcused absences. Using crimemapping techniques, police identified a

strong relationship between truancy and

juvenile crime activities. Juvenile burglary

rates were particularly high during school

hours, a problem attributed to large numbers of youth being out of school. However,

in 1996, only 41 percent of youth on probation were enrolled in school, 44 percent had

dropped out of the school district entirely,

and there were no school records on the

remaining 15 percent.

The Truancy Enforcement Program is a

cooperative effort of six county law enforcement agencies, the County Probation Department, and W.C.C.U.S.D. and is coordinated

by the Richmond Police Department. Police

officers conduct intensive sweeps throughout

the school district and deliver truant youth to

the School Welfare and Attendance Team

(SWAT) office, where probation staff and

district school staff assess the level of truancy

of each youth based on school records and

determine a course of action. Parents are

called and must pick up their children to return them to school. Youth who have not

been enrolled in school are either enrolled

in school at that time or placed in one of
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 193

the alternative school programs. Parents and

youth are counseled regarding the State

Education Code’s compulsory attendance

requirements and are provided with recommendations for remediating truancy and

nonenrollment problems. Youth with a history of chronic truancy are referred to the

Student Attendance Review Board (SARB),

which is made up of nine representatives

from social service agencies and youthserving organizations. Parents and students

are required to attend a hearing before SARB

to discuss factors contributing to the student’s

poor attendance (e.g., fear of violence, illiteracy, substance abuse) and to institute a

contracted plan of action.

In a recent study of factors contributing to

school truancy, 80 percent of youth surveyed

said they feared the trip to and from school.

The students said that going to school forced

them to cross the ‘turf’ of hostile gangs and

that they often skipped school rather than

risk violence. Half of the respondents said

they knew a close friend or family member

who had died violently, had overdosed on

drugs, or had been harmed as a result of

gang conflict.

—Resource Development Associates,

Reclaiming Our Children and Families:

A Comprehensive Truancy and

Delinquency Reduction Strategy for

West Contra Costa County, 1997.

In addition to the intensive sweeps to pick

up truant youth, local police officers are

encouraged to make contact with all youth

on the street during school hours. Students

without a written excuse for being out of

school are transported to the SWAT office.

The multiagency truancy enforcement efforts were immediately productive. In the

first 4-day intensive sweep, March 11–14,

1996, 175 youth were picked up, of whom

118 were taken to the SWAT office, 26 were

taken directly to school, 25 were taken

Profile No. 57 (continued)

home, and 6 were arrested. Two months

later (May 13–17), another 4-day sweep

netted 176 youth: 84 were taken to the

SWAT office, 42 were taken back to school,

46 were taken home, and 4 were arrested.

A third sweep, November 19–21, 1996,

resulted in 110 youth being taken to the

SWAT office, taken back to school, or returned home. More than 460 youth were

picked up in the 1996 sweeps; 669 youth

were picked up in three sweeps conducted

in 1997; and in 1998, three intensive sweeps

resulted in 840 youth being returned to

school. In addition to the intensive truancy

sweeps, officers of all six enforcement agencies have stepped up regular beat activity

(by 35 percent since the previous year) by

identifying and picking up truant youth

whom they see or who are reported to be

on the streets.

Student enrollment figures increased by

1,561 students (a 5-percent increase) from

1994–95 to 1997–98 (an increase attributed

partly to the truancy enforcement program

and population growth), and the rate of truancy dropped dramatically. The program is

reported to have evoked a positive response

from the entire school community. Police

appreciate the program because it helps

keep youth off the streets and reduces juvenile crime. Responses from parents of truant

students have been overwhelmingly positive.

In addition, community residents regularly

call the SWAT office to report that youth are

on the streets during school hours. The program is not punitive, and even the youth

have acknowledged that they prefer to be

in school.

The Richmond Police Department’s role in

the Truancy Enforcement Program is one

component of the city’s initiative to reduce

gun violence. The W.C.C.U.S.D. Truancy

Enforcement Program is also being replicated

by other cities in the East Bay Corridor.
194 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 57 (continued)

Finally, the East Bay Public Safety Corridor

Partnership (see profile 5) is assisting

W.C.C.U.S.D. in developing a comprehensive Truancy Reduction Program that

includes the Truancy Enforcement Program,

SafeFutures Probation Aftercare, Family/

Schools Community Partnership, Girls

Mentoring, and Family Preservation

Services.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 195

Youth Violence and Gang

Prevention Programs

Interventions to reduce youth violence must address

a variety of individual and social factors. Violent

behavior is not purely a matter of individual temperament; it also is influenced by a variety of family,

peer, neighborhood, and societal factors. Two lines

of thought about the development of violent and

delinquent behavior are prevalent in the literature.

One is that youth who engage in violence have failed

to develop appropriate social skills. They engage in

violence because they are unable to solve problems

and satisfy their needs in a more socially constructive way. The second viewpoint is that delinquent

youth are very good at analyzing and interpreting

behavior, but they employ this skill in a socially

unsanctioned way. According to this view, many

delinquent youth live in violent and unforgiving

environments and have adopted a violent pattern of

response to survive. From the perspective of these

youth, violence is justified if it helps them achieve a

goal or command respect. Sociologist Elijah Anderson has called this the code of the streets.1

Early violence prevention programs targeted older

adolescents age 15 and above.2

 Newer programs

target younger children as well. Most of these programs are designed to improve social skills, problem

solving, and anger management, while promoting

beliefs that are favorable to nonviolence. Many

encourage youth to consider the long-term consequences of their actions, both for themselves and

for others.3

Few violence prevention programs have been subjected to carefully controlled evaluation. Those that

have been evaluated produced mixed results.4

 Most

produced only modest effects on self-reported rates

of aggressive or violent behavior and did not change

the underlying views of youth or measured rates of

serious violence. It is important to note, however,

that evaluated programs generally targeted older

adolescents, and younger children may be more

affected by intervention efforts.

Changing long-established patterns of behavior may

require a more sustained commitment to education

and followup than was previously appreciated.

There is growing appreciation of the enormous influence that peer groups exercise over the behavior

of adolescents; therefore, programs that ignore

group dynamics by focusing entirely on individual

behavior diminish their chances for success.

Notes

1. E. Anderson, “The code of the streets,” Atlantic

Monthly 273:80–94, 1994.

2. D.W. Webster, “The unconvincing case for

school-based conflict resolution,” Health Affairs 126–

141, Winter 1993.

3. A.L. Kellerman, D.S. Fuqua-Whitley, F.P. Rivara,

and J.A. Mercy, “Preventing youth violence: What

works?” Annual Review of Public Health 19:271–292,

1998.

4. J.C. Howell (ed.), Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1995; and

Kellerman et al.,1998.
196 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Profile No. 58

Promising

Boston Community Centers’ Streetworkers Program—

Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Gang intervention and prevention program.

Program Goal:

To reach out to gang members, at-risk

youth, and their families.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Gang members, youth, and their families.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Tracy Litthcut, Unit Manager of Youth

Services

Boston Community Centers

1010 Massachusetts Avenue

Boston, MA 02118

Phone: 617–635–4920

Years of Operation:

1990–present.

The Streetworkers Program operates 24

hours a day through Boston Community

Centers, city-funded agencies located

throughout Boston (including in many

middle and high schools). Thirty collegeeducated staff, ages 25 to 55, conduct gang

and youth outreach activities engaging

gang members in the streets and through

home visits. The streetworkers advocate for

gang members in the courts (when appropriate), help the probation department with

supervision, mediate disputes and gang

truces, and refer gang members and their

families to existing government and community programs. Streetworkers also have

played a critical role in Operation Ceasefire

(see profile 21), personally inviting gang

members to meetings with Federal, State,

and local law enforcement agencies to communicate a message of zero tolerance for

firearm homicides.

The Streetworkers Program is one element

of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy

implemented in Boston to address escalating

violent crime rates. For more detailed information on the Streetworkers Program, and a

discussion of how it fits into Boston’s overall

crime reduction strategy, see profile 2, Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 197

Profile No. 59

Promising

Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office and Gang Task Force—

Houston, TX

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Gang intervention and prevention programs.

Program Goal:

To reduce juvenile and gang-related crime

and violence through partnerships with law

enforcement, criminal justice agencies,

schools, and youth service providers.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

Criminal street gangs and at-risk juveniles.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Houston, TX.

Evaluated by:

Internal data collection.

Contact Information:

Kim Ogg, Director

Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office, City of

Houston

P.O. Box 1562

Houston, TX 77251

Phone: 713–247–1576

Years of Operation:

1994–present.

In response to the rise in gang-related crime

in the early 1990’s, Houston’s mayor instituted an Anti-Gang Office and Gang Task

Force. The office’s mission is to develop a

comprehensive mechanism to reduce gangrelated violence and crime. To meet this

goal, the office has implemented prevention,

intervention, and suppression program partnerships with law enforcement, criminal

justice agencies, schools, youth service providers, and the public. No additional costs

are incurred by taxpayers because the office

utilizes existing resources. The office coordinates citywide antigang efforts, including

gathering and sharing information on gang

activity, crime prevention, and gang abatement. Many programs involve innovative

collaborations that include the following:

◆ The Anti-Gang Office developed a computerized gang geomapping and tracking

system to identify the location of gangs

and gang gun violence in the city, and to

locate existing youth program resources.

This system helps identify hotspots of

gang-related crime and necessary youth

services.

◆ The Gang Offender Probation Program

was developed to improve judicial oversight of gang members on probation by

partnering probation and law enforcement

officers for increased supervision. More

intensive probation requirements were

imposed on gang members, including participation in gang offender treatment programs. Through close monitoring of the

activities of gang members under supervision, the courts are able to provide more

assistance to first-time offenders.

◆ The Anti-Gang Office initiated a community service program whereby juvenile

probationers clean up graffiti-vandalized

sites and maintain city facilities and vehicles. Since its implementation in 1994,

6,482 graffiti-vandalized sites have been

cleaned. In 1997, 2,833 hours of community service, including rectifying graffitivandalized sites, were served by adult and
198 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

juvenile probationers. The Anti-Gang

Office and the Houston Paint and Coatings Association have donated more than

10,000 gallons of recycled paint for graffiti abatement.

◆ The Gang Education Awareness Resistance (GEAR) program is a partnership

between the Anti-Gang Office, the school

district, and two police departments.

GEAR trains school personnel, including

school administrators, to recognize gang

activity on school campuses and provides

a model for notifying parents and police

when criminal activity is identified.

◆ The Gang-Related Information Tracking

System is a regional gang intelligence data

base serving more than 50 Houston area

law enforcement agencies. This program

identifies Houston area gangs and provides

information on gang members and gang

vehicles. Mobile Data Terminals also are

used, supplying an added security measure

for patrol officers participating in inquiries

related to a suspect’s criminal background.

Profile No. 59 (continued)

Several local youth service providers have

received funding from the Mayor’s AntiGang Office to engage in suppression, intervention, and prevention activities related to

gang violence. The Association for the Advancement of Mexican Americans’ Gang

Prevention Program, for example, provides

legal education and individual counseling to

troubled youth, facilitates program participation and alternative activities, sustains

intervention planning, and provides student

services ranging from tutoring and drug

abuse counseling to HIV testing and financial aid. In 1997, roughly 62 youth between

the ages of 13 and 17 completed this program and reported that the experience had

significantly affected them.

In 1997, the percentage of juveniles accused

of murder declined 23.1 percent from 1996,

rape convictions declined by 5.7 percent,

robbery convictions declined by 10 percent,

aggravated assault convictions declined by

14.2 percent, and overall violent crimes declined by 11.6 percent.
Section VII: Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies 199

Profile No. 60

Demonstrated

Se Puede—San Juan, TX

Program Type or Federal Program Source:

Gang intervention and prevention program.

Program Goal:

To prevent at-risk youth from becoming

involved with gun violence, gangs,

and drugs; to improve their academic

performance.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:

At-risk middle school students and their

parents.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:

Tricity area (Pharr, Alamo, and San

Juan), TX.

Evaluated by:

OZ White Associates, San Antonio, TX.

Contact Information:

OZ White Associates

527 Kings Court

San Antonio, TX 78212

Phone: 210–736–1712

Years of Operation:

1996–present.

The tricity area of Pharr-Alamo-San Juan,

TX, has 5,000 gang members (about onefourth of the student body) attending the

district’s schools. It is an area of high drug

use and drug trafficking within 44 neighborhoods (“colonias”) characterized by high

unemployment, few job opportunities, and

substandard housing that is often without

indoor plumbing. Children who are most at

risk often come from families involved in

drug use and/or trafficking and frequently

have been sexually abused.

The Se Puede (“You Can”) program brings

together teachers, counselors, and school

security personnel to provide positive alternatives and role models to counter daily

exposure to violence, gangs, and drugs

while helping to improve the student’s academic performance. Students participate in

the program for 1 year. Each participating

school campus designates a trained and

appropriately licensed program staff member to provide both individual and group

counseling. A curriculum component,

Project Heart, combines substance abuse

and violence prevention principles and

techniques through culturally sensitive

lessons that are taught weekly in every

school.

To improve behavior and academic skills in

school, Se Puede offers students, many of

whom have never been out of their colonia,

weekend camping experiences. Groups of

10–15 students from each of the nine schools

participate each month in modified survival

skills outings in which they learn to camp,

fish, cook, canoe, and complete rope challenge courses. High school students who

have exhibited leadership potential are

trained in mentoring and given responsibility for assisting younger participants during

the outings. According to evaluators, “rival

gang members who began trips by flashing

gang signs and exhibiting hostility returned

from the experience asleep on the shoulder

of their former enemy.” Some of the former

gang members even went on to become

mentors on subsequent trips.
200 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

In the communities in which the nine

schools in the tricity school district are

located, the number of gangs increased from

9 to 22 during the 12 months of Se Puede’s

implementation. Arrests of juveniles increased by 32 percent from 699 to 923.

However, of the 826 participants in Se Puede

(99 percent Hispanic and 124 speaking only

Spanish), 20 percent stopped participating in

gangs after 6 months; another 10 percent

dropped gang status after 12 months. During

the same period, “wannabes” dropped from

13 percent to 3 percent. Arrest rates among

Se Puede participants dropped from 13 to 10

percent, adjudicated participants from 12 to

6 percent, and repeat offenders from 15 to 3

percent. The number of participants having

no contact with law enforcement increased

from 34 to 65 percent. After 6 months, 18

percent of Se Puede participants reported

they had stopped using drugs, and another 19

percent reported that they had stopped using

drugs after 12 months.

Profile No. 60 (continued)

Participants also demonstrated improved

school behavior; absenteeism was reduced

by 10 percent and disciplinary incidents

decreased by 20 percent. Teachers reported

better classroom behavior for 50 percent of

participants, and results of tests administered before and after the program indicated

improvement in decisionmaking skills, communication, and healthy behaviors such as

drug avoidance.

Violent behavior among participants also

declined significantly. During the year prior

to Se Puede (1995–96), 395 aggravated assaults were reported among 6,750 students

in all grades, a rate of 5.9 percent. During

the program’s first year, Se Puede participants committed only eight aggravated

assaults, representing less than 1 percent

of the program’s participants.
Research, Technical Assistance,

and Education Programs

Section VIII
Section VIII. Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs

Overview ...................................................................................................................................................... 203

Federal Programs ....................................................................................................................................... 203

Comprehensive Communities Program—U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of

Justice Assistance .................................................................................................................................. 203

Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders—

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention .................... 203

Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative—International Association of Chiefs of Police

and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance ......................................................... 204

Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence—U.S. Department

of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, The George Washington

University .............................................................................................................................................. 205

National Weed and Seed Program—U.S. Department of Justice,

Executive Office for Weed and Seed ................................................................................................... 205

National Youth Gang Center—U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention ................................................................................................... 206

Operation Safe Home—U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Office of the Inspector General ............................................................................................................ 206

Partnerships To Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence—U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention .................................................................... 207

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act—U.S. Department of Education ..................... 208

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms .................................. 209

Non-Federal Programs .............................................................................................................................. 211

Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach—Boys & Girls Clubs of America ............................ 211

Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research ......................................................................... 211

National School Safety Center ............................................................................................................. 211

Youth Violence Project .......................................................................................................................... 212
Section VIII: Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs 203

Overview

This section presents programs that provide research,

technical assistance, and educational resources for those

communities seeking to reduce gun violence. These

resources include Federal and private programs that

support the development and implementation of effective firearm violence reduction strategies. They focus

on law enforcement and other intervention initiatives to

reduce the sources of illegal guns, the possession and

carrying of illegal firearms, and the illegal use of guns.

Brief descriptions of the program or agency are given

followed by contact information. Although a variety of

violence reduction programs are included in this section, the listed agencies and organizations do not represent all of the available technical assistance and

educational resources that can be accessed by interested jurisdictions. Appendix E lists the many organizations and sources contacted for the development of

this Report. Several of these agencies and groups also

provide research, technical assistance, and educational

support to reduce firearm violence.

Federal Programs

Comprehensive Communities

Program—U.S. Department of

Justice, Bureau of Justice

Assistance

The Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) is

a Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) initiative that

implements a community-based comprehensive approach to crime control and prevention. CCP, which

was initiated in 1994, receives technical assistance

from the National Crime Prevention Council and

operates in 16 demonstration sites across the country,

including Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA;

Columbia, SC; Denver, CO; East Bay, CA; Fort

Worth, TX; Gary, IN; Hartford, CT; Omaha, NE;

Phoenix, AZ; Salt Lake City, UT; Seattle, WA;

Washington, DC; Wichita, KS; and Wilmington, DE.

CCP promotes the engagement of Federal, State, and

local governments; the private sector; and the community in combating violent crime and drug use and

abuse in our communities. The objectives of the program are to: (1) suppress violence and restore the

sense of community in the target neighborhoods;

(2) focus on community problems by implementing

comprehensive planning and improved intergovernmental and community relationships; (3) develop a

comprehensive, multiagency strategy to identify the

causes of violence in the target community, and to

control and prevent violent crime; (4) implement

community policing and other efforts that encourage

citizens to take an active role in problem solving; and

(5) coordinate and concentrate Federal, State, and

local, government organizations and private resources

to maximize their impact on reducing violent crime.

The 16 demonstration sites have implemented a wide

range of crime prevention and control activities that

integrate criminal and juvenile justice systems with

social service systems. In addition to promoting community policing and other community mobilization

efforts, these jurisdictions are attempting to implement

innovative approaches to combat crime including drug

courts, community prosecution and diversion, conflict

resolution training, and alternatives to incarceration.

Contact information:

Jay Marshall

Bureau of Justice Assistance

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

202–616–3215

Comprehensive Strategy for

Serious, Violent, and Chronic

Juvenile Offenders—U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention (OJJDP) published its Comprehensive

Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile

Offenders in 1993. After developing and testing both

the prevention and graduated sanctions components of the program over the next 2 years,

OJJDP launched a national training and technical
204 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

assistance initiative in 1995 with the publication of

a guide for implementing the Comprehensive Strategy. The guide provides a framework for developing and implementing the program, and is based

on the creation of a continuum of juvenile delinquency prevention, early intervention, and graduated sanctions strategies. The continuum starts

with prenatal prevention and includes communitybased prevention services based on risk and resource assessment, immediate interventions, and a

range of graduated sanctions that include institutional care and aftercare services. These strategies

are key points along the continuum and are designed to reduce the risk factors that contribute to

delinquent behaviors.

OJJDP has provided intensive training and technical

assistance to three pilot sites (San Diego County, CA;

and Jacksonville and Ft. Myers, FL) to develop

strategic plans for implementing the Comprehensive

Strategy. In addition, eight States (Florida, Iowa,

Maryland, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and

Wisconsin) were selected to test the program by receiving onsite technical assistance or by field testing

a community planning manual. OJJDP also has provided strategic planning assistance for implementing

the Comprehensive Strategy for the six SafeFutures

jurisdictions (Boston, MA; Contra Costa, CA; Seattle,

WA; St. Louis, MO; Imperial County, CA; and

Ft. Belknap Indian Community, Harlem, MT).

SafeFutures is designed to test the implementation of a

continuum of care for at-risk and delinquent youth and

their families to prevent and control juvenile crime and

victimization. SafeFutures is conceptually consistent

with the Comprehensive Strategy initiative.

The three pilot sites are participating in the training

and technical assistance component of the program,

and are in the process of publishing their strategic

plans for implementing the Comprehensive Strategy.

Valuable lessons learned in these pilot sites have

helped to develop additional implementation tools

that have been used to help expand strategic planning efforts in the other sites.

At this time OJJDP’s Comprehensive Strategy

intensive training and technical assistance is available only in the competitively selected Comprehensive Strategy States, the San Diego County pilot

site, and the SafeFutures sites.

Contact information:

Mark Matese

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

202–307–5924

Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative—

International Association of

Chiefs of Police and U.S.

Department of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Assistance

The International Association of Chiefs of Police

(IACP), in conjunction with the Bureau of Justice

Assistance, provides 15 law enforcement agencies with

technical assistance on crime gun interdiction and investigation. The program, developed in cooperation

with State, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies, addresses the following aspects of crime gun

interdiction and investigation: (1) tracing crime guns,

identifying patterns, and focusing enforcement efforts;

(2) developing policy and implementing standard operating procedures regarding firearm tracing; (3) understanding the connections among firearms, gangs, and

youth violence; (4) developing effective strategies

for the interdiction of illegally trafficking firearms;

(5) creating a multijurisdictional firearm interdiction

and investigation task force; (6) developing and implementing a memorandum of understanding with other

agencies; (7) working with firearm dealers to reduce

illegal firearm and ammunition sales; and (8) working

with the courts to prosecute cases effectively.

Technical assistance is provided by IACP and ATF

experts on crime gun interdiction and investigation

issues, and during visits to the National Tracing

Center. In addition, IACP and ATF assist law enforcement agencies in developing local policies,

strategies, and protocols to reduce the illegal flow

and availability of crime guns to violent criminals,

gang offenders, and juveniles.
Section VIII: Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs 205

Contact information:

Paul E. Bolton

International Association of Chiefs of Police

515 North Washington Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

703–836–6767

Hamilton Fish National Institute

on School and Community

Violence—U.S. Department of

Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention, The

George Washington University

During the early 1990’s, the National Academy of

Sciences and the U.S. General Accounting Office

noted that most prior efforts to develop school violence prevention strategies had been hastily prepared, implemented for only short periods, and not

rigorously evaluated. They urged that investments

be made in rigorous research, development, and

evaluation of programs to reduce violence in and

around schools.

Their recommendations inspired the creation of the

Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and

Community Violence, which was founded in 1997 to

serve as a national resource to test the effectiveness

of school violence prevention methods and to develop more effective strategies. The Institute’s goal is

to determine what works, what does not work, and

what can be replicated to reduce violence in schools

and their immediate communities across the Nation.

Drawing from previous research on school violence

and from the experience and knowledge of leading

violence prevention experts, teachers, school administrators, and others, the Institute identifies the most

promising violence prevention strategies and tests

them in local schools. After strategies are identified,

tested, and refined, the Institute disseminates this

information to the public.

The Institute services include: (1) providing the most

current information and analysis about the levels and

trends of school violence in the Nation; (2) providing

comprehensive literature reviews, research papers,

and a searchable data base for resources on violence

prevention topics; (3) consulting on effective strategies

for school violence prevention; (4) assisting schools

in conducting needs assessments for violence prevention and evaluating school violence interventions;

and (5) providing assistance to practitioners and

policymakers on the national, State, and local levels.

The Institute is funded by the U.S. Department of

Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, and is administered by George Washington University.

Contact information:

Dr. Paul Kingery, Director

1925 North Lynn Street, #305

Rosslyn, VA 22209

703–527–4217

703–527–8741 (Fax)

Web site: www.hfni.gsehd.gwu.edu

National Weed and Seed

Program—U.S. Department of

Justice, Executive Office for

Weed and Seed

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Weed and Seed

program was developed to demonstrate an innovative and comprehensive approach to law enforcement and community revitalization, and to prevent

and control violent crime, drug abuse, and gang

activity in target areas. The program, initiated in

1991, attempts to weed out violent crime, gang activity, and drug use and trafficking in target areas,

and then seed the target area by restoring the neighborhood through social and economic revitalization.

Weed and Seed has three objectives: (1) develop a

comprehensive, multiagency strategy to control and

prevent violent crime, drug trafficking, and drugrelated crime in target neighborhoods; (2) coordinate and integrate existing and new initiatives to

concentrate resources and maximize their impact

on reducing and preventing violent crime, drug

trafficking, and gang activity; and (3) mobilize community residents in the target areas to assist law

enforcement in identifying and removing violent

offenders and drug traffickers from the community
206 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

and to assist other human service agencies in identifying and responding to service needs of the target

area. To achieve these goals, Weed and Seed integrates law enforcement, community policing, prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood

restoration efforts. The Weed and Seed program is

being implemented in more than 150 communities

across the country.

The Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS)

within the Office of Justice Programs is responsible

for overall program policy, coordination, and development. EOWS also serves to enhance the law enforcement and prosecution coordination among Federal,

State, and local agencies, and coordinates with other

cooperating programs and agencies such as AmeriCorps, Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities,

and the Comprehensive Communities Program.

Contact information:

Paul Casagrande, Program Manager

Executive Office for Weed and Seed

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street NW., Sixth Floor

Washington, DC 20531

202–616–1152

National Youth Gang Center—U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention

In response to escalating gang membership and violence in the last two decades, the Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention established the

National Youth Gang Center (NYGC). The Center’s

goals follow:

◆ Collect and analyze gang-related data and generate annual surveys and reports. Ultimately, a gang

reporting system will be developed containing

comprehensive data from a nationally representative sample of jurisdictions.

◆ Compile and analyze gang-related legislation. A

listing of legislation, cross-referenced by State, is

available to the public at NYGC’s Web site

(www.iir.com/nygc).

◆ Collect the most current gang literature, which

OJJDP makes available through the Juvenile

Justice Clearinghouse (800–638–8736).

◆ Identify promising gang intervention and prevention strategies across the country, develop documentation, and prepare summary reports.

◆ Participate in and serve as the coordinator for the

OJJDP-sponsored Youth Gang Consortium,

which coordinates gang program development

and information exchange among Federal, State,

and local agencies. The Consortium conducts

regular meetings and produces reports to disseminate gang-related data and information.

NYGC also supports and implements GANGINFO,

an online forum on youth gangs. Subscribers can

exchange information about effective strategies for

identifying and combating youth gangs.

GANGINFO regularly posts announcements of

relevant conferences and new literature.

Contact information:

John Moore

National Youth Gang Center

Institute for Intergovernmental Research

P.O. Box 12729

Tallahassee, FL 32317

850–385–0600

Operation Safe Home—U.S.

Department of Housing and

Urban Development, Office of the

Inspector General

In recent years, law-abiding residents of public and

assisted housing have been terrorized by gun, gang,

and drug activity that destroys the quality of life for

residents and the surrounding community. The Operation Safe Home initiative was based on analysis

by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), that violent crime was seriously undermining the efficiency of the country’s low-income

housing programs. The rising tide of violence was

due, in part, to poor communication and cooperation
Section VIII: Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs 207

between housing authorities and local law enforcement; inadequate emphasis on crime prevention (as

opposed to law enforcement); and fragmented Federal, State, and local law enforcement efforts.

Operation Safe Home seeks to address these problems by creating: (1) a collaboration of Federal, State,

and local law enforcement focused on reducing the

level of violent crime within public and assisted housing; (2) a collaboration between law enforcement

agencies and public housing managers and residents

to devise methods to prevent violent crime; and (3) the

introduction of HUD and other Federal initiatives

specifically geared to preventing crime.

In response to a request from a crime-plagued public

or assisted housing community, a task force is assembled to identify persons who are engaged in illegal

activity involving weapons or drugs within the publicly

funded housing area and the housing units where the

illegal activity is taking place. Evidence is then developed through the use of informants, cooperating witnesses, surveillance, and covert drug or gun purchases,

and presented to Federal or State courts to secure

arrest and/or search warrants. This traditional law

enforcement phase may take several months from

inception to prosecution. However, HUD/OIG’s

responsibility to the HUD-funded community does

not end with arrests, but includes efforts to further

the community’s recovery, improve the quality of life

for residents, and prevent the criminal element from

reasserting control. The postenforcement strategies

include: (1) formation of neighborhood watch groups;

(2) institution of drug education, gun safety, and life

skills programs; (3) implementation of efforts to rid

housing complexes of trash and graffiti; and (4) institution of job training programs and reading programs

for children.

Contact information:

Lee Isdell

Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development

451 Seventh Street SW.

Washington, DC 20410

202–708–0430

Partnerships To Reduce Juvenile

Gun Violence—U.S. Department

of Justice, Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency

Prevention

In 1997, as part of its commitment to address the

escalating problem of youth violence, the Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

awarded grants to demonstration sites to implement

partnerships to reduce juvenile gun violence. The

purpose of these partnerships is to increase the effectiveness of existing youth gun violence reduction

strategies by enhancing and coordinating prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies and

strengthening linkages between community residents, law enforcement, and the juvenile justice

system. The program is based on research showing

that a community assessment of the local youth gun

violence problems should guide program development and that program implementation should use

suppression intervention and multiple prevention

strategies. The sites seek to: (1) reduce illegal gun

availability to juveniles, (2) reduce the incidence of

juveniles illegally carrying guns, (3) reduce juvenile

gun-related crime, (4) increase youth awareness of

the personal and legal consequences of gun violence,

(5) increase participation of community residents

and organizations in public safety efforts, (6) improve community residents’ attitudes toward law

enforcement and alleviate their concerns about

safety, and (7) increase and coordinate services and

resources for at-risk juveniles, especially juveniles

involved in the justice system. Seven strategies are

being implemented to achieve these goals:

◆ Institute a suppression strategy that reduces juvenile

access to illegal guns and illegal gun trafficking by

developing special gun units, using community allies

to report illegal gun trafficking, targeting gang members and illegal guns, targeting for prosecution

those who possess, and imposing sanctions on those

who are involved in gun violence.

◆ Develop a juvenile justice strategy that applies

appropriate interventions to respond to the needs

of juvenile gun offenders. These interventions

may include family counseling, victim impact
208 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

counseling, drug abuse treatment, probation, and

community supervision.

◆ Implement a law enforcement strategy that expands

neighborhood communication, includes community

policing, and initiates community supervision to

educate at-risk and court-involved juveniles on the

legal consequences of gun violence.

◆ Provide positive opportunities for youth, such as

mentoring, job-readiness training, and afterschool

programs.

◆ Institute an educational strategy in which students learn how to resolve conflicts, resist peer

pressure to carry or possess guns, and distinguish

between real life and television violence.

◆ Implement a public information strategy that uses

radio, local television, and print outlets to communicate the dangers and consequences of gun

violence to juveniles and youth and to present

information about positive youth activities in the

community.

◆ Implement a community mobilization strategy

that engages neighborhood residents, including

youth, in improving the community.

Contact information:

Frank Smith or Jeff Slowikowski

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

202–307–5911

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and

Communities Act—U.S.

Department of Education

The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities

Act (SDFSCA) State and Local Grants Program,

authorized by the 1994 Elementary and Secondary

Education Act (ESEA) (Title IV, §§ 4111–4116, 20

U.S.C. 7111–7116), is a central part of the Federal

Government’s effort to encourage the creation of safe,

disciplined, and drug-free learning environments that

will help all children meet challenging academic standards. The program provides support for school- and

community-based programs to prevent youth violence

and alcohol and other drug use.

SDFSCA primarily supports prevention programs

and activities. Its program provides funding for formula grants to States to support local educational

agencies and community-based organizations in

developing and implementing programs to prevent

drug use and violence among children and youth.

The program also provides funding for national

leadership activities that directly support classroom

teaching. The following list highlights some of these

activities.

◆ Developing comprehensive drug and violence

prevention programs for all students from preschool through grade 12 that include health

education, early intervention, pupil services,

mentoring, rehabilitation referral, and related

activities.

◆ Devising strategies to integrate family services

from a variety of providers to enhance school

performance and boost attachment to school and

family.

◆ Providing professional training and development

for school personnel, parents, law enforcement

officials, and other community members.

◆ Supporting “safe zones of passage” for students

between home and school through enhanced law

enforcement, neighborhood patrols, and similar

measures.

Copyright © 1998 PhotoDisc, Inc.
Section VIII: Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs 209

◆ Offering direct services to schools and school

systems afflicted with especially severe drug and

violence problems.

Contact information:

William Modzeleski, Director

Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program

U.S. Department of Education

600 Independence Avenue SW., Room 604

Washington, DC 20202

202–260–3954

U.S. Department of the Treasury,

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF) is a law enforcement agency within the U.S.

Department of the Treasury that enforces Federal

laws and regulations relating to alcohol, tobacco,

firearms, explosives, and arson. ATF works directly

and in cooperation with other agencies to suppress

and prevent crime and violence; provide fair and

effective industry regulation and revenue collection;

support and assist Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement; and provide innovative

training programs in support of its functions.

To curb the illegal use of firearms and enforce Federal

firearm laws, ATF issues firearms dealers’ licenses

and conducts firearms licensee qualification and

compliance inspections. In addition to aiding the

enforcement of Federal requirements for gun purchases, compliance inspections of existing licensees

focus on assisting law enforcement to identify and

apprehend criminals who illegally purchase firearms.

The inspections also help improve the likelihood that

crime gun traces will be successful, because inspectors educate licensees in proper recordkeeping and

business practices. Compliance inspections target

licensees likely to divert firearms from legitimate

trade to criminal use and dealers with a history of

poor compliance. Investigative priorities focus on

armed violent offenders and career criminals, narcotics traffickers, narcoterrorists, violent gang members,

and domestic and international arms traffickers. ATF

also works with Federal, State, and local law enforcement to target, investigate, and recommend prosecution of armed career criminals and narcotics traffickers; to reduce the level of violent crime; and to

enhance public safety.

National Tracing Center

ATF established the National Tracing Center (NTC)

as the sole agency responsible for tracing firearms

used in crimes and recovered at crime scenes. Firearm tracing is the systematic tracking of firearms

from manufacturer to purchaser for the purpose of

aiding law enforcement officials in identifying suspects involved in criminal violations, establishing

stolen status, and proving ownership. The volume

and efficiency of NTC trace operations has increased

significantly. In 1997, NTC traced 199,000 crime

guns. NTC currently houses more than 100 million

firearm records as part of a reference library that

identifies firearms, manufacturers, and importers.

NTC communicates trace requests to the gun manufacturer, which is required to provide the name of

the wholesale/retail distributor and the date of transfer. The chain of wholesale/retail transactions is then

followed from the point of sale to an individual

citizen. Further tracing is then at the discretion of

ATF and dependent on the significance of the individual investigation and the availability of special

agent resources.

Project LEAD

Project LEAD is an automated data system that

tracks illegal firearms. It provides investigative

leads to law enforcement by analyzing crime gun

trace data and multiple sales information to identify

indicators of illegal firearm trafficking.

An illegal firearm trafficking indicator is a factor or

circumstance, most often revealed by recurring

trends and patterns, that is associated with illegal

firearm diversion or sales. Project LEAD allows

investigators to identify such indicators, which can

then help law enforcement to identify and investigate the most active and prolific illegal firearm traffickers. One such indicator is the “time-to-crime”

rate of a firearm. Time-to-crime is the period of time

(measured in days) between a firearm’s retail sale

and law enforcement’s recovery of the firearm in
210 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

connection with a crime. A short time-to-crime rate

usually means the firearm will be easier to trace, and

when several short time-to-crime traces involve the

same individual/Federal firearm licensee, illegal trafficking activity is highly probable.

The comprehensive tracing of all recovered crimerelated firearms in an area experiencing high rates of

armed crimes can identify individuals who are illegally trafficking firearms to violent criminals, gang

offenders, and in particular, to juveniles and youth.

Integrated Ballistics Identification System

The Integrated Ballistics Identification System

(IBIS) has been implemented by NTC. IBIS is a

computer identification system that correlates and

matches projectile and shell casing ballistic evidence.

A unique comparison system allows firearm technicians to digitize and sort bullet and shell casings at a

greatly accelerated rate, and to maintain a national

data base that quickly assimilates local law enforcement evidence. Now, local law enforcement can fire

a recovered weapon and enter digitized information

from the bullet that will provide “fingerprint” evidence for all other bullets fired from it. When a suspect is linked to a gun, IBIS can quickly determine

if bullets fired from that gun can be linked to other

crimes. With every recovered gun, projectile, or

shell casing, the data base and the potential for individual criminal prosecution grow.

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

(YCGII) is a component of ATF’s illegal gun trafficking enforcement program. Begun in July 1996 in 17

cities, YCGII seeks to reduce the illegal supply of

firearms to juveniles, youth, and adult criminals.

Police departments participating in the program

agree to trace all recovered crime guns and to collaborate with ATF in investigations of trafficking. ATF

assists the departments in developing electronic tracing capability and provides training in tracing and

trafficking interdiction. ATF’s Crime Gun Analysis

Branch also provides each participating community

with a standardized analysis of the crime guns recovered and traced from that jurisdiction. Twenty-seven

communities participate in YCGII, and ATF expects

to expand the program in the next few years. ATF

and local law enforcement are investigating and

arresting illegal gun traffickers by using comprehensive trace information and traditional investigative

methods.

Gang Resistance Education and Training

ATF’s Gang Resistance Education and Training

(G.R.E.A.T.) program is designed to help children

set goals for themselves, resist negative peer pressure, learn how to resolve conflicts without violence,

and understand how gangs and youth violence affect

the quality of their lives. G.R.E.A.T. students discover for themselves the ramifications of gang and

youth violence through structured exercises and

interactive approaches to learning.

G.R.E.A.T. curriculums reach third/fourth-grade

and fifth/sixth-grade students. To date, thousands of

law enforcement officers from hundreds of agencies

throughout the United States, Canada, Guam, and

Puerto Rico, and military personnel from overseas

bases in Japan and Germany have been trained to

present the core curriculum in elementary, middle,

and junior high school classrooms. The estimated

cumulative number of students who have received

the G.R.E.A.T. program exceeds 1.5 million.

Contact information:

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

650 Massachusetts Avenue, NW.

Washington, DC 20226

202–927–8700

Forest Webb

National Tracing Center

2029 Stonewall Jackson Drive

Falling Waters, WV 25419

304–274–4100

Joe Coffee

Gang Resistance Education and Training

Tech World, Suite 600, North Lobby

800 K Street, NW.

Washington, DC 20091

202–927–2150
Section VIII: Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs 211

Non-Federal Programs

Gang Prevention Through

Targeted Outreach—Boys & Girls

Clubs of America

The Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach

program was initiated in 1991 to help local Boys &

Girls Clubs build a network of local community

representatives (including community agencies,

schools, social service organizations, courts, and

police and other law enforcement officials) to assess

their local gang problem, recruit youth (ages 6 to 18)

who are at risk of gang membership, and focus

efforts and resources on the reduction of gang involvement by providing these at-risk youth with

alternative activities. According to Frank Sanchez,

Jr., Director of Delinquency Prevention for the

Boys & Girls Clubs of America, the major goal of

the program is to satisfy youth interests and their

social and physical needs by providing prosocial

activities. These activities center around five target

areas: character and leadership development; health

and life skills; the arts; sports, fitness, and recreation; and education. In addition to the activities

provided in the program, the youth are provided

with counselors and are tracked for the first year

of their participation while being mainstreamed into

normal club activities. Since the program’s inception, more than 120 clubs nationwide have been

funded, serving more than 6,850 youth.

Contact information:

Frank Sanchez, Jr., Director of Delinquency

Prevention

Boys & Girls Clubs of America

1230 West Peachtree Street NW.

Atlanta, GA 30309

404–815–5763

Johns Hopkins Center for

Gun Policy and Research

The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research began in 1995 with funding from the Joyce

Foundation of Chicago. It is dedicated to reducing

gun violence by providing information on firearm

injuries and gun policy; by developing, analyzing,

and evaluating strategies to prevent firearm injuries;

and by conducting public health and legal research

to identify gun policy needs. Recently, the Center

published an annotated bibliography on firearm

violence, and a model State law on “personalized”

handguns. Personalized handguns, or “smart” guns,

are handguns that, through various technologies,

can be fired only by authorized users; smart guns

can reduce the incidence of teenage suicide, unintentional shootings, and the use of stolen firearms.

Contact information:

Stephen Teret

Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy Research

624 North Broadway

Baltimore, MD 21205

410–955–3995

National School Safety Center

The National School Safety Center (NSSC) was

created by Presidential directive in 1984. The

Center was formed by a partnership between the

Copyright © 1998 PhotoDisc, Inc.
212 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department

of Education, and Pepperdine University. The

Center’s national headquarters are in Westlake Village, CA. NSSC’s mandate is to focus national attention on cooperative solutions to problems that

disrupt the educational process. Special emphasis is

placed on efforts to rid schools of crime, violence,

and drugs, and on programs to improve student

discipline, attendance, and achievement, and school

climate. NSSC provides technical assistance, offers

legal and legislative aid, and produces publications

and films. The Center also serves as a clearinghouse

for information on school safety issues.

NSSC’s communications section conducts a comprehensive national public relations program that includes

producing public service announcements, films, publications, resource papers, articles, conferences, and

other promotional activities. NSSC’s School Safety News

Service is published nine times annually. Considered

one of America’s leading school crime prevention news

journals, it features topical articles by prominent authors and communicates trends and exemplary programs for delinquency prevention and school safety.

These materials promote NSSC’s underlying theme:

the need for partnerships between schools, other public and private institutions, and the community.

NSSC maintains a resource center with more than

50,000 articles, publications, and films on victim’s

rights, school security, student discipline, bullying,

character development, law-related education, drug

trafficking and abuse, school/law enforcement partnerships, public/community relations, and attendance issues.

The NSSC field services section coordinates a national

network of education, law enforcement, business, legal,

and other civic and professional leaders who are working cooperatively to create and maintain safe schools.

The field services section provides online training and

technical assistance programs worldwide.

Contact information:

Ronald Stephens

4165 Thousand Oaks Boulevard

Suite 290

Westlake Village, CA 91362

805–373–9977

Youth Violence Project

The Youth Violence Project (YVP) is supported by

the Curry School of Education at the University of

Virginia. YVP has three primary goals: (1) to identify effective methods and policies for preventing

and responding to youth violence, especially in

school settings; (2) to provide education and training on youth violence and aggression for educators,

psychologists, and other colleagues in the social,

legal, and human services professions; and (3) to

conduct and disseminate research on the understanding and reduction of violent behavior in youth.

YVP does not work with youth directly but funds

several projects that work with youth.

For example, YVP is collaborating with Virginia

Commonwealth University on the Youth Gang

Project, which works with Virginia communities

with identified gang problems. The project trains

community members in violence prevention, conducts needs assessments, assists in program development, and funds local community grants to nonprofit

organizations focusing on gang prevention. One

program is the United Neighborhoods Project,

which brings rival gang members from Arlington

and Fairfax, VA, together in an effort to reduce intergang conflict, graffiti, and violence, and to encourage community service. Another is the Gang

Prevention Through Targeted Outreach program of

the Newport News Boys & Girls Club, which offers

club membership to youth referred by the courts,

schools, or police, or identified through targeted

outreach efforts.

Contact information:

Dewey Cornell

University of Virginia

405 Emmet Street

Charlottesville, VA 22903

804–924–0793
References

Section IX

Section IX: References 215

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Appendixes

Section X
Section X. Appendixes

Appendix A. Geographical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies ............................ 221

Appendix B. Alphabetical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies .............................. 225

Appendix C. Matrix of Participating Key Agencies and Organizations ................................................. 227

Appendix D. Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory .............................................................. 235

Appendix E. Organizations and Sources Contacted for the Inventory ................................................... 245

Appendix F. Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies ............................................. 249
Section X: Appendixes 221

Appendix A: Geographical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Alabama

Juvenile Gun Court—Birmingham 43

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Birmingham 25

Arizona

Operation Safe Streets Gang Prevention Initiative—Phoenix 22

California

Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond 4

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland 5

Municipal Firearms Ordinances, East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland 16

Oakland Firearms Licensee Compliance Program—Oakland 12

Teens on Target—Oakland 55

Weapons Are Removed Now (W.A.R.N.) Program—Los Angeles 56

West Contra Costa Unified School District Truancy Enforcement Program—Richmond 57

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Inglewood 27

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Salinas 29

Connecticut

Child Development-Community Policing (CD–CP) Program—New Haven 48

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Bridgeport 26

Washington, DC

Hands Without Guns 50

Straight Talk About Risks (STAR), Center to Prevent Handgun Violence 54

Georgia

Bibb County, GA, Department of Education, Violence and Weapons Prevention and

Intervention Program—Macon 34

Youth, Firearms, and Violence—Atlanta 24

Illinois

Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement Program (CAGE)—Chicago 11

Indiana

Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis 6

Project LIFE—Indianapolis 45

Targeted Enforcement Program, Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis 23

Program Name and Location, by State Profile Number
222 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Louisiana

Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge 8

Operation Eiger, Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile

Gun Violence—Baton Rouge 32

Maryland

Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program—Baltimore 1

Baltimore County Police Gun Squad—Baltimore 9

Baltimore Police Violent Crimes Division and Youth Violence Strike Force—Baltimore 18

DISARM, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Baltimore 36

The Living Classroom Foundation—Baltimore 51

Shock Mentor Program—Prince George’s County 53

Massachusetts

Boston Gun Project—Boston 10

Boston Community Centers’ Streetworkers Program—Boston 58

Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence—Boston 2

Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006—Boston 46

Operation Ceasefire—Boston 21

Operation Night Light—Boston 33

Suffolk County Community-Based Juvenile Justice Program—Boston 35

Michigan

Handgun Intervention Program—Detroit 41

Minnesota

Calling the Shots—St. Paul 47

Juvenile Gun Program—Minneapolis 44

Minnesota Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI), Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis 31

Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis 7

Missouri

Consent to Search and Seize Firearms—St. Louis 15

Kansas City Gun Experiment—Kansas City 20

New York

Buffalo Weed and Seed Initiative—Buffalo 3

Getting Guns Off the Streets, New York City Police Department—New York 19

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiatives—Rochester 40

Appendix A: Geographical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Program Name and Location, by State Profile Number
Section X: Appendixes 223

North Carolina

Violent Crime Task Force—Charlotte 13

Rhode Island

Gun Court—Providence 37

Tennessee

U.S. Attorney’s Office Anti-Violence Crime Task Force—Memphis 39

Weapon Watch—Memphis 17

Texas

Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office and the Gang Task Force—Houston 59

Se Puede—San Juan 60

Virginia

Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety Education Program, National Rifle Association—Fairfax 49

Project Exile, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Eastern District of Virginia 38

Washington

Juvenile Firearms Prosecution—Seattle 42

Safe Gun Storage Campaign—Seattle 52

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Seattle 30

West Virginia

West Virginia Firearms Violations Task Force—Charleston 14

Wisconsin

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Milwaukee 28

Appendix A: Geographical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Program Name and Location, by State Profile Number
Section X: Appendixes 225

Appendix B: Alphabetical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program—Baltimore, MD 1

Baltimore County Police Gun Squad—Baltimore, MD 9

Baltimore Police Violent Crimes Division and Youth Violence Strike Force—Baltimore, MD 18

Bibb County, GA, Department of Education, Violence and Weapons Prevention and

Intervention Program—Macon, GA 34

Boston Community Centers’ Streetworkers Program—Boston, MA 58

Boston Gun Project—Boston, MA 10

Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence—Boston, MA 2

Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006—Boston, MA 46

Buffalo Weed and Seed Initiative—Buffalo, NY 3

Calling the Shots—St. Paul, MN 47

Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement Program (CAGE)—Chicago, IL 11

Child Development-Community Policing (CD–CP) Program—New Haven, CT 48

Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond, CA 4

Consent to Search and Seize Firearms—St. Louis, MO 15

DISARM, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Baltimore, MD 36

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland, CA 5

Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety Education Program, National Rifle Association—Fairfax, VA 49

Getting Guns Off the Streets, New York City Police Department—New York, NY 19

Gun Court—Providence, RI 37

Handgun Intervention Program—Detroit, MI 41

Hands Without Guns—Washington, DC 50

Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN 6

Juvenile Firearms Prosecution—Seattle, WA 42

Juvenile Gun Court—Birmingham, AL 43

Juvenile Gun Program—Minneapolis, MN 44

Kansas City Gun Experiment—Kansas City, MO 20

The Living Classroom Foundation—Baltimore, MD 51

Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office and the Gang Task Force—Houston, TX 59

Minnesota Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI), Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis, MN 31

Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis, MN 7

Municipal Firearms Ordinances, East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland, CA 16

Oakland Firearms Licensee Compliance Program—Oakland, CA 12

Operation Ceasefire—Boston, MA 21

Operation Eiger, Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of

Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA 32

Operation Night Light—Boston, MA 33

Operation Safe Streets Gang Prevention Initiative—Phoenix, AZ 22

Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA 8

Project Exile, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Eastern District of Virginia 38

Project LIFE—Indianapolis, IN 45

Safe Gun Storage Campaign—Seattle, WA 52

Se Puede—San Juan, TX 60

Program Name and Location Profile Number
226 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Shock Mentor Program—Prince George’s County, MD 53

Straight Talk About Risks (STAR), Center to Prevent Handgun Violence—Washington, DC 54

Suffolk County Community-Based Juvenile Justice Program—Boston, MA 35

Targeted Enforcement Program, Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN 23

Teens on Target—Oakland, CA 55

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiatives—Rochester, NY 40

U.S. Attorney’s Office Anti-Violence Crime Task Force—Memphis, TN 39

Violent Crime Task Force—Charlotte, NC 13

Weapon Watch—Memphis, TN 17

Weapons Are Removed Now (W.A.R.N.) Program—Los Angeles, CA 56

West Contra Costa Unified School District Truancy Enforcement Program—Richmond, CA 57

West Virginia Firearms Violations Task Force—Charleston, WV 14

Youth, Firearms, and Violence—Atlanta, GA 24

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Birmingham, AL 25

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Bridgeport, CT 26

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Inglewood, CA 27

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Milwaukee, WI 28

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Salinas, CA 29

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Seattle, WA 30

Appendix B: Alphabetical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Program Name and Location Profile Number
Section X: Appendixes 227

A matrix of key participating agencies has been developed to identify the variety of criminal justice,

law enforcement, government, social service, and community organizations that are involved in each

of the listed gun violence reduction strategy profiles. These agencies and organizations make up the

key components of each strategy.

In many instances, the profiled strategies include the participation of researchers from universities or

consulting firms. These experts often provide valuable assistance for the collaborating group as they

attempt to identify the gun violence problems in their communities. These researchers also help the

participants develop measurable goals and data collection mechanisms for assessing program outcomes.

The involvement of the media and newspapers also is a valuable component in several programs. The

media can assist in getting the gun violence reduction message out to the public. Local newspapers

and broadcast media can target specific high-risk populations and help create a culture of change.

However, the matrix does not include every agency that may be involved in implementing gun violence reduction programs. A variety of public and private agencies are needed to develop effective gun

violence reduction strategies. The following matrix is limited to those organizations that have key

collaborative roles.

Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations
228 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Planning/Crime Mapping

Patrol/Investigation

Weapons Unit

Gangs Unit

Community Policing

Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Other Special Units

Federal Law Enforcement

State Law Enforcement

State and Local Prosecutors

U.S. Attorneys

Juvenile/Family Courts

State/Local Courts

Juvenile/Adult Probation/Parole

Juvenile/Adult Corrections

Other Criminal Justice

1. Baltimore Comprehensive

Communities Program–Baltimore, MD X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

2. Boston Strategy to Prevent

Youth Violence–Boston, MA X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

3. Buffalo Weed and Seed

Initiative–Buffalo, NY X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

4. Comprehensive Homicide

Initiative–Richmond, CA X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

5. East Bay Public Safety

Corridor Partnership–Oakland, CA X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

6. Indianapolis Weed and Seed

Initiative–Indianapolis, IN X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

7. Minnesota HEALS–

Minneapolis, MN X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

8. Partnership for the Prevention

of Juvenile Gun Violence–Baton Rouge, LA X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

9. Baltimore County Police Gun

Squad–Baltimore, MD X X X X X XXXX X

10. Boston Gun Project–

Boston, MA X X X

Criminal Justice System

Local Law

Enforcement Community/Other Federal and State Agencies Government Social Services

Gun Violence

Reduction Strategy

Mayor/City Manager

Hospitals/Trauma Centers

School Districts

Other State/Local Agencies

Other Federal Agencies

Substance Abuse/Mental Health

Job Training/Employment

Mentoring Programs

Prevention Education

Other Service Providers

Faith Community

Neighborhood Crime Prevention

Other Civic Organizations

Community Partnerships

Foundations

Businesses/Corporations

Universities/Research Organizations

Media/Newspapers

Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations
Section X: Appendixes 229 11. Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement Program (CAGE)–Chicago, IL X X X X X X X X X X X X X 12. Oakland Firearms Licensee Compliance Program– Oakland, CA X X X X X 13. Violent Crime Task Force– Charlotte, NC X X X X X X 14. West Virginia Firearms Violations Task Force– Charleston, WV X X X X X 15. Consent to Search and Seize Firearms–St. Louis, MO X X X X X X X X 16. Municipal Firearms Ordinances, East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership–Oakland, CA X X X X X X XXX X X 17. Weapon Watch–Memphis, TN X XX 18. Baltimore Police Violent Crimes Division and Youth Violence Strike Force– Baltimore, MD X X X X X X X 19. Getting Guns Off the Streets, New York City Police Department–New York, NY X XXXX X 20. Kansas City Gun Experiment– Kansas City, MO X X X X X X X Criminal Justice System Local Law Enforcement Community/Other Federal and State Agencies Government Social Services Gun Violence Reduction Strategy

Planning/Crime Mapping

Patrol/Investigation

Weapons Unit

Gangs Unit

Community Policing

Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Other Special Units

Mayor/City Manager

Hospitals/Trauma Centers

School Districts

Other State/Local Agencies

Other Federal Agencies

Substance Abuse/Mental Health

Job Training/Employment

Mentoring Programs

Prevention Education

Other Service Providers

Faith Community

Neighborhood Crime Prevention

Other Civic Organizations

Community Partnerships

Foundations

Businesses/Corporations

Universities/Research Organizations

Media/Newspapers

Federal Law Enforcement

State Law Enforcement

State and Local Prosecutors

U.S. Attorneys

Juvenile/Family Courts

State/Local Courts

Juvenile/Adult Probation/Parole

Juvenile/Adult Corrections

Other Criminal Justice

Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations
230 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations 21. Operation Ceasefire– Boston, MA X X X X X X X X X X 22. Operation Safe Streets Gang Prevention Initiative– Phoenix, AZ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 23. Targeted Enforcement Program, Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative–Indianapolis, IN X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

24. Youth, Firearms, and

Violence–Atlanta, GA XX X

X

25. Youth Firearms Violence

Initiative–Birmingham, AL X X X X X X X X X X X X

26. Youth Firearms Violence

Initiative–Bridgeport, CT X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

27. Youth Firearms Violence

Initiative–Inglewood, CA XXX X X XX X X X

28. Youth Firearms Violence

Initiative–Milwaukee, WI X X X X X X X X X X X

29. Youth Firearms Violence

Initiative–Salinas, CA XX X

30. Youth Firearms Violence

Initiative–Seattle, WA X X X X X X X X X

Criminal Justice System

Local Law

Enforcement Community/Other Federal and State Agencies Government Social Services

Gun Violence

Reduction Strategy

Substance Abuse/Mental Health

Job Training/Employment

Mentoring Programs

Prevention Education

Other Service Providers

Planning/Crime Mapping

Patrol/Investigation

Weapons Unit

Gangs Unit

Community Policing

Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Other Special Units

Federal Law Enforcement

State Law Enforcement

State and Local Prosecutors

U.S. Attorneys

Juvenile/Family Courts

State/Local Courts

Juvenile/Adult Probation/Parole

Juvenile/Adult Corrections

Other Criminal Justice

Mayor/City Manager

Hospitals/Trauma Centers

School Districts

Other State/Local Agencies

Other Federal Agencies

Faith Community

Neighborhood Crime Prevention

Other Civic Organizations

Community Partnerships

Foundations

Businesses/Corporations

Universities/Research Organizations

Media/Newspapers
Section X: Appendixes 231

Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations 31. Minnesota Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI), Minnesota HEALS–Minneapolis, MN X X X X 32. Operation Eiger, Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence– Baton Rouge, LA X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 33. Operation Night Light– Boston, MA X X X X

34. Bibb County, GA, Department

of Education, Violence andWeapons Prevention andIntervention Program–Macon, GA X X X X X X

35. Suffolk County CommunityBased Juvenile Justice

 Program–Boston, MA X X X X X

36. DISARM, U.S. Attorney’s

Office–Baltimore, MD X X X XX

37. Gun Court–Providence, RI XX XX XX X38. Project Exile, U.S. Attorney’s

Office–Eastern District of Virginia X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

39. U.S. Attorney’s Office

Anti-Violence Crime TaskForce–Memphis, TN X X X X X X

40. U.S. Attorney’s Office

Initiatives–Rochester, NY X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Criminal Justice System

Local Law

Enforcement Community/Other Federal and State Agencies Government Social Services

Gun Violence

Reduction Strategy

Planning/Crime Mapping

Patrol/Investigation

Weapons Unit

Gangs Unit

Community Policing

Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Other Special Units

Mayor/City Manager

Hospitals/Trauma Centers

School Districts

Other State/Local Agencies

Other Federal Agencies

Substance Abuse/Mental Health

Job Training/Employment

Mentoring Programs

Prevention Education

Other Service Providers

Faith Community

Neighborhood Crime Prevention

Other Civic Organizations

Community Partnerships

Foundations

Businesses/Corporations

Universities/Research Organizations

Media/Newspapers

Federal Law Enforcement

State Law Enforcement

State and Local Prosecutors

U.S. Attorneys

Juvenile/Family Courts

State/Local Courts

Juvenile/Adult Probation/Parole

Juvenile/Adult Corrections

Other Criminal Justice
232 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations 41. Handgun Intervention Program–Detroit, MI X X 42. Juvenile Firearms Prosecution–Seattle, WA XX X XX 43. Juvenile Gun Court– Birmingham, AL X X X X X X X X X X X 44. Juvenile Gun Program– Minneapolis, MN

X

45. Project LIFE–Indianapolis, IN XX X X46. Boston Ten-Point Coalition–

Operation 2006–Boston, MA

X

47. Calling the Shots–St. Paul, MN X XX X48. Child Development-Community

Policing (CD–CP) Program–New Haven, CT X X X X X X X X

49. Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun

Safety Education Program,National Rifle Association–Fairfax, VA X X X X X X

50. Hands Without Guns–

Washington, DC X X

51. The Living Classroom

Foundation–Baltimore, MD X XX X X

Criminal Justice System

Local Law

Enforcement Community/Other Federal and State Agencies Government Social Services

Gun Violence

Reduction Strategy

Federal Law Enforcement

State Law Enforcement

State and Local Prosecutors

U.S. Attorneys

Juvenile/Family Courts

State/Local Courts

Juvenile/Adult Probation/Parole

Juvenile/Adult Corrections

Other Criminal Justice

Substance Abuse/Mental Health

Job Training/Employment

Mentoring Programs

Prevention Education

Other Service Providers

Planning/Crime Mapping

Patrol/Investigation

Weapons Unit

Gangs Unit

Community Policing

Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Other Special Units

Mayor/City Manager

Hospitals/Trauma Centers

School Districts

Other State/Local Agencies

Faith Community

Neighborhood Crime Prevention

Other Civic Organizations

Community Partnerships

Foundations

Businesses/Corporations

Universities/Research Organizations

Media/Newspapers

Other Federal Agencies
Section X: Appendixes 233

Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations 52. Safe Gun Storage Campaign– Seattle, WA X X X X X X 53. Shock Mentor Program–Prince George’s County, MD XX X 54. Straight Talk About Risks (STAR), Center to Prevent Handgun

Violence–Washington, DC X X X XXX X XX X X

55. Teens on Target–Oakland, CA XX XXX X X56. Weapons Are Removed Now

(W.A.R.N.) Program–Los Angeles, CA 

X

57. West Contra Costa Unified

School District TruancyEnforcement Program–Richmond, CA X X X X X

58. Boston Community Centers’

Streetworkers Program–Boston, MA X X X X X X X X X X X X X

59. Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office and

the Gang Task Force–Houston, TX X X X X X X

60. Se Puede–San Juan, TX X X X X X X X X X X X

Criminal Justice System

Local Law

Enforcement Community/Other Federal and State Agencies Government Social Services

Gun Violence

Reduction Strategy

Planning/Crime Mapping

Patrol/Investigation

Weapons Unit

Gangs Unit

Community Policing

Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Other Special Units

Mayor/City Manager

Hospitals/Trauma Centers

School Districts

Other State/Local Agencies

Other Federal Agencies

Federal Law Enforcement

State Law Enforcement

State and Local Prosecutors

U.S. Attorneys

Juvenile/Family Courts

State/Local Courts

Juvenile/Adult Probation/Parole

Juvenile/Adult Corrections

Other Criminal Justice

Substance Abuse/Mental Health

Job Training/Employment

Mentoring Programs

Prevention Education

Other Service Providers

Faith Community

Neighborhood Crime Prevention

Other Civic Organizations

Community Partnerships

Foundations

Businesses/Corporations

Universities/Research Organizations

Media/Newspapers
Section X: Appendixes 235

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiatives

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—District of Arizona Phoenix AZ

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—District of Delaware Wilmington DE

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—Northern District of Georgia Atlanta GA

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—District of Kansas Wichita KS

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—Eastern District of Louisiana New Orleans LA

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—Middle District of Louisiana Baton Rouge LA

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—District of Maryland Baltimore MD

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—Western District of New York Buffalo NY

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—District of Oregon Portland OR

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—District of Vermont Burlington VT

U.S. Attorney’s Office Initiative—Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria VA

Memphis U.S. Attorney’s Anti-Violence Crime Task Force Memphis TN

OJJDP Partnerships to Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence

Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence Baton Rouge LA

East Oakland Partnership to Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence Oakland CA

The Syracuse Partnership to Reduce Gun Violence Syracuse NY

National Institute of Justice Research Programs

Reducing Firearms and Injuries: City of Indianapolis Indianapolis IN

Evaluation of the St. Louis Firearms Suppression Project St. Louis MO

High School Youth, Weapons, and Violence (Tulane University) New Orleans LA

Bureau of Justice Assistance Programs

Comprehensive Homicide Initiative Richmond CA

Comprehensive Communities Program—Oakland, CA Oakland CA

Comprehensive Communities Program—Baltimore, MD Baltimore MD

Comprehensive Communities Program—Boston, MA Boston MA

Comprehensive Communities Program—Fort Worth, TX Fort Worth TX

Comprehensive Communities Program—Salt Lake City, UT Salt Lake City UT

Firearms Trafficking Program—New Orleans, LA New Orleans LA

Firearms Trafficking Program—Chicago, IL Chicago IL

Firearms Trafficking Program—Santa Ana, CA Santa Ana CA

Firearms Trafficking Program—Oakland, CA Oakland CA

Firearms Trafficking Program—New York, NY New York NY

Firearms Trafficking Program—Indianapolis, IN Indianapolis IN

Firearms Trafficking Program—Raleigh, NC Raleigh NC

Firearms Trafficking Program—Richmond, VA Richmond VA

Firearms Trafficking Program—South Charleston, WV South Charleston WV

IACP/BJA Crime Gun Interdiction Project Alexandria VA

Program Name, by Type of Program City State
236 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Byrne Grants

Drugfire Computerized Firearms Identification Indianapolis IN

Firearms Interdiction Johnson City TN

Firearms Investigative Task Force Richmond VA

Gun Program Minneapolis MN

Multijurisdictional Task Force Little Rock AR

Weed and Seed Programs

Weed and Seed Program—Kansas City Kansas City MO

Weed and Seed Program—Baltimore, MD Baltimore MD

Weed and Seed Program—Buffalo, NY Buffalo NY

Weed and Seed Program—Dallas, TX Dallas TX

Weed and Seed Program—Dyersburg, TN Dyersburg TN

Weed and Seed Program—Fort Myers, FL Fort Myers FL

Weed and Seed Program—Gainesville, FL Gainesville FL

Weed and Seed Program—Miami, FL Miami FL

Weed and Seed Program—New Britain, CT New Britain CT

Weed and Seed Program—Oakland, CA Oakland CA

Weed and Seed Program—Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia PA

Weed and Seed Program—New York City New York NY

Community Oriented Policing Services Office Programs

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Baltimore Police Department Baltimore MD

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Salinas Police Department Salinas CA

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Seattle Police Department Seattle WA

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Birmingham Police Department Birmingham AL

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Bridgeport (CT) Police Department Bridgeport CT

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Cleveland Police Department Cleveland OH

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Inglewood (CA) Police Department Inglewood CA

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Milwaukee Police Department Milwaukee WI

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

Richmond Police Department Richmond VA

COPS Office Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—

San Antonio Police Department San Antonio TX

COPS Antigang Site—Boston, MA Roxbury MA

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Program Name, by Type of Program City State
Section X: Appendixes 237

COPS Antigang Site—Chicago, IL Chicago IL

COPS Antigang Site—Miami, FL Miami FL

COPS Antigang Site—Phoenix, AZ Phoenix AZ

COPS Antigang Site—St. Louis, MO St. Louis MO

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Programs

ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative—Baltimore, MD Baltimore MD

ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative—Boston, MA Boston MA

ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative—Memphis, TN Memphis TN

ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative—Milwaukee, WI Milwaukee WI

ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative—New York, NY New York NY

ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative—Salinas, CA Salinas CA

ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative—San Antonio, TX San Antonio TX

ATF Youth Crime Interdiction Initiative—St. Louis, MO St. Louis MO

G.R.E.A.T. Program—Boston, MA Boston MA

G.R.E.A.T. Program—Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia PA

Court-Related Programs

Gun Court—Providence, RI Providence RI

Gun Court—Birmingham, AL Birmingham AL

New York City Juvenile Weapons Court New York NY

Save Our Streets Washington DC

Project LIFE Indianapolis IN

National Funding Collaborative On Violence Prevention

Crescent City Peace Alliance New Orleans LA

Alternatives to Violence Coalition Minneapolis MN

Circle of Hope Project Washington DC

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership Oakland CA

Fountain for Youth Collaborative New York NY

Neighborhood Violence Prevention Coalition Flint MI

Pro-Youth Coalition of Santa Barbara Santa Barbara CA

Rockford Area Family Violence Prevention Collaborative Rockford IL

Somewhere All Feel Equal (SAFE) Haven Project New Haven CT

San Antonio Violence Prevention Collaborative San Antonio TX

Stop the Violence Collaboration Spartanburg SC

Violence Prevention Collaborative Knoxville TN

Department of Education

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Washington DC

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Program Name, by Type of Program City State
238 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Department of Health and Human Services

Center for Substance Abuse Prevention coalition sites Washington DC

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Little Rock, AR Little Rock AR

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles CA

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Denver, CO Denver CO

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Washington, DC Washington DC

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Atlanta, GA Atlanta GA

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—New Orleans, LA New Orleans LA

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Baltimore, MD Baltimore MD

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Boston, MA Boston MA

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Detroit, MI Detroit MI

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Newark, NJ Newark NJ

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Columbus, OH Columbus OH

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia PA

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Houston, TX Houston TX

Safe Neighborhoods Action Program (SNAP)—Richmond, VA Richmond VA

Other Local Programs, by State

Alabama

Mobile Bay Area Partnership for Youth Mobile AL

Society Against Firearm Endangerment Vestavia AL

Block Watch Community Program Birmingham AL

Arizona

Juvenile Diversion Program Tucson AZ

Arizona Lawyers Committee on Violence Glendale AZ

Handgun Control Activists Glendale AZ

Operation Safe Street Phoenix AZ

Arkansas

Volunteer Assisted Community Organizing Project (VACOP) Little Rock AR

California

Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence Against Kids Mill Valley CA

Fresno Youth Violence Prevention Network Fresno CA

PACT Pleasant Hill CA

Violent Injury Prevention Coalition Salinas CA

Weapons Are Removed Now (W.A.R.N.) Reseda CA

Zero Tolerance Program San Diego CA

Alternatives to Gang Membership Paramount CA

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Program Name, by Type of Program City State
Section X: Appendixes 239

Barrios Unidos Santa Cruz CA

The Firearms and Violence Policy Group Berkeley CA

Community Youth Gang Services Los Angeles CA

Contra Costa Coalition to Prevent Gun Violence Walnut Creek CA

Jack Berman Advocacy Center San Francisco CA

Los Angeles Teens on Target/Youth Alive! Downey CA

Anti-Violence Campaign Sherman Oaks CA

Drive-By-Agony Lynwood CA

Oakland Police Department Gun Suppression Strategy Oakland CA

Familias Unidas Richmond CA

Los Angeles Police Department Gun Unit Los Angeles CA

Colorado

Colorado Children’s Campaign Denver CO

Project PAVE (Promoting Alternatives to Violence Education) Denver CO

Colorado Information Network for Community Health (CINCH) Denver CO

Connecticut

Child Development-Community Policing (CD–CP) Program New Haven CT

Connecticut Coalition Against Gun Violence Southport CT

Peace Bell Project Southport CT

District of Columbia

Violence Policy Center Washington DC

Operation Save One Washington DC

The MayDay Program Washington DC

Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety Education Program Washington DC

Gun Recovery Unit Washington DC

Hands Without Guns Washington DC

Howard University Violence Prevention Project Washington DC

Straight Talk About Risks (STAR) Washington DC

Us Helping Us Network, Inc. Washington DC

Operation Safe Home Washington DC

Save Our Streets Program Washington DC

Florida

Florida Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, Inc. Dania FL

Gun Safety Awareness Program Miami FL

Youth Intervention Program Jacksonville FL

SAFE Program (Student and Family Empowerment) Orlando FL

Georgia

Youth, Firearms, and Violence in Atlanta Atlanta GA

Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach Atlanta GA

Georgians Against Gun Violence Marlette GA

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Program Name, by Type of Program City State
240 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Georgians United Against Gun Violence Atlanta GA

Bibb County Department of Education—Prevention

and Intervention Programs Macon GA

Hawaii

ACT Kealakekua HI

Firearms Coalition Kailua HI

Hawaii Firearms Control Coalition Honolulu HI

Illinois

Youth Peace Chicago IL

Cermak Health Services of Cook County Chicago IL

Illinois Council Against Handgun Violence Chicago IL

STOP and Firearms Prevention Training Program Elk Grove Village IL

Hands Without Guns at the UHLICH Children’s Home Chicago IL

Vehicle Impoundment in the City of Chicago Chicago IL

Mile Square Community Center Chicago IL

Chicago Crime Commission Chicago IL

Chicago Commons Innovative Human Services Program Chicago IL

Gang Violence Reduction Project Chicago IL

Indiana

Project LIFE Indianapolis IN

Concerned Citizens About Gun Violence Indianapolis IN

GRIEF of Indiana Muncie IN

Iowa

Iowans for the Prevention of Gun Violence Cedar Rapids IA

Kansas

Second Chance School Topeka KS

Kansans for Handgun Control Shawnee Mission KS

Kentucky

Kentucky Chapter for Handgun Control Prospect KY

Louisiana

Louisiana Ceasefire Baton Rouge LA

Maryland

Maryland’s Gun Hot Spots Communities Program Baltimore MD

Juvenile Violence Prevention Initiative Bethesda MD

Youth Trauma Services Team Baltimore MD

Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research Baltimore MD

Build the Missing Peace Cloverly MD

Handgun Violence Reduction Program Towson MD

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Program Name, by Type of Program City State
Section X: Appendixes 241

Shock Mentor Program Cheverly MD

Marylanders Against Handgun Abuse Baltimore MD

The Living Classroom Foundation Baltimore MD

Baltimore County Police Department Gun Squad Baltimore MD

Baltimore City Police Department’s Violent Crime Task

Force Gun Squad Baltimore MD

Massachusetts

Adolescent Wellness Program Boston MA

Barron Assessment and Counseling Center Jamaica Plain MA

Citizens for Safety Boston MA

Firearm Injuries Program Newton MA

Firearms and Violence: Juveniles, Illicit Markets, and Fear Cambridge MA

Words Not Weapons Boston MA

Dorchester Youth Collaborative Dorchester MA

Gang/Drug Prevention Program Mattapan MA

Stop Handgun Violence Newton MA

Boston Safe Futures Program Boston MA

Safety First—Lowell Lowell MA

Operation Ceasefire—Boston Boston MA

National Ten-Point Leadership Foundation Boston MA

Streetworker Program Boston MA

Operation Night Light Dorchester MA

The Log School Dorchester MA

Community Academy Boston MA

Community-Based Juvenile Justice Boston MA

Community Policing and the Truancy Patrol Boston MA

Michigan

Handgun Intervention Program Detroit MI

Pioneers for Peace Detroit MI

Alliance for a Safer, Greater Detroit Detroit MI

Michigan Citizens for Handgun Violence Birmingham MI

Women Against Gun Violence Farmington Hills MI

Minnesota

Citizens for a Safer Minnesota Maplewood MN

Juvenile Program Link Mentor Program Minneapolis MN

Minnesota Higher Education Center Against Violence and Abuse St. Paul MN

Initiative for Violence-Free Families and Communities St. Paul MN

The Gun Program Minneapolis MN

Calling the Shots St. Paul MN

St. Paul Police Department’s Gun Violence Prevention Coordinator St. Paul MN

Minnesota HEALS Minneapolis MN

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Program Name, by Type of Program City State
242 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Program Name, by Type of Program City State

Missouri

Project Complete Kansas City MO

Assault Crisis Teams St. Louis MO

Hazelwood Center High School Student Intervention Program Florissant MO

Ad Hoc Group Against Crime Kansas City MO

Coalition Against Concealed Guns St. Charles MO

ENOUGH Kansas City MO

Missourians Against Handgun Violence Kansas City MO

Ceasefire—St. Louis St. Louis MO

Jackson County Jail Violence Prevention Program Kansas City MO

Firearms Suppression Program St. Louis MO

Nebraska

MAD DADS Omaha NE

Nebraskans for Responsible Gun Ownership Omaha NE

New Jersey

No Guns in Schools Camden NJ

Cooper Hospital Trauma Centers Camden NJ

Injury Prevention and Control Unit Trenton NJ

State Attorney General’s Law Enforcement and

Educational Task Force Trenton NJ

New Mexico

Firearm Injury Prevention Curriculum Albuquerque NM

Gang Prevention and Intervention Program Albuquerque NM

New York

Project LISA (Locate, Identify, Seize, and Apprehend) New York NY

Keep Our Kids Alive New York NY

New York City Metal Detector Program New York NY

POWER New York NY

RAVE (Respect Action Value Enterprise) Brooklyn NY

Committee for The Silent March New York NY

Fellowship of Reconciliation Nyack NY

New York Police Strategy No. 1: Getting Guns off of the

Streets of New York New York NY

Community Policing—New York City New York NY

North Carolina

North Carolinians Against Gun Violence Chapel Hill NC

Ohio

Gun Safety Institute Program Cleveland OH

Solutions Without Guns Cleveland OH

Handgun Control Federation of Ohio Cleveland OH

LENA Akron OH
Section X: Appendixes 243

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Program Name, by Type of Program City State

Oklahoma

Guns, Teens, and Consequences Tulsa OK

Pennsylvania

Youth Gang Prevention Network of Allegheny County, PA Pittsburgh PA

Harrisburg EC Mobile Police Center Harrisburg PA

South Carolina

Citizens for a Safer South Carolina Beaufort SC

Police and Community Together Program (PACT) Aiken SC

Charleston Police Department Charleston SC

Tennessee

Weapon Watch Memphis TN

Tennesseeans For Responsible Gun Ownership Clarksville TN

Violence Reduction Project Memphis TN

Philip Moore Outreach Center Knoxville TN

Memphis Police Department Memphis TN

Texas

Alternatives to Violence Project/USA Inc. Houston TX

Citizens Crime Commission of Tarrant County Ft. Worth TX

Communities in Schools Program Baytown TX

Se Puede San Juan TX

Houston Area Violence Prevention Houston TX

Madras por la Vida Houston TX

Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office and the Gang Task Force Houston TX

Texans Against Gun Violence Austin TX

Texans Against Violence Dallas TX

Texas Crime Prevention Clearinghouse Austin TX

Zero Accidental Killings Houston TX

Tarrant County Progressive Sanctions Fort Worth TX

Tarrant County Advocate Program (T–CAP) Fort Worth TX

Pathways Learning Center Fort Worth TX

Victim Offender Mediation/Dialogue Austin TX

Texas Youth Commission Austin TX

Giddings State School’s Capital Offender Group Treatment Program Giddings TX

Southwest Key Program, Inc. Austin TX

San Antonio Police Department San Antonio TX

Utah

Firearm Injuries Surveillance Project Salt Lake City UT

Utahns Against Gun Violence Salt Lake City UT

Salt Lake City Police Department Salt Lake City UT
244 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Program Name, by Type of Program City State

Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

Vermont

Vermonters Against Violence South Burlington VT

Virginia

University of Virginia Youth Violence Project Virginia Beach VA

Crime Control in Public Housing Richmond VA

Northern Virginians Against Handgun Violence Fairfax VA

Virginians Against Handgun Violence Norfolk VA

Virginians Against Handgun Violence—Richmond Chapter Richmond VA

Washington

TAG Foundation (Teens Against Guns) Seattle WA

Juvenile Justice Prosecution Unit Seattle WA

Seattle Campaign Against Violence Seattle WA

Mothers Against Violence in America Seattle WA

Seattle Community-Oriented Problem-Solving Police Program Seattle WA

Washington Ceasefire Seattle WA

Safe Storage Campaign Seattle WA

West Virginia

School-Based Initiative on Assaults Charlestown WV

Wisconsin

Menominee Law Enforcement Community Organization Project Keshena WI

Wisconsin Anti-Violence Effort (WAVE) Milwaukee WI

Milwaukee Police Department Milwaukee WI
Section X: Appendixes 245

Appendix E: Organizations and Sources Contacted for the Inventory

Abt Associates Inc.

Cambridge, MA

617–492–7100

Adolescent Violence Prevention

Resource Center

Newton, MA

617–969–7100

American Bar Association, Coordinating

Committee on Gun Violence

Washington, DC

202–662–1769

American Medical Association

Chicago, IL

312–464–5000

American Prosecutors Research Institute (APRI)

Alexandria, VA

703–549–4253

American Trauma Society

Upper Marlboro, MD

800–556–7890

301–420–4189

Annie E. Casey Foundation

Baltimore, MD

410–547–6600

Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Office

of Government Relations

Rockville, MD

301–251–6676

California Wellness Foundation

Woodland Hills, CA

818–593–6600

Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research,

Northeastern University

Boston, MA

617–373–3702

Center for Gun Policy and Research,

Johns Hopkins University

Baltimore, MD

410–614–3243

Center for Injury Control, Emory University

Atlanta, GA

404–727–9977

Center for the Prevention of School Violence

Raleigh, NC

800–299–6054

919–515–9397

Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence,

University of Colorado

Boulder, CO

303–492–8465

Center on Crime, Community, and Culture

New York, NY

212–548–0135

Center to Prevent Handgun Violence

Washington, DC

202–289–7319

Charles Stewart Mott Foundation

Flint, MI

810–238–5651

Children’s Defense Fund—Gun Violence

Prevention Division

Washington, DC

202–628–8787
246 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Appendix E: Organizations and Sources Contacted for the Inventory

Children’s Safety Network

Newton, MA

617–969–7101

George Gund Foundation

Cleveland, OH

216–241–3114

Hamilton Fish National Institute on School

and Community Violence,

The George Washington University

Rosslyn, VA

703–527–4217

Handgun Control, Inc.

Washington, DC

202–898–0792

The Hudson Institute,

Indiana University

Bloomington, IN

317–545–1000

International Association of

Chiefs of Police

Alexandria, VA

703–836–6767

Joyce Foundation

Chicago, IL

312–782–2464

Kennedy School of Government,

Harvard University

Cambridge, MA

617–495–1402

Mothers Against Violence in America

Seattle, WA

206–323–2303

National Association of Attorney Generals

Washington, DC

202–326–6000

National Association of Counties

Washington, DC

202–393–6226

National Association of Police

Athletic Leagues

North Palm Beach, FL

561–844–1823

National Center for Juvenile Justice

Pittsburgh, PA

412–227–6950

National Collaboration for Youth

Washington, DC

202–347–2080

National Council on Crime and Delinquency

San Francisco, CA

415–896–6223

National Crime Prevention Council

Washington, DC

202–466–6272

National District Attorneys Association

Alexandria, VA

703–549–9222

National Rifle Association

Fairfax, VA

703–267–1000

National School Safety Center

Westlake Village, CA

805–373–9977
Section X: Appendixes 247

National Youth Gang Center

Tallahassee, FL

850–385–0600

Not Even One,

The Carter Center

Atlanta, GA

404–420–5100

Pacific Center for Violence Prevention

San Francisco, CA

415–285–1793

Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)

Washington, DC

202–466–7820

Police Foundation

Washington, DC

202–833–1460

The RAND Corporation

Santa Monica, CA

310–393–0411

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

Princeton, NJ

609–452–8701

Rural Law Enforcement Center,

University of Arkansas

Little Rock, AR

800–635–6310

501–570–8000

Stop Handgun Violence

Newton, MA

617–243–8174

Urban Institute

Washington, DC

202–261–5592

U.S. Conference of Mayors

Washington, DC

202–293–7330

Violence Policy Center

Washington, DC

202–822–8200

YWCA of the U.S.A

New York, NY

212–273–7800

Appendix E: Organizations and Sources Contacted for the Inventory
Section X: Appendixes 249

Appendix F: Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Overview of Approach

The range and focus of strategies currently employed by communities attempting to implement effective gun

violence reduction programs were examined by conducting a two-wave national telephone inventory of promising strategies to reduce firearms violence. To facilitate selection of these programs, the project team developed a taxonomy of strategies based on a review of available program information and research findings (see

table 1). The taxonomy’s gun violence focus areas include reducing illegal access to guns, reducing use of guns

by violent perpetrators, and reducing accidents related to gun violence. Strategies for reducing gun violence

include legislative and regulatory approaches, gun supply initiatives (suppression and interdiction), and demand reduction programs (prevention and intervention).

An inventory of promising programs and strategies was conducted during May and June 1998. The inventory

covered gun supply initiatives by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to remove illegal weapons from the community and demand reduction strategies focusing on preventing possession, carrying, and

use of illegal guns by adults and youth. Strategies involving legislation and regulation were limited to State

and local laws and regulations perceived as having an impact on the development of supply-and-demand programs. A comprehensive review of the impact of Federal gun control laws, such as the Brady Bill, was not

included in this inventory.

Based on the results of the inventory, an indepth screening of selected strategies was conducted during August and September 1998. Comprehensive gun violence reduction programs incorporating both gun supply

and gun demand strategies were selected for followup case studies. The project team conducted site visits to

these selected comprehensive programs during October 1998.

Wave 1

Telephone Inventory

During May and June 1998, the project team identified 425 candidate gun violence reduction programs by

contacting agencies and organizations that had been funding or supporting innovative and effective programs

(appendix B lists these programs). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) funded or partly funded many of

the programs and strategies in the inventory. In addition, the project team contacted other Federal agencies,

individuals, and private organizations involved in programs that reduce gun violence (appendix C presents a

list of contact sources). The project team then developed a telephone interview protocol to gather relevant

program data. The protocol included questions on program goals, targeted populations, development of measurable goals and objectives, and other pertinent information (this protocol is located at the end of this appendix). The project team’s ability to conduct effective telephone surveys was contingent on identifying and

contacting a project director or other key stakeholder who was knowledgeable about the strategy.

Selection Criteria

The inventory was used to identify initiatives that had the following characteristics:

◆ A program structure with active participation by a variety of public and community organizations, including

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies; prosecutors; courts; probation and parole; county and

State corrections institutions; substance abuse treatment programs; job-readiness programs; schools; health

services; youth-serving agencies; community grassroots organizations; parents; the faith community; local

businesses; and the media.
250 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Appendix F: Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Table 1. Taxonomy of Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

● Brady Bill.

● Restrictions on manufacture

and sales of automatic

weapons and bullet clips.

● Local ordinances restricting

sales and distribution of

guns.

Legislative and Regulatory Reduction of Supply

● Federal and local law

enforcement initiatives to

reduce illegal gun trafficking.

● Gun tracing leading to

prosecution of illegal gun

dealers.

● Local police and community

initiatives to identify and

remove illegal guns from the

community.

● Public education programs, media campaigns,

and rallies focusing on the problems of gun

violence and the availability and access to

illegal guns in the community.

Focus of Gun Violence

Reduction Strategies

Reduce Illegal

Access to Guns

Reduction of Demand

● Criminal laws specifying use

of guns while committing

crimes.

● Laws restricting concealed

weapons.

● Sentencing guidelines for

offenders convicted of using

guns.

● Triggerlock laws.

● Safe storage ordinances.

Reduce Gun Violence

Related Accidents

● ATF and local police gun

tracing programs.

● Prosecution of violent

perpetrators using guns.

● Intensive probation and

parole supervision of violent

offenders.

● Criminal justice and social service programs to

address the reasons violent offenders use guns, and

initiatives to prevent subsequent gun violence by

juvenile offenders.

● School- and community-based mentoring and conflict

resolution programs, gang and drug prevention

initiatives, parenting-skills programs, and jobreadiness training for high-risk youth.

● Gun violence prevention strategies including

classroom training programs, afterschool alternatives

strategies, and trauma centers’ counseling initiatives.

● Gun safety education programs.

Reduce Use of Guns by

Violent Perpetrators

◆ A plan for reducing gun violence based on a needs assessment of the gun violence problems in the community and baseline data that identified specific high-risk target populations. The plan also was to include effective strategies with measurable goals and outcomes.

◆ Gun violence reduction strategies that addressed supply and access issues (e.g., police suppression and enforcement, gun tracing, and community mobilization) and demand and prevention issues (e.g., justice system programs, intensive supervision, aftercare placements, mentoring, school tutoring, gun violence

educational programs, parenting support, crisis counseling, and public media campaigns).

Analysis of the Telephone Inventory

Strategies identified during the telephone inventory were assessed by assigning them to one of three levels

of program development (see table 2). The criteria for these assessments included completion of a comprehensive needs (problem) assessment, availability of baseline data, identification of target groups, development of well-planned strategies based on an analysis of a problem assessment, a written plan linking the

strategies, and identification of measurable goals and objectives.

Limitations of the Inventory Process

While comprehensive and thorough, this inventory did not attempt to sample programs scientifically from a

known universe of gun violence reduction strategies. Known program sources were targeted because of the

limited timeframe in which the inventory had to be completed. Another significant limitation was the lack of

consistent evaluation outcome information. Many of the programs contacted were not engaged in formal
Section X: Appendixes 251

evaluations. These included initiatives not funded by Federal, State or local governments. However, many

locally supported programs have extensive evaluation results, and in other instances, government-funded initiatives were not engaged in impact evaluations.

Report of Initial Findings to a Focus Group

The telephone inventory data were analyzed and drafted into a “Summary of the National Survey of Promising Violence Reduction Strategies.” The program profiles included in this report documented those strategies

and initiatives that met the criteria for effective programs described above. They contained descriptions of 89

strategies that demonstrated promise in reducing gun violence. On July 30, 1998, the Attorney General’s

Working Group held a focus group meeting to discuss the Summary Report and provide feedback on its contents. The focus group was composed of mayors, government representatives, law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, researchers, and community representatives. Comments from the focus group were assembled

by the project team and used to revise the structure of the final Report.

Wave 2

Followup Screening and Data Collection

To identify the most promising of those strategies presented in the Summary Report, a followup telephone

screening was conducted. The screening included an intensive review of the promising firearms violence reduction strategies based on data documenting the strength of these interventions. This included evaluation

reports or other documentation on third-party assessments or outcomes. Data sources used to assess those

outcomes also were reviewed by the project team. Candidate strategies for intensive case study were selected

from among those reviewed during this second screening process.

Appendix F: Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Not conducted.

Not obtained.

No target groups.

Activities rather than strategies.

Comprehensive plan not

developed.

Goals not linked to needs.

Level 1

Insufficient Development

Limited needs assessment.

Baseline data may be linked to

needs but not to target groups.

Target groups not linked to

needs assessment.

Strategies developed but not

linked to needs.

Plan developed but strategies

not linked.

Goals not measurable.

Comprehensive needs

assessment.

Baseline data linked to program

goals.

Target groups linked to needs

and baseline data.

Strategy development based on

sound theory and research.

Comprehensive plan with linked

strategies.

Measurable goals with baseline

data.

Developmental Elements

Needs Assessment

Baseline Data

Identification of

Appropriate Target Groups

Well-Planned Strategies

Comprehensive Plan with

Linked Strategies

Measurable Goals and

Objectives

Level 2

Limited Development

Level 3

Strong Development

Table 2. Three Levels for Assessing Program Capacity
252 Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence

Site Visits to Promising Programs

The project team, in collaboration with members of the Attorney General’s Working Group, selected a small group

of promising programs for intensive case study site visits. The following criteria were used to select these sites:

◆ Had a comprehensive implementation plan for reducing gun violence.

◆ Included active participation by a variety of agencies, including law enforcement and community-based

organizations.

◆ Used strategies that included a range of both gun supply and demand reduction components.

◆ Identified specific short- and long-term outcomes, and had data for measuring specified outcomes.

◆ Expressed an interest and willingness to participate in the case study process.

The sites selected for the intensive case studies included the following:

◆ Operation Ceasefire—Boston, MA.

◆ Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN.

◆ East Bay Public Safety Corridor—Oakland, CA.

◆ Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond, CA.

◆ Youth, Firearms, and Violence in Atlanta—Atlanta, GA.

◆ Partnership to Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA.

◆ Comprehensive Communities Program—Baltimore, MD.

◆ Weed and Seed Program—Indianapolis, IN.

◆ Weed and Seed Program—Buffalo, NY.

◆ Juvenile Gun Court—Birmingham, AL.

During site visits, the project team and members of the Working Group reviewed program documentation and

available records from the implementing agencies. The team also examined implementation procedures, investigated causal links between services and outcomes, identified and examined rival hypotheses that may have accounted for the cited outcomes, and, where possible, collected community contextual data. During the site visit,

team members interviewed key program administrators, stakeholders, program staff, service providers, and

other community and public agency officials, using a semistructured protocol.

During the Wave 1 telephone inventory, many jurisdictions were found to have several candidate strategies

focusing on both supply and demand gun violence reduction issues. In most cases, the project team was unable to determine if these strategies were linked into a comprehensive gun violence reduction program. During the Wave 2 followup screening and subsequent site visits, the project team identified those jurisdictions

where comprehensive gun violence reduction programs had been implemented. Information was collected to

assess how these multiple strategies were linked and whether the programs had an organizational structure to

monitor program outcomes.

Appendix F: Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies
Section X: Appendixes 253

Development of This Report

The project team identified promising strategies for reducing gun violence for inclusion in the Report by conducting programmatic reviews of strategies with documented outcomes. For inclusion in the Report, the strategies must have implemented innovative strategies based on well-developed and recognizably effective

program development procedures. The project team also collected formal evaluation data, when available, and

data compiled by the programs themselves. In many instances, programs are included even if they have not

been formally evaluated. Each profile in the Report contains the following information:

◆ Preexisting community problems related to gun violence.

◆ Goals of the gun violence reduction strategy.

◆ Populations targeted by the strategy.

◆ The organization and structure of the strategy, including lead agency, key stakeholders, and coordinating

structures.

◆ The gun violence reduction strategy(s), including roles, procedures employed, and so on.

◆ Quantifiable outcomes and impact measures, where possible.

Appendix F: Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies
Publications From OJJDP

OJJDP produces a variety of publications—

Fact Sheets, Bulletins, Summaries, Reports,

and the Juvenile Justice journal—along with

videotapes, including broadcasts from the

juvenile justice telecommunications initiative.

Through OJJDP’s Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse (JJC), these publications and other

resources are as close as your phone, fax,

computer, or mailbox.

Phone:

800–638–8736

(Monday–Friday, 8:30 a.m.–7:00 p.m. ET)

Fax:

301–519–5212

Online:

OJJDP Home Page:

www.ncjrs.org/ojjhome.htm

E-Mail:

puborder@ncjrs.org (to order materials)

askncjrs@ncjrs.org (to ask questions

about materials)

Mail:

Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse/NCJRS

P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000

Fact Sheets and Bulletins are also available

through Fax-on-Demand.

Fax-on-Demand:

800–638–8736, select option 1, select option 2,

and listen for instructions

To ensure timely notice of new publications,

subscribe to JUVJUST, OJJDP’s electronic

mailing list.

JUVJUST Mailing List:

e-mail to listproc@ncjrs.org

leave the subject line blank

type subscribe juvjust your name

In addition, JJC, through the National Criminal

Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), is the

repository for tens of thousands of criminal and

juvenile justice publications and resources from

around the world. They are abstracted and

made available through a data base, which is

searchable online (www.ncjrs.org/database.htm).

You are also welcome to submit materials to

JJC for inclusion in the data base.

The following list highlights popular and recently

published OJJDP documents and videotapes,

grouped by topical areas.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention Brochure (1996, NCJ 144527 (23

pp.)) offers more information about the agency.

The OJJDP Publications List (BC000115) offers

a complete list of OJJDP publications and is

also available online.

Corrections and Detention

Beyond the Walls: Improving Conditions of

Confinement for Youth in Custody. 1998,

NCJ 164727 (116 pp.).

Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders. 1997,

NCJ 164258 (42 pp.).

Conditions of Confinement Teleconference

(Video). 1993, NCJ 147531 (90 min.), $14.00.

Effective Programs for Serious, Violent and

Chronic Juvenile Offenders Teleconference

(Video). 1996, NCJ 160947 (120 min.), $17.00.

Juvenile Arrests 1996. 1997, NCJ 167578

(12 pp.).

Juvenile Boot Camps Teleconference (Video).

1996, NCJ 160949 (120 min.), $17.00.

Juvenile Court Statistics 1995. 1998,

NCJ 170607 (112 pp.).

Courts

Has the Juvenile Court Outlived Its Usefulness?

Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 163929

(120 min.), $17.00.

Offenders in Juvenile Court, 1995. 1997,

NCJ 167885 (12 pp.).

RESTTA National Directory of Restitution

and Community Service Programs. 1998,

NCJ 166365 (500 pp.), $33.50.

Delinquency Prevention

1997 Report to Congress: Title V Incentive

Grants for Local Delinquency Prevention

Programs. 1998, NCJ 170605 (71 pp.).

Allegheny County, PA: Mobilizing To Reduce

Juvenile Crime. 1997, NCJ 165693 (12 pp.).

Combating Violence and Delinquency: The

National Juvenile Justice Action Plan (Report).

1996, NCJ 157106 (200 pp.).

Combating Violence and Delinquency: The

National Juvenile Justice Action Plan (Summary).

1996, NCJ 157105 (36 pp.).

Communities Working Together Teleconference

(Video). 1996, NCJ 160946 (120 min.), $17.00.

Mentoring—A Proven Delinquency Prevention

Strategy. 1997, NCJ 164834 (8 pp.).

Mentoring for Youth in Schools and Communities

Teleconference (Video). 1997, NCJ 166376

(120 min.), $17.00

Mobilizing Communities To Prevent Juvenile

Crime. 1997, NCJ 165928 (8 pp.).

Reaching Out to Youth Out of the Education

Mainstream. 1997, NCJ 163920 (12 pp.).

Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders. 1998,

NCJ 170027 (8 pp.).

Treating Serious Anti-Social Behavior in Youth:

The MST Approach. 1997, NCJ 165151 (8 pp.).

The Youngest Delinquents: Offenders Under

Age 15. 1997, NCJ 165256 (12 pp.).

Youth-Oriented Community Policing Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 160947 (120 min.),

$17.00.

Youth Out of the Education Mainstream Teleconference (Video). 1996, NCJ 163386 (120

min.), $17.00.

Gangs

1995 National Youth Gang Survey. 1997,

NCJ 164728 (41 pp.).

Gang Members and Delinquent Behavior. 1997,

NCJ 165154 (6 pp.).

Youth Gangs: An Overview. 1998, NCJ 167249

(20 pp.).

Youth Gangs in America Teleconference

(Video). 1997, NCJ 164937 (120 min.), $17.00.

General Juvenile Justice

Comprehensive Juvenile Justice in State

Legislatures Teleconference (Video). 1998,

NCJ 169593 (120 min.), $17.00.

Developmental Pathways in Boys’ Disruptive

and Delinquent Behavior. 1997, NCJ 165692

(20 pp.).

Guidelines for the Screening of Persons Working With Children, the Elderly, and Individuals

With Disabilities in Need of Support. 1998,

NCJ 167248 (52 pp.).

Juvenile Justice, Volume III, Number 2. 1997,

NCJ 165925 (32 pp.).

Juvenile Justice, Volume IV, Number 2. 1997,

NCJ 166823 (28 pp.).

Juvenile Justice, Volume V, Number 1. 1998,

NCJ 170025 (32 pp.).

Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States

1994–1996. 1997, NCJ 165697 (81 pp.).

A Juvenile Justice System for the 21st Century.

1998, NCJ 169726 (8 pp.).

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1997 Update

on Violence. 1997, NCJ 165703 (32 pp.).

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National

Report. 1995, NCJ 153569 (188 pp.).

Keeping Young People in School: Community

Programs That Work. 1997, NCJ 162783

(12 pp.).

Sharing Information: A Guide to the Family

Educational Rights and Privacy Act and

Participation in Juvenile Justice Programs.

1997, NCJ 163705 (52 pp.).

Missing and Exploited Children

Court Appointed Special Advocates: A Voice

for Abused and Neglected Children in Court.

1997, NCJ 164512 (4 pp.).

Federal Resources on Missing and Exploited

Children: A Directory for Law Enforcement and

Other Public and Private Agencies. 1997,

NCJ 168962 (156 pp.).

In the Wake of Childhood Maltreatment. 1997,

NCJ 165257 (16 pp.).

Portable Guides to Investigating Child Abuse:

An Overview. 1997, NCJ 165153 (8 pp.).

When Your Child Is Missing: A Family Survival

Guide. 1998, NCJ 170022 (96 pp.).

Substance Abuse

Beyond the Bench: How Judges Can Help Reduce Juvenile DUI and Alcohol and Other Drug

Violations (Video and discussion guide). 1996,

NCJ 162357 (16 min.), $17.00.

Capacity Building for Juvenile Substance

Abuse Treatment. 1997, NCJ 167251 (12 pp.).

Drug Identification and Testing in the Juvenile

Justice System. 1998, NCJ 167889 (92 pp.).

Juvenile Offenders and Drug Treatment:

Promising Approaches Teleconference (Video).

1997, NCJ 168617 (120 min.), $17.00.

Preventing Drug Abuse Among Youth Teleconference (Video). 1997, NCJ 165583 (120 min.),

$17.00.

Violence and Victimization

Child Development–Community Policing:

Partnership in a Climate of Violence. 1997,

NCJ 164380 (8 pp.).

Combating Fear and Restoring Safety in

Schools. 1998, NCJ 167888 (16 pp.).

Conflict Resolution for Youth Teleconference

(Video). 1996, NCJ 161416 (150 min.), $17.00.

Epidemiology of Serious Violence. 1997,

NCJ 165152 (12 pp.).

Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive

Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic

Juvenile Offenders. 1995, NCJ 153571 (6 pp.).

Reducing Youth Gun Violence Teleconference

(Video). 1996, NCJ 162421 (120 min.), $17.00.

Youth in Action

Planning a Successful Crime Prevention

Project. 1998, NCJ 170024 (28 pp.).
NCJ 173950