a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2003 MILITARY 

READINESS

DOD Needs to 

Reassess Program 

Strategy, Funding 

Priorities, and Risks 

for Selected 

Equipment

GAO-04-112
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-112.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-112, a report to 

congressional requesters 

December 2003

MILITARY READINESS

DOD Needs to Reassess Program 

Strategy, Funding Priorities, and Risks 

for Selected Equipment 

Many of our assessments of 25 judgmentally selected critical equipment 

items indicated that the problems or issues we identified were not severe 

enough to warrant action by the Department of Defense, military services, 

and/or the Congress within the next 5 years. The condition of the items we 

reviewed varies widely from very poor for some of the older equipment 

items like the Marine Corps CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter to very good for 

some of the newer equipment items like the Army Stryker vehicle. The 

problems we identified were largely due to (1) maintenance problems 

caused by equipment age and a lack of trained and experienced technicians, 

and (2) spare parts shortages. 

Although the services have mapped out program strategies for sustaining, 

modernizing, or replacing most of the equipment items we reviewed, 

some gaps exist. In some cases, such as the KC-135 Stratotanker and the 

Tomahawk missile, the services have not fully developed or validated their 

plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the items. In 

other cases, the services’ program strategies for sustaining the equipment 

are hampered by problems or delays in the fielding of replacement 

equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to budget cuts. 

For 15 of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, there appears to be a 

disconnect between the funding requested by the Department of Defense 

or projected in the Future Years Defense Program and the services’ 

program strategies to sustain or replace the equipment items. For example, 

we identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded requirements, as reported by 

the services, totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft—the CH-47D 

helicopter, F-16 fighter aircraft, C-5 transport aircraft, and CH-46E 

transport helicopter. 

The 25 equipment items we reviewed appear to be capable of fulfilling their 

wartime missions. While we were unable to obtain sufficient data to 

definitively assess wartime capability because of ongoing operations in Iraq, 

the services, in general, will always ensure equipment is ready to go to war, 

often through surging their maintenance operations and overcoming other 

obstacles. Some of the equipment items we reviewed, however, have 

capability deficiencies that could degrade their wartime performance in the 

near term. 

GAO was asked to assess the 

condition of key equipment items 

and to determine if the services 

have adequate plans for sustaining, 

modernizing, or replacing them. To 

address these questions, we 

selected 25 major equipment items, 

and determined (1) their current 

condition, (2) whether the services 

have mapped out a program 

strategy for these items, (3) 

whether current and projected 

funding is consistent with these 

strategies, and (4) whether these 

equipment items are capable of 

fulfilling their wartime missions. 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense reassess 

program strategies and funding 

priorities for key equipment items 

to ensure that the equipment items 

are sustained until replacement 

items are fielded. The department 

should also highlight for the 

Congress risks involved in 

sustaining these equipment items 

and steps the department is taking 

to address those risks. In its 

written comments on a draft of this 

report, the department partially 

concurred that it needed to 

reassess program strategies and 

funding priorities, but did not agree 

that it needed to provide the 

Congress with additional 

information on the potential risks. 

Because the department did not 

agree, the report includes a Matter 

for Congressional Consideration 

suggesting that the Congress may 

wish to require the department to 

provide this information. 
Page i GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5

Background 12

Overall Condition of Selected Equipment Items Varies Widely 13

Services Have Mapped Out Long-Range Program Strategies for 

Sustaining and Modernizing Most Equipment Items but Some 

Gaps Exist 16

Requested Funding Does Not Reflect the Services’ Long-Range 

Program Strategies 18

Equipment Is Generally Capable of Fulfilling Wartime Missions 

despite Some Limitations 20

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 22

Matter for Congressional Consideration 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 27

Appendix II: Assessments of Selected Equipment Items 32

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 94

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 103

103

Tables Table 1: Assessment Summary 7

Table 2: Unfunded Requirements for Selected Aircraft Equipment 

Items, Fiscal Year 2003 19

Figures Figure 1: Abrams Tank 33

Figure 2: AH-64A/D Apache Helicopter 36

Figure 3: Stryker 39

Figure 4: CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter 41

Figure 5: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 43

Figure 6: Patriot Missile 46

Figure 7: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 48

Figure 8: F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft 50

Figure 9: B-2 Spirit Bomber 53

Figure 10: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft 55

Figure 11: KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft 57
Contents

Page ii GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Figure 12: Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile 60

Figure 13: Joint Direct Attack Munition 62

Figure 14: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer 64

Figure 15: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate 67

Figure 16: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft 70

Figure 17: EA-6B Prowler Aircraft 72

Figure 18: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship 75

Figure 19: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile 78

Figure 20: Tomahawk Cruise Missile 81

Figure 21: AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter 83

Figure 22: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter 85

Figure 23: Assault Amphibian Vehicle-Personnel 87

Figure 24: Light Armored Vehicle-Command & Control 90

Figure 25: AGM-65E Maverick Missile 92

Abbreviations

AAV Assault Amphibian Vehicle

AAW anti-air warfare

ACC Air Combat Command

ASW anti-submarine warfare

ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile Vehicle

CALCM Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile

CBR Center Barrel Replacement

CV Commander Vehicle

DOD Department of Defense

DPICM Dual Purpose Improved Convention Munition

EFV Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (formerly the 

AAAV—Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle)

ERAM Extended Range Active Missile

ESV Engineer Squad Vehicle

FLE Fatigue life expenditure

FSV Fire Support Vehicle

FYDP Future Years Defense Plan

GMLRS- Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 

HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

HME hull, mechanics, and electrical

ICAPIII Improved Capability 3rd Generation

ICV Infantry Carrier Vehicle

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

LAR Light Armored Reconnaissance
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Contents

Page iii GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

LAV-C2 Light Armored Vehicle-Command & Control

MC Mortar Carrier

MEV Medical Evacuation

MGS Mobile Gun System

NBCRV Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle

OMB operation and maintenance

O&S Operation and Support

PAC-3 Patriot Missile

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RAM Rolling Airframe Missile

RAM/RS Reliability, Availability and Maintenance/Rebuild to 

Standard

RHIB Ridged Hull Inflatable Boat

RV Reconnaissance Vehicle

SEP Systems Enhancement Program

SLEP Service Life Extension Program

TACTOM Tactical Tomahawk
Page 1 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

December 19, 2003 Letr

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable John Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Norm Dicks

House of Representatives

Many of the weapons and support equipment items in the Department of 

Defense’s inventory were purchased in the 1970s and 1980s, and are likely 

to reach the end of their expected useful lives in this decade unless major 

modernizations are made. Equipment age as well as delays in fielding 

replacement systems can adversely affect maintenance costs, and 

ultimately, equipment readiness and wartime capabilities. The added 

effects of simultaneous military deployments and recent increases in 

operating tempo place additional stress on equipment that is, in some 

cases, more than 30 years old.

The department is faced with the challenges of both sustaining and 

transforming the current military force structure, including replacing aging 

equipment. The costs associated with meeting these challenges are likely to 

be significant. For example, a 2001 Joint Chiefs of Staff analysis of the 

funding needed to sustain the current force structure concluded that a 

procurement budget of $100 billion to $110 billion would be required 

annually. The President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request included a total of 

about $72.7 billion for Defense procurement, an amount significantly less 

than that identified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the 

Congressional Budget Office estimated that the investment needed to 

develop and purchase new Defense equipment would likely increase from 

$137 billion in fiscal year 2004 to a peak of about $223 billion in fiscal year 

2013 if cost risk is considered.1

 The impending reconstitution of equipment 

resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom will also require billions of dollars. 

Competing for these funds for sustainment and modernization are the 

Department of Defense’s efforts to transform its current force structure 
Page 2 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

into a force that maintains or improves its lethality but deploys faster, is 

lighter, and relies on information rather than brute force to defeat its 

adversary.

You asked us to assess the condition of key equipment items and to 

determine if the services had adequate plans to address identified 

deficiencies. Specifically, you asked that we determine which items 

warranted immediate attention by the department and/or the Congress. You 

also asked us to identify whether the department’s procurement plans and 

projected budgets are sufficient to sustain or improve these equipment 

items. To address these objectives, we determined:

• the current condition of key military equipment items;

• whether the services have mapped out a long-range program strategy for 

sustaining, modernizing, or replacing2

 these equipment items consistent 

with the current condition and expected service life;

• whether current and projected funding for these equipment items 

through fiscal year 2009 is consistent with the services’ program 

strategies for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing the equipment; and

• whether these equipment items are generally capable of fulfilling their 

wartime missions.

As agreed with your offices, we worked with the military services to 

judgmentally select 25 equipment items that are key in terms of meeting the 

strategy outlined in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. We 

selected approximately two weapons equipment items, two support 

equipment items, and two munitions from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps.3

 We relied extensively on input from the military services 

and prior GAO work to select equipment items that have been in use for a 

number of years and are critical to supporting the services’ missions. The 

1

 Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: 

Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).

2

 Modernizing refers to upgrading equipment items or replacing specific parts; replacing 

refers to complete replacement of one equipment item with a new equipment item, e.g., the 

Marine Corps plans to replace the CH-46E helicopter with the MV-22 Osprey.

3

 The 25 equipment items we selected for review include 7 Army equipment items, 6 Air 

Force equipment items, 7 Navy equipment items, and 5 Marine Corps equipment items.
Page 3 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

25 equipment items we selected were those that the military services 

agreed were critical to meeting current capability requirements and defined 

as essential to meet the strategy laid out under the Quadrennial Defense 

Review. Our assessments apply only to the 25 equipment items we 

reviewed. Consequently, the results of our assessments cannot be 

projected to the entire inventory of Department of Defense equipment.

Our analysis of the condition of these 25 equipment items focused on a 

number of key metrics, including equipment age, performance, and use 

from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2002. To assess condition, we obtained 

data on equipment age and expected service life and other specific service 

performance indicators such as mission capable rates,4

 utilization rates,5

and various other metrics. While we limited our observations and 

assessments to equipment in the active duty inventory, the readiness data 

and other metrics we collected from the military services also includes 

equipment in the guard and reserve forces. Our review of the program 

strategy for these equipment items focused on the extent to which the 

services have developed or updated their plans for the sustainment, 

modernization, or recapitalization of the equipment items to the end of the 

items’ useful service lives in order to meet mission requirements. Our 

review of the funding for these equipment items focused on the extent to 

which the services’ requests for sustainment, modernization, and 

recapitalization funds in the current and historical defense budgets and the 

projected funding envisioned in the Future Years Defense Program reflect 

their long-range program strategies. The Future Years Defense Program 

reflects the department’s official projection of the forces and resources 

needed to support the programs approved by the Secretary of Defense for 

the prior year, current year, biennial budget years, and the following 

four years. According to Department of Defense officials, the Future Years 

Defense Program takes the services’ priorities into consideration, 

balancing future investment and risk. Our review of the wartime capability 

of the selected equipment items focused on the extent to which each of the 

equipment items is capable of fulfilling its wartime mission. Because of 

ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited access to the deployed units and 

equipment performance indicators during these operations, we were 

unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess wartime capability for 

4

 Mission capable rates are measures of aircraft material condition that indicate the aircraft 

can perform at least one and potentially all of its designated missions.

5

 Utilization rates refer to flying hours, tank miles, and steaming days.
Page 4 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

all of the 25 equipment items we reviewed. Therefore, our assessments of 

wartime capability are limited to anecdotal evidence obtained primarily 

through discussions with military service officials, program managers, and 

equipment operators and maintainers. In some cases we were able to 

obtain specific data regarding wartime capability for specific equipment 

items; however, data availability was not consistent across all of the 

military services.

We met with officials from all four of the military services, one selected 

combatant command,6

 and several major commands. We also visited 

selected units and maintenance facilities to observe the equipment items 

during operation or under maintenance, and discussed condition and 

wartime capability issues with program managers and equipment operators 

and maintainers.

To determine which equipment items require immediate attention by the 

department, the military services, and/or the Congress, we developed an 

assessment framework based on three criteria: (1) the extent of the 

existence of a problem or issue, (2) the severity of the problem or issue, 

and (3) the estimated time frame within which the problem or issue needs 

to be addressed. To assess the relative ranking of the 25 equipment items, 

we used a traffic light approach—red, yellow, or green—to indicate the 

existence, severity, and urgency of the problem as follows:

• Red indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to warrant 

action by the Department of Defense, the military services, and/or the 

Congress within the next 1-3 years;

• Yellow indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to 

warrant action by the Department of Defense, the military services 

and/or the Congress within the next 3-5 years; and

• Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 

issues at the time of our review, or that any existing problems or issues 

we identified are not of a severe enough nature that we believe warrant 

action by the Department of Defense, the military services and/or the 

Congress within the next 5 years.

6

 Our scope was limited to one combatant command, Pacific Command, due to the 

remaining combatant commands’ participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Page 5 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

While we attempted to obtain consistent metrics for each of the other three 

categories across all four of the military services, data availability varied 

significantly by service and type of equipment. Our assessments, therefore, 

are based on the data available to us from multiple sources. 

Our assessments represent the problems and issues we identified at the 

specific point in time that we conducted our work, and can change quickly 

given current events. Although our assessments for each of the 

four categories—condition, program strategy, funding, and wartime 

capability—are largely qualitative in nature, our analyses are based on data 

and information provided by the military services and discussions with 

military service officials and program managers for the individual 

equipment items. We do not provide color-coded assessments for the 

wartime capability of each equipment item in this report because, as 

previously mentioned, we were unable to obtain adequate data to perform 

a definitive assessment of wartime capabilities.

For a complete description of our methodology, see appendix I. 

Appendix II contains our detailed assessments for each of the 

25 equipment items. We performed our review from September 2002 

through October 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards.

Results in Brief As table 1 indicates, many of our assessments of the condition, program 

strategy, and funding for each of the 25 equipment items we reviewed 

indicate that the problems or issues we identified were not severe enough 

to warrant action by the Department of Defense, military services, and/or 

the Congress within the next 5 years. However, the table also indicates that 

some equipment items have severe enough problems related to condition, 

program strategy, and funding to warrant more immediate action by the 

Department of Defense, the military services, and/or the Congress. 

Specifically, as shown in the table, we identified problems and issues 

related to the Army’s CH-47D, the Marine Corps’ CH-46E, the Air Force’s 

KC-135, and the Navy’s EA-6B Prowler, Standard Missile-2, and Tomahawk 

missile that we believe warrant action within the next 1 to 3 years. The 

remaining items, while not yet severe enough to warrant immediate action 

by the Department of Defense, the military services, and/or the Congress, 

showed signs of problems related to condition, program strategy, or 

funding that, if not addressed within the next 3 to 5 years, could become 

severe. While we did not definitively assign a color-coded assessment of 

the wartime capability for each of the 25 equipment items, military service 
Page 6 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

officials, program managers, operators, and maintainers we met with 

identified a number of concerns that are discussed later.
Page 7 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Table 1: Assessment Summary

Assessment area

Equipment Condition Program strategy Funding

Army

Abrams Tank

AH-64 A/D Apache Helicopter

Stryker

CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

Patriot Missile

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System

Air Force

F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft

B-2 Spirit Bomber

C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft

KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft

Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile

Joint Direct Attack Munition

Navy

DDG-51Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer

FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft

EA-6B Prowler Aircraft

LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship

Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile

Tomahawk Cruise Missile

Marine Corps

AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter

CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter

Assault Amphibian Vehicle-Personnel

Light Armored Vehicle-Command and Control Variant

AGM-65E Maverick Missile a

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

a

The Marine Corps does not track trend data such as mission capable rates or operational readiness 

rates for munitions as it does for aircraft or other equipment.
Page 8 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Condition The condition of the selected equipment items we reviewed varies widely 

from very poor for some of the older equipment items like the Marine 

Corps CH-46E helicopter to very good for some of the newer equipment 

items like the Army Stryker vehicle. The three equipment items for which 

we assessed the current condition as red and in our opinion warrants 

attention within 1 to 3 years are the CH-47D helicopter, the Standard 

Missile-2 munitions, and the CH-46E helicopter. These items generally did 

not meet mission capable or operational readiness goals for sustained 

periods and were either older equipment items and/or had high utilization 

rates. The 11 items for which we assessed the condition as yellow also may 

have failed to meet mission capable or operational readiness goals, but to a 

lesser extent. Left unattended, the condition of some of these yellow items 

may worsen. There were various reasons for the degraded condition of 

these equipment items including maintenance problems due to parts or 

personnel inadequacies. Parts inadequacies include parts shortages, 

unreliable parts, or obsolete parts due to the advanced age of the 

equipment. Equipment operators believed a lack of trained and 

experienced technicians also affected equipment items’ condition.

Program Strategy Although the services have mapped out program strategies for sustaining, 

modernizing, or replacing most of the equipment items we reviewed, some 

gaps exist. In some cases, such as the KC-135 Stratotanker and the 

Tomahawk missile, the services have not fully developed or validated their 

plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the equipment 

items. For example, in the case of the KC-135, the Air Force developed a 

long-term program strategy to modernize the aging KC-135 tanker fleet but 

as we have previously reported7

 has not demonstrated the urgency of 

acquiring replacement aircraft and has not defined the requirements for the 

number of aircraft needed. In other cases, the services’ program strategies 

for sustaining the equipment are hampered by problems or delays in the 

fielding of replacement equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to 

budget cuts. As a result, the services may incur increased costs due to 

maintenance to sustain aging equipment items in the event that the 

replacement equipment is not fielded as scheduled. For example, the 

planned replacement equipment for the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter 

(i.e., the MV-22 Osprey) has been delayed by about 3 years and is not 

7

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft: Observations on the Air Force’s Plan to 

Lease Aerial Refueling Aircraft, GAO-03-1143T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2003).
Page 9 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

scheduled to be fielded until 2007; as a result, the Marine Corps will have to 

retain more CH-46E helicopters in its inventory longer than it had planned. 

Similarly, procurement of the replacement equipment for the Marine Corps’ 

Assault Amphibian Vehicle has been delayed. The program strategy for the 

Assault Amphibian Vehicle includes overhauls, but for only 680 of the 

1,057 vehicles in the inventory.8

 Other program strategies which we 

assessed as yellow may need to be validated or updated because the 

programs are highly susceptible to budget cuts as the equipment item’s 

mission changes. For example, planned modernization programs for Navy 

frigates are susceptible to budget cuts, according to Navy officials, because 

their future role is uncertain given the development of the Littoral Combat 

ship. In the meantime, the frigates are being used increasingly for 

homeland defense missions, yet their program strategy does not reflect that 

they are being used more often and in different ways.

Funding There appears to be a disconnect between the funding requested by the 

Department of Defense or projected in the Future Years Defense Program 

and the services’ program strategies to sustain or replace many of the 

equipment items we reviewed. According to Department of Defense 

officials, the Future Years Defense Program strikes a balance between 

future investment and program risk and takes into consideration the 

services’ stated requirements as approved by the department. Specifically, 

we assessed the funding for 15 of the 25 equipment items we reviewed as 

either red or yellow because current and projected Department of Defense 

funding is not consistent with the services’ stated requirements to support 

their program strategies for these equipment items. For example, we 

identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded requirements, as reported by 

the services, totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft equipment 

items—the CH-47D helicopter, F-16 fighter aircraft, C-5 transport aircraft, 

and CH-46E transport helicopter.9

 We did not, however, independently 

verify these unfunded requirements. The most significant funding shortfalls 

occurred when parts, equipment upgrades, and maintenance were not fully 

8

 In its written comments on a draft of this report, the department stated that they plan to 

upgrade an additional 327 vehicles for a total of 1,007 vehicles, assuming funding is 

provided.

9

 In its written comments on a draft of this report, department officials stated that the Navy 

lists CH-46E safety improvements as an unfunded requirement of $10 million to $14 million 

based upon the retirement schedule of the CH-46E and the fielding schedule of the MV-22 

replacement.
Page 10 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

funded. In addition, according to service officials, requests for funds for 

some older equipment items are sometimes reduced on the basis of 

anticipated fielding of replacement equipment items in the near future. 

Gaps in funding also result when fielding of the replacement equipment 

items is delayed and the older equipment must be sustained longer than 

anticipated. Funding for the older equipment items may also be a target for 

funding reductions to support higher service transformation priorities, 

such as new equipment or new technology. Other funding shortfalls occur 

when the services subsequently identify additional maintenance 

requirements that were not planned in the budget request. Army officials 

expressed concerns that operation and maintenance funding to sustain 

these aging equipment items in the future may not be sufficient to cover the 

costs of retaining these items in the inventory longer than expected.

Wartime Capability Although there were some limited capabilities, according to service 

officials, the equipment items we reviewed are generally capable of 

fulfilling their wartime missions. In general the services will always ensure 

equipment is ready to go to war, often through surges in maintenance and 

overcoming obstacles such as obsolete parts, parts availability, and 

cannibalization of other pieces of equipment. These officials pointed out, 

however, that some of these equipment items have capability deficiencies 

that could degrade their wartime performance in the near term. For 

example, only 26 out of 213 Marine Corps Assault Amphibian Vehicles at 

Camp Lejeune had been provided enhanced protective armor kits prior to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to Marine Corps officials at Camp 

Lejeune, lack of the enhanced protective armor left the vehicles vulnerable 

to the large caliber ammunition used by the Iraqi forces. Similarly, 

according to Navy officials, there is an impending negative impact on the 

Navy’s wartime capabilities without an increase in the number of available 

Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft with upgraded capabilities. Only one of the 

equipment items we reviewed, the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter, could 

not accomplish its intended mission because of significant degradation in 

its lift capacity. Marine Corps officials stated, however, that they were 

generally satisfied with the CH-46E performance in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom despite its lift limitations.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with 

the Secretaries of the military services, reassess the program strategies 

for the sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of key legacy 

equipment items, and reconcile funding requests for these equipment items 

to ensure that the equipment will be adequately sustained until 
Page 11 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

replacement equipment items can be fielded. In reconciling these program 

strategies to funding requests, the Secretary of Defense should highlight for 

the Congress the risks involved in sustaining key legacy equipment items if 

adequate funding support is not requested and the steps the department is 

taking to address those risks. As part of this process, the Secretary of 

Defense should identify the key equipment items that, because of impaired 

conditions and their importance to meeting the department’s military 

strategy, should be given the highest priority for sustainment, 

recapitalization, or replacement. To strengthen congressional oversight of 

the department’s major equipment programs, we are also suggesting that 

the Congress may wish to consider having the Secretary of Defense provide 

an annual report, in conjunction with the department’s annual budget 

submissions, on the condition, program strategy, and funding for major 

equipment items.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

partially concurred with our recommendation that it should reassess the 

program strategies for equipment modernization and recapitalization, and 

reconcile those strategies to the services’ funding requests. However, the 

department did not concur with our other two recommendations that it 

should (1) highlight for the Congress the risks involved in sustaining key 

equipment items if adequate funding support is not requested and the steps 

the department is taking to address those risks, and (2) identify the 

equipment items that should be given the highest priority for sustainment, 

recapitalization, modernization, or replacement. Specifically, the 

department stated that its current budget processes and its annual budget 

submission to the Congress are already designed to identify, at the 

corporate Department of Defense level, the department’s highest funding 

priorities. While we recognize that the budget process is designed to 

identify the department’s highest funding priorities, the budget information 

presented to the Congress does not identify the trade-offs and risks 

associated with the department’s budgeting decisions. Therefore, we 

continue to believe that the Congress needs to be better informed of 

specific equipment condition deficiencies, the long-range strategies and 

required funding to address those deficiencies, and the risks associated 

with not adequately funding specific equipment modernization and 

recapitalization requirements. This report, for example, specifically 

identifies significant equipment condition deficiencies that were not 

adequately reflected in the department’s budget documents, and a lack of 

specific program strategies and funding plans to address those 

deficiencies.
Page 12 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

The department also noted in its written comments that our report 

identifies the CH-47D, CH-46E, KC-135, E/A-6B, Standard Missile-2, and the 

Tomahawk Missile as equipment items with problems and issues that 

warrant action within the next 1 to 3 years. The department stated that it 

will continue to reassess these equipment items as it goes through its 

resource allocation process. Lastly, the department provided technical 

comments related to our assessments of specific equipment items in 

appendix II. We reviewed and incorporated these technical comments, as 

appropriate.

The department’s comments and our evaluation are on pages 23-25 of 

this report.

Background The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined a 

strategy to sustain and transform the military force structure that has been 

in place since the mid-1990s.10 In this review, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) committed to selectively recapitalize older equipment items to meet 

near-term challenges and to provide near-term readiness. DOD recognized 

that the older equipment items critical to DOD’s ability to defeat current 

threats must be sustained as transformation occurs. DOD also recognizes 

that recapitalization of all elements of U.S. forces since the end of the Cold 

War has been delayed for too long.11 DOD procured few replacement 

equipment items as the force aged throughout the 1990s, but it recognizes 

that the force structure will eventually become operationally and 

technologically obsolete without a significant increase in resources that are 

devoted to the recapitalization of weapons systems.

The annual Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contains DOD’s plans for 

future programs and priorities. It presents DOD estimates of future funding 

needs based on specific programs. Through the FYDP, DOD projects costs 

for each element of those programs through a period of either 5 or 6 years 

on the basis of proposals made by each of the military services and the 

policy choices made by the current administration. The 2003 FYDP extends 

10 Force structure includes 10 active and 8 reserve Army divisions, 12 Navy Carrier 

Battle Groups and 10 active and 1 reserve Carrier Air Wing, 3 active and 1 reserve 

Marine Expeditionary Force, 12 active and 7 reserve Air Force Fighter Wings, and 

112 combat-coded heavy bombers.

11Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2001).
Page 13 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007, and the 2004 FYDP extends from 

fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009. Congress has expressed concerns that 

the military modernization budget and funding levels envisioned in the 

FYDP appear to be inadequate to replace aging equipment and incorporate 

cutting-edge technologies into the force at the pace required by the QDR 

and its underlying military strategy.

Overall Condition of 

Selected Equipment 

Items Varies Widely

As shown in table 1, of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, we assessed 

the current condition of 3 of these equipment items as red, 11 as yellow, 

and 10 as green. We were not able to obtain adequate data to assess the 

condition for the Marine Corps Maverick Missile because the Marine Corps 

does not track readiness trend data, such as mission capable or operational 

readiness rates, for munitions as they do for aircraft or other equipment.

Rotary wing lift helicopters, specifically the CH-46E and the CH-47D 

helicopters, had the lowest condition rating among the equipment items we 

reviewed, followed by fixed wing aircraft. Although we assessed the 

condition as green for several equipment items such as the Army’s Abrams 

tank and the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, and the Marine 

Corps Light Armored Vehicle-Command and Control Variant, we identified 

various problems and issues that could potentially worsen the condition of 

some equipment items in the near future if not attended to. Specifically, for 

the Abrams tank, and similarly for the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 

Truck, Army officials cited supply and maintenance challenges at the unit 

level such as repair parts shortages, inadequate test equipment, and lack of 

trained technicians that could impact the tank’s condition in the near 

future. While the Marine Corps has a Light Armored Vehicle-Command and 

Control Variant upgrade program under way, Marine Corps officials caution 

that any delays in the upgrade program could affect future readiness. 

According to service officials and prior GAO reports, the services are 

currently able to alleviate the effects of these problems, in many cases, 

through increased maintenance hours and cannibalization of parts from 

other equipment.12

12 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft: Services Need Strategies to Reduce 

Cannibalizations, GAO-02-86 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2001); Military Aircraft: 

Cannibalizations Adversely Affect Personnel and Maintenance, GAO-01-93T

(Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2001).
Page 14 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

The military services use a number of metrics to measure equipment 

condition. Examples include mission capable rates for aircraft, operational 

readiness rates for equipment other than aircraft,13 average age, and 

utilization rates (e.g., flying hours). The equipment items we assessed as 

red did not meet mission capable or operational readiness goals for 

sustained periods, were older equipment items, and/or had high utilization 

rates. For example, 10 of 16 equipment items for which readiness data were 

available did not meet mission capable or operational readiness goals for 

extended periods from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. The 

average age of 21 of the equipment items ranged from about 1 year to 

43 years.14

Some equipment items for which we assessed the condition as yellow 

also failed to meet mission capable or operational readiness goals and were 

more than 10 years old. However, offsetting factors, such as how frequently 

the equipment items did not meet readiness goals or by what percentage 

they missed the goals, indicated less severe and urgent problems than 

items we assessed as red. Other equipment items may have had high 

mission capable rates, but because of overall age and related corrosion 

problems, we assessed these equipment items as yellow to highlight the 

fact that these items could potentially present problems if not attended to 

within the next 3-5 years.

The equipment items for which we assessed the condition as green 

generally met mission capable and operational readiness goals. While three 

of these equipment items—the Army Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 

Truck, the Air Force F-16, and the Marine Corps Light Armored VehicleCommand and Control Variant—did not meet mission capable or 

operational readiness goals, we assessed the condition as green because 

the condition problems identified were less severe than the items we 

assessed as red or yellow. For example, an equipment item may have been 

slightly below the goal but only for non-deployed units, or the fleet-wide 

goals may have been met for the equipment item overall, although the 

specific model we reviewed did not meet the goals. In addition, although 

the rates for an equipment item may be slightly below its goal, it may be 

able to meet operational requirements. We also considered any upgrades 

13 Operational readiness refers to the capability of equipment items other than aircraft to 

perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed and may be used in 

general terms to express a level or degree of readiness.

14 However, the services do not use a uniform methodology to calculate average age.
Page 15 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

that were underway at the time of our review that would extend the service 

life of the equipment.

Maintenance problems were most often cited by the Army and Marine 

Corps officials we met with as the cause for equipment condition 

deficiencies for the equipment items we reviewed. Equipment operators 

and maintainers that we met with believed equipment degradation was the 

result of maintenance problems in one of two categories—parts or 

personnel. The parts problems include availability of parts or logistics and 

supply system problems. Availability problems occur when there are parts 

shortages, unreliable parts, or obsolete parts due to the advanced age of the 

equipment items. Logistics and supply system problems occur when it 

takes a long time to order parts or the unit requesting the parts has a low 

priority. In June, July, and August of 2003, we issued six reports 

highlighting deficiencies in DOD’s and the services’ management of critical 

spare parts.15 We also issued a report on problems DOD and the services 

are having dealing with corrosion for military equipment and that they had 

not taken advantage of opportunities to mitigate the impact of corrosion on 

equipment.16 Maintenance problems due to personnel include (1) lack of 

trained and experienced technicians and (2) increases in maintenance 

man-hours required to repair some of these aging equipment items. We 

reported in April 2003, for example, that DOD has not adequately 

positioned or trained its civilian workforce at its industrial activities to 

meet future requirements.17 Consequently, the Department may continue to 

have difficulty maintaining adequate skills at its depots to meet 

maintenance requirements.

15U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: The Army Needs a Plan to Overcome 

Critical Spare Parts Shortages, GAO-03-705 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003); Defense 

Inventory: Air Force Plans and Initiatives to Mitigate Spare Parts Shortages Need Better 

Implementation, GAO-03-706 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003); Defense Inventory: 

The Department Needs a Focused Effort to Overcome Critical Spare Parts Shortages, GAO03-707 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003); Defense Inventory: Navy Logistics Strategy and 

Initiatives Need to Address Spare Parts Shortages, GAO-03-708 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 

2003); and Defense Inventory: Several Actions Are Needed to Further DLA’s Efforts to 

Mitigate Shortages of Critical Parts, GAO-03-709 (Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2003); and 

Defense Inventory: Opportunities Exist to Improve Spare Parts Support Aboard Deployed 

Navy Ships, GAO-03-887 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29, 2003).

16 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion 

Costs and Increase Readiness, GAO-03-753 (Washington, D.C.; July 7, 2003).

17 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning 

Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD’s Civilian Industrial Workforce, GAO-03-472

(Washington, D.C.; Apr. 30, 2003).
Page 16 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Services Have Mapped 

Out Long-Range 

Program Strategies for 

Sustaining and 

Modernizing Most 

Equipment Items 

but Some Gaps Exist

In most cases, the services have developed long-range program strategies 

for sustaining and modernizing the 25 equipment items that we reviewed. 

However, some gaps exist because the services either have not validated 

their plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the 

equipment items, or the services’ program strategies for sustaining the 

equipment are hampered by problems or delays in the fielding of 

replacement equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to 

budget cuts.

The two equipment items for which we assessed the program strategy as 

red are the KC-135 Stratotanker and the Tomahawk Cruise Missile because, 

although the services may have developed long-range program strategies 

for these equipment items, they have not validated or updated their plans 

for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing these items. In the case of the 

KC-135 Stratotanker, the Air Force has embarked on a controversial, 

expensive program to replace the tanker fleet, but as we have reported,18 it 

has not demonstrated the urgency of acquiring replacement aircraft and it 

has not defined the requirements for the number of aircraft that will be 

needed. Similarly, for the Tomahawk missile, the Navy has not identified 

how many of these missiles it will need in the future, thereby significantly 

delaying the acquisition process.

18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft: Observations on the Air Force’s Plan 

to Lease Aerial Refueling Aircraft, GAO-03-1143T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2003).
Page 17 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

We assessed the program strategy for eight of the services’ program 

strategies as yellow, some of them because they will be affected by delays 

in the fielding of equipment to replace the items in our review. According to 

service officials, as the delivery of new replacement equipment items is 

delayed, the services must continue using the older equipment items to 

meet mission requirements. Consequently, the services may incur 

increased costs due to maintenance that was not programmed for 

equipment retained in inventory beyond the estimated service life. For 

example, the planned replacement equipment for the Marine Corps CH-46E 

helicopter (i.e., the MV-22 Osprey) has been delayed by about 3 years and is 

not scheduled to be fielded until 2007. DOD has also reportedly cut the 

number of replacement aircraft it plans to purchase by about 8 to 10 over 

the next few years, thus the Marine Corps will have to retain more CH-46E 

helicopters in its inventory. Program management officials have requested 

additional funds to repair airframe cracks, replace seats, and move to lightweight armor to reduce aircraft weight, engine overhauls, and avionics 

upgrades to keep the aircraft safe and reliable until fielding of the 

replacement equipment. According to Marine Corps officials, the CH-46E 

program strategy has also been hampered by the 5-year rule,19 which limits 

installation of new modifications other than safety modifications into the 

aircraft unless 5 years of service are left on the aircraft. Procurement of the 

replacement equipment for the Marine Corps’ Assault Amphibian Vehicle 

has also been delayed (by 2 years), and it is not scheduled for full fielding 

until 2012. The program strategy for the Assault Amphibian Vehicle 

includes upgrades, but for only 680 of the 1,057 vehicles in the inventory.20

We also assessed the program strategy for some equipment items as yellow 

if they were vulnerable to budget cuts. For example, according to Navy 

officials, the Navy frigates’ modernization program is susceptible to budget 

cuts because the frigates’ future role is uncertain as the Littoral Combat 

ship is developed. In addition, the program strategy for the frigates is 

questionable because of the uncertainty about the role frigates will play. 

Specifically, Navy frigates are increasingly used for homeland defense 

19Public Law 105-56, title VIII, section 8053; Oct. 8, 1997; 111 Stat. 1232.

20 In its written comments on a draft of this report, department officials stated that they plan 

to upgrade an additional 327 vehicles for a total of 1,007 vehicles, assuming funding is 

provided. They have received funding through fiscal year 2003 supplemental funding, a 

fiscal year 2004 congressional plus-up, and fiscal year 2005 funding to upgrade 148 vehicles 

and plan to address the remaining 179 vehicles in a fiscal year 2006 Program Objective 

Memorandum.
Page 18 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

missions, and their program strategy has not been updated to reflect that 

they will be used more often and in different ways. The Army’s CH-47D 

helicopter is also vulnerable to budget cuts. The Army plans to upgrade 279 

CH-47D helicopters to F models under its recapitalization program; the 

upgrade includes a purchase of CH-47F model helicopters planned in fiscal 

year 2004. The fiscal year 2004 budget for this purchase has already been 

reduced. Program managers had also planned to purchase 16 engines, but 

funding was transferred to requests for higher priority programs.

We assessed the program strategy for the remaining 15 equipment items as 

green because the services have developed long-range program strategies 

for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing these items consistent with their 

estimated remaining service life. For example, the Army has developed 

program strategies for all tracked and wheeled vehicles in our sample. 

Likewise, the Air Force has developed program strategies for most fixed 

wing aircraft in our sample throughout the FYDP. In the case of munitions, 

with the exception of the Navy Tomahawk Cruise Missile and Standard 

Missile-2, the services have developed program strategies for sustaining 

and modernizing the current missile inventory in our sample.

Requested Funding 

Does Not Reflect the 

Services’ Long-Range 

Program Strategies

In many cases, the funding DOD has requested or is projecting for 

future years in the FYDP for the equipment items we reviewed does not 

reflect the military services’ long-range program strategies for equipment 

sustainment, modernization, or recapitalization. According to service 

officials, the services submit their budgets to DOD and the Department 

has the authority to increase or decrease the service budgets based upon 

the perceived highest priority needs. According to DOD officials, for 

future years’ funding, the FYDP strikes a balance between future 

investment and program risk, taking into consideration the services’ stated 

requirements as approved by DOD. As shown in table 1, we assessed the 

funding for 15 of the 25 equipment items as red or yellow because the 

department’s requested funding did not adequately reflect its long-range 

program strategies for modernization, maintenance, and spare parts.21 For 

example, as shown in table 2, we identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded 

requirements totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft equipment 

items we reviewed.

21We did not independently verify the services’ stated requirements.
Page 19 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Table 2: Unfunded Requirements for Selected Aircraft Equipment Items, 

Fiscal Year 2003

Dollars in millions

Aircraft equipment item Unfunded requirements

CH-47D Transport Helicopter $316.0

F-16 Fighter Aircraft 13.5

C-5 Transport Aircraft 39.4

CH-46E Transport Helicopter 4.0

Total $372.9

Source: GAO analysis.

The most significant funding shortfalls occurred when parts, equipment 

upgrades, and maintenance were not fully funded or when replacement 

equipment items were not fielded as scheduled. The equipment items for 

which we assessed the funding as yellow had funding shortfalls of a lesser 

extent than the red items. Although we assessed the funding as green for 

the remaining nine equipment items, program managers raised concerns 

about the availability of operation and maintenance funds in future years, 

and stated that insufficient operation and maintenance funds could 

potentially result in more severe condition problems and increased future 

maintenance costs.

According to service officials, funding shortfalls occurred when parts, 

equipment upgrades, or maintenance were not fully funded or funds were 

reduced to support higher priority service needs. As we have previously 

reported, DOD increases or decreases funds appropriated by Congress as 

funding priorities change.22 Other shortfalls occur when units subsequently 

identify maintenance requirements that were not programmed into the 

original budget requests. In addition, when replacement equipment items 

are not fielded as scheduled, the services must continue to maintain these 

aging equipment items for longer than anticipated. Equipment items 

considered legacy systems23 such as the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter 

22U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Budget: DOD Should Further Improve Visibility 

and Accountability of O&M Fund Movements, GAO/NSIAD-00-18 (Washington, D.C. Feb. 9, 

2002).

23 Legacy systems are equipment items whose critical functionality will be subsumed by a 

new system and is scheduled for termination. The Stryker, Patriot, and Guided Multiple 

Launch Rocket System are not legacy equipment items.
Page 20 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

may not receive funding on the basis of anticipated fielding of replacement 

equipment in the near future. The gaps between funding for legacy systems 

(which are heavily used and critical to the services’ mission) and funding 

for future replacement equipment result when fielding of the new 

equipment has been delayed and budgets have been reduced for 

maintenance of legacy systems. Funding for these legacy systems may also 

be a target for funding reductions to support higher service priority items.

According to the program managers for some of the equipment items we 

reviewed (including the Army Abrams tank, Heavy Expanded Mobility 

Tactical Truck, and Navy EA-6B Prowler), as the services retain aging 

equipment in their inventories longer than expected, maintenance 

requirements increase, thus increasing operation and maintenance costs. 

Program managers raised concerns about the availability of sufficient 

operation and maintenance funding to sustain these aging equipment items 

in the future. Also, program managers stated that present sustainment 

funds (i.e., operation and maintenance funds) may only cover a 

small percentage of the equipment’s requirements, and they frequently rely 

on procurement funds to subsidize equipment improvements common to 

multiple equipment items.24 However, once production of the equipment 

item has been completed and procurement funds are no longer available 

for use, program managers must compete with the rest of the service for 

limited operation and maintenance funds. Program managers expressed 

concerns that operation and maintenance funds are not currently available 

to fund equipment improvements and noted operation and maintenance 

funds may not be available in the future.

Equipment Is Generally 

Capable of Fulfilling 

Wartime Missions 

despite Some 

Limitations

Based on our analysis of equipment condition, the performance of the 

equipment items in recent military conflicts, and discussions with service 

officials, program managers, and equipment operators and maintainers, we 

found that most of the equipment items we reviewed are capable of 

fulfilling their wartime missions despite some limitations. In general, the 

services will always ensure equipment is ready to go to war, often through 

surges in maintenance and overcoming obstacles such as obsolete parts, 

parts availability, and cannibalization of other pieces of equipment. Some 

24 Operating and support costs or total life-cycle costs are the total costs of acquiring and 

owning a weapon or materiel system over its full life, including development, procurement, 

operation, support, and disposal. About 60 percent of O&S funding is appropriated to the 

operation and maintenance accounts that pay for spare and repair parts.
Page 21 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

of these equipment items (such as the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter and 

all Air Force aircraft except the B-2) were used in Operation Desert Storm 

and have been used in other diverse operations such as those in Kosovo 

and Afghanistan. With the exception of the Army Stryker and GMLRS, all of 

the equipment items we reviewed were used recently in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom.

The services, in general, ensure that equipment is ready for deployment by 

surging maintenance operations when necessary. Only one equipment item, 

the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter, could not accomplish its intended 

wartime mission due to lift limitations. However, Marine Corps officials 

stated that they were generally satisfied that the CH-46E met its mission in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom despite these limitations. Of the remaining 

equipment items we reviewed, including all Air Force fixed-wing aircraft, 

all tracked and wheeled vehicles, and most munitions, service officials 

believe that most of these items are capable of fulfilling their wartime 

missions.

According to service officials and program managers, while final Operation 

Iraqi Freedom after action reports were not available at the time of our 

review, initial reports and preliminary observations have generally been 

favorable for the equipment items we reviewed. However, these officials 

identified a number of specific concerns for some of these equipment items 

that limit their wartime capabilities to varying degrees. For example, only 

26 out of 213 Marine Corps Assault Amphibian Vehicles at Camp Lejeune 

had been provided enhanced protective armor kits prior to Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. According to Marine Corps officials at Camp Lejeune, lack of the 

enhanced protective armor left the vehicles vulnerable to the large caliber 

ammunition used by the Iraqi forces. According to Navy officials, 

warfighting capabilities of the Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft will be 

degraded if their capabilities are not upgraded and the outer wing panels 

are not replaced. Fleet commanders expressed concerns about potentially 

deploying some ships we reviewed with only one of three weapons systems 

capable of being used. However, program managers stated that plans were 

in place to reduce the vulnerability of these ships by fielding two 

compensating weapons systems.

Conclusions Although the military services are generally able to maintain military 

equipment to meet wartime requirements, the ability to do so over the next 

several years is questionable especially for legacy equipment items. 

Because program strategies have not been validated or updated and 
Page 22 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

funding requests do not reflect the services’ long-range program strategies, 

maintaining this current equipment while transforming to a new force 

structure as well as funding current military operations in Iraq and 

elsewhere will be a major challenge for the department and the services. 

We do not believe, however, that the funding gaps we identified are 

necessarily an indication that the department needs additional funding. 

Rather, we believe that the funding gaps are an indication that funding 

priorities need to be more clearly linked to capability needs and to longrange program strategies.

The military services will always need to meet mission requirements and to 

keep their equipment ready to fulfill their wartime missions. However, this 

state of constant readiness comes at a cost. The equipment items we 

reviewed appear to have generally fulfilled wartime missions, but often 

through increased maintenance for deployed equipment and other 

extraordinary efforts to overcome obstacles such as obsolete parts, 

parts availability, and cannibalization of other pieces of equipment. The 

reported metrics may not accurately reflect the time needed to sustain and 

maintain equipment to fulfill wartime missions. Substantial equipment 

upgrades or overhauls may be required to sustain older equipment items 

until replacement equipment items arrive.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

While our review was limited to 25 equipment items and represents a 

snapshot at a particular point in time, the department should reassess its 

current processes for reviewing the condition, program strategy, and 

funding for key legacy equipment items. Specifically we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army, 

Air Force, and the Navy, reassess the program strategies for equipment 

modernization and recapitalization, and reconcile those strategies with the 

services’ funding requests to ensure that key legacy equipment, especially 

those items needed to meet the strategy outlined in the September 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review, are sustained until replacement equipment 

items can be fielded. In reconciling these program strategies to funding 

requests, the Secretary of Defense should highlight for the Congress, in 

conjunction with the department’s fiscal year 2005 budget submissions, the 

risks involved in sustaining key equipment items if adequate funding 

support is not requested and the steps the department is taking to address 

those risks. As part of this process the department should identify the key 

equipment items that, because of impaired conditions and their importance 

to meeting the department’s military strategy, should be given the highest 

priority for sustainment, recapitalization, modernization, or replacement.
Page 23 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

If the Congress wants a better understanding of the condition of major 

equipment items, the department’s strategy to maintain or recapitalize 

these equipment items, and the associated funding requirements for certain 

key military equipment needed to meet the strategy outlined in the QDR, 

the Congress may wish to consider having the Secretary of Defense provide 

an annual report, in conjunction with its annual budget submissions, on 

(1) the extent to which key legacy equipment items, particularly those that 

are in a degraded condition, are being funded and sustained until 

replacement equipment items can be fielded; (2) the risks involved in 

sustaining key equipment items if adequate funding support is not 

requested; and (3) the steps the department is taking to address those risks.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

partially concurred with our recommendation that it should reassess the 

program strategies for equipment modernization and recapitalization, and 

reconcile those strategies to the services’ funding requests. However, the 

department did not concur with our other two recommendations that it 

should (1) highlight for the Congress the risks involved in sustaining key 

equipment items if adequate funding support is not requested and the steps 

the department is taking to address those risks, and (2) identify the 

equipment items that should be given the highest priority for sustainment, 

recapitalization, modernization, or replacement. The department’s written 

comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III.

In partially concurring with our first recommendation that it should 

reassess the program strategies for equipment modernization and 

recapitalization, and reconcile those strategies to the services’ funding 

requests, the department agreed that, while the overall strategy outlined in 

the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review may be unchanged, 

events over time may dictate changes in individual program strategies, that 

requires an order to meet the most current threat. The department stated, 

however, that through its past Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 

System and the more current Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution processes, the department had and continues to have an annual 

procedure to reassess program strategies to ensure equipment 

maintenance, modernization, and recapitalization funding supports the 

most recent Defense strategy. While we acknowledge that these budget 

processes may provide a corporate, department-level review of what is 

needed to accomplish the national defense mission, the department’s 

budget and the information it provides to the Congress do not clearly 
Page 24 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

identify the funding priorities for individual equipment items. For example, 

although the funding to sustain the department’s major equipment items is 

included in its Operation and Maintenance budget accounts, these budget 

accounts do not specifically identify funding for individual equipment 

items. We continue to believe that the department, in conjunction with the 

military services, needs to develop a more comprehensive and transparent 

approach for assessing the condition of key legacy equipment items, 

developing program strategies to address critical equipment condition 

deficiencies, and prioritizing the required funding.

The department did not concur with our second recommendation that, in 

reconciling the program strategies to funding requests, it should highlight 

for the Congress, in conjunction with its fiscal year 2005 budget 

submissions, the risks involved in sustaining key equipment items if 

adequate funding support is not requested and the steps the department is 

taking to address those risks. Specifically, the department stated that its 

budget processes and the annual Defense budget provide the Congress a 

balanced program with all requirements “adequately” funded and that the 

unfunded requirements identified by the program managers or the services 

may not be validated at the department level. While we agree that the 

department’s budget may identify its highest funding priorities at the 

department wide level, it does not provide the Congress with an 

assessment of equipment condition deficiencies, unfunded requirements 

identified by the services, and the potential risks associated with not fully 

funding the services’ program strategies. In this report, we identify a 

number of examples of equipment condition deficiencies and 

inconsistencies between the program strategies and the funding requests to 

address those deficiencies that were not fully addressed in the 

department’s budget documents. We believe that the Congress, in its 

oversight of the department’s major equipment programs, needs to be 

better informed of specific equipment condition deficiencies, the longrange strategies and required funding to address those deficiencies, and the 

risks associated with not adequately funding specific equipment 

modernization and recapitalization requirements.

The department also did not concur with our recommendation that it 

should identify for the Congress the key equipment items that, because of 

impaired condition and their importance to meeting the department’s 

military strategies, should be given the highest priority for sustainment, 

recapitalization, modernization, or replacement. In its comments, the 

department stated that, in developing the annual Defense budget, it has 

already allocated resources according to its highest priorities. The 
Page 25 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

department further stated that key items that are vital to accomplishing the 

department’s mission are allocated funding in order to meet the 

requirements of the most current Defense strategy, and that there is no 

need to restate these priorities with a list. Similar to our rebuttal to the 

department’s response to our second recommendation as discussed above, 

we do not believe that the department’s annual budget provides the 

Congress with sufficient information on the most severe equipment 

condition deficiencies and the funding priorities for addressing those 

deficiencies. We believe that a separate analysis, in conjunction with the 

department’s budget submissions, that highlights the most critical 

equipment condition deficiencies, the planned program strategies for 

addressing those deficiencies, and the related funding priorities is needed 

to provide the Congress with the information it needs to make informed 

budget decisions.

The department also noted in its written comments that our report 

identifies the CH-47D, CH-46E, KC-135, EA-6B, Standard Missile-2, and the 

Tomahawk missile as equipment items with problems and issues that 

warrant action within the next 1 to 3 years. The department stated that it 

would continue to reassess these equipment items as it goes through its 

resource allocation process. 

Lastly, the department provided technical comments concerning our 

assessments of specific equipment items in appendix II, including the 

KC-135 Stratotanker, Assault Amphibian Vehicle, MV-22, Tomahawk Cruise 

Missile, and the CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter. We reviewed and 

incorporated these technical comments, as appropriate. The revisions that 

we made based on these technical comments did not change our 

assessments for the individual equipment items. In some cases, the data 

and information the department provided in its technical comments 

resulted from program and funding decisions that were made subsequent 

to our review. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps; and other interested parties. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 26 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Please contact me on (202) 512-8365 if you or your staffs have any 

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are 

included in appendix IV.

William M. Solis, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 27 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To determine the level of attention required by the Department of Defense, 

the military services, and/or the Congress for each of the 25 equipment 

items we reviewed, we performed an independent evaluation of the 

(1) equipments’ current condition; (2) services’ program strategies for the 

sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the equipment items; 

(3) current and projected funding levels for the equipment items in relation 

to the services’ program strategies; and (4) equipments’ wartime 

capabilities. Based on our evaluation of the condition, program strategy, 

and funding for each of the 25 equipment items, we used a traffic light 

approach—red, yellow, or green—to indicate the severity and urgency of 

problems or issues. We established the following criteria to assess the 

severity and urgency of the problems. 

• Red indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to warrant 

action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress within the 

next 1-3 years. We selected this time frame of 1-3 years because it 

represents the time frame for which DOD is currently preparing annual 

budgets.

• Yellow indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to 

warrant action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress 

within the next 3-5 years. We selected this time frame of 3-5 years 

because it represents the near-term segment of DOD’s Future Years 

Defense Plan.

• Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 

issues at the time of our review, or that any existing problems or issues 

we identified are not of a severe enough nature that we believe warrant 

action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress within the 

next 5 years. We selected this time frame of 5 years because it 

represents the longer-term segment of DOD’s Future Years Defense 

Plan.

We also reviewed the wartime capability of the selected equipment items, 

focusing on the extent to which each equipment item is capable of fulfilling 

its wartime mission. Because of ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited 

access to the deployed units and related equipment performance data, we 

were unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for each of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, as we did for 

each of the other three assessment areas.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 28 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

To select the 25 equipment items we reviewed, we worked with the military 

services and your offices to judgmentally select approximately two 

weapons equipment items, two support equipment items, and 

two munitions items from the equipment inventories of each of the 

four military services—Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. We relied 

extensively on input from the military services and prior GAO work to 

select equipment items that have been in use for a number of years and are 

critical to supporting the services’ mission. We based our final selections 

on the equipment items that the military services believed were most 

critical to their missions. The 25 equipment items we selected for review 

include 7 Army equipment items, 6 Air Force equipment items, 7 Navy 

equipment items, and 5 Marine Corps equipment items. Our assessments 

apply only to the 25 equipment items we reviewed, and the results of our 

assessments cannot be projected to the entire inventory of DOD 

equipment.

To assess equipment condition, we obtained and analyzed data on 

equipment age, expected service life, and the services’ equipment condition 

and performance indicators such as mission capable rates, operational 

readiness rates, utilization rates, failure rates, cannibalization rates, and 

depot maintenance data for each of the equipment items we reviewed. The 

specific data that we obtained and analyzed for each equipment item varied 

depending on the type of equipment and the extent to which the data were 

available. The scope of our data collection for each of the equipment items 

included both the active and reserve forces. We also met with the services’ 

program managers and other cognizant officials from each of the four 

military services for each of the 25 equipment items. In addition, we visited 

selected units and maintenance facilities to observe the equipment during 

operation or during maintenance and to discuss equipment condition and 

wartime capability issues with equipment operators and maintainers. Our 

observations and assessments were limited to equipment in the active duty 

inventory.

To assess the program strategy for these equipment items, we reviewed the 

services’ plans for future sustainment, modernization, recapitalization, or 

replacement of the equipment items in order to meet the services’ mission 

and force structure requirements. We met with the services’ program 

managers and other military service officials to discuss and assess the 

extent to which the services have a strategy or roadmap for each of the 

25 equipment items, and whether the program strategy is adequately 

reflected in DOD’s current budget or the Future Years Defense Plan.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

To assess equipment funding, we obtained and analyzed data on historical, 

current, and future years’ budget requests for each of the 25 equipment 

items we reviewed. We also reviewed the services’ budget requests, 

appropriations, and obligations for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003 

to determine how the funds that had been requested and appropriated for 

each of the equipment items were used. In addition, we reviewed the 

Future Years Defense Program for fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007 and 

for fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 to determine if the projected funding 

levels were consistent with the services’ program strategies for 

sustainment, modernization, recapitalization, or replacement of the 

selected equipment items. We also met with the services’ program 

managers for each of the 25 equipment items to identify budget shortfalls 

and unfunded requirements. We did not independently validate the 

services’ requirements. We were unable, however, to obtain specific 

information from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff 

on the long-term program strategies and funding priorities for these 

equipment items because officials in these offices considered this 

information to be internal DOD data and would not make it available to us.

To review the wartime capability of each equipment item, we discussed 

with military service officials, program managers, and equipment operators 

and maintainers the capabilities of the equipment items to fulfill their 

wartime missions and the equipments’ performance in recent military 

operations. Because of ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited access to 

the deployed units and related equipment performance data, we were 

unable to collect sufficient data to definitively assess wartime capability 

or to assign a color-coded assessment as we did with the other three 

assessment areas. We also reviewed related Defense reports, such as after 

action reports and lessons learned reports, from recent military operations 

to identify issues or concerns regarding the equipments’ wartime 

capabilities.

We performed our work at relevant military major commands, selected 

units and maintenance facilities, and one selected defense combatant 

command. Our access to specific combatant commands and military units 

was somewhat limited due to their involvement in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. The specific military activities that we visited or obtained 

information from include the following:

• U.S. Army, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology, Washington, D.C.;
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

• U.S. Army Forces Command Headquarters, Atlanta, Ga.;

• U.S. Army, 1st Calvary Division, 118th Corps, Ft. Hood, Tx.;

• U.S. Army, Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Precision 

Fire and Missile Project Office, Huntsville, Al.;

• U.S. Army, Tank and Armament Automotive Command, Warren, Mi.;

• U.S. Army, Cost and Economic Analysis Center, Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Army, Pacific, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii; and

• U.S. Army, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii;

• U.S. Air Force, Headquarters, Plans and Programs Division, 

Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Air Force, Combat Forces Division, and Global Mobility Division, 

Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Air Force, Munitions Missile and Space Plans and Policy Division, 

Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Air Force, Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Ga.;

• U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Directorate of Requirements and 

Plans, Aircraft Division, and the Installation and Logistics Division, 

Langley Air Force Base, Va.;

• U.S. Air Force, Pacific, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk Naval Base, Va.;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk Naval Base, Va.;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Va.;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet, Naval Amphibious Base, 

Coronado, Calif.;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Forces, Naval Air Station North Island, Coronado, 

Calif.;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Calif.;

• U.S. Navy, Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station 

Whidbey Island, Wash.;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, 

Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Air Station 

Patuxent River, Md.;

• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Depot, Naval Air Station North Island, Calif.; and

• U.S. Navy, Avondale Shipyard, Avondale, La.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Systems Command, Quantico, Va.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Weapons Branch, Pentagon, Washington, 

D.C.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Tank Automotive and Armaments Command, 

Warren, Mich.;
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

• U.S. Marine Corps, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, 

Calif.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Research Lab, Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, AAAV Technology Center, Woodbridge, Va.; and

• U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii.

We also obtained and reviewed relevant documents and reports from DOD 

and the Congressional Budget Office, and relied on related prior GAO 

reports. We performed our review from September 2002 through October 

2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.
Page 32 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items ApendxiI

For the 25 equipment items, each assessment provides a snapshot in time 

of the status of the equipment item at the time of our review. The profile 

presents a general description of the equipment item. Each assessment 

area contains a highlighted area indicating the level of DOD, military 

service, and/or congressional attention each equipment item needs, in our 

opinion, based on our observations of each equipment item, discussions 

with service officials, and reviews of service-provided metrics. 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 33 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Army

Abrams Tank First delivered in the early 1980s, the Abrams is the Army’s main battle tank 

and destroys enemy forces using enhanced mobility and firepower. 

Variants of the Abrams include the M1, M1A1, and M1A2. The M1 has a 

105mm main gun; the M1A1 and M1A2 have a 120 mm gun, combined with a 

powerful turbine engine and special armor. There are 5,848 tanks in the 

inventory, and the estimated average age is 14 years. The M1 variant will be 

phased out by 2015. The M1 and M1A2 variant are being upgraded to the 

M1A2 Systems Enhancement Program (SEP) by July 2004.

Figure 1: Abrams Tank

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as green because it 

consistently met its mission capable goal of 90 percent from fiscal year 

1998 through fiscal year 2002. Although the Abrams met its mission capable 

goal, supply and maintenance operations at the unit-level are a challenge 

because of repair parts shortages, unreliable components, inadequate test 

equipment, and lack of trained technicians. There are concerns that the 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 34 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

future condition of the Abrams could deteriorate in the next 5 years due to 

insufficient sustainment funds. The lack of funds could result in an 

increase of aging tanks and maintenance requirements.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the Abrams as green because the 

Army has developed a long-term strategy for upgrading and phasing 

out certain variants of aging tanks in its inventory. The Army’s 

Recapitalization Program selectively implements new technology upgrades 

to reduce operations and support cost. Additionally, the Army is phasing 

out the M1A2 from its inventory by 2009, and procuring 588 M1A2 SEPS. 

The SEP enhances the digital command and control capabilities of the 

tank. The Army also developed a program for improving the Abrams M1A2 

electronics called the Continuous Electronic Evolution Program, which is 

part of the SEP. The first phase of this program has been approved and 

funded. According to an Army official, the next phase is expected to start in 

approximately 5 years.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the Abrams as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to 

sustain and modernize the Abrams tank inventory. The Army reduced the 

recapitalization budget by more than 50 percent for the M1A2 SEP, thereby 

decreasing the number of upgrades from 1,174 to 588. Unfunded 

requirements for the Abrams tank include the vehicle integrated defense 

systems, safety and environmental fixes, and an improved driver’s viewer 

system. Without adequate funding, obsolescence may become a major 

issue once tank production ends and procurement funds are no longer 

available to subsidize tank requirements. Procurement funding for the 

M1A2 SEP will be completed by 2003 and deliveries completed by 2004. 

According to an Army official, the Abrams procurement funding provides 

approximately 75 percent to 80 percent of the tank requirements due to 

commonality among the systems.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the Abrams, a detailed pre-war assessment prepared by the 

program manager’s office indicated that the tank is not ready or able to 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 35 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

sustain a long-term war. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Abrams 

tank was able to successfully maneuver, provide firepower, and protect the 

crew. Losses were attributed to mechanical breakdown and 

cannibalization. The detailed assessment by the program manager’s office, 

however, indicated that limited funding, war reserve spare part shortages, 

and supply availability could impact the tank’s ability to sustain a long-term 

war.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 36 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

AH-64A/D Apache 

Helicopter

The Apache is a multi-mission aircraft designed to perform rear, close, deep 

operations and precision strikes, armed reconnaissance and 

security during day, night, and adverse weather conditions. There 

are approximately 728 Apache helicopters in the Army’s inventory—418 

AH-64A models and 310 AH-64D models. The fleet average age is about 

12 years.

Figure 2: AH-64A/D Apache Helicopter

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the Apache as yellow because the Apache AH64D model failed to meet the mission capable goal of 75 percent 

approximately 50 percent of the time, from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal 

year 2002; however, according to officials, the Apache mission capable 

rates have consistently exceeded the 75 percent goal in calendar year 2003. 

Aviation safety restrictions were cited as the reason why the Apache failed 

to meet mission capable goals. A safety restriction pertains to any defect or 

hazardous condition that can cause personal injury, death, or damage to the 

aircraft, components, or repair parts for which a medium to high safety risk 

has been determined. These restrictions included problems with the 

(1) aircraft Teflon bushings, (2) transmission, (3) main rotor blade 

attaching pins, (4) generator power cables, and (5) the removal, 

maintenance and inspection of the Auxiliary Power Unit Takeoff Clutch. 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 37 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

The Army’s Recapitalization Program includes modifications that are 

intended to address these safety restrictions.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the Apache as green because the 

Army has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and upgrade 

the aging Apache fleet. The Army’s Recapitalization Program addresses 

costs, reliability, and safety problems, fleet groundings, aging aircraft, and 

obsolescence. The Army plans to remanufacture 501 AH-64A helicopters to 

the AH-64D configuration. The goal is to reduce the fleet average age to 

10 years by 2010, increase the unscheduled mean time between removal by 

20 percent for selected components, and generate a 20 percent return on 

investment for the top 10 cost drivers. The Army is on-schedule for fielding 

the Apache AH-64D.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the Apache as green because current and 

projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated requirements for 

sustaining and upgrading the Apache fleet. The Apache program is fully 

funded through fiscal year 2005 at a total cost of $6.7 billion. The funding 

supports remanufacturing and upgrading 501 Apache AH-64A to the newer 

Longbow Apache AH-64D aircraft, as well as funding other reliability and 

safety issues. The Army has expended $3.6 billion to convert 284 A models 

to D models from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2001. The other 

$3.1 billion supports upgrading the remaining 217 A models to address 

reliability and safety issues, procuring Detection Systems, and procuring 

Internal Auxiliary Fuel System/Ammo Flat Pack for the Apache fleet. The 

Army has not made a decision to fund modifications needed in fiscal year 

2005 through fiscal year 2012, which is estimated to cost approximately 

$3.4 billion

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the Apache, Army officials did not identify any specific 

concerns. These officials indicated that the Apache successfully fulfilled its 

wartime missions in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the AH-64D conducted combat operations for 

both close combat and standoff engagements. Every mission assigned was 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 38 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

flown and accomplished with the Apache AH-64D. The Longbow 

performance has been enhanced by targeting and weapon systems 

upgrades that have improved the Longbow performance over the AH-64A.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 39 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Stryker The Stryker is a highly deployable-wheeled armored vehicle that employs 

10 variations—the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), Mortar Carrier (MC), 

Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), Commander Vehicle (CV), Medical 

Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV), Anti-Tank 

Guided Missile Vehicle (ATGM), and Fire Support Vehicle (FSV), the Mobile 

Gun System (MGS), and the Nuclear Biological and Chemical 

Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV). There are 600 Stryker vehicles in the 

Army’s inventory, and the average age is less than 2 years. The Army plans 

to procure a total of 2,121 Stryker vehicles through fiscal year 2008.

Figure 3: Stryker

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the Stryker as green because it has 

successfully achieved the fully mission capable goal of 95 percent, based 

on a 3-month average from April 2003 through July 2003. The Congress 

mandated that the Army compare the operational effectiveness and cost of 

an infantry carrier variant of the Stryker and a medium Army armored 

vehicle. The Army compared the cost and operational effectiveness of the 

Stryker infantry carrier against a medium armored vehicle. The Army 

selected the M113A3, and the comparison shows the Stryker infantry 

carrier vehicle is more survivable and provides better overall performance 

and mobility when employed in combat operations than the M113A3.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 40 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the Stryker as green because the 

Army developed a long-term program strategy for procuring a total of 2,121 

vehicles through fiscal year 2008, which will satisfy the total requirement. 

Of the 600 currently in the inventory, 449 are at 2 brigades—a 3rd brigade of 

the 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, 

both of which are located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The other 151 are at 

fielding sites, training centers, and the Army Test and Evaluation Center. 

The remaining 1,521 will be procured through fiscal year 2007 with 

expected deliveries through fiscal year 2008. The next brigade scheduled to 

receive the Stryker is the 172nd Infantry Brigade at Forts Richardson and 

Wainwright, Alaska. The remaining Stryker Brigades Combat Teams to be 

equipped with the Stryker are the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, 

Louisiana; 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; 

and 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National 

Guard.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the Stryker as green because current and 

projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to 

sustain the Stryker program. The program is fully funded to field the 

six Stryker brigade combat teams. Approximately $4.1 billion has been 

allocated for all six combat teams through fiscal year 2009. The Secretary 

of Defense has authorized the procurement of the first three brigades, but 

the fourth brigade cannot be procured until the Secretary of Defense 

solidify to Congress that the results of the Operational Evaluation 

mandated by Congress indicated that the design for the interim brigade 

combat team is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The 

evaluation was completed in May 2003 and results are being finalized.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the Stryker, the Army did not identify any specific concerns 

regarding the system being able to meet its wartime mission. The Stryker 

has not yet been used in any conflict situation. In May 2003, GAO reported 

that the Army Test and Evaluation Command concluded that the Stryker 

provided more advantages than the M113A3 in force protection, support for 

dismounted assault, and close fight and mobility, and was more survivable 

against ballistic and non-ballistic threats.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 41 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

CH-47D/F Chinook 

Helicopter

The CH-47 helicopter is a twin-engine, tandem rotor helicopter designed for 

transportation of cargo, troops, and weapons. The Army inventory consists 

of 426 CH-47D models and 2 CH-47F models. The CH-47F Improved Cargo 

Helicopter is a remanufactured version of the CH-47D and includes a new 

digital cockpit and a modified airframe to reduce vibration. The overall 

average age of the CH-47 is 14 years old. The Army plans to convert 76 D 

model aircraft to the F model between fiscal years 2005 and fiscal year 

2009.

Figure 4: CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the Chinook as red because it consistently 

failed to meet the Army’s mission capable goal of 75 percent from fiscal 

year 1998 to fiscal year 2002. Actual mission capable rates ranged from 

61 percent to 69 percent. Army officials attributed the failure to meet the 

75 percent mission capable goal to aging equipment, supply shortages, and 

inexperienced technicians. Maintaining aircraft has become increasingly 

difficult with the CH-47D failing to meet the non-mission capable 

maintenance goal of 15 percent, increasing from 27 percent in fiscal year 

1998 to 31 percent in fiscal year 2002.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 42 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the Chinook as yellow because the 

Army has developed a long-term strategy for upgrading and replacing the 

Chinook, but the strategy is not consistent with the Army’s funding 

priorities. There has been a delay in the plan to upgrade 279 D models to 

F models between fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2017 under the Army’s 

Recapitalization Program, reducing the number of CH-47F helicopters 

planned in the fiscal year 2004 budget by five due to unexpected funding 

constraints. These budgetary constraints also delayed the Army’s plans to 

purchase 16 engines because funding was transferred to support other nonrecurring requirements. Readiness may be adversely affected if these 

engines are not procured because unit requisitions for these engines will 

not be filled and aircraft will not be fully mission capable.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the Chinook as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s requirements for 

sustaining and upgrading the Chinook helicopter. At present, the Army has 

identified unfunded requirements totaling $316 million, with $77 million 

needed to procure the five CH-47Fs and the 16 engines for which the funds 

had been previously diverted. The remaining $239 million would support 

other improvements including common avionics system, rotor heads, 

crashworthy crew seats, and engine modifications. The Army will resolve 

some or all of these requirements with projected funding of $3 billion to 

support the CH-47 program through fiscal year 2017.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the Chinook, Army officials indicated that it successfully 

fulfilled its wartime mission for Operation Iraqi Freedom despite current 

condition problems. These officials stated that the deployed units were 

able to overcome these condition problems because the deployed aircraft 

were provided a higher priority than non-deployed aircraft for spare parts. 

As a result, the estimated mission capable rates for deployed aircraft 

increased to about 86 percent during the operation.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 43 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Heavy Expanded Mobility 

Tactical Truck (HEMTT)

The HEMTT provides transport capabilities for re-supply of combat 

vehicles and weapon systems. The HEMTT’s five basic configurations 

include the cargo truck, the load handling system, wrecker, tanker, and 

tractor. The HEMTT entered into the Army’s inventory in 1982. The current 

inventory totals about 12,500 and the average age is 13 years.

Figure 5: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the HEMTT as green because mission capable 

rates have been close to the Army’s 90 percent goal, averaging 89 percent 

between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2002. Moreover, the overall supply 

availability rates have exceeded the 85 percent goal from May 2002 to 

October 2002, averaging between 96 percent and 99 percent, respectively. 

In some instances, however, meeting the operational goals has been 

continually challenging because of aging equipment, heavy equipment 

usage, and the lack of trained mechanics. The lack of trained mechanics 

may also impact the Army’s future ability to meet the specified mission 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 44 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

capable goals. In addition, a detailed pre-war assessment by the program 

manager’s office indicated that concerns regarding shortages of spare parts 

would significantly degrade the HEMTT readiness rates.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the HEMTT as green because the 

Army has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and 

modernizing the HEMTT inventory. The Army’s plans include procuring 

1,485 new tankers and wreckers through fiscal year 2007, which will satisfy 

the Army’s stated requirement. The Army also plans to rebuild some of the 

existing vehicles through the HEMTT Extended Service Program. This 

program, scheduled to be complete in fiscal year 2012, will insert 

technology advancements and will provide continuous improvements to 

the vehicle. Although there has been a reduction in the Army’s budget for 

the Extended Service Program, the plan is to continue rebuilding trucks in 

smaller quantities and at a slower pace. The Army’s Forces Command has 

implemented a Vehicle Readiness Enhancement Program that serves as an 

interim maintenance program for the HEMTT awaiting induction into the 

Extended Service Program.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the HEMTT as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to 

sustain and modernize the HEMTT inventory. Specifically, the Army has 

unfunded requirements of $10.5 million as of fiscal year 2003, of which 

$3.9 million is for spare parts and $6.6 million is for war reserves. In 

addition, the Army reduced the Recapitalization Program by $329 million. 

The Army had planned to upgrade 2,783 vehicles currently in the inventory; 

however, 1,365 will not be upgraded as a result of the reductions in the 

Recapitalization Program. Consequently, according to Army officials, 

maintenance and operating and support costs will likely increase.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the HEMTT, Army officials indicated that it has successfully 

fulfilled its wartime requirements during recent combat operations. 

Based on the program manager’s preliminary observations, the HEMTT 

performed successfully during Operation Iraqi Freedom. A detailed pre-war 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 45 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

assessment by the program manager’s office indicated that the HEMTT was 

ready for war, but could experience sustainment problems due to a 

shortage of war reserve spare parts. The program manager’s office is 

currently assessing the condition of the active and war reserve equipment 

used in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 46 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Patriot Missile (PAC-3) The PAC-3 missile is considered a major upgrade to the Patriot system. 

Sixteen PAC-3 missiles can be loaded on a launcher versus four PAC-2 

missiles. The Army plans to buy 2,200 PAC-3 missiles. The Army had a 

current inventory of 88 PAC-3 missiles as of July 2003. The average age of 

the PAC-3 missile is less than 1 year.

Figure 6: Patriot Missile 

Source: U.S. Army.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the PAC-3 missile as green because 

approximately 89 percent of the missiles in the inventory were ready for 

use as of July 2003. Specifically, of the 88 PAC-3 missiles currently in the 

inventory, 78 were ready for use and 10 were not. In addition, the Army has 

not experienced any chronic or persistent problems during production. The 

PAC-3 missile completed operational testing and was approved for full 

production of 208 missiles in 2003 and 2004.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 47 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the PAC-3 missile as green because 

the Army has developed a long-term strategy for sustaining the PAC-3 

inventory, including procurement of 2,200 missiles that will satisfy the total 

requirement. The Army plans to purchase 1,159 PAC-3 missiles through 

fiscal year 2009. The remaining 1,041 missiles will be procured after fiscal 

year 2009. During the low-rate initial production, the Army procured 164 

PAC-3 missiles from 1998 to 2002 at $1.7 billion. The Army has completed 

the low-rate initial production and has been granted approval for full 

production of 208 PAC-3 missiles beginning in fiscal year 2003, at a total 

estimated cost of $714 million.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the PAC-3 missile as green primarily because 

current and projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated 

requirements to sustain the PAC-3 inventory. The program manager’s office 

has not identified any funding shortfalls for the missile. Funding has been 

approved for the production of 1,159 PAC-3 missiles through fiscal year 

2009 at an average production rate of nearly 100 missiles per year. The total 

production cost of the 1,159 PAC-3 missiles equates to $4.3 billion. The 

remaining 1,041 missiles will be procured after fiscal year 2009.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the PAC-3 missile, Army officials indicated that it successfully 

fulfilled its wartime mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom, successfully 

hitting enemy targets within two missile shots. The PAC-3 has also 

completed the operational testing phase and has been approved for 

full production.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 48 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Guided Multiple Launch 

Rocket System (GMLRS)

The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Dual Purpose Improved 

Convention Munition (GMLRS-DPICM) is an essential component of the 

Army’s transformation. It upgrades the M26 series MLRS rocket and is 

expected to serve as the baseline for all future Objective Force rocket 

munitions. The Army plans to procure a total of 140,004 GMLRS rockets. 

There are currently no GMLRS rockets in inventory, but it was approved in 

March 2003 to enter low rate initial production to produce 108 missiles.

Figure 7: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 

Source: U.S. Army.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the GMLRS as green because the system has 

demonstrated acceptable performance during the System Development 

and Demonstration Phase, and was approved to enter low rate initial 

production in March 2003.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 49 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the GMLRS as green because the 

Army has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining the 

GMLRS inventory, including procurement of a total of 140,004 missiles that 

will satisfy the total requirement. Of this total, the Army plans to procure 

18,582 missiles by fiscal year 2009. The remaining 121,422 will be procured 

after fiscal year 2009. The Army approved low rate initial production for a 

total of 1,920 missiles through fiscal year 2005. The initial operational 

capability date is scheduled for 2nd quarter fiscal year 2006. The Army has 

also preplanned a product improvement to the GMLRS-DPICM called the 

GMLRS—Unitary. This improvement is in the concept development phase 

and is scheduled to begin a spiral System Development and Demonstration. 

The Army has not decided how many of the 1,920 initial production rockets 

will include the guided unitary upgrade.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the GMLRS as green because current and 

projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to 

sustain the GMLRS Munitions program. The GMLRS program is fully 

funded and properly phased for rapid acquisition. The Army plans to 

purchase a total of 140,004 GMLRS rockets for $11.7 billion. Of the 

140,004 GMLRS rockets, the Army plans to procure 18,582 through fiscal 

year 2009 for $1.7 billion. The remaining 121,422 rockets will cost the Army 

approximately $10 billion. In March 2003, the system met all modified low 

rate initial production criteria to enter the first phase to produce 108 

rockets for $36.6 million. Phases II and III will procure the remaining 1,812 

rockets during fiscal year 2004 (786 rockets) and fiscal year 2005 (1,026 

rockets) for $220.4 million.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the GMLRS, Army officials did not identify any specific 

capability concerns. The GMLRS-DPICM is expected to achieve greater 

range and precision accuracy. The upgraded improvement will reduce the 

number of rockets required to defeat targets out to 60 kilometers or 

greater, and reduce collateral damage. It is also expected to reduce 

hazardous duds to less than 1 percent.
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Air Force

F-16 Fighting Falcon 

Aircraft

The F-16 is a compact, multi-role fighter with air-to-air combat and 

air-to-surface attack capabilities. The first operational F-16A was delivered 

in January 1979. The Air Force currently has 1,381 F-16 aircraft in its 

inventory, and the average age is about 15 years. The F-16B is a two-seat, 

tandem cockpit aircraft. The F-16C and D models are the counterparts to 

the F-16A/B, and incorporate the latest technology. Active units and many 

reserve units have converted to the F-16C/D. The Air Force plans to replace 

the F-16 with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter beginning in 2012.

Figure 8: F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the F-16 as green because mission capable 

rates have been near the current goal of 83 percent with mission capable 

rates for all of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC) F-16s ranging 

from 75 percent to 79 percent during the past 5 years. Although these rates 

are below the goal, officials said they were sufficient to provide flying 

hours for pilot training, and to meet operational requirements. In fiscal year 

2002, the planned utilization rate, (i.e., the average number of sorties per 
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aircraft per month) for ACC aircraft was 17.5 sorties per month, and the 

actual utilization was 17.7 sorties. Although the average age of the F-16 is 

about 15 years, there are no material deficiencies that would limit its 

effectiveness and reliability. Known and potential structural problems 

associated with aging and accumulated flying hours are being addressed 

through ongoing depot maintenance programs.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the F-16 as green because the 

Air Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and 

replacing the F-16 inventory. The program should ensure that the aircraft 

remains a viable and capable weapons system throughout the FYDP. 

Subsequently, the Air Force intends to begin replacing the F-16 with the 

Joint Strike Fighter (F-35), which is already in development.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the F-16 as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements 

to sustain and replace the F-16 inventory. There are potential shortfalls in 

the funding for depot maintenance programs and modifications during the 

next 3-5 years. Although funding has been programmed for this work, 

unexpected increases in depot labor rates have been significant, and 

additional funding may be required to complete the work. For fiscal year 

2004, the Air Force included $13.5 million for the F-16 in its Unfunded 

Priority List.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the F-16, the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its recent 

wartime missions. F-16 fighters were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991 

in support of Operation Desert Storm, and flew more sorties than any other 

aircraft. The F-16 has also been a major player in peacekeeping operations 

including the Balkans since 1993. Since the terrorist attack in September 

2001, F-16s comprised the bulk of the fighter force protecting the skies over 

the United States in Operation Noble Eagle. More recently, F-16s played a 

major role in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom, and have 

performed well in combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which the F-16 

once again provided precision-guided strike capabilities and suppression of 
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enemy air defenses. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force 

deployed over 130 F-16s that contributed significantly to the approximately 

8,800 sorties flown by Air Force fighter aircraft.
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B-2 Spirit Bomber The B-2 is a multi-role heavy bomber with stealth characteristics, capable 

of employing nuclear and conventional weapons. The aircraft was 

produced in limited numbers to provide a low observable (i.e., stealth) 

capability to complement the B-1 and B-52 bombers. Its unique stealth 

capability enables the aircraft to penetrate air defenses. The Air Force 

currently has 21 B-2 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is about 9 

years. The first B-2 was deployed in December 1993, and currently all B-2s 

in the inventory are configured with an enhanced terrain-following 

capability and the ability to deliver the Joint Direct Attack Munition and the 

Joint Stand Off Weapon.

Figure 9: B-2 Spirit Bomber

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the B-2 as yellow because the B-2 did not 

meet its mission capable goal of 50 percent. Officials said that the aircraft 

itself is in good condition, but it is the maintainability of its stealth 

characteristics that is driving the low mission capable rates. Officials 

pointed out that despite low mission capable rates the B-2 has been able to 

meet requirements for combat readiness training and wartime missions. 

For example, four B-2 aircraft were deployed and used during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, and maintained a mission capable rate of 85 percent. 

Mission capable rates have improved slightly, and officials said that recent 

innovations in low observable maintenance technology and planned 

modifications are expected to foster additional improvement.
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Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the B-2 as green because the Air 

Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining the 

B-2 inventory. Program plans appear to ensure the viability of this system 

through the Future Years Defense Plan. Procurement of this aircraft is 

complete. The Air Force plans to maintain and improve its capabilities, 

ensuring that the B-2 remains the primary platform in long-range 

combat aviation.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the B-2 as green because current and projected 

funding is consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements to sustain the 

B-2 inventory. The programmed funding should allow execution of the 

program strategy to sustain, maintain, and modify the system through the 

Future Years Defense Plan. The B-2 is of special interest to the Congress, 

which requires an annual report on this system, including a schedule of 

funding requirements through the Future Years Defense Plan. No items 

specific to the B-2 were included in the Air Force’s fiscal year 2004 

Unfunded Priority List.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the B-2, the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its wartime 

missions despite current condition weaknesses. The Air Force 

demonstrated the aircraft’s long-range strike capability by launching 

missions from the United States, striking targets in Afghanistan, and 

returning to the States. More recently, the Air Force deployed four B-2 

aircraft to support Operation Iraqi Freedom, where they contributed to the 

505 sorties flown by bombers during the conflict. The B-2 Annual Report to 

the Congress states that the B-2 program plan will ensure that the B-2 

remains the primary platform in long-range combat aviation.
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C-5 Galaxy Transport 

Aircraft

The C-5 Galaxy is the largest of the Air Force’s air transport aircraft, and 

one of the world’s largest aircraft. It can carry large cargo items over 

intercontinental ranges at jet speeds and can take off and land in relatively 

short distances. It provides a unique capability in that it is the only aircraft 

that can carry certain Army weapon systems, main battle tanks, infantry 

vehicles, or helicopters. The C-5 can carry any piece of army combat 

equipment, including a 74-ton mobile bridge. With aerial refueling, the 

aircraft’s range is limited only by crew endurance. The first C-5A was 

delivered in 1969. The Air Force currently has 126 C-5 aircraft in its 

inventory, and the average age is about 26 years.

Figure 10: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the C-5 as yellow because it consistently 

failed to meet its mission capable goal of 75 percent; however, mission 

capable rates have been steadily improving and, in April 2003, active duty 

C-5s exceeded the goal for the first time. Program officials pointed out that, 

although the total fleet has never achieved the 75 percent goal, there has 

been considerable improvement over time, with the rate rising from about 

42 percent in 1971 to about 71 percent in 2003. The Air Force Scientific 

Advisory Board has estimated that 80 percent of the airframe structural 
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service life remains. Furthermore, Air Force officials said that the two 

major modification programs planned, the avionics modernization program 

and reliability enhancement and re-engining program, should significantly 

improve mission capable rates.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the C-5 as green because the Air 

Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and 

modernizing the aging C-5 inventory. The Air Force has planned a 

two-phase modernization program through the future years defense 

program that is expected to increase the aircraft’s mission capability and 

reliability. The Air Force plans to modernize the C-5 to improve aircraft 

reliability and maintainability, maintain structural and system integrity, 

reduce costs, and increase operational capability. Air Force officials stated 

that the C-5 is expected to continue in service until about 2040 and that, 

with the planned modifications, the aircraft could last until then. As an 

effort to meet strategic airlift requirements, the Air Force has contracted to 

buy 180 C-17s, will retire 14 C-5s by fiscal year 2005, and may retire 

additional aircraft as more C-17s are acquired.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the C-5 as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements 

to sustain and modernize the aging C-5 inventory. According to officials, the 

program lost production funding because of problems during the early 

stage of the program. Currently 49 aircraft are funded for the avionics 

program through the Future Years Defense Plan. For fiscal year 2004, the 

Air Force included $39.4 million in its Unfunded Priority List to restore the 

program to its prior timeline.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the C-5, Air Force officials indicated that the aircraft has 

successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. The Air Force has not 

noted any factors or capability concerns that would prevent the C-5 from 

effectively performing its wartime mission.
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KC-135 Stratotanker 

Aircraft

The KC-135 is one of the oldest airframes in the Air Force’s inventory, and 

represents 90 percent of the tanker fleet. Its primary mission is air 

refueling, and it supports Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied aircraft. 

The first KC-135 was delivered in June 1957. The original A models have 

been re-engined, modified, and designated as E, R, or T models. The E 

models are located in the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. The 

total inventory of the KC-135 aircraft is 543, and the average age is about 

43 years.

Figure 11: KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the KC-135 as yellow because it maintained 

mission capable rates at or near the 85 percent goal despite the aircraft’s 

age and potential corrosion of its structural components. Although the 

aircraft is about 43 years old, average flying hours are slightly over a third 

of its expected life of 39,000 hours, and an Air Force study projected the 

KC-135 would last until about 2040. All KC-135s were subjected to an 

aggressive corrosion preventive program and underwent significant 

modifications, including replacement of the cockpit. Nevertheless, citing 

increases in the work needed during periodic depot maintenance, costs, 

and risk of the entire fleet being grounded, the Air Force decided to 

accelerate recapitalization from 2013 to about 2006.
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Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the KC-135 as red because the Air 

Force has developed a long-term program strategy to modernize the aging 

KC-135 tanker fleet, but it has not demonstrated the urgency of acquiring 

replacement aircraft and has not defined the requirements for the number 

of aircraft that will be needed. As we stated in testimony before the House 

Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Projection Forces, the 

department does not have a current, validated study on which to base the 

size and composition of either the current fleet or a future aerial refueling 

force.1

 The Air Force has a large fleet of KC-135s (about 543), which were 

flown about 300 hours annually between 1995 and September 2001. Since 

then utilization is about 435 hours per year. Furthermore, the Air Force has 

a shortage of aircrews to fly the aircraft it has. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

a relatively small part of the fleet was used to support the conflict 

(149 aircraft). Without a definitive analysis, it is difficult to determine if 

recapitalization is needed and what alternatives might best satisfy the 

requirement.

Funding

We assessed the funding of the KC-135 as red because current and future 

funding is not consistent with the Air Force stated requirements to sustain 

and modernize the KC-135 tanker fleet. The Air Force has not addressed 

recapitalization funding in the current defense budget or in the Future 

Years Defense Plan. The Air Force plans to begin acquiring new aircraft 

almost immediately, but does not want to divert funding from other 

programs to pay for them. The Air Force proposed a unique leasing 

arrangement with Boeing that will provide new tankers as early as 2006. 

There remains controversy over the lease terms, aircraft pricing, and how 

the Air Force will pay for the lease.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the KC-135, Air Force officials indicated that the aircraft has 

successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions despite current condition 

1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft: Information on Air Force Aerial 

Refueling Tankers, GAO-03-938T (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2003).
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problems. The KC-135 comprised 149 of the 182 tanker aircraft the Air 

Force used during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and those aircraft flew almost 

6,200 sorties and offloaded over 376 million pounds of fuel. The KC-135 

maintained a mission capable rate above the current goal of 85 percent 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
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Conventional Air Launched 

Cruise Missile (CALCM)

The CALCM is an accurate long-range standoff weapon with an adverse 

weather, day/night, and air-to-surface capability. It employs a global 

positioning system coupled with an inertial navigation system. It was 

developed to improve the effectiveness of the B-52 bombers and became 

operational in January 1991. Since initial deployment, an upgraded avionics 

package, including a larger conventional payload and a multi-channel 

global positioning system receiver, has been added on all of the missiles. 

The CALCM total inventory is about 478, and the average age is about 

15 years.

Figure 12: Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the CALCM as green because the CALCM has 

demonstrated high reliability. The Air Force has not noted any chronic 

factors or problems that limit the effectiveness or reliability of the missile. 

However, according to officials, the diagnostics test equipment needs to be 

upgraded because it is old and was designed to support less sophisticated 

missiles. Currently, the Air Force uses the same test equipment for both the 

conventional and nuclear weapons.
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Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the CALCM as green because the Air 

Force has a long-term program strategy for sustaining and modernizing its 

current inventory of cruise missiles. The Air Force does not have any future 

plans to convert or purchase any additional nuclear missiles. The Joint 

Chief of Staff must authorize the use of the conventional weapons and 

approve the program in order to procure additional missiles. As the 

inventory is depleted, the conventional weapon will be replaced with other 

systems with similar capabilities, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 

Missile, which is currently under development. The Joint Air-to-Surface 

Standoff Missile will not be a one-for-one replacement for the conventional 

missile.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the CALCM as green because current and 

projected funding is consistent with the Air Force stated requirements to 

sustain and modernize its cruise missile inventory. Procurement of the 

cruise missile is complete, and no funding has been provided for research 

and development or procurement in the fiscal year 2003 budget.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the CALCM, Air Force officials indicated that it successfully 

fulfilled its recent wartime missions. These officials indicated that the 

cruise missile played a significant role in the initial strikes during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 153 missiles were 

expended, and the version that is designed to penetrate hard targets was 

first employed.
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Joint Direct Attack Munition 

(JDAM)

The Joint Direct Attack Munition is a guidance tail kit that converts existing 

unguided bombs into accurate, all-weather “smart” munitions. This is a 

joint Air Force and Navy program to upgrade the existing inventory of 2,000 

and 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs by integrating them with a 

guidance kit consisting of a global positioning system-aided inertial 

navigation system. In its most accurate mode, the system will provide a 

weapon circular error probable of 13 meters or less. The JDAM first 

entered the inventory in 1998. The total projected inventory of the JDAM is 

about 92,679, and the current average age is less than 5 years. Future 

upgrades will provide a 3-meter precision and improved anti-jamming 

capability.

Figure 13: Joint Direct Attack Munition

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the JDAM as green because it consistently 

met its reliability goal of 95 percent. The munitions are used as they 
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become available; therefore, no maintenance is involved. Although the Air 

Force does not monitor the condition of munitions, they keep track of each 

component of the guidance kit, which is tracked for serviceability. The kit 

is under a 20-year warranty. The munitions are purchased serviceable and 

are tested before used by the operational units. In addition to high 

reliability, the JDAM can be purchased at a low cost and are being delivered 

more than three times as fast as planned.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the JDAM as green because the Air 

Force has a long-term program strategy for sustaining and maintaining its 

production of the munitions. The Joint Direct Attack Munition 

requirements are driven by assessments of war readiness and training 

requirements. Currently, Boeing is in full production and is increasing its 

production to about 2,800 per month for the Air Force and Navy, an 

increase from approximately 700–900 a month. The second production line 

is up and running.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the JDAM as green because current and 

projected funding is consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements to 

sustain and maintain production of the munitions. The President’s fiscal 

year 2003 budget provided funding for the procurement of the system 

through the future years defense plan. Air Force officials stated that the 

munitions have all the funding it needs; however, it is limited by the 

production capability of its contractor, Boeing. 

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the JDAM, Air Force officials indicated that it has successfully 

fulfilled its recent wartime missions. The weapon system played a role in 

operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. According to the Air Force, 

the weapon has operationally proven to be more accurate, reliable, and 

effective than predicted. The Air Force has not noted any factors or 

capability concerns that would prevent the Joint Direct Attack Munitions 

from effectively fulfilling its wartime mission.
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Navy

DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class 

Destroyer

Navy Destroyers are multi-mission combatants that operate offensively and 

defensively, independently, or as part of carrier battle groups, surface 

action groups, and in support of Marine amphibious task forces. This is a 

62-ship construction program, with 39 in the fleet as of 2003. The average 

age of the ships is 5.8 years, with the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) coming into 

service in 1991. The follow-on program is the DD(X), with initial 

construction funding in 2005 and delivery beginning 2011.

Figure 14: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the DDG-51 as yellow because work 

programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not 

accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock 

period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the 

industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work 
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package during dry-dock periods. Those items are then deferred to the next 

scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous 

maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance affects corrosion issues, 

particularly the ship’s hull. Engineering and combat systems have priority 

for resources with desirable, though not necessarily essential, crew quality 

of life improvements deferred to a later time. The Navy balances risk 

between available resources and deferring maintenance to make the most 

cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or with minimal 

safety or combat system deficiencies.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the DDG-51 as yellow because the 

Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and 

upgrading the DDG-51 fleet; however, budget cuts in the Navy’s 

shipbuilding program affect upgrades to the warfighting systems and may 

lead to potential problems in the industrial base when transitioning from 

DDG to DD(X) ships. Navy officials noted that these budget cuts prevent 

them from buying the latest available technologies. These technologies are 

usually in warfighting systems, such as command and control and system 

integration areas. Management of the transition period from DDG to DD(X) 

shipbuilding between 2005 and 2008 will be key to avoid problems from 

major fluctuations in the workload and workforce requirements.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the DDG-51 as yellow because current 

and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s statement 

requirements to sustain and upgrade the DDG-51 fleet. Lack of multiyear 

budget authority creates budget inefficiencies because the Navy is required 

to spend supplemental and 1-year funds within the year in which it is 

appropriated. The Navy attempts to reduce ship maintenance costs by 

leveling the maintenance workload for ship contractors, which provides 

the Navy and contractors greater flexibility and predictability. The lack of 

multiyear budgeting and the need to spend supplemental and 1-year funds 

in the current year limits that effort. Ports are not equipped or manned to 

accomplish the volume of work required in the time-span necessary to 

execute 1-year appropriations. In some cases, differences between the 

Navy estimate of scheduled maintenance costs and the contractor bid to do 
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the work requires cuts to the ship’s planned work package, further 

contributing to the deferred maintenance backlog.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the DDG-51, Navy officials raised a number of capability 

concerns. Specifically, these officials indicated that the DDG-51 has 

successfully fulfilled its recent wartime mission, but with some limitations 

such as communications shortfalls and force protection issues. Although 

the DDG-51 class is the newest ship in the fleet with the most up to date 

technologies, fleet officers said there is insufficient bandwidth for 

communications during operations. Navy officials cited effective 

management of available communications assets rather than the amount of 

available bandwidth as the more immediate challenge. In the current threat 

environment, force protection issues remain unresolved. The use of the 

Ridged Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) during operations at sea without onboard crew-served weapons and hardening protection concerns 

commanders. The small caliber of sailors’ personal and crew-served 

weapons limits their effectiveness against the immediate and close-in 

threat from small boat attack.
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FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry 

Class Frigate

Navy FFG-7 Frigates are surface combatants with anti-submarine warfare 

(ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities. Frigates conduct escort for 

amphibious expeditionary forces, protection of shipping, maritime 

interdiction, and homeland defense missions. There are 32 FFGs in the 

fleet, with 30 programmed for modernization. The average age of the fleet 

is 19 years. The FFGs are expected to remain in the fleet until 2020.

Figure 15: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the FFG-7 as yellow because work 

programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not 

accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock 

period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the 

industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work 

package during dry-dock periods. These items are then deferred to the next 

scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous 

maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance affects corrosion issues, 

particularly the ship’s hull. Engineering and combat systems have priority 

for resources with desirable, though not necessarily essential, crew quality 

of life improvements deferred to a later time. The Navy balances risk 

between available resources and deferring maintenance to make the most 
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cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or with minimal 

safety or combat system deficiencies. There is the additional burden of 

maintaining older systems on the frigates.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the FFG-7 as yellow because the 

Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and 

modernizing the FFG-7 fleet; however, the program is susceptible to budget 

cuts. The modernization program is essential to ensure the frigates’ 

continued viability. There is also uncertainty about the role frigates will 

play as the Littoral Combat Ship is developed.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the FFG-7 as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to 

sustain and modernize the FFG-7 fleet. Uncertainty about modernization 

program funding and budget inefficiencies created by the lack of multiyear 

budget authority and the requirement to spend supplemental and 1-year 

funds when they are appropriated. The Navy attempts to reduce ship 

maintenance costs by leveling the maintenance workload for ship 

contractors, which provides the Navy and contractors greater flexibility 

and predictability. The lack of multiyear budget authority and the need to 

spend supplemental and 1-year funds in the current year in which they are 

appropriated limits that effort. Ports are not equipped or manned to 

accomplish the volume of work required in the time span necessary to 

execute 1-year appropriations. In some cases, differences between the 

Navy estimate of scheduled maintenance costs and the contractor bid to do 

the work requires cuts to the ship’s planned work package, further 

contributing to the deferred maintenance backlog.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the FFG-7, Navy officials identified a number of capability 

concerns including communications shortfalls and potential vulnerabilities 

to air warfare. The frigate’s ability to operate in a battle group environment 

is limited by insufficient bandwidth and lack of command circuits for 

communications requirements. The Navy shut down the frigate’s missile 

launcher because of excessive maintenance costs. Ship commanders in the 
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fleet expressed concern about potentially deploying with only one of three 

compensating systems for anti-air warfare missions, the on-board 76-mm 

rapid-fire gun (CWIS-1B, Close-In Weapons System). Officials in the 

program manager’s office stated fielding plans were in place for the other 

two systems, the MK53 Decoy Launch System, called NULKA, and the 

Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). These systems will help mitigate the 

frigate’s vulnerability after shutting down the missile launcher. The frigate’s 

value to surface groups operating independently of carriers is as a 

helicopter platform.
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F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet 

Aircraft

The F/A-18 is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft expected to fly in the 

fleet to 2030. There are six models in the current inventory of 875: A, 178; B, 

30; C, 405; D, 143; E, 55; and F, 64. Average age in years is: A, 16.4; B, 18.0; C, 

10.6; D, 10.1; E, 1.7; and F, 1.5. The Navy plans to eventually replace the 

F/A-18 with the Joint Strike Fighter.

Figure 16: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the F/A-18 as yellow because it consistently 

failed to meet mission capable and fully mission capable goals of 

75 percent and 58 percent, respectively. Squadrons that are deployed or are 

training for deployment generally exceed these goals. Maintaining the 

aircraft is increasingly difficult because of personnel shortfalls, increased 

flying requirements, and lack of ground support equipment. Navy depot 

personnel indicated that the availability of spare parts remains the largest 

issue in repairing and returning aircraft to the fleet.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the F/A-18 as yellow because the 

Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and 

maintaining the F/A-18 fleet; however, it lacks a common baseline 

capability for all aircraft. Navy officials stated managing the configuration 
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of the various versions of the aircraft is challenging. Each version of the 

aircraft has different repair parts, unique on-board equipment, and 

specially trained maintainers and pilots. To increase the service life of the 

aircraft, the Navy initiated the Center Barrel Replacement (CBR) program. 

CBR replaces those parts of the F/A-18 fuselage that have the greatest 

stress placed on them from landing on aircraft carriers. The Navy is also 

initiating a Navy/Marine Tactical Air Integration program that combines 

low flying-hour / low carrier-landing aircraft for carrier use and high flyinghour / high carrier-landing aircraft for shore basing. If CBR is adequately 

funded and the Tactical Air Integration initiative proceeds, the F/A-18 will 

remain a viable system into the future.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the F/A-18 as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to 

sustain and maintain the F/A-18 fleet. The Navy intends to fly the F/A-18A-D 

models until 2020 and the E/F models to at least 2030. Funding for ground 

support equipment for the A–D models was eliminated, leaving operators 

and program managers to find resources elsewhere. Program dollars are 

often drawn back, pushing modernization to the out years. This is a 

problem for the CBR program that is $72 million short in the current Future 

Years Defense Plan. Navy personnel state that the CBR program must be 

fully funded to meet the number of aircraft required to support the Tactical 

Air Integration initiative and standards in the new Fleet Response Plan.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the F/A-18, Navy officials indicated that the aircraft has 

successfully fulfilled its wartime missions despite current condition 

problems. The A-D models, along with the E/F models coming into the 

inventory, provide a multi-capable aircraft for the many roles the war 

fighting commanders require. These multi-role capabilities were 

demonstrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom with the F/A-18 performing 

air, ground attack, and refueling missions. Navy officials stated that they 

will do whatever is necessary to accomplish the mission, but raised 

concerns that maintenance costs are increasing due to current conditions 

problems. Specifically these officials stated that increased maintenance 

man hours per aircraft sortie, increased cannibalization rates, and 

decreased readiness rates are creating more stress on the aircraft and the 

personnel who fly and maintain them.
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EA-6B Prowler Aircraft The EA-6B is an integrated electronic warfare aircraft system combining 

long-range, all-weather capabilities with advanced electronic 

countermeasures. Its primary mission is to support strike aircraft and 

ground troops by jamming enemy radar, data links, and communications. 

The current inventory is 121 with an average age of 20.7 years. The 

follow-on aircraft is the E/A-18G Growler Airborne Electronic Attack 

aircraft, a variant of the F/A-18 E/F.

Figure 17: EA-6B Prowler Aircraft

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the EA-6B as yellow because it consistently 

failed to meet the mission capable goal of 73 percent. However, squadrons 

training for deployment or those that are deployed generally exceed this 

goal. Fatigue life expenditure (FLE), the predictable rate of wear and 

deterioration of wing center sections and outside wing panels, is a critical 

problem and has caused aircraft to be temporarily grounded or placed 

under flying restrictions to mitigate risk to the aircraft. Wing center 

sections are that part of the plane where the wings and fuselage attach. 

Outer wing panels are that part of the wing that fold up when the plane is 

onboard carriers. The Navy is aggressively managing the problem and has 

programs in place to replace these items in the near term.
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Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the EA-6B as yellow because the 

Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading the EA-6B 

fleet; however, aircraft capability requirements may not be met in the 

future. The Improved Capability 3rd Generation (ICAPIII) upgrade is a 

significant technology leap in jamming capabilities over the current 

second-generation capability. ICAPIII will counter threats through 2015 and 

provides an advanced jamming capability, accurate target location, and full 

circle coverage. By 2007, 30 percent of the fleet will be ICAPIII equipped. 

The Navy plans for the follow-on EA-18G Growler to join the fleet between 

2008 and 2012. The Navy purchase plan calls for 90 aircraft with over twothirds (65 aircraft) procured by 2009.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the EA-6B as red because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to 

sustain and upgrade the EA-6B fleet. The Navy relies upon additional 

congressional appropriations rather than requesting funds to meet program 

requirements. In fiscal year 2003, the Congress appropriated an additional 

17 percent ($40 million) over DOD’s request for the EA-6B. The Navy is not 

funding modernization programs to the stated requirements. The Navy’s 

requirement for the ICAPIII electronic attack upgrade is 42 systems, 

although the Navy is only funding 35 systems. According to the program 

manager, funding for replacing the EA-6B’s outside wing panels is still 

uncertain.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the EA-6B, Navy officials indicated that the aircraft has 

successfully fulfilled its wartime missions with some limitations. Potential 

funding shortfalls and capability limitations may affect the aircraft’s ability 

to perform its mission. Only 98 out of 108 aircraft in the Navy’s EA-6B 

inventory are available to the fleet. Current EA-6B capabilities can meet the 

threat, although without an increase in the number of ICAPIII capable 

aircraft, the Navy may not be able to meet future threats. According to 

Navy officials, there is an impending severe impact on warfighting 

capabilities if the Navy does not receive fiscal year 2003 procurement 

funding for outside wing panels as requested. Specifically, the combination 
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of the expected wear and tear on the panels and the normal aircraft 

attrition rate could reduce the total EA-6B inventory by 16 in 2005.
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LPD-4 Amphibious 

Transport Dock Ship

The LPD-4 ships are warships that embark, transport, and land elements of 

a Marine landing force and its equipment. There are currently 11 in the 

inventory with an average age of 35 years. These ships are expected to 

remain in the fleet until 2014. The San Antonio-class LPD-17 (12-ship 

construction program, LPD-17 through LPD-28) will eventually replace the 

LPD-4.

Figure 18: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the LPD-4 as yellow because work 

programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not 

accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock 

period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the 

industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work 

package during dry-dock periods. These items are then deferred to the next 

scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous 

maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance increases corrosion problems, 
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particularly for the ship’s hull. There are consistent problems with the 

engagement system for on-board weapons and the hull, mechanics, and 

electrical (HME) systems associated with the ship’s combat support 

system. The age of the LPD-4 fleet directly contributes to the deteriorating 

condition of the ships, particularly the hydraulic systems. The Navy 

balances risk between available resources and deferring maintenance to 

make the most cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or 

with minimal safety or combat system deficiencies.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the LPD-4 as green because the Navy 

has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and replace 

amphibious dock ships and improve support to Marine amphibious forces. 

The Extended Sustainment Program was initiated because of delay in 

delivery of the new LPD-17 class ships. The program will extend the service 

life of 6 of 11 ships for an average of 7.3 years to the 2009–2014 time frame. 

The program consists of 37 prioritized work items endorsed by the Navy. 

The follow-on LPD-17 ship construction program incorporates innovative 

design and total ownership cost initiatives; however, no modernization or 

upgrades are planned in the construction timeline from 1999 to 2013.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the LPD-4 as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to 

sustain and replace amphibious dock ships. The age and decommissioning 

schedule for the ships means funding priorities are placed elsewhere. The 

Navy is seeking cost savings through efforts to level the industrial base in 

ports and provide predictability and management flexibility for 

programmed maintenance work. A significant limitation in that effort is the 

inability to use multiyear budgeting and the need to spend supplemental 

and 1-year funds in the year of appropriation. Ports are often not equipped 

and manned to accomplish the volume of work required in the time-span 

necessary to execute 1-year budgets.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the LPD-4, Navy officials did not identify any specific 

capability concerns. These officials indicated that the LPD-4 fulfilled its 
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recent wartime missions of transporting and moving Marines and their 

equipment ashore.
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Standard Missile-2 

Surface-to-Air Missile

The Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) is a medium to long-range, shipboard 

surface- to-air missile with the primary mission of fleet area air defense and 

ship self-defense, and a secondary mission of anti-surface ship warfare. The 

Navy is currently procuring only the Block IIIB version of this missile. 

While the actual number in the inventory is classified, the Navy plans to 

procure 825 Block IIIB missiles between fiscal years 1997 and 2007. 

Currently, 88 percent of the inventory is older than 9 years. A qualitative 

evaluation program adjusted the initial 10-year service life out to 15 years.

Figure 19: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
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Condition

We assessed the condition of the Standard Missile–2 as red because it failed 

to meet the asset readiness goal of 87 percent and only 2 of 5 variants 

achieved the goal in fiscal year 2002. The asset readiness goal is the missile 

equivalent of mission capable goals. The percent of non-ready for issue 

missiles (currently at 23 percent of the inventory) will increase because of 

funding shortfalls.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the Standard Missile-2 as yellow 

because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for 

upgrading the Standard Missile-2 inventory; however, the Navy’s strategy 

mitigates risk with complementary systems as the SM-2 inventory draws 

down and upgrades to counter known threats are cut from the budget. In 

2002, the Navy cancelled production of the most capable variant at the 

time, the SM-2 Block IVA. Currently, the most capable missile is the SM-2 

Block IIIB, which is the only variant in production. This missile will be the 

main anti-air warfare weapon on board Navy ships into the next decade. 

Improved Block IIIB missiles will be available in 2004. The SM-6 Extended 

Range Active Missile (ERAM) is programmed for initial production in 2008 

and will be available to the fleet in 2010.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the Standard Missile-2 as red because 

current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated 

requirements to upgrade the Standard Missile-2 inventory. There is a 

$72.6 million shortfall for maintenance and a shortfall of approximately 

$60 million for procurement in the current Future Years Defense Plan.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the Standard Missile-2, Navy officials indicated that it 

successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some limitations. 

Block IIIB and improved Block IIIB missiles successfully counter the 

threats they were designed to counter. However, the most capable variant 

in the current inventory cannot handle the more sophisticated known air 
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threats. The Navy lost a capability to intercept extended range and ballistic 

missiles when development of the Block IVA variant was cancelled. The 

improved Block IIIB missiles will mitigate some risk until the SM-6 ERAM 

is deployed in 2010. Further, Navy officials stated that the Navy accepts an 

element of risk until the SM-6 is deployed because the threat is limited in 

both the number of missiles and the scenarios where those missiles would 

be employed. Officials also described the Navy’s anti-air warfare capability 

as one of complementary systems and not singularly dependent on the 

SM-2 missile. The Navy successfully increased the deployment of these 

missiles to the fleet for the recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but 

the growing shortage of ready-for-issue missiles in future years could 

severely limit the Navy’s ability to meet future requirements.
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Tomahawk Cruise Missile The Tomahawk Cruise Missile is a long-range, subsonic cruise missile used 

for land attack warfare, and is launched from surface ships and 

submarines. The current inventory is 1,474 missiles, with an average age of 

11.88 years and a 30-year service life. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

788 Tomahawk’s were expended. The follow-on Tactical Tomahawk 

(TACTOM) is scheduled to enter the inventory in 2005.

Figure 20: Tomahawk Cruise Missile

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as green 

because it consistently met asset readiness goals in recent years. The asset 

readiness goal is classified.
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Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as red 

because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for 

upgrading the Tomahawk Cruise Missile inventory; however, the future 

inventory level will not be determined until funding questions are resolved. 

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 789 Tomahawks were expended with a 

remaining inventory of 1,474. The replenishment missiles are all 

programmed to be the new Tactical Tomahawk missile. Even when funding 

is appropriated and executed this fiscal year, the first available date for 

new missiles entering the inventory will be late 2005–2006.2

 A 

remanufacturing program planned for 2002–2004 is upgrading the 

capabilities of older missiles. There are 249 missiles remaining to be 

upgraded.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as red because 

current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated 

requirements to replenish the inventory and new production is unresolved. 

Inventory replenishment funding was authorized by the Congress and, at 

the time of our review, was in conference to resolve differences between 

the two bills.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile, Navy officials indicated that it 

has successfully fulfilled its wartime missions during recent operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. Improved Tomahawks came into the inventory in 

1993 and provided enhanced accuracy on targets. The newest variant, the 

Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM), is scheduled to come into the inventory in 

2005 and improves the missile with an upgraded guidance system and inflight re-programming capability. This upgrade program is also expected to 

lower the missile’s production unit and life-cycle support costs.

2

 In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Tactical Tomahawk is 

scheduled to enter the inventory in 2004 with initial operational capability in May 2004.
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Marine Corps

AH-1W Super Cobra 

Helicopter

The AH-1W Super Cobra provides en route escort and protection of troop 

assault helicopters, landing zone preparation immediately prior to the 

arrival of assault helicopters, landing zone fire suppression during the 

assault phase, and fire support during ground escort operations. There are 

193 aircraft in the inventory with an average age of 12.6 years.

Figure 21: AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the AH-1W as yellow because it consistently 

failed to meet its mission capable goals from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 

2002. Although Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune AH-1W maintainers 

cited insufficient spare parts and cannibalization as problems, overall, 

operators were always positive in their comments about the condition of 

the AH-1W. Condition concerns will be remedied in the near term by the 

AH-1W upgrade program that is proceeding as scheduled with an October 

1, 2003, anticipated start date.
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Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the AH-1W as green because the 

Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading 

the AH-1W helicopter to the AH-1Z, achieving 85 percent commonality with 

the UH-1Y helicopter fleet. Estimated savings of $3 billion in operation and 

maintenance costs over the next 30 years have been reported. Additionally, 

the upgrade program will enhance the helicopter’s speed, maneuverability, 

fuel capacity, ammunition capacity, and targeting systems.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the AH-1W as green because current and 

projected funding is consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated requirements 

to sustain and upgrade the AH-1W fleet. Although we assessed funding as 

green, Marine Corps officials at Camp Pendleton cited the need for 

additional funding for spare parts and noted that cost overruns have 

occurred in recent years for the AH-1W upgrade program.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the AH-1W, Marine Corps officials indicated that it 

successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some limitations. 

Specifically, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps operators at 

Camp Pendleton stated that the AH-1W’s ammunition and fuel capacity was 

insufficient for some operations, such as Afghanistan. The AH-1Z upgrade 

program, however, will address these concerns.
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CH-46E Sea Knight 

Helicopter

The Sea Knight helicopter provides all weather, day/night, night-vision 

capable assault transport of combat troops, supplies and equipment during 

amphibious and subsequent operations ashore. There are 226 aircraft in the 

inventory. The CH-46E is more than 30 years old. The MV-22 Osprey is the 

planned replacement aircraft for the CH-46E.

Figure 22: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the CH-46E as red because it consistently 

failed to meet mission capable goals between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal 

year 2002. The operational mean time between failures decreased from 

1.295 hours to 0.62 hours during the course of our review. Marine Corps 

officials cited concern over the aircrafts age and the uncertainty about the 

fielding of the MV-22 to replace the Sea Knight. Marine Corps officials 

called the current maintenance programs critical to meeting condition 

requirements.
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Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the CH-46E as yellow because the 

Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and 

replace the CH-46E fleet. The sustainment strategy, dated August 19, 2003, 

outlines the service’s plans to sustain the CH-46E until retirement in 2015 or 

longer. However, according to press reports, DOD has decided to reduce 

the purchase of replacement systems by about 8 to 10 aircraft over the next 

few years. If DOD buys fewer replacement systems, the service will have to 

adjust the sustainment strategy to retain additional CH-46E aircraft in its 

inventory longer.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the CH-46E as red because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated 

requirements to sustain and replace the CH-46E fleet. Marine Corps 

officials asserted continued funding for maintaining the CH-46E is 

essential. The fiscal year 2004 budget request included a request for 

funding of safety improvement kits, long-range communications upgrade, 

aft transmission overhaul, and lightweight armor. The Navy lists CH-46E 

safety improvement kits as a $4 million unfunded requirement.3

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the CH-46E, Marine Corps raised a number of specific 

capability concerns. Specifically, these officials stated that the intended 

mission cannot be adequately accomplished due to lack of payload. The 

CH-46E has lost 1,622 pounds of lift since its fielding over 35 years ago due 

to increased weight and can only carry a 12-troop payload on a standard 

day. More recently, Marine Corps officials rated the performance of the 

CH-46E during Operation Iraqi Freedom as satisfactory despite these lift 

limitations.

3

 In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Navy lists CH-46E 

safety improvements as an unfunded requirement of $10 million to $14 million based upon 

the retirement schedule of the CH-46E and the fielding schedule of the MV-22 replacement.
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Assault Amphibian VehiclePersonnel (AAV)

The AAV is an armored, fully-tracked landing vehicle that carries troops in 

water operations from ship to shore through rough water and surf zone, or 

to inland objectives ashore. There are 1,057 vehicles in the inventory. The 

Marine Corps plans to replace the AAV with the Expeditionary Fighting 

Vehicle (formerly the AAAV—Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle).

Figure 23: Assault Amphibian Vehicle-Personnel

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the AAV as yellow because of its age and the 

fact that the Marine Corps plans to upgrade only 680 of the 1,057 AAVs 

currently in the inventory.4

 Furthermore, the planned upgrade program will 

only restore the vehicle to its original operating condition rather than 

4

 In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Marine Corps plans to 

upgrade 1,007 vehicles, an additional 327 vehicles, assuming funding is provided. The AAV 

program received funding for 148 vehicles through the fiscal year 2003 Operation Iraqi 

Freedom supplemental, a fiscal year 2004 congressional plus-up, and fiscal year 2005 

funding. DOD also stated that the Marine Corps plans to address the remaining 179 vehicles 

in a fiscal year 2006 Program Objective Memorandum initiative to upgrade 90 vehicles in 

fiscal year 2006 and 89 vehicles in fiscal year 2007. 
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upgrading it to perform beyond its original operating condition. We could 

not base our assessment of the condition on readiness rates in relation to 

the readiness rate goals because the Marine Corps did not provide 

sufficient trend data. Marine Corps officials at Pacific Command stated that 

the heavy usage of the AAV during Operation Iraqi Freedom and the long 

fielding schedule of the replacement vehicle present significant 

maintenance challenges. However, we assessed the condition yellow 

instead of red based on favorable comments about the current condition of 

the AAV from operators and maintainers.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the AAV as yellow because the 

Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for overhauling 

the AAV; however, the program only restores the vehicle to its original 

operating condition and does not upgrade the vehicles beyond original 

condition. The Marine Corps initiated a Reliability, Availability and 

Maintenance/Rebuild to Standard (RAM/RS) upgrade program in 1998 to 

restore capabilities and lengthen the expected service life of the AAV to 

sustain the vehicles until the replacement system, the Expeditionary 

Fighting Vehicle (formerly the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle), can 

be fielded. The RAM/RS is expected to extend the AAV service life an 

additional 10 years.5

 These vehicles will be needed until the replacement 

vehicles can be fielded in 2012. However, the procurement of the 

replacement vehicles has reportedly already been delayed by 2 years.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the AAV as yellow because current and 

projected funding is not consistent with the Marine Corps’ requirements to 

upgrade the AAV inventory. Requested funding rose from $13.5 million in 

fiscal year 1998 to $84.5 million in fiscal year 1999 as the Marines initiated 

the RAM/RS program. The requested funding level declined to $66.2 million 

by fiscal year 2002. The Marine Corps identified a $48.9 million unfunded 

program in the fiscal year 2004 budget request to extend RAM/RS to more 

5

 In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD officials stated that the RAM/RS 

program is expected to extend the service life an additional 20 years to the exit date of 2018.
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vehicles. Marine Corps officials are concerned reconstitution of the 

vehicles from Operation Iraqi Freedom will not include funding for vehicles 

returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom for the RAM/RS program.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the AAV, Marine Corps officials indicated that it has 

successfully fulfilled its wartime missions but with some limitations. While 

these officials cited the AAV as integral to ground operations during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, they noted specific stresses placed on the 

vehicles. For example, AAVs deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom traveled, 

on average, over 1,000 miles each, a majority of those miles under combat 

conditions. Those conditions added about 5 years worth of miles and wear 

and tear to the vehicles over a 6- to 8-week period. In addition, prior to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps officials at Camp Lejeune 

highlighted problems they encountered with obtaining enhanced armor kits 

to protect the vehicles from the .50 caliber ammunition that was used by 

Iraqi forces. At the time of our review, only 26 of 213 AAVs at Camp Lejeune 

had been provided the enhanced armor kits. Marine Corps officials at 

Camp Lejeune believed the lack of kits was due to insufficient funding.
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Light Armored VehicleCommand & Control 

(LAV-C2)

The LAV-C2 variant is a mobile command station providing field 

commanders with the communication resources to command and control 

Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) units. It is an all-terrain, all-weather 

vehicle with night capabilities and can be made fully amphibious within 

three minutes. There are 50 vehicles in the inventory with an average age of 

14 years.

Figure 24: Light Armored Vehicle-Command & Control 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition

We assessed the condition of the LAV-C2 as green because the Marine 

Corps has initiated a fleet-wide Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to 

extend the service life of the vehicle from 20 years to 27 years. The LAV-C2 

SLEP includes enhancements to communications capabilities. Marine 

Corps officials cautioned that any delays in SLEP could affect future 

readiness. While we assessed the condition as green, we noted the 

operational readiness rate for the command and control variant was 
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90.5 percent, below the 100 percent goal but higher than the operational 

readiness rate of 85 percent for the entire fleet.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the LAV-C2 as green because the 

Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading 

the LAV-C2 inventory. The program funded in the current FYDP will 

enhance communications capabilities and power systems and may afford 

commonality with Unit Operation Center and helicopter systems. The 

Marines Corps intend for the upgraded LAV-C2 to provide a prototype to 

establish baseline requirements for future capabilities and a successor 

acquisition strategy. Marine Corps officials stated the C2 upgrade program 

needs to be supported at all levels.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the LAV-C2 as green because current and 

projected funding is consistent with Marine Corps stated requirements to 

upgrade the LAV-C2 inventory. Marine Corps officials have requested 

$72.2 million in the current FYDP to support major LAV-C2 technology 

upgrades. Marine Corps officials at Pacific Command recommended 

increased funding for procurement of additional vehicles, citing the current 

inventory deficiency as critical.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the LAV-C2, Marine Corps officials indicated that it has 

successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. Marine Corps reports 

regarding the operations in Afghanistan cited LAVs in general as the most 

capable and dependable mobility platform despite the fact that the number 

of available C-17 transport aircraft limited the deployment of the vehicles. 

Initial reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom also indicate that the LAV-C2 

performed successfully.
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AGM-65E Maverick Missile The Maverick missile is a precision-guided, air-to-ground missile 

configured primarily for the anti-tank and anti-ship roles. It is launched 

from a variety of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters and there are laser and 

infrared-guided variants. The Maverick missile was first fielded in 1985.

Figure 25: AGM-65E Maverick Missile

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

Condition N/A

We assessed the condition of the Maverick missile as not applicable 

because the Marine Corps does not track readiness data such as mission 

capable or operational readiness rates for munitions as they do for aircraft 

or other equipment.

Program Strategy

We assessed the program strategy for the Maverick missile as green 

because the Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for 

replacing the Maverick missile with more capable missiles. Maverick 

missile procurement ended in 1992 and the infrared variant will no longer 
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be used in 2003. According to Marine Forces Pacific Command officials, a 

joint common missile is being developed and scheduled for initial 

operational capability in 2008. The new missile will be a successor to the 

Maverick, Hellfire, and TOW missiles. Marine Corps officials stated a joint 

reactive precision-guided munition for both fixed- and rotary-winged 

aircraft as a potential successor to Maverick and Hellfire missiles will be 

submitted to the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee for evaluation in 

fiscal year 2003.

Funding

We assessed the funding for the Maverick missile as green because current 

and projected funding is consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated 

requirements to replace the Maverick missile inventory. Since fiscal year 

1998, the Marine Corps limited funding for the Maverick to the operation 

and maintenance accounts.

Wartime Capability While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime 

capability of the Maverick missile, Marine Corps officials indicated that it 

has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some 

limitations. Specifically, these officials stated that the Maverick missile 

lacks an all-weather capability. Marine Corps officials cited increased risks 

due to sensor limitations of the laser variant that restricts the missile’s use 

to low threat environments. Although the Maverick fulfilled its wartime 

mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps officials stressed 

that its success was due to the fact that this was the optimal environment 

for the Maverick—desert environment and a lack of low cloud cover. In any 

other type of environment, however, the Maverick’s use is limited.
Page 94 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 95 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 96 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 97 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 98 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 99 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 100 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 101 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 102 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness
Page 103 GAO-04-112 Military Readiness

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact David A. Schmitt (757) 552-8124

Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Richard Payne, Donna Rogers, 

Jim Mahaffey, Patricia Albritton, Tracy Whitaker, Leslie Harmonson, John 

Beauchamp, Warren Lowman, Ricardo Marquez, Jason Venner, Stanley 

Kostyla, Susan Woodward, and Jane Lusby made key contributions to this 

report.

(350273)
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