IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. NICK IN YOUNG PARK, Appellant. No. 73661-2-1 DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION

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### Trickey, J. — A jury found Nick In Young Park guilty of several counts of 

### cyberstalking, two counts of violation of a court order, and one count of telephone harassment. He appeals his convictions and sentence, alleging that there was no 

### affirmative showing that he waived his right to remain silent at trial, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court abused its discretion when 

### imposing an exceptional sentence. Finding no error, weaffirm.
FACTS Nick Park and Naree McCormick were in a romantic relationship in 2005. The 

### relationship deteriorated when Parkbegan yelling, slapping, and threatening McCormick. He started stalking her after shebroke up with him. McCormick also realized that Park 

### had opened a credit card account in her name. Park was convicted of identity theft for opening the credit card. The court then ordered Park not to have any contact with McCormick. Park violated that no contact order in 2008. In March 2013, McCormick startedreceiving Facebook messages from anaccount underthe name "Daniel Kim."1 At first, she thought Daniel was an old coworker, butshe

1Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 15, 2014) at 86, 89-90.No. 73661-2-1/2

soon suspected that Kim was Park. Kim made comments about her background, boyfriend, daughter, and workplace. Hetold McCormick that she knewhim "very well."2 He said he would have a "surprise" for her, "[a] big bang."3 Several other women received Facebook messages from Kim's account, Park's account, and e-mails and Facebook messages from a "Zach Baughman."4 Kim, Baughman, and Park sent similar messages to these women that included references to pantyhose or nylons, the word legs spelled "leggs," and unusual phrases such as "great pair of looking leggs."5 Some ofthe messages contained death threats, sexually explicit content, and implicationsthatthe sender knew where the recipient lived and worked. Kim sent someone Park's cell phone number in a Facebook message. Park also had a relationship with a woman named Kristine Felt. Park called Felt repeatedlyfrom jail, despite her request that he stop calling her.6 In January 2014, the State charged Park with two counts of violation of a court order, one count oftelephone harassment, one count of harassment, and six counts of cyberstalking. Beforetrial, the State and Park stipulated that Park's prior convictions for stalking and violations of a no contact order would be admissible as predicate offenses for the cyberstalking and violations of a no contact order charges. They agreed that his other prior convictions would not be admissible unless Park testified, at which point they would be admissible for impeachment purposes. Park was the last witness to testify.
2RP(Jan. 15, 2014) at 94. 3RP(Jan. 15, 2014) at 93. 4RP (Jan. 21, 2014) at 284, 286-87; RP (Jan. 15, 2014) at 122; RP (Jan. 16, 2014) at 212. 5RP (Jan. 16, 2014) at 212; RP (Jan. 21, 2014) at 278, 281-82. 6Without viewing the exhibits themselves (which were notincluded in the record) it is impossible to count the number of telephone calls, but Kitsap County Sheriff's Deputy Britney Gray's testimony indicates that they were numerous. The State estimates that there were over 100 telephone calls from Park to Felt, while Park was in jail.No. 73661-2-1/3 The jury convicted Park on all charges, except one charge of cyberstalking. At sentencing, the State recommended thatthe court impose an exceptional sentence based
on the free crimes principle. Park's trial counsel did not file a response in opposition to the State's recommendation.7 The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 300 months, commenting on the number of victims, Park's apparent lack ofremorse, and that having all the sentences run concurrently would be a "slap in the face" to some of the victims.8 Running all the sentences concurrently would have resulted in a 60 month sentence. Instead, the court

ran the sentences for violations of a court order, harassment, and telephone harassment consecutively to the cyberstalking charges and each other. The court's finding of facts and conclusions of law indicated that the basis for the exceptional sentence was that the "defendant's high offender score results in some of the current offenses going unpunished."9 ANALYSIS I. Right to Remain Silent Park argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court allowed him to testify without ensuring that he understood his right to remain silent, in violation of his right against self-incrimination, guaranteed to him byboth the Washington and United States Constitutions. Wash. Const, art. I, § 9; U.S. Const, amend V. He contends there must be some showing, in the record, that he affirmatively waived his right to remain silent.

7The clerk's papers did not include a response bytrial counsel, and no one mentioned one during the sentencing hearing. 8RP (Feb. 28, 2014) at 520; Clerk's Papers (CP) at 298. 9 CP at 294.No. 73661-2-1/4 Because Park's counsel, not the court, was responsible for advising him of his right to testify and his right to remain silent, we hold that there was no error. A. Standard of Review We may consider issues not initially raised in the trial court ifthe issue presents a "manifest error affecting a constitutional right." RAP 2.5(a)(3). B. Proof ofWaiver of Fifth Amendment Right before Testifying At trial, a defendant must choose between exercising his fundamental right to 

### testify andhis fundamental righttoremain silent. TheFifth Amendmentgives adefendant 

### the right to remain silent and the Sixth Amendment's right to call witnesses, combined with the Fourteenth Amendment's right to due process, give a defendant the right to 

### testify. U.S. Const, amend. V; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 50-52, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987). Awaiver ofeither right must be knowing, but it neednot be "onthe-record." State v. Thomas, 128 Wn.2d 553, 559, 910 P.2d 475 (1996). 

### Instead, Washington courts rely on trial counsel toadvise testifying defendants of their testimonial rights. When reviewing cases where a criminal defendant has not 

### exercised his right to testify, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that it is "counsel's responsibility, notthejudge's, toadvisethedefendantwhetherornottotestify." Matter ofPers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d 296, 317, 868 P.2d 835, decision clarified sub nom. In re Pers. Restraint Petition ofLord, 123 Wn.2d 737, 870 P.2d 964 (1994); see alsoThomas, 128Wn.2d at 559 ("The right to remain silent iswaived bythe act oftaking 

### the stand."). The court has discouraged trial courts from inquiring into a defendant's decision totestify because itmight "appeartoencourage thedefendantto invoke orwaive his Fifth Amendment rights." Lord, 123Wn.2d at 317. Thus, thetrial court did not err.No. 73661-2-1/5

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Park alleges that trial counsel's performance was ineffective overall, and in four specific ways, counsel did not (1) object to the admission of prior bad acts; (2) move to
sever unrelated charges; (3) object to evidence introduced on redirect that was outside the scope of cross-examination; and (4) present a psychological evaluation or other mitigating evidence at sentencing. Because each of Park's trial counsel's decisions could have been a reasonable trial tactic, Park did not receive ineffective assistance ofcounsel. A. Effective Assistance of Counsel and Standard of Review The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 

### 674 (1984). To prevail on aclaim ofineffective assistance, thedefendant must show that 

### (1) trial counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness" and (2) that thedefendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance. State v. Sutherbv, 165Wn.2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009). To establish prejudice, a defendant 

### must show by "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome oftheproceeding would have beendifferent." Statev. Nichols, 161 Wn.2d 1,8, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007). Thedefendant must show that there was no "legitimate strategic
ortactical reason" to explain trial counsel's act orfailure to act. Sutherbv, 165Wn.2d at 

### 883. "[Exceptional deference must be given when evaluating counsel's strategic decisions." State v. McNeal. 145 Wn.2d 352, 362, 37 P.3d 280 (2002). If a party fails to 

### satisfy either thedeficiency or theprejudice prong, a reviewing court need not consider the other. State v. Foster, 140Wn. App. 266, 273, 166 P.3d 726 (2007). This standard 

### applies to each allegedly ineffective act. We review claims of ineffective assistance ofNo. 73661-2-1/6 counsel de novobecause the claims present mixed issues offact and law. Sutherbv, 165 Wn.2d at 883. We may consider a claim ofineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal because it is an issue ofconstitutional magnitude. Nichols, 161
Wn.2d at 9. B. Failure to Object to Evidence of Prior Bad Acts Park contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to McCormick's 

### testimony about the specifics ofhis prior convictions for stalking andviolation ofa court order. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that Park's prior convictions for stalking and violation of no contact orders were admissible as predicate offenses.10 The court agreed to read the abbreviated account of his convictions to the jury at the close of the State's

case. 

### The parties' pretrial stipulation to the admissibility ofPark's convictionsfor stalking and violation of a court order as predicate offenses does not limit the State's ability to introducetheinformation for anotherpurpose.11 Sp?e Old Chiefv. United States, 519U.S. 

### 172, 190, 117 S. Ct. 644, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1997) (State may seek admissibility of evidence related to prior crimes to show motive or identity, even if defendant has 

### stipulated to priorconvictions); State v. Teal, 117Wn. App. 831, 844, 73 P.3d402 (2003), aff'd, 152 Wn.2d 333, 96 P.3d 974 (2004) (allowing State to introduce evidence of defendant's crimes ofdishonesty to impeach defendant, in a case where those crimes 

### were predicate offenses and defendant offered tostipulate totheprior convictions).

10 The cyberstalking charges required a previous conviction for some harassment crime. The violation ofa court order charges required two prior convictions for violation ofa court order. 

### 11 These stipulations for convictions for predicate offenses protectthe defendantfrom having his 

### prior convictions discussed at length as part of proving the State's case. The State actually objects to these stipulations but is bound by law to acceptthem.No. 73661-2-1/7 While the fact of the prior convictions themselves was all that was necessary for their proofas predicate offenses, the details of the stalking and violation of a no contact order convictions were relevant for other purposes. Usually, "[ejvidence ofother crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." ER 404(b). However, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible ifthe evidence is used for a different purpose, such as proving motive, intent, 

### plan, oridentity. ER 404(b). The State alleged, and Park denied, thatPark was Daniel Kim.12 McCormick's history with Park, including the basis of her fear ofhim, isprobative ofPark's motive to send the harassing messages underKim's name, and how McCormick identified Kim as Park.13 See State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 259, 893 P.2d 615 (1995) 

### ("[MJotive goesbeyond gain and can demonstrate animpulse, desire, orany othermoving 

### power which causes an individual to act."). Thus, the evidence was admissible as proof of identity and motive. Park's trial counsel could reasonably have chosen not to object to McCormick's 

### testimony about Park's prior stalking behavior and violation ofa court order because she believed itwas admissible. Trial counsel's decision to object or not to object to evidence 

### is a "classic example" oftrial tactics. Statev. Madison, 53Wn. App. 754, 763, 770 P.2d 

### 662 (1989). This court will only reverse a conviction based on "failure to object" when there are"egregious circumstances." Madison, 53 Wn. App. at763. Further, even ifthe courtwould have sustained an objection byPark's counsel, Park has notshown prejudice.
12 The State made the argument during closing statements. Park denied he had set up a Facebook account as Daniel Kim during his testimony. 13 Kim knew details about McCormick's life, including information about her employment, 

### boyfriend (now husband), daughter, and background. He also claimedthat McCormickknew him and would recognize him. McCormick testified that she began to suspect Kim was Park based on that knowledge.No. 73661-2-1/8 The evidence ofprior bad acts, especially coming from the very first witness, had the potential to negatively influence the jury's impression of Park throughout the trial. However, the admissible evidence against Park was very strong. Park has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if his attorney would have objected to this evidence. Park's trial counsel could also have reasonably decided not to object to McCormick's testimony about Park's identity theft because she believed evidence would 

### be admissible by the end ofthetrial. Evidence ofa witness's prior conviction for a crime 

### involving dishonesty isadmissible toimpeach thatwitness. ER 609(a); Statev. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 545, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991) (holding that "crimes of theftinvolve dishonesty 

### and areperse admissible for impeachment purposes under ER 609(a)(2)"). Both parties 

### agreed that Park's convictions for crimes ofdishonesty would beadmissible only ifPark decided to testify. Park had not announced that he would testify when McCormick 

### discussed Park opening acreditcard accountin her name.14 Therefore, the introduction ofthis evidence waspremature, and thecourtwould have sustained an objection by trial
counsel. But, Park's attorney could have made the strategic choice not to call attention to 

### the evidence by objecting toit. Madison, 53 Wn. App. at763 (holding thatfailure to object will only be ineffective assistance ofcounsel "in egregious circumstances, on testimony central to the State's case"). Further, Parkdid eventually testify, so the State could have
14 It was not until a day after McCormick's testimony thattrial counsel indicated to thecourt that Park would testify. However, McCormick's details about Park opening a credit card account in her name were in the middle of a line ofquestioning about the admissible stalking and violation of a court order convictions. The State's question was about no contact orders. Trial counsel would not have had reason toobjecttothequestion before theanswerwasgiven, andmay have made a choice not to call attention to the evidence by objecting afterward. 8No. 73661-2-1/9 introduced this evidence to impeach his credibility. Park has not shown thattrial counsel
was deficient for failing to object to the testimony of his prior bad acts, so we need not examine whether there was prejudice. Thus, trial counsel's acts here do not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. C. Failure to Move to Sever Unrelated Charges 

### Park argues thatcounsel was ineffective because she did not move to sever the 

### telephone harassment charge from the other charges. He contends that he was 

### prejudiced because the evidence for the telephone harassment charge was much stronger than the evidence for some ofthe cyberstalking charges. We disagree. Park has not shown that the trial courtwould have granted such a motion and, even ifitwould have, Park has not shown that itwould have made a difference. 

### To prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to sever charges, the defendant must show: (1) thatthemotion would have beengranted, and (2) thatthere is 

### a "reasonable probability" that theoutcome would have been different. State v. Warren, 

### 55 Wn. App. 645, 653-54, 779 P.2d 1159 (1989) (internal quotation marks) (citation omitted). When deciding whether to sever charges, the court first determines ifthere is the "potential for prejudice," and then whether that prejudice is offset by other factors. Warren, 55 Wn. App. at654-55. That prejudice may exist "when there is a risk that the 

### jury will use the evidence ofone crime to inferthe defendant's guiltfor another crime or to infer ageneral criminal disposition." Sutherbv, 165 Wn.2d at883. But, trial courts will not severthe charges ifthat risk is offset because of: 

### (1) the strength of the State's evidence on each count; (2) the clarity of defenses as to each count; (3) courtinstructions to thejuryto considereach 

### count separately; and (4) theadmissibility ofevidence oftheother charges even if notjoined for trial.No. 73661-2-1/10

State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 63, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). Trial counsel's failure to move to sever charges was held to be ineffective when the evidence for one of the crimes was much stronger than the other. Sutherbv, 165 Wn.2d at 884. In Sutherbv, the defendant was charged with both child molestation and 

### possession ofchild pornography. 165 Wn.2d 870, 884, 204 P.3d 916 (2009). The 

### pornography evidence, which was much stronger than the molestation evidence, would 

### likely have been inadmissible in the child molestation case. Sutherbv, 165 Wn.2d at885- 86. Thecourt held thatthejury might have relied on thepornography evidence toconvict the defendant of molestation. Sutherbv, 165 Wn.2d at 885-86. 

### Conversely, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a defendant's motion for severance when the potential for prejudice was offset by other factors. State v. Bvthrow, 114Wn.2d 713, 723, 790 P.2d 154 (1990). In Bythrow, the court held that evidence ofone ofthe crimes would not have been admissible in a trial of the other. 114Wn.2d 713, 720, 790 P.2d 154(1990). However, the courtheld that there 

### was no prejudice or that any prejudice was offset by the properjury instructions, short trial, simplicity ofthe issues, and overall strength ofthe evidence. Bvthrow, 114 Wn.2d

at 720-23. 

### Here, trying the telephone harassmentcharges withthe cyberstalking charges had 

### the potential to prejudice Park. The evidence of telephone harassment, including a recording of the victim yelling at Park to stop harassing her, would likely have been inadmissible in the cyberstalking charges. It might have influenced thejury's beliefthat Park was the person who sent the harassing Facebook messages. 

### However, evenifthere was some potential for prejudice, the court did not need to

10No. 73661-2-1/11

severthe trials because otherfactors offset that prejudice. The State had strong evidence against Park foreach of the charges for which he was found guilty. Park's defenses were not contradictory. And, the court appropriately instructed thejury to "decide each count separately" and that its "verdict on one count should not control [its] verdict on any other count."15 Even ifPark had shown that the court would have granted a motion to sever, he has not demonstrated thatthere is a "reasonable probability"thatthe outcome would have been different. Despite the strong evidence against Park for many of the other charges, thejury acquitted Parkofone charge ofcyberstalking. This suggests that thejuryfollowed its instructions to consider the evidence for each charge separately. Therefore, Park's 

### attorney's failure tomove to severcharges was not ineffective assistance ofcounsel. D. Failure to Object to Evidence Introduced on Redirect that was outside the Scope of Cross-Examination 

### During the State's redirect examination of McCormick, the State introduced a 

### picture of McCormick's house. Park argues that his counsel should have objected because the exhibit was outside the scope ofcross-examination. 

### The purpose ofredirect examination is to give the other side the opportunity to rehabilitate its witness or to clarify matters discussed during cross-examination. State v. Stevens, 69 Wn.2d 906, 907, 421 P.2d 360 (1966). But, the trial court has the discretion to admit or exclude rebuttal evidence that was outside the scope of cross-examination. State v. Hinklev, 52 Wn.2d 415, 419, 325 P.2d 889 (1958). It is not an abuse of that discretion to allow a party to "supply testimony omitted by oversight." State v. Conklin. 37 Wn.2d 389, 392, 223 P.2d 1065 (1950).

15 CP at 139. 11No. 73661-2-1/12 Park's trial counsel could have objected to the State's introduction of a picture of McCormick's house because itwas outside the scope ofcross-examination. Park's trial counsel's cross-examination of McCormick centered on her Facebook contact with Kim. Park's counsel never mentioned the location of McCormick's house. However, trial counsel could have reasonably determined that an objection was unwise ifshe believed that the court would exercise its discretion to allow this evidence 

### and, by objecting, shewould waste thecourt's time. Therefore, Park's counsel's failure toobject during McCormick's redirect examination was not ineffective assistance. E. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence at Sentencing 

### Park claims that his attorney "simply gave up on [him]" at sentencing.16 

### Specifically, he argues that it was unreasonable for his attorney to fail to request a 

### presentencing psychological evaluation or argue that all his sentences should run concurrently. Without those failings, he contends, there is a reasonable probability that the courtwould have imposed a shorter sentence. Based on therecord beforethis court, Park cannot show either deficient performance or prejudice. 

### We cannotreview claims thatrely on evidence outside therecord. Statev. Wilson, 

### 75Wn.2d 329, 332,450 P.2d 971 (1969). Parkclaimsthata"pre-sentencing investigation 

### or psychological evaluation" would have helped him.17 But, we have no way ofjudging the impact ofsuch information because none ofit is in the record. In orderfor the court todetermine thatfailure toconsult an expert was prejudicial, thedefendant must be able to show what evidencewould have been discovered. See State v. Garcia, 57Wn. App. 

### 927, 933, 791 P.2d 244 (1990). IfPark's claim ofineffective assistance ofcounsel relies

16 Br. ofAppellant at 28. 17 Br. ofAppellant at 26. 12No. 73661-2-1/13 on evidence outside the record, he could bring that claim in a personal restraint petition.
See RAP 16.4. 

### Additionally, Park has not established a nexus between his attorney's allegedly 

### deficient argument and the sentence imposed. "[A]n allegedly unsuccessful or poor 

### quality sentencing argumentalone is unlikelytoresultin demonstrable prejudice because 

### of the near impossibility of showing a nexus between the argument and the eventual sentence." State v. Goldberg, 123 Wn. App. 848, 853, 99 P.3d 924 (2004). 

### The record shows that the judge's reluctance to impose a sentence that would 

### include community custody stemmed from how short that community custody would be, not from a belief that Park would not benefit from treatment. The judge expressed 

### frustration thatthe sentencing scheme did not allow enough treatmentto "make adent in 

### [Park's] overall need."18 Additionally, the judge was "tempted to consider the full maximum45" years.19 Parkhas notshownthatanypossibleargumentbyhistrial counsel would have resulted in a shorter sentence. Therefore, his attorney's performance at 

### sentencing wasnot ineffective assistance.20 III. Exceptional Sentence 

### Park argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it relied on 

### impermissiblefactors when deciding to impose an exceptional sentence and becausethe sentence of300 months is five times longer than 60months, themaximum sentence for

18 RP (Feb. 28, 2014) at 521-22 19RP(Feb. 28, 2014) at 523 

### 20 Parkclaims thatthe State arguedthatParkshould receive alongersentence because hefailed 

### to accept aplea agreement. The State does not appearto have made that argument. Parkcites to his trial counsel's commentthat Park (in his statement tothe court during sentencing) did not 

### "accept responsibility" for his actions, and to the State's decision to add additional counts of 

### cyberstalking when Parkrefusedthe State's offered plea. RP (Feb. 28, 2014) at511; CP at290. 13No. 73661-2-1/14 each ofthe nine convictions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion because itbased its decision only on proper grounds, and because the length of Park's sentence was not clearly excessive. A. Standard of Review To reverse an exceptional sentence, we must conclude that (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reasons do notjustify a sentence outside the standard sentence range for that offense; or (b) that the sentence imposed was clearly excessive orclearly too lenient. 

### RCWA 9.94A.585(4). We review the legal justification for an exceptional sentence de
novo. Statev. France, 176 Wn. App. 463, 469, 308P.3d 812 (2013), review denied, 179 

### Wn.2d 1015, 318 P.3d 280 (2014). We review thelength ofanexceptional sentence for abuse of discretion. France, 176 Wn. App. at 469. 

### The trial court properly imposed an exceptional sentence based on Park's high offender score. RCW 9.94A.589. Atrial court may impose a sentence outside of the 

### standard range, an exceptional sentence, when it finds that "[t]he defendant has committed multiple current offenses and the defendant's high offender score results in someofthe currentoffenses going unpunished." RCW9.94A.535(2)(c). These arecalled "free crimes." France. 176 Wn. App. at 468. Here, the court imposed consecutive 

### sentences based on the free crimes principle.21 Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 

### 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, the sentencing range increases based on the defendant's 

### offenderscore, upto ascoreof9. RCW9.94A.510. Park's scorewas 22foreachcount.22
21 "Consecutive sentences may only be imposed under the exceptional sentence provisions of RCW9.94A.535."RCW9.94A.589(1)(a). 

### 22 Park's score may have been actually been 26, based on the State's recalculations before the sentencing hearing. 14No. 73661-2-1/15 Park concedes that the free crimes principle applies to this case. The court did not base its exceptional sentence on future dangerousness. Park's argument to the contrary is not supported by the record. The court did not mention dangerousness when it imposed the sentence.23 It focused instead on the number of victims and the fact that the crimes against some of them would go unpunished if it ran all the sentences concurrently. The trial court's "Findings of Fact and ConclusionsofLaw 

### for Exceptional Sentence" listed onlythefree crimes basis forthe exceptional sentence.24 Itwas not an abuse ofdiscretion for the trial courtto impose a 300 month sentence, 

### eventhough themaximum sentencewould have been 60months ifthe sentences all ran 

### concurrently. "When no improper reasons areinvolved, a 'sentence is excessive only if its length, in light ofthe record, shocks theconscience.'" State v. Burkins, 94 Wn. App. 677,701, 973 P.2d 15 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Statev. Vaughn, 

### 83 Wn. App. 669, 681, 924 P.2d 27 (1996)). Park's only argument againstthe length of the sentence is that it isfive times the standard sentence range. That is not a sufficient basis tofind an abuse ofdiscretion. See State v. Ritchie, 126Wn.2d 388, 397, 894 P.2d 

### 1308 (1995) (holding thatexceptional sentences do not need to be proportional in length to the standard sentence). Therefore, the court did not err in imposing a 300 month

sentence.

23 The closest the courtcame to mentioning future dangerousness was "And Ihave absolutely no doubt that Mr. Park's behavior will continue if unchecked by this court." RP (Feb. 28, 2014) at 521. 24 CP at 294. 15No. 73661-2-1/16

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:



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