Conference Proceedings

September 19-20, 2018

College of Information and Cyberspace

National Defense University

Fort McNair, Washington DC
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National Defense University

Non-Attribution Policy

All sessions and discussions at Cyber Beacon V were governed by the following NDU 

Non-Attribution Policy: 

(1) So that guests and other University officials may speak candidly, the University offers 

its assurances that presentations and discussions will be held in strict confidence. This 

assurance derives from a policy of non-attribution which is morally binding on all who 

attend. 

(2) Specifically, the non-attribution policy provides that: 

(a) Without the express permission of the speaker, nothing will be attributed 

directly or indirectly in the presence of anyone who was not authorized to attend 

the conference. 

(b) Unclassified information gained during lectures, briefings, panels, and 

discussions may be used freely. However, without consent, neither the speaker 

nor any element of NDU may be identified as the originator of the information. 

(3) This policy of non-attribution will be strictly maintained except when the visiting 

speakers make public release of their own remarks.
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National Defense University

National Defense University (NDU) was established in 1974, and is comprised of 

five graduate colleges and several research and support centers. NDU has 

campuses in both Washington, DC and Norfolk, VA. 

NDU’s mission is to educate rising national security professionals through 

rigorous academics, research, and engagements in order to develop critical 

thinkers and prepare future global security leaders to succeed in strategic 

assignments.

College of Information and Cyberspace

The College of Information and Cyberspace (CIC) is one of the five NDU 

graduate colleges, located at Fort McNair in Washington, DC. 

CIC’s mission is to prepare its graduates to lead national security institutions and 

advance global security in the information environment.

Acknowledgement

Cyber Beacon V was generously sponsored by the NDU Foundation, 

Circadence, Oracle, Emagine It, and Rockwell Collins.

Conference Proceedings by Jennifer H. Mandula, Cyberspace Education Analyst, 

College of Information and Cyberspace 
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Letter from the CIC 

Acting Chancellor 

Colleagues, 

Cyber Beacon V was hosted on 19-20 September 2018 by the College of 

Information and Cyberspace with support from the National Defense University 

Foundation. The conference hosted over 200 speakers and participants from 

across DoD, the interagency, the private sector, and academia. Over the course 

of two days, these participants wrestled with some of the most pressing 

challenges to national security. 

Cyber Beacon V included eight keynote speeches, five panels, and one 

interactive game-designing session. Perhaps most valuably, attendees engaged 

with one another, making connections and forging relationships that will push 

forward efforts in innovation and collaboration. 

The theme of the conference this year was Decision-Making in Cyberspace. As 

we heard many times throughout Cyber Beacon V, the nation is now in persistent 

contact with adversaries in the cyberspace domain, and is also the focus of 

multiple foreign disinformation campaigns designed to sow distrust and division. 

The College of Information and Cyberspace is working diligently to educate 

national security professionals to prepare them to respond now and in the future 

to these threats. We hope you will continue to engage with us throughout the 

year to discuss and advance ideas—in the classroom and beyond. 

We look forward to hosting you again next year for Cyber Beacon VI. 

Sincerely, 

Thomas C. Wingfield 
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Cyber Beacon V 

Agenda

Wednesday 19 September, 2018 

Opening Remarks: VADM Fritz Roegge, BG(Ret) Jack Pellicci (NDU Foundation 

Chairman), and Tom Wingfield (Acting Chancellor of NDU CIC)

Speaker: GEN Paul Nakasone (CDRUSCYBERCOM and DIRNSA)

Session 1: Deterrence

Speaker: ADM (Ret) Bill Studeman (former CIA Dep Director and DIRNSA)

Panelists: Stephen Peterson (USCYBERCOM Advisor), Dan Johnson (Director of 

Oracle Strategic Mission Initiatives), Dr. Vaughn Standley (Dept of Energy), and 

Beau Woods (Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council)

Panel Moderator: COL Nancy Blacker (CJCS Chair at CIC)

Session 2: Law/Authorities

Speaker: RDML Dave Dermanelian (Commander of US Coast Guard Cyber 

Command)

Panelists: Gary Brown (former USCYBERCOM SJA), Matthew Slowik (DHS 

Cybersecurity Attorney-Advisor), and LtCol Kurt Sanger (USCYBERCOM Office 

of the Staff Judge Advocate)

Panel Moderator: Tom Wingfield (Acting Chancellor of NDU CIC)

Session 3: Gaming and Cyber Strategy

Jennifer Mandula (CIC Cyberspace Education Analyst) and Hyong Lee, Center 

for Applied Strategic Learning (CASL)
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Thursday, 20 September, 2018 

Speaker: Jason Healey (Columbia University) 

Speaker: MG(Ret) Joe Brendler (former USCYBERCOM Chief of Staff)

Session 4: Innovative Collaboration

Speaker: Col Mike McGinley (DIU Boston Lead)

Panelists: The Honorable Zachary Lemnios (VP of Physical Sciences and 

Government Programs at IBM), RADM(Ret) Janice Hamby (CIC Chancellor 

Emerita), Mike Moniz (CEO of Circadence), and Paul de Souza (Founder and 

Director of the Cyber Security Forum Initiative)

Panel Moderator: Harry Wingo (Cybersecurity Faculty Chair at CIC)

Session 5: Information/Disinformation

Speaker: JD Maddox (Global Engagement Center, State Dept)

Panelists: COL Max Thibodeaux (Joint Information Operations Warfare Center), 

John Petrik (Editor of The Cyber Wire), Siobhan MacDermott (Global Cyber 

Public Policy Executive at Bank of America), and Dr. Haroon Ullah (Chief 

Strategy Officer of the US Agency for Global Media)

Panel Moderator: Jim Churbuck (CIC)

Session 6: Cyber Graduate Education

Speaker: Dr. Pano Yannakogeorgos (first Dean of AF Cyber College)

Panelists: Col(Ret) Jerry Lynes (JS J7 Dep Dir for Joint Ed and Doctrine), LtCol 

Mark Reith (Dir of the Center for Cyber Research at the Air Force Institute of 

Technology), Tom Wingfield, and Dr. Cynthia Irvine (first Chair of the Cyber 

Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School)

Panel Moderator: Dr. Cassandra Lewis (Associate Dean for Academic Programs 

at CIC)
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Deterrence 

Discussion 

The US strategy of cyberspace deterrence has thus far successfully prevented 

cyber acts above the threshold of armed attack, after which the law of armed 

conflict would apply, but has been unsuccessful at deterring actions that fall 

below it. 

Deterrence is fundamentally about consequence: do adversaries know the 

consequences of action, and do they fear them? As the discussion noted, the US

has been reluctant to declare red lines in the cyberspace domain, which means 

that cyber-capable adversaries are not aware of 1) the threshold for US response 

or 2) the available response capabilities. Furthermore, the success of a 

deterrence strategy relies on a deterrable adversary; when anyone with internet 

access can pose a hostile threat, it is no longer reasonable to assume that all 

malicious actors can be deterred. There was therefore some consensus that 

deterrence models from the past (i.e., nuclear) are not appropriate to discussions 

of deterrence in cyberspace.

Speakers and panelists noted that while the US frequently defaults to a 

discussion of cyber vulnerabilities, adversaries have recognized the extraordinary 

strategic possibilities of cyberspace and they have far more to gain and far less 

to lose than the US.

Insights and Ideas

• Defining red lines will require a commitment to attribution and associated 

identifying technologies

• US adversaries are strategically using cyberspace to sow division and 

distrust; notably, the Chinese have a word for deterrence that includes the 

concept of coercion

• US embraces a free and open internet, and has inaccurately assumed that 

the rest of the world would as well
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Law/Authorities

Discussion

Law can be a mission enabler rather than a mission obstacle; law provides

certainty through boundaries and framework for action. Responding to the 

deterrence sessions, discussions focused on how the US can engage 

adversaries who are operating in the poorly-defined gray areas below the 

threshold of armed conflict. The US can either do nothing, engage similarly by 

conducting aggressive but not use of force actions, or push for changes in 

international law.

International norms come about when states agree to current practices, and the 

same is true of the cyberspace domain. To push international law forward, states 

will need to publically acknowledge and explain their actions in cyberspace. 

Speakers and panelists discussed the specific roles of CYBERCOM, Department 

of Homeland Security, and US Congress. It was noted that most US government 

actions in cyberspace going forward will be considered traditional military 

activities, with significant changes for cyber actions not only in DoD, but 

throughout the government.

Insights and Ideas

• Actions below the threshold of armed conflict are not actions the US cannot 

address, they are actions the US has chosen not to address 

• CYBERCOM does not have the authorities to effectively protect certain nonDODIN networks, though it can be argued it has responsibility to do so as 

part of preparing defense of the nation

• DHS will implement some mandatory measures for private companies

• The majority of Congress’s current role in cyberspace involves clarifying 

existing authorities and prompting the executive branch

• No hardware or software developers have been held accountable for 

releasing flawed devices and software
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Gaming and Cyber 

Strategy

Discussion

Multiple panelists, speakers, and guests at Cyber Beacon V called for expanding 

the use of gaming and simulation to help prepare today and tomorrow’s 

cyberspace and information workforce and leaders. The interactive design 

session led by CIC and the Center for Applied Strategic Learning (CASL) at NDU

closed out the first day of Cyber Beacon V, with participants working in teams to 

design and put forth ideas for exactly this type of game. 

CIC and CASL intend to use these design suggestions to develop a working 

wargame that can be deployed across the national security community. Some

key trends and themes emerged from the game design submissions, which 

suggest that these characteristics are sought in cyber and information wargames. 

Insights and Ideas

• Many suggestions for roleplay-style gaming, to include political, industry, 

military, intelligence, and state and non-state adversaries

• Involve different victory conditions for players based on role or character; 

possibility for these conditions to be secret 

• Practice decision making, value proposition assessment, and risk-reward 

calculation 

• Include an inciting crisis event such as a critical infrastructure attack or 

foreign influence campaign 

• Cooperative and collaborative gaming, with or without an individual winner 
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Innovative 

Collaboration 

Discussion

The modern competition for global economic preeminence is, in many ways, a 

race to be first to develop the next generation of innovative technologies. This 

next generation of technologies includes artificial intelligence, quantum 

computing, and autonomous systems, as well as enabling technologies to 

advance both technical and human systems. 

For the US to win these critical technology races of our time, it must invest and 

partner with the private sector in developing and advancing innovative 

technologies. Discussions noted that commercial research and development 

investment dwarfs that of the combined Defense Industrial Base. 

Innovation is intrinsically linked with risk, and the US has historically been 

reluctant to risk the failures required for forward movement in innovation. 

Collaboration with private sector can ameliorate this risk, but the US government 

as a whole must also speed acquisition processes and foster internal innovation. 

Insights and Ideas

• Crowdsourcing may be a way forward for broadening the reach of and 

speeding innovation 

• If DIU (formerly DIUx) is dissolved in several years, it will be a net-positive, 

signaling that the principles of simple solicitation, negotiation, and 

accelerated awarding of contracts have been embraced across the DoD 

• Private and public collaboration must fully embrace the value of their different 

perspectives as critical to innovation 
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Information/

Disinformation

Discussion 

The US invented mass marketing and modern advertising, and is the center of 

the film and television industry. And yet, the US has proved surprisingly 

vulnerable to strategic disinformation campaigns, particularly those of Russia and 

China. The primary goal of these campaigns is to reduce trust in US institutions, 

such as government and media, and attendant principles, such as democracy 

and capitalism. Notably, Russia and China are even more invested in disrupting 

information and sowing disinformation in emerging democracies, which will likely 

have long-term ramifications for the global environment. 

Investment in AI technology for identifying and predicting disinformation 

campaign may be able to slow or impede the spread of disinformation. However,

the problem is fundamentally one of human behavior: people believe things that 

align with their existing belief frameworks. Countering malicious disinformation, 

therefore, requires a large-scale framework that involves media system 

resilience, fact-checking mechanisms, disinformation detection techniques, and a 

national narrative and sense of shared purpose. Discussions noted that this

last—a shared national narrative—is a particular challenge for the US right now. 

Insights and Ideas 

• Geopolitical borders are no longer the defining characteristic of community; 

common language has assumed that role, making “lexical” rather than 

national communities 

• Emerging research suggests that states with significant investment in public 

media are more resilient to foreign interference 

• There is no US governmental actor looking for broad trends in disinformation 

campaigns; resources are currently only focused on removing bad-actors 
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Cyber Graduate 

Education

Discussion 

DoD cyber education at the graduate level has the challenge of balancing both 

immediate needs and skills with preparation for future, long-term needs and 

skills. This is particularly significant given the fast rate of change in the 

cyberspace domain. Students need to be educated not only on current 

technologies and cases, but on broad frameworks and theory that can be applied 

to future technologies and incidents. Nevertheless, DoD cyber education must be 

able to adapt at a faster rate of change to integrate current technologies into 

curriculum. 

Government, military, industry, and academia are competing for the same limited 

cyber workforce and experts. It is therefore imperative that cyber education be 

integrated earlier and more fully into DoD training and education at all levels. 

Insights and Ideas 

• Leveraging experiential and active learning in cyber graduation 

• If there are to be significant changes to JPME education, the JPME granting 

institutions themselves will need to lead the push to revise the OPMEP

• Digital natives are not an ‘automatic’ cyberspace workforce simply because 

they have grown up with computers; we will continue to require a cyberspace 

education ecosystem 
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Save the Date: 

CYBER BEACON VI

11-12 September, 2019