23 March 2012

Countering Air and Missile Threats

Joint Publication 3-01
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides doctrine for joint counterair operations and protection against 

air and missile threats across the range of military operations. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY 

VADM, USN 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

ii JP 3-01 

Intentionally Blank 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-01 

DATED 05 FEBRUARY 2007 

• Introduces and defines integrated air and missile defense in countering air and 

missile threats. 

• Adds protection to the definition of counterair. 

• Characterizes air and missile threats as air-breathing (aircraft and cruise missiles) 

and ballistic missiles. 

• Provides considerations for operations that cross geographic combatant 

commander area of responsibility boundaries. 

• Discusses the global perspective of ballistic missile defense. 

• Defines the term air and missile defense. 

• Defines global ballistic missile defense. 

• Deletes the definition of theater missile. 

• Adds appendix on global ballistic missile defense synchronization. 

 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-01 

Intentionally Blank 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

 General ....................................................................................................................... I-1 

 Counterair Framework ............................................................................................... I-2 

 Countering Air and Missile Threat Integration and Synchronization ....................... I-5 

 Air and Missile Threats ............................................................................................. I-6 

 Supporting Homeland Defense .................................................................................. I-7 

 Global Ballistic Missile Defense ............................................................................... I-9 

CHAPTER II 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

 General ......................................................................................................................II-1 

Section A. Command Relationships and Responsibilities 

 Command Relationships ...........................................................................................II-1 

 Support Relationships ...............................................................................................II-2 

 Joint Force Commander ............................................................................................II-3 

 Component Commanders .........................................................................................II-4 

 Joint Force Air Component Commander ..................................................................II-8 

 Area Air Defense Commander ...............................................................................II-10 

 Regional and Sector Air Defense Commanders .....................................................II-12 

 Airspace Control Authority ....................................................................................II-14 

 Cross Area of Responsibility Command Relationships Considerations .................II-15 

Section B. Multinational Considerations 

 General ....................................................................................................................II-16 

 Command Relationships .........................................................................................II-16 

 Organization ...........................................................................................................II-17 

Section C. Command and Control Systems and Functions 

 General ....................................................................................................................II-19 

 Requirements, Infrastructure, and Resources .........................................................II-19 

 Situational Awareness ............................................................................................II-24 

 Battle Management .................................................................................................II-27 

CHAPTER III 

COUNTERAIR PLANNING 

 General .................................................................................................................... III-1 
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vi JP 3-01 

Section A. Intelligence Preparation 

 General .................................................................................................................... III-1 

 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace ........................................................... III-2 

Section B. Airspace Control Considerations 

 General .................................................................................................................... III-4 

 Planning and Coordination Requirements .............................................................. III-5 

 Airspace Coordinating Measures ............................................................................ III-8 

 Other Considerations .............................................................................................. III-9 

Section C. Rules of Engagement 

 General .................................................................................................................. III-10 

 Criteria .................................................................................................................. III-11 

 Planning ................................................................................................................ III-11 

Section D. Identification 

 General .................................................................................................................. III-12 

 Methods of Identification ..................................................................................... III-13 

 Identification, Commitment, and Engagement Authorities .................................. III-16 

 Combat Identification ........................................................................................... III-17 

 Multinational Considerations ................................................................................ III-18 

Section E. Asset Protection 

 General .................................................................................................................. III-18 

 Critical Asset List Development ........................................................................... III-20 

 Defended Asset List Development ....................................................................... III-21 

Section F. Enabling Capabilities 

 Special Operations ................................................................................................ III-23 

 Information Operations ......................................................................................... III-23 

 Space Operations .................................................................................................. III-24 

 Intelligence Support .............................................................................................. III-25 

 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ................................................... III-25 

 Air Refueling ........................................................................................................ III-26 

CHAPTER IV 

Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

 General .................................................................................................................... IV-1 

Section A. Offensive Counterair Planning 

 General .................................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Offensive Counterair and the Joint Air Operations Plan ........................................ IV-2 

 Offensive Counterair Assets ................................................................................... IV-5 

 Enemy Air Defenses ............................................................................................... IV-7 
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vii 

Section B. Offensive Counterair Operations 

 General .................................................................................................................... IV-8 

 Attack Operations ................................................................................................... IV-9 

 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses .................................................................... IV-12 

 Fighter Escort ........................................................................................................ IV-16 

 Fighter Sweep ....................................................................................................... IV-18 

CHAPTER V 

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 

 General ..................................................................................................................... V-1 

Section A. Defensive Counterair Planning 

 General ..................................................................................................................... V-1 

 Defensive Counterair Assets .................................................................................... V-3 

 Integrated Air Defense Systems .............................................................................. V-4 

 Enemy Air and Missile Threats ............................................................................... V-6 

 Identification and Tracking ...................................................................................... V-7 

 Area Air Defense Planning ...................................................................................... V-9 

 Ballistic Missile Defense Planning ........................................................................ V-17 

Section B. Defensive Counterair Operations 

 General ................................................................................................................... V-18 

 Passive Air and Missile Defense ........................................................................... V-19 

 Active Air and Missile Defense ............................................................................. V-23 

APPENDIX 

A Combat Identification ....................................................................................... A-1 

B Area Air Defense Plan Format ..........................................................................B-1 

C Defensive Counterair Estimate Format .............................................................C-1 

D Threat Missile Systems ..................................................................................... D-1 

E Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization ............................................ E-1 

F References ......................................................................................................... F-1 

G Administrative Instructions .............................................................................. G-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-7 

FIGURES 

I-1 Counterair Framework ................................................................................ I-3 

II-1 Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations ............................II-18 

II-2 Notional Joint Interface Control Officer 

Functional/Command Relationship .........................................................II-25 

III-1 Principles for Planning Airspace Control ................................................. III-6 
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viii JP 3-01 

III-2 Formation Assessment Spatial Relationship .......................................... III-15 

III-3 Combatant Commander’s Critical Asset List ......................................... III-19 

IV-1 Joint Air Estimate Process ........................................................................ IV-2 

IV-2 Primary Offensive Counterair Missions ................................................... IV-9 

V-1 Defensive Counterair Operations ............................................................ V-19 

A-1 Identification Process Sample Matrix ....................................................... A-5 
ix 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Covers the Fundamentals for Countering Air and Missile Threats 

• Addresses Command and Control Relationships and Responsibilities, including 

those for the Area Air Defense Commander and the Airspace Control Authority 

• Describes Counterair Planning and the Airspace Control Plan 

• Discusses Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations and Offensive Counterair 

as part of the Joint Air Operations Plan 

• Explains Defensive Counterair Planning and Operations and the Area Air Defense 

Plan 

Introduction 

The joint force 

commander (JFC) 

counters air and missile 

threats to ensure friendly 

freedom of action, provide 

protection, and deny 

enemy freedom of action. 

Counterair integrates offensive and defensive operations 

to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority 

and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft 

and missiles, both before and after launch. Integrated air 

and missile defense (IAMD) is an evolving approach that 

uses the counterair framework at the theater level. IAMD 

emphasizes the integration of offensive counterair (OCA) 

attack operations, defensive counterair (DCA) operations, 

and other capabilities as required to create the joint force 

commander’s (JFC’s) desired effects. The IAMD approach 

also encompasses global strike and global missile defense 

beyond the theater level. 

Counterair Framework 

The counterair framework 

is based on integrating 

offensive and defensive 

operations against both 

aircraft and missile 

threats. 

The counterair mission integrates both offensive and 

defensive operations, by all capable joint force 

components, and counters the air and missile threat by 

attaining and maintaining the degree of air superiority and 

protection desired by the JFC. Generally, OCA operations 

seek to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the launch of 

threats, while DCA operations defeat enemy air and 

missile threats attempting to penetrate or attack through 

friendly airspace. 

Countering Air and 

Missile Threat Integration 

and Synchronization 

Although OCA and DCA are considered separate 

operations, they must facilitate unity of effort through 

integration and synchronization. Integrating a mixture of 

capabilities from components bolsters the friendly force 

potential and likely will frustrate the enemy’s ability to 
Executive Summary 

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defend itself. Synchronization of OCA and DCA 

operations is vital to avoid duplication of effort and help 

prevent fratricide. 

Air and Missile Threats Potential adversary air and missile threats continue to grow 

in numbers and capabilities. Expanded technology and 

proliferation of missiles, including cruise missiles (CMs), 

ballistic missiles (BMs), and air-to-surface missiles 

(ASMs), expand the scope and complexity of protecting 

friendly forces and vital interests. The detection 

capabilities, engagement ranges, mobility, and lethality of 

surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and fighter aircraft 

have significantly increased the air and missile defenses 

(AMDs) of US adversaries. CMs and unmanned aircraft 

also present elusive targets and are difficult to detect, 

identify, and engage. 

Supporting Homeland 

Defense 

There is no higher priority 

than the security and 

defense of the US 

homeland. 

Proliferation of advanced technologies for missiles, 

guidance systems, and weapons of mass destruction 

warheads has increased the potential missile threat to the 

homeland. The Commander, US Northern Command, in 

concert with missions performed by North American 

Aerospace Defense Command, and the Commander, US 

Pacific Command, have specific responsibilities for 

planning, organizing, and as directed, executing homeland 

defense operations within their respective areas of 

responsibility (AORs). Although this publication primarily 

focuses on countering theater air and missile threats (i.e., 

those affecting an overseas geographic combatant 

commander’s (GCC’s) AOR/a subordinate JFC’s joint 

operations area [JOA]), those forces and capabilities 

employed by overseas GCCs also may support a layered 

defense beginning in the forward areas against strategic air 

and missile threats to the homeland. 

Global Ballistic Missile 

Defense 

Strategic planning documents task each GCC with some 

form of missile defense and the employment of appropriate 

force should deterrence fail. Commander, United States 

Strategic Command is responsible for synchronizing 

planning for global missile defense and coordinating global 

missile defense operations support. Global ballistic missile 

defense is the overarching characterization of the 

cumulative (worldwide) planning and coordination for 

those defensive capabilities designed to neutralize, destroy, 

or reduce the effectiveness of enemy BM attacks whether 

within or across the boundaries of any GCC’s AOR. 
 Executive Summary 

xi 

Command and Control 

The growing capabilities 

of air and missile threats 

(speed, range, accuracy, 

stealth, lethality) and their 

proliferation require joint 

forces to be responsive, 

flexible, and integrated to 

effectively counter those 

threats. 

The JFC normally tailors forces to the specific tasks to 

enable effective spans of control, responsiveness, tactical 

flexibility, and protection. Because counterair is a joint 

mission and can involve all components of the joint force, 

clear command relationships and properly assigned 

responsibilities are essential for effective and efficient 

operations. 

Command Relationships 

The JFC determines the 

most appropriate 

command relationships 

for the component 

forces/capabilities made 

available for counterair. 

In operations of limited scope or duration, the JFC may 

organize and conduct counterair operations using the joint 

force staff (e.g., the operations directorate of a joint staff). 

If the JFC designates a joint force air component 

commander (JFACC), the JFC may designate the JFACC 

as the supported commander for strategic attack, air 

interdiction, and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (among other missions). As a joint mission 

area, counterair is conducted by all components with the 

necessary capabilities, with the JFC/JFACC ensuring unity 

of command (or unity of effort), centralized planning and 

direction, and decentralized execution. When the JFC 

organizes the joint force, in addition to a JFACC, the JFC 

also normally designates an area air defense commander 

(AADC) (for DCA) and an airspace control authority 

(ACA) (for joint airspace control). Normally, the JFC 

designates the JFACC as the AADC and ACA, because the 

three functions are so integral to one another. If the 

situation dictates, the JFC may designate an AADC and/or 

ACA separate from the JFACC.

Support Relationships For counterair operations, support relationships are 

particularly useful for forces made available for tasking and 

those shared for conducting other joint operations. An 

establishing directive normally is issued to specify the 

purpose of the support relationship. 

JFC Some of the primary responsibilities of the JFC as they 

apply to joint counterair include the following: 

• Develop and maintain a command and control (C2) 

system to unify the employment of subordinate forces in 

carrying out assigned counterair missions 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-01 

• Designate an AADC and approve an area air defense 

plan (AADP) 

• Designate an ACA and approve the airspace control 

plan (ACP) 

• Establish a theater air and missile warning architecture 

to share warnings 

Component Commanders The Service component commanders are responsible for 

making available to the JFACC those counterair 

forces/capabilities not required for their primary roles and 

tasks per the apportionment guidance by the JFC. 

Functional component commands serve to ease the burden 

on the theater and joint task force staffs, free the JFC to 

focus more on strategic aspects of the campaign, and 

provide individual air, land, maritime, and special 

operations forces (SOF) headquarters for coordination with 

the other components. 

Joint Force Air 

Component Commander 

The JFC will typically designate responsibility for joint air 

operations to a JFACC. Although not a joint air operation, 

but a joint operation, counterair normally is an assigned 

responsibility of the JFACC. Some responsibilities of the 

JFACC relating to joint counterair operations include the 

following:

• Develop, coordinate, and integrate joint counterair 

planning with operations of other components for JFC 

approval 

• Provide information operations strategies to neutralize 

enemy air and missile threats 

• Provide centralized direction for allocating and tasking 

joint counterair capabilities and forces made available by 

the JFC 

• Perform the duties of the AADC when directed by the 

JFC 

• Perform the duties of the ACA when directed by the 

JFC 

Area Air Defense 

Commander 

The AADC normally is the component commander with 

the preponderance of AMD capability and the C2 and 

intelligence capability to plan, coordinate, and execute 

integrated AMD operations, including real-time battle 
 Executive Summary 

xiii 

management. Primary responsibilities of the AADC 

include the following: 

• Develop, integrate, and distribute a JFC-approved joint 

AADP. 

• Develop and execute a detailed plan to disseminate 

timely air and missile warning and cueing information to 

components, forces, allies, coalition partners, and civil 

authorities, as appropriate. 

• Develop and implement, in coordination with the 

component commanders and with JFC approval, 

identification (ID) and combat identification (CID) 

procedures and authorities, and engagement procedures. 

• Establish appropriate joint, fighter, and missile 

engagement zones. 

Regional and Sector Air 

Defense Commanders 

During complex operations/campaigns conducted in a large 

JOA/theater of operations, the AADC may recommend and 

the JFC may approve the division of the operational area 

into separate air defense regions, each with a regional air 

defense commander (RADC) who could be delegated 

responsibilities and decision-making authority for DCA 

operations within the region. The AADC and RADC, as 

approved by the JFC, may choose to further divide regions 

into sectors, each with a sector air defense commander 

(SADC) with appropriate authority for their 

responsibilities. 

Airspace Control 

Authority 

The ACA coordinates use of airspace through the ACP, 

including integration with the host nation (HN) airspace 

control system (ACS), and synchronizes/deconflicts all user 

requirements using the airspace control order (ACO). The 

ACA responsibilities for counterair operations include, but 

are not limited to: 

• Link the ACP to the AADP when designating volumes 

of airspace. 

• Develop airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) that 

support and enhance operations. 

• Provide a flexible ACP that can adapt to changing 

requirements of the tactical situation. 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-01 

Cross Area of 

Responsibility Command 

Relationships 

Considerations 

GCCs are supported commanders for assigned missions in 

their AORs, and they anticipate the possibility for “crossAOR” operations based on threats and capabilities. 

Coordination authority between GCCs should enable 

coordination at component and tactical levels 

supporting unity of effort for cross-AOR ballistic 

missile defense (BMD).

Multinational 

Considerations 

Most joint operations are now conducted within a 

multinational context (i.e., an alliance or coalition). The 

JFC (who may be the multinational force commander) must 

evaluate key considerations and differences involved in 

planning, coordinating, and conducting counterair 

operations in a multinational environment. 

Multinational Command 

Relationships 

In multinational force (MNF) operations, understanding the 

agreed upon command relationships and the related 

command authorities is key to developing the desired unity 

of effort for counterair operations. The JFACC/AADC 

may expect no more than tactical control over MNF 

counterair units/capabilities, and very likely, may have 

simple support relationships based on mission-type orders.

Multinational 

Organization 

Each nation normally establishes a national center or cell as 

a focal point to ensure effective support and control of its 

forces, to include counterair forces. Because sharing 

intelligence and warning information is vital to unity of 

effort, any issues related to the release of intelligence 

information and products to MNF partners must be 

resolved early during planning. Before assigning tasks to 

MNF units, the JFACC/AADC should ensure that all 

elements can make meaningful contributions to the overall 

counterair mission. The AADC should ensure that MNF 

rules of engagement (ROE), engagement authorities, and 

procedures are consistent with the combined AADP and the 

MNF ability to identify friendly forces, in order to prevent 

gaps and ensure joint air forces are not subject to an 

increased risk of fratricide and MNF are not restricted from 

self-defense. 

Command and Control 

Systems and Functions 

Joint counterair operations require reliable C2 capabilities 

that allow the JFC/JFACC/AADC, component 

commanders, and subordinate forces to integrate and 

synchronize/deconflict OCA and DCA operations. C2 

systems must support OCA operations while at the same 

time detecting, identifying, and tracking threats in order to 

warn, cue, and coordinate DCA assets, including providing 
 Executive Summary 

xv 

accurate warnings of enemy missile launches and impact 

points. 

Requirements, 

Infrastructure, and 

Resources 

The C2 systems should be capable of rapidly exchanging 

information, interfacing among components, and displaying 

a common tactical picture (CTP) to all participating 

components. The C2 architecture among all levels of 

command should be survivable, interoperable, flexible, 

secure, and redundant to the maximum extent possible. 

The C2 infrastructure should consist of interoperable 

systems that provide complete coverage for an integrated 

diverse force spread across a theater/JOA including 

considerations for any MNF assets. Service components, 

the joint force special operations component commander, 

and specialized joint communications elements provide the 

core of the communications capabilities for C2 for the joint 

force. 

Situational Awareness A primary objective the staff seeks to attain for the 

commander and for subordinate commanders is situational 

awareness, a prerequisite for commanders to 

understand and anticipate counterair opportunities and 

challenges. In simplest terms, this results in the ability “to 

see first, understand first, and act first” across the full range 

of military operations. The combatant commander uses the 

common operational picture (COP) and CTP for theater 

situational awareness. A subordinate JFC uses the COP 

and CTP as graphic depictions of the situation within the 

theater/JOA. 

Battle Management 

Battle management entails 

visualizing where, when, 

and with which forces to 

apply capabilities against 

specific threats. 

The dynamics of the counterair mission often require 

flexibility during decentralized execution that normally 

takes place at the tactical level. This flexibility 

accomplished through battle management allows the direct, 

often real-time monitoring and execution of operations 

based on the intent and within the scope of the operationallevel commander’s orders. 

Counterair Planning 

The integration and 

synchronization of 

offensive counterair 

(OCA) and defensive 

counterair (DCA), in 

conjunction with the other 

joint missions supporting 

The JFC develops an operation/campaign plan focused on 

the enemy centers of gravity (COGs) while ensuring that 

friendly COGs are protected. Counterair operations strive 

for the degree of air superiority and protection required by 

the JFC’s course of action (COA) to attain the desired 

objectives. Counterair requires a combination of OCA and 

DCA operations based on the JFC’s air apportionment 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-01 

the JFC, are the basis for 

counterair planning.

decisions and balanced against the enemy’s potential COAs 

and air and missile threats. 

Intelligence Preparation Counterair planning considerations include accurate joint 

intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

(JIPOE) and intelligence preparation of the battlespace 

(IPB). 

Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the 

Operational Environment 

and Intelligence

Preparation of the 

Battlespace 

JIPOE supports counterair planning by identifying 

adversary air and missile capabilities and their likely 

employment. JIPOE products are used by JFC and 

component staffs in preparing their estimates and analysis, 

selection of friendly COAs, and continuing planning 

requirements (e.g., development of a viable concept of 

operations.) IPB assists the counterair planner in 

visualizing the operational environment, assessing 

adversary air and missile capabilities, and identifying the 

adversary’s probable intent and attack locations. IPB is not 

simply enumeration of adversary air and missile systems, 

but must describe how the adversary air and missile forces 

operate. 

Airspace Control 

Considerations 

Airspace control is 

provided to reduce the risk 

of friendly fire, enhance 

air defense operations, 

and permit greater 

flexibility of operations. 

For counterair, all components of the joint force may 

potentially share a part of the theater/JOA airspace for 

offensive/defensive operations. The ACA establishes an 

ACS that is responsive to the needs of the JFC and 

integrates when appropriate the ACS with that of the HN. 

The ACS is an arrangement of those organizations, 

personnel, policies, procedures, and facilities required to 

perform airspace control functions. The ACP establishes 

the procedures for the ACS in the operational area. The

ACO is an order that provides the details of the approved 

requests for ACMs. ACMs are employed to facilitate the 

efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and 

simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. 

Rules of Engagement 

(ROE) 

The JFACC/AADC should offer ROE recommendations to 

the JFC in anticipation of the need, or when requested to do 

so. The ROE are an integral part of the AADP and the 

ACP. Commanders and their staffs must ensure that the 

AADP contains specific instructions that implement the 

ROE. 

Identification (ID) ID is the process of determining the friendly or hostile 

character of an unknown detected contact and the product 

(classification) of that process. The CID process 

complements the ID process to support application of 
 Executive Summary 

xvii 

weapons resources and other military options. For 

counterair, CID should be accomplished with near real time 

(NRT) or better exchange of information between airspace 

control/air defense units and airspace users to meet the time 

and accuracy demands of combat operations. 

Methods of ID For the purposes of counterair, the intent of an ID process 

is to either facilitate airspace control or to support an 

engagement decision through CID. The objective of CID is 

to obtain the highest confidence, positive ID possible. 

Lacking positive ID, the objective is to reach the level of 

confidence in an ID that can be supported by the ROE for 

an engagement authority to make a decision. ID can be 

accomplished through several recognized methods (e.g., 

positive ID, procedural ID, auto-ID, formation 

assessment, or formation tracking). The JFC approves 

the procedures used for ID and designates who may be 

delegated that authority in the AADP and ACP. 

ID, Commitment, and 

Engagement Authorities 

The authorities of ID, 

commitment, and 

engagement are required 

for decisions based on 

established criteria that 

may be tied to operational 

capability and are rooted 

in the ROE. 

The AADC will establish the policy for ID authority, with 

JFC approval, and will promulgate it via the AADP, special 

instructions, and/or an operations task link supplement. 

Commit authority may be used (and delegated) by the 

AADC as a battle management tool. The air defense 

echelon with commit authority is permitted to authorize 

assets to prepare to engage an entity (e.g., position a DCA 

fighter to intercept or direct an air defense artillery unit to 

track and target). Commit authority does not imply 

engagement authority. The JFC is vested with authority 

to prosecute engagements within the theater/JOA consistent 

with ROE currently in effect. The air defense authority 

with engagement authority is permitted to authorize 

engagement of an air or missile threat. For air defense 

engagements within the integrated air defense system 

(IADS), the authority normally is delegated to the AADC 

who may further delegate the engagement authority to 

tactical levels (e.g., RADC/SADC). 

Multinational 

Considerations 

Special attention must be paid to establishing a workable 

CID system during MNF operations. A mix of units with 

dissimilar capabilities and differing electronic systems, fire 

control doctrine, and training can present the AADC with 

an extremely difficult air defense situation. Advanced 

planning may be required to compensate for a “patchwork”
Executive Summary 

xviii JP 3-01 

 of separate MNF CID capabilities, not just for the surface 

air defense and air control units, but for their aircraft as 

well. 

Asset Protection The JFC and staff, normally the plans directorate of a joint 

staff, develops a prioritized critical asset list (CAL) for 

each general phase of an operation with inputs from the 

components and based on the theater level protection 

required to support tasks/missions assigned by the JFC. 

The CAL should include designated assets and areas within 

the joint security areas (JSAs) of the JOA. For DCA 

protection, the joint security coordinator designated by 

the JFC normally coordinates with the AADC to ensure 

the JSAs are appropriately covered by the AADP. The 

completed CAL is forwarded to AADC, who will allocate 

available active AMD forces to defend the prioritized assets 

listed. The product of this effort is the defended asset list 

(DAL). The DAL is a list of those assets on the CAL 

that can be covered by JFC AMD forces and 

capabilities.

Enabling Capabilities Some enabling capabilities to take into account during 

counterair planning are: special operations; information 

operations; space operations; intelligence support; 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and air 

refueling. 

Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

General OCA operations normally have a high priority as long as 

the enemy has the air and missile capability to threaten 

friendly forces and the JFC does not have the degree of air 

superiority desired to accomplish the objectives required 

for the end state. OCA operations reduce the risk of air and 

missile attacks, allowing friendly forces to focus on their 

mission objectives. The preferred method of countering air 

and missile threats is to destroy or disrupt them prior to 

launch using OCA operations. 

OCA Planning OCA planning begins with JIPOE and IPB and considers 

the JFC’s assessment of the overall air and missile threat, 

the predicted effectiveness of the defense design, target 

database, ROE, objectives, priorities, missions, available 

friendly capabilities, and the weight of effort or force 

apportionment decision. IPB enhances the commanders’ 

ability to find targets, task attack forces, and assess their 

effectiveness. OCA planning includes targeting enemy air 
 Executive Summary 

xix 

and missile threats and their C2 and supporting 

infrastructure.OCA targets should be attacked on the 

surface prior to launch and as close to their source as 

possible. However, based on the JFC’s priorities and ROE, 

many mobile targets, especially time-sensitive targets 

(TSTs), may be sought and attacked wherever and 

whenever they are found. 

OCA Assets The effectiveness of OCA operations depends on the 

availability and capabilities of friendly assets. The choice 

of a particular weapon system or capability may depend 

upon the situation, target characteristics, desired effects, 

threats, weather, and available intelligence. Whenever 

possible and within the ROE, commanders should employ 

weapon systems that minimize the risk to friendly forces 

and noncombatants. 

Enemy Air Defenses 

An enemy integrated air 

defense system attempts to 

provide a seamless 

capability to destroy, 

disrupt, or neutralize 

intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance and 

air and missile attacks or 

other penetrations of their 

airspace. 

An enemy IADS could include detection, C2, and weapon 

systems integrated to protect those assets critical to 

achieving their strategic, operational, and tactical 

objectives. To degrade effectiveness of friendly OCA 

operations, enemy defensive tactics may include jamming 

aircraft navigation, communications, target acquisition 

systems, and precision weapons guidance systems. As a 

target system or number of target systems, enemy IADSs 

need to be analyzed in depth to neutralize or avoid their 

strengths and exploit their weaknesses.

OCA Operations The preferred counterair employment strategy is to execute 

OCA operations prior to the launch of air and missile 

threats and as close to their source as possible. Under 

decentralized execution, units tasked for OCA operations 

should have the latitude to plan, coordinate, and execute 

their operations. OCA operations may be conducted by any 

component of the joint force with the requisite capability 

using aircraft, missiles, SOF, surface fires, C2 systems, or 

ground forces. OCA operations can be preemptive or 

reactive, and may be planned using deliberate or dynamic 

targeting. OCA operations include attack operations, 

suppression of enemy air defenses, fighter escort, and 

fighter sweep.
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-01 

Defensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

General 

Because of their timesensitive nature, DCA 

operations require 

streamlined coordination 

and decision-making 

processes. 

DCA operations consist of active and passive AMD 

measures executed through a joint C2 infrastructure. The 

AADC normally is responsible for developing an IADS by 

integrating the capabilities of different components with a 

robust C2 architecture. The AADC uses assigned 

operation/campaign plan tasks to develop the AADP with 

the coordination of component commanders, MNF 

partners, and the JFC’s staff.

DCA Planning The AADP is designed to be a plan of action for DCA 

operations, and the RADCs/SADCs, if established, may be 

required or may wish to provide supplements to the AADP 

to reflect additional guidance or intentions. DCA planning 

should adhere to the following principles and ideals: 

centralized planning and direction; decentralized execution; 

planned responses; effective and efficient communications; 

layered defense; 360-degree coverage; ID and tracking; 

alert and warning; and establish modes of control.

DCA Assets DCA operations employ a mix of weapon, sensor, 

communications, and C2 systems integrated from all 

components into an IADS to protect friendly forces, assets, 

population centers, and interests from air and missile 

threats.

Integrated Air Defense 

Systems 

An IADS is not a formal system in itself but the aggregate 

of Service/functional component AMD systems comprising 

sensors, weapons, C2, communications, intelligence 

systems, and personnel operating in a theater/JOA under 

the command of an AADC. However, the IADS typically 

depends on support and enabling functions from national 

assets and systems not controlled by the JFC. Because the 

IADS is normally composed of different components, it 

requires significant integration and interoperability of 

communications and tactical data link architectures to 

generate its expected synergistic effects for the JFC. To 

ensure counterair situational awareness and enable decision 

making, plans for an IADS must include the requirement 

for a reliable, consistent COP/CTP available in all major 

and supporting C2 facilities.

Enemy Air and Missile 

Threats 

Enemy threats comprise two main elements: air threats, 

including manned and unmanned aircraft and CM, and BM. 

GCCs should specifically focus intelligence efforts on 

potential adversaries and their air and missile threats in 
 Executive Summary 

xxi 

their theaters and adjacent areas of interest, and assess the 

vulnerability to cross-AOR threats from outside an 

established JOA/theater of operations.

ID and Tracking Execution of efficient DCA operations requires a 

continuous surveillance and reporting system capable of 

NRT production and dissemination of the tracking data 

necessary for effective decision making. As a track is 

detected, it is identified and labeled and this information is 

disseminated as rapidly as possible. The track data 

provided is sufficiently detailed and timely to allow 

decision makers to evaluate the track, determine the 

significance of the threat, and either designate DCA forces 

for interception or engagement or advise units of the 

passage of friendly aircraft.

Area Air Defense 

Planning 

Development of the AADP and planning DCA operations 

involves integrating friendly force capabilities and 

limitations against adversary vulnerabilities to achieve 

optimum results in a dynamic tactical environment. 

Weapon engagement zones (WEZs) are a critical part of 

DCA planning because they represent part of the current 

defense posture against the air and missile threats. Defense 

against BMs, CMs, ASMs, and aircraft each have unique 

requirements for active air defenses. During planning, 

multiple options should be developed using various 

combinations of weapon systems and WEZs allowing the 

flexibility to defend all critical assets, although there may 

be resources shortfalls.

Ballistic Missile Defense 

Planning 

GCCs should locate, identify, and assess potential BM 

threats. To facilitate JFC planning, and specifically missile 

defense planning, those GCCs should produce target 

folders for potential missile threats. Target folders should 

be available for a subordinate JFC to complete and use 

when necessary, including for TSTs. For the joint force, 

the commander, Army air and missile defense command 

(normally the deputy area air defense commander) and 

commander, task force integrated AMD, and their staffs are 

acknowledged subject matter experts regarding the BM 

threat and missile defense. They can support OCA 

planners to help eliminate the threat and DCA planners to 

defend against it.

DCA Operations The AADP reflects the JFC’s objectives, priorities, and the 

specific need for air superiority and protection, and the 

appropriate component commanders provide the surface-, 
Executive Summary 

xxii JP 3-01 

air-, and sea based forces/capabilities for those DCA 

operations required to execute that plan. 

Passive Air and Missile 

Defense (AMD)

Commanders at all levels 

are responsible for 

planning and executing 

appropriate passive AMD 

measures. 

Passive AMD provides individual and collective protection 

for friendly forces and critical assets and is the 

responsibility of every commander in the joint force. It 

includes measures, other than active AMD, taken to 

minimize, mitigate, or recover from the consequences of 

attack aircraft and missiles. Passive measures do not 

involve the employment of weapons, but they do improve 

survivability.

Active AMD Under the counterair framework, active missile defense is 

integrated with active air defense as a DCA operation. 

Generally, the same capabilities used for missile defense 

are capable of air defense. The important factors are the 

enemy missile threat and the conservation of missile 

defense assets to prevent that unique capability from 

being exhausted against aircraft when an alternative air 

defense strategy and tactics could be used against airbreathing threats. Active BMD involves direct defensive 

action taken to destroy in flight BM threats. Active missile 

defense systems are primarily SAM systems and their 

supporting infrastructure. Although BM launches are 

detected and warnings are sent to the JFC with the 

predicted impact point, engagements are only possible once 

organic missile defense radars detect them.

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides doctrine for joint counterair 

operations and protection against air and missile threats 

across the range of military operations.
I-1 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

1. General 

a. The joint force commander (JFC) counters air and missile threats to ensure friendly 

freedom of action, provide protection, and deny enemy freedom of action. Counterair 

integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air 

superiority and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both 

before and after launch. Offensive counterair (OCA) typically seeks to dominate enemy 

airspace and destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and 

their supporting structures as close to their sources as possible before and after launch. 

Defensive counterair (DCA) normally attempts to degrade, neutralize, or defeat enemy air 

and missile attacks attempting to penetrate friendly airspace. Counterair operations may also 

be conducted to ensure access and freedom of action in international airspace. These 

operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), surface-to-air missiles 

(SAMs), artillery, ground forces, special operations, and electronic attack (EA). US forces 

must be capable of countering the air and missile threats during all phases. 

b. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). IAMD is an evolving approach that 

uses the counterair framework at the theater level. IAMD emphasizes the integration of 

OCA attack operations, DCA operations, and other capabilities as required to create the 

JFC’s desired effects. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) is responsible for 

IAMD operations within the theater. The IAMD approach also encompasses global strike 

and global missile defense beyond the theater level. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 

establishes command relationships for global ballistic missile defense (GBMD), global 

strike, and other cross-area of responsibility (AOR) operations. Commander, United States 

Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for 

global missile defense.

Refer to Chapter II, “Command and Control,” Section A, “Command Relationships and 

Responsibilities,” for cross-AOR command relationships considerations and Appendix E, 

“Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization,” for further discussion. 

c. The counterair mission is inherently a joint and interdependent endeavor. Each 

component of the joint force contributes capabilities necessary for mission success. In 

addition, Service capability and force structure development reflect a purposeful reliance on 

all components to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing 

relative vulnerabilities. Due to the joint and interdependent nature, all components of the 

joint force normally are tasked to conduct operations in support of the counterair mission. 

Unity of command (or unity of effort), centralized planning and direction, and decentralized 

execution are also vital tenets for countering air and missile threats. 

“If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it quickly.” 

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery 

British Army, 1908-1958 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-01 

(1) Air Superiority. Air superiority is that degree of dominance in the air battle of 

one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related 

land, maritime, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by 

the opposing force’s air and missile threats. Historically, air superiority has proven to be a 

prerequisite to success for an operation/campaign because it prevents enemy air and missile 

threats from interfering with operations of friendly air, land, maritime, space, and special 

operations forces, assuring freedom of action and movement. Counterair operations usually 

begin early in the conduct of a campaign to produce the desired degree of air superiority at 

the times and places chosen by the JFC. 

(a) The degree of control of the air domain may vary from local air superiority 

to theater air supremacy, depending on the situation and the JFC’s concept of operations 

(CONOPS). In some situations the commander may have limited resources, having only 

adequate assets to establish air superiority for specific periods of time. However, air 

superiority may not totally eliminate the air and missile threats. 

(b) Joint force requirements for air superiority may be continuous or 

temporary. JFCs conduct continuous counterair operations to maintain the desired degree of 

air superiority over the homeland, key US assets, and designated portions of friendly 

territory. When necessary, JFCs conduct counterair operations to establish and maintain the 

desired degree of air superiority over friendly territory, in international airspace, and over 

enemy territory in a manner, time, and place of the JFC’s choosing. 

(2) Protection. Protection focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting 

potential. One of the key tasks associated with the protection function is providing air and 

missile defense (AMD). In this regard, the JFC is responsible for protecting US and friendly 

forces, US vital interests, friendly population centers, logistic sites, other critical assets, and 

politically sensitive assets of host nations (HNs) during all phases of operations. To 

adequately protect the force, commanders must employ complementary weapon systems and 

sensors, including active and passive AMD. These operations not only defend against attack, 

but also ensure that US forces can strike potential threats prior to their employment against 

friendly forces. 

For additional information regarding homeland defense (HD), see Joint Publication (JP) 

3-27, Homeland Defense.

2. Counterair Framework 

The counterair mission integrates both offensive and defensive operations, by all capable 

joint force components, and counters the air and missile threat by attaining and maintaining 

the degree of air superiority and protection desired by the JFC (see Figure I-1). Counterair 

operations may use the range of military capabilities to neutralize or destroy enemy aircraft, 

missiles, and launchers before and after launch. Generally, OCA operations seek to 

dominate enemy airspace and prevent the launch of threats, while DCA operations defeat 

enemy air and missile threats attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. 

Joint forces must be integrated to exploit the mutually beneficial effects of synchronized 

offensive and defensive operations to destroy, neutralize, or minimize air and missile threats. 
 Introduction 

I-3 

Counterair operations are subject to JFC-approved weapons control procedures and airspace 

coordinating measures. The counterair framework is based on integrating offensive and 

defensive operations against both aircraft and missile threats. 

a. Offensive Counterair 

(1) OCA is offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, 

missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after 

launch, and as close to their source as possible. The goal of OCA operations is to prevent the 

launch of enemy aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting 

infrastructure prior to employment. 

(2) OCA operations are the preferred method of countering air and missile threats 

because they reduce the level of the threat that defensive forces must face. OCA operations 

generally are conducted at the initiative of friendly forces, and normally are a high priority as 

long as an enemy has the air and missile capability to threaten friendly forces and regions 

and conduct aerial surveillance and reconnaissance in friendly airspace. OCA operations 

also include targeting those assets that directly or indirectly enable enemy airpower, such as 

petroleum, oils and lubricants, airfield facilities, missile reload and storage facilities, aircraft 

repair structures, and command and control (C2) facilities. OCA includes the four 

operations briefly described as follows: 

(a) Attack Operations. OCA attack operations include targeting enemy air 

and missile forces on the surface and the infrastructure and systems that contribute to their 

capabilities. Some Services refer to these as “strike” operations. 

Figure I-1. Counterair Framework 

Counterair Framework

Counterair

Offensive Counterair











Attack operations

Attacks on missile sites, airfields, 

command and control, infrastructure

Fighter escort

Suppression of enemy air defenses

Fighter sweep





Active air and missile defense

Air defense

Ballistic missile defense

Passive air and missile defense

Detection and warning

Chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear defenses

Camouflage, concealment, 

and deception

Hardening

Reconstitution

Dispersion

Redundancy

Mobility





















Defensive Counterair
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-01 

(b) Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). Activity that neutralizes, 

destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses (AD) by destructive 

and/or disruptive means. 

(c) Fighter Escort. Fighter escort includes providing dedicated protection 

sorties by air-to-air capable fighters in support of other offensive air and air support 

operations over enemy territory or in a DCA role to protect aircraft such as high value 

airborne assets (HVAAs). 

(d) Fighter Sweep. Fighter sweep is an offensive mission by fighter aircraft to 

seek out and destroy enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated area. 

Detailed discussions of these missions can be found in Chapter IV, “Offensive Counterair 

Planning and Operations.” 

b. Defensive Counterair. DCA is all defensive measures designed to detect, identify, 

intercept, and neutralize or destroy enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through 

friendly airspace. DCA includes both active and passive AMD measures to protect friendly 

forces, critical assets, population centers, infrastructure, etc., and deny enemy freedom of 

action in friendly airspace. The goal of DCA operations, in concert with OCA operations, is 

to provide an area from which forces can operate while protected from air and missile 

threats. DCA operations must be integrated and synchronized with OCA operations and all 

other joint force operations. 

Further discussion of responsibilities for developing weapons control procedures and 

airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) can be found in Chapter III, “Counterair 

Planning.” 

(1) Active Air and Missile Defense. Active AMD is direct defensive action taken 

to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats against friendly 

forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, AD weapons, missile defense weapons, 

electronic warfare (EW), multiple sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities. Ideally, 

integration of those systems will allow for a defense in depth, with the potential for multiple 

engagements that increase the probability for success. Air and ballistic missile defenses 

(BMDs) should be closely integrated to form an essential capability within DCA. While AD 

is defensive measures designed to destroy attacking aircraft or missiles in the atmosphere, or 

to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack, BMD is recognized as unique because of 

the significance of the ballistic missile (BM) threat and the difficulty of the defense. The 

integration of these elements provides for an integrated air defense system (IADS) that is 

unique to each JFC and contributes to defense in depth, with the potential for multiple 

engagements that increase the probability for success. 

(2) Passive Air and Missile Defense. Passive AMD is all measures, other than 

active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against 

friendly forces and assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage, 

concealment, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction. Passive AMD 

improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of detection and targeting of friendly assets 
 Introduction 

I-5 

and thereby minimizing the potential effects of adversary reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

attack. Passive AMD measures are considered the same for air and BM threats, with one 

exception: detection and warning of BM attack is normally provided by supporting 

assets from outside the theater/joint operations area (JOA) in concert with deployed 

AMD C2 systems and sensors. 

Further discussion of DCA can be found in Chapter V, “Defensive Counterair Planning and 

Operations.” 

3. Countering Air and Missile Threat Integration and Synchronization 

a. Although OCA and DCA are considered separate operations, they must facilitate 

unity of effort through integration and synchronization. Many of the same forces may be 

required for both OCA and DCA operations; therefore, early, continuous, and close 

coordination is required. Integrating a mixture of capabilities from components bolsters the 

friendly force potential and likely will frustrate the enemy’s ability to defend itself. 

Synchronization of OCA and DCA operations is vital to avoid duplication of effort and help 

prevent fratricide. 

b. Countering air and missile threat operations requires integration and synchronization 

including the actions within and across the following areas: 

(1) Integration of OCA elements capable of contributing to attack operations. 

(2) Integration of DCA elements includes the integration of active and passive 

AMD capabilities and measures. 

(3) Integration of OCA and DCA. 

(4) Focuses on coordination between GCCs. 

(5) Balancing the BMD needs at the combatant commander (CCDR) level with the 

broader global BMD needs, which include HD. GBMD focuses on a collaborative planning 

process among CCDRs orchestrated/led by a designated commander with coordinating 

authority. 

(6) Participation with and defending our allies is a critical part of IAMD. For this 

reason, capabilities of US forces and allies must be integrated and leveraged to achieve 

maximum warfighting potential during all phases of the conflict. 

c. Considerations for integrating and synchronizing OCA and DCA include: 

(1) Using a single commander with an adequate C2 system to be responsible for 

both OCA and DCA operations. Typically, this is the joint force air component commander 

(JFACC), who normally is also the area air defense commander (AADC) and the airspace 

control authority (ACA). 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-01 

(2) Establishing and monitoring an interoperable and robust C2 system from the 

JFC/JFACC through the component commanders and down to the tactical units to facilitate 

the centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution normally required for 

counterair. The C2 system should be able to seamlessly flow information and warnings and 

to control assets from one mission/task to another, based on the daily requirements to support 

the JFC’s operation/campaign. Communications architecture is a critical element for 

counterair due to the time-sensitivity of some targets. The C2 system must connect sensors 

to intelligence nodes and decision makers and to operators throughout the operational area. 

(3) Ensuring commanders integrate counterair capabilities and optimize the balance 

between OCA and DCA strengths and vulnerabilities. For example, destruction of BMs 

prior to their launch provides greater force protection than engaging them in flight. These 

prelaunch attacks must be planned and synchronized with the overall DCA scheme to 

maximize the effectiveness of resources. 

d. If the adversary is successful in launching BMs against US and multinational forces 

(MNFs), the joint force relies on the defensive coverage provided by US Navy Aegis cruisers 

and destroyers and US Army AD systems for missile defense. 

e. The GCC’s theater counterair effort, and especially the missile defense planning and 

actions, should be coordinated and synchronized with those of the GCCs in other theaters 

and the worldwide synchronizing headquarters for missile defense planning, United States 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and its subordinate Joint Functional Component 

Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD). 

f. OCA and DCA operations require sharing many of the same systems (i.e., sensors, 

weapons, and C2), so integration of the component assets, as well as synchronization of their 

use, is necessary for unity of effort. 

4. Air and Missile Threats 

a. Potential adversary air and missile threats continue to grow in numbers and 

capabilities. Expanded technology and proliferation of missiles, including cruise missiles 

(CMs), BMs, and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), expand the scope and complexity of 

protecting friendly forces and vital interests. The regional threats from short-range ballistic 

missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles (IRBMs) are clear and present where the US deploys forces and maintains 

security relationships, and those threats are growing at a rapid pace. The proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), coupled with a conventional means of delivery (i.e., 

aircraft, CMs, or BMs), greatly increases potential lethality of any adversary and elevates the 

importance of maintaining robust counterair capabilities to protect US and friendly forces 

and areas. The US, while protecting some allies and partners, also works to enable them to 

defend themselves against the air and missile threats. 

b. Other trends also complicate the counterair mission. The detection capabilities, 

engagement ranges, mobility, and lethality of SAM systems and fighter aircraft have 
 Introduction 

I-7 

significantly increased the AMDs of US adversaries. CMs and unmanned aircraft (UA) also 

present elusive targets and are difficult to detect, identify, and engage. 

c. Adversaries may employ area denial strategies designed to prevent the protected 

buildup of US forces. Most “anti-access” strategies today rely in some measure on the threat 

or employment of advanced aircraft and/or missiles that may be employed alone or in 

coordinated operations with other area denial capabilities. Targets may include attacks on 

the infrastructure supporting US power projection capability (e.g., seaports, sea bases, 

airfields, and communications networks [COMNETs]) or relevant military and political 

targets. In this environment, adversary use of WMD against US forces, allies, and interests 

should not be ruled out. Since nations can acquire modern missiles rather cheaply, the 

number of countries with a small but lethal offensive missile capability will continue to 

increase. 

d. The JFC also must assess the cross-AOR BM threat from a state/non-state that 

possesses long-range missiles and may be aligned with the adversary. See Chapter II, 

“Command and Control,” Paragraph 10, “Cross Area of Responsibility Command 

Relationships Considerations,” for more details regarding cross-AOR operations. 

e. Some adversaries may consider military aircraft and missiles to be instruments of 

political coercion. They may also consider civilian population centers and government, 

cultural, and religious structures and locations as valid targets. In addition, propaganda value 

exists in attacking US and MNFs to show their vulnerability, particularly in rear areas. 

f. For a given operation/campaign, proper assessment for counterair planning should 

take into account the possibility that initial enemy attacks may employ missiles in 

conjunction with manned and UA against a variety of targets: air defense artillery (ADA) 

sites, C2 elements, communications nodes, air facilities, seaports, sea bases, logistic centers, 

key civilian facilities such as power and water plants, nuclear delivery systems, storage sites, 

and industrial complexes. 

g. Consideration must be given to the potential for irregular forces using civilian aircraft 

(e.g., hijacked or stolen) to attack friendly forces. Other considerations include the 

following: intelligence to provide situational awareness of the irregular threat; a security 

system to prevent illicit use of civilian aircraft; and the proper use of identification (ID), 

tracking, and combat identification (CID) to engage asymmetric aircraft threats but not 

accidentally engage innocent civilian aircraft. 

For additional details regarding offensive missile threats, see Appendix D, “Threat Missile 

Systems.” 

5. Supporting Homeland Defense 

a. There is no higher priority than the security and defense of the US homeland. For 

most CCDRs, a general responsibility from the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is to “detect, 

deter, and prevent attacks against the United States, its territories and bases, and employ 

appropriate force to defend the nation should deterrence fail.” The homeland is the 

geographic region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, US territories, 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-01 

and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. The Commander, US Northern Command 

(CDRUSNORTHCOM), in concert with missions performed by North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD), and the Commander, US Pacific Command 

(CDRUSPACOM), have specific responsibilities for planning, organizing, and as directed, 

executing HD operations within their respective AORs. Proliferation of advanced 

technologies for missiles, guidance systems, and WMD warheads has increased the potential 

missile threat to the homeland. This is significant because the predominant threat is not from 

a competing superpower, but more likely from the deliberate launch of a BM from a “rogue 

state,” failed state, or terrorist group. Deterrence is not possible against some threats. 

Although this publication primarily focuses on countering theater air and missile threats (i.e., 

those affecting an overseas GCC’s AOR/a subordinate JFC’s JOA), those forces and 

capabilities employed by overseas GCCs also may support a layered defense beginning in 

the forward areas against strategic air and missile threats to the homeland. 

b. Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CDRNORAD), is 

tasked to provide aerospace warning for North America that consists of the detection, 

validation, and warning of an attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles, or 

space vehicles. CDRNORAD is also tasked to provide the aerospace control for North 

America that includes surveillance and control of Canadian and US airspace, including 

Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, in coordination with the Federal Aviation 

Adminstration and Transportation Canada/NAV Canada. To provide integrated tactical 

warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA) of an aerospace attack on North America, 

NORAD, as the supported command, will correlate and integrate relevant information. 

Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) supports 

CDRNORAD by providing the missile warning and space surveillance necessary to fulfill 

the US commitment to the NORAD agreement. CDRUSSTRATCOM also provides 

ITW/AA of space or missile attacks on North America to CDRNORAD, should 

CDRNORAD be unable to accomplish the assessment mission. 

c. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported commander for HD within that AOR, in 

concert with missions performed by CDRNORAD, who is the supported commander in 

accordance with the NORAD Agreement and NORAD Terms of Reference. 

CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for air operations outside the scope of the NORAD 

agreements along with land and maritime defense within that AOR. CDRUSPACOM is 

responsible for defense of US homelands within the US Pacific Command (USPACOM)

AOR including protection against air and missile threats. However, CDRUSNORTHCOM, 

as approved by SecDef and in coordination with CDRUSPACOM, has certain homeland 

BMD responsibilities within the USPACOM AOR to ensure a seamless defense against BMs 

that target the homeland. CDRUSSTRATCOM aids that seamless defense by globally 

synchronizing planning and coordinating support for all BMD operations. 

d. As assigned in the UCP, CDRUSSTRATCOM aids in the seamless synchronization 

of planning for homeland BMD and in support of GCCs worldwide. USSTRATCOM 

provides the warning and attack assessment if a GCC is unable to make that assessment. 

e. Both offensive and defensive capabilities are required for deterring or defeating 

attacks against the homeland, US forces, and protected friends and allies. A homeland 
 Introduction 

I-9 

BMD strategy should include an offensive capability, because some BM threats cannot be 

deterred by massive retaliation or BMD. If a strategic threat requires offensive 

actions/operations to protect the homeland, CDRUSSTRATCOM may provide global strike 

capabilities in direct coordination with a supported/supporting GCC, as directed by the 

President. An overseas GCC (or subordinate JFC) may be tasked to support homeland 

defense by offensive actions against hostile missile threats, or BMD support after the launch 

of a hostile missile. Because of the time-sensitivity and difficulty of defending against a 

potential missile threat after launch, GCCs in the forward regions of the world and functional 

CCDRs should have plans/agreements with appropriate operating procedures for offensive 

actions/operations supporting defense of the homeland and other friendly nations as may be 

directed by the President/SecDef. 

Refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, for additional discussion of homeland BMD. 

6. Global Ballistic Missile Defense 

The proliferation of WMD and missile technology requires a globally oriented capacity 

for BMD of the homeland and the overseas theaters. Strategic planning documents task each 

GCC with some form of missile defense and the employment of appropriate force should 

deterrence fail. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for global 

missile defense and coordinating global missile defense operations support. GBMD is the 

overarching characterization of the cumulative (worldwide) planning and coordination for 

those defensive capabilities designed to neutralize, destroy, or reduce the effectiveness of 

enemy BM attacks whether within or across the boundaries of any GCC’s AOR. GBMD 

recognizes the phased adaptive approach to BMD tailored to the threats unique to each 

theater. GCCs should anticipate theater BMD operations, some of which may be cross-AOR 

BMD. Unless otherwise directed by the President/SecDef, the GCCs of targeted AORs are 

the supported commanders for BMD planning and operations within their AORs/theaters of 

operations. Multiple GCCs can potentially conduct BMD operations in their theaters 

simultaneously. For intratheater BMD, a GCC may control all elements involved but, as the 

range of threat missiles increases, so does the potential cross-AOR impact. The links from 

sensors to decision makers to shooters must occur rapidly and reliably, often across 

traditional geographic and AOR boundaries. For example, a missile launch that crosses 

AOR boundaries complicates C2 of defensive assets and actions and requires timely 

planning, coordination, and rehearsal among multiple affected GCCs prior to anticipated 

execution. Also, GCCs should anticipate planning for some form of support in their AORs 

for a homeland BMD strategy that includes offensive options against a BM threat should 

deterrence fail. CCDRs (and their subordinate JFCs as applicable) coordinate their BMD 

planning and support with CDRUSSTRATCOM (JFCC-IMD). 

See Appendix E, “Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization,” for additional 

information about the synchronization of BMD planning and coordination of support for 

other aspects of BMD. 

 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-01 

Intentionally Blank 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. General

The growing capabilities of air and missile threats (speed, range, accuracy, stealth, 

lethality) and their proliferation require joint forces to be responsive, flexible, and integrated 

to effectively counter those threats. The manner in which a JFC organizes forces directly 

affects their responsiveness and versatility. Based on the situation, the JFC normally tailors 

forces to the specific tasks to enable effective spans of control, responsiveness, tactical 

flexibility, and protection. Because counterair is a joint mission and can involve all 

components of the joint force, clear command relationships and properly assigned 

responsibilities are essential for effective and efficient operations. 

SECTION A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2. Command Relationships

a. The JFC organizes forces, establishes command relationships, assigns 

responsibilities, and promulgates necessary coordinating instructions. The organization 

should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of contemplated operations and 

any subsequent development that may require a change in plans. In operations of limited 

scope or duration, the JFC may organize and conduct counterair operations using the joint 

force staff (e.g., the operations directorate of a joint staff [J-3]). If the JFC designates a 

JFACC, the JFC may designate the JFACC as the supported commander for strategic attack, 

air interdiction, and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (among 

other missions). As a joint mission area, counterair is conducted by all components with the 

necessary capabilities, with the JFC/JFACC ensuring unity of command (or unity of effort), 

centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. The JFC determines the 

most appropriate command relationships for the component forces/capabilities made 

available for counterair. Regardless of the command relationship, all counterair forces are 

subject to the rules of engagement (ROE), airspace control, weapons control measures, and 

fire control orders established by the JFACC, AADC, and/or ACA as approved by the JFC. 

Additionally, the AADC will be granted the necessary command authority to deconflict and 

control engagements and to exercise real-time battle management.

b. JFACCs, as functional component commanders, normally have operational control 

(OPCON) over only their own Service component forces and tactical control (TACON) or 

direct support of the other Service/functional component forces/capabilities made available 

for tasking. For example, air sorties made available for tasking normally are provided under 

“Our superiority in precision munitions, stealth, mobility and command, control, 

communications, and computers proved to be decisive force multipliers.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Commander, US Central Command

1991
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II-2 JP 3-01 

TACON while surface-based AMD forces are provided in direct support with mission-type 

orders. Those other component forces typically remain under the OPCON of their 

Service/functional component commanders. All command relationships (especially support 

relationships) between the JFACC, AADC, and other joint force component commanders 

must be clearly established by the JFC.

c. When the JFC organizes the joint force, in addition to a JFACC, the JFC also 

normally designates an AADC (for DCA) and an ACA (for joint airspace control). 

Normally, the JFC designates the JFACC as the AADC and ACA, because the three 

functions are so integral to one another. Those functions are described later in this chapter.

d. If the situation dictates, the JFC may designate an AADC and/or ACA separate from 

the JFACC. In that case, the JFC must clearly establish the command relationships of the 

JFC and the JFACC to the AADC and the ACA. The function of the ACA is integral to both 

the JFACC and AADC, so either may be designated the ACA, if not designated separately 

by the JFC. When the JFACC, AADC, and ACA are not the same individual, close 

coordination among all is essential for unity of effort, synchronization/deconfliction of 

operations, and prevention of fratricide. 

See JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, for details regarding the 

JFACC, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for additional details about the ACA and 

airspace control. 

3. Support Relationships

SecDef designates support relationships between CCDRs for planning and execution of 

operations and campaigns. JFCs typically establish support relationships between 

subordinate commanders for missions and operations when one force is required to aid, 

protect, complement, or sustain another force. For counterair operations, support 

relationships are particularly useful for forces made available for tasking and those shared for 

conducting other joint operations. An establishing directive normally is issued to specify the 

purpose of the support relationship, and unless limited by that directive, the supported 

commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort that 

includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the 

supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. The 

supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and 

communications to be employed in providing this support. See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States, Appendix A, “Establishing Directive (Support Relationship) 

Considerations,” for details normally contained in the establishing directive. 

a. Supported Combatant Commander. The supported CCDR is designated by 

SecDef in the appropriate warning/alert order. The supported CCDR may retain direct 

responsibility for the campaign or operation as a JFC or may designate a subordinate JFC (a 

commander, joint task force [JTF]) to plan and execute it. 

b. Supporting Combatant Commanders. In the same warning/alert order that 

designates the supported CCDR, SecDef designates the supporting CCDRs based on their 
Command and Control 

II-3 

capabilities. Two typical supporting functional CCDRs are Commander, US Transportation 

Command, who supports force deployments and movements; and CDRUSSTRATCOM, 

who is responsible for synchronizing planning and coordinating support for global missile 

defense operations to minimize operational seams across AOR boundaries, provides missile 

launch warnings, as well as space and strategic forces/capabilities. For counterair, a good 

example is BMD against a cross-AOR threat, while another common example is federated 

intelligence support between CCDRs, as described in JP 2-01, Joint and National 

Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

c. The supported GCC in an overseas theater may concurrently be tasked for a 

supporting relationship with a functional CCDR or one of the GCCs with a homeland 

defense responsibility.

Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for further information on 

command relationships and authorities. 

4. Joint Force Commander

a. Primary responsibilities of the JFC as they apply to joint counterair include the 

following: 

(1) Develop and maintain a C2 system to unify the employment of subordinate 

forces in carrying out assigned counterair missions. 

(2) Develop and produce a joint operation plan (OPLAN) or an operation order that 

includes AMD guidance. 

(3) Establish appropriate command relationships for the component commanders.

(4) Define and assign operational areas within which component forces will 

operate.

(5) Assign tasks, functions, and responsibilities to, and direct coordination among, 

the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in accomplishing joint counterair 

missions.

(a) Designate an AADC and approve an area air defense plan (AADP) 

developed by the AADC in conjunction with the joint force components. The AADP also 

may be synchronized with other BMD planning by direction of the supported CCDR and in 

coordination with USSTRATCOM. 

(b) Designate an ACA and approve the airspace control plan (ACP) developed 

by the ACA in coordination with the joint force components. 

(c) Establish a theater air and missile warning architecture to share warnings 

with joint force components, allies, interagency entities, and HN agencies, as required by 

agreements.
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II-4 JP 3-01 

(6) Establish, coordinate, and disseminate ROE to all subordinate commanders. 

(7) A supported JFC normally designates a space coordinating authority (SCA) to 

coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity 

and scope of operations, the JFC can either retain SCA or designate a component 

commander as the SCA.

b. The JFC’s staff assists in the decision-making process. The staff’s sole function is 

command support, and its only authority is delegated to it by the JFC. The staff plans, 

monitors, advises, and coordinates the above listed JFC responsibilities. The JFC has the 

authority and latitude to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to ensure unity of effort 

and accomplishment of assigned missions (to include joint counterair operations). The 

composition of the staff normally reflects the composition of the joint force to ensure those 

responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of total force capabilities, 

needs, and limitations. Normally, each staff division is responsible for a specific area and is 

required to coordinate its actions, planning, and progress with other concerned divisions and 

agencies within the command. The primary staff divisions and their responsibilities are 

discussed in detail in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

5. Component Commanders

a. Service Components. The Service component commanders are responsible for 

making available to the JFACC those counterair forces/capabilities not required for their 

primary roles and tasks per the apportionment guidance by the JFC. They are responsible for 

passing warnings of air and missile attacks to their forces and for establishing the means of 

C2 for the decentralized execution of counterair operations. Some of the Service 

components are capable of establishing regional/sector AD commands and providing the 

regional air defense commanders (RADCs)/sector air defense commanders (SADCs). The 

following are elements of the Service components that support counterair: 

(1) Army. The commander, Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC), is 

the Army forces (ARFOR) operational lead for counterair operations who ensures the 

ARFOR contribution is properly planned, coordinated, integrated, and synchronized. The 

AAMDC provides a significant focus on countering adversary offensive air and missile 

capabilities. The commander, AAMDC, is normally designated the theater Army air and 

missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) for the theater Army commander or the joint 

force land component commander (JFLCC), if one is established. As approved by the JFC, 

the AADC may designate the commander, AAMDC, as a deputy area air defense

commander (DAADC) for AMD in support of the AADC for DCA operations. The 

AAMDC is responsible for balancing the Army counterair assets/capabilities between the 

Army/JFLCC maneuver units and the theater level requirements established in the JFC 

approved defended asset list (DAL) and the AADP. The AAMDC ensures that Army theater 

AMD operations are internally coordinated and properly integrated with the joint force and 

MNFs. The Army provides C2, sensors, and weapon systems for counterair, but does not 

provide the capability for regional/sector AD commands within the land component area of 

operations (AO). Regional/sector AD commands are normally provided by C2 elements 
Command and Control 

II-5 

(control and reporting center [CRC], tactical air operations center [TAOC], or an Aegis

equipped ship) of the other components. 

(2) Navy. Navy forces (NAVFOR) contribute to the joint counterair effort by 

providing sensor, engagement, and C2 capability. In addition to defending maritime forces 

from air and missile threats, NAVFOR may be employed in support of operations or to 

defend assets on land. Maritime surface AMD capability is centered on multi-mission 

capable ships that are employed to meet multiple JFC priorities. To balance competing 

operational requirements and adjudicate between conflicting demands, the Navy component 

commander (NCC) retains OPCON and TACON of ships with AMD capability. Navy OCA 

capability can be employed theater-/JOA-wide, but their DCA capability is normally within 

the maritime AO. The Navy has an integrated AMD planning and battle management 

capability, normally performed by a commander, task force integrated air and missile 

defense (CTF IAMD). CTF IAMD, or a subordinate Navy commander such as an air and 

missile defense commander (AMDC) may function as a RADC/SADC. Depending on the 

threat and available forces, the AMDC function may be split between a separate air defense 

commander (ADC) and BMD commander. For some limited, maritime-centric operations 

such as an amphibious operation, the NCC may function as the JFACC or AADC. 

(3) Marine Corps. Marine Corps forces (MARFOR) task organize as a Marine 

air-ground task force (MAGTF) that remains under the OPCON of the commander, Marine 

Corps forces (COMMARFOR). The COMMARFOR under a JFC is typically a MAGTF 

commander who retains OPCON of organic air assets. During joint operations, the MAGTF 

aviation combat element (ACE) will be in support of MAGTF ground combat element 

(GCE) to accomplish the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties 

available to the JFC, for tasking through the JFACC, for AD, long-range interdiction, and 

long-range reconnaissance. MAGTF air assets are made available for counterair through the 

air apportionment process. The MAGTF can provide a joint SADC utilizing its TAOC. 

(4) Air Force. Counterair is a primary function of the Air Force forces (AFFOR) 

during joint operations. The AFFOR can make available sensor systems, C2 systems, and 

weapon systems and is capable of providing one or more RADCs/SADCs throughout the 

JOA, including within the land component AO. The Air Force operates a number of air and 

space operations centers worldwide. For joint operations, one of these with suitable joint 

augmentation is capable of being used as a joint air operations center (JAOC). The 

commander, Air Force forces(COMAFFOR), maintains centralized control of air operations 

through the Air Force air and space operations center and the daily air tasking order (ATO). 

Decentralized execution of the ATO is normally accomplished by subordinate air 

commanders using elements of the theater air control system (TACS). The CRC may be 

used as the core element for an AD region/sector and can monitor/direct implementation of 

airspace control, ID, and weapons control procedures. For a large-scale, extended campaign, 

the COMAFFOR may provide appropriate elements of the TACS (i.e., CRCs and the 

Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS]) in support of joint air operations and 

counterair operations. If required, several CRCs may be provided to cover various 

operational areas within the JOA. AWACS may provide an initial TACS capability in the 

JOA until the CRCs are deployed and operational. The AWACS provides elevated sensors 

and radios for operational reach and in operations of a limited scope or duration can provide 
Chapter II

II-6 JP 3-01 

some of the functions of a CRC such as monitor/control airspace, ID, and weapons control 

procedures. 

(5) The Services support a complex and complementary array of sensor, weapon, 

C2, and battle management capabilities that are integrated to form the IADS, airspace control 

system (ACS), and theater air-ground system (TAGS). 

For more information on TAGS, see Field Manual (FM) 3-52.2/Naval Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures (NTTP) 3- 56.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) 

(AFTTP[I]) 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater AirGround System (TAGS).

b. Functional Components. Functional component commands serve to ease the 

burden on the theater and JTF staffs, free the JFC to focus more on strategic aspects of the 

campaign, and provide individual air, land, maritime, and special operations forces (SOF) 

headquarters for coordination with the other components. The JFC assigns responsibilities to 

and establishes command relationships among the functional component commanders, to 

include planning, organizing, coordinating, and executing functional area joint operations 

based on the JFCs’ CONOPS. In addition to the JFACC, functional component commanders 

can include the JFLCC, joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC), and the joint 

force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). 

(1) JFLCC. The JFC normally designates a JFLCC when the land forces comprise 

two or more component forces (e.g., ARFOR and MARFOR). The JFLCC will provide a 

better degree of centralized planning and direction for an expansive or complex land 

operation. The JFLCC, as a single commander for joint land operations, not only enhances 

synchronization of all land operations, but also provides forces/capabilities in direct support 

of the counterair mission. While ARFOR and MARFOR maneuver units have organic air 

defense assets, they have different counterair capabilities. The MARFOR has organic fixedwing aircraft capable of OCA and DCA operations, limited SAM capability, and armed 

rotary-wing aircraft capable of limited OCA operations. The ARFOR has armed rotary-wing 

maneuver units and ground based AD units effective against theater missiles and aircraft, but 

no fixed-wing AD aircraft. The ARFOR also has the Army Tactical Missile System for a 

short to medium range offensive capability that could be used in support of OCA. 

(a) The MAGTF ACE is sized to support the GCE. The ACE has fixed- and 

rotary-wing assets and the means to control them. The MAGTF can support both OCA and 

DCA operations. The MAGTF normally makes aircraft sorties available for counterair 

tasking under TACON to the JFACC/AADC. The MAGTF commander’s AD battle 

manager is a SADC whose authority is determined by the ACE commander. The MAGTF 

air control assets while supporting the ACE are normally part of the joint force IADS, and if 

sized to the mission, can function as a sector AD command. 

(b) As discussed previously, the Army component provides an AAMDC that 

integrates the operational elements of Army active AD, passive AD, attack operations, C2 

systems, and intelligence, and synchronizes the Army contributions to counterair operations. 

Normally, the AAMDC is under OPCON of the JFLCC and in direct support of the AADC. 
Command and Control 

II-7 

The AAMDC conducts split-based operations to provide the necessary support and deploys 

liaison teams to major theater C2 headquarters to ensure Army AMD assets are integrated 

and synchronized in joint operations. The commander, AAMDC, also commands all Army 

theater-level AMD forces.

Refer to JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, for more detailed 

information regarding the JFLCC and joint land operations. 

(2) JFMCC. The JFMCC is the single commander for joint maritime operations

and is normally supported by a maritime operations center (MOC). The JFMCC is 

responsible for accomplishing the joint sea control mission using multipurpose ships 

executing multiple missions simultaneously. The JFMCC typically has robust AMD 

capabilities that can be employed in support of joint counterair. Due to the interrelated 

nature of air, surface, and subsurface operations, if the JFC establishes a maritime AO, it 

may include a congruent regional or sector AD command covering the open ocean and 

littorals, for which the JFMCC should be granted sufficient authorities to conduct operations 

and defend fleet units, including the authority to engage missile platforms such as 

submarines, patrol boats, and aircraft, or coastal defense CMs. In the case of maritime air 

defense regions, the JFMCC may recommend a subordinate maritime commander who 

possesses planning and battle management capabilities to the AADC for assignment as a 

RADC/SADC (e.g., CTF IAMD or AMDC).

(3) The JFMCC normally provides aircraft sorties for counterair tasking under 

TACON of the JFACC/AADC, but retains OPCON/TACON of multipurpose AMD capable 

ships providing their AMD capabilities in support to the JFACC/AADC. 

(4) Task force IAMD is a functionally based Navy organization to which the 

numbered fleet commander (NFC), who may be the JFMCC, assigns a CTF IAMD with 

selected planning and execution authorities. CTF IAMD provides a standardized C2 layer 

between the NFC and subordinate maritime commanders focused on tactical level missions.

Refer to Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational 

Level of War, and NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center, for additional discussion of 

Navy C2 and CTF IAMD.

(5) JFSOCC. The JFSOCC may be the commander, theater special operations 

command, a subordinate unified command under a GCC. Under a JFC subordinate to the 

GCC, the JFSOCC may be a designated commander, joint special operations task force 

(CDRJSOTF). The JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF can provide OCA support through employment of 

some of their core activities such as direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional 

warfare, and information operations (IO), normally in enemy territory. Those core 

operations and activities represent the collective capabilities of all SOF rather than those of 

any one unit. Normally, SOF have no capability to support DCA outside of self-defense 

using small arms or man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). The JFSOCC normally 

provides a special operations liaison element (SOLE) to the JFACC at the JAOC and a 

special operations C2 element to the JFLCC, and to the JFMCC, if necessary. The SOLE, in 

close coordination with all JFSOCC components, coordinates and deconflicts SOF surface
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II-8 JP 3-01 

and air operations with the air component including coordination for shared assets and 

fratricide prevention.

For further details concerning the JFSOCC, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

6. Joint Force Air Component Commander

The JFC will typically designate responsibility for joint air operations to a JFACC. 

Normally, the JFACC is the Service component commander having the preponderance of air 

assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations. The need for a 

JFACC is based on the JFC’s overall mission, CONOPS, missions and tasks assigned to 

subordinate commanders, forces available, duration and nature of joint air operations desired, 

and the degree of control required for joint air operations. Although not a joint air operation, 

but a joint operation, counterair normally is an assigned responsibility of the JFACC. The 

functions of the JFACC, AADC, and ACA must be integrated to ensure that joint air 

operations, OCA, DCA, and airspace control are fully integrated and synchronized. 

The responsibilities of the JFACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally 

assigned to one individual, but they may be assigned to two or more individuals when the 

situation dictates. Based on the situation, if the JFC decides not to assign the JFACC, 

AADC, or ACA as one individual, then close coordination between all three positions is 

essential. 

a. The JFACCs normally have OPCON over their own Service component forces and 

TACON or direct support of the other forces/capabilities made available to the JFACC for 

tasking. The JFACC generally uses centralized direction and planning with decentralized 

execution for counterair operations. This parallels the JFACC using centralized control with 

decentralized execution for joint air operations. These are not to be confused with the 

surface AD control modes of centralized control, when higher echelon AD units direct target 

assignments over their fire units, and the normal mode of decentralized control, when the 

higher echelon monitors fire unit actions, making direct target assignments to units only 

when necessary to ensure proper fire distribution or to prevent engagement of friendly 

aircraft. 

b. The responsibilities of the JFACC normally include, but are not limited to, joint air 

operations planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking, based on the JFC’s concept of 

operations and air apportionment decision. Other responsibilities of the JFACC relating 

to joint counterair operations include the following:

(1) Develop, coordinate, and integrate joint counterair planning with operations of 

other components for JFC approval. 

(2) Make an air apportionment recommendation to the JFC, after consulting with 

other components and supporting commanders, which includes counterair, strategic attack, 

interdiction, and close air support (CAS). 

(3) Provide centralized direction for allocating and tasking joint counterair 

capabilities and forces made available by the JFC.
Command and Control 

II-9 

(4) Provide IO strategies to neutralize enemy air and missile threats while 

preserving friendly offensive and defensive capability.

(5) Perform the duties of the AADC when directed by the JFC. 

(6) Perform the duties of the ACA when directed by the JFC. 

(7) Perform the duties of the SCA when directed by the JFC.

(8) When approved by the GCC and directed by the JFC, coordinate cross-AOR 

operations with the JFACC/JFC in adjacent AORs. 

c. The JFACC plans, directs, and executes counterair operations throughout the 

theater/JOA in accordance with JFC guidance and priorities, and therefore determines the 

priority, timing, and effects of counterair fires throughout the theater/JOA. When the JFC 

designates land/maritime force commanders, they are the supported commanders within their 

designated AOs, and they synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction within their AOs, to 

include prioritizing targets, effects, and timing of fires. The JFACC has the latitude to plan 

and execute JFC prioritized missions within a land or maritime AO in coordination with that 

land or maritime force commander.

(1) Although the JFACC normally has the latitude to plan and execute high-priority 

counterair operations and to attack targets within the land and maritime AOs, the JFACC 

must coordinate specific counterair operations with those component commanders to avoid 

adverse affects and fratricide. If counterair operations would have adverse effects within a 

component’s AO, then the JFACC must adjust the plan, resolve the issue with that 

component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution. 

(2) The JFC may designate and prioritize certain time-sensitive targets (TSTs) that 

require immediate action whenever and wherever those TSTs are found. In doing so, the 

JFC has assessed and approved the higher risk for that priority target. The JFACC, JFLCC, 

JFMCC, and JFSOCC must plan, coordinate, and rehearse how the JFACC will 

engage TSTs within the land and maritime AOs and the joint special operations areas.

d. A JAOC normally functions as the JFACC’s principal operations center. It links with 

national and theater sensors, intelligence, communications, and component operations 

centers. The Service component commanders dual-designated as JFACCs will normally use 

their organic air operations centers to form the cores of their JAOCs. Other component 

commanders normally will augment the JAOC. The effectiveness of the JAOC also rests on 

the expertise of component liaisons such as the Army battlefield coordination detachment 

(BCD), naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), Marine liaison element (MARLE), 

the SOLE, and the AAMDC element. These liaison elements enhance coordination between 

their component commanders and the JFACC. The JFACC may establish one or more joint 

air component coordination elements (JACCEs) with other commanders’ headquarters to 

better integrate joint air operations with their operations. When established, the JACCE is a 

component level liaison that serves as the direct representative of the JFACC. The 

component operations centers and liaison elements facilitate the planning, coordination, 
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II-10 JP 3-01 

integration, and deconfliction of all joint counterair operations with other component 

operations. 

e. An IADS normally is established by the JFACC/AADC for DCA with the JAOC 

leading its operation. The IADS is a robust integration of the Services’ AMD capabilities 

and comprises sensors, weapons, COMNETs, C2 systems, intelligence systems, and 

personnel. The IADS allows the JFACC/AADC to optimize mutual support with the 

strengths of the Services’ capabilities while “covering” for their limitations. 

f. The JFACC establishes a component joint data networks operations officer equivalent 

(CJE), as does each of the joint force components. The CJEs support the JFC’s joint data 

network (JDN) operations officer (JDNO) who is responsible for the common tactical picture 

(CTP). The JFC typically designates the JFACC as the designated component commander 

for the joint multi-tactical data link network (MTN). 

Refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, for more detailed 

information regarding the JFACC, the JAOC, JACCE, and joint air operations. 

Refer to FM 3-01.15/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-25E/NTTP 

3-01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an 

Integrated Air Defense System, for additional details regarding an IADS. 

7. Area Air Defense Commander

a. The JFC designates an AADC with the authority to plan, coordinate, and integrate 

overall joint force DCA operations. The AADC normally is the component commander with 

the preponderance of AMD capability and the C2 and intelligence capability to plan, 

coordinate, and execute integrated AMD operations, including real-time battle management. 

b. Normally, for a large operation/campaign, the AADC will establish an IADS through 

the comprehensive integration of all available component C2 systems and AMD 

capabilities/assets. In the interest of decentralized execution, the AADC and 

RADCs/SADCs should be granted the necessary authorities to synchronize/deconflict and 

control engagements and to exercise battle management. Those authorities may include ID, 

commitment, emissions control, and engagement, all of which are discussed in Chapter III, 

“Counterair Planning,” paragraph 13, “Identification, Commitment, and Engagement 

Authorities.” 

c. The JFC will define the command relationships between the AADC and other joint 

force component commanders. Components will provide representatives, as appropriate, to 

the AADC’s headquarters to provide both specific weapon systems expertise and broader 

mission expertise. If the JFACC is the AADC, or they are colocated, those representatives 

normally are within the same liaison elements provided to the JAOC (BCD, AAMDC, 

NALE, MARLE, and SOLE). If the AADC is not located at the JAOC, then appropriate 

liaison elements will be required from the Service/functional components.

d. With the support of the component commanders, the AADC develops, integrates, 

and distributes a JFC-approved joint AADP. A critical feature of a joint, integrated plan 
Command and Control 

II-11 

is a common operational picture (COP) (i.e., a fused and correlated air, ground, and maritime 

picture) available in all supporting C2 facilities. 

(1) The plan also should contain detailed weapons control and engagement 

procedures for all DCA weapons systems and forces integral to DCA operations. 

(2) The plan should be closely integrated with the ACP through the ACA. 

(3) The AADP should include IO measures and actions supporting counterair 

operations. 

e. Primary responsibilities of the AADC include the following:

(1) Develop, integrate, and distribute a JFC-approved joint AADP in coordination 

with Service and functional components. 

(2) Develop and execute, in coordination with the intelligence directorate of a joint 

staff (J-2), J-3, communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6), and joint force 

components, a detailed plan to disseminate timely air and missile warning and cueing 

information to components, forces, allies, coalition partners, and civil authorities, as 

appropriate. Planning for BMD should include coordination for launch warnings, attack 

assessments, and other aspects of missile defense, either through the supported GCC or 

directly with USSTRATCOM, if authorized. 

(3) Develop and implement, in coordination with the component commanders and 

with JFC approval, ID and CID procedures and authorities, and engagement procedures that 

are appropriate to counterair.

(4) Establish timely and accurate track reporting procedures among participating 

units to provide a CTP. 

(5) Perform the duties of the ACA when directed by the JFC. 

(6) For complex operations, the JFC may approve establishment of AD

regions/sectors and designation of RADCs/SADCs, as appropriate, to enhance decentralized 

execution of DCA operations. 

(7) Establish appropriate joint, fighter, and missile engagement zones (MEZs) in 

coordination with the RADCs/SADCs and the ACA. 

(8) Appoint DAADCs as required, to advise on how to integrate and synchronize 

their Service component DCA capabilities/assets for complex DCA plans and operations. 

(9) Ensure all support assets, including surface-based and space-based early 

warning systems, are fully coordinated to support DCA operations. 

(10) Make DCA recommendationsto the JFC/JFACC after consultation with DCA 

representatives from the joint force components. 
Chapter II

II-12 JP 3-01 

(11) Make OCA attack operations recommendations to the JFC/JFACC to help 

counter the air and missile threat. The AADC should prioritize those desired effects to be 

created to support achievement of objectives through OCA. 

(12) As approved by the JFC, coordinate with supported/supporting commands for 

cross-AOR operations (e.g., cross-AOR BMD).

f. DAADC. When a significant portion of the DCA capability is contributed by a 

component other than that of the AADC, a senior officer from that component may be 

designated by the JFC or AADC as a DAADC. DAADC responsibilities include assisting in 

AADP development; integrating respective component and multinational AMD into DCA 

operations; and advising on ROE, ACMs, weapons control measures, air defense warnings 

(ADW), and respective component AMD operations and capabilities. As the senior Army 

air defender, the commander, AAMDC, is normally designated as a DAADC and advises the 

AADC on the best distribution of the Army AMD capabilities between the requirements for 

the theater level DAL and maneuver forces of the ARFOR/JFLCC. As a DAADC, the 

commander, AAMDC, will deploy personnel and equipment to the JAOC. 

Note: The Army BCD normally deployed to the Air Force air and space operations center or 

the JAOC is only a liaison element. Although the BCD has an AD section, responsibility to 

integrate the ARFOR AMDs resides with the senior ADA commander, normally the 

commander, AAMDC. 

8. Regional and Sector Air Defense Commanders

During complex operations/campaigns conducted in a large JOA/theater of operations, 

the AADC may recommend and the JFC may approve the division of the operational area 

into separate AD regions, each with a RADC who could be delegated responsibilities and 

decision-making authority for DCA operations within the region. The AADC and RADC, as 

approved by the JFC, may choose to further divide regions into sectors, each with a SADC 

with appropriate authority for their responsibilities. Generally, the regions/sectors are based 

on geographic size and obstacles/features overland. When RADCs/SADCs are employed in 

support of BMD operations, regional/sector boundaries are normally assigned on the basis of 

predicted BM impact points. The open ocean and littorals normally are part of a maritime 

AO/region and the RADC/SADC may be afloat, so its complete integration with the 

bordering land-based RADC/SADC and the AADC is essential to prevent a seam in the 

IADS. The core of a RADC/SADC is a Service component air control/AD organization 

with the necessary situational awareness and communications links up to the 

AADC/JFACC/JFC, down to the tactical units’ operation centers, and laterally to other 

RADCs/SADCs. A tactical data link (TDL) such as Link 16 enables sharing of the CTP 

between Service systems and RADCs/SADCs. The COP at the higher echelons, normally a 

Global Command and Control System (GCCS) environment, includes the Link 16 CTP data.

a. The maritime component (NAVFOR/JFMCC) normally has the open ocean and 

littorals as a region with a Navy AMDC on an Aegis ship, but the littorals also could be 

covered by a Navy tactical air control center (TACC) or Marine TAOC. Over land, there 
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II-13 

may be numerous RADCs/SADCs, normally operated by the AFFOR or the MARFOR. The 

role of the Army does not require a capability to operate a RADC/SADC.

b. The AADC also may delegate certain planning functions to a RADC/SADC 

concerning the deployment of air and surface AMD assets. In all cases, the AADC should 

establish clear guidance concerning the responsibilities and authorities delegated to the 

RADC/SADC. 

c. Each RADC/SADC with a surface-based AD requirement/capability must have that 

expertise on staff and the requisite C2 links. For a Navy/maritime component, the 

integration of air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities is organic to established fleet air 

defense. The MAGTF also has an integrated organic AD capability. The Air Force must 

rely on Army augmentation/liaison for surface-to-air expertise. A Navy or Marine Corps 

RADC/SADC should have that Army expertise as a liaison if they rely on an Army AMD 

capability within their region/sector. Additionally, if a ground-based RADC/SADC is being 

supported by a Navy/JFMCC surface-based AMD system (e.g., Aegis-equipped ship), then 

an equivalent Navy AD specialist should augment or be liaison to that RADC/SADC. 

d. Army Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer (ADAFCO). The ADAFCO is the 

single point of contact between Army land-based AMD fire direction centers and the 

joint/Army controlling authority. An ADAFCO is required in any area/regional/sector air 

defense command in which an Army AMD capability is employed. The ADAFCO is 

responsible for coordinating Army AMD for designated assets/areas on the DAL in that 

area/region/sector and for coordinating and monitoring the tracking and engagement 

activities of individual Army ADA fire units. The ADAFCO is the Army AMD engagement 

expert for the AADC/RADC/SADC on what course of action (COA) Army ADA units 

would likely follow during any situations, especially with degraded communications, and 

what limitations ROE can have on autonomous Army ADA units, what tactics may be more 

effective, etc. ADAFCO elements should be part of/liaison to any Service component AMD 

operations centers that may have control of or support from Army AMD assets. The 

ADAFCO element should be capable of continuous (24-hour) operations with the 

AADC/RADC/SADC, and normally is placed under the direct control of the senior air 

defense officer (SADO), senior weapons director, or mission crew commander. The 

ADAFCO must have access to dedicated AD communication links (e.g., dedicated AD voice 

circuit) with Army AD C2 nodes when conducting active AD operations. The ADAFCO 

also needs a display of the local track data the ADA systems hold and are preparing to 

engage. Normally, an ADAFCO should not be placed on an airborne warning and 

control/airborne C2 aircraft that are not designated as a full time SADC directing groundbased AD in conjunction with active air intercepts. Those air control type aircraft normally 

lack a dedicated seat position and communications for the ADAFCO. However, some 

operations may require ADAFCO support on those aircraft, so the Army and air component 

planners must anticipate and properly coordinate for that requirement to ensure effective use 

of the available ADAFCO assets.

(1) AAMDC ADAFCO. The AAMDC ADAFCO, in conjunction with a Navy 

liaison for the Aegis, will typically be located with the AADC/JFACC and the SADO at the 

JAOC, and will be responsible for the coordination and deconfliction of upper-tier (i.e., exo-
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II-14 JP 3-01 

atmospheric) BM engagements. Currently, upper-tier engagements of BMs may be executed 

by Aegis and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, and 

coordination/deconfliction will normally be accomplished by preplanned tactics, techniques, 

and procedures. The AAMDC ADAFCO maintains communications with the brigade (BDE) 

ADAFCOs at the various regional/sector AD commands to share situational awareness. To 

accomplish the mission, the AAMDC ADAFCO requires reliable voice and data 

communications with the Aegis controlling authority, the THAAD battery tactical 

control officer, and the BDE ADAFCOs. The AAMDC ADAFCO requires a joint air 

picture shared with the SADO. Note: For homeland BMD, CDRUSNORTHCOM employs 

the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) for exo-atmospheric engagements of BMs. 

(2) BDE ADAFCO. The BDE ADAFCO is responsible for lower-tier engagements 

(i.e., endo-atmospheric) within a particular region or sector. Lower-tier engagements include 

terminal phase engagements of BMs, ASMs, and air breathing threats (aircraft and CM). 

The BDE ADAFCOs are normally located with the RADCs/SADCs, and specifically with 

their mission crew commanders or senior weapons directors. The BDE ADAFCOs are the 

Army link between Patriot units and the joint controlling agency (e.g., RADC/SADC). The 

BDE ADAFCO issues all fire control orders to their subordinate units. The BDE ADAFCO 

requires voice and data communications with the tactical directors at the battalion’s 

information coordination central and a joint air picture feed from the RADC/SADC or 

the commander with engagement authority. Due to the requirement to colocate with a 

RADC/SADC, BDE ADAFCOs are usually located with a US Air Force CRC, US Navy 

Aegis, Marine Corps TAOC, or, in very specific circumstances, a US Air Force AWACS. 

To ensure error free clearing of fires, the ADAFCO should be provided a dedicated position 

with display of the CTP and supporting voice communications. 

9. Airspace Control Authority

a. The JFC designates an ACA who has overall responsibility for establishing and 

operating the ACS. The ACA also develops policies and procedures for airspace control that 

are incorporated into an ACP and promulgated throughout the theater/JOA. A key 

responsibility of the ACA is to provide the flexibility needed within the ACS to meet 

contingency situations that necessitate rapid employment of forces. 

b. The ACA coordinates use of airspace through the ACP, including integration with the 

HN ACS, and synchronizes/deconflicts all user requirements using the airspace control order 

(ACO). The ACA must be able to rapidly implement ACMs in the dynamic counterair 

environment to enhance freedom of action of components while preventing fratricide. The 

ACP is implemented by the ACO, and all component forces that affect joint air operations 

are subject to the ACO. However, this control of airspace by the ACA does not imply any 

type of command authority (OPCON or TACON) over any air asset. 

c. The ACA responsibilities for counterair operations include, but are not limited to: 

(1) Link the ACP to the AADP when designating volumes of airspace.

(2) Develop ACMs that support and enhance operations. 
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II-15 

(3) Provide a flexible ACP that can adapt to changing requirements of the tactical 

situation.

Refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for more details concerning the ACA. 

10. Cross Area of Responsibility Command Relationships Considerations

The primary strategic planning documents, Guidance for Employment of the Force and 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, discuss “cross-AOR” in campaign planning. GCCs are 

supported commanders for assigned missions in their AORs, and they anticipate the 

possibility for “cross-AOR” operations based on threats and capabilities. They must plan 

accordingly and coordinate with other affected and supporting CCDRs. 

a. A significant concern for GCCs is not only long-range BMs that can traverse entire 

AORs, but also SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, because they represent the most prevalent

threats.

b. When establishing command relationships and C2 for cross-AOR BMD, the 

following should be considered: 

(1) Span of Control. Span of control is based on factors such as the number of 

subordinates/components, number of activities, range of weapon systems, force capabilities, 

the size and complexity of the operational area, and the method used to control operations 

(e.g., centralized or decentralized execution). Coordination authority between GCCs 

should enable coordination at component and tactical levels supporting unity of effort 

for cross-AOR BMD. 

(2) Simplicity. Simplicity is achieved through an unambiguous chain of command, 

well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities. 

For cross-AOR BMD, which typically must be executed in a manner of minutes, simplicity 

is essential and enables fully planned and rehearsed actions before execution is actually 

required. 

(3) Unit Integrity. Component forces should remain organized as designed and in 

the manner accustomed through training, but cross-AOR operations may necessitate unique 

support relationships, including units supporting forces in other theaters. 

(4) Interoperability. C2 capabilities should be interoperable within the joint 

force headquarters, among component commands and other supporting commands, and 

between joint forces in support relationships. Collaborative planning at various levels is 

an essential aspect of interoperability among joint force components and 

supported/supporting commands. 

c. Authorities and Battle Management. Short missile engagement windows place a 

premium on clearly established authorities. For example, in AORs without active conflicts 

involving air or missile threats, the GCC may only approve the theater JFACC/AADC for 

engagement authority of inbound threats within friendly airspace. In an operational area 

with imminent or ongoing hostilities, the JFC may approve delegation of engagement 
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II-16 JP 3-01 

authority down to a RADC/SADC. The air and missile threats posed by adversaries are 

normally known, and plans/orders, including ROE, are approved in anticipation of the 

indications and warnings that would precede a possible hostile launch. 

d. Existing plans and orders address a number of known cross-AOR threats. A 

primary concern involving cross-AOR fires/operations is the potential difficulty of 

prioritizing tactical actions of a supporting unit. Support relationships between GCCs 

can be clearly established, but responding to conflicting requirements or priorities can create 

an operational dilemma: How does the unit commander respond to multiple tasks? When 

may there be conflicting times and locations? This type of situation should be mitigated 

through exercises and rehearsals.

e. Other essential considerations in cross-AOR BMD are differences in GCCs plans and 

procedures, command relationships, and battle management procedures. For example, 

command relationships and the engagement procedures for homeland BMD are 

significantly different than those for other regional BMD. These differences can be 

overcome through prior planning, training, and rehearsals among the supported and 

supporting commanders and tasked units. This applies to both the offensive and defensive 

aspects of a missile defense strategy.

SECTION B. MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

11. General

Most joint operations are now conducted within a multinational context (i.e., an alliance 

or coalition). Each MNF operation is unique, and the international situation, along with the 

perspectives, motives, and values of each MNF member may vary. The JFC (who may be 

the multinational force commander [MNFC]) must evaluate key considerations and 

differences involved in planning, coordinating, and conducting counterair operations in a 

multinational environment. A major characteristic of operating in the multinational 

environment is that consensus through compromise is often essential to success. Within 

designated command authorities and in close coordination with the civilian leadership, the 

MNFC may have responsibilities to both national and foreign leaders and must be prepared 

to negotiate with MNF partners when planning and developing ROE, ACMs, weapon control 

measures, and other appropriate procedures and processes such as CID. 

12. Command Relationships 

a. The traditional command relationships used by US forces generally may not be 

possible with all MNF partners because of political necessity. Some MNF partners may 

accept US command authorities; others may not. In MNF operations, understanding the 

agreed upon command relationships and the related command authorities is key to 

developing the desired unity of effort for counterair operations. 

b. If command relationships and support requirements (e.g., security and logistics) are 

not already provided for in existing agreements, the JFC should request to have such 

agreements concluded (memorandums of agreements, technical arrangements, status of 

forces agreements, etc.) between US and MNF members conducting counterair operations. 
Command and Control 

II-17 

The authority to negotiate and conclude international agreements with MNF members is not 

an inherent aspect of the JFC’s OPCON authority, and must be exercised only by those 

entities specifically delegated authority to negotiate and/or conclude international agreements 

(i.e., SecDef, Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff [CJCS], CCDRs).

c. The JFC must be aware that many different interpretations of OPCON and TACON 

exist among MNF partners, and all must ensure complete understanding of the terms early 

during the planning of the operation. The JFACC/AADC may expect no more than TACON 

over MNF counterair units/capabilities, and very likely, may have simple support 

relationships based on mission-type orders. 

Refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for more details on organizing alliance and 

coalition command structures and headquarters. 

13. Organization 

a. No matter how the MNF is organized, the organizational structure and command 

relationships must be clearly understood by all commanders and supported by the C2 

capability. 

b. Some significant organizational considerations affecting counterair include force 

capabilities and disparities, information and equipment security, unit procedural and 

organizational differences, cultural differences, language barriers (including differing use of 

common terms), and interoperability of the C2 systems of the MNF components. See Figure 

II-1 for a listing of some principal factors affecting national military capabilities.

(1) Each nation normally establishes a national center or cell as a focal point to 

ensure effective support and control of its forces, to include counterair forces. 

(2) National intelligence systems should be integrated to ensure responsiveness to 

counterair operational needs. Because sharing intelligence and warning information is vital 

to unity of effort, any issues related to the release of intelligence information and products to 

MNF partners must be resolved early during planning. At all levels, the senior US officer 

needs to be concerned with the issues of foreign disclosure guidance and intelligence sharing 

early in the planning process to ensure the commander’s requirements and intent have been 

clearly stated and understood. 
Chapter II

II-18 JP 3-01 

(3) Some nations are particularly sensitive to certain force protection measures (use 

of flares, security patrols by national forces other than their own, arming of force protection 

personnel, limiting access of airfield support personnel to aircraft, etc.). These issues should 

be coordinated ahead of time, and agreements must be continually updated as situations 

warrant. 

(4) Before assigning tasks to MNF units, the JFACC/AADC should ensure that all 

elements can make meaningful contributions to the overall counterair mission. Some 

partners may be restricted to the types of targets they are permitted to attack and the level of 

risk they are willing to accept due to domestic politics, arms limitation agreements, or their 

capabilities.

(5) The AADC should ensure that MNF ROE, engagement authorities, and 

procedures are consistent with the combined AADP and the MNF ability to identify friendly 

forces, in order to prevent gaps and ensure joint air forces are not subject to an increased risk 

of fratricide and MNF are not restricted from self-defense. When MNF ID and C2 

capabilities are not consistent with joint capabilities, it may be necessary to implement 

additional ACM, procedural ID, and engagement control measures, or to limit MNF 

engagements to self-defense only. US liaison elements may be required at MNF AD or air 

operations facilities to ensure an adequate capability for ID and engagement control exists.

c. All critical forces and geopolitical areas should receive adequate protection from air 

and missile threats. Some MNF partners are not uniformly capable of defending against air 

and missile threats and may require DCA assets from another theater or nation. 

d. The JFACC/AADC should consider using liaison officers to assess and/or assist 

MNF partners’ counterair capabilities and to maintain span of control and keep forces 

connected at the tactical level. Also, depending upon the makeup of the MNF, the need for 

interpreters should be considered. 

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for further detail 

concerning multinational operations. 

Figure II-1. Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations

Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations













National interests

Objectives

Arms control limitations

Doctrine

Training

Leader development













Equipment

History

Defense budget

Domestic politics

Religion

Culture
Command and Control 

II-19 

SECTION C. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS 

14. General

Joint counterair operations require reliable C2 capabilities that allow the 

JFC/JFACC/AADC, component commanders, and subordinate forces to integrate and 

synchronize/deconflict OCA and DCA operations. Effective C2 systems facilitate 

centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution, helping commanders to 

synchronize geographically separated operations into a unified action. C2 systems must 

support OCA operations while at the same time detecting, identifying, and tracking threats in 

order to warn, cue, and coordinate DCA assets, including providing accurate warnings of 

enemy missile launches and impact points. 

Refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for details regarding planning 

communications systems for joint operations. 

15. Requirements, Infrastructure, and Resources

a. Requirements. The C2 systems should be capable of rapidly exchanging 

information, interfacing among components, and displaying a CTP to all participating 

components. The components typically are tasked to provide a CTP. The components’ 

CTPs and information from the joint planning network contribute to a GCC’s COP. The 

information flow should be as complete, reliable, secure, and as near real time (NRT) as 

possible to support commanders’ decision-making cycles. These systems should be flexible 

enough to allow NRT retasking and coordination for attacks on TSTs. The C2 architecture 

among all levels of command should be survivable, interoperable, flexible, secure, and 

redundant to the maximum extent possible. C2 integration includes communications and 

data links for sensors, weapons systems, staffs and liaisons, and supporting agencies. 

Effective C2 systems support unity of effort during counterair operations by enabling 

commanders to fuse disparate databases and geographically separated offensive and 

defensive operations into a single COP/CTP that enhances situational awareness and 

understanding. For every operational element involved in counterair the C2 family of 

systems must support the following: 

(1) Rapid communications and coordination links and procedures. 

(2) Data fusion and decision-making nodes. 

(3) Warning and cueing systems.

(4) Links to dedicated weapons systems, other MNF partners, and/or civilian 

authorities.

(5) Vertical, horizontal, technical, and procedural interoperability. Counterair C2 

processes are built using existing joint and Service systems and capabilities. 

b. Infrastructure. The C2 infrastructure should consist of interoperable systems that 

provide complete coverage for an integrated diverse force spread across a theater/JOA 
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II-20 JP 3-01 

including considerations for any MNF assets. The systems will include large, fixed site C2 

facilities, small remote relay sites, mobile land and maritime sites, and airborne systems. 

These systems should be connected to commanders at appropriate decision and execution 

levels to integrate forces and missions. The C2 architecture provides the timely intelligence 

and operational information needed to plan, employ, coordinate, deconflict, execute, and 

sustain joint counterair operations. These systems also facilitate the integration of counterair 

with other joint operations via rapid communications among commanders, staffs, sensors, 

weapon systems, and supporting agencies. 

(1) Part of that infrastructure is the TAGS, a system of the various component airground systems integrated for planning and execution of air-ground operations. The TAGS

consists of an overarching joint C2 architecture and Service coordination links. It is not a 

formal system in itself but rather the sum of the component air-ground systems operating in 

the theater. It is applicable to all theater operations to include air, ground, maritime, and 

amphibious operations. 

Refer to FM 3-52.2/NTTP 3-56.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System, for detailed discussion of the TAGS and the 

Service component contribution to the infrastructure. 

(2) For theater warning, the Theater Event System reports the launch (voice and 

data) in-theater over two types of satellite broadcast networks: the Integrated Broadcast 

Service-Simplex (IBS-S) and the Integrated Broadcast Service-Interactive (IBS-I). IBS-S 

transmits real-time data via the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) or 

tactical terminal to the GCCS. IBS-I can provide timely intelligence information directly 

from collectors and associated ground processing facilities to the theater commanders for 

targeting, battle management, and overall situational awareness.

(3) The IADS is another part of the infrastructure that is not a formal system, but an 

integration of numerous systems that includes not only C2, but sensors, weapons, etc. 

Although primarily for DCA operations, some components of the IADS infrastructure and 

C2 architecture comprise a component of the TAGS. 

Refer to FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System, for details regarding the 

IADS.

c. Resources. Service components, the JFSOCC, and specialized joint communications 

elements provide the core of the communications capabilities for C2 for the joint force. The 

following summarize some of those capabilities that contribute to C2 for various aspects of 

counterair:

(1) Air Force C2. The Air Force TACS provides resources for a C2 infrastructure 

that can support the AFFOR or joint operations. The TACS includes the following elements 

that function under the tenets of centralized control and decentralized execution for joint air 

operations. 
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II-21 

(a) The Air Force air and space operations center is the senior air operations 

element of the TACS with the primary function of planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling air operations. It is capable of operating as a JAOC for the JFACC. 

(b) The CRC, as a worldwide deployable airspace control and battle 

management platform, is employed at the tactical level to support air operations planning and 

execution across the entire range of operations. The CRC operates independently or in 

combination with other tactical C2 elements (e.g., Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System [JSTARS], the air support operations center [ASOC], and AWACS). It supports 

horizontal integration with tactical resources and vertical integration with the Air Force air 

and space operations center. A CRC is capable of being a regional/sector AD center.

(c) The ASOC plans, coordinates, and directs air support for land forces, 

normally at corps level and below. It is directly subordinate to the Air Force air and space 

operations center and is responsible for the integration of air operations within its assigned 

corps sector to include CAS, air interdiction, air surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting, 

SEAD, theater airlift, and personnel recovery. 

(d) JSTARS E-8C aircraft provide NRT surveillance and targeting information 

on moving and stationary ground targets, slow-moving rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, and 

rotating antennae. These surveillance platforms also provide attack support to friendly 

offensive air elements in all ambient light and weather conditions. Based on the JFC’s 

objectives, JSTARS supports the JFLCC’s scheme of maneuver as well as the JFACC. 

JSTARS is a battle management, ISR, and C2 platform and is considered an HVAA.

(e) AWACS E-3B/C aircraft is a C2 platform with organic sensors that 

provides battle management and air surveillance functions, including airspace management, 

identifying and tracking friendly aircraft; detecting, identifying, and tracking enemy air 

threats for early warning and AD purposes; and it supports execution of the ATO. AWACS 

works directly with other Services’ AD aircraft and SAM units supporting the joint defense 

against air breathing and to a limited extent, BM threats. An AWACS may be designated as 

a SADC if a CRC or other ground-based C2 node is not in the JOA/AOR. This is usually a 

short-term solution until a CRC deploys into theater, or if an operation is of limited scope or 

a short duration. AWACS is considered an HVAA.

(2) Army C2 Assets. The Army air-ground system (AAGS) is the control system 

for synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating air operations with an Army land force 

commander’s scheme of maneuver. The AAGS initiates, receives, processes, and executes 

requests for air support and disseminates information and intelligence produced by aerial 

assets. Although some elements within AAGS (such as the tactical air control party 

[TACP]) belong to different Services or other nations, they function as a single entity in 

planning, coordinating, deconflicting, and integrating air support operations with ground 

operations. The Army elements of the AAGS consist of operations, fire support, AD, 

mission command, and coordination/liaison elements. The Army uses fires cells at all 

echelons to plan, coordinate, and execute joint fires and fire support within the 

Army/JFLCC’s AO. These elements can support OCA operations by advising the Army 
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II-22 JP 3-01 

unit commander/JFLCC on capabilities and the effective use of assets and by assisting 

in the planning and coordination of attacks of OCA targets within the AO.

(a) BCD. The Army provides a BCD as the interface for selected battlefield 

functions between the ARFOR/JFLCC and the AFFOR/JFACC. Typically, a BCD is 

colocated with the JAOC. The BCD supports OCA operations by advising the 

JFACC/JAOC on the capabilities and effective employment of ARFOR systems. The 

BCD passes JFACC requests for ARFOR/JFLCC support for OCA. The BCD assists in the 

synchronization of joint air operations with Army/JFLCC maneuver and fires and the 

exchange of operational and intelligence data.

(b) AAMDC. For OCA, the AAMDC, through its attack operations cell, 

plans, analyzes, tracks, develops, and nominates enemy air and missile targets. The 

AAMDC should colocate with, or nearby the JAOC, or provide a liaison element to the 

JFACC. For DCA, the AAMDC is the senior Army air defender for both the theater Army 

commander/JFLCC (as the TAAMDCOORD) and the AADC (as the DAADC).

For more information on Army fire support C2 assets, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

(3) Navy C2 Assets

(a) Navy Tactical Air Control System (NTACS). NTACS is the principal air 

control system afloat. The senior Navy air control agency is the Navy TACC and the 

subordinate airborne element is the E-2 Hawkeye aircraft. The Navy TACC is responsible 

for planning and conducting naval air operations as well as coordinating operations that 

affect airspace. If the JFACC’s command operations center is afloat, the Navy TACC may 

support operations as the JAOC. The link between the JFACC and naval commanders is the 

NALE located in the JAOC. The NALE assists in integrating naval air capabilities 

(including counterair) to help the JFACC meet JFC objectives through the NTACS. 

(b) CTF IAMD. CTF IAMD provides a standardized C2 layer between the 

NFC with their associated MOC and subordinate maritime commanders. CTF IAMD is 

subordinate to the NFC and will support the NAVFOR and one or more assigned JFMCCs, 

as required. CTF IAMD is the JFMCC’s tactical execution agent for supporting the 

JFACC’s counterair mission by implementing the AADC’s defense design for protecting the

prioritized DAL. 

(c) E-2C Hawkeye. The E-2C is an all-weather, aircraft carrier-capable 

tactical airborne early warning aircraft with comparable C2 capabilities to the AWACS E3B/C. With its organic sensors (active and passive) as well as large communication and data 

link suite, it provides airborne battlefield C2 and air surveillance functions, including 

airspace management; identifying and tracking friendly aircraft; detecting, identifying, and 

tracking enemy air threats for early warning and AD purposes; and it supports execution of 

the ATO. The Hawkeye works directly with other Services’ AD aircraft, C2 platforms, and 

SAM units supporting the joint defense against air breathing and to a limited extent, BM 

threats. Cooperative engagement capability-equipped Hawkeyes enhance early cueing of the 

Navy Aegis weapons system, dramatically extending the lethal range of the standard missile 
Command and Control 

II-23 

against airborne low-altitude, low-radar cross-section targets. E-2C crews train to act as a 

SADC if a CRC or other ground-based C2 node is not in the JOA/AOR. This is usually a 

short-term solution until a CRC deploys into theater or if an operation is of limited scope or a 

short duration. The limiting factor for the E-2 is on station time as it currently does not have 

the ability to refuel airborne. E-2 is considered an HVAA.

(4) The Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). The MACCS 

provides the Marine ACE commander with the capability to C2 and influence the application 

of Marine aviation assets. The Marine air C2 agencies involved in OCA and DCA are the 

tactical air command center (TACC) and the TAOC. 

(a) The Marine TACC is the senior agency for the ACE commander and battle

staff to plan, command, supervise, and direct MAGTF air operations. The TACC maintains 

complete information on the friendly situation, including an integrated air picture with 

ground combat information essential to the air effort. It can provide automated displays, 

ATO generation equipment, and data link feeds. Functionally, it is divided into four 

mutually supporting sections: current operations, future operations, future plans, and air 

combat intelligence. The TACC current operations section executes and assesses the daily 

ATO, while the TACC future operations section helps develop future ATOs and operation 

orders for the ACE. The TACC future plans section conducts aviation planning in support of 

the next mission, or potential mission, assigned to the MAGTF. The TACC air combat 

intelligence section supports the entire TACC by producing and disseminating aviationspecific all-source intelligence required to plan and execute air operations, to include 

counterair operations. 

(b) The TAOC is the principal AD agency in the MAGTF. Subordinate to the 

TACC, the TAOC provides real-time surveillance, direction, positive control, and 

navigational assistance for friendly aircraft. It performs real-time direction and control of all 

antiair warfare operations, including manned interceptors and surface-to-air weapons. The 

TAOC has the capability to serve as a SADC.

(c) The MARFOR normally provides a MARLE to the JAOC to serve as the 

Service conduit to the JFACC/AADC. 

(5) The SOF under a JFSOCC (or a CDRJSOTF designated for an operation) have 

their own joint force C2 architecture and are linked to and a part of the JFC’s C2 

architecture. The CDRJSOTF has at least one secure dedicated C2 network for their 

operations and other networks with the SOF Service components. Although SOF can play a 

significant role in OCA operations and they may share common operational areas with the 

JFACC (both routinely operate deep in enemy territory), the SOF only control their own 

operations or operations in which they are the supported command. The SOF have no 

capability for DCA. Therefore, SOF aviation and surface activities must be closely 

coordinated with all other joint operations, from planning through execution, to provide 

synchronization/deconfliction and to prevent fratricide. The SOLE serves as the JFSOCC’s 

representative to the JFACC and coordinates, deconflicts, and integrates all SOF air and 

surface activity into the ATOs and ACOs. 
Chapter II

II-24 JP 3-01 

(6) Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO). The JICO is the senior interface 

control officer in support of MTN operations and is the MTN coordinator for the JDN within 

the theater/JOA. The MTN is the primary feed/data source to support generation of a CTP. 

The CTP subsequently feeds the CCDR’s theater COP. The JICO is responsible for 

planning, monitoring, and managing the architecture and technical integration of joint data 

and communications systems for the MTN. The MTN components are the TDLs such as 

Link 11, Link 11B, Link 16, etc. The JICO controls and acts as the coordinating authority 

for the joint interface control cell (JICC) and for any regional interface control officer 

(RICO)/sector interface control officer (SICO) for planning and executing TDL functions 

that cross regional and/or sector boundaries or impact the theater-wide MTN. When a JTF is 

formed, there will be only one JICO per JTF, and the JICO will normally be located in a C2 

facility with connectivity to the primary TDLs (normally the JAOC). There may be Service 

component interface control officers located at the JICC. 

(a) When regional/sector AD commands are established, the JICO will 

coordinate with the RICOs/SICOs designated for and normally located at those commands. 

The RICO/SICO coordinates with the JICO but is responsible to the RADC/SADC for TDL 

continuity at their level. RICOs/SICOs may require interface control cells depending upon 

the complexity of their TDL networks. See Figure II-2 for a depiction of a notional joint 

interface control officer functional/command relationship. 

(b) The JICO is responsible to the JDNO for the MTN, which is one of four 

networks in the JDN. In turn, the JDNO is responsible to the JFC for integration of 

information from the sub-networks into a common track database used to generate the CTP. 

The JDN is the primary feed to support generation of the CTP. The CTP and information 

from the joint planning network contributes to the COP. 

Refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3115.01B, Joint Data 

Network (JDN) Operations, and CJCSM 6120.01D, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link (TDL) 

Operating Procedures, for full details regarding the JICO and JDN and TDL operations. 

(c) Navy interface control officer for IAMD located at the MOC (with JFMCC 

or CTF IAMD) also requires connectivity to the primary TDLs as both a redundant 

capability to the JAOC JICO and in support of C2 of multi-mission Navy IAMD forces or as 

a RADC/SADC.

16. Situational Awareness 

“When we started our deployment, we had only the most rudimentary 

communications infrastructure in Southwest Asia and the challenge of distance 

was daunting. Thanks to good planning and our understanding of the 

importance of satellites, we quickly and smoothly transitioned to a mature 

tactical theater network.”

General Colin L. Powell, United States Army,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

December 1990
Command and Control 

II-25 

a. A primary objective the staff seeks to attain for the commander and for subordinate 

commanders is situational awareness, a prerequisite for commanders to understand and 

anticipate counterair opportunities and challenges. In simplest terms, this results in the 

ability “to see first, understand first, and act first” across the full range of military operations. 

Therefore, supporting situational awareness at this level dictates technical integration of joint 

data and communications systems for the MTN. True understanding should be the basis for 

information provided to commanders in order to make decisions. Knowledge of friendly 

capabilities and enemy capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs enables commanders to 

focus joint counterair efforts where they best and most directly contribute to achieving air 

superiority objectives. Further, the JFC’s situational awareness must be broad to include the 

relevant actions and intentions of MNF partners, civilian agencies, adjacent commands, 

higher headquarters, and HN authorities.

b. The CCDR uses the COP and CTP for theater situational awareness. A subordinate 

JFC uses the COP and CTP as graphic depictions of the situation within the theater/JOA. 

There may be multiple CTP inputs to the COP. The COP and CTP normally indicate 

position location information of significant friendly, neutral, unknown, and enemy forces. 

The COP and CTP are normally shared with the component commands. The COP is at best 

NRT. Currently, the COP is the picture provided in the GCCS, supplemented by Command 

and Control Battle Management and Communications System-provided BMD situation 

awareness at key locations. A COP facilitates collaborative counterair planning and assists 

Figure II-2. Notional Joint Interface Control Officer Functional/Command Relationship

Notional Joint Interface Control Officer

Functional/Command Relationship

Legend

AADC area air defense commander

JICO joint interface control officer

RADC regional air defense commander

RICO regional interface control officer

command coordination

JICO

Cell

RICO

Cell

RICO

Cell

RADC

Single AADC/RADC Multiple RADCs

JICO

Cell RADC

AADC AADC
Chapter II

II-26 JP 3-01 

all echelons to achieve situational awareness. A theater JFACC may have the COP at the 

JAOC. 

(1) For counterair situational awareness, a properly managed CTP: 

(a) Reduces the degree of operational uncertainty.

(b) Allows commanders to create and control the dynamics of the operational 

area and not react to them.

(c) Gives commanders more situational awareness of the operational tempo of 

MNF and US forces.

(d) Reduces decision-making time, thereby dominating the opponent’s 

decision cycle.

(e) Gives commanders the ability to identify, focus, and control counterair 

operations against the enemy’s capabilities.

(f) Allows the commander to monitor the execution phase of counterair 

operations and assess how well the operations are progressing in accordance with the plan.

(g) Provides commanders with shared situational awareness to coordinate joint 

counterair operations. 

(2) An accurate CTP requires proper track management that is the responsibility of 

the GCC or a designated representative, typically one of the component commanders (e.g., 

JFACC). For a subordinate joint force, track managers are assigned at the headquarters and 

component commands who are responsible for their reporting and database management. 

Track information from the components is consolidated in the CTP utilizing data link 

interfaces.

(3) The data link interfaces used for consolidating the track information for CTP 

are the responsibility of the JICO who subsequently works with the JFACC’s CJE for 

air/space track data and JFMCC’s CJE for maritime track data and subsequent data inputs to

the JFC’s CTP/COP. The JICO and the JICO cell normally reside at the JAOC to manage all 

theater/JOA data link interfaces. There may be Service component interface control officers 

located at the JICO cell, or at their respective Service headquarters, and there may be 

subordinate interface control officers designated at regional/sector AD commands to manage 

links for the RADC/SADC who report counterair related tracks up to the JAOC. When 

designated as a RADC, CTF IAMD requires access to voice, data, and chat circuits required 

for DCA coordination and execution across the joint force and with multinational partners. 

TDL access should include all available frequencies and networks. To ensure quality of 

service and assured C2 connectivity, CTF IAMD requires the ability to manage fleet or joint 

TDL network access, to include redundant and alternate communication paths, and support 

disadvantaged end users. Due to the nature of force orders and real-time data coordination, 

TDL capability must be verified to be reliable and validated for tactical operation.
Command and Control 

II-27 

(4) To provide effective support to the JFACC’s JICO, Service component 

interface control officers, and in the case of the Navy, the maritime RICO normally located 

at the MOC, are tasked with providing persistent monitoring and management of maritime 

MTN health and participant status, and verification of operational adherence to 

communications planning and execution documents such as the operations task link 

(OPTASKLINK) message.

c. Additional counterair situational awareness is provided by the theater joint 

intelligence operations center by processing information from surveillance and 

reconnaissance sensors for display on various mediums, including on the COP. 

d. At the tactical level, the CTP is a source of situational awareness. The CTP is a 

current depiction of the operational environment in the JOA within the GCC’s AOR. The 

CTP is an accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that integrates tactical 

information from the MTN, composite tracking network, intelligence network, and ground 

digital network. The CTP enables C2, situational awareness, and CID. It supports the 

tactical elements of all joint mission areas, to include counterair operations and supports the 

development of the COP.

17. Battle Management 

a. Battle management is the management of activities within the operational 

environment based on the commands, direction, and guidance given by appropriate authority. 

C2, including battle management, is the binding element that integrates capabilities and 

operations within and among joint force commands. 

b. Battle management entails visualizing where, when, and with which forces to apply 

capabilities against specific threats. The dynamics of the counterair mission often require

flexibility during decentralized execution that normally takes place at the tactical level. This 

flexibility accomplished through battle management allows the direct, often real-time 

monitoring and execution of operations based on the intent and within the scope of the 

operational-level commander’s orders. Some counterair examples: AWACS aircraft, with an 

air battle manager, may provide battle management of an OCA multistage attack against 

TSTs using Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM) and aircraft; an AWACS assisting the 

air-to-air interception of enemy fighter-bombers beyond visual range (BVR); or the SADC 

(at a CRC) using battle management of friendly fighters and SAMs to defend assets in the 

sector against an air attack by enemy aircraft and CMs. 

c. Successful counterair battle management supports synchronization and integration of 

active and passive AD efforts with other air operations, supporting unity of effort and 

reducing the expenditure of resources and the risks of fratricide. For subordinate 

commanders and controllers, effective battle management requires situational awareness,

managing available resources, directing and controlling the correct action in a timely 

manner, and monitoring and assessing the execution.

d. Based on the principles of centralized planning and direction and decentralized 

execution, the JFC typically delegates commit, ID, and engagement authority to the 
Chapter II

II-28 JP 3-01 

JFACC/AADC and authorizes further delegation to the optimum level for mission 

accomplishment consistent with the ROE. The responsibilities and authorities assigned to 

battle managers should be clear and unambiguous, and may be limited in time, scope, or by 

specific operations/activities.

e. Automated battle management aids can assist operators in sensor management and 

weapons pairings, allowing operators to manage by exception. The speed of the engagement 

process and the complexity of sensor-weapons performances and integration may require 

some degree of automation to assist in effective intercepts. Automated systems are not 

infallible, and weapons systems operators must maintain situational awareness and exercise 

sound judgment in accordance with ROE to prevent fratricide. 
III-1 

CHAPTER III

COUNTERAIR PLANNING

1. General

a. The JFC develops an operation/campaign plan focused on the enemy centers of 

gravity (COGs) while ensuring that friendly COGs are protected. Counterair operations 

strive for the degree of air superiority and protection required by the JFC’s COA to attain the 

desired objectives. 

b. Counterair requires a combination of OCA and DCA operations based on the JFC’s 

air apportionment decisions and balanced against the enemy’s potential COAs and air and 

missile threats. The integration and synchronization of OCA and DCA, in conjunction with 

the other joint missions supporting the JFC, are the basis for counterair planning. 

c. This chapter discusses counterair planning in the context of preparation, major

considerations, and enabling capabilities that support both OCA and DCA. This discussion 

assumes a JFACC is responsible for counterair (specifically OCA operations) and an AADC 

is responsible for DCA operations, whether or not the JFACC is designated as both the 

AADC and ACA. The joint air operations plan (JAOP) and the AADP, as well as other 

detailed planning factors, will be discussed in the respective chapters for OCA and DCA. 

d. Counterair planning considerations include accurate joint intelligence preparation of 

the operational environment (JIPOE) and intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), 

airspace control, ROE, ID and CID requirements, and some major enabling capabilities. 

e. GBMD planning complements coordination of cross-AOR aspects of counterair 

operations. This process enhances a GCC’s ability to employ forces and capabilities within 

their AOR in support of another GCC. Planners must balance competing requirements for 

potentially scarce resources. GBMD planning tools assist planners in both preparing and 

validating defense designs. See Appendix E, “Global Ballistic Missile Defense 

Synchronization.” 

SECTION A. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION 

2. General

Knowledge of the potential enemy is one of the fundamentals of joint warfare. JIPOE 

and IPB are the analytical processes and methodologies employed by joint commands and 

Services to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products to 

support the commander’s decision making. JIPOE and IPB generally differ in terms of their 

relative purpose, focus, and level of detail. JIPOE is focused at the JFC level, while IPB is 

focused at the joint force component command and Service level. To support the decision-

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a

hundred battles.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Chapter III

III-2 JP 3-01 

making process, the JIPOE effort also must remain dynamic, constantly integrating new 

information into the initial set of facts and assumptions. The JIPOE effort must be fully 

integrated and coordinated with the separate IPB efforts of the component commands and 

Service intelligence centers. JIPOE and IPB should begin as early as possible during the 

planning process, preferably during peacetime. 

3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and Intelligence 

Preparation of the Battlespace 

a. JIPOE is described as the continuous, analytical process used by joint intelligence 

organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products 

to support the JFC’s decision-making process and all joint force planning. The JIPOE 

process assists JFCs and their staffs in achieving information superiority by providing 

predictive intelligence and focusing intelligence collection at the right time and place. 

JIPOE helps the JFC to react faster and make better decisions than the adversary, or simply 

stated, to stay inside the enemy’s decision-making cycle. JIPOE provides the basis for 

intelligence direction, collection management, and synchronization that supports not only the 

COA selected by the JFC, but all joint force planning. JIPOE supports counterair planning 

by identifying adversary air and missile capabilities and their likely employment. JIPOE 

products are used by JFC and component staffs in preparing their estimates and analysis, 

selection of friendly COAs, and continuing planning requirements (e.g., development of a 

viable CONOPS.) The process for JIPOE involves four basic steps: 

(1) Defining the operational environment. 

(2) Describing the impact of the operational environment. 

(3) Evaluating the adversary.

(4) Determining adversary COAs, particularly the adversary’s most likely COA 

and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment. During 

analysis of the adversary’s potential COAs, consideration must be given to the escalation 

potential when attacking adversary’s C2 and other strategic systems.

b. JIPOE and IPB products generally differ in terms of their relative purpose, focus, and 

level of detail. JIPOE supports the JFC by using a macro-analytic approach to identify an 

adversary’s strategic vulnerabilities and COGs, whereas IPB requires micro-analysis to 

support an operational level component command. JIPOE and IPB analyses are intended to 

support each other while avoiding a duplication of analytic effort. 

c. The components’ IPB focuses on the adversary’s forces and operations necessary to 

accomplish the most likely and most dangerous COAs identified by JIPOE. Certain factors 

of operation planning are particularly important when conducting the IPB process, and 

failure to properly consider an adversary’s most likely and most dangerous COAs can have 

serious consequences. This is a focal point of OCA/DCA integration, and procedures must 

be developed to rapidly share data between OCA and DCA forces. 
Counterair Planning 

III-3 

d. IPB assists the counterair planner in visualizing the operational environment, 

assessing adversary air and missile capabilities, and identifying the adversary’s probable 

intent and attack locations. IPB is not simply enumeration of adversary air and missile 

systems, but must describe how the adversary air and missile forces operate. 

e. JIPOE/IPB for counterair relates to any information about adversary air and missile 

threats and supporting infrastructure, including information on enemy ADs, C2 networks, 

radar coverage, and other early warning/detection systems, etc. JIPOE/IPB will provide 

available information on the following: 

(1) Location, status, and disposition of WMD and the capabilities for employing 

them.

(2) Aircraft operating bases and dispersal sites, to include aircraft carriers and other 

air capable ships.

(3) Missile target systems, including their infrastructure, storage and operating 

locations, launch platforms, C2 nodes, missile stocks, forward operating locations/bases 

(FOLs/FOBs), transload sites, reloading/refueling sites, terrain and road infrastructure 

(bridges, tunnels) where their destruction could interrupt enemy missile operations and 

logistics. For example, intelligence will identify BM operating areas where an adversary’s 

missile C2, infrastructure, and forces may operate. 

(4) Order of battle of adversary IADS (i.e., aircraft, SAMs, airfields, and 

antiaircraft artillery [AAA]), including C2 systems (i.e., early warning/ground control 

intercept [GCI] sites and facilities), communication links, and any associated facilities.

(5) Signals intelligence capabilities and EW assets, including operating 

instructions, vulnerabilities, redundancies, capabilities, and locations. 

(6) Changes by adversary in direct and indirect threat emitters, including wartime 

reserve modes and reprogramming of target sensing weapon systems.

(7) Climate and terrain within the JOA and their effects on friendly and enemy 

operations. 

(8) Overall assessment of the strengths and vulnerabilities of adversary offensive 

and defensive air systems, including location and status of all key nodes and targets that 

affect their ability to sustain air operations.

(9) Analysis of adversary’s potential escalation COAs if their leadership, national 

C2, and other strategic systems are attacked.

(10) Adversary preparations, including camouflage, concealment, and deception; 

movement of noncombatants and civilians; ID of no-strike sites; indications of hidden enemy 

capabilities; etc. 
Chapter III

III-4 JP 3-01 

Details regarding the JIPOE and IPB processes can be found in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

SECTION B. AIRSPACE CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

4. General 

a. The primary goal of joint airspace control is to enhance combat effectiveness of the 

joint force. Airspace control should maximize the effectiveness of combat operations 

without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of any 

Service/functional component. For counterair, all components of the joint force may 

potentially share a part of the theater/JOA airspace for offensive/defensive operations. This 

environment becomes increasingly complex with the addition of civilian, nongovernmental 

and intergovernmental organizations, interagency, HN, and MNF users. Airspace control 

procedures and planning considerations must allow for a transition from peacetime 

operations to combat operations and back to peacetime operations.

b. Airspace control is provided to reduce the risk of friendly fire, enhance AD

operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Although airspace control is the 

responsibility of the ACA, the controlling authority of the ACA does not infringe on the 

command authorities vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat 

operations. The ACA recommends and the JFC approves the boundaries within which 

airspace control is exercised and provides priorities and restrictions regarding its use. 

Airspace control requires positive and procedural controls. 

(1) Positive control is a method of airspace control that relies on positive ID, 

tracking, and direction of aircraft within an airspace and is conducted with electronic means 

by an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. 

(2) Procedural control is the method of airspace control that relies on a combination 

of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. 

c. Airspace Control System. The ACA establishes an ACS that is responsive to the 

needs of the JFC and integrates when appropriate the ACS with that of the HN. The ACS is 

an arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures, and facilities required 

to perform airspace control functions. Airspace control should be executed through a 

responsive theater/tactical air control system capable of real-time control that includes 

surface and airborne assets, as necessary (e.g., CRC and AWACS). The ACS requires 

timely exchange of information through reliable, secure, and interoperable communications 

networks. Elements of the ACS may have dual roles as DCA assets (e.g., a CRC can be a 

RADC/SADC).

d. Airspace Control Plan. Beginning with an ACP approved by the JFC, the ACA 

develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required 

among units within the theater/JOA. The ACP establishes the procedures for the ACS in 

the operational area. The ACP must consider procedures and interfaces with the 

international or regional air traffic systems because the ACP is designed to identify all 
Counterair Planning 

III-5 

airspace users, facilitate the engagement of hostile air and missile threats, and expedite the 

safe passage of friendly and neutral forces. 

e. Airspace Control Orders. Implementation of the general guidance of the ACP is 

accomplished through ACOs that provide specific airspace control procedures applicable for 

defined periods of time. ACOs are designed to deconflict and identify all airspace users as 

well as eliminate fratricide. The ACO is an order that provides the details of the 

approved requests for ACMs. It is published either as part of the ATO or as a separate 

document and must be adhered to by all components. It defines and establishes airspace for 

military operations. It notifies all agencies of the effective time of activation and the 

composite structure of the airspace to be used. The ACO may include ACMs, such as air 

routes, base defense zones, drop zones, pickup points, restricted areas, etc., and fire support 

coordination measures (FSCMs), such as the fire support coordination line (FSCL), no-fire 

areas, and restrictive fire areas. A change to the ACO should be distributed whenever a new 

area is established or an existing area deleted or modified.

f. Airspace Coordinating Measures. ACMs are designed to facilitate the efficient use 

of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly 

forces. ACMs may take several forms and will be discussed in paragraph 6. 

g. Integration of the ACP with the AADP. The ACP facilitates synchronization and 

deconfliction of joint operations. Prioritization of airspace users for 

deconfliction/synchronization is essential. The ACP must be integrated with the AADP 

because airspace control areas/sectors normally coincide with AD areas/sectors, and there are 

DCA operations and procedures that could interfere with other airspace control procedures. 

Both plans should complement available C2 systems and capabilities. JFC-approved 

ACMs help integrate the two plans. Airspace control must be flexible enough to meet rapid 

changes such as the real-time retasking of OCA forces against TSTs. 

5. Planning and Coordination Requirements 

a. Planning for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. Every JTF is different and

each operational area has specific operational requirements for airspace. These requirements 

must be determined as early as possible and incorporated in the overall joint force planning 

effort. Political constraints and national and military airspace management systems and 

procedures and their capabilities and limitations are important considerations. ROE, 

disposition of AD weapons, fire support plans, and procedures for ID of US and MNF 

aircraft are also important items to consider. The following broad principles of planning

(see Figure III-1) are essential for effective airspace control:

(1) Interoperability. Plans for airspace control should be exercised in the joint 

and multinational environments during peacetime and in conflict. Planning should strive to 

maximize the interoperability of equipment, personnel, and terminology and facilitate 

continuous, detailed coordination. The ACS must function with the AMD families of 

systems and may include dual tasking of certain radar, sensor, and C2 assets. 

Interoperability is essential to effective operations, conservation of force, and to prevent 

fratricide.
Chapter III

III-6 JP 3-01 

(2) Unity of Effort. The ACS must be integrated and coordinated with the AMD 

system, including dual tasking of assets as necessary. Integration of an HN AD system (as 

part of an IADS) and air traffic control (ATC) system should be properly planned. Proper 

liaison is essential and should be identified and exercised prior to hostilities when integrating 

HN and joint force airspace control. 

(3) Mass and Timing. Planning should consider the aircraft traffic volume and 

timing to fully integrate DCA with OCA and other joint missions. Constraints may require 

changes in positive or procedural control measures. 

(4) Integrated Planning Cycles. The airspace control planning cycle must be 

integrated with the joint operation/campaign planning cycle, and more specifically, the 

AADP planning cycle. The ACP normally is added as an appendix to the operations annex 

of the joint OPLAN or operation order. 

(5) Degraded Operations. The ACP must anticipate degraded operations of 

airspace control and AD systems as the results of attacks (combat losses) and enemy EW 

efforts. Loss of communications can dramatically degrade positive control measures. 

Effective plans should span the spectrum from minimal to full degradation and consider the 

effects of adverse weather and night operations. 

Refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for detailed information regarding airspace 

control, the ACP, and the ACO. 

b. Military ATC facilities and radar control units (e.g., Marine TAOC, or Air Force 

CRC) normally will provide flight following and monitoring throughout the airspace control 

area. If an HN ATC system is used before hostilities, then procedures must be in place to 

revert to the military system when required. The urgent exchange of information between 

the ATC facilities, radar control units, and airspace users requires reliable voice and data 

nets; radars; identification, friend or foe (IFF); and selective ID features. Accurate and 

timely ID enhances engagement of enemy aircraft and missiles, conserves friendly 

resources, and reduces risk to friendly forces. 

c. Key factors to consider when developing the ACP are as follows: 

(1) The ACP should be coordinated with the HN and any partner nations if it 

includes their airspace or their systems.

Figure III-1. Principles for Planning Airspace Control 

Principles for Planning Airspace Control







Interoperability

Unity of effort

Mass and timing





Integrated planning cycles

Degraded operations
Counterair Planning 

III-7 

(2) When developing the ACP, combine familiarity with the basic OPLAN or 

operation order, knowledge of host and multinational constraints and restraints, capabilities 

and procedures of HN civil and military airspace management systems, and general locations 

of friendly and enemy forces.

(3) The ACP needs to support an orderly transition between peacetime and combat 

operations. Such a transition could occur during a period of increasing tensions or suddenly 

without warning. 

(4) The ACP specifies ACMs to be used in the operational area and how these 

measures will be distributed and implemented. The ACP should provide guidance on what 

FSCMs will be placed on the ACO. The ACP also should provide guidance on componentunique ACMs, terms, or graphics that may be included in the ACO. 

(5) The ACP provides procedures to fully integrate the resources of military ATC 

facilities responsible for terminal area airspace control or en route ATC. ATC facilities 

should be interfaced and linked with ACS communications to form a system that ensures the 

safe and efficient flow of air traffic.

(6) The ACP should include processes for establishing procedural ACMs, including 

activating/deactivating weapon engagement zones (WEZs) and minimum-risk routes 

(MRRs) and procedures for AD and air control operations in a degraded communications 

environment. Detailed engagement procedures and decentralized weapons control 

procedures (as applied to AD) are key to counterair operations in a degraded environment. 

The geographic placement of weapons, the location of specific AD operations, and specific 

procedures for ID of aircraft and missiles are critical factors to include in the ACP.

(7) The ACP and AADP must be distributed to all joint force components,

applicable HN, MNF, and interagency partners, as well as those commands providing direct 

delivery (intertheater) and/or intratheater support to the theater/JOA. Not understanding or 

following the ACP and AADP may result in hazardous air traffic situations, cause 

confusion between aircraft and control agencies, and increase the risk of fratricide.

d. Some specific counterair requirements that must be accounted for in the ACP or 

through ACMs include: 

(1) General orbit locations for DCA combat air patrols (CAPs), airborne warning 

and control, C2, surveillance, reconnaissance, air refueling (AR), and EW platforms. 

(2) Coordinating authorities for controlled airspace and their responsibilities and 

coverage areas, including the RADCs/SADCs and other C2 nodes. 

(3) WEZs and their activation procedures. 

(4) Procedures for positive and procedural airspace controls. 

(5) Positive ID and procedural ID criteria and procedures.
Chapter III

III-8 JP 3-01 

(6) Procedures to expeditiously route outbound OCA packages through friendly 

airspace. This will become more complex in a multinational environment.

(7) Develop airspace control procedures for OCA missions including the 

communications conduits (e.g., airborne C2 or satellite communications) for missions that 

may occur beyond the visual/communications range of ground-based C2 agencies.

(8) Locations and procedures for MRRs, for turning on/off IFF equipment, air 

defense ID, and areas for sanitizing returning OCA packages from enemy aircraft. 

(9) Procedures to support planned responses for AD emergencies.

(10) Procedures to support immediate attacks on TSTs by aircraft or long-range 

surface fires such as SSMs, rockets, and CMs.

(11) Identify airspace control tasks for airborne elements of the TACS (e.g., 

AWACS). The sensor capability of airborne platforms makes them well suited for providing 

airspace control for real-time execution of OCA and DCA operations. 

(12) Procedures to recover aircraft unable to self-identify and unmanned aircraft

systems (UASs) recovering autonomously. 

(13) Identify potential ACMs and FSCMs that allow aircraft and surface fires to 

simultaneously engage ground targets in support of the land forces—the aircraft being above 

the airspace required for supporting surface fires.

(14) Identify potential ACMs to minimize hazards to aircraft from outbound longrange interceptors transiting to MEZs/joint engagement zones (JEZs). 

6. Airspace Coordinating Measures

a. ACMs are employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions 

and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Airspace control requires a 

combination of positive and procedural controls that rely on proper ID of the users. ID is 

discussed in Section D, “Identification.” Positive control requires radar or other sensor 

tracking and direct communications between the airspace controller and the user. Procedural 

controls are established through ACMs. 

b. ACMs not established in the ACP are normally forwarded through a component 

command’s senior airspace control element to the ACA for processing and approval. 

Approved ACMs are normally promulgated through ACOs and, when necessary, in the 

ATO. Some ACMs are planned, requested, and approved, but not promulgated or activated 

until required. 

c. For standardization, more than a hundred ACMs have been categorized and 

defined/described with applicable uses and planning considerations. Those ACMs have 

been grouped in the following categories: AD areas, AD operations areas, ATC, air 
Counterair Planning 

III-9 

corridors/routes, procedural controls, reference points, restricted operations zones, and 

special use airspace. 

d. A good example of the use of ACMs for integrating procedural airspace control with 

DCA operations is the WEZ. In AD, a WEZ is airspace of defined dimensions within which 

the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapons 

system. WEZs include fighter engagement zone (FEZ), high-altitude missile engagement 

zone (HIMEZ), low-altitude missile engagement zone (LOMEZ), and short-range AD

engagement zone (SHORADEZ), each of which is established by an ACM. WEZs are 

discussed in more detail in Chapter V, “Defensive Counterair Planning and Operations.” 

Refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for more details regarding ACMs, including a 

representative airspace control request format for a procedural ACM, and for the list of the 

most common ACMs. 

7. Other Considerations

a. Maritime strike groups are not static; they are usually a “moving JEZ.” In a littoral 

environment, an amphibious operations area may encompass a sector of a land AO and 

include a MEZ. In this case, maritime combatants may be restricted by geography when 

defending selected coastal assets. Linking land-based SAM systems with search and fire 

control data from maritime forces, or vice versa, can result in improved ability to 

defend littoral areas of the theater. Without that kind of close coordination between land 

and maritime air defenders, a seam may be found in the AMDs. 

b. Operations along the edges of WEZs, sectors, or other geographically defined areas 

of airspace with separate controlling units/commands may create seams and present 

commanders with extensive coordination challenges. Enemy aircraft may cross into adjacent 

sectors during engagement or may fly through friendly corridors or attack targets in one 

sector or WEZ from an adjacent area. The following are some considerations that may 

facilitate coordination:

(1) Establish procedures to coordinate handoffs of flight operations between sectors 

and regions that grant permissions to enter and depart airspace and coordinate combat zone 

control activities with HN ATC services. A dedicated communications network/line for the 

regions/sectors is a must if real-time handoffs are required. 

(2) Liaison officers should be located at ATC centers that provide positive control 

for areas overlapping or adjacent to AD areas.

(3) Designate buffer zones in which one AD region/sector can authorize 

engagement in an adjacent area. 

(4) Whenever possible, establish friendly air corridors outside the ranges of 

friendly AD forces that rely only on visual ID to reduce the risk of fratricide, since visually 

aimed surface weapons often have no capability to readily identify airspace boundaries or 

control measures in their portion of the operational environment. The ACA and AADC must 

collectively plan to address the issue. 
Chapter III

III-10 JP 3-01 

c. During forcible entry operations or in undeveloped theaters, C2 should be simple and 

facilitate the joint force’s ability to respond to a given threat. The ACP must be 

continuously assessed through feedback from commanders to ensure it adequately 

supports operational requirements in a potentially dynamic operational environment. 

The initial architectures may need to be modified based on the situation and/or additional 

assets arriving into the operational area. 

SECTION C. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

8. General

ROE are directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the 

circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat 

engagement with other forces encountered. Standing ROE, including rules on the inherent 

right of self-defense and supplemental measures for mission accomplishment, as approved 

by SecDef, are found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, 

Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces. 

Approved ROE for mission accomplishment, applicable to a specific mission, are typically 

found in the mission’s respective warning order, execute orders, operations order/plan, ROE 

serials, and/or special instructions (SPINS) section of the ATO. 

a. With SecDef approval, CCDRs may augment the standing rules of engagement 

(SROE)/standing rules for the use of force (SRUF) with theater-specific ROE and with 

supplemental instructions. The JFC and commanders at every echelon are responsible for 

establishing/implementing ROE, but their ROE cannot be less restrictive than that approved 

for a superior commander. 

b. The JFC implements the approved SROE/SRUF/theater ROE and may request more 

specific ROE for the JOA/mission. The JFC normally requests inputs from subordinate 

commanders when developing the ROE. To prevent violations or misunderstandings, ROE 

should be clear, concise, and unambiguous. The JFACC/AADC should offer ROE 

recommendations to the JFC in anticipation of the need, or when requested to do so. In 

conjunction with ROE recommendations, engagement authority and its delegation and other 

authorities must be considered and may be part of the ROE. MNF operations may further 

complicate processes for establishing and executing ROE. The key is to anticipate the 

requirement so the changes may be staffed and approved at the appropriate level for

implementation when needed at a specific time or for a special circumstance. When 

planning counterair operations, the component commanders must ensure they comply with 

the established ROE for the theater/JOA that may include special (and somewhat different) 

ROE for separate operations. ROE can limit or restrict certain options, targets, and methods. 

For example, the air ROE may restrict firing of air-to-air weapons if the target is BVR or 

across an international boundary. ROE are promulgated through command channels by 

numerous means and normally can be found in the SPINS section of the ATO. 

Commanders must not only promulgate ROE to the joint force, but must also train the 

joint force on the ROE.
Counterair Planning 

III-11 

c. For MNF operations, nations may have specific ROE that cannot be changed or 

overruled by alliance or coalition chains of command. These national procedures must be 

identified, published, and understood by all other nations and command echelons within the 

MNF. 

9. Criteria

a. Obligation and Responsibility for Defense. Unit commanders always retain the 

inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or a 

demonstrated hostile intent. Self-defense includes defense of other US military forces in the 

vicinity, as well as defense of any others identified in the mission-specific ROE. The 

commanders of all US forces must ensure that the ROE as established do not place 

constraints on a unit’s ability to defend itself. Upon commission of a hostile act or 

demonstration of hostile intent, all necessary means available and all appropriate actions may 

be used in self-defense. If time and circumstances permit, forces should attempt to 

deescalate the situation. In addition, force used in self-defense should be proportional; that 

is, sufficient to respond decisively. Force used may exceed that of the hostile act or hostile 

intent, but the nature, duration, and scope of force should not exceed what is required to 

respond decisively. 

b. Functional Rules. Commanders should also develop functional rules as to how 

ROE are to be tactically implemented. Some examples are arming orders, which specify 

circumstances under which commanders will permit loading or arming of munitions and 

border crossing authority (BCA). National borders are sovereign and cannot be crossed

without specific authorization. Permission to violate borders may be pre-delegated to the 

JFC after hostilities or under specific conditions or restrictions to enable force protection. 

BCA also applies to aerial reconnaissance. Space platforms are not restricted as the United 

States adheres to a policy of freedom of navigation in space based on treaty and customary 

international law. 

c. Integration with the ACP and AADP. The ROE are an integral part of the AADP 

and the ACP. Commanders and their staffs must ensure that the AADP contains specific 

instructions that implement the ROE. It is an important point to ensure the ACP, AADP, and 

the ROE are consistent with regard to aircraft in international air corridors. These corridors 

are usable by civilian aircraft, even those operated by an adversary, until the international 

governing body or an appropriate authority closes a route and a notice to airmen is issued. 

Commanders must ensure the proper response is made when penetrations of the friendly 

airspace occur under the auspices of international air flight.

10. Planning

a. Normally, the initial ROE are already established by higher authority or an existing 

plan. The JFC is responsible for implementing the ROE and anticipating changes to ROE 

based on operational necessity such as changing phases of an operation. The ROE are an 

integral part of the operations planning process, and the J-3 is responsible for their

integration for the JFC. Centrally planned ROE, ID, and engagement procedures are vital for 
Chapter III

III-12 JP 3-01 

minimizing duplication of effort and the potential for fratricide/friendly fire while providing 

necessary flexibility to engage. 

b. The current SROE recognizes a fundamental difference between the two sets of 

supplemental measures. Measures that are reserved to the President, SecDef, or CCDRs are 

generally permissive; that is, the particular operation, tactic, or weapon is generally 

restricted, and the President, SecDef, or CCDR approves the supplemental measure to 

specifically permit the particular operation, tactic, or weapon. In contrast, the remainder of 

the supplemental ROE measures (i.e., those delegated to subordinate commanders) are all 

restrictive in nature. Absent implementation of supplemental measures, commanders are 

generally allowed to use any weapon or tactic available and to employ reasonable force to 

accomplish the mission, without having to get permission first. Only when enacted will 

these supplemental ROE measures restrict a particular operation, tactic, or weapon.

c. ROE may be permissive or restrictive, depending on the circumstances. For example, 

ROE may allow use of BVR weapons to engage hostile targets as early as possible. 

Permissive ROE would entail instructions directing decentralized execution by the joint 

force to immediately engage any incoming BMs. However, that same ROE may restrict

retaliatory or preemptive attacks against the launcher that may result in its destruction but 

permit the use of nonlethal capabilities that disable or neutralize the launch system. JFCs 

may elect to include any category of CM or antiship missiles for accelerated engagement as 

the situation warrants. 

d. When developing their ROE recommendations, commanders and staffs must 

coordinate with their staff judge advocates (SJAs) for compliance with US and customary 

international law, as well as treaties and conventions to which the US is a signatory. Once 

the ROE are approved, commanders, assisted by their SJAs, are responsible for promulgating 

the ROE and ensuring that all subordinate forces understand the ROE. Commanders must 

also maintain close coordination with the public affairs office to ensure their awareness of 

any command or strategic messaging considerations. 

e. Lower echelon MNFCs and local HN commanders may lack the authority to speak on 

behalf of their nations in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or 

standardization of ROE should be sought, but obtaining concurrence for ROE from other 

national authorities can be a time-consuming process. 

f. US forces participating in MNF operations will follow the ROE established by the 

MNFC if authorized by SecDef. US forces will be under the control of an MNFC only if 

SecDef determines that the ROE for that MNF are consistent with the policy guidance on 

unit self-defense and with the rules of individual self-defense contained in the SROE/SRUF. 

If the MNFC has not issued ROE, US forces will operate under the SROE/SRUF. 

SECTION D. IDENTIFICATION

11. General

a. ID is the process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an unknown 

detected contact and the product (classification) of that process. Assigning ID requires ID 
Counterair Planning 

III-13 

authority and criteria. ID authority is the authority to assign an identity classification to an 

unknown contact, if possible. This authority is inherent within the C2 chain. The JFC 

normally delegates ID authority to JFACC/AADC and authorizes further delegation to

subordinate commanders for decentralized execution as allowed by ROE and necessitated by 

the operational situation. ID authority and ID criteria should be stated and discussed in the 

AADP and ACP for approval by the JFC. Both ID authority and criteria may require 

modification, sometimes in conjunction with ROE, in a dynamic operational 

environment and/or with changes in phases of the campaign. 

b. ID is an essential and inseparable part of airspace control and AD operations. 

Comprehensive surveillance and accurate and persistent tracking combined with accurate, 

timely, and consistent ID enhances situational awareness, improves weapons employment 

options, helps conserve friendly resources, and reduces the risk of fratricide. 

c. The CID process complements the ID process to support application of weapons 

resources and other military options. For counterair, CID should be accomplished with NRT

or better exchange of information between airspace control/AD units and airspace users to 

meet the time and accuracy demands of combat operations. CID is discussed separately in 

paragraph 14, “Combat Identification.” 

12. Methods of Identification

a. For the purposes of counterair, the intent of an ID process is to either facilitate 

airspace control or to support an engagement decision through CID. The objective of CID is 

to obtain the highest confidence, positive ID possible. Lacking positive ID, the objective is 

to reach the level of confidence in an ID that can be supported by the ROE for an 

engagement authority to make a decision. ID can be accomplished through several 

recognized methods. The JFC approves the procedures used for ID and designates who may 

be delegated that authority in the AADP and ACP. 

b. Positive ID. Positive ID is ID derived from visual recognition, electronic support 

systems, noncooperative target recognition techniques, IFF systems, or other physics-based 

ID techniques. Positive ID does not assume identity solely based on location or adherence to 

airspace procedures. To prevent fratricide or undesired engagements, positive ID normally is 

required by ROE as a basis for CID for engagement (shoot/no-shoot) decisions for air 

threats. Normally, a positive ID means much more than a simple “lack of friend” or “lack of 

enemy” level of accuracy. The degree of accuracy of a positive ID method is specific to that 

method and should remain a constant, whereas CID criteria can be changed by the JFC based 

on ROE. Positive ID ACMs should be established in the AADP and ACP and can be 

modified through ACMs promulgated by ACOs and the SPINS. 

c. Procedural ID. Procedural ID is based on adherence to airspace control measures 

and rules. ID is assumed to be friendly as long as rules are followed, but ID is assumed 

hostile if rules are not followed and the suspect vehicle is not otherwise positively identified. 

Procedural ID separates airspace users by geography, altitude, heading, time, and/or 

maneuver. Normally, a combination of positive and procedural ID is used to identify 

friendly and hostile tracks. Procedural ID can be advantageous for some missions and 
Chapter III

III-14 JP 3-01 

scenarios, but generally not for engagement decisions for which positive ID is normally 

required because of the risk of fratricide. The AADP should include a matrix with criteria 

developed by the AADC in coordination with the components and approved by the JFC 

that can be used to establish a track ID for a detected object. The ID matrix is a logic 

tree for categorizing a track (e.g., friendly, hostile, unknown, or neutral) and following it 

throughout its life in the AOR/JOA. The ID matrix applies logical steps to ID a track using 

all available means in the operational area. By following the criteria in the matrix, users 

assess the identity of an unknown for tracking and additional action, if necessary. If not 

identified as friendly, an object being tracked may require further assessment based on 

position, the ROE, and weapons control status (WCS). WCS will be discussed in Chapter V, 

“Defensive Counterair Planning and Operations,” paragraph 11, “Active Air and Missile 

Defense.” 

d. Auto-ID Systems. Some weapon systems have the capability to execute an auto-ID 

function (e.g., aircraft carrier auto-ID, Aegis-equipped ships, and PATRIOT missile 

systems). Use of auto-ID can reduce the workload (no man in the loop) and improve the 

timeliness of the ID process in an extremely dynamic/saturated AD environment, but it also 

can result in mistaken ID and fratricide, engagement of noncombatants, or inadvertent 

protection for the enemy. The CID and ROE criteria for engagement should explicitly 

discuss when and what types of auto-ID are allowed. Automation should enhance, and not 

replace, the judgment of operators in a tactical situation and should be used only to keep the 

operators from being so overwhelmed they become ineffective and cannot make enough 

knowledgeable decisions. 

e. Formation assessment, applicable to both friendly and hostile formations, is a 

procedural ID method used to apply the ID (from positive or procedural means) of one air 

track to other aircraft operating in mutual support as determined by their spatial relationship. 

That spatial relationship (horizontal range, altitude separation, speed, and course), called 

formation criteria, must be determined by the AADC and ACA, approved by the JFC, and 

published in the AADP and ACP. Formation criteria may vary by theater/JOA. See Figure 

III-2 for a depiction of that spatial relationship. These formation criteria are a procedural 

ACM to help manage the volume of tracks (and operator workload) that must be displayed 

on the joint TDL and elsewhere (e.g., COP). Formation strength information may be 

handled in various ways by those surveillance elements of the IADS that contribute to the 

MTN. To declutter the air tracking displays of surveillance systems, a single track is carried 

with the number of objects meeting the formation criteria entered as a number on the track 

information associated with the ID symbol. Referred to by various systems as strength/flight 

size/raid numbers/composition, the process is described as formation tracking. The purpose 

of formation assessment is to provide timely and accurate track ID to engagement platforms 

(airborne or surface-based AD assets) to support engagement decisions for hostiles yet 

minimize the chances of fratricide. The use of formation assessment presumes that a 

formation track has been established and that an ID has been placed upon the formation track 

by competent ID authority. Also, the same formation assessment criteria must be applied to 

the other local tracks (non-TDL tracks) as was used by the surveillance system used to create 

the formation track to ensure integrity of the process. Failure to use the same specified 

criteria for formation tracking and formation assessment may mistakenly result in the 

application of “friend protection” to hostile aircraft or engagement of friendly aircraft by 
Counterair Planning 

III-15 

friendly weapons platforms. The risk of friendly engagements and friendly protection to 

hostile aircraft is greater with formation assessment in effect, but to help mitigate this risk, 

care should be taken in the development of the spatial criteria used for the formation 

assessment. 

f. Formation Tracking. Formation tracking is the use of a single data link air track 

(with a strength field indicating the number or estimated number of aerial vehicles 

comprising the formation) to represent a formation of two or more aerial vehicles. To 

qualify for formation tracking, the aircraft in the formation must maintain a consistent

relationship with each other (horizontal and vertical separation, speed, and course). Air 

surveillance systems selectively employ formation tracking when displaying air tracks. 

Formation tracks are displayed to the operators and transmitted to other air surveillance and 

AD systems via joint TDL. Formation tracking reduces operator workload, allows older C2 

systems to handle larger surveillance responsibilities, and reduces the number of transmitted 

tracks required to represent the entire air picture.

Figure III-2. Formation Assessment Spatial Relationship

Formation Assessment Spatial Relationship

3 nautical miles

Hostile

Identification

Not Assessed Hostile Assessed Hostile

Velocity

Vector

10,000 feet
Chapter III

III-16 JP 3-01 

13. Identification, Commitment, and Engagement Authorities 

a. The AADC has certain authorities, delegated by the JFC, that must be understood and 

may be delegated to subordinate commanders such as a RADC/SADC. The authorities of 

ID, commitment, and engagement are required for decisions based on established criteria that 

may be tied to operational capability and are rooted in the ROE. Delegation of those 

authorities is a means of decentralizing the execution of DCA operations. In joint and MNF 

operations, subtle differences may exist in the processes and terminology used to authorize 

the employment of weapons. It is imperative that the command lines, engagement 

authorities, engagement procedures, ROE, and terminology be standardized, documented, 

clearly understood, and rehearsed (if possible) before an engagement decision is necessary. 

b. Identification Authority. The AADC will establish the policy for ID authority, with 

JFC approval, and will promulgate it via the AADP, SPINS, and/or an OPTASKLINK 

supplement. Execution of the ID policy normally is delegated to the tactical level, but care 

must be taken that the tactical commander is capable of performing the ID function in real 

time. There are seven track classification symbols, but due to varying host-system 

implementations of Military Standard 6016D, Tactical Data Link (TDL) 16 Message 

Standard, only three can be used across the IADS to produce a common and unambiguous 

(unique) track display: friend, hostile, and unknown. The next closest unique symbol is 

“neutral,” but there are inconsistencies in how “neutral” is interpreted and displayed by some 

Service component systems. Some systems implement variations in symbols such that use of 

“pending,” “suspect,” and “assumed friend” carry a significant risk of system-to-system 

variance and will produce an uncommon MTN picture. Proper and consistent execution of 

the ID policy is extremely important to minimize fratricide and prevent enemy tracks 

misidentified as friendly/neutral from successfully penetrating the defenses for an attack. 

(1) The criteria for track classifications and the meanings of those classifications 

are approved by the JFC as part of the AADP, and any changes, especially those regarding 

ROE (e.g., meaning of hostile and engagement criteria) would be promulgated on the current 

SPINS and through ROE serial changes. An ID of hostile, subsequently placed on the 

TDL with a hostile symbol, normally does not constitute authority to engage (employ 

weapons). Engagement criteria are a product of threat analysis, risk management, and 

collateral damage assessment as determined by the JFC. Based on the ROE, a positive 

engagement order normally is required,such as a voice or specific electronic direction to 

engage. An ID of hostile may be assigned a track based on procedural ID, but the 

engagement decision normally is based on positive ID or affirming hostile intent or a hostile 

act. To avoid fratricide and potential TDL ambiguities, any uncertainty as to what 

specifically constitutes engagement authority must be resolved within tactical timelines 

before allowing weapons employment (engagement). 

(2) Once identified, a track is followed until it is no longer of significance (friendly 

or neutral) or required to be engaged (confirmed hostile by CID or hostile intent). It is not 

uncommon for a procedural ID of a track to be changed, based on better information, such as 

a later positive ID or a change in the determined intent.
Counterair Planning 

III-17 

(3) Proper application of ID authority and classification may impact AMD units 

based on their assigned WCS (free, tight, or hold/safe). AMD units often rely on linked 

track data until tracks are within range of their sensors. For example, under weapons hold or 

tight, a positive hostile ID and a command to engage is typically required, but under a 

weapons free state, presence of a track not positively identified as friendly may be engaged.

c. Commit Authority. Commit authority may be used (and delegated) by the AADC 

as a battle management tool. The AD echelon with commit authority is permitted to 

authorize assets to prepare to engage an entity (e.g., position a DCA fighter to intercept or 

direct an ADA unit to track and target). Commit authority does not imply engagement 

authority. Further permission is required to engage an entity that has been committed upon. 

If the unit with commit authority also holds engagement authority, the engagement decision 

is still separate and unique. Commit and engagement authorities are typically split during the 

transition phase of a major campaign or during containment and show of force operations to 

avoid accidental escalation of conflict. For example, during a deter/engage phase, the JFC 

may approve delegation of commit authority down to the tactical level (e.g., RADC/SADC) 

but retain engagement authority with the AADC or the JFC to prevent inadvertent escalation 

by a lower level command.

d. Engagement Authority. The JFC is vested with authority to prosecute engagements 

within the theater/JOA consistent with ROE currently in effect. The AD authority with 

engagement authority is permitted to authorize engagement of an air or missile threat. For 

AD engagements within the IADS, the authority normally is delegated to the AADC who 

may further delegate the engagement authority to tactical levels (e.g., RADC/SADC). The 

degree of delegation must be consistent with the ROE, the DAL, and the inherent right of 

self-defense. In addition to engagement authority, the process and means of ordering 

engagements (shoot/no-shoot) must be clearly stated in the AADP or ACO and SPINS. For 

example, a TDL track identified and carried as hostile (by symbol) and passed from one 

sector to another remains hostile, but normally cannot be engaged without further assessment 

(CID or known hostile act or intent) and a real-time engagement order by the controlling AD

command with engagement authority. 

14. Combat Identification

a. CID is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects 

in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. Ideally, 

the CID process uses the most positive ID methods available to allow the highest confidence 

required for that decision, because it normally is one of the most critical decisions to be 

made. Some commanders use the CID process as the basis for high confidence, timely 

application of other military options, and not just for the employment of weapons. 

b. The CID process is determined by the JFC (normally in coordination with 

subordinate commanders), supported by the ROE, and may be situational dependent and/or 

time-sensitive. CID allows the commander to balance the level of confidence in the ID 

method against the risk associated with an erroneous ID. While high confidence-low risk is 

always desired, the commander may face situations when the absence of positive ID requires 

procedural ID be used with a recognized increase in the risk of fratricide or to mis-ID an 
Chapter III

III-18 JP 3-01 

enemy (i.e., low confidence-high risk). This remains a commander’s decision. For example, 

during DCA operations against numerous simultaneous attacks by enemy aircraft and CMs, 

potentially with WMD, it may be necessary to accept lower confidence ID methods for 

hostiles and increased risk of fratricide to minimize the risk of a “leaker” getting through to 

the target. Unambiguous lines of command and clarity of ROE are particularly important to 

the CID process, especially when delegating authority for engagement decisions during 

decentralized execution. 

c. The CID process is for all joint forces and for defensive action as well as 

offensive. For example, CID may provide a positive ID of friendly SOF positioned in close 

proximity to a high-priority target system deep in enemy territory being attacked from the 

air. The leader/battle manager of the attacking force would use that CID when making an 

engagement decision on that target.

d. A CID matrix is a good tool for the CID process for counterair. To that end, the CID 

matrix should mirror the ID criteria and the CID process contained in the counterair plans 

and must be coordinated to ensure no conflicts arise during joint operations. 

See Appendix A, “Combat Identification,” for additional discussion of CID and a sample ID 

process matrix.

15. Multinational Considerations 

a. Special attention must be paid to establishing a workable CID system during MNF 

operations. A mix of units with dissimilar capabilities and differing electronic systems, fire 

control doctrine, and training can present the AADC with an extremely difficult AD

situation. Advanced planning may be required to compensate for a “patchwork” of separate 

MNF CID capabilities, not just for the surface AD and air control units, but for their aircraft 

as well. 

b. No matter how well integrated a CID system is, as much training as possible should 

be conducted to facilitate the CID processes. Means of positive ID should be stressed as 

early in the planning phases as possible and every effort made to devise a system of positive 

ID for each MNF members’ aircraft when airborne.

c. In addition to the ID/CID obstacles, the AADC must ensure the promulgation of that 

data throughout the MNF. While US joint forces may have TDL, many MNF may not have 

the same TDL interoperability.

SECTION E. ASSET PROTECTION

16. General

a. The JFC and staff, normally the plans directorate of a joint staff, develops a 

prioritized critical asset list (CAL) (see Figure III-3) for each general phase of an operation 

with inputs from the components and based on the theater level protection required to 

support tasks/missions assigned by the JFC. Within each general phase (e.g., seize initiative 

phase), subordinate JFCs or component commanders may establish additional phases that fit 
Counterair Planning 

III-19 

their CONOPS (e.g., phase I, deploy; phase II, forcible entry; phase III, defense; phase IV, 

offense) for which there may be separate CALs. The task CAL maintained by a GCC’s 

Defense Critical Infrastructure Program office may be useful in providing a preliminary 

baseline for JFCs for various operational scenarios within a JOA. The CAL should include 

designated assets and areas within the jointsecurity areas (JSAs) of the JOA. Protection for 

JSAs outside the JOA, but within the AOR, normally remains the responsibility of the 

supported GCC. Protection of the lines of communication outside the AOR and vulnerable 

to enemy (or their ally’s) air and missile attack must be coordinated with the responsible 

CCDRs by the supported GCC. For DCA protection, the joint security coordinator 

designated by the JFC normally coordinates with the AADC to ensure the JSAs are 

appropriately covered by the AADP. Usually the number of assets requiring some level of 

AMD will be greater than the resources available to defend them. Also, due to the dynamics 

of joint operations, priorities may change over the course of the operation or campaign. 

b. The completed CAL is forwarded to AADC, who will allocate available active AMD 

forces to defend the prioritized assets listed. The product of this effort is the DAL. The 

DAL is a list of those assets on the CAL that can be covered by JFC AMD forces and 

capabilities. Each defended asset on the DAL should be prioritized as requiring active AD

or appropriate passive measures if that is all that is available. After initial active AD

allocation, commanders should consider “clustering” to conserve AMD forces and assess if 

passive measures alone satisfy an assets’ required defensive posture. If passive measures 

alone are insufficient to defend an asset on the DAL, the issue should be resolved by the 

JFC. Once completed, the DAL is approved by the JFC.

See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for additional details regarding plan phases. 

Figure III-3. Combatant Commander’s Critical Asset List

Combatant Commander's Critical Asset List

Phase III

Dominate

Phase II

Seize Initiative

Phase I

Deter

Examples of Critical Theater Assets by Phase





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Seaports

Air bases

Population centers

Fleet operating areas

Command and control 

(C2) nodes

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Air bases

Fleet operating areas

Population centers

Maneuver forces

C2 nodes

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Air bases

Seaports

Maneuver forces

Fleet operating areas

Population centers

C2 nodes
Chapter III

III-20 JP 3-01 

17. Critical Asset List Development

a. All assets nominated for the CAL usually are prioritized based on a methodology of 

assessing the three major factors of criticality, vulnerability (includes recoverability), and the 

threat (CVT). This is called the “CVT methodology.” The CVT process is objective and 

considers intelligence, air operations, ground combat operations, maritime operations, and 

support operations. Each asset is evaluated against defined criteria, and these criteria are 

weighed based on the consideration of the JFC’s intent, CONOPS, and COG concerns. 

b. CAL Development Factors

(1) Criticality is the degree to which an asset is essential to accomplishing the 

mission. It is determined by assessing the impact that damage to or destruction of the asset 

will have on the success of the operation/campaign. Damage to an asset may prevent, 

significantly delay, or have no impact on success of the plan. 

(2) Vulnerability consists of two parts: susceptibility (the degree an asset is 

susceptible to surveillance, attack, or damage), and recoverability, if attacked and damaged. 

Recoverability, once a factor itself, is now a subset of vulnerability and is the degree and 

ability to recover/reconstitute from inflicted damage in terms of time, equipment, and 

manpower and to continue the mission. Commanders should consider the time to replace 

personnel, equipment, or entire units, as well as whether other forces can perform the same 

mission. The following factors should be considered when assessing vulnerability: 

(a) Survivability and cover (hardening). 

(b) Camouflage, concealment, and deception. 

(c) Mobility and dispersion. 

(d) Ability to adequately defend itself from air/missile threats.

(3) Threat. Assess the probability an asset will be targeted for surveillance or 

attack by a credible/capable adversary. Determination of adversary intent and capability are 

key determinants of assessing the probability of attack. A thorough JIPOE oriented 

specifically on adversary air and missile capabilities is key to an accurate threat assessment. 

Examples include targeting information provided by intelligence estimates, past adversary 

surveillance and attack methods, and threat doctrine. 

c. High Value Assets(HVAs). HVAs are classified as friendly critical assets requiring 

protection. They may be any forces, facilities, or area, etc., the friendly commander requires 

for the successful completion of the mission. They are categorized as follows: 

(1) High Value Geopolitical Assets. Those assets so important that the loss of 

even one could seriously impact the JFC’s operation/campaign. In addition, the political 

ramifications of destroying one of these assets could provide the adversary with a 

tremendous propaganda victory. 
Counterair Planning 

III-21 

(2) HVAA 

(a) Include all major airborne platforms for C2, reconnaissance and 

surveillance, targeting, AR, and EW (e.g., AWACS, Rivet Joint, JSTARS, Compass Call, 

Cobra Ball, U-2, E-2C, and EP-3). Depending on the defensive situation, other special 

mission aircraft also may be considered. 

(b) Active protection for an HVAA normally is performed by fighter escorts, a 

fighter CAP between the HVAA and all potential air-to-air threats, or surface-based AD 

systems between the HVAA and the enemy.

(c) Passive protection includes positioning HVAA stations or orbits beyond 

SAM range and where an enemy interceptor attack can be detected in time to retrograde the 

HVAA out of harm’s way. 

(3) High Value Units

(a) Maritime assets include aircraft carriers, maritime pre-positioning ships, 

combat logistics force ships, and amphibious ships conducting amphibious assaults and 

landings. Maritime HVAA include the E-2C or EP-3 aircraft.

(b) Active protection normally is provided by maritime AMD capable systems 

(e.g., fleet AD assets).

(c) Passive protection is accomplished by operating outside of the range of the 

enemy’s weapons envelope. 

(d) Land assets include air and surface ports of debarkation, major supply route 

checkpoints, early entry forces, operations centers, and logistical centers. 

(e) Active protection normally is provided by SAMs and/or airborne 

interceptors. 

(f) Passive protection is accomplished by cover and concealment, dispersal, 

hardening, and operating outside the envelope of the enemy’s weapons capabilities. 

18. Defended Asset List Development

a. DAL Development Considerations. The DAL is developed through the process of 

applying the CVT methodology, AMD resources, and defense design to the CAL while 

identifying the risk. It identifies the prioritized assets from the CAL to be actually defended 

with resources available. For prioritizing the DAL, the following are those considerations 

for levels of protection and levels of engagement effectiveness. 

(1) Levels of Protection. A level of protection is an aggregated probability that an 

asset will not suffer mission critical damage from an air or missile attack. It encompasses all 

joint force capabilities used to defeat the air and missile threat. Levels of protection are 

assigned to each entry on the CAL list based upon the outcome of the CVT analysis. 
Chapter III

III-22 JP 3-01 

(a) Level 1. Level 1 provides the highest level of protection to assigned assets. 

It is a primary driver for resource positioning, planned methods of fire/integration of fires, 

and initialization of DCA systems to obtain the highest feasible probability of protection 

against specific threats.

(b) Level 2. Level 2 provides the highest protection achievable while 

maintaining the highest level of protection for highest ranked assets. 

(c) Level 3. Level 3 provides the highest protection achievable while 

maintaining directed level for higher ranked assets.

(2) Levels of Engagement Effectiveness. There are five levels of operational 

engagement effectiveness. The AADC normally implements the JFC-directed protection

level for each defended asset on the DAL based on the threat capabilities and proximities,

terrain and weather, support available–time available, and civil considerations. 

Implementation may include active and passive AMD measures. After a level is established, 

the defense design and firing parameters are developed. Levels of engagement effectiveness 

0-4 are employed using tiers or methods of coverage with some employing multiple tiers and 

a variety of active and passive measures. Tiers are commonly categorized as upper and 

lower. The AADC should recommend OCA attack operations against the anticipated threats 

when an asset cannot be adequately defended from an attack due to the threat composition,

strength, or proximity. 

(a) Level 0 (None)—described as the commander’s decision to accept 

maximum risk where active AD forces provide no tiers of protection. 

(b) Level 1 (Low)—for commanders that wish to provide some level of 

protection throughout their defended areas. One tier of protection will be used. 

(c) Level 2 (Medium)—the normal level of defense used to provide specific 

military assets using a single tier of protection. While a single tier operating alone normally 

provides Level 2, it may employ two integrated tiers of defense.

(d) Level 3 (High)—described as the appropriate level of defense for assets 

that require a more robust level of protection than Level 2. Level 3 normally employs two 

tiers but may use one tier operating independently. This also may include areas where 

coordination between upper and lower tiers is used to defend a common asset. 

(e) Level 4 (Very High)—described as the maximum defense for high priority 

assets. This level normally requires two tiers operating together in an integrated defense. 

This may include areas where coordination between upper and lower tiers is used to defend a 

common asset.

b. The DAL must be continuously assessed, especially in a dynamic, multi-phased 

campaign. The AADC normally delegates further assessment of the DAL to a working 

group/coordination board with appropriate staff and component representation (e.g., a DAL 

reprioritization board or DAL synchronization board). The assessment and recommended 

adjustments to the DAL are presented to the AADC for concurrence and forwarding to the 
Counterair Planning 

III-23 

JFC for final approval. Changes to the DAL should be anticipated with changes in phases of 

an operation/campaign due to changes in the priority of defended assets by phase, loss of 

AMD assets due to attrition, inventory depletion, or the arrival of additional AMD forces. 

Normally, DAADC will chair the working group/board for assessing the DAL for changes.

See FM 3-01.94, Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations, for detailed 

discussion of CAL and DAL, including sample worksheets for the CVT process. 

SECTION F. ENABLING CAPABILITIES

19. Special Operations

SOF core operations and activities should be considered when planning counterair 

operations. SOF can aid counterair operations by providing information or by destroying or 

disrupting air and missile assets, bases, logistic sites, and C2 facilities. For example, SOF 

can locate enemy assets (especially those being concealed/camouflaged) behind the lines, 

provide terminal guidance (e.g., laser target designation) for joint air attacks, and provide 

post-attack assessment. They may be used for OCA operations, but they are not a 

recognized DCA asset. To ensure proper ID and reduce the potential for fratricide, SOF 

liaisons must ensure proper procedures are in place for CID of SOF teams and aircraft during 

cross-border operations or those considered behind enemy lines or in enemy rear areas. 

Often special liaison or trusted agents will coordinate/facilitate SOF movements, including

using ACMs for activation of joint special operations areas or restricted fire areas.

For more detailed information on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

20. Information Operations 

a. Counterair operations are most effective when they are conducted from a position of 

information superiority. IO can provide significant capabilities against OCA target sets such 

as C2 systems, AD nodes, missile sites, and airfields/operating bases. Adversary IO 

vulnerabilities related to their offensive and defensive air and missile systems should be 

identified as early as possible in the planning process. Denying the adversary knowledge of 

friendly counterair capabilities and their locations is integral to effective counterair 

operations and is achieved via the full range of IO measures, such as operations security 

(OPSEC), military deception, and EW. 

b. IO can be employed offensively to degrade the adversary’s situational awareness and 

their decision-making processes, disrupt vital AD information transmissions and their 

capability to synchronize AMDs, disrupt their ability to coordinate attacks, and deny them 

reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Military deception can be used to lead the 

adversary into making erroneous decisions and wasting resources, or to mask friendly force 

intentions. 

c. EW is normally a multifaceted very high demand/low density capability. EW aircraft 

are especially heavily tasked to support a myriad of joint missions. An EW coordination 

cell (EWCC), or its functional equivalent, is required within the JAOC, separated from 

but integrated with the IO cell, to coordinate requirements, set priorities for EW assets, 
Chapter III

III-24 JP 3-01 

and take advantage of reachback capabilities within the reprogramming centers that 

support specialized and self-protection EW systems. Airborne EW is especially important 

to SEAD operations throughout a campaign. 

d. The development and updating of the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) is critical 

to successful counterair operations because of the EW and IO implications. All joint 

operations require a JRFL to identify and deconflict/synchronize friendly force use of 

frequencies. This list is a critical tool in the management of the use of the electromagnetic 

spectrum, and it specifies protected frequencies that should not be disrupted either because of 

friendly use or friendly exploitation. The JRFL is maintained and promulgated by the J-6 

through the joint frequency management office (JFMO) in coordination with the J-2, J-3, and 

the JFC’s EW staff or an EWCC, if delegated. The JFMO must manage all frequencies used 

by the joint force. For defensive purposes, the JRFL is a means of preventing radio 

frequency interference among friendly users. Frequency deconfliction through the use of the 

JRFL is also a key to a successful coordinated defense against enemy C2-attack operations. 

EW planners must know what frequencies to protect from enemy EW action. The JRFL is 

constantly being modified, and a daily EW deconfliction message normally is used to protect 

frequencies from jamming or other forms of manipulation. Experience has shown that 

during intense SEAD operations, friendly forces have been erroneously attacked because 

their electronic emitters were not recognized as friendly. 

For more details regarding the JFRL and JFMO and in-depth discussion on EW, see JP 3-

13.1, Electronic Warfare.

For more information on IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.

21. Space Operations

a. The enabling capabilities that space operations bring to the joint force are significant 

for countering air and missile threats. Space forces provide BM launch warnings and attack 

assessments, engagement sensor cueing, launch locations, predicted headings and impact 

areas, global and theater-/JOA-wide communications, current and forecast weather 

information, space based ISR, global positioning system (and navigation and timing assets 

for accuracy of precision munitions), and theater-/JOA-wide ID/CID systems support. Space 

assets also may be used to facilitate emission control and jamming/spoofing when 

conducting SEAD missions. 

b. The JFC normally designates a lower echelon commander as the SCA to serve as the 

focal point for coordinating user requirements for space support with USSTRATCOM. Each 

GCC has a network of space operators resident on staffs at multiple echelons. Their primary 

purpose is to serve as theater advisors for space systems (national, civil, commercial, 

military, and foreign) and for integrating space capabilities into joint force planning and 

employment. These individuals concentrate primarily on working the detailed activities of 

theater space operations. 

For more information on space operations, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.
Counterair Planning 

III-25 

22. Intelligence Support

a. Intelligence support for counterair operations begins with the JIPOE and IPB 

processes. Ongoing intelligence support provides current, integrated, accurate, and timely 

all-source intelligence of adversary capabilities and activities developed from interface with 

existing national and theater intelligence sources. The intelligence system is vital to decision

making and must support the status, assessment, planning, warning, and JIPOE and IPB 

functions, as well as target prioritization and engagement decisions. Intelligence elements 

should be tailored to support real-time operations as well as deliberate planning. Intelligence 

functions include collection management; combat assessment, including battle damage 

assessment from OCA efforts, indications and warning/early warning/launch warning, 

assessing weather effects, and providing the NRT data on enemy targets; operating bases; 

missile launch sites and hide sites; EW systems; C2 facilities; surveillance and control 

systems; and logistic and infrastructure support. 

b. The JFC normally will be supported by a joint intelligence element where appropriate 

and possibly by a national intelligence support team. Although the functional systems 

(sensors, decision support, or fusion centers and firing units) may be dissimilar, interoperable 

communications and software must be possible, including making allowances for systems of 

MNF members. Issues regarding the release of intelligence to MNF partners must be 

addressed as early as possible during counterair planning. 

c. Increasing the readiness posture includes performing the vital operating functions that 

prepare weapon systems, ISR assets, and C2 nodes for the level of hostile activity 

anticipated. Once enemy air and missile activities are detected, the preparation and planning 

measures provide a capability for parallel defensive and offensive responses. Hostile air and 

missile activity observed and identified through sensor and surveillance systems (national, 

theater, and tactical) keys the C2 process that uses communications interfaces to provide 

NRT DCA and OCA responses. Data is made available in NRT to C2 centers, systems, and 

forces supporting counterair operations. Simultaneously, while enemy air and missiles are in 

flight, updated enemy launch locations and target database information are passed to the 

appropriate C2 and attack systems, and launch warnings are provided to all units or 

commands within the theater. 

For more information, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military 

Operations, and JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 

23. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

a. Situational awareness relies on joint force ISR and associated processing, 

exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. Those capabilities are provided by air-, land-, 

space-, and sea-based platforms. As a group, ISR platforms with multidimensional sensors 

provide the most accurate “picture” of the adversary. Many ISR assets are high demand/low 

density and require careful planning for their utilization. 

b. The backbone of ISR capabilities is a theater ISR CONOPS based on a coherent 

collection strategy that fully integrates and optimizes the use of all organic, multinational, 
Chapter III

III-26 JP 3-01 

commercial, and requested national or interagency ISR assets. The capabilities include both 

periodic reconnaissance and continuous surveillance of the operational area. While some of 

the information requires processing for intelligence, other producers can be directly linked to 

commanders and OCA or DCA forces as required. This is especially true for time-sensitive 

targeting and decision making. Depending on the capabilities of the sensor and surveillance 

systems and the source and quality of the intelligence, cueing of additional systems may be 

necessary to provide more refined adversary air and missile threat data to ensure accurate 

targeting and assessment. National or theater sensor and surveillance assets may be able to 

detect, footprint, or search areas that will then require more refined ISR activities by theater 

and tactical assets. Friendly aerial reconnaissance, ground surveillance systems, and other 

intelligence assets requiring cueing are focused rapidly to achieve the necessary accuracy for 

IPB targeting objectives.

c. The JFACC normally is responsible for airborne ISR for the JFC, and the JAOC has 

an ISR division for planning and execution. The GCC is responsible for theater-level ISR, to 

include ISR support to the subordinate JFC. Typically, the GCC manages ISR operations via 

the joint reconnaissance center and ISR collection management via the intelligence 

directorate collection management staff entity. At the national and the Department of 

Defense (DOD) levels, USSTRATCOM identifies, develops, and recommends sourcing 

solutions for DOD ISR and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination 

capabilities to satisfy combatant command and national operational and intelligence 

requirements while synchronizing operational ISR plans and allocation strategies to integrate 

national and theater capabilities. 

Refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and 

JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, for more details regarding ISR. 

24. Air Refueling

a. AR is an important force multiplier and enabling function for counterair and joint air 

operations. AR greatly increases the range, endurance, and payloads of aircraft conducting 

counterair and other joint air operations. 

b. During a combat operation, the highest priority for intratheater AR units is normally 

supporting combat and combat support aircraft executing joint air operations. This is 

especially true during the initial phases of a conflict. Theater AR assets bolster the security 

of air assets by allowing them to be based beyond the range of enemy threats. AR increases 

the endurance of air combat support assets such as AWACS type aircraft, and JSTARS 

aircraft and are among the many crucial airborne platforms used to help manage, direct, and 

conduct combat operations. Depending upon the operation, extending range or endurance 

could reduce the number of sorties required, decrease ground support requirements at 

forward locations, and may reduce the number of aircraft required to be deployed to a 

theater.

c. AR not only allows combat aircraft to greatly extend their range of operation (which 

may allow them to operate from bases further away from the conflict that may be more 

secure and have existing infrastructure and logistic capabilities that are critical to military 
Counterair Planning 

III-27 

operations) and endurance (making possible longer “on-station” times, thereby decreasing 

the number of aircraft needed to meet objectives), but may also allow some types of aircraft 

to carry a larger payload on initial takeoff by decreasing the amount of onboard fuel 

required. Fuel necessary for mission range requirements is on-loaded after takeoff by either 

pre-strike or post-strike refueling (or both). The ability to increase an aircraft’s weapons 

load multiplies the combat force and combat efficiency of that aircraft. A lack of airspace 

for AR tracks can limit the amount of combat and combat support sorties the 

JFACC/AADC is able to schedule and execute. AR support is essential for both DCA 

and OCA.

Refer to JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, for more details regarding AR operations. 
Chapter III

III-28 JP 3-01 

Intentionally Blank
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 

1. General 

OCA operations normally have a high priority as long as the enemy has the air and 

missile capability to threaten friendly forces and the JFC does not have the degree of air 

superiority desired to accomplish the objectives required for the end state. OCA operations 

reduce the risk of air and missile attacks, allowing friendly forces to focus on their mission 

objectives. The preferred method of countering air and missile threats is to destroy or disrupt 

them prior to launch using OCA operations. 

SECTION A. OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING 

2. General 

a. OCA planning begins with JIPOE and IPB and considers the JFC’s assessment of the 

overall air and missile threat, the predicted effectiveness of the defense design, target 

database, ROE, objectives, priorities, missions, available friendly capabilities, and the weight 

of effort or force apportionment decision. IPB enhances the commanders’ ability to find 

targets, task attack forces, and assess their effectiveness. Considerations include the enemy’s 

air and missile operating areas, signatures, capabilities, and deployment and employment 

procedures. IPB attempts to provide a comprehensive picture of the enemy activity, terrain, 

and weather within the theater/JOA and generally requires planning for surveillance and 

reconnaissance in support of intelligence collection. 

b. Through centralized planning and direction, the JFACC synchronizes OCA 

operations with DCA and other joint operations and relies on robust C2 systems for 

decentralized execution. Decentralized execution allows components and units to exercise 

initiative, responsiveness, and flexibility within their command authorities to accomplish 

their tasks. Operations against fixed targets require emphasis on preplanning, accurate and 

timely intelligence, target selection, time over target, and published ROE. OCA operations 

against mobile targets or TSTs (e.g., SAMs, BM or CM launchers) also require preplanned 

procedures that can be implemented or modified quickly to assign the optimum weapon 

system relying on integrated C2 systems for as close to real time control as possible. This 

emphasis on planning enhances mission effectiveness while minimizing potential for 

fratricide and interference with other operations. 

c. Reliable and secure C2 systems are needed to ensure timely and accurate integration, 

planning, responsiveness, and close coordination. These systems represent the collective

“After all, the great defense against aerial menace is to attack the enemy’s aircraft 

as near as possible to their point of departure.” 

Winston Churchill 

Memo of 5 September 1914 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-01 

threads that tie all joint forces together, and those C2 systems must be aggressively 

protected from enemy interference. 

d. Planning should include the use of longer range attack operations against deep 

threats. These should be included in planning contingencies developed under the 

collaborative planning process with other CCDRs. 

3. Offensive Counterair and the Joint Air Operations Plan 

a. The preponderance of OCA operations are conducted with joint air forces/capabilities 

that are integrated in action through the JAOP. OCA planning is an integral part of this 

overall joint air operations planning. The air estimate process has six phases that result in 

the JAOP. While the phases are presented in sequential order, they can be worked either 

concurrently or sequentially. The phases are integrated and the products of each phase are 

checked and verified for coherence. Figure IV-1 illustrates the six phases. The following 

explains the process in regards to OCA planning, not each phase: 

(1) The process begins with mission analysis (i.e., analyzing the JFC guidance, the 

situation, resources, and risks involved). Mission analysis provides the data that is used to 

answer the essential question about an operation. The JFACC uses the mission analysis to 

produce air objectives that support the JFC’s objectives. In general terms, the focus of OCA 

is to attain and maintain the JFC’s desired degree of air superiority in the operational area. 

This requires that both an enemy’s offensive and defensive air and missile capability be 

made combat ineffective to some degree. Specific OCA objectives and desired effects 

Figure IV-1. Joint Air Estimate Process

Joint Air Estimate Process

Mission Analysis

Situation and Course of Action (COA) Development

COA Analysis

COA Comparison

COA Selection

Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) Development

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) is initiated. Phase focuses on 

analyzing the joint force commander’s guidance.

IPB is refined to include adversary COAs. Adversary and friendly centers of gravity 

are analyzed. Multiple air COAs or one air COA with significant branches and 

sequels are developed.

Friendly COAs are wargamed against adversary COAs.

Wargaming results are used to compare COAs against predetermined criteria.

Decision brief to joint force air component commander (JFACC) with COA 

recommendation. JFACC selects COA.

Selected COA is developed into a JAOP.
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-3 

must be clearly defined and measurable so the JFACC can assess whether or not OCA 

operations are achieving the objectives while avoiding undesired effects. 

(2) After establishing OCA objectives, the JFACC uses the data from the mission 

analysis to examine resources and risks, as well as enemy COA (both known and 

anticipated) to arrive at the best option for integrating OCA into the JFACC’s COA for joint 

air operations. 

(3) The JFACC’s COA is approved or amended by the JFC and gets translated into 

the final JAOP that includes details on the integration of OCA into the overall air operations 

plan. The JAOP should identify objectives by priority order, describing in what order they 

should be attacked or otherwise neutralized, the desired effects, and the weight of effort 

required to achieve them. For OCA operations, the JAOP should account for current and 

potential offensive and defensive threats and indicate the phasing of joint air operations. The 

results of the planning process also are incorporated into the daily master air attack plan 

(MAAP). 

(4) The MAAP forms the basis of the daily ATO. During MAAP development 

OCA resources are allocated to accomplish specific tasks. OCA planning considers the 

operational context and environment and the results from current operations. Planners will 

work with specialty teams, component liaisons, and unit representatives, incorporating and 

synchronizing OCA aspects of the air operations directive, joint prioritized integrated target 

list, threat situation, joint prioritized collection, forecast weather, weapons system 

availability, AR, and weapons employment options. The MAAP has sufficient flexibility to 

adapt to the changing situation throughout the theater/JOA. Planners adjust to the changing 

availability of joint assets to ensure each task or target is assigned the best available 

capability. 

b. OCA planning includes targeting enemy air and missile threats and their C2 and 

supporting infrastructure. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the 

appropriate response to them, accounting for operational requirements and capabilities. The 

following seven criteria are normally used to establish targets and their priorities: 

(1) Objective—the degree to which targets contribute to the OCA objectives. 

(2) Threat—determining the need and urgency to counter the threat posed by the 

target. 

(3) Expected Effect—the degree the enemy capability can reasonably be expected 

to be affected by a successful action. 

(4) Delay in Effect—the time between the initial engagement and the desired effect. 

(5) Risk Calculation—the probable risk to attacking forces. 

(6) Forces Available—the composition of forces required to achieve the desired 

results. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-01 

(7) Assessment—the ability to determine the effect of an attack on enemy 

capability. 

Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for a detailed discussion of the targeting process. 

c. OCA targets should be attacked on the surface prior to launch and as close to their 

source as possible. However, based on the JFC’s priorities and ROE, many mobile targets, 

especially TSTs, may be sought and attacked wherever and whenever they are found. Target 

ID and planning should start prior to hostilities, but target data should be as current as the 

latest intelligence. Target defenses, to include active and passive systems, also should be 

evaluated to determine vulnerability. Commanders should consider the following target 

systems for OCA operations: 

(1) WMD. The engagement of targets involved with the production, storage, and 

delivery of WMD present the JFC with significant and unique challenges. When tackling 

these challenges, the JFC must consider targeting priorities, reviewing and revising existing 

ROE where needed, and developing clear guidance for WMD targeting. When planning 

OCA against WMD targets, risk assessments should consider the unique nature of the 

collateral damage. Escalation concerns may place some enemy WMD and delivery 

capabilities on the restricted target or no-strike lists. 

See JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, for further guidance on combating 

WMD planning. 

(2) Missiles and Support Infrastructure. OCA operations are most effective 

against missiles prior to their launch. The destruction of missiles, launch facilities, storage 

facilities, and other support infrastructure greatly limits subsequent missile attacks. OCA 

assets may also be rapidly retasked to destroy TSTs such as mobile launchers. 

IRAQI INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM DURING DESERT STORM 

“The underlying principle of the suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) 

plan was to attack KARI [nickname for Iraqi integrated air defense system] 

as a whole. It would not be necessary to kill all the surface-to-air missile 

(SAM) sites; it would be enough, if the coalition SEAD assets intimidated 

the Iraqis to the point that those running SAM sites would refrain from 

turning radar on. Finally, the plan to suppress enemy air defenses aimed 

to defeat the SAM threat, so that allied aircraft could operate at medium 

altitudes which would minimize the threat posed by Iraqi antiaircraft 

artillery. In effect, planners looked to maximize the inherent inefficiencies 

and frictions within KARI. They believed that the Iraqis could not operate 

effectively without centralized direction; once the system began to break 

down at the center, it would no longer function at all.” 

SOURCE: The Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II 
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-5 

(3) Airfields and Operating Bases. Destruction of hangars, shelters, maintenance 

facilities, and other storage areas as well as petroleum, oils, and lubricants will reduce the 

enemy’s capability to generate aircraft sorties. Runway or taxiway closures often prevent 

use of the airfield for short periods, thus preventing subsequent takeoffs and forcing 

returning aircraft to more vulnerable or distant locations. Direct attacks on crews and 

maintenance personnel facilities may reduce sortie generation rates longer than attacks on the 

infrastructure of airfields and operating bases. 

(4) Aircraft. Target aircraft include enemy fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft 

(manned or unmanned), whether in flight or on the ground. Destruction of these targets will 

limit enemy attacks, observation, and defensive capability. 

(5) C2 Systems. C2 systems are critical to the employment of forces and should be 

given a high priority during OCA operations. Remember the desired effect may be to take 

away the enemy’s C2 capability while retaining the ability to reconstitute it after the conflict. 

C2 systems include intelligence gathering, warning and control systems (i.e., GCI sites, early 

warning and acquisition radars, space-based systems, and other sensors), as well as their 

supporting facilities. Fixed site, hardened facilities are usually easier to locate than mobile 

systems. Attacks against fixed sites can also be preplanned with appropriate weapons to 

increase the probability of kill (Pk). Attacks should also be considered against airborne, 

maritime, and ground-based C2 platforms, as well as against systems supporting space-based 

platforms. IO capabilities should be employed offensively for the desired effects whenever 

possible. 

(6) Naval Platforms. Enemy naval platforms capable of employing aircraft, longrange SAMs, or missiles are also important OCA targets. Destruction of these platforms 

limits the enemy’s ability to conduct air and missile attacks in the littoral or possibly 

influence vital sea lines of communications. 

(7) AD Systems and Enemy Forces. Disruption or destruction of enemy AD 

systems and the personnel who control, maintain, and operate them significantly limit enemy 

self-defense efforts. 

4. Offensive Counterair Assets 

a. The effectiveness of OCA operations depends on the availability and capabilities of 

friendly assets. The choice of a particular weapon system or capability may depend upon the 

situation, target characteristics, desired effects, threats, weather, and available intelligence. 

Whenever possible and within the ROE, commanders should employ weapon systems that 

minimize the risk to friendly forces and noncombatants. 

b. Aircraft. Offensive aircraft provide the advantages of air-refuelable manned systems 

(flexibility of control), night and all-weather capable, long ranges, tailorable weapons loads, 

precision weapons, and most are capable of self-defense. Offensive aircraft include 

bombers, air-to-air fighters, fighter-attack, EW aircraft, and fighters especially configured for 

SEAD. Additionally, there are the warning and control, reconnaissance, aerial tankers, 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-01 

special operations, and airlift aircraft that directly support the offensive aircraft or other 

forces capable of OCA operations. 

c. UA. UA can be used for attacks, surveillance, reconnaissance, deception, jamming, 

and decoy of enemy forces and AD systems. UA are preprogrammed or remotely piloted 

and often provide intelligence to friendly forces while providing confusing and erroneous 

information to the enemy. Some UA are night-capable and carry precision guided weapons. 

UA may cause the enemy to expend weapons and other AD resources to evaluate or attack 

them. Airspace control can be a problem when mixing UA and manned aircraft in close 

proximity. 

d. Missiles. Missiles that may be used for OCA include surface-to-surface, air-tosurface, and air-to-air guided missiles as well as air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles 

(SLCMs). CMs provide the capability to attack very heavily defended targets when the risk 

to aircrews is not acceptable. 

e. SOF. SOF conduct direct action, provide terminal guidance, observe attacks, and 

collect intelligence through special reconnaissance. SOF may strike enemy targets that are 

normally beyond the capability of other conventional munitions. Examples include targets 

concealed by difficult terrain, underground facilities, or “safe haven” targets. SOF may also 

be used to locate, positively identify, and designate targets for other forces. Coordination 

with the SOLE at the JAOC is critical to synchronize/deconflict operations and avoid 

fratricide for SOF working behind the lines and/or in the land/maritime AO. 

f. Surface Fire Support. Artillery and naval surface fire support may be used during 

OCA operations if enemy targets are within range. Surface fire may provide the safest and 

fastest method of attacking targets. 

g. Antisubmarine Warfare Forces. Sea- and land-based antisubmarine capabilities 

may be employed against some enemy CM and BM submarines, based on approved ROE. 

Employment is dependent upon whether the enemy presents an operational threat and the 

commander’s desires regarding conflict escalation. 

h. Armed Helicopters. When apportioned by the JFC and made available for tasking, 

these assets may be placed in direct support of the JFACC with mission-type orders for 

attack operations. Army attack helicopters are considered maneuver units for the land forces. 

i. C2 Systems. C2 support for OCA includes early warning and surveillance systems, 

radars, ID/CID systems, communications systems, and other surface-, air-, and space-based 

sensors. These systems provide indications and warning, intelligence, targeting data, and 

C2. C2 systems are vital to counterair. 

j. IO. IO can generate nonlethal effects that have proven to be essential to OCA 

operations. The employment of information-related capabilities can save valuable aircraft 

sorties during a high-tempo air war. Many OCA targets, such as C2 nodes, missiles, and 

support infrastructure, and airfields/operating bases can be affected by various IO actions 

that include computer network operations and EW. Some information-related capabilities 

afford the JFACC access to targets that may be inaccessible by other means. 
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-7 

5. Enemy Air Defenses 

a. Enemy ADs may range from autonomous AAA to the most advanced IADS. An 

enemy IADS could include detection, C2, and weapon systems integrated to protect those 

assets critical to achieving their strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. An enemy 

IADS attempts to provide a seamless capability to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize ISR and air 

and missile attacks or other penetrations of their airspace. To degrade effectiveness of 

friendly OCA operations, enemy defensive tactics may include jamming aircraft navigation, 

communications, target acquisition systems, and precision weapons guidance systems. 

IADSs have become increasingly complex and can differ widely in terms of organization, 

sophistication, and operational procedures. As a target system or number of target systems, 

enemy IADSs need to be analyzed in depth to neutralize or avoid their strengths and exploit 

their weaknesses. 

b. C2. Traditionally, many potential adversaries exercise rigid centralized control over 

AD activities. ADCs located in centralized C2 posts provide warning and cueing, assign 

targets, and control weapons readiness using overlapping and redundant communication 

links. However, some potential adversaries may employ a decentralized system where 

multiple nodes may have the redundancy to direct the entire IADS. Radio-based C2 is now 

being supplemented by combinations of communications over landline (cable/fiber optics), 

microwave, cellular, satellite, and Internet systems. 

c. Employment. Mobile AD elements allow forces to echelon in depth and include 

tactical and strategic SAM and AAA systems. Technologies are now available that allow 

passive detection with little warning prior to weapon engagements. Known adversaries are 

adept at camouflage, concealment, and deception, complicating the targeting process. SAM 

forces have become more mobile and lethal, with some systems demonstrating a “shoot-andmove” time in minutes rather than hours or days. Modern SAM systems have been 

dramatically improved in both range and capability and some older systems have received 

substantial upgrades that continue to make them serious threats to US forces. Long-range 

SAMs are usually located near high-value targets and provide area and point defense 

coverage. However, their range and mobility mean these systems could provide AD 

coverage over the forward edge of the battlefield at various stages of the conflict and threaten 

friendly airborne warning and control, surveillance, and reconnaissance and targeting 

platforms well into friendly airspace. Point defenses and maneuver units may use shortrange air defenses (SHORADs) including SAMs, multiple calibers of AAA, and MANPADS 

that may be guided by infrared or radio frequency methods. For enemy maneuver units, the 

SHORAD will probably present a primary threat against air assault, air mobility, and CAS 

operations. The proliferation and lack of warning of some SHORAD systems make them a 

serious threat to all fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft operating at low and medium altitudes, 

especially during takeoff and landing. OCA planners should expect MANPADS and AAA 

coverage wherever enemy forces are encountered. 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-01 

SECTION B. OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS 

6. General 

a. The preferred counterair employment strategy is to execute OCA operations prior to 

the launch of air and missile threats and as close to their source as possible. Prior planning 

and accurate and timely intelligence are keys to locating and attacking OCA targets as well 

as their supporting elements. Under decentralized execution, units tasked for OCA 

operations should have the latitude to plan, coordinate, and execute their operations. OCA 

operations may be conducted by any component of the joint force with the requisite 

capability using aircraft, missiles, SOF, surface fires, C2 systems, or ground forces. 

b. OCA operations can be preemptive or reactive, and may be planned using deliberate 

or dynamic targeting. Missions using deliberate targeting are scheduled or on-call targets 

and included in the ATO and rely on continuous and accurate intelligence to identify them at 

particular locations and times. Missions using dynamic targeting are unanticipated/unplanned 

targets, such as mobile TSTs, that fall outside the ATO cycle and require immediate action. 

Minutes often define the timeline when these targets are vulnerable to attack. Those targets 

requiring immediate action cannot be effectively attacked unless responsiveness and 

flexibility is built into the targeting process and the ATO. OCA may require provisions for 

ground/airborne alert aircraft, on-call surface fire support, and diverting aircraft with suitable 

weapons for the target/target system. 

c. To ensure unity of effort, conservation of force, and fratricide prevention, attacks 

within a designated surface AO require coordination with that supported component 

commander, as designated by the JFC. For a land AO, the land force commander normally 

establishes a fire support coordination line (FSCL) as a permissive FSCM. Attacks short of 

the FSCL are controlled by the land force commander. Beyond the FSCL, coordination and 

restrictive measures are used to avoid conflicting or redundant operations. Forces attacking 

targets beyond the FSCL must coordinate with all affected commanders to allow necessary 

reaction and avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. Generally, the ATO process 

provides sufficient coordination for scheduled and on-call targets beyond the FSCL. If 

permitted by specific JFC guidance, ROE, and preplanned procedures, 

unanticipated/unplanned targets may be attacked quickly using whatever information and 

coordination that can be provided through the C2 system. Liaison elements can be very 

useful for coordination of operations against unanticipated/unplanned targets. Under 

exceptional circumstances, if approved by the JFC, the inability to perform coordination may 

not preclude attacking the target, with the commander of the attacking force assuming the 

increased risk of fratricide. Therefore, the component commanders must plan and coordinate 

procedures for operations against unanticipated/unplanned targets, especially those in the 

land or maritime component AOs. OCA operations include attack operations, SEAD, fighter 

escort, and fighter sweep, shown in Figure IV-2. 
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-9 

7. Attack Operations 

a. OCA attack operations are offensive actions against surface targets that contribute to 

the enemy’s air and missile capabilities. All components normally have forces capable of 

supporting attack operations. Some Service components refer to attack operations as strikes. 

The objective of attack operations is to prevent the hostile use of enemy aircraft and missiles 

by attacking them and their supporting elements and infrastructure with the fires necessary to 

create the desired effects. 

b. OCA Attack Operation Targets. Attack operations target the following 

components of enemy air and missile capability (not in a prioritized order): 

(1) Air and missile unit C2 nodes/centers. 

(2) Aircraft on airfields and in shelters. 

(3) CMs and BMs on fixed and mobile launchers. 

(4) Airfield runways, taxiways, and underground facilities entrances. 

DESERT STORM OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR 

The Iraqi Air Force posed both a defensive threat to Coalition air 

operations and an offensive threat to Coalition forces in the region. In 

addition to a defensive capability, the Iraqi Air Force had a chemical 

weapons delivery capability and had used precision-guided missiles. 

Initial targeting of the Iraqi Air Force during Operation DESERT STORM 

emphasized the suppression of air operations at airfields by cratering and 

mining runways, bombing aircraft, maintenance and storage facilities, and 

attacking [command, control, and communications] facilities. Coalition 

planners anticipated the Iraqis initially would attempt to fly large numbers 

of defensive sorties, requiring an extensive counterair effort. Air 

commanders also expected the Iraqis to house and protect aircraft in 

hardened shelters. An attempt to fly some aircraft to sanctuary in a 

neighboring country also was expected, although the safe haven was 

thought to be Jordan, rather than Iran. 

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992 

Figure IV-2. Primary Offensive Counterair Missions 

Primary Offensive Counterair Missions





Attack operations

Suppression of enemy air defenses





Fighter escort

Fighter sweep
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-01 

(5) Major IADS C2 facilities. 

(6) Operations and maintenance facilities, equipment, and personnel. 

(7) Logistic support (e.g., fuel storage, munitions depots, electrical power 

generation and transmission). 

(8) ISR and target acquisition systems. 

(9) Transportation infrastructure serving garrisons/deployment sites for 

mobile/moveable missiles (e.g., bridges, tunnel adits, rail choke points). 

(10) Aircraft carriers and sea-based offensive missile and AMD platforms. 

c. Resources

(1) Assets used to support OCA attack operations include fixed- and rotary-wing 

aircraft, CMs, SOF, other surface-to-surface fires, ground maneuver forces, EW and other IO 

capabilities, and ISR systems. Also, when required, long-range strike capabilities may be 

available to support the OCA effort. 

(2) Attack operations are highly dependent upon predictive and developed 

intelligence. Because of the difficulty in detecting highly mobile launch systems, a seamless 

network of C2 systems and sensors should be employed to share information and support 

NRT targeting and attack. National sensor systems normally will be required to augment 

theater air and surface based systems. Space systems provide tactical information to assist in 

determining enemy missile launch points and tracking. Additionally, intelligence collected 

by these systems can enable theater forces to anticipate hostile air and missile operations and 

determine their unit locations. 

d. Execution. In addition to the JFACC’s own Service component forces, the JFC may 

apportion additional component force/capabilities to the JFACC to support theater-/JOAwide attack operations. The JFACC’s recommendation and the JFC’s decision on 

apportionment determine the amount of effort made available for OCA attack operations. 

Attack operations are generally planned against scheduled and on-call targets, but some 

flexibility must be planned for unanticipated/unplanned targets of opportunity. 

(1) Planned Scheduled Targets. Normally, OCA targets are nominated and 

prioritized through the joint targeting process that results in planned targets; that may include 

a list of approved TSTs that must be attacked at the onset of hostilities, or even prior to the 

onset of hostilities. Typically, JFCs organize a joint targeting coordination board 

(JTCB) for determining apportionment of operational fires and shaping the operational 

environment in the theater/JOA, including fires supporting OCA attack operations. 

The JTCB normally simultaneously addresses at least three ATO cycles that are either being 

planned, about to be executed, or in execution. 

(2) Planned On-Call Targets. The quicker the joint force can locate, identify, and 

target the enemy air and missile threats, the quicker they can be attacked and defeated. On-
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-11 

call missions are conducted against on-call targets, those emerging mobile targets and TSTs 

that require the execution of mutually supporting tasks (e.g., detection, acquisition, ID, 

tracking, attack, and assessment). These operations rely on sensor systems, a responsive 

NRT sensor management and communications network, and weapon systems capable of 

attacking targets as soon as adequate targeting information is available. 

(3) Target Acquisition. Acquisition and tracking systems may utilize cueing from 

wide-area and local surveillance systems and receive warning data from other intelligence 

sources. Acquisition supports target ID, discrimination, and timely engagement by 

accurately locating and monitoring targets and transmitting information relative to their 

movements. 

(a) Target Detection. In the case of BMs and CMs, detection can be 

accomplished through identifying launch signatures or intelligence sources such as 

measurement and signature intelligence or signals intelligence. To support attack operations 

in all environments, joint forces should minimize the effects of enemy countermeasures 

while capitalizing on distinctive equipment signatures. Surveillance capabilities should 

integrate national level intelligence with theater level capabilities. Space-, sea-, air-, and 

ground-based area and point surveillance sensors also will be key to establishing a 

comprehensive surveillance network. Detection involves a systemic search of areas of 

interest identified during the IPB. After detection, warning or location data should be passed 

immediately to joint and component intelligence and operations centers, executing units, and 

air and surface search equipment. Simultaneously, tactical warnings also should be provided 

to potential friendly targeted assets. 

(b) ID. ID of aircraft and missiles and their supporting nodes requires 

management of target movement data, determination of the type of system employed, and 

discrimination of the launch and support systems from decoys. Target ID also requires the 

use of predictive intelligence, including the ID of potential future target locations, area 

limitation analysis, and automated cueing of sensors to threatening targets. 

(4) Attack. Observed enemy activity should trigger timely counterair execution. 

Targets identified in the IPB database are included in the JFC’s plan for preemptive strikes 

or operations at the onset of hostilities. Targets acquired are attacked in accordance with 

JFC guidance that normally allows attack of unanticipated/unplanned targets as they 

present themselves. 

(5) ATO. The ATO should be flexible enough to deal with immediate attack 

operations. The combat operations division of the JAOC is responsible for adjusting the 

ATO in order to deal with real-time developments in the operational area. One method to 

permit this flexibility is designating selected forces in the ATO as either ground alert or 

airborne alert. These on-call assets can then be tasked real time against immediate counterair 

targets. 

(6) TSTs. Prior planning, delegating authority, and having the appropriate C2 

systems can streamline decision cycles for attacking counterair TSTs. 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-01 

Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for a discussion of targeting and TSTs. 

8. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 

a. SEAD is activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based 

enemy ADs by destructive or disruptive means. SEAD must be an integral part of all 

planning and air operations, but the SEAD requirement will vary according to mission 

objectives, system capabilities, and threat complexity. SEAD operations are based upon the 

JAOP and the components’ suppression needs, target priorities, and availability of SEAD 

assets. 

b. SEAD objectives are specified by the JFC, who will consider the unique capabilities 

of each component to contribute to counterair operations. Traditionally, there are three 

categories of SEAD, each of which reduces attrition and creates more favorable conditions 

for friendly air operations: AOR-/JOA-wide joint AD system suppression, localized 

suppression, and opportune suppression. For each category, there are two means of 

executing SEAD, destructive and disruptive. 

c. SEAD assets are often used in conjunction with other air operations/missions (i.e., air 

interdiction, OCA attack, airborne operations) when surface ADs are a factor. Specially 

trained aircrew and specially equipped aircraft are designed for SEAD missions, especially 

against an IADS. SEAD dedicated aircraft normally are equipped with special electronic 

detection and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment, deceptive expendables (chaff, 

flares, or decoys), and antiradiation missiles (ARMs) for use against emitting radars. During 

major operations, SEAD assets normally are too valuable to be used for missions without a 

SEAD requirement. Other fighter-attack and multi-role fighter crews normally are trained to 

support the SEAD mission, especially against the enemy AD infrastructure. 

d. Threat. AD threats can encompass many national or multinational systems normally 

integrated into an IADS. Potential adversaries’ IADSs have become increasingly complex 

and can differ widely from country to country in terms of organization, sophistication, and 

operational procedures. An adversary’s IADS needs to be analyzed in-depth with an eye to 

potential strengths and weaknesses, especially seams in coverage. The goal is to identify 

command structure, AD doctrine, early warning and tracking capabilities, C2 

reliability/redundancy, and defensive weapons systems. SEAD operations target the 

following components of an IADS: 

(1) IADS C2 nodes/centers. 

(2) SAM sites. 

(3) AAA. 

(4) Early warning and fire control radars and GCI sites. 

(5) SAM carriers and storage bunkers. 

(6) AD operations and maintenance personnel. 
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-13 

e. Resources. Each component has its own capabilities for SEAD. Most are normally 

oriented toward their mission areas, and they assume the immediate responsibility for 

suppressing enemy AD threats expected against their forces. The components with 

dedicated, specialized aircraft and aircrews have the best potential and options for SEAD. 

Some of these options include aircraft with special detectors, jammers, and ECM equipment, 

ARMs, and terminally guided munitions (TGMs). Dedicated SEAD forces may be 

supported by aircraft with TGMs or unguided air-to-surface munitions. Land forces may use 

EW equipment, attack helicopters, and direct or indirect fires (including mortars, artillery, 

missiles, or naval surface fire support). SOF may be used for direct action (attack) or 

providing terminal guidance for air attacks. Additionally, space assets may also be used to 

facilitate emission control and jamming/spoofing when conducting SEAD missions. 

f. Means of SEAD Execution. SEAD operations are accomplished through destructive 

and disruptive means. 

(1) Destructive Means. Destructive means seek the destruction of the target 

system or operating personnel. 

(2) Disruptive Means. Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, 

delay, or neutralize enemy surface AD systems. Disruptive means may be either active or 

passive. 

(a) Active means include EA, directed energy, electromagnetic jamming, 

electromagnetic deception, expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys), and tactics such as 

deception, avoidance, or evasive flight profiles. In addition, UASs can be used to actively 

employ disruptive means. 

(b) Passive means include emission control, camouflage, infrared shielding, 

warning receivers, and material design features, to include stealth technology. 

g. Categories of SEAD Execution

(1) AOR-/JOA-wide AD System Suppression. AOR-/JOA-wide suppression is 

conducted against specific enemy AD systems throughout the AOR/JOA to degrade or 

destroy their major capabilities/effectiveness. It targets high payoff AD assets that result in 

the greatest degradation of the enemy’s total system. It normally is a major effort to 

destroy/disrupt the whole enemy IADS and therefore may have a higher priority than 

localized suppression. Typically, destruction of key C2 nodes has the most disruptive 

effect on an IADS. In conjunction with SEAD, efforts are normally made to destroy/disrupt 

enemy equivalent AWACS aircraft. The immediate objective is to destroy or disrupt the 

integration and synchronization of the enemy AMDs. The duration and level of disruption 

depends upon the JFC’s objectives and the sophistication of the IADS. 

(2) Localized Suppression. Localized suppression operations normally are 

confined to geographic areas associated with specific targets or transit routes for a specific 

time. Under localized suppression, SEAD aircraft normally escort other aircraft to protect 

them from a surface-based air defense threat in that sector. Localized suppression normally 

takes place in different areas and times throughout the AOR/JOA. Although planned to 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-01 

protect specific operations or missions, localized suppression may also support AOR-/JOAwide AD suppression. 

(a) Planned Localized Suppression. Localized SEAD coordination occurs at 

all echelons. Localized suppression requests are processed from the lowest echelon of 

command to the highest using the appropriate air control system. Liaison elements located 

in the JAOC aid this effort. A requesting echelon or component must first consider what 

organic SEAD systems are available. When the requirements exceed the capability or 

availability of organic systems, the requesting component passes the requirements through its 

respective chain of command to the JFACC for resolution. Units requesting air support are 

required to identify known or suspected AD systems that could threaten the mission. SEAD 

requests also will include these defensive systems and identify other supporting targets that 

likewise cannot be engaged with organic capabilities/forces. 

(b) Immediate Localized Suppression. Threat assessment and suppression 

requirements, usually destructive, must be made quickly when processing a request for this 

type of SEAD support. Procedures for requesting immediate localized suppression are 

similar to immediate requests for CAS. If a surface force cannot support the SEAD 

requirement, their component control center passes the request to the JFACC through the 

appropriate air control system for immediate SEAD support considerations. 

(3) Opportune Suppression. Opportune suppression is unplanned and includes 

aircrew self-defense and attack against surface-AD targets of opportunity. The proliferation 

of highly mobile AD weapon systems, coupled with deception and defensive tactics, will 

lead to an increase of opportune suppression. Any movement by air defense systems from 

targeted locations will change localized suppression into opportune suppression. The JFC 

will establish ROE for opportune suppression because SEAD operations require correct ID 

of enemy systems to prevent fratricide, especially when launching ARMs against sources of 

unknown, spurious electronic signals. Realizing that the window to engage highly mobile 

targets may be fleeting, concern should be given to establishing ROE and detailed 

planning that will allow the rapid prosecution of threats before they have the 

opportunity to move or conceal themselves again. Opportune suppression is a continuous 

operation involving immediate response to acquired targets of opportunity. In cases where 

air assets are not available or not required, the component commander establishes priorities 

for opportune suppression. These priorities are forwarded from the designated fire support 

coordinator at component-level headquarters to the executing commands. The following are 

the different types of opportune suppression: 

(a) Aircrew Self-defense. An aircraft commander has the inherent authority 

and is obligated to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in 

self-defense of the aircraft and other US forces in the vicinity. Nothing in the SROE, 

theater-specific ROE, or SPINSs limit this inherent right and obligation. However, for 

clarity and understanding, commanders may establish parameters for certain self-defense 

situations, and the allowable responses based on the operational environment. For further 

guidance, see CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces. 
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-15 

(b) Targets of Opportunity. SEAD targets of opportunity are those enemy air 

defense systems detected by surface or airborne sensors or observers within range of 

available weapons and not yet targeted. Many SEAD efforts by surface forces may be 

against targets of opportunity. Surface and air weapon systems may suppress AD targets of 

opportunity whenever capabilities, mission priorities, and ROE permit. Such suppression 

operations must be in accordance with established rules and FSCMs. The purpose of SEAD 

ROE is to enhance effective SEAD while minimizing risks to friendly forces. 

(c) Targets Acquired by Observers or Controllers. Combat elements may 

often be in good position to acquire SEAD targets of opportunity. Observers, spotters, 

controllers, and liaison officers from the components have the authority to request 

suppression for SEAD targets of opportunity. Such personnel may include joint terminal 

attack controllers, airborne controllers and observers, TACPs, Marine assault support 

coordinators, artillery forward observers, UA operators, Army fire support teams and combat 

observation/lasing teams, and STRYKER platoons. The observers or controllers will 

forward these requests through their respective fire support channels. Requirements should 

first be passed to suppression systems that belong to or support the unit acquiring the target 

because they can respond immediately. If the suppression requirement exceeds the 

capabilities of the ground forces, the immediate request will be sent via the air request net to 

the component control centers. 

(d) Targets Acquired by Aircrews. When aircrews have acquired SEAD 

targets of opportunity but have not engaged them because of mission priorities, weapons 

limitations, or SEAD ROE, they pass the information to the agency controlling their mission. 

This agency should immediately pass the targeting data through the appropriate C2 

channels to the battle manager/operations center of the force component capable of 

targeting the threat.

h. Surface Component SEAD Capabilities. Based on the JFC guidance, the land and 

maritime surface components’ fires cells, fire support elements and fire support coordination 

centers will determine the weapon systems available to conduct SEAD. Examples of these 

capabilities/forces include field artillery, mortars, naval surface fire, attack helicopters, EW, 

and SSMs. To ensure unity of effort and conservation of force, components need to 

coordinate their SEAD activities within their AOs with the JFACC to ensure they meet 

mission requirements and do not interfere with other planned operations. Component liaison 

elements, such as the BCD located in the JAOC, can assist localized suppression operations 

by coordinating the means to request surface fire support. A rapid and free exchange of 

SEAD target information between the JFACC and other component commanders is 

required for effective surface suppression. 

(1) Component commanders will use their organic assets to locate, identify, and 

attack SEAD targets within their AOs and areas of interest whenever possible. They 

continually update lists of potential SEAD targets, including target location, desired effects, 

timing, and sequence of attack. In many cases, however, only the JFACC has assets to 

specifically find and identify or attack certain SEAD targets so the components must request 

SEAD support. Component liaison elements normally are responsible for consolidating their 

component’s SEAD requirements and priorities for action. 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-01 

(2) An air support request (ASR) should identify known or suspected enemy air 

defense threats to, from, and around the target area. Within their capabilities, each echelon 

handling the request refines and updates threat data. The ASR contains this updated data, 

along with the type of suppression desired by the requesting component. For example, 

during the planning and execution of CAS, TACPs and other fire support agencies identify 

potential local SEAD targets and request SEAD fire support. 

Refer to FM 3-01.4/MCRP 3-22.2A/NTTP 3-01.42/AFTTP(I) 3-2.28, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, for additional detailed 

information regarding SEAD. 

9. Fighter Escort 

a. Fighter escort missions are often essential to offensive air operations and for 

protection of HVAAs. As an OCA mission, fighter escort sorties are normally flown over 

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES IN “THE STORM” 

On the morning of 17 January [1991], an EA-6B from Marine Tactical 

Electronic Warfare Squadron Two provided electronic warfare support for 

Marine, Navy, and Royal Air Force strike packages attacking strategic 

targets at the Al-‘Amarah and Az-Zubayr command and control sites, as 

well as the Az-Zubayr railroad yards and the Al-Basrah bridges across the 

Tigris River. These targets were heavily defended by interlocking belts of 

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Iraqi 

fighters also were a potential threat. This was a dangerous mission—

among the first daylight strikes of the war. Long before they approached 

the targets, the EA-6B crew started to work. The first enemy radar that 

came up was quickly jammed. Shortly after, however, additional radars 

were noted searching for the strike groups. Jamming of Iraqi long-range 

early warning radars allowed the strikers to approach undetected. 

However, Iraqi ground control intercept radars as well as target tracking 

radars simultaneously began probing the Coalition strike package. The 

EA-6B crew quickly introduced intense electronic jamming into all modes 

of the Iraqi air defense system, which prevented the vectoring of enemy 

fighters. They also forced SAM and AAA systems into autonomous 

operation, uncoordinated by the command and control system which 

greatly reduced their ability to locate and track Coalition aircraft. To 

accomplish this, the EA-6B crew did not attempt evasive action but placed 

themselves into a predictable, wings-level orbit which highlighted their 

position amidst the beaconing (sic) and jamming strobes of the enemy 

radars. The severe degradation to radio transmissions caused by 

jamming interference limited the EA-6B’s ability to receive threat calls, 

making it vulnerable to enemy aircraft. Nonetheless, the crew remained 

on station, enabling all Coalition aircraft to strike the targets, accomplish 

the missions, and return home without loss or damage. 

SOURCE: 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing Award Citation 

cited in DOD Final Report to Congress, 

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992 
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-17 

enemy territory to protect other primary mission aircraft from enemy fighters en route to and 

from a target area during offensive missions (i.e., for air interdiction, OCA attack, SEAD, an 

airborne operation). Fighter escorts may protect airlift, AR, EW, C2, search and rescue, and 

SOF aircraft from enemy fighters. Fighter escorts also may be used as a DCA mission, as in 

the case of HVAA protection. Air planners, along with JFACC/JAOC intelligence staff, 

must evaluate the threat posed by the adversary counterair forces and determine the type and 

size of fighter escort force required, because the same air assets are usually shared for DCA 

operations. The planners also must coordinate the support required by the escort force (i.e., 

AR, EW, C2). 

b. Offensive Fighter Escorts. Joint air operations may require air-to-air capable 

fighters to be used as escorts to protect friendly aircraft over enemy territory from attacks by 

enemy fighters. After considering the mission requirements, the required capabilities of the 

fighter escorts (i.e., speed, sophistication of weaponry, data links, guns) are determined by 

the operational/tactical commanders responsible for air operations. Those air operations 

packages also may be supported by specially equipped and trained SEAD assets when 

surface AD threats are also a concern. 

c. Defensive Fighter Escorts. Fighter escort missions may be planned as DCA 

missions to protect HVAAs (i.e., AWACS, JSTARS, Rivet Joint, Compass Call, E-2C) from 

potential enemy fighter attack over neutral or friendly territory. 

d. Threats/Targets. The primary threats for fighter escorts include any enemy aircraft 

with a capability to attack and disrupt/destroy the primary mission aircraft. Escort fighters 

target only those airborne aircraft that threaten the primary mission. Fighter escorts in 

conjunction with their supported aircraft must avoid the direct threat of enemy surface-based 

ADs (unless the fighters are escorting a SEAD package). If SAM/AAA threats cannot be 

avoided, the threat and risk to the primary mission and fighter escorts require SEAD support. 

e. Resources. Dedicated air-to-air or multi-role fighters are best suited for the escort 

mission. Escort missions are more effective when ground and airborne early warning or GCI 

radar assets are available for situational awareness and threat warnings. Airborne C2 (battle 

management) assets normally are required for rapidly synchronized/complex air operations. 

The duration of the escort mission may require AR support for the escorts, even if the 

primary mission or other support aircraft do not. IO support, apart from SEAD support, also 

may be required to disrupt the effectiveness of enemy communications and information 

systems that support their acquisition, tracking, and interception capabilities. 

f. Execution. The specific responsibilities of the fighter escort force must be clear to all 

participants. In direct support, their mission is to protect the primary mission force and not 

necessarily attrite enemy aircraft. If the enemy chooses not to attack because a fighter 

escort is present, then the objective of the fighter escort has been met. Conversely, 

escort fighters must exercise caution against being drawn away from the escorted force by 

diversion or decoys, thereby leaving that force vulnerable to other enemy aircraft. 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-01 

10. Fighter Sweep 

a. The fighter sweep is an offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy 

enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated area. 

b. Fighter sweeps are conducted by fighter/fighter-attack/multi-role fighter aircraft. 

Normally, fighter sweeps are conducted in order to achieve local or JOA air superiority. 

Based on the targeting potential, AWACS and ISR assets should be used in support for more 

effective acquisition of targets. 

c. The need for fighter sweep missions versus attack operations will depend on the air 

and missile threat and the objectives of the JAOP. Intelligence should help OCA planners 

determine the proper force mix (air-to-air and air-to-ground) for a fighter sweep in a given 

sector. 

d. Threats/Targets. The fighter sweep is a flexible air mission because threats/targets 

can be anywhere in the allotted sector. Fighter sweeps should normally be planned into areas 

where the threat from surface-based ADs is minimized, through tactics or attrition. This 

enables the concentration of OCA assets on the destruction of enemy aircraft, missiles, 

missile launchers, and other such soft targets of opportunity. 

e. Resources. Package aircraft normally are those fighter/bomber aircraft used for 

OCA attack, air interdiction, CAS, strategic attack, and fighter escort missions. Friendly 

early warning and GCI radar sites and AWACS aircraft should be tasked to support the 

mission. This may be especially important when aircraft with BVR ID systems and weapons 

are used or when significant numbers of enemy aircraft may be encountered. SEAD 

requirements will be determined by enemy surface-based AD capabilities and the JFC’s 

acceptable level of risk. Based on mission duration and distances, AR also may be required. 

EW may be used to enhance the element of surprise/disruption and give the attacking force a 

tactical advantage. 

f. Execution. Although a flexible air mission, the fighter sweep involves employing 

fighter aircraft over hostile territory. Fighter sweep missions normally should follow a series 

of OCA attack and SEAD operations aimed at neutralizing/destroying the enemy offensive 

and defensive aircraft and missile threats. However, a sweep may be synchronized with a 

rapid series of OCA operations (including attack, SEAD, and escort missions), or into other 

offensive air operations (i.e., air interdiction, strategic attack). Ground or airborne warning 

and control assets enhance overall effectiveness, but if those supporting resources are not 

available, execution of autonomous fighter sweeps with fighters using only their own fire 

control radar and ID systems are possible. Flexibility being key, some fighter sweeps may 

be just air-to-air capable fighters looking for airborne targets; others can be multi-role 

fighters hunting air and ground targets. 
 Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations 

IV-19 

 

58TFS FIGHTER SWEEP/ESCORT DURING DESERT STORM 

“The plan’s essence—as far as the 58th was concerned—was that twenty 

F15s, in line with strategically positioned four ships (four-ship flights of 

aircraft) from several squadrons, were going to be the first air-to-air 

fighters to sweep across the Iraqi border after the STEALTHs, F-15E 

bombers, and TOMAHAWK missiles had made a surprise attack mostly on 

Baghdad’s vital command and communications centers, hopefully 

knocking them out and, with them, the country’s air defenses. 

Then, as the bombers, done with their surprise missions, sped back to 

safety south over the border, the EAGLES, including two four ships from 

the 58th would charge in over their top, engaging any enemy 

fighters...and clearing a path for the waves of conventional nonstealth 

bombers and other warplanes that would be following.” 

SOURCE: Wings of Fury by Robert Wilcox, 1996, pp. 220–221
Chapter IV 

IV-20 JP 3-01 

Intentionally Blank 
V-1 

CHAPTER V

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

1. General

a. DCA operations consist of active and passive AMD measures executed through a 

joint C2 infrastructure. The AADC normally is responsible for developing an IADS by 

integrating the capabilities of different components with a robust C2 architecture. Because 

of their time-sensitive nature, DCA operations require streamlined coordination and 

decision-making processes. 

b. The AADC uses assigned operation/campaign plan tasks to develop the AADP with 

the coordination of component commanders, MNF partners, and the JFC’s staff. (See 

Appendix B, “Area Air Defense Plan Format”). The AADP prescribes the integration of 

active AD design, passive AD measures, and the C2 system to provide a comprehensive 

approach to defending against the threat. The AADP builds upon the DCA Estimate (see 

Appendix C, “Defensive Counterair Estimate Format”) and should address command 

relationships, the adversary and friendly situations, the AADC’s intent, concept of operation, 

and logistics and C2 requirements, as well as detailed weapons control and engagement 

procedures. The AADP must be closely integrated with the ACP and should facilitate a 

streamlined decision and coordination process for DCA operations. Due to the dynamic 

nature of joint counterair operations, the AADP may need to be continually modified. 

Ideally, as the JFC’s operation/campaign progresses and the AADP is refined, the 

combination of DCA and OCA operations should diminish the enemy’s ability to conduct air 

and missile attacks, reducing the requirement for DCA operations and the threat to the JFC’s 

freedom of action. 

c. This chapter discusses AMD from the perspective of an AADC being responsible for 

DCA operations, whether or not a JFACC is also designated as the AADC and/or ACA. 

SECTION A. DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING

2. General

a. Through promulgation of the AADP, the AADC implements theater-/JOA-wide DCA 

priorities, authorities, procedures, tasks, and actions approved by the JFC. The AADP is 

designed to be a plan of action for DCA operations, and the RADCs/SADCs, if established, 

may be required or may wish to provide supplements to the AADP to reflect additional 

guidance or intentions. 

b. DCA planning should adhere to the following principles and ideals: 

“Find the enemy and shoot him down, anything else is nonsense.”

Captain Manfred Baron von Richtofen

The Red Baron, 1917
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-01 

(1) Centralized Planning and Direction. Centralized planning and direction is 

essential for coordinating the efforts of the DCA forces. The JFACC/AADC maintains unity 

of effort and optimizes the contributions of all forces. 

(2) Decentralized Execution. Decentralized execution permits timely, decisive 

action by tactical commanders without compromising the ability of operational-level 

commanders to direct DCA operations. Decentralized execution is essential due to the high 

tempo of DCA operations and because no one commander can control the detailed actions of 

a large number of units or individuals during a complex operation. The AADC-RADCSADC organizational structure with delegated commit, ID, and engagement authority 

enables this principle. 

(3) Planned Responses. Planned responses support prompt, decisive tactical 

action by exploiting prior development, testing, and rehearsal of DCA operations. Use of 

planned responses is especially important for BMD operations due to compressed timelines.

(4) Effective and Efficient Communications. In addition to being fully 

interoperable and efficient, COMNETs require superior information management processes 

for timely data and information exchanges. An optimized, effective network that avoids 

unnecessary communications will both provide for an improved operational tempo and 

support key decision making. 

(5) Layered Defense. A layered defense should provide multiple engagement 

opportunities, ideally beginning at the maximum range from friendly forces and areas, before 

attacking aircraft release their weapons and missile warheads can impact. This includes 

interception of enemy surveillance and reconnaissance/targeting aircraft. The layered 

defense normally includes land- or sea-based aircraft, long- and medium-range SAMs, and 

SHORADs (including AAA and close-in weapons systems). The layered defense normally 

includes support by necessary surface and airborne early detection, warning, and tracking 

assets and electronic decoys/jammers and chaff.

(6) 360-Degree Coverage. 360-degree coverage guards against unpredictable 

targets, pop-up targets, and multithreat/multiaxis attacks by aircraft (including ASMs) or 

CMs. Since the flight profiles of most BMs are very predictable, the specialized assets used 

for BM defense normally cover specific launch-space sectors or BM operating areas rather 

than 360 degrees.

(7) ID and Tracking. Early detection, location, ID, and tracking support prompt 

attack warnings and timely cueing of not only AMD, but they also enable prompt, informed 

decision support for determining launch sites and engaging targeting of TSTs (e.g., deployed 

enemy BMs).

(8) Alert and Warning. Design, administer, and implement alert and warning 

procedures and networks, which influence combat system and weapons readiness conditions. 

(9) Establish Modes of Control. For tactical AMD forces, these modes are key to 

operations. In AD, centralized control is the mode whereby a higher echelon makes direct 

target assignments to fire units, and decentralized control is the normal mode whereby a 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-3 

higher echelon monitors unit actions, making direct target assignments to units only when 

necessary to ensure proper fire distribution or to prevent engagement of friendly aircraft. 

3. Defensive Counterair Assets

a. DCA operations employ a mix of weapon, sensor, communications, and C2 systems 

integrated from all components into an IADS to protect friendly forces, assets, population 

centers, and interests from air and missile threats. 

b. The integration of AMD systems provides efficient control and exchange of 

information to all DCA forces. Assets used in conducting DCA operations normally include 

air-to-air capable fixed-wing aircraft; SAMs; AAA; surface-, air-, and space-based sensors; 

EW systems; and C2 systems; all networked into an IADS using a redundant and flexible C2 

architecture with interoperable data links, voice command circuits, and common displays. If 

OCA is not possible before threat aircraft or missiles are launched, and because DCA is by 

nature reactive, the enemy may gain the early initiative; the IADS must be flexible enough to 

respond to the most challenging threats. 

c. BMD Assets. BMD systems provide lower-and-upper tier intercept capabilities to 

counter BMs of all ranges. The objective of BMD is an integrated, “layered” architecture 

that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can 

reach their targets.

d. Land-based and sea-based AMD forces possess the following type of SAM 

capabilities: 

(1) ARFOR ADA battalions are task organized under ADA BDEs to protect JFC 

and/or ARFOR critical assets. AMD forces have short-range and medium- to high-altitude 

AD capabilities. They normally are configured with two-four missile battalions (high-tomedium-altitude air defense [HIMAD]) and/or a SHORAD capability. In addition, theaterlevel BDEs, with HIMAD and/or exo-atmospheric assets normally will be made available to 

the AADC for DAL protection, usually under C2 of the commander, AAMDC. 

(2) Varying with the size of the MAGTF, MARFOR are equipped with long-range 

radars, SHORAD weapons, and extensive C2 facilities.

(3) NAVFOR AMD capabilities include SAMs and the C2 suitable for 

regional/sector AD commands. Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers will provide area 

(e.g., high-to-medium altitude AD and BMD) and point (e.g., SHORAD) AMD. In addition 

to those AMD capable ships, all surface combatants are provided with some self-defense 

capability (guns and/or missiles). Area defense capable ships normally will deploy as part of 

a carrier strike group but may also be attached to amphibious ready groups or deploy 

independently. Some of the Aegis-equipped/command ships may be made available and 

assigned tasks in support of the AADC for C2 of AD in a maritime or littoral area while 

remaining under the OPCON/TACON of the appropriate NAVFOR commander. The 

AMDC may be established by a composite warfare commander/officer in tactical command 

(CWC/OTC) to conduct AD within the task group/task force assigned operational area. CTF 

IAMD coordinates with the AMDC through the CWC/OTC to ensure seamless integration of 
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-01 

maritime forces in the execution of the AADP. Maritime assets assigned to DCA missions 

within the sphere of influence of a strike group commander will operate within the CWC 

structure. Maritime assets assigned to DCA missions outside of a strike group may be 

TACON to CTF IAMD. Planning for the AMD of maritime assets performing other 

missions outside of a strike group will be the responsibility of CTF IAMD. 

e. Interceptor Aircraft. The AFFOR, NAVFOR, and MARFOR possess fixed-wing 

aircraft capable of an AD role. However, both the multi-role and air-to-air capable aircraft 

normally can be tasked against both DCA and OCA operations, dependent upon the JFC’s 

daily air apportionment decision.

f. Other aircraft that are critical to DCA include the airborne C2, AR, signals 

intelligence, and EW aircraft.

g. When operating with an MNF, a multitude of AMD capabilities (aircraft, 

interceptors, sensors, SAMs, ISR, and C2) from simple legacy to state-of-the-art is possible. 

Integration of those capabilities without creating a seam or hole in the AMD coverage is the 

challenge.

h. In addition to EW, IO assets and procedures can be essential to DCA operations 

because of the critical reliance on electronic and computer systems for sensing, passing, and 

displaying air and missile threat and defense information. Understanding that reliance, an 

enemy may attempt offensive IO against DCA assets.

4. Integrated Air Defense Systems 

a. An IADS is not a formal system in itself but the aggregate of Service/functional 

component AMD systems comprising sensors, weapons, C2, communications, intelligence 

systems, and personnel operating in a theater/JOA under the command of an AADC. 

However, the IADS typically depends on support and enabling functions from national assets 

and systems not controlled by the JFC. Because the IADS is normally composed of different 

components, it requires significant integration and interoperability of communications and 

TDL architectures to generate its expected synergistic effects for the JFC. An IADS requires 

planning that begins with organizing the AMD forces and determining command 

relationships through the establishment of the COMNET for C2 of all the weapon systems 

integrated for DCA operations. 

b. To ensure counterair situational awareness and enable decision making, plans for an 

IADS must include the requirement for a reliable, consistent COP/CTP available in all major 

and supporting C2 facilities. 

c. The heart of the IADS is the integrated forces/capabilities controlled by, made 

available to, or in direct support of the AADC, and the actions planned and executed in 

accordance with the JFC’s AADP. Subject to the authority of the JFC, each component 

commander within a joint force does the following in support of DCA operations: 

(1) Coordinates and prioritizes their DCA operations and needs with the JFC and 

other component commanders through the AADC. 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-5 

Note: The commander responsible for the JSAs within the JOA will coordinate with the 

AADC to ensure those areas are covered by the AADP, and should provide a joint security 

coordinator liaison officer to JAOC or whichever facility is the prominent C2 node for the 

IADS.

(2) Employs AMD weapons in accordance with the ROE and the AADP. 

(3) Identifies AADP capability shortfalls to AADC and requests OCA and other 

support to mitigate gaps. 

(4) Coordinates and deconflicts the employment of forces with other subordinate 

commands. Coordination for airspace control may be facilitated by colocating key airspace 

control facilities, AMD, and fire support coordination organizations. 

(5) Coordinates/provides airspace control, as required, in designated areas in 

accordance with the ACP. Is prepared to assume airspace control in other areas when 

combat or other factors degrade the ACS. 

(6) Forwards requests for ACMs in accordance with the ACP.

(7) Develops detailed airspace control instructions, plans, and procedures in 

accordance with ACP guidance. Keeps these detailed instructions, plans, and procedures 

consistent with JFC-approved ACP. 

(8) In support of the IADS, provides necessary facilities and personnel for airspace 

control functions in assigned areas and identifies those facilities and personnel for inclusion

in the ACP. 

d. It is the responsibility of the JFC’s communications system officer, the J-6, to plan, 

oversee, and maintain the IADS C2 architecture. This includes all voice communications 

networks and the JDN. 

(1) JDN. The JDN is essential to the IADS. The JDNO is responsible to the JFC, 

through the J-3 with support from the J-6, for all JDN operations, including the intelligence 

network, ground network, sensor network, and MTN and integrating data from the 

component commands into the common database used to generate the CTP. Each of those 

networks has a responsible manager as do the components (i.e., the CJE). The JDNO 

ensures interoperability and integrates joint force information systems that provide the input 

to the CTPs and the COP. Although closely associated with DCA operations, the networks 

administered by the JDNO are critical to tasks throughout the entire operational area and for 

every component. The JDNO may be located with the JFC or JFACC. 

(2) JICO. The JICO cell is responsible for planning, establishing, and maintaining 

the MTN and provides a CTP input to the JDN for integration into the COP. The JFC, with 

recommendations from the JICO through the JFACC/AADC, may require a RICO/SICO for 

each RADC/SADC. The RICO/SICO reports to the RADC/SADC to develop and maintain 

their portion of the CTP and ultimately for the COP. RICOs/SICOs will coordinate with and 

answer to the JICO for planning and execution functions that cross regional boundaries or 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-01 

impact the theater-wide JDN. The JICO may recommend resolution of architectural and data 

coordination issues between RICO/SICO cells. 

For more detailed information on the JICO, see CJCSM 3115.01B, Joint Data Networks 

(JDN) Operations.

Refer to FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System, for a discussion of IADS.

5. Enemy Air and Missile Threats

a. Enemy threats comprise two main elements: air threats, including manned and UA

and CM, and BM. 

(1) Air. Air threats can include bombers, fighter-attack, fighter escorts, ISR, 

SEAD, EW, airlift (for airborne attacks), helicopters, CMs, ASMs, manned suicide bombers, 

airborne early warning, UA, and AR aircraft. It should be noted that UA are being 

developed with more technologically advanced systems and capabilities. They can duplicate 

some of the capabilities of manned aircraft for both surveillance/reconnaissance and attack 

missions. They can be small enough and/or slow enough to elude detection by standard early 

warning sensor systems and could pose a formidable threat to friendly forces. 

(2) BMs. BMs pose a significant challenge since they are often difficult to detect 

and destroy after launch. They can be employed from long ranges across AOR boundaries 

and in all types of weather. BMs, whether employed in high or low altitude trajectories, also 

present unique problems, including high velocities and short reaction times for the defender. 

BMs include short, medium, intermediate, and long range/intercontinental and have 

trajectories that are commonly divided into four phases of flight: boost, ascent, midcourse, 

and terminal. 

Additional information is provided in Appendix D, “Threat Missile Systems,” and Appendix 

E, “Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization.” 

b. C2 facilities, like other infrastructure targets (e.g., ammunition storage), are vital 

links in the enemy’s system that enable them to generate combat power and attack through 

the air domain. 

c. Air and missile threats vary in technological sophistication and capabilities; 

additionally, technology transfers and weapons proliferation complicate the ability to assess 

all potential threats with certainty. Many countries possess and continually upgrade modern 

combat aircraft, but an air force and its sustainment can be very expensive in comparison to a 

missile force. Based on improved technologies and increases in the number of available 

missile systems, the number of countries with both short- and long-range missile capabilities 

is likely to increase. Also, a mobile missile force can be dispersed to complicate its being 

targeted and employed from remote sites without the infrastructure, support, and manpower 

required for aircraft. The proliferation of CMs, BMs, and UASs complicates the tasks of 

providing force protection and attaining air superiority. 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-7 

d. GCCs should specifically focus intelligence efforts on potential adversaries and their 

air and missile threats in their theaters and adjacent areas of interest, and assess the 

vulnerability to cross-AOR threats from outside an established JOA/theater of operations. 

Emphasis should be placed on WMD capabilities and potential aircraft and missile delivery 

systems. Intelligence developed during peacetime planning and collected regularly, or as 

necessary, should prevent the strategic or tactical surprise of an unanticipated capability by a 

potential adversary. Intelligence can support ROE decision points for proactive AMD 

protection measures based on imminent hostilities.

6. Identification and Tracking

a. ID and tracking relies on surveillance and reporting. Execution of efficient DCA 

operations requires a continuous surveillance and reporting system capable of NRT 

production and dissemination of the tracking data necessary for effective decision making. 

Target track production is a sequential process that begins with the surveillance function. 

NRT surveillance and threat analysis is dependent upon the ability to merge all-source sensor 

data into an accurate theater/JOA attack assessment, whether from ground-, sea-, or air-based 

radars, or space-based sensors. As a track is detected, it is identified and labeled and this 

information is disseminated as rapidly as possible. The track data provided is sufficiently 

detailed and timely to allow decision makers to evaluate the track, determine the significance 

of the threat, and either designate DCA forces for interception or engagement or advise units 

of the passage of friendly aircraft. 

b. Surveillance Planning and Execution Considerations. Detection, tracking, and ID 

are dependent upon the surveillance plan. The three most commonly accepted plans include 

mutual support (preferred method), track/report by exception, and track production areas (or 

a combination). Each has advantages, depending on the mix of surveillance sensors and 

platforms and their degree of interoperability. 

(1) Detection. Tracking begins with detection. The types of sensors and their 

placement determine the detection capability of the IADS. Sensor placement is affected by 

the threat, threat axis, terrain, weather, time-distance analysis, defended assets, desired 

engagement zone, and surveillance requirements. Sensor placement also must consider 

accessibility, connectivity, force protection, mutual interference, and HN support. 

(2) Tracking. The surveillance plan will contribute directly to the ability of the 

IADS to continuously and efficiently track airborne objects. Regardless of the surveillance 

plan adopted, interoperability for effective tracking and reporting can be difficult because of 

a number of anomalies in the systems. The surveillance and data link (reporting) planners 

must consider the following factors to minimize the effects of gaps in interoperability:

(a) Track Deconfliction. More than one sensor may detect and track a target. 

The assumption that all C2 participants will always see the same tracks, with the same 

identity, and in the same place, is not valid and leads to misunderstanding and mistakes. 

Robust voice communication among C2 agencies (ID authorities) is critical to resolving 

track discrepancies. Differences in sensor platforms can aggravate preexisting problems of 

miscorrelation and dual tracking. The following problems may result: 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-01 

1. Tracks not updating/tracking aircraft.

2. Tracks appear to be tracking aircraft but are not.

3. Tracks that “swap” or “jump” from one aircraft to another.

4. IFF modes and codes swapped among tracks, conflicting their IDs. 

5. Dual tracks. “Dualing” is the occurrence of multiple tracks on one 

target resulting in an air picture with more tracks than actual objects of interest. This occurs 

frequently within the IADS. Failure of some surveillance systems to correlate contacts with 

precise participant location and identification (PPLI) data (symbols) can also cause dual 

tracking.

(b) Track Correlation Problems. Correlation problems include varying size 

of correlation windows, auto-correlation system differences (or lack thereof), radar-measured 

altitude differences between systems, IFF conflicts by systems, sensor registration/gridlock 

problems, and lack of familiarization of the other Service system’s capabilities and 

operations. Track correlation problems can create ID conflicts, which are dangerous and can 

result in loss of situational awareness and contribute to the risk of fratricide. All combat 

systems introduce a certain amount of ambiguity into the “link” and although TDL 

message standards are common to all Services, the implementation of those standards 

may be inconsistent and selective. Combat system software baselines and ID doctrine 

also can introduce uncertainty into shared data. 

(3) ID. ID is used to support current ROE in light of weapon systems capabilities. 

The AADC is responsible for developing IADS ID criteria (both procedural and positive) for 

JFC approval in the AADP, with specific instructions in the ATO and/or SPINS. Not all 

IADS participants may see the same ID-related information. This is dependent primarily on 

TDL system implementation, J-series versus M-series message standards, and operator 

display capabilities. Because of the different implementation of TDL messages, planners 

should consider limiting the number of track classification symbols (ID symbols) to reduce 

confusion and the potential for fratricide. Positive ID (either on-board or off-board) or visual 

ID nearly always will be part of the ID process. The AADC may use the following 

considerations when developing ID criteria consistent with and in support of the current 

ROE:

(a) IFF Modes (1-5 per the ATO).

(b) PPLI.

(c) Procedural measures (e.g., MRRs). 

(d) A radar contact correlated with a voice (position) report from an air or 

ground control agency. 

(e) Off-board/on-board CID systems. 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-9 

(f) Visual ID.

(g) Point of origin. 

(h) Track maneuvers (e.g., noncompliance with ACMs). 

(i) Validated speed, direction, altitude, and hostile intent/act. 

(j) Formation assessment (“guilt by association”). Formation assessment is a 

procedural ID that can be used to identify all members in a group of targets. This group ID 

is based on the ID of at least one member of the group (using ID criteria). Factors such as 

similarity to known threat tactical formations and relative spatial relationships (distance, 

speed, and altitude) contribute to the formation assessment ID of the group. Once the group 

has been identified and the group is observed to split, all contacts in each of the resulting 

groups maintain the ID. This ID methodology requires that one or more radar systems (e.g., 

fighter or surface) continuously monitor the group or groups during the split. The group is 

considered “continuously tracked” if not lost/faded for more than one radar sweep/cycle. 

Note: Army ADA systems (with the exception of Patriot) do not use group IDs and each 

track is evaluated using current ID criteria.

c. It is incumbent on the combat system making the ID (having ID authority) and the 

TDL operator to ensure tracks are correctly identified. Every opportunity within tactical 

timelines should be taken to resolve all track and ID ambiguities prior to engagement by 

firing units. Evaluation reports with details of tracking shortfalls may be researched at the 

Joint Deployable Analysis Team (JDAT). See the JDAT Web site at https://jdat.eglin.af.mil.

d. During plans development, the parameters and details for positive and procedural ID, 

auto-ID systems, formation assessment, and CID should be developed and approved by the 

JFC along with the ROE and promulgated as discussed in Chapter III, “Counterair 

Planning,” Section D, “Identification.” 

Refer to FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System, for a detailed discussion 

of the ID/CID process within an IADS. 

7. Area Air Defense Planning

a. Planning Considerations. Development of the AADP and planning DCA 

operations involves integrating friendly force capabilities and limitations against adversary 

vulnerabilities to achieve optimum results in a dynamic tactical environment. Factors that 

should be taken into consideration for planning include: 

(1) Mission Analysis. The mission statement is the AADC’s expression of what 

DCA forces must accomplish and why. During mission analysis, the AADC translates 

specified and implied tasks into missions for the component and subordinate commands with 

DCA assets. Intent of the JFC, the current situation, resources available, and the desired end 

state contribute to the mission statement. 
Chapter V 

V-10 JP 3-01 

(2) DCA Estimate. Planners use the DCA estimate to evaluate how factors in each 

field of interest will influence the potential COAs, to provide information regarding their 

supportability, to recommend DCA priorities, and to form a basis for the AADP. The 

estimate provides the basis for planning current and future DCA operations and is developed 

in concert with the JFC’s staff. See Appendix C, “Defensive Counterair Estimate Format.”

(3) Objectives. The AADC develops an AADP to achieve DCA objectives that 

support the counterair effort to gain and maintain the degree of air superiority and protection 

required by the JFC to satisfy overall campaign objectives. 

(4) Force Requirements. The AADC determines the type and number of forces 

needed to sustain the DCA effort until the objectives are accomplished, understanding that 

some assets may be shared with and lost between OCA, DCA, and other operations. 

(5) Logistics. A comprehensive analysis of logistic capability is integral to support 

of DCA requirements. Planners must anticipate losses of critical items (e.g., fuel storage) 

and be aware of any agreements or CCDR directives that significantly alter responsibilities 

for logistic support. 

(6) Synchronization/Timing. Synchronizing/deconflicting employment of 

capabilities/forces and matching appropriate weapons against enemy critical vulnerabilities 

are essential functions for the AADC. 

(7) Weapons Availability and Pairing. Airborne targets may seem vulnerable to 

attack but may be impervious to certain weapons or EW systems. Planners must have a 

detailed understanding of enemy capabilities and friendly force DCA weapons and systems 

capabilities. They must analyze the threat from the perspective of correctly paired targetshooter adequacy of the DCA force. This will feed into logistic planning, CAL/DAL force 

allocation, and forces requests.

(8) Force Availability. Careful planning is required to ensure timely arrival and 

quick integration of DCA forces and to synchronize use of assets for DCA, OCA, and other 

operations. 

(9) Economy of Force. In conjunction with planned responses, proper sizing and 

composition of responses to enemy attacks/penetrations of friendly airspace are essential. 

Economy of force includes analysis of the probability of destruction/disruption, distances, 

weather, weapon system reliability, etc. 

(10) Operational Assessment. A comprehensive, continuous operational 

assessment is an essential part of DCA planning. The AADC’s staff must determine how to 

evaluate the results of OCA and DCA operations to assist in ID of the decision points (e.g., 

points of attrition of enemy missiles or aircraft) regarding achievement of the operational 

objectives. 

b. Weapon Engagement Zones. WEZs are a critical part of DCA planning because 

they represent part of the current defense posture against the air and missile threats. WEZs 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-11 

are established through the AADP and ACMs and can be changed as necessary. WEZs also 

represent the integration of airspace control with AMDs. 

(1) WEZ. In AD, airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility 

for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon system.

(a) FEZ. In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the 

responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft. 

(b) HIMEZ. In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the 

responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with high-altitude SAMs.

(c) LOMEZ. In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the 

responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to medium-altitude 

surface-to-air missiles. 

(d) SHORADEZ. In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the 

responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with SHORAD weapons. It may 

be established within a low- or high-altitude missile engagement zone. 

(e) JEZ. In AD, that airspace of defined dimensions within which multiple AD

systems (SAMs and aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats. The JEZ 

construct blends MEZ and FEZ constructs into a more flexible engagement zone that can 

concurrently support operations against enemy airborne targets, including BMs.

(2) A MEZ can include one or more HIMEZs, LOMEZs, and/or SHORADEZs. 

Note: By definition, a SHORADEZ may be established within a LOMEZ or HIMEZ because 

the SHORADEZ has SHORAD weapons (e.g., short-range SAMs, AAA, and small arms).

c. Active AD Design. DCA operations require not only the integration of all 

appropriate DCA forces/capabilities within a theater/JOA, but also their efficient and 

effective employment to protect selected assets and forces from attack. These operations are 

subject to the weapons control procedures established by the AADC. Defense against BMs, 

CMs, ASMs, and aircraft each have unique requirements for active ADs. During planning, 

multiple options should be developed using various combinations of weapon systems and 

WEZs allowing the flexibility to defend all critical assets, although there may be resources 

shortfalls. When possible, the AADC should design a layered defense to allow multiple 

engagement opportunities for friendly forces. 

(1) An active AD includes the following types of defensive coverage:

(a) Area Defense. Area defense uses a combination of weapon systems (e.g., 

aircraft and SAMs) or various combinations of airborne and ground-based sensors and 

shooters to defend broad areas. 
Chapter V 

V-12 JP 3-01 

(b) Point Defense. Point defense protects limited areas, normally in defense 

of vital elements of forces or installations. For example, a SAM or AAA unit positioned to 

protect an airfield is considered point defense. 

(c) Self-Defense. Self-defense operations allow friendly units to defend 

themselves against direct attacks or threats of attack through the use of organic weapons and 

systems. The right of self-defense is inherent to all ROE and weapons control procedures.

(d) HVAA Protection. HVAA protection defends airborne assets that are so 

important that the loss of even one could seriously impact US warfighting capabilities. 

HVAA protection is normally performed by fighter aircraft using various CAP or escort 

tactics, but can also be accomplished by surface-based assets such as Aegis ships. 

(2) The following tasks also should be considered when planning active ADs:

(a) Determine Surveillance Coverage Areas. Defended airspace must be 

under continuous surveillance to facilitate early warning. The DCA planner should use a 

combination of air-, surface-, and space-based detection assets to achieve this requirement. 

Adequate early warning of air and missile attacks provides the reaction time necessary for 

friendly forces to seek shelter or take appropriate action. Early warning of hostile air and 

missile attacks is vital for a layered defense.

(b) Develop the Active AMD Fire Plan. The objective is to provide the 

required level of protection specified in the CAL. Defense resources involve applying a mix 

of the following six employment guidelines, because not all may be required or possible to 

defend dependent upon the threat and DCA assets available: 

1. Mutual Support. Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one 

weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the adjacent weapon systems. For gun 

systems, this dead zone is usually small. For missile systems, the dead zone may be large 

and mutual support is a critical element. Mutual support can also cover non-operational 

units or units at lower states of readiness.

2. Overlapping Fires. Weapons are positioned so that their engagement 

envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes from which the enemy can attack or 

conduct surveillance operations, defense planners must apply mutual supporting and 

overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.

3. Balanced Fires. Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of 

fires in all directions. This is necessary for AD in an area where the terrain does not canalize 

the enemy or when the avenue of approach is unpredictable. 

4. Weighted Coverage. Weapons are positioned to concentrate fires 

toward the most likely threat direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a 

commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to 

weight coverage in a more likely direction.
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-13 

5. Early Engagement. Sensors and weapons are positioned to maximize 

early warning and to engage and destroy aircraft and missiles before they acquire and fire on 

or damage the defended asset.

6. Defense in Depth. AMD sensors and weapons are positioned to enable 

multiple engagement opportunities and deliver an increasing volume of fire as an enemy air 

or missile threat approaches the protected asset. Defense in depth reduces the probability 

that “leakers” will reach the defended asset or force.

(c) Plan a MEZ. Proper sequencing in the establishment of WEZs is critical 

to an effective IADS and DCA operations. MEZs established for surface defense are based 

on specific boundaries and weapons system capabilities. For the organic SAM capability of 

a surface force, the MEZ boundaries should be within the component AO, and for direct 

support the MEZ should cover the defended asset/area. The MEZ area should be large 

enough to allow early engagement of threats: ASM launch platformsshould be destroyed or 

neutralized before they can launch standoff munitions, UA before they reach sensor/weapon 

range of defended assets, and BMs prior to maneuver or submunitions release. To the 

maximum extent possible, all targets should have multiple, layered engagement opportunities 

to ensure an effective defense. The AADP, ACMs, and SPINS should specify what targets 

can be engaged in the MEZ and the weapons to be used. 

(d) Consider the fact that maritime forces are not “static” and they usually 

employ a “moving MEZ” with separate operational areas for air operations. In a littoral 

environment, amphibious operations may encompass a portion of the land AO and function 

as a MEZ. In this case, maritime combatants may be restricted by geography when 

defending selected coastal assets. Linking land-based SAM systems with maritime force 

generated search and fire control data and vice versa can result in improved ability to defend 

the littoral areas.

(e) Determine Surface-Based Defenses C2 Coverage and Fire Control. 

DCA operations depend upon effective and redundant C2 planning. The IADS should 

integrate the ground- and sea-based C2 nodes, airborne C2 platforms, and the surface force 

AD fire direction centers. As a minimum, the following is required: 

1. Designate RADCs/SADCs as required and incorporate into the IADS 

architecture.

2. Specify required data links between C2 nodes and forces. 

3. Designate primary and secondary C2 centers for all active AMD forces. 

4. Align control centers with their operational forces whenever possible.

5. Establish an intelligence and warning architecture; ensure remote units 

and separate forces are addressed.
Chapter V 

V-14 JP 3-01 

6. Delegate necessary authorities and establish conditions for automatic 

permissions, transfers of function, or other means to establish and sustain a responsive 

defense.

7. Determine level of control (engagement authority). This describes 

the AD echelon permitted to authorize engagement of an air or missile threat. It can be the 

AADC, RADC, SADC, ADA battalion fire direction center, or the individual fire unit. 

Engagement authority, originating with the JFC and normally delegated to the AADC, may 

be delegated to the RADC/SADC to allow for decentralized execution. Further delegation of 

engagement authority depends on operational necessity and ROE for DCA operations. The 

AD element with engagement authority makes the decision whether to commit weapons 

to a particular air or missile threat. Engagement authority may be established at different 

levels for fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, UA, and missiles, and the levels of control 

may change over the course of an operation. For example, engagement authority is 

delegated to the lowest level SHORAD fire units for CMs and UA, to SAM fire units for BM 

engagements, and normally remains at SADC or higher for enemy aircraft.

8. Determine modes of control. For certain surface-based AD the two 

modes of control are centralized and decentralized. The mode of control will depend upon 

the capabilities of the C2 systems being employed and both the friendly and enemy air 

situations. Centralized control is when a higher echelon must authorize target engagements 

by fire units. Permission to engage each track must be requested by the fire unit from 

that higher echelon. Centralized control is used to minimize the likelihood of engaging 

friendly aircraft while permitting engagements of hostile aircraft and missiles only when 

specific orders are issued to initiate the engagement. Normally, centralized control is used 

for engaging aircraft. Decentralized control is the mode of control used when a higher 

echelon monitors unit actions, making direct target assignments on a management by 

exception basis to units only when necessary to ensure proper fire distribution, to prevent 

engagement of friendly air platforms, and to prevent simultaneous engagements of hostile 

air targets. Decentralized control is used to increase the likelihood that a hostile 

aircraft or missile will be engaged as soon as it comes within range of a given weapon. 

Surface-based AD forces (including SHORAD units) will comply with established ROE and 

WCS as directed by the designated ADC for their operational area.

9. Determine specific trigger events, when they should be changed, and 

who has the authority to change them, such as autonomous operations when a firing unit 

has lost both voice and data link (i.e., all communications) to higher tactical headquarters. 

The firing unit commander assumes full responsibility for control of weapons and 

engagement of hostile targets in accordance with existing ROE, WCS, and previously 

received directives.

(f) Establish CAP Stations. One method of employing fighters is the CAP. 

Fighter aircraft normally perform CAPs during DCA operations. CAP stations usually 

contain two to four fighter aircraft armed for air-to-air engagements. The following 

considerations apply when planning a CAP: 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-15 

1. Assign barrier CAPs for the defense of a broad area when protecting 

multiple assets.

2. Assign a CAP to a specific asset (e.g., high value surface or airborne 

asset).

3. Assign CAPs to special missions, as appropriate. For example, a barrier 

CAP may be tasked to inspect or “sanitize” returning strike packages to ensure enemy 

aircraft do not shadow friendly aircraft back to friendly areas/bases. 

4. If made available for tasking for DCA, consider Navy and Marine 

CAPs as not only defending maritime forces, but also for defense of land-based assets by 

positioning them over land during littoral operations. 

5. Consider employing a CAP if defense is still required and inventory 

depletion or combat losses result in gaps in SAM coverage in MEZs, or if specific SAM 

interceptor inventory must be conserved for defense against BM threats rather than used 

against air threats. 

(g) Establish a FEZ. Establish a FEZ to support CAP operations after the 

surface MEZs are established.

1. The FEZ normally extends above the coordinating altitude to the upper 

limit of either the assigned DCA or primary threat aircraft operating envelope.

2. Where a MEZ and FEZ overlap horizontally, they may be separated 

vertically.

3. Fighters are normally given a larger WEZ to perform an area defense 

mission and to accommodate their longer-ranged weapons system capabilities.

(h) Establish a Crossover Zone. To facilitate mutual support, defense in 

depth, and overlapping fires, MAGTF AD assets employ a crossover zone that overlaps a 

MEZ and FEZ. This allows C2, DCA aircraft, and ground-based AD weapons systems to 

coordinate engagement in this area by the most appropriate weapons system, while 

maintaining a MEZ/FEZ construct.

(i) Position Airborne C2 Stations

1. Station assets within ranges to perform their C2 function but where 

threats are minimal and assets cannot be easily engaged and destroyed.

2. Plan to dedicate fighter escort or CAP protection. 

(j) Determine Airborne C2 Coverage and Fire Control. When planning 

coverage and fire control, consider the following: 
Chapter V 

V-16 JP 3-01 

1. DCA fighter aircraft are normally under positive control of a C2 

element. Fighters may conduct intercepts autonomously when authorized. 

2. With a lack of C2 aircraft or if the distance of operations precludes 

positive TACON, C2 agencies may provide broadcast information of target data. 

3. US fighter aircraft usually operate with enhanced fire control radar and 

BVR weapons that allow simultaneous engagements of multiple targets.

4. Fighters normally are in communication with a C2 element that points 

out targets, provides CID when available, and may vector them toward airborne targets. The 

C2 element also provides a communications link between the JAOC combat operations 

division and the airborne fighters. This communication link provides a flexible and reactive 

C2 arrangement.

5. Dependent upon the situation and ROE, airborne C2 elements may have 

the capability to retask fighters to meet protection requirements.

(k) Establish a JEZ. The JEZ only is appropriate or possible when the 

JFC/JFACC/AADC has a high level of confidence in the CTP and positive control and 

separation that will prevent SAMs from targeting friendly fighters before and after launch. 

Dependent upon the operational situation and ROE, a JEZ may be employed when one or 

more of the following factors exist:

1. The enemy’s employment of low altitude CMs dictates the need to 

ensure the ability to engage with all available forces throughout the zone, accepting risk to 

friendly aircraft.

2. There are significantly more assets that require defense than there are 

forces to defend them. 

3. The operational characteristics of friendly aircraft and surface-based 

missile systems and the nature of the operation do not lend themselves to establishing a 

separate MEZ/FEZ.

4. The AADC and subordinate commanders (e.g., RADC/SADC) are 

confident that there is sufficient situational awareness and established CID procedures to 

reduce the possibility of fratricide.

(l) Weapons Readiness States. Determine the required degree of readiness of 

AD weapons which can become airborne or be launched to carry out an assigned task. 

Weapons readiness states are normally expressed in numbers of weapons and numbers of 

minutes. Examples of weapons readiness states are as follows: 

1. 2 minutes—Sixteen PAC-3 missiles can be launched within 2 minutes. 

2. 15 minutes—12 F-22 fighters can be launched within 15 minutes. 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-17 

3. 3 hours—64 PAC-3 missiles can be launched within 3 hours. 

4. Released—24 PAC-3 missiles are released from defense commitment 

for 6 hours. 

8. Ballistic Missile Defense Planning

The best missile defense strategy is to destroy missiles prior to launch. 

a. GCCs should locate, identify, and assess potential BM threats. To facilitate JFC 

planning, and specifically missile defense planning, those GCCs should produce target 

folders for potential missile threats. Target folders should be available for a subordinate JFC 

to complete and use when necessary, including for TSTs. For the joint force, the 

Commander, AAMDC (normally the DAADC) and CTF IAMD, and their staffs are 

acknowledged subject matter experts regarding the BM threat and missile defense. They can 

support OCA planners to help eliminate the threat and DCA planners to defend against it. 

For planning to counter the long-range missile threat across AOR boundaries, 

USSTRATCOM synchronizes planning efforts and coordinates support for BM defense 

operations with the affected GCCs. See Chapter II, “Command and Control,” Paragraph 10, 

“Cross-Area of Responsibility Command Relationships Considerations.” 

b. General BMD Planning Considerations. BMD planning adds a unique aspect to 

the development of the AADP and to planning DCA operations. While plans for both air 

and BM defenses are integrated in the AADP, the BM threat normally is more difficult to 

counter. Generally, BMs do not require as much infrastructure and support as an air force; 

thus, they have a reduced footprint and signature. Mobility, dispersal, and concealment 

further complicate the offensive targeting process against enemy BMs so the primary tactic 

of destroying/negating the missile threats prior to their launch can be difficult. Once 

launched, some BMs often are difficult to detect and track for the purpose of engagement. 

The same 10 planning factors listed for AD planning should also be considered for missile 

defense planning (see paragraph 7a). Additionally, the following factors are considered in 

BMD planning and design: 

(1) Positioning of Assets. Assets should be positioned to provide a shoot-lookshoot opportunity where possible. The judicious application of a shoot-look-shoot firing 

doctrine can reduce interceptor consumption and provide high levels of protection to those 

designated critical assets.

(2) Salvo Sizes. Salvo sizes can accommodate varying levels of protection for 

defended assets in accordance with the commander’s guidance.

(3) Launch Area Denied (LAD). Assigning units to affect LAD by analyzing BM 

operating areas for assigning assets may be one method of consideration in formulating the 

defense design.

(4) Interceptor Inventories. Commander’s guidance should establish interceptor 

inventory threshold levels at which operators may need to modify firing procedures to 

prevent premature inventory exhaustion. 
Chapter V 

V-18 JP 3-01 

(5) Firing Doctrine. Guidance should also be provided for inventory management 

to include threshold levels and modified procedures once those threshold levels are crossed. 

Factors include: 

(a) Determining the single shot Pk for own force interceptors against threat 

missile types in the enemy missile order of battle.

(b) Formulating the number of upper-and-lower tier interceptors required to 

achieve the designated levels of protection.

(c) Equating threat BM impact point prediction with the designated level of 

protection for the threatened asset. 

(d) Establishing a firing policy (e.g., first interceptor to be able to intercept the 

threat MB being the first interceptor battery to engage and the next system being designated 

to cover the engagement should the initial system miss).

(e) Firing lower-tier missiles in the last engagement window and factoring in 

their cumulative Pk in determining the number of upper-tier interceptors to fire in the final 

salvo. 

c. Active Missile Defense Design. Based on an expected air and BM threat, the 

challenge for the AADC will be to balance competing air (including CMs) and BM 

(including short, -medium, -and long-range) defense demands. This could result in an 

economy of force issue: use land-and sea-based SAMs that are capable of both active BM

and AD only for missile defense, while using purely AD assets for defending against the 

enemy air threat. For example, against a formidable BM threat that could not be eliminated 

by OCA operations, the AADC may use SAMs only against BMs, not against air threats, and 

increase reliance on fighter escorts and CAPs in a layered defense against air threats. A 

significant missile threat will have great impact on the AADP (i.e., the DAL, placement of 

WEZs, and types of defensive coverages). Flexibility will be required as there may not be 

enough resources to defend all assets. 

SECTION B. DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

9. General 

The AADC develops the AADP in coordination with the joint force components, 

integrating DCA operations throughout the theater/JOA (see Figure V-1). The AADP 

reflects the JFC’s objectives, priorities, and the specific need for air superiority and 

protection, and the appropriate component commanders provide the surface-, air-, and seabased forces/capabilities for those DCA operations required to execute that plan. 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-19 

10. Passive Air and Missile Defense

a. No defensive scheme is perfect. Focused attacks by adversary air and missile threats 

may overwhelm defense designs. Therefore, passive AMD techniques should be employed 

at every location, including those protected by active AMD assets. Commanders at all levels 

are responsible for planning and executing appropriate passive AMD measures. 

b. Passive AMD provides individual and collective protection for friendly forces and 

critical assets and is the responsibility of every commander in the joint force. It includes 

measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize, mitigate, or recover from the 

consequences of attack aircraft and missiles. Passive defense is generally similar for air and 

missile threats, with the exception of detection and warning timelines.

(1) The AADC is responsible for timely warning of air and missile attacks, which 

initiates some of the passive AD measures. Warnings may be either general or specific. 

General warnings indicate that attacks are imminent or have occurred, while specific 

warnings signify that only certain units or areas are in danger of attack. The timeliness and 

accuracy of AMD warnings may have a significant impact on the effectiveness of passive 

AD measures.

(2) Passive measures do not involve the employment of weapons, but they do 

improve survivability. Depending on the situation and time available, a variety of measures 

may be taken to improve the defensive posture of friendly forces and assets. Some measures 

should be planned and practiced during peacetime. Those assets not assigned adequate 

AMD defense assets rely more heavily on passive AD measures for protection. 

Figure V-1. Defensive Counterair Operations

Defensive Counterair Operations

Passive Air and Missile Defense

















Detection and warning systems

Camouflage and concealment

Deception

Hardening

Reconstitution

Chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear defense equipment and facilities

Redundancy

Dispersal







Air Defense Targets

Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft

Unmanned aerial vehicles

Missiles (air-breathing)

Missile Defense Targets

Ballistic missiles

Active Air Defense

Operations

Area defense

Point defense

Self-defense

High value airborne asset protection



















Active Air and Missile Defense
Chapter V 

V-20 JP 3-01 

(3) The likelihood and timing of an attack may be estimated by analyzing the 

expected enemy COA, targeting process, and offensive air and missile capabilities (including 

munitions characteristics and quantities). 

c. Considerations and Measures. When planning passive AD, the following are four 

principal considerations and the passive AD measures they incorporate.

(1) Detection and Warning Systems and Procedures. Timely detection and 

warning of air and missile threats provide reaction time for friendly forces to seek shelter or 

take appropriate action. Reliable and redundant connectivity for communications and sensor 

systems is vital for accurate and timely warning. A combination of air-, space-, and surfacebased detection and communication assets should be established to maximize detection and 

warning. Warning methods and procedures must be established, disseminated, and 

rehearsed down to the unit level to be effective. “All clear” procedures should also be 

established to notify forces when a warning is false or the threat no longer exists. 

(a) Within the theater/JOA, the detection of enemy air-breathing threats and 

warning/cueing for AD measures are normally provided by the JFC’s DCA, theater ISR, or 

national ISR assets. The JFC/AADC controls the surface- and air-based radars/sensors that 

detect and track the enemy air threats and the C2 systems that disseminate those warnings. 

(b) National assets, under the control of CDRUSSTRATCOM, normally detect 

the launches of threat BMs, predict the impact points, and communicate warnings to the 

applicable JFC in the theater/JOA. When tasked, and upon the initial missile warning 

provided by national assets, theater-based radar may help track a threat missile. The JFC, in 

turn, is responsible for dissemination of the tactical warnings throughout the theater/JOA. 

(2) Reduction of Enemy Targeting Effectiveness. Certain measures may be 

taken to reduce the effectiveness of enemy targeting and attacks, to include mobility, 

deception, and OPSEC. 

(a) Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability by 

complicating enemy surveillance and reconnaissance efforts to pinpoint locations of targets. 

Mobility may be coupled with concealment to “hide” assets.

(b) Deception. Deception misleads adversaries by manipulating, distorting, or 

falsifying friendly actions. Deception may be used to cause an enemy to waste munitions on 

false targets, deceive their combat assessment process, and falsely influence their decision 

makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information. 

Deception may deny the enemy the ability to gain correct tactical, operational, and strategic 

information when using their reconnaissance and surveillance systems.

(c) OPSEC

1. Emission Control/Communications Security. Communications 

security and an emission control program for infrared, electromagnetic, and acoustic 

signature reduction can deny the enemy sensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisition 

and ID of friendly target systems (e.g., C2 nodes). 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-21 

2. Unit Security/Counter-Surveillance. Local unit security is an 

important element in denying accurate targeting data to enemy SOF or other enemy agents. 

Patrolling and ground forces support is important to keep enemy threat forces of Level I 

(agents, saboteurs, and terrorists) and Level II (small tactical units) from conducting 

harassment or interdiction attacks against DCA assets.

3. Nighttime Support Operations. Consider nighttime for conducting 

time-consuming resupply or other operations that could highlight units’ visibility and 

increase their vulnerability. 

4. Camouflage and Concealment. Practice visual signature reduction 

measures that can “hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets/target systems. These 

measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings. Timely 

intelligence concerning the overflight by enemy satellite and aircraft collection systems is 

important to the effort. Those measures also may be coupled with deception measures to 

further complicate chances of effective enemy attacks. The employment of obscurants can 

negate the effectiveness and accuracy of attack threats during DCA operations. 

Refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, for additional discussion regarding OPSEC. 

Refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, for more details regarding deception operations. 

(3) Reducing Vulnerability. There are four measures that may enable friendly 

assets to survive enemy attacks by reducing their vulnerability.

(a) Hardening. Valuable assets and their shelters are hardened to protect 

against physical attack, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and transient radiation. Hardening 

measures should be accomplished during peacetime whenever possible. Hardening reduces 

the effect of attack on systems and facilities (i.e., aircraft, missiles, air base support 

equipment and facilities, nuclear delivery systems, nuclear storage areas, C2 facilities, 

communications nodes, and logistic facilities). When EMP hardening is not feasible, an

EMP vulnerability assessment should be made to identify suitable preparatory and defensive 

measures.

(b) Redundancy. A principal means of preserving combat power is 

duplication of critical nodes, capabilities, and systems that are particularly vulnerable to air 

and missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. 

Redundancy includes dual, contingency, or backup capabilities that can assume primary 

mission functions (in whole or in part) upon failure or degradation of the primary system. Of 

primary concern are “soft” targets such as C2 nodes and sensors (antenne) and fixed sites 

such as airfields and ground stations for airborne sensors. 

(c) Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing 

concentration and making a target system less lucrative. Combined with mobility and 

deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is 

occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed. 
Chapter V 

V-22 JP 3-01 

(d) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense 

Equipment and Facilities. CBRN defensive equipment and facilities protect against the 

effects of CBRN hazards by providing contamination detection, shelter, and 

decontamination. Individual protective equipment allows vital functions to continue in the 

CBRN environment and to minimize effects of WMD attacks. 

See JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments, for further details regarding protection and operations in a CBRN 

environment. 

(4) Recovery and Reconstitution. Following an air or missile attack, units should 

be restored to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission 

requirements and available resources. Resources should be made available to restore 

capabilities in accordance with JFC established priorities. Recovery and reconstitution after 

a WMD attack will require special planning considerations, as improper handling of CBRN 

casualties and contaminated material and equipment may impact other activities. 

d. Resources for Passive AD. The components of the joint force bring unique 

capabilities to the different aspects of passive AMD. Engineers, CBRN defense and 

decontamination experts, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, and medical units may 

contribute significantly to passive AD efforts. A threat-based risk analysis, distributing area 

responsibilities, and establishing support tasks are factors that impact AMD. Some MNF 

members may specialize in passive AD capabilities. HN support and civilian infrastructure 

may augment or enhance joint force recovery efforts, either through government coordinated 

action or contracted support. It is essential that these capabilities, when available, are 

planned and integrated into the total passive AMD capability.

e. Execution of Passive Air Defenses 

(1) Responsibilities. The AADC and chain of command are responsible for timely 

warning of attacks. Component commanders and their forces have delegated responsibilities 

to ensure passive AD measures are planned and executed in a timely manner down to the 

unit level. 

(a) As a minimum, the AADC must be able to pass warnings directly to the 

joint force Service and functional component commands, and if applicable, establish 

procedures to pass warnings to and from HN authorities. BM warnings generally will 

originate from the theater event system. Airborne threat warnings generally are issued 

through the C2 system (e.g., RADC/SADC). Local commanders may declare local ADW 

based on the local threat.

(b) Component commanders establish and maintain communications links 

down to the lowest unit level. 

(c) Cross-component support is a unit and component commanders’ 

responsibility. Cross-component support may establish connectivity to geographically 

isolated units of other Services or MNF units that are unable to link within their parent 

organizations. 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-23 

(2) Defense Clustering. To facilitate the span of control for local commanders, 

support activities may be grouped into clusters. Grouping defended assets with active DCA 

units or locating critical force elements near declared assets enables economy of force for 

protection and may enhance localized defense in depth. Clustering also may enhance the 

availability and contributions of HN assets. In the early stages of force projection, grouping 

allows any one location to draw upon the resources of the group. 

11. Active Air and Missile Defense

a. Active AD Operations. Under the counterair framework, active missile defense is 

integrated with active AD as a DCA operation. Generally, the same capabilities used for 

missile defense are capable of AD. The important factors are the enemy missile threat 

and the conservation of missile defense assets to prevent that unique capability from 

being exhausted against aircraft when an alternative AD strategy and tactics could be 

used against air-breathing threats. For example, in some situations, a battle manager may 

require a missile defense-capable SAM to defeat the air-breathing threat to a high priority 

asset on the DAL. 

b. Active BMD Operations. Active BMD involves direct defensive action taken to 

destroy in flight BM threats. Active BMD uses sensors, interceptors, and platforms that are 

both unique to BMD (e.g., sea-based X-band radar, AN/TPY-2, THAAD, and Aegis SM-3 

[Standard Missile 3]), and those capable of the traditional AD (e.g., AN/TPS-59, Patriot, and 

Aegis SM-2 [Standard Missile 2]). The active BMD mission includes use of forward-based 

missile defense assets in the defense of the territory of the US as an augmentation to the 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System.

(1) BMD assets and resources are under the control of the GCC/JFC to whom they 

are assigned or attached. Due to the short timelines involved in missile defense, tasking and 

engagement authority should be delegated to the lowest practical level. The process and 

means of ordering engagements will be clearly stated in AADPs, SPINS, or other orders. 

Engagement authority must be identified for proper coordination and synchronization of 

global and theater BMD assets. Engagement coordination requires the ability to optimize 

BMD resources considering the operational environment, decision timelines, and the ability 

to detect, identify, track, and engage multiple, simultaneous missile threats. 

(2) A GCC under BM attack is the supported commander for BMD in their 

respective AOR. This means with multiple threat missiles in flight, the GCC may 

simultaneously be supported and supporting commander for BMD. The processes linking 

sensors to decision makers to fire control nodes that cross AOR boundaries will require 

coordination between neighboring GCCs to enable multiple engagement opportunities. 

c. Active missile defense systems are primarily SAM systems and their supporting 

infrastructure. Although BM launches are detected and warnings are sent to the JFC with the 

predicted impact point, engagements are only possible once organic missile defense radars 

detect them. Other missiles such as CMs and ASMs present the same problem—they must 

be detected to be engaged and many use low-observable techniques or low altitude ingress to 

avoid detection. To conserve missile defense SAMs and improve the probability of raid 
Chapter V 

V-24 JP 3-01 

annihilation, AD aircraft should be used to counter the enemy aircraft that normally carry 

CMs and ASMs before they are in threatening range. 

d. Execution of DCA operations requires continuous surveillance of the theater/JOA. 

Integration and connectivity of sensors should provide a complete, reliable, and timely CTP 

for decision making. The track production (including ID) follows a sequential process with 

dissemination of track data as rapidly as possible. That detailed track data permits C2 nodes 

to evaluate tracks and determine their significance. Tactical warnings trigger some passive 

AD measures and cue active AD assets for action. Active AD forces then engage hostile 

tracks or allow passage of friendly tracks. Through effective battle management the 

positively identified threats are engaged by the optimum system available.

e. The AADC controls the battle using approved authorities (e.g., ID, commitment, and 

engagement) and the flexibility of the IADS. To decentralize execution, the AADC 

normally will delegate some or all AADC authorities down to the RADC/SADC level (if 

established). The AADC must specify the conditions and limits within which engagement 

authority is decentralized. Based upon the threat level and the complexity of 

engagements, a control node should retain engagement authority if it can adequately 

perform battle management. For air battle management, the AADC or a RADC/SADC 

uses three tools for which the authorities may be delegated further down to the tactical level: 

ADW, WCS, and fire control orders. 

(1) Air Defense Warning Conditions (ADWCs). An AD warning, which 

includes missile attacks, is issued as an ADWC. The ADWC is a degree of air attack 

probability based on the threat assessment. The AADC establishes the baseline ADWCs for 

the joint force. ADWCs may be different for air-breathing threats than for BMs. 

Subordinate ADCs may issue higher but not lower ADWCs for their areas. ADWCs are 

disseminated though joint and components C2 channels to all AMD elements and fire units.

(a) ADWC White—An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is improbable.

(b) ADWC Yellow—An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is probable.

(c) ADWC Red—An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is imminent or in 

progress. 

(2) WCS. WCS is a control measure designed to establish the freedom for fighters 

and surface AD weapons (including small arms weapons) to engage threats. The AADC 

establishes WCS for the joint force. The WCS may be different for air-breathing threats 

than for BMs. WCS authority originates with the AADC and can be delegated to 

subordinate commanders. Different WCSs may be applied simultaneously to different 

weapons systems and in different airspace areas. US forces use three standard WCSs that 

may be declared for a particular area and time. US forces do not disseminate these WCS 

orders via TDL. The WCSs are “free, tight, and hold.” 

(a) Weapons Free—The least restrictive status; when any target not positively 

identified as friendly in accordance with current ROE may be engaged. Weapons free zones 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-25 

may be established around key government infrastructure when other areas are designated 

weapons tight or weapons hold. 

(b) Weapons Tight—The normal status. Units may only fire on targets 

identified as hostile in accordance with current ROE.

Note: Weapons free and weapons tight control orders impose a status or condition 

applicable to weapons systems within a defined volume of airspace, and normally, any unit 

directly threatened by a missile of any type, friend or foe, may engage it. 

(c) Weapons Hold—The most restrictive status. Units may only fire in selfdefense or when ordered by proper higher authority. 

(3) Fire Control Orders. Fire control orders, which include both air and missile 

threats, are established to standardize tactical firing instructions issued during the conduct of 

an air battle. They are given to direct or inhibit firing by surface-to-air weapons units 

based on the ROE and rapidly changing tactical situations. Based on the ROE, the JFCapproved AADP should establish how fire control orders will be communicated. There are 

three primary fire control orders. 

(a) “Engage” directs or authorizes units and weapon systems to fire on a 

designated target. 

(b) “Cease engagement” or “cease fire” directs units to stop the firing 

sequence against a designated target; however, units may continue to track and missiles 

already in flight are permitted to continue to intercept. 

(c) “Hold fire” is an emergency order used to stop firing. If technically 

possible, missiles already in flight must be prevented from intercepting.

f. Weapon Systems Employment. Although DCA operations are defensive in nature, 

they should be conducted as far from friendly areas as feasible. Advanced warning of hostile 

air and missile actions is vital for a layered defense. Intercepts as early as possible facilitate 

potential for multiple engagements. For effective attrition of enemy air and missile threats, 

the engagement process should continue throughout the approach, entry, and departure from 

the friendly operational area. Once CMs or BMs are detected, ROE normally should allow 

for their immediate engagement based on their unique target profiles, their potential 

warheads and threat to friendly assets, and the quick reaction necessary for success. The 

strength of an IADS is the synchronization of the integrated surface-to-air and air-toair systems in mutual support of defensive coverage for the operational area. 

(1) Surface-to-Air Weapon Systems. These weapons include SAMs and AAA 

and are employed in both area and point defenses—often in self-defense. Their effectiveness 

requires reliable ID/CID processes, C2 connectivity, and interfaces with airborne systems to 

preclude engagement of friendly aircraft and unnecessary expenditure of weapons against 

enemy threats. Surface weapon systems have optimal capabilities against targets at different 

ranges and altitudes as reflected in their WEZs. In extremely dynamic AD situations with a 
Chapter V 

V-26 JP 3-01 

multitude of targets, some systems are capable of automatic detection and engagement. 

Surface-to-air systems operate under fire control orders based on the ROE and WCS. 

(2) Air-to-Air Fighter Interception. Fighter aircraft performing DCA or OCA 

missions may be tasked to respond to the detection of hostile, potentially hostile, or unknown 

airborne targets. Aircraft normally operate under positive control of a C2 element but may 

initiate and conduct intercepts autonomously when authorized (e.g., self-defense or depth of 

the operation precludes positive control). When close or positive control is not possible, the 

controlling element may provide general broadcast information on targets to all affected 

fighters. Air-to-air fighters operating with enhanced fire control radars can engage multiple 

targets with BVR weapons to defend against hostile targets before they are within 

threatening range of friendly assets. However, the ROE must allow use of BVR weapons. 

(a) AD fighter aircraft normally perform CAPs, DCA fighter escort, or respond 

to airborne threats from ground alert locations. Fighters normally will be under positive 

control for vectors toward their airborne targets. CAPs include barrier CAPs for area defense 

and CAPs for base defense or local asset defense. Some CAPs also may have additional 

missions such as using barrier CAPs to inspect or “sanitize” returning strike packages to 

ensure enemy aircraft do not shadow “friendlies” back to base. Additionally, DCA fighters 

may be dedicated to protect HVAAs from airborne threats. 

(b) C2 elements also provide a link between the JAOC combat operations 

division and the fighters. This communication link provides a flexible and reactive C2 

arrangement for retasking flights to meet dynamic DCA operational requirements or to 

support OCA operations. 

(c) NAVFOR CAPs defending carrier or amphibious groups may be positioned 

over land during littoral operations and can provide collateral defense of the land AO. 

g. Other Employment Considerations

(1) Movement and Mobility. US surface-based AMD forces are normally 

moveable or mobile. When operations require ground AMD units to change location, 

displacement times must be considered. Dependent upon the weapon system and situation, 

these surface unit displacements may take hours or days. Extensive coordination may be 

required for convoy plans, permissions, protection, realignment of logistics, travel time, and 

shifting of backfill forces may be necessary. Maritime forces afloat are capable of full 

operations while repositioning. 

(2) Cross-Boundary Operations. Boundaries between sectors and between forces 

and units are areas of risk. Procedures for distribution and control of fires between sectors 

and units should be addressed during planning. To minimize the risk of fratricide and 

prevent excessive weapons employment while providing a seamless defense, coordination 

must be rehearsed, not just planned. When engagements cross a unit boundary or are in a 

buffer zone, priority of fires normally will be given to the threatened unit. 

(3) Alert Posture. Levels of readiness should be tailored to the level of threat and 

warning. Crews and systems cannot be maintained at high levels of alert status indefinitely. 
Defense Counterair Planning and Operations

V-27 

Unless forces are actively conducting engagements or redeploying, some portion should be 

engaged in crew rest and/or maintenance. “All clear” procedures should be established when 

a threat no longer exists. 

(4) Transfer of Authority and Transitions in DCA Operations 

(a) Transfers of C2 functions such as airspace control, battle management 

authorities, etc., from one level of command or controlling element to another, should be 

accomplished smoothly, with the succeeding element not assuming C2 functions until the 

appropriate level of capability is actually in place—and rehearsed, if possible. Prior to 

hostilities, if possible, redundant or secondary C2 nodes should rehearse primary C2 

functions. 

(b) Temporary transfers of authority (e.g., ID or engagement authority) must 

be acknowledged by establishing and receiving elements and acknowledged by their 

subordinates. For example, if an AWACS is given a SADC function from a CRC, their 

subordinate air and surface fire control units, as well as the AWACS, must acknowledge the 

transfer. When the CRC regains that function, the AWACS and subordinates must again 

acknowledge the transfer. In all cases the next higher C2 node also must be notified and 

acknowledge the changes. 

(c) Detection of enemy offensive preparations may be an indication or warning 

of an impending hostile act and signal a decision for transition from peace to combat 

operations. Detection of these preparations allows for the transmission of tactical warnings 

that alert commanders, automated weapon systems, sensors, fusion centers, C2 nodes, and, in 

some cases civil authorities, to anticipate the attack.
Chapter V 

V-28 JP 3-01 

Intentionally Blank
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

COMBAT IDENTIFICATION 

1. General 

CID is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the 

operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. In counterair 

operations, CID should be accomplished with NRT or better exchange of information 

between airspace control/AD units and airspace users to meet the time and accuracy demands 

of combat operations. CID is essential to prevent fratricide in dynamic counterair operations 

and to ensure economy of force. Effective CID enhances joint force capabilities by 

providing confidence in the accuracy of counterair engagement decisions throughout the 

force. While CID is a process for all joint forces in both defensive and offensive operations, 

the focus in this appendix is on application of CID in counterair. 

2. Objective 

The objective of CID for AMD is to maximize effectiveness by providing high 

confidence IFF of a potential target so an engagement decision can be made in accordance 

with the ROE. The CID process complements the ID process, which is used for AD tracking 

and airspace control. 

3. Considerations for Conducting Combat Identification 

a. CID provides a process that allows an engagement decision based on the JFC’s 

chosen balance between the confidence level of ID and the risk of fratricide or mistaking an 

enemy as friendly, all framed within the operational situation and supported by the ROE. 

b. While the CID process uses some of the same systems and information used for the 

basic ID process, there are ID systems specifically designed for the higher confidence, 

positive ID that is more suitable for the purpose of CID. Some ID systems have an 

autonomous ID capability, with data links and digital information exchanges (including realtime imagery of targets/target areas) that greatly enhance their ability to perform more 

effective CID (e.g., blue force tracker). 

c. ID information may be obtained from onboard or external surface-, air-, and spacebased systems (e.g., radars, IFF systems, and selective ID features) and through established 

processes and procedures approved by the JFC. An effective C2 system (including reliable 

voice and data networks) is required to gather, assimilate, assess, and distribute this 

information from a myriad of sources and nodes. 

d. Planning and executing the CID process requires thorough knowledge of the joint 

force scheme of maneuver, OPLANs, and ACMs documented in the ACP, AADP, and ACO. 

To avoid a single point of failure, normally no one C2 node acts as an exclusive end user of 

all CID information. Optimally, all CID information is disseminated to all C2 nodes 

applicable to their operational area. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-01 

e. Electronic methods provide the earliest and most reliable means of positive ID. 

Positive visual ID may be required by the ROE in some scenarios, but may not be practical 

in others due to time and distances or consideration of an enemy’s BVR weapons 

capabilities. For example, due to their unique flight profiles, ROE normally allow BMs and 

CMs, with high-confidence ID, to be engaged immediately—the approved ROE being the 

controlling factor. It is important that ROE allow for the most advantageous means of ID. 

While airspace control can function with an effective combination of different methods of 

ID, AD engagements (with few exceptions) require positive ID (e.g., visual observation or 

electronic ID). For example, for SEAD operations, correct ID of all friendly electromagnetic 

signal emitters is important to prevent erroneous suppression (destruction or disruption) of 

friendly force electronic systems. Experience has shown that some friendly forces’ 

electronic emitters are not properly identified to the SEAD forces. Those spurious emitters 

may be read as “unknown” or “hostile” by a SEAD aircrew, and dependent upon the ROE 

and intensity of the situation, that emitter may be engaged, perhaps in self-defense, unless 

positive ID is accomplished. If that friendly force with a spurious emitter could be positively 

identified by secure electronic means (i.e., CID), it would probably not be engaged in that 

context. 

f. In the absence of positive ID, procedural ID may be used based on ROE and the 

commander’s decision to accept the potential increased risks of fratricide or misidentification 

of enemy as friend. For example, when a surface AD unit becomes autonomous and 

procedurally reverts to a self-defense mode, the threat of fratricide may increase because that 

unit would be more likely to engage friendly aircraft that fly toward the unit. Procedural ID 

methods using airspeed, altitude, and planned flight corridors as parameters may mitigate the 

perceived threat to the AMD unit. 

g. ROE are critical to both the ID and CID processes. ROE directly supports the CID 

process and should allow for the most advantageous means of identifying a detected object: 

the CID process identifies friend or foe and ROE determines response. A good example is 

the ID criteria for missiles, which normally should be different than that for aircraft. 

Because BMs have a distinct flight profile, with little warning, and a very short opportunity 

for intercept, the ROE should allow for advantageous ID and immediate engagement. 

Experience has shown the ROE for incoming enemy CMs, once detected and classified as a 

CM using high confidence means, also should allow immediate engagement because they are 

difficult to continuously track. 

4. Identification Matrix 

The AADC should develop an ID matrix to complement the ID process normally used 

for tracking and to facilitate engagement decisions. Often, track ID on the TDL may be from 

procedural methods that will not support the ROE criteria for engagement. The TDL will 

carry that track ID classification (e.g., a hostile ID track), but the engagement authority may 

require either positive ID, a determination of hostile act/intent, or violation of a procedural 

ID restriction before an engagement decision is made. To that end, CID criteria contained in 

the matrix and in all plans must be coordinated to ensure no conflicts arise during execution 

of counterair operations. 
 Combat Identification 

A-3 

a. ID Matrix Use Versus Implementation of TDL Track ID/Classification. Track 

ID/classification data shared over a TDL may not support the CID process. Planners must 

consider how the IDs are determined and entered into the track ID/classification system (e.g., 

a TDL) that portrays a particular track throughout the C2 systems. The JICO cell planners 

should provide a list of ID classifications (e.g., unknown, friendly, hostile, neutral) to be 

used on the TDL. 

(1) The ID matrix must take into consideration the limitations inherent in the 

employed systems that will implement the ID procedures. Once the set of track symbols is 

determined, the use of terminology for these symbols must be aligned. Each JFC should 

have ID criteria that include brevity code terms. For example, pay particular attention to the 

“bandit” codeword versus the system track symbol for “hostile.” An enemy aircraft with a 

TDL tracking symbol for hostile could be called a “bandit” (ID as enemy not authorized to 

engage) or called a “hostile” (ID as enemy with authority to engage). The AADC should 

ensure only those specific voice brevity terms approved by the JFC for authority to engage 

are used throughout the CID process. 

(2) Build the ID matrix to the lowest common denominator, that is, what everyone 

can classify/transmit/receive/forward to support the shooter. This will reduce the risk of 

missed targets and fratricide. 

b. ID Criteria. ID criteria are used for application of ROE. The ROE supports CID 

criteria for an engagement decision dependent upon weapon systems capabilities. The 

AADC is responsible for recommending DCA ROE and developing ID and engagement 

criteria for JFC approval in the AADP, with specific instructions in the ATO and/or SPINS. 

c. Positive ID Methods

(1) IFF Modes (1-5 per the ATO/SPINS). 

(2) PPLI. 

(3) A radar contact correlated with an authenticated/secure voice (position) report 

from an air or ground control agency. 

(4) External/onboard CID systems (e.g., blue force tracker or noncooperative target 

recognition). 

(5) Visual ID. 

d. Positive ID Considerations

(1) Positive ID is an ID derived from visual observation and/or electronic systems, 

possibly combined with other factors (e.g., point of origin), with a higher confidence of 

accuracy than a simple lack of friend or lack of enemy. Positive ID criteria, as established by 

the commander’s ROE, are a basis for CID for engagement (shoot/no-shoot) decisions, so it 

is useable for ID for airspace control and AD tracking. When available, positive ID is used 

because it provides the most rapid, reliable, and transferable means of ID. Most enemy 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-01 

positive hostile IDs are derived from technology-based ID systems that exploit the physical 

or electronic characteristics of a target (e.g., noncooperative target recognition, signals 

intelligence, or electronic support measures). 

(2) Not all CID participants may see the same ID-related information. This is 

dependent primarily on system implementation, J-series versus M-series message standards, 

and operator display capabilities. Because of the different implementation of TDL messages, 

planners should consider limiting the number of track classification symbols to reduce 

confusion and the potential for fratricide. 

e. Figure A-1 provides a sample ID matrix for tracks. 

For a detailed discussion of CID in an IADS, refer to FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-

01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated 

Air Defense System.

 
 Combat Identification 

A-5 

 

Figure A-1. Identification Process Sample Matrix 

Identification Process Sample Matrix

ACO airspace control order

ATO air tasking order

CIDS combat identification system (e.g., blue 

force tracker)

ID identification

IDBO identification by origin

IR instrumentation route

MRR minimum-risk route

POO point of origin

PPLI precise participant location and identification

RTF return to force

SAAFR standard use Army aircraft flight route

SPINS special instructions

VID visual identification

VR visual route

Legend

NOTES:

1. Update IDs at any level in the ID matrix; IDBO or POO considerations

2. ID friend by voice/data link verification

3. In accordance with daily ATO/SPINS

4. RTF/MRR and civilian air routes listed in ACOs and Airspace Annex and does not include military VR and IR 

training routes

5. In accordance with track classification guide

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Reevaluate Track

1. Detection

IDBO

POO

2.

4.

4.

5.

4.

4.

3.

Red/Green CIDS/VID

Crown*

Air Route and 

Mode 3/C

Flight Profile

Hostile

Valid Mode 

1 or 2

Mode 4 or 

PPLI

MRR/ 

SAAFR**

MRR/ 

SAAFR**

Positive 

Friendly

or

Positive 

Hostile

Positive 

Neutral

Positive Friendly

Red/Green Crown is a US Navy Weapons Controller

High fast fliers will not be considered on an MRR and are a step in the procedural ID toward hostile.

*

**

Positive Means Procedural Means

No

No

No No

No No

5.

5.

5.

Friend

Unknown

Neutral
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-01 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1 

APPENDIX B

AREA AIR DEFENSE PLAN FORMAT 

Copy No. 

 Issuing Headquarters 

 Place of Issue 

 Date/Time Group of Signature 

AREA AIR DEFENSE PLAN: Operation/Exercise NUMBER OR CODE NAME 

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. Situation 

Briefly describe the situation the plan addresses. The related OPLAN or concept plan, 

as well as any other applicable OPLAN/AADP that may apply, should be identified as 

appropriate. Include a description of the conditions under which the guidance and 

procedures in the AADP are applicable (e.g., the exercise, OPLAN, operation order, military 

operation, coordination between air and ground defense forces). 

a. Guidance. Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memorandums, 

treaties, and strategic plans, including any campaign/OPLANs received from higher 

authority, that apply to the plan. 

b. Enemy Order of Battle. Provide a reference to the intelligence annex of the 

governing plan and/or a top-level summary of pertinent intelligence data, including 

information on the following: 

(1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of major enemy 

forces that can influence action in the operational area. 

(2) Definition of threat axes, DCA operations, known WMD, and estimated enemy 

COAs. 

(3) Known IPB for the operational area. 

(4) Enemy vulnerabilities, COGs, and decisive points. 

c. Friendly Order of Battle. State information on friendly forces assigned. 

(1) Describe friendly AD forces, including C2, aircraft (including counterair, 

reconnaissance, surveillance, and support), location of SAM units, and support forces. 

(2) Describe missile defense forces, including those with both AMD capabilities. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-01 

(3) Describe BM defense system capabilities if any are located within the JOA or 

can support the JFC. 

d. Non-Allied Forces 

(1) Describe neutral forces and AD capabilities in or near the theater that could 

impact operations. Include general statement and any specific information about COAs and 

WMD capabilities. Include air and sea routes, shipping lanes, location of SAM units, and 

ATC information. 

(2) Describe noncombatants in or near the theater that could impact operations. 

Include information on shipping lanes and international air traffic, if known. 

2. Mission 

State the joint AD tasks and the purposes and relationships to achieving the AADC’s 

objectives. 

3. Air and Missile Defense Operations 

a. Intent 

b. CONOPS. Describe the CONOPS, including the mission assumptions, maintenance 

policies, and JOA within which the AADP applies. 

(1) AD organization—AD area, regions, and sectors identified, including 

boundaries. Air and surface sensors, shooters, and C2. 

(2) Provide or reference the list of critical assets to be defended (with asset 

criticality) with respect to campaign phase and timing within the campaign phase. 

(3) Designation of prioritized defended assets with their associated levels of 

protection as approved by the JFC. May include specific responsibilities of defending 

commander and allocation of forces. 

(4) AMD forces deployed locations overview. 

(5) Phases of air defensive operations in relation to the plan. 

(6) Timing and duration of phases. 

c. Coordinating Instructions 

(1) Describe the integrating policy, including the philosophy of the weapons 

control plan and interfaces between commanders at various levels. Include plans and 

procedures for employing air control units and missile control units. Also include a list of 

vital areas and target priorities policy and guidance, as well as return to ship/base procedures. 

Generally describe the passive AMD warning responsibilities, including MNF and HN 

notifications, with reference to Appendixes 1 and 3, in Annex C (Operations) of the AADP. 
Area Air Defense Plan Format 

B-3 

(2) Describe Weapons Coordination Policy and Code Words. Describe preplanned 

responses to tactical situations, including lost communications, approach of hostile aircraft or 

low/slow fliers, antiship CM/land attack CM launch/detection, transporter/erector/launcher 

detection or BM launch, reconnaissance aircraft detection, adverse weather, and detection of 

TSTs. 

(3) ROE 

(a) Include ID and CID procedures and requirements and deconfliction 

procedures. 

(b) Describe the ROE’s impact and constraints on joint AMD operations. 

(4) Describe reporting requirements, including the ATO, SPINS, ACO, tactical 

operational data (TACOPDAT), daily intentions messages, OPTASKLINK, and status 

reports. 

(5) Describe/discuss interaction between AMD operations and procedures and the 

ACP. 

4. Logistics 

Give references to where this information is maintained. 

5. Command, Control, and Communications 

a. Command Relationships. State the planned C2 structure for the entire joint AMD 

operation. Indicate any transfer of forces contemplated during the AMD operations, 

including the time of expected transfer. Give locations of all pertinent C2 agency locations 

and command posts for various commanders. 

b. Communications. State where to find the communications plan(s). 

c. Command Designators. If certain terms or code words are an integral part of a 

Service’s DCA lexicon, be sure to define or explain them; for example, the Navy uses “Red 

Crown” for its airspace control center. 

6. Area Air Defense Plan Guidance 

The AADP is developed in collaboration with the JFC, component commanders, and 

MNF partners. Although the AADP is designed to be the AADC’s plan of action, it is a 

“living” document. RADC/SADC may wish to provide supplements to the plan to reflect 

additional guidance or intentions. While the AADP includes topics for discussion, it may be 

written to reflect greater or lesser detail and may serve as a reference document to point users 

to other more detailed messages like the TACOPDAT, OPTASKLINK, SPINS, ATO/ACO, 

etc. 

(Signed) (Commander—AADC) 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-01 

ANNEXES: (List of notional AADP annexes, appendices, and tabs.) 

Annex A: Air Defense Task Organization 

Annex B: Intelligence 

Annex C: Operations 

 Appendix 1: Launch Warning Reports 

 Tab A: Theater Voice Warning Report Format 

 Tab B: JFACC Tier II Voice Early Warning 

 Tab C: JFLCC Tier II Voice Early Warning 

 Tab D: JFMCC Tier II Voice Early Warning 

 Appendix 2: Combat Air Patrol Management and Control 

 Appendix 3: Air Defense Warning Conditions 

 Appendix 4: Critical Asset List/Defended Asset List 

 Tab A: Critical Asset List 

 Tab B: Phase I Defended Asset List 

 Tab C: Phase II Defended Asset List 

 Tab D: Phase III Defended Asset List 

 Tab E: Phase IV Defended Asset List 

 Appendix 5: Air Defense Procedures 

 Tab A: Low Missile Procedures 

 Tab B: Fire Control Orders 

 Tab C: SAM SHORAD Tactical Order Format 

 Tab D: Alert States 

 Tab E: Weapons Control Status 

 Tab F: Air Breathing Threat Engagement Reports 

 Tab G: BM Engagement Reports 
Area Air Defense Plan Format 

B-5 

 Tab H: SAM Status Report Format 

 Tab I: Self-Defense Criteria 

 Tab J: Theater Air and Missile Defense Airspace Control Order Form 

 Appendix 6: Flush Procedures 

 Appendix 7: Kill Box Grid System 

 Appendix 8: Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

 Appendix 9: OPTASKLINK 

 Appendix 10: RADC/SADC/Operations Centers Reports 

 Appendix 11: OPSEC 

Annex D through Annex I: Not used 

Annex J: Air Defense Command Relationships 

 Appendix 1: Air Defense Area, Region, and Sector Boundaries 

Annex K: Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems 

 Appendix 1: JRE and C2 Voice Connectivity 

 Appendix 2: TDL Network 

 Appendix 3: JICO Cell Communications 

 Appendix 4: Sensor Network 

 Appendix 5: ADA Brigade Network 1 

 Appendix 6: ADA Brigade Network 2 

 Appendix 7: ADA Battalion Network 

 Appendix 8: Link 16 Network 

Annex L: Coalition Forces 

 Appendix 1: Ballistic Missile Shared Early Warning to Coalition Forces 

Annex M through Annex Y: Not used 

Annex Z: Distribution 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-01 

Enclosure 1: References 

Enclosure 2: Terms and Definitions 

Enclosure 3: Acronyms 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
C-1 

APPENDIX C

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR ESTIMATE FORMAT 

DCA ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 

(Classification) 

 Headquarters 

 Place 

 Date, time, and zone 

 Message reference number 

DCA ESTIMATE NUMBER ____ 

References: Maps, charts, or other documents. 

Time Zone Used Through the Estimate: 

1. Mission 

Clearly state the task given to the AADC by the JFC and the purpose for the task. The 

task should describe what friendly DCA forces will do to the enemy. The purpose describes 

the reason for the task and should remain effective even after the task becomes outdated due 

to a change in the situation. 

2. Situation and Considerations 

This paragraph describes the conditions under which the unit will perform its mission 

and the possible COAs of the supported force. 

a. Characteristics of the operational area. For this paragraph, determine those factors 

that influence friendly and enemy actions and that may influence the choice of a COA. In 

the absence of facts, use logical assumptions that might directly affect the mission. Include 

an analysis of the effects of conducting DCA operations. 

(1) Weather. Put the analysis of data from predicted weather, atmospheric 

conditions, and solar/lunar data for the period in this paragraph. Climatological data also 

should be investigated when completing this paragraph. Assess how the weather influences 

friendly and enemy operations. For enemy operations include an evaluation of how current 

and forecast weather and solar/lunar data impacts enemy use of UASs; missiles; aircraft 

(fixed- and rotary-wing); and airborne or air assault operations. Try to determine or predict 

when the enemy is most likely to use those assets due to the weather. 

(2) Terrain. Analyze the effects of terrain, including effects on observation and 

fire; cover and concealment; movement (surface and air); employment of friendly and enemy 

WMD; communications, EW, and combat surveillance; unconventional warfare; military 

information support operations; and other aspects of military operations. Determine key 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-01 

terrain and air avenues of approach. Also discuss terrain features that limit air vehicle 

detection or target acquisition and terrain that might canalize or force air targets to fly a 

particular profile. Try to determine where the enemy will most probably use air assets. 

(3) Other pertinent factors. List analysis of political, economic, sociological, 

psychological, and other factors (such as hydrographics, environment, communications, 

science, technology, materiel, transportation, safety and accident prevention, and manpower). 

Include deduction about their effects on friendly and enemy operations. 

b. Enemy Air and Missile Forces 

(1) Disposition. List locations of enemy air and missile forces that could 

participate in operations. Determine combinations of air platforms that the enemy may use 

when conducting a particular type of operation. 

(2) Composition. How the enemy organizes for combat. Includes identity of units, 

types of air platforms and missiles, and armament. Also address the expected number of 

sorties and missiles flown per day and possible composition of those sorties. 

(3) Strength. Numbers and sizes of committed and reinforcing units. Consider the 

enemy’s location, doctrine, and mission. Identify air and missile assets and air support units 

that could or may affect the operations. When, where, and how many air platforms will the 

enemy fly during this operation? 

(4) Other considerations. Enemy forces not discussed above. 

(5) Recent and present significant activities. Summarize recent enemy activities 

that were both successful and unsuccessful. Highlight any enemy air activity, to include 

number, type of air platforms, and locations. 

(6) Peculiarities and weaknesses. Indicate enemy peculiarities and weaknesses that 

might influence combat effectiveness, including vulnerability to deception. 

(7) Courses of Action. Identify available information from which to determine 

possible enemy COAs and their relation to the enemy’s joint COA. 

c. Friendly Forces. Identify disposition, composition, and strength. Highlight the 

vulnerability of the joint force to enemy air and missile attacks and surveillance. 

(1) Friendly COAs. State the JFC’s COA. Include any guidance that affects DCA 

operations. Include description of any phasing of operations in the COA and the impact of 

those operations on support relationships or requirements. 

(2) Current status of resources within theater/JOA. Identify the status of personnel 

and logistics in the unit. Identify civil-military operations requirements. Identify limitations 

that affect or may affect the conduct of DCA operations. Can the mission be accomplished? 

(3) Current status of other DCA resources that affect theater/JOA. 
 Defensive Counterair Estimate Format 

C-3 

(4) Comparison of DCA requirements versus capabilities and recommended 

solutions. 

(5) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability. 

d. Assumptions. State the assumptions relevant to the situation, mission, forces, 

capabilities, threat, etc., that will affect the commanders’ decisions. 

3. Analysis 

Analyze each COA using evaluation criteria. Identify those aspects in the JFC’s plan 

that create difficulty in providing DCA coverage and affect the ability of the force to 

accomplish its mission. 

4. Comparison 

a. Compare COAs using evaluation criteria. Rank order COAs for each key 

consideration. A decision matrix should visually support comparison. Present a DCA COA 

for each JFC COA. 

b. Each COA should include the following aspects: 

(1) DCA mission. 

(2) DCA priorities. 

(3) DCA fires. 

(4) DCA scheme of maneuver. 

(5) Task organization. 

(6) Command and support relationships. 

(7) Key passive AD measures. 

5. Recommendations and Conclusions 

a. Recommended COA based on the comparison. 

(1) Indicate which joint COA(s) DCA can best support (using the elements of who, 

what, where, when, how, and why). 

(2) Recommend list of DCA priorities. 

(3) State the recommended DCA organization for combat and employment of other 

active DCA assets. 

(4) Possible OCA targets. 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-01 

(5) Passive and active DCA measures that will be most effective. 

(6) Issues, deficiencies, and risks with recommendations to reduce their impacts. 

b. Conclusions. 

ANNEXES: (as required) 
D-1 

APPENDIX D

THREAT MISSILE SYSTEMS

1. Background 

a. Threat missiles include BMs, CMs, and ASMs (not including short-range, 

nonnuclear, direct fire missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-guided 

missiles). Their targets are within a given theater of operations. Threat missiles have unique 

capabilities that must be considered when planning countermeasures. For example, no other 

target system can put a warhead into the theater JSA or threaten friendly population centers 

and neutral countries in a matter of minutes. Other target systems do not create public panic 

and a political situation each time a launch is broadcasted on television worldwide by 

reporters wearing gas masks. Effectively countering this threat, coupled with the somewhat 

elusive nature of some threat missile systems, requires the dedicated attention of determined, 

knowledgeable professionals. 

b. Modern threat missiles can have very long ranges, deliver a variety of warheads, 

including high explosives and WMD, and can be difficult to counter. Because they are 

relatively cost-effective weapons, BMs are weapons of choice for many developing nations. 

Such weapons provide an offensive capability and, when mated with a WMD, may give a 

nation the ability to deter a potential adversary by holding population centers and/or military 

forces at risk. Rogue nations believe missiles provide them with a counter to sophisticated 

land, air, and naval forces. As a result, nations around the world are actively pursuing 

missile capabilities.

c. Threat missiles may be used alone or in conjunction with other weapon systems. 

Their targets can vary from political to military, such as population centers, ports, airfields, 

headquarters, AD sites, C2 elements, communications nodes, and logistics centers. They can 

quickly put key civilian facilities at risk, such as power and water stations, petroleum 

pumping and storage sites, and industrial complexes. BMs and CMs also present a serious 

threat to merchant shipping, critical sea-lanes, and maritime operations in the littorals. 

ASMs also have proven to be effective weapons against point targets, and they are difficult 

to defend against. 

2. Generic Architecture

Although there are many variables between the different types of threat missiles, they 

generally share a common architecture. Missile programs may have one or more of the 

following aspects:

a. Research and Development. If a country is developing its own missile system or 

adapting a system purchased from another country, there will be a center, institution, and 

personnel responsible for the research and development (R&D) effort. However, if a country 

purchases the complete missile system, there may be no R&D effort unless they attempt to 

improve the design. R&D efforts should provide some signatures for intelligence sources.
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-01 

b. Manufacturing. Countries that develop their own systems or adapt those produced 

by other nations require dedicated manufacturing and testing facilities. They also may have 

to develop or refine the fuel for the missile systems. Although the fuels are of a specific 

type, they are commonly available on the international market from several sources. The 

manufacturing process should produce signatures and products (the missiles) that 

intelligence sources should recognize.

c. Purchase and Import. Countries that purchase systems from other nations will have 

prepared sites for receipt of missile system components and fuels. These ports of entry may 

be air-, land- (road or rail), or sea-based. These locations may have receipt, inspection, and 

storage capabilities. If the equipment requires assembly, there may be facilities created 

nearby to support these activities. 

d. Transportation. Missile components move from their manufacturing or importing 

site by rail, road, air, and/or sea to permanent storage sites. In some cases, the missiles may 

be carried by their transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) unit. The combination of purchasing 

and transportation should provide signatures or some trail or recognition for intelligence 

sources.

e. Missile Storage. Missile storage locations are required at the point of manufacture, 

at the point of receipt, in missile unit base locations, and at training installations. Missile 

storage sites are likely to be constructed and developed within projected operational areas as 

well. If not mounted on a TEL, storage may include innocuous containers or special 

canisters that house the missiles until they are launched. 

f. Warhead Storage. Warhead storage sites are usually located in ammunition areas 

and may not be easily discernible from bunkers holding other munitions. However, WMD 

warheads require specialized storage, handling, and, most notably, higher security. WMD 

generally have telltale signs for not only storage but for movement as well.

g. Basing. Missile units are usually located at military bases for OPSEC and safety 

purposes. Most training and equipment maintenance occurs at these locations. Land-based 

units likely will move from their garrisons to conduct combat operations. Air units with 

CMs and ASMs conduct training and wartime operations directly from their home air bases 

or from dispersal fields. BM units are likely to utilize passive AD measures such as 

mobility, dispersal, and concealment to complicate their being targeted. Naval units 

generally have their missiles aboard ships for added mobility and movement to potential 

firing locations. Normally, intelligence sources should be able to identify adversaries with 

missile-capable aircraft and ships.

h. Assembly Areas. In cases where BMs and warheads are shipped and stored 

separately, one of the final stages of preparing the weapon for operations is mating the 

warhead to the missile body. This may be a training event so it can be efficiently done for 

combat operations. For aircraft, the loading process could be an indication and warning for 

intelligence sources, as would the assembly of BMs. 
Threat Missile Systems 

D-3 

i. Launch Areas. Missile attacks normally take place from planned launch areas. The 

characteristics of the launch areas are dependent on missile type. Historically, BMs usually 

start from a hide position then move to the launch point. ASMs must be flown to a launch 

point within range of the target. 

j. Launch Preparation. After arrival at a launch area, most BMs require some 

prelaunch preparation. These activities may involve fueling and testing the missile and 

warhead components along with some assembly operations. Launch preparations for liquidfueled missiles generally require longer setup/checkout time than do solid fuel missiles. For 

CMs and ASMs, these activities likely will occur at an airfield or port and may involve 

simply moving the missile from a storage area to the delivery platform (aircraft or ship).

k. C2. Planning missile operations is normally a highly centralized process with tight 

control over the employment and selection of targets. Execution of missile operations may 

be either centralized or decentralized. The degree of centralization is generally determined 

by the degree of control desired by senior civilian or military leaders, the capability for 

secure communications, the ability of the opposing forces to detect or locate transmitters, 

and the tactics employed. WMD-armed missiles will be tightly controlled because of their 

political sensitivity and the possibility of retaliation. Thus, WMD-associated missile units 

normally will require robust communication links or constant communication with national 

leadership for launch authorization. 

l. Support Units. Most missile systems require a support system. Support units 

provide a variety of functions to include maintenance, rearming and refueling, personnel 

replacement, etc. They also deliver replacement warheads and missiles and conduct all the 

electronic testing and repair. During peacetime, these units probably will be colocated with 

the missile firing units in garrison. For employment, they may move to FOBs or 

dispersal/staging airfields. For naval units the support is likely organic to the ship. 

3. Ballistic Missiles

a. BMs (or SSMs) are characterized by their trajectory, having one or more boosters and 

an initial steering vector. 

b. Threat Employment Concepts

(1) Prime targets for BMs are large, soft, or heavily defended facilities, critical to a 

nation’s warfighting ability, that are normally located in rear areas. Examples include 

airfields, AD sites, transportation centers (ports and airfields), logistic hubs, and major C2 

nodes. Additionally, key population centers are prime targets whose attack might create 

panic and foster a political crisis. BMs also may be used in a tactical sense to affect 

battlefield logistics and operations, although this is less likely given the strategic importance 

of such weapons to smaller or less developed nations. 

(2) TBMs normally are carried on a TEL so mobility enhances BM survivability 

and, conversely, complicates their being targeted. Their long range affords the enemy 

increased options in selecting operating areas and determining potential targets. For 

example, BMs have been exported by many nations and can be set up and fired in less than 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-01 

45 minutes and relocated within minutes. Missiles often present multiple tracks, either from 

staging or from their tendency to break up during terminal phase descent, thereby further 

complicating defensive efforts.

(3) SAM systems have been modified into SSMs in some countries, and this trend 

likely will spread to other nations. As missile systems and missile technology proliferate, 

nations will acquire or be able to produce missile systems using solid fuels. This will 

significantly reduce the dwell time required for system checks and fueling during launch 

preparation. This reduced dwell time will significantly reduce the missile’s signature and the 

time available for attack operations.

c. Threat Employment Operations. TBM operations generally are broken down into 

five major phases. These include readiness, deployment, employment, sustainment, and 

reconstitution. 

(1) Readiness Phase. The readiness phase encompasses normal day-to-day 

peacetime operations. During this phase, BM forces train on wartime tasks and practice 

doctrinal employment in the local training areas or in garrison. This normally entails TEL 

operation, missile erection, site preparation, and missile maintenance. Support units will 

perform maintenance on firing units and conduct resupply operations. 

(2) Deployment Phase. The deployment phase may include initial movement from 

the garrison location(s) to the initial war fighting positions to support subsequent launch 

operations. BM force deployment will depend on the range to the target, missile capability, 

terrain, and survivability considerations. Firing units will move to either hide positions or 

directly into launch positions. Support units likely will move to a forward base and conduct 

support to include reloading operations. Deployments may or may not convey hostile intent, 

depending upon the circumstances.

(3) Employment Phase. The employment phase encompasses initial combat 

operations. During this phase, TELs move missiles to their initial firing positions from a 

hide site and then, after launch, move to another hide site or directly to reload operations. 

The support unit will establish that location based upon doctrine, terrain, the BM force 

commander’s firing schedule, and the threat. 

(4) Sustainment Phase. During the sustainment phase, support units likely will 

use a forward base/location to conduct the necessary repair/replacement operations to sustain 

the BM force. Sustainment operations require support units to use lines of communications 

from garrison locations, field storage areas, and/or the manufacturing infrastructure/import 

facilities to the forward bases and onward. 

(5) Reconstitution Phase. The reconstitution phase encompasses continuous 

operations between firing units, support units, and higher echelon logistic locations to 

regenerate BM forces.

d. Threat Employment—Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Threat Missile Systems 

D-5 

(1) TEL Operations. TELs can serve as the transporter and launch platform for 

missiles. TELs present a small, extremely mobile target with very short dwell time. TELs 

generally travel only short distances between hide sites, launch sites, and transload sites, 

unless required to return to a forward base for additional maintenance. A TEL will be in 

launch configuration for a very short period of time and can displace to a new hide site in a 

matter of minutes.

(2) Transload Site. The transload site is where fueled, ready missiles are loaded 

onto TELs. Support unit personnel, vehicles, and equipment from the forward base or 

location will rendezvous at this site with firing unit TELs. At this site there generally are a 

number of vehicles: missile resupply vehicles (with one to three missiles), a crane (possibly 

attached to the resupply vehicle), and other ground support equipment as required by the 

missile type. The transload site usually is an open area large enough to allow the crane to 

lift/pivot the missile onto the TEL, approximately 50 by 50 meters. This operation can occur 

in large buildings or underground facilities with sufficient height, approximately 20 meters. 

When detected, this site will remain vulnerable throughout its established dwell time.

(3) FOL. The FOL is typically where warheads and missiles are mated, missiles 

are fueled, and missiles are loaded onto the resupply vehicle. The FOL remains in place 

from half-a day to 3 days. The FOL usually contains warheads and missile airframes, 

transporters, cranes, checkout vehicles, fuel trucks (vehicle and missile fuel), and resupply 

and other support vehicles. FOLs can be located in rural or urban settings and may be 

hidden in a building complex or underground facility. The FOL has a larger footprint than 

TEL or transload operations, but is still difficult to locate. Some countries may not employ 

FOLs, preferring to conduct these operations out of the FOB. 

(4) FOB. The FOB is the main missile unit supply and storage activity and will be 

spread out over a large geographic area for survivability. The number of FOBs will depend 

on the size of the missile force (targets selected and acceptable travel distances for support 

units). In situations where a country’s geographic area is small, it is possible that operations 

typically associated with the FOB could be conducted from garrison. 

(a) A typical FOB contains warhead, missile, and propellant storage sites; 

transporters and cranes; checkout vehicles; fuel trucks (vehicle and missile fuel); and 

resupply and other support vehicles. An FOB can be established in an urban environment 

hidden in large buildings, in underground facilities, or in the field. The FOB normally will 

deploy support equipment to FOLs and/or transload sites as needed to sustain launch 

operations. FOBs require robust lines of communications (primarily roads and rail lines) to 

support continuous operations. 

(b) The FOB cannot be easily hidden but may be difficult to distinguish from 

other logistic facilities. Once established, the FOB probably will not be moved in total, but 

certain components may be moved to complicate detection, create a deception, or facilitate 

launch operations. 
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-01 

4. Cruise Missiles

a. A CM is a guided missile, the major portion of whose flight path to its target is 

conducted at approximately constant velocity and depends on the dynamic reaction of air for 

lift and upon propulsion forces to balance drag. CMs are unmanned, self-propelled vehicles 

that sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight. CMs usually 

navigate autonomously to targets and, depending on their sophistication, can position 

themselves through a number of update methods along extended flight routes. CMs are 

capable of delivering the full complement of warheads from conventional to WMD.

b. Threat CMs

(1) Very few nations currently possess sophisticated CMs such as the Navy TLAM 

or the Air Force conventional air launched cruise missile (ALCM). Employment by 

developed nations has been limited. The majority of CMs in potential threat nations are 

short-range anti-ship/coastal defense CMs with ranges in excess of 100 nautical miles. Some 

countries are modifying anti-ship CMs for a land attack role. 

(2) Future CM technology will build on existing low observable, sensor defeating 

designs using radar absorbing materials and composite materials such as Kevlar or carbon 

fiber to further reduce their radar cross-sections and render them more difficult to detect. 

CMs generally possess some of the following features: 

(a) Radar cross-section under 1 square meter (-10 decibel and lower). 

(b) Low infrared signature (varies by type of CM). 

(c) Acoustic signature (varies by type of CM).

(d) Cruise altitude of 100 feet to 2000 feet above ground level or 50,000 feet 

above mean sea level.

(e) Range of 100 to 1000 nautical miles. 

(f) Payload of 200 to 1000 pounds. 

(g) Speed range of high subsonic (low altitude) or supersonic (high altitude).

(h) Air-, land-, or sea-launched. 

c. Threat CM Employment

(1) CMs put stress on AD systems because they are difficult for theater sensors and 

weapons systems to detect, identify, track, acquire, and destroy. CMs are more difficult to 

detect than the larger BMs because they do not give off as large a heat signature at launch, 

fly at very low altitudes during their attack legs, and normally have a smaller radar crosssection. Ground-based surveillance radars have a difficult time detecting CMs when in low 

level flight (following terrain contours) because of line-of-sight restrictions created by radar 
Threat Missile Systems 

D-7 

horizon and terrain masking. Similarly, airborne radar systems may have a difficult time 

isolating CMs from ground clutter. These traits, when combined with radar evasion 

techniques and low observable construction methods, cause delays in detection and 

engagement decisions by engagement authorities and shooters per the ROE. However, once 

detected in flight, CMs can be engaged by fighters, AAA, and SAMs. The best tactic is to 

shoot down the aircraft carrying the CMs. 

(2) SLCMs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) present opportunities 

for detection as well as challenges for surveillance systems. Surface launch systems 

normally must be boosted to “cruise” altitude. The boost phase often uses a rocket motor 

that will produce an infrared signature that could potentially be exploited by space-based or 

properly positioned theater assets. ALCMs do not have a boost plume since aircraft or UASs 

deliver them above the cruise altitude. Although the ALCM has a small radar cross-section, 

it is vulnerable to radar detection during descent to its low-level altitude. Once near the 

surface and in a terrain following mode, sensors have to filter radar ground clutter to extract 

a radar signature from these low-altitude profile missiles.

(3) High-altitude, high-mach profiles rely on altitude and speed to overcome 

defenses. Because the CM is high, ground-based radars will not be obstructed by the 

curvature of the earth, and airborne radars can discriminate them from ground clutter. As a 

result, when using the high-altitude profile, CMs are more likely to be detected earlier in 

flight than when using a low-level profile.

(4) CMs provide a significant standoff range for the aircraft or launch platform and 

remove the “manned” component of the weapons system from the immediate target area. 

The release range of CMs from aircraft and other platforms can easily be beyond a 

defender’s radar and sensor range. The long distance release or launch of CMs and their 

smaller radar signature increase the possibility that surveillance assets will not detect them. 

Battle managers require cues to focus their search in detecting CMs in any surveillance area. 

Combining hostile aircraft attacks with CM and ASM attacks may allow “leakers” to get 

through. Indeed, CMs may resemble and be misidentified as manned aircraft. 

(5) Rapid CID is critical for CM defense. CM defense is complicated by the use of 

low observable technology and the potential of SOF or other friendly aircraft without IFF 

transponders operating in the same airspace, thus requiring ID verification prior to 

engagement. CMs make surveillance and detection difficult because their flight profiles are 

specifically designed to defeat or confuse radar tracking. As with BMs, the objective is to 

eliminate as many CMs as possible before launch. CMs in flight may be part of TST target 

sets designated by the JFC. The challenge for defending against CMs is to find them early, 

before launch if possible, and engage them before they can navigate to their targets. 

(6) Training patterns or identifiable launch sequence events for GLCMs are rarely 

observed or practiced in an overt environment. Consequently, the probability is small for 

conclusively identifying a GLCM TEL using current sensor data. Attacking a CM TEL 

requires the earliest possible detection of the target and the ability of sensors to discriminate 

between TELs and other targets. Successfully targeting CMs before launch will depend in 

great part on pre-hostility JIPOE/IPB efforts. Targeteers will require information on 
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 3-01 

infrastructure, logistic support patterns, movement discipline, and signatures of typical 

storage and assembly facilities. Identification by signature is key to finding CMs before 

launch, since detecting the launch itself or tracing the flight path back to the launch site may 

be extremely difficult when they are launched from maximum range.

d. CM Target Development 

(1) Procedures for finding and targeting CMs on the ground are no different than 

for finding other targets using a variety of theater and national sensors. Space-based and 

theater reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition assets normally will collect 

intelligence data on these targets prior to armed conflict as part of IPB. Sensors on JSTARS 

and UASs and SOF pass CM target information to analysts and battle managers by data link 

or voice. Data collected and fused from multiple sensors will provide the necessary 

confirmation of the target. Immediate threat data will be broadcast over intelligence 

processing and transmissions systems such as tactical related applications and tactical data 

dissemination systems.

(2) When conflict begins, sensors must be used to validate known target 

information. With proper ISR, aircraft and naval launch platforms for ALCMs and SLCMs 

provide identifiable signatures and will yield opportunities to detect, ID, track, and attack 

those platforms. GLCMs will present a more difficult target set. The following is a 

discussion of targeting methods against each category: 

(a) ALCM. Destroying ALCM-capable aircraft on the ground or neutralizing 

their supporting airstrips/bases is the best means to prevent ALCM employment. In this 

context, missions against this target system do not differ from other OCA missions in terms 

of tactics or weapons. The IPB process must focus on providing the intelligence that 

targeteers need to determine which aircraft and air bases support ALCM activity and task 

missions against them accordingly. 

(b) SLCM. Destroying the launch platform in port is the best means to 

prevent SLCM launch. The IPB process will provide the naval order of battle information to 

identify specific SLCM carriers and support bases for targeteers and battle managers to task 

missions against them. Signatures of naval vessels and their substantial support base 

infrastructure will facilitate finding SLCM targets by satellite, UAS, and other surveillance 

platforms.

(c) GLCM. GLCM platforms normally are an adaptation of any available 

vehicle chassis capable of supporting one to two tons. Any medium-to-large size truck or 

tracked vehicle could be developed into a CM TEL. These TELs likely will be considerably 

smaller and less distinct than heavier BM TELs; however, a robust IPB effort can catalog 

such known and suspected vehicles for exploitation by surveillance sensors. GLCM 

deployment and training in suspect nations must be collected against and studied for 

behavioral cues to detection. Long-range GLCM permit the enemy to establish a large 

number of well-dispersed, fixed-launch locations (both actual and decoys) deep within their 

own territory. The enemy can be expected to employ camouflage, concealment, and 

deception for fixed and mobile TELs to reduce probability of detection. Detecting and 
Threat Missile Systems 

D-9 

targeting mobile GLCM platforms or newly built fixed launch sites will depend on a robust 

IPB, dynamic management of ISR assets, dedicated and trained analysts aided by technology 

improvements such as automatic target recognition systems, and a responsive C2 

architecture.

5. Air-to-Surface Missiles 

ASMs employment can be expected on all battlefields. Like BMs and CMs, ASMs are 

capable of delivering a complete range of warheads and can be carried by a variety of rotaryand fixed-wing platforms. Flight profiles, short flight times, and reduced radar cross-section 

make these missiles difficult to detect, track, and engage. Additionally, their speed and 

relatively short flight times leave a small window for interception. ASMs increase the 

survivability of the delivery platform through standoff capability, usually beyond the range 

of some point defenses. Many of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and former 

Warsaw Pact nations are equipped with US and Russian manufactured systems and have 

exported them throughout the world. The best method for countering ASMs is to target the 

delivery platforms and related bases and facilities. 

6. Conclusion 

While each missile system is unique, each category (BM, CM, and ASM) exhibits 

similar characteristics and functional operations. This appendix provides the essential 

THE LURE OF THE UNEXPECTED

Deception is a key part of any combat operations. The examples below 

illustrate what happens when analysts stop analyzing events and begin to 

believe what they think they are seeing.

World War II

Prior to the beginning of the V-1 attacks against London on June 12, 1944, 

the Allied attack operations concentrated on an elaborate system of 

“sites” which were believed to be Nazi V-1 launch locations. The 

locations were dubbed “ski sites” because of the shape of several long, 

curved buildings that were characteristic in the aerial photographs of 

each location. These sites were targeted and heavily bombed from 

December 1943 through May 1944. Although the “ski sites” were largely 

destroyed, not one of the real V-1 sites was attacked during this period. 

Once Hitler unleashed his missile force on England in June, the volume of 

V-1 launches provided incontrovertible evidence that a second set of 

launch sites was actually being used. Not until then did the weight of the 

Allied bombing effort finally begin to shift to the correct targets. Even so, 

the real sites were so hard to find due to Nazi camouflage and 

concealment measures that attacks were still being made on nearby 

decoy “ski sites” until the end of June.

SOURCE: Based on Operation CROSSBOW 

Volume of the US Strategic Bombing Survey
Appendix D 

D-10 JP 3-01 

framework for each in a generic fashion and serves as a foundation for an initial 

understanding of how missiles are employed. Specific analysis is required to apply this 

information to a particular missile system and country. The following vignette is a reminder 

that some “facts” should be verified, not simply accepted. 

Gulf War

The initial hope of the planners in Riyadh that heavy attacks on the fixed 

Scud sites during the opening hours of the air campaign would largely 

eliminate Iraq’s capability to launch tactical ballistic missiles against 

Israel or regional members of the US-led Coalition proved to be illusory. 

On the night of 16-17 January 1991, the fixed Scud launchers in western 

Iraq functioned as “decoys” that diverted attention away from the mobile 

launchers that had already deployed to their wartime “hide” sites, and the 

first of Iraq’s extended-range Scuds were fired at Israel the following 

night. Once Scuds started falling, first on Israel and then on Saudi Arabia 

two days later, the next best military option would have been to locate and 

attack mobile launchers before they had time to fire. Soviet exercise 

patterns in central Europe with Scud-B’s and Iraqi practice during the 

Iran-Iraq War, indicated that if the Iraqis followed prior practices, there 

might be enough pre-launch signatures and time to give patrolling aircraft 

some chance of attacking mobile launchers before they fired. However, 

the Iraqis dramatically cut their pre-launch set-up times, avoided any prelaunch electromagnetic emissions that might give away their locations 

before launch, and seeded the launch areas with decoys (some of which 

were very high in fidelity)...most (and possibly all) of the roughly 100 

mobile launchers reported destroyed by Coalition aircraft and special 

operation forces now appear to have been either decoys, other vehicles 

such as tanker trucks, or other objects unfortunate enough to provide 

“Scud-like” signatures.

SOURCE: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993
E-1 

APPENDIX E

GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYNCHRONIZATION

1. General

GBMD is the overarching characterization of the cumulative (worldwide) planning, 

synchronization, integration, coordination, and asset management of defensive capabilities 

designed to destroy, neutralize, or reduce the effectiveness of enemy BM attacks within or 

across any GCC’s AOR boundaries. 

a. Global BM Threats. The BM threat continues to increase both quantitatively and 

qualitatively. Worldwide trends indicate BM systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, 

survivable, reliable, and accurate. A number of states are favoring longer-range BMs and 

increasing their ability to penetrate missile defenses. Several states are also developing 

nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles. Such capabilities could 

significantly increase their utility both during conflict as well as in times of relative peace, 

when adversaries may use them to coerce states into actions contrary to US interests. The 

potential for proliferation to state and non-state actors may have significant impacts to 

regional and global stability. Certain regional actors continue to develop long-range missiles 

that threaten the US and its friends, and allies. Uncertainty exists about when and how this 

type of intercontinental ballistic missile threat will mature. Additionally, SRBMs/MRBMs 

continue to increase as threats. The advance in threats and evolution of technical solutions 

necessitate strategic solutions to the deployment of low-density, high-demand missile 

defense assets at the theater level. BMD deployments must be tailored to the unique 

deterrence and defense requirements of each theater, which may vary considerably by 

geography, the character of the threat, and the military-to-military relationships on which to 

build partnerships and cooperation for missile defense. BMs, whether employed in standard, 

lofted, or depressed trajectories, present unique problems, including high velocities and short 

reaction times for the defender. Accordingly, the proliferation of missile technology and 

WMD requires BMD capabilities for defending the homeland and deployed forces, as well as 

protecting allies and partners overseas. 

b. BMD Systems. To accomplish BMD globally, USSTRATCOM, working with the 

GCCs, integrates and synchronizes a wide range of sensors, interceptors, and C2 elements. 

Systems collectively employed include sensors (air, land, sea, and space), weapons (ground, 

air, and sea based), C2, manning, and logistics. These include GMD, THAAD, Aegis-BMD, 

Patriot, Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), the COBRA DANE radar, the SeaBased X-band radar, AN/TPY-2 Forward Based Mode radars, space-based Infrared 

System/Defense Support Program satellites, Command and Control, Battle Management, and 

Communications system, and applicable partner nation BMD capabilities. 

c. GBMD is supported by communications, comprised of the infrastructure which 

physically connects strategic and regional missile defense assets in support of operational 

and/or research, development, test, and evaluation activities. The main communications 

network used by GMD is the BMD COMNET. This network may be comprised of 

numerous distinct communications systems including, but not limited to, military and 

commercial satellite communications and Defense Information System Agency provisioned 
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terrestrial services. The BMD COMNET includes the GMD Communications Network and 

Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications BMD Communication 

Network.

2. Global Ballistic Missile Defense Roles and Responsibilities

a. The UCP tasks each CCDR with, “Detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks 

against the United States, its territories and bases, and employing appropriate force to defend 

the nation should deterrence fail.” CCDRs will coordinate the employment of active and 

passive missile defense measures and strike forces to defeat BM attacks in all phases of 

flight, or prior to their launch. Each GCC is the “supported” commander for all operations 

conducted to defeat BM threats in their respective AOR. A missile launch that crosses AOR 

boundaries complicates C2 of defensive assets and requires coordination among multiple 

GCCs. For theater BMD, a GCC may control all elements involved; however, as the range 

of threat missiles increases, and depending on the location of their launchers, so does the 

potential for cross-AOR BM attacks. This will test the speed and reliability of C2 which ties 

sensors and interceptors to decision makers across traditional command boundaries. The 

need to close gaps and seams across AOR boundaries led to the UCP direction for 

CDRUSSTRATCOM to be responsible for synchronizing the planning for global missile 

defense. All GCCs and subordinate JFCs coordinate their BMD planning and support with 

USSTRATCOM JFCC-IMD. 

b. Many organizations have a role in BMD. By its very nature, BMD is inherently joint

and may be executed in multiple AORs simultaneously by the affected GCCs. Because there 

are no overarching GBMD C2 structures, GCCs use existing theater AMD C2 organizations 

(e.g., AADCs, AAMDCs, RADCs, and SADCs) to conduct BMD, and they must coordinate 

across AOR boundaries. 

3. General Ballistic Missile Defense Characteristics

a. BMD consists of passive AD, active AD, attack operations, and battle management. 

It aligns with DCA required for BM threats when a JFC conducts counterair operations (see 

counterair framework diagram in Chapter I, “Introduction,” Figure I-1).

b. GBMD includes capabilities to detect, deter, defend against, and defeat adversary 

BM threats. GBMD must synchronize and integrate defensive capabilities to destroy or 

disrupt adversary missiles prior to launch, or to defeat inbound missiles in all phases of 

flight. Effective and efficient GBMD requires a balanced use of resources among the GCCs. 

To achieve unity of effort, GBMD will need to fully synchronize defensive actions and 

supporting systems to engage a target with multiple weapons systems throughout its 

trajectory.

c. Effective GBMD battle management requires shared situational awareness, effective 

management of high-demand–low-density resources, directing and controlling the correct 

actions in a timely manner, and monitoring and assessing the execution. GBMD utilizes a 

wide range of integrated BMD battle-management and planning systems to mitigate 

complexities associated with multiple theater BMD events. 
Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization 

E-3 

4. Global Ballistic Missile Defense Planning

a. GBMD requires a collaborative process that provides GCCs with the ability to 

coordinate cross-AOR BMD in multiple theaters while preserving functions performed at the 

GCC level and below. While such a planning process is designed to mitigate risks associated 

with BM threats, it also enhances a GCC’s ability to employ forces and capabilities within 

their AOR in support of another GCC. Planners balance competing requirements for lowdensity and high-demand strategic resources.

b. To ensure that GBMD planning supports a CCDR’s overall campaign planning and 

facilitates integration of missile defense force requirements with Global Force Management 

processes, the collaborative planning process must be conducted in accordance with 

established DOD deliberate planning activities.

c. Planning activities identify potential areas of risk to GCC and JFC operations. Any 

consideration of missile defense resources and shared airspace should account for the fact 

that BMD resources are integral to the theater counterair mission when the JFC desires air 

superiority to accomplish an assigned mission. Some BMD resources, specifically Aegis 

BMD ships, are multi-mission platforms that may also be required for strike and anti-surface 

or antisubmarine warfare tasking in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. In addition to producing 

planning products, planning activities serve to identify capability shortfalls and explore 

materiel and non-materiel solutions to mitigate vulnerabilities in the protection of the 

homeland, deployed US forces, allies, and friends. 

d. Planning for BMD should include coordination of launch warnings, offensive 

operations that support a missile defense strategy, plan assessment metrics, Global Force 

Management, and C2 of missile defense operations. Gaps and seams between AOR 

boundaries and between forces in different AORs can be areas of risk. Procedures for 

distribution and control of fires between AORs should be addressed during planning. 

Collaborative planning efforts should produce recommendations to mitigate operational gaps 

and vulnerabilities associated with BM threats. 

e. In preparation for deployment of BMD forces in support of a GCC, the principal 

players will participate in joint collaborative planning. This is done using the supported 

GCC’s priorities and CALs/DALs, and results in development of the theater AADP, 

finalization of the ROE and engagement criteria, refinement of existing defense plans, 

coordination of cross-AOR engagement requirements, and force allocation. Multinational 

BMD forces should be included in all phases of planning, and training of those forces must 

be considered. 

5. Global Synchronization of Ballistic Missile Defense Planning

a. GCCs are responsible for planning and executing BMD within their geographic 

AORs and other areas as directed. SecDef designates supported and supporting 

commanders. As a general rule, a GCC under missile attack will be the supported 

commander. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported commander for homeland BMD and 

may be the supporting commander for BMD in other theaters. As either a supported or 
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supporting commander, balancing regional missile defense priorities with homeland missile 

defense priorities is critical, especially in situations where multiple GCCs are under attack 

simultaneously. CDRUSSTRATCOM, as the global synchronizer for global missile defense 

planning, leads the GBMD collaborative planning process and is responsible for maintaining 

global situational awareness, performing globally focused cross-AOR analysis and 

developing inputs, recommendations, and assessments. CDRUSSTRATCOM facilitates the 

alignment of GCC plans in an effort to balance risk, standardize procedures, and mitigate 

operational seams to meet established priorities. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for 

synchronizing planning for global missile defense and coordinating global missile defense 

operations support. For unanticipated situations, a collaborative planning process will 

facilitate adaptations or refinements to existing plans. For cross-AOR operations, execution 

will be based on the supported GCC’s plans. During execution, CCDRs will retain execution 

authority over assigned and attached forces. Command relationships are established through 

plans or orders based on real threats. Increasing range, location of launchers, and other 

technological advances in BMs may necessitate missile defense forces in one AOR providing 

support to an adjacent CCDR. The supported GCC’s plan establishes the overarching 

framework used by subordinate component commanders and supporting CCDRs to develop 

supporting plans. 

b. CDRUSSTRATCOM has established the Missile Defense Global Synchronization 

Board as a general/flag officer resolution body to resolve issues related to GBMD plans, 

operational planning guidance or policy, plans assessments, and force management. Chaired 

by Deputy CDRUSSTRATCOM, this body includes general/flag officers from the 

combatant commands’ operations and plans directorates, the Joint Staff, the Services, Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA), Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization, JFCCIMD, and, as needed, Office of the Secretary of Defense. In all cases, CCDRs retain the 

prerogative to elevate irreconcilable issues to SecDef.

c. BMD Global Force Management. BMD resources are low-density, high-demand, 

and expensive. SecDef will assign or allocate forces to respective GCCs as required for 

BMD.

(1) Missile Defense Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). SecDef 

allocates missile defense forces annually through the GFMAP. Modifications to the GFMAP 

can be made through a request for forces (RFF). CCDRs submit RFFs to support emerging 

or crisis-based operational requirements to SecDef via the CJCS. 

(2) Missile Defense Joint Functional Manager. USSTRATCOM serves that 

function, including identifying, developing, and recommending globally optimized sourcing 

solutions for DOD missile defense capabilities in coordination with DOD joint force 

providers, Services, other CCDRs, MDA, and other DOD agencies. USSTRATCOM, 

through JFCC-IMD, is responsible for identifying and recommending missile defense assets 

in response to the requirements of the GCCs. 

d. GBMD Planning Principles and Considerations. Successful GBMD planning is 

based on the principles of unity of effort, unity of command, centralized planning and 
Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization 

E-5 

direction, and when engagement authority has been delegated to subordinate commanders, 

decentralized execution.

(1) Unity of Command. GCCs are supported commanders for all BMD in their 

respective AORs. Due to speed, range, and the potential for cross-AOR missile threats, 

GCCs may simultaneously be supported and supporting for BMD. Changes in command 

relationships do not affect unity of command. For example, forces assigned to Commander, 

United States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM), supporting BMD operations in 

United States European Command’s AOR, normally would remain under the command of 

CDRUSCENTCOM. 

(2) Unity of Effort. BMD can be conducted simultaneously at theater, regional, 

AOR, and cross-AOR levels and require intratheater and intertheater integration and 

coordination of capabilities to optimize engagement opportunities. Integrating a full array of 

offensive options with active and passive missile defense measures is essential to 

establishing and sustaining a deterrence and defense against BM attack of the homeland, 

forward deployed troops, allies, and friends. Integration of multinational BMD capabilities 

into GBMD requires coordination of effort to support both passive air and active ADs. 

While, at times, a GCC may control all elements in an engagement, the processes linking 

sensors to decision makers to fire control nodes may cross AOR boundaries and will require 

coordination between neighboring GCCs to enable multiple engagement opportunities. A 

GCC must coordinate BMD with other combatant commands and multinational partners to 

ensure unity of effort. 

(3) Centralized Planning. GCCs are responsible for planning all assigned missions 

within their AOR, including regional BMD, and support to HD. In addition, GCCs are 

responsible for coordinating and integrating cross-AOR activities with adjacent and other 

supporting CCDRs. Planning will reflect the differences in how BMD operations will be 

conducted based on threats of various missile classes, launch points, impact points, and 

projected numbers. Because BMs can rapidly cross AOR boundaries, the joint force must 

integrate layered BMD forces and resources across multiple commands to establish an 

effective defense in depth. Global collaborative planning enables the coordination and 

integration of all BMD capabilities. USSTRATCOM will lead collaborative centralized 

GBMD planning efforts to ensure gaps and vulnerabilities are mitigated in cross-AOR 

planning. Support relationships must be well-defined during planning to ensure clarity 

during mission execution and minimize operational gaps. Planning for BMD will factor in 

the multi-mission capabilities of BMD resources, cross-AOR attack operations, and the 

ability to have supporting fires and coordinated engagements among BMD forces. Planned 

responses and pre-coordinated engagement criteria between GCCs support the prompt, 

decisive engagement of BM threats. While it is the goal to provide warfighters the planning 

tools to conduct planning in the forward AORs at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels, certain threat prototype systems and other circumstances may require higher fidelity 

reachback planning from Service sponsors or acquisition authorities. Service specific 

reachback planning shall be coordinated through the applicable AOR Service component. 

(4) Decentralized Execution. BMD forces and resources are under the control of 

the JFC to whom they are assigned or attached. Tasking and engagement authority will be 
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delegated to the lowest practical level consistent with the ROE, the DAL, the AADP, and the 

authority of the JFC. The process and means of ordering engagements will be clearly stated 

in AADPs, ACOs, and SPINS, or other orders. Engagement coordination requires the ability 

to plan GBMD resources to optimize the operational environment and decision timelines; 

identify and track multiple, simultaneous missile threats; and direct engagement against 

multiple BM threats. To optimize decentralized execution of BMD engagement 

opportunities, it is essential to have clear policy guidance, shared situational awareness, 

minimal system latency, and the capability to synchronize efforts across AORs. The one 

exception to decentralized execution of BMD is for homeland BMD, using the ground based 

mid-course defense system, which requires positive direction from the weapons release 

authority (WRA). WRA is the authority delegated from the President to use certain weapons 

against BM threats (e.g., ground-based interceptors). 

(5) Support Relationships. Directives that establish a support relationship for 

GBMD must include the forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort; the time, 

place, level, and duration of the supporting effort; the relative priority of the supporting 

effort; the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in 

the event of an exceptional opportunity or an emergency; and the degree of authority granted 

to the supported commander over the supporting effort. Unless limited by the establishing 

directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of 

the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets 

or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary 

for coordination and efficiency. The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, 

methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The 

supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters 

concerning the employment and limitations of such support, assist in planning for the 

integration of such support into the supported commander’s effort as a whole, and ensure 

that support requirements are appropriately communicated with the supporting commander’s 

organization. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the BMD needs 

of the supported commander and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, 

consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. 

(6) Offensive Operations. The GCC in whose AOR the threat resides is responsible 

to plan offensive options that support homeland BMD and cross-AOR BMD. Because of the 

relative scarcity of defensive assets when compared to the threat, GCCs and functional 

CCDRs should have well-developed plans and agreements with appropriate operating 

procedures in place for suitable offensive actions to counter BM threats. If offensive 

operations are directed by the President, other GCCs may be tasked to support a neighboring 

GCC by conducting offensive strikes against imminent missile threats (pre-launch) or BMD 

support after the launch and identification of a BM as hostile. CDRUSSTRATCOM may 

provide global strike in coordination with a supported/supporting GCC, as directed by the 

President. BMD planners should coordinate their efforts with combating WMD planners to 

optimize use of offensive actions/operations. 

For additional information regarding combating WMD, see JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction.
Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization 

E-7 

(7) ROE. ROE are the means to provide military commanders guidance for 

weapons employment consistent with law and policy. Due to short engagement timelines 

and the vulnerability of communications relating to GBMD, robust, prior political 

agreements will need to be reached, planning synchronized, and operations thoroughly 

trained and exercised. A set of general standing ROE is essential for all BMD and GBMD. 

ROE must comply with the requirements of any alliance, treaty, coalition, bilateral, or 

multilateral agreementsto which the United States is a party. Agreements between coalition 

and/or allied nations should be reached to permit interceptor and sensor operations in 

territorial airspace. 

(8) International Law. Due to the short engagement timelines and the vulnerability 

of communications between nations, tasking and engagement authorities for multinational 

forces and resources conducting GBMD must be planned and take into account individual 

national interpretations of international law and constitutional limitations. Planners must 

also recognize that each nation in a coalition or alliance may invoke separate, legal, and 

political obligations to third parties through treaties, alliances, and other such bilateral or 

multilateral agreements. DOD forces will adhere to the law of armed conflict during all 

military operations. 

(9) Collateral Effects. Two key planning considerations are minimizing collateral 

effects of BMD offensive actions and defensive measures to minimize the effects of hostile 

BMD attacks. In principle, priority should be given to actions that maximize the probability 

of success of actions saving the most lives. Defense effectiveness should take primacy over 

debris mitigation when protecting a defended asset. Response actions to the collateral effects 

of BMD employment may include responding to personal injury, property loss, terrestrial or 

space debris cleanup resulting from BMD engagements or testing, high-altitude EMP, and 

CBRN. The coordination of information between organizations planning BMD and potential 

HN first responders is essential. Moreover, partner nations will require a system or systems 

to warn member nations and affected third parties on defensive actions and possible 

consequences. 

For additional information regarding CBRN hazards, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, and regarding CM, see JP 3-

41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management.

e. Contributing Capabilities

(1) Missile Warning. BMD is greatly enabled by persistent and reliable strategic 

indications and warnings. Space-based and ground-based systems are crucial for timely 

detection and communicating warning of nuclear detonations or adversary use of BMs 

against US forces and allies. Integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems are 

essential for the execution of the US strategic missile warning for attacks on the US and

Canada. Tactical warning is a notification to C2 centers that a specific threat event is 

occurring or has occurred. Attack assessment is an evaluation of information to determine 

the potential or actual nature and objectives of an attack for the purpose of providing 

information for timely decisions. The component elements that describe threat events 

include the country of origin, the event type and size, the country that is determined to be 
Appendix E 

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under attack, and the time of the event. The two missile warning missions are strategic and 

theater; both use a mix of space-based and terrestrial sensors. Strategic missile warning is 

the notification to national leaders of a missile attack against North America or allied and 

partner nations. Theater missile warning is the NRT notification to operational command 

centers and the warfighter of a potential threat of a missile event-any event launched from, 

overflying, or projected to impact a designated AOR, JOA, and/or area of interest.

(a) Strategic Missile Warning. Space-based sensors, such as Defense Support 

Program and Space-Based Infrared System, usually provide the first level of immediate 

missile detection. The satellite sensors also accomplish nuclear detonation detection. 

Ground-based radars provide follow-on information on launches, attack assessment, and 

confirmation of strategic attack. Although the primary mission of the ground-based radars is 

conducting missile warning, a portion of the radar resource is allocated to conducting space 

surveillance; however, the radar is always scanning the horizon for incoming missiles. 

These ground-based radar systems include Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, PAVE 

PAWS [Perimeter Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System], and Perimeter 

Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System. UEWRs are multi-mission radars 

supporting the missile warning, space surveillance, and the missile defense missions, and are 

integrated into the BMDS to improve midcourse sensor coverage. There is no room for error 

in strategic missile warning; therefore, all information provided must be timely, reliable, 

accurate, and unambiguous. 

(b) Theater Missile Warning. Because the reaction time for theater forces to 

respond to incoming missiles is very short (less than 5 minutes), GCCs have adopted a 

strategy known as “assured” warning, which weighs accepting potentially false reports 

against the time required to obtain unambiguous reports. Under this strategy, the GCCs have 

elected to receive quicker launch notifications, understanding the warning could be 

ambiguous or inaccurate. 

(c) Shared Early Warning. The US exchanges missile detection and warning 

information with its allies and partner nations. Shared early warning (SEW) is the 

continuous exchange of missile early warning information derived from US missile early 

warning sensors and the sensors of the SEW partner, when available. Information on missile 

launches is provided on an NRT basis. This information can take the form of data, voice 

warning, or both. The objective of SEW is to enhance regional stability by providing theater 

BM warning to GCCs, sponsored partner nations, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

allies. GCCs will recommend/sponsor SEW partner nations. DOD policy is to provide 

continuous, NRT, BM early warning information on regional launches that is of the same 

high quality and timeliness as the launch warning that would be made available to US forces 

if operating in the same area at the same time. Currently, the SEW system provides both 

messages and voice warning to partner nations. The Shared Early Warning System includes 

both space-based warning and surface radar-based warning. Space-based warning provides 

BM warning information from space-based sensors. It is US policy to share with selected 

allies, with few exceptions, continuous, NRT, early warning information of BM launches of 

the same high quality and timeliness as made available to US forces. Missile warning data is 

provided to SEW partners subject to a country-by-country disclosure and arms control 

clearance. The release of BM data derived from surface-based radars to surface radar-based 
Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization 

E-9 

warning is authorized when this data is made available to US forces for BM early warning 

and to support active missile defense. 

(2) Space Operations. The enabling capabilities that space operations bring to the 

joint force are significant for GBMD and are considered critical enabling activities for both 

global and regional BMD. Space-based systems provide BM launch warnings and attack 

assessments; launch locations; tracking data such as predicted headings and broad impact 

areas; global, theater-wide, or JOA-wide communications; current and forecast weather 

information; space-based ISR; global positioning system (and navigation and timing assets 

for accuracy of precision munitions); and theater- or JOA-wide CID systems support. 

(3) Intelligence Operations. Intelligence on threat BMs is absolutely critical to 

GBMD success. A common assessment of the adversary BM capabilities and intent (shared 

among combatant commands, intelligence agencies, and partner nations) is imperative for 

unified action. Understanding the payloads of adversary missiles can aid decision makers in 

determining shot doctrine and interceptor and sensor allocations. Mobile missiles are 

especially challenging to defensive planners; detecting, tracking, and targeting mobile 

missiles are essential intelligence tasks that support GBMD. Understanding the strategic 

environment and providing indications and warnings of the entire situation, and not just the 

status of adversary BM readiness for launch, will assist national decision makers on the 

appropriate time to take action to mitigate BM threats. ISR platforms and their associated 

processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities must be tasked early to ensure they 

are involved before hostilities commence. 

(4) Allied Capabilities. GBMD is both joint and combined; one nation’s “region” 

may be another’s “homeland.” Integrating the capabilities of our allies into the theater BMD 

architectures is critical to implementing a global strategy to deter adversaries, mitigate 

operational gaps, and provide BMD protection to the homeland, forward deployed forces, 

allies, and friends. Building partner capability and integration of our allies into the planning 

process enhances the development of such a cohesive strategy. General BMD security

cooperation objectives include encouraging friends and allies to develop their own BMD 

capabilities, or co-develop them with the US; gain agreements for HN use and support for 

US or partner nation BMD activities; political support for BMD capability deployments; 

integration of friends and allies into a defensive architecture; bilateral or multilateral BMD 

war games and exercises; and further the understanding and education of friends and allies 

on BMD systems, capabilities; and limitations. Efforts to integrate BMD with allies consider 

current requirements, policies, and restrictions regarding data sharing with each specific 

country, for each specific system, and the communications path under consideration. 

6. Global Ballistic Missile Defense Supporting Activities

a. GBMD Asset Management. A key consideration of GBMD is collaborative asset 

management. Sensors, weapons and command, and control networks must be managed to 

ensure availability of the BMDS to national decision makers. CDRUSSTRATCOM supports 

day-to-day GBMD readiness via BMDS asset management, which ensures BMD systems 

globally are maintained at an appropriate state of readiness for the prevailing threat 

condition. Asset management allows the flexibility to conduct sustainment and research, 
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E-10 JP 3-01 

development, testing, and evaluation to improve capabilities. The output from these 

collaborative planning efforts should be the ability to create effects recommended by the 

supported GCC for countering BM threats. GCCs operating assets within one AOR tasked 

to support BMD within another AOR have the responsibility to plan and coordinate with 

appropriate GCCs and USSTRATCOM. Multi-mission assets residing within a supported 

commander’s area may be required to support another GCC’s operations. MDA maintains 

control of R&D assets that are a potential source of additional BMD capability. When 

required, USSTRATCOM, in conjunction with applicable GCCs and MDA, will recommend 

to SecDef activating early delivery capability assets to support the missile defense mission. 

The BMDS Emergency Activation Plan governs activation of developmental BMD assets. 

b. GBMD Logistics Support. The UCP assigns CDRUSSTRATCOM responsibility for 

coordinating global missile defense operations support. BMD logistics status reporting and 

assessment is a synchronized effort conducted with geographic and functional combatant 

commands and MDA. Logistics reporting is directly associated with operational capability 

reporting procedures, and a logistics situation report is initiated upon a change in the 

operational capability of a missile defense asset. USSTRATCOM and JFCC-IMD logistics 

directorates establish and verify BMDS logistics reporting and assessment procedures; they 

receive and consolidate reports from the GCCs, their components, and MDA, including 

assets in a developmental status identified to support operational missions. 

c. GBMD Training and Exercises. To minimize the risk of fratricide while providing 

seamless defense, coordination must be rehearsed, not just planned. Demonstrating 

proficiency in the implementation of emerging BMD concepts requires training and 

exercises in cross-AOR BMD situations to refine and validate processes and procedures, 

highlight potential BMD gaps between AORs, and develop options to mitigate associated 

risk. USSTRATCOM, operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint staff (J-7), 

and MDA tri-chair the BMD Training and Education Group, which identifies and resolves 

joint and multinational issues and establishes policies, procedures, and standards for BMD 

training and education as identified by the GCCs or Services. Additionally, the group assists 

combatant commands and Services in defining and coordinating enhanced, jointly integrated, 

standardized, and cost-effective BMD training and education for the warfighter.

d. GBMD Security and Force Protection. USSTRATCOM has oversight authority for 

determining security requirements for GBMD and designates security system levels for 

operational or operationally capable missile defense components and systems. 

USSTRATCOM provides basic standardized guidance on physical security requirements to 

protect missile defense mission systems and assets. GCCs have force protection authority 

and responsibility for missile defense sites or systems located in their AORs, and generally, 

that responsibility falls to the lead Service for the asset unless other agreements have been 

made.

e. GBMD System Certification. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for the 

management and control of the integrity of systems responsible for strategic and space 

warning, theater warning, and missile defense. The certification process provides 

CDRUSSTRATCOM and GCCs with assurance that a new system or system change satisfies 

system integrity requirements and is capable of accomplishing its assigned mission. 
Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization 

E-11 

USSTRATCOM will certify BMD assets as mission ready as they become available to the 

GCC.

f. GBMD Requirements Development and Advocacy. Due to the rapid development 

and fielding requirements to achieve an early initial operational capability, many aspects of 

BMDS development, acquisition, and sustainment take place outside of established DOD 

acquisition processes; nevertheless, compliance with required regulatory and policy 

oversight is maintained. The Missile Defense Executive Board, supported by five standing 

committees, provides senior policy and acquisition oversight over the BMDS. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM, as the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority, executes the 

Warfighter Involvement Process to collaboratively develop CCDR and Service AMD 

capability needs. BMD needs are forwarded to MDA via the BMDS Life Cycle 

Management Plan process, and AMD needs are forwarded to the Services via the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council board structure. 
Appendix E 

E-12 JP 3-01 

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F-1 

APPENDIX F 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-01 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Strategic Guidance and Policy 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives 

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force 

for US Forces. 

b. CJCSI 3151.01B, Global Command and Control System Common Operational 

Picture Reporting Requirements. 

c. CJCSI 5120.02B, Joint Doctrine Development System.

d. CJCSM 3115.01B, Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations.

e. CJCSM 6120.01D, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link Operating Procedures (JMTOP).

3. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

c. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

d. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

e. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

f. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

g. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

h. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

i. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

j. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

k. JP 3-14, Space Operations.

l. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.
Appendix F 

F-2 JP 3-01 

m. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

n. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

o. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 

p. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

q. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

r. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

s. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

t. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

4. Multi-Service Publications 

a. FM 3-01.4/MCRP 3-22.2A/NTTP 3-01.42/AFTTP 3-2.28, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.

b. FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) (with classified 

appendices). 

c. FM 3-27, Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD) Operations. 

d. FM 3-52.2/NTTP 3- 56.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS).

e. Military Standard 6016D, Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL) J Message Standard. 

5. Service Publications 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-01, Counterair Operations. 

b. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-52, Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 

c. FM 3-01.94, Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations.

d. FM 3-01, US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations.

e. MCWP 3-22, Antiair Warfare. 

f. MCWP 3-25, Control of Aircraft and Missiles.

g. Navy Warfare Publication 3-01.01, Fleet Air Defense. 

h. Navy Warfare Publication 3-56, Composite Warfare Doctrine.
G-1 

APPENDIX G 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition 

Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, 

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, 

consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the Director for Joint Force Development, J7/JEDD. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for 

Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 5 February 

2007. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JEDD// 

JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5-JOWPD// 

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint 

and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine 

Support Division, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, 

J-7/JEDD. 

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and 

other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 3-01 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant 

commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments 

or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché 

Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base AnacostiaBolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community 

member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. 

This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can 

be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AAA antiaircraft artillery 

AADC area air defense commander 

AADP area air defense plan 

AAGS Army air-ground system 

AAMDC US Army Air and Missile Defense Command 

ACA airspace control authority 

ACE aviation combat element (USMC) 

ACM airspace coordinating measure 

ACO airspace control order 

ACP airspace control plan 

ACS airspace control system 

AD air defense 

ADA air defense artillery 

ADAFCO air defense artillery fire control officer 

ADC air defense commander 

ADW air defense warnings 

ADWC air defense warning condition 

AFFOR Air Force forces 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

ALCM air launched cruise missile 

AMD air and missile defense 

AMDC air and missile defense commander 

AO area of operations 

AOR area of responsibility 

AR air refueling 

ARFOR Army forces 

ARM antiradiation missile 

ASM air-to-surface missile 

ASOC air support operations center 

ASR air support request 

ATC air traffic control 

ATO air tasking order 

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 

BCA border crossing authority 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BDE brigade 

BM ballistic missile 

BMD ballistic missile defense 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

BVR beyond visual range 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-01 

C2 command and control 

CAL critical asset list 

CAP combat air patrol 

CAS close air support 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDRJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force 

CDRNORAD Commander, North American Aerospace Defense 

 Command 

CDRUSCENTCOM Commander, United States Central Command 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CID combat identification 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CJE component joint data networks operations officer 

 equivalent 

CM cruise missile 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

COMMARFOR commander, Marine Corps forces 

COMNET communications network 

CONOPS concept of operations 

COP common operational picture 

CRC control and reporting center 

CTF IAMD commander, task force integrated air and missile defense 

CTP common tactical picture 

CVT criticality-vulnerability-threat 

CWC composite warfare commander 

DAADC deputy area air defense commander 

DAL defended asset list 

DCA defensive counterair 

DOD Department of Defense 

EA electronic attack 

ECM electronic countermeasures 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

EW electronic warfare 

EWCC electronic warfare coordination cell 

FEZ fighter engagement zone 

FM field manual (Army) 
Glossary 

GL-3 

FOB forward operating base 

FOL forward operating location 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

GBMD global ballistic missile defense 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GCCS Global Command and Control System 

GCE ground combat element (MGTF)

GCI ground control intercept 

GFMAP Global Force Management Allocation Plan 

GLCM ground-launched cruise missile 

GMD ground-based midcourse defense 

HD homeland defense 

HIMAD high-to-medium-altitude air defense 

HIMEZ high-altitude missile engagement zone 

HN host nation 

HVA high-value asset 

HVAA high value airborne asset 

IADS integrated air defense system 

IAMD integrated air and missile defense 

IBS-I Integrated Broadcast Service-Interactive 

IBS-S Integrated Broadcast Service-Simplex 

ID identification 

IFF identification, friend or foe 

IO information operations 

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace 

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

ITW/AA integrated tactical warning and attack assessment 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff 

J-7 operational plans and interoperability directorate of a 

 joint staff 

JACCE joint air component coordination element 

JAOC joint air operations center 

JAOP joint air operations plan 

JDAT joint deployable analysis team 

JDN joint data network 

JDNO joint data network operations officer 

JEZ joint engagement zone 

JFACC joint force air component commander 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-01 

JFC joint force commander 

JFCC-IMD Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated 

 Missile Defense 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JFMO joint frequency management office 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JICC joint interface control cell 

JICO joint interface control officer 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

 environment 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JRFL joint restricted frequency list 

JSA joint security area 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

JTF joint task force 

LAD launch area denied 

LOMEZ low-altitude missile engagement zone 

MAAP master air attack plan 

MACCS Marine air command and control system 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MANPADS man-portable air defense system 

MARFOR Marine Corps forces 

MARLE Marine liaison element 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MEZ missile engagement zone 

MNF multinational force 

MNFC multinational force commander 

MOC maritime operations center 

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile 

MRR minimum-risk route 

MTN multi-tactical data link network 

NALE naval and amphibious liaison element 

NAVFOR Navy forces 

NCC Navy component commander 

NFC numbered fleet commander 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NRT near real time 

NTACS Navy tactical air control system 
Glossary 

GL-5 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OCA offensive counterair 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPSEC operations security 

OPTASKLINK operations task link 

OTC officer in tactical command 

PK probability of kill 

PPLI precise participant location and identification 

R&D research and development 

RADC regional air defense commander 

RFF request for forces 

RICO regional interface control officer 

ROE rules of engagement 

SADC sector air defense commander 

SADO senior air defense officer 

SAM surface-to-air missile 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SEW shared early warning 

SHORAD short-range air defense 

SHORADEZ short-range air defense engagement zone 

SICO sector interface control officer 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SLCM sea-launched cruise missile 

SOF special operations forces 

SOLE special operations liaison element 

SPINS special instructions 

SRBM short-range ballistic missile 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

SRUF standing rules for the use of force 

SSM surface-to-surface missile 

TAAMDCOORD theater Army air and missile defense coordinator 

TACC tactical air command center (USMC); 

 tactical air control center (USN) 

TACON tactical control 

TACOPDAT tactical operational data 

TACP tactical air control party 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-01 

TACS theater air control system 

TAGS theater air-ground system 

TAOC tactical air operations center (USMC) 

TDL tactical data link 

TEL transporter-erector-launcher 

TGM terminally guided munitions 

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile 

TST time-sensitive target 

UA unmanned aircraft 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

UEWR upgraded early warning radar 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

VID visual identification 

WCS weapons control status 

WEZ weapon engagement zone 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WRA weapons release authority 
GL-7 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

abort. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

action information center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

active air defense. Direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the 

effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Aegis. A ship-based combat system that can detect, track, target, and engage air, surface, 

and subsurface threats, including ballistic missiles on some modified ships. (Approved 

for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

aerospace. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air alert. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air and missile defense. Direct [active and passive] defensive actions taken to destroy, 

nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against 

friendly forces and assets. Also called AMD. (Approved for inclusion included in 

JP 1-02.) 

airborne alert. A state of aircraft readiness wherein combat-equipped aircraft are airborne 

and ready for immediate action to reduce reaction time and to increase survivability. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

airborne early warning and control. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air-breathing missile. A missile with an engine requiring the intake of air for combustion 

of its fuel, as in a ramjet or turbojet. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

air defense. Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in 

the atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. Also called AD. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

air defense area. 1. overseas—A specifically defined airspace for which air defense must 

be planned and provided. 2. United States—Airspace of defined dimensions designated 

by the appropriate agency within which the ready control of airborne vehicles is 

required in the interest of national security during an air defense emergency. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

air defense artillery. Weapons and equipment for actively combating air targets from the 

ground. Also called ADA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as 

the source JP.) 

air defense control center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-01 

air defense direction center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air defense early warning. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air defense operations center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air defense region. A geographical subdivision of an air defense area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-01) 

air defense sector. A geographical subdivision of an air defense region. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

air defense warning condition. An air defense warning given in the form of a color code 

corresponding to the degree of air raid probability with yellow standing for when an 

attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is probable; red for when an attack by hostile 

aircraft or missiles is imminent or is in progress; and white for when an attack by hostile 

aircraft or missiles is improbable. Also called ADWC. (Approved for replacement of 

“air defense warning conditions” and its definition in JP 1-02.) 

air facility. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air intercept control common. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air interception. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air-launched ballistic missile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air request net. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

airspace control area. Airspace that is laterally defined by the boundaries of the 

operational area, and may be subdivided into airspace control sectors. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

air strike. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle by one force that permits the 

conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from 

air and missile threats. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

air supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing force is incapable of 

effective interference within the operational area using air and missile threats. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

air surveillance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

air-to-air guided missile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

antiradiation missile. A missile which homes passively on a radiation source. Also called 

ARM. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

apogee. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

area air defense commander. The component commander with the preponderance of air 

defense capability and the required command, control, and communications capabilities 

who is assigned by the joint force commander to plan and execute integrated air defense 

operations. Also called AADC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Army tactical data link 1. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

ascent phase. That portion of the flight of a ballistic missile or space vehicle that begins 

after powered flight and ends just prior to apogee. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

autonomous operation. In air defense, the mode of operation assumed by a unit after it has 

lost all communications with higher echelons forcing the unit commander to assume full 

responsibility for control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

ballistic missile. Any missile which does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift 

and consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

ballistic wind. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

barrier combat air patrol. One or more divisions or elements of fighter aircraft employed 

between a force and an objective area as a barrier across the probable direction of enemy 

attack. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

battle management. The management of activities within the operational environment 

based on the commands, direction, and guidance given by appropriate authority. Also 

called BM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

boost phase. That portion of the flight of a ballistic missile or space vehicle during which 

the booster and sustainer engines operate. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

buffer zone. 1. A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which disputing 

or belligerent forces have been excluded. Also called area of separation in some United 

Nations operations. Also called BZ. (JP 3-07.3) 2. A designated area used for safety in 

military operations. (JP 3-01) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

burn-through range. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

centralized control. 1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon makes 

direct target assignments to fire units. (JP 3-01) 2. In joint air operations, placing 

within one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and 

coordinating a military operation or group/category of operations. (JP 3-30) (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP for Definition #1.) 

close-controlled air interception. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-01 

combat air patrol. An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, 

the critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defense area, for the purpose of 

intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their targets. Also called 

CAP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

combat surveillance. A continuous, all-weather, day-and-night, systematic watch over the 

battle area in order to provide timely information for tactical combat operations. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

commit. The process of assigning one or more aircraft or surface-to-air missile units to 

prepare to engage an entity, prior to authorizing such engagement. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

common tactical picture. An accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that 

integrates tactical information from the multi-tactical data link network, ground 

network, intelligence network, and sensor networks. Also called CTP. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

counterair. A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and 

maintain a desired degree of air superiority and protection by neutralizing or destroying 

enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

critical asset list. A prioritized list of assets or areas, normally identified by phase of the 

operation and approved by the joint force commander, that should be defended against 

air and missile threats. Also called CAL. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

cruise missile. Guided missile, the major portion of whose flight path to its target is 

conducted at approximately constant velocity; depends on the dynamic reaction of air 

for lift and upon propulsion forces to balance drag. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

decentralized control. In air defense, the normal mode whereby a higher echelon monitors 

unit actions, making direct target assignments to units only when necessary to ensure 

proper fire distribution or to prevent engagement of friendly aircraft. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

deck alert. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

defended asset list. A listing of those assets from the critical asset list prioritized by the 

joint force commander to be defended with the resources available. Also called DAL. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

defensive counterair. All defensive measures designed to neutralize or destroy enemy 

forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. Also called DCA. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-11 

dispersal. Relocation of forces for the purpose of increasing survivability. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

dispersal airfield. An airfield, military or civil, to which aircraft might move before H-hour 

on either a temporary duty or permanent change of station basis and be able to conduct 

operations. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

dispersion. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

dual (multi)-purpose weapons. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

dual-purpose weapon. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

early warning. Early notification of the launch or approach of unknown weapons or 

weapons carriers. Also called EW. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with 

JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

engage. 1. In air defense, a fire control order used to direct or authorize units and/or weapon 

systems to fire on a designated target. (JP 3-01) 2. To bring the enemy under fire. 

(JP 3-09.3) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

engagement. 1. In air defense, an attack with guns or air-to-air missiles by an interceptor 

aircraft, or the launch of an air defense missile by air defense artillery and the missile’s 

subsequent travel to intercept. (JP 3-01) 2. A tactical conflict, usually between 

opposing lower echelons maneuver forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

engagement authority. An authority vested with a joint force commander that may be 

delegated to a subordinate commander, that permits an engagement decision. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

escort forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fighter engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which 

the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft. Also 

called FEZ. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

fighter escort. An offensive counterair operation providing dedicated protection sorties by 

air-to-air capable fighters in support of other offensive air and air support missions over 

enemy territory, or in a defensive counterair role to protect high value airborne assets. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

fighter sweep. An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy enemy 

aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

flash message. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fleet ballistic missile submarine. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 3-01 

flight advisory. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

flight following. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

flight plan correlation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

flight profile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

friendly. A contact positively identified as friendly. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

global ballistic missile defense. Defense against ballistic missile threats that cross one or 

more geographical combatant command boundaries and requires synchronization among 

the affected combatant commands. Also called GBMD. (Approved for inclusion in JP 

1-02.) 

ground alert. That status in which aircraft on the ground/deck are fully serviced and armed, 

with combat crews in readiness to take off within a specified period of time after receipt 

of a mission order. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

ground-based interceptor. A fixed-based, surface-to-air missile for defense against longrange ballistic missiles using an exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interception of the targeted 

reentry vehicle in the midcourse phase of flight. Also called GBI. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

ground-based midcourse defense. A surface-to-air ballistic missile defense system for 

exo-atmospheric midcourse phase interception of long-range ballistic missiles using the 

ground-based interceptors. Also called GMD. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

ground liaison officer. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

guard. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

guided missile. An unmanned vehicle moving above the surface of the Earth whose 

trajectory or flight path is capable of being altered by an external or internal mechanism. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

harassment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

high-altitude missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions 

within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with highaltitude surface-to-air missiles. Also called HIMEZ. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

high value airborne asset protection. A defensive counterair mission using fighter escorts 

that defend airborne national assets which are so important that the loss of even one 

could seriously impact United States warfighting capabilities or provide the enemy with 
Glossary 

GL-13 

significant propaganda value. Also called HVAA protection. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

homing guidance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

hostile intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, United States 

forces, or other designated persons or property. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

identification. 1. The process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an 

unknown detected contact. 2. In arms control, the process of determining which nation 

is responsible for the detected violations of any arms control measure. 3. In ground 

combat operations, discrimination between recognizable objects as being friendly or 

enemy, or the name that belongs to the object as a member of a class. Also called ID. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

indirect fire. Fire delivered on a target that is not itself used as a point of aim for the 

weapons or the director. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the 

source JP.) 

inflight report. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

initial point. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

integrated air and missile defense. The integration of capabilities and overlapping 

operations to defend the homeland and United States national interests, protect the joint 

force, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to create adverse 

effects from their air and missile capabilities. Also called IAMD. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

intercontinental ballistic missile. A land-based, long-range ballistic missile with a range 

capability greater than 3,000 nautical miles. Also called ICBM. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

intermediate-range ballistic missile. A land-based ballistic missile with a range capability 

from 1,500 to 3,000 nautical miles. Also called IRBM. (Approved for inclusion in JP 

1-02.) 

intrusion. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint data network operations officer. The joint task force operations directorate officer 

responsible to the commander for integrating data from supporting components into a 

common database used to generate the common tactical picture. Also called JDNO. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

joint engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which 

multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles and aircraft) are simultaneously 
Glossary 

GL-14 JP 3-01 

employed to engage air threats. Also called JEZ. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

joint interface control officer. The senior interface control officer for multi-tactical data 

link networks in the joint force who is responsible for development and validation of the 

architecture, joint interoperability and management of the multi-tactical data link 

networks, and overseeing operations of a joint interface control cell. Also called JICO. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint suppression of enemy air defenses. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

launch time. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

launch window. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

lock on. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

low-altitude missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions 

within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to 

medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Also called LOMEZ. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

medium-range ballistic missile. A ballistic missile with a range capability from about 600 

to 1,500 nautical miles. Also called MRBM. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

midcourse guidance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

midcourse phase. That portion of the flight of a ballistic missile between the boost phase 

and the terminal phase. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

missile defense. Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles, or to 

nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which 

the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with surface-to-air missile 

systems. Also called MEZ. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

mode (identification, friend or foe). The number or letter referring to the specific pulse 

spacing of the signals transmitted by an interrogator or transponder used for radar 

identification of aircraft. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

multiple warning phenomenology. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nickname. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

notice to airmen. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

offensive counterair. Offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, 

missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and 
Glossary 

GL-15 

after launch, and as close to their source as possible. Also called OCA. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

offensive counterair attack operations. Offensive action by any part of the joint force in 

support of the offensive counterair mission against surface targets which contribute to 

the enemy’s air and missile capabilities. Also called OCA attack operations. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

on-call. 1. A term used to signify that a prearranged concentration, air strike, or final 

protective fire may be called for. 2. Preplanned, identified force or materiel 

requirements without designated time-phase and destination information. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

over-the-horizon radar. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

pass. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

passive air defense. All measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the 

effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Patriot. A point and limited area defense surface-to-air missile system capable of 

intercepting aircraft and theater missiles, including short-, medium-, and intermediaterange ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

penetration aids. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

positive identification. An identification derived from observation and analysis of target 

characteristics including visual recognition, electronic support systems, non-cooperative 

target recognition techniques, identification friend or foe systems, or other physicsbased identification techniques. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

positive identification and radar advisory zone. None. (Approved for removal from 

JP 1-02.) 

preset guidance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

procedural identification. An identification based on observation and analysis of target 

behaviors including location and trajectory, as well as compliance with airspace control 

measures. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

profile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

radar beacon. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

radar coverage. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

radar horizon. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-16 JP 3-01 

radar netting unit. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

recognition. 1. The determination by any means of the individuality of persons, or of 

objects such as aircraft, ships, or tanks, or of phenomena such as communicationselectronics patterns. 2. In ground combat operations, the determination that an object is 

similar within a category of something already known. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

regional air defense commander. Commander, subordinate to the area air defense 

commander, who is responsible for air and missile defenses in the assigned region and 

exercises authorities as delegated by the area air defense commander. Also called 

RADC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

return to base. An order to proceed to the point indicated by the displayed information or 

by verbal communication. Also called RTB. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

satellite and missile surveillance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

sector air defense commander. Commander, subordinate to an area/regional air defense 

commander, who is responsible for air and missile defenses in the assigned sector, and 

exercises authorities delegated by the area/regional air defense commander. Also called 

SADC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

short-range air defense engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined 

dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests 

with short-range air defense weapons, and may be established within a low- or highaltitude missile engagement zone. Also called SHORADEZ. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

short-range ballistic missile. A land-based ballistic missile with a range capability up to 

about 600 nautical miles. Also called SRBM. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

sighting. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

simultaneous engagement. The concurrent engagement of hostile targets by combination 

of interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

space-based infrared system. A consolidated system for infrared space, air, and terrestrial 

surveillance and reconnaissance along with associated communications links, designed 

to meet missile defense, missile warning and intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance mission requirements. Also called SBIRS. (Approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

supporting attack. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-17 

suppression. Temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance 

of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

suppression of enemy air defenses. Activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily 

degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. 

Also called SEAD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

surface-to-air missile site. A plot of ground prepared in such a manner that it will readily 

accept the hardware used in surface-to-air missile system. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

terminal phase. That portion of the flight of a ballistic missile that begins when the 

warhead or payload reenters the atmosphere and ends when the warhead or payload 

detonates, releases its submunitions, or impacts. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

terrain following system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

theater missile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

track. 1. A series of related contacts displayed on a data display console or other display 

device. 2. To display or record the successive positions of a moving object. 3. To lock 

onto a point of radiation and obtain guidance therefrom. 4. To keep a gun properly 

aimed, or to point continuously a target-locating instrument at a moving target. 5. The 

actual path of an aircraft above or a ship on the surface of the Earth. 6. One of the two 

endless belts on which a full-track or half-track vehicle runs. 7. A metal part forming a 

path for a moving object such as the track around the inside of a vehicle for moving a 

mounted machine gun. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

track correlation. Correlating track information for identification purposes using all 

available data. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

track management. Defined set of procedures whereby the commander ensures accurate 

friendly and enemy unit and/or platform locations, and a dissemination procedure for 

filtering, combining, and passing that information to higher, adjacent, and subordinate 

commanders. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

track production area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

track telling. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

traverse level. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

unknown. 1. A code meaning “information not available.” 2. An unidentified target. An 

aircraft or ship that has not been determined to be hostile, friendly, or neutral using 

identification friend or foe and other techniques, but that must be tracked by air defense 

or naval engagement systems. 3. An identity applied to an evaluated track that has not 
Glossary 

GL-18 JP 3-01 

been identified. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as the source 

JP.) 

vulnerability. 1. The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means 

through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to 

fight diminished. (JP 3-01) 2. The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a 

definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of 

having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (man-made) hostile 

environment. (JP 3-60) 3. In information operations, a weakness in information system 

security design, procedures, implementation, or internal controls that could be exploited 

to gain unauthorized access to information or an information system. (JP 3-13) 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 102.) 

warning of attack. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

warning red. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

warning white. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

warning yellow. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

weapon engagement zone. In air defense, airspace of defined dimensions within which the 

responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon 

system. Also called WEZ. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-01 as 

the source JP.) 

weapons control status. An air defense control measure declared for a particular area and 

time by an area air defense commander, or delegated subordinate commander, based on 

the rules of engagement designed to establish the freedom for fighters and surface air 

defense weapons to engage threats. Also call WCS. (Approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

weapons free zone. An air defense zone established for the protection of key assets or 

facilities, other than air bases, where weapon systems may be fired at any target not 

positively recognized as friendly. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with 

JP 3-01 as the source JP.) 

weapons readiness state. The degree of readiness of air defense weapons which can 

become airborne or be launched to carry out an assigned task, and normally expressed in 

numbers of weapons and numbers of minutes. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

weapons release authority. The authority originating from the President to engage or direct 

engagement of ballistic missile threats using ground-based interceptors of the groundbased midcourse defense. Also call WRA. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

wingman. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development









JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first

draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

J adjudicates FC comment

matrix

FC joint working group

oint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS)

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins

24-27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years

after publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #1 - Initiation













Joint doctrine development

community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant

command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below

illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint

Publication (JP) 3-01 Operations