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87–062 PDF 2003

S. HRG. 107–989

FBI COMPUTERS: 1992 HARDWARE—2002

PROBLEMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT 

AND THE COURTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 16, 2002

Serial No. J–107–93

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SHARON PROST, Minority Chief Counsel 

MAKAN DELRAHIM, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Chairman 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

BENJAMIN LAWSKY, Majority Chief Counsel 

ED HADEN, Minority Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Page

Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois .................... 15

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 41

Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York ............ 1

Sessions, Hon. Jeff, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama .......................... 4

WITNESS

Higgins, Sherry, Project Management Executive, Office of the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., Accompanied by Mark Tanner, Deputy Chief Information Officer ............................................................... 5

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Sherry Higgins to questions submitted by Senator Grassley ........ 21

Responses of Sherry Higgins to questions submitted by Senator Schumer ....... 26

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD 

Higgins, Sherry, Project Management Executive, Office of the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ............ 42

(1)

FBI COMPUTERS: 1992 HARDWARE—2002 

PROBLEMS 

TUESDAY, JULY 16, 2002

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE

OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Schumer, Durbin, and Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Chairman SCHUMER. The hearing will come to order, and I apologize to my colleague Jeff Sessions and to all the witnesses; I was 

here and forgot something and so had to go all the way back. 

So let me begin and thank all of you for being here and thank 

Jeff again for his patience. He is more patient with me than I am 

with him, which I appreciate. 

Anyway, the events of September 11 have lit a fire under Congress, the administration, and most of our Federal agencies, especially those on the front lines in the war on terrorism. 

We all agree that the problems with the FBI’s technology infrastructure have taken on a new urgency since September 11. But 

these problems, as we know, have been around for a long time. In 

fact, the only difference now is that we have witnessed firsthand 

the horrors of terrorism. In the past, terrorism was something that 

mostly happened to people in other countries. We know now just 

how costly that attitude can be. 

Over a year ago, I introduced legislation that would have established a review commission to examine the systemic and structural 

problems at the FBI as well as the Bureau’s relationship with other 

law enforcement entities. 

I also held a hearing in April of this year that focused on how 

technology and cultural issues were acting as barriers to information-sharing between our law enforcement agencies. I heard from 

the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the INS, who all readily 

and forthrightly, to their credit, acknowledge the problems they 

face. 

The Senate Judiciary Committee has held 11 oversight hearings 

since June 2001 on the FBI and the Justice Department, focusing 

on problematic issues from technology to security to personnel. I 

2

say all this to underscore the fact that no one should think that 

the challenges the FBI is facing today are new ones in any way. 

There are a number of new signs that the FBI is headed down 

the right path. In public testimony and in private meetings, Director Mueller has been blunt about the hurdles the Bureau has to 

clear in order to become an agency with state-of-the-art technology 

and with personnel who not only know how to turn on their computers but can also type, maneuver the mouse, and who can successfully use top-of-the-line hardware and software. 

In reading Ms. Higgins’ testimony, I was impressed by her honesty about the difficult days ahead. Ms. Higgins, your frankness 

and that of the Director is refreshing. 

I am also happy to report that we received Ms. Higgins’ testimony yesterday over email, in contrast to how we received FBI testimony 3 months ago, when the FBI had to personally deliver it on 

a disk, making it impossible to circulate and store it online. 

For a long time, the FBI’s data base warehouse was like Medusa, 

with over 40 data bases with separate functions operating out of 

the same body but totally disconnected from one another. Here are 

a couple of quick visuals to give you an idea of what we are talking 

about. 

The first visual shows you the FBI’s five major investigative data 

bases and how they look now—disconnected and disparate. The second visual shows you how the data bases will look in a post-Trilogy 

world—they will be interconnected and accessible. 

The Trilogy system takes an enormous step forward, not only in 

connecting these five major investigative data bases, but also in ensuring that every agent has a desktop computer to use, that every 

agent knows how to use it, and that every analyst can manipulate 

the resources of information available at their fingertips in real 

time. 

I do not think I have to spell out in too much depth why connecting these networks is so important for the future of law enforcement. We know now more than ever that the backbone of 

homeland defense is a good information-sharing and coordination 

system between Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

If an agency cannot coordinate information and make it easily accessible, the entire house of cards will fall. We all felt the effects 

of this scenario on September 11, and I pray to God that we never 

feel it again. But if we do not fix our communication and technological woes, we could. 

Dinosaur-era technology, like the painstaking process it takes for 

an agent to use the automated case system where an FBI agent 

has to make her way through 12 different functions just to store 

a document must be transformed into efficient, accessible, streamlined technology. 

Another example of a fossil technology is the FBI’s inability to 

search across different data bases by plugging in a couple of key 

words. For example, if an agent wanted to find any information 

available on suicide bombers, say, in the United States, he could 

just type in ‘‘suicide’’ or ‘‘bomber’’ or a related phase like ‘‘homicide 

bomber’’ and come up with the relevant information. 

Also, the agent should be able to type in different versions of a 

name—that is, take my own name. If I were to spell out S-c-h-uVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:14 Oct 24, 2003 Jkt 087062 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\87062.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
3

m-e-r, the search engine should be able to find my name regardless 

of whether it has been misspelled, which believe me happens all 

the time. 

The point here is that the FBI needs technology of the new millennium—technology that has some kind of artificial intelligence so 

the agency does not have to pull teeth to get one piece of information. 

Glenn Fine, the Inspector General of the Justice Department, 

said in his testimony to the committee few months ago, and I 

quote: ‘‘DOJ concluded that the FBI’s troubled information systems 

are likely to have a continuing negative impact on its ability to 

properly investigate crimes and analyze information throughout 

the FBI.’’

According to the FBI, Trilogy gives the Bureau a technological 

foundation upon which it can build. The other components of a 

state-of-the-art system cannot be implemented without first implementing the critical parts of Trilogy. 

My sincere hope is that under the leadership of Ms. Higgins and 

Director Mueller, Trilogy will be implemented soon and will fulfill 

its given function. If not, I fear that Inspector General Fine’s prediction will prove true—and, if true, possible disastrous. 

Before I close, I want to recognize a different sort of brass tacks. 

The FBI saw an increase in funding of approximately 127 percent 

from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2002 for information management, automation, and telecommunication, IMAT, which includes 

all Trilogy-related functions. Congress appropriated approximately 

$223 million in fiscal year 2001 and $507 million in fiscal year 

2002. This was an enormous increase, a jump that we all understand and deem necessary. 

In addition, the Senate Appropriations Committee has recommended an appropriation of $30 million for the FBI’s Information Resources Division to help implement Phase II of Trilogy in 

the fiscal year 2002 supplemental. The FBI has requested an additional $48 million for fiscal year 2003 for IMAT, and I expect that 

as Congress considers this new request, we will want to know a detailed plan for additional funding and why it is needed. 

Finally, in preparation for this hearing, I spoke with many private sector groups and what they have to say about their past dealings with the FBI in terms of lack of policy guidance, a heavy bureaucracy, and a general feeling of apathy toward the need for the 

latest technology. I believe that things are changing at the Bureau. 

I have met with some of the people here and many others. And I 

would like to propose the idea of forming an advisory group made 

up of representatives from the private sector to work with the FBI 

on their technology development. Perhaps this group could work in 

conjunction with Ms. Higgins’ Office of Programs Management, and 

hopefully, Ms. Higgins, we can discuss that idea in today’s hearing. 

When Director Mueller testified before the Judiciary Committee 

a few months ago, he stated that it would take 2 to 3 years from 

now for the Trilogy system to be up-to-snuff. To me, that is unacceptable. I, and I believe the American people, do not need another 

9/11 to prove how far behind our law enforcement agencies are in 

their communications and technological development. 

4

I find it impossible to believe that we cannot, for the safety of 

our Nation, implement Trilogy any faster. So I will be asking you 

some questions on this issue later in the hearing. If Trilogy is indeed the foundation upon which the FBI’s technology is built, then, 

we need it not today and not tomorrow—we really needed it yesterday. 

Again I thank the witnesses for being here, apologize for my tardiness, and call on my patient colleague, the junior Senator from 

Alabama. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF ALABAMA 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

your interest in this important issue. 

Things do happen around here often so fast that it can happen 

to anybody that you do have a conflict that you just cannot balance, 

so I certainly understand that, and I think everybody else does, too. 

I will just say a few things about this subject. I remember when 

I was United States Attorney that an effort was made to have a 

computerized system for the FBI that was going to solve 

everybody’s problems, that you could be in court and punch in the 

questions, and it would appear for you and all that. And I think 

it was done. I do not know how many millions of dollars were spent 

on it, but that was done. 

There is a tendency today to blame errors on the computer. The 

computer will not work if the information is not put in. It will not 

work if people are not following up. So I do not know how to make 

vague documents for all missed; I think some of that was just a 

failure to read the email that was sent out and to followup in each 

and every field office, who probably thought they did not have anything to do with the case. 

I am concerned about the money, and I am glad that you mentioned that, Mr. Chairman. This is a huge increase in money. I 

think we have 60-some field offices in America, and we are talking 

about nearly $400 million for this program. That is a lot of money 

for a field office. I trust that we can justify that kind of system. 

We are rushing fast, we are trying to do a lot of things at once, 

and we have simply got to watch our expenditures in Congress. I 

am getting troubled by the fact that we seem to be losing discipline. 

One more thing. I do believe that you should be sure to listen 

to agents in the field who do the daily work and will be inputting 

the data into this system. They have got to feel comfortable with 

it, it has got to meet their needs, they have got to feel comfortable 

relying on it, or it will not be as effective as we would like to see 

it. I think that is important, and in any review that you do, I want 

to ask about that. 

Finally, I think the most dangerous thing in all of this is security. I just believe very, very strongly that any system that allows 

broad-based access to security information is subject to being penetrated. You have in every FBI office in America clerks and staff 

people and agents. We had a Hansen, for that matter, a special 

agent for the FBI, who was not proven reliable and betrayed his 

country. 

5

So I want to know that if we make an error, it will be to keep 

this material contained more closely than some might like and 

keep it contained in a way that is very difficult for anyone to penetrate. 

Thank you for having this hearing, Mr. Chairman. If we do this 

thing right, I think you are correct that enemy agents could be 

identified quicker than we ever thought possible on occasion. 

Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Jeff. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Now let me call our single witness here 

today, one witness but a very important one and we believe worth 

a whole hearing. 

Sherry Higgins is new. I had the pleasure of meeting her when 

I asked Director Mueller how are we going to straighten this thing 

out, he had a few-words answer, but among the words he mentioned were ‘‘Sherry Higgins.’’

She is the project management executive in the Office of the Director at the FBI. She began her career in 1971 with AT&T. She 

was then assigned to Lucent Technologies after AT&T split. 

Ms. Higgins has held several positions with both AT&T and 

Lucent, including both the Lucent Chief Information Officer and 

Chief Technical Officer of the Global Program and of Project Management. Most recently, she was an instructor of project management with the International Institute for Learning, and she also 

supported the Technology Command Center at the 2002 Salt Lake 

Olympic Games. 

She has been industry-certified as a project management professional through the Project Management Institute since 1991. She 

holds master’s certificates in both commercial and international 

project management—this biography is a mouthful—and was inducted into the International Who’s Who of Professionals in 2000 

and was featured in the August 2000 edition of CIO magazine. 

Ms. Higgins, your entire statement will be included in the record. 

Please proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF SHERRY HIGGINS, PROJECT MANAGEMENT 

EXECUTIVE, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU 

OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY 

MARK TANNER, DEPUTY CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER 

Ms. HIGGINS. Thank you. 

First of all, I want to thank you for inviting me up here. I too 

think it is a very important issue. 

I want to thank you for inviting me and for your support and for 

what I know will be your continued support. 

I can tell from your charts that both of you have had a lot of discussion about Trilogy, and there have been a lot of things that you 

have heard in the past about Trilogy. 

I have been with the FBI for 4 months, and I too have heard an 

awful lot about Trilogy. What I have said, though, and what I have 

instituted within the organization and the teams that I have been 

working with on the Trilogy project is I have been given a lot of 

reasons for why the FBI is where they are right now, and what I 

have asked people to do, though, is not to give me a history of excuses, but I will take history as lessons learned. We will figure out 

6

how not to do things in the wrong way or the way that they have 

been done in the past, but improve and move forward. 

Presently on the Trilogy Project, I am not sure how much you 

understand about the way the project is actually divided, but it is 

between a part that they call TNC/IPC and a part that they call 

UAC. One thing that I probably did not put in my testimony is that 

surprise I had when I came to the FBI—I thought that the communications industry had a lock on acronyms, but I found out that the 

FBI has more than that. 

The TNC/IPC side is what I call the network and the hardware, 

the actual PC side of it. And the UAC side is the applications side. 

The TNC/IPC side is projected to be completed over a year ahead 

of schedule. The original intent was for the program to be a 36-

month schedule, and it was 36 months from the time the contract 

was awarded, which would have put us completing the network 

and the hardware side sometime in May of 2004. The projection for 

the network side is to complete by the first fiscal quarter of 2003, 

no later than the second quarter of 2003. 

The UAC side, or the virtual case file side, the application side, 

is projected to complete on schedule. Contract was awarded in June 

of 2001, and 36 months from that would be June 2004. 

The solution that we are implementing now, that we are designing now, that we are developing now, is significantly different from 

what was projected from the very beginning. So there are things 

in my testimony that explain that and some things that I am going 

to show you on a powerpoint presentation to demonstrate that. 

Communications is improving within the Trilogy Project and 

other programs within the FBI. We are not there yet, but we are 

cross-pollinating information to make sure that we are partnering 

on all the programs that we have within the FBI. 

We are focusing on the right solution, not just the fastest solution. We have a constant eye on the schedule to make sure that as 

we are moving down this road and we are putting in the right solution that we are looking for anywhere that we can get efficiencies 

and gain a faster schedule. 

The future is bright; I agree with that. And the people who are 

surrounding the Trilogy program feel that the future is bright, and 

they resonate with the Director’s view that the future is bright, 

that we are moving ahead. 

On your point, Senator Sessions, one of the things that I totally 

align with is that we do have to have the agents’ buy-in. In developing the UAC or virtual case file component, part of that is using 

what we call a ‘‘joint application design.’’ That is made up of 

agents, analysts and support people to look at not how do you do 

your jobs with the tools that are existing, but what tools do you 

need to do your job. So that in reality, what we have gotten is buyin from the beginning. We are asking, and we have recognized that 

they are the ones who are going to be using these tools. 

We are not just rebuilding old applications. We are looking at a 

new application and pulling the best information from those five investigative applications. 

Trilogy is an enterprise solution. Enterprise solutions create and 

facilitate change, so we are recognizing that. Part of the joint appliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:14 Oct 24, 2003 Jkt 087062 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\87062.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
7

cation design will be eliminating some old business process that are 

no longer required. 

We have a positive future in our sights where we already have 

a plan in place to not allow Trilogy to get old and outdated; we 

have a plan to change that out as technology changes so that it 

stays current. 

We are assessing the impact of not only those five applications 

but other applicants that we look at and determine whether those 

need to be included or they need to be eliminated. 

The Director has established the Office of Programs Management 

for us to have a disciplined approach on not only the Trilogy 

Project but any other highly critical, high-dollar, visible project 

that we have is critical and will support the FBI’s mission and 

strategy. 

We as an Office of Programs Management, managing these major 

programs, will be accountable to you as our stakeholders and to our 

other stakeholders, including the end-users. We will be developing 

repeatable processes, we will build in quality, and we are set for 

the future. Trilogy is setting the standard; it is the base for us to 

be able to do all the things that are in our vision moving forward. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Higgins appears as a submissions for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, maybe Ms. Higgins can move 

to the Department of Homeland Security after this. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Yes. When you finish this one, we are going 

to move you over to Homeland. 

Did you have a presentation? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Yes, I do have a quick presentation where I would 

like to show you the difference between today’s environment and 

our national view—and I have been coached several times to make 

sure that I do not leave here without you knowing that this is a 

national view. And my point in saying that is——

Chairman SCHUMER. Excuse me. Could you just explain what a 

‘‘notional view’’ is? 

Ms. HIGGINS. I am getting ready to. 

Chairman SCHUMER. OK. 

Ms. HIGGINS. A notional view is when you have a contract, or you 

bring a contractor in who is also one of the people in the JAD, that 

joint application development session, you tell them what you 

need—you do not design the solution for them. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I see. 

Ms. HIGGINS. So that what you are going to be seeing is a view 

of how the agents and support people would like it to look. It will 

still have the same functions, but it may not look exactly like what 

you are going to see here. 

Chairman SCHUMER. OK. 

Ms. HIGGINS. The first thing we are going to do is show you—

you alluded, Senator Schumer, to the 12 screens—I am just going 

to show you very quickly, going into FBINET, Automated Case 

Support, and Electronic Case File, all the things that you have to 

use just to upload one document. 

Here are the first five screens that every agent has to go 

through. Anything they are going to want to do in ACS, they have 

8

to go through every, single one of these screens. Those are five 

mandatory screens, and they are all function key-driven; there is 

no mouse, no icon, no year 2000 look to it. It is all very keyboardintensive-driven. 

To actually upload a document, you then have these six additional screens that you have to go through. The very last screen, 

just to make one more point, is a screen that says you now have 

to print the document after you have uploaded, so it can go into 

the official system of record, because ACS is not used as a system 

of record. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Do you then have to get out of your seat 

and do a backflip? [Laughter.] 

Ms. HIGGINS. Yes, sir. [Laughter.] 

Our future planned solution—what I am going to show you is the 

difference between Virtual Case File and ACS and explain the 

workload to you. 

Here is the same thing, showing how you would enter a document into the system, be able to submit it and have it approved 

all in one step. An agent will submit information—for instance, an 

intake form—he takes down the information on the victim, the victim complaint, he submits the information, the supervisor approves 

it, and then it automatically goes into the electronic file. At that 

point, it is then able to be shared by other FBI agents or analysts 

who can look at that information that has just been submitted. 

Over top of that, there will be a Data Mining Application——

Senator SESSIONS. In other words, they could do the interview 

and actually enter the data instead of taking notes, and it is immediately in the system? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Absolutely, absolutely. And it can be done both 

ways. It can be done by not being in front of the computer, writing 

it down, and then, it is a lot easier to just immediately go into the 

system. 

We will have the Data Mining Application, which I believe both 

of you alluded to, which will allow the agent to not only get information from the virtual case file, but those other stovepipe applications, and also be able to go out and mine information from other 

agencies. 

What they are going to be able to do then is what the agent calls 

‘‘mining for gold.’’ They will go out and grab a bunch of the information, put it together in their analytical work box, and in that analytical work box, they are able to say, ‘‘Now I have something.’’ 

They will submit that, it is approved, and it goes into the electronic 

case file, and it is ready to be viewed or collaborated or shared with 

other people within the FBI. 

Chairman SCHUMER. What is the process for someone else in the 

FBI seeing that file under this new system? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Depending on the——

Chairman SCHUMER. Do they have to get separate approval or 

anything like that? 

Ms. HIGGINS. If they are within the FBI and they have the same 

level of security, their job title will drive how much of the information they will be able to see. 

Chairman SCHUMER. So if I am an agent in Minneapolis, I could 

get hold of a file, let us say, to take another place in Phoenix? 

9

Ms. HIGGINS. Right. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Right away? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Right. 

Chairman SCHUMER. OK—which could not happen before, I take 

it. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Exactly. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Before, you had to get 16 different approvals, and you would virtually never get it. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Exactly. And to speak to your issue of Hansen, we 

will have audits built into this so that you will be able to see who 

has been looking at my case, what other people have done what to 

this case, so we have audit trail there. 

Senator SESSIONS. Is this the time to ask a question? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Yes, why not? 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. Would the memorandum from Arizona be immediately available for review by a person in Minnesota 

who had a similar type situation, or would the computer simply 

register that there was relevant information of some kind? In other 

words, would a memo such as the one written in Arizona and/or 

the one written in Minnesota—to me, both of those were pretty 

sensitive information, and there are a lot of people who have access 

to computers—FBI offices are open 24 hours; you have clerks in 

there and other people. I think it would be pretty easy, if you were 

determined over a period of time, to get somebody in there who 

knew how to penetrate the system. 

Is there any limit on that? 

Ms. HIGGINS. The first question that I think you are asking me 

is about being able to actually do a collaboration—will the document be there so that other agents can see that information. And 

yes, out of that virtual work box, the analytical work box that I explained in our earlier screen, it will be immediately available to 

other agents in the field. 

As far as being able to hack into the system or be able to bypass 

security regulations, we are working with the security program—

they are part of our project team—to make sure that we have built 

in the security as opposed to bolting it on. 

So we are using industry practices and using input from the security department. We also have people from security who have 

come over from different agencies. So we are implementing that as 

we go. 

Senator SESSIONS. I am just thinking about—Mr. Chairman, let 

us say there are people in your city—and I know how deeply you 

care about this and how real it is to the people of New York; it is 

not academic, it is very, very real—but we are out interviewing 

people right now, people are getting information on a confidential 

basis. There has been abuse over the years in my view by police 

and FBI agents saying, ‘‘My informant’s information is so secret, I 

do not ever tell anybody,’’ which is an overreaction in one way. But 

at the same time, they would be dead—there are people living in 

the community who are providing information this day, and if that 

information goes into the system and somebody identifies who they 

are, they will disappear tomorrow. So this is really serious about 

our security, not counting the potential danger in a lot of other 

ways. 

10

Chairman SCHUMER. It is an interesting—Senator Sessions is 

right. I asked Director Mueller why things were so backward. It is 

my view that the FBI system, at least as of 9/11, was more rudimentary than the system that I bought my 7th grade daughter for 

$1,400. He said there are two reasons. One, he said the FBI always 

had the attitude that ‘‘We can do it better,’’ instead of relying on 

all the geniuses in Silicon Valley and everybody else, they invented 

their own system, and they were not too good at it. 

But the second reason, which is the one you bring up, is security. 

Obviously, you do not want a system that is simply open to everybody because of classified information, because of investigative 

problems, et cetera. And I guess the balance you face is to make 

it as accessible and as open as possible so an enterprising agent in 

Minnesota can get to see a lot of information that other agents 

have had, and at the same time, not having such information, certain sensitive information, be too accessible. 

But I take it that with passwords and certain codes, you can sort 

of have an open system with certain blockages that you need special clearance to get to and so on. 

Am I wrong about that? 

Ms. HIGGINS. No; you are right. 

Senator SESSIONS. I just think this has got to be given attention, 

because if every agent can access and input into the system, and 

you have one bad agent, the whole system is drained of intelligence 

in an exceedingly bad event. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Yes; a very good point. 

What do you say to that? I mean, the advantage of the internet 

is a two-edged sword, as we learned about 9/11. What do you say 

to the fact that if you get a high-up person in the system, they 

might be able to get every bit of information on that system and 

give it to an enemy? How do we deal with that? That is a very serious and good question. 

Ms. HIGGINS. There are several items that I want to bring up in 

response to that. One is that, again, we have audits built into the 

system so that we can get flags, know that someone who is not at 

the level of a certain case to be able to work on that case—we know 

that someone else has been working in it. 

We are also regulated so that not all information is shared so 

that you can protect the individuals, too. I am not going to profess 

to know what all of those laws and regulations are. I just know 

that they are there, and I am digging deep into them to try to 

make sure that we are making the system as flexible but as secure 

as it possibly can be. 

As far as sharing the information or the amount of information 

being able to be shared or be released or someone getting into the 

system, technology can provide the solution, and I totally agree 

with you that the system is only as good as the human being who 

designed that system. On the other side of that, you can only protect the system—you have to look at what level of risk you are willing to assume, and that is what we are up against right now, looking at what level of risk we are willing to assume—not that there 

is not a solution to give all that information or to block all the information. You do not want to do one or the other. You have got 

11

to figure out that level of risk. And that is what we are working 

on. 

Chairman SCHUMER. The fact of the matter is that a foreign 

agent high up in the FBI could do a lot more damage in terms of 

retrieving and sending information under our new system than 

under the old one. That is something that we have to be aware of. 

Is that fair to say? 

Ms. HIGGINS. I think we have more control. 

Chairman SCHUMER. You do? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Yes, I do. 

Chairman SCHUMER. It is freer and it has more controls. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Yes, yes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Let us hope. 

Ms. HIGGINS. And it is going to be easier to use—and we have 

had agents’ input. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we know that wars have been ended 

quickly and terminated one way or the other because of breaches 

in intelligence. The code-breakers in World War II and other wars 

have literally made the difference in who won key battles. I just 

do not think you can put too much emphasis on that. Frankly, I 

would say that the most sensitive things that are being done at the 

Intelligence Center of the FBI probably should be on an entirely 

different system in my view and should not be accessible to people 

around the country. 

In other words, that team in my vision has always been—the 

team in Washington or wherever it is located will be the one to 

spot the patterns, spot the duplications, and give notice to the 

agents in the field, rather than allowing them to necessarily peruse 

everything that is in the system. It just looks for hot points. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Do you want to keep going? Did you finish 

your presentation? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Do you want me to just show you a couple of other 

things within the notional view——

Chairman SCHUMER. Yes, and then I have a few questions, and 

maybe Senator Durbin does. 

Ms. HIGGINS. OK. Again, this is the notional view of the virtual 

case file. This would be the work space or the actual home page 

of an agent. When they walk in in the morning, they will see this. 

On the left-hand side are the items that are what they do every 

day, the frequently used activity, if you are familiar with work 

space on your daughter’s PC. 

What I want to do is show you that same intake form that we 

were talking about earlier and show that the information would be 

inputted into a screen like this, it will be mouse-driven, it will have 

pull-down screens so you do not have to type everything in. It gives 

you the capability to put in free-form comments at the bottom. 

What would happen here is the agent would input the information 

and would then submit the information to the supervisor, and the 

supervisor can then, from another screen, assign it to one of the 

agents within their squad. 

What they will have there on notional view again is a list of 

agents within their squad, so it is a simple case of just clicking and 

being able to pick a particular agent and assign the work to him. 

What the agent will then see is their activity within their caseload. 

12

They will be alerted to new information within their toolbox, within 

their caseload. 

In this particular case, if you look at the very first item, they can 

drill down on that information to see what new has been added to 

their toolbox. In this particular case, they see that it is one of the 

last items, and there were pictures that were uploaded into the virtual case file. 

Chairman SCHUMER. And that happens automatically—any time 

on some case, some other agent has added new information, they 

will get a ‘‘tickle’’ that says go look at it. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Right. One of the things that is significant here, 

too, is that it is given the capability to put multimedia into the 

case file. Another thing that is significant about this is that the information stays resident with the file as opposed to staying in another locked are or another system of record; it is now resident 

with the case. 

So the whole thing that I was showing you there goes back to 

the discussion that I was talking about business processes changing. if you look here, that is the intake form. It serves the functions 

in the middle, but what it is actually doing is replacing at least five 

different forms, handwritten information, and a printed copy that 

goes into an actual system of record. 

Our work is investigative by nature. This shows that they are 

able to put in their information, and it is one of the other forms 

that will tell you, when you ask ‘‘What is it that I want to document?’’ you will be able to——

Chairman SCHUMER. This looks like pretty standard stuff. 

Ms. HIGGINS [continuing]. Exactly—and you will be able to click 

on it, and instead of bring you up a screen, like NACS, where you 

have 12 screens, depending on the activity that you want to do, it 

is only going to bring up those screens. So it is a productivity tool. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Let me ask you a couple of other questions 

if I could, Ms. Higgins. How about the problem—we have talked 

with Trilogy about getting the FBI system to talk to one another. 

What preparation is being made to get the FBI systems to talk to 

other Federal Government computer system, whether it be INS or 

CIA or Social Security or Border Patrol, et cetera? Is the system 

that you are building done with that in mind, or not? Tell me a little about that. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Yes, it is. As I said before, we are setting the enterprise architecture standard for the FBI that will allow us in the future to share information with other agencies. We are making sure 

that we are using the actual technology that will allow us to integrate and share information with Department of Justice or the Department of Defense, CIA, whoever it is—so that we have the same 

type of technology, the same products, that we have data warehouses, and in some cases, we are even using the same vendor so 

that we will be complementary to each other. 

Chairman SCHUMER. So that when this is finished in the second 

quarter of 2003, at least the hardware will be able, let us say, to 

talk to INS’ computer system? 

Ms. HIGGINS. We will be able to lay the plan. We are laying the 

foundation. The plans to be able to do that would be another proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:14 Oct 24, 2003 Jkt 087062 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\87062.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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gram. Trilogy is laying the foundation for the enterprise architecture. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I see. So you will have the hardware to do 

it, you will have the underlying method of doing it, but you have 

still got to work out the deal with each of the different agencies. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Absolutely. 

Chairman SCHUMER. OK. And what about similarly with our allies internationally—clearly, you are going to have more of a need 

to talk to them. Let me give you one example. 

As you know, when it comes to fingerprints, there are two 

types—flat and rolled. And many of our allies have created civil 

fingerprint systems for travel visas and other purposes that use the 

flat print. INS, as I understand it, also uses the flat print. 

Because of the Patriot Act, the Border Security Act, we are going 

to have to start running these flat prints of foreign travelers 

against your system for homeland security protections, the FBI system. 

But from what I understand, the FBI’s current finger print analysis system has something like a 40 percent error rate when it 

processes flat prints because it is set up to handle rolled prints 

which are used for criminal investigations. So batting 600 may get 

you into the Hall of Fame, but it is not good enough when it comes 

to fighting terrorism. 

That is just one example of the hundreds of problems that you 

face, but how are we dealing with that problem? 

Ms. HIGGINS. I wish I could answer that question for you. As far 

as the program that you are talking about and being part of that 

data base, the fingerprint system that you are talking about is not 

part of Trilogy. So what I can do is get back to you with an answer 

to that, but I cannot personally answer it. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Does anyone else have an answer here? 

Mr. TANNER. I am Mark Tanner. I am the Deputy CIO, so I have 

information about all of our FBI systems. 

I do know something about the fingerprint system, that is the 

IAFIS, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Information System. 

It is a 10-print system. It is a rolled fingerprint system that is used 

for identification of people. It is not wholly compatible with the flat 

fingerprint technologies, but there is a lot of research being undertaken to make those systems more compatible. 

The IAFIS does, though, establish a standard for fingerprint minutiae and identification purposes which is shared with the international partners——

Chairman SCHUMER. Right, but it has a pretty high error rate, 

doesn’t it? 

Mr. TANNER. No. IAFIS, with the rolled fingerprint, has a very 

low error rate. It was designed to give us a 2-hour turnaround on 

a criminal fingerprint identification and a 24-hour civil print identification, and it is meeting those expectations. But a flat print may 

provide you a candidate list of persons, but it will have to go 

through a visual inspection to make the actual identification. 

Chairman SCHUMER. It will take a lot longer, I imagine. 

Mr. TANNER. It will take longer. But it is a technology that can 

mature. 

14

Chairman SCHUMER. If you could, Ms. Higgins, in writing just 

get back to us as to how we are dealing with that issue. 

Now, what about what I mentioned at the beginning—getting 

this private sector advisory board on board. We have just looked at 

corporate responsibility here, and what we found is that it is good 

for the accountants to have somebody else looking over their shoulder, giving them advice, to make sure they are not just in their 

own world, et cetera, particularly given what the old FBI mentality 

was, at least according to Mueller—‘‘We can do it better, and we 

will do it our own way’’—which did not lead to too much good. 

What about the idea of some kind of private sector advisory 

board composed of top-level people who would really work closely 

with you—may even lend you people on a full-time basis for a period of time to help give suggestions for improvements. My guess 

is that some of these people will have come up against similar 

problems that you have had. Obviously, the emphasis on security 

is higher for the FBI than for most other places. But tell me what 

you think of that. 

Ms. HIGGINS. I totally support it, and I know the Director supports it, too. There are plans to look at just that. We have looked 

at how we would do that. So I know the Director supports it, and 

I also support that. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Could we talk about—and I will call on 

Senator Durbin in a minute; I have been here a long time on these 

questions—my constituents in New York have a personal interest 

in this, and when Director Mueller said it would take 3 years to 

get everything up and working, we said, gee whiz, we do not want 

to risk another horrible attack. Nobody in America—nobody in the 

world—does. 

Now the timetable has moved up a little bit, but what are the 

barriers—what are the barriers to moving up the timetable further? Is it fiscal? Is it that you do not have the right personnel? 

Boil it down to its brass tacks. Given that this should be one of the 

highest priorities that America has, it is still going to take us a 

couple of years before both the hardware and then the application 

of the hardware is really working, up and available. 

Did you say 2004? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Yes. June 2004 will be its completion. 

Chairman SCHUMER. That seems like an awfully long time given 

how important this is. What are the barriers, and what if anything 

can be done to move that timetable up? 

Ms. HIGGINS. The right solution takes a longer time than just to 

get a solution. Let me backstep. We recognize the fact that June 

2004 for the final completion date of this project is an extremely 

long time. There is nobody within the FBI who does not have that 

focus of wanting to get something into the hands of the agents as 

quickly as possible. 

When you are looking at what it is that needs to be done as far 

as what is the right tool, that in itself takes time. And looking at 

old systems that do not have a lot of documentation—it takes time 

to recreate documentation just to be able to implement the new 

system to make sure that you have a lot of that information that 

is out there. 

15

Chairman SCHUMER. But isn’t that a personnel—you could hire 

more people to take the old documentation and update it; right? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Part of it is resources, part of it is knowledge of 

what is existing out there to make sure that it is in there. But it 

is also making sure we have the right solution in place. We have 

people who are very focused on putting in the right solution from 

a standpoint of bringing in other resources that are from outside 

industry—that might help in some cases—but what you have really 

got to focus on is the right tool for the agents, so you will need to 

use the FBI resources and the FBI intelligence. There are very 

many bright people within the FBI, but this is a new solution. 

Chairman SCHUMER. So it is a learning curve issue more than 

just about anything else? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Well, it is a combination of things. It is a learning 

curve; it is the fact that we do not have the documentation to be 

able to implement the solution—for instance, to take ACS and say 

we know everything that is there, so only take these parts. There 

is documentation that is missing, so you have got to identify where 

the parts are. 

One of the things that I was going to say, though, is that between now and June of 2004, we are looking at ways to relieve the 

pain so that the agents are not in pain until the first delivery in 

December of 2003. We are looking at putting search engines out 

there that will be faster and more efficient and more robust. We 

are looking at putting fixes—not fixes, but pain relievers, what I 

keep calling pain relievers—into the system to do things like be 

able to monitor when someone is in your cases. 

We are looking at every way that we can while we are implementing the right solution to provide pain relievers along the way. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I have a written question for you which I 

will not ask you to answer now, and then I will turn to Senator 

Durbin. But if I were the Director of the FBI, and I said, ‘‘You have 

a mandate to cut 6 months off that timetable deadline,’’ what 

would you do? 

I am not asking you for an answer now, but I am going to ask 

you that in writing, and maybe you can give us some answers. 

Ms. HIGGINS. I appreciate you not asking me that, and I will explain later why. 

Chairman SCHUMER. That Southern charm gets me every time. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Durbin? 

Senator DURBIN. Southern Brooklyn. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Southern Brooklyn—he knows; he has been 

there. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Ms. Higgins, for joining us today. 

I am going to ask a series of questions, but first let me relate for 

a moment to a question asked by Senator Schumer. 

I am serving on this Committee on the Judiciary, Governmental 

Affairs, and Intelligence, so I hear about this issue from many different angles, and it strikes me that there is one thing that we are 

overlooking, and it was raised by Senator Schumer, and that is 

16

that I think it is a great idea—and I applaud the idea—to bring 

in the experts to the FBI to take a look at it—can we do this better 

and faster, can we create something that can grow with the agency’s needs. But for lack of a better word, the interoperability with 

other agencies is also critical. 

We are considering the creation of another agency which will collect, maybe generate, intelligence data—the Department of Homeland Security—which will join four or five other agencies. The 

question is whether each of these agencies is designing its computers in a way that they can ultimately work together. I do not 

believe that any successful business would consider having separate branches with totally different computer systems that cannot 

communicate. 

One of the things that I have thought about and that I am going 

to propose as part of the Department of Homeland Security is 

something like a Manhattan Project, where someone in the White 

House has the authority to take a look at the whole picture and 

say here is how the CIA and the FBI and the INS and all of the 

different agencies will have a computer system that can ultimately 

merge data into an effective use. 

In the frustration of the arrest of Mr. Moussaoui in Minneapolis, 

the FBI agent who testified said, ‘‘We even thought at one point 

that we would break the rules and go to the CIA for information’’ 

to find out what was going on. That was considered out of line, I 

guess, but from where I am sitting, she did the right thing, or at 

least the people involved did the right thing. 

So what is being talked about in terms of coordinating all of 

these agencies so that there is some interoperability of the computer systems? 

Ms. HIGGINS. We are having conversations with the other agencies to see how their architecture is set up. We are taking lessons 

learned from other agencies. We are making sure that the architecture that we are building is going to be robust and be able to—at 

some point in the future; the plans are not laid, the plans are not 

in effect yet—but the plan is to be able to do just exactly what you 

are talking about, that is, to make sure that we have the technology and the architecture in place that will allow us to share information. 

There is a data mining/data warehousing program within the 

FBI that Ken Richard is program manager for. The Trilogy program is working in lockstep with both data mining and data 

warehousing, which gives you the capability to look at information 

both from within the FBI and other agencies. 

Senator DURBIN. The reason I raise that—I think that has to be 

done, and I think there has to be someone at the highest level, perhaps at the White House, who really does have this Manhattan 

Project type—we are looking for a new word—but a Manhattan 

Project type approach——

Chairman SCHUMER. How about the Brooklyn Project? [Laughter.] 

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. Well, the Brooklyn Project—you 

heard it here, folks—but the idea is to come up with something 

that coordinates these things. 

17

For example, 6 weeks ago, I believe it was, the Attorney General 

announced that he had a plan to fingerprint and photograph visaholders coming into the United States. He did not specify the number of people involved, but it is my impression that it could range 

as high as some 30 million visa-holders who are in the United 

States during the course of a year. I thought at the time that that 

raised an interesting Constitutional question, an interesting 

profiling question, an interesting law enforcement question, but it 

is almost laughable from a technology viewpoint to think that we 

have the capability to collect, process, share, evaluate millions of 

pieces of information about visa-holders coming in on a regular 

basis. 

Do you think we have that capability at the FBI and the INS 

today? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Well, first of all, are you saying INS within FBI? 

Senator DURBIN. Yes. 

Ms. HIGGINS. With the systems that we have right now, with just 

this year’s photographs, I do not think we have the capability for 

it to be retrievable. That kind of data collection and being able to 

be retrievable is what we are moving to. The architecture that we 

are building is scalable. 

Senator DURBIN. That is the way that I feel. I think that is an 

honest answer. And it really raises a question about why we announce something like this when we know it is over the moon—it 

is not going to happen. 

If I am not mistaken—and maybe you or one of your colleagues 

can answer this—2 or 3 years ago, Congress said to the INS and 

to the FBI, We want you to merge your fingerprint data bases, because both collect them, and in a merged data base, we would be 

able to come up with a lot more usable information. 

The Inspector General for the Department of Justice told us just 

a few weeks ago that they are still not even close to that happening. Are you familiar with that Congressional mandate and the 

progress on that merger at the data bases? 

Ms. HIGGINS. No, I am not. 

Mark, do you know anything about that? I am not familiar with 

IAFIS and the fingerprinting systems, and Mark obviously has 

some knowledge. 

Mr. TANNER. I am familiar with it. It is mainly a different operational posture that we take. INS does a two-print check, and we 

do a 10-print check, so there are differences in the technologies 

that support those two operational postures. There has been a lot 

of work done to figure out how those things can be integrated. 

Right now, off the top of my head, I do not have the details of 

where we are on that. 

Senator DURBIN. I will not put you on the spot, but it is another 

illustration that when we have an announcement from the Department of Justice about potentially collecting tens of millions of fingerprints and photographs of visa-holders coming into the United 

States, and we take a look at the real world, technology world, that 

you live in, we realize that it is impossible. We do not have it. 

I asked someone on the Intelligence Committee at a higher level, 

and he said the only option is to contract this out. We cannot do 

this. 

18

I think we just went through a contracting out debate over security at airports, so we would have to face that issue, too, as we get 

into it. 

Let me ask you this, Ms. Higgins. As you take a look at the computer capabilities at the FBI today and compare it to the computer 

capabilities of AT&T or Lucent where you used to work, what are 

the most obvious things that a worker at Lucent would walk in and 

look at the FBI system and say, ‘‘Wait a minute—you do not 

have’’—fill in the blank. What is missing at the FBI today? 

Ms. HIGGINS. First of all, the PC technology, which we are changing out. A part of Trilogy is upgrading the laptop or the work station environment. 

Another is what I alluded to about the green screen environment 

as opposed to a gooey-based or a mouse-driven application that people use. 

One of the other glaring things is email, lack of email. We are 

looking at that as far as being able to do intra email. Right now, 

the FBI does have an email package, but when we are looking at 

what we will be implementing and what someone like myself coming in from the outside, if I were to look at it, I would be expecting 

at least a more state-of-the-art email package. 

It is those kinds of things that you would see as a layman—or, 

not a layman—but someone from a communications company coming in. 

Senator DURBIN. Do FBI computers have access to the internet? 

[Pause.] 

Senator DURBIN. It is taking you too long to answer. 

Ms. HIGGINS. FBINET—the information that we have within the 

FBI—is not accessible through the internet. We are looking——

Senator DURBIN. Of course, that is good. Now, how about the 

other way? 

Ms. HIGGINS. And it is not accessible the other way, the way that 

we have it planned. 

Senator DURBIN. So an FBI agent working at a computer who 

wants to access the internet for some information in an investigation cannot do it? 

Ms. HIGGINS. That is not true, that is not true. I am sorry. 

Senator DURBIN. What is true? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Another part that is being planned outside of the 

Trilogy Project is what we are calling an internet cafe. That is 

where they will have the capability to search for information, but 

because of legal ramifications, they will not be doing case information on the internet. They will be able to mine for information and 

then stake it and use it——

Senator DURBIN. But today, that does not exist. 

Ms. HIGGINS. In some of the field offices where we have already 

implemented, they have some of that capability. 

Senator DURBIN. All right. So it does not exist throughout the 

agency. 

Senator Schumer asked Director Mueller at an earlier hearing 

about word search, and I believe the answer was that they could 

search for the name of a person in a file, but they could not search 

for a phrase like ‘‘flight training schools’’. Is this true? 

19

Ms. HIGGINS. You can put multiple word searches into ACS, and 

that is the system that I had put before. I know that there were 

some questions—there are some issues within ACS and some of the 

systems, and the fact that you have to go into each system to do 

multiple searches. But because it is an older system, and because 

it does not ahve the robust search engine in there, there is the ability to make a mistake and not get the information back. 

You can put in ‘‘flight school’’ and other information. I believe 

Mr. Collingwood explained in more detail some of the issues about 

how you could go down through ACS in itself and further refine 

your search, so you could put ‘‘flight school’’ or you could put ‘‘Minnesota flight school’’. 

Senator DURBIN. The Wall Street Journal piece that was written 

back in July by Messrs. David Rogers and John Wolke went into 

some of the Bureau’s case numbering systems. Does the Bureau 

still hand out this little blue or yellow booklet with J. Edgar Hoover’s case numbering system? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Right. 

Senator DURBIN. And is that still being followed in the computer 

programs that you are constructing? 

Ms. HIGGINS. As it stands today, they are, but we do not have 

the final system yet. We are looking at all the business processes. 

Senator DURBIN. Just to show you how archaic it is, the Wall 

Street Journal writes that: ‘‘The system issued to every FBI agent 

still includes offenses relating to prohibition, white slaver, and sedition.’’ That is not encouraging. 

I have two final questions, and I will make them as fast as I can. 

It seems to me that if you were starting a corporation with the 

data challenge that we have today, and you said we will not be 

operational until the middle of 2004 that your investors would say, 

‘‘That does not compute. If you cannot be operational in a faster period of time, then you are not going to serve our needs’’ and in this 

case, serve the needs of national security. 

Mr. Dies, who testified here a couple of times, brought to my attention problems with procurement and the procurement laws of 

the Federal Government. I will not go into the long history about 

how I got involved in this, but my question to you directly is this. 

Are there procurement laws in the Federal Code that are stopping 

or slowing you from doing what you would do in the private sector 

to cutoff 6 months, a year, or 2 years and move more quickly into 

a modern system that would serve the FBI’s needs? 

Ms. HIGGINS. I would say yes, and I would say that things that 

we have had to do because of that will tie our hands in cases of 

putting in a faster way to procure the funds or to acquire the 

funds, and in one case, tie our hands in being able to deal directly 

with the vendors that we have. 

Senator DURBIN. So if you brought in Oracle and said, ‘‘Design 

the system,’’ they would be disqualified from bidding on the system. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Right. 

Senator DURBIN. I will tell you—I might as well put it on the 

record—that I went all the way up the chain from Director Muller, 

Attorney General Ashcroft, Vice President Cheney, to the President, and said I am prepared to put in language to waive the procurement laws. Let us get beyond this, and I will take the heat if 

20

I am wrong, but we have got to bring in the new system. And I 

was stopped by—who would stop me—OMB. OMB stopped me last 

Decmeber and said, ‘‘No. We want you to follow procruement laws, 

and the people at the FBI just do not understand them.’’

Now, I am going to give to you the same challenge that I gave 

to Mr. Dies. I want to bring you in with OMB and sit down and 

go through this again, beacuse time has passed, and we cannot afford anymore delay here. And if this is being caught up in some 

red tape and bureaucracy, it is time to put an end to it. We need 

to have a modern computer system. 

Mr. Chairman, you have been kind to give me extra time, and 

I yield back. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Great job. 

I want to thank you, Ms. Higgins. We have these written questions, and we hope to now have our Chief Information Officer, as 

soon as he is i office, come before us for more questions, and we 

are going to keep pursuing this until things get up to snuff. 

We thank you. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I ask unanimous consent that statements of 

Senators Hatch and Cantwell be read into the record. Without objection. 

Chairman SCHUMER. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. SHERRY HIGGINS PROJECT MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Good morning. I’m Sherry Higgins, the FBI’s Project Management Executive for 

the Office of the Director. I have been asked to talk to you about how the FBI is 

fixing old problems and building a collaborative information infrastructure to better 

support our mission. I have also been asked to share with you some personal perspectives on how the FBI differs from the private sector in developing our computing infrastructure. 

Today, we live in a dangerous world, where criminals and terrorists exploit advances in technology to perpetrate crimes against United States citizens and our national interests. High-speed digital and wireless communications, including the 

Internet, are the ‘‘tools of choice.’’ Instant global communication has expanded traditional organized crime and allowed terrorists to operate from the remotest of areas. 

These kinds of abilities helped facilitate the 9/11 attacks. In response, Director 

Mueller is restructuring and reshaping the FBI to better fit a new mission with different priorities and to put in place the analytical and information sharing capabilities needed in the post-9/11 environment. 

A component is the information infrastructure necessary to enhance our ability 

to collect, store, search, retrieve, analyze and share information. Prior testimony before Congress has described the problems the FBI is experiencing because of outdated technology. Thanks to support from Congress, the FBI has embarked on the 

information infrastructure revitalization that I will describe today and that is well 

under way. A word of caution, however. The FBI’s problems with information technology didn’t occur over night and they won’t be fixed over night either. That is because it is more important to get it right and know that we have the systems and 

capabilities that precisely fit our mission as well as cure past problems. 

The first major step in this direction is our Trilogy Program. The Trilogy Program 

was designed as a 36-month effort to enhance our effectiveness through technologies 

that facilitate better organization, access and analysis of information. 

The overall direction of the Trilogy Program is to provide all FBI offices with improved network communications, a common and current set of office automation 

tools, and easy-to-use, re-engineered, web-based applications. Our Trilogy system 

consists of 3 components: 

Information Presentation Component (IPC). Hardware and software within each 

office to provide each employee with a current ‘‘desk top’’ environment and equipment. 

Transportation Network Component (TNC). High-speed connections linking the offices of the FBI. 

User Applications Component (UAC). Five user-specific software applications to 

enhance each employee’s ability to access, organize and analyze information. 

The Information Presentation Component relies primarily on commercial-off-the 

shelf (COTS) hardware and software products that provide a modern desktop environment and connectivity, thus facilitating employees’ ability to input, retrieve, manipulate and present information in text, image, audio and video formats. The Information Presentation Component is replacing our antiquated computer workstations, 

providing an updated e-mail capability, and includes simple things like additional 

printers and scanners that increase productivity. This component is nearing completion. 

The Transportation Network Component is simply the telecommunications network consisting of high-speed connections linking the offices of the FBI, and the 

hardware, software and new workstations within each office to link at high speeds 

the entire FBI. It will provide connectivity between FBI facilities (via a WAN) and 

within FBI facilities (via a LAN), so that investigative information and analysis may 

be shared among agents and analysts easily, accurately, rapidly and securely, and 

at the high data volumes our new applications support. This is nearing completion 

as well. 

The User Application Component is replacement of user applications that will enhance our ability to access, organize and analyze information. Specifically, the Trilogy Program will migrate five investigative applications into a ‘‘Virtual Case File’’ 

(VCF), to provide user-friendly, web browser access to mission critical information. 

A web-based interface will enable our users to have a graphical interface with investigative information. It will eliminate the cumbersome aspects of our current system, greatly enhance our collaborative environment and go a long way towards 

eliminating the problems obvious from Hanssen and McVeigh. 

Under the FBI’s old legacy investigative information system, the Automated Case 

Support (ACS), users navigate with the function keys instead of the point and click 

method common to web based applications. Simple tasks, such as storing an elecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:14 Oct 24, 2003 Jkt 087062 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\87062.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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tronic version of a document today, require a user to perform twelve separate functions, in a ‘‘green screen’’ environment. That will soon change with Trilogy. Automated workflow will allow for a streamlined process to complete tasking. Storing a 

document for the record will occur with a click of the mouse button. This will make 

investigative and intelligence information immediately available to all personnel 

with appropriate security. 

Enhanced ad hoc reporting, online information sharing and state-of-the-art analytical tools will permit those conducting investigations and analyzing data to easily 

organize and filter events and trends. Representatives from our field offices who are 

defining the VCF user needs are also challenging current FBI business practices to 

improving workflow and to ensure that archaic business rules are not automated. 

Multimedia functionality will allow for the storage of information in its original 

form. Under the old system, agents cannot store non-compatible forms of digital evidence in an electronic format, instead having to describe the evidence and indicate 

where the evidence is stored in a control room. Multimedia functionality will facilitate electronic storage of digital evidence and media to the investigative case file, 

allowing access to the information from the desktop. 

Trilogy also includes an Enterprise Management System (EMS), that supports all 

three of the components of the Trilogy Program. The EMS will allow the FBI to configure, monitor and administer information systems and components through a central Enterprise Operations Center (EOC), with local Field Office visibility into the 

status of equipment at their location. The EMS will gather and provide appropriate 

IT system metrics for Trilogy from the operations center. EMS functions include 

mandatory and optional capabilities for fault, configuration, accounting, performance, and security management. 

The original plan for Trilogy was development and deployment over 36 months 

from the date of the contract awards for the infrastructure and applications development, May and June 2001, respectively. The events of September 11, 2001 impacted 

many aspects of the FBI, including the Trilogy Program. The urgent need for improved information technologies prompted the Director to request that Trilogy implementation be accelerated, with emphasis on those capabilities most urgently 

needed to support the FBI’s priority cases. 

In response, Congress provided additional funding and Trilogy’s network and 

desktop infrastructure improvements were accelerated. The resulting improvements 

are significant. 

Infrastructure enhancements are being deployed in two phases.The first phase, 

called ‘‘Fast Track’’, is installation of Trilogy architecture at our 56 Field Office locations and as many of our Resident Agencies as can be completed before the second 

phase begins. This consists of new network printers, color scanners, local area network upgrades, desktop workstations, and Microsoft Office applications. By the end 

of April 2002, deployment at all 56 FBI Field Offices and two Information Technology Centers (ITCs) was completed. Fast Track is continuing to deploy this infrastructure to our Resident Agencies. 

The second phase of infrastructure deployment is called ‘‘Full Site Capability,’’ 

representing the complete infrastructure upgrade. The full upgrade will provide the 

wide area network connectivity together with new encryption devices to protect our 

data, new operating systems and servers, and new and improved e-mail capability. 

The WAN design also has been enhanced to eliminate possible single points of failure. Completion of this phase was moved from the accelerated date of July 2002 to 

March 2003 to allow additional time to test and deploy a secure, operational system. 

The Enterprise Operations Center (EOC) facilities, circuit and bulk fiber installations, electronic key management system, and installation of encryptors are all on 

schedule. 

User training on the new desktop office automation software has begun and a new 

training management system deployed. 

The UAC component is scheduled to be delivered by January 2004, or four months 

ahead of the original schedule. And although the Trilogy Program is accelerating the 

network and desktop infrastructure ahead of applications development, there are 

significant benefits to modernizing the infrastructure before the upgraded applications are available. Infrastructure enhancement will immediately provide FBI field 

offices the high-speed connections to link with one another (and within each office) 

and share investigative and administrative information currently available in their 

legacy systems. It will provide nearly every FBI employee a modern desktop, and 

applications and database productivity tools, which will significantly enhance work 

productivity. 

Further, during the interim while Trilogy UAC is under development, the FBI is 

enhancing some of our existing legacy systems to enable web access to certain applications. So, for example, two new capabilities are the Case Control system and GlobVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:14 Oct 24, 2003 Jkt 087062 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\87062.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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al Index Application. The Case Control system was delivered in April 2002; the 

Global Index Application was delivered in April 2001. The Case Control System 

keeps track of the location of each Counter-terrorism related hard copy file, as it 

is routed to our field divisions and nine scanning centers; this ensures that all files 

are scanned and accurate file locations maintained. The Global Index Application 

allows the user to search for a name, date of birth, address, and/or phone number, 

against four of our main investigative applications systems (ACS, IIIA, CLEA, and 

TA), with one query, returning basic case information. 

The User Application development is now planned in two increments. The initial 

VCF release will migrate data from the current Automated Case Support (ACS) and 

IntelPlus to the VCF. VCF Release One has a targeted completion date of December 

2003. This release will allow different types of users, such as agents, analysts, and 

supervisors, to access information from a ‘‘dashboard’’ that is specific to their individual needs. This VCF release will also enhance our capability to set and track 

case leads, index case information, and move document drafts more quickly through 

the approval process, with digital signatures. 

The second release will migrate the Criminal Law Enforcement Application 

(CLEA), Integrated Intelligence Information Application (IIIA), and Telephone Application (TA) into the VCF. VCF Release Two has a targeted completion date estimated for June 2004. It will provide Audio/Video Streaming capability and provide 

our agents with ‘‘content management’’ capability. This will help them access information from our data warehouse, regardless of where in the system the information 

was entered. For the first time we will have a ‘‘one query does it all’’ capability. 

The VCF Team is currently using an industry-standard process called Joint Application Development (JAD) planning, to define and prioritize the users’ operational 

requirements. By joining the application developers with the users (agents, analyst, 

and support personnel), applications will be built that will reflect the items needed 

by these individuals to perform their jobs. This approach differs from the old way 

of doing business: figuring out how to do your job with the tools you already have. 

JAD is not a rebuild of the old system. It has brought users, designers, future systems operators together to develop applications that are operationally sound and 

maintainable. JAD sessions started at the end of January this year and are expected to conclude next week. Additional JAD sessions will take place as part of the 

process for VCF Release Two. 

As with any automation project, a number of risks must be managed to a have 

a successful Trilogy Program deployment. The top three are all related to our aggressive deployment schedule. I believe all are manageable. They are: INC/PC and 

UAC test and acceptance; the enterprise operations center; and legacy system interoperability. 

Before we deploy our Full Site Capability infrastructure to the field, we need to 

test the desktops, servers, and networks to ensure that there are no problems with 

our final configuration. Our current schedule allows a tight allocation of time for 

testing, which leaves little room for resolving potential problems. To mitigate this 

risk, the test team is prioritizing requirements and developing a common understanding of system acceptance test coverage, conditions, and criteria. Once identified, the plan is to test the most critical aspects of the system first, and, if necessary, continue testing the non-critical areas during initial deployments. 

Our aggressive schedule also leaves little time for EOC preparations in support 

of the deployed infrastructure. To mitigate this risk, current available EOC staff 

will be trained to support the Trilogy infrastructure and additional external resources will be identified for full operational support at the start of FSC deployment. Finally, contractor personnel will be utilized to supplement government staff 

for network services, central systems, security and the data center. 

Interoperability with legacy applications is another risk area. There is currently 

a lack of documentation in place that captures the old legacy system functions and 

operations. Therefore, the UAC team is still identifying new interfaces and modifications to existing interfaces. Our schedule allocation for engineering and testing may 

not be adequate for successful integration infrastructure deployment with the current applications and servers. To mitigate this risk, the test team is also prioritizing 

these test requirements and developing a common understanding of system acceptance test coverage, conditions and criteria. 

Once we catch up to a standard PC environment, the future looks very positive. 

We are planning for a technology refreshment program (TRP) which will replace 

Trilogy network and workstation hardware, network data storage, server hardware, 

and embedded software on a periodic basis to prevent system performance degradation and rising O&M costs due to obsolescence. The TRP also envisions the incorporation of new technology as it becomes available in the private sector and the study 

of emerging technologies to evaluate potential future uses and benefits and to better 

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anticipate future resource needs. In essence, a viable infrastructure technology refreshment plan is essential to maintain the benefits of the Trilogy investment, the 

efficiency and capabilities of FBI investigative support systems and to better plan 

and budget for out year expenditures. 

I have been asked to provide my personal perspective on what I have changed 

since reporting to the FBI this March, and how the FBI contrasts with my experience in the private sector. 

Before my arrival at the FBI, the Trilogy Program was overly focused on achieving an accelerated schedule. Although the Trilogy Program will still be brought in 

ahead of its original schedule, we have begun allowing for more test time to ensure 

we deliver a quality product to the field. Industry best practices recommend ‘‘building in quality’’, instead of ‘‘inspecting it in’’. Using quality standards and compliance 

up front will allow us to identify and prevent mistakes that would require expensive 

fixes later on down the line. 

Effective communications within and without the Trilogy Program is also essential to our success. I am in the process of developing a Trilogy Communications Plan 

that will promote effective communications across our business enterprise, so that 

valuable development information is not retained in pockets. 

I am also developing an integrated master schedule for the Trilogy Program, 

which will reflect the program’s critical path, dependencies and integration tasks between our three components. We will constantly review this schedule to capitalize 

on efficiencies and schedule improvement opportunities. 

One of the striking differences between the private sector and the FBI is the Bureau’s lack of a dedicated corps of acquisition specialists with which to plan, develop 

and manage large projects. The FBI has many talented people with some of these 

requisite skills; we have pockets of expertise in program management disciplines, 

such as financial analysis, budgeting, contract management and system engineering, 

residing in different divisions. However, the FBI has operated for too long without 

an organization responsible for proper development business practices, which would 

ensure that FBI systems under development are responsive to our users’ requirements. 

Private industry and most government agencies recognize the advantages of instituting a project management executive with a project management office to manage 

complex, expensive, high-risk development efforts. According to the Gartner Group, 

‘‘enterprises utilizing a project office to manage the growing complexity involved 

with creating or acquiring and then implementing and managing these applications 

have a distinct advantage over those that do not.’’. Perhaps the most frustrating experience I have had since coming to the FBI from private industry is trying to work 

information technology issues that cut across the FBI’s organization. ‘‘Stove piped’’ 

communications internal to the FBI prevents information and communications flow 

that is required to be responsive to our users and oversight. Successful project development and implementation at the FBI requires constant and accurate communications across our entire business enterprise. 

To make this a reality, I have recommended, and Director Mueller has approved 

of the establishment of an Office of Programs Management. This office will develop, 

manage, and deploy high-priority, complex and high-risk projects of high dollar 

value, to successfully support the FBI’s operational mission. The office will have a 

staff of subject matter experts in key program management functions, matrixed to 

development project managers. These project managers will be ‘‘loaned’’ from their 

sponsoring divisions to the Office of Program Management during the development 

of the project, from the concept phase until the project is ready to be transitioned 

to operations. 

In addition, the Office of Program Management will be charged with using repeatable processes for these efforts; in other words, we will implement a business approach to our large acquisition efforts, by instituting core program management disciplines from a project’s concept phase until it is transitioned to operations and 

maintenance. We will train a skilled corps of FBI PM subject matter experts, and 

advise the FBI Director on program management and acquisition-planning related 

organizational issues, proposals, and strategies. 

Because of its user/management orientation, the Office of Program Management 

will be in a position to make the most informed recommendations concerning tradeoffs between performance, schedule, and costs of projects, to determine the best 

course for return on the FBI’s investment in IT. This office will also gauge the impacts of delays of delivered functionality for the field divisions and headquarters, 

and develop budget justifications for the acquisition of required resources to support 

approved systems projects. 

In summary, Trilogy gives the FBI workable standards and a base it can build 

upon. Trilogy is being built to allow for interchanges with different systems, internal 

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and external, so that the historical problem of ‘‘not putting the pieces together’’ is 

no longer an issue. Trilogy will provide the resources and tools the FBI needs to 

support investigations and the critical building blocks for future improvements. The 

Trilogy Program is focused on getting these critical resources to our Special Agents 

and field support personnel as quickly as possible.

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