F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

G L O R I A I B A R R A -H E R N A N D E Z , P etitioner
,

v

.

E R I C H. H O L D E R , J R ., Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 11-70739

Ag ency No. A095-767-460

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Arg ued and Submitted October 6, 2014—Phoenix

, Ariz ona

F iled November 5, 2014

B efore: Dorothy

W . Nelson, B arry

G. Silverman, and Milan D. Smith, J r., Circuit J udg es.

Per Curiam OpinionI B A R R A -H E R N A N D E Z V

. H O L D E R 2

SUMMARY *

Im m igration

The p anel denied Gloria I barra-Hernande z ’s petition for review of the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals’ decision finding her inelig ible for c ancellation o f removal because her conviction for taking the identity of anothe r involves moral turpitude.

The panel held that I barra-Hernandez ’ s c o nviction pursuant to Ariz ona Revised Statutes § 13-2008(A) is n o t a categ orical crime involving mor a l turpitude, because the
statute is div i s i b l e and n ot every possible variation of the crime requires proof of fraud. Ho w e v er, apply ing the modified categ orical approach, the panel found that I b arraHernandez admitted at her chang e of plea hea r ing that she used a real person’s identity without his knowledg e o r consent to obtain employ ment. The panel held that the B I A reasonably found that stealing a real person’s identity f or the
purpose of obtaining employ ment is inherently fr a

udulent, and that it therefore involves moral turpitude.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.I B A R R A -H E R N A N D E Z V

. H O L D E R 3

COUNSEL

Hug o F . L arios (arg

ued), Tempe, Ariz ona, for Petitioner.

Dawn S. Conrad (arg

ued) a nd L uis E Perez
, Office o f I mmig r a tion L itig ation C i v i l Division, United States Department of J ustice, W ashing ton D.C., for Respondent.

OP INION

PER CURI AM:

Gloria I barra-Hernandez

, a native a n d citiz en of Mex ico, petitions for review o f a final order of removal. The B oard o f I mmig r a tion Appeals held that petitioner is ineli gi ble for cancellation of removal because her conviction for taking the i d e n tity of a

nother in violation of Ariz ona Revised Statute s § 13-2008(A) invol v e s m o ral turpitude under b oth the categ orical and modified categ orical approache s

. W e hold that A.R.S. §13-2008(A) is not a categ orical c rime involving moral turpitude. The statute is d ivisible, and n o t every possible variation of the crime r e q uires proof of fraud. F o r

ex a mple, under the statute, a defendant can be convicted for using a fictitious perso n ’ s i d e ntity with only the intent to obtain employ

ment, not to def

r a u d

. However, p etitioner ad m i t t e d a t the c h ang e of p lea hearing to using a real person’s identity

, without that p erson’s knowledg e o r consent, to obtain employ ment. Apply ing the m o d i f ied categ orical approach, the B oard r easonably held that stealing

a real person’s identity for the purpose of obtaining employ ment i s i nherently fraudulent, and therefore, that it involves moral turpitude.I B A R R A -H E R N A N D E Z V

. H O L D E R 4

I. Background

Petitioner, a nat i v e and citiz en of Mex ico, entered the United States in 1994 without inspection. On December 17, 2008, she pled g uilty pursuant to a w ritten plea ag reement to taking the identity of a n other in violation of A.R.S. § 13- 2008(A). The relevant version of § 13-2008(A) provides:

A person c o mmits taking the identity o f anothe r p erson o r e ntity if the person kn o wing ly takes, p urchases, manufactures, records, possesses or uses any personal identify ing infor m a tion o r entity identify ing information o f another person or entity

, includi n g a real or fictitious person or entity

, without the consent of that other person o r entity

, with t h e intent to obtain or use the other p erson' s or entity ' s ident ity for any unlawful purpose or to cause loss to a person

or entity whether or not the person or entity actually suffers any economic loss as a result of the offense, or with the int e n t to obtain o r continue employ

ment.

A § 13-2008(A) conviction is a Class F our felony

. Id. § 13- 2008(E). At t h e chang e of plea hearing

, petitioner admitted that she used the Social Security number of a

n actual person wi t h o u t his k

nowledg e or permission to g et a job at a retail
store f rom April 9, 2006 to O ctober 8, 2008. On J anuary 21, 2009, the Ari z ona Superior Court in Maricopa County sentenced petitione r t o 90 day s in jail and two y ears o f supervised probation.I B A R R A -H E R N A N D E Z V

. H O L D E R 5

The Department of Homeland Security subsequently initiated r emoval proceeding s, all e g ing that petitioner was inadmissible on two g rounds: F irst, pursuant to 8 U .S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for being present without b eing admitted

o r p a r o l e d ; a n d s e c o n d

, p u r s u a n t t o 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I

), f o r h aving committed a crime involving moral turpitude. I n addition to rendering an alien removable,

a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude r enders an alien inelig ible for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Petitioner a pplied for cancellation o f removal, admitting that she was removable for having entered without inspection, but deny ing that her crime involved moral turpitude.

Affirming the immigr a tion judg e, the B o ard held that petitioner was both inadmissible an d inelig ible for cancellation of removal b ecause a § 13-2008 conviction involves moral turpitude. The B oard hel d t h a t the A riz o na statute was categ orically a crime involving moral turpitude a s

one involving fraud. I n the alternative, the B oard applied the modified categ orical approach and hel d that the chang e-ofplea c olloquy established that petitioner u s e d the Social Security number of a

n actual person w ithout his knowledg e

or permission to obtain e mploy ment. Thus, p etitioner committed fraud when she took and u s e d the identity o f F rancisco Mejia, a real person.

II. Jurisdiction

Althoug h w e lack jurisdiction to review removal orders for al i e ns who have been convicted of certain crimes, 8 U.S.C. § 1 252(a)(2)(C), we retain jurisd i c t i o n to consider questions of law, includi n g w h ether a crime involves moralI B A R R A -H E R N A N D E Z V

. H O L D E R 6

turpitude. Marmolejo-Campos v

. Holder

, 558 F .3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

III. Analysis

The g overn m e nt concedes that the B oard erred in ruling that A.R.S. § 13-20 0 8 (A) is categ orically a crime involving moral turpitude. S

e e Descamps v. United States
, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281–82 (2013). W e ag ree. I t is possible to c ommit a violation o f A.R.S. § 13-2008(A) b y us ing a fictitious person’s name – say , Mickey Mouse – and a n on

- e x istent Social Security number solely for the p urpose o f ge t ting a job, a nd not with the intent to cause loss to any one. W e thus
ag ree with the g overnment that § 13-2008(A) is not categ orically a crime involving moral turpitude. W e now turn to the B oard’s a l ternative holding that petitioner’s crime is

one involving moral turpitude under the modified categ orical approach.

The chang e of plea transcript establish es t hat p etitioner admitted to taking the Social Security number of a real person without his k

n o w ledg e or consent in order to o btain o r maintain employ

ment. Unlike the Mickey Mouse ex ample, this particular offens e w a s a form of theft involving fraud. The B oard reasonably rul e d that petitioner’s conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, rendering h er inelig ible for cancellation of removal.

P ETITION DENIED.