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U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBERIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 2, 2003

Serial No. 108–58

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota 

THOMAS P. SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

NOELLE LUSANE, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Walter H. Kansteiner III, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 7

Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 11

Alex Vines, Senior Researcher, Business and Human Rights Division, Human 

Rights Watch ........................................................................................................ 25

Nohn Kidau, President, Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia ............... 35

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 5

The Honorable Walter H. Kansteiner III: Prepared statement ........................... 9

Theresa Whelan: Prepared statement ................................................................... 13

Alex Vines: Prepared statement ............................................................................. 28

Nohn Kidau: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 36

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 47

The Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 48

David M. Crane, Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 48

Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and 

Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Liberia: Prepared statement ... 52

UN Security Council statement of Jacques Paul Klein, September 16, 2003 .... 56

Peter Seligmann, Chairman and Executive Officer, Conservation International: Prepared statement .............................................................................. 60

Robert P. Winter, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID): Prepared statement ............................................................................. 62

Mohammed S. Kromah, National President, Union of Liberian Associations 

in the Americas (ULAA): Prepared statement ................................................... 63

Briefing document by Alice Blondel, Lead Campaigner, Global Witness ........... 64

Question for the record submitted to the Honorable Walter H. Kansteiner 

III, by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, together with response ..................... 67

Final Report on Liberia dated July 16, 2003 by the United States European 

Command, Humanitarian Assessment Survey Team ....................................... 68

(1)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBERIA 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m. in Room 2172, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce [Chairman 

of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Africa Subcommittee will come 

to order. And the nature of this hearing is U.S. policy toward Liberia. 

Liberia is a failed state. Years of war have taken a devastating 

toll, and an estimated 250,000 Liberians have been killed since the 

1990s. There are some 700,000 that are displaced. In Liberia today, 

child soldiers are commonplace. It is a humanitarian disaster. 

The UN Security Council has approved a mandate for what is 

likely to become the largest UN peacekeeping operation. This follows the commendable peacekeeping effort of several West African 

countries that are now in Liberia. These countries realize that Liberian insecurity is their own insecurity. 

Establishing a functional democratic government in Liberia, the 

goal of this peacekeeping operation, is going to be a great challenge. Legal institutions have been smashed. Corruption has shattered the public sector there. Seventy-five percent of Liberia’s physical infrastructure has, in fact, been destroyed. 

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has spoken of the need 

to eliminate what he calls the culture of violence in Liberia, and 

no one has done more to promote the culture of violence than 

Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor is gone, but not forgotten. Last 

June, Sierra Leone Special Court Prosecutor David Crane unsealed 

a 17-count indictment against the then Liberian President charging 

him with murder, rape, torture, mutilation and other charges. Several Members of this Committee are strong supporters of the Special Court and its mission of bringing to justice those bearing the 

greatest responsibility for the carnage in Sierra Leone. 

Understandably, Nigerians are speaking out against the asylum 

that Charles Taylor has been given by their government. The Nigerian Union of Journalists and the Nigerian Bar Association have 

both condemned it. Many others recognize that this asylum is undermining the principle of accountability, to the detriment of Nigeria’s struggling democracy and to the detriment of all of West Africa. 
2

There is also a very practical reason to reject Nigeria’s asylum. 

Charles Taylor has made no secret of his intention to return to Liberia. Given his notorious history, we had better take him seriously. Any Taylor return, we know, would be a bloody return. Even 

while in Calabar, in Nigeria, Taylor is trying to sabotage the peace 

process, and he is doing it on a constant basis with his cell phone 

in hand. I do have to ask about the wisdom of supporting an expensive peacekeeping operation in Liberia while this regional cancer 

roams free and taunts those who are involved in the process back 

in Liberia, of trying to put a state back together. 

I have chaired the Nigeria Caucus in Congress, and I observed 

Nigeria’s historic 1999 election. Today I am asking the Nigerian 

Government to turn Charles Taylor over to the Special Court. We 

should also be looking at returning the tens of millions of dollars 

that he has stolen from the Liberian people. Today, Charles Taylor 

is living in luxury, sitting on a stolen fortune, while unfortunate 

Liberians are barely surviving, and the U.S. is set to pay a peacekeeping bill in the hundreds of millions of dollars. This is just plain 

wrong. 

The first U.S. military commitment to an African conflict since 

Somalia has now wound down. Our troops were well received in 

Monrovia, and the operation incurred no casualties. They did a 

good job. U.S. military officials had described this deployment as 

a security blanket. The blanket has been pulled. I am concerned 

about the capabilities of the West Africans and the UN peacekeepers to follow. Fighting flared in Monrovia yesterday. I hope 

that we are prepared to provide these troops with logistical, intelligence, and training assistance. 

Lastly, I will raise the issue of timber management in Liberia. 

Charles Taylor oversaw the destruction of a good part of Liberia’s 

forests, which are the last significant block of forest in West Africa. 

He stole timbering revenues, which fueled the war. There is a push 

to undo UN timber sanctions on Liberia. We need to go slow, assuring that sustainable forestry practices are in place and that the 

revenues are tightly controlled. Liberia isn’t near these goals. 

Without objection, individual testimony will be included in the 

record from Peter Seligmann of Conservation International, which 

has been working for years and years in Liberia. His testimony 

notes that 25 years ago Liberia was a model of resource management in Africa. 

Liberia faces many hurdles. Regaining control over its resources 

is one of these hurdles. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the opening statement of Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA) at this afternoon’s hearing on U.S. policy towards Liberia: 

‘‘Liberia epitomizes the failed state. Years of war have taken a devastating toll. 

An estimated 250,000 Liberians have been killed since 1990; some 700,000 are internally displaced. Child soldiers are commonplace. Liberia is a humanitarian disaster. 

‘‘The U.N. Security Council has approved a mandate for what is likely to become 

the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation. This follows the commendable peace-
3

keeping effort of several West African countries now in Liberia. These countries realize that Liberian insecurity is their insecurity. 

‘‘Establishing a functional democratic government in Liberia, the goal of this 

peacekeeping operation, will be a great challenge. Legal institutions have been 

smashed and corruption has shattered the public sector. Seventy-five percent of Liberia’s physical infrastructure has been destroyed. U.N. Secretary General Kofi 

Annan has spoken of the need to eliminate the ’culture of violence’ in Liberia. 

‘‘No one has done more to promote the culture of violence than Charles Taylor, 

who is gone but not forgotten. Last June, Sierra Leone Special Court prosecutor 

David Crane unsealed a 17-count indictment against the then-Liberian president, 

charging him with murder, rape, torture, and mutilation, among other charges. Several Members of this Committee are strong supporters of the Special Court and its 

mission of bringing to justice those bearing the greatest responsibility for the carnage in Sierra Leone. 

‘‘Understandably, Nigerians are speaking out against the asylum that Charles 

Taylor has been given by their government. The Nigerian Union of Journalists and 

the Nigerian Bar Association have condemned it. Many others recognize that this 

asylum is undermining the principle of accountability, to the detriment of Nigeria’s 

struggling democracy, and all of West Africa. 

‘‘There’s also a very practical reason to reject Nigeria’s asylum. Charles Taylor 

has made no secret of his intention to return to Liberia. Given his notorious history, 

we better take him seriously. Any Taylor return, we know, would be a bloody return. Even while in Calabar (Nigeria), Taylor is trying to sabotage the peace process 

with his cell phone. I do have to ask about the wisdom of supporting an expensive 

peacekeeping operation in Liberia while this regional cancer looms and taunts. 

‘‘I’ve chaired the Nigeria Caucus in Congress; I observed Nigeria’s historic 1999 

election. Today I’m asking the Nigerian government to turn Charles Taylor over to 

the Special Court. We should also be looking at returning the tens, if not hundreds 

of millions of dollars that he has stolen from the Liberian people. Today, Charles 

Taylor is living in luxury, sitting on a stolen fortune, while unfortunate Liberians 

are barely surviving and the U.S. is set to pay a peacekeeping bill in the hundreds 

of millions of dollars. This is just plain wrong. 

‘‘The first U.S. military commitment to an African conflict since Somalia has 

wound down. Our troops were well received in Monrovia, and the operation incurred 

no casualties. They did a good job. U.S. military officials had described this deployment as a ’security blanket.’ The blanket has been pulled. I’m concerned about the 

capabilities of the West Africans and the U.N. peacekeepers to follow. Fighting 

flared in Monrovia yesterday. I hope that we’re prepared to provide these troops 

with logistical, intelligence and training assistance. 

‘‘Lastly, I’ll raise the issue of timber management. Charles Taylor oversaw the destruction of a good part of Liberia’s forests, which are the last significant block of 

forest in West Africa. He stole timbering revenues, which fueled the war. There’s 

a push to undo U.N. timber sanctions on Liberia. We need to go slow, assuring that 

sustainable forestry practices are in place, and that the revenues are tightly controlled. Liberia isn’t near these goals. Liberia faces many hurdles; regaining control 

over its resources is a big one.’’

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing was scheduled 2 weeks ago. It fell victim to Hurricane Isabel. David Crane, the Prosecutor of the Special 

Court for Sierra Leone, and Jacques Klein, the UN’s top official in 

Liberia who will head the peacekeeping operation there, were slated to testify then. They could not be with us today, and without 

objection, their testimonies will be placed into the record. 

And I would now like to turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Donald Payne of New Jersey, for any statement he might have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me 

commend you for calling this very timely and critical hearing on 

U.S. policy toward Liberia. 

The beginning of 2003 has been a time of change, transition and 

progress toward peace in many parts of the African continent. The 

Democratic Republic of Congo—termed a ‘‘heart of darkness’’ by 

Conrad many years ago, and a country of great natural wealth and 

history of visionaries like Patrice Lumumba, and also, though a tyrant, Mobutu Sese Seko—has ended a 4-year war and has formed 
4

a transitional government where all sides, including former rebel 

forces, civil society, religious societies and all, are in Kinshasa for 

the first time in 40 years to talk about a government peacekeeping 

mission in Sierra Leone, the U.S.—the UN’s largest in the world 

at this time, has proven to be a success. 

In the spring, Nigeria held its second democratic election since 

independence and reelected its current President without incident. 

Rwanda, a country that a genocide of close to a million people occurred 7 or 8 years ago, where two ethnic groups were at each 

other, had an election that, as a matter of fact, the minority ethnic 

group in that country, the current leader, President of Rwanda, 

was elected President, President Kagame. And so we have seen 

positive events occur, the transition of government to the Vice 

President in Burundi, who will serve for 18 months. So we were 

pleased with some of the positive solutions. 

However, we have seen the situation in Liberia this year deteriorate, and by midway through the year, the world began to take notice of the growing crisis in Liberia as the rebel groups LURD and 

MODEL moved closer and closer to Monrovia. 

In June when the peace talks began in Accra, Ghana, and President Bush’s trip was a month away, the debate began to take center stage. What should the U.S. role be in the Liberian crisis? It 

should have been no question about the role as many Members of 

Congress, and in particular the Congressional Black Caucus, talked 

about the U.S. participating in trying to have a settling position on 

the situation in Liberia. 

We recall back in 1991, when the U.S. was confronted with the 

first Persian Gulf War, the same thing was occurring, and Charles 

Taylor was wreaking havoc on the Liberian population. And his 

forces seized power in parts of Liberia, and then, as you know, the 

election there, he became the victor. There should have been no 

question about the role that the U.S. should have played in those 

days because there would not have been a Charles Taylor had we 

intervened to prevent him from gaining military force and then 

forcing the people of Liberia to vote for him as President. 

We know about the historical ties when the United States Congress voted $100,000 to President James Monroe and the American 

Colonization Society to begin this experiment in Liberia. The 

United States has had economic, military and political interests in 

Liberia since the beginning of 1822. In 1847, the people of Liberia 

declared their independence, and they selected the colors of the 

American flag: Red, white and blue. They modeled their Constitution after the Constitution of the United States. And companies 

flourished, like Firestone Rubber and Tire Company, where billions 

of dollars were made, and during World War II it was very critical 

to the United States in our war effort since the U.S. was cut off 

from the sources of rubber from the Pacific region. 

And so as a strong supporter of mutual defense, allied during the 

cold war, the Voice of America signals were sent from Liberia. But 

then in 1980, Samuel Doe seized power in a coup, and President 

Tolbert and many of his ministers were executed. However, because of the cold war, U.S. military aid during Doe’s ruling decade 

exceeded what Liberia had received collectively over its 150-year 

history. And so there is a role, there was a role there. There is a 
5

responsibility of the United States since we have had such a strong 

hand in that nation. 

But in conclusion, let me say that I was disappointed at the slow 

pace that the U.S. became involved. We sent an assessment team 

even a month before President Bush’s trip to Africa, and the assessment team assessed and assessed and assessed for weeks and 

weeks and months. We sent three ships. They were almost like the 

Love Boat as they slowly went around Africa to finally get to Liberia. And then, as an old song said, they didn’t sit on the dock of 

the bay, but they sat in the boat watching the tide roll away as 

this country was wreaked with so much havoc. 

And so we were disappointed that there was not more assertion, 

that there was not more activity, that there was not more of a leadership from the United States. But we were pleased that we sent 

in 200 troops that were on the ground for a week or so. We know 

that the United Nations Security Council have recently passed a 

resolution approving 15,000 troops, and Special Envoy Klein, who 

was supposed to come but, as you know, was unable, as we heard 

from the Chairman, has made the request. So we are hoping now 

that the United States will be supportive. 

I understand that the Government in Monrovia has no funds to 

try to move forward, as I heard a report from the mayor of Monrovia, who I expect to be here, if she’s not here already. And so as 

I conclude—there you are. Okay. How are you, Ms. Mayor? 

So as I conclude, we have a lot of work to do. I have some other 

remarks, but I will have it included in the record. And I would 

hope that we will be able to get some answers today. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We will include those in the 

record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for calling this timely and critical hearing on U.S. 

policy toward Liberia. 

The beginning of 2003 had been a time of change, transition, and progress towards peace in many parts of the African continent. The Democratic Republic of 

Congo, termed the ‘‘Heart of Darkness’’ by Conrad and a country of great natural 

wealth with a history of visionaries like Patrice Lumumba and the brutal tyranny 

of Mobutu Sese Seko, had ended the 4-year war and formed a transitional government with all sides, including all rebel factions, in Kinshasa for the first time. 

Rwanda held non-violent elections and Burundi saw a relatively peaceful transition 

of power. The peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, the UN’s largest in the world 

at the time, had proven to be a success. In the spring, Nigeria held its second democratic elections since independence. 

But mid-way through the year, the world began to take notice of the growing crisis in Liberia as the rebel groups LURD and MODEL moved in closer and closer 

to Monrovia. In June when the peace talks began in Accra, Ghana, and President 

Bush’s Africa trip was a month away, the debate began to take center stage: What 

should the U.S. role be in the Liberia crisis? 

There should be no question about what role the U.S. should have played in 1991 

when Charles Taylor was wreaking havoc on the Liberian population as his forces 

seized power and the world turned to the U.S. calling for it to take its responsibility. 

There should have been no question about the role the U.S. should have played in 

the days leading up to Charles Taylor’s departure when more than 1,000 lives were 

lost. After all, Liberia as we know it was created in 1820 with a grant of $100,000 

from the U.S. government by President James Monroe and the American Colonization Society. Their plan was to send America’s growing population of freed blacks 
6

back to Africa. Since then, the U.S. has had a hand in Liberia’s economic, military, 

and political operations and has greatly enjoyed the benefits of that close relationship. 

In 1847, the people of Liberia declared their independence. They gave their country a flag and a constitution modeled on that of our own. American companies, such 

as the Firestone Rubber and Tire Company, have made billions off of Liberia’s land. 

In 1942, the republic allowed the United States to station troops on its soil. Liberia also was a key Cold War ally. A mutual defense pact was signed and the US 

established a massive air base and built communications facilities to handle intelligence traffic and relay a Voice of America signal throughout the continent. 

Samuel Doe seized power in a coup from President Tolbert in 1980. In spite of 

his brutal, horrendous dictatorship, Doe received more in U.S. military aid than all 

previous Liberia leaders combined. Doe’s destabilization of the country paved the 

way for Charles Taylor and other rebel leaders to try their hand at rule by force 

and devastation. So the U.S. is complicit in the state of Liberia today. 

Though even our closest allies such as Britain were expecting the U.S. to lead a 

peacemaking force in Liberia, President Bush and his advisers decided to send only 

200 troops which were on the ground for a few short days. As we know, the three 

U.S. warships that took weeks to arrive off Monrovia’s shores like the Love Boat 

slowly making its way from the Red Sea, finally sailed away yesterday. 

The UN Security Council passed a resolution two weeks ago approving 15,000 

troops which Special Envoy Jacques Klein requested. The U.S. troops should have 

stayed long enough to see the transition from ECOWAS to the UN and from Interim 

President Moses Blah to Gyude Bryant, the businessman, who was chosen by the 

delegates at the peace talks in Ghana to head the two-year National Transitional 

Government. 

Just as there was no question about the U.S.’s responsibility in 1822, 1991, and 

this past July, there should be no debate over our role in helping Liberia today as 

it transitions towards peace, democracy, and reconstruction. 

Liberia should be considered for emergency funding for its reconstruction as the 

President is requesting $87 billion for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. ROYCE. We have two witnesses on our first panel. First is 

Walter Kansteiner, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and it is good to have him with us. Prior to assuming his duties at the Department of State, Mr. Kansteiner was a founding 

principal of the Scowcroft Group; Director of African Affairs on the 

National Security Council staff; an African specialist on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff; and a member of the Strategic Mineral Tasks Force for the Department of Defense. And 

through these various positions, he gained more than 20 years’ experience in African issues and emerging market issues, and we are 

certainly delighted to have the Assistant Secretary with us today. 

Also, we have Ms. Theresa Whelan. She serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of Defense. She 

has served as the Director of the Office of African Affairs for 2 

years before becoming the Deputy Assistant Secretary. Ms. Whelan 

served as Countries Director for Southern Africa from 1994 to 

1997, and Countries Director for West Africa from 1991 to 1994. 

I am going to ask that we recess now for 10 minutes. This should 

be enough time to make this vote and the next vote, and we will 

ask our witnesses and our audience to bear with us here. And 

there should not be any further interruptions as these are the last 

two votes of the day. 

So, Mr. Kansteiner, Ms. Whelan, we will be right back. Thank 

you very much. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing is reconvened. We will go to Mr. Walter 

Kansteiner. 
7

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WALTER H. KANSTEINER III, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is always a 

pleasure to appear before you and your Committee. 

For the past year, U.S. policy toward Liberia has been guided by 

some very simple principles: Stop the killing, help humanitarian 

aid flow, and help begin to construct new governance for Liberia. 

We have an opportunity to help this small country in West Africa. 

And, Mr. Chairman, as you know, opportunities to shape the future 

of a country in a region don’t come often. Quite frankly, we have 

had a couple opportunities in the last few decades in Liberia, and 

with the future of Liberia and we missed those opportunities. Ultimately, I think, we cannot afford to miss another opportunity for 

this country. 

This past summer our government asked itself some very tough 

questions and I think came up with some very appropriate and reassuring answers. One was should American boots, as we say, 

‘‘boots on the ground,’’ should American troops ever go to Africa? 

And could it ever be worthwhile? And could it be honorable, and 

could it be successful? And the answer to all of those questions was 

yes, indeed, it can be. American boots on the ground in Africa does 

make sense in the right circumstances, and it can be honorable, 

and it certainly can be successful. 

We asked the question about projecting force, and we discovered 

that even if the military footprint is relatively small, that force projection can bring excellent results. We learned some good lessons 

and asked ourselves some hard questions about diplomacy. We 

found out that long, hard hours of diplomatic negotiation among 

rebel groups and tough governments, in fact, pays off. And we also 

found that Foreign Service officers’ bravery is very real and very 

powerful. 

And let me just spend a moment to thank those professional diplomats in the Foreign Service that stood in Monrovia. Along with 

our Ambassador, John Blaney, our entire Embassy staff refused to 

abandon their post, and they endured shelling and automatic weapon fire, and they kept our flag flying. And, you know, the symbolism of the U.S. flag flying over that Embassy, the only Embassy 

left open in Monrovia, was not lost on the Liberians. And I am 

proud of them, and I am proud to be part of that African Bureau 

that did that. 

Now that Monrovia is calmer, we can start addressing some of 

the humanitarian crises. Of particular concern is the protection of 

some half million internally displaced people. We know that there 

is going to be a lot of hard work ahead of us. These internally displaced people will begin to move, and they should begin to move 

back to their homes, and we, the United Nations and the NGO 

community, must help them get there. 

The United States has played a significant role in mitigating this 

humanitarian crisis in large part due to the U.S. contributions. The 

UN right now is feeding some 400,000 people. The U.S. Government has provided $40 million to international and nongovernment 

organizations for water sanitation and shelter programs, disease 

control, medical services, some $17 million for food, and this is 
8

really just the beginning. Measles, malaria, cholera are still serious 

health issues that face Monrovia and all of Liberia. 

Security is key to resolving this humanitarian crisis and preparing the way for a political transition. In this respect, the 

ECOWAS states that you, Mr. Chairman, spoke of, and that Congressman Payne referred to in his opening statement, is meeting 

that security challenge. I am proud that the United States provided 

critical support to the 3,600 ECOMIL peacekeeping troops. Quite 

frankly, without this U.S. assistance, those intervention forces 

never would have been deployed to Liberia and never would have 

been able to be the peacekeepers that they, in fact, are. We committed some $26 million to transport all the contingents 

and to fund contracted logistical support for all of ECOMIL. Yesterday we saw that ECOMIL force become what we call blue-helmeted 

and, in fact, become part of the UN peacekeeping operation. 

Mr. Chairman, you refer to the joint task force having departed, 

but I assure you the United States will remain involved. We are 

going to support the peacekeepers, and we are going to help restructure and train a new professional Liberian Army. 

On the UN front, the United States drafted and endorsed the UN 

Security Council resolution 1509, which, in fact, establishes the 

peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII authority. It calls for up 

to 15,000 peacekeepers, 250 military observers and a robust police 

component. The United States is seconding a number of officers to 

UNMIL, and we are looking for ways to assist in this very important demobilization and disarming and police training. 

While we await the full UN deployment in Liberia, we keep a 

close eye on Charles Taylor. We recognize that Nigeria granted 

Taylor exile for the sake of regional peace. And we also, Mr. Chairman, recognize that for that same regional peace, he must be 

watched and watched very carefully. We are working with Nigeria 

and the international community to help ensure that Taylor no 

longer has influence in Liberia today. 

We also seek continued cooperation from President Moses Blah. 

As you know, President Blah has pledged to step down in just a 

couple of weeks, on October 14, and the transitional government 

will come in place. So far President Blah’s government has supported the deployment of peacekeepers and the distribution of humanitarian assistance and the observance of the Accra Accords. 

Under those agreements, the Liberian delegates in Accra selected 

a new head of state that will be inducted on October 14, and that 

is Mr. Gyude Bryant. This new, young transitional government 

that comes into power on the 14th of October is going to need all 

of our help, and when I say all, I mean the international community, I mean the UN, and I mean the United States. We have to 

be the catalyst for this. The world is looking to us. They are watching us. We have to be the leaders. We have to be there with resources, with encouragement, with people on the ground. Mr. 

Chairman, this State Department is ready to do so. I look forward 

very much to working with the Congress in finding the appropriate 

resources to make this involvement happen. 

In conclusion, may I just say that since August, Liberians have 

had spontaneous and, I think, very heartfelt public expressions of 

joy at the intervention of U.S. troops. They are excited about our 
9

newfound involvement in their country, and I think we owe it to 

them to respond to their response. Both leaders of the former government and fighters among the rebel groups have told us explicitly that they are willing to give up their arms, and they are willing to seek peace, and they are willing to see their country go 

through a true transformation only because of U.S. involvement. 

So, sir, I look forward to working with you and your Committee 

to see this opportunity through. We have a window that is open. 

Let us not miss the chance on this one. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Kansteiner, and we 

certainly agree with you on the importance of that involvement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kansteiner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALTER H. KANSTEINER, III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today to discuss Liberia. For the past year the U.S. government has had three overarching priorities in Liberia: to stop the killing, to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid, and to achieve a comprehensive, profound change in the way the country 

was governed. We have worked long and hard, in cooperation with likeminded Liberians and the international community, in pursuit of these goals. 

We are greatly encouraged by the results. We actively supported and made possible the successful deployment of West African peacekeepers and played a key role 

in producing the Accra Accords. We brokered the rebel withdrawal from Monrovia, 

opening the way for renewed humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of 

suffering people. We did this with a small—but crucial—military footprint. Liberia 

has taken the first steps toward stability. Largely through our efforts, the killing 

of innocent civilians has been substantially reduced, and assistance is starting to 

reach those in need. 

In my testimony today I will highlight the next steps to expand these gains. But 

first I would like to discuss briefly the history of Liberia and its unique relationship 

with the United States. 

Liberia and the United States have deep and longstanding ties. This land on the 

coast of West Africa was founded at the initiative of Presidents James Monroe and 

Andrew Jackson, as well as Daniel Webster, Francis Scott Key, Henry Clay, and 

George Washington’s nephew Bushrod. In 1819, Congress provided $100,000 for the 

effort. 

In 1847, Liberia became the first independent African republic. Liberians patterned their constitution, flag, attire, place names and architecture on U.S. models. 

Liberia was a key ally during World War Two, when we used Liberian territory as 

a re-supply center for the campaign in North Africa. During the Cold War, Liberia 

served as a relay station for Voice of America broadcasts, for tracking shipping, and 

for communications surveillance. We also helped create Liberia’s shipping registry. 

Today five percent of Liberia’s population is descended from freed slaves. The remainder of the population of three million people comes from 16 ethnic groups. 

Descendants of the original American settlers, or ‘‘Americo-Liberians,’’ ruled over 

the indigenous population until 1980, when Samuel Doe and a group of noncommissioned officers overthrew the government. A decade of predatory rule contributed to 

the conditions for the 1989–1996 civil war, and Doe’s brutal death. 

The new government, led from 1997 until August of this year by Charles Taylor, 

also terrorized the Liberian people. Rather than work to improve the lives of Liberians, Taylor supported the bloody Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, fomenting unrest and brutal excesses in the region. Liberia’s new rebel groups, ‘‘Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy’’ and ‘‘Movement for Democracy in 

Liberia’’, draw from factions that fought against Taylor in the early 1990s, and on 

support from neighboring countries that Taylor’s forces attacked using arms purchased through the trade in Sierra Leone’s conflict diamonds. 

Today, we seek to help Liberians change the violent and negative course of their 

recent history. During this summer’s fight for Monrovia, the capital, Ambassador 

Blaney and our Embassy staff kept our flag flying and refused to abandon their 

post, courageously enduring shelling and automatic weapons fire. They offered a ray 

of hope for war-weary Liberians by not abandoning them to the combatants. Meanwhile, in support of the International Contact Group on Liberia, we facilitated negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement. President Bush insisted that Charles 
10

Taylor step down and leave Liberia. The presence of U.S. troops and our financial 

commitments were critical to the success of our diplomacy, and the United States 

will continue to participate in efforts to bring peace to Liberia. 

Now that Monrovia is calmer, addressing the humanitarian crisis is the first order 

of business. Of particular concern is the protection of 500,000 Internally Displaced 

Persons, 280,000 Liberian refugees in neighboring countries and 50,000 Sierra 

Leonean and Ivoirian refugees within Liberia, many of whom have fled their homes 

more than once. 

The United States has played a significant role in mitigating the humanitarian crisis in Liberia. USAID’s Office of Food for Peace has already committed $16.7 million in P.L. 480 Title II Food Assistance, or more than 24,000 metric tons of food. 

With our help, the UN World Food Program is feeding more than 400,000 people. 

Overall, the U.S. Government has provided $40 million to international and nongovernment organizations for water, sanitation, and shelter programs; for disease 

control and prevention; for medical services and work to combat sexual and genderbased violence; for logistical support and security for humanitarian workers; and, 

for food stocks. However, much remains to be done. Measles, malaria, cholera, and 

diarrhea are serious health issues. Food security and reintegration of refugees and 

Internally Displaced Persons are also outstanding issues. 

Security is key to resolving the humanitarian crisis, and preparing the way for 

the political transition. In this respect the Economic Community of West African 

States—ECOWAS, led by Nigeria and seven other regional countries, is meeting the 

challenge. The United States provides critical support to the 3,600 ECOMIL peacekeeping troops, without which the intervention forces never would have deployed to 

Liberia. We have committed $26 million to transport all the contingents and to fund 

contracted logistics support and equipment for ECOMIL. A UN peacekeeping operation, UNMIL, began operations October 1, subsuming ECOMIL units, at the same 

time that the direct support role by U.S. Marines deployed to Liberia ended, as ordered by President Bush. 

Although the U.S. Joint Task Force established to support West African peacekeepers now has departed, the United States will remain involved in other ways in 

supporting the peacekeepers, and in restructuring and training a new and professional Liberian military. In order to further support Liberia’s August 18 peace 

agreement, we drafted and endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 1509, which 

establishes a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII authority. In keeping with 

the UN Secretary General’s recommendations, it calls for a force of up to 15,000 

peacekeepers, with 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, a robust police component of up to 1,115, and a significant civilian component and support staff. The 

United States is seconding nine officers to UNMIL (two headquarters staff officers, 

seven military observers). 

While we await the full UN deployment in Liberia, we keep a close eye on Charles 

Taylor and seek to ensure that he creates no further mayhem. During his Presidency Taylor controlled every aspect of Liberia’s political system and economy; we 

have every reason to believe that if he has the means he will try to use his old connections in an attempt to undermine the fragile peace. We recognize that Nigeria 

granted Taylor exile for the sake of regional peace. We are working with Liberia 

and the international community to help ensure that Taylor no longer has any influence in Liberia, and we support Nigeria’s stern warning to Taylor not to have any 

contacts with Liberia. 

We also seek continued cooperation from President Moses Blah, who assumed office upon Charles Taylor’s resignation. President Blah has pledged to step down on 

October 14 in favor of a two-year transitional government. So far, his government 

has supported the deployment of peacekeepers, the distribution of humanitarian assistance, and the observance of the Accra Accords. Under those agreements, the Liberian delegates in Accra selected among the non-combatants a head of state, Mr. 

Gyude (pronounced ‘‘Judy’’) Bryant. The combatants, political parties, and civil society divided cabinet positions and within the next few weeks in Monrovia, they will 

select ministers and candidates for an interim unicameral legislature. 

The Transitional Government will need a lot of help. The UN will bring significant, but not enough, resources to the table, and it will take time for the UN effort 

to become fully operational. The international donor community will respond to Liberia adequately only if the United States helps Liberia. Continued US assistance 

for Liberia is critical in areas such as humanitarian aid; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all combatants; restructuring of the security services; economic recovery; environmental protection; national reconciliation; and good governance. We need to continue to support programs to help refugees and displaced persons return safely to their homes and to set the stage for free and fair elections in 

October 2005. 
11

Since August, Liberians’ spontaneous and heartfelt public expressions of joy at the 

intervention of U.S. troops have provided yet another example of the deep connection Liberians feel toward the United States. They profoundly hope that their 

friendship with the United States will help lift them out of their current political 

and humanitarian crisis. Both the leaders and fighters among government and rebel 

forces have stated explicitly that they are willing to give up their arms and seek 

peace only because of U.S. involvement. 

A successful political transition leading to a stable Liberia will serve U.S. strategic interests. U.S. follow-through on Liberia will affect our relations with Nigeria 

and the other 14 countries of ECOWAS. The historically unique U.S.-Liberia relationship can be used in furthering the Global War on Terrorism. Peace and security 

in Liberia will have a profound impact in the areas of human rights, good governance, the rule of law, environmental preservation, and opportunities for U.S. investors. Liberia’s disintegration, conversely, would have created a new terrorist and 

criminal training ground. 

Liberia’s stability is important not only for our relations with our African partners 

whom we depend on increasingly for security and energy assistance, but also for our 

relations with Europe. Specifically, the United Kingdom and France, which have invested significantly in stabilizing Sierra Leone and Coˆte d’Ivoire, have publicly 

called on the U.S. to take the lead in resolving the Liberia crisis. Indeed, had the 

United States walked away from the country it created, many in the world would 

have doubted the depth of our commitment to Africa. While humanitarian relief and 

the avoidance of further violence constitute more than sufficient reasons for us to 

remain engaged in Liberia, our strategic interests are also significant. 

In sum, the United States has demonstrated leadership and humanitarian compassion. The situation, however, is still fluid, and Liberians need to hear and see 

that the United States will stay the course. Continued U.S. assistance and limited 

but visible U.S. support for the other elements as outlined above, including security, 

will send a clear message that we will remain involved in Liberia, and greatly boost 

prospects for the success of the Transition Government, ECOMIL, and the UN. It 

would also encourage all parties to the conflict to work toward rebuilding Liberia, 

ending the industry of war. Such U.S. actions would prompt international support 

for creating a new Liberia, and represent for us a memorable foreign policy success 

story. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with Congress, your Committee, and 

others to promote U.S. interests in Liberia and peace and stability in West Africa. 

I will be happy to answer your questions.

Mr. ROYCE. We will now go to Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Whelan. We have read your testimony, Ms. Whelan, so if you want 

to capsulize that and keep that to 5 minutes, we would appreciate 

it. 

STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. WHELAN. I will try and keep it to 5 minutes or less. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss with 

you and your Committee U.S. policy toward Liberia and the Department of Defense’s role. 

The Defense Department’s activities in Liberia build upon our security cooperation programs which are designed and developed to 

develop the capabilities of allied and friendly militaries for self-defense and coalition operations. In early June the Department of Defense deployed approximately 1,800 personnel offshore Liberia to 

assist if needed in securing the U.S. Embassy and evacuating 

Americans and foreign nationals due to the threat posed by advancing rebels and undisciplined government forces. 

Our forces withdrew on 17 June when the rebels halted their offensive and the security situation in the capital appeared to stabilize. Subsequently, the President indicated his willingness to support the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States, 

ECOWAS, in mediating peace talks and considering an ECOWAS 
12

peacekeeping force for Liberia once a cease-fire was in place and 

a peace agreement was signed. The President offered U.S. military 

support to this West African effort under certain conditions, namely the departure of Charles Taylor from office and from Liberia, a 

cease-fire between rebel groups and Liberian Government forces, 

and the firm commitment by West African countries to provide 

leadership and the bulk of the troops for any peacekeeping effort. 

Following the signing of the cease-fire on 17 June, ECOWAS 

agreed to deploy an interim peacekeeping force into Liberia known 

as ECOMIL, the ECOWAS military mission to Liberia. ECOWAS 

requested U.S. and international donor support for funding logistics and a quick reaction force to back up an ECOMIL force that 

would number roughly 3,600. At this point the President tasked 

DOD to provide liaison assistance to ECOMIL to facilitate its deployment to Liberia and to provide the quick reaction force to back 

up ECOMIL. This became the primary mission of the 26th Marine 

Expeditionary Unit. 

The U.S. mission has been to assist ECOMIL to mitigate the humanitarian situation and to help the conditions for transition to a 

UN stability force as soon as possible. The plan was for the U.S. 

mission to end once the UN established its mission in Liberia, 

which occurred yesterday, setting the groundwork for U.S. troop 

withdrawal. 

We knew from our previous cooperation with ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast that it could field a credible force 

for the Liberia mission with targeted assistance from other countries. Many of its member states have been trained and equipped 

through our military cooperation programs, such as Operation 

FOCUS RELIEF and the African Crisis Response Initiative. We 

also knew that this force would need to rely totally on donor assistance for funding and logistical support to include tactical and strategic airlift. 

The Department of State addressed these weaknesses through 

the use of peacekeeping operations funds to establish a U.S. commercial contract logistics task force. In the last 90 days DOD has 

provided the following forces to support U.S. policy in Liberia: A 

50-person Fleet Antiterrorist Support Team, which remains in 

Monrovia from Rota, Spain, deployed in August to secure the U.S. 

Embassy; an 18-person Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team deployed from Stuttgart, Germany, to assess the humanitarian situation in Monrovia and to look at the condition of the airport, seaport, road and bridge systems; a five-person Forward Surgical 

Team deployed from Stuttgart, Germany, to support the deployed 

DOD forces and U.S. Embassy with medical care; three- to fourperson Liaison and Facilitation Teams, deployed to the 8 troop-contributing countries throughout ECOWAS, and to the ECOMIL 

headquarters in Monrovia, and to the peace talks in Accra, Ghana. 

These teams assisted ECOMIL in its deployments and in developing equipment requirements for their troop-contributing countries. 

The U.S.S. Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group with its 

2,100-person 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived off the Liberian coast on 13 August. Elements moved to shore for temporary 

assignment, such as supporting ECOMIL forces when they moved 
13

to secure the seaport. U.S. Navy specialists conducted assessments 

of the seaport to evaluate its capability. Throughout, the quick-reaction force routinely conducted presence and demonstration overflights with its helicopters and aircraft.

The U.S. European Command also used elements of its Southern 

European Task Force to provide a 40-person joint task force headquarters to conduct planning and liaison with ECOMIL. 

Since we are running short of time, to conclude, I would note 

that we have seen in Liberia evidence that our programs to support 

West African peacekeeping troops have worked to achieve those 

goals. Specifically, ECOMIL has Operation FOCUS RELIEFtrained and equipped forces as well as African Crisis Response Initiative-trained and equipped individuals. Also, the new African 

Contingency Operation Training and Assistance program, created 

based on lessons learned from focus relief and the ACRI program, 

was useful in predeployment training for the Ghanaians. ECOMIL 

is also leavened with officers who are former students from our 

international military education and training programs. 

In conclusion, we have seen our African security cooperation efforts bear fruit in this combined U.S.–ECOWAS endeavor in Liberia. There is far more work to be done. UN peacekeepers are critical to short-term success in Liberia, and continued U.S. leadership 

in training programs will also continue to pay dividends in regional 

stability. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Ms. Whelan. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE

OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOD POLICY TOWARD LIBERIA

Mr. Chairman, 

Thank you very much for this opportunity to discuss with you US policy toward 

Liberia and the Department of Defense (DOD) role. 

Department of Defense Role in Liberia 

The Defense Department’s activities in Liberia build upon our security cooperation programs, which are designed to develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalitions operations. In early June, the Department of Defense deployed approximately 1,800 personnel offshore to assist, if needed, in securing the US Embassy and evacuating American and foreign nationals due to the 

threat posed by advancing rebels and undisciplined government forces. Our forces 

withdrew on 17 June when the rebels halted their offensive and the security situation in the capital appeared to stabilize. 

Subsequently, the President indicated his willingness to support the efforts of the 

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in mediating peace talks 

and considering an ECOWAS peacekeeping force for Liberia once a cease-fire was 

in place and a peace agreement was signed. 

The President offered US military support to this West African effort under certain conditions: the departure of Charles Taylor from office and from Liberia; a 

cease-fire between rebel groups and Liberian government forces; and the firm commitment by West African countries to provide leadership and the bulk of the troops 

for any peacekeeping effort. 

Following the signing of the cease-fire on 17 June, ECOWAS agreed to deploy an 

interim peacekeeping force into Liberia known as ECOMIL—The ECOWAS Military 

Mission to Liberia. ECOWAS requested US and international donor support for 

funding, logistics, and a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to back up an ECOMIL force 

that would number roughly 3,600. 

At that point the President tasked DOD to provide liaison assistance to ECOMIL 

to facilitate its deployment to Liberia, and to provide the quick reaction force to 
14

back up ECOMIL. This became the primary mission of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). 

The US mission has been to assist ECOMIL to mitigate the humanitarian situation and to help set the conditions for transition to a UN stability force as soon as 

possible. The plan was for the US mission to end once the UN established its mission in Liberia, which occurred yesterday, setting the groundwork for US troop 

withdrawls. 

We knew from our previous cooperation with ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 

and Ivory Coast that it could field a credible force for the Liberia mission with targeted assistance from other countries. Many of its member states have been trained 

and equipped through our military cooperation programs such as Operation FOCUS 

RELIEF (OFR) and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). We also knew 

that this force would need to rely totally on donor assistance for funding and 

logistical support to include tactical and strategic airlift. 

The Department of State (DOS) addressed this weakness through the use of 

peace-keeping operations funds to establish a US commercial contract logistics task 

force. 

Specific DOD Support 

In the last 90 days DOD has provided the following forces in support of US policy 

in Liberia:

• A 50-person Fleet Antiterrorist Support Team (FAST) from Rota, Spain deployed in August to secure the US Embassy.

• An 18-person Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) deployed from 

Stuttgart, Germany to assess the humanitarian situation in Monrovia and to 

look at the condition of the airport, seaport, and road and bridge systems.

• A 5-person Forward Surgical Team (FST) deployed from Stuttgart, Germany 

to support the deployed DOD forces and US Embassy with medical care.

• Three-to-four person Liaison and Facilitation Teams (LAFT) deployed to 8 

Troop Contributing Countries throughout ECOWAS and to the ECOMIL 

Headquarters in Monrovia and the peace talks in Accra, Ghana. The teams 

assisted ECOMIL in its deployments and in developing equipment requirements for the Troop Contributing Countries.

• The USS IWO JIMA Amphibious Readiness Group with the 2,100 person 26th 

Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived off the Liberian coast on 13 August. Elements moved ashore for temporary assignments, such as supporting ECOMIL 

forces when they moved to secure the seaport. US Navy specialists conducted 

assessments of the seaport to evaluate its capability. Throughout, the quickreaction force has routinely conducted presence and demonstration overflights 

with its helicopters and aircraft. 

US European Command (EUCOM) used elements of its Southern European Task 

Force (SETAF) to provide a 40-person Joint Task Force Headquarters to conduct 

planning and liaison with ECOMIL. 

DOD has agreed to provide personnel to the UN mission to Liberia (UNMIL). 

The total number of DOD personnel deployed to support this effort reached almost 

5,000 at its peak. Forces remaining in Liberia now number less than 100 and will 

continue to reduce this month. 

DOD Long Term Policies Supported 

As noted earlier, DOD’s Liberia support mission builds upon DOD’s security cooperation programs that develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations and, in Africa in particular, create a capability for 

peace-keeping operations and enhance regional stability and security. 

We have seen in Liberia some evidence that our programs work to support the 

above goals. Specifically, ECOMIL has Operation FOCUS RELIEF-trained and 

-equipped forces as well as African Crisis Response Initiative-trained and -equipped 

individuals. Also, the African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance program (ACOTA), a new program created based on lessons learned from Operation 

Focus Relief and the African Crisis Response Initiative was useful in pre-deployment training for the Ghanaians. ECOMIL is also leavened with officers who are 

former International Military Exchange Training (IMET) students. Finally, US programs complement similar programs with our allies, notably the UK, France, and 

Portugal in this regard. 

In conclusion, we have seen our Africa security cooperation efforts bear fruit in 

this combined US/ECOWAS endeavor in Liberia. There is far more work to be done. 

UN peacekeepers are critical to short-term success in Liberia and continued US 

leadership in training programs will continue to pay dividends in regional stability.
15

Mr. ROYCE. I am now going to ask a question of Secretary 

Kansteiner, and it has to do with a comment made by Jacques 

Klein, the UN representative in Liberia. He recently reported that 

Charles Taylor, the former President, calls the Liberian transitional government two or three times every day, and he added that 

Taylor continues to undermine the political process, and he says 

Taylor is clearly rebuilding his network. He is like a vampire, his 

words, until you drive a stake in his heart, he won’t die. A Sierra 

Leonean human rights activist has said of Taylor’s current practices there, he is like Saddam Hussein. You know he is gone, but 

he is not dead. It would be naive to think he is not a real player 

in the picture. 

And, Secretary Kansteiner, as you know, the Chairman and 

other Members of the International Relations Committee wrote the 

Secretary in June, during speculation of Taylor’s exile, and they 

warned there is no reason to believe that Taylor’s willingness and 

ability to foment conflict and destabilize his neighbors will be any 

less virulent if he is sent to Tripoli or Rome or Paris or Abuja or 

elsewhere. Well, he ended up in Calabar, Nigeria, which, I understand, conditions there are better than Abuja. 

I would like to know what we are doing to bring Taylor to justice. 

And as I said in my opening statement, this is critical not just for 

the sake of justice, but there are real practical reasons for doing 

this. Unless we get him, he threatens not only the investment we 

are being asked to make in Liberia, but he also threatens the investment we have made in Sierra Leone. And it seems only right 

to press the Nigerian Government to do what most Nigerians, as 

I understand it, want to see done, and that is to have Taylor 

turned over to the Special Court. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The reports that we have, in fact, verify what you suggest, that 

Taylor is in regular contact with what is essentially his old government that—you know, it is his Vice President, now President, Blah 

that sits in the chair for the next 12 days. That changes on October 

14 when the transitional government comes in, and that is a good 

thing. 

I might add that I believe that his behavior, that is this contact, 

and his seemingly somewhat capabilities of influencing events in 

Monrovia, wanes every day. Every day he is gone from Monrovia, 

his clout, his power, his ability to make things happen is lessened. 

The fear of him is that much weaker. The desire to help him, 

please him, obey his orders, is that much less. 

Nonetheless, I totally agree with you. His behavior seems to be 

outside the bounds of the Nigerian hospitality. When the Nigerians 

provided him exile, there were certain rules that apparently transpired, and his noninvolvement in things Liberian was one of those 

rules. So he seems to be in violation with this type of behavior. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you this, though. When you say it appears that his influence is lessening by the day, it also appears 

that all Liberians, with the exception of Charles Taylor, will be eligible for positions in the new national transitional government. 

And many cronies of Charles Taylor appear headed for high posts. 

Likewise, top rebel leaders are going to gain key positions. How 

does this bode for building a responsible government in Liberia? 
16

And what about Elie Saleeby, the Governor of the Central Bank, 

who, I understand, is still clinging to that position? I would like to 

ask you about that. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, again, the complexion of the government 

changes in 12 days. There are, according to the Accra Accords, 

rules that the Liberians have placed on themselves on who is going 

to be participatory in that government headed by Gyude Bryant. 

And there are numerous Liberians that I think are very capable 

that have not been involved in the political situation, either on the 

rebel side or on the government side, that I hope come to the fore, 

in fact play a very real role. 

Mr. Chairman, let me go back to one point that I don’t think I 

have adequately answered, and that was your question about what 

are we doing vis-a-vis the Nigerians, what we are talking to the Nigerians about. And I just want to assure you that we have urged 

the Nigerians to not only keep a close eye on Charles Taylor, but 

to consider transferring him to the court in Sierra Leone, because 

ultimately Charles Taylor needs to stand in front of that court and 

let the charges be heard. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Secretary Kansteiner. 

Let me ask about a recent report in which the United Nations 

documented that Taylor’s government had misused funds, had embezzled money from several bank accounts, and they included in 

this report six U.S. financial institutions where money has been 

parked. Should we consider freezing these accounts so that the 

money can be used to rebuild Liberia and not end up supporting 

Charles Taylor in a rather posh exile? I think the UN peacekeeping 

operation is going to be costly in Liberia, and we might as well get 

what we can from Taylor and from his associates, right? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. I agree. And in perhaps a closed session I could 

describe what some of those next steps are. 

Mr. ROYCE. I know you were on the right side of a previous argument, but I hope we can move faster than we moved on Mugabe’s 

assets. I know we can sometimes get concurrence on this, but 

somehow we don’t seem to move quickly. 

The next question has to do with the weapons that Charles Taylor has stored in Liberia, and we hear reports about the magnitude 

of this. I wanted to ask you about that. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. The question of weapons is one of the big 

issues for this country. The demobilization and disarmament, is an 

absolute must if we are going to take this opportunity that we all 

talk about. We not only have to take the weapons that have been 

in the hands of Charles Taylor’s militias, for sure we have to do 

that. But we, the international community; we, the United Nations; 

we, the United States, in support of those institutions, we also 

have to disarm the entire society, quite frankly. I mean, we have 

to break this cycle of ‘‘grab a gun and go pillage and grab what you 

can.’’

So, yes, I think we need to stay focused on the disarmament 

throughout the entire society. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

I wanted to ask Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan a question 

about the departure of U.S. troops from Liberia, which really precedes the deployment of UN peacekeepers in any significant num-
17

bers. Yesterday fighting flared in Monrovia, and my question is 

who will provide quick reaction capacity now if West African peacekeeping troops stumble as they originally stumbled in neighboring 

Sierra Leone? 

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With regard to the question, yes, U.S. forces have departed. However, there are still 3,600 ECOMIL troops in the greater Monrovia 

area; Senegalese, Ghanaians, all very capable peacekeeping contributors. Two battalions of Nigerians are there as well; as are 

Gambians, Guinea-Bissauans, Togolese. So Liberia is not absent an 

international force that can help maintain order. 

The quick reaction force for the present is being provided by a 

Nigerian company that has armored vehicles as part of its equipment. There is also an agreement to get support from the 

UNAMSIL helicopters, attack helicopters, in Sierra Leone should 

that be needed. However, over the course of the next couple of 

weeks, the UN forces will be flowing in. There is a Bangladeshi brigade that will begin flowing in in the next 2 weeks, so there will 

be a significant increase over time of international force presence 

in Liberia, and that should help keep the lid on the situation. 

And I would note that while there was an incident at a red light 

district yesterday, that ECOMIL did respond, was able to restore 

order, and that things today are reported to be totally calm. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Whelan. 

We will now go to our Ranking Member Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. And I would like to just formally once again introduce the mayor of Monrovia, Mrs. Ophelia 

Saytumah. If you would stand. Glad to have you here with us, and 

thank you for coming. 

Let’s see. Mr. Kansteiner, currently we have the ECOWAS troops 

there, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Togo, and, of course, Nigeria. 

I understand up to date we have made $21 million available. Is 

there any way that the State Department or USAID or someone, 

Department of Defense, could make funds available, because I am 

sure that it is woefully inadequate to help support the effort. Do 

you have any idea? 

And secondly, the problems in Monrovia, sewage system, water, 

potable water and so forth, I understand that there has been no 

money budgeted for this at the present time. Someone said maybe 

$75 thousand, but that was a mistake. Could you tell me how that 

fits in, and where we are going, and maybe what you see in the 

near future in the request for an appropriation? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Yes, sir. On the security side, we have spent 

about $27 million thus far on bringing these multinational troops 

to Liberia. Of course, our UN assessment, our 27, 28 percent of 

that assessment, is yet to come down. But assuming the UN gets 

close to the 15,000 ceiling, and we might not, as the UN might decide that they only need 12- or 13,000. So we have to wait and see. 

Of course, we will pay our assessment of the 27 percent, which will 

be a sizable figure, quite frankly. 

On the humanitarian-reconstruction-redevelopment side, about $40 million has been spent. We have got tens of millions more in 

the pipeline, but we need—and this is a very rough figure—but we 

need about $200 million in fiscal year 2004, and I don’t know 
18

where we are going to get it. And we need to work with you all, 

and we need to figure out how we can take advantage of this opportunity, because if we are going to ever spend the money, this is the 

year to spend it. This is our chance. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

I would like to—believe it or not I would like to commend the Department of State for its advocation. I was in Amman, Jordan, on 

June the 21st at a meeting dealing with economic forums and so 

forth and had an opportunity to ask Secretary Colin Powell about 

would the U.S. intervene, and what was his position. And I think 

he was very supportive of U.S. intervention in Liberia. And so I do 

appreciate that. 

Let me get to the Department of Defense. Now, you withdrew. 

There is a transition going on October the 4th, so I add up 117 people that the Department of Defense was able to spare, looking at 

your remarks. Okay. We did 50 people on FAST, 18 people on 

HAST, 5 people on FST, 3 people on the LAFT, and 2,000 on a 

boat. What was the reluctance of the Department of Defense to put 

some boots on the ground in Liberia if we have a $400 billion budget? 

We have our hands full in Iraq, there is no question about it, but 

I think it was absolutely disgraceful that Secretary Rumsfeld continually arguing against deploying a single person in Liberia. It is 

disgraceful, it is unconscionable, and it just makes me feel that if 

it is a black person dying in Africa, Rumsfeld doesn’t think they 

are worth our men on the ground. 

Now, you are not Rumsfeld, but I am so sick and tired of his pontificating no policy in Iraq and continually arguing against having 

any kind of humanitarian issue, any kind of persons on the ground. 

A thousand people died while the assessment team was in there. 

What was there to assess? Could you answer that? I count 117 people. 

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Congressman. 

No, I am not the Secretary, but to answer your question, there 

are actually a total of 4,900 personnel deployed in the region. 

Mr. PAYNE. How many is on the ground? How many stepped into 

Monrovia? 

Ms. WHELAN. How many total stepped into Monrovia? There 

were, between the fast team, between——

Mr. PAYNE. That was 50. 

Ms. WHELAN. The fast team is 50 and is still there. Our quick 

reaction force, which did deploy for 10 days to the airport, we did 

have in excess of 200 on the ground. 

Mr. PAYNE. They stayed for a week. 

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, they did, in support of an ECOMIL operation 

to go take the seaport as designed. Our mission was—we carried 

out our mission. It was the mission that the President set for us. 

Our mission was to support ECOMIL; not to take over for 

ECOMIL, but to support ECOMIL. 

Mr. PAYNE. If that was the mission, that was the false and wrong 

mission in the first place. We were asking the United States to join 

with ECOWAS and go into Liberia together, the same way that the 

British, who supported the United States in Iraq, went into Sierra 

Leone with their troops, the same way that the French went into 
19

Cote d’Ivoire with their troops, with help from the other troops, the 

same way that they went into Bunia and Eastern Congo, French 

troops with African troops coming in. And the greatest defense 

team in the world found that it could not send 1,000 people, 500? 

They sent 40 people? 

Ms. WHELAN. There were 4,900 people involved in the whole operation spread throughout West Africa during the time. We had 

forces deployed in Dakar supporting this. We had forces deployed 

in Sierra Leone supporting this. We had forces deployed. We had 

teams deployed in all of the countries that contributed to 

ECOWAS. We had our forces, as you said, deployed offshore positioned to go onshore should they be needed. The good news is they 

weren’t needed. They were there to go onshore if they were needed, 

but ECOMIL was capable of handling the situation and demonstrated that they were capable, which I think is a credit to our 

cooperation with them and our security cooperation programs 

which have built the capacity that you saw demonstrated by the 

Nigerians, that you saw demonstrated by the Senegalese and the 

Ghanaians and the Beninwa and the Guinea-Bissauans, who have 

conducted a very successful operation. 

Mr. PAYNE. After 1,000 people died. If they had gone in in June 

when we suggested it, I even suggested to the President himself 

that I don’t think that one single shot would be fired at America. 

I know for—I would have staked my career that one shot wouldn’t 

have been fired at a United States marine. They didn’t even shoot 

at the Nigerians, and they don’t even like them. They like us. And 

we stood around and let 1,000 people die during the summer while 

this great execution went on. 

I will yield back Mr. Chairman. I rarely get annoyed, but this 

made no sense. It was, I feel, disgraceful. And I think that—and 

if I get the opportunity to see Secretary Rumsfeld, I will tell him 

the same way that I am—unfortunately, you are the messenger. 

You know, you just happened to be there. You don’t look like him, 

thank God. 

Ms. WHELAN. I will report that back to the Secretary, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Please give him my remarks, not my regards. 

Mr. ROYCE. We will now go to Mr. Tancredo from Colorado. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Whelan, you mentioned that there will be troops, more 

ECOMIL troops, going into Liberia, and when do you anticipate 

that they will actually hit that 15,000 authorization level? 

Ms. WHELAN. My understanding is that the UN plans to hit the 

15,000 by March 1904. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Given the reports that we have had about forced 

labor in the countryside, once again, starting some of those stories 

that end up being so ugly when they finally get here, and we hear 

of various kinds of atrocities, given the status of the country at the 

present time, which certainly, one would have to say is—you know, 

the best way to describe it is still a basket case, then do you think 

that, number one, that number is appropriate in order to maintain 

the status quo, and number two, to actually improve conditions? Do 

you think that 2004 is a date soon enough for this all to happen? 
20

Ms. WHELAN. With regard to the number, the UN military planners came up with that number, and so I will not pass judgment 

on that number. But I would note that in Sierra Leone, which is 

roughly comparable in size to Liberia, that there were roughly 

about 17,000 plus troops for the UN mission in Sierra Leone. So 

in that context I think they were capable of addressing the security 

situation in Sierra Leone once the UN got its ceiling increased. 

This was later on. This was not initially. Initially the UN had a 

much smaller number in Sierra Leone, which, as everyone knows 

here, created significant difficulties for that UN mission. When 

they increased their ceiling, it went well over 17,000. They were 

able to put the lid back on the security problem in Sierra Leone. 

I think extrapolating from that you can make a reasonable judgment that the UN’s estimate of 15,000 for Liberia is an adequate 

number at this stage. Obviously if the UN feels it is not adequate 

in the future, they can come back and adjust that number and seek 

to have that number adjusted. But in our judgment it appears adequate. 

Mr. TANCREDO. And when we think back to other operations 

there in Liberia, of ECOWAS troops in the 1990s, we had some 

problems. There were problems of the way they comported themselves. And what, if anything, do you think is being done to avoid 

that kind of a problem? 

Ms. WHELAN. I would note that in the 1990s the mission in Liberia was not a UN mission, it was an ECOMOG mission run by 

ECOWAS. The Nigerians were in charge, and, yes, there were 

problems, although one, again, must give ECOWAS credit because 

they did that primarily on their own with very little international 

support, if you look at the 10-year history. 

But in this particular case, the bulk of the UN contributors are 

actually not going to be West Africans. You are looking currently 

at 3,600 West Africans, and you are looking at a total UN force of 

15,000. Most of the contributors are actually coming from outside 

of Africa. They are experienced peacekeepers, such as the 

Bangladeshis, the Indians, the Pakistanis. So I think that you will 

see a UN operation conducted in the appropriate manner, and you 

will not see abuses. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Will there be—is it your opinion, either one of 

you, that their primary purpose is to maintain the peace as opposed to actually bringing about some major element of change, 

major element of salutary change? And, for instance, we certainly 

have heard about international criminal networks that are operated inside Liberia, and you can have a force there that will contain the situation, but how do you actually get to—I mean, can we 

dislodge them? Is that possible? Would it be under the auspices of 

this commitment, this troop commitment, or are we going to just 

leave that up to the government that takes control? 

Ms. WHELAN. I am going to toss part of that question to Assistant Secretary Kansteiner. But with regard to the security aspects 

of the question, the UN mission in Liberia is a very broad mission. 

Security is one part of it, and then there are all kinds of other aspects to it, including helping reconstruct the Government of Liberia, get a police force, et cetera. 
21

As far as the security mission and the 15,000 forces that will be 

committed to that security mission, their responsibilities will be 

primarily to establish a secure environment in which the other elements of the UN mission as well as international organizations, 

NGOs, et cetera, can work to help with regard to reconstruction of 

Liberian society to include addressing criminal issues and other police-related issues. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. There are other jobs that the UN is willing to 

take on, and I am grateful that they are. These tasks include the 

demobilization, disarming, breaking of these gang cartels. It is really helping stand up a new government. And Jacques Klein has got 

a tremendous amount of energy and is very focused on all of these 

DDRR-type issues that, in fact, will provide the structure for a new 

government. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and let me just subscribe 

to what my friend said. I never seen him upset before, Mr. Payne, 

but I think this is a serious issue in which we are currently involved in. And Mr. Chairman, I would like afterwards—I had an 

opening statement—to submit it for the record. 

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. MEEKS. The question really comes up—a lot of it is, are the 

people of Liberia suffering any less than those of Iraq? If you look 

at our two policies, are the children who are more accustomed to 

carrying a rifle than a schoolbook, are they any less in need of a 

childhood than an Iraqi child; the natural resources of diamonds, 

gold and timber and agriculture any less able than oil to one day 

transform Liberia into a self-sufficient country? 

I ask these questions because I try to understand why the Administration’s policies feel that American taxpayers can pay. There 

is no question—Mr. Secretary Kansteiner said we don’t know 

where the money is going to come from. We can find $87 billion to 

rebuild a nation that actually throughout history has not even 

made a fraction of the same contribution to America as those individuals from Liberia. The question is especially relevant when the 

estimated price tag for intervention in Liberia is only $275 million. 

We talk about having multilateral forces. Well, the international 

community has already agreed to provide the majority of the troops 

for the peacekeeping and such that the U.S. doesn’t even have to 

request the assistance of international troops. Therefore, it becomes 

a question of value of lives on the African continent. 

There are other things taking place on the continent now. I know 

there is supposed to have been an agreement on the border dispute, 

and now things don’t seem to be happening there. The question is, 

what is the true commitment to saving the lives of individuals who 

happen to be of color, particularly when you look at Liberia and the 

closeness that it has had with the United States of America. Before 

the ECOWAS and the UN can have their troops on the ground, we 

are pulling out. It does not send the right message. 

My question I guess first to you, Mr. Secretary, is what can we 

do to make sure that others in the international community will 

just see our—not see our retreat from Liberia as an example of 

what they should do. Unlike the other governments, as Mr. Payne 

has indicated, they marched in because of the connection between 
22

those countries and Africa and themselves with those troops, the 

African troops, to make sure they had a better life. I put that to 

you, Mr. Secretary Kansteiner. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

What we can do is be the leader. What we can do is, when it 

comes to a pledging conference that the UN will probably call for 

Liberia at some point in the next few months, we not only show 

up with a checkbook but we show up with ideas; we show up with 

plans on how we can actually take this opportunity to rebuild this 

little country or help rebuild this little country. We take the chance 

to work with the other donor countries not only to provide resources but in the security case to provide troops. 

The Irish, for instance, are right now seriously considering providing a headquarters battalion for Monrovia for the UN peacekeeping operation. That is terrific. We need to be working with 

Dublin encouraging them to do that. That is great news. But they 

are looking for our leadership in this. They are looking at what are 

the Americans doing, and we have to project that leadership, and 

we have to demonstrate that we are interested, we do care, we are 

going to spend the money. We are going to find the $200 million, 

and we will. I think working together we will find it. I am pretty 

confident about that. The world wants to see that; and then they 

will come, they will follow. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask you this, maybe this will help us, what 

was the result of the weeks of assessments carried out by the Department of Defense. Do you know the results of that, their assessments? 

Ms. WHELAN. The assessments were of dual nature. There was 

the humanitarian assistance team—assessment team that was in 

Liberia for a little over—a couple of weeks, which did provide a report which was utilized by AFTA and other U.S. Government agencies as a part of all of the data that they were gathering on the 

situation. There were also assessment teams and facilitation teams 

that were sent to the troop-contributing countries for ECOMIL. 

Their purpose was to go and help those countries get ready for 

their deployments, help them plan for their deployments, help 

them assess the readiness of their equipment, the readiness of 

their troops, advise them; and that is exactly what they did. So 

during that time they were working with those countries, helping 

prepare those countries for their movement into Liberia. 

We also helped ECOWAS plan for this mission. We had U.S. 

military planners in Ghana; we had them in Dakar during the 

ECOWAS summit. They held an impromptu Foreign and Defense 

Ministers summit to come to an agreement on the ECOMIL mission. We had planners with them there. 

So we were constantly working with ECOWAS to facilitate what 

they were trying to do with regard to their regional organization, 

taking responsibility for regional security problems that impacted 

directly on all the members. 

Mr. MEEKS. Would you say that was a robust force? 

Ms. WHELAN. Yes. I mean, we had teams in eight countries; and 

we were facilitating ECOWAS conducting the mission. We were not 

conducting the mission for them. We were working with them so 

that they could conduct the mission as they desired to do. 
23

Mr. ROYCE. We have one more panel——

Mr. MEEKS. When will that report be accessible to the Members 

of the African Subcommittee for both the House and Senate? The 

L.A. Times recently reported that the word ‘‘robust’’ force was 

stricken by the Administration or squashed by the Pentagon, and 

I would like an opportunity to see what the assessment was and 

what the report stated. When do you think the Members of this 

Committee will have an opportunity to see that report? 

Ms. WHELAN. Are you speaking with regard to the survey team 

report? 

Mr. MEEKS. The results of the assessments, the report that they 

talked about, the assessments from the weeks or the months or 

however long you were there that you determined what the situation was on the ground in Liberia. The L.A. Times said there is a 

report that was completed. Certain things I understand were redacted from the report as a result of pressure from the Pentagon. 

I would like to see the report or any report that came out in that 

regard. 

Ms. WHELAN. I am not familiar with the L.A. Times report, sir. 

We will take the question and get back to you. 

Mr. ROYCE. We have one more panel we are going to go to, but 

first we want to go to Congresswoman Barbara Lee for her questions. 

Ms. LEE. I want to thank the Chairman for the hearing today 

and thank both of you for participating. 

I, too, myself, associate with the very clear remarks of our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, and also of Mr. Meeks and just want to 

take this maybe a little bit further in terms of a broader question 

as it relates to Africa. 

As a Member of this Subcommittee, I have noticed that the 

peacekeeping and democracy building accounts in the Africa budget 

continue to decrease, while the incidents, of course, of civil conflict 

that they were talking about in Liberia and unrest on the continent 

is on the increase. I just want to know basically what is this Administration’s position on the issue of peace, democracy and longterm sustainable growth on the continent of Africa? I mean, what 

is it? 

Secondly, let me say, just as it relates to the $200 million that 

you mention, Mr. Kansteiner, that it is probably going to be hard 

to find, but $87 billion showed up from nowhere. Where—I think 

we need at least $500 million for 2004. Why can’t we shave $500 

million off that $87 billion? 

I know African Americans, millions of us, pay taxes in this country; and I am sure there would be widespread support for at least 

for $500 million going into Liberia off that $87 billion. That may 

be an easy way for you, in terms of the supplemental coming down, 

for you to make sure that not only is the $200 million there but 

at least $500 million. 

Mr. ROYCE. The total is probably close to $400 million. 

Ms. LEE. I am thinking $500 million. Let us say $500 million a 

year. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Let us go for a billion. 

Ms. LEE. We have some development costs I think that we need 

to pursue during this moment of opportunity. 
24

Mr. KANSTEINER. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. I 

think there are going to be opportunities that arise that you can’t 

always budget for 18 months, 2 years ahead of time, quite frankly. 

I am hoping that we are looking at a very successful Sudan peace 

agreement that is just right around the corner. There will be some 

resources needed to sustain and bolster that. 

Ms. LEE. Eighty-seven billion dollars. Maybe five hundred million dollars. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. I don’t think it will be hard to find the $200 

million. I think we will find resources for Sudan, too. If you go back 

and look at what our peacekeeping operations dollars spent, not 

what we budgeted for 2003 but what we actually spent in 2003, 

those peacekeeping operation funds were considerably higher than 

they were in 2002 and 2001. Now partially that is because we had 

some conflict resolution that we participated in and in fact engaged 

in and partially because it was opportunities at hand and we have 

to strike while the iron is hot. 

Ms. LEE. Where are you going to find the $200 million? Where 

are you going to put it? Is it going to be in the supplemental? Is 

it—find some discretionary money over there? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. I will leave it to the appropriators and the people in the State Department that in fact work those appropriation 

numbers. 

Ms. LEE. You have asked for it. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. We will be asking. 

Ms. LEE. Let me just ask you in terms of the UN special court 

for Sierra Leone. My understanding is there is no money left to 

prosecute people like Charles Taylor as it relates to the reconciliation process. 

Mr. KANSTEINER. I believe the UN court’s budget is under some 

stress. Our commitment was a $15-million, 3-year commitment. 

That was 2001, 2002 and 2003 monies. We in the Africa bureau 

kicked in $5 million per year. $15 million, that was our obligation. 

That was what we promised. That was our obligation, and we fulfilled it. 

The court seems to realize that it is not enough. They don’t have 

enough to continue on. There are some building costs, and they 

were building courthouses, and they had some very legitimate 

costs. So they have added expenses that they weren’t prepared for 

and didn’t realize. So they have come back and asked, if there is 

any way the U.S. Government can kick in more. We are looking at it. We have met our obligation of the $15 million. We were happy to do it. 

The court is a very important mechanism; and, in fact, Charles 

Taylor is indicted under that court. How that court can get the necessary resources that will be needed—it is going to be far more 

than $5 million from us or $2 million or whatever we find. That 

is a bigger question, and perhaps the UN needs to help out there, 

too. 

Ms. LEE. When will we know, given this indictment, whether or 

not we are going to at least help with this effort? 

Mr. KANSTEINER. Well, our $15 million, the last tranche of that, 

that last $5 million in 2003 was transferred to the court about 3 

months ago. I don’t know if they have blown through that money 
25

or what, but we will be happy to look in the next few weeks and 

see if there are some additional resources that we can find for 

them. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Lee. And I would mention that, compared to the international criminal tribunal that tried Mr. 

Milosevic or other international courts, this Committee has been 

impressed with the cost-effectiveness of the court in Sierra Leone. 

We are now going to our second panel, and we are going to again 

thank Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner and Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Theresa Whelan for their testimony today. 

Before you leave, Assistant Secretary Kansteiner, I will be submitting a question for your response concerning the Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute. So, Walter, I look forward to our continued 

work together on seeing that that flashpoint doesn’t explode, and 

I will appreciate your quick response on that question. 

I will ask our two panelists to take their seats. 

Let me begin with Ms. Nohn Kidau. She served as President of 

the Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia and has served 

since 2001. She was a participant at the Accra, Ghana, peace conference; and last spring, Ms. Kidau helped organize a conference on 

the future of Liberia that included representatives of most major 

Liberian parties and leaders from Liberian civil society as well. She 

is an accountant by training, as am I. 

Mr. Alex Vines has worked for the New York-based Human 

Rights Watch over the last decade with a focus on Africa. He is currently a senior researcher for the Business and Human Rights Program. Since last September, Mr. Vines has also been head of the 

Africa Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 

London. In April 1901, he took a leave of absence from Human 

Rights Watch and joined the UN panel of experts on Liberia that 

was established under Security Council Resolution 1343. Mr. Vines 

served on 3 subsequent panels as an expert until May 1903. 

Mr. Vines, we will go with your testimony first; and then we will 

go with Ms. Nohn Kidau. 

STATEMENT OF ALEX VINES, SENIOR RESEARCHER, BUSINESS 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Mr. VINES. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I 

would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on 

Liberia. 

As we have already heard, conditions remain worrying in Liberia 

as we are reminded by the shooting in Monrovia yesterday. Last 

weekend, two U.S. warships left waters off Liberia’s coast and 

sailed home, followed this week by a third ship. Yet the Administration defends its actions by claiming that Liberia is stabilized 

and U.S. forces are no longer needed there. But field research by 

Human Rights Watch in Liberia even last month shows that currently there are large numbers of marauding armed bands continuing to commit murder, rape, force recruitment and looting in 

many parts of the country. There is a more detailed description in 

the submission I have given you. 

Protection of the civilian population remains an urgent priority, 

and a significant U.S. presence on the ground as part of an inter-
26

national force would have had a profound psychological effect as 

well as making recruiting of other forces from other countries for 

the peacekeeping operation easier. Even now, a visible U.S. presence such as a return of U.S. Navy ships at key moments in the 

peace process would signal that the U.S. is still watching. This 

worked very well in Sierra Leone when the British did this with 

their warships from time to time at key moments of the peace process. 

The Administration should seek funds from Congress to support 

the country’s reconstruction, including the rebuilding of its judicial 

and law enforcement institutions. It should back the UN peacekeeping force with human and logistical support. The U.S. could 

show leadership by quickly contributing personnel to the UN peacekeeping operation; and, as I have already said, civilian protection 

remains a key priority. 

We have heard about the indictment of Mr. Taylor, and Human 

Rights Watch believes this is a defining moment. We do encourage 

the U.S. Administration to urge the Nigerian authorities to hand 

Mr. Taylor over to the special court. We believe that is absolutely 

essential. 

We have also heard about UN sanctions, and I should mention 

a little bit about them. They have played an important role in the 

progress toward ending the war in Liberia. They are coming up for 

review in a month’s time in November and could still play a role 

in supporting efforts to obtain security and stability on the ground 

in Liberia and in the region. 

The Liberian sanctions were at their core designed to shore up 

the peace process in Sierra Leone. They did fully achieve this objective. But their original justification on Liberia was to cut off 

Charles Taylor’s support for the Sierra Leone rebels. This is no 

longer valid following the peace process and successful elections in 

Sierra Leone. 

I must note that the effectiveness of sanctions have also been 

poor and deteriorating over time. 

Taylor’s forces and the rebel groups have obtained large amounts 

of arms and ammunition. Indeed, one has to note that Liberia’s 

neighbor, Guinea, has helped undermine the Liberian sanctions 

through their support for the LURD rebels. Guinea’s support of the 

LURD rebels became all too visible in July, 2003, during the mortar shelling of central Monrovia. 

The LURD mortars were very likely to have originated through 

Guinea; and Guinea, as the Committee knows, sits on the Security 

Council at the UN and is a very active Member in the Sanctions 

Committee. We believe at Human Rights Watch that the U.S., as 

a key member of the Security Council, should ensure that Guinea 

is properly reprimanded for its support of violation of UN sanctions 

and its continued support of the LURD from what we see. 

Obtaining a consensus on the Security Council for the new basis 

for Liberian sanctions which is not contingent on events in Sierra 

Leone was not possible in 2002 and may still be difficult. We believe that there needs to be some rethinking about how sanctions 

are progressing. 

Yesterday, the current panel of experts on Liberia monitoring the 

sanctions submitted their report to the Sanctions Committee. Over 
27

the next month, the UN Sanctions Committee will discuss its findings in the run-up to the Security Council’s review in early November. 

The U.S. is a permanent member of the Security Council and can 

have influence over the debate there, and I suggest that there are 

some key issues that the U.S. could vanguard. One is that the export of diamonds through the Liberian government should be permitted once a credible certification scheme compatible with the 

Kimberley process is established. 

I would also say there should be a suspension of the travel ban 

on many of those named on the current list, but it is important to 

signal that people like Mr. Taylor and key names as sanction busters and human rights abusers should remain on that list. 

Finally, the arms embargo shouldn’t be lifted. It should stay for 

the foreseeable future at least until 2005. 

We also think that the panel of experts itself should probably be 

reconfigured, a smaller panel that is very targeted on the current 

needs of Liberia, rather than based on the previous needs of Security Council 1343 would be a good idea. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to sum up by talking about the 

very important issue of misuse of revenue by the Taylor government and the challenge that that provides. The reform of the management of Liberian sources of revenue, including the timber sector, is critical for the reconstruction of the country. This is especially true given that the transitional administration that takes 

over in mid-October has divided the management of the key 

sources of revenue such as forestry, mines, ports and the maritime 

registry between the protagonists in the civil war. 

For the last 6 years under Charles Taylor, much of the country’s 

wealth was diverted or disappeared, making Liberia one of the 

poorest nations in the world. Tens of millions of state revenue disappeared through extra-budgetary expenditures or through ad hoc 

tax exemptions. Rubber, timber and the maritime revenues were 

key; and, according to the IMF, Liberia’s revenues, if properly managed, would generate around U.S. $79 million a year if tax revenues included. 

What I think needs to happen is that—the Security Council 

passed Resolution 1408 in May, 2002, which called for an audit of 

revenues particularly deriving from shipping and the timber industry. This was the first time that the Security Council had required 

an audit of this type. Unfortunately, the Liberian government 

never conducted any sort of financial audit; and this would be a 

good step forward if the U.S. could ensure that an internationally 

verifiable audit regime is introduced for both maritime and timber 

revenues by the forthcoming transitional government. 

We also would like to see—the Liberian government also needs 

to ensure that the Bureau of Maritime Affairs has its bank account 

only in the Central Bank of Liberia in order to ensure transparency 

regarding its use. Although Liberia announced that it would do this 

in 2001, in fact nothing has occurred. The revenue generation of Liberia is an important challenge, and this is a window of opportunity here to ensure that the wealth of Liberia benefits its poor 

rather than benefits elite groups who then use it in a highly unaccountable manner. 
28

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vines. We thank you and Ms. Kidau 

for making the trip here and for your testimony. We have put it 

in the record, and you both made some very good suggestions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vines follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALEX VINES, SENIOR RESEARCHER, BUSINESS AND HUMAN

RIGHTS DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committee, I would like to thank you for 

giving me the opportunity to speak on Liberia. I have worked for the New Yorkbased Human Rights Watch for over the last decade with a focus on Africa. I am 

currently a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch’s Business and Human 

Rights Program. Since last September I have also been the Head of the Africa Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London. 

In April 2001 I took leave of absence from Human Rights Watch to join the U.N. 

panel of experts on Liberia established under Security Council Resolution 1343 

(2001). I have served on three subsequent panels as an expert, until May 2003. I 

testify before you on behalf of Human Rights Watch, but also with the benefit of 

the insights I gained over the last two years from being on the U.N. panel of experts 

on Liberia. 

I shall focus in this testimony on the immediate need for civilian protection. I 

wish to first provide you with a summary from Human Rights Watch’s field investigation in Liberia less than a month ago. I will also discuss the issue of sanctions. 

Finally, I will talk about the important question of Liberia’s management of its revenue and especially its maritime registry. In each case I will highlight recommendations for U.S. policy toward Liberia. 

I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Current Human Rights Conditions 

Conditions remain worrying in Liberia, despite assurances by the West Africanled peacekeepers that the situation has stabilized. President Bush pledged that 

America would ‘‘help the people of Liberia find the path to peace,’’ on his way to 

Africa this summer. Three ships with thousands of U.S. Marines steamed for Liberia’s shores. And on August 15, after the departure of Liberia’s brutal leader, 

Charles Taylor, a ‘‘vanguard’’ force of 200 Americans landed in Monrovia, raising 

hopes among Liberians that the United States would aid them at last. 

Ten days later the Marines withdrew to their ships, leaving an ill-equipped and 

undermanned West African force in Liberia’s capital. Last weekend two U.S. warships left waters off Liberia’s coast and sailed home, followed this week by the third 

ship. This leaves just about 100 U.S. troops in Liberia, providing security at the 

U.S. embassy and working as coordinators with the 3,250 peacekeepers. Was this 

just a token gesture without the risk of assuming any responsibility? 

The thinking behind this deployment appears to be the product of compromise between the State Department’s vision of wider American global interests and the 

Pentagon’s narrower view. The administration defends its actions by claiming Liberia is stabilizing and U.S. forces are no longer needed. It is true that West African 

peacekeepers have helped reduce violence in Monrovia, Kakata and Buchanan. The 

problem is that peacekeepers have barely moved into the unstable countrysidewhere U.S forces could make a significant difference. 

The U.N. took over the peacekeeping responsibilities in Liberia yesterday and a 

force of 15,000 has been proposed, but it could take months for the force to reach 

full capacity. In Sierra Leone, the delayed deployment of peacekeeping troops following the 1999 Lome ́ peace accord contributed greatly to the collapse of the country 

back into war in April 2000. Currently marauding armed bands continue to commit 

murder, rape, forced recruitment and looting in many parts of the country. 

Ragtag government militias and fighters from both rebel groups—Liberians 

United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the splinter group made up 

of ex-LURD members called the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—operate with little discipline or command-and-control. They loot in part because they 

are hungry and not being paid. 

Hundreds of thousands of persons have repeatedly been uprooted as they fled the 

countryside in terror of these armed groups. Those groups are also seeking to secure 

the last spoils of battle in expectation of the territory being secured by peacekeepers. Soldiers systematically extort money and other goods from those seeking 

refuge and have blocked them from moving to safety. Fleeing civilians are also vulnerable to rape and abduction by the armed groups. Thousands of people remain 

in hiding in the bush where adequate food, water, shelter and medical care are 
29

scarce or non-existent. Most of the population remains in grave need of basic necessities, particularly outside the capital, Monrovia. In Bong County, fighting between 

government forces and the LURD rebels has caused the mass displacement of the 

population. 

Rape and other sexual violence against girls and women remain pervasive and is 

committed by all parties. The sexual violence, which is also committed against 

young boys, often accompanies the widespread looting. 

Both the government militias and rebel fighters rely on child soldiers, most of 

whom are between thirteen and sixteen years old, but some are as young as six. 

Many have been forcibly recruited. Human Rights Watch researchers saw many soldiers that appeared to be below the age of eighteen (perhaps as young as thirteen) 

at government and rebel checkpoints. 

A comprehensive peace agreement signed on August 18, 2003, included a pact by 

the government and rebel forces to grant access to humanitarian organizations 

throughout the country. However, the insecure situation continues to impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in greatest need. 

Protection of the civilian population remains an urgent priority. All sectors of Liberian society, from civilians to civil society groups, and even the combatants from 

all the warring parties, have repeatedly called for a prompt and expansive deployment of ECOMIL (the 3,500 West African peacekeepers now operating under a U.N. 

mandate and known as UNMIL) and other international forces. 

A more robust U.S. military deployment could have gone a long way to ending 

much of this misery. Liberia is not Somalia or the Middle East. The U.S. is much 

respected and welcomed in Liberia, probably more so than in most other countries 

in the world. A significant U.S. presence on the ground as part of the international 

force would have had a profound psychological effect on Liberians and the leaders 

of the armed factions. It would have deterred further violence on the ground and 

also make recruiting more forces from other countries for the peacekeeping operation easier. 

The administration should seek funds from Congress to support the country’s reconstruction, including the rebuilding of its judicial and law enforcement institutions. It should back the 15,000 strong U.N. peacekeeping force with human and 

logistical support. It is not too late for the U.S. presence on the ground to be beefed 

up. The U.S. could show leadership by quickly contributing Marines to the U.N. 

peacekeeping operation. Civilian protection, facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and establishment of conditions for the safe and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and support for disarmament and 

demobilization efforts are immediate priorities. 

For more recommendations, as well as a detailed description of ongoing human 

rights abuses, see the September 9, 2003, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, ‘‘Liberia: Greater Protection Required For Civilians Still at Risk,’’ available as a link 

from www.hrw.org/press/2003/09/liberia091603.htm. 

The Indictment of Charles Taylor 

A defining moment came on June 4, 2003, when the Special Court for Sierra 

Leone ‘‘unsealed’’ its indictment against Charles Taylor. He is charged as one of the 

people who bears ‘‘the greatest responsibility’’ for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed 

during Sierra Leone’s brutal civil war. His alleged crimes include murder, taking 

hostages, rape, extermination, sexual slavery, and the use of child soldiers. 

The indictment set off a chain of events that resulted in Taylor accepting an offer 

of exile from President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. President Bush repeatedly 

told Charles Taylor to leave Liberia. In a deal supported by West African leaders 

and welcomed by the U.N., Taylor handed the presidency to an interim government. 

In mid-October, that government will be replaced by a transitional government of 

national unity, whose chairperson will lead the country until elections are held in 

late 2005. 

Taylor now resides in a hilltop mansion in Calabar, in southeastern Nigeria. However, Human Rights Watch believes that exile must not shield Taylor from prosecution before the Sierra Leone Special Court. International law does not accept amnesty for atrocities that amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes. The Special Court’s statute and implementing legislation provide that neither amnesty nor 

a suspect’s official capacity is a bar to prosecution. 

The U.S. administration should urge the Nigerian authorities to hand over exPresident Charles Taylor to the Special Court. 
30

1 United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 

(2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, U.N. document S/2001/1015 (New York: United Nations, October 26, 2001). 2See U.N. Liberia panel reports: United Nations, Report of Panel of Experts on Liberia in accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1408 (2002), (United Nations: New York, October 25, 

2002), U.N. document S/2002/1115; United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to 

Security Council resolution 1395 (2002), paragraph 4, in relation to Liberia, (United Nations: 

New York: April 19, 2002), U.N. Document No. S/2002/470; United Nations, Report of the Panel 

of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1458 (2003), concerning Liberia, (United Nations: New York, April 24, 2003), U.N. document S/2003/498. 

II. SANCTIONS ON LIBERIA

The Role of Sanctions 

U.N. sanctions have played an important role in progress toward ending the war 

in Liberia. They are coming up for review within a month (November 4, 2003) and 

could still play a role in supporting efforts to obtain security and stability on the 

ground in Liberia and in the region. 

An arms embargo was placed on Liberia in 1992 following a request from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) after they had intervened militarily in the Liberian civil war to prevent Charles Taylor and his NPFL rebels from 

taking power. However, Liberia became an example of the lack of implementation 

of sanctions. It even took two years for a Sanctions Committee to be established to 

monitor their enforcement. Because of the failure of enforcement, the sanctions had 

no impact, even though they were maintained on Liberia after Charles Taylor was 

elected president in 1997. 

In March 2001 this changed. In response to a report presented by the Panel of 

Experts established to monitor sanctions applied to the rebel Revolutionary United 

Front (RUF) and other forces operating in Sierra Leone, the Security Council decided to approve new sanctions on Liberia to start in May 2001. The basis for these 

sanctions was President Taylor’s support for the RUF in Sierra Leone in violation 

of the existing sanctions. Security Council Resolution 1343 reauthorized the arms 

embargo on Liberia; imposed a travel ban on key officials, their spouses, and business associates; mandated the freezing of all financial assets of the RUF; and called 

for the expulsion of RUF members from Liberia. An embargo was also imposed on 

all of Liberia’s diamond exports, and in July 2003 an embargo on the export of timber was also added. 

A new panel of experts was also created to monitor compliance with the Liberian 

sanctions. Drawing originally from the Sierra Leone panel of five, it has since been 

renewed five times for periods ranging from five weeks to six months. 

Security Resolution 1343 was the first time that the Council imposed sanctions 

on one country for its refusal to comply with sanctions on another. The Liberia sanctions were at their core designed to shore-up the peace process in Sierra Leone. 

They fully achieved this objective. The diamond embargo in particular resulted in 

an almost complete cessation of the trade in illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone to 

Liberia. The sanctions assisted with the trade axis re-aligning itself to Freetown. 

Patterns of diamond trading also changed, with some Liberian rough gems passing 

through to Sierra Leone to be sold from there.1

Events in Sierra Leone in late 2000 and 2001 also show that the threat and imposition of sanctions on Liberia probably contributed to the RUF’s decision to sign an 

unconditional ceasefire in November 2000 and their re-affirmation of the agreement 

in May 2001. Sanctions were not solely responsible for this positive development. 

Hundreds of troops from the United Kingdom sent in May 2000 to support the U.N., 

as well as sustained Guinean military operations against the RUF in Liberian territory also played a role. Sanctions on Liberia within this context helped to weaken 

Monrovia’s support of the RUF. This in turn assisted the RUF’s efforts to transform 

itself into a political party that peacefully contested the parliamentary and presidential elections in December 2002. 

Mandate of Sanctions Needs to Change 

By early 2003, following successful elections in Sierra Leone, the original justification of Security Council Resolution 1343 for sanctions on Liberia had been superseded by events on the ground. In late 2002 and mid 2003 the Panel of Experts submitted reports demonstrating that the mandate for the panel was increasingly outdated and that if the sanctions were to continue they needed to be underpinned with 

a new basis.2

The effectiveness of the sanctions had also deteriorated over time. Increasingly 

the Liberian government violated the sanctions imposed on it. For example, the 

travel ban was routinely violated and weekly sanctions-busting flights of arms and 
31

ammunition arrived in Monrovia. The Panel also found its investigations in Liberia 

became more difficult to carry out. People were less willing to speak to the Panel, 

and the government became more defiant, obstructive, and hostile to the Panel’s 

work. Public sympathy for sanctions also had declined in the face of a growing rebel 

insurgency backed by neighboring Guinea. 

The Guinea Connection 

Liberia’s neighbor Guinea has helped undermine the Liberia, though support for 

the LURD rebels. Guinea’s support of the LURD rebels became all too visible in 

July 2003, during the mortar shelling of central Monrovia. Dozens of mortar rounds 

fell on a compound across from the U.S. Embassy, where thousands of civilians had 

taken shelter. Scores of civilians died and over 2,000 people were wounded by mortars and stray bullets in the attack. 

The supply of these mortar rounds is telling. In late June, the LURD ran out of 

ammunition and were forced to abandon an offensive in Monrovia. Three weeks 

later, re-supplied with ammunition, including mortar rounds, LURD attacked again. 

Their bombardment led to many of the casualties around the U.S. embassy. 

The LURD mortars very likely came through Guinea, a recipient of U.S. military 

aid. Human Rights Watch documented LURD’s links to Guinea last year and called 

on Guinea and the United States to hold LURD accountable for its abusive conduct 

of war (See, ‘‘Back to the Brink: War Crimes by Liberian Government and Rebels,’’ 

May 2002, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/liberia/liberia0402–04.htm). In April 

of this year a U.N. panel of experts, which had also linked Guinea and LURD, reported suspicions that flights into Guinea for a mining company carried weapons 

that were later transported to LURD by sea and land. 

Guinea’s support of the LURD has been widely documented, not least in U.N. 

panel reports, but only in July this year did the U.S. government strongly call on 

Guinea to cease its support for the LURD. Human Rights Watch is also concerned 

about the nature and level of U.S. military assistance to Guinea in recent years, 

in light of Guinea’s known ties to the LURD. 

Guinea is currently a member of the Security Council and has shown a keen interest in U.N. monitoring of the sanctions on the Liberian government. Yet Guinean 

support of the LURD is in violation of U.N. sanctions. Guinea has thus far evaded 

international condemnation, or any serious consequences, for its record of support 

to an abusive insurgent group and violations of the sanctions on Liberia. Particularly since Guinea sits on the Security Council, its violation of these sanctions needs 

to be condemned in the strongest manner-including by the United States. Moreover, 

the U.N. Security Council should consider imposing secondary sanctions on all regional governments found to have been involved in the Liberian war. 

A New Basis for the Liberia Sanctions 

Obtaining a consensus in the Security Council for the new basis for Liberia sanctions was not possible in 2002. Instead, the status quo was preferable for a handful 

of states that had regime change as their ultimate goal. The involvement of Liberian 

troops in support of rebels in western Cote d’Ivoire in September 2002 also resulted 

in France ending its opposition to a U.S.-proposal for timber sanctions on Liberia. 

The agreement in the Security Council to add timber sanctions were used to signal 

to Charles Taylor’s supporters to drop him and by Liberia’s rebels as encouragement 

for their efforts to remove Taylor. 

Next Steps on Sanctions 

On September 30, the current Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions against Liberia submitted their report to the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. Over 

the next month at the U.N., the Sanctions Committee will discuss its findings in 

the run-up to the Security Council’s review of Liberia in early November. 

Liberia’s sanctions are currently in force to May 2004 and will be reviewed in November 2003. In anticipation of the review of the Liberia sanctions, a debate is already underway about the future of the sanctions regime on Liberia. At this stage, 

the fate of timber sanctions is difficult to predict. The U.N. Special Representative 

for Liberia, Jacques Klein, has called for a lifting of the sanctions. However, environmental and conservation groups oppose lifting sanctions and wish to see them 

transformed into an industry reform mechanism. 

With respect to the other sanctions on Liberia, the experience adjusting the sanctions regimes on Sierra Leone and Angola is instructive. In Sierra Leone, the Panel 

of Experts was not reappointed in 2001 and much of the travel ban was lifted in 

2002 in the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections in December. However, an arms embargo remains in place on Sierra Leone for non-state actors. 

The Sierra Leone diamond embargo imposed in 2000 finally expired on June 4, 

2003, and could prove to be a model for Liberia. Diamond exports started in late 
32

3 Ibid. 

2000 following a trilateral mission of the United Kingdom, the United States and 

Belgium in July 2000 to inspect a Certificate of Origin Monitoring System for imports of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone. The certification regime was approved 

by the Security Council on October 6, 2000 and exports started shortly afterwards. 

Since then there has been an upsurge in diamond exports. The value in exports increased 160 percent in 2001 followed the introduction of the scheme. In 2002 this 

increased further to 351,859.23 in carats. More than 1,000 diamond-mining licenses 

have been issued in 44 chiefdoms. However, smuggling still accounts for over 50 percent of the trade. Such a scheme could be replicated in Liberia-hopefully with a 

stronger monitoring process to halt smuggling. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and 

Energy has already engaged in discussions about establishing a credible Kimberley 

Process diamond certification scheme.3

As a permanent member of the Security Council, the U.S. can have significant influence over the direction of the sanctions debate on Liberia. The following are steps 

that should be supported:

• The export of diamonds through the Liberian government should be permitted 

once a credible certification scheme is established and, as in Sierra Leone, the 

Sanctions Committee should monitor progress over several years prior to an 

eventual lifting of the diamond embargo.

• Suspension of the travel ban on many of those named on the current list is 

important to signal progress in the post-Taylor period; however, key names—

such as those of known arms dealers, Charles Taylor, and other persons implicated in gross human rights abuses—clearly need to remain.

• The arms embargo needs to continue for the foreseeable future, at least until 

2005, after presidential and parliamentary elections.

Ensuring that that the arms embargo is properly respected should be a key task 

of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. The example of the United Nations Mission in 

Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) could help here. The Milops operation and its Military Intelligence Office cell at UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown played a critical role. 

It was a nerve center producing daily, weekly and monthly briefings on political and 

military developments. The system relied heavily on personnel from the United 

Kingdom. In Liberia, this could be a key strategic area where the U.S. contributes 

skilled personnel and logistical support. 

A Future Panel of Experts 

The monitoring of these sanctions in this review period could call on the Sierra 

Leone and Angola experience for guidance. The number of experts on the Liberia 

panel could be reduced in November, below its peak level of six experts. Numbers 

of experts do not necessarily equate with better reporting, and a reduction in size 

provides cost-saving in addition to signaling a positive response to political developments. Human Rights Watch further recommends, as it has in the past, that the 

Security Council establish a permanent sanctions unit in the U.N. Secretariat to ensure continuity and the preservation of institutional memory with respect to the 

monitoring of U.N. sanctions regimes.

• A smaller investigative panel should be appointed in 2004. It should have a 

mandate of several months to submit a report prior to the review of sanctions 

in May.

• The U.S. should support and promote the creation of a permanent sanctions 

unit in the U.N. Secretariat. 

III. MANAGEMENT OF REVENUE

Misuse of Revenue by the Taylor Government 

The reform of the management of Liberia’s sources of revenue, including from the 

timber sector, is critical for the reconstruction of the country. This is especially true 

given that the transitional administration that takes over in mid-October has divided the management of the key sources of revenue, forestry, mines, ports and the 

maritime registry between the protagonists in the civil war. 

For the last six years, under Charles Taylor, much of the country’s wealth was 

diverted or disappeared, making Liberia one of the poorest nations in the world. 

Tens of millions of dollars of state revenue disappeared, through extra-budgetary expenditures or through ad hoc tax exemptions. Rubber, timber and maritime revenues were key and, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), could generate U.S. $79 million a year if tax revenue is also included. 
33

The sanctions-busting arms trade to Liberia depended on the ability of clients or 

their patrons to pay, whether in cash or precious gems. Liberia’s weapons purchases 

from 1999 to 2003 were mainly financed by off budget spending by the Liberian government. Payments were made from revenue that bypassed the central bank and 

was therefore not accounted for in the budget. Taylor favored maintaining major offbudget agencies—the Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA), the Forestry Development 

Authority (FDA) and the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC)—headed by 

his close associates. 

The U.N. Liberia panel of experts, on which I served, documented nine payment 

instructions for a total of $7,500,000 from 1999 to 2001 to nine different bank accounts. These were all off-budget expenditures from the timber industry. Two of 

these were used as payments for defense-related expenditure. 

On May 6, 2002, prior to the introduction of timber sanctions in July 2003, the 

U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1408 (2002). That resolution called for an 

audit of the revenues derived from the shipping registry and the Liberian timber 

industry. It represents the first time that the Security Council has required an 

audit. The relevant portion of the resolution states:

‘‘Calls upon the Government of Liberia to take urgent steps, including 

through the establishment of transparent and internationally verifiable audit 

regimes, to ensure that revenue derived by the Government of Liberia from the 

Liberia Shipping Registry and the Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes, and not in violation of 

this resolution, and to report back to the Committee on the steps taken and results of such audits not later than three months after the date of adoption of 

this resolution.’’

The Liberian government did very little in response to the resolution. It commissioned a systems and management audit, one that avoided any financial analysis. 

There remains an important opportunity to ensure that the timber revenues are appropriately audited and managed. The U.S. should encourage and provide technical 

assistance for a full audit and the creation of a system to ensure this revenue is 

used for ‘‘legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes.’’

Maritime Revenues: A Case Study 

Maritime revenues have been problematic. Liberia has hosted a United Statesbased maritime shipping registry since 1949. Liberia today has the second largest 

maritime fleet in the world. The registry has traditionally had a high proportion of 

tanker tonnage. In recent years, the prime concern has not been about the technical 

quality of the registry but what happens to the money generated from it. From 1949 

to 1999, the registry earned around U.S. $700 million for the Liberian government. 

During the 1990–1996 civil war in Liberia and during the interim period following 

that war, revenue from the registry represented some 90 percent of the Liberian 

government’s total income. In 2003 this was once again the case. Maritime revenues 

provide on average some U.S. $15 to 18 million a year, although in 2003 the IMF 

estimated this had declined to U.S. $13 million. 

Transactions by the United States-based Liberian International Shipping and 

Corporate Registry (LISCR) to off-budget accounts were also used to pay for illegal 

arms shipments. After LISCR ceased the practice in August 2000, other off-budget 

outlays of maritime funds were utilized. 

The U.N. panel also documented in detail how the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs assisted sanctions-busting efforts, notably by arranging payments from the Bureau of Maritime Affair’s (BMA) funds and providing logistical support. The U.N. 

panel concluded in its October 2001 report that the Liberia’s commissioner of maritime affairs and the BMA were ‘‘little more than a cash extraction operation and 

cover from which to fund and organize off-budget expenditures, including for sanctions-busting, and that the funds would need to be protected from Bureau misuse.’’

Human Rights Watch gave a detailed testimony on misuse of Liberian maritime 

revenues to the House Armed Services Special Oversight Panel on the Merchant 

Marine on June 13, 2002. It can be found at: http://armedservices.house.gov/

openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02–06–13vines.html. 

Accounting for the Maritime Revenue in Monrovia 

The U.N. panel investigations found that the maritime funds were remitted directly to a tripartite account held at the Ecobank in Monrovia; the commissioner of 

maritime affairs and the minister of finance are signatories with a third 

determinational signatory controlled by the Executive Mansion—the Liberian presidency. 
34

4Tim Weiner, ‘‘Ex-Leader Stole $100 Million From Liberia, Records Show,’’ New York Times, 

September 18, 2003. 

Following a recommendation by the International Monetary Fund, in October 

2001 the Liberian authorities directed that government bank accounts be moved 

from commercial banks to the Central Bank of Liberia. The Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA), however, still maintains its own three-signatory account, and payments 

by LISCR were not made directly to the Central Bank but through a Liberian Embassy and a Bureau of Maritime Affairs account in the U.S. 

This makes tracking what happens to the money once it reaches the BMA difficult—all the more so, because Liberia’s auditor general last audited the BMA over 

a decade ago, in 1988. When the U.N. panel tried to examine the accounts of BMA 

in April 2002, it was not able to do so. The panel was informed that a generator 

had broken down and that it would be repaired only after the panel had left Liberia. 

Liberia’s Ministry of Finance admitted that in 2001, due to increased defense expenditure, there had been significant diversion of maritime funds for extrabudgetry 

use by the Executive Mansion. The figures provided by the Ministry of Finance for 

2001 provided much higher remittances than those registered by the Central Bank 

of Liberia. This significant discrepancy is mainly due to high extrabudgetry demands on these funds by the Liberian presidency. The Finance Minister from September 1999 to July 2002, Nathaniel Barnes, also admitted that ‘‘the revenue was 

largely diverted,’’ for the ‘‘war effort. But there was no kind of accountability.’’ 4

In September 2000, following an IMF staff visit to review the January-June 2000 

Staff Monitored Program (SMP), the IMF expressed concern about the shortfall in 

maritime revenue and wrote that ‘‘the continued decline in maritime inflows is troublesome and should be reviewed closely so that remedial measures can be taken if 

necessary.’’ In December 2001, IMF again noted after its Article IV consultations 

that reported payments from the shipping registry to the government differed from 

collections at the Ministry of Finance by some U.S. $2 million, reflecting deductions 

at source by the BMA or timing differences in the transfer of funds from offshore 

accounts. The IMF in its 2002 Article IV report of February 2003 noted that its mission had been ‘‘unable to attain any meaningful financial information . . . even of 

an unaudited basis, for the BMA and that there had been no action for a independent financial audit of it.’’ Table 1 shows almost U.S. $4 million discrepancy between the funds received by 

the Ministry of Finance and those recorded by the Central Bank of Liberia during 

2001 and early 2002.

Table 1: Maritime Remittances2001–2002

Month Ministry of 

Finance Central Bank 

Jan-Feb 3,242,090 387,272

Mar-Apr 1,530,211 489,091

May-Jun 2,545,237 1,198,181

Jul-Aug 1,116,149 0

Sep-Oct 1,003,581 3,356,363

Nov-Dec 2,570,022 1,657,000

Jan-Feb 02 2,682,096 2,488,000

Total U.S. $ 13,312,386 9,576,907

Discrepancy equals U.S. $ 3,736,479

The main problem with the Liberian shipping and corporate registry is what happens to the money once it is transferred to an account controlled by the Liberian 

government. 

The Need for Independent Oversight and Transparency 

The publication of three U.N. panel of experts’ reports (S/2001/1015 of October 26, 

2001; S/2002/470 of April 19, 2002; and S/2002/1115 of October 25, 2002) has heightened international attention on how the Liberian flag of convenience is run and 

what happens to the funds it generates. 

The U.N. panel in its October 2001 report recommended that the U.N. Security 

Council committee should set up an escrow account for all revenues generated from 

the shipping and corporate registry. It also encouraged the IMF and the government 

of Liberia to reach an agreement to audit these funds and to designate those funds 
35

for development purposes. Sadly, the recommendation of setting up an escrow account was never taken up by the Security Council. 

The Liberian Ministry of Finance on November 23, 2001, announced that it would 

audit and ring-fence the shipping and corporate registry. On receipt of income from 

the registry, the Ministry of Finance would channel the funds through the Central 

Bank of Liberia and would segregate those funds for infrastructure, social, health 

and welfare development and support programs. 

This was followed on December 3, 2001, by a letter from the Ministry of Finance 

to the IMF requesting assistance to set up a financial monitoring mechanism. The 

IMF replied on December 14, welcoming the initiative, but ruled that it was enterprise specific and therefore outside the IMF’s mandate. The Ministry of Finance and 

LISCR then approached the nongovernmental anti-corruption group Transparency 

International for assistance, but Transparency International also turned down the 

request on the grounds that such an exercise was outside its mandate. However, 

they recommended that the ministry approach Crown Agents, a United Kingdombased company that specializes in port management, auditing and project management. 

Security Council Resolution 1408 (2002) called for an audit of the revenues derived from the shipping registry, as noted. Serious negotiations with the Crown 

Agent Consultancy, Inc. began in mid-July 2002 but by August had collapsed over 

the Liberian government’s insistence on a strict liability clause in any contract. In 

September the government then announced first-stage bids for auditing maritime 

and forestry. This turned out to be a management audit and systems design—which 

would not look at any figures. The government awarded the contract to Deloitte & 

Touche, who withdrew from the contract in December on the advice of its New York 

and London offices. The government then continued with a local firm called Voscom 

Inc. 

A full independent audit of the funds received by the Liberian government still 

has not been conducted. However, this audit will only be as effective as its terms 

of reference allow. An audit should be retroactive to 1997, run for a number of years 

and be publicly available for independent scrutiny. This audit trail should also include how the funds are then allocated and spent.

• The U.S. should ensure that an internationally verifiable audit regime is introduced for both maritime and timber revenues by the forthcoming transitional government in accordance with Resolution 1408.

• The Liberian government also still needs to ensure that the BMA has its 

bank account only at the Central Bank of Liberia in order to ensure transparency regarding its use of shipping revenue. Although the Liberian government announced in October 2001 that this would be done, it has taken no action to date to comply with this promise to the IMF.

Mr. ROYCE. Now we are going to Ms. Nohn Kidau and ask you 

to keep it to 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF NOHN KIDAU, PRESIDENT, MOVEMENT FOR 

DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN LIBERIA 

Ms. KIDAU. I am deeply gratified and humbled by the opportunity to address this august body on behalf of the Liberian people. 

The Liberian people have endured so much pain, death and destruction for nearly 2 decades. I feel today with anxiety about the 

hearing, hoping that it will serve as a springboard from which a 

blueprint can continue to support the United States——

Mr. ROYCE. You know the good news, Ms. Kidau, we have read 

your testimony because you submitted it in advance. So what I 

would like to ask of you is if you would, in your own words, in the 

next couple of minutes just tell us how you feel and just tell us 

your observations. You are the President of the Movement for 

Democratic Change. You have something to say. We are going to 

listen to the next few minutes. Don’t worry. We read this last 

night. 

Ms. KIDAU. I have two things that I want to ask you. I ask the 

United States of America take the lead and play an active role in 
36

the future of Liberia and that the United States of America backs 

up its role and leadership so that—with the necessary resources so 

that peace and stability can come to Liberia and Liberia be used 

as a showcase for democracy. 

As you know, I was part of the peace accord in Accra, and I believe that the peace agreement was worth it, and if it is implemented, we will have peace in Liberia. As you know, no agreement 

is worth the paper it is printed on without a means to enforce the 

agreement. 

Liberia—the point that I want to make here is that Liberia 

should not be viewed as a burden on the United States; rather, as 

a friend that you have in Africa. We were there for you during the 

cold war. In my opinion, Liberia is the only country in the whole 

world that is as loyal to the United States as we are. You created 

Liberia and the population—you create a Liberia. Contrary to the 

popular belief that Liberia was created by freed American slaves, 

Liberia was actually created by the American Colonization Society, 

the ACS. The freed American slaves were never a member of the 

ACS. For that, the whole world looks to United States to take the 

lead and to lift Liberia out of the civil war, just like the French did 

for Ivory Coast and Great Britain did for Sierra Leone. 

Most important here is disarmament. Nothing is going to work 

in Liberia unless combatants are disarmed and they are demobilized and that they are reintegrated into society. 

There are a lot of internally displaced people. There are a lot of 

refugees that are going to be returning to Liberia. They are going 

to need—you need to put some resources behind that. Otherwise 

there will be no peace in Liberia, and that is the main point of this 

whole hearing—this testimony. 

I will also ask that you please permit my lengthy testimony to 

be a part of your record. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kidau follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NOHN KIDAU, PRESIDENT, MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC

CHANGE IN LIBERIA

Chairman Ed Royce, members of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Congress of 

the United States of America. I am deeply gratified and indeed humbled for the 

privilege extended me to address this august body on behalf of the faceless, innocent 

people of my country, Liberia. I join my countrymen in salute of this great country 

for the critical role it has played and continues to play in our search for lasting 

peace and stability for our beloved Liberia. The people of Liberia, having endured 

so much pain, death, and destruction for nearly two decades now, especially those 

of the past 13 years, are filled with anxiety about this hearing, hoping that it serves 

as a springboard from which a blueprint for continued support by the US government for peace in Liberia will come. 

We only ask two simple but critical things:

1 That the United States of America takes the lead and active role in Liberia’s 

future;

2 That the United States of America backs up its role and leadership with the 

necessary resources to make Liberia a showcase for democracy in all of Africa.

I would like to acknowledge at this time the contributions of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, in particular its Director, Mr. Todd 

Howland and Dr. Abdelilah Kadili, who have provided important support to us 

throughout our struggle. Special thanks also go to Professor Katherine S. Broderick, 

Dean of the University of the District of Columbia School of Law, Professor William 

L. Robinson and Professor Fariborz S. Fatemi, co-chairs of the Liberia Support 
37

Group created by the Center for Human rights to support the work of Archbishop 

Francis. 

The Liberia Support Group has endeavored to chart a course of action that would 

bring maximum publicity to bear on the situation in Liberia, as well as make certain that the international community is, at all times, apprised of the circumstances 

as they exist. This testimony is an attempt to further buttress this objective by providing a realistic view of the Liberian conflict and efforts to resolve it, and to help 

bring lasting peace to our war-torn country. 

THE VIABILITY OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

The peace agreement reached in Accra, Ghana between the warring factions, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, LURD, Movement for Democracy in 

Liberia, MODEL, and the Charles Taylor Government, GOL, sets the stage for implementing lasting peace in Liberia. It is my considered opinion that the peace 

agreement, though flawed, represents our best hope for achieving peace in our country, Liberia. I refer to the document as being flawed because it allocates too much 

power to the warring factions, but given the prevailing circumstances under which 

this agreement was reached, there seemed to be no other alternative to move the 

process forward so as to affect a cessation of the fighting. 

As you are well aware, no agreement is worth the paper it is printed on without 

the means to enforce the terms of the agreement. Likewise the viability of the Liberian Peace Agreement is dependent upon the availability of a force with a mandate 

to enforce its terms. The document is in no way a panacea for addressing the atrocities that have been perpetrated on an innocent populace; however, within the 

framework of this agreement lay the desire of the Liberian people to rise up from 

the ashes of destruction and rebuild our country brick by brick. 

Another factor that influences the viability of the peace agreement is the lack of 

funding to foster reintegration programs for refugees, internally displaced persons, 

as well as former combatants. In my opinion, this is one of the keys to the success 

of this agreement. Without the means to adequately address the needs of these people, we run the risk of having them remain indefinitely in limbo, thus creating an 

environment conducive to starting more strife. We appeal to you, to assist us in this 

regard to provide for our people the basic necessities to begin life. 

Since the beginning of hostilities in Liberia, in December 1989, there have been 

numerous attempts at resolving the conflict between warring factions. These efforts, 

at best, have achieved only temporary cessation of the fighting. This conflict has resulted in the deaths of approximately 250,000 Liberians, according to estimates by 

the United Nations. 

Our best hope for peace came in the form of an agreement attained by forcing 

the warring parties to attend a peace conference in the Ghanaian capital, Accra. The 

conference was organized under the auspices of the Economic Community of West 

African States (ECOWAS) and attended by members of the international community, including representatives of the government of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and other friendly governments. The former head 

of state of Nigeria, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, served as facilitator of the conference, while the President of The Republic of Ghana, H.E. John Kuffour, Chairman of ECOWAS, served as host and general chairman. The results of this conference are proving to be the best vehicle yet for attaining lasting peace in Liberia, 

providing the framework for putting into place an interim government charged with 

the responsibility of leading the country to democratic civilian elections. 

Liberia should not be viewed as a burden on the United States and the international community—we are a founding member of the United Nations, and the 

closest friend of the United States in Africa. We were there for you during the cold 

war and we played a role, however small, in your victory. It was Liberia whose signature broke the tie to create the state of Israel. Above all, Liberia and the United 

States have a unique relationship dating as far back as the 1800s. For that, the 

world looks to the United States to take the first step and lead the efforts to lift 

Liberia out of the ashes of the bloody civil war and save it from itself just as France 

did for the Ivory Coast and Great Britain for Sierra Leone. 

Liberia needs you now more than ever before. You cannot and should not abandon 

Liberia now when it needs you most. The world is not only watching you, but it is 

calling on you to do right by Liberia so that there can be lasting peace in the West 

African Sub-region. 

ARCHBISHOP FRANCIS’ VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS: 

The Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Liberia Support Group were instrumental in helping to put together a series of events that 
38

eventually led to intense pressure being brought to bear on Taylor which culminated 

in his resignation and departure to Nigeria. One such event was the recent visits 

Archbishop Michael K. Francis, the Robert F. Kennedy 1999 Human Rights Award 

Laureate, made to the United States in February and July, 2003. Archbishop Michael Kpakala Francis, the most outspoken critic of the brutal Taylor years, provided a very detailed insight of the ills of the Taylor administration. 

During his first visit to the US, from February 27 to March 7, 2003, at the invitation of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and the Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia (MDCL), Archbishop Francis gave a very 

powerful and moving address in which he outlined the atrocities being committed 

by the Taylor administration against the citizens of Liberia. He also met with Mr. 

Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, members of the 

United States House of Representatives, as well as Members of the United States 

Senate, the Director of The Agency for International Development and representatives of local and international human rights organization. In each of these meetings, Archbishop Francis insisted on the need for the U.S. to adopt a more proactive 

role towards the situation in Liberia. He also made it clear to all that peace and 

security were considered sine none qua to free, fair and democratic elections in Liberia. 

Archbishop Francis visited the United States a second time from July 27 to 30, 

2003. He then met with Mr. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor’s Assistant for Africa, Senator Ted Kennedy and other members of the U.S. Senate, as well as members of the Congressional Black Caucus. 

Archbishop Francis also met with the Secretary General of the United Nations Mr. 

Kofi Annan. There again Archbishop Francis made the case for a strong and unequivocal intervention of the U.S. in the warring situation in Liberia. These two visits helped to spur calls from Members of Congress, the UN Secretary General, the 

press, as well as from some European and African leaders for intervention by the 

United States. 

Liberians salute Archbishop Francis, recipient of The Robert F. Kennedy 1999 

Human Rights Award, laureate and a Champion of Human Rights in Liberia for his 

gallant efforts toward peace in our country. 

UN REPRESENTATIVE JACQUES PAUL KLEIN

The appointment of Mr. Jacques Paul Klein as Special Representative of the 

United Nations Secretary General to Liberia is certainly a positive development for 

Liberia. Liberians are very excited about the prospects for peace that this man 

brings to the country. It is our hope and expectation that the international community with the backing of the US government will provide him the support he needs 

to succeed. 

political presence such as the UN Special Representative is useful in enhancing 

the following:

• The transitional government and the parties to the conflict are all acting in 

accordance with the terms of the peace agreement;

• The transitional government is creating minimum conditions to hold credible 

elections;

• The transitional government and the international community are working in 

full coordination to ensure the integration of ex-combatants into the legitimate institutional, political and security framework of the country and providing training and opportunities for their integration into the socio-economic 

frame work of the country;

• Assisting the newly elected government and legislature in consolidating 

peace;

• Providing that the national media and civil society with the necessary means, 

tools and financial resources to play an effective role in the consolidation of 

the peace process and the establishment of democracy and the rule of law;

• Effective civilian governance capacity depends upon skilled technicians and 

professionals setting up the critical structures of state and civil society particularly civil administration, police and judiciary and must ensure that minimum state structures for effective governance are re-established;

• Civil Administration: Particular effort should be made to obtain civil administrators from ECOWAS countries to act primarily in an advisory capacity but 

may need to act in an executive capacity;

• Police: Critically needed to monitor, advise, and restructure the national police force. Police from primarily common law countries should be recruited. 
39

One leading bi-lateral partner should be identified to provide long-term development and training support;

• Legal practitioners: Judges, lawyers, prosecutors of common law background 

are to monitor and advise the re-establishment of the national judiciary. One 

lead agency/bi lateral partner should be identified early on to provide longterm development and restructuring of the judiciary. Transitional justice for 

war crimes and crimes against humanity should be placed under the authority of the International Criminal Court;

• Electoral experts: must be assigned to ensure the training and oversight of 

National Elections Officers to conduct elections. 

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

There are strategic objectives being cited repeatedly by Archbishop Francis and 

others in Liberian civil society, through several leading organizations in the country 

and from around the world. These objectives were reiterated by Archbishop Francis 

during meetings held with representatives of the US government earlier this year. 

They are in fact recognized by Liberian organizations as the best way to ensure that 

the country is definitely out of the civil war and headed toward peace and democracy. The strategies include the need to:

• Consolidate the cease fire and stabilize the security situation on the ground,

• Ensure the demobilization of the militia and their proper reintegration into 

the civil society,

• Create a secure environment over the entire country,

• Contribute to consolidating national unity and assist in establishing a viable 

transitional government,

• Assist in the preparation of free, fair, transparent and democratic elections

Their achievement requires a thoughtful planning process; one that, far from any 

rush to quick fixes or semi-solutions, takes into account the realities on the ground 

and the complexity of the situation; and factors in the importance of the help Liberian society needs to heal its wounds, and make peace with decades of civil war and 

social unrest. 

The United Nations, individual members of the Security Council and other parties 

involved should neither consider that the cease-fire is a finality of and by itself and 

therefore abandon the process any time soon, nor should they rush to try to achieve 

any other objective short of those already defined by Liberian civil society. Adequate 

consideration needs to be given to, on one hand investing as much time as the planning phase requires, and on the other, providing the process with the necessary 

means, tools and most importantly, financial resources to guarantee its real success. 

SPECIAL TASKS AHEAD AND REQUIREMENTS: 

The United Nations and the parties involved should ensure that the following requirements are met and that the ensuing tasks are fully implemented as they constitute essential conditions to free, fair, democratic and transparent elections.

• The militia is disarmed, demobilized and its members reintegrated into the 

Liberian society;

• A new army is created, and its members are trained to protect the Liberian 

people and to respect their fundamental rights;

• A stabilization force is put in place so as to guarantee not only the security 

of the Liberian Nation, but also the security of the voters and those seeking 

elective office;

• A national census is conducted;

• The Election Commission is restructured, its membership replaced, and the 

new members appropriately trained,

• An enabling environment conducive to free, fair and democratic elections is 

created;

• The voters are registered in such a way as to ensure everybody’s freedom to 

participate in the elections without fear or intimidation;

• Priority is given to voters’ education. 

REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION: 

The implementation of these tasks requires:
40

• A UN Security Council mandate that authorizes the dispatch of a robust military presence that would stabilize the country and deter anyone who would 

pose a threat to the peace, and create a secure environment;

• The military force should be provided the necessary resources, authority and 

flexibility to undertake the following:

1. Disarm and demobilize all combatants; 

2. Provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees; 

3. Support the establishment of law and order and assist in the restructuring of the military and security forces. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

In addition to the challenges we have listed above, we specifically recommend the 

following for effective governance and security during the transitional period.

1. Consider the young people who, either willingly or unwillingly, joined the 

killings in the 1990s as well as those involved in the current insurgencies 

as victims. Their plight must not only be considered a priority, but also the 

international community should commit substantial resources for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This problem is the ‘‘landmine’’ in 

the peace process. There can be no lasting peace in Liberia until it is dealt 

with head-on and resolved. The future of Liberia is at stake because its 

younger population is less educated than its older population.

2. There is, indeed a need to cut off the line of communication between Charles 

Taylor and the current government of Liberia to stop his micro-managing of 

the affairs of that government. Taylor is in continued contact with his allies 

giving them orders to undermine the peace process. That must stop now.

3. We strongly encourage you to stay closely engaged in our efforts in fashioning an interim process to fix the country and ready it for the political 

process. We do not only request that you support a process that puts the national interest above all else, but also we believe strongly that honest and 

reputable Liberians from within the ranks of Liberian civil society who commit not to participate in the national elections will be useful instruments for 

national reconstruction. We believe that these individuals will seek the national interest and do everything possible to secure the future of our country. 

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTACT GROUP ON LIBERIA AND ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST

AFRICAN STATES

We appreciate the efforts of the International Contact Group on Liberia, comprised of Britain, France and the United States, (ICGL), and the ECOWAS, for their 

role in bringing peace to Liberia, as well as making possible the removal of Mr. Taylor from Liberia. We are very happy to note that on Friday, September 19, 2003 a 

resolution passed unanimously in the Security Council, authorizing the deployment 

of 15,000 troops for peace keeping in Liberia. 

THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

In addition with the ongoing war the mediator, facilitators and organizers of the 

peace conference refused to begin the talks unless an unconditional cease-fire was 

in place. There was nearly a two-week deadlock in the peace process, as the three 

warring parties (the Government of Liberia, (GOL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, 

(MODEL), struggled over the terms of the cease-fire. Endless hours were spent trying to convince the belligerents to sign the cease-fire agreement. Finally, on June 

17, the accord was signed. 

Included in the cease-fire agreement were timelines set for certain things to happen so that the cease-fire could hold. A joint verification team, (JVT), should have 

immediately been deployed to verify each warring party’s position. Once that was 

done, ECOWAS would have immediately established and deployed an interposition 

force in Liberia, to secure the cease-fire, create buffer zones to separate the aggressive forces, provide a safe passage for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and 

to ready the country for an international stabilization force to go to Liberia to keep 

the peace. As you know, the cease-fire was constantly violated—making it nearly 

impossible to make any progress. 
41

LACK OF FUNDING

The lack of adequate funding played critical role in delaying the process leading 

to the signing of the accord. This problem still hampers this process. ECOWAS had 

requested that a $100 million fund be established for the implementation of a mandate for peace. As you may be aware, there was very little money available at the 

time. The U.S. Government pledged an initial sum of $10 million dollars, while The 

European Union pledge an initial sum of $6.4 million dollars. With initial funding 

available, as soon as a ceasefire agreement was secured, the first Nigerian Troops 

began arriving in Liberia to secure territory given up by warring factions. 

DIVISION AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES

In Accra, Ghana, there were initially the group of eight, (‘‘G–8’’) political parties, 

(those who had not been bought by Taylor), and a group of nine, (‘‘G–9’’) political 

parties (those who were basically in Taylor’s pocket). The ‘‘G–8s’’ seemed more objective and tended to work well with the civil society. Both the G–8s and the civil society worked with all warring parties to bring all the opposition political parties together. The ‘‘G–9ers’’, of course, worked alongside the ruling party and the Government of Liberia. Their moods changed with what was happening in Monrovia. When 

Taylor seemed weak, they would soften their position, but when he seemed strong, 

they would become unwilling to cooperate with the rest of us. We managed to reduce G–9 to G–3 and increased G–8 to G–14 at one time. Then finally, all 17 opposition political parties came together, even though the bond was very fragile. 

Before the peace agreement was reached, there were various strands of opinions 

that are important to mention as an evaluation of the evolution of the talks. The 

major points of disagreement lied within the structure of the transitional government as indicated below:

a. Term of office for the transitional government; 

b. Numbers of cabinets to be activated during the transition period; 

c. Numbers of cabinets to be activated during the transition period; 

d. Transitional head and vice head(s); 

e. The question of whom serves as president or vice president(s); 

f. Number of seats in the unicameral transition legislature; 

g. Distribution of the unicameral transition legislative seat; 

h. The process of selecting the transitional president and vice president(s). 

THE CHALLENGES

While we are ever thankful for all that has been achieved thus far, there is a 

great deal more to be done to avoid risking the time, efforts, and other resources 

that have been invested in this process and reverting back to fighting. We cannot 

and we must not jeopardize what we have achieved. Yes, the cost may be great, but 

the alternative is unthinkable. H.E. Ambassador Pamela Bridgewater, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa could not have put it any better when she said 

in a speech on March 1, 2003 that ‘‘The cost may be great, but the cost of doing 

nothing will undoubtedly be even greater for the Government of Liberia, for the 

Government of the United States, and for the international community, and most 

importantly, for you the citizens of Liberia . . .’’

Since the start of the Liberian conflict in December of 1989, Liberians have been 

bearing the brunt of the human suffering. Yet, as keen observers know, the conflict 

has been and remains in no small measure an international one. In the 1990s, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal were in the thick of efforts to restore peace in Liberia. Nations which were not only involved in the Liberian peace process, but also have been 

affected immeasurably by the violence sown in Liberia include, among others, Sierra 

Leone, Guinea, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Gambia. All of these nations suffered 

untold civilian or military casualties either in Liberia or on their own territories. 

Our goal now is not to go back in time, but to focus on the second chance Liberians have been given to reclaim their nationhood. Liberians want a place among 

the community of civilized nations. Additionally, they want to put behind them, forever, the culture of violence that has engulfed Liberia and the sub-Africa region and 

caused unspeakable human suffering. But even more importantly, Liberians want 

to put behind them those practices that have been the cause of violence—political 

and social injustice, dictatorship, class manipulation and the squandering of national economic resources. 

Mr. Chairman, I cannot overemphasize the need for the United States Government to heed the calls of innocent Liberians and the international community atlarge and take the lead now in bringing some form of normalcy to Liberia. We count 

on you to ensure that the peace process moves forward and reaches a successful out-
42

come. As I have indicated, the United States should take the leadership to bring 

peace, security and democracy to Liberia. If the United States can spend billions of 

dollars and sustain human and material casualties in the conflict in Iraq, we have 

no doubt it can put a fraction of those resources to help out a friend of more than 

170 years. We do not want another bloodbath in Liberia. 

Bringing the belligerent parties in Liberia to the negotiating table, where they 

were able to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement, signed on August 18, 2003, 

was certainly an important achievement that brought hope back to the hundreds of 

thousands of traumatized and war-wary Liberians. Members of the International 

Contact Group on Liberia and representatives of the different countries that helped 

with the process are certainly to be commended for their efforts, which led to this 

important breakthrough. 

It should, however be stressed that the peace agreement and the formation of a 

transitional government is but the necessary first step of a laborious and lengthy 

process aimed at establishing democracy and the rule of law in Liberia. Members 

of the Contact Group and representatives of the governments involved in the negotiations are therefore to be strongly reminded that the process could well fail if 

other important steps are not taken to begin laying down the infrastructure that 

the country needs to move toward democracy and the respect of the rule of law. 

The situation on the ground is by all counts still very precarious as was demonstrated by the eruption of hostilities only a few days after the signing of the 

cease-fire agreement. The ceasefire could be broken again at any time and send the 

country spiraling back into violence. The strengthening of the process hinges on the 

measures the United Nations and those members of the Security Council involved 

in the peace negotiations are willing to take, and the efforts they are willing to dedicate in order to keep the country from sinking into a worse situation. The success 

or failure of the process depends largely on the targeted strategic objectives, on the 

amount of planning the parties involved are willing to undertake, and a clear definition of the tasks ahead as well as fulfilling the requirements for their implementation. Finally, the success of the process depends on the full participation of Liberian 

and international Non-Governmental Organizations, NGOs, particularly those which 

have been at the forefront of the struggle, such as the Justice and Peace Commission and the Inter Religious Council of Liberia, both headed by Archbishop Francis. 

I would like Mr. Chairman to have your permission to include in the record the 

testimony of Mr. Cyril Jones, a Liberian lawyer, law professor and member of the 

Liberia Support Group; and also a letter the Human Rights Directors sent to Secretary Powell about the situation in Liberia. 

Once again, I thank you on behalf of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for 

Human Rights and the Liberia Support Group. We hereby assure you of our continued commitment to the establishment of durable peace and democratic governance 

in Liberia. Thank you.

Ms. KIDAU. I have also submitted two other documents, one from 

Cyril Jones and one from—the one that was written to Secretary 

of State in Liberia. 

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection, we will do that. 

[NOTE: The information referred to was not submitted to the 

Committee.] 

Mr. ROYCE. There was one particular point that you made in 

your testimony that others didn’t focus on and that was the allocation of so many positions within the transition government to people that were involved in the warring factions and your concerns 

to what that would lead to. Would you take a moment to explain 

that concern for the Committee? 

Ms. KIDAU. Well, the concern was that there are so many positions given to them where positions should not be given to warring 

parties. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs—that is the Secretary of the President, but it is 

given to the warring party. Minister of Finance. Those were key 

ministries that were given. And the maritime affairs. Those were 

key positions that were given to the warring parties, and it makes 

it seem as if they were rewarded for fighting the war. But, you 
43

know, under the circumstances that is what we had; and that is 

what we have to live with. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you again for your testimony. 

I also wanted to ask a question of Mr. Vines, and that had to do 

with the question of how much money was pilfered from Liberia, 

your best estimate, by Charles Taylor and whether your organization would support an effort to try to collect this money, collect 

these stolen assets that really belong to the Liberian people, but 

also maybe how difficult do you think that an operation would be 

to try to go after that money now. 

Mr. VINES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Indeed, it was an issue that I spent much time pursuing while 

I was on the UN panel of experts. I was successful in tracking 

money related to the shipping registry’s misuse, and this is why—

and it ties to the comment by my noble colleague here that one of 

our concerns is that there needs to be a proper revenue system set 

up in Liberia itself and Monrovia in that, even in post Taylor, bad 

habits will die hard. Unless there is a proper system of scrutiny, 

the warring factions that have now been rewarded with positions 

in the transitional administration may well fall into the habits that 

were a benchmark of the Taylor administration. 

Turning to your point on how we track the money, there needs 

now to be forensic research and access to all the accounts that are 

available in Monrovia. The Central Bank of Liberia, the ministry 

of finance and particularly the accounting and the off budget agencies—those are the bureau of maritime affairs and the Liberian petroleum refining company—a lot of money went through those 

probably to the benefit of the executive mansion. This needs to be 

reconstructed. 

It may be actually a good thing that some sort of independent 

investigation is commissioned. That could actually happen through 

a part of the wrap-up process at the UN to investigate exactly what 

happened to the money. We know that money has been frozen in 

Switzerland already. Some of that is offshore Liberian businesses 

which have nothing to do with Mr. Taylor. It is part of the corporate registry. 

Mr. ROYCE. Ball park. 

Mr. VINES. I would say tens of millions. We are probably talking about $100 million in total. Mr. Taylor wasn’t as wealthy as people 

would like to believe, either. He did have cash problems, and that 

was reflected in the procurement patent of arms and ammunition. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you about Elie Saleeby. If I understood 

the Assistant Secretary’s testimony correctly, there is going to be 

a fresh start in 12 days, but there again you are talking about the 

governor of the Central Bank. Is there any special authority that 

the United Nations would need to get at these records? I am sure 

you are going to play a role in trying to audit this. 

Mr. VINES. It needs a mandate in the Security Council that will 

come up in November. So if the United States, as part of its activities in the Security Council, can pursue this, that would be a very 

good thing for what may be the final mandate before May next 

year for a proper investigation of where has the money gone. All 

Liberians would like to know that. 

Mr. ROYCE. We will follow up on that. 
44

Then the last, I was going to ask you about the organizations in 

Nigeria that have spoken out against President Obasanjo’s harboring of Charles Taylor; and we have human rights organizations, 

journalists and so forth. Why do you think the President continues 

to harbor Taylor in Nigeria under these circumstances? Isn’t it—

and your organization is calling today—from your testimony calling 

him to turn over Taylor to the special court. 

Mr. VINES. I think that the more harassment President Obasanjo 

has on this issue by international NGOs, civil society groups inside 

Nigeria, demarches and papers by countries about the need for Mr. 

Taylor to face justice by the special court, probably the more anxious he will come to eventually handing him over. 

Mr. ROYCE. Which leads to one other question. Should we be concerned about Taylor leaving Nigeria for a third country, given this 

debate at this moment? 

Mr. VINES. We certainly should be worried that he would go to 

a third country where we have even less leverage over—I mean, 

Libya would like to improve its relationship with the United 

States, as we know, so that probably wouldn’t be a destination on 

this issue at the moment. But there may be other places that Mr. 

Taylor could go. 

Another scenario, a lot of the Taylor assets have moved up to 

Nimba and the Bong area, and Mr. Taylor may be considering meddling in that area of Liberia. I would hate to think of him going 

back to the rain forests of Liberia and trying to be troublesome in 

this period that we have between the Navy ships sailing away and 

what we heard from Mr. Kansteiner that UN will only be in full 

position in Liberia by March of next year. 

Mr. ROYCE. In closing, for that very concern and given the evidence that he has been on a cell phone destabilizing Liberia, that 

is the reason why Nigeria should at this juncture turn him over to 

the special court before something like that happens. 

Mr. VINES. Absolutely. The safest place for Mr. Taylor to be is 

to share the prison company of various other individuals who have 

been indicted by the special court. We can then guarantee that he 

won’t be on his mobile phone and won’t be a threat. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vines. 

I will go to our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

I, too, have a concern with—Mrs. Kidau, maybe you might be 

able to respond. With the flare-up in Monrovia and with the 

UNMIL troops being insufficient, do you believe that there could 

really be a new outbreak? As we indicated before, when the UN 

sent troops in Sierra Leone, they were—I think they were UN or 

Nigerian troops. They didn’t have enough. They were overtaken by 

the rebels. Matter of fact, their weapons were taken; their vehicles 

were taken. My question is, if we don’t have enough force on the 

ground, that this whole business could flare-up again. What is your 

opinion? 

Ms. KIDAU. I agree that there would be more problem if there is 

not enough forces on the ground especially to go into the interior 

of the country to disarm those who are still fighting at this time. 

They are still fighting in the interior of Liberia. I don’t know for 
45

what reason it would be. I don’t know that they are supposed to 

stop fighting, or maybe they are just intimidating people. 

I thought I read something about how the civilians in those areas 

were asking the UN not to give any food because, once they get 

food, they worry that the fighters will go in and harass them, shoot 

out and then take everything that they have. So, as hungry as they 

were, they were asking that the UN didn’t give them food. So it is 

necessary to disarm these people. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. Vines, there are some concerns—I met with some Liberians, 

Mr. Cole here from New Jersey and others that had a feeling that, 

you know, the political crowd, generally speaking, is not the group 

that would be transparent and that you are going to just bring in 

former political people and remnants of Doe is still around, remnants of the old Tolbert government, remnants of the Taylor government. What do you think the prospects for fair and free elections and governance is for the future of Liberia? 

Mr. VINES. Well, the first thing is the situation, of course, needs 

to be stabilized in Liberia itself. We do have a transition process 

to the end of 2005 depending on events on the ground. Several 

years would be enough to make a playing field more level than the 

last elections in Liberia, but it will depend on ensuring that there 

is proper independent monitoring of the process way before the 

election dates themselves. A tendency of elections in this part of 

the world has been that monitoring comes rather late and rather 

too close to the election dates. 

I don’t think I want to be overpessimistic. I think Liberia really 

has a great opportunity here. Within 2 years, as long as the international scrutiny and assistance is sufficient, I think Liberia can 

pull off a successful election, which is good for the country and 

good for the region, in the manner in which we were excited to see 

the results of the elections last year in Sierra Leone which was a 

very peaceful and exciting election which has bridged into a country that has emerged from a very horrific period of war itself. 

Mr. PAYNE. Final question is, there are some people—and, you 

know, I am glad that there is not total pessimism—however, there 

are some people that have suggested that a trusteeship type—

maybe not the same type that the UN trusteeships—not necessarily always been viewed very positively in the developing 

world, but if there can be some kind of—even an African Union 

type trusteeship or trusteeship in the UN, which we haven’t seen 

in a while, what do you think, either one of you, think about a 

trusteeship type, someone coming in, sort of running the government for 5 years or so until things straighten up? 

Ms. KIDAU. There is a need for a quarter change in Liberia, quarter change from violence to peace and from corruption to accountability. But I think there is a way you can do it without having 

someone take away the country. We can maybe set up a group of 

people that monitor the government and make sure that it is accountable and that is abiding by the rules that were set up in 

Accra, and that is going to work if we do that. If we really stay 

close to the issues and make sure that they work, I think it would 

be better. I don’t think Liberians would want a trusteeship at this 

time. 
46

Mr. VINES. Yes, Congressman, I would agree, too. 

I think if there are systems of verification—for example, with the 

revenue trail, if there was an order trail that indicates how funds 

were used and allocated and spent, that would be a break from the 

past, and it would change things. It is possible. Liberia is small. 

These things are possible. With political will and assistance, these 

things can be achieved. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Vines, we are going to ask you and certainly ask 

Ms. Kidau if you fashion some ideas that you—in terms of transparency that you think would be helpful in the Security Council 

resolution, we would like to assist in trying to make certain that 

we get that transparency in reference to that resolution. 

Mr. VINES. Mr. Chairman, we at Human Rights Watch would be 

happy to provide a draft text that would assist you. 

Ms. KIDAU. We will do the same. 

Mr. ROYCE. We appreciate your attendance today, and this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
(47)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Ranking member for calling today’s hearing. My 

hopes are that today’s hearing will be the first step on the road to alleviating the 

suffering of the Liberian people. 

As we know, Liberia is at a pivotal point in its history. If peace is to become a 

mainstay in Liberia, the international community must remain involved. I ask 

today, what the role of the U.S. will be in instilling long term peace and stability 

in Liberia. 

Years of war have resulted in the deaths of 250,000 Liberians and the displacement of nearly a million more. The very fabric of Liberian society has been torn 

asunder. Instead of students, schools now house the victims of war. 

This present day picture of Liberia differs significantly from that of the Liberia 

founded by free Black Americans from the U.S. in 1820. A Liberia whose aid was 

instrumental in success during WWI and II. A Liberia who is responsible for the 

success of Firestone and its great contribution to the American economy. 

I ask today that we work to return the favors granted by Liberia by ensuring the 

creation of lasting peace and stability in the country. 

And although our troops are withdrawing as I speak, this means that some form 

of U.S. presence must remain in place until UN peacekeeping forces can be firmly 

established in the country and the infrastructure of Liberia rebuilt, such that is can 

become a self-sufficient democratic nation. 

It means that we must seriously consider the long lasting effects the freedom of 

Charles Taylor can have on Liberia and the precedent it would set for those who 

would choose to rule unjustly across the African continent. 

We have agreed to do no less in Iraq. Why not perform these services for a country that was founded based upon our own democratic principles, who is only struggling to return to that base. 

Are the people of Liberia suffering any less than those of Iraq? Are the children 

more accustomed to carrying a rifle than a schoolbook any less in need of a childhood than an Iraqi child? Are the natural resources of diamonds, gold, timber, and 

agriculture any less able than oil to one day transform Liberia into a self-sufficient 

country? 

I ask all these questions in an attempt to understand why our President feels 

American taxpayers can find $87 billion to rebuild a nation that throughout history 

has not even made a fraction of the same contribution to America. This question 

is especially relevant when the estimated price tag for intervention in Liberia is 

$275 million and the international community has already agreed to provide the 

majority of troops for peacekeeping, such that the U.S. does not even have to request the assistance of the international community in restoring Liberia. 

Ladies and Gentleman, I can see no reason why we should not make this commitment to a country that historically created itself in our own image and only seeks 

to return to those roots. 

I ask today that we consider what the greater costs might be to both Liberia and 

our nation in the future if we fail to select a policy that addresses the underlying 

causes of war in Liberia. We have seen how generations of terrorists can grow from 

the soil of poverty, absence of education, and the appearance of zealots. 

Ladies and gentleman, let’s work together to ensure that Liberia will not become 

another fertile ground. Let’s provide the $275 million necessary to ensure that the 
48

peacekeepers charged with protecting our legacy have sufficient training and supplies. Thank you. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Payne, I am very happy that we are having 

this hearing today. 

I believe peacekeeping is critical at this time in Africa, specifically the Western 

Region of Africa. Currently, conflicts in Cote D’ Ivoire, the Congo, and Liberia have 

shaken a region that has historically partnered with the United States to promote 

peace and democracy. 

Daily, we see the desperate conditions that remain as a result of the civil conflict 

in Liberia. We watched the bodies mount at the U.S. embassy, the child soldiers 

take up arms, and water and food became scarce; while the Administration’s rhetoric produced a lack luster peacekeeping effort. 

Today, Liberia needs more than temporary military assistance; they need significant peacekeeping force which will allow the transitional government to take office 

in an environment of security and opportunity. The United States must play a role 

in helping create the conditions for peace, prosperity, and long-term democracy. The 

Bush Administration has pulled out U.S. peacekeeping troops and now is the time 

to commit financially to the U.N. and Ecomil effort. 

I can’t begin to describe the conditions in which we have left our historically tied 

brothers and sisters in Liberia. 

A million people have been displaced by the organized violence that has racked 

the country and the region. Almost one in ten Liberians is HIV positive. The economy has been shattered. Unknown numbers have been killed, raped and left starving in not only the capital but the entire country. 

Our response must be a multi-faceted and long-term effort. 

Peacekeeping is part of this program, but in thinking about such a mission we 

must consider the larger meaning of peace. 

‘‘True peace,’’ Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. taught us, ‘‘Is not merely the absence 

of tension; it is the presence of justice.’’

It is also the presence of food, water, electricity, and medicine. 

We address the current instability and prospects for democracy by addressing all 

these needs. 

On July 8th, I joined members of the International Relations Committee and the 

Congressional Black Caucus in offering a resolution expressing our strong conviction 

that the United States should assume a leadership role in the international community to help establish a ceasefire and successful economic and political transition in 

Liberia. 

Although our troops came and went, the situation on the ground remains perilous. 

To restore peace and ensure freedom, we must develop a comprehensive strategy 

that includes security and peace throughout all of Liberia (not just the capitol of 

Monrovia), support the transitional government and democratic elections in 2005, 

and finally we must revive our commitment to Africa financially and diplomatically. 

Diplomacy is the mechanism to bring about a peace, and a U.N. peacekeeping mission is the way to preserve it. 

This strategy must incorporate programs designed to promote democracy; preserve 

human rights; restore electricity and other basic services; expand healthcare access, 

including HIV–AIDS treatment and prevention; and address the social, economic, 

and political results of fourteen years of civil war and misrule. 

As an advocate of peace and a person of faith, I believe I have an obligation to 

Liberia and to all the people who are desperately fighting for peace, so they may 

someday enjoy freedom. 

I welcome our panelists, and all who are in attendance from the Liberian community. Thank you and I look forward to this discussion. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID M. CRANE, CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE SPECIAL

COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE IN SIERRA LEONE—A FUTURE MODEL OF

SUCCESS FOR LIBERIA

We live in a world today where threats to our security and to the security of other 

countries are growing in number and complexity. The threats include international 

terrorism and drug trafficking, the development and deployment of weapons of mass 
49

destruction, environmental transformations, and global economic upheavals, which 

are placing whole societies at risk. 

I have come back to Washington from West Africa to speak about another clear 

and present danger to people around the world—war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as the 

lurking danger of impunity on the African continent. 

A survey of today’s headlines shows that these atrocities are all too frequent in 

modern conflict and internal power struggles. The absence of justice is too often the 

norm rather than the exception in lands where atrocities proliferate. Combatants 

know nothing about the laws of war. Typical among the victims are women—often 

in the thousands—raped and slaughtered for their mere existence. Typical among 

the perpetrators are children—often as young as six—abducted and forced to commit 

unspeakable acts of barbarity. 

I am here today to tell you about a successful effort to respond to this assault 

on humanity—the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a hybrid international war crimes 

tribunal. It can be a future model for success in Liberia 

For the past year, I have served as the Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for 

Sierra Leone. Appointed to the position in April 2002 by United Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, I have been in Sierra Leone working with a talented team of 

international and national professionals to bring ‘‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’’ for the atrocities during the country’s civil war to justice. The Special 

Court is a groundbreaking bold new experiment to combat impunity and construct 

justice in a devastated society recovering from a decade of war in West Africa. 

In over thirty years of public service, I have never witnessed such pure evil. And 

I have never before served on a more noble or important mission. 

I arrived in Sierra Leone in early-August 2002. Criminal investigations began two 

weeks later. On March 3, 2003, I signed eight indictments. These indictments were 

confirmed by a trial chamber judge on March 7 in London. At noon on Monday, 

March 10—just seven months after our arrival—members of my investigations 

team, along with the Sierra Leone Police launched ‘‘Operation Justice,’’ taking down 

simultaneously all five indictees who were in Sierra Leone at the time, including 

the sitting Minister of Interior, Samuel Hinga Norman. 

To date we have twelve indictments. Twelve of the worst criminal actors Africa 

and the world have ever seen are now ‘‘off the street’’. They will not terrorize West 

Africa again. We have eight of them in custody in our detention facility. Two 

indictees are outside of Sierra Leone with outstanding warrants for their arrest 

(Charles Taylor, exile, and Johnny Paul Koroma believed murdered by Taylor), one 

has died of natural causes while in custody (Fodoy Sankoh), and one was murdered 

on orders of Charles Taylor while the President of Liberia in May of this year (Sam 

Bockerie). Further indictments will follow. 

Sierra Leone is one of the most horrific and challenging crime scenes in the world. 

Thousands of civilians have been murdered, raped, hideously mutilated, or terrorized. The magnitude of massacres, mutilations, torture, and destruction of civilian 

property is so great that its full extent is still unknown. I have personally seen the 

children whose limbs have been chopped off by drug-crazed child soldiers under the 

command of greedy individuals. I have walked through the mass grave sites that 

litter the country’s hauntingly beautiful landscape. 

The character of the Sierra Leone conflict is indicative of what will likely confront 

the international community in the future and was mirrored in neighboring Liberia: 

an undisciplined force of child soldiers, led by revenge-seeking rebels and former 

government soldiers who exercise no restraint whatsoever in the prosecution of their 

campaign for power; of funding derived from control of a natural resource, such as 

diamonds; of foreign governments collaborating with war criminals; of the humanitarian crisis wrought by such criminal behavior. How we choose to respond to the 

‘‘Sierra Leones and Liberias of the world’’ is telling of our own character as the 

world’s only remaining superpower and the responsibility that title entails. 

What is the Special Court for Sierra Leone? 

The Special Court is an innovative step in the evolution of international war 

crimes tribunals designed to prevent future atrocities. I believe it is a model that 

can work to combat impunity in Liberia at the appropriate time. 

The Court is a new kind of ‘‘hybrid’’ tribunal that is independent of the United 

Nations and any state. Established through an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone in January 2002, the Court is both international and national. 

The Court’s Registrar, Robin Vincent from the United Kingdom, and I were appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General in April of last year. My Deputy 

Prosecutor Desmond DeSilva QC, was appointed by the Government of Sierra 
50

Leone. The Chambers of the Court are a combination of international and national 

judges. All eight judges were sworn-into office in early-December 2002. Geoffrey 

Robertson, a distinguished human rights advocate from the United Kingdom, was 

elected the President of the Court. 

Our mandate is to try those who ‘‘bear the greatest responsibility’’ for serious violations of international humanitarian law, including the laws of war; crimes against 

humanity, including widespread or systematic murder, enslavement, rape, sexual 

slavery and other forms of sexual violence, torture, and other inhumane acts; and 

certain crimes under Sierra Leone law. These crimes were also perpetrated in Liberia. Cases can be brought against anyone who committed such crimes or were responsible for these crimes committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996 to include any head of state. Our mandate is very specific and we have 

three years to finish it. 

Unlike the two existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the Court’s budget is drawn entirely from voluntary contributions rather than assessments from UN 

member-states. The entire three year budget for the Court, including the construction of a permanent court site, was set initially at $57 million. It will now most likely be around $75 million over its three year life, on the average of around $25 million per year. Compare this with the Rwanda war crimes tribunal of around $110 

million for just one year. Thus far, over 30 countries have generously provided financial or in-kind contributions. With an annual budget that is about a tenth of 

what the other tribunals spend each year, the Court must be more efficient and operate with a leaner staff and less resources. The Court currently faces a grave financial crisis. Pledges and contributions for this year to date only cover half of the approved budget by the Management Committee based at the United Nations in New 

York. The Court currently has enough operating funds until the end of the calendar 

year. After that we are simply out of business. 

The Special Court sits in the country where the violations occurred. I believe this 

is exactly the right place for the Court to be—in the heart of Sierra Leone, delivering justice directly to the people who suffered during the civil war. This can be 

done in Liberia as well. Our courtroom will be open to the public and proceedings 

will be broadcast live over the radio. An ambitious outreach and public information 

program is already in place to keep Sierra Leoneans informed and engaged in the 

work of the Court. This is, first and foremost, their Court. 

The Court hopes to make a lasting contribution to promoting accountability and 

the rule of law long after its work has finished. Thus, capacity-building and legacy 

activities constitute an important part of our work. 

The Court will also break new ground in another area as well, child soldiers. A 

whole generation of Sierra Leonean boys and girls has been lost due to the war. 

Children were particularly victimized during the civil war. I intend to send a clear 

message to the world that the international community will not tolerate the recruitment and enslavement of children. For the first time in history, child abduction and 

recruitment will be prosecuted as a war crime. This crime has been alleged in our 

indictments. 

While gender crimes were replete in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the character of crimes committed in Sierra Leone took place on a much larger and twisted 

scale. From the start, we included gender crimes in our prosecutorial strategy. They 

have been thoroughly and actively investigated and our indictments include them 

as core charges against those who bear the greatest responsibility 

We have focused, as well, on the role of illicit resources in fuelling the conflict. 

The war in Sierra Leone was a civil war, but it was equally a regional and international conflict. The international community has too often misunderstood or underestimated the regional dimension of conflicts in Africa, but the recent attention 

on conflict diamonds and shifting locations of on-going tension in West Africa makes 

it impossible to ignore. 

All too often, massive civilian carnage has been associated with those conflicts. 

Consider for a moment the thousands of maimed civilians in Sierra Leone, who have 

paid for that conflict with their limbs. If we are serious about wanting to prevent 

atrocities, we need to be willing to take on difficult issues such as the linkage between illicit diamond trading and atrocities. 

The diamond trade is attractive to rebels and terrorists alike. The role of Liberia 

and other African states in supporting the rebels in Sierra Leone and throughout 

West Africa also requires continued attention and response. Without foreign support, including gunrunners and other criminal organizations, the rebels would have 

been a much weaker force. I have publicly stated that the case I’m investigating is 

local, regional, and international in scope. Those found to be involved in this joint 

criminal enterprise will be brought to justice. 
51

The Way Ahead 

As alluded to earlier, this model for success can be implemented in Liberia at the 

appropriate time. It must be stressed, however, like in Sierra Leone, true peace can 

only be achieved in Liberia when there is accountability for what appears to be war 

crimes and crimes against humanity committed during Charles Taylor’s reign of terror. 

The Special Court for Sierra Leone is accomplishing the task that the international community, the people of Sierra Leone, and indeed the United States have 

asked it to do. We’ve done it efficiently, effectively, taking off the street at this point 

in time, as I have stated earlier, twelve of those who clearly bear the greatest responsibility for the tragedy that took place in West Africa. 

The United States has invested a great deal in ensuring the Special Court is a 

success. It is an investment that is paying off for not only the United States but 

for the people of Sierra Leone and West Africa. This committee has particularly 

stood shoulder to shoulder with us in our efforts to return the rule of law to West 

Africa. Along with your colleagues in the Senate, you are allowing us to show the 

world that this bold and noble experiment is working and working well. 

Our investigation against this joint criminal enterprise, led by Charles Taylor continues worldwide. There will be more indictments and trials are anticipated to begin 

around January, 2004 only 16 months from the time we stepped off the airplane 

in Freetown. We will be done in 2005 as mandated. 

However, we will never be completely finished, nor will there be true peace for 

Sierra Leone, Liberia and West Africa until Charles Taylor, war criminal and terrorist, is brought to justice and handed over to this international war crimes tribunal. His seventeen count indictment for murder, terror, rape, sexual slavery, 

looting, burning, maiming, mutilation, and enslavement, among other alleged 

crimes, stands as an eternal flame against injustice and impunity. 

We are appreciative of African, UN, and US leaders for refusing all efforts by Taylor to have this indictment dropped prior to his departure this past August. Their 

actions sent a signal that warlords will pay some price for their actions. But that 

signal is weak unless he actually faces these charges. Note the clear directive by 

the United Nations Security Council in their resolution of 6 May 2003, S/Res/1478 

(2003), calling on all states to cooperate fully with the Special Court for Sierra 

Leone. 

Simply put, Charles Taylor must be turned over to the Special Court for Sierra 

Leone. There can be no impunity in the 21st Century. Carving out an exception for 

wayward African leaders who commit horrendous crimes insults the people of that 

continent, undercuts the principles laid out so carefully at Nuremburg, and ignores 

the cries for justice by hundreds of thousands of the murdered dead, raped, maimed 

and mutilated victims; and the millions of displaced human beings throughout West 

Africa as a result of Charles Taylor and other members of this joint criminal enterprise. 

Today, according to the United Nations, Charles Taylor continues to foment terror 

and exert influence over events in Liberia as he sits in exile. Even on the day he 

left he was emptying the treasury of Liberia of millions of dollars as he boarded a 

plane for exile and disgrace. In other words Taylor is violating the very conditions 

of that exile. Quoting Jacques Klein, UN Special Representative of the Secretary 

General for Liberia, Taylor continues to undermine the political process. Klein stated recently: ‘‘If he violates the terms of his stay in Nigeria, Nigeria will have to reassess his presence . . . I hope Taylor will be judged and punished . . . justice ha(s) 

to be done.’’ Recall Taylor’s chilling words as he left a devastated Liberia: ‘‘I’ll be 

back.’’

Conclusion 

I strongly believe the Special Court model will succeed and in time such a war 

crimes tribunal can succeed in Liberia. 

Over the past thirteen months, I have traveled throughout the country to meet 

with my clients—the people of Sierra Leone. In ‘‘town hall meetings’’ I listen to concerns and thoughts on how I should approach my mandate of prosecuting those who 

bear the greatest responsibility for the heinous atrocities committed in this country. 

Victims, perpetrators, and witnesses have overwhelmed me with stories from the 

war. 

Their stories fit a familiar pattern: the rebels burned down entire neighborhoods, 

lined up men, women, and children and, one-by-one, chopped off their arms and/or 

feet, lips, ears, buttocks and breasts. Some were spared mutilation, at least for a 

while, and abducted to serve as slave labor to the rebels and as soldiers themselves. 

Large numbers of young girls and women were raped and kept in sexual slavery 
52

until killed. I met one young woman without an arm; her three-year old son missing 

a leg. 

I will not forget their stories. These cases remind us that the war crimes agenda 

is more than the pursuit of abstract goals and interests. It is about real people who 

are real victims. 

We are at a moment in world history when the international community can 

make a critical difference in waging peace by supporting efforts to bring war criminals to justice. America has led the way since the Civil War to codify international 

rules to govern armed conflict and to outlaw the slaughter of civilians. Our soldiers 

fought to defend those principles in two world wars and throughout the Cold War, 

and they stand prepared to sustain those principles today. 

You should all be very proud of America’s commitment to the Special Court. You 

should be proud of your fellow Americans working in Sierra Leone, along with a 

large staff of Sierra Leoneans, and others from throughout Africa and around the 

world, to fight impunity and promote justice in West Africa. 

Sierra Leone and Liberia desperately need to eliminate a culture of impunity that 

undermines all other efforts to bring peace, stability, and reconciliation to that tortured land. Accountability forms the cornerstone of any just and sustainable peace—

and in Sierra Leone, we have begun the long march towards accountability. 

This is a cause and mission as noble as the undertaking by another American 

Chief Prosecutor, Robert Jackson, at the end of World War II at Nuremburg who 

said:

‘‘We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression 

by those in power against the rights of their own people only when we make 

all men answerable to the law.’’

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUES PAUL KLEIN, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

SECRETARY-GENERAL AND COORDINATOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN

LIBERIA

For the past twelve years the people of Liberia have lived in hellish limbo, suffering at the whim of warlords and despots, exploited by a criminal kleptocracy 

without help or relief in sight. Their lives and their country are held hostage by 

armed drugged thugs who destroy the state and engulfed the region in chaos. The 

ravages of self-centred political and criminal ideologies spread the conflict beyond 

Liberia’s borders and caused enormous suffering and havoc in the neighbouring 

states. Thousands of its citizens do not have access to life’s basic necessities of shelter, water, food or even rudimentary medical care. This massive humanitarian and 

political crisis calls for immediate intervention. 

Founded in 1820 by Freed Black slaves, Liberia became in 1847, the oldest African Republic. Relations between Liberia and the United Sates are more than just 

historical. The Constitution of Liberia and its flag were modeled after the US. Even 

its capital Monrovia was named after former President James Monroe. A founding 

member of the of the United Nations, Liberia played a key and critical role in the 

fight against fascism—Roberts field was built as an entrepot for allied aircraft 

transiting to Europe; Liberia also produced the majority of the free world’s rubber 

supplies that ensured allied victory after the plantations of Southeast Asia were 

overrun. Time and again when Liberia was called upon for help or assistance, it 

gave—does it deserve no less now that they need our help? If Liberia can be rebuilt, 

it can become an engine for stability in the region. On the other hand, continued 

instability in Liberia will undermine neighbouring states and the sub-region. 

Today Liberia is not even listed on the UNDP human development index. Seventy-five percent of its citizens are living below the poverty line; the unemployment 

rate is eighty-five percent; literacy is at thirty-eight percent; fifty percent of the population is under fifteen years of age. Added to this is that seventy percent of the 

belligerents are child soldiers, coerced, psychologically traumatized, manipulated 

and exploited by self-appointed military leaders. We have a phenomenon not known 

elsewhere in the world where the younger population is less well educated than 

their parents. 

We have an obligation to assist in putting an end to this cycle of brutality, violence, corruption and instability that has destroyed the social fabric of society and 

has also spilled over the borders of Liberia and profoundly affected the region. This 

effort will require dramatic, engaged and bold solutions. Liberia and the region need 

to be stabilized and brought into a larger African framework where it can be given 

the political support, the encouragement and mentoring required to help it become 

a stable and self-sustaining member of Africa and the international community. 
53

The efforts of ECOWAS leaders under the chairmanship of President John Kufuor 

of Ghana and personal involvement of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria have 

created the conditions for peace in Liberia. Through the concerted political action 

and the commitment of troops, ECOWAS has underscored its importance and its energy as the regional organization committed to ensuring peace, stability and development in West Africa. 

There is urgent need to build on the efforts of ECOWAS. The international community must act now by making a strong commitment to help Liberia. It must be 

prepared to commit the resources and the personnel needed to help the people of 

Liberia rebuild their country. And, whilst the international community must provide 

the resources, this must also be a partnership with the citizens of Liberia for they 

ultimately have the responsibility for ending the conflict and healing and rebuilding 

their nation. 

An essential part of the healing and rebuilding process is the bringing to justice 

of those who have committed violations of international law. Without justice, there 

can be no healing. Without justice, those who believe that they can act with impunity will be tempted to do so again. Without justice, Liberia cannot bring to closure 

this dark past and look to a brighter future. Ultimately, until you punish the guilty, 

you cannot absolve the innocent. 

I arrived in Monrovia on 14 August to see first hand the situation on the ground. 

From 21 August, I had the opportunity to lead a UN multi-disciplinary assessment 

mission in Liberia. This mission gathered useful information that was used to prepare the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council, which has been issued 

as UN document (S/2003/875). 

From 24 to 29 August, I met with President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire, 

President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and Prime Minister Lamine Sidime 

of Guinea and members of the diplomatic community, the Commander of the French 

Forces in Cote d’Ivoire, the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 

United Nations officials. On 1 September in Monrovia I met with President 

Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and his Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji. In my 

meetings all pledged their support and full cooperation with UNMIL and stressed 

the need for regional cooperation. It is this cooperation that is crucial if United Nations efforts in Liberia and the region are to be successful. 

During this period I also worked with UN agencies and other partners on the 

ground on arrangements to address priority needs of the country, which include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, establishing a safe and secure environment for refugee return; addressing law and order issues; gender issues; seriously 

attacking cross-border criminal activities. 

SECURITY

I must commend the rapid deployment of ECOMIL to Liberia, and take this opportunity to salute the troops from Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, 

Benin and Togo in the highly visible and volatile situation that they originally 

faced. Subsequent to the deployment of ECOMIL with support from the off shore 

assets of the United States, stability has begun to be restored in and around Monrovia. Clearly, however, much more remains to be done. 

The multi-national force that is now presently in Liberia. On 19 September, the 

Security Council is expected to approve the establishment of United Nations 

(UNMIL) force in Liberia, which will replace ECOMIL on 1 October. This UN Force 

must be credible, well trained and fully equipped. Its leadership must be focused, 

impartial and experienced and professional. Without these ingredients the mission 

will be in jeopardy. Troops will be asked to carry out extremely difficult tasks such 

as securing the capital and other major towns, ensuring combatants respect the 

Peace Agreement, monitoring the borders, establishing cantonment sites for disarmament, overseeing demobilization and ensuring that a safe and secure environment is established for all members of the Liberian population. Therefore, well-led, 

trained and equipped forces can make the difference between success and failure, 

between peace and chaos. 

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

One of the major challenges facing us will be the Disarmament, Demobilization 

and Reintegration of all ex-combatants. United Nations experience in Liberia, Sierra 

Leone, Cote d’ Ivoire, the Congo and Mozambique should serve as lessons learned. 

Firstly, there cannot be disarmament and demobilization without reintegration, rehabilitation and reinsertion into society. 

Therefore, it must be stressed, adequate and secure financing for the programme 

is critical and must include the maintenance of cantonment sites, supporting ex-
54

combatants and their families during the process, and providing alternative means 

of vocational training, employment and education. In this respect, particular attention must be focused on:

a) Child ex-combatants who face greater difficulty in re-entering civil society 

and will require special assistance in compliance with the UN Convention on 

the Rights of the Child. This assistance will focus on family reunification 

along with special medical, shelter, and education and technical assistance 

facilitated by UNICEF and other child protection agencies until such time 

as they can be safely reintegrated into civil society;

b) Female ex-combatants also face difficulties. They need to receive specialized 

medical treatment, shelter, education and re-training and counseling assistance; and

c) The medical rehabilitation of all ex-combatants will be required. Those with 

physical disabilities must be given high priority assistance.

It should also be noted that most of the ex-combatants have neither completed 

formal education nor have they acquired the necessary technical skills to compete 

in the economic development of Liberia. Without the prospect of participating in the 

economic life of the country, most of the ex-combatants will revert to criminal activities to sustain a livelihood. It is crucial that programmes be created to ensure that 

ex-combatants have a fair chance to secure employment or educational opportunities 

if they are to be peacefully reintegrated into Liberian society. 

HUMAN RIGHTS

On the human rights front, the armed conflict in Liberia has been characterized 

by egregious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law including, deliberate and arbitrary killings, extra-judicial executions, disappearances, torture, widespread rape of women and girls, sodomizing of young boys and men, arbitrary arrests and detention—sometimes incommunicado, forced conscription, recruitment and use of child soldiers, arson, widespread and often malicious looting, systematic and forced displacement as well as deliberate targeting of civilians. 

Government security forces including the Special Operations Division (SOD), Antiterrorist Unit (ATU) Special Security Service and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) 

have been responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 

The rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and 

Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) have also been responsible for violations. 

There has been a severe deterioration and gradual attrition of the institutions for 

the protection and promotion of human rights, including courts and police. Although 

a National Human Rights Commission was established in 1997 its weak mandate 

and other structural defects made it susceptible to Government control. 

UNMIL, as an integrated mission will encourage and coordinate international protection efforts and the promotion of human rights in Liberia. I will give priority to 

the improvement of the human rights situation and the protection of civilians, especially women and children. 

RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Police Reform 

One of the yardsticks by which UNMIL’s ultimate success will be measured is its 

contribution to reforming and restructuring the criminal justice system to better reflect the communities they serve and to provide confidence for returnees. I have 

placed a high priority on this process. 

In all of these endeavors our focus is to ensure that police performance meets 

international standards of policing and human rights. This requires co-location of 

CIVPOL officers with local police for the purpose of monitoring and mentoring. But 

the key to self-sustaining police reform is professional training. We will institute the 

essential programmes of human dignity and transitional courses and basic and specialized courses such as leadership, management, community policing, firearms and 

traffic training. Our aim will be to create an effective educational infrastructure 

within one year so that the local police can become self-sustaining in their training 

programmes, thus freeing up our resources for the more extensive programme of colocation. 

Judicial Reform 

We will also work to ensure objectivity in the judicial system that has been rendered dysfunctional through political intimidation and lack of resources. As I have 

said often, if police reform is not accompanied by judicial reform, it is like trying 
55

to clap with only one hand. This is a bitter lesson learned from my last two missions. Those entrusted with this programme and the new Judicial Review process, 

must be competent professionals who have the confidence and trust of the local judicial community. The overall management of judicial reform and review remains the 

responsibility of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) with assistance provided by expert international organizations, under the lead of the 

United Nations through the expertise and resources of the United Nations Development Programme. 

Until citizens know and believe that the courts are truly independent bodies with 

enforceable decisions, with an effective police force trained to international standards of policing and human rights, only then can there be a guarantee of the rule 

of law. 

Corrections 

UNMIL will, in partnership with the (NTGL), provide substantive assistance in 

areas related to the prison system, and will center its efforts on: prison reform, 

training and development of prison service personnel. This will naturally include 

monitoring functions to ensure international standards of human rights are protected and ingrained. 

A team of correctional system experts will provide assistance, advice and mentoring support to regional institutional and headquarters prison personnel, including 

administration, human resources and finance, and the Ministry of Justice. As with 

Police reform, prison reform will entail co-location and monitoring in the prisons 

and the headquarters with their national counterparts. Also necessary and key to 

the reform and development of the prison system will be the redevelopment of a national training capacity. This reform of the criminal justice system will not come 

cheap. 

To accomplish these objectives funding of civil institutions is crucial. I am proposing to call a conference of potential donors and seek international assistance for 

the reform and development of civil institutions. These activities will encompass 

tasks ranging from basic training for civil servants to the provision of essential 

equipment and infrastructure. I also intend to seek funding for the salaries of civil 

servants to bridge the interim period until the Liberian Government is able to collect revenue to support its activities. The prompt payment of salaries is a key element in building professionalism and discouraging public employees from seeking 

bribes to supplement their incomes. 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

As indicated earlier, I have witnessed first hand that Liberia’s conflict has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe impacting not only on Liberians but refugees 

from Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. Humanitarians often refer to ‘‘forgotten 

emergencies.’’ Liberia is one of the worst examples; it has been almost completely 

neglected. The international community imposed sanctions, but they did not give 

humanitarians the resources they needed to help Liberians. 

For the international community to become re-engaged, it took fighting in the 

streets of the capital and media attention. Media interest is now waning and going 

back to Iraq. 

The entire population of 2.7 million has been affected by fighting. 500,000 people 

are displaced. Many of them were displaced several times. 300,000 more have fled 

to neighboring countries. There are parts of Liberia—Lofa County for instance—that 

have not had any aid for three years. 

Funding for the current emergency appeal stands at about 50% of the relatively 

paltry $69 million we have asked for. (Funding requirements for next year expected 

to be roughly $100 million. I’m urging donors to step up. 

As indicated above, security is vital. Without security Liberians are raped, intimidated, and extorted and murdered. Without security, the humanitarian community 

can’t deliver assistance to the people who need it. 

While ECOMIL is doing a good job of deploying outside the capital, there are only 

some 3,000 of them on the ground and they have logistical constraints. Agencies are 

negotiating access one location at a time. They are running cross-line and cross-border operations. They are gaining access to more and more locations farther and farther away from Monrovia. 

Where there has been security, humanitarian agencies have been successful. In 

the last month, NGOs and UN agencies have tackled a cholera epidemic in Monrovia. From 16 August until 5 September, WFP aided some 420,000 people by distributing nearly 3,000 metric tons of food. Children are being vaccinated against diseases. Lives have been saved. 
56

Even where security is precarious, humanitarian agencies are bringing aid. For 

example, a relief ship went on 12 August to the southern port of Harper for the first 

time since May. Agencies have reached areas such as Tubmanburg and Buchanan. 

Conditions in much of the country, however, remain difficult. Recent assessments 

show that rates of malnutrition—especially among children—and cholera have continued to rise in places like Tubmanburg and Buchanan. Persistent looting and insecurity make aid distribution difficult and dangerous. IDPs in Totota last week asked 

us not to give them food for fear the rebels would come and steal it. In recognition 

of this fear humanitarian agencies began to distribute food—mostly to children—in 

small amounts. 

There is a humanitarian agreement signed by the Government of Liberia, UN, 

MODEL, LURD witnessed by ECOWAS and the AU on 17 August, which guarantees ‘‘free and unimpeded’’ access. The parties have the obligation to honor it. There 

are obvious problems with command and control of the various armed forces. An estimated 70% of the fighters are under 18 years of age. None of them are paid. They 

loot to feed themselves. This must be stopped. 

Liberia has natural resources to develop (Iron Ore, Gold, Diamonds, Timber). But 

a series of corrupt and kleptocratic governments have kept the profits for themselves. As a result, Liberia remains near the very bottom of the UN’s Human development index. 

Liberians bear primary responsibility for protecting civilians and guaranteeing access and ultimately for rebuilding their own country. But they cannot transform 

their country without help. That is why we are urging the donors to support the 

humanitarian plan for Liberia. 

You only have to look to Sierra Leone for an example to follow. 5 years ago, Sierra 

Leone was synonymous with ‘‘atrocity’’ and ‘‘kleptocracy’’. Today, stability is setting 

in. Rights are being protected. Development is underway. These positive developments require sustained commitment from the international community. It requires 

keeping the peace and meeting humanitarian needs. It requires political resolve to 

see the transition through. Liberia requires these same things. 

In conclusion, the importance of what is happening now in Liberia cannot be overstated. This is Liberia’s best chance in a decade to achieve peace, stability and development. If the opportunity is lost, conditions in the country will worsen and the 

whole region will be further destabilized. 

Thank you. 

UN SECURITY COUNCIL STATEMENT OF JACQUES PAUL KLEIN, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND COORDINATOR OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA, SEPTEMBER 16, 2003

Monsieur le Pre ́sident, Messieurs (Mesdames) les Repre ́sentants Permanents, 

Messieurs, Mesdames, 

C’est un honneur pour moi que de vous pre ́senter, aujourd’hui, le premier Rapport 

du Secre ́taire ge ́ne ́ral en ma capacite ́ de Repre ́sentant spe ́cial du Secre ́taire ge ́ne ́ral 

et Coordinateur des ope ́rations des Nations Unies au Libe ́ria. Au moment ou` la 

communaute ́ internationale examine de pre`s le roˆle joue ́ et les re ́sultats obtenus par 

les Nations Unies dans la re ́solution des conflits de part le monde, j’espe`re que la 

situation qui pre ́vaut au Libe ́ria continuera a` mobiliser une attention et un engagement soutenus sur le plan international. C’est dans cet esprit, et sous re ́serve d’eˆtre 

approuve ́es par les membres de ce Conseil, que les recommandations contenues dans 

le pre ́sent rapport, en vue notamment de la mise en place d’une Mission des Nations 

Unies au Libe ́ria, ont e ́te ́ formule ́es. 

Liberia’s massive humanitarian and political crisis calls for immediate intervention. Thousands of its citizens do not have access to life’s basic necessities of shelter, 

water, food or even rudimentary medical care. Their suffering echoes the words of 

the scriptures—‘‘ Eloi, Eloi, lamma sabacthani! My God, my God why hast Thou forsaken us’’. 

For the past twelve years they have lived in hellish limbo, suffering at the whim 

of warlords and despots, exploited by a criminal kleptocracy without help or relief 

in sight. Their lives and their country are held hostage by armed drugged thugs who 

destroy the state and engulfed the region in chaos. The ravages of self-centred political and criminal ideologies spread the conflict beyond Liberia’s borders and caused 

enormous suffering and havoc in the neighbouring states. 

It is hard to assess the psychological effects of these crimes against justice and 

humanity. The matter becomes more complex when we think of it as something 

which a nation has absorbed into its very being—a sort of virus which, through 

channels of circulation—has infected the entire body politic. The result—the fearful 
57

economic waste; the untimely death of no small part of the population; a measure 

of terror and pain that can only be partially conceived and estimated; and the collective national consciousness of having been witness to enormous crimes. 

This is a fearful legacy to be left to future generations. Life becomes cheap; nothing is absolutely safe or sure; deeds of injustice and violence become common facts 

in daily life; and there is the ever-present fear of imminent war. Events however 

revolting, are soon forgotten in our often-tempo centric world. ‘‘Bernard Shaw wrote 

that the worst sin toward our fellow man is not to hate them, but to be indifferent 

to them—that is the essence of inhumanity. 

The decent and good people of Liberia, and there are many of them, deserve better from us. Liberia was a founding member of the United Nations. It played a key 

and critical role in the fight against fascism—Roberts field was built as an entrepot 

for allied aircraft transiting to Europe; Liberia also produced the majority of the free 

world’s rubber supplies that ensured allied victory after the plantations of Southeast 

Asia were overrun. Time and again when Liberia was called upon for help or assistance, it gave—does it deserve no less now that they need our help? 

Today Liberia is not even listed on the UNDP human development index. Seventy-five percent of its citizens are living below the poverty line; the unemployment 

rate is eighty-five percent; literacy is at thirty-eight percent; fifty percent of the population is under fifteen years of age. Added to this is that seventy percent of the 

belligerents are child soldiers, coerced, psychologically traumatized, manipulated 

and exploited by self-appointed military leaders. We have a phenomenon not known 

elsewhere in the world where the younger population is less well educated than 

their parents. 

We have an obligation to assist in putting an end to this cycle of brutality, violence, corruption and instability that has destroyed the social fabric of society and 

has also spilled over the borders of Liberia and profoundly affected the region. This 

effort will require dramatic, engaged and bold solutions. Liberia and the region need 

to be stabilized and brought into a larger African framework where it can be given 

the political support, the encouragement and mentoring required to help it become 

a stable and self-sustaining member of Africa and the international community. 

The first steps have already been taken. We need to pay a special tribute to the 

courage and diligence of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Nigerian Foreign 

Minister Olugemi Adeniji, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, General Abdulsalami 

Abubakar and to the staff who supported the recent peace talks in Ghana. ECOWAS 

has played the lead role in creating the conditions for peace in Liberia. Through concerted political action and the commitment of troops, ECOWAS has underscored its 

importance and its energy as the regional organization committed to ensuring peace, 

stability and development in West Africa. 

To build on the efforts of ECOWAS, the international community must make a 

strong commitment, now, to Liberia. From disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, establishing a safe and secure environment for refugee return; addressing law and order issues; gender issues; seriously attacking cross-border criminal activities. These efforts if successful will transform Liberia from a failed state at war 

with itself to a nation at peace. Despite the multitude of challenges facing us, there 

is room for hope. Progress can be made but it will be expensive, arduous and at 

times frustrating. At a time of many calls on the attention and resources of the 

international community, it is necessary to plan next steps not only in Liberia but 

also in the context of the region on the basis of objective analysis. 

We cannot be timid and handicap ourselves from the outset of this enterprise, as 

we did in Sierra Leone. The international community must be prepared to commit 

the resources and the personnel needed to help the people of Liberia rebuild their 

country. And, whilst the international community must provide the resources, this 

must also be a partnership with the citizens of Liberia for they ultimately have the 

responsibility for ending the conflict and healing and rebuilding their nation. 

An essential part of the healing and rebuilding process is the bringing to justice 

of those who have committed violations of international law. Without justice, there 

can be no healing. Without justice, those who believe that they can act with impunity will be tempted to do so again. Without justice, Liberia cannot bring to closure 

this dark past and look to a brighter future. Ultimately, until you punish the guilty, 

you cannot absolve the innocent. 

During 24–29 August I met with President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire, 

President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and Prime Minister Lamine Sidime 

of Guinea and members of the diplomatic community, the Commander of the French 

Forces in Cote d’Ivoire, the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 

United Nations officials. 

On 1 September in Monrovia I met with President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria 

and his Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji. In my meetings all pledged their support 
58

and full cooperation with UNMIL and stressed the need for regional cooperation. It 

is this cooperation that is crucial if United Nations efforts in Liberia and the region 

are to be successful. 

I turn now to the work facing UNMIL. The Secretary-General’s report which is 

before you (S/2003/875) details key elements that are required if this mission is to 

achieve its mandate. 

SECURITY

I must commend the rapid deployment of ECOMIL to Liberia, and take this opportunity to salute the troops from Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, 

Benin and Togo in the highly visible and volatile situation that they originally 

faced. Subsequent to the deployment of ECOMIL with support from the off shore 

assets of the United States, stability has begun to be restored in and around Monrovia. Clearly, however, much more remains to be done. 

The multi-national force that is now presently in Liberia, with your approval, will 

be replaced by a United Nations Force on 1 October. This UN Force must be credible, well trained and fully equipped. Its leadership must be focused, impartial and 

experienced and professional. Without these ingredients the mission will be in jeopardy. Troops will be asked to carry out extremely difficult tasks such as securing 

the capital and other major towns, ensuring combatants respect the Peace Agreement, monitoring the borders, establishing cantonment sites for disarmament, overseeing demobilization and ensuring that a safe and secure environment is established for all members of the Liberian population. Therefore, well-led, trained and 

equipped forces can make the difference between success and failure, between peace 

and chaos. 

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

One of the major challenges facing us will be the Disarmament, Demobilization 

and Reintegration of all ex-combatants. United Nations experience in Liberia, Sierra 

Leone, Cote d’ Ivoire, the Congo and Mozambique should serve as lessons learned. 

Firstly, there cannot be disarmament and demobilization without integration, rehabilitation and reinsertion into society. 

Therefore, it must be stressed, adequate and secure financing for the programme 

is critical and must include the maintenance of cantonment sites, supporting excombatants and their families during the process, and providing alternative means 

of vocational training, employment and education. In this respect, particular attention must be focused on:

a) Child ex-combatants who face greater difficulty in re-entering civil society 

and will require special assistance in compliance with the UN Convention 

on the Rights of the Child. This assistance will focus on family reunification 

along with special medical, shelter, and education and technical assistance 

facilitated by UNICEF and other child protection agencies until such time 

as they can be safely reintegrated into civil society;

b) Female ex-combatants also face difficulties. They need to receive specialized 

medical treatment, shelter, education and re-training and counseling assistance; and

c) The medical rehabilitation of all ex-combatants will be required. Those with 

physical disabilities must be given high priority assistance.

It should also be noted that most of the ex-combatants have neither completed 

formal education nor have they acquired the necessary technical skills to compete 

in the economic development of Liberia. Without the prospect of participating in the 

economic life of the country, most of the ex-combatants will revert to criminal activities to sustain a livelihood. It is crucial that programmes be created to ensure that 

ex-combatants have a fair chance to secure employment or educational opportunities 

if they are to be peacefully reintegrated into Liberian society. 

RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Police Reform 

One of the yardsticks by which UNMIL’s ultimate success will be measured is its 

contribution to reforming and restructuring the criminal justice system to better reflect the communities they serve and to provide confidence for returnees. I have 

placed a high priority on this process. 

In all of these endeavors our focus is to ensure that police performance meets 

international standards of policing and human rights. This requires co-location of 

CIVPOL officers with local police for the purpose of monitoring and mentoring. But 
59

the key to self-sustaining police reform is professional training. We will institute the 

essential programmes of human dignity and transitional courses and basic and specialized courses such as leadership, management, community policing, firearms and 

traffic training. Our aim will be to create an effective educational infrastructure 

within one year so that the local police can become self-sustaining in their training 

programmes, thus freeing up our resources for the more extensive programme of colocation. 

Judicial Reform 

We will also work to ensure objectivity in the judicial system that has been rendered dysfunctional through political intimidation and lack of resources. As I have 

said often, if police reform is not accompanied by judicial reform, it is like trying 

to clap with only one hand. This is a bitter lesson learned from my last two missions. Those entrusted with this programme and the new Judicial Review process, 

must be competent professionals who have the confidence and trust of the local judicial community. The overall management of judicial reform and review remains the 

responsibility of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) with assistance provided by expert international organizations, under the lead of the 

United Nations through the expertise and resources of the United Nations Development Programme. 

Until citizens know and believe that the courts are truly independent bodies with 

enforceable decisions, with an effective police force trained to international standards of policing and human rights, only then can there be a guarantee of the rule 

of law. 

Corrections 

UNMIL will, in partnership with the (NTGL), provide substantive assistance in 

areas related to the prison system, and will center its efforts on: prison reform, 

training and development of prison service personnel. This will naturally include 

monitoring functions to ensure international standards of human rights are protected and ingrained. 

A team of correctional system experts will provide assistance, advice and mentoring support to regional institutional and headquarters prison personnel, including 

administration, human resources and finance, and the Ministry of Justice. As with 

Police reform, prison reform will entail co-location and monitoring in the prisons 

and the headquarters with their national counterparts. Also necessary and key to 

the reform and development of the prison system will be the redevelopment of a national training capacity. This reform of the criminal justice system will not come 

cheap. 

To accomplish these objectives funding of civil institutions is crucial. Therefore, 

should the Council approve this mandate, I propose to call a conference of potential 

donors and seek international assistance for the reform and development of civil institutions. These activities will encompass tasks ranging from basic training for civil 

servants to the provision of essential equipment and infrastructure. I also intend to 

seek funding for the salaries of civil servants to bridge the interim period until the 

Liberian Government is able to collect revenue to support its activities. The prompt 

payment of salaries is a key element in building professionalism and discouraging 

public employees from seeking bribes to supplement their incomes. 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

I have witnessed first hand that Liberia’s conflict has resulted in a humanitarian 

catastrophe impacting not only on Liberians but refugees from Sierra Leone and the 

Ivory Coast. 

What I also can state is that emergency programmes are beginning to resurface 

to help alleviate this crisis. As mentioned in the Secretary-General’s Report Ms. 

Carolyn McAskie Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and Humanitarian Envoy 

for the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire and the United Nations Country Team to Monrovia 

and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Red Cross movement are providing emergency interventions, particularly in the food, health, nutrition, water 

and sanitation, education and protection sectors. Those now engaged in these efforts 

include: the World Food Programme (WFP) and its partners , The World Health Organization (WHO); the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United 

Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and other health agencies; and the ICRC. 

UNHCR has re-started its operations. It is assisting refugees from Sierra Leone and 

the Ivory Coast to return to their places of origin. 

In addition, humanitarian agencies began relocating IDPs in Monrovia to the 

camps in Montserrado County on 11 September. Several thousand IDPs in temporary settlements will be assisted to return to their previous camps where they will 
60

continue to receive assistance and protection. Priority is being given to IDPs occupying school buildings in order to enable children to return to school by mid October. 

In the last few weeks the UN Special Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Ross Mountain and I have engaged in negotiations with the authorities in the neighbouring 

countries, as well as the Liberian parties to secure their cooperation in facilitating 

cross-border humanitarian operations to various parts of Liberia. On 12 September, 

a 15-member inter-agency team including UN Agencies and NGOs undertook a 3-

day mission to Harper, on the southern border with Sierra Leone. The mission, 

which was undertaken by boat, has paved the way for re-establishing relief programmes in the area and for initiating cross-border activities, particularly for refugees on the Sierra Leone border. 

To ensure a coordinated and effective response to humanitarian assistance proper 

funding is critical. To date donors have been generous in providing start-up resources for life-saving activities, but more is still required to ensure sustainability 

in all these programmes. I am particularly pleased that a Consolidated Inter-Agency 

Appeal for 2004 will be launched at the end of the year. 

In sum, a well-planed, coordinated and funded humanitarian programme is a crucial requirement in order for sustained development and peace to flourish in Liberia 

and give its citizens hope for a productive future. The peace process deserves no 

less. 

Allow me to address the issue of human rights. UNMIL, as an integrated mission 

will encourage and coordinate international protection efforts and the promotion of 

human rights in Liberia. I will give priority to the improvement of the human rights 

situation and the protection of civilians, especially women and children. I assure 

this Council that human rights protection will include monitoring and publicly reporting on the current situation in this regard. 

Distinguished Representatives, 

L’avenir du Libe ́ria et de son peuple se trouve a` pre ́sent entre les mains des 

membres du Conseil. Le roˆle et les objectifs que je viens de pre ́senter pour une mission de l’ONU au Libe ́ria requie`rent une mise a` disposition de ressources ade ́quates 

et l’expression d’un soutien continu de la part du Conseil de se ́curite ́. Si nous 

voulons le succe`s de cette mission, il est impe ́ratif que les Etats membres fassent 

montre de leur volonte ́ de nous octroyer le mandat et les ressources ne ́cessaires pour 

re ́aliser nos objectifs. Dans le meˆme temps, il est essentiel que le peuple du Libe ́ria 

reconnaisse et accepte sa responsabilite ́ premie`re dans le de ́veloppement de sa nation. Cette ope ́ration se doit d’eˆtre un re ́el partenariat qui permettra au Libe ́ria de 

s’engager dans la bonne voie et de faire en sorte que, plus jamais, ses habitants ne 

soient les victimes de seigneurs de la guerre et que son territoire cesse d’eˆtre un 

refuge pour ceux qui cherchent a` de ́stabiliser la re ́gion. 

The people of Liberia deserve better. The international community, in partnership 

with Liberia, must rise to the challenge. 

As my Alsatian countryman, Albert Schweitzer wrote many years ago:

‘‘We are not free to choose whether we will or will not do the right thing in 

Africa—we owe it to them. The good, which we do, is not an act of charity—

indeed after we’ve done everything there is in our power to do—we shall have 

repaid only a small part of the mistakes committed against them in the past’’.

In sum, we are putting together an outstanding group of United Nations staff 

members, international civil servants and a credible military force. Give us the 

mandate and the tools and I assure you we will do what is just and what is right. 

Thank you. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER SELIGMANN, CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL

Conservation International (CI) is a non-governmental organization dedicated to 

conserving biodiversity and to demonstrating that human societies can live harmoniously with nature. CI maintains offices in over 30 countries and works with communities, businesses, governments, and others to design and implement conservation strategies. 

Liberia is a CI priority. It retains the last significant block of forest in West Africa—nearly half the forest cover left in the Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem, which 

ranges from Togo to Guinea. This ecosystem is extraordinarily rich in species, with 

over 2,000 flowering plants, 240 tree species, 150 mammals, 620 birds, 125 reptiles 

and amphibians as well as abundant freshwater and marine biodiversity. It is one 
61

of CI’s 25 global biodiversity ‘‘hotspots’’. At a workshop in Ghana in 1999, CI convened over 150 regional experts to assess biodiversity conservation efforts and needs 

in the Upper Guinea Forests. They identified several areas within Liberia as the 

highest conservation priorities in the region and the only chance to protect significant vestiges of this critical ecosystem. 

From the 1960s to the 1980s, Liberia received considerable assistance in managing and protecting its natural resources. By the late 1970s, Liberia’s Forest Development Authority (FDA) had become an example to other African forest regulatory 

authorities of the technical skills, equipment and professionalism needed to responsibly manage forests. Yet mismanagement of forest sector revenue by the Samuel 

Doe government, gradual dissolution of that government in the late 1980s, onset of 

civil conflict in the 1990s, and the Taylor Administration’s use of the forest sector 

to support armed conflict, have combined to cripple the FDA and its capacity to protect and manage Liberia’s forests. 

CI is partnering with Liberian and international organizations to rebuild the 

FDA’s capacity. A key project has been the Liberia Forest Re-assessment (LFR), coimplemented by CI and the UK’s Fauna and Flora International in partnership with 

government technicians. The LFR focuses on increasing available scientific information through field surveys and remote sensing and also on building natural resource 

management capacity. The latter is particularly critical as it recognizes that Liberians must take ultimate responsibility for conserving their resource base. CI’s experiences around the world provide ample evidence that strong institutions, good governance, and capable people are essential to responsible natural resource management. 

Recognizing the importance of Liberia’s biodiversity and based on the initial results of the LFR, CI met with top Liberian officials in January 2002 to promote an 

appropriate conservation strategy for the country. A framework was agreed upon 

and signed in a Memorandum of Understanding between CI and the government to: 

1) establish a network of protected areas; 2) jointly build capacity in government 

ministries, civil society and institutions of higher education; and 3) implement a 

moratorium on logging in forest reserves and proposed protected areas. While CI 

has consistently met its part of the agreement, the government has continuously 

stalled and fallen short of its obligations. 

Throughout the recent conflict, CI has maintained a presence in Monrovia and a 

dialogue with the government. We have done so under the leadership of Alex Peal—

a Goldman Prize winner and former director of Liberia’s Parks and Wildlife Division. CI and partners have raised over US$1.5 million from donors including the 

World Bank, European Union, United States, Japan, Global Environment Facility, 

John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and Global Conservation Fund for 

conservation efforts in Liberia. Additional fundraising efforts are ongoing. 

The return of peace and stability to Liberia presents the international community, 

warring factions, and the interim government with the best opportunity since the 

1980s to protect and manage Liberia’s environmental resources for the benefit of all 

Liberians, their neighbors and the world. UN Security Council timber sanctions imposed on July 7 provide crucial breathing space to prevent timber revenue from fueling conflict. When the sanctions are lifted, however, mismanagement of forest resources and misappropriation of timber revenue (as documented throughout the 

Taylor Administration and stated in UN Expert Panel reports) are almost certain 

to continue absent serious reform of the FDA and institutionalization of the fledgling Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The UN Security Council Panel of Experts has warned that without reform timber revenue is likely to continue fueling 

conflict and the IMF has expressed concern that, unless restrained, growth in the 

timber sector may threaten environmental viability and long-term sustainability of 

the sector. Thus without reform, without building strong governing institutions, relief and development interventions will be severely undermined by corruption in the 

forest sector that fuels conflict and handicaps Liberia’s potential for long-term economic stability, durable peace and prosperity. While the urgent need to create jobs 

and generate revenue for the interim government is compelling, the imperative of 

forest sector reform must be considered in concert with any decision to lift the sanctions. 

Despite pressure from FDA technicians, rural communities, Liberian refugees, Liberian civil society groups and some private sector timber operators, warring factions and the interim government have failed to make meaningful commitments to 

forest sector reform. Reports of continued logging in violation of UN sanctions persist, and information on logging company negotiations and preparations indicate increasing pressure to exploit forest resources without regulatory authority. The Accra 

Peace Agreement places responsibility for the FDA in the hands of the MODEL faction, which currently controls much of southeast Liberia. MODEL must take on the 
62

responsibility to reconstruct the FDA, end corruption, operate transparently, and reform the forest sector for the benefit of the Liberian population. It is critical that 

the international community assist MODEL and the interim government in this 

task. 

CI offers the following recommendations for US Government action related to the 

conservation and long-term sustainable management of Liberia’s forests:

1) Provide financial and technical support to the FDA, EPA and other agencies 

mandated with protecting and managing Liberia’s natural resources and 

support efforts to establish greater protection for Liberia’s biodiversity as 

outlined in CI’s MOU with the Government of Liberia;

2) Press foreign governments and the UN to respect current UN timber sanctions;

3) Urge that any decision to rescind timber sanctions be linked to the development and implementation of a credible forest sector reform program;

4) Support efforts to establish transparency and accountability in natural resource management and private sector operations.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. WINTER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) 

The people of Liberia have suffered greatly over the past decade. Civil war has 

led to the deaths of an estimated 200,000 or more people, mostly innocent civilians. 

This conflict has left many Liberians without food and water, vulnerable to disease, 

and in great need of assistance. 

The U.S. Government has stepped forward to help. We have contributed to date 

$35.5 million in humanitarian assistance to meet the emergency needs of Liberians. 

In response to the current crisis, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) through the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance 

(DCHA) has provided $22.5 million to save lives and alleviate suffering in Liberia. 

The U.S. Government is responding to proposals by nongovernmental organizations 

and to the activities identified by the United Nations (UN) as most urgent and appropriate. The United States leads the way internationally in responding to this crisis, contributing nearly one-third of the total amount requested by the UN. 

On July 20, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to the 

region. The eight-member DART includes technical experts on food, health, water 

and sanitation, abuse prevention and protection for internally displaced persons 

(IDPs), and refugees. The team’s purpose is to make sure that the U.S. identifies 

and meets the critical needs of Liberians. The DART accomplishes this through a 

variety of activities, including assessing the humanitarian situation; coordinating 

with relevant parties in the region, including the U.S. military and the UN; providing technical assistance to the humanitarian response; identifying appropriate 

U.S. Government humanitarian activities; and providing timely information to decision makers in Washington. 

In response to needs identified by the DART, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided nearly $6 million to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies for programs targeting health, 

water, sanitation, emergency nutrition, shelter, coordination and logistical support 

of humanitarian assistance, and protection on behalf of internally displaced persons 

and war-affected populations. Over 81,000 children have now been vaccinated 

against measles, with more to be treated soon. Thousands of families who fled their 

homes in haste have received basic household supplies to help them cook and clean. 

Each day, more and more Liberians are served by OFDA assistance programs. 

The military and economic disruptions created by this crisis have also resulted in 

extensive hunger across Liberia. USAID is providing generous food aid to feed those 

in need. USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (FFP) is providing 24,480 metric tons 

(MT) of P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance, valued at $16.7 million, to Liberia. The agricultural commodities include a combination of cereals, pulses, vegetable 

oil, and corn soya blend (CSB) for therapeutic and supplementary feeding. USAID 

emergency food assistance is provided to internally displaced persons, refugees and 

other vulnerable populations through direct distribution, food for work programs, 

maternal and child health programs, and supplementary and therapeutic feeding 

programs. USAID’s food assistance program in Liberia is implemented through the 

World Food Program. 
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In addition to sustaining lives over the short run, USAID is implementing programs aimed at fostering a peaceful, thriving Liberia over the long run. Reinvigorating social services and cultivating safer communities are two of our primary 

aims. In conjunction with its main mandate of delivering primary health services 

to communities, the USAID Africa Bureau’s NGO partner, Africare, has assisted 

local NGOs in providing ambulance services to various IDP settlements in the Monrovia area. Through its existing network of clinics and hospitals established prior 

to the current crisis, Africare will be able to re-start the delivery of sustainable primary health services to communities in Bong and Nimba Counties, outside Monrovia. USAID’s Africa Bureau is working to strengthen the capacity of its local partners and prepare public information messages related to health, reconciliation and 

peace building. USAID’s Community Peace-Building and Development project has 

been working in 100 villages and will expand over the next two years to target 300 

communities. A key feature of the project will be the reintegration of ex-combatants 

into their home communities. Creating livable communities is the first step in rebuilding a vibrant society. 

USAID has helped sponsor important public information campaigns. USAID assistance brought together a team of Liberian producers and radio personalities to 

produce a twice weekly radio program for ECOMIL, which was broadcast on several 

Liberian radio stations. This programming provided key information to Liberians 

concerning the deployment of peacekeepers and distribution of humanitarian relief. 

This project has been a unique example of interagency cooperation, with U.S. military information specialists, State Department staff, and USAID technical experts 

working together early in a humanitarian crisis to produce a public information 

campaign serving the purposes of all three agencies. 

As is the case in many modern emergencies, the most limiting factor in the provision of humanitarian aid in Liberia continues to be security. Through the organizations it funds, USAID will expand assistance to include newly accessible populations 

as security improves. 

As this situation evolves, USAID will continue to assess, identify and meet emerging needs in Liberia. Our DART team is working with relief agencies and local authorities to ensure that the right aid is reaching the right people at the right time. 

The U.S. Government is committed to assisting our Liberian friends in their time 

of need. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MOHAMMED S. KROMAH, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, UNION OF

LIBERIAN ASSOCIATIONS IN THE AMERICAS (ULAA) 

The Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA) expresses its thanks 

and appreciation to the members of the Subcommittee on African Affairs for holding 

this hearing on US policy on Liberia. This hearing, and the policy that develops 

thereafter, are very crucial for the future democratization and reconstruction of Liberia. The timing of this hearing, after the indictment and exile of former President 

Charles Taylor and the expected seating of the Transition Government of Liberia, 

is a positive indication that the United States of America will remain fully engaged 

in the present and future of Liberia. 

ULAA and the Liberians at home and abroad express their gratitude to the US 

Government and the American people for their efforts to end dictatorial rule, civil 

war, and human suffering in Liberia by steadfastly supporting peace, security, political stability, economic recovery and national reconstruction for the well-being of the 

people of Liberia. No doubt that Liberians in the United States, in Liberia, and on 

the refugee camps in the West African sub-region are counting on the US Congress 

and Administration to bring lasting peace and security, and humanitarian relief to 

Liberians. 

It is obvious to the Liberian people, the international community, watchers of USLiberia relations, and interested members of Congress that the United States will 

not at this critical juncture demonstrate any lack of ’interest’ in Liberia. The US 

has already spent millions of dollars and used its leverage to help freed Liberia from 

tyrannical rule and self-annihilation. Again, since it is now poised to further contribute millions for peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction, it is imperative that the United States does not sit on the sidelines or merely observe as 

nation-building events unfold. During the heydays of the Liberian crisis, the United 

States was the only Western country that maintained an embassy—a fully functional one—in Liberia. We are therefore optimistic that the United States will not 

write off Liberia now or in the immediate future. 

In the last two decades of Liberian life, Liberians and friends of Liberia have witnessed the enormity of war, political and economic crimes meted out against ordi-
64

nary and defenseless Liberians and foreigners residing within our borders. Past and 

present human rights abuses, wanton killings, physical destruction, lawlessness, 

high crimes, rampant corruption, and other social vices, which sapped our country, 

would definitely discourage any nation, institution or well-meaning individual to 

take Liberians seriously. Be as it may, each nation has a period of ’historical awakening’ during which times its people fall on hard times. For us Liberians, our situation is a self-inflicted deep wound. 

The United States should not relegate itself to the role of ’observer’ in Liberian 

affairs, as was the case during the recent Liberian peace conference in Ghana. As 

the head of the ULAA delegation at this conference, and one seated as one of 3 representatives of Liberians in the Diaspora, much was expected, given our ultimate 

desire and mandate to form a strong, independent and technocratic interim government—one in which the warring factions would have very minimal power and authority. The opposite was the case. This outcome in itself has given rise to despair 

by some Liberians and friends of Liberia. As a result of the situation we now find 

ourselves, those who have waged war have been rewarded with the transitional governance. The future of Liberia cannot be left entirely to the Transitional Government, which is dominated by the warring factions. 

We, the people of Liberia, would like to see concerted action taken in the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive US policy towards Liberia, as follows:

1. That the UN and US must ensure that Charles Taylor is fully brought to 

justice. His co-conspirators in crimes committed against humanity must also 

face justice before the UN Special Court on Sierra Leone.

2. That the US supports the independence of the Liberian National Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission. Its findings, if deemed criminal and egregious as 

to be in flagrant violation of international rule, must lead to the formation 

of a UN Special Court on Liberia to prosecute key perpetrators of crimes 

against humanity as committed within the borders of Liberia.

3. That the US supports the UN Mission in Liberia led by Mr. Jacques Klein, 

the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Liberia, in carrying 

out the will and mandate of the international community. For Liberia to 

fully recover from the present horrors of civil wars and renewed fears of civil 

strife, as well as to be transformed from a criminal state enterprise, international pariah state, and a regional terror base, the international community must carry out a comprehensive national reformation mission covering 

all aspects of the governance and management of Liberia’s transition to civility.

4. That the US must ensure that during this transitional period credible efforts 

are made to reform the Liberian government. No peace and security will be 

sustained if the executive branch remains imperial, the legislative branch remains weak, and the judiciary branch remains corrupt.

5. That the transitional government is not given a free hand in fiscal and monetary policies, and financial management without the institution of processes 

and procedures that bespeak of good governance, accountability and transparency.

6. That the US specifically undertakes the training and formation of a professional Liberian national army and a national police force.

7. That the US and the UN must ensure that all necessary terms and conditions are in place before the holding of free and fair elections in Liberia.

8. That the US grants permanent resident status to all eligible Liberians on 

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for over a decade. They are nation builders.

ULAA is the umbrella group of Liberians and our various organizations in the 

United States. Our Union seeks the general welfare of the Liberian people, is a 

watchdog on the Liberian Government, and works with the American government 

and people towards building and sustaining freedom, democracy and development 

in Liberia. 

I thank the honorable members of this Committee for providing an opportunity 

to hear from me. 

BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY ALICE BLONDEL, LEAD CAMPAIGNER, GLOBAL WITNESS

For further detail, please refer to the Global Witness briefing document, ‘Against 

the People, for the Resources’, as sent to the United States Mission to the United 
65

1 UN Expert Panel report on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195); ‘Taylor-made: the pivotal role of Liberia’s forests and flag of convenience in regional conflict’, Global Witness, September 2001. 2 ‘The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s weapons and mercenaries in Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone’, 

Global Witness, March 2003. 3 UN Expert Panel on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195), UN Expert Panel report on Liberia (S/2001/

1015). 4 ‘Revised list of persons subject to travel restrictions pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001) on 

Liberia, updated 6 June 2003’; UN Expert Panel on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195); UN Expert 

Panel on Liberia (S/2001/1015). 5 UN Expert Panel report on Liberia (S/2003/779). 

6 Ibid. 

Nations on Thursday, 4 September 2003. The full briefing document is also available on the Global Witness web page, www.globalwitness.org

While the UN-mandated peacekeeping force is slowly deploying and a new interim 

administration will assume control in October 2003, Liberia remains primarily 

under rebel occupation and armed conflict continues. Global Witness believes that 

lifting timber sanctions now, before both Liberian government and extractive industries have been reformed, will lead to further diversion of revenue and the perpetuation of conflict, undermining the best efforts of the United States and the United 

Nations. 

The role of the Liberian logging industry in fuelling regional insecurity 

Liberia has decayed under 14 years of continued conflict and insecurity, beginning 

in 1989 with the invasion by then-warlord Charles Taylor and his rebel group, the 

National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL). Charles Taylor supported the NPFL’s 

violent insurrection in part through revenue generated from the export of natural 

resources, including timber, from territory under NPFL control. Upon assuming control of Liberia, President Charles Taylor intensified his use the Liberian logging industry both to enrich a criminal elite and to financially and logistically support domestic instability and rebel fighters in neighbouring Sierra Leone 1 and Cote 

d’Ivoire 2. More than just serving as a source of revenue for extra-budgetary expenditures, 

Global Witness and UN investigators have documented how some elements of the 

Liberian logging industry actively helped perpetuate regional conflict, through payment for weapons and import of arms in violation of UN sanctions 3, the creation 

of abusive militias, and support of foreign rebel groups. The UN has placed numerous personalities involved in the Liberian logging industry on a travel ban for their 

support of RUF rebels during Sierra Leone’s civil war, including arms dealers Victor 

Bout, Sanjivan Ruprah and Leonid Minin, who also owned the Liberian logging company, ETTE; and Gus Kouwenhoven, head of the largest logging company in Liberia, the OTC 4. 

The Liberian logging industry still poses a threat to international peace and security 

While logging companies have largely halted operations due to the ongoing conflict, the rainy season and the UN sanctions on Liberian timber and timber products, the Liberian logging industry still threatens international peace and security. 

Armed non-state actors in Liberia have already made contact with loggers and 

NGOs, showing interest in restarting logging in order to generate revenue 5. LURD 

and MODEL control the majority of the country’s logging concessions and log stockpiles, MODEL controls numerous logging ports as well as the porous border region 

with Cote d’Ivoire, which has historically been a transit point for illegal Liberian 

timber exports. This opportunity for illegal exports and abuse is exacerbated by 

MODEL’s control of the new interim administration Forestry Development Authority (FDA), which oversees the country’s timber resources. Without proper accounting 

and evidence to the contrary, the Expert Panel states that, ‘it must be assumed that 

[the government of Liberia] and non-State actors will continue to exploit the resource to foment conflict’ 6. 

Restarting the Liberian logging industry now will not provide an economic panacea 

and will undermine Liberia’s security. 

Global Witness understands the need for revenue generation in Liberia and 

agrees that if managed properly the logging industry could provide a sustainable 

source of income for Liberia. However, without thoroughly reforming Liberian government and industry procedures first, restarting logging operations will open up 

Liberia to the same weapons imports and unscrupulous companies that perpetuated 

recent conflict. The latest Expert Panel report on Liberia (S/2003/779) concurs, holding that, ‘before logging should resume, significant reform is required in forest governance . . . this will require time and effort. Therefore, the Security Council 
66

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid. 

9 Ibid. 

10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 ‘Against the People, For the Resources’, a briefing document by Global Witness, September 

2003. 

should maintain the timber ban until governance in Liberia has improved.’ 7 The 

Panel continues, ‘in the short term, logging poses a large risk that: (a) the establishment of legal trade will have the perverse effect of facilitating illegal logging: and 

(b) parties will misappropriate the revenue and fund conflict.’ Global Witness believes that timber should not be looked at as a quick fix to Liberia’s economic and 

humanitarian problems, and agrees with the Panel’s conclusion that, ‘it will not be 

possible to alleviate suffering through the immediate resumption of resource extraction’ and that the Security Council must ‘accept its responsibility for the negative 

impact of the timber sanctions and ensure that emergency relief aid is provided.’ 8

Moreover, it must be noted that the Liberian logging industry provides neither reliable wages nor significant employment opportunities for Liberians, especially rural 

Liberians, and logging company militia members have been involved in abuses 

against local populations. As the UN Expert Panel states, some logging companies 

do not pay their workers for work performed 9, and ‘few rural people were hired by 

the logging companies (less than 0.2 per cent of the population), and communities 

were no better served by clinics or schools, for example, whether they were inside 

or outside logging concessions.’ 10 Also, as Global Witness has reported previously 

and the latest UN Expert Panel has recognised, ‘the departure of some logging companies (the Oriental Timber Company (OTC), the Royal Timber Company (RTC) and 

the Maryland Wood Products Industry (MWPI)) has relieved many Liberians of 

human rights abuses, intimidation of local people and alleged sexual exploitation of 

women and girls’ 11. 

The UN must effectively enforce the current sanctions regime, with particular attention to Liberia’s borders with Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. 

The new UN peacekeeping force must ensure tighter control of Liberia’s borders, 

so that its natural resources are not smuggled into neighbouring countries, and military supplies transported back into Liberia, in violation of UN sanctions. This illegal 

export of timber products is highly likely, given rebel control of logging areas, ports 

and government ministries, as detailed above. Global Witness, in its latest briefing 

document, ‘Against the People, for the Resources’, provides a detailed description of 

where the UN should focus monitoring activities, and how it will be feasible to more 

effectively oversee key export routes to prevent violations of the UN sanctions regime 12. 

The UN must implement a thorough Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration 

and Repatriation programme (DDRR) 

Having an effective Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation 

(DDRR) programme, as called for in Security Council Resolution 1509 (S/2003/1509), 

is of critical importance to the future stability of Liberia and the surrounding region. There are thousands of armed combatants from numerous countries, some of 

them children, who have fought for LURD, MODEL and pro-government militias. 

Not unlike the DDR process in Sierra Leone, it will be necessary to organise educational and employment opportunities for ex-combatants, with an emphasis on 

local reintegration initiatives, to prevent the influx of ex-combatants to the capital, 

as was seen in Sierra Leone, and encourage reintegration across the country. 

Before sanctions can be lifted, the following checklist of basic reforms must be 

implemented: 

Liberia’s logging industry must be free of ties to arms imports, mercenaries and 

the abuse of local populations. Logging companies should not, in any way, facilitate 

weapons imports, either financially or logistically, nor should they be engaged in the 

hiring and maintenance of mercenary fighters and abusive militias for either their 

or another parties’ use. 

The Liberian government must undergo a comprehensive review of financial and 

administrative procedures, instituting transparency and accountability at all levels. 

The US and UN must ensure that systems are put into place at all levels of government to institutionalise an open decision-making process and proper accounting of 

revenue intake and expenditure. There must also be transparency in the way the 

government interacts and makes agreements with the extractive industries, espe-
67

cially the timber industry. All concession applications, taxes, payments and environmental and social impact assessments should be made public. 

The Liberian government must have the capacity to investigate and prosecute violators of national environmental and labour laws. Logging operations must be made 

open and accountable to the monitoring and scrutiny of the Liberian government, 

whether it is through a reconstituted and improved Forestry Development Authority 

(FDA), or an independent monitor acting on behalf of the new Liberian government. 

The FDA, which is mandated to oversee the nation’s forest resources and which will 

be controlled by MODEL forces in the upcoming interim administration, must also 

be reformed to rule out conflicts of interest that may hinder its investigative and 

enforcement capabilities. 

A comprehensive review of Liberian forest resources and forestry law must be undertaken. A moratorium on all logging and processing should be maintained until 

a national forest policy is created and a review of existing forest resources completed. How logging companies operate, both environmentally and socio-economically, must be reviewed, with the emphasis on transparency, accountability and respect for the individual and the community in which the company operates. Such 

a legal review must include a reconsideration of all existing concessions, as many 

were granted under questionable legal authority. 

Global Witness is cautiously optimistic about the future for Liberia, given the 

United States’ activities there and the UN’s recent decision to commit its resources, 

both militarily and politically, to helping solve the problem. However, to ensure that 

the mistakes of the past are not repeated, and to make certain that a reconstituted 

logging industry no longer undermines Liberian security and threatens regional 

peace, Global Witness holds that the current timber embargo must be maintained 

until good governance and the reforms outlined above are instituted. 

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE WALTER H. KANSTEINER

III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, TOGETHER WITH RESPONSE

Question: 

What is the Administration’s position on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border demarcation? How does it view Ethiopian calls to set up a new border demarcation commission? 

Answer: 

The Administration’s position remains constant—the Boundary Commission’s decision is binding. From the outset, both Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed that the arbitration by the Boundary Commission was final and binding. For that reason, the 

Boundary Commission remains the appropriate mechanism to demarcate the border. 

The Ethiopia—Eritrea border is a bilateral issue. Ultimately, it is up to both parties to discuss any concerns and implement the decision together. The United States 

remains willing to help both nations to the extent possible during this difficult process. 
68

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FINAL REPORT ON LIBERIA DATED JULY 16, 2003 BY THE

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT SURVEY TEAM
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