F PB99-917007

NTSB/HZM-99/02

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENT REPORT

OVERFLOW OF GASOLINE AND FIRE

AT A SERVICE STATION-CONVENIENCE STORE

BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI

AUGUST 9, 1998

7120A
National Transportation Safety Board. 1999. Overflow of Gasoline and Fire at a Service StationConvenience Store, Biloxi, Mississippi, August 9, 1998. Hazardous Materials Accident Report

NTSB/HZM-99/02. Washington, DC.

Abstract: This report explains the gasoline overflow and resulting fire that occurred during a cargo transfer

by Premium Tank Lines, Inc., to an underground storage tank at a Fast Lane gasoline station-convenience

store in Biloxi, Mississippi, on August 9, 1998. The fire engulfed three vehicles at a nearby intersection,

which ultimately resulted in the deaths of five occupants and the serious injury of one. Damages were

estimated at $55,000.

From its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board identified safety issues in the following areas:

Premium Tank Line, Inc.’s management oversight; R.R. Morrison and Son, Inc.’s procedures for accepting

petroleum product deliveries to underground storage tanks; and Federal requirements and oversight. Based

on its findings, the Safety Board made recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration, the

Research and Special Programs Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, Premium Tank

Lines, Inc., R.R. Morrison and Son, Inc., the American Petroleum Institute, the National Tank Truck

Carriers Association, the National Association of Convenience Stores, the National Association of Truck

Stop Operators, the Petroleum Marketers Association of America, the Service Station Dealers of America,

and the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting

aviation, raiload, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency

is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation

accidents, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies

involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident

reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety at http://www.ntsb.gov/. Other information about

available publications may also be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza, East, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National

Technical Information Service. To purchase this publication, order report number PB99-917007 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000
Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Overflow of Gasoline and Fire

at a Service Station-Convenience Store

Biloxi, Mississippi

August 9, 1998

NTSB/HZM-99/02

PB99-917007 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7120A 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted: September 21, 1999 Washington, D.C. 20594

iii Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Synopsis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Preaccident Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Events at Fast Lane Station No. 741. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Police Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Fire Department Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Vehicle Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Hazardous Materials Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Facility Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Other Overfills at Station No. 741 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Personnel Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Driver’s Military Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Civilian Training and Work History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Other Overfills by the Truckdriver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Operating Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Work-Rest Routine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Toxicological Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Carrier Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Hiring Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Safety Briefings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Dispatch Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Transfer Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Carrier Oversight by the Federal Highway Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Red JacketTM Monitoring System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Fast Lane Employee Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Contents iv Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Environmental Protection Agency Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Safeguards Against Overfills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Regulations Pertaining to Monitoring Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

EPA State Program Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Regulatory Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Notification of Hazardous Materials Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Adequacy of Premium’s Management Oversight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Hiring Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Employee Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Adherence to Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Dispatch Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Adequacy of Fast Lane Employee Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Adequacy of EPA Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Accident Notification Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Appendixes

A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

B: Driver-Trainer’s Checksheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
v Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Executive Summary

On August 9, 1998, about 12:53 a.m., a Premium Tank Lines, Inc., truckdriver was

transferring gasoline from a cargo tank to underground storage tanks at a Fast Lane

gasoline station-convenience store in Biloxi, Mississippi, when an underground storage

tank containing gasoline overflowed. An estimated 550 gallons of gasoline flowed from

the storage tank, across the station lot into the adjacent highway, through an intersection,

and into a storm drain. The gasoline ignited, and fire engulfed three vehicles near the

intersection, which ultimately resulted in the deaths of five occupants and the serious

injury of one. Damages were estimated at $55,000.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the accident was the failure of Premium Tank Line, Inc.’s officials to follow established

company procedures in hiring and training new drivers, the company’s lack of adequate

procedures for dispatching drivers and delivering cargo to customer facilities, and the

failure of R.R. Morrison and Son, Inc., to have adequate safety procedures for accepting

product offered for delivery at its Fast Lane stations. Contributing to the accident was the

truckdriver’s various and numerous operating errors during the gasoline transfer process

that led to the underground storage tank overfill.

The following safety issues are discussed in this report:

• Premium Tank Line, Inc.’s management oversight;

• R.R. Morrison and Son, Inc.’s procedures for accepting petroleum product

deliveries to underground storage tanks; and

• Federal requirements and oversight.

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board makes

recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration, the Research and Special

Programs Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, Premium Tank Lines,

Inc., R.R. Morrison and Son, Inc., the American Petroleum Institute, the National Tank

Truck Carriers Association, the National Association of Convenience Stores, the National

Association of Truck Stop Operators, the Petroleum Marketers Association of America,

the Service Station Dealers of America, and the Society of Independent Gasoline

Marketers of America. 

1 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Synopsis

On August 9, 1998, about 12:53 a.m., a truckdriver for Premium Tank Lines, Inc.,

(Premium) was transferring gasoline from a cargo tank to underground storage tanks at a

Fast Lane gas station-convenience store in Biloxi, Mississippi, when gasoline from one of

the underground storage tanks began to overflow. An estimated 550 gallons of gasoline

flowed from the storage tank, across the station lot into the adjacent highway, through the

intersection, and into a storm drain. The gasoline ignited, and fire engulfed three vehicles

near the intersection. Each of the three vehicles had two occupants. Of the six people, five

sustained fatal injuries and one received serious injuries. Additionally, a firefighter

dispatched to the accident site sustained minor injuries while attempting to suppress the

fire. Damages were estimated at $55,000.

Accident Narrative 

Preaccident Events

Shortly after 5:30 p.m. on August 8, 1998, a Biloxi-based Premium truckdriver, in

accordance with the company’s operating practices, telephoned the weekend dispatcher at

Premium’s headquarters in Jackson, Mississippi, to obtain the assigned deliveries for his

evening shift. The safety director, who was serving as dispatcher, told the truckdriver the

delivery locations and the type and amount of gasoline to be delivered that evening. He

said that he told the driver to make deliveries to the following Fast Lane stations: Nos.

742, 743, and 736. The driver’s notes indicated that he wrote down the following station

numbers: 742, 743, and 741.1

 The driver did not, nor was he required by written company

procedures to, repeat or read back the information to the dispatcher to verify its accuracy

during the telephone call.2

The Premium truckdriver departed Biloxi about 9:00 p.m. and drove his tractorcargo tank trailer combination about 70 miles to the Shell Refinery in Saraland, Alabama,

where he arrived about 10:08 p.m. He loaded one of the cargo tank’s four compartments

with 2,473 gallons of premium unleaded gasoline and the other three compartments with a

total of 5,891 gallons of regular unleaded gasoline. He left the refinery at 10:23 p.m. 

1 The Premium dispatch records indicate that this same driver had made a delivery to Fast Lane station

No. 741 on his shift that ended the morning of August 8; no delivery was scheduled to the station during his

shift that ended on August 9.

2 Premium did not have a policy of providing its drivers with confirmation of assigned deliveries by

means of a written letter, facsimile, or electronic mail. Information about company policies appears later in

this report. 
Factual Information 2 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Events at Fast Lane Station No. 741

Arriving at Fast Lane station No. 741 about midnight, the truckdriver parked the

tractor cargo tank combination next to the remote fill ports (figure 1). Premium’s

operating practices require its drivers to present the bill of lading to the station operator

before making the gasoline transfer. The truckdriver, however, did not do this. Drivers are

also required to determine and document the gasoline level in an underground storage tank

by inserting a graduated measuring stick that they carry on the cargo tank truck into the

direct fill ports before and after transferring gasoline. This procedure, which drivers refer

to as “sticking the tank,” provides drivers with a product level reading in inches.3

 Figure 1. Layout of accident site. The vehicles numbered 1, 2, and 3 are, respectively, 

a 1995 four-door Hyundai sedan, a 1997 four-door Mazda sedan, and a 1999 

Ford pick-up truck.

3 Because the sizes of storage tanks differ, the inch level of gasoline does not directly correlate with the

number of gallons in a tank. The method drivers use to determine the number of gallons in a storage tank is

discussed later in this report. 

Fast Lane station No. 741 has three underground storage tanks, which are indicated by the dotted line figures to

the right of the gasoline pumps. One tank is for premium unleaded gasoline, one is for regular unleaded

gasoline, and one is for diesel. Each of the tanks may be filled through either of two ports: a direct fill port

located on the east side of the gas station property in a parking area or a remote fill port located on the south

side of the property near the gas pumps. The direct and the remote fill ports are about 90 feet apart.

Truckdrivers most often use the remote fill ports to transfer gasoline at the station.
Factual Information 3 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

According to the truckdriver, he was able to stick the premium unleaded tank, but

access to the regular unleaded direct fill port initially was blocked by a parked vehicle. He

therefore went into the convenience store to obtain an inventory printout from the on-site

Red JacketTM system terminal.4 He said that he did not know how to use the Red JacketTM

system so he asked for help from a Fast Lane employee. The store’s assistant manager

then generated a printout for him. Although the Red JacketTM printout showed the gallons

of gasoline and ullage5 in each of the underground storage tanks, the driver later told

Safety Board investigators that he did not fully understand the printout and that he had

obtained it only for the inch reading that he was required to record on his paperwork.6

The truckdriver said that, upon exiting the store, he discovered that the vehicle

blocking the direct fill port had moved. He was then able to stick the regular unleaded tank

for his reading. He said that he did not use the inch readings to calculate the available

space in the underground storage tanks. Instead, he relied solely on the information he had

obtained earlier from the Premium dispatcher. After taking the inch readings, he did not

replace the lids on the direct fill ports. 

The truckdriver told Safety Board investigators that he took the inch readings

before he began transferring gasoline, that he hooked up the unloading hoses for both the

premium and regular gasoline at the same time, and that he began unloading regular and

premium simultaneously. The Red JacketTM system printouts indicate the order of events

listed in table 1.

Station No. 741’s video surveillance system tape shows the truckdriver entering

the station at 12:04:14 a.m., walking to and from the restroom corridor, and then leaving at

12:05:29 a.m.7

 The video tape shows the truckdriver reentering the store at 12:11:20,

walking past the checkout counter, and then leaving the store at 12:18:01.8

4 The Red JacketTM system is an automatic computer-based system that monitors the product levels in

the underground storage tanks. Data from the Red JacketTM system is transmitted to Premium’s

headquarters, which uses the information to determine the amount of product to be dispatched. Additional

information about the Red JacketTM system appears later in this report. 

5 Ullage is the amount by which a container lacks being full; in this case, the space above the liquid in

the tank.

6 On September 23, 1998, an independent contractor evaluated the Red JacketTM system at station No.

741 and concluded that, although the Red JacketTM system was a good indicator of liquid levels in

underground storage tanks, sticking a tank with an accurate measuring device was a more precise

measurement method. 

7 The Red JacketTM system and the video camera system were not synchronized. 

8 After viewing the video tape, store employees stated that they thought the truckdriver went into the

room behind the checkout area where the automatic tank monitoring system printer was located. The

truckdriver was identified on the video tape by the two store employees and by the customer who had alerted

the truckdriver to the overflow. 
Factual Information 4 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

The truckdriver transferred the cargo compartment of premium unleaded gas and

two of the three compartments of regular unleaded gas into the underground storage tanks

without incident. During the transfer from the cargo tank’s third compartment into the

regular unleaded underground storage tank, a customer witnessed gasoline flowing from

the direct fill port on the east side of the station property. (See figure 2.) The customer said

that he saw the truckdriver standing near the cargo tank, seemingly unaware of the

gasoline as it washed across the parking area in front of him. The customer described the

gasoline stream as “several feet wide” and said that it “should have been visible to the

truckdriver.” The customer said that the truckdriver appeared to be “gazing” beyond the

overflow “toward the casinos on U.S. Highway 90 (US 90).” The customer said that he

told the truckdriver that gasoline was overflowing. The truckdriver then responded,

“Okay, thanks,” and closed a valve on the cargo tank to stop the flow. 

Table 1. Events recorded by Red JacketTM computer-based monitoring system

Time Event

11:58:18 Transfer of gasoline into premium gasoline tank begins

12:16:39 Inventory report generated [by Fast Lane assistant manager]

12:17:44 Transfer of gasoline into regular unleaded gasoline tank begins

12:17:57 Transfer of gasoline into premium gasoline tank ends

12:40:21 Transfer of gasoline into regular unleaded gasoline tank ends

 Figure 2. Dotted lines from the regular unleaded underground storage tank to the storm 

drain represent the flow of the gasoline overfill.
Factual Information 5 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

The customer said that when he returned from the convenience store to his car, he

saw the truckdriver looking down at the transfer hoses. The truckdriver then climbed the

ladder on the rear of the cargo tank, walked forward along the top of the tank, opened the

manhole cover, and looked down inside the tank.

The driver stated that after he was approached by the customer, he shut off the flow

of regular unleaded gasoline from the cargo tank, walked to the open direct fill port to

make sure it was no longer overflowing, and then climbed on top of the tank to assess the

amount of gasoline remaining inside the cargo tank. 

About 550 gallons9 of regular unleaded gasoline overfilled the underground

storage tank. The excess gasoline flowed south from the open fill port through the gas

station parking lot, then west along the north side of US 90 across the Brady Drive

intersection, where it entered a storm drain under the highway. The drain emptied into an

open concrete culvert, which ran southward toward the Gulf of Mexico.

At the time of the overfill, three passenger vehicles, each of which had two

occupants, were near the US 90-Brady Drive intersection. Two sedans were waiting in line

to turn onto US 90, while an eastbound pickup truck was turning onto Brady Drive. Biloxi

Police Department reports indicate that witnesses observed a fire ignite under one of the

cars and engulf all three vehicles. (See figure 3.) The fire ultimately caused the fatal injuries

of five occupants and the serious injury of one occupant. The fire, following the fuel flow,

spread to the open fill port lid in the Fast Lane station and through the storm drain.

9 Investigators determined how many gallons the station’s underground tank and its associated piping

would have held by identifying the pretransfer ullage. They next subtracted the gallons of regular unleaded

gasoline left in the truck’s cargo tank from the amount that had been loaded on the cargo tank to determine

how many gallons had been pumped. They compared these figures to determine the overfill amount. 

 Figure 3. One of the sedans and the pickup after emergency responders extinguished 

the blaze. The Premium cargo tank truck is in the background.
Factual Information 6 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Emergency Response

Police Response

About 12:53 a.m., a Biloxi police officer on routine motor patrol on US 90

observed a large fire consume an automobile at the intersection of US 90 and Brady Drive.

The police officer radioed for assistance, and additional officers arrived within the next 10

minutes. The police evacuated a total of 80 people from the area, including the customers

and staff from a restaurant at 2200 Beach Boulevard (US 90), a hotel on Brady Drive, and

Fast Lane station No. 741. 

Fire Department Response

At 12:53 a.m., a caller notified the Biloxi 911 operator that a person was on fire at

the Fast Lane gas station. At 12:54 a.m., a Biloxi fire engine company was dispatched to

the accident site, where it arrived about 12:59 a.m. In response to a second alarm at 12:56

a.m., two engines, an aerial truck, and supervisory personnel were dispatched to the scene,

arriving between 1:00 a.m. and 1:03 a.m. Responders established a command post on

US 90, east of the fire scene. Fire units used about 50 gallons of foam and engaged in fire

suppression and rescue operations until 1:40 a.m., when the fire was extinguished. 

Injuries

Table 2 is based on the injury criteria of the International Civil Aviation

Organization, which the Safety Board uses in accident reports for all transportation modes.

Harrison County coroner records indicate that five of the six occupants of the

vehicles died as a result of the fire. The Hyundai sedan operator, a 25-year-old male,

sustained serious injuries and survived. The Mazda sedan passenger, a 20-year-old female,

and the Ford pick-up truck passenger, a 56-year-old female, died at the accident scene.

The Hyundai passenger, an 18-year-old male, the Mazda operator, a 43-year-old female,

and the Ford operator, a 58-year-old male, died from their injuries after being admitted to

Table 2. Injuries sustained in Biloxi, Mississippi, accident

Drivers Passengers Others Total

Fatal 2 3 05

Serious 1 0 01

Minor 0 0 11

None - - --

Total 3 3 17

49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines fatal injury as “any injury which results in death within 30 days of the

accident” and serious injury as “an injury which: (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7

days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes,

or nose); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) involves

second- or third-degree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.”
Factual Information 7 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

area hospitals. A firefighter who received minor injuries was treated and released from a

local hospital.

Damages

The convenience store, adjacent landscaping, restaurant signs, and cargo tank

truck sustained minor thermal damage. Estimated damages totaled about $55,000 and

included the value of the three destroyed passenger vehicles and the costs of repairing the

truck tractor, of repairing and testing the cargo tank, and of reopening Fast Lane station

No. 741.

Vehicle Information 

The tractor of the semitrailer combination vehicle was a 1992 Freightliner. It was

coupled to an elliptically shaped aluminum MC 306 cargo tank, which had been

manufactured to Federal specifications in 1978 by Pullman Trailmobile of Chicago. The

cargo tank had four separate compartments. Table 3 shows the capacity of each of the

compartments and the total capacity of the cargo tank. 

Premium company records and exterior markings on the front head of the cargo

tank indicated that the cargo tank had been inspected and tested in accordance with

Federal regulations. Following the accident, certified Mississippi Public Service

Commission (MPSC) inspectors completed a CVSA10 (Commercial Vehicle Safety

Alliance) inspection on the tractor and the cargo tank and noted no defects that would have

rendered them out of service before the accident. 

Hazardous Materials Information

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) classifies gasoline as a hazard

Class 3 (flammable liquid). Gasoline has a flash point of -40° Fahrenheit, an auto ignition

temperature of 500° Fahrenheit, and a flammable range of 1.3 to 7.6 percent in air.

Table 3. Capacity of cargo tank

Compartment Capacity (gallons)

1 (Forward) 2,500

2 2,000

3 1,750

4 (Aft) 2,750

Total 9,000

10 The CVSA is a body composed of Federal, State, and industry representatives who meet regularly to

formulate uniform inspection procedures for commercial motor vehicles involved in the transportation of

hazardous and nonhazardous cargoes.
Factual Information 8 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Facility Information

General

At the time of the accident, Fast Lane station No. 741 was 1 of 55 gas stationconvenience stores in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee owned by R.R. Morrison and

Son, Inc., (Morrison) which is headquartered in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The station has

three underground storage tanks, each with a capacity of 12,032 gallons. 

At most Fast Lane stations, each underground storage tank has one fill port

through which gasoline is transferred. At four sites, however, each underground storage

tank has two fill ports; one is a direct fill port, and the other is a remote fill port. Those

sites are station No. 741 and stations in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, Jackson, Tennessee,

and Bastrop, Louisiana. Figure 4 illustrates a typical gas station that has both direct and

remote fill ports. According to Premium officials and drivers, using the remote fill ports at

station No. 741 for gasoline transfers affords drivers greater safety. Drivers said that they

preferred to use the remote fill port at station No. 741 because doing so enabled them to

drive forward to exit the site. If they use the direct fill port, they have to exit the station by

backing onto US 90. 

Federal regulations contained in 40 CFR 280.20 require that underground storage

tanks be equipped with safeguards to prevent spilling and overfilling during gasoline

transfer. Morrison elected to install float valves (figure 4) in the tank vents of the Fast

Lane station storage tanks. The float valve rises as gasoline fills the tanks, eventually

seating against the end of the vent pipe and restricting the vapor flow through the vent

pipe, which causes pressure to build. The pressure in the tank works against the head of

the liquid in the cargo tank and the transfer hoses, causing a reduction in the flow of

gasoline. Because the operation of a float valve is pressure controlled, at a station having

both direct and remote fill ports, such as Fast Lane station No. 741, only one fill port

should be open during a gasoline transfer. If a second fill port is open, the vapor can

escape through it, rendering the float valve safety feature ineffective.

Other Overfills at Station No. 741

On July 15, 1996, a different Premium truckdriver was involved in an overfill of

about 50 to 60 gallons at Fast Lane station No. 741. That truckdriver told Safety Board

investigators that he was transferring gasoline through the remote fill ports when it began

to overfill through the direct fill ports, which he had left open after gauging the

underground storage tanks. This truckdriver told Safety Board investigators that he was

not aware of any Premium document explaining transfers at facilities with remote fill

ports.
Factual Information 9 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Gasoline transferred through the remote fill ports does not flow directly into the underground storage tanks

but though pipes that extend at an angle from the port openings. Because of the angle of the pipes,

measurements to gauge the amount of gasoline in the tank cannot be taken through the remote fill ports but

must be made through the direct fill ports.

 Figure 4. Top illustration is a cutaway of a typical service station having both direct and 

remote fill ports. Lower illustration shows a typical float valve, which was the 

type of safeguard against spills and overfills that the Morrison company had 

installed in many Fast Lane stations.

At Fast Lane station No. 741, the Red JacketTM monitoring system was designed to trigger an alarm

whenever the gasoline level in a tank reached 90-percent capacity.

The vent of the underground storage tank

is equipped with a float valve, which is

designed to rise as gasoline fills the tanks.

At a predetermined level, the stainless

steel ball float seats against the end of the

vent pipe, restricting the vapor flow

through the tank vent, which creates

pressure in the underground tank that

affects the flow of gas from the cargo tank.

If the direct and the remote fill ports to an

underground storage tank are both open

during the gasoline transfer, the pressure

will not build but will escape through the

open fill port, which renders the float valve

safety feature ineffective.
Factual Information 10 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Personnel Information

Driver’s Military Background

The truckdriver involved in the Biloxi accident was a 20-year veteran of the U.S.

Navy who had retired from military service in 1997. He had graduated from high school

before enlisting in the military. While in the Navy, he completed six college-level

correspondence courses and, in 1994, military law enforcement school. His military skills

list shows that, as of 1993, he had received training in operating or been awarded military

licenses to operate the following vehicles: truck tractors and trailers, cranes and

attachments, graders, crawlers, front-end loaders, forklifts, and buses. His military service

history records show that, among other assignments, he had driven trucks and operated

heavy equipment, including cargo cranes for unloading ships. 

His military records also indicate that he had been involved in a series of accidents

that resulted in referrals for medical evaluation and, ultimately, his suspension from

operating heavy equipment in 1989. He subsequently was transferred to maintenance

duties. In 1991, his licenses were reinstated, and he served in northern Iraq during the

Persian Gulf Conflict, making aircraft runway repairs and driving ambulances. From 1993

until his retirement in 1997, he worked in maintenance services and security. His records

show that his security duties consisted primarily of investigating mishaps, giving

examinations for equipment operating licenses, dispatching security vehicles, and

scheduling vehicle maintenance. 

His military personnel evaluations were favorable. Many contained comments

from various supervisors on his accuracy and excellent work, his dedication to the Navy,

and his care in observing military dress standards. With occasional exceptions, he was

recommended for retention and for promotion. 

Civilian Training and Work History

On July 27, 1997, the truckdriver enrolled, in a 6-week semitractor-trailer driving

training course at the Commercial Driver Institute, Inc., (CDI) in Gulfport, Mississippi.

He received a passing overall score of 86.95 percent for the class work and, on August 22,

1997, was issued a Mississippi Commercial Drivers License (CDL) that included both a

hazardous materials and cargo tank endorsement.

While in training at the CDI, on August 4, 1997, the truckdriver applied for a job

with Werner Enterprises, Inc., (Werner) of Omaha, Nebraska, an interstate freight carrier.

Upon successful completion of his CDI training, Werner hired him. Company personnel

records indicate that the driver’s employment was terminated on September 12, 1997,

during his training period for “not progressing as a trainee.” His Werner personnel file

contains two documents that deal directly with the cause for his dismissal. One document

is a complaint and incident report stating that his driver-trainer found the truckdriver to be

unsuitable and a “danger to himself and others.” The other document, a “Driver-Trainee
Factual Information 11 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Status Worksheet,” indicates the driver was not progressing as a trainee and contains the

annotation, “Driver has grossly unsafe instincts and practice(s).”11

The truckdriver did not report his job with Werner on the applications for his next

two jobs.12

After leaving Werner, the truckdriver was employed in September 1997 by John

Fayard Fast Freight Trucking (Fayard) of Gulfport, Mississippi, as an over-the-road driver

for van-type tractor-trailers. As required of all new Fayard drivers, he had a 1-week

training class and an 8-week probationary period during which he was accompanied by a

driver-trainer while on his routes.

The driver-trainer observed that the truckdriver operated safely and characterized

him overall as a “pretty good driver.” He described the truckdriver as being conscientious

about watching over his rig when it was parked and keeping his log book current and

accurate. The driver-trainer noted that the truckdriver had problems with company

paperwork, paying attention during training, noticing roadway signs, and backing the

truck. He said that sometimes the truckdriver was “hard to reason with.” On one occasion,

the driver-trainer observed the truckdriver taking medication and asked him what it was.

The truckdriver told him it was Ritalin.13 The driver-trainer reported the incident to the

company. Personnel records indicate that the truckdriver worked for Fayard as a regular

driver for 5 months, until he quit without notice in April 1998. 

The truckdriver was hired by Premium on April 20, 1998. He received 6 days of

training, which began with 1 day of company orientation that included information and

two video tapes on hazardous materials. He was required to take a written examination on

hazardous materials, which he passed. During the next 5 days, he was in an on-the-job

training (OJT) status, during which he was accompanied by a driver-trainer on deliveries. 

The driver-trainer said the OJT began with the trainer performing the delivery

work on the first day so that the new employee could see how things were to be done.

During the rest of the OJT period, the truckdriver was supposed to perform the tasks while

the driver-trainer observed and provided explanations or instructions as necessary. The

driver-trainer told Safety Board investigators that he explained to the truckdriver how to

convert inch readings to gallon figures using a tank chart and asked the truckdriver to let

11 Safety Board investigators made numerous attempts to contact the Werner driver-trainer. He is no

longer employed with the company and could not be located. Other Werner officials were unable to recall

the specific details of the truckdriver’s employment with the company.

12 The truckdriver also did not disclose his employment with Werner during interviews with Safety

Board investigators. The Safety Board obtained this and other information about the truckdriver from

depositions taken later during civil proceedings. 

13 Ritalin is the brand name for methylphenidate hydrochloride, a mild prescription stimulant commonly

used to treat attention deficit disorders (typically characterized by a history of chronic short attention span,

distractibility, emotional lability, impulsivity, and moderate-to-severe hyperactivity) and narcolepsy

(typically characterized by excessive daytime sleepiness with involuntary daytime sleep episodes, disturbed

nighttime sleep, and sudden weakness). The most common adverse reactions to Ritalin are nervousness and

insomnia.
Factual Information 12 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

him know if he wanted a copy of the tank charts. The driver-trainer said the truckdriver

never asked for them. The truckdriver said that Premium never provided him with any

charts or handbooks for determining whether the cargo tank load was greater than the

available capacity of the receiving tanks. 

The driver-trainer told investigators that after he checked underground tank levels

using the direct fill ports, he always ensured that he replaced the lids to the direct ports if

he chose to use the remote fill ports for the gasoline transfer. He said that he had instructed

the truckdriver to do the same. 

The driver-trainer said that, during the OJT period, the truckdriver sometimes took

notes in a spiral notebook. Safety Board investigators found a spiral notebook in the cab of

the accident truck. Most of the notebook’s pages contain personal rather than work

information. One page contains the notes shown in figure 5.

During the OJT period, the driver-trainer and the truckdriver made two deliveries

to Fast Lane station No. 741. The truckdriver’s first visit to the station was on his second

day of OJT, when, according to the training protocol, he was supposed to make the

gasoline delivery while the driver-trainer oversaw his work. Instead, the driver went inside

the convenience store for a sandwich while the driver-trainer made the transfer. The

truckdriver made a delivery to station No. 741 on his last day of OJT. On this occasion, the

driver-trainer noted no problems with the delivery. 

In his interview with Safety Board investigators, the driver-trainer described the

truckdriver as “a nice guy” but said he was “hard to reason with” and “hard headed.” He

said that the truckdriver frequently did not pay attention when things were explained to

him. He said that the truckdriver consistently demonstrated two operating problems,

backing the cargo tank and unloading the gasoline at the stations. The driver-trainer

indicated that after working with the driver for 4 days, he was going to “turn him down”;

however, when he informed the safety director of his determination, the safety director

told him to “take him out again.” The driver-trainer said that, during the next day of OJT,

he gave the truckdriver a “sharp lecture” about his lack of attentiveness before they began

making deliveries, and the truckdriver performed well. When they returned to Premium’s

Unloading Procedures

1. Stick tanks Get reading

2. Open tank valves

3. Remove caps

4. Hook up hose

5. Fill out bills/need manifest

6. Make sure [to] send in a Fax on all Morrison loads

On remote tank sick [sic] first The[n] use tank chart

Customer gets green, yellow [and] blue

 Figure 5. Notes written in truckdriver’s spiral notebook.
Factual Information 13 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

headquarters that evening, the driver-trainer told the safety director about the truckdriver’s

improved performance.

The next day was a Sunday. The truckdriver asked and was given permission to

take off to attend church. The following day, Monday, the driver-trainer was off duty.

When the truckdriver returned to work on Monday, the safety director told him that he

could work alone.

The driver-trainer told Safety Board investigators that he did not learn that the

truckdriver had been allowed to work by himself until several days later. He said that he

never approved the truckdriver’s working alone, and he thought that he (the trainer)

should have spent 2 or 3 more days with him to “go over everything again” to “ensure that

things were clear in the driver’s mind.” The driver-trainer said that the safety director told

him to complete and backdate the truckdriver’s certificate and other materials showing

that he had successfully completed the training so the truckdriver could be paid at the end

of his second work week. The driver-trainer complied with the safety director’s

instructions and backdated the items to show that the driver had successfully completed

the driver training program.

The safety director said he hired the truckdriver because he had “a soft spot for

vets” and preferred hiring career veterans over other applicants. The safety director said

that his reason for instructing the truckdriver to make his first solo trip was that he needed

a driver and the trainer had told him that the truckdriver had shown improvement on his

last day of training. The safety director said that the truckdriver was allowed to continue

working alone because everything went smoothly on his delivery run. 

Other Overfills by the Truckdriver

Several weeks before the fire, the truckdriver overfilled an underground storage

tank at the Bay St. Louis Fast Lane station. On this occasion, the truckdriver made the

delivery to the correct facility.

Like station No. 741, the Bay St. Louis Fast Lane station has both direct and

remote fill ports, although they are much closer together. The incident occurred during the

day, and the driver noticed the overfill after a small amount of gasoline (about 5 to 10

gallons) overfilled. The truckdriver contacted Premium’s Jackson office; and the

operations manager, who was not aware that the Bay St. Louis station had remote fill

ports, instructed him to climb on top of the cargo tank and determine how much of the

load remained by looking into the cargo tank compartment. The operations manager

directed the truckdriver to gauge all the receiving tanks and unload the rest of the gasoline

into the premium unleaded underground storage tank. Morrison, the owner of the facility,

maintained no records of the overfill at the Bay St. Louis Fast Lane station.

Operating Violations 

The truckdriver’s personnel file shows that, from May 5 to July 9, 1998, Premium

officials noted 20 hours-of-service violations, including 15 70-hour violations, 3 10-hour
Factual Information 14 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

violations, and 2 15-hour violations.14 According to Premium’s safety director, the

company issued the truckdriver three letters of reprimand for his violations. 

The Premium Tank Lines Driver’s Manual (driver’s manual) lists the following

consequences for failing to comply with Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety15 rules:

First Offense - Letter of reprimand

Second Offense - 3-day layoff

Third Offense - 1-week layoff

Premium’s records do not indicate that the company pursued any action other than

issuing disciplinary letters to the truckdriver for his infractions.

Medical

Federal Requirements. Title 49 CFR 391.41 states that drivers of commercial

motor vehicles must be physically qualified and provides instructions for individuals

performing and recording physical examinations. The regulations stipulate that a person

who has a “mental, nervous, organic, or functional disease or psychiatric disorder that is

likely to interfere with his ability to drive safely” is not qualified to drive a commercial

vehicle. Federal regulations further stipulate that “the examining physician is required to

certify that the driver does not have any physical, mental, or organic defect of such a

nature as to affect the driver’s ability to operate safely a commercial motor vehicle.”

Federal regulations do not require that physicians verify the information given by drivers

during the examination. 

Driver’s Medical Background. As noted earlier, while with the Navy, the

truckdriver was referred for medical evaluation because he had been involved in a series

of equipment operating accidents. Military physicians made a diagnosis of “attention

deficit disorder” (ADD) and prescribed Ritalin for the condition. The medical records

indicate that the truckdriver did well on the Ritalin. Nonetheless, as a result of a

neurological evaluation in June 1989, Navy physicians made the following observation:

It is recommended that this individual be cross-trained into some field

where his attention deficits and visual-motor coordination problems will

have less impact on his job safety and performance.

Additionally, the truckdriver’s military medical records note that he was referred

for evaluation because “Co-worker reports patient sits and stares sometimes up to 15

minutes.” The military medical files do not contain the results of a CT scan, an EEG

(electroencephalogram), or an MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging test) or physicians’

comments indicating that the truckdriver had been the subject of such tests.

14 For a 70-hour violation, the driver had to exceed 70 hours of driving and being on duty in an 8-day

period. For a 10-hour violation, he had to exceed 10 hours of driving without an 8-hour break. For a 15-hour

violation, he had to exceed 15 hours of being on duty and driving without an 8-hour break. 

15 The name of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety has been changed to the Office of Motor Carrier and

Highway Safety (OMCHS).
Factual Information 15 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Records indicate that after retiring from the Navy, the truckdriver received two

DOT physical examinations: the first for his acceptance into the CDI, the second for his

employment with Premium. Neither examination form indicates any type of psychiatric

disorder or any other nervous disorder. The physician who performed the truckdriver’s

most recent medical examination said that he had no knowledge of the truckdriver’s

neurological history.

At the time of the Biloxi accident, the truckdriver had a current medical card, and

the only medical restriction on his personal operator’s license and his CDL was for

wearing corrective lenses while driving. His medical records indicate that he had myopia

(nearsightedness) with astigmatism, which was corrected to 20/20 vision with glasses. 

Work-Rest Routine

The truckdriver told Safety Board investigators that he was not fatigued on the

morning of the fire. He had arranged with Premium to work the night shift. He said that he

normally slept about 6 hours during the day, left for work about 9:00 p.m., and arrived

back home between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. His “Driver’s Daily Log” indicates that on August

5 to 7, he went on duty at 10:45 p.m., 11:00 p.m., and 7:15 p.m., respectively. On

August 8, he said, he went to bed at 11:30 a.m. and awoke at 5:30 p.m., at which time he

called the dispatcher. His shift that evening began at 9:00 p.m. 

Toxicological Testing 

Investigators found bottles of ginseng, aspirin, and “Bee Awake,” a bee pollen

product, in the truck cab after the accident. The truckdriver said that the bee product was

intended to boost his energy. He said that he had taken one ginseng tablet, one aspirin

tablet, and no other medication on the night before the accident. 

Biloxi police officials stated that, in anticipation of a possible criminal case, their

personnel collected postaccident blood samples from the truckdriver and sent the

specimens to the Mississippi State Crime Laboratory in Jackson. When the Safety Board

became involved in the investigation, it asked that samples be forwarded to the Civil

Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City for alcohol and drug testing. The

analysis included testing to determine whether the truckdriver had taken Ritalin at

therapeutic levels. The test results for alcohol, drugs, and Ritalin were negative. 

Carrier Information 

General

Premium is a for-hire16 motor carrier that primarily delivers petroleum products to

storage tanks at service stations and other facilities. In addition to the drivers who work

16 The DOT defines for-hire as “a person engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers for

compensation.”
Factual Information 16 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

out of the Jackson headquarters, Premium has cargo tank truckdrivers based in the

following Mississippi cities: Collins, McComb, Meridian, Vicksburg, and Biloxi.

Premium was formed and incorporated in 1986. In 1992, the company expanded to

include trash and waste hauling. It sold all but one trash route in 1996. In 1997, Premium

was hired by Morrison to monitor and fill underground storage tanks with gasoline and

diesel fuel at selected Fast Lane gas stations. At the time of the accident, Premium

serviced 12 Fast Lane stations along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, including station No. 741. 

As of mid-1998, Premium’s petroleum distribution division employed 25 full-time

drivers, 2 part-time drivers, and 7 office staff members; its fleet included 30 companyowned truck tractors, 13 owner-operator truck tractors, 54 company-owned cargo tanks,

and 3 leased cargo tanks. Premium’s waste hauling division employed 3 full-time and 2

part-time drivers; its fleet had 6 truck tractors and 9 trailers, which were all company

owned. 

Hiring Procedures 

Premium’s safety director, who is responsible for hiring drivers, stated that

Premium usually hires truckdrivers with about 2 years of over-the-road experience.

Although the driver involved in the accident did not have 2 years of over-the-road

experience, the safety director hired him because of his military background. 

Federal regulations at 49 CFR 391.23 require motor carriers to investigate a driver

applicant’s employment record during the preceding 3 years. Section 391.23(c) states: 

The investigation of the driver’s employment record....must be made

within 30 days of the date his/her employment begins. The investigation

may consist of personal interview, telephone interview, letters, or any other

method of obtaining information that the carrier deems appropriate. Each

motor carrier must make a written record with respect to each past

employer contacted.

The Premium safety director made the Federally required employment check with

Fayard concerning the truckdriver. He said that he did not attempt to contact the military

because he did not think it would be possible to obtain information. The safety director did

not check with Werner because the truckdriver’s employment application did not show his

work experience with Werner. The safety director said that the truckdriver had the

necessary licenses and his State motor vehicle record (MVR) did not reveal any violations.

Premium hired the truckdriver after he passed a physical examination and drug screening. 
Factual Information 17 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Training

Regulatory Requirements. Federal requirements contained in 49 CFR Subpart

H, “Training,” Section 172, stipulate that a hazardous materials (hazmat) employer17 must

ensure that (hazmat) employees18 receive training and are tested on subjects in the

following categories: general awareness and familiarization, function-specific, and safety. 

Highway-specific training requirements at 49 CFR 177.816 (b) stipulate that each

person who operates a cargo tank be trained in a number of areas, including attendance to

a hazardous materials vehicle and loading and unloading procedures.

Overview of Premium’s Program. Premium’s driver training program, which

spanned 1 to 2 weeks, began with a 1-day orientation taught by company officials at the

Jackson headquarters. New drivers were shown several videotape presentations, including

two tapes about hazardous materials, and were given a test on the information presented.

Most of the orientation information was general in nature and included such topics as

pretrip equipment inspections; required documents, stickers, and shipping papers;

customer service; defensive driving; and emergency procedures. The instruction did not

include discussions about how to transfer gasoline at stations, how to use tank charts, or

how to determine the ullage in a tank. According to Premium’s safety director, instruction

directly related to gasoline transfers was handled by the driver-trainer who spent the

remainder of the training period with the new employee and evaluated the trainee for

suitability as a regular company driver. 

When a newly hired driver successfully concluded the training period, the new

driver was issued a certificate of training completion signed by the driver-trainer that

indicated the driver was prepared to work independently. The Premium Tank Lines’ Driver

Trainer Manual (trainer’s manual) states that the driver-trainer is “the final decisionmaker on whether or not the new hire will be a good, safe professional driver, capable of

handling all the duties required....”

Driver-Trainer Qualifications. Premium selected its driver-trainers based on their

experience, knowledge of operations, and work record. The driver-trainer for the driver

involved in the overfill had worked for petroleum companies since 1977 and Premium

since 1987, when he joined the company as a lease operator. His background included

several years as a dispatcher and extensive experience in tank operations. He had been a

trainer of cargo tank truckdrivers for a previous employer; while at Premium, he had

trained between 10 and 15 drivers. When not instructing new employees, the driver-trainer

served as a full-time driver in Premium’s coastal region. 

17 Section 171.8 states, in part, “a hazmat employer means a person who uses one or more employees in

connection with: transporting hazardous materials in commerce.”

18 Section 171.8 states, “a hazmat employee means a person who is employed by a hazmat employer and

in the course of employment directly affects hazardous materials transportation safety.” The definition

includes an individual who “loads, unloads, or handles hazardous materials” and who “operates a vehicle

used to transport hazardous materials.”
Factual Information 18 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Premium’s safety director said that, because of the driver-trainer’s thoroughness,

he had intentionally teamed him with the truckdriver. The driver-trainer told Safety Board

investigators that he was knowledgeable about the subjects listed in the trainer’s manual

but that he did not have a complete understanding of the Red JacketTM automatic tank

gauging system. 

Training Materials. Premium’s 37-page driver’s manual, which is distributed to

employees when they are hired, contains safety policies and general work procedures,

including alcohol and drug policies and testing, emergency and accident procedures,

defensive driving, and loading and unloading cargo. The driver’s manual contains some

safety requirements regarding unloading gasoline, including stipulations that a driver must

stay in attendance while the unit is being unloaded19 and must shut down the unloading

process when away from the controlling valve. The driver’s manual cautions, “Be sure

you are at the right plant or station.” The manual contains no guidance advising drivers

how or when they should make this determination, but it does stipulate, “Before

unloading, always get the consignee to check and sign your Bill of Lading.” The driver’s

manual does not contain instructions for determining the ullage in underground storage

tanks or a discussion of tank charts. 

The 17-page trainer’s manual contains information on company practices, daily

training activities, and lists general subjects that should be explained to truckdrivers

during the training period. The trainer’s manual does not state that the trainer should

ensure that a new driver knows how to determine the ullage in underground storage tanks.

Like the driver’s manual, the trainer’s manual states that drivers are to remain with the

unit when gasoline is being unloaded. The driver-trainer told investigators that he had

explained to the truckdriver the importance of staying with the unit when unloading. 

Neither manual contains specific instructions explaining safeguards against

overfills or factors to consider when unloading gasoline at facilities with remote fill

ports.20

In addition to the trainer’s manual, each driver-trainer had a 2-page checksheet

(appendix B) that lists subjects to review and critique during a new hire’s OJT phase. Page

one of the checksheet, at the top, has an area for remarks by the driver-trainer. The

checksheet next has two blocks, one entitled “tractor” and the other “trailer,” listing items

to be explained by the driver-trainer to the new hire. Item 2 in the trailer block is “Where

calibration charts are and how to use them.” Premium officials stated that this reference is

to the calibration charts that are used to determine the available space in the cargo tank.

The remainder of the checksheet form contains 17 operating categories that the

driver-trainer is to critique and check if the new hire does not perform the procedure

satisfactorily. Most of the subjects deal with inspecting and operating the vehicle.

19 Title 49 CFR 177.834 stipulates that a truckdriver must stay within 25 feet of the cargo tank during

unloading.

20 No Federal requirements stipulate that a hazmat employer or carrier have specific written procedures

addressing loading and unloading gasoline.
Factual Information 19 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Category XVI, “Loading and Unloading,” has nine check items, including “Doesn’t

unload before checking address of customer with address on bill of lading” [item A];

“Doesn’t break seals or unload until the customer has initialed bill of lading and inspected

load” [item B]; and “Stays with unit; stands by product control valve (Driver controlled

loading and unloading)” [item E].

Safety Briefings

According to the company safety director, he travels to Premium’s five bases of

operations quarterly to conduct safety briefings with the truckdrivers assigned to those

locations. He plans his briefings based on the kind of problems the company is

experiencing. He said that recent briefings conducted before the Biloxi accident had

focused on DOT regulations, driving habits, and paperwork, among other subjects. Two of

the five Biloxi-based truckdrivers had experienced overfills before the accident discussed

in this report. None of the five drivers recalled station overfills or stations with remote fill

ports being discussed at company safety briefings in Biloxi. Before the August 9 accident,

the safety director’s last safety briefing in Biloxi had been on August 7. 

Dispatch Procedures

Premium’s customers order gasoline to be delivered in a variety of ways. Some

customers monitor their own storage tanks and, when a delivery is necessary, telephone or

fax a request to Premium’s Jackson office. In the case of Morrison, it hired Premium not

only to deliver gasoline but also to monitor the gasoline levels at selected Fast Lane

service stations by means of a computer link between the Red JacketTM system and

Premium’s headquarters computer system.21 When data indicated that an underground

storage tank needed to be filled, a Premium employee estimated the amount of gasoline to

be sold to the station owner based on the present quantity of gasoline in the tank and the

anticipated amount of gasoline that would probably be sold to the public before delivery

could be made. As a safeguard against overfills, the Premium employee adjusted the

amount of gasoline to be delivered to the underground tank based on 90 percent of its

capacity. Headquarters personnel then prepared a master dispatch sheet assigning

deliveries to the drivers, who obtained their assignments by telephone.

According to the Premium operations manager, a miscalculation by Premium’s

headquarters personnel, slow retail sales at the gas station, or a maintenance problem at a

station could result in too much gasoline being dispatched for a particular underground

storage tank. 

The dispatch sheet indicates that, on the day before the accident, the same driver

was dispatched to deliver 6,600 gallons of regular unleaded gasoline and 1,900 gallons of

premium unleaded gasoline to Fast Lane station No. 741. Delivery reports verify that the

underground storage tanks were filled during the early morning hours of August 8. 

21 Premium’s computers use PathwayTM software to convert data from the Red JacketTM system.
Factual Information 20 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

On the eve of the accident, the safety director was operating from his home and

using a photocopy of the dispatch sheet to issue delivery assignments. He said that he

directed the truckdriver to make the following deliveries to Fast Lane stations: No. 742

(6,000 gallons regular and 2,500 gallons premium gasoline); No. 743 (6,000 gallons

regular and 2,500 gallons premium gasoline); and No. 736 (6,000 gallons regular and

2,500 gallons premium gasoline). He said that he did not learn that the truckdriver had

gone to station No. 741 until he was contacted from the fire scene. 

The truckdriver stated that he wrote down what the safety director told him while

they were still on the telephone. After the accident, in the truck cab, investigators found a

small note on which was written the following: “742, 743, and 741; 31, 34, and 33,22 and

6000NL and 2500P.” The truckdriver told Safety Board investigators that, although he had

previously made deliveries to the same station twice in one day, he had never made

deliveries that frequently to station No. 741.

Both the safety director and the operations director indicated that they had made

dispatch errors in the past; the safety director stated, however, that he was sure that he did

not make an error on the evening of August 8.

Since this accident, Premium has sent its dispatchers a memorandum outlining the

operating changes that are being incorporated into the company’s dispatch functions.

Under “Procedures,” the revised operating manual will stipulate: 

A. Dispatcher will give drivers instructions concerning products, amounts,

customer location, etc., in written form whenever possible. (via

personal written or fax)

B. When it is not possible to provide written instructions to the driver, the

dispatcher will give the instructions to the driver no less than two (2)

times, then will require the driver to repeat the instructions to be sure

the instructions have been communicated clearly.

Transfer Procedures 

The Safety Board interviewed all five Biloxi-based truckdrivers regarding gasoline

transfer procedures, in particular, about determining the ullage in an underground tank and

making deliveries at stations with remote fill ports. 

Calculating Existing Ullage. The Premium driver’s manual states, “Before

unloading, always get the consignee to check and sign your Bill of Lading. By so doing,

you are protecting yourself and your company.” Neither the driver’s manual nor the

trainer’s manual lists a standard procedure for calculating the volume of the underground

storage tanks. 

22 The numbers 31, 34, and 33, which represent the line numbers on the dispatch sheet, show the

scheduled deliveries for Gulfport Fast Lane station No. 742, Biloxi Fast Lane station No. 743, and Long

Beach, Mississippi, Fast Lane station No. 736. 
Factual Information 21 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Drivers convert the stick readings of underground storage tanks levels from inches

to gallons by using the appropriate calibration chart, also called a tank chart.23 By

subtracting the gallons of gasoline in the tank from its total storage capacity, drivers can

determine the available space. They can then compare this gallon figure to that shown on

their shipping papers to determine whether the total amount of gasoline loaded on the

cargo tank will fit into the underground storage facility. According to a Morrison official,

each Fast Lane station maintains tank charts specific for that facility. 

Four of the five Biloxi-based Premium drivers stated that, based on their

experience, they could generally tell from the “stick readings” whether the tank would

hold the gasoline to be delivered. Most said that they checked the tank charts only if the

stick reading indicated that the delivery might nearly fill the tank to capacity. Two of the

drivers had obtained charts for each of the different sized tanks to which they delivered.

The third driver, who was the truckdriver’s driver-trainer, had most of the tank charts; the

fourth driver did not carry any charts. The driver who did not carry tank charts said that if

he had a question about the delivery, he either asked the service station personnel or called

the dispatcher. 

The truckdriver involved in the accident (the fifth Biloxi-based driver) said that he

never used a tank chart to figure the available space in the underground storage tank. He

told investigators that he did not consider it his responsibility to know how much was in

the tanks and that he thought he was required to stick the tanks to obtain a figure for

billing purposes, not for assessing the space available in them. He said that, when making

gasoline transfers, he relied solely on Premium’s telephonic dispatch to provide the correct

amount of gasoline and the station location. 

Using Remote Fill Ports. Neither the driver’s manual nor the driver-trainer

manual lists a standard procedure for transfer at facilities that have both direct and remote

fill ports.

The four other Biloxi-based truckdrivers told investigators that insect nests and

other debris occasionally clogged the storage tank vents at station No. 741, making

gasoline transfers difficult. The driver-trainer and another driver said that they always

replaced the lids before a gasoline transfer. One driver said that he occasionally left the

lids off if the transfer was slow.24 The fourth driver, who was the Premium employee

involved in the July 15, 1996, overfill at station No. 741, stated that he had never been told

a specific procedure for delivering to stations with remote fills. He said that dirt dauber25

nests occasionally plugged vents at station No. 741 and that leaving the lid off the direct

fill port made the gasoline transfer easier. After his overfill at the station, however, he was

23 Tank charts differ depending on the volume of the tank and list both an inch reading and an equivalent

gallon figure. 

24 By opening the second port during the gasoline transfer, the pressure that slows the gasoline flow will

not build but will escape through the open fill port.

25 Dirt daubers, also called mud daubers, are wasps that build nests of mud for their larvae.
Factual Information 22 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

careful to replace the lids before every transfer. He said that if he found the vents to be

clogged, he would contact the facility owner.

Carrier Oversight by the Federal Highway Administration

An OMCHS inspector last performed a complete review of Premium in June 1992.

During the compliance review, the inspector took a sampling of 154 duty status records

and identified 6 hours-of-service violations in the records reviewed. The agent

recommended that Premium “Ensure all employees involved in handling hazardous

materials shipments are properly trained and familiar with the regulations applicable to

their jobs in the hazardous materials transportation system.”26 Premium received a

satisfactory27 rating as a result of the review and has not been the subject of a complete

OMCHS audit since 1992. 

Red JacketTM Monitoring System 

According to product literature, the Red JacketTM underground storage tank

monitoring system is used for complete leak detection and inventory management of

underground storage tanks containing petroleum-based gasolines. The Red JacketTM

system was linked to computers at Premium, which used the PathwayTM software to

extrapolate data and to determine the deliveries at some Fast Lane stations, including

station No. 741. 

Each station equipped with the Red JacketTM system has a remote terminal that

prints different types of reports, including inventory, delivery, tank leak detection, and

alarms. Each of these reports includes the date, time, station information, report name,

tank number, gasoline type, and tank capacity. Reports may be scheduled, event-driven, or

initiated by the key pad.

The Red JacketTM system has a feature that sounds an alarm inside the convenience

store for a number of reasons, including when an underground storage tank reaches 90-

percent capacity. The monitoring system does not have the capability to shut down a

gasoline transfer when the alarm activates. The station’s assistant manager described the

alarm as a “mild beep” that lasts 2 to 3 seconds and then shuts off. She said that she

typically heard the Red JacketTM alarm about twice a month when deliveries were made.

She indicated that, over the months, she had become accustomed to the alarm sound and

usually did not respond to it any longer. Although the Red JacketTM system printout

indicates that an alarm sounded when the gasoline level in the underground tank reached

26 Safety Board investigators questioned the agent, who no longer works for the OMCHS, regarding

Premium’s compliance review. Due to the passage of time, she could not remember many specifics of the

audit but did remember the hours-of-service violations. Regarding her recommendation for hazardous

materials training, she stated that she could not remember a problem with the training. She said that she

often listed recommendations in review areas where she did not discover a violation, adding, “There is

always room for motor carriers to evaluate areas of their program and make improvements.”

27 Motor carriers may receive a satisfactory, a conditional, or an unsatisfactory rating based on the

OMCHS evaluation.
Factual Information 23 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

90-percent capacity on the day of the accident, neither of the two Fast Lane employees

then on duty recalled hearing the beep. They said that they were busy stocking or were

with customers in the convenience store.

Following the accident, an independent contractor conducted an evaluation of the

Red JacketTM system and noted no significant problems with it.28

Fast Lane Employee Training

The Fast Lane chain owner and the convenience store clerks working at the time of

the accident stated that Fast Lane employees do not receive any specific training for

monitoring or responding to the Red JacketTM system for gasoline dispatch and transfer.

Station employees are trained to use the Red JacketTM system primarily to complete

inventory and other paperwork requirements. Station employees are not trained to respond

to the overfill alarm. 

The Fast Lane chain owners indicated that station employees usually signed the

driver’s paperwork following a gasoline delivery. The station employees stated that

sometimes they were not aware that a delivery had been made until the driver entered the

store for signature. 

Environmental Protection Agency Requirements

Safeguards Against Overfills

Federal regulations enacted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in

1988 require that underground storage tanks be equipped with a means of preventing

overfills and spills. As defined by 40 CFR 280.12, an overfill release occurs when a tank

is filled beyond its capacity, resulting in a discharge of the regulated substance to the

environment. Spilling is a release of hazardous materials that “results from improper

dispensing practices such as disconnecting the delivery hose from the tank’s fill pipe

before the hose has drained completely.”29 Federal regulations at 40 CFR 280.20 require

that underground storage tanks be equipped with safeguards to prevent spilling and

overfilling during gasoline transfer. The EPA regulations list several acceptable safeguard

devices or methods that owners can use. The Morrison company elected to install float

valves in the underground tanks at its Fast Lane stations. 

Regulations Pertaining to Monitoring Transfers 

Title 40 CFR 280.30 (a), “Spill and overfill control,” stipulates that

28 The contractor found that the amount recorded by the monitoring system was slightly greater than the

actual amount of product in the underground tanks. 

29 “Analysis of Today’s Rule,” Federal Register, Vol. 53, No. 185, p. 37133, published September 23,

1988.
Factual Information 24 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Owners and operators must ensure that releases due to spilling or

overfilling do not occur. The owner and operator must ensure that the

volume available in the [underground storage] tank is greater than the

volume of product to be transferred to the tank before the transfer is made

and that the transfer operation is monitored constantly to prevent

overfilling and spilling.

In response to the 1988 rulemaking, operators of certain facilities, such as tank

farms, indicated that constant direct monitoring would be extremely difficult. The EPA,

therefore, changed the final rule to allow monitoring with remote equipment.

In its analysis of the rule, the EPA took the position that the owner of the

underground storage system is responsible for any release. The analysis states: 

Although EPA agrees that responsible carriers are the primary agents in the

field to prevent spills and overfills, for the purpose of complying with

today’s requirements, the UST [underground storage tank] system owner

and operator is responsible for preventing spills and overfills. The agency

must take this approach because it has no legal authority to regulate

transporters under Subtitle I. Thus, regardless of whether the owner and

operator decides to share (by contract) responsibility for the monitoring of

the transfer with the carrier, under today’s final regulations the owner and

operator will continue to be responsible in the event that there is a release

during delivery.

EPA State Program Approval

In discussing the challenges for compliance, the EPA stated that a regulatory

program of underground storage systems can best be carried out by “those closest to the

problem, who can respond quickly, and who can create a visible presence, that is, the State

and local governments.” Toward this end, the EPA initiated a process of examination,

called the State Program Approval, in which Federal EPA officials review State

underground storage tank regulations to determine that they are “no less stringent” than

Federal law. The criteria for the no-less-stringent determination include general operating

requirements stipulating, in part, that all underground storage systems:

prevent spills and overfills by ensuring that the space in the tank is

sufficient to receive the volume to be transferred and that the transfer

operation is monitored constantly.

State or local agencies whose regulations meet Federal requirements are accorded

the primary responsibility for implementing and, when necessary, enforcing underground

storage tank regulations. To date, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 27 States,

including Mississippi, have been granted enforcement authority under the EPA State

Program Approval. In Mississippi, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality

(DEQ) serves in this capacity. According to EPA and DEQ representatives, Mississippi

adopted verbatim the Federal regulations related to underground tank storage safety,

including the requirements for overfill protection. 
Factual Information 25 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Regulatory Enforcement

In States that have EPA State Program Approval, the EPA relies primarily upon

State agencies to enforce regulations, although EPA inspectors may also enforce the

regulations. According to the EPA’s Office of Underground Storage Tanks (UST), Federal

and State inspectors enforce underground storage tank regulations by various means,

including warnings or fines, depending upon the severity of the violation. EPA officials

indicated that in the agency’s oversight of underground storage tanks, it has focused on

equipment safeguards and preventing underground storage tank leaks.

The Mississippi DEQ has four inspectors who regulate about 10,000 underground

storage tanks, of which about 8,500 are currently in use and about 1,500 are temporarily

out of use. Mississippi DEQ officials indicated that, based on available staff and funding,

its inspectors visit a facility about every 4 years. Before the August 1998 accident,

Mississippi DEQ representatives last inspected the underground storage tanks at station

No. 741 in December 1997 and noted no significant violations at that time. After the

accident, DEQ inspectors performed a visual inspection of the site to determine whether

the top of the tank had loose fittings that may have caused or contributed to the release

from the underground storage system. They found that all the fittings appeared to be tight.

Interviews with Mississippi DEQ officials indicated that the State has not enforced

requirements that facility owners in Mississippi determine available underground storage

space or monitor product transfers. Moreover, the State has not cited any facility owners

for violating 40 CFR 280.30 (a). 

For this investigation, the Safety Board contacted the acting director of the EPA’s

Office of UST to determine the scope of enforcement of 40 CFR 280.30 (a) by EPA

investigators. The UST official surveyed EPA regional directors, of whom none could cite

any specific case of enforcement. 

Notification of Hazardous Materials Incidents

Soon after the fire erupted, the truckdriver notified the Premium safety director,

who immediately drove from Jackson to the accident scene, a distance of about 170 miles.

The safety director later stated that he maintained a telephone list of agencies to contact in

the event of an emergency and that he made several unsuccessful attempts to report the

accident to the National Response Center (NRC) while he was at the accident scene

throughout the day. He said that he then drove back to his home in Jackson, where he fell

asleep. When he awoke about 9:00 p.m., he remembered that he had been unsuccessful in

reporting the accident and again tried to telephone the NRC with no success. He said that

he then left his residence and drove to the Premium headquarters to check the phone

number. At the office, he discovered that the number he had been using was incorrect,

whereupon he called the NRC, which recorded the notification at 12:22 a.m. eastern

standard time,30 about 23 hours after the accident occurred. 

30 11:22 p.m. central standard time in Jackson.
Factual Information 26 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Title 49 CFR 171.15, “Immediate notice of certain hazardous materials incidents,”

requires that motor carriers who transport hazardous materials report by telephone

incidents meeting specified criteria, including a fatality, to the NRC “at the earliest

practicable moment.” In the October 1969 proposed rulemaking on accident reporting

requirements, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) stated:

The immediate report would cover the essential items of information

necessary for the operating administrations of the Department and the

National Transportation Safety Board to determine what immediate action

should be taken by them, if any.31

In March 1999, RSPA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(ANPRM) to determine the need for regulatory changes to the reporting requirements of

the hazardous materials contained in 49 CFR Part 171.

In its June 1999 response to RSPA’s ANPRM, the Safety Board cited three

accidents involving transportation-related unloading operations that demonstrated

deficiencies in the existing telephonic notification and incident requirements contained in

49 CFR Part 171. The Safety Board included the August 9, 1998, Biloxi accident as an

example, stating:

Although the accident occurred about 1:00 a.m. on August 9, 1998, the

motor carrier did not notify the NRC until nearly 24 hours after the

accident. The delayed notification precluded the Safety Board and other

Federal agencies...from responding promptly and initiating the accident

investigation.

The Safety Board further noted:

Under reporting criteria at 49 CFR 171.15, a carrier who transports

hazardous materials is required to provide telephonic notification ‘at the

earliest practicable moment.’ However, during its investigation of the

Biloxi accident, the Safety Board has noted that the term ‘the earliest

practicable moment’ is not defined in the Hazardous Materials

Regulations, nor has RSPA issued an interpretation that provides any time

constraints on the reporting time frame. The Safety Board itself requires

railroads under 49 CFR 840.3 to provide telephonic notification through

the NRC not later than 2 hours after an accident resulting in a fatality, the

release of hazardous materials, or evacuation of the public and not later

than 4 hours after an accident resulting only in damages exceeding

specified thresholds. The Safety Board believes that the effectiveness of

the requirements for telephonic notification should be strengthened and a

specific time frame given for providing telephonic notifications.

In related matters, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA),

requires notification within 8 hours of the death or in-patient treatment of any employee

following a work-related accident.32

31 Federal Register, Vol. 34, No. 208. Published October 29, 1969. Page 17450.

32 29 CFR 1904.8
27 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Analysis

General

This analysis is divided into three main sections. In the first part, the Safety Board

identifies factors that can be readily excluded as causal or contributory to the accident. In

the second section, the Board provides a synopsis of events directly leading to the

accident. In the final section, the Board discusses deficiencies in three major areas that

were identified as issues during this investigation: 

• Premium’s management oversight;

• Morrison’s procedures for accepting petroleum product deliveries to

underground storage tanks; and

• Federal requirements and oversight.

The issue of Federal requirements and oversight includes regulatory requirements

relating to written procedures for loading and unloading cargo tanks transporting

hazardous materials, the regulatory requirements for notifying Federal agencies of a

hazardous materials incident, and the EPA’s enforcement of the regulatory requirements

contained in 40 CFR 280.30 (a) for preventing overfills.

Exclusions

The toxicological test results of blood samples taken from the truckdriver were

negative for alcohol and drugs. The driver’s work-rest schedule did not require alternate

night and day sleeping, which probably neutralized the effect of his working early

morning hours. In the 4 days before the accident, he reportedly obtained his normal

amount of rest. Based on these findings, the Safety Board concludes that the Premium

truckdriver was not impaired by drugs, alcohol, or fatigue on the morning of the Biloxi

accident.

Accident Analysis

On the eve of the accident, the truckdriver telephoned the Premium dispatcher to

obtain the assigned deliveries for his shift. The safety director, who was serving as

dispatcher, orally provided the driver with a list of three delivery locations and the number

of gallons to be delivered to each site. He said that he told the driver to make deliveries to

Fast Lane station Nos. 742, 743, and 736. The driver said that he wrote down the delivery

sites that the safety director had given him. His notes matched all of the dispatch line

numbers and two of the station numbers (742 and 743). However, station number No. 741

is listed rather than station No. 736. The dispatcher did not ask the driver to read the list to

him to verify that he had understood and correctly recorded the delivery assignments. The

dispatcher also did not provide a fax or written dispatch record to the driver. 
Analysis 28 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

After picking up his load of gasoline, the truckdriver went to Fast Lane station No.

741, which was not scheduled to receive a delivery. When the cargo tank truck arrived at

the station, the Fast Lane station employees did not compare the amount of gasoline

scheduled for delivery to the amount that the Red JacketTM monitoring system indicated

was in the underground tanks. Morrison, the station owner-operator, did not train and

require its employees to monitor the volume of gasoline in underground tanks or to confer

with cargo tank drivers to ensure the accuracy of deliveries; such a comparison, in this

case, would have shown that the driver was in error and could have prevented the overfill.

Once at the station, the driver made a number of operating errors. He did not

determine the quantity of gasoline in the underground storage tanks, and he did not

calculate the amount of gasoline that could safely be transferred from the cargo tank to the

station storage tanks. After sticking the underground storage tanks through the direct fill

ports, he failed to use the measurement that he obtained to calculate the available space for

gasoline in the storage tank. He then failed to close the lids of the direct fill ports before

beginning the gasoline transfer through the remote fill ports. Having both the remote and

the direct port fill lids open rendered the tank system’s pressure-controlled safety device

ineffective and resulted in gas overflowing the direct fill port of the regular unleaded

gasoline storage tank.

Finally, the truckdriver did not properly monitor the gasoline transfer. The Red

JacketTM printout and the convenience store video tapes indicate that he left the cargo tank

truck while gasoline was being transferred into the underground tanks, which was contrary

to company procedures. When he was standing by the cargo tank, he did not notice the

gasoline overflowing from the storage tank and streaming across the station lot. A

customer at the station observed him gazing across the road, seemingly unaware of the

gasoline near him.

The stream of gasoline ran along the side of the road and across the intersection,

which, at the time, was occupied by three passenger vehicles. A fire erupted under one of

the vehicles and immediately engulfed all three. Five of the occupants in the vehicles

sustained fatal injuries, and one occupant suffered serious injuries. 

Adequacy of Premium’s Management Oversight

Hiring Practices

The Safety Board examined the truckdriver’s performance in the context of

information obtained from his past personnel and medical files and from observations by

OJT personnel and noted some factors that should have prompted greater scrutiny during

the hiring process. The Safety Board then looked at Premium’s screening process for new

applicants and noted some deficiencies.

Medical Condition of the Truckdriver. Navy records indicate that the truckdriver

was referred for medical evaluation and that several of his military-issued equipment

operating licenses had been suspended after he had a series of equipment-related

accidents. His Navy medical records indicate that military physicians diagnosed him as
Analysis 29 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

having ADD. His records show that after he was prescribed Ritalin, his condition

improved and his licenses were restored. 

The truckdriver’s actions during his civilian jobs were consistent with a medical

condition such as ADD. During his training at Fayard and Premium, his driver-trainers

complained that he frequently seemed preoccupied, was inattentive during instruction, and

was easily distracted.

The neurological condition described in the truckdriver’s Navy medical records

may explain his reaction to the Biloxi gasoline overfill. According to a witness, the

overfill was in clear view of the truckdriver as he stood near his vehicle. However, the

truckdriver was observed staring over the overfill and did not respond until the witness

spoke to him. A more thorough assessment of the truckdriver’s behavior cannot be offered

without current neurological tests of the subject. 

The truckdriver failed to report background information related to his neurological

disorder to physicians who performed his DOT physicals. Two physicians, lacking

pertinent information, found the truckdriver to be medically qualified. The Safety Board

concludes that the physicians who performed the truckdriver’s DOT physical could not

adequately evaluate the truckdriver’s medical fitness because he did not report

background information related to his neurological condition.

The Safety Board has addressed the issue of improperly reported medical

information in earlier accident reports.33 Physicians cannot adequately evaluate the

medical fitness of drivers unless truthful information about previous medical conditions is

provided. Similarly, once information is given, physicians have no way to verify the

truthfulness and completeness of answers.

As part of the Safety Board’s truck and bus safety initiative, in January 1999, the

Board approved a series of public hearings to be conducted by its Office of Highway

Safety. The first hearing, which took place in April 1999, focused on commercial vehicle

oversight and crash data. As a result of the April hearing, additional Congressional

interest, and its investigation of the May 9, 1999, crash of a motorcoach in New Orleans,

Louisiana, that fatally injured 22 passengers, the Safety Board identified a group of issues

that warrant additional examination:

33 See, for example, the following reports: (Publisher and place of publication for all works cited is

National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C.) Greyhound Bus Collision with Concrete Overpass

Support Column on I-880, San Juan Overpass, Sacramento, California, November 3, 1973, Highway

Accident Report NTSB/HAR-74/05 (1974); Collision of Humbolt County Dump Truck and Klamath-Trinity

Unified District Schoolbus, State Route 96 near Willow Creek, California, February 24, 1983, Highway

Accident Report NTSB/HAR-83/05 (1983); Academy Lines, Inc., Intercity Bus Run-off Roadway and

Overturn, Middletown, New Jersey, September 6, 1987, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-88/03

(1988); Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., Intercity Bus Loss of Control and Overturn, Interstate Highway 65 in

Nashville, Tennessee, November 19, 1988, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-89/03 (1989); Factors

that Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck Accidents, Safety Study NTSB/SS-95/01 (1995).
Analysis 30 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

• The safety implications of the North America Free Trade Agreement;

• The adequacy of the OMCHS’s oversight of medical fitness and drug issues as

they relate to the commercial vehicle driver;

• The adequacy of the CDL program; and

• The lack of a national CDL database accessible to motor carriers for driver

selection and hiring purposes.

The April hearing revealed that although commercial vehicle drivers are required

to possess a CDL and a medical certificate, often there is no verification program for the

driver’s medical fitness and drivers submit falsified certifications or, as in the case of the

Biloxi accident, fail to inform examining physicians or the motor carriers of significant

medical issues. Additionally, Safety Board investigations have found that examining

physicians frequently do not understand the nature of the activities they are certifying

drivers to perform, and no program is available to educate physicians how to conduct their

examinations. Furthermore, medication impairment appears to be increasing among

commercial drivers, especially in connection with combinations of prescribed and overthe-counter medication. Based on these findings, the Safety Board’s Office of Highway

Safety has proposed that a hearing addressing CDL and medical fitness issues be

conducted in FY 2000.

Applicant Screening. Despite the truckdriver’s failure to report pertinent

information on his application to Premium, the carrier’s officials might have been able to

determine his fitness for duty had they conducted the 3-year background check required

by Federal regulations (49 CFR 391.23). The safety director verified the truckdriver’s

employment only with Fayard. The safety director told the Safety Board that he did not

think that he would be able to obtain background information from the Navy. 

What is disturbing to the Safety Board in this case is that Premium officials did not

even attempt to obtain Navy records. Had Premium made the information request, it may

have obtained documents showing the truckdriver’s medical history before the accident

occurred, which may have alerted company officials that the truckdriver had a medical

condition that could affect his skills and abilities. The Safety Board concludes that

although a significant factor in Premium’s hiring the truckdriver was his military

background, the safety director did not attempt to check or to request the driver’s military

records, which contained useful information for determining his medical fitness and

ability to operate heavy equipment. 

The driver also did not report his previous employment with Werner. Had he done

so, Premium officials may have been able to question why the driver’s employment with

Werner had been terminated. The Safety Board concludes that, because the truckdriver

failed to report on his job application his employment with a carrier that had dismissed

him, useful information from that carrier was not available to Premium to help company

officials evaluate the truckdriver’s ability to perform his duties.
Analysis 31 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

At the Safety Board’s April 1999 hearing, associations and motor carriers testified

that one of their primary concerns is their ability to select competent drivers. They stated

that drivers’ records often do not transfer with them from State to State, nor do their

records reflect all traffic violations. Motor carriers must rely on driver self-reporting to

review prior work experience; so carriers are often unable to obtain a true picture of the

driver’s history. The Safety Board’s Office of Highway Safety has therefore recommended

that the failure of applicants to accurately report prior work history be addressed in the

Safety Board’s proposed FY 2000 public hearing.

Employee Training

Because of the dangers that hazardous materials pose, the drivers transporting

them must be among the most skilled operators. In addition to having a high degree of

general truck driving skill and experience, drivers transporting hazardous materials need

specialized knowledge, which makes training related to specific job functions especially

important. Drivers must not only be well-versed in the properties of their cargo and the

rules of the road concerning the transportation of those materials but also in all proper

handling procedures if they are to be responsible for loading and unloading.

Premium’s training program had two main phases: a 1-day orientation that

provided new hires with a general overview of the company, the products transported,

employee benefits, and pertinent Federal regulations, and an OJT period that focused on

operational procedures. The OJT phase varied from 1 to 2 weeks, depending on the

proficiency demonstrated by the new hire. In addition to the preliminary training, the

safety director conducted quarterly safety briefings on subjects that he determined needed

additional emphasis. 

Interviews with experienced Premium drivers and the truckdriver involved in the

Biloxi accident revealed that the employees’ knowledge of company policies and

procedures concerning loading and unloading gasoline varied widely. The Safety Board

therefore looked at the reference materials and instructions Premium provided to its new

hires concerning gasoline transfers. 

The driver’s manual given to Premium’s new hires and the trainer’s manual and

the checksheet used by its driver-trainers were very general in nature and addressed few

safety topics other than those concerning over-the-road transport. The manuals contained

minimal instructions addressing gasoline transfers; the checksheet lacked detailed items

under the category “Loading and Unloading.” Although the driver-trainer said that he

explained and demonstrated specific unloading procedures to the truckdriver, the

truckdriver’s personal notes taken during training list only very general steps and contain

few safety considerations. 

When addressing operational considerations with serious safety implications, oral

instructions are not sufficient. Oral instructions can be misinterpreted. Even when drivertrainers follow up their oral instructions by watching the drivers perform a function, there

is no guarantee that the drivers understand the safety implications of the procedures they

are following. Further, over time many trainees will forget instructions on procedures that
Analysis 32 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

they are not required to perform frequently. All drivers of cargo tank trucks therefore need

specific written job procedures if they are to operate safely. In the case of new employees,

in particular, well written loading and unloading procedures can establish desired work

patterns before bad habits are learned. 

Because his operating manual lacked detailed operating instructions addressing

cargo unloading, the truckdriver had no thorough written source to reference if he could

not recall his driver-trainer’s instructions or could not make sense of his own cryptic and

inaccurate notes. This deficiency of information and training negatively affected the

truckdriver’s gasoline transfer activities in several ways.

First, Premium’s delivery loads to the Fast Lane stations were based on

conservative estimates of daily gasoline sales. Consequently, circumstances such as

unusually slow sales, shutdowns for maintenance, and miscalculations could result in the

driver arriving with too much gasoline for the underground storage tank. Both the

employee manual and the driver-trainer manual indicated that the driver should present

the bill of lading to the station operator before making a transfer, but neither manual

explains why this should be done first or identifies any potential safety benefits arising

from this sequence. The manuals could have shown that by first obtaining the operator’s

approval of the bill of lading, the driver could determine whether he was delivering the

gasoline to the correct location and, at facilities having tank-volume monitoring systems,

could ascertain the actual amount of gasoline in the underground tanks before beginning

the transfer.

By failing to discuss the rationale for first obtaining the bill of lading signature,

Premium lost an opportunity to emphasize to its truckdrivers the safety consequences of

this action. Lacking this explanation, the truckdrivers apparently did not absorb the

importance of the procedural sequence. Fast Lane personnel told the Safety Board that the

cargo tank truckdrivers rarely, if ever, showed or discussed the bill of lading with them

before initiating a gasoline transfer.

Additionally, as the previous overfills at the Biloxi and the Bay St. Louis stations

demonstrate, the gasoline cargo amounts dispatched by Premium to a location are

sometimes greater than the available space in the underground tanks. Consequently, it is

essential that cargo tank truckdrivers correctly determine the ullage in the underground

storage tanks and whether the intended amount of gasoline will fit into the tank before

beginning a gasoline transfer. Nevertheless, neither the driver nor trainer manual advised

truckdrivers that this determination is vital to safety or provided an example showing how

to calculate available underground storage tank space. Omission of such safety-significant

information illustrates the inadequacy of Premium’s reference manuals.

As a safeguard against overfills, it is incumbent upon Premium to ensure that all its

truckdrivers know the specific steps for unloading gasoline, including the various methods

for calculating ullage in underground tanks and how to use tank charts. The truckdriver

who overfilled Fast Lane station No. 741 in 1996 stated that he was unaware of any

specific procedures for dealing with tanks with remote fills. Although Premium’s

management officials were aware of both this overfill and the overfill at the Bay St. Louis
Analysis 33 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Fast Lane station, they still did not develop specific written procedures stressing the

importance of calculating available space and replacing fill caps before beginning the

transfer. Moreover, the safety director did not discuss potential procedural problems at

stations with remote fill ports during his quarterly safety meetings. 

How a carrier manages the training of its new employees has a tremendous impact

on their attitude toward their work and their ability to do their job effectively and

efficiently. Inadequate instruction can leave new hires confused and uncertain of how to

do the jobs for which they were hired. Inadequate training materials and vague procedural

directions concerning cargo unloading procedures permit drivers to pick up bad habits and

follow incomplete and potentially dangerous practices.

The Safety Board concludes that Premium’s operating manuals for its new

employees and its driver-trainers lacked the specificity that employees need to ensure that

they practice correct and safe cargo unloading procedures. The Safety Board believes that

Premium should revise its driver and driver-trainer manuals to include specific written

instructions on loading and unloading cargo and on the use of tools, such as storage tank

capacity charts, necessary to deliver gasoline safely. 

But the Safety Board emphasizes that, while Premium did not provide sufficient

training or adequate reference materials to its drivers concerning gasoline loading and

unloading, Premium’s deficiencies are symptomatic of a much larger problem in this

area—the nationwide lack of Federal regulations addressing these significant safety

issues. Although Federal regulations currently require that drivers be trained in loading

and unloading procedures, the regulations do not require that motor carriers of bulk

hazardous materials maintain specific written loading and unloading procedures. The

Safety Board concludes that, to help drivers follow safe loading and unloading

procedures, Federal regulations should require carriers that transport hazardous materials

in cargo tanks to have specific written procedures for loading and unloading. The Safety

Board therefore believes that RSPA should promulgate regulations requiring motor

carriers that transport hazardous materials in cargo tanks to develop and maintain specific

written cargo loading and unloading procedures for their drivers. Once regulations are

promulgated, the FHWA should ensure that the motor carriers are in compliance with the

regulations. 

The Biloxi accident presents issues relevant to all carriers involved in the transport

of gasoline and petroleum products. The Safety Board therefore believes that the National

Tank Truck Carriers Association and the American Petroleum Institute should inform their

members of the facts and circumstances of the Biloxi accident and urge them to review the

adequacy of their procedures for hiring and training truckdrivers and their written

procedures for loading and unloading hazardous materials. 

Adherence to Policy

The Safety Board is also concerned by the failure of Premium management to

adhere to its own clearly stated policies and procedures. The record of the truckdriver

involved in the accident showed a regular pattern of Federal hours-of-service violations.
Analysis 34 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Although the Premium driver’s manual states that suspension is the consequence of failing

to comply with these Federal regulations, company officials merely continued to issue the

truckdriver written warnings as a disciplinary measure rather than suspending him. 

Additionally, carrier officials failed to follow their own written procedures when

they retained the truckdriver after the driver-trainer recommended termination. According

to the Premium driver-trainer manual, the driver-trainer with whom a new employee is

teamed has the final determination on the length of the driver’s initial training and on

whether the new hire should be advanced to the status of qualified driver or terminated. In

this case, the truckdriver’s trainer had determined the truckdriver’s unsuitability by their

fourth day of working together. Instead of terminating the truckdriver as recommended by

the driver-trainer, the safety director told the driver-trainer to take the truckdriver out

again. The driver-trainer spent one more day of training with the truckdriver but believed

that the truckdriver was not ready to work by himself. The driver-trainer had anticipated

having two or three additional days to work with the truckdriver; however, while the

driver-trainer was off-duty, company officials allowed the ill-prepared driver to make a

delivery alone. The Safety Board concludes that the Premium safety director failed to

adhere to company procedures for hiring and training the truckdriver and for disciplining

him when he failed to comply with the hours-of-service requirements. The Safety Board

believes that Premium should establish procedures to ensure that company officials adhere

to written policies relating to hiring, training, and disciplining of company truckdrivers.

Dispatch Procedures

On the evening of August 8, 1998, during the telephone conversation between the

safety director, who was serving as dispatcher, and the truckdriver, a miscommunication

occurred that resulted in the truckdriver erroneously making a delivery to station No. 741.

A review of the dispatch sheet and of statements made by the safety director indicated that

the delivery was intended for a station in Long Beach, Mississippi. 

The safety director claimed to have correctly dispatched the truckdriver, and the

truckdriver claimed to have accurately recorded the dispatches he was given. The

miscommunication demonstrated that Premium’s dispatching procedures lack safeguards

against errors. Both the safety director and the operations manager stated that they and

other dispatchers had sometimes made errors in relaying information to truckers. Despite

the fact that all company dispatches were given over the telephone and truckdrivers never

saw the written assignments before delivery, the company dispatch procedures lacked

safeguards for ensuring that truckdrivers received the correct information about the type,

amount, and destination of the gasoline to be delivered. The Safety Board concludes that

Premium’s lack of adequate procedures for verifying the accuracy of dispatch orders

resulted in the truckdriver delivering gasoline to the wrong location. The Safety Board is

pleased to learn that, since this accident, Premium has revised its dispatch procedures to

include methods by which the dispatcher may verify that the driver has received the

correct delivery information. 
Analysis 35 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Adequacy of Fast Lane Employee Training

The Fast Lane employees at station No. 741 interviewed after the accident

indicated that they were busy with various routine activities during their work shift on the

night of the overfill. They also indicated that they had become accustomed to hearing the

overfill alarm and no longer responded to it. 

The EPA not only requires facility owners and operators to verify before transfer

operations begin that the amount of gasoline being delivered will fit into underground

gasoline storage tanks, it also requires that owners and operators monitor the transfer. The

EPA allows owners and operators the option of using monitoring equipment, such as the

Red JacketTM system, to satisfy this Federal requirement. 

According to Morrison, the owner of Fast Lane station No. 741, its employees are

not trained to monitor the Red JacketTM system during transfer nor are they trained to

respond to the Red JacketTM overfill alarm. Morrison officials stated that, because of their

agreement with Premium, they considered the carrier responsible for determining that the

volume of cargo being delivered would fit in the underground tanks. 

The Safety Board is concerned by this attitude. The EPA requires that station

owners and operators ensure that underground storage tanks have available space for the

gasoline being delivered and that the transfer operation is monitored. The safest and most

effective way to accomplish this is for station employees to work with truckdrivers to

ensure the safe execution of gasoline deliveries. The Safety Board concludes that Fast

Lane employees lacked adequate procedures and training to prevent overfills of the

underground storage tanks. Morrison did not require its Fast Lane employees either to

determine whether the amount of gasoline intended for delivery would fit in the

underground storage tanks or to monitor alarms warning that the tanks were nearing

maximum fill levels during cargo transfers. The Safety Board believes that Morrison

should establish procedures and provide training to ensure that its employees verify that

underground storage tanks have sufficient capacity for the gasoline or other petroleum

products offered for delivery and monitor such transfer so that overfills do not occur. 

The Safety Board doubts that the failure to require station employees to monitor

the gasoline transfer process is limited to Morrison. Accordingly, other station owners

need to be made aware of the potential problems of relying on the hazardous materials

carrier to safely load and unload gasoline. The Safety Board is convinced that industry

associations should promote improved safety at service stations by publicizing the

problems identified in the Biloxi accident. The Safety Board therefore believes that the

National Association of Convenience Stores, the National Association of Truck Stop

Operators, the Petroleum Marketers of America, the Service Station Dealers of America,

and the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America should inform their

members of the facts and circumstances of the Biloxi accident and urge them to review

their procedures and, if necessary, to revise them to require that station employees verify

that underground storage tanks have sufficient capacity for gasoline or other petroleum

products offered for delivery and to monitor such transfers so that overfills do not occur. 
Analysis 36 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Adequacy of EPA Enforcement

The EPA has very clear requirements stipulating that facility owners and their

operators should ensure that the amount of gasoline delivered will fit into underground

storage tanks. In December 1997, the Mississippi DEQ conducted an inspection at Fast

Lane station No. 741 and noted no significant violations at that time. However, the

inspectors did not check to determine whether the facility owner had trained or was

requiring his employees to monitor transfers to the underground storage tanks. Following

the 1998 overfill and fire, DEQ inspectors visually inspected the site to determine whether

the top of the tank had loose fittings that may have caused or contributed to the release

from the underground storage system. They found that all the fittings appeared to be tight.

From interviews with Federal EPA officials and Mississippi DEQ staff, the Safety

Board determined that neither the Federal nor the State agency has enforced the

requirement that facility owners or operators determine the available underground storage

space and monitor transfer procedures as required by 40 CFR 280.30. The EPA’s programs

have focused on equipment safeguards and preventing underground storage tank leaks.

The Safety Board concludes that the EPA’s program for preventing underground storage

tank releases has not adequately addressed the requirements in 40 CFR 280.30 for

preventing overfills of the type that occurred in Biloxi. 

Had the owner of Fast Lane station No. 741 required his employees to determine

whether the amount of gasoline intended for delivery would fit into the underground

tanks, the Biloxi accident probably would not have occurred. The Safety Board believes

that the EPA should take action to improve compliance with and enforcement of 40 CFR

280.30, which requires that owners and operators of underground storage tanks prevent

their overfilling. 

Accident Notification Requirements

Premium did not notify the NRC until nearly 24 hours after the accident. The

delayed notification precluded the Safety Board and other Federal agencies from

responding promptly and initiating the accident investigation.

Under reporting criteria at 49 CFR 171.15, a carrier that transports hazardous

materials is required to provide telephonic notification “at the earliest practical moment.”

However, the phrase “the earliest practical moment” is not defined in the hazardous

materials regulations, nor has RSPA issued an interpretation that provides any time

constraints on the reporting time frame. The Safety Board itself requires railroads under

49 CFR 840.3 to provide telephonic notification through the NRC not later than 2 hours

after an accident resulting in a fatality, the release of hazardous materials, or an evacuation

of the public and not later than 4 hours after an accident resulting in damages exceeding

specified thresholds. Similarly, OSHA requires notification within 8 hours of the death or

in-patient treatment of any employee following a work-related accident. The Safety Board

concludes that the effectiveness of requirements for telephonic notification of certain

hazardous materials accidents would be strengthened if the requirements contained a
Analysis 37 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

specified time frame. The Safety Board believes that RSPA should require that a

hazardous materials incident meeting the immediate notification requirements in 49 CFR

171.15 be reported within a specified time period to Federal authorities.
38 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. The Premium Tank Lines, Inc., truckdriver was not impaired by drugs, alcohol, or

fatigue on the morning of the Biloxi, Mississippi, accident.

2. The physicians who performed the truckdriver’s U.S. Department of Transportation

physical could not adequately evaluate the truckdriver’s medical fitness because he did

not report background information related to his neurological condition.

3. Although a significant factor in Premium Tank Lines, Inc.’s hiring the truckdriver was

his military background, the safety director did not attempt to check or to request the

driver’s military records, which contained useful information for determining his

medical fitness and ability to operate heavy equipment.

4. Because the truckdriver failed to report on his job application his employment with a

carrier that had dismissed him, useful information from that carrier was not available

to Premium Tank Lines, Inc., to help company officials evaluate the truckdriver’s

ability to perform his duties.

5. The Premium Tank Lines, Inc.’s safety director failed to adhere to company

procedures for hiring and training the truckdriver and for disciplining him when he

failed to comply with the hours-of-service requirements. 

6. The Premium Tank Lines, Inc.’s operating manuals for its new employees and its

driver-trainers lacked the specificity that employees need to ensure that they practice

correct and safe cargo unloading procedures.

7. To help drivers follow safe loading and unloading procedures, Federal regulations

should require carriers that transport hazardous materials in cargo tanks to have

specific written procedures for loading and unloading. 

8. Premium Tank Lines, Inc.’s lack of adequate procedures for verifying the accuracy of

dispatch orders resulted in the truckdriver delivering gasoline to the wrong location.

9. Fast Lane employees lacked adequate procedures and training to prevent overfills of

the underground storage tanks. R. R. Morrison and Son, Inc., did not require its Fast

Lane employees either to determine whether the amount of gasoline intended for

delivery would fit in the underground storage tanks or to monitor alarms warning that

the tanks were nearing maximum fill levels during cargo transfers.
Conclusions 39 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

10. The Environmental Protection Agency’s program for preventing underground storage

tank releases has not adequately addressed the requirements in 40 Code of Federal

Regulations 280.30 for preventing overfills of the type that occurred in the August 9,

1998, accident in Biloxi, Mississippi. 

11. The effectiveness of requirements for telephonic notification of certain hazardous

materials accidents would be strengthened if the requirements contained a specified

time frame.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the accident was the failure of Premium Tank Line, Inc.’s officials to follow established

company procedures in hiring and training new drivers, the company’s lack of adequate

procedures for dispatching drivers and delivering cargo to customer facilities, and the

failure of R.R. Morrison and Son, Inc., to have adequate safety procedures for accepting

product offered for delivery at its Fast Lane stations. Contributing to the accident was the

truckdriver’s various and numerous operating errors during the gasoline transfer process

that led to the underground storage tank overfill.
40 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board makes the following safety

recommendations: 

To the Research and Special Programs Administration:

Promulgate regulations requiring motor carriers that transport hazardous

materials in cargo tanks to develop and maintain specific written cargo

loading and unloading procedures for their drivers. (H-99-57)

Require that a hazardous materials incident meeting the immediate

notification requirements in 49 Code of Federal Regulations 171.15 be

reported within a specified time period to Federal authorities. (H-99-58)

To the Federal Highway Administration:

Once the Federal regulations requiring motor carriers that transport

hazardous materials in cargo tanks to provide written cargo loading and

unloading procedures are promulgated, ensure that the motor carriers are in

compliance with the regulations. (H-99-59)

To the Environmental Protection Agency:

Take action necessary to improve compliance with and enforcement of 40

Code of Federal Regulations 280.30, which requires that owners and

operators of underground storage tanks prevent their overfilling. (H-99-60)

To Premium Tank Lines, Inc.:

Revise your driver and driver-trainer manuals to include specific written

instructions on loading and unloading cargo and on the use of tools, such as

storage tank capacity charts, necessary to deliver gasoline safely. (H-99-61)

Establish procedures to ensure that company officials adhere to written

policies relating to hiring, training, and discipline of company truckdrivers.

(H-99-62)

To R.R. Morrison and Son, Inc.:

Establish procedures and provide training to ensure that your employees

verify that underground storage tanks have sufficient capacity for the
Recommendations 41 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

gasoline or other petroleum products offered for delivery and monitor such

transfers so that overfills do not occur. (H-99-63)

To the National Association of Convenience Stores, the National Association of Truck

Stop Operators, the Petroleum Marketers of America, the Service Station Dealers of

America, and the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America: 

Inform your members of the facts and circumstances of the August 9, 1998,

accident in Biloxi, Mississippi, and urge them to review their procedures

and, if necessary, to revise them to require that station employees verify

that underground storage tanks have sufficient capacity for gasoline or

other petroleum products offered for delivery and to monitor such transfers

so that overfills do not occur. (H-99-64 through -68)

To the National Tank Truck Carriers Association:

Inform your members of the facts and circumstances of the August 9, 1998,

accident in Biloxi, Mississippi, and urge them to review the adequacy of

their procedures for hiring and training truckdrivers and their written

procedures for loading and unloading hazardous materials. (H-99-69)

 To the American Petroleum Institute:

Inform your members having cargo tank motor carrier operations of the

facts and circumstances of the August 9, 1998, accident in Biloxi,

Mississippi, and urge them to review the adequacy of their procedures for

hiring and training truckdrivers and their written procedures for loading

and unloading hazardous materials. (H-99-70)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

Adopted: September 21, 1999

43 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified about 12:30 a.m. eastern

daylight time on August 10, 1998, of an overfill and fire at a gasoline station-convenience

store in Biloxi, Mississippi. The investigator-in-charge and other members of the Safety

Board investigative team were dispatched from the Washington, D.C., headquarters office.

Upon arriving on scene, the Board established investigative groups to study hazardous

material factors, vehicle factors, carrier operations, human performance, emergency

response, and survival factors.

The Safety Board was assisted in the investigation by the Federal Highway

Administration, the Mississippi Public Service Commission, the City of Biloxi, Premium

Tank Lines, Inc., and R.R. Morrison and Son, Inc.
44 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Appendix B

Driver-Trainer’s Checksheet

The following pages show photocopies of the two-page checklist used by

Premium’s driver-trainers during a new hire’s OJT.
Appendix B 45 Hazardous Materials Accident Report
Appendix B 46 Hazardous Materials Accident Report
47 Hazardous Materials Accident Report

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADD attention deficit disorder

ANPRM Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

API American Petroleum Institute 

CDI Commercial Driver Institute, Inc.

CDL commercial drivers license

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CVSA Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FHWA Federal Highway Administration 

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

hazmat hazardous materials

MPSC Mississippi Public Service Commission 

MVR motor vehicle record

OJT on-the-job training

OMCHS Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety

OSHA Occupational Health and Safety Administration

NRC National Response Center

RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration

UST underground storage tank