In the matter of 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGINEERING SERVICES 

Respondent 

Administrative Law Judge 

J.E. Sullivan 

ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO 

COMPLIANANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Only by ignoring the record compiled in this matter, the Federal Aviation 

Administration ("Complainant" or "FAA") has filed a motion for summary judgment 

against Respondent ("FAA Motion") claiming that the evidence of the alleged improper 

maintenance by Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services ("AMES") is 

"uncontroverted." FAA Motion at 15, 19 and 22. The FAA Motion should be denied 

and the pending motion for summary judgment submitted by AMES should be granted. 

I. Introduction 

The FAA Motion virtually ignores the central issue of this case, and that is 

whether there is substantial, reliable and probative evidence that AMES, a certificated 

Part 145 repair station, failed to perform maintenance in accordance with its customer's 

Aircraft Maintenance Manual ("AMM") given the substantial passage of time and 

intervening maintenance between the dates AMES performed the work and the date of 

the FAA inspection ofthe three aircraft between two and almost 10 months later. The 

FAA also completely ignores the evidence establishing the minor nature of all of the 

post-inspection repairs done to address the discrepancies written up by the principal FAA 
inspector or at the request of the aircraft operator. Further, some of the corrective actions 

taken were not, in fact required to be done as the aircraft operator instructed AMES to 

make the aircraft "like new" even if the AMM did not compel the installation of new 

parts. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 76, 85-86)(describing AMES' "marching orders" from 

CCIA, its customer, to make the landing gear and flying doors "like new" and 

"immaculate"). Further, upon a more complete inspection, some of the discrepancies 

initially identified, such as "improper hardware stack up," were found not to be the case. 

Moreover, the FAA seeks to attribute many of the discrepancies to AMES regarding 

hinge covers (called access doors in the AMM) and hinge pins even though AMM 32-ll00 does not direct the maintenance provider to install hinges or otherwise disassemble the 

door by the hinge. See pages 26-27 below. Only by ignoring these critical, established 

facts could the Complainant argue that it is entitled to summary judgment. 

On the other hand, the pending summary judgment motion filed by Respondent is 

based on all of the evidence, including the important and revealing testimony of Mr. 

Jeffrey Becker, AMES Director of Quality Assurance and Training, who had personal 

knowledge of the facts and who testified in response to questions from FAA counsel that 

the corrective action needed to rectifY any discrepancy was of a minor nature, such as 

"blend and treat" type repairs, and can readily be explained by the obvious impact of 

normal wear and tear on the aircraft. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 86-88, 102-104). Mr. 

Becker's testimony was fully consistent with the expert report provided by AMES to 

FAA counsel on May 2, 2014 regarding the nature of the repairs required to address the 

Inspector's list of discrepancies. See Exhibit 2 consisting of the Expert Report of Daniel 

J. Hancher, dated April30, 2014. Specifically, Mr. Hancher finds, based on his review of 

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the corrective actions documented by AMES, that he has "no difficulty concluding that 

the issues requiring attention were of a 'wear and tear' variety and not the result of 

improper reinstallation of the MLGs and flying doors." Id (Expert Report of Daniel J. 

Hancher at~ 5). FAA counsel may not have liked the answers provided by Mr. Becker or 

the expert opinion of Mr. Hancher, but simply ignoring them does not a summary 

judgment motion make. AMES specifically noted in its motion the undisputed facts upon 

which it is relying in support of its motion. Complainant, for its part, did not bother to 

include a statement of undisputed facts-but rather simply states the purported facts on 

which relies without any attempt to put the facts in context or to make any claim as to 

their undisputed nature. Having obviously ignored the substantial contrary evidence, the 

FAA's dispositive motion must be denied. 

As an important preliminary matter, Respondent notes that the FAA included as 

Exhibit A to its Motion an Expert Declaration of Michael Christensen. In doing so the 

FAA was fully aware that Respondent had a pending Motion before Your Honor to 

preclude the testimony of Specialist Christensen. See Respondent's Rule 37 Declaration 

and Renewal of Motion for Sanctions, dated December 16,2014, and Respondent's 

Reply to Complainant's Response to Renewed Motion for Sanctions and Answer to 

Complainant's Motion to Compel and Exclude, dated January 5, 2015, at pages 1-7. 

Respondent moved to preclude the testimony of Specialist Christensen because the FAA 

did not serve its initial expert disclosures on Respondent until December 1, 2014 -- 13 

days after the deadline set by Your Honor's September 30, 2014 scheduling order-- and 

because the FAA did not provide a good cause basis for failing to request additional time 

for the late service of its initial expert disclosures. Further, as Your Honor is aware, 

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Complainant refused to make Specialist Christensen available to be deposed before the 

period set for dispositive motions as Respondent's counsel had requested. See 

Respondent's Rule 37 Declaration and Renewal of Motion for Sanctions at I and 4; 

Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Exclude, and Granting/Denying Other Motions, 

served February 11, 2015, at 6 ("February 11, 2015 Order"). 

The inclusion of Specialist Christensen's Declaration in support of the FAA's 

Motion for Summary Judgment, without Respondent's counsel having the opportunity to 

examine the declarant -- a right that is expressly provided for in FRCP 26(b )( 4) -- is 

precisely the type of prejudice that Your Honor identified in the February II, 2015 Order 

that warranted granting Respondent's Motion for Sanctions to preclude Specialist 

Christensen as an expert witness for the FAA. As noted in the February 11, 2015 Order, 

Respondent is correct that prejudice has occurred .... As ofthe date of this 

Order, the parties have already filed dispositive motions. It is unfair to the 

Respondent, after a year of active discovery, for the FAA to identify a new 

expert witness after the final deadline set for expert identification and 

disclosures, and then refuse to set a deposition prior to the final close of 

discovery (December 12, 2014) or even prior to the close of extended 

discovery.... The FAA is also unreasonable in its argument that the 

Respondent should be precluded from taking an expert deposition. 

February 11, 2015 Order at 7 (citations omitted). 

Complainant has trampled upon Respondent's procedural and substantive rights 

by including in its Motion for Sununary Judgment what is in effect the expert's report 

that should have been made available at a much earlier stage of the proceeding and to 

have allowed Respondent to question the conclusions of Specialist Christensen at a 

deposition. This counsel for Complainant refused to do, and has now compounded the 

prejudice flowing from his refusal by seeking to rely on the report of the Specialist to 

rebut the position that Respondent has taken consistently throughout the proceeding that 

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wear and tear fully explain the condition of the aircraft as observed by the FAA on May 

25,2010. Accordingly, and consistent with Your Honor's ruling contained in the 

February II, 2015 Order, the Expert Declaration of Michael Christensen must be 

disregarded in evaluating the FAA Motion. 

The FAA Motion contains two lines of argument. First, that the initial 

discrepancies documented by AMES on so-called "non-routine cards" are evidence of the 

fact that AMES did not properly rig the flying doors after completion of the main landing 

gear removals and replacements. See FAA Motion at 4-5, 6-7 and 9; FAA Exhibits N, T 

and DD. In so arguing, the FAA virtually ignores the undisputed facts that the FAA 

inspection of the three aircraft on May 25, 2010 came months after the AMES 

maintenance was performed, after the aircraft conducted hundreds of flights and after 

intervening maintenance was performed. Indeed, the FAA has made no attempt to 

explain why the intervening months of in-service operations and maintenance can simply 

be ignored when asserting that the condition of the aircraft months after the subject 

maintenance was accomplished, and which the FAA has undoubtedly exaggerated, is 

sufficient to support a finding of the alleged violations based on the §13.223 standard of 

proof, which the FAA has the burden to meet. §13.224. 

The other line of argument put forth by Complainant is that AMES has admitted it 

had improperly installed the flying doors on the three aircraft. As detailed in Section IV 

below, there have been no such admissions on the part of AMES. The FAA's feeble 

attempt to intentionally misinterpret certain documents on which it relies discredits the 

Movant and its Motion. 

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As a final preliminary matter, and as noted above, because the Christensen 

Declaration cannot be considered, there is no contrary evidence put forth in the FAA 

Motion to that presented by AMES through the testimony of Mr. Becker, and the expert 

report of Mr. Hancher (that Complainant choose not to challenge at a deposition or 

otherwise) establishing that whatever discrepancies were documented regarding the 

condition of the flying doors, the corrective actions in the non-routine cards that describe 

the low level maintenance required to address the discrepancies were all indicative of 

normal wear and tear. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 86-88, I 02-1 04); Exhibit 2 (Expert 

Report of Daniel J. Hancher at '1[5). With this background in mind, AMES now 

addresses the specific arguments put forth by the Complainant in support of its 

dispositive motion. 

II. The Records of the Corrective Action Taken by AMES After the FAA 

Inspection Prove the Condition ofthe Flying Doors Was the Result of 

Normal Wear and Tear and that Certain Other Discrepancies Were Simply 

Not Attributable to the Maintenance AMES Performed. 

While the FAA chooses to focus on the discrepancies that were documented as a 

result of the FAA's initial inspection of the three aircraft, the Complainant ignores the 

more telling and dispositive evidence and that is the corrective actions that were actually 

necessary to be taken to address the discrepancies. It is one thing to note all possible 

issues that a mechanic is directed to subsequently inspect and correct as may be 

necessary.

1 It's quite another to see what corrective action was actually accomplished in 

response to the written discrepancy as only the corrective action description explains the 

1 Mr. Becker testified that he was instructed by the air carrier customer "to write up every 

nick, every minor flaw" even if not required by the applicable AMM. Exhibit 1 (Becker 

Tr. at 76). 

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real extent of the discrepancy and whether it required a major or minor repair, or whether 

the discrepancy existed at all which was determined not to be the case, for example, with 

respect to the alleged improper hardware stack up? As testified to by Mr. Becker, a 

discrepancy write up is just an "initial judgment." Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 113). 

Moreover, it is hardly appropriate to assume every discrepancy as noted was reflective of 

the condition of the aircraft on the day AMES replaced the landing gear pursuant to its 

agreement with its custom, Capital Cargo International Airlines ("CCIA"). The FAA 

makes the wholly incorrect assumption that every noted discrepancy can be attributed to 

the work performed by AMES on the day the work was accomplished even though the 

aircraft operated for many months thereafter. 

AMES completed the landing gear change on N899AA on July 31, 2009, on 

N898AA on September 29, 2009, and on N287SC on March 22, 2010. The FAA did not 

inspect the aircraft until May 25, 2010- between two and ahnost 10 months later. As the 

FAA concedes, in that interim, the landing gear on N899AA were extended and retracted 

1,586 times (784 complete cycles), the landing gear on N898AA were extended and 

retracted 1,256 times (628 complete cycles) and the landing gear on N287SC were 

extended and retracted 344 times (172 complete cycles). See FAA Enforcement 

Investigative Report, Section B, Page 3; FAA Motion at 3, 5 and 9. To disregard, as has 

the FAA, that the landing gear and flying doors had undoubtedly experienced at least the 

normal amount of wear and tear during this time (see Exhibit 3 (Lipinski Tr. at 204-205) 

is to ignore the applicable case law requiring the FAA to present sufficient evidence 

2 Mr. Becker testified that the need to make only a minor repair, as distinguished from a 

major repair, is evidence that the aircraft would still be in airworthy condition. See 

Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at I 02). 

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(meeting the standard required by§ 13.223) to show the alleged deficient condition of the 

three aircraft existed at the time AMES completed the landing gear changes months 

earlier and to ignore the laws of physics. 3 

N899AA 

Exhibit N to the FAA Motion is a compilation of the so-called "non-routine" 

work cards for N899AA which, with supporting documents, call out the discrepancy and 

the corrective action taken by AMES in response thereto. Complainant lists the 

discrepancies at pages 4-5 of the FAA Motion, yet makes no attempt whatsoever to 

address the almost I 0 month gap in time during which the aircraft was in continuous allcargo line operations. Incredibly, the FAA is not even claiming that the discrepancy list 

describes the condition of the aircraft on July 31, 2009-the day the FAA alleges in its 

Complaint that AMES, by failing to follow the AMM, left the aircraft in a discrepant 

condition. See FAA Complaint at 'll 4.a. For this reason alone, the Complaint should be 

dismissed with respect to N899AA and N898AA and N287SC, consistent with 

Respondent's pending motion for summary judgment. 

To prove the point, below each discrepancy that the FAA describes at pages 4-5 of its 

Motion, and which the FAA claims is proof of AMES' failure to properly rig the flying 

door on N899AA, AMES has responded with an explanation for the discrepancy and its 

significance. 

Both the left-hand and right-hand flying doors had improper hardware stackups 

on both the aft and forward flying door hinges, (Exhibit N at 2-7; non-routine 

cards 0003, 0004, 0005, and 0006); 

o AMES Explanation: "Improper stack up" refers to the discrepancy as 

3 Administrator v. Lewis, NTSB Order EA-1177, 3 NTSB 1241, 1978 NTSB LEXIS 51 

(Aug. 17, 1978), 

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written on the non-routine fonn (Exhibit N to the FAA Motion) based on 

Inspector Lipinski's initial assessment of the condition of the aircraft. The 

corrective actions for each of these non-routine forms states "verified 

hardware" which was then "reinstalled" meaning there was no "improper 

stack up" found to exist which would be the case if the hardware had been 

"rep laced" .. 

- There was excessive play at the gear fitting of the left-hand flying door, which 

was addressed by installing new gimbal hardware, Exhibit N at 8-9 (non-routine 

card 0007); 

o AMES Explanation: The corrective action taken by AMES determined 

that the excessive play was in the linkage and joint that includes the 

tubular bearing at the actuation rod. AMES records show, without 

dispute, that when it changed the main landing gear it accomplished AMM 

steps 5.AL (10) and (11), covering this hardware and fitting. See Exhibit 

4. After installation the landing gear had extended and retracted 1,586 

times since the C check was performed. The wearing of the hardware was 

to be expected given this number of operations. Further, given this time 

the aircraft was in line operation, tire, wheel and brake changes would 

have necessitated the movement of the flying door to facilitate such 

maintenance. If incorrect methods to move the flying door were used as 

evidenced by the hinge door cracks that existed and even though Boeing 

warned ofthe consequences of doing so (see Exhibit 5 (B-727 AMM, 

Section 32-45-01), then one of the consequences would be the loose gear 

fitting as documented. Finally, after AMES reinstalled this hardware 

during the initial gear change, ifthere was and excessive play in the 

linkage it would have been found during gear swings and gap checks it 

performed. 

There was excessive play at the gear fitting of the right-hand flying door, which 

was addressed by reshimming the saddle support fitting, Exhibit N at 10-11 (nonroutine card 0008); 

o AMES Explanation: The noted corrective action was reshimming saddle 

support fitting in accordance with the B-727 overhaul manual32-10-0l. 

The reference to the overhaul manual, and not the AMM, means that the 

saddle support fitting and gear build up was the responsibility of the 

landing gear supplier. AMES was not responsible for the condition of the 

landing gear assembly as provided to it by its customer. See Exhibit 1 

(Becker Tr. at 11 0). 

The aft angle on the fairing for the right-hand forward flying door cutout was 

damaged, which was addressed by replacing the angle, Exhibit N at 12 (nonroutine card 0009); 

o AMES Explanation: The non-routine card does not document the extent of 

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the damage but in any event the aft angle was replaced by AMES. 

Referring to FAA Motion Exhibit N, non-routines 0012 and 0013, it 

appears that the consequence of the cracked right hand hinge loops 

resulted in the damage to the aft angle on the right hand fairing. There is 

no evidence that the aft angle was damaged when AMES completed the 

landing gear change on N899AA on July 31, 2009. If the aft angle had 

been damaged it would have been replaced by AMES at the time of the 

landing gear change. 

The hinge loop on the forward outboard hinge cover for the right-hand flying door 

was cracked, which was addressed by replacing the hinge, Exhibit N at 15-16 

(non-routine cards 0012 and 0013); 

o AMES Explanation: Nothing in AMM 32-11-00 requires a maintenance 

technician to insert pins in hinge access doors as part of the process of 

removing and reinstalling the flying doors in connection with a main 

landing gear change. See FAA Exhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 3.F 

(I) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423)4 Therefore, discrepancies 

associated with any hinge cover or hinge pin are not directly or indirectly 

attributable to the main landing gear change AMES performed on behalf 

of CCIA. Further, as discussed above, cracking at these locations are an 

indication of overextending the doors beyond "normal service position"-

a practice Boeing specifically cautioned against in Boeing AMM 32-45-01 

as testified to by Mr. Becker. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 124-125). 

The aft hinge cover on the right-wing flying door was worn to the point that the 

hinge had to be replaced, Exhibit Nat 17 (non-routine card 0014); 

o AMES Explanation: The condition was noted as "worn," indicating that it 

was subjected to wear and tear after months of operation. As described by 

Mr. Becker, AMES was under instructions to replace any worn parts, even 

if still within limits, with new hardware, etc. to make it structure "like 

new" to prevent any further concerns by the operator or the FAA. See 

Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 76, 85-86). 

- The bracket for the forward hinge cover on the left-hand flying door was worn to 

the point that the hinge had to be replaced, Exhibit N at 18 (non-routine card 

0015). 

o AMES Explanation: Same as above (non-routine card 0015). 

4 Exhibit L of the FAA Motion is a picture of hinge cover (referred to as an access door 

in AMM 32-11-00) from N287SC according to the FAA. See FAA Motion, footnote 6. 

In the process of removing the flying doors, the maintenance provider is instructed to 

unscrew the three screws shown in the picture. There is no requirement to remove a 

hinge pin or reinstall a hinge as part of the procedure for either removing or reinstalling 

the flying door as part of the main landing gear change procedure. 

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N898AA 

Next, the FAA states that Respondent executed various maintenance actions to 

address discrepancies associated with N898AA relying for its information the non-routine 

work cards reproduced in Exhibit T to the FAA Motion. Once again, the FAA lists only 

the noted discrepancies and is silent about the nature of the corrective action taken, 

which, as noted, is the best evidence of the actual condition of the flying doors since not 

every discrepancy was proven to be accurate based on the corrective action performed. 

Nor was every corrective action even mandatory since AMES was under the instruction 

of CCIA to make the flying doors "like new" which is not the standard contained in the 

AMM. Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 76). 

Further, as testified to by Mr. Becker, a discrepancy write up is just an "initial 

judgment." Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 113). In addition, depending upon what part of the 

flying door was written up, AMES may or may not have had responsibility for the item 

based on the requirements and instructions set forth in AMM 32-11-00-the AMM the 

FAA alleges AMES failed to follow. Obviously, if an item like a finding of a migrating 

hinge pin and resulting damage to surrounding structure is alleged by the FAA to be 

attributable to AMES, the FAA will have to show to establish a violation that as part of 

the MLG change or landing door rigging that the AMM required AMES to ensure access 

door hinge pins were installed correctly. However, the AMM contains no such 

instruction and therefore AMES cannot be held legally liable for the condition of the 

hinge pins months after the landing gear were changed. Finally, Exhibit T offers no 

evidentiary support for the FAA contention in paragraph 4. c. and d. of the Complaint 

that the flying doors on N898AA were not properly rigged on September 29, 2009 --

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eight months before the FAA's May 25,2010 inspection. 

At pages 6-7 of the FAA Motion, Complainant lists the following discrepancies 

for N898AA. After each one AMES has completed the analysis by describing the 

corrective action taken to address the discrepancy. In every case, the discrepancy 

involved an area of the flying door that is not within the scope of the AMM landing gear 

change procedures, or was of a minor nature indicating the effect of wear and tear on the 

structure. 

Following up on reports that there were problems with the hardware on the righthand flying door, Respondent replaced the forward hinge (because it was 

cracked), the aft hinge (because it was loose), and several bushings (because they 

were worn beyond limits), Exhibit Tat 1-3 (non-routine card 0001). 

o AMES Explanation: Nothing in AMM 32-11-00 requires a maintenance 

technician to insert pins in hinge access doors as part of the process in 

removing and reinstalling the flying doors in connection with a main 

landing gear change. See FAA Exhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 3.F 

(I) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423). Cracked hinges are attributable 

to the movement of the flying door beyond its "normal service position" 

that occurred during the course ofline operations, such as when tires are 

changed, and not actions attributable to AMES maintenance activities. 

See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 124-125). Therefore, discrepancies 

associated with any hinge cover or hinge pin are not directly or indirectly 

attributable to the main landing gear change AMES performed on behalf 

of CCIA. As to the bushings they were removed and checked with a 

micrometer for wear limits lAW AMM 32-12-11, Figure 601, see Exhibit 

6 (AMM 32-12-11, Figure 601), and were replaced when they were 

determined to have been worn beyond limits. However, AMM 32-11-00 

does not direct the maintenance provider to reference AMM 32-12-11, 

Figure 601 in connection with a landing gear change and therefore AMES 

did not deviate from the relevant AMM as alleged. Further AMM 32-11-

00 step 3.F. (4) (Page 402) (FAA Exhibit C) contains a note to "observe 

the number and position of washers under nuts and boltheads" as they are 

to be replaced in the same order they were removed. AMM instructions 

specifying the reuse of existing hardware, as is the case here, is typical and 

means AMES was not required to install new hardware at the time of the 

landing gear change. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. 132-133). 

Following up on reports that there were problems with the hardware on the left-

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hand flying door, Respondent replaced several bushings (because they were worn 

beyond limits), the forward hinge (because it was cracked), and the aft hinge 

(because a pin had come out of the hinge), Exhibit Tat 4-7 (non-routine card 

0002). 

o AMES Explanation: Same explanation as above regarding hinge pins and 

cracked and worn bushings. 

- There was a crack on the inner skin ofthe right-hand flying door at the hinge 

fitting, which was addressed by repairing the damage, Exhibit T at I 0-13 (nonroutine card 0004). 

o AMES Explanation: Although the FAA did not include in its description 

of the discrepancy the corrective action, if it had Your Honor would have 

seen that the crack was noted as a "possible small crack." The crack had 

to be confirmed using Eddy Current methods (a method used to identify 

cracks that are so small that they are not usually visible). It was blended 

and treated meaning the repair was minor in nature and did not affect the 

airworthiness of the aircraft. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 102). Further, 

the development of small (invisible) cracks is entirely consistent with wear 

and tear type damage. See id (Becker Tr. at 86). 

The skin on the right wing had been gouged by the flying door, which was 

addressed by repairing the damage, Exhibit T at 14-15 (non-routine card 0005). 

o AMES Explanation: To correct the noted condition, the gouge was 

addressed by first, preparing the surface for paint and then painting over it, 

a process referred to as "blend and treat". Mr. Becker testified that this 

type of repair is indicative of normal wear and tear. See id (Becker Tr. at 

86-87). 

- There was damage on the left-hand inboard flap track fairing adjacent to the 

flying door's aft hinge, which was addressed by repairing the damage, Exhibit T at 

16-17 (non-routine card 0006). 

o AMES Explanation: The damage was described in the referenced nonroutine card as the fairing being merely "chafed." AMES Engineering 

found the damage to be within the limits established by the Boeing 

Structural Repair Manual ("SRM") and therefore the fairing was simply 

blended. See discussion of non-routine card 0005 above regarding the 

minor nature of such repairs, which are indicative of nonnal wear and tear. 

- The forward hinge on the left-hand flying door was cracked, and had to be 

replaced, Exhibit T at 18-19 (non-routine card 0008). 

o AMES Explanation: The subject hinge cover was found cracked and 

replaced. Again, as noted above, nothing in AMM 32-11-00 requires a 

maintenance technician to insert pins in hinge access doors as part of the 

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process in removing and reinstalling the flying doors in connection with a 

mail landing gear change. See FAA Exhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 

3.F (1) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423). Cracked hinges are 

attributable to the movement of the flying door beyond its "normal service 

position" that occurred during the course ofline operations, such as when 

tires are changed, and not actions attributable to AMES maintenance 

activities. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 124-125). Therefore, 

discrepancies associated with any hinge cover or hinge pin are not directly 

or indirectly attributable to the main landing gear change AMES 

performed on behalf of CCIA. 

There were gouges in the skin of the left-hand flying door near the mid attach 

bracket, which was addressed by repairing the damage, Exhibit T at 20-21 (nonroutine card 0015). 

o AMES Explanation: The damage was to the surface area that faces the 

runway on take off and landing and the existence of "gouges" was very 

likely caused by debris from runways (causing foreign object damage 

known as FOD) that was kicked up by the aircraft tires during take-off or 

landing. There is no proof these gouges were present at the time AMES 

completed the main landing gear change on N898AA on September 29, 

2009. 

- There were gouges in the skin of the left-hand flying door near the stop bracket, 

which was addressed by repairing the damage, Exhibit T at 22-23 (non-routine 

card 0017). 

o AMES Explanation: To correct the noted condition, the gouges were 

analyzed to determine if they were within allowable limits per the Boeing 

SRM. When determined that they were, they were addressed by first, 

preparing the surface for paint and then painting over it, a process referred 

to as "blend and treat." Mr. Becker testified that this type of repair is 

indicative of normal wear and tear. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 86-87). 

- The aft hinge cover on the left-hand flying door had a migrating hinge pin and a 

cracked hinge lobe, which were addressed by replacing the hinge, Exhibit T at 24-

25 (non-routine card 0020). 

o AMES Explanation: Nothing in AMM 32-11-00 requires a maintenance 

technician to insert pins in hinge access doors as part of the process in 

removing and reinstalling the flying doors in connection with a mail 

landing gear change. See FAA Exhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 3.F 

(1) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423). Cracked hinges are attributable 

to the movement of the flying door beyond its "normal service position" 

that occurred during the course ofline operations, such as tire changes, 

and not actions attributable to AMES maintenance activities. See Exhibit 

1 (Becker Tr. at 124-125). Therefore, discrepancies associated with any 

hinge cover or hinge pin are not directly or indirectly attributable to the 

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main landing gear change AMES performed on behalfofCCIA. 

There was a cracked bushing in the left-hand flying door fitting, which was 

addressed by replacing the bushing, Exhibit Tat 27-28 (non-routine card 0023). 

o AMES Explanation: This bushing was found cracked after removal of 

flying door when the aircraft returned to the AMES facility. AMM 

Section 32-11-00 step 3 .F. ( 4) (Page 402) (FAA Exhibit C) contains a note 

to "observe the number and position of washers under nuts and boltheads" 

as they are to be replaced in the same order they were removed. AMM 

instructions specifYing the reuse of existing hardware, as is the case here, 

is typical and means AMES was not required to install new hardware at 

the time of the landing gear change. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 132-

133). When the bushing was subsequently found to be cracked, it was 

replaced. There is no evidence the bushing was cracked when the landing 

gear were installed by AMES. 

- The aft internal stiffener on the left-hand flap track fairing was cracked in two 

places, which was addressed by repairing the damage, Exhibit T at 31 (nonroutine card 0027), see also Exhibit Tat 29-30 (non-routine card 0024). 

o AMES Explanation: The flap track fairing is not removed during gear 

changes and it would not have been observed by AMES when it 

performed the gear change. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 148). Further, 

the inspection and replacement of the part is not part ofthe applicable 

AMM requirements for changing the landing gear. Subsequently, when 

the flap track fairing was removed and the stiffeners found cracked they 

were repaired. 

- The forward attach plate for the left-hand fairing was cracked, and had to be 

replaced, Exhibit T at 32-33 (non-routine card 0028). 

o AMES Explanation: As is the case with non-routine card 0024 discussed 

immediately above, the forward attach plate is not exposed during the 

landing gear change and the inspection and replacement of the part is not 

part of the applicable AMM requirements for changing the landing gear. 

Therefore, the condition of the attach plate is not attributable to AMES. 

See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 148). 

- An attach plate for the right-hand fairing had been chafed all the way through, and 

had to be replaced, Exhibit Tat 34-35 (non-routine card 0029) 

o AMES Explanation: As is the case with non-routine cards 0024 and 0028 

addressed above, the attach plate for the right-hand fairing is not exposed 

during the landing gear change and the inspection and replacement of the 

part is not part of the applicable AMM requirements for changing the 

landing gear. Therefore the condition of the attach plate is not attributable 

to AMES. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 148-149). 

- 15-
After the above work was accomplished, Respondent was still unable to get the 

left-hand flying door adjusted to properly fit on the aircraft, and the left-hand 

flying door was replaced entirely, Exhibit T at 8-9, 36-39 (non-routine cards 0003 

and 0031). 

o AMES Explanation: After AMES completed its corrective action, it 

reinstalled the door, this time with new hardware installed as directed by 

the customer. With the new hardware installed, the door failed the initial 

adjustment/rig checks. Although AMES could have re-rigged the door, 

since the door had to be removed to accomplish there-rigging process, 

Charles Werking (CCIA Director of Maintenance) ordered AMES to 

install a new door since CCIA had one in stock. The customer made the 

determination to install a replacement door, rather than re-rigging the 

existing door, in the interest of expediency. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 

137). 

N287SC 

Finally, we respect to aircraft N287SC, the FAA Motion listed the following 

discrepancies with respect to the left-hand flying door.5 See FAA Motion at 9. Again, 

AMES has indicated below each discrepancy the nature of the corrective action taken and 

the basis on which AMES can and does assert that there is no indication based on the 

corrective action that AMES did not correctly rig the flying doors on N287SC. 

Due to reports of discrepant condition on the left-hand flying door, an unspecified 

number ofbushing were replaced, Exhibit DD at 1-2 (non-routine card 0001). 

o AMES Explanation: This non-routine card only states "suspect worn 

bushings." The corrective action noted that bushings were replaced. 

There is no documentation (substantial evidence) of the actual condition of 

the removed bushings. Moreover, under the direction of CCIA, AMES 

was instructed to replace hardware to make the aircraft flying doors "like 

new." See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 76, 85-86). Finally, AMM Section 32-

11-00 step 3.F. (4) (Page 402)(FAA Exhibit C) contains a note to "observe 

the number and position of washers under nuts and boltheads" as they are 

to be replaced in the same order they were removed. AMM instructions 

specifying the reuse of existing hardware, as is the case here, is typical and 

5 The FAA noted in its Motion that "the question of the relationship of the discrepancies 

on the right-hand main landing gear flying door and associated structures to the 

maintenance performed by Respondent does not appear to be a suitable subject for a 

motion for summary judgment[]" and that the status of the right main landing gear on 

N287SC after April 20, 2010 would not be further addressed. FAA Motion at 9, fu. II. 

- 16-
means AMES was not required to install new hardware at the time ofthe 

landing gear change. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 132-133). 

The aft and forward hinge cover pins on the left-hand wing door were improperly 

installed, which was addressed by installing new pins, Exhibit DD at 7 (nonroutine, card 0008). 

o AMES Explanation: As explained, nothing in AMM 32-11-00 requires a 

maintenance teclmician to insert or secure pins in hinge access doors as 

part of the process in removing and reinstalling the flying doors in 

connection with a mail landing gear change. See FAA Exhibit C, AMM 

Sections 32-11-00 3.F (I) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423); Exhibit I 

(Becker Tr. at I 01 ). Subsequently when the pins were found to be loose, 

they were secured. As a precautionary measure only, AMES provided 

subsequent instruction to its teclmicians to follow a non-mandatory 

Boeing reconunendation on the method to secure hinge pins. See FAA 

Motion Exhibit 0; Exhibit I (Becker Tr. 157-158). 

The left-hand flap track fairing had slight damage at the wing door forward hinge 

opening, which was addressed by repairing the damage; Exhibit DD at 8-9 (nonroutine card 0009). 

o AMES Explanation: This appears to be damage from the protruding or 

loose hinge pin. As noted, the subject AMM does not include any 

instructions for installing or securing access door hinge pins. Becker Tr. 

I 0 I. In any event, the initial damage description was documented as being 

minor (i.e., "slight") and was repaired by merely blending and treating the 

area. Again, Mr. Becker testified that this type of repair is indicative of 

normal wear and tear. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 86-87). 

lll. The FAA Cannot Establish that AMES Was Responsible 

for the Missing Tubular Bearing on N287SC 

With respect to the landing gear change that AMES performed on N287SC, the 

FAA argues that a missing tubular bearing alone is sufficient to establish that AMES did 

not follow the AMM, failed to follow the CCIA maintenance program and therefore 

violated sections 41.13(a), 43.13(b) and 145.205(a) of the FARs. See FAA Motion at 20-

21. As the FAA states it, the tubular bearing was found to be missing from the actuating 

rod assembly of the right-hand flying door on N287SC during an occurrence 

investigation conducted shortly after an April16, 2010 aircraft vibration incident. See id 

- 17-
at 20. The FAA claims that since the tubular beariug was missiug when the aircraft was 

iuspected in April 2010 that this "demonstrates that Respondent did not install the tubular 

beariug at all." I d at 21. 

The FAA summarily dismisses the fact that interveniug maiutenance was 

performed on N287SC (i.e., an outboard tire change that CCIA performed on N287SC 

after AMES installed the MLG on the aircraft but before the vibration iucident) and that 

the iuterveniug maintenance very likely caused the tubular bear to go missiug. See id at 

21. The FAA concludes, without justification, that "the only rational explanation for the 

missiug beariug is that it was not iustalled by Respondent iu the first place[.]" !d. 

The FAA, however, simply ignores the persuasive testimony that Jeffrey Becker, 

AMES Director of Quality Assurance and Traiuiug, gave during his deposition regardiug 

the very real potential for the tubular beariug to go missing as a result of the iuterveniug 

tire change. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 42-49, 123-127). 

On March 25, 2010, three days after AMES completed replaciug the MLG on 

N287SC and released the aircraft, a tire was replaced on the aircraft's right-hand 

outboard wheel. See id (Becker Tr. at 42-45); Exhibit 7 (CCIA Aircraft Technical Log 

Report). Mr. Becker explained during his deposition that outboard tire changes on B-727 

aircraft require the landiug gear door (or flyiug door) to be repositioned so the mechanic 

can gaiu access to the wheel and the B-727 AMM contaius specific steps for usiug the 

actuating rod to move the landiug gear door for this purpose. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 

45-46). Mr. Becker confirmed to FAA counsel that in order to change an outboard tire it 

is necessary to reposition the flyiug door and that this repositioniug requires moving the 

- 18 -
landing gear door further than would be the case by simply opening the landing gear. See 

id (Becker Tr. at 47). FAA counsel then directly asked Mr. Becker the following: 

"And it is AMES' beliefthat it's possible that the [tubular] bushing 

could've fallen out during that procedure?" 

Mr. Becker answered "Correct." See id (Becker Tr. at 47) 6 

Mr. Becker also took the opportunity during his deposition to explain to FAA 

counsel that it was incorrect to state as CCIA did in its letter to the FAA that no 

additional maintenance was done on the right-hand MLG ofN287SC after it left the 

AMES facility and stated "in fact, there was maintenance performed, and maintenance 

that did involve the flying door." Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 46, 124); FAA Exhibit BB 

(Letter from CCIA, Benjamin Buck, to Inspector Bobby Evans, dated June 8, 201 0). 

FAA counsel also asked Mr. Becker if he agreed that CCIA indicated in a letter to the 

FAA that the reason for the missing bushing was AMES leaving it out when installing the 

main landing gear door. In response, Mr. Becker questioned how CCIA (Benjamin 

Buck) could have reached such a conclusion since the date of the letter (June 8, 2010) 

was prior to completion of AMES' investigation of the matter and stated his belief that 

Mr. Buck did not conduct a thorough investigation or use the benefit of the AMES 

investigation results in his answers to the FAA. See id (Becker Tr. at 48-49). 

FAA counsel returned to the issue of the tubular bearing later in Mr. Becker's 

deposition. See id (Becker Tr. at 123-127). Mr. Becker then explained that as part of 

AMES' investigation he had discussed the missing tubular bearing with Mike Ebert, then 

director ofline maintenance for AMES, who had had a conversion with a CCIA 

6 Mr. Becker also confirmed for FAA counsel that the AMM sometimes refers to "tubular 

bushing" and to "tubular bearing" but that they are the same component. See Exhibit I 

(Becker Tr. at 47). 

- 19-
representative to learn how tire changes were actually perfonned by line maintenance 

personnel. Mr. Becker testified that the CCIA representative advised Mike Ebert that "at 

times line maintenance people will remove that bolt that contains the tubular bearing and 

hold up the flying door out of the way as they change the wheel." Id (Becker Tr. at 124). 

Mr. Becker explained to FAA counsel that the Boeing AMM has a note that specifically 

cautions mechanics not to remove the bolt in this manner because it will damage the 

hinge cover. See id (Becker Tr. at 125). Specifically, the B-727 AMM wheel change 

instructions advise mechanics "CAUTION: DO NOT REMOVE ACTUATION ROD 

ATTACHMENT BOLT AND RAISE DOOR ABOVE NORMAL SERVICE POSITION 

AS HINGE COVER MAY BE DAMAGED." Exhibit 5 (B-727 AMM, Section 32-45-

01 ). The actuation rod attachment bolt holds the tubular bearing in place. FAA Motion, 

Exhibit A, Figures 401 and 402; Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 115). 

Removal of the actuation rod attachment bolt was no doubt such a common way 

for mechanics to reposition landing gear doors during outboard tire changes that Boeing 

felt compelled to include the cautionary note in its AMM. Consistent with the notations 

of discrepancies ofbroken or damages access door hinges and hinge covers (see Section 

II above) Mr. Becker noted that ahnost every aircraft had some form of hinge cover 

damage (see Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 125)), which suggests that when changing outboard 

tires or wheels mechanics did remove the actuation rod attachment bolt and manually 

raising the door above the nonnal service position thereby resulting in the observed 

damage, despite the cautionary note in the AMM. Further, Mr. Becker noted that during 

AMES' investigation the mechanic who performed work on N287SC specifically stated 

- 20-
that he recalled putting the tubular bearing back in when rigging the landing gear door 

after the MLG change. See id (Becker Tr. at 125-126). 

Finally, Mr. Becker noted that AMES performed a gear swing after replacing the 

MLG and rigging the landing gear doors and the doors met all the fair conditions. See id 

(Becker Tr. at 126). Mr. Becker explained that it would have been evident during the 

function check if the tubular bearing was missing because "there would've been issues or 

problems with that door if that tubular bearing was missing when it left the AMES 

facility." Id (Becker Tr. at 126). Further, Mr. Becker noted that Randy Buol, the CCIA 

VP of Maintenance, advised AMES in an email that the aircraft flew perfectly, and that 

no problems were noted after the gear change. See id (Becker Tr. at 126); Exhibit 8 (EMail Correspondence from CCIA VP of Maintenance to AMES Complementing AMES 

on its Work). Taking all ofthese facts into consideration, Mr. Becker testified that he is 

"fairly confident that AMES left that tubular bearing in" and that he "fmd[ s] it hard to 

believe that AMES left out that tubular bearing." Jd (Becker Tr. at 126). Thus, Mr. 

Becker explained that although AMES was willing to help its customer as much as it 

could, he could not state in the Corrective Action Report that AMES sent to CCIA 

(Benjamin Buck) that AMES left out the tubular bearing. See id (Becker Tr. at 126-127; 

Exhibit EE to FAA Motion. 

The FAA simply disregarded in its Motion for Summary Judgment the 

compelling testimony offered by Jeffrey Becker regarding the high likelihood that the 

missing tubular bearing was caused by an intervening tire change that was not performed 

by AMES. While the FAA Motion acknowledges the fact that there was an intervening 

tire change, it summarily dismisses the implications ofthis intervening maintenance on 

- 21 -
this case. 7 See FAA Motion at 21. The FAA has the burden of proving, based on 

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, that the passage of time and the conduct of 

hundreds of flights, and documented intervening maintenance, did not alter the condition 

of the aircraft from when AMES first replaced the landing gearHaving failed to explain 

away the fact that intervening maintenance was documented, and lacking any evidence 

that the bearing was missing when AMES replaced the landing gear more than 25 days 

prior to the discovery of the missing bearing, the FAA failed to satisfy its burden of 

proof Accordingly, this aspect of the FAA's Motion should be denied. 

IV. AMES Has Never Admitted That It Failed to Properly 

Install and Rig the Flying Doors 

The FAA repeatedly claims that the Respondent "admitted" that it failed to 

properly install and rig the flying doors. See FAA Motion at 16, 18 and 22. This 

assertion, however, is based on the FAA's faulty logic and a misreading of the documents 

Complainant cites to support its claim. 

To substantiate its claim of an AMES admission, the FAA relies upon a series of 

documents that do not, in fact, state what the FAA claims. With respect to aircraft 

N899AA, CCIA, AMES' customer and the aircraft operator, created a document known 

as a "Corrective Action Record" ("CAR") and designated QAACVG004. Exhibit P 

attached to FAA Motion. In tum, AMES produced a Discrepancy Notice which simply 

quotes word-for-word the description of the discrepancy as stated by CCIA in the CAR. 

7 The FAA, citing the Expert Declaration of Michael Christensen, states that the tire 

change "has nothing to do with the tubular bearing." FAA Motion at 21. As addressed 

above, the Christensen Declaration cannot be considered leaving no evidence to 

contradict the testimony of Mr. Becker establishing the logical connection between the 

intervening tire change on N287SC and the discovery of the missing tubular bearing 

more than 25 days after AMES completed the landing gear change on the aircraft. 

- 22-
See Exhibit 0 to FAA Motion. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 152 (explaining that the 

description of the discrepancies in the AMES Discrepancy Notices were "cut and past" 

directly from CCIA's CARs for administrative tracking purposes).8 

The CCIA CAR QAACVG004, relating to N899AA, states: 

"During the FAA ramp check, our PMI discovered the RIH flying 

door fwd hinge has damaged the mid section of the mid section of the 

inboard flap fairing. After an evaluation, our mechanics determined the 

damage to the fairing was out of limits. The condition was due to the 

flying door hinge pin migrating out of the hinge assembly. The aircraft 

had the RIH MLG replaced at its last "C" check, this was accomplished at 

AMES on 8-26-2009. The hinge assembly was not properly installed 

allowing the pin to migrate[.]" 

FAA Motion Exhibit P. 

The same statement is reproduced verbatim in the AMES Discrepancy Notice. 

See Exhibit 0 to FAA Motion. As noted in Section II hereof, the steps described in the 

AMM to remove and replace the main landing gear and removal and reinstallation of the 

flying door do not require the maintenance provider (AMES) to remove and reinstall 

hinge pins as part of the flying door removal/reinstallation process. Therefore, hinge pin 

migration is not the result of any maintenance performed by AMES, as claimed by the 

FAA. 

Exhibit V to the FAA Motion sets out the CCIA CAR designated QAACVG005 

relating to N898AA. FAA Motion Exhibit EE sets out the CCIA CAR designated 

QAACVG006 relating to N287SC. CAR QAACVG005 asserts that the flying door 

8 Complainant observes at pages 5 and 7 of the FAA Motion that the AMES Discrepancy 

Notice (FAA Motion Exhibits 0 and U) are categorized as "Major" as if to suggest 

something sinister. AMES designated the discrepancy notice as "major" only because 

the FAA had sent a letter of investigation in connection with the matter. Had that not 

been the case, the notice would have been deemed "minor". The designation had nothing 

to do with the extent of the maintenance required to address a discrepancy. 

- 23 -
rigging was not properly done at the time of the gear change and that its condition should 

have been discovered by CCIA maintenance during intervening aircraft inspections 

known as "A checks." CAR QAACVG006 contained a similar statement that the flying 

doors were not properly rigged when AMES replaced the main landing gear, but notes 

that CCIA maintenance should have discovered the issue during the intervening A 

checks. FAA Exhibit U is the AMES Discrepancy Notice that simply repeats verbatim 

CCIA's statements from CAR QAACVG005 and QAACVG006 and notes that to the 

extent any A checks were performed by AMES under contract to CCIA, that technicians 

would receive additional training to specifically inspect the condition of the flying doors 

for the type of damage allegedly observed by CCIA. Noting contained in the AMES 

Discrepancy Notices (FAA Exhibits 0 and U) admit that AMES failed to follow the 

applicable AMM in performing its services. 

In addition to directing Your Honor's attention to the CCIA-produced CARs and 

the AMES Discrepancy Notices referred to above, the FAA also attempts to rely on the 

March 21, 2011 response of AMES to the FAA's Letter oflnvestigation. Exhibit HH to 

FAA Motion. In it response, AMES stated: 

The results of our review and action taken were documented on CCIA' s 

Corrective Action Report #'s QACVG004, QAACVG005 and 

QAACVG006 .... The details of the investigation and results have been 

sent to you by CCIA in a letter dated October 25, 2010 in response to your 

letter dated October 4, 2010 .... We worked very closely with the operator 

to put a corrective action plan together that would prevent the 

reoccurrence for both our operations. 

The FAA attempts to spin this statement (see FAA Motion at 15-16, 18-19,22-

23) into an unqualified "admission" when no such inference can or should be drawn since 

nowhere does AMES admit that it improperly installed the flying doors in question. 

- 24-
AMES only states that it put in place corrective action plans with the operator. And as 

discussed below, the corrective action plans have nothing to do with the AMM steps 

required to be followed when replacing main landing gear. 

In fact, counsel for the FAA questioned the AMES witness, Mr. Becker, at his 

October 29, 2014 deposition at which time Mr. Becker, as the author of the letter 

reproduced as FAA Exhibit HH, explained that his response was intended to tell the FAA 

Inspector (Lipinski) that AMES was not going to be seeing any different corrective action 

than what had already been stated by CCIA. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 176-177). He 

then went on to tell FAA counsel that his letter sought to convey the fact that AMES and 

its customer, CCIA, were working together and, since the matter had not yet matured into 

a civil penalty proceeding, he did not want to start the process of stating all of the reasons 

why the statements made by CCIA in its response to the FAA Letter ofinvestigation 

(attached to the FAA Motion as Exhibit H) were wrong or based on incomplete 

information all the while working with the AMES customer. See id (Becker Tr. at 178-

180). Mr. Becker, however, explained how he did not believe CCIA's Mr. Benjamin 

Buck was looking at the entire event and that CCIA did not do a complete investigation. 

See id. Likewise, Mr. Becker noted that Inspector Lipinski was simply relying upon the 

information supplied by CCIA, without any critical analysis of it. See id. 

The FAA argues, unconvincingly, what it claims the documents say and it can do 

so only by ignoring the testimony of the author of the AMES response to the FAA Letter 

ofinvestigation regarding its true meaning and intent. The fact remains, however, that 

AMES has not admitted any violations. As Complainant surely knows, from day one of 

this proceeding, AMES has unequivocally maintained that the FAA's claims are 

- 25-
unsubstantiated and should be dismissed. See AMES Answer to the FAA Complaint, 

dated July 18, 2013. The FAA inspections in May 2010 were months after the landing 

gear changes were accomplished and the FAA has yet to offer any reasonable explanation 

for the very real impact of wear and tear on the landing gear doors other than to make the 

unsubstantiated claim that it does not explain the noted discrepancies. Further, the FAA 

ignores that the critical information is actually contained in the non-routine cards where 

the corrective actions taken to address the discrepancies are described and which show 

that no discrepancy actually existed (e.g., "verified hardware") or evidence the minor 

nature of the discrepancy (e.g., "blend and treat"). See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 86) 

Instead, the FAA relies on the preliminary and unfiltered write up of the discrepancies 

that were based on a simple visual inspection or included because CCIA asked AMES to 

make the landing gear doors "like new" and to look "inunaculate. Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. 

at 76, 85-86) Moreover, the FAA's claim ofmisrigged doors is not once based on any 

FAA observation of a "gear swing," which is the only conclusive way to determine in the 

flying door is properly faired. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 71). 

The "admissions," such as they are, relate to training concerning hinge pin 

installation best practices (as to QAACVG0004) and training for effective visual 

inspections of flying doors during A checks (as to QAACVG005 and QAACVG006). As 

to the hinge pin installations, two important points must be made. First, nothing in AMM 

32-11-00 requires the maintenance provider to remove or reinstall any access door hinge 

pins. See FAA Exhibit C consisting of AMM section 32-11-00. Nonetheless, AMES, in 

the interest of assisting its customers in every possible way, provided training in the 

technique suggested, but not mandated, by Boeing contained in a Product Standard 

- 26-
Process (BAC 518, page 34) for ensuring hinge pins are secure should AMES ever be 

called upon to provide such maintenance. As noted, however, AMM 32-11-00 does not 

call for the removal or insertion of any hinge access door pins. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. 

at 101, 144-145). Therefore, AMES cannot be alleged to have failed to follow the AMM 

based on allegations of hinge pin migration or related discrepancies. 

Similarly, the FAA's attempt to stretch the meaning and import ofQAACVG005 

and QAACVG006 (FAA Exhibit U) to support its argument that AMES admitted 

violations is nonsensical since these forms only call for training in A check inspections. 

Again, the subject matter of these CAR's do not relate to the allegations that AMES did 

not properly reinstall and rig the flying doors on the CCIA aircraft that had been removed 

solely to facilitate maintenance (in this case, the replacement of the main landing gear). 

Rather, they relate to the manner in which maintenance technicians are to conduct A 

check visual inspections of the aircraft. Nothing in the CCIA CAR's or the AMES 

Discrepancy Notices in any way add up to an "admission" and it is misleading to suggest 

otherwise. 

V. Conclusion 

The FAA Motion is wide of the mark. As amply demonstrated above, the 

evidence on which the FAA seeks to rely is disputed and cannot support an affirmative 

ruling on its Motion. Complainant has presented no evidence of the condition of the 

flying doors and related assemblies on the dates they were reinstalled after the landing 

gear changes were completed up to almost ten months before the date of the FAA 

inspection. Nor did the FAA make any attempt to explain away the obvious impact of 

wear and tear on the structure other than to assert it could not have been a factor at all 

-27-
(see Exhibit 3 (Lipinski Tr. at 204-205)--an assertion that is simply unsupportable. On 

the other hand, through the testimony of Mr. Becker, AMES was able to state that 

whatever discrepancies were documented, the corrective actions taken to address them 

were minor in nature and the product of normal wear and tear. In addition, many 

discrepancies do not relate to the actions of AMES, as directed by AMM 32-11-00, when 

replacing the landing gear. The report of the AMES expert, Mr. Hancher, supports this 

AMES position. 

- 28-
While the FAA's motion must be denied, Respondent's pending motion for 

summary judgment is based on the undisputed fact that the FAA lacks any evidence of 

the condition of the flying doors when they were replaced after removal to allow for the 

landing gear change. The FAA's May 25,2010 inspection was conducted up to ahnost 

l 0 months after the fact and the agency simply cannot establish any reasonable inference 

that the alleged deficient condition existed at the time of the much earlier performed 

maintenance. Consequently, the Respondent's pending dispositive motion should be 

granted. 

Dated: February 16, 2015 

Respectfully submitted, 

SILVERBERG GOLDMAN, L.L.P. 

Attorneys for 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

ENGI NGSE~/ZCES 

/ / . " By:~~~~r~--~~~~~-4~- Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 

1101 30th Street, N.W. 

Suite 300 

Washington, D.C. 20007 

Tel: (202) 944-3304 

Fax: (202) 944-3306 

Email: rsilverberg@sgbdc.com 

-29-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 16'h day of February 2015, I caused the foregoing 

Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment to be 

served by FedEx upon the following: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

600 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Wilbur Wright Building 

Suite 2W1000 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

(Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430) 

Tel: (202) 267-0377 

(original and one copy) 

The Hon. J.E. Sullivan 

Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Tel: (202) 366-2132 

Fax: (202) 366-7536 

Christopher R. Stevenson, Attorney 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Office of the Regional Counsel, AS0-7 

Southern Region 

1701 ColumbiaAvenue 

College Park, GA 30337 

Tel: ( 404) 305-5200 
Exhibit 1 

Exhibit 2 

Exhibit 3 

Exhibit 4 

Exhibit 5 

Exhibit 6 

Exhibit 7 

Exhibit 8 

List of Exhibits 

Transcript Pages from Deposition of Jeffrey Becker taken Oct. 29,2014 

Expert Report of Daniel J. Hancher, dated April30, 2014 

Transcript Pages from Deposition of Frank Lipinski taken Dec. 18,2014 

AMES Partial Work Sheet No. 79 Showing Completion of AMM Section 

32-11-00, Para. 5, Steps AH through AL in Connection with the Original 

Left-Hand MLG Change on N 899AA 

B-727 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), Section 32-45-01 

B-727 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), Section 32-12-11, Figure 

601 

CCIA Aircraft Technical Log Report Documenting Tire Change on 

Aircraft N287SC 

E-Mail Correspondence from CCIA VP of Maintenance to AMES 

Complementing AMES on its Work 

Exhibit 1 

Transcript Pages from Deposition of Jeffrey Becker taken Oct. 29, 2014 
In The Matter Of: 

Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services 

Jeffrey Becker 

October 29, 2014 

Legal Realtime Reporting 

622 E. Central Blvd. 

Orlando, FL 32801 

Original File 102914 Becker fmal.txt 
1 

2 

3 

4 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

In the matter of 

5 

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 

6 ENGINEERING SERVICES 

7 Respondent 

8 

9 * * * * * * * * 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

Case No. 2011S0290032 

Administrative Law Judge 

J.E. Sullivan 

* * * * * * 

10 DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY BECKER 

11 . DATE TAKEN: 

12 TIME: 

13 

PLACE: 

14 

October 29, 2014 

COMMENCED: 8:55 a.m. 

CONCLUDED: 2:55 p.m. 

215 North Eola Drive 

Orlando, Florida 32801 

* 

15 REPORTED BY: Rita G. Meyer, RDR, CRR, CBC, CCP 

16 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

1 
42 

1 specific individuals. 

2 Q. But my understanding from what you just said is 

3 that at the time that AMES was internally investigating 

4 this, you interviewed these people and they could not 

5 provide any information other than 

6 A. Correct. 

7 Q. This is what the records are? 

8 A. Correct. 

9 Q. Okay. And again, same question. With regards 

10 to N287SC and the main landing gear replacement performed 

11 in March of 2010, is that the same situation, those 

12 individuals cannot provide additional information beyond 

13 identifying the records? 

14 A. Correct. 

15 Q. Okay. Now, there have been references in your 

16 discovery responses to a, if I understand correctly, a 

17 tire replacement on N287SC that occurred after AMES 

18 replaced the main landing gear but before the vibration 

19 incident on April 10 of 2010. Do I understand that 

20 correctly? 

21 A. Right. 

22 Q. Okay. And how do you know that the tire was 

23 changed? 

24 A. I was provided, from Capital Cargo, 

25 of the maintenance performed on that aircraft 

a print .. ~ut I 

over a t~ 
43 

1 period -- I believe it was from the time it left our 

2 facility on or about the middle of March to the time that 

3 it left Cincinnati after the vibration work. 

4 

5 i 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

out? 

the 

Q. Okay. And do you have a copy of that print 

MR. SILVERBERG: It's in our materials. 

A. I believe it is part of the omnibus. I mean 

discovery materials. 

MR. SILVERBERG: I have a copy of it. 

MR. STEVENSON: Okay. 

MR. SILVERBERG: You should have a copy of it. 

MR. STEVENSON: Can you identify what number 

that was? 

MR. SILVERBERG: 111. While you're rooting 

through your files, let's go off the record. I'm 

16 going to take a quick bathroom break. 

17 (Proceedings recessed at 9:43 a.m.) 

18 (Proceedings resumed at 9:53 a.m.) 

19 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

20 Q. All right. So I understand correctly, the tire 

21 change took place on March 25th, 2010, which would've 

22 been three days after the landing gear was approved for 

23 return to service by AMES? 

24 

25 

A. 

Q. 

Correct. 

And do you know what physically is involved in 
44 

1 changing the tire on a 727? 

2 A. Yes. Based on the procedures both published by 

3 Capital Cargo and that are in the AMM, yes. 

4 

5 

6 

Q. And can you summarize those? 

A. Well, again, I'd like to have the documents 

because I can point specifically to it. It's easier for 

7 me to communicate the steps and make sure I don't miss 

8 any key items. 

9 Q. I understand. I'm not asking you to go into it 

10 in detail. But I mean, you said you knew what the 

11 procedures were. I'm just asking you in general terms 

12 what the procedure is. We can look at the documents at 

13 some later time if we want, but right now I'm just asking 

14 you --

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

:: 

MR. SILVERBERG: Do you have the document that 

you're referring to? 

MR. STEVENSON: I'm guessing no, unless you 

provided it to me, since this document was not 

identified in your discovery response such that I 

realized what it was. 

MR. SILVERBERG: So you're just asking this 

witness to summarize his understanding of the 

document? We don't have the document in front of 

us? 

MR. STEVENSON: We're not -- I'm not handing 

~------------~ 
1 

2 

3 

him a document. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. 

MR. STEVENSON: I'm asking him to summarize 

45 

4 his understanding of what is involved in changing 

5 the tire on one of the main landing gear on a 727. 

6 A. As it applies to the flying door, one of the 

7 steps -- and this is for the outboard tires only -- the 

8 flying door is in the way of removing the tire. And 

9 there is a banana link or what's called an actuating rod, 

10 I believe, in the maintenance manual, and there's some 

11 steps in order to move the door out of the way in order 

12 to get access to the wheel. 

13 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

14 Q. Okay. And how do you know -- okay. Let me --

15 you said that that was for an outboard tire? 

16 

17 

A. 

Q. 

Mln-hmm. 

Do you know if this was an inboard or outboard 

18 tire that was replaced on March 25, 2010? 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

A. On March 25th, it was an outboard. 

number four, based on my memory. 

It was a 

Q. Okay. And are those -- how are the tires 

numbered for the 

A. 

Q. 

Left to right, it's 1, 2, 3, 4. 

And just for the clarity of the record, as is 

25 usual with aviation, I presume that left to right is from 
46 

1 the point of view of somebody sitting in the cockpit? 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

A. Correct. 

Q. And so, if I understand correctly, AMES' 

position is that it's possible that the missing bushing 

that was observed in April of 2010, could or would've 

been caused by some -- whoever was doing the tire change? 

A. What I believe -- what our belief is is that 

there was a statement that no additional maintenance was 

done on that right-hand side after it left our facility. 

10 And what our point is, is in fact, there was maintenance 

11 performed, and maintenance performed that did involve the 

12 flying door. 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

Q. Okay. Is that something -- do you dispute that 

there was a missing bushing on the aircraft at the time 

of the vibration incident in April of 2010? 

A. No. 

Q. Okay. So how would that bushing have come to 

be fallen off or be left off during the course of the 

tire change? 

A. Again, it's a line maintenance environment. 

21 Line maintenance has to move the flying door out of the 

22 way in order to change the tire. That link is what holds 

23 the flying door to the landing gear. 

24 Q. When you say that they moved the flying door 

25 out of the way, are they removing the flying door? 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 L_ 

A. No. They are just repositioning it. 

Q. Okay. And are they repositioning it -- may I 

presume that you're saying they repositioned it further 

than they would just by opening the landing gear? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And it is AMES' belief that it's possible that 

the bushing could've fallen out during that procedure? 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Asked and 

answered. Go ahead and answer. 

A. Correct. 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

47 

Q. There are some -- with respect to this 

component, there are references to a bushing or a tubular 

bearing. Are you aware of any difference between those 

or are they referring to the same thing? 

A. I've seen it listed different ways in the AMM 

depending on where you look. I've seen it stated as a 

tubular bearing or tubular bushing. 

Q. Okay. But those would be references to the 

same component? 

A. Right. 

Q. You're aware that CCIA told the FAA that the 

missing bushing was the result of AMES' actions in 

reinstalling the landing gear in March of 2010? 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection as to the form of 
the question. Leading. 

A. I'm aware that they responded to Frank stating 

something like that. 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

48 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 Q. I'm going to mark this as Deposition Exhibit C. 

6 On its face, this is identified as a -- it's a letter on 

7 Capital Cargo letterhead dated June 8, 2010 and addressed 

8 to Aviation Safety Inspector Bobby Evans and signed by 

9 Benjamin L. Buck. Can you review that, Mr. Silverberg? 

10 Now if you would take a moment to review that, 

11 Mr. Becker, and let me know when you have .. 

12 (Exhibit C Received and Marked) 

13 

14 

15 

A. Yes. 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

Q. And was this a document that you had seen prior 

16 to today? 

17 A. Yes. 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

Q. Okay. And would you agree with me that in this 

letter from CCIA, that they indicate that the reason for 

the missing bushing was AMES leaving it out when 

installing the main landing gear door? 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection as to the form of 

the question. Leading. 

A. It states that in the letter. But looking at 

25 the date, which is dated June 8, 2010, that was prior to 
1 us completing our investigation, so I'm not sure how Ben 

2 Buck came to that conclusion. 

3 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

4 

5 

6 

Q. Okay. Do you believe that Mr. Buck is biased 

against AMES? 

A. I really don't -- I don't know. Based on some 

7 of the documents that I've seen from Ben Buck, I don't 

8 believe he did a thorough investigation or used the 

9 benefit of our investigation results in his answers. 

49 

10 Q. I'd like to ask you now about late May of 2010. 

11 It's my understanding that from approximately May 25 to 

12 May 27 of 2010, several FAA inspectors were looking at 

13 CCIA aircraft in Toledo and it's my understanding that 

14 you were present for some or all of that? 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

A. Yes. I came in to work -- I don't remember. 

I'm assuming it was the 25th of May. I came in to work 

and I didn't even have my door open and my boss called 

and said, hey, we're having, or Capital Cargo is having 

some problems with some airplanes in Toledo. They are 

claiming that it might have something to do with some 

maintenance we had performed. So please drive up there 

with Dan Boggs -- who was then the director of heavy 

maintenance 

issues are. 

and meet with Frank and see what the 

Q. Okay. And when you say your boss, to whom are 
1 Q. Okay. And this is the aft hinge on 287? 

2 A. Right. Yeah. You notice there are no hinges 

3 or no washers on each side. And I remember him pointing 

4 to that. 

5 Now, you know, just like us, I don't expect 

6 Frank to have the AMM memorized. I'm sure, you know, he 

7 pointed to it and he said, hey, look there's no washers, 

8 not knowing that per the AMM, there's not supposed to be 

9 any washers there. 

10 Q. Okay. Do you know at the time that you 

11 observed 287SC on May 25th and 26th, whether the flying 

12 doors on that aircraft were out of rig? 

71 

13 A. First of all, you can't check the rig of a door 

14 unless you swing the gear. So seeing an airplane, I 

15 don't know how anybody, including Mr. Lipinski can look 

16 at a door and say, hey, it's misrigged. You can't do 

17 that until you swing it. 

18 Q. Okay. Did you -- I'm going to provide you with 

19 a document that's been marked for this deposition as 

20 Exhibit E. It is identified on its face as an FAA 

21 memorandum dated September 28, 2010 from Jack Gasche to 

22 Frank Lipinski. It was contained in the EIR. I'll let 

23 Mr. Silverberg review it. 

24 (Exhibit E Received and Marked) 

25 MR. SILVERBERG: It appears to be one of the 
1 

! 

2 

3 

287SC? 

A. 

Q. 

Yes. 

Okay. And what, if anything, do you remember 

4 observing about the condition of those aircraft? 

5 A. Yeah, I mean, we were under direction -- we 

6 were under direction from Charles Working. We were -- I 

7 recall that our marching orders from the operator, which 

8 is completely understandable in the case, was we need to 

9 make this like new. We want this -- we want these 

10 landing gear or these flying doors immaculate. We don't 

761 

11 want any opportunity for Frank or any other FAA inspector 

12 to inspect any of these airplanes after the fact and find 

13 any more problems. 

14 So I do recall that my inspectors were asked to 

15 inspect the flying doors and the areas with a fine tooth 

16 comb. They wanted us to write up every nick, every minor 

17 flaw -- which is not normal, by the way, in a "C" Check 

18 environment or anything else. Unless there's a specific 

19 job card that drives you to a specific area. 

20 Q. Sure. Do you have any personal recollection of 

21 what, if any, nicks or flaws were on these aircraft? 

22 A. Um, no. I mean, most of my dialogue -- I mean, 

23 I knew that there was nonroutines. Written, many 

24 nonroutines. I remember talking to Dan Boggs about it 

25 and saying, yeah, there's a lot of nicks and bumps and 
1 the point where the door was not faired. 

2 Q. Okay. So when you say not faired, that would 

3 mean that if there was an improper stack up, that would 

4 mean that the door was not fairing properly and was out 

5 of rig? 

6 A. Right. Right. Did not pass the rig checks. 

85 

7 Q. Okay. Now, you had indicated, before we took a 

8 break, that you were -- I think your phrasing was that 

9 you were under marching orders from CCIA to make these 

10 doors like new? 

11 Mi:n-hmm. 

12 

A. 

Q. So were there actions that AMES took, were 

13 there maintenance actions that AMES took with regards to 

14 these three aircraft that were unnecessary in your 

15 opinion, then? 

16 A. I mean, again, we're under the direction of 

17 Capital Cargo. Capital Cargo, the rep, Charles Working, 

18 I mean, he reviewed every nonroutine. He looked at all 

19 the wheel wells and the flying doors, himself. 

20 Again, our direction was, you know, we want to 

21 make this thing so that there was absolutely no 

22 misunderstanding about whether these doors are rigged or 

23 

24 

25 

not. So, I'm sorry, I don't know if I answered your 

question directly. 

Q. Yeah. I don't think you did. Let me try to 
ask it again. 

Are you aware of any maintenance actions that 

AMES took that weren't necessary? And by necessary I 

mean that would not have been called for by CCIA's 

maintenance requirements, or the Boeing AMM, but were 

just things that you were doing because CCIA wanted them 

done? 

86 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

A. Yeah. I mean, really, you know, in my opinion, 

10 

almost all the work done, I mean, again, we've never 

stated or agreed that the doors were misrigged to begin 

11 with. And specifically, not misrigged when they left 

12 AMES's facilities or control. 

13 You know, when I reviewed the specific 

14 nonroutines, again, all I see is wear and tear, blend and 

15 treat. You know, fixing nicks. Replacing a worn seal. 

16 Again, to me, these are normal operational type wear and 

17 tear items. When the airplane comes in for a "C" Check, 

18 yes, a lot of these things may be written up, but not to 

19 the detail that was written up in the May visit. 

20 Q. I'm curious. I think you referred a couple 

21 times today to blending damage and the impression that I 

22 get when you refer to that is that you don't consider it 

23 a significant thing. 

24 

25 

A. No. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Leading. If you 
have a question about what blending means, you can 

certainly ask him that. 

87 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

MR. STEVENSON: Are you instructing him not to 

answer? 

MR. SILVERBERG: No. I'm just noting the 

6 objection. 

7 MR. STEVENSON: Okay. 

8 A. I mean, my definition of a blend and treat, it 

9 comes from my engineering background. If you don't have 

10 to repair something, if all you're doing is prepping a 

11 surface and putting paint on it, that's what I 

12 consider -- what I believe is a blend and treat. That's 

13 what I refer to as a blend and treat. And, no, if you're 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

not adding any material back, if you're not performing a 

repair, no, it's not a repair. It's a minor -- it's a 

scratch. It's a nick. It's, you know. 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

Q. So your understanding, if I'm reading AMES 

19 maintenance documents and it says that there was damage 

20 and it was blended, that means that it was just a new 

21 coat of paint was applied to make it smooth? 

22 A. Right. Yeah, basically, you blend the surface 

23 to remove any rough spots and you prime and paint it. 

24 Q. Okay. What do you mean by blend the surface to 

25 remove rough spots? 
88 

1 A. Well, using a piece of sandpaper or, you know, 

2 again, just smoothing it out so that the paint adheres. 

3 Q. Okay. So there's some imperfection in the 

4 surface and you're using sandpaper or some other 

5 abrasive 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

Correct. 

-- to scrape away some small bits of the --

Yes. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Let him finish. 

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 

11 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

Q. So you would be -- there's a rough surface and 

you're using some sort of abrasive to scrape away part of 

the surface of that component? 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Asked and 

answered. 

A. I guess, yeah. To be more specific, airplanes 

are made out of aluminum; aluminum corrodes. The only 

way you prevent corrosion is to make sure that there's a 

coat of paint over everything. Any time there's a nick 

or an abrasion on an aluminum surface, yeah, you would go 

ahead and you would do what I'd say is a blend and treat. 

Which is buff the area so that the paint adheres and you 

24 put paint on it. 

25 Q. Okay. And was that something that AMES 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

101 

needed to be replaced or 

A. I mean, it's a stop strip. So, you know, my 

recollection is, yeah, it's a wear strip. It's something 

that a stop stops against. So it became dislodged. 

Item number 10, left-hand main landing gear 

wing door forward and aft hinge cover, hinge pins 

improperly installed. This is on the left-hand side. 

These hinge pins are part of a hinge pin cover assembly. 

It's part of the landing gear change procedures. My 

recollection is we don't do anything with these hinge 

pins. So again, I have no comment about what they mean 

12 by improperly installed or whether AMES, you know, had 

13 done that. Because as far as I know, there was no work 

14 done on these hinge covers when it was in the -- when 287 

15 was in our facility in March. 

16 Q. Do you know if that was something that needed 

17 to be done? 

18 

19 

20 

21 

A. I'm 

the description. 

yeah. I'm sorry, I'm just looking at 

Improperly installed. It doesn't tell 

me if they were loose or exactly what was going on. 

Q. Okay. 

22 A. But then again, it was in operation for two 

23 months after it left our facility. So if a line mechanic 

24 found a loose hinge pin and did something, we wouldn't 

25 have known about it. 

'--------~-----------------------~------------__j 
102 

1 Item Number 9, left-hand inboard flap fairing 

2 has slight damage in forward main landing gear wing door 

3 hinge at, I'm sorry, at forward main landing gear wing 

4 

5 

6 

7' 

8 

door hinge opening. Blended. It was a blend and treat. 

Q. Do you know whether or not that was something 

that would've been needed to be done in accordance with 

the AMM or the MIP? 

A. This says we requested engineering to evaluate 

9 it. 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

MR. SILVERBERG: If you know. 

A. Yeah. I mean, no. I'm thinking. I don't --

yeah. No, I don't know. I don't know if it again, 

just based on the, you know, this could've been something 

as minor as chips on paint or, you know, something, but 

bottom line, it was blended. So based on my knowledge of 

what defines an airworthy or unairworthy condition, 

17 blending is a minor repair. A minor repair, by 

18 definition, doesn't impact airworthiness. 

19 Item number 8, again, another hinge opening, 

20 blended damage. It was a blend and treat repair. So 

21 again, minor. And that's all the items in Exhibit M. 

22 

23 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

Q. Okay. So would it be fair to say that, setting 

24 aside the pinched conduit, your opinion would be that 

25 almost all of that work was not something that was 
103 

1 necessary to be done but was either minor or cosmetic? 

2 A. Or customer --

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection to the form of the 

question. Leading. 

A. All those items are either wear and tear or 

customer requests. 

BY MR. STEVENSON: 

Q. Well, let me make a distinction. An item -- a 

9 component could be so damaged by wear and tear that it's 

10 necessary to do a repair, right? 

11 A. Correct. 

12 Q. Okay. So just for the purpose of clarity, I'm 

13 not asking whether or not you think it's what the 

14 cause of it was, but am I understanding correctly that 

15 you did not think that any of that damage was to the 

16 point where it would've been a required repair? 

17 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection, leading. 

18 A. I guess we're talking about all eight items. 

19 May I take a look at those again and just look through 

20 them real quick? 

21 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

22 

23 

24 

25 

Q. Sure. I will provide you with M. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Could we have the question 

read back, please? 

(Reporter Complied with Above) 
104 

1 A. The answer would be no. 

2 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

3 Q. Okay. I would now like to switch from 287SC to 

4 899AA. Again, I'm talking exclusively in the late May 

5 2010 time frame. 

6 So this first document I'm going to show you is 

7 from Toledo, but then most of them are going to be from 

8 Wilmington. I'm going to show you what's been marked as 

9 Government's Exhibit N as in Nancy. This was identified 

10 by the Respondent as Document 58 in its production. And 

11 what I'm specifically going to be asking about is item 3, 

12 when you guys are familiarizing yourself. I don't plan 

13 on asking about the other discrepancies. 

14 MR. SILVERBERG: Specifically number 3? 

15 

16 

17 

about. 

MR. STEVENSON: Is what I'm going to be asking 

MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. Go ahead. 

18 (Exhibit N Received and Marked) 

19 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

20 Q. All right. Do you have -- do I understand 

21 correctly that that is a CCIA write up? 

22 

23 

A. 

Q. 

Yes. 

Okay. And do you have any reason to doubt the 

24 accuracy of the discrepancy write up on that, 

25 specifically of Discrepancy 3? 
1 

2 

113 

improper hardware stack up. 

Q. Well, but this says discrepancy left-hand main 

3 

4 

landing gear flying door aft hinge has improper hardware 

stack up. 

5 A. Mm-hmm. 

6 Q. Now, I would not normally expect a mechanic to 

7 write that hinge has an improper hardware stack up if 

8 they didn't have a reason to believe that the hinge had 

9 an improper hardware stack up. 

10 

11 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection, argumentative. 

don't know that your understanding of what a 

12 mechanic would do is relevant, but if you can, 

13 answer the question. 

14 A. Again, regardless of the discrepancy, the 

I 

15 discrepancy is just an initial judgment. We always go to 

16 the corrective action. The corrective action says they 

17 verified hardware. There are no problems. There were no 

18 problems with it. And they signed it off per the 

19 maintenance manual. Or in this case -- actually, I'm 

20 sorry, they signed it off to the service bulletin. 

21 I mean, what you'll find on each one of these 

22 cases is we removed the doors and we verified the 

2 3 hardware. 

241 Q. 

25 L______ 

Sure. That was item 3? 

MR. SILVERBERG: Correct. 
have the partial work accomplished for item I 

11? I 

2 A. Yes. 

3 Q. One of the entries in the discrepancy it says 

4 for entry number one it says, as written, door removed 

5 FOM. What would a technician mean when he says FOM? 

6 A. To facilitate maintenance. Facilitation of 

7 maintenance. 

8 Q. All right. 

9 A. So in order to check the hardware stack, he had 

10 to remove the door. 

11 Q. Sure. Proceed. 

12 A. Item number 7, left-hand main flying door has 

13 excessive play at gear gitting. They really meant 

14 fitting, misspelled fitting. And they checked and 

15 replaced hardware. 

16 Now, it says in the corrective action, 

17 installed gimbal hardware as required per 32-11. The 

18 gimbal, when they refer to the gimbal fitting, it is the 

19 end of the actuation rod. This is the fitting where the 

20 tubular bearing is. So, again, this airplane was in 

21 service for nine months. They found some play and so 

22 they fixed it. 

23 

24 

25 

Q. Now, as I review this, since, ultimately the 

question we ask is necessary or unnecessary. When I look I 

at this, it says that they installed the gimbal hardw~ 
123 

1 are repairing it. 

2 MR. STEVENSON: All right. Now, I note that 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

it's after noon. I don't know what your gentlemen's 

10 

11 

12 

preferences for lunch are, but now it's sort of time 

if you wanted to, I'm okay for now. But --

MR. SILVERBERG: I can keep going except for a 

walk down the hall. I had much too much coffee this 

morning. I apologize for that. But it's up to you, 

because you're the 

THE WITNESS: I'm fine. I'm fine. 

MR. SILVERBERG: We can keep going. 

MR. STEVENSON: Okay. That's fine. Off the 

13 record. 

14 (Proceedings recessed at 12:16 p.m.) 

15 (Proceedings resumed at 12:20 p.m.) 

16 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

17 Q. All right. Mr. Becker, I wanted to go back a 

18 moment before we delve into 898AA, and ask you a little 

19 bit about the tire replacement on 287SC from, sorry, that 

20 occurred in late March of 2010. 

21 If I understand correctly, you had indicated 

22 that it was possible that during that tire replacement, 

23 the bushing fell out or was not reinstalled or something 

24 along those lines. 

A. Mm-hmm. 
124 

1 Q. I'm sorry, just for clarity, was that a yes or 

2 a no? You said mm-hmm and I'm just trying to --

3 

4 

A. Yes. Yes. My contention is, is that there's a 

possibility. There was another maintenance event. Ben 

5 Bucks' statement in one of the letters was that there 

6 were no other maintenance events and I'm just stating 

7 it's incorrect. There's a possibility that that could've 

8 happened. 

9 Q. Sure. Based on, you know, your knowledge and 

10 experience, do you know how likely that would be? 

11 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. But go ahead. 

12 A. Where my frame of reference comes from is my 

13 discussions with Mike Ebert, who was then the director of 

14 line maintenance for AMES. 

15 When the tubular bearing came up missing as 

16 part of the investigation, I talked to Mike and I said, 

17 okay. So what's, you know, what's the line maintenance 

18 version of what goes on? You know, how does that work? 

19 And he said that he had had conversations with somebody 

20 in Capital Cargo I don't know who. It may have been 

21 Mark Summers, it may have been some other line 

22 maintenance folks from Capital Cargo, but that at times, 

23 the line maintenance people will remove that bolt that 

24 contains the tubular bearing and hold up the flying door 

251 out of the way as they change the wheel. 
125 

1 That procedure is not in the Capital Cargo 

2 procedures for changing the wheel. And in the Boeing 

3 procedures for changing the wheel, it has that note that 

4 specifically says, hey, you'll damage the hinge cover if 

5 you remove the link that way. Because you're holding up 

6 the door, it's not steady. 

7 So that's where my, again, that's where my 

8 frame of reference is coming from. That there was an 

9 opportunity for that tubular bearing to be missing. That 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

coupled with when we did our investigation, the mechanic 

that performed the work specifically said in his 

statement, I recall putting the tubular bearing back in. 

Q. Sure. So if I understand correctly, for the 

tubular bearing to have come out while the mechanic was 

15 changing the tire, that mechanic would have to have been 

16 doing that maintenance action in a way that the Boeing 

17 AMM specifically tells him not to do because it might 

18 damage these hinge covers? 

19 A. Yeah. All I recall is it has a note specific 

20 that says, if you do not use this other procedure, that 

21 hinge cover damage can occur. And as we found, almost 

22 every single one of the airplanes that came in had some 

23 form of hinge cover damage. 

24 Q. Do you think that it is more likely that the 

25 bushing was left out when the MLG was installed at AMES 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

or more likely that this mechanic violated the AMM and 

lifted that door such that the bushing fell out? 

126 

A. I think as I stated in my response to the Ben 

Buck, we did not have any proof or even any inkling that 

that bushing or that tubular bearing was missing. And 

not only did we have a statement from the technician that 

says he specifically recalls putting the bearing back in, 

but again, the doors were swung. They met all the fair 

conditions. We can only assume that if you're gonna go 

ahead and do a function check to make sure that all the 

11 procedures followed, that that door, there would've been 

12 issues or problems with that door if that tubular bearing 

13 was missing when it left the AMES facility. 

14 So all I could say is, I am fairly confident 

15 that AMES left that tubular bearing in. Also that 

16 airplane flew and we got an e-mail from Randy Buol, the 

17 vice-president of Capital Cargo said the airplane flew 

18 perfect. No problems noted after the gear changes. You 

19 would think that if that tubular bearing missing had 

20 caused vibration, that you would've felt it immediately. 

21 Again, you know, putting, stringing all those 

22 conclusions together, I find it hard to believe that AMES 

23 left out that tubular bearing. And that's why I stated 

24 it in the, in the CAR that I responded to Ben Buck, that, 

25 you know, we're here to help as much as we can, which is 
1 the way we work, but I can't tell you that we left that 

2 out. 

3 Q. Okay. Let's turn to 898. If I am keeping 

4 track correctly, we're up to Exhibit P. And this is a 

5 one-page document that was identified by the Respondent 

127 

6 as Number 16 in his document production. And I will give 

7 opposing counsel the opportunity to look at that. 

8 MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. 

9 (Exhibit P Received and Marked) 

10 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

11 Q. All right. Now, would I understand correctly 

12 that this supplemental sheet contains one discrepancy 

13 that was written up by CCIA? 

14 

15 

A. 

Q. 

Correct. 

Okay. And do you have any reason to doubt the 

16 accuracy of the discrepancy they wrote up? 

17 

18 

A. 

Q. 

No. 

Okay. All right. What I have here are the 

19 I have one large document that I'm going to mark as 

20 Exhibit Q. This should be Item of Proof 25. It's the 

21 package as contained in the EIR of the nonroutine cards 

22 from AMES for 898AA in late May 2010. I will note for 

23 you that like the similar ones, the highest numbered card 

24 

25 

I have is 33. And I do not seem to have 23 or 31. So 

unless we notice them while we're going through here --

1.·-----------------------------·--·---·~~ .. ~ 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

MR. SILVERBERG: Nor by the -- there are 

the first one is the May 29th. Here's one for the 

28th. Here's the 27th. 

chronological order. 

So they are out of 

MR. STEVENSON: They are not. 

MR. SILVERBERG: They have been reordered in 

item number. Just so you know, Jeff. 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 

132 

MR. SILVERBERG: I don't know if that's going 

to make a difference to you, but I just want to make 

sure it's clear on the record. 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 

MR. STEVENSON: Thank you. 

A. Okay. So, yeah. Again, just like the other 

15 aircraft, this aircraft was in service seven months after 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

we changed the gear, after AMES changed the gear. So a 

lot of these discrepant conditions we may or may not have 

had any control over at the time. 

One of the distinctions I did want to mention 

when I saw the words suspected worn bushing in this 

nonroutine, again, to make the matter of record 32-11-00, 

22 when you remove the gear door, it says to use the 

23 existing hardware. Right? 

24 So what we did at the time we changed these 

25 bushings and/or changed these landing gear, is we removed 
1 the doors. We kept all the existing hardware and we 

2 replaced it. As long as the doors faired, per the 

3 adjustment and test procedures, we did not replace 

133 

4 bushings and shims and hardware at the time unless we had 

5 

6 

problems rigging the doors. 

Q. Do you consider that to be an absolute? That 

7 the mechanic can pull out the burnings and shims and 

8 other hardware and put it back in and regardless of the 

9 observed condition or configuration? 

10 A. If the mechanic saw that the bushings or 

11 washers were damaged or worn or whatever, he may replace 

12 them. But again, the procedures, which he signed off to, 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

doesn't require him to replace them. So that's -- I want 

to make that distinction as we go through some of these 

where we've replaced, we replaced shims and bushings and 

so forth. That was part of the Charles Working direction 

when the airplanes came back in May. 

requirement when we changed the gear. 

Okay. 

It was not the 

Q. 

A. All right. So on this item number 1, right 

21 main gear wing door reported for discrepant condition. 

22 Suspect worn bushings and hardware. 

23 The corrective action is that we replaced all 

24 the hardware with brand new hardware, basically. 

25 Q. When I look at this, what I would infer from 
137 

1 the door back into fair? 

2 A. My recollection was Charles Working, again, was 

3 managing all this. When the airplanes were flown to 

4 Wilmington, Capital Cargo go ahead and check their 

5 inventory and ship wing doors as just a precautionary at 

6 the time. 

7 Based on the nonroutine record, it failed to 

8 check -- in order to fail, in order to rerig this door, 

9 you have to drop the door anyways. The customer decided 

10 to go ahead and replace the door. I can't tell whether 

11 they saw something that caused them to make that decision 

12 or not, but they did -- he did decide to replace the 

13 door. 

14 I do recall comments along the lines -- and I 

15 don't know if it applies to this door or the right main 

16 landing gear door of 287 that was replaced but, quote 

17 unquote, Capital Cargo had doors in stock. So they may 

18 have felt it was quicker and more expedient to just try 

19 to put up a new door instead of trying to rerig the old 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

door. 

MR. SILVERBERG: What number? 

A. Item number 6. Right-hand main landing gear 

door, wing door, hinge fitting, possible small crack. 

They repaired it per an engineering REA. The REA is a 

blend and treat REA. So they must not have had a 
1 

2 

144 

my inspectors. It was written up the same day the 

airplane came in. So I'm trying to determine whether it 

3 was something we caused and we tried to repair it or 

4 whether it came in like that. I'm not sure. But this 

5 did require -- this looks like they drilled out the 

6 damage and installed the fastener or installed the rivet. 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

Q. Now, and this says, when I read tool mark, that 

makes it sound to me like, I don't know, not that it's 

really like, yeah, somebody had a drill or a screwdriver, 

something, and it slipped and 

A. And dinged the --

Q. -- hit the side? 

A. Yeah. And that's what I was trying to 

14 determine based on the dates, whether it was something 

15 maybe we did or somebody else, but I can't determine that 

16 based on the nonroutine. Either way, my inspector found 

17 it. We repaired it and we evaluated it; we blended it. 

18 MR. SILVERBERG: Next item. 

19 A. Next item, item number 20. This time corrosion 

20 on lower inner surface of left main landing gear flying 

21 door. And it says clean minor surface corrosion. So it 

22 was a blend and treat, even though it was corrosion. 

23 Item number 21 is a loose or migrating hinge 

24 pin. And the hinge lobe was cracked, so they removed and 

25 replaced the hinge. Again, like we said, this hinge pin 
145 

1 is not covered in the procedures for changing the flying 

2 door. So it's one of those things that if when it is 

3 in our I would think that they would've written up a 

4 migrating hinge pin if that was noted when they were 

5 doing the gear changes and would've fixed it at that 

6 time. 

7 Item number 22, swivel clamps are installed on 

8 the left-hand main landing gear. Hose swivel clamp 

9 installed incorrectly. We repositioned them and again, 

10 this is -- the reference here for the corrective action 

11 is overhaul manual. Again, the AMM procedures do not 

12 reference the swivel clamps, only the overhaul manual. 

13 So the vendor, the landing gear vendor would've been 

14 responsible for locating these swivel clamps. 

15 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

Q. But now, when this is being signed off by -- I 

mean, what is the significance of the signature by AMES 

at the bottom of this then? 

A. Oh, I mean, the nonroutine was that we found 

the clamps installed incorrectly. The corrective action 

was that we referenced the overhaul manual to locate the 

22 clamps correctly. My comment is that AMES, during a 

23 landing gear change, would not have located or changed 

24 these swivel clamps. It would've come in as part of the 

25 assembly of the landing gear. 
148 

1 would've removed the door and then they would've found 

2 this condition after they removed the door. It wouldn't 

3 have been visible unless you dropped the door. 

4 Item number 28, left wing forward fairing, aft 

5 internal stiffeners cracked in two places. Actually, 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

this was referenced in another nonroutine. So this is 

after they removed the fairing. It was an internal 

stiffener and they would not have seen this stiffener 

until they removed the fairing. And then they repaired 

it in accordance with SRM. Again, that's something you 

would not have seen and it would not be part of the AMM 

procedures for changing a gear. 

Q. But that was something that once detected, 

needed to be replaced? 

A. Correct. Item number 29, left wing forward 

fairing, inboard attach plate is cracked, so they 

replaced the attach plate. Again, this is an internal 

part of the fairing, so we wouldn't have seen this item 

unless we removed it. 

Item number 30, right wing forward fairing 

inboard attached plate is chafed through on the 

right-hand side. The same attach plate as in the 

left-side had to be replaced. Again, you wouldn't have 

seen it unless you removed the fairing. 

Item 33, left-hand main landing gear flying 
1 door requires replacement. Cannot adjust. So this 

2 refers -- this is the nonroutine referred to when that 

3 other nonroutine said that the left-hand door failed, 

4 this provides the procedures for changing that door. 

5 And again, rightfully so, this nonroutine was 

6 initiated on May 31st. So, yes, well after they 

7 performed the gear swings. 

149 

8 Item number 32, remove and -- remove right-hand 

9 main landing gear antiskid conduit for transfer to 287. 

10 So they robbed the antiskid conduit to send it off to 287 

11 and then they replaced it. 

12 MR. SILVERBERG: Robbed in the technical 

13 sense. 

14 A. Yeah. Cannibalized, took it off of one 

15 airplane so it could be installed on another. 

16 MR. SILVERBERG: I wanted to make sure Rita 

17 didn't assume we're a bunch of thieves. 

18 

19 

20 

A. And then, yeah, Exhibit Q includes a copy of 

the RFTS. I'm sorry. And RFTS means request for 

technical service. It's a memo document that comes from 

21 heavy maintenance to engineering, requesting assistance. 

22 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

23 

24 

Q. 

A. 

Okay. 

So, yeah, these are a number of the items and 

25 the nonroutines are referenced. 
1 

2 

3 

confir.m; 77 -- and 77. 

(Exhibits S & T Received and Marked} 

A. Okay. 

152 

4 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

5 Q. Now, Mr. Becker, before we get into the details 

6 of any of this, just looking at the first two pages, 

7 these are titled Discrepancy Notice; the second page 

8 seems to have handwriting on it. The first page is 

9 primarily typed. 

10 What are these discrepancy notices? What's the 

11 function of them in AMES' interaction with CCIA? 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

A. First of all, the verbiage up in the 

description area is cut and paste from Capital Cargo's, 

they call them CARS, but it's the same thing as the 

Discrepancy Notice. So we basically cut and paste that 

procedure; we put it into our form for our tracking. 

Instead of trying to track all the different customers, 

you know, type thing, we just put it in our for.m and we 

submit it to the, in this case, Brady Stevens, who's the 

line maintenance manager at CVG. 

The handwritten one is usually the handwritten 

one we get back from them. It's just as a matter of 

putting it into our database and everything. It's easier 

24 for the auditors to type everything, so they actually 

25 type it all out. So that's the difference between those. 
157 1 

1 sure that there's a thorough investigation. A root cause 

2 or a corrective action is identified. And then at that 

3 point, then, for instance, if there's a follow-up listed, 

4 such as the manual changes are going to be done or, in 

5 this case, maybe some training that's published or going 

6 to be taken, then the QA auditor will follow up and make 

7 sure whatever they say they're going to do, they're going 

8 to do. 

9 Q. All right. Now, my understanding is that as 

10 part of the corrective actions resulting collectively 

11 from the issues with these three aircraft, that AMES 

12 ended up doing some additional training with its 

13 mechanics on 727 landing gear. 

14 

15 

16 

MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Leading. Go 

ahead. 

A. We put together some training. It included the 

17 input from Frank from Capital Cargo and was also in the 

18 middle of -- I mean, we listed several corrective 

19 actions. 

20 One of the things we do and we do with any sort 

21 of issues that arise, whether it's something that's 

22 brought to our attention by a customer or their FAA or 

23 our FAA, is we focus on increasing the awareness among 

24 the technicians and we do that by issuing computer-based 

25 training modules or MILS. We call them maintenance , ____________________________________________________________ __j 
1 information letters. And our initial purpose is to get 

2 that information out to the technicians where we're a 

1581 

3 transparent organization so if one area is having issues, 

4 we communicate it throughout the organization because we 

5 want to prevent it from happening again. 

6 During this time, yeah, there was an awful lot 

7 of confusion about applicability, about the manual and 

8 all that other stuff, but we took what we felt was a very 

9 conservative course and developed the training module for 

10 it. 

11 Q. Okay. Let me mark this as Exhibit U. My 

12 understanding is that this is a training course that was 

13 as of June lOth, 2010 that AMES used. There have been a 

14 couple of different presentations of that as IOPs and in 

15 your discovery responses, the one that was slightly 

16 shorter. I'm sorry. It's shorter because there's two 

17 slides per page, not because there are slides that are 

18 

19 

20 

21 

missing. 

(Exhibit U Received and Marked) 

MR. SILVERBERG: What's the source of this? 

MR. STEVENSON: That was in the EIR. 

22 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

23 Q. And if you have the chance, Mr. Becker, let me 

24 know if you are familiar with that. 

25 A. Mm-hmm. Yes. So that's, as I stated prior, 
176 

1 Again, I don't have any quotes or anything specific, but 

2 I do remember having conversations with Mike. In fact, I 

3 do remember that Mike Loline specifically said that Frank 

4 told him to issue these CARS to AMES. 

5 Q. Okay. We're up to v. I'm going to mark as 

6 Exhibit V, the March 21, 2011 letter that -- my 

7 understanding is this is the letter that you sent to 

8 Inspector Lipinski in response to his letter of 

9 investigation. You'll be able to correct me if that 

10 impression is incorrect in a moment. 

11 (Exhibit V Received and Marked) 

12 MR. SILVERBERG: That looks right. 

13 A. Yeah. That's correct. 

14 BY MR. STEVENSON: 

15 Q. Okay. Now, I notice in there that you, at 

16 least as I read it, you take the time to identify several 

17 things that you believe are errors in Inspector 

18 Lipinski's letter of investigation. 

19 Yes. 

20 

21 

A. 

Q. But I note that you -- if we're looking at the 

last full paragraph on this page, it says: "The details 

22 of the investigation results were sent to you by CCIA in 

23 a letter dated October 25, 2010." 

24 So did you, at the time you were writing this 

25 letter, did you believe that the contents of the CCIA 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

letter you were referencing, were accurate? 

A. No, I didn't. 

Q. Why, in response to a letter of investigation 

to the FAA, would you tell the inspector to go look at 

the results of a particular set of results of an 

investigation if you did not believe that those results 

were accurate? 

A. What I was referring to here is, what I was 

trying to advise Frank was that he was going to see the 

same corrective actions that he saw with Ben Buck's 

177 

10 

11 letter. In other words, he wasn't going to see anything 

12 new. He was going to see the same we wrote the main 

13 landing gear change card. We did the additional 

14 training. I mean, he wasn't going to see anything new. 

15 So in my verbiage there -- and that's why I 

16 reference specifically Capital Cargo's corrective 

17 actions, he's going to see the same information. 

18 Q. Sure. 

19 A. I wasn't really sure why Frank would issue an 

20 LOI to one entity and then the same LOI to another 

21 entity, so I was a little bit confused about why he did 

22 that, but I didn't know if he was looking for different 

23 information. So I added those comments to say, you've 

24 already seen this information and I'm sending you the 

25 same information. 
178 

1 Q. During the course of this litigation, AMES has 

2 identified what it asserts are a variety of errors in the 

3 letter of investigation that Inspector Lipinski sent to 

4 you. 

5 

6 

A. 

Q. 

And in the EIR. 

Yes. Now, in this letter, you identify some 

7 things that you assert are errors in the letter of 

8 investigation, but there are many, many things that you 

9 are now asserting are errors that you didn't assert were 

10 errors at the time. Why the change in what you're 

11 asserting is errors? 

12 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Argumentative, 

13 

14 

but you may answer. 

A. Well, I mean, this is an LOI, right? So at 

15 this point, we weren't talking civil penalties. What I 

16 was doing my best is trying to put a face to Frank of 

17 AMES and the operators are working together to correct 

18 the problems. 

19 As I stated, I forget what that other issue 

20 was -- is. I wasn't going to point fingers at Capital 

21 Cargo. I, again, wanted to go ahead and put forth to the 

22 FAA we're working together to fix the problems. I wasn't 

23 about to list in my LOI, all the problems I saw with 

24 Capital Cargo's letter. I didn't agree with those. 

25 I talked to Ben Buck about them and all I can 
179 

1 say is he was very -- he was very opinionated, you know. 

2 I had my opinions and he had his. And he's the operator, 

3 so he I don't change what he's writing to the FAA and 

4 he doesn't change mine, either. 

5 Q. When you say he was very opinionated, do you 

6 mean opinions beyond those expressed in his letter of 

7 response? 

8 A. I can remember having a conversation and his 

9 only response to me was, Jeff, I only look at the facts 

10 and this is the paper in front of me and I don't look at 

11 anything else. And that was his response. And I 

12 remember telling him that I didn't think he was looking 

13 at the whole event. Again, I'm working -- they are my 

14 customer. So you have that customer/supplier 

15 relationship. I can't dictate to him how he responds to 

16 an FAA investigation. 

17 Q. Can you think of -- I mean, AMES has asserted 

18 in this litigation that a variety of opinions and 

19 statements made by Inspector Lipinski are the result of 

20 his bias. Do I understand that correctly, right? 

21 A. Yes. 

22 Q. Benjamin Buck, in his letter of response to the 

23 FAA, makes many of the same or similar statements as 

24 Inspector Lipinski does. Why would Mr. Buck be making 

25 those assertions? 
MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Calling for 

speculation as to what Mr. Buck would or wouldn't 

have done or did do. 

180 

1 

2 

3 

4 A. I mean, the answer is I don't know. I would be 

5 speculating and guessing about why he made the decisions 

6 he did. 

7 I do know that I talked to him and I do know he 

8 did an incomplete investigation. And it's pretty 

9 obvious, based on the comments in the EIR, that Frank 

10 didn't go any farther than that, either. 

11 Q. What sort of investigation, if any, did AMES 

12 perform in this matter above and beyond what CCIA had 

13 done as referred to in their letter of response to 

14 Inspector Lipinski? 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

MR. SILVERBERG: Do you understand the 

question? 

A. 

Q. 

A. 

I don't know. I guess it's kind of broad. 

Let me clarify. 

I would have to look at their letter again to 

refresh my mind about the exact points. But I do know 

21 there were many -- there were inaccuracies in Ben Buck's 

22 letter. 

23 Q. You indicated a moment ago that, correct me if 

24 I misunderstood you, that CCIA had conducted an 

25 incomplete investigation into this situation. 

Exhibit 2 

Expert Report of Daniel J. Hancher, dated April30, 2014 
REPORT OF DANIEL J. HANCHER 

1. My name is Daniel J. Hancher. Since 2010 I have been a consultant to major 

air carriers, maintenance repair organizations, and aircraft manufacturers on 

aircraft maintenance shop processes, quality control principles, and aircraft 

maintenance inductions. Since 1964 and in various capacities I have been 

engaged in aircraft maintenance organizations, including air carrier maintenance 

departments and major repair station organizations. My resume is attached 

hereto as Exhibit 1. 

2. In my capacity as a line mechanic, as a supervisor of line mechanics and in 

senior management positions at repair stations and at air carriers, I estimate that 

I have had control or responsibility for the proper removal and replacement of B727 main landing gear assemblies on well over 700 aircraft. This figure does not 

include changes of main landing gear assemblies, over which I had some aspect 

of control or responsibility, on other than B-727 aircraft. I consider myself an 

expert in the field of aircraft maintenance in general, and rnain aircraft landing 

gear removal, replacement and routine maintenance, in particular. In addition I 

consider myself as expert in the matter of routine aircraft maintenance, daily 

service checks, and more in-depth checks such as "A" checks. I am expert in 

categorizing minor aircraft discrepancies, resulting from inevitable wear and tear 

resulting from normal line operations as distinguished from either minor or major 

damage. 

2. I was contacted by counsel for AMES with a request to review maintenance 

records associated with the AMES-accomplished three main landing gear 

changes performed on N898AA, N899AA and N287SC. The records consisted 

of those created by AMES when it first changed out, at the request of its 

customer, Capital Cargo International Airlines ("CCIA''), the main landing gear 

("MLG") in connection with a "C" check of the three aircraft. I also reviewed the 

records created by AMES in connection with the work performed by AMES after 

the aircraft were flown to the AMES facility to address any of the FAA's alleged 

deficiencies in connection with the condition of the MLG doors, often referred to 

as "flying doors". I also reviewed the FAA-compiled Statement of the Case in this 

matter. 

3. As a result of a FAA-conducted ramp inspection of the three aircraft, FAA 

Inspector Lipinski claimed the flying doors were damaged and improperly rigged 

by AMES when the repair station had previously peformed MLG removals and 

replacements. Significantly, the ramp inspection was performed anywhere from 2 

to 9 months after AMES completed the "C" checks on each of the aircraft and the 

interval between the completion of the "C" checks and the May 201 0 ramp 

inspection is as follows: 

Aircraft 

N287SC 

N898AA 

Date of MLG RIR 

March 2010 

October 2009 628 

Cycles Movements 

172 344 

1256 
N899AA August2009 

3. The FAAs complaint alleges that as of the dates AMES completed the MLG 

changes and reinstallation of the flying doors that it improperly did so based on 

the condition observed by the FAA inspector on May 25-26, 2010, which as noted 

above, is anywhere from 2 to 9 months before the FAA inspected the aircraft. I 

have not seen any records produced by the FAA in this matter which details the 

condition of the MLG and flying doors on the dates AMES performed the MLG 

changes. I question how the FAA can allege the three aircraft were in discrepant 

condition on a dates certain when it never inspected the aircraft on said dates. 

4. Apart from this obvious issue of proof of a violation, and based on my review 

of the discrepancies noted at the time of the ramp inspection coupled with my 

review of the corrective action taken by AMES based on the discrepancies, it is 

my opinion that none of the items noted as a result of the FAAs ramp inspection 

were of a serious airworthiness nature that required an immediate attention or 

repair in my opinion and could have continued in operation until the next A or C 

check. 

5. Based on my review of the corrective actions as documented by AMES, 1 

have no difficulty concluding that the issues requiring attention were of a "wear 

and tear" variety and not the result of improper reinstallation of the MLGs and 

flying doors. The Inspector's ramp inspection noted minor imperfections of flying, 

door hinge fairing wear, migrating hinge pins, chafing of the wing doors, wear of 

flying door bushings and misrouting of the anti skid harness. Where the Inspector 

documented more serious findings, they were not born out based on the types of 

corrective actions required by AMES to clear the noted discrepancies. Also, the 

FAA noted the absence of a required bushing on N287SC, although the missing 

bushing is not necessarily attributable to AMES because the aircraft in question 

had two tire changes and a landing gear cylinder replacement after AMES 

performed its MLG change in March 2010. My experience with the landing gear 

of the B-727 aircraft is that the FAA generated ramp inspection findings could be 

generated on any in-service B-727 after months of flying and it is too simplistic to 

assume that the noted items were the result of improper maintenance by AMES. 

6. Based on my experience, were the flying doors not properly rigged by AMES 

at the time it performed the "C" checks as alleged by the FAA, the aircraft 

operator would have immediately noticed the discrepancies when the aircraft 

returned to performing line service. There is no evidence this was the case as 

each aircraft flew for months without any indication of aerodynamic flight issues 

resulting from misfitted flying doors until N287SC returned to the departure 

airport due to a pilot report of airborne buffeting. Although the FAA Inspector 

attributed this event to a flying door that was not properly faired, it seems more 

likely that the air return was the result of rudder vibration caused by ceased 

rudder assembly bushings. As noted, were the need for the air return attributable 

to AMES' mis-installation of the flying doors, the issues would have manifested 

themselves immediately upon the aircraft being returned to service and not 

months later. 
6. After the ramp check the three subject aircraft were repositioned to AMES' 

facility to address the Inspector's findings. The wing doors cited by the Inspector 

were removed and bushing's replaced (due to wear) and in two instances the 

doors replaced as a precaution and to satisfy CCIA and the FAA. However, the 

replacement of the doors does not necessarily mean they were damaged by the 

actions of AMES as alleged by the FAA. In my experience it is typical of 

operators to exceed the work required to address wear and tear issues when 

FAA inspectors are questioning some aspect of carrier or repair station practices. 

The hallmark of being a good operator is being responsive to FAA inspector 

requests even if there are asking work be performed that is not mandatory based 

on applicable aircraft maintenance programs. 

7. In reviewing the relevant documents including the applicable aircraft 

maintenance manual provisions, I note that the Inspector Lipinski claimed that 

AMES failed to follow the applicable AMM provisions when performing the gear 

change and reinstalling the flying doors. From the maintenance records I 

observed that AMES cited Section 32-11-00. The FAA contends that AMES 

should have referenced AMM section 32-11-12 for the purpose of installing and 

rigging the flying doors. The FAA erred in reaching its conclusion. Not citing the 

wing door wing installation section 32-11-12 does not mean that improper 

maintenance was performed. Reference to section 32-11-00 encompasses the 

instructions for installing the main gear wing (flying) doors. This is shown on 

page 423 of 32-11-00, Step AL. Step 19 of Step AL states: "Adjust (rig) wing 

door (AMM 32-12-11/501). The FAA allegation that the lack of a reference to 

section 32-11-12 means the correct maintenance was not performed is based on 

an incorrect reading of AMM section 32-11-00. 

I reserve the right to modify, revise or enlarge my opinions as information is 

made available to me. 

Executed on April30, 2014 

- 1 -
Exhibit 1 

Daniel J. Hancher 

4926 Esplanade Street, Bonita Springs, Florida 34131, (407)314-8317 

Experience 

2010-Present Consultant to major airline, MROiJ€fMs and aircraft manufacturers on shop 

processes, contract negotiations, quality and aircraft inductions, 

1996-2010 Airtran Airways, Orlando, Florida 

General Manager Maintenance 

Managed and directed the Maintenance Control, Line Maintenance and Heavy 

Maintenance Departments. Oversaw the Maintenance of Airtrans' DC-9, B-717 and B-737 

fleet of aircraft. Responsible for overall operations of the 145 repair stations that 

accomplishes heavy maintenance of Airtrana€TMs fleet of aircraft. Accountable for the 

day-to-day scheduled maintenance checks per AirtraniJ€fMs General Maintenance 

Manual and FARs. 

1996-1999 Pemco World Air Services, Dothan, Alabama 

President 

Responsible for the overall management of a 145 repair station and day-to-day supervision 

of all aircraft maintenance and Quality Assurance activities. Accomplished modifications, 

maintenance checks, and structural repair to fulfill contractual obligations of the repair 

station. Regular customers were Northwest Airlines, Air Jamaica, Avianca, ILFC, UPS, TWA 

and military aircraft. Performed various structural modifications, heavy maintenance visits 

and cargo door modifications on DC-9, MD-80, 757, 767, 727, DC-1 0, A300, A31 0 and A320. 

1991-1996 The Dee Howard Company, San Antonio, Texas 

Vice President 

Managed the day-to-day operation of the repair station, including the supervision of all 

aircraft maintenance and Quality Assurance activities. Accomplished modifications, 

maintenance checks and structural repair to fulfill contractual obligations of the repair 

station. Frequent customers included Northwest Airlines, UPS, Federal Express, TWA and 

ContinentaL Performed various structural modifications, heavy maintenance visits and 

cargo door modifications on Dc-9, MD-80, 757, 767, 727, DC-1 0, A300 and other nonscheduled aircraft. 

1964-1991 Eastern Airlines, Miami, Florida 
Director of Atlantic Region Maintenance 

Began as a mechanic of line maintenance and progressed through the company to fulfill 

the directors position. Worked the line maintenance, C Checks, D Checks on all Eastern 

Fleet: 8727, 757, DC-9, A300, L 1011. Received certificates of training on all of the listed 

aircraft. 

References References are available on request. 

Exhibit 3 

Transcript Pages from Deposition of Frank Lipinski taken Dec. 18, 2014 
In The Matter Of: 

In the matter of Airborne Maintenance and Engineering 

Frank Lipinski 

December 18, 2014 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

Certified Court Reporters 

P.O.Box81124 

Atlanta, Georgia 30366 

770/458-5500 800/767-2030 

Original File 121814airb-jlp.txt 
1 

2 

3 

BEFORE THE 

US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

4 In the matter of: ) Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 

) FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 

5 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND) 

ENGINEERING SERVICES, ) 

6 ) Administrative Law Judge 

Respondent ) J.E. Sullivan 

7 ) 

8 

9 FRANK LIPINSKI 

10 

11 Deposition of FRANK LIPINSKI taken on behalf of 

12 Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services, at the 

13 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional 

14 Counsel, Southern Region, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College 

15 Park, Georgia, commencing on December 18, 2014, at 

16 9:25a.m. before Jennifer L. Pope, Certified Court 

17 Reporter and Registered Professional Reporter. 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

Certified Court Reporters 

P.O. Box 81124 

Atlanta, Georgia 30366 

770/458-5500 800/767-2030 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

1 ' 
1 indicating up to a point, going along with --

2 THE WITNESS: I'm listening to you. 

3 MR. SILVERBERG: -- by the nodding of his 

4 1 head --

5 THE WITNESS: I'm listening to you. 

6 BY MR. SILVERBERG: 

7 

s' 

9 

Q. 

A. 

Q. 

Okay. We agree that's the case? 

Yeah. 

Those are facts which are not in dispute. 

10 You didn't see the aircraft at those times 

11 I just indicated? 

12 

13 

A. 

Q. 

That's correct. 

Okay. Now, so whether or not the work 

14 performed months earlier was substandard such that 

15 it presented itself on May 25th when you saw the 

16 aircraft, after those intervening months and hours 

17 of operation, you -- your position is that, based on 

18 your observation of the condition of the flying 

19 doors --

20 

21 

A. 

Q. 

Yeah. 

-- and the rigging, that all of that, all 

22 of those discrepancies you noted were all, without 

23 exception, attributable to the original work that 

24 was done by AMES? 

25 A. I would say yes. 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

204 
1 Q. With no intervening event that would 

2 preclude any other finding? 

3 A. I would say yes. 

4 

5 

6 

Q. And that includes any intervening 

maintenance? 

A. (Nods head affirmatively.) 

7 Q. And tire changes, wheel changes, brake 

8 changes? 

9 A. (Nods head affirmatively.) 

10 Q. And that includes wear and tear? 

11 A. Yes. 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

Q. 

A. 

Okay. That's your position? 

As I previously stated, yes. 

MR. SILVERBERG: Off the record. 

(Recess from 3:16p.m. to 3:21p.m.) 

MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. Those are our 

17 questions for today. Do you have any redirect? 

18 MR. STEVENSON: I have no follow-up. We 

19 are going to request a read and sign. 

20 (Deposition concluded at 3:21p.m.) 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

(Signature reserved.) 

LYON REPORTING, INC. 

205 
Exhibit 4 

AMES Partial Work Sheet No. 79 Showing Completion of 

AMM Section 32-11-00, Para. 5, Steps AH through AL 

in Connection with the Original Left-Hand MLG Change on N899AA 
c 

PARTIAL WORK SHEET NO. 

R-11A 

08FEB09 

PAGE I oFf 

G r'fYl I Dl [) f 

-NO.~ -· , . "'"' """" r , ,w; ... ,~ 1.\f'>v: .) Ut+- ~r IAJ-1/d 

.,~, G.V< wd/ t..:tiit·s:..-<r-()" ' ?5..--f(-c)Q ~S>~ <: srff> N!r.. ·"'---' / 

TS" ~ ~ ."L y.. ll-c ;~-;J;;Jt "'- -...... ~ , , ~')-., ilX<. u.1 ;.~,, ~r:a'J VAi? A.."'l 

-'\ .,1\ 

./ , . ....-#1-_;;/...-p 1 '1~or;o2 lif/ ' 1· 

-~~-'fi414i>h"~b'-z l~i.?ll·'~ ~ i-ssrm3"""' l~ik'! I 7 -IL~ -;: ·-r '""'''"'-\ ("-'...,._p/,-t!-1_ .,_,.i':/t.. 

7u<4 S...., ~' -~.., _;,'n7 -fl "'- }V /4 1/ > II' ' 

7 

~ / ./' 

(~ 1-;;:::: ~4 ~~cecoz -..?'- ./?"'~~ -;.; •oo2.. 1~/>"//c-r 

./ 

· ..... .;.,. 

·-· .' 
Exhibit 5 

B-727 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), Section 32-45-01 
DOE~~~ 

MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

MAIN GEAR WHEELS - REMOVAL/INSTALLATION 

1. General 

A. Matching of tires on dual wheels is necessary so that each tire will have 

the same contact area with the ground and carry an equal share of the 

load. Whenever possible, install .tires having equal pressure and 

inflated diameters within 1/2 inch. Tires with diameters that differ 

more than 3/4 inch must not be used in pairs. Position larger diameter 

wheel assemblies on inboard side of gear. 

2. Equipment and Materials 

A. Wheel Change Dolly- Commercially available 

B. Main landing Gear Wheel Retaining Nut Wrench - 3ME65-72761 

C. Airplane jack for main gear 

D. Torque wrench 

E. Grease 

C1> Aeroshell 5 (preferred> <AMM 20-60-02) 

(2) MIL-G-81322 (alternate) (AMM 20-60-02) 

F. Dow Corning 200 fluid or No. 10 machine oil <AMM 20-60-02) 

G. Axle Thread Protector - F72880-3 or F72913-3 

3. Remove Main Gear Wheel 

A. Set parking brake to hold brake disks aligned for when the wheel is 

installed. 

NQII: If brake disks misalign when brake pressure is off it will be 

necessary to align brake disks before installing wheel. 

B. Jack main gear until wheel clears and deflate tire (Ref Chapter 7, 

Jacking). 

WARNING: YOU MUST NOT REMOVE THE TWO WHEELS AT THE SAME TIME. IF THE 

AIRPLANE ACCIDENTALLY FALLS OFF THE JACK, INJURIES TO PERSONS 

AND DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE CAN OCCUR. 

WARNING: FAILURE TO DEFLATE TIRE COULD RESULT IN INJURY IF A DEFECTIVE 

TIRE/WHEEL SHOULD EXPLODE. 

(1) If tire cannot be deflated, back off valve stem slowly while 

applying a slight pressure on the valve stem during removal. 

WARNING: EXCESSIVE TWISTING FORCE CAN CAUSE SEPARATION OF VALVE 

CORE PARTS. STAY OUT OF VALVE PATH DURING REMOVAL OR 

INJURY MAY RESULT. 

c. Remove hubcap bolts <Fig. 201) and hubcap. 

D. Remove axle nut lockbolt. 

EFFECTIVITY·------------, 32-45-01 

ALL 

01 Page 401 

Dec 01/05 

BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished Work- See title page for details. 
E. 

< 

ao.e"~:=l·R~~ MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

Remove axle nut using special wrench. 

Remove washer and outer bearing, 

To remove outboard wheels, remove two bolts through wing door actuating rod, raise wing door to servicing position and replace one bolt. 

CAUTION: DO NOT REMOVE ACTUATION ROD ATTACHMENT BOLT AND RAISE DOOR 

ABOVE NORMAL SERVICE POSITION AS HINGE COVER MAY BE DAMAGED. 

H. Install axle thread protector. 

I. Position wheel change dally, raise wheel, and remove. 

J. Mark the reason for the tire removal on the tire to aid the inspectors when they examine the tire. · · 

K. Check that inner main wheel bearing and dust seal remain in wheel. 

~: On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal-felt-type dust seal, inner main wheel bearing and dust seal are retained in wheel with 

a retainer ring. On airplanes using wheels equipped with 

metal-rubber-type dust seal, inner main wheel bearing and dust 

seal are not retained with a retainer ring. 

4. Install Majn Gear Wheel 

NOTE: Main landing gear may have one of two types of dust seals supplied with the wheels. ·one type consists of a metal-felt-type seal used 

with a wiper ring and a retaining ring. The ather type consists of a 

metal-rubber-type seal used without a wiper ring and retaining ring. 

A. 

B. 

On airplanes .using wheels equipped with metal-felt-type dust seal, check 

that· dust seal and inner bearing are held in place in wheel by a retainer 

ring and that antirotation tab on dust seal ring is in notch in wheel 

hub. 

On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal-rubber-type dust seal, check that dust seal and inner bearing are positioned properly in wheel. 

Installation instructions are imprinted on side of seal: THIS SIDE 

TOWARD BEARING. 

Ensure that bearing has been packed with grease before wheel 

installation. On airplanes using wheels equipped with 

metal-felt-type dust seal, ensure that felt has been soaked in 

light machine oil or Dow Corning 200 fluid for 5 minutes and let 

drain for 15 minutes prior to installation. 

EFFECTIVITY'---A-LL---------,1 " 32-45-01 

BOEliLG PROPRIETARY - Copyr1gt-.t (C} - Unpubtish~d \lork - Se~ title page fQr details. 

Page 402 

Apr 01/07 

\ 

r 

I 

Exhibit 6 

B-727 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), 

Section 32-12-11, Figure 601 
) 

HDEI~ 

MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

!NBD~ ~FWD 

I 

1 

I 

\ 

\ 

'-=--

' / 

' ............ __ --/ I 

I 

I ' 

SECTION A-A 

I 

! 

1 

I 

I 

I 

flain Gear Wing Door - Wear Limits 

Figure 601 (Sheet 1J 

32-12-11 

Page 602 

Dec 01/05 

g EFFECTIVITY---A-L-L---------., D' 

BOEitlG PROPRIETARY .. Copyr-ight (C) -Unpublished \lcrk ~ see titte page for details. 
INDEX PART 

NO. NAME DIM 

1 ROO 10 

2 BOLT 00 

3 BUSHING 10 

4 BUSHING 00 

5 BUSHING ID 

6 GIMBAL OD 

13::> BUSHING ID 7 

B> BUSHING ID 

8 BUSHING OD 

§:> BUSHING 10 9 

B> BUSHING ID 

10 BUSHING OD 

H BUSHING 10 

12 BUSHING 1 oo 

BUSHING 

13 TO - BUSHING 

WASHER 

!I> TO 

WASHER --

fi> IF INSTALLED. 

1 

DUEl~ 

MAINTENANCE MANUAL 

DESIGN LIMITS WEAR LIMITS 

DIAMETER MAX 

MAX D!A REPlACE 

WEAR CLEAR WORN 

MIN MAX DIM ANCE PART 

0.5625 0.5640 0.5685 X 

0.0070 

0.5605 0.5615 0.5575 X 

0.7510 0.7520 0.7560 X 

0.0070 

0.7485 0.7490 0.7440 X 

1.2490 1.2500 1.2535 X 

0.0060 

1.2470 1.2475 1.2430 X 

0.5010 0.5020 0.5050 0.0050 X 

0.5032 0.5052 0.5114 0.0114 X 

0.4995 0.5000 0.4960 0.0050 X 

0.5010 0.5020 0.5050 0.0050 X 

0.5032 0.5052 0.5114 0.0114 X 

0.4995 0.5000 0.4960 0.0050 X 

0.6250 0.6265 0.6310 X 

0.0070 

0.6230 0.6240 0.6180 X 

1.9380 1.9640 1.9220 X 

0.094 

~ 1.966 2.016 - X 

REPAJR 

WORN REPAIR 

PART INSTR. 

~ DESIGN CLEARANCE IS O.OOZINCH MINIMUM, 0.0781NCH MAXIMUM. IF WEAR IS IN EXCESS OF 

0,086 INCH, INSPECT THRUST FACE OF BOTH BUSHING. IF EITHER FACE SHOWS WEAR THROUGH 

SINTERED BRONZE SURFACE, REMOVE AND REPLACE BUSHINGS. 

13:> AIRPLANES NOT INCORPORATING SB 32-234 

B> AIRPLANES INCORPORATING SB 32-234 

!-lain Gear Wing Door- Wear Limits 

Figure 601 (Sheet 2) 

EFFECTIVITY------------. 

ALL 

01 

32-12-11 

Page 603 

Dec 01/05 

BQE:ING Pfl:ilPRIETARY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished lt'otk - Se;e title page for detail.s. 

Exhibit 7 

CCIA Aircraft Technical Log Report 

Documenting Tire Change on Aircraft N287SC 
( 

~rs f'fiL. 

( iffl6 'AhLt 

4-ftrr, MrE.W! 

.TOL. 

7H 

BNA 

·CVG 

·CVG 

1\II!~G S-t...} SIU./lceti/ 

,, II II 

,, " I<- ,., 

RPT COD&: 1.1.9 

PAGE NO.·: lTAIL NO. : 267 

bl' N 

" 

·N 

N 

i'1 
( DA'!'£; 09/21/2012 TIME~ 16.:il 

ACFT; N287SC • B727 ''· 

" .. #ATA 

- "'"it.!Ec. 

(_~_-· 

( 

··: .Capital Cci.rgo :tnter:r:l:.atibtLal - AMIS-2.0·12 

720 

MOO 

FLL 

,jj4 BRAKE Q/D LllAKS AT BRAKE N 

1-~~«}·§H•§ MAIN§~~~IN~S~'l'~·llEQt!I~~RE~D~S=TE=P:..::•X_::{S~)-THR==li-~ . 'REF. AMM 32"11-.00 . N 

AcCoM>'i.Isimo STEP X (S) .TfiRU COMPLETION R/!1 

-MLG ·RBF .. .AMM 32-ii-·06 .. NoJiMA+_, 

NORMAL ESTENSION/RE:TIU!.t:I'IbN :&. 'EMER EXTENSION .. (,!KS . . . . , . · . 

. PAGES .7 .ITEMS 

N 

~ 

li. ·"!t,G . . . . . ruj$Y· f.<JlEIDS REPL/l<CED OtiE TO .LBi\K N 

#j, >!LG :~ MSY 'MEi>,lllm..ING 'PIN 'DAMAGED 8'j 

:RETURNEO ~WING DOOR 'ON RT GEAR TO NORMiiL 

·POSITION .PER AMM -3.2 'l'4l-32 

:mSTALI.E:!;'f #3 TIRE ASSY· PER J\MM 32-45-01, 'NO 

DISC NOTED~ "OK FOR 'CON'!' SERVICE . 

!t.TIRE. 

INSTAiiLED #4 TIRE >ASSY PER AMM :3·2-45-01 1 NO 

DISC NOTED. bK FOR .CONT SERVICE 

f-'L=:.,.T;;:.::N·o ;;:.::SB .. ~TII\E:::. ·:...:~=DRN:J'~T.:_OtiM=J;.TS =------1 N 

'R'&.R LT ·NOSE ,'n:RE PER .AMM '32-4-5-~~. NO DISC 

I{OTEO. OK FOR .CQET SERVICE 

Exhibit 8 

E-Mail Correspondence from CCIA VP of Maintenance 

to AMES Complementing AMES on its Work 
· ' {In Archive} Capital Cargo Aircraft N287SC 

RandyBuol 

to:· 

· daniel.boggs@aitbornemx.com 

. i ··~22/2010 05:43 ~M 

· ''Brady.Templeton@airbomemx.com", Charles Werking 

Hide Details 

· From: Randy Buol <rbuol@capitalcargo.com> 

'!~o: ·"daniel.boggs@airbornemx.com" <daniel.boggs@airbomemx.com> 

Page 1 of 1 

, . Cc: "Brady.Templeton@airbomemx.com" <Brady.Templeton@airbornemx.com>, Charles 

:. lw,erking <cwerking@capitalcargo.com> ! ':'i.• .. ',' '·· .. '. ', '' ', .. ' 

Dan~ 

': ·, : :· ' . ; ·. :' .. ' 

..... >-.;: 

i. :.i .. '· ,· 

: i . '~: '.· . ~ . 

J ~ ·.:' ! 

. lli8tory: This message has been forwarded. 

: ;,,Archive: This message is being viewed in an archive. 

t;·~-. .' .. ,.,; .. :.· .•.;:.~ .. ·:-·:·,; 

l wanted to write a quick note to say thank you for an on-time, high quality delivery of our aircraft. 

After the test,flight our aircraft is now in Toledo and on schedule for its next revenue flight. 

Please pass on ~o your team my thanks for a job well done. 

Best regards, . 

Randy Buol :;:'·. 

VP Maintenance • 

Capital Cargo. 

~ i ; . : 

'·--·· 

: ;, ,;· .o ~ : j _::: . -'• ~--: . . 

!;:-··