### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 15, 200 6 S es sio n
FEDERATED RURAL ELE CTRIC I NSURANCE EXCHANGE, ET AL 

### . v.

WILLIAM R. HILL, ET AL 

### . Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 05C-1284 The Honorable Barbara Haynes, Jud ge

No. M2005- 02461-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on March 26, 2007

Em plo y e r a nd its ins ur e r f

ile d su it a g a ins t e mpl oy e e fo r fr a ud in t he pr oc ur e me nt o f w or

ke rs ' comp en s ati on benef

its. Employ ee a

nd his wife filed a

counter -complaint alleg ing intentional infliction of emotional distress. reta liatory discharg e and loss of c onso rt i u m

. T h e trial court dismiss ed the c ounter-c omplaint for fa ilure to state a c laim. Employ ee soug ht to amend the counte rc omp la int to a dd pr oc ur e me nt of br e a c h of em plo y me nt co ntr a c t and a tor

tio us int e rf

e re nc e c la im
a g a in s t t h e in s u r e r

. T h e tr ia l c o u rt a ls o d e n ie d th e s e c la im s

. Emp lo y e e an d h is w if e a p p e a l. We
reve rse in par

t, affir m in part, and re mand.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed in Par t, Aff irm ed in Par t, and Rem anded

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Clifford E. Wilson of Madisonvil le, Tenne ssee f or Ap p ellants, Fe derated rura l Electric I nsuranc e Ex chang e and F ort L oudoun Electric Cooperative

W. S tuart Scott and Autumn L

. Gentry of Nashville, Tenne ssee for Appellees, Wil liam R. Hill and Suza nn C. H ill

OP IN ION During the cour se of his employ ment with Fort L oudoun Electric Cooperative ( “F ort L oudoun,”), William R. Hil l all ege d ly suffe red on- the-job injuries to his knees ove r the c ourse of
s ev er al y ea rs

. I n1 9 9 0 , Fo rt L o u d o u n an d i t s i n s u re r, Fe d er at edR u ra l E l ec t ri c Ins u ra n ce E x ch an ge (“F eder ate d ” an d , toge ther with F ort L oudoun, “Plaintiffs” or “ Appellee s”) a cce pted a wor kers
c omp e ns a tio n c la im and vo lun tari ly pa id Mr

. Hi ll $2 3, 59 5. 00 in t e mpo ra ry tot a l di sa bil ity be ne fi ts and $51,160.11 in medica l benef its for alleg ed injuries to Mr. Hill’s knee s. T he 1990 settlement resulted in 70% pe rmane nt partial disability to the body

as a w hole.-2-

On July 9, 20 03 , F or

t L ou do un and F e de rate d e nte re d int o a se c on d se ttl e me nt wi th Mr . H ill wh e re by the y a g re e d to pa

y Mr

. Hi ll wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts f or an a lle g e d 1 99 8 in

jur y to Mr. Hill’ s kn e e s

. U n d e r th e A g r e e d O r d e r , th e Pl a in ti f f s p a id me d ic a l b e n e f

it s in th e a mo unt of $1 14 ,0 64 .4 9, c a se mana g e me nt c os ts o f $ 8, 46 4. 13 , a nd $1 4, 34 6. 42 in t e mpo ra

ry dis a bil ity be ne fi ts. Th is s e ttl e me nt, a lon g wi th the 19 90 se ttl e me nt, tot a le d 1 00 % p e rm ane nt, pa rt ia l di sa bil ity be ne fi ts to the body

as a w hole. I n addition, Fede rate d and F ort L oud oun ag ree d to leave life time future medical be nefits open f

or trea tment of Mr. Hill’s injuries, and paid $2,500.00 a s an adva nce pa y ment tow ard futur e lif e tim e me dic a l be ne fi ts. Com bin e d, the 19 90 and 20 03 se ttl e me nts br ou g ht M r. Hi ll to over 100% in tempor ary , total and per manent, par

tial disabilit y

benef its, thereby ex ce eding the
ma ximuma mou

nt t o w hic h a c la ima

nt is e nti tle d un de r the Te nn e sse e Wor ke rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n A c t, T.C.A. § 50-6-102.

I n November

2004, Mr. Hill underwe nt an arthrosc opic proce dure on his knees, which w as perf ormed by Dr. Rick Parsons. The rea ft er , M r. Hill was off ere d light-duty

desk work at Fort L oudoun. Whil e Mr. Hill wa s out f rom work a

nd collectingtotal disabilit y benef its, he was ca

ug ht on videotape building a bar n. Over the cour se of se vera l day s, Mr. Hill was see n climbing up a nd d o w na l a d d e r , w a l k i n g o v e r u n e v e n g r o u n d , an d w a l k i n g a c r o s s a r o o f w i t h o u ta p p ar e n td i f

f i c u l t y. After revie wing the videotape s, Mr. Hill’s treatingphy sician, Dr. P ar s o n s , opined in an Apr il 25, 2005 letter that “[Dr. Parsons] ce rtainly do[es] not fee l like Mr. Hill is t otally disabled to work a

nd g iven his doc umented phy sical activities

. . . it is difficult to imag ine the patient havingrestric tions g iven the phy sical labor he did on an ong oing ba sis . . . .”

B y le tte r da te d May 2, 20 05 , F or t L ou do un

te rm inate d M r. Hi ll’ s e mpl oy me nt. On that sa me day , For t L oudoun and F eder ated f i l ed s u i t against Mr. Hill for f raud, pur suant to T.C.A. § 50-6- 225(a) (1) and the W orker s’ C ompensation Fr aud Act, T.C.A. § 56-47-101 et seq., citing Mr. Hill’s
a b il it y to p e r f o r m s tr e n u o u s , p h y s ic a l a c ti v it y a s c a u g h t o n v id e o ta

p e

. T h e Pl a in ti f

f s reque sted a finding that Mr. Hill was improper ly collectingtemporar

y , total disa

bility benef

its a nd a finding that Mr. Hill had eng ag ed in fra ud. The Plaintiffs pra

y ed that Mr. Hill be assessed appropr iate pena lties and that his rig ht to any additional worke rs’ compensation benef its (which had be en appr oved by the trial court’s order of J uly

9, 2003, su

pra ) be te rminated. At the time they filed the Complaint, the Plaintiffs a ls o s e r

v e d in te r r o g a to r ie s , r e qu e s ts f

o r p r o d u c ti o no f d o c u me n ts an d

r e qu e s ts f

or admissions on Mr. H ill. Mr. Hill wa s serve d with the se discovery reque sts on or about May 7, 2005. Mr. H il l f

il e d n o r e s p o n s iv e p le a d in g s

. Rath e r , o n o r a b o u t M ay 2 3 , 2 0 0 5 , M r

. H il l s e r v ed the Plaintiffs with noti ce to take de positions. On May 25, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Quash the discovery reque sts and, on May 27, 2005, Mr. Hill r esponded to the Motion to Quash. The motions
we re he ard o n May

27 , 2 00 5 a

nd , b y or de r o f Jun e 6, 20 05 , th e tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d th e Mo tio n to Quash.

On June 2, 20 05 , Mr. Hi ll fil e d a motio n to dismi ss, in wh ic h he fi rs t obje c te d to ven ue in the Davidson Count y court. Plaintiffs filed a r esponse to the motion to dismi ss on J uly 8, 2005. The motion was hear d on J uly 15, 2 0 0 5

. By o rder

of Jul y 27, 2005, the trial cour

t entere d an orde r denying Mr . Hill’s motion t o dismiss and spec ifically reta ining ve nue.-3-

On J une 9, 2005, Mr. Hill f iled an Answer to the Complaint. On J uly 29, 2005, Mr. Hill filed a Counter- Complaint aga inst Fede rate d and F ort L oudoun for intentional infliction of emotional distress and re taliatory

dischar ge. M r. Hi ll’s wife, Suzann (tog ether with Mr. Hill, the “Hills” or “Appe llants”) joined in the Counter- Complaint, asserting de rivative c auses of action and a loss of consortium claim stemming from the termination of Mr. Hill’s employ ment. On Aug ust 26, 2005, in r esponse to the Counter-Complaint, Plainti ffs filed a “Motion to Dismis s the Counter-Complaint fo r f a ilure to s ta te a

c la im u po n w hic h r e li ef may

be g ra nte d, to s tr ike the Counte r- Com pla int , to Request a m o re D efinitive Statement.” The Hills filed a re sponse to this mot ion on September 6, 2005 and the motion was he ard on Septe mber 9, 2005. On September

21, 2005, the trial cour

t entered an Or der, w hich re ads, in rele vant par t, as fo llo ws :
3. Wil liam R. Hill ha s acknow ledg ed that there is no valid tort of bad

faith cla im ag ainst the Plai ntiffs or either of them. Insofar

as the Counter-Complaint impli ed a tort of ba d faith existed ag ainst the Plaintiffs or either of them, any and all such claims are stricken a nd dis mis se d w ithpr e

jud ic e

. Th e De fe nd ant, ho we ve r, Willi a m R. H ill , throug h his attorney

has take n the position that the C o u n t erComplaint, which he previously filed, was not intended to include a tort of bad f

aith. There is, theref

ore, no tort of

bad fa ith which has be e n a sse rt e d o r w hic h w ill or may be purs ue d in this l aws uit . T his Court a lso fi nd s tha t no tort of

ba d f a ithha s e ve r b e e n a lle g e d a g a ins t Fe derated Rural Elec tric Insuranc e Exchang e and F ort L oudoun Electric Cooperative.

4. Willi a m R. Hi ll a sse rt s int e nti on a l inf lic tio n of e mot ion a l di str e ss and what appea

rs t o be outra g eous conduc t. These torts ar e bar red by the e xclu siv e re me dy

pr ov isi on s o f t

he Te nn e sse e Wor

ke rs ’ Compensation Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-108. In addition, the CounterComplai nt failed to asse rt the ele ments which Tenne ssee law mandates a s nece ssary

to pursue any

such tort claims, eve n if they
wer e otherwise allowed. The se cla ims are dismissed with prejudice to the ref iling ther eof.

5. Suza nn Hi ll a sse rt s e nti tlem ent to n ume ro us fo rm s o f d a ma g e s. The g rava men of he r alle gat i ons appea rs to be intentional infliction of e mot ion a l di str e ss a

nd re ta liator y dis c ha rg e . Su zann H ill ’s c la ims fail to g ener ate a claim upon which relief can be g rante d under Tenne ssee law . Her

tort claim s are barr ed by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Tenne ssee Workers’ Compensation Ac t and the damag es she se eks ar e no t d amag es which she may rec over unde r reta liatory

discharge o r o t herw ise in this lawsuit. I n addition, the-4- Counte r- Com

pla int fa ils to a sse rt ne c e ssa

ry e le me nts to s up po rt

the se c la ims un de r T e nn e sse e law. Suza nn Hi ll is not a pro pe r p art y to t his lawsuit. Her c laims are loss of consor tium or derivative c laims of the torts whi ch ar e barr ed by the exclusive remedy

provisions of the Tenne ss ee W o rk ers’ Compensation Act. Any and all cla ims of Suz ann Hill are dismiss ed with pre judice.

6. Th e Counte r- Com

pla int of the De fe nd ant, W il li a m R. Hi ll, is stricken. Wil liam R. Hill sha ll g ener ate a ne w C o u nter-Complaint which complies with Tenne ssee law within 30 da

y s of September 15, 2005. This Counter-C o m p l ai nt shall contain only claims under the Tenne ssee Workers’ Compensation A ct and for reta liatory discharg e. This Counter-Complaint sh al l co mply with Tennesse e law a

nd the Rules of Civil Procedur e including a short and plain stateme nt of ea ch claim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief a nd a dema

nd for judgme nt for the r elief the pleade r see ks in harmony with Tennesse e law. The Counter-Complaint sha ll make a more definite statement as to eac h of these two r emaining claims in harmony with Tenne s s ee Rules of Civil P roce dure Rule 12.05. F urther, only the damag es allowed by

Tenne ssee law

for these two rem ai n i n g claims shall be ple d. I n ad dit ion , all oth e r cl a ims of the De fe nd ant, Willi a m R. Hi ll,
are dismiss ed with pre

judice to the re filing the reof

. On Octobe r 12, 2005, Mrs. Hill filed her Notice of

Appea l from the September 21, 2005 Orde r. On that same day , Mr. Hill filed his First Amende d Counter-Complaint. C o u n s el for Plaintiffs prot est ed the Ame nded Counter- Complaint and informed counse l for Mr. Hill that they
wo uld fi le a mot ion to dis mis s if the Cou

nte r- Com pla int wa s no t fu

rt he r a me nd e d to c omp ly

wi th Te nn e sse e law a

nd th e S ept e mbe r 2 1, 20 05 Or de r. Mr . H ill did no t make the re qu e ste d c ha ng e s. Ra the r, on

or a bo ut D e c e mbe r 1 , 2 00 5, Mr

. Hi ll f ile d a Mo tio n f or De fa ult Judg me nt f

or Pla int if fs ’
a lle g e d f a ilur e to a

ns we r. On

De c e mbe r 8 , 2 00 5, Pla int if fs fi le d a Mo tio n to Di smi ss, Mo tio n to Strike, Motion to S tay

L itigation and Response to Motion for Def ault J udg ment, in which Plaintiffs argued, inte r a lia , that Mr. Hill had fa iled to state a c laim upon which re lief could be g rante d.

On Dece m b er 28, 2005, Mr. Hill filed a Motion to Amend the first Amende d CounterCompla i n t s ee king to a dd claims ag ainst Fe derated for tor tious int erf

ere nce w ith contrac t and p r o c u r e me n t o f b r e a c h o f c o n tr a c t. O n Ja n u ar y 6 , 2 0 0 6 , Pl a in ti f

f s f il e d a r e s p o n s e in w h ich they
a sse rt that th e pr op os e d A me nd e d Co un te r- Com pla int fa ils to s ta te a

c la im. All pending motions we re hear d on J anuar y 20, 2006. On Fe bruar

y 13, 2006, the trial cour

t
e nte re d it “ F ina l O rd e r, ” wh ic h r e a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
1. The De fenda

nts’ Motion for De fault Judgment is overr uled. Ther e is n o v a lid

ba sis fo r a

de fa ult judg me nt a g a ins t th e Pla int if fs in t his-5- matter. The proposed Counter- Compl ai nt and Amende d CounterCom pla int c on ta in t or

t c la ims whi ch the De fe nd ant h a d p re vio us ly been advised vi olate the exclusive reme dy provision of the Tenne ssee Workers’ Compensation Ac t, T.C.A. § 50-6-108. I n addition, the tort
c la im s s o u g h t t o b e in c lu d e d b y th e D e f e n d an t f a il to a s s e rt t

he
ne c e ssa ry e le me nts and , th e re fo re , th e y fa iled to c omp ly

wi th Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure , Rule 12.02(6).

* * *
3. Any and all litigation in thi s matter is s t ay ed

. This Court previously

lifted the S chedulingOrde r. Since this time, the Def endant, although he failed to attend a Scheduling Confere nce se t by thi s Co ur t, ha s app are ntl y a tte mpt e d to pur su e lit ig a tio n b e fo re thi s Trial Court while simultaneo usly appea ling the Septe mber 9, 2005 ruling of t his Court to the C ourt of Appeals. The rulingof the Court of Appe als could af

fec t the parties, the claims, the l eg al theorie s and the damag es. This Court finds it is inappropriate for a ny additional litigation to occur

in this m atter at this t ime and, ther efor e, stay s any and a ll p ro c e e din g s p e nd inga fi na l r uli ng fr om the Ap pe llate Court s reg ardingany

issues appea led in this case.

Mr . H ill fi le d a tim e ly No tic e of Ap pe a l fr om t his Or de r a

nd his a pp e a l w a s c on so lid a te d w ith Mrs. Hill’s appea l. The Hills raise se ven issues for revie w, as stated in their

brief:

1. Whether or not the t rial cour t was cor rec t in overruling the motion to di s m iss filed by

Wil liam R. Hill seekingto have this litigation dismiss ed or transfe rre d to Monroe County asser ting that Da

vidson County is an improper ve nue?

2. Whether or not the c ourt’s order dated J une 6, 2005 quashing the
no tic e to t a ke de po sit ion s f ile d b y the Hi lls wa s e rr on e ou s?

3. W h et h er o r not the trial cour t’s order of September

21, 2005 str iki ngthe c ounte r c omp la int in i ts e nti re ty

wa s e rr on e ou s?

4. Whether or not the tria l court’s ord er o f S eptember 21, 2005 dismiss ing Suzann C. Hill as a par ty and dismissing her

loss of consortium claim, beinga der ivative claim of Mr . Hill’s retaliatory dis c ha rg e c la im, wa s e rr on e ou s?

5. Whether or not the t ri al court’s order of September 21, 2005, att em p t i n g t o p ro h i b i tfu tu re am en d m en t s t o t h e c o unter-c omplaint on-6- behalf of Mr. Hill was [a violation] of Rul e 15 of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedur e which establishes a libera l policy with reg ard to the allowanc e of amendments to ple ading s and whe ther or not the c ourt in pursuance of that stated policy was c orre ct when it over ruled Counte r- Pla int if

fs ’ mot ion to a me nd to a lle g e a cla im a g a ins t F e de rat ed Rur a l E le c tr ic I ns ur anc e Exc ha ng e that it

tor tio us ly interfe red w ith Mr. Hill’s c ontrac t of employ ment with Fort L oudoun El e c tr ic Coo pe rativ e or

that it int e nti on a lly

int e rf e re d w itha

bu sin e ss arr ang e me nt b e tw e e n Wil liam R. Hill and F or t L ou do un

El e c tr ic Cooperative?

6. Whether or not the trial court’s orde r of January 20, 2006, staying
a ll p ro c e e din g s at th e tr ia l c ourt le ve l, i nc ludin g the wo rk e rs ’
c omp e ns a tio n c la im o f M r. Hi ll, wh ile the a pp e a l pe rf

e c te d b y Mr s. Hi ll w a s p e nd ing , w a s e rr on e ou s?

7. Whether or not the trial court was c orre ct when it re fused to g rant Mr. Hill’s motion for defa ult judg ment made a g ainst Fe derated Rural Electric I nsuranc e Exchang e and F ort L oudoun Electric Coope r a ti v e?

Venue

I n the first issue on appe al, Mr. Hill contends that ve nue for both the Plaint i ffs’ Petiti ons alleg ing f raud a s well as the Hills’ own c ounter c lai m s l i es i n Monroe County , Tenne ssee, a s opposed to Davidson County , Tenne ssee. We disag ree

. Pla int if fs fi le d th e pe tit ion

fo r r e lie f in the Cir c uit

Cou rt a t D a vid so n Co un ty , T e nn e sse e in the same c ase w here a pre vious settlement ag ree ment was a pproved, se esup ra

. The gra vamen of Plaintiffs’ suit is t hat Mr. Hill was guilty of fr audulent ac ts in obtaining the be nefits re flec ted in the J uly 9, 2003 ag ree d settlement. T.C.A. § 50-6-225( a)( 1), under which the Plaintiffs bringtheir fr aud suit, and the g ener al venue statute for tra nsitory actions, T.C.A. § 20-4- 101, both state that an a ction may b e b r o ug

ht in a county

wh e re the c la ima

nt r e sid e s ( ve rs us wh e re the inj ur y oc c ur re d) . B oth statutes use the pe rmissive lang uag e “ma y file” a nd “may be broug ht.” Neither s t atute, howe ver, mandates that venue be in a par ticular loca le.
Our Supreme Court has held that, althoug h venue is the persona l pr ivilege of the de fenda nt to b e s u e d

i np art i c u l ar

c o u n t i e s , i tm ay

b e w a i v e d

b y a d e f e n d an tw h o d e f

e n d s u p o nt h e m e ri ts without first interposing an objection to improper venue

. Se eCor ky v . M att he ws , 541 S.W .2d 789, 79 1 (T e nn . 197 6)

. He re , Mr. Hi ll sub mit te d to ven ue in the Da

vid so n Coun ty c ourt by

e nte ri ngint o an ag ree d settlement that was a pproved by

that court. Plaintiffs’ pre sent ac t ion for fr aud contemplates a

revisiting or

rec onsid er ati on of that orig inal settlement ag ree ment in light of the videotaped evidenc e. I n Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co. , 27 S.W.3 d 909 (T e nn . 2 00 0) , o ur Sup re me Court addre ssed t he question of venue when reconsider ing a claimant’s prior aw ard ma de pursua nt-7-

to a settlement. In holding that ve nue for the cl ai m ant’s new

cause of ac tion requesting
rec onsideration of a

previous wor

kers’ compensation settlement awa rd shoul d be filed in the c ourt that approve d the orig inal settlement, the Court rea soned:

The statute e mploy s the terms “r econside r” and “re considera

tion.” “Rec onsider” me ans “to c onsi der a g ain,”
e s p e c i a l l y “ w i t h i n t e n tt o m o d i f

y an e ar l i e r

d e c i s i o n

. ” W e b s t e r ' s II New Colleg e Dictionar

y 927 (1995). B lack' s L aw Dictionary states that “ re c on sid e ratio n” imp lie s “ a dif fe re nt d e c isi on

by the e nti ty wh ic h in iti a lly

de c ide d it .” B la c k' s L aw D ic tio na ry 12 72 (6 th ed.1990); c f. L ester Witte & Co. v. Pate, 15 8 Ga.App. 204, 279 S.E .2 d 5 01 , 5 02 (1 98 1) (“ re c on sid e r” me ans “ to c on sid e r a g a in; to revie w with car e, espe cially with a view to a r ever sal of pre vious action.”) . We find the l ang uag e of Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241 to be unambig uous. By

employ ing the term “r econside r,” it i s evident that the leg islature re g ard eda r eq u es tfo r r ec o n s i d er at i o nb ro u gh tp u rs uant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 50- 6-241(a )(2) as a c ontinuation of the orig inal
wo rk e rs ' c ompens atio n c la im. F ur the rm or e , a s th e de fe nd ant p oin ts
ou t, t he st a tut or

y langua g e “ a

pp lic a tio n to the a

pp ro pr ia te c ourt ”
c le arl y ind ic a te s th e re is b ut o ne c ourt in w hic h th e mot ion

is appropr iate-the court that orig inally hear d the settlement. See 82 Am.J ur.2d Workers' Compensation § 651 ( 1992) (the c ourt having jurisdiction to secure c ompensation is usua lly empower ed to re open or modify its awards) ; 101 C.J .S. W orkmen' s Compensation § 855 (1 9 5 8 ) ( “ap ro ce ed i n g t o m o d i fy an aw ar d i s n o ta n ew p ro ce ed i n g, b u t is o n e b a s e d o n th e ju r is d ic ti on of the

AAA court a cquire d in the orig inal proce eding .”); see a lso 49 C.J .S. J udg ments § 278 (1997). Thus, we c onclude that a motion for rec onsideration broug ht pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241( a)( 2) m ust be filed in the same c ourt that exercised jurisdiction over the origi n al workers' compensation
c la im.

Th is h old inga s to Te nn .Code Ann. § 5 0- 6- 24 1( a )( 2) is
co n s istent with thi s Court's a pproac h reg ardingmodification of worke rs' compensation benefits under Tenn.Code Ann. § 50- 6-231 (for merly Tenn.Code Ann. 50- 1025(b)) . Section 231(2) . . . .

Id. at 912.

Al tho ug h th e pr e se nt c a se do e s n ot t ur n o n th e same statut e a s Freeman , th e Court ’s log ic is equally applicable here beca use, as discussed above, the fr aud cla im requires r econside ration of the or ig ina l w or

ke rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n s e ttl e me nt.-8-

Ho we v er , even if we a ssume, arguendo , that Plaintiffs’ suit is not, in essenc e, a rec onsideration, we nonetheless c onclude that Mr. H ill has waived his objection t o venue by filing
a notice to ta

ke deposition in the Davidson County court. See Oakley

v. Oake y , No. 01A01-9410- CH-00506H, 1995 W L459112 (Tenn. Ct. App., Aug . 4, 1995). (I f a pa rty makes a g ener al appea ranc e and doe s not take issue with venue , the issue of ve nue is waive d. Id . at *3.) Quashing the Notice to Ta ke De positions

I t is well settled that decisions reg ardingpre- trial discover y matters re s t within the sound discretion of the trial court. The dec ision of the trial court in discove ry matters will not be re verse d on appea l unless a clea

r abuse of discre tion is demonstrated. Be a to n v . Sn y der , 8 2 5 S.W .2d 409 (T e nn . 1 99 2) ; Paine v. Ram sey , 591 S.W .2d 434, 436 (Tenn. 1979). Whil e the “ abuse of discretion” sta nd ard lim its the sc op e of

our r e vie w o f d isc re tio na ry deci sions , it

do e s n ot i mmunize the se decisions completely

from appe llate re view. Duncan v. Duncan , 7 89 S.W. 2d 55 7, 56 1 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1990). Eve n though it prevents us from sec ond-g uessing the trial cour t, Whit ev . V and e rb ilt Univ. , 21 S.W .3d 215, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), or from substituting our discr etion for the tr ial court’s discr etion, Myint v. Alls tate Ins. C o. , 970 S.W .2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998) ; it does not prevent us from examining the tria l court’s de cision to deter mine whether it has t aken the applicable law and rele vant fa cts into acc ount. Ballard v. Herzke , 924 S.W .2d 652, 661 (Te n n . 1996). We will not hesitate to conc lude that a tria l court “abused its discretion” when the c ourt has applied a n incorre ct leg al standard, has rea ched a decision that is illogica l, has based its dec ision on a clea rly err oneous assessment of the evidenc e, or ha s employ ed re asoningthat cause s an injustice to the complaining party

. Clin ard v. Blackwood , 4 6 S. W.3 d 1 77 , 1 82 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Buc kne r v . Ha sse ll , 44 S.W .3d 78 , 8 3 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; Ove rstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc. , 4 S.W .3d 694, 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

I n the instant case , Mr. Hill filed a Notice to Take D epositions of Robert R. L ong , CEO of For t L oudoun, and Mi chelle Muller, claims Represe ntative for F eder ated. Ms. Muller’ s residenc e and plac e of e mploy

ment is in Kansa s; howeve r, Mr. Hill’s notice indicate s that depositions will be taken i n V o n o r e , T e n n e s s e e

. Pr io r to f il in g h is N o ti c e to T a k e D e p o s it io n s , M r

. H il l h a d filed no
ans we r, no r ha d h e re sp on de d to any of the dis c ov e ry

re qu e sts fi le d b y

Pla int if fs . In li g ht o f t

he se fac ts, the Plainti ffs filed a Motion to Quash, which was g rante d by Orde r of June 6, 2005. Plainti ffs take the po sit ion

tha t th e Hi lls se e k a

n unf a ir a dv anta g e by

a tte mpt ingto u se the dis c ov e ry pr oc e ss fo r s ur pr ise and a mbu shin v iol a tio n o f T e nn e sse e law. Th e Hi lls take the po sit ion that Pla int if fs ’ pet i t i o n was filled with fa lse ac cusations and innuendos, a nd that the voluminous discovery propounded by

Plaintiffs (which include 38 inter rog atories, 82 r equests to admit, and 22 re quests for production of doc uments) was de sign e d a s a ” k n o ck-out punc h.” The Hills contend that the re quested depositions were nece ssary “[i] n order

to asce rtain the sourc e of w hat the Hills con s idere d misinformation and outrig ht fabric ation.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.03 gives the tria l court broa d discretion to “make any order which justice require s to protect a pa

rty or per son from annoy ance , embar rassment, oppression, or undue bur den
or e xpe ns e ,” inc lud ing“ that di sc ov e ry no t be ha d, ” or “ that di sc ov e ry

may be ha d o nly

on sp e c if ic te rm s and c on dit ion s.

. . .” Al tho ug h Te nn . R. Civ. P. 26.0 4 sta te s tha t “di sc ov e ry may be us e d in-9-

any sequenc e and the fac t that a par ty is conducting discovery , whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not ope rate to delay any other pa rty ’s discover

y ,” the r ule does not provide a

n absolute rig ht to c onduct discovery

in any sequenc e the pa

rties desire . Rather, the r

ule g rants the tria l court powe r to or der the discovery sequenc e “for the convenie nce of parties and witnesses and in the intere sts of justice.” He re, it a

ppear s that the trial court has done just that. Given the fac t that Mr . Hill had not
ans we re d th e pe tit ion or the dis c ov e ry re qu e sts and the fa c t tha t Mr. Hi ll re qu e ste d to de po se a n o utof-town witness in East Tenne ssee, we cannot conclude that the trial cour t abused its discretion or oth e rw ise vio la te d th e ru le s o f d isc ov e ry in q ua sh ingMr . H ill ’s No tic e to T a ke De po sit ion s. Striking Counter Complaint

I n r e sp on se to P la int if

fs ’ M oti on

to Di smi ss the Hi lls ’ Counte r- Com pla int , the tr ia l c ourt

did so by Orde r of Septembe r 21, 2005. Specifica lly , the t rial cour t struck and dismissed the tort of ba d faith base d upon Mr. Hill’s acknow ledg ment “that ther e is no valid tort of bad faith . . . .” The trial court di smissed Mr. Hill’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and/or outra g eous conduct on the g rounds th at same is “ba rre d by the exclusive remedy

provisions of the Tenne ssee Workers’ Compensation Ac t, T .C.A. § 50-6-108,” and that the Counter-Complaint “fa iled to assert the elements

. . . nece ssary to pur sue such tort claims

. . . .” The trial court also dismissed any and all claims asser

ted by Mrs. Hill beca

use her “cla ims fail to ge nerate a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d,” and be cause “[h] er tort c laims are ba rre d by the exclusive remedy

provi sions of the Tenne ssee Worker s’ Compensation Act and the damag es she se eks ar e not damag es which she may re c ov e r u nd e r r e ta liator

y dis c ha rg e or oth e rw ise

. . . .” Th e tr ia l c ourt a lso or de re d M r. Hi ll t o pr od uc e a ne w C ounte r- Com

pla int that c omp lie d w ithTe nn e sse e law a nd wh ic h s pe c if

ic a lly c on ta in “only claims under the Tenne ssee Worker s’ Compensation Act and f or re taliatory

discharg e.” F ur the rm or e , th e tr ia l c ourt

ins tr uc te d M r. Hi ll t o c omp ly wi th t he Te nn e sse e Ru le s o f C ivi l Procedur e by

setting f orth a more definite statement pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 12.05, and setting forth a shor

t and plain statement of the claim as c ontemplated by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01.
On appe al, the Hills assert that the tr ial court err ed in dismissing their re spective c auses of
a c tio n. We wil l add res s ea c h o f t he c a us e s o f a c tio n s e t out in

the Counte r- Com

pla int in o rd e r t o deter mine whether

the trial cour

t abused its discretion in dismissi ng any or all of these ca

uses of action.

We first addre ss a tec hnicality , which the Hills raise in their brief . The Hills contend that the t r i a l c o u rt a

b u s e d T e n n

. R

. C i v

. P

. 1 2

. 0 6 b y “ s t r i k i n g ” t h e e n t i r e C o u n t e r
- C o mp l a i n t

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, the Hills a ssert that, “while applying [Tenn. R. Civ. P.] 12.06 to the Counter- Complaint i t does not lead one to the conclusion that the entire Counter-Complaint should have bee n stricken.” Whil e we conce de that “[o]rdinarily , a motion to strike is not t he prope r vehic le by which to strike an entire pleading ,” Curve Elem entary School v. Lau derdale Ct y. School , 6 08 S.W. 2d

85 5, 85 7 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 0 ) ( ci t at i o n s o m i t t ed ), T en n

. R

. C i v

. P

. 1 2

. 0 6 m ay b e u s edt o “e l i m i n at e a nen t i re p l ea d i n g, inc lud inga

c ompl ain t, whe re its a lle g a tio ns are of fe ns ive , s c ur

ri lou s o r i n g ro ss v iol a tio n o f R ule 8 , Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure .” Id. ( c it a ti o n s o mi tt e d )

. A lt h o u g h th e tr ia l c ourt’s September 21, 2005 O rder states that “[t] he Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is well taken and g rante d,”-10-

a c los e r r e a din g of the su

bs tanti ve pa

ra g ra ph s of the Or de r i nd ic a te s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt wa s, in f a c t,
a pp lyingTe nn . R. Civ . P. 12 .0 2 ( 6) - “ fa ilure to s ta te a c la im up on wh ic h re lie f c an b e g ra nte d” - i n dismissing , with pr ejudice, the Hills’ cause s of ac tions. W e will, there fore , revie w the trial c ourt’s decision under

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 (6).

A motion to dis miss pursuant to Tenn. R

. C i v .P. 12.02(6) for f ailure to state a

claim upon which re lief ca

n be g rante d is the equivalent of a demurre r under our for mer c ommon law proce dure and thus is a test of the suff iciency of the lea ding ple ading

. See Cornpropst v. Sl oan , 528 S.W .2d 188, 190 (Tenn.1975) . The motion admits the truth of al l releva nt and mater ial aver

ments in the
c o mp l a i n tb u ta s s e rt s t h a tt h e s t a t e m e n t s d o n o tc o n s t i tu t e a c a u s e o f a c t i o n

. S e e i d

. a t1 9 0

. In consideringwhether

to dismi ss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court should construe the complaint liberally

in favor of

the plaintiff, takingall of t he allegations of fac t therein a s true. See Huckeby v

. Spangl er , 521 S.W .2d 568, 571 (Tenn.1975)

. A complaint should not be dismissed upon such a moti on “unless it appea rs beyond doubt that the plaintiff ca n prove no se t of fac ts in support of hi s claim that would entitle him to relief.” Fue rst v . M e tho dis t Ho sp ita l So uth , 566 S.W .2d 847, 84 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 8 )

. O b v io u s ly , w e ar e li mi te d to an e xa mi n a ti o n o f th e c o mp la in t a lo n e , th u s the fa c tua l mate ri a l in

the op ini on

is t a ke n s ole ly

fr om t he c omp la int

. Mr. Hill’s Causes of Ac tion

T. C.A . § 50 -6 -1 08 state s, in r e le va nt p art : (a) T h e r ig h ts an d r e me d ie s g r an te d to an e mp lo y e e s u b je c t to the Workers' Compensation L aw, compiled in this chapte r, on acc ount of per s o n al injury

or death by

acc ident, including a

minor whether lawfully or unlawf

ull y empl oy ed, shall exclude all other r ights a nd
reme dies of such employ ee, such employ ee' s persona l repre sentative, depende nts or next of kin, at common law or other wise, on ac count of such injury

or death.

Under Tenne ssee wor

kers’ compensation law, employ ers are require d to pay compensation fo r an e mpl oy e e ’s pe rs on a l injury or de a th b y a c c ide nt a

ri sin g ou t of

and in t he c ours e of

e mpl oy me nt. The e mploy ee’ s remedie s under the w o rk ers’ compensation statutes ar e exclusive. T.C.A. § 50-6- 108. Consequently , an employ ee w ho is injured in an ac cident duringthe co u rse of his or her
e mpl oy me nt m ay re c ov e r on ly wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n be ne fi ts fr om his or he r e mpl oy e r; the statut e bars the e mploy ee f

rom filing a

persona l injury

lawsuit for damag es aga i n s t t he employ er. See V alencia v. Freeland and Lem m Const . Co. , 10 8 S.W. 3d 23 9, 24 2 (T e nn

. 20 03 ). “ [I ]n ge ne ra l, worke rs’ c ompensation laws involve a quid pro quo i n t h at wo rk ers g ive up ce rtain common law ri g ht s a g a i n s tt h e i r

e mp l o y e r s i nr e tu r

nf o r a s y s t e m p r o v i d i n g m o r e c e rt a i nc o mp e n s a t i o n , t o t a lly independe nt of any

fault on the pa

rt o f t h e em p l o y er.” Pe rry v . T ra nsa meric a I

ns. Gr oup , 703 S.W .2d 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) ( citations omitt ed). Consequently , it appea rs t hat t he trial court did not err in holding that Mr. Hill’s cause s of ac tion were barr ed by the exclusive remedy

provision of the Worker s’ Compensation Act, su pra

.-11-

Howeve r, eve n if we a ssume, arguendo, that Mr. Hill’s claim of i n t enti onal infliction of emotional distress and/or outra g eous conduc t could proce ed in the fa ce o f t he author ity outlined above, we nonetheless conclude that Mr. Hill’s Counter -Complaint f ails to set out a pr im a fa c ie c a se for this tort. We f

irst note that intentional inf liction of emotional distress and outra g eous conduc t are simply differ ent names f

or the same caus e of a ction, which has thre e esse ntial elements: (1) the conduct c omplained of mu s t b e i n t entional or re ckless, (2) it must be so outrag eous that it is not tolerate d by a civili zed society , and (3) it must result in serious mental injury

. Se eBai n v . W e lls , 936 S.W. 2d 61 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . T he a c tio na ble c on du c t un de r t

his the or y mus t be s e t out in

the ple a din g s. Medlin v. Alli ed Inv. Co. , 2 17 Te nn . 469 , 398 S.W. 2d 27 0 (T e nn . 196 6)

. F ur the rm or e , th e a c tio na

ble conduct should be se t out in the complaint describing the substance and seve rity of the c onduct that is alleg ed to be outra g eous. Bra swe ll v . Ca ro the rs , 8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 7 2 2 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 9 3 )

. In Medlin v. A llied Inv. Co., our Supreme Court a ddresse d the question of what constitutes outrag eous c on du c t and

he ld a s f oll ow s:
These f actor s are set o u t i n t h e Restateme nt of Torts (2d), § 46, ‘O u t ra geo u s C o n d

u ct C au s i n g S ev er e E m o t i o n al Di s t re s s '. (1) One who by

ex t reme and outra g eous conduc t intentionally

or re cklessly

cause s sever e emotional distress to another is subjec t to liabili ty for suc h
e mot ion a l di str e ss, and

if bo dil y ha rm re su lts from it , fo r s uc h b od ily

ha rm

. Cla ri fi c a tio n o f t

his state me nt i s f

ound in t he fo llo wi ng

c omm e nt:

d. Ex treme a

nd Outrag eous Conduct. The c ases thus far de c id e d

h a v e f o u n d li a b il it y o n ly w h e r e the de fe nd ant' s c on du c t has be e n extr e me and outr a g e ou s. I t has not been e noug h that the def endant h as acte d wi th anin te n t w h ic h is to rti o u s o r e v e nc r im in a l, or that he has i ntended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his c onduct is chara cter ized by ‘malice ’, or a deg ree of ag g ravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damag es for

another tort. L iability

has bee n found only

wher e the c onduct has be en so out rag eous in char acte r, and so e x treme in de g ree , as to g o bey ond
a ll b ound s o f d e c e nc y , a

nd to b e re g ard e d a s atr oc iou s, an d u t t e r l y u n t o l e r a b l e i na c i v i l i z e d

c o m m u n i t y. Gene rally , the ca se is one in which the rec itation of the fa c ts t o a n ave ra g e me mbe r o f t

he commun ity

wo uld
aro us e his re se ntm e nt a g a ins t the a c tor , a nd le a d h im t o e xcla im, ‘O utr a g e ou s.-12-

Me dli n , 398 S.W .2d at 274. Turning to the Counter-Complaint, in support of his cl aim for intentional infliction of
e mot ion a l di str e ss, Mr . H ill a ve rs :

I . That on May

2, 2005, the Counter-D efe ndants, throug h
a coor dinated and joint plan, fil ed t h e o ri ginal claim in this case . . . ba se d on the fa lse pr e mis e that WI L L I AM R. H I L Lha d f ra ud ule ntl y mis re pr e se nte d th e c on dit ion of his ri g ht kne e in or de r t o f ra ud ule ntl y ob ta in w or

ke rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts, and wh ic h f ur the r f a lse ly claimed that WI L L I AM R. HI L Lclaimed that he could not perf orm light, se d entary

work on F ebrua

ry 15, 2005, which information the Counter-De fe n dants knew at the time they filed this liti g ation was false. I n addition to filing the a

bove-de scribed action, which was filed with false innuendos a

nd ou t ri g ht false state ments, the CounterDe fe nd ant s in clu ded

in t he ir pla n th e fi ri ngof

Mr . H ill on

tha t sa me date . In a dd iti on

to t he fi lin g of

the su it a nd fi ri ngof Mr . H ill , th e se pa rt ie s atta c he d to the ir

joi nt l aw sui t I nte rr og a tor ie s, Re qu e sts to Admit and Request for Produc t i o n of Doc uments, which we re c a lc ulate d to ins ult

and inc e ns e the Cou

nte r- Pla int if

fs wi th t he fu ll knowledg e that the Counter- Plaintiff WI L L I AM R. HI L L was a lrea dy underg oing tr eatment f

or depr essi o n broug ht on by the y ear s of
reoc curr ing pa in, ten (10) surg erie s, including a total knee r eplac ement surg ery of the lef

t knee, a ll arising out of worke rs’ c ompensation injuries. Counter-Plaintiffs ave r t h at the ac tions of these CounterDef endants we re taken for

the purpose of

intentionally

inflicting
e mot ion a l ha

rm on bo th of the Counte r- Pla int if fs

. . . a s w e ll a s th e ir g ood name in the c ommunity . . . . Counter-Plain t iffs would fur ther sh owthat th e Co un te r- De fe nd ants we re su c c e ssf ul i n th a t th is litigation, coupled w ith the firing , h as ca used the e motional harm intended, making it nece s s ar y for the Counter -Plaintiffs to expend sums to obtain additional me d ical tre atment for de pression, which depr e s s io nd e e p e n e d

s e r io u s ly a s a r e s u lt o f th e ma li c io u s a ctions take n b y the Cou

nte r- De fe nd ant , in c lud ingthe fl oo d o f f a lse statements contained in the pleading s coupled with the firin g o f M r. Hi ll. Th e Counte r- Pla int if fs have wo rk e d in

the ir c omm un ity , th e ir churc h and their respe ctive plac es of e mploy ment for ne arly

three (3) de c a de s and

have str ive d to se t e xamp le s f or the ir c hil dr e n a

nd the ir peer s in t h e way

they have c onducted themse lves, and to have such fa lse a nd ma lic iou s a lle g a tio ns ma de by the Counte r- De fe nd ants , contempora

neously with the firing of Mr. Hill, wa s most tra umatic and
cause d emotional pain, anguish, and g reat s t re ss. Counter-Plaintiffs would further aver that these actions of the Counter-De fenda nts were-13- done deliber ately

an d fo r the sing ular a

nd selfish motive of saving money f o r th e s e tw o ( 2 ) Co u n te r
- D e f e n d an ts

. F o r

a ll o f w h ic h the Counter-Plaintiffs sue the Counter -De fenda nts, both j o intly

and
sever ally , for the sum of O ne Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00).

The alleg ed actionable conduct is not set out in the pleading s, see Medlin v. Al lied Inv. Co. , 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. 1996). Moreove r, taking the alleg ations as true a nd construing them liberally

in favor of

Mr. Hill, Cook Uithoven v. Spinn aker’s of Rive rgate, Inc., 878 S.W .2d 934 (T e nn . 1 99 4) , w e no ne the le ss c on clu de th a t th e se ple a din g s d o n ot c on sti tut e “ c on du c t th a t is so outrag eous that it is not tol erated by a civilized society .” Bai n v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d at 622.

Mr. Hill’s claim for r etaliatory discharg e wa s also dismiss ed by the trial cour

t. A ca u se of action for discharg e in re taliation for asserting a workers’ c ompensation claim has f our ele ments: (1) the pla int if

f w a s an e mpl oy e e of

the de fe nd ant at th e tim e of the inj ur y ; ( 2) the pla int if

f ma de a c la im ag ainst the defe ndant for worke rs’ compensation benef its; (3) the defe ndant terminate d the plaintiff’s employ ment; and (4) the claim for w orker s’ compensation benefits was a substantial fac tor in the
e mp lo y e r ’ s mo ti v a

ti on to terminate the e mploy ee’ s employ ment. A n d

er s o n v. S t a ndard Regist

er Co. , 857 S.W .2d 555, 558 (Tenn. 1993)

. “T h e b u rd en o f proof rests . . . upon the plaintiff to prove the
e le me nts of

t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a

c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e nt h e c l a i m f o r w o r k e r s’ compensation benefits a nd the termination of e mploy ment.” Id. at 558. I t is well-settled that termination without a

ny evidenc e of a c ausal link to the worke rs’ c ompensation claim is insufficient to prove re taliatory

discharg e. Id . When an employ ee is discha rg ed fo r reasons other tha n for exercising rig hts under the Wo r k e r s ’ Co mp e n s a

ti on Act, then the c ausation ele ment of the e mploy ee’ s prima facie case of re taliatory discharg e is prec luded, and his or he r ac tion must fail.

I n the instant case , Mr. Hill’s Counter Complaint avers a s fol l o ws conce rning the alleg ed reta liatory

discharg e:
The Counter- Plaintiffs alleg e that the Counter -D efe ndants’ ac tions constitute a re taliatory d ischarg e of the Counter-Plaintiff WI L L I AM R. H I L L , th a t hi s f

ir ingwa s th e re su lt o f h is h a vin g a wo rkers’ compensat i o n claim which would r equire , among other thing s, the pay ment by Counter-De fenda

nts for the c ost of a rig ht total knee repla ceme nt surg ery , along with the reha bilitation ex penses, a s well as
surg ic a l r e pa ir s to the le ft art if ic ia l kne e and

te mpo ra ry tot a l di sa bil ity benef its during the time p eriod required f or the surg ery

and reha bilitation, all of which has bee n known for y ear s bythese CounterDef endants to be require d as his tre ating phy sicians have so indicated
as ea r ly a s th e y e ar

2 0 0 0 , w h ic h c o s ts w o u ld li k e ly e xc e ed $100,000.00.

I I I . Comes the Counter-Plai n t iffs and sue the CounterDef endants for

additional cause of ac tion and say that the fa ctual-14- alleg ations contained in Count I and I Iare incorporated into this C ount as if they wer e fully copied verbatim at t his point. I n addition to and
se pa rate and a pa rt fr om t he c omp e ns a tor

y dama g e c la im s e t f

or th i n Count I I , Counter-Plaintiff WI L L I AM R. HI L Lis entitl ed to be
awa rded punitive or e x emplar y damag es ag ainst these CounterDef endants for

the wrong ful d i s ch ar ge on May 2, 2005 of Counter Plaintiff WI L L I AM R. HI L L , which ac tion was t ak en as a pa rt of a common plan by

the Counter-D efe ndants. Co u n t er-Plaintiff W ILLIA M R

. H ILL w o u l d s h o w t h a t F O R T LO U D O U N E LE C T R IC COOPERATI VE has a net value in the tens of millions of dollars, the exact amount of which w ill be shown to the Court and jury , and that t h e C o u n t e r
- D e f

e n d a n t F E D E R A T E D R U R A L E LE C T R IC I NSU RA NC E E XC HA

NG E h a s a

muc h h ig he r n e t va lue tha n F OR T L OUDOU

N EL ECTRI C COO PE RA T IV E , wh ic h v a lu e will be shown to the Court and jur

y

. Counte r- Pla int if

f a ve rs that th e a c tio ns of

the se Counte r- De fe nd ants are wi llf ul, c a lc ulatin g and

ma lic iou s, and

that in order to preve nt the se two (2) Counter-De fenda nts from treating other
e mp l o y e e s i n a s i m i l ar f a s h i o n , t h e C o u n t e r
- P l a i n t i f f d e m a nd s a judgme nt for punitive or exemplary damag es in such an amount as the jury might fix to deter the C ounter-de fenda nts from such a cour se of action in the future

. Although the majority

of Mr. Hill’s alleg ations are conclusory , he does alleg e that he made
a wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n c la im a nd that he wa s d isc ha

rg e d b e c a us e he ma de su c h a c la im. He a lso alleg es that this was motivated in part by the Plaintiffs’ desire to save money , beca use the ter mination of his employ

ment would preve nt the future pa y ment of medical b ills which they had her etofore ag ree d to. I n any

event, Mr. Hill ha s bare ly proved his position sufficie ntly , but w e must g ive eve ry benef it of the doubt to the non-movant in a 12.02(6) motion. According ly , we will re verse the trial court’s dismissal of the of the Counter-C o m p l ai nt and re taliatory discharg e. We do this with the understandingthat this, in no way , preve nts a motion to strike for irrele vant or other

wise scur rilous alleg ations in the complaint, nor does this preve nt the filing of a summary

judgme nt motion on t he part of Plaintiffs.

Mrs. Hill’s Causes of Ac tion

As discussed above , Mr. Hill so u gh t to add his wife a s a counte r-plaintiff, a sserting loss of
c on so rt ium

c la ims a nd

de ri vativ e tor

t c la ims ari sin g fr om the a lle g e d tor t c la ims of

Mr . H ill . B e c a

us e we have dete rmined t hat t he trial court corr ectly dismiss ed Mr. Hill’s ca

uses of a ction, any

derivative claims made by Mrs. Hill must nece ssarily fail. Concerning Mrs. Hill’s loss of consortium claim, our Supreme Court has he ld that loss of consortium is “‘a separ ate claim from that of an injure d spouse.’” Tug gle v . Al lri ght Pa rking Sy s. , 9 2 2 S

. W

. 2 d 1 0 5 , 1 0 8 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 )( qu o t i n g Jackson v. Miller , 776 S.W. 2d 11 5, 11 7 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 89 ))

. Ho we ve r, a sp ou se ’s los s o f c on so rt ium c la im e xists on ly ag ainst a third-pa

rty tortfea sor. Hanley v. Silver Furn itur e Mfg. Co. , 38 S.W .3d 555, 558 (Tenn.-15-

20 01 ). An e mpl oy e e ’s sp ou se ha s no ri g ht to br ing su it a g a ins t th e e mpl oy e r f or los s o f c on so rt ium

. Na pie r v . M artin , 2 50 S.W. 2d

35 , 3 6 ( Te nn . 1 95 2) . Co ns e qu e ntl y , th e tr ia l c ourt was corr ect

in dis mis sin g bo th t

he los s o f c on so rt ium

c la im a nd the de ri vativ e c la ims ra ise d b y Mr s. Hi ll. Alleg ed Violation of Te nn. R. Civ. P . 15

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 15 .0 1 p ro vid e s th a t th e ple adi ngs in a laws uit may be a me nd e d “ on c e a s a matter of c ourse at any

time before a re sponsive pleadingis served.” Otherw ise, amendme nt may be made only

“by written conse nt of the other pa rty or by leave of the c ourt.” The rule provide s that permission to amend should be liberally g rante d; how ever , wher e a motion to amend is filed after a responsive ple ading has bee n filed, the g rant or de nial of the motion is wi t hin the sound discretion of the trial c ourt. Such discre tionary decisions may not be reve rsed on appea l, a bsent a showing of abuse of discretion, McKinn ey v

. Educator & E

xecutive Insurers, Inc. , 569 S.W .2d 829, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); or wher e failure to allow an amendment will result in injusti ce. Wilson v. Riccardi , 77 8 S. W.2 d 45 0, 45 3 (Tenn. C t. A pp . 1 98 9) ; Hop

pe r v . D av ids on Co unty , 333 S.W .2d 917, 920 (Tenn. 1960)

.
I n his moti on to amend the f irst amended Counter -Complaint, Mr. Hill seeks to amend the Counter-Complaint to alleg e that F eder ated “ tortiously interfe red w ith an employ ment contra ct betwee n [Fort L oudoun] an d [Mr. Hill ].” I n his moti on, Mr. Hill further alleg es that F eder ated

“ de lib e rate ly

se t out on

a c ours e of

a c tio n to int e rf

e re wi th t hat r e la tio ns hip [i.e ., the re la tio ns hip betwee n For

t L oudoun and Mr. Hill] and to induc e [Fort L oudoun] to terminate [ M r. Hi l l ’s
e mpl oy me nt] i n o rd e r that [F e de rate d] c ou ld a vo id the pa y me nt of wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts. . . .”

After

revie wing the pr o p o s ed ame ndments, we pe rce ive that Mr. Hill has fa iled to state a claim for e ither proc ureme nt of brea ch o f contra ct or tortious interfe renc e with an e mploy ment
c on tr a c t.

Procure ment of B rea ch of Contra ct

I n orde r to r e c o v e r f

o r p r o c u r e me n t o f b r e a c h o f c o n tr a c t, a p la in ti f f mu s t p r o v e seve n elements: (1) there must be a lega l contra ct; (2) the wrong doer must have knowledg e of the exi stence of the c ontrac t; (3) there must be an intention to induce its breac h; (4) the wr ong doer must have acte d wi th m a lic e ; ( 5) the re mus t be a br e a c h o f c on tr a c t; ( 6) the a c t com pla ine d of m

us t be the pr oximate
cause of the brea ch of c ontrac t; and (7) ther e must have be en dama g es re sulting fr om the brea ch of contra ct. Buddy Lee At

t r a ctions, In c. v. William Morris A gency, Inc. , 13 S.W .3d 343, 354-55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); T.C.A. § 47- 50-109.

I t is un c on te ste d th a t Mr

. Hi ll wa s an a t- wi ll e mpl oy e e of F or t L ou do un

. As su c h, Mr . H ill had no employ

ment contra ct wit h For

t L oudoun. Absent a leg al contract, t here can be no induceme nt to brea ch same . The trial c ourt corr ectly denied Mr. H ill’s request to add this ca use of a ction.-16-

Tortious I nterfe renc e with an Employ ment Contract

A p l ai n t i ff may

bring a cla im for intentional interfe renc e with an at-will employ ment relationship. I n such a c laim, the plaintiff m ust provide specific proof that the def endant c ommitt ed p e r se wrong ful ac ts or committed lawful ac ts with malice and without justification. Forrester v. Sto c ks til l , 869 S.W .2d 328, 335 (Tenn. 1994) . The Forrester Court outlined three fa ct o rs t o be dis c us se d in e va luatin g tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e c la ims : ( 1) wh e the r t he pe rs on int e nd e d to int e rf

e re wi th the plaintiff’s e mploy

ment; (2) whether the defe ndant i nterfe red with the plaintiff’s employ ment by such methods as intimidation, d ef am ati on, or violence ; and (3) w hether the purpose or

motive for interfe ring was ba sed solely on a desire to harm the plaintiff. Id. at 333-34. I n the instant case , there is no indication that Fede rate d soug ht to have Mr. Hill fire d or that the termination of Mr. H ill’s employ ment worke d any

benef it to Feder ated. There is no indication in the rec ord that F eder ated ha s failed to comply with the Ag ree d Orde r of July 9, 2003. Ra t h er, F e de rate d is bo un d b y

that a g re e me nt, re g ard le ss o f M r. Hi ll’ s e mpl oy me nt s ta tus

.
Fur thermore , there is no actual proof that Fe derated had any hand in t he ter mination of Mr. Hill’s employ

ment. I t a ppear s that Fort L oudoun chose to ter minate Mr. Hill’s employ

ment only afte r he wa s caug ht on videotape vigor ously using the knees he claimed wer e too painful to per form eve n a desk job. Plaintiffs set out in the termination letter that it was the videotape d evidenc e that provided t h e b a s i s f

o r t e r m i n a t i n g M r

. H i l l ’ s e mp l o ym e n t d u e t o d i s h o n e s t y an d

v i o l a t i o no f

c o mp an y p o l i c y, to w it:

Th is l e tte r i s in re sp on se to the me e tin g I ha d with y ou on F ri da y , Apr il 29 , 2 00 5. At

the me e tin g y ou we re g ive n the op po rt un ity to s ha re wi th me y our explanation and re asons for c hoosing to c onstru ct a bar n while off f

rom work with phy s i cal restrictions imposed upon y ou by y our phy sician, due to y our worke rs’ c ompensation i n j u ry . Your actions and dishonesty

wer e a de finite infra ction of F L EC’s Boa rd Policy 20 1 A r

u le s o f c o n d u c t a n d p e r f o r ma n c e

. A f te r h e ar in g y o ur explanation and afte r ca

ref ul consideration of all of the informati o n, I have no choice but to terminate y our employ ment with Fort L oudoun E l e c t r i c O o p e r a t i v e e f

f e c t i v e i m m e d i a t e l y. Consequently , the trial cour t did not err in disallowing this cause of action.

Al tho ug h M r. Hi ll a lle g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s Or de r o f S ept emb er 21, 20 05 a tte mpt s to prohibit future amendments to his Count er- Complaint i n violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15, a review of the orde r re veals no such pr ohibition. R ather , the cour t orders Mr . Hil l to fashion a CounterCompli ant that complies with T enn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 and 12.05. There is no pr ohibition on M r. Hill’s amendinghis Counter-Complaint to alle ge an y viable cla ims. However , as discussed a bove, the proposed c laims are not viable and, ther efor e, the tria l court wa s corr ect in disallowing same.
S t ay o f P ro ce ed i n gs-17-

I n it s F e br

ua ry 13 , 2 00 6 O rd e r, the tr ia l c ourt sta y e d a ll l iti g a tio n pe nd ing the ru lin g of thi s Court. T he trial court rea soned that our ruling “could aff ect the parties, the claims, the leg al theorie s and the dama g e s.

. . .” Th e de c isi on to sta y a pr oc e e din g is a matte r of dis c re tio n with the tr ia l c ourt , and, on appe al, a pa

rty taking issue with that decision has the burden to show that the c ourt abused its discretion. Rac he ls v

. St e e le , 633 S.W .2d 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). The decision of the trial court wi l l not be disturbed on appe al unless it is clear f rom the re cord that there w as an a buse of discretion. Id. at 475. Turning to the fac ts of this case, the H ills’ appeal inv o l v es n umerous cla ims that were not allowed by t h e t ri al court. The trial cour t corre ctly

notes that this Court’s decision bear s upon the
su bs tanti ve c la ims tha

t ma y be a llo we d to pro c e e d. As a re su lt, to c on tin

ue wi th t he lit ig a tio n w ou ld l i k e l y r e s u l ti nu n d

u e e x p e n s e an d

w a s t e d t i m e i np u r s u i n g c l a i m s t h a tar e n o tp r o p e r

. C o n s e qu e n t l y, the tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

sta y ingthe pr oc e e din g be low pe nd ingthe ou tc ome of

thi s a pp e a l.

Def ault J udg ment

Th e tr ia l c ourt

ha s b ro a d d isc re tio n in

de te rm ini ngwh e the r a grant of de fa ult jud g me nt i s proper . The fa ilure to g rant a defa ult judgment will not be re verse d on appea l absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., He nson v. Diehl Machines, Inc. , 674 S.W .2d 307 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

I n th e ins tant c a se , M r. Hi ll’ s mo tio n f or de fa ult jud g me nt fo r fa ilure to ans we r w a s q uic kly followed by

Plaintiffs’ motion to di smiss, se esup ra

. T h e t r i a l c o u rt d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n f or de fault judgme nt until i t had an oppor tunity to rule on the motion to dismi ss. Given the f acts of this ca se, the trial cour

t’s decision does not constitute an a buse of discr etion.

T h e o rd er o f t h e t ri al co u rt d i s m i s s i n g t h e C o u n t er -C o mp l ai n to nt h e r et al i at o ry d i s ch ar ge c a us e of a c tio n is re ve rs e d. Th e or de r of the tr ia l c ou rt in a ll oth e r r e sp e c ts i s a ff ir me d. Cos ts o f t

his
a p p e a l ar e a s s e s s e d

a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l an t s , W i l l i a m R

. H i l l an d S u z an nC

. H i l l , an d

t h e i r s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. F RA NK CR AW FORD, P RE S I DI

NG J UD GE , W. S.