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TURKEY’S FUTURE DIRECTION AND

U.S.–TURKEY RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 1, 2003

Serial No. 108–50

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Soref Fellow and Coordinator, Turkish Research Program, The Washington Institute ......................................................................... 8

Bulent Aliriza, Senior Associate and Director, Turkey Project, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies ................................................................... 15

Sedat Ergin, Senior Editor, Hurriyet Daily ........................................................... 27

The Honorable Mark Parris, Senior Public Policy Advisor, Baker, Donelson, 

Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C. ............................................................... 36

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Doug Bereuter, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Nebraska, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statement 3

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 6

Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 11

Bulent Aliriza: Prepared statement and additional material submitted for 

the record .............................................................................................................. 20

Sedat Ergin: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 30

The Honorable Mark Parris: Prepared statement ................................................ 39

The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 52

(1)

TURKEY’S FUTURE DIRECTION AND 

U.S.–TURKEY RELATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:35 p.m. in Room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Douglas Bereuter 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. The Europe Subcommittee today will hold a hearing, an open hearing, 

called ‘‘Turkey’s Future Direction and United States-Turkey relations.’’

I will have an opening statement. I will proceed with that and 

then will turn to the Ranking Member. 

I welcome our witnesses here today, we appreciate the fact you 

have devoted some time to this and we look forward to your testimony, written and oral, and also, of course, to some opportunity to 

raise some questions for you. 

Today the Subcommittee meets to assess recent developments in 

Turkey. We will also seek views on the direction that Turkey will 

likely take in the future, that is optimistic or ambitious. Finally, 

we will reevaluate United States relations with Turkey, one of our 

long-term friends and strategic partners. 

This is the first time in recent memory that the International Relations Committee at any level has held a hearing specifically focused on Turkey. That is unfortunate, but we will try to begin 

making up for that neglect. 

Turkey, of course, is certainly a study in contrasts. When this 

Member visited Istanbul last year, it was clear that in this overwhelmingly Muslim nation where loudspeakers still call the faithful to prayer each day modern capitalism in the form of—well, 

many forms, but upscale restaurants, bars, shopping malls, dance 

clubs, featuring a wide array of music from American jazz to European techno-rock, which I do not understand, has become a major 

component of Turkish society and I have been pleased to visit most 

corners of your country, but not the interior, except for Ankara. I 

am looking forward to future opportunities. 

Today, in the aftermath of a stunning election outcome last fall, 

Turkey is governed by a single political party rooted in Islamic traditions, yet it appears the AKP leadership remains loyal to the vision of Ataturk that Turkey must retain a secular, moderate, democratic and tolerant, political orientation. 
2

Turkey’s governing system is seen by many as a political model 

for the region fraught with authoritarian rule, intolerance and antiwestern views in so many other locations. Yet many in Turkey 

yearn to be recognized, it is quite evident, as European and fully 

express their desire to be invited into the European Union and the 

European community generally. 

Turkey maintains a popular and influential military establishment and maintains a significant armed force. Turkey has also 

been a long and valued member of NATO, of course. But Turkey’s 

leaders remain ever cautious, finding real and potential threats 

from Kurds, Iran, Syria, Armenia, recently Iraq and even Greece, 

a fellow NATO ally. 

I will give you a few of my own views now more specifically. 

Internally, the road ahead for Turkey could be difficult as it attempts to define its future within the region and toward Europe. 

Turkey’s internal efforts to implement difficult political, social and 

economic reforms in anticipation of membership in the European 

Union must be encouraged to continue. Turkey’s role as a sensible 

alternative to the fundamentalist and anti-western views promoted 

by some in the region, I think, must be reinforced. 

We must continue to support the Turkish government leadership 

as it faces these challenges and as it continues with a commitment 

to those values that we share. 

With respect to United States-Turkey relations, as stated at the 

outset the United States and Turkey, of course, have long been 

close friends and strategic partners. As the anchor of NATO in the 

southeastern region of Europe, Turkey provided us with invaluable 

assistance during the entire period of the cold war. 

After September 11, Turkey was one of the first to join us in the 

struggle against global terrorism. Turkey became a staging area for 

the Afghan operation and later took command of the international 

security force there. Over the past 12 years, as we implemented 

our campaign to isolate and contain Saddam Hussein, Turkey has 

provided invaluable support. 

I watched what happened when Turkey was requested to permit 

American forces to move through Turkey for staging purposes. The 

government was very new at the time. I have every belief that the 

governing party expected the vote would be positive in the Parliament. I think there was some understandable ineptitude in the 

way things were handled and they were surprised, as many were 

in this country and elsewhere, that the vote did not pass. 

I think officials in the American government in some cases were 

far too hard on Turkey and they wielded too strong an arm on Turkey during this period of time and there would be reason for some 

resentment. I know what the polls were showing with respect to 

American military activity in Iraq, those polls within Turkey, and 

the fact that they were willing to try to have that vote and expected to be able to have it and to provide an opportunity for Americans to launch some forces into northern Iraq was itself a fairly 

courageous step. 

I would say that today what appears to many here as Turkey’s 

inability to define a role in Iraq has led some in this country, including in parts of our own government, to begin to question our 

relationship with Turkey and to treat Turkey as if it were no 
3

longer a very close friend and ally. They are limited in number and 

I think they are wrong in this respect. They should not be influencing, in my judgment, our policies toward the Turkish nation. 

The ill feelings of just a few people in the Administration and 

some perhaps in the Congress toward Turkey and some in Turkey 

today toward the United States should, I think, not be the excuse 

used to promote an attitude that the United States-Turkey relationship must be redefined with the view in mind that the relationship is no longer as important as it has been. 

For this Member of Congress, Turkey remains a vital element of 

America’s strategy in NATO, in the eastern Mediterranean, in the 

Caucasus region and in the Middle East. 

In today’s hearing, we hope to review recent developments in 

Turkey to determine how Turkey views its own political identity 

and its role in the world. We will also revisit our relationship with 

Turkey to better understand what is going on in that country and 

what we need to do as Turkey moves toward the future. In doing 

that, however, we should do whatever we can to reduce the frictions, I think, which have recently entered the relationship and reaffirmed Turkey’s important to the United States. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, but I would first 

like to turn to the distinguished Ranking Member from Florida, the 

gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. Wexler? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

TURKEY’S FUTURE DIRECTION AND U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS

Today the Subcommittee meets to assess recent developments in Turkey. We will 

also seek views on the future direction that Turkey will likely take. Finally we will 

reevaluate U.S. relations with Turkey, one of our long-time friends and strategic 

partners. 

This is the first time in recent memory that the International Relations Committee has held a hearing specifically focused on Turkey. 

Turkey is certainly a study in contrasts. 

When this Member visited Istanbul and Ankara last year, it was clear that in this 

overwhelmingly Muslim nation where loudspeakers still call the faithful to prayer 

each day, modern capitalism, in the form of upscale restaurants and bars, shopping 

malls, and dance clubs featuring a wide range of music from American jazz to European techno-rock, has become a major component of Turkish society. 

Today, in the aftermath of a stunning election outcome last Fall, Turkey is governed by a single political party rooted in Islamic traditions. Yet, it appears the 

AKP leadership remains loyal to the vision of Ataturk that Turkey must retain a 

secular, moderate, democratic and tolerant, political orientation. 

Turkey’s governing system is seen by many as a political model for a region 

fraught with authoritarian rule, intolerance and anti-western views. Yet many in 

Turkey yearn to be recognized as European and fully express their desire to be invited into the European community. 

Turkey maintains a popular and influential military establishment and maintains 

a significant armed force. Turkey has also been a long and valued member of NATO. 

Yet Turkey’s leaders remain ever cautious, defining real and potential threats from 

Kurds, Iran, Syria, Armenia, recently Iraq, and even Greece, a fellow NATO ally. 

Internally, the road ahead for Turkey could be difficult as it attempts to define 

its future within the region and towards Europe. Turkey’s internal efforts to implement difficult political, social and economic reforms in anticipation of membership 

in the European Union have been impressive but must be encouraged to continue. 

Turkey’s role as a sensible alternative to the fundamentalist and anti-western views 

promoted by some in the region, must be reinforced. 
4

We must continue to support the Turkish government leadership as it faces these 

challenges and as it continues with a commitment to those values that we share. 

With respect to U.S.-Turkey relations, as stated at the outset, the United States 

and Turkey have long been close friends and strategic partners. As the anchor of 

NATO in the southeastern region of Europe, Turkey provided us invaluable assistance during the entire period of the cold war. After September 11, Turkey was one 

of the first to join us in the struggle against global terrorism. Turkey became a key 

staging area for the Afghan operation and later took command of the International 

Security Force there. Over the past 12 years as we implemented our campaign to 

isolate and contain Saddam Hussein, Turkey has provided invaluable support 

It was unfortunate and truly disappointing that the political forces in Turkey 

were unable to provide a second front for U.S. military operations against the Iraqi 

regime. The rancor which followed the vote in the Parliament was intense. Incidents, such as the one which took place over the July 4 period in northern Iraq, 

were regrettable. 

Today, what appears to many here as Turkey’s inability to define a role in Iraq 

has lead some in this country, including in parts of our own government, to begin 

to question our relationship with Turkey and to treat Turkey as if it were no longer 

a close friend or ally. 

These views are wrong and must not influence our policy toward that nation. The 

ill-feelings of some here toward Turkey and some in Turkey toward the U.S., should 

not be the excuse used to promote an attitude that the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship must be redefined with a view in mind that the relationship is no longer 

as important as it has been. 

For this member, Turkey remains a vital element of America’s strategy in NATO, 

in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Caucasus and in the Middle East. 

In today’s hearing we hope to review recent developments in Turkey to determine 

how Turkey views its own political identity and its role in the world. We will also 

revisit our relationship with Turkey to make sure we understand what is going on 

in that nation and what we need to do as Turkey moves toward the future. In doing 

that, however, we should do whatever we can to reduce the frictions which have recently entered the relationship and reaffirm Turkey’s importance to us. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Chairman Bereuter, and in this instance a special thank you for arranging this meeting and a special 

appreciation to the witnesses, some of which have made a double 

trip because of our schedule during the hurricane. 

As America faces its most difficult foreign policy challenges since 

the end of the cold war it is critical that we acknowledge and work 

closely with those nations with whom we share common values, 

strategic interests and economic ties. Those nations who have contributed to the war on terror and those nations, such as Turkey, 

with whom we have an historic partnership that has remained 

steadfast over the past 50 years. 

From the Korean War through Operation Enduring Freedom, 

Turkey has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States as 

one of our most valuable strategic partners. For more than a decade following the end of the Gulf War, Turkey permitted American 

and British pilots to patrol northern Iraq which debilitated and 

contained Saddam Hussein, provided a safe-haven for millions of 

Kurds, and contributed significantly to the overwhelming military 

superiority our forces recently enjoyed in Iraq. 

Following September 11, Turkey demonstrated testimony steadfast commitment to aiding the United States by leading the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, Turkey opened the use of its airspace for the deployment of coalition forces and permitted the use of its territory 

and equipment for the overland transfer of fuel and humanitarian 

aid. 
5

Unfortunately, this multi-faceted alliance was strained following 

the decision of the Turkish Parliament not to open its soil to 

United States troops in Iraq. While reciprocal political missteps 

leading up to the March 1st vote represented a low point in United 

States-Turkey relations, we have no choice but to pick up the 

pieces and look forward to a future of cooperation. A future of joint 

efforts rebuilding and securing Iraq. A future of promoting democracy and combating extremism. A future of deepened bilateral economic and political ties. 

We must remember history, Mr. Chairman. We would be foolish 

to dismiss the past 50 years because of the past 6 months. The 

American-Turkish partnership is too deep and too meaningful to 

allow it to become a casualty of the war in Iraq. 

This is why I strongly urge the Turkish government to support 

the deployment of its troops to serve side-by-side with American 

forces in Iraq. As a NATO ally, Turkey is uniquely capable of enhancing stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The Turkish military speaks the language, knows the lay of the land and represents 

one of the most capable armed forces in the world. Additionally, 

Turkey has an enormous amount at stake in terms of Iraq’s economic, political and military future, and a vested interest in promoting democracy and security in its own backyard. Finally, this 

cooperation will put to bed the recent strains in American-Turkish 

relations. Of course, there are strategic steps and confidence-building measures that must be taken by the United States to coincide 

with the Turkish Parliament’s debate on the deployment of troops 

to Iraq. 

First, the Administration must enhance direct lines of communication with Turkey to ensure that the mistakes and misunderstandings of this past year are not repeated. And there were, indeed, several significant American mistakes. The Bush Administration must begin to appreciate that our allies may have legitimate 

national interests and concerns that do not coincide with those of 

the United States. Likewise, I hope the Administration recognizes 

that the strategy of public confrontation employed with Turkey 

leading up to the war in Iraq was a failure and contrary to American objectives. Allies of 50 years do not militarily confront one another, like we did on July 4th, without exhausting every diplomatic 

precaution and employing every alternative means of resolution. 

Coordination among our militaries, which has traditionally been 

strong, must be increased in the hopes of avoiding clashes reminiscent of July 4th. The United States must assure that PKK terrorists will not renew bloodshed in northern Iraq and Turkey and 

there must be a clear and public recognition, by the Bush Administration, that the alliance with Turkey is extremely important to the 

United States. That Turkey is a strategic partner in Iraq, a valued 

interlocutor in the Middle East peace process and a bridge to central Asia. The mistakes were made on both sides in the past year, 

and now it is time to move on. 

Equally important to our military alliance is the enhancement of 

our economic and political ties. The United States should begin to 

increase bilateral trade and foreign investment and consider pursuing a free trade agreement with Turkey. Furthermore, the Bush 

Administration should praise more than it has Turkey’s recent po-
6

litical reforms and continue to strongly encourage its entrance into 

the EU. Recent improvements in human rights law and a fundamental alteration of the political-military dynamic demonstrates 

Turkey’s commitment to meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey 

must ensure these reforms are thoroughly implemented and the 

EU should stop raising the bar and embrace Turkey as a future 

Member State. 

Mr. Chairman, the redefinition and renewal of bilateral relations 

between the United States and Turkey is critical to defending 

shared national interests and defeating mutual security threats. 

Moreover, cooperation between our nations is essential to ensuring 

that Iraq becomes a source of stability and democracy in the Middle East. I am hopeful that the Bush Administration, which recently approved $8.5 billion in loans to Turkey, and I applaud that, 

will seize on this new opportunity to reach out to our ally and set 

a new path for future relations. 

Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me for 10 more seconds, I 

was in Brussels 2 weeks ago and had an opportunity to spend some 

time with the NATO commander, an American general, General 

Jones, and he offered, I think, what to me was some of the most 

positive consultations regarding the American-Turkish relationship 

in defining the new discussions that the American military and the 

NATO military are having with Turkey and he defined them as 

being at a level of cooperation that he has not seen in a long time 

and I think that is a wonderful thing. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman, 

As America faces its most difficult foreign policy challenges since the end of the 

Cold War, mounting security threats and obstacles to world peace, it is critical that 

we acknowledge and work closely with those nations with whom we share common 

values, strategic interests and economic ties. Those nations who have contributed 

to the war on terror, and those nations—such as Turkey—with whom we have a 

historic partnership that has remained steadfast over the past fifty years. 

From the Korean War through Operation Enduring Freedom, Turkey has stood 

shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States as one of our most valuable strategic 

partners. For more than a decade following the end of the Gulf War, Turkey allowed 

American and British pilots to patrol Northern Iraq which debilitated and contained 

Saddam Hussein, provided a safe-haven for millions of Kurds, and contributed significantly to the overwhelming military superiority our forces recently enjoyed in 

Iraq. 

Following September 11, Turkey demonstrated its steadfast commitment to aiding 

the United States by leading the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Turkey opened the use of its airspace for the deployment of coalition forces and permitted the use of its territory and equipment for 

the overland transfer of fuel and humanitarian aid. 

Unfortunately, this multifaceted alliance was strained following the decision of 

the Turkish parliament not to open its soil to U.S. troops in Iraq. While reciprocal 

political missteps leading up to the March 1st vote represented a low point in U.S.-

Turkish relations, we have no choice but to pick up the pieces and look toward a 

future of cooperation. A future of joint efforts rebuilding and securing Iraq. A future 

of promoting democracy and combating extremism. A future of deepened bilateral 

economic and political ties. 

We must remember history, Mr. Chairman. We would be foolish to dismiss the 

past fifty years because of the past six months. The American-Turkish partnership 

is too deep and too meaningful to allow it to become a casualty of the war in Iraq. 
7

This is why I strongly urge the Turkish government to support the deployment 

of its troops to serve side-by-side with U.S. forces in Iraq. As a NATO ally, Turkey 

is uniquely capable of enhancing stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The Turkish military speaks the language, knows the lay of the land and represents one of 

the most capable armed forces in the world. Additionally, Turkey has an enormous 

amount at stake in terms of Iraq’s economic, political and military future, and a 

vested interest in promoting democracy and security in its own backyard. Finally, 

this cooperation will put to bed the recent strains in American-Turkish relations. 

Of course, there are strategic steps and confidence-building measures that must 

be taken by the United States to coincide with the Turkish Parliament’s debate on 

the deployment of troops to Iraq. 

First, the Administration must enhance direct lines of communication with Turkey to ensure that the mistakes and misunderstandings of this past year are not 

repeated. And there were, indeed, several significant American mistakes. The Bush 

Administration must begin to appreciate that our allies may have legitimate national interests and concerns that do not coincide with those of the United States. 

Likewise, I hope the Administration recognizes that the strategy of public confrontation employed with Turkey leading up to the war in Iraq was a failure and contrary 

to American objectives. Allies of fifty years don’t militarily confront one another, like 

we did on July 4th, without exhausting every diplomatic precaution and employing 

every means of resolution. 

Coordination among our militaries—which has been traditionally strong—must be 

increased with the hopes of avoiding clashes reminiscent of July 4th. The United 

States must assure that PKK terrorists will not renew bloodshed in Northern Iraq 

and Turkey, and there must be a clear and public recognition—by the Bush Administration—that the alliance with Turkey is extremely important to the United 

States. That Turkey is a strategic partner in Iraq, a valued interlocutor in the Middle East peace process and a bridge to Central Asia. That mistakes were made on 

both sides in the past year, and now it is time to move on. 

Equally important to our military alliance is the enhancement of our economic 

and political ties. The U.S. should begin to increase bilateral trade and foreign investment and consider pursuing a free trade agreement. Furthermore, the Bush Administration should- praise Turkey’s recent political reforms and continue to strongly encourage its entrance into the EU. Recent improvements in human rights law 

and a fundamental alteration of the political-military dynamic demonstrates Turkey’s commitment to meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey must ensure these 

reforms are thoroughly implemented, and the EU should stop raising the bar and 

embrace Turkey as a future Member State. 

Mr. Chairman, the redefinition and renewal of bilateral relations between the 

United States and Turkey is critical to defending shared national interests and defeating mutual security threats. Moreover, cooperation between our nations is essential to ensuring that Iraq becomes a source of stability and democracy in the Middle 

East. I am hopeful that the Bush Administration—which recently approved $8.5 billion in loans to Turkey—will seize on this new opportunity to reach out to our ally 

and set a new path for future relations.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Wexler. 

The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, is joining us here. 

He is the co-Chairman of the Turkey Caucus but is not a Member 

of the Committee. Without objection, I intend to allow him to participate in the question period to follow. 

Is there an objection? 

[No response.] 

Mr. BEREUTER. Hearing none, Mr. Whitfield, you will be able to 

do that as we proceed through the Members. 

I would like now to introduce the witnesses one at a time and 

assure all of you that your entire written statements will be made 

a part of the record. You will have about 8 minutes to make an oral 

presentation in any fashion that you would like. 

First, we will hear from Dr. Soner Cagaptay. He is a Soref Fellow and Coordinator of the Turkish Research Program at the 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Cagaptay has written numerous articles on United States-Turkey relations, Turkish 

domestic politics, Turkish nationalism, Kemalism and the Balkans. 
8

Dr. Cagaptay has also taught courses on the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe in the History Department at Yale 

University, where he holds his Ph.D. He also holds a B.A. in international relations from Marmara University in Istanbul and an 

M.A. degree in international relations from Bilkent University in 

Ankara. 

Dr. Cagaptay, you may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., SOREF FELLOW AND 

COORDINATOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman, for giving me the 

chance to come here today and speak about very important issues, 

including the future of Turkey, as well as United States-Turkish 

relations. It is an honor to have been invited to testify before this 

prestigious body today. 

We have a number of issues today and I think I would like to 

focus on three of them, namely, first the Turkish-EU relations; second, Turkey’s role in Iraq; and, third, the future of United StatesTurkish relations in order to draw some eventual policy suggestions for the sake of this panel. 

I think a discussion of Turkish-EU relations is germane to our 

debate today because the desire to join the EU is perhaps one of 

the most significant political forces in Turkey right now. 

Although Turkey applied to join the EU back in 1963, for many 

decades, not much was done on this front because the EU objected 

to Turkish membership on the grounds that Turkey did not satisfy 

the political leg of its accession rules, the so-called Copenhagen criteria. The argument was that Turkey was a flawed democracy because its military had too much influence over politics and that it 

had a poor human rights record because of its treatment of the 

Kurds. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe today it has become difficult to draw 

such conclusions about Turkey or it is becoming increasingly more 

difficult to do so. 

Turkey is changing and it is changing very fast. Over the past 

couple of years, the country has passed significant reforms to quality for EU accession. These reforms, including laws on par with the 

first amendment here, have altered the countries political landscape and are doing so as we speak. 

In this regard, for instance, the military’s executive powers are 

now being trimmed and things are also changing on the Kurdish 

front. Subsequent to the recent EU reforms, Turkey has given cultural rights to the Kurds in the country who are now allowed to 

receive education, run T.V. programs and carry out election propaganda in Kurdish. Accordingly, I would argue that when it comes 

to the Copenhagen criteria of ‘‘respect of minorities,’’ Turkey is now 

in safe territory. 

Although the recent reforms apparently have made Turkey a 

likely candidate for EU accession, I will argue that I am quite 

skeptical about the EU offering Turkey membership any time soon. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, Turkey may indeed not be a stellar example 

of Anglo-Saxon democracy, I will grant that, but I think my point 

is that subsequent to the recent reforms Turkey qualifies for EU 
9

membership as much as the countries of Eastern Europe which are 

slated to join the Union in May 2004. 

Some of these countries themselves have significant political and 

economic problems, yet they are going in and not Turkey, so the 

question is why? 

I believe and I am convinced this is because of the fact that Brussels has neither the financial capability nor the political vision to 

make a country the size of Turkey a full member any time soon, 

regardless of how ready Turkey is for membership. 

Even if it does not result in Turkey’s eventual EU membership, 

I think the EU process has been beneficial because it has catalyzed 

significant and much-needed political reforms in Turkey, yet it is 

also important since we are discussing foreign policy today to note 

that the powerful force behind the EU reforms is also symptomatic 

of Turkey’s emerging pro-European tendency in foreign policy, especially toward Iraq. 

It is possible to say, for example, that Turkey’s reluctance over 

the past winter to fully support the idea of a northern front in the 

Iraq campaign was at least in part a product of Ankara’s desire to 

align itself with European foreign policy. It may come as a surprise 

that this resonates even with Turkey’s AKP government since 

many analysts regard the AKP as a party with an Islamist pedigree, so the party’s pro-European bias brings questions to a lot of 

people’s minds. 

I believe we should judge the AKP not by what we think about 

it, but rather through its actions. From Washington’s perspective, 

I would suggest that until now AKP’s performance has been mixed. 

On the one hand, the party has singlehandedly passed the much 

needed reforms toward EU accession, putting Turkey on a track of 

political restructuring, but on the other hand I would also suggest 

that AKP has not been a consistent supporter of America’s Iraq 

policy. 

Back in the winter, for example, when the Turkish Parliament 

was debating the idea of American troop deployment in Turkey, 

while some people in the AKP leadership were trying to muster 

support for that initiative, there were others in the leadership who 

were opposing it and a few of them even cited Muslim solidarity 

as the basis of their objection an American campaign against Iraq. 

This was, of course, not the only reason why Turkey did not fully 

cooperate with the United States in the Iraq war. The perception 

that America’s campaign would in the end create a Kurdish state 

in northern Iraq I would say was one of the biggest concerns. 

Now, this may come as a surprise and many people would ask 

why is there such a big concern in Turkey over the Kurdish question? Why cannot the Turks just get over the Kurdish issue? 

I think the answer is the PKK. This is a terrorist organization 

which is on the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. It has been active since the early 1980s. Today, the PKK 

has about 5000 militants in northern Iraq. In the past, it has 

launched many very bloody attacks from northern Iraq into Turkey, and so there is a fear that the PKK’s presence in northern 

Iraq is a continuing threat to Turkey and this was also the perception back in the winter. 
10

The PKK’s violence, just to put it into perspective, has cost Turkey since the early 1980s about 30,000 casualties. I would suggest 

that the pains that the PKK has created in Turkey are similar to 

the trauma of the September 11 terrorist attacks here and this is 

why I think Turkey’s long fight against terrorism has created a 

deep distrust in Turkey toward both PKK as well as Kurdish nationalism. 

Mr. Chairman, when we analyze the reasons that underlined 

Turkey’s aversion to an Iraq campaign back in March, which I have 

just highlighted, and when we look at Turkey today, we reach a 

conclusion that the factors that underlined this aversion still loom 

large in Turkey. So the question is if not much has changed in the 

Turkish view, vis-a-vis Operational Iraqi Freedom, the question is 

can anything be done to clear the air between Washington and Ankara? 

Mr. Chairman, I believe the key to rebuilding the relations goes 

through establishing a new foundation for the United States-Turkish partnership. Now, we know, and I am sure the other speakers 

will elaborate very well on that, that the United States-Turkish 

partnership since the end of World War II, what was termed as a 

strategic partnership was a working relationship; it was based on 

mutual interests in the sense that the United States as a superpower took care of Turkey’s global interests, whether protecting 

Turkey against communism during the cold war or promoting Turkey’s EU accession in the 1990s, and supporting the idea of a 

Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in the Iggos and, in return, Turkey provided 

America with support in its neighborhood, from the Balkans to the 

Caucasuses and Middle East, both during the cold war and since 

then. 

The question today is whether Turkey can still provide such support for America. In other words, is Turkey still strategically important for the United States? 

In the long run, America may indeed not need Turkey for all the 

reasons of the past, but I will suggest that the United States will 

still need Turkey for a variety of very important reasons. If you go 

through them briefly: 

Assistance in Iraq, whether it is military or not, it is substantial 

to maintaining and achieving security and stability there. 

Turkey is needed also outside the Middle East. The Caspian 

basin, with which Ankara has strong historic and cultural relations, a very volatile region that has the world’s second largest oil 

reserves, is where Turkey will be needed. 

Other places from Turkish-Israeli partnership to the war on terror are also where we are going to need Turkish support, especially 

I have to emphasize that in the war on terror I think Turkey has 

had a fantastic record, from running post-war Afghanistan to sharing intelligence against the war on terror and I think that is where 

we have to give the Turks a lot of credit. 

If it is indeed the fact that Washington needs Turkey, then the 

question is does Ankara need Washington? Is this mutual? 

My answer is yes. I think this especially becomes important 

when you look at the question of who is going to be Turkish global 

partner in a couple of years down the road when it becomes clear, 
11

as I suggest, that the EU is not going to take Turkey in as a full 

member. 

As a regional country with limited power, Turkey is going to 

need America to guard its global interests, as has been the case in 

the past. 

If American and Turkish interests are likely to overlap in the future, as I suggested, I think the question is can anything be done 

to bridge the gap between Washington and Ankara. The United 

States is now Turkey’s southeastern neighbor. If the two countries 

are going to rebuild their relations, they have to start in Iraq and 

it has to be based on cooperation in Iraq. 

Many things can be done here, we can elaborate on that later on, 

from shutting down the PKK or joint action against the PKK, 

which, as I highlighted earlier, is a first concern in Turkish minds, 

to military confidence building measures between the two armies, 

but also a need, I think, exists to improve economic relations with 

Turkey so that the next time Washington and Ankara face a challenge their bond will not be standing on the single pillar of military 

to military relations. 

Before I finish, Mr. Chairman, a few more sentences about the 

Turkish side. I guess with time Turkey will determine what it can 

do to improve its relations with the United States and Ankara will 

step up to the plate, but first I believe Turkey will find it useful 

to decide if in the future it will cash in its strategic importance 

with America, something it has not done so well recently. 

What I mean by that, Mr. Chairman, is that I see a choice for 

Turkey. If the AKP government refrains from helping America in 

Iraq or elsewhere, then I think in Washington’s eyes Turkey will 

remain a country with unused and therefore not so valuable strategic importance. But, if on the other hand, Ankara cooperates with 

Washington on the many issues concerning its neighborhood, with 

time, I believe Turkey could once again become a valuable ally and 

subsequently I think the United States-Turkish partnership could 

be built on even firmer grounds than before. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., SOREF FELLOW AND

COORDINATOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the chance to come here today and speak 

about Turkey and the future of U.S.-Turkish relations. It’s an honor to have been 

invited to testify before this prestigious body. 

We have a number of issues to discuss today. I would like to focus on three of 

these topics, namely:

• Turkish-European Union (EU) relations and reforms in Turkey;

• Turkey’s role in Iraq, and;

• The future of U.S.-Turkish relations;

in order to draw eventual policy suggestions for the sake of this panel. 

1. TURKISH-EU RELATIONS AND REFORMS IN TURKEY: 

Background: A discussion of Turkish-EU relations is germane to our debate since 

the desire to join the EU is one of the most significant political forces in Turkey 

today. 

Ankara applied to join the EU in 1963, but for decades, little progress was made 

toward that goal. In this regard, the emergence of the Kurdistan Workers Party

(PKK)—an organization on the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
12

list—in the 1980s played a significant role in delaying Ankara’s membership. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the PKK terrorized Turkey, throwing the country into 

political chaos, and dampening its willingness to carry out the necessary political 

reforms towards EU membership. 

However, things changed in February 1999, when Turkey captured the PKK’s 

leader Abdullah Ocalan. Left without a head, the PKK declared a ceasefire in February 2000. As violence subsided, Turkey relaxed. Significant reforms, from Kurdish 

education to new laws on par with the First Amendment, followed. 

The future of Turkish-EU relations: Turkey’s chance for EU accession seems to 

have increased after the recent reforms. In December 2004, Brussels will decide 

whether to offer Turkey an accession calendar, opening the way for eventual Turkish accession into the Union. 

For this to happen, Turkey has to satisfy the EU’s accession rules, the so-called 

Copenhagen criteria. So far, the EU’s main objection to Turkish membership has 

been that Ankara does not satisfy the political leg of the Copenhagen criteria. The 

EU has said that Turkey is a flawed democracy since its military has too much influence over politics. It also objected to Turkish membership asserting that Ankara 

has a poor human rights record because of its treatment of the Kurds. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe today it has now become difficult to draw such conclusions. Turkey is changing, and it is changing fast. In this regard, for instance, the 

political powers of the military are now being trimmed. In August, EU reforms 

civilianized the Turkish National Security Council (NSC), the country’s’ top foreign 

policy body, in which the military used to enjoy dominance. Today, the NSC is an 

advisory body with a majority of civilian officials, reporting to the Deputy Prime 

Minister. A sign of the military’s changing role was that, last winter, as Turkey was 

discussing the Iraq War, the army was conspicuously absent from this debate. 

Today, it is not a far-fetched conclusion to say that the Turkish military is moving 

towards becoming an institution of government, instead of an institution over government. 

Things are changing also on the Kurdish front. In August, Turkey granted am- nesty to the members of the PKK. A lenient new law makes it possible for the PKK’s 

foot soldiers to lay down arms and receive only minimal punishment. On the other 

hand, with the recent EU reforms, Turkey has given cultural rights to the Kurds, 

who are now allowed to receive education, run TV programs, and even conduct election propaganda in Kurdish. Accordingly, when it comes to the Copenhagen (political) criterion of ‘‘respect for and protection of minorities,’’ Turkey is now in safe territory. 

Although the recent reforms have made Turkey a likely candidate for EU accession, I have to admit that I am skeptical about the chances of the EU offering Turkey membership anytime soon. 

Mr. Chairman, Turkey may indeed not be a stellar example of Anglo-Saxon democracy. My point is that subsequent to the recent reforms, Turkey qualifies for EU 

membership at least as much as the countries of Eastern Europe slated to join the 

EU in May 2004. Some of these countries themselves do not quite possess the perfect record to join the EU, especially when it comes to minority rights. 

Let’s take two examples: Slovakia and Latvia. Recent reports indicate that last 

year; around 150 Roma (Gypsy) women were forcefully sterilized in Slovakia. (In 

most countries of East-Central Europe, the Roma are treated dismally, cast off to 

modern ghettos). Then, there is Latvia, where the Russian-speaking community 

faces outright discrimination. Russian-speakers in Latvia lack citizenship and cannot vote or receive passports. I am not arguing that Latvia, Slovakia, or other countries should be kept outside the EU because of their problems. Joining the EU will 

only help them become better democracies, and indeed in May 2004, these countries 

will enter the EU. 

What puzzles me is that the EU seems to be accepting countries with less than 

perfect human rights records, while intending to keep Turkey out. 

The answer to this lies in understanding the EU’s expansion dynamics: in 2004, 

the Union will take in 10 new countries, with a total population of 75 million people. 

Almost all these countries have income levels below that of the EU, and will therefore receive significant development funds from Brussels as per the EU’s plans to 

transfer funds from the wealthier countries to the poorer ones. Since the European 

economies have been growing very slowly, barely over 1%, for the last decade, the 

EU has very little money to hand out to the poor incoming countries. At this stage, 

accepting Turkey, with 70 million mostly poor inhabitants, would make expansion 

challenging for the EU. The EU is not rich enough to deal with Turkey right now. 

Hence, its unwillingness to offer Ankara accession. 

Even if it does not result in Turkey’s eventual membership, the desire for EU accession has been beneficial for Turkey by catalyzing political reforms. Today, most 
13

Turks see EU membership as a positive development. The EU process is a political 

avalanche in Turkey. Because of that, no one wants to be caught in the unpopular 

position of being culpable for blocking Turkey’s EU accession. That explains, among 

other reasons, why the Turkish military, whose powers have been trimmed as a result of the reforms, did not outright object to these changes. 

That is also the reason why, over the past 18 months, seven revolutionary reform 

packages, harmonizing the Turkish political system with that of the EU, have been 

passed swiftly by the Turkish parliament. In the long run, the Turks will benefit 

from the consolidation of their democracy as a result of the EU reforms. Yet, it is 

important to note that the powerful impetus behind these reforms is symptomatic 

of Turkey’s emerging pro-European bias in foreign policy, especially towards Iraq. 

2. TURKEY’S ROLE IN IRAQ

Mr. Chairman, it is possible to say that Turkey’s reluctance over the past winter 

to support a northern front in the Iraq War was at least in part a product of Ankara’s desire to align itself with European foreign policy. This attitude is prevalent especially among the foreign policy elite in Ankara. But more importantly, it resonates 

with Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. Since many outside observers have come to regard the AKP as an Islamist party, or a party with 

an Islamist pedigree, the party’s pro-European bias may come as a surprise. There 

are two takes on why the AKP has vigorously pursued EU reforms:

• First is that the AKP sees the reform process as a chance to consolidate the 

Turkish democracy,

• And the second is that the AKP views this process as a means to an end, 

using the reforms to curb the influence of the military—the traditional guardian of Turkey’s secular democracy—over politics.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we should judge the AKP not by what we think about 

it, but rather through its actions. From Washington’s perspective, until now, AKP’s 

performance has been mixed. On the one hand, the party has single-handedly passed 

EU laws, putting Turkey on a much-needed reform track. On the other hand, however, the AKP has not been a consistent supporter of America’s Iraq policy. Back 

in the winter, when the Turkish parliament was voting on American troop deployment in Turkey, while some in the AKP leadership were trying to muster support 

for this initiative, others were opposing it. A few of them were citing Muslim solidarity as the basis of their objection to a war against Iraq. 

There were other reasons why the AKP and Ankara declined to cooperate with 

the U.S. in the Iraq War. The Kurdish issue was the biggest concern. Many people 

in Turkey feared that America’s Iraq campaign would, in the end, create a Kurdish 

state there. (The fact that Turkey was not privy to American plans about post-war 

Iraq exacerbated such concerns). Why was there such a big fear in Turkey over the 

Kurdish issue? The reason is the PKK, which has 4,000–5,000 militants in northern 

Iraq from where it has launched attacks into Turkey in the past. The PKK’s violence has left over 35,000 deaths behind, creating pains in Turkey whose American 

equivalent would be the trauma of the September 11 terrorist attacks. For many 

Turks, the two-decade long fight against terrorism has produced a deep distrust towards the PKK and Kurdish nationalism. 

Mr. Chairman, when we review the reasons that underlined Turkey’s aversion to 

the Iraq War back in March, and analyze Turkey today, we reach the following conclusion. The factors that made the Iraq War unpopular still loom large today:

• The AKP government treats EU foreign policy as a yardstick in deciding 

Turkish policy towards Iraq.

• The Islamists within the AKP are increasingly more upset with what they see 

as emerging chaos in Iraq. They are convinced that the situation is only going 

to get worse, and would like to have nothing to do with it.

• Then, there is a new factor: in the light of the upcoming nation-wide local 

elections in April 2004, the AKP government, which sees the elections as a 

vote of confidence as well as a means to consolidate power, has an unfavorable view of sending Turkish peacekeepers to Iraq. If Turkish troops suffer 

casualties there, this will have negative ramifications for the AKP’s success 

in the April 2004 elections.

• And finally, the PKK is still in northern Iraq. In fact, today, the fear of the 

PKK is stronger than before: on September 2, the organization renounced its 

February 2000 ceasefire. This has made likely PKK violence infiltrating from 

northern Iraq the top item on the Turkish agenda.
14

If not much has changed in the Turkish view vis-a ́-vis Operation Iraqi Freedom; 

the question is can anything be done to clear the air between Washington and Ankara? 

3. FUTURE OF U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS

Mr. Chairman, the key to rebuilding U.S.-Turkish relations goes through establishing a new foundation for that partnership. As I am sure the other speakers will 

elaborate on it, for fifty years after the end of World War Two, the United States 

and Turkey built a working relationship that President Clinton named a ‘‘strategic 

partnership’’ in 1999 This was based on mutual interests: as a superpower, America 

took care of Turkey’s global interests (for example, protecting Turkey against communism during the Cold War; or making Turkey a partner on the energy corridor 

leading out of the Caspian basin and supporting Ankara’s EU candidacy in the 

1990s). And as a regional power, Turkey provided America with support in its neighborhood, from the Balkans, to the Caucasus and the Middle East. 

The question today is whether Turkey can still provide such support to America. 

In other words, is Ankara still strategically important for Washington? Some people 

argue that America does not need Turkey anymore. Washington may indeed not 

need Ankara today for all the reasons of the past, but I will argue that in the long 

run, America will continue to need Turkey. 

For example, it is becoming increasingly clear that Turkish assistance in Iraq, 

whether it is peacekeepers or reconstruction aid, would be beneficial to the U.S. in 

achieving security and stability there. 

The U.S. will need Turkey outside the Middle East too, such as in the Caspian 

basin, a volatile region with the world’s second largest oil reserves. Turkey’s traditionally good relations with the countries of the Caspian area make Ankara a desirable partner for Washington in facing the challenges awaiting the Caspian region. 

There are many other issues on which Washington and Ankara could continue to 

cooperate, ranging from the Turkish-Israeli partnership to the War on Terror. In the 

War on Terror for example, Turkey has had a fantastic record, from running postwar Afghanistan to sharing valuable intelligence with America against terror 

groups. 

Finally, there is the symbolic factor that in the post-September 11 environment, 

America will be interested in Turkey’s success as a predominantly Muslim, yet prosperous and peaceful society. 

If it is indeed the fact that Washington needs Turkey, then, the question is does 

Ankara need Washington? My answer is yes. Who will be Turkey’s global partner

when, for instance, it becomes clear in several years that the EU is unable to offer 

Ankara accession anytime soon? I argue that as a regional country with limited 

power outside its neighborhood, Turkey will continue to need America to guard its 

global interests. 

If American and Turkish interests are likely to overlap in the future, the question 

whether anything can be done to bridge the gap between Washington and Ankara? 

The first step towards good mutual relations would be cooperation in Iraq. The U.S. 

is now Turkey’s southeastern neighbor, and if America and Turkey are going to rebuild their relations, they will have so start in Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, the following steps may help Washington develop a better rapport 

with Ankara in Iraq and beyond:

1. Joint engagement against the PKK: Turkey sees battle against the PKK as 

a sine qua non of U.S.-Turkish cooperation in Iraq. Besides, if the PKK stays 

in northern Iraq, this would turn the area into another southern Lebanon, 

a region of nominal government authority where terrorist groups operate 

freely. This is not in the interests of the United States, or Turkey or of a 

unified Iraq.

2. Military to military confidence building measures: For many decades, military relations formed the bedrock of the U.S.-Turkish alliance. While economic, and cultural links between America and Turkey hovered at a minimum (for instance, in 2002, Turkey ranked twenty-ninth among America’s 

trading partners), military relations flourished. Such rapport was not limited 

to ever-important defense cooperation. Rather, a strong human element lay 

at the core of the U.S.-Turkish military partnership, with American and 

Turkish officers working as colleagues, studying at the same academies, and 

participating in joint military operations. As a result of such first-hand contact, U.S. military officers developed perhaps the most accurate, and therefore the most sympathetic, view of Turkey and the Turks, becoming one of 

Ankara’s best allies in Washington. 
15

Yet, as indicated by the latest events, including the July 4 incident in 

Suleymaniye (when American troops detained Turkish special operations 

forces on the grounds that they were conspiring to assassinate elected Kurdish officials in northern Iraq), things have changed. The complex game 

played out over the past year between Washington and Ankara over northern 

Iraq has poisoned U.S.-Turkish military relations to a previously inconceivable level. Many in Ankara believe that the United States is trying to set up

a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, and many in Washington are convinced 

that Turkey is aiming to complicate things there for the United States. Accordingly, little trust can be found today between American and Turkish 

troops, especially those stationed in Iraq. Thus, as Washington and Ankara 

negotiate the deployment of Turkish troops to Iraq, a precondition for effective cooperation would be military confidence-building measures, including: 

• Increased use of liaison officers, 

• Military diplomacy, 

• Joint reconstruction work in Iraq. 

• Sharing political plans for Iraq’s future with the Turks. (This has not 

been done quite so well over the past year), 

• Making Turkey a partner in Iraq’s political and economic reconstruction.

3. Beyond Iraq, improve economic relations with Turkey: Develop deeper economic ties with Turkey to buttress U.S.-Turkish relations so that next time 

Washington and Ankara face a challenge, their bond will not be standing on 

the single pillar of military to military relations.

The Turkish side: There are many ways for Turkey to step up to the plate and 

improve relations with the United States. In due course, Ankara will determine 

what these steps are. But, first, Turkey may find it useful to decide if in the future 

it will cash in its strategic importance with the U.S., something it has not done so 

well recently. 

Mr. Chairman, before I finish, I would like to emphasize that here, I see a choice 

for Turkey: if the AKP government refrains from helping America in Iraq or elsewhere, then in Washington’s eyes, Turkey will remain a country with unused and, 

therefore not so valuable strategic importance. On the other hand, if Ankara decides 

to cooperate with Washington on the many issues troubling its neighborhood, with 

time, Turkey could once again become a valuable ally to America. Subsequently, the 

U.S.-Turkish partnership could be built on even firmer ground than before. 

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Cagaptay, I thank you very much for your 

testimony. 

Next, we will hear from Dr. Bulent Aliriza. He has been a Senior 

Associate and Director of the Turkey Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC since 1994. He 

is also co-Director of the CSIS Caspian Energy Project. 

Prior to joining CSIS, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace. His previous activities include 

close involvement in the Cyprus issue as a Turkish Cypriot representative. He has a B.S. degree in international relations from 

the London School of Economics and Political Science and a doctorate in diplomatic history from the University of Oxford. 

Dr. Aliriza, please proceed as you wish. Thank you for your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF BULENT ALIRIZA, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND DIRECTOR, TURKEY PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. ALIRIZA. Mr. Chairman, the old adage that Turkey is an 

eastern country if you come from the west and a western country 

if you come from the east has never been more apt. 

Literally straddling the Asian and European continents, as you 

have seen, Turkey has been committed to synthesizing its culture, 
16

traditions and religion, which originate in the east, with a commitment to join the western community of nations. 

As a secular, free market democracy, member of NATO and aspirant for European Union membership, with a predominantly Moslem population, Turkey would appear to be the ideal bridge between the western and Islamic worlds. However, particularly since 

September 11, relations between the two worlds that Turkey belongs to have become even more strained, making Turkey’s position 

on the fault line between civilizations more important and also that 

much more complicated. 

Mr. Chairman, the best example, perhaps, of the new complexity 

for Turkey in the current international environment was the vote 

in the national assembly on March 1. We cannot say with any degree of accuracy how much the Turkish public and Turkish Parliamentarians, particularly those from the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP), which, as I said, has its ancestry in the Islamist 

political movement, were affected by the new global strains before 

the assembly failed to muster the requisite number of votes to 

allow the United States to open a northern front. 

However, in line with the rest of the Islamic world, opinion polls 

in Turkey prior to the vote consistently indicated strong opposition 

to supporting the United States in the imminent conflict with Iraq. 

The vote was undoubtedly a major reversal for the JDP government which had its own reservations about the imminent conflict, 

but forwarded the motion in accordance with the overriding need 

for cooperation with Turkey’s most important ally, the United 

States. 

JDP had every reason to believe that its overriding majority 

would ensure passage. However, it had come into the office only a 

few months earlier and the Chairman of the party, Recep Tayyip 

Erdogan, had still to take over the premiership. At the same time, 

the powerful Turkish military refrained from giving an unambiguously clear approval or recommendation in favor of the motion. 

The President of the republic, along with the parliamentary opposition, the Republican People’s Party, were against the motion. However, the reality is that the vote went down ultimately because of 

defections from the JDP. 

The vote was also a shock for the U.S. Administration, which included access for United States ground focus through Turkey in its 

war plans. Turkey subsequently allowed the use of its air space 

and provided important help, as Congressman Wexler said, 

through other means as Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul, who 

visited in Washington in July have repeatedly stressed. However, 

while the visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell to Ankara back 

in April soon after the war along with the inclusion of a one billion 

grant for Turkey in the supplementary request underlined continuing United States interest in Turkey, I would argue that the 

bilateral relationship is far from fully back on track. 

Several months after the vote, the Turkish government is once 

again moving cautiously toward another major decision with significant implications for United States-Turkish relations. However, 

sending Turkish troops to support the United States in stabilizing 

post-war Iraq is not backed by the majority of Turkish voters, the 

parliamentary opposition or the President again, and the JDP’s 
17

handling of this issue will have inevitable domestic as well as external reverberations. 

I will get back to United States-Turkish relations later, but let 

us look briefly at the domestic picture. 

Parallel to the major global developments during the past 2 

years, there have been very important domestic changes in Turkey. 

The general elections of November 2002, which can rightly be characterized as a political earthquake, crushed the three political parties, which had gone into the polls in coalition government, along 

with the main opposition party. None of these parties which had 

dominated Turkish politics for decades, were able to gain parliamentary representation. 

The JDP, which had been established only in August 2001, swept 

into office as Turkey’s first single party government in over a decade on the back of a massive backlash against the chronic mismanagement of the economy, cronyism and corruption by gaining 

nearly two-thirds of the seats in the assembly. 

Many of the leaders of the JDP were members of the National 

Salvation Party and the Welfare Party which served in previous coalition governments but were subsequently banned for Islamist activities. In fact, prior to its dissolution, the Welfare Party was 

ousted from government in 1997 following pressure from the Turkish military. Committed to the preservation of Turkish secularism, 

Turkey’s armed forces have carried out four interventions as part 

of their broadly defined mission to defend the republic. 

Understandably, the JDP government has been stressing its 

break from the Islamist movement and specifically rejects the Islamic label. Its leaders instead define the JDP as a conservative 

democratic party and as the heir to the Democratic Party which 

governed Turkey between 1950 and the coup of 1960, as well as 

Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, which came into office in the first 

elections after the 1980 coup. 

At the same time, the JDP has been carefully avoiding the inflammatory statements and actions which previously characterized 

the Turkish Islamists in government. For example, although the 

wives of most of the JDP leaders wear Islamic headscarves, the 

JDP has not made any moves on this very controversial issue. 

As we move toward the first anniversary of its election victory, 

it remains to be seen whether the JDP has transformed the Turkish political landscape in a lasting manner. This, I believe, will depend on a great deal on the success of the subjective redefinition 

by Erdogan and his colleagues which is directed at the majority of 

the Turkish voters who did not vote for them and who still have 

lingering suspicions about their ultimate aims. 

Recent opinion polls suggest that the JDP has been able to 

broaden its appeal, but this may be more a reflection of the disarray in opposition ranks than the success of the JDP itself. Currently, none of the other political parties is in a position to challenge the JDP, as the local elections are likely to confirm next year. 

Mr. Chairman, the most important component of the JDP strategy in government is the pursuit of the linked goals of Turkish accession to the European Union (EU) and political reforms in accordance with the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. 
18

In marked contrast to the Welfare Party-led government under 

Necmettin Erbakan, who gave the impression that his main goal 

in foreign affairs was to strengthen links with the Islamic world, 

the JDP government has been stressing EU membership as its primary objective. Most of Erdogan’s visits have been to European 

capitals. 

At the same time, the JDP, as has been noted, has been accelerating the process of reforms it inherited. The national assembly 

passed a legislative package directed mainly at Kurdish speaking 

citizens which reduced the scope of the anti-terror laws and provided conditional amnesty for individuals involved in Kurdish separatist activities. Much more significantly, I would argue, the JDP 

then pushed through a package effectively reversing the expansion 

of the influence of the Turkish armed forces, particularly through 

the National Security Council (NSC). 

During the past 20 years of its 4-decade existence, the NSC, 

which brought together in its monthly meetings Turkey’s civilian 

and military leadership, expanded its powers far beyond its original advisory role. The NSC Secretary General, always a four-star 

general, accumulated and wielded virtually unsupervised power in 

a very wide sphere of Turkish life. The new legislation has curbed 

the powers of the NSC, authorized the nomination of a civilian as 

NSC Secretary General and gave responsibility for monitoring and 

coordinating the implementation of NSC recommendations to a 

Deputy Prime Minister. 

Although Erdogan apparently agreed at the last minute to refrain from proceeding immediately to the appointment of a civilian 

as NSC Secretary General, the changes are likely to be very significant. 

Mr. Chairman, despite the parliamentary majority and public 

support, the JDP would not have been able to proceed smoothly to 

the restructuring of civilian-military relations without the support 

of the current military leadership, in particular the Chief of Staff. 

As the inheritor and defender of the Kemalist commitment to 

westernization, the Turkish military has acknowledged that accession to the EU would commit Turkey to finally proceed to full 

membership of the western community. Accordingly, Chief of Staff 

Ozkok has signalled that the Turkish armed forces would not be 

an impediment in this important process. 

Nevertheless, dissenting voices have been raised within the miliary establishment relating to the advisability of the reforms and 

although some of the generals who were most vociferous have retired, there are others still in uniform who voice similar concerns. 

Each of the four military interventions in the past followed domestic ferment. That is not present today and one does not get the 

feeling that we are on the eve of the kind of problems with the 

military that Turkey had in the past. 

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will quickly look at a couple of the 

problems ahead and United States-Turkish relations. 

It is not clear whether the EU will ultimately proceed to accession negotiations with Turkey when it takes up the issue in December 2004. In fact, it is possible that Turkey’s EU journey could be 

brought to a halt by the Cyprus problem. 
19

Although the solution of this long-running dispute is not a specified condition for Turkish entry, the admission of the island into 

the EU in May 2004 with or without a settlement will certainly 

complicate Turkey’s own accession plans. 

The logical way out of the predicament is a negotiated solution 

by May 2004 under the auspices of the U.N., as the EU and U.S. 

have been advocating. 

For its part, the JDP government has stated that despite its 

flaws, the current U.N. plan could provide the basis for a settlement, apparently recognizing that while active diplomacy will bring 

certain domestic dangers in a confrontation with its opponents and 

the Euroskeptics who reject the U.N. plan, these are outweighed by 

the diplomatic dangers of allowing the current stalemate to continue beyond May 2004. 

There will also have to be major improvements in the Turkish 

economy to conform to the EU’s Maastricht criteria. After all, Turkey is a country of 70 million with a per capita income around 

$3,000 and the current economic recovery is due to a great extent 

to the $39.5 billion from the IMF as part of standby packages, as 

well as the $1 billion in grants which will be converted to $8.5 billion in debt relief. 

Although foreign debt is manageable, the domestic debt is worrisome because previous governments have run up the domestic debt 

to finance their mismanagement of the economy. There are populist 

pressures from below which could force the government to relax fiscal and financial discipline. 

Last but not least, there is the thorny question of religion and 

culture that the EU and Turkey ultimately have to tackle. For the 

moment, the issue of whether a predominantly Moslem country can 

be integrated into the EU has been put on the back burner. Meanwhile, the JDP leaders continue to underline Turkey’s role as a 

bridge, but it remains to be seen whether the EU will reciprocate 

their gesture. 

Finally, on Turkey and the United States, as I said at the outset, 

playing the role of a bridge to prevent the clash of civilization is 

something that Mr. Erdogan has been stressing and he raised this 

with President Bush when he came here in December 2002. It is 

impossible to overemphasize how difficult this is for Turkey, given 

the current global ferment, but also impossible to overemphasize 

the contribution Turkey could make in complementing the current 

military campaign with its own unique example as a country that 

belongs to both worlds. 

This is not to downplay the contribution Turkey could make in 

the military sphere. Turkey has been discussing with the United 

States the idea of sending troops to Iraq and the government may 

seek parliamentary authorization with the backing of the military 

as early as this month. This will be a very difficult decision, 

fraught with great consequences. The Turks are not going into 

northern Iraq where most of the Turkish public would want them 

to go for reasons that you are very familiar with. The U.S. is opposed to that. They would instead go into the so-called Sunni triangle and subsequent Turkish casualties will almost certainly 

cause major problems for the government. 
20

The troop deployment would have to be justified by the government as an essential component of Turkey’s responsibility as a regional power toward a troubled neighbor. Another major aspect of 

the policy that would have to be stressed is Turkey’s ability and 

desire to play a significant role in the economic reconstruction of 

Iraq. 

Finally, we need to note that the troop issue is at the forefront 

of the current debate and the decision makers at both ends have 

to realize that the underlying problems that were revealed and accentuated by the March vote cannot be eradicated simply by sending Turkish troops to Iraq. The relationship was a product of vital 

mutual needs during the cold war era and continued with ad hoc 

adjustments, particularly on Iraq, even after the common foe, the 

Soviet Union, disappeared over a decade ago. The issue of restructuring and redefining the relationship has been avoided and although it is a very difficult task, it needs to be tackled as soon as 

possible. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aliriza follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BULENT ALIRIZA, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND DIRECTOR, 

TURKEY PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR INVITING ME TO 

TALK ABOUT TURKEY AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS. 

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO COMMEND YOU AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EUROPE FOR FOCUSING ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT AT THIS CRITICAL 

JUNCTURE. 

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE OLD ADAGE THAT TURKEY IS AN EASTERN COUNTRY IF YOU COME TO IT FROM THE WEST AND A WESTERN COUNTRY IF 

YOU COME FROM THE EAST HAS NEVER BEEN MORE APT. 

LITERALLY STRADDLING THE ASIAN AND EUROPEAN CONTINENTS, 

TURKEY HAS BEEN COMMITTED, PARTICULARLY SINCE KEMAL ATATURK 

CREATED THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC OUT OF THE ASHES OF THE 

OTTOMAN EMPIRE 80 YEARS AGO, TO SYNTHESIZING ITS CULTURE, TRADITIONS AND RELIGION, WHICH ORIGINATE IN THE EAST, WITH A COMMITMENT TO JOIN THE WESTERN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. 

AS A SECULAR, FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY, MEMBER OF NATO AND ASPIRANT FOR EUROPEAN UNION (EU) MEMBERSHIP, WITH A MOSLEM POPULATION, TURKEY WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE IDEAL LINK OR BRIDGE 

BETWEEN THE WESTERN AND THE ISLAMIC WORLDS. HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY’S TWO WORLDS HAVE BECOME EVEN MORE STRAINED, 

MAKING TURKEY’S POSITION ON THE FAULT LINE BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS MORE IMPORTANT THAN BEFORE BUT ALSO MUCH MORE COMPLICATED. 

MR.CHAIRMAN, PERHAPS THE BEST EXAMPLE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF 

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR TURKEY WAS THE VOTE 

IN THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON MARCH 1. 

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY WITH ANY DEGREE OF ACCURACY HOW MUCH 

THE TURKISH PUBLIC AND THE TURKISH PARLIAMENTARIANS, PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM THE RULING JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY 

(JDP), WHICH HAS ITS ANCESTRY IN THE ISLAMIST POLITICAL MOVEMENT, WERE AFFECTED BY THE NEW GLOBAL STRAINS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY FAILED TO MUSTER THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOTES TO 

ALLOW THE US TO OPEN A NORTHERN FRONT IN THE WAR AGAINST 

IRAQ. 

HOWEVER, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT, IN LINE WITH THE REST OF THE 

ISLAMIC WORLD, OPINION POLLS IN TURKEY PRIOR TO THE VOTE CONSISTENTLY INDICATED STRONG OPPOSITION TO SUPPORTING THE US IN 

THE IMMINENT CONFLICT WITH IRAQ. 

THE VOTE WAS A MAJOR REVERSAL FOR THE JDP GOVERNMENT WHICH 

HAD STATED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE IMMINENT CONFLICT, BUT NEVERTHELESS FORWARDED THE MOTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OVER-
21

RIDING NEED FOR COOPERATION WITH TURKEY’S MOST IMPORTANT 

ALLY. 

THE JDP SURELY HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IT ENJOYED IN THE ASSEMBLY WOULD ENSURE 

PASSAGE. HOWEVER, IT HAD COME INTO OFFICE ONLY A FEW MONTHS 

EARLIER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY, RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN, 

HAD STILL NOT TAKEN OVER THE PREMIERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE 

POWERFUL TURKISH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAD REFRAINED FROM 

GIVING AN UNAMBIGIOUSLY CLEAR RECOMMENDATION IN FAVOR OF 

THE MOTION, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, AHMET NECDET SEZER, 

HAD OPENLY INDICATED HIS RESERVATIONS AND THE MAIN OPPOSITION 

IN THE ASSEMBLY, THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY, HAD CHOSEN TO 

MOUNT AN ALL OUT CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MOTION. HOWEVER, THE 

REALITY IS THAT ULTIMATELY THE VOTE WENT DOWN BECAUSE OF JDP 

DEFECTIONS. 

NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE VOTE WAS ALSO A SHOCK TO THE US ADMINISTRATION, WHICH HAD INCLUDED ACCESS FOR US GROUND FORCES 

THROUGH TURKEY IN ITS WAR PLANS. TURKEY SUBSEQUENTLY ALLOWED THE USE OF ITS AIR SPACE AND PROVIDED IMPORTANT HELP 

THROUGH VARIOUS OTHER MEANS, AS ERDOGAN AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABDULLAH GUL, WHO VISITED WASHINGTON IN JULY, HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED. HOWEVER, WHILE THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF 

STATE COLIN POWELL TO ANKARA BACK IN APRIL UNDERLINED CONTINUING US INTEREST IN TURKEY, THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS 

NOT YET GOT BACK ON TRACK. 

SEVEN MONTHS AFTER THE VOTE, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS 

ONCE AGAIN MOVING CAUTIOUSLY TOWARDS ANOTHER MAJOR DECISION 

WITH SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR US-TURKISH RELATIONS. JUST AS 

IN MARCH, SENDING TURKISH TROOPS TO SUPPORT THE US IN STABILIZING POST WAR IRAQ IS NOT BACKED BY THE MAJORITY OF TURKISH 

VOTERS, AND THE JDP’S HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE WILL ALSO HAVE DOMESTIC AS WELL AS EXTERNAL REVERBERATIONS. 

MR. CHAIRMAN, PARALLEL TO THE MAJOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, THERE HAS ALSO BEEN IMPORTANT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN TURKEY. THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF NOVEMBER 

2002, WHICH CAN RIGHTLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE, CRUSHED THE THREE POLITICAL PARTIES, WHICH HAD GONE TO 

THE POLLS IN COALITION GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY. NONE OF THESE PARTIES, WHICH HAD DOMINATED TURKISH POLITICS FOR DECADES, WERE ABLE TO GAIN PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION. 

THE JDP, WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED ONLY IN AUGUST 2001, 

SWEPT INTO OFFICE AS TURKEY’S FIRST SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN 

OVER A DECADE ON THE BACK OF A MASSIVE BACKLASH AGAINST THE 

CHRONIC MISMANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY, CRONYISM AND CORRUPTION BY GAINING ALMOST 2/3 OF THE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. 

MOST OF THE LEADERS OF THE JDP WERE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL 

SALVATION PARTY AND THE WELFARE PARTY WHICH SERVED IN PREVIOUS COALITION GOVERNMENTS BUT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY BANNED 

FOR ISLAMIST ACTIVITIES. IN FACT, PRIOR TO ITS DISSOLUTION, THE 

WELFARE PARTY WAS OUSTED FROM GOVERNMENT IN 1997 FOLLOWING 

PRESSURE FROM THE TURKISH MILITARY. COMMITTED TO THE PRESERVATION OF TURKISH SECULARISM, TURKEY’S ARMED FORCES HAVE CARRIED OUT FOUR INTERVENTIONS AS PART OF THEIR BROADLY DEFINED 

MISSION TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC. 

UNDERSTANDABLY, THE JDP GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN STRESSING ITS 

BREAK WITH THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AND REJECTS THE ISLAMIST 

LABEL, PREFERRING TO DEFINE THE JDP AS A CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. THE JDP LEADERS CLAIM THAT THE PARTY IS THE HEIR 

TO THE DEMOCRAT PARTY, WHICH CAME INTO POWER IN 1950 WITH THE 

ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE ERA OF GENUINE MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND SERVED FOR A DECADE BEFORE THE MILITARY COUP OF 1960, 

AND TURGUT OZAL’S MOTHERLAND PARTY, WHICH CAME INTO OFFICE IN 

THE FIRST ELECTIONS AFTER THE 1980 COUP. 

AT THE SAME TIME, THE JDP HAS BEEN AVOIDING THE INFLAMMATORY 

STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS, WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE TURKISH 

ISLAMIST PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH THE 

WIVES OF MOST OF THE JDP LEADERS WEAR ISLAMIC HEADSCARVES, 
22

THE JDP HAS NOT MADE ANY MOVES TO EASE THE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS. 

HOWEVER, AS WE MOVE TOWARDS THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF ITS 

ELECTION VICTORY, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE JDP HAS 

TRANSFORMED THE TURKISH POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN A LASTING MANNER. THIS WILL DEPEND TO A GREAT EXTENT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE 

ONGOING SUBJECTIVE REDEFINITION BY ERDOGAN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WHICH IS DIRECTED AT THE MAJORITY OF THE ELECTORATE 

WHO DID NOT VOTE FOR THEM AND RETAIN LINGERING SUSPICIONS 

ABOUT THE ULTIMATE AIMS OF THE JDP. 

RECENT OPINION POLLS SUGGEST THAT THE JDP HAS BEEN ABLE TO 

BROADEN ITS APPEAL. HOWEVER, THIS MAY BE MORE A REFLECTION OF 

THE CONTINUING DISARRAY IN OPPOSITION RANKS AND THEIR FAILURE 

TO FASHION AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY TO CONFRONT THE JDP THAN OF 

THE SUCCESS OF THE JDP ITSELF. IN ANY CASE, THE REALITY IS THAT 

NONE OF THE OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES ARE CURRENTLY IN A POSITION TO CHALLENGE THE JDP, AS THE LOCAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED IN 

THE SPRING OF 2004 ARE LIKELY TO CONFIRM, PARTICULARLY IF THE 

TROUBLED TURKISH ECONOMY CONTINUES TO IMPROVE. 

MR. CHAIRMAN, A VERY IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE JDP’S STRATEGY IN GOVERNMENT IS THE PURSUIT OF THE LINKED GOALS OF TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EU AND POLITICAL REFORMS IN ACCORDANCE 

WITH THE COPENHAGEN CRITERIA FOR EU MEMBERSHIP. IN MARKED 

CONTRAST TO THE WELFARE PARTY-LED GOVERNMENT UNDER 

NECMETTIN ERBAKAN, WHO GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS MAIN 

GOAL IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS TO STRENGTHEN LINKS WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD, THE JDP GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN STRESSING EU MEMBERSHIP AS ITS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. UNLIKE ERBAKAN, ERDOGAN HAS 

POINTEDLY CHOSEN TO MAKE MOST OF HIS FOREIGN TRIPS TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. 

AT THE SAME TIME, THE JDP HAS BEEN ACCELERATING THE PROCESS 

OF REFORMS IT INHERITED. BEFORE ITS SUMMER BREAK, THE ASSEMBLY 

ADOPTED A LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE DIRECTED AT KURDISH-SPEAKING 

CITIZENS, WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THE SCOPE OF THE ANTI 

TERROR LAWS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A BILL TO GRANT CONDITIONAL 

AMNESTY FOR INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN KURDISH SEPARATISM. MORE 

SIGNIFICANTLY, THE JDP THEN PUSHED THROUGH A PACKAGE EFFECTIVELY REVERSING THE EXPANSION OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

COUNCIL (NSC). 

DURING THE PAST TWENTY YEARS OF ITS FOUR-DECADE EXISTENCE, 

THE NSC, WHICH BROUGHT TOGETHER IN ITS MONTHLY MEETINGS TURKEY’S CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP, HAD EXPANDED ITS POWERS 

FAR BEYOND ITS ORIGINAL ADVISORY ROLE. THE NSC SECRETARY GENERAL, A FOUR STAR GENERAL, HAD ACCUMULATED AND WIELDED VIRTUALLY UNSUPERVISED POWER IN A VERY WIDE SPHERE OF TURKISH 

LIFE. THE NEW LEGISLATION CURBED THE POWERS OF THE NSC, AUTHORIZED THE NOMINATION OF A CIVILIAN AS NSC SECRETARY GENERAL AND GAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONITORING AND COORDINATING 

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NSC RECOMMENDATIONS TO A DEPUTY PRIME 

MINISTER. 

ALTHOUGH ERDOGAN APPARENTLY AGREED AT THE LAST MINUTE TO 

REFRAIN FROM PROCEEDING IMMEDIATELY TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A 

CIVILIAN AS NSC SECRETARY GENERAL, THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF 

THE CHANGES ON THE TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM ARE LIKELY TO BE 

SIGNIFICANT. 

MR. CHAIRMAN, DESPITE ITS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY AND PUBLIC 

SUPPORT, THE JDP WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROCEED SMOOTHLY TO THE RESTRUCTURING OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS TO CONFORM TO EU NORMS WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE CURRENT MILITARY 

LEADERSHIP, AND, IN PARTICULAR, CHIEF OF STAFF HILMI OZKOK. 

AS THE INHERITOR AND DEFENDER OF THE KEMALIST COMMITMENT 

TO WESTERNIZATION, THE TURKISH MILITARY HAS ACKNOWLEDGED 

THAT ACCESSION TO THE EU WOULD PERMIT TURKEY TO FINALLY PROCEED TO FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE WESTERN COMMUNITY. ACCORDINGLY, OZKOK HAS SIGNALLED THAT UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT BE AN IMPEDIMENT IN THIS IMPORTANT PROCESS. 
23

HOWEVER, DISSENTING VOICES HAVE BEEN RAISED WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT RELATING TO THE ADVISABILITY OF THE REFORMS WITHOUT THE ASSURANCE OF EU MEMBERSHIP AND THE PERCEIVED THREAT POSED BY THE JDP TO SECULARISM. WHILE A NUMBER 

OF THE MOST POWERFUL VOCAL CRITICS RETIRED FROM THE MILITARY 

IN AUGUST, THEIR SCEPTICAL VIEWS HAVE SINCE BEEN ECHOED BY A 

NUMBER OF THEIR FELLOW GENERALS WHO CONTINUE TO SERVE. 

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT EACH OF THE TURKISH MILITARY 

INTERVENTIONS FOLLOWED MAJOR DOMESTIC FERMENT, HIGHLIGHTED 

BY THE INFLUENTIAL TURKISH MEDIA. THAT IS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE 

TODAY AND THE TURKISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY, WHICH CONTROLS 

MOST OF THE MEDIA, ALONG WITH THE MAJORITY OF TURKISH VOTERS, 

APPARENTLY WANT THE UNITERRUPTED CONTINUATION OF THE EU 

PROCESS AND THE REFORMS WHICH HAVE HELPED TO BOOST THE ECONOMY. 

MR. CHAIRMAN, DESPITE THE RECENT STEPS, IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR 

WHETHER THE EU WILL ULTIMATELY PROCEED TO ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH TURKEY WHEN IT FORMALLY REVIEWS THE ISSUE IN DECEMBER 2004. IN FACT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TURKEY’S LONG EU JOURNEY COULD BE BROUGHT TO A HALT BY THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH THE SOLUTION OF THIS LONG-RUNNING DISPUTE IS NOT A 

SPECIFIED CONDITION FOR TURKISH ENTRY, THE ADMISSION OF THE ISLAND INTO THE EU IN MAY 2004 WITH OR WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT COMPLICATES TURKEY’S OWN ACCESSION PLANS. 

THE LOGICAL WAY OUT OF THE PREDICAMENT IS AN AGREEMENT 

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AS THE EU AND THE US 

HAVE ALSO BEEN ADVOCATING. FOR ITS PART, THE JDP GOVERNMENT 

HAS STATED THAT DESPITE ITS FLAWS, THE CURRENT UN PLAN COULD 

PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION. THE ERDOGAN GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THAT WHILE ACTIVE DIPLOMACY TO PROMOTE A SOLUTION 

BRINGS DOMESTIC DANGERS IN A CONFRONTATION WITH ITS OPPONENTS AND THE EUROSCEPTICS WHO REJECT THE UN PLAN, THESE ARE 

LIKELY TO BE OUTWEIGHED BY THE DIPLOMATIC DANGERS OF ALLOWING THE CURRENT STALEMATE TO CONTINUE BEYOND MAY 2004. 

THE JDP GOVERNMENT ALSO KNOWS THAT ULTIMATE EU MEMBERSHIP 

WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AND CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT OF THE 

TURKISH ECONOMY IN ORDER TO SATISFY THE MAASTRICHT ECONOMIC 

CRITERIA OF THE EU. AFTER ALL, A COUNTRY OF OVER 70 MILLION WITH 

A PER CAPITA INCOME BELOW $3,000 IS NOT A VIABLE CANDIDATE. THE 

CURRENT RECOVERY IS DUE IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO THE $ 39.5 BILLION IN LOANS PROVIDED BY THE IMF AS PART OF ITS CURRENT STANDBY AGREEEMENTS. THE $1 BILLION GRANT TO BE PROVIDED BY THE US, 

WHICH CAN BE CONVERTED INTO AN $8.5 BILLION LOAN FOR DEBT RELIEF, IS ALSO A RELEVANT FACTOR IN THE CURRENT RECOVERY. 

WHILE THE LARGE FOREIGN DEBT APPEARS MANAGEABLE, THE 

ALARMINGLY HIGH LEVEL OF DOMESTIC DEBT WITH HIGH INTEREST, 

WHICH SUCCESSIVE TURKISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE USED TO SUSTAIN 

BAD ECONOMIC POLICIES, IS A MATTER OF GREATER IMMEDIATE CONCERN. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS THE CONSTANT DANGER THAT POPULIST PRESSURES FROM ITS LOWER INCOME SUPPORTERS COULD FORCE 

THE JDP TO RELAX FISCAL AND FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE WITH SERIOUS 

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. 

LAST BUT NOT LEAST, THERE IS THE THORNY QUESTION OF RELIGION 

AND CULTURE THAT THE EU AND TURKEY ULTIMATELY HAVE TO TACKLE. FOR THE MOMENT, THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A PREDOMINANTLY MOSLEM COUNTRY WITH VERY DIFFERENT TRADITIONS CAN BE INTEGRATED 

IN THE EU HAS BEEN PUT ON THE BACKBURNER IN THE EU-TURKISH 

DIALOGUE. MEANWHILE, THE JDP LEADERS CONTINUE TO UNDERLINE 

TURKEY’S DIVERSITY AND POTENTIAL ROLE AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN RELIGIONS AND CULTURES IN THEIR EU CAMPAIGN. HAVING PREVIOUSLY OPPOSED THE EU AS A CHRISTIAN CLUB FROM WITHIN THE TURKISH 

ISLAMIST MOVEMENT, THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR CHANGE OF HEART 

FOR THE JDP LEADERS. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE EU WILL 

RECIPROCATE THEIR GESTURE. 

MR. CHAIRMAN, ERDOGAN MADE THE CASE FOR TURKEY’S POTENTIAL 

ROLE IN HELPING TO AVOID A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS TO PRESIDENT 

BUSH WHEN HE VISITED WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER 2002. AS I SAID AT 

THE OUTSET, SUCH A ROLE IS DIFFICULT IN THE MIDST OF THE CUR-
24

RENT GLOBAL FERMENT AND THE US-LED EFFORT TO ROOT OUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OVEREMPHASIZE THE CONTRIBUTION TURKEY COULD MAKE IN COMPLEMENTING THE CURRENT MILITARY CAMPAIGN WITH ITS OWN UNIQUE EXAMPLE AS A COUNTRY THAT BELONGS 

TO BOTH THE ISLAMIC AND WESTERN WORLDS. 

THIS IS NOT TO DOWNPLAY THE CONTRIBUTION TURKEY COULD MAKE 

IN THE MILITARY SPHERE. HAVING INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO 

SEND SOLDIERS TO IRAQ, TURKEY HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE US 

SINCE JULY THE DETAILS OF SUCH POSSIBLE SUPPORT. THE ISSUE WAS 

CONSIDERED AT THE NSC MEETING IN ANKARA LAST MONTH, AND WITH 

THE BACKING OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH SHARES THE 

DESIRE OF TURKEY’S CIVILIAN LEADERS TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE DONE 

TO US-TURKISH RELATIONS BY THE MARCH VOTE, THE GOVERNMENT 

MAY PROCEED TO SEEK PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORIZATION THIS MONTH. 

HOWEVER, THE JDP REALIZES THAT THIS WILL BE A DIFFICULT DECISION FRAUGHT WITH GRAVE CONSEQUENCES. TO BEGIN WITH, TURKISH 

SOLDIERS WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM NORTHERN IRAQ, WHERE TURKEY HAS A STATED INTEREST IN CONFRONTING THE TWIN THREATS IT 

PERCEIVES FROM SEPARATIST TURKISH KURDS AND THE EXPANSION OF 

IRAQI KURDISH INFLUENCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE TURKMENS. THEY 

WOULD INSTEAD GO INTO THE DANGEROUS SO-CALLED SUNNI TRIANGLE 

NEAR BAGHDAD. CONSEQUENTLY, EVEN IF THE JDP GOVERNMENT SUCCEEDS IN PERSUADING ITS OWN PARLIAMENTARIANS TO SET ASIDE 

THEIR VERY REAL RESERVATIONS TO PERMIT THE DISPATCH OF TROOPS, 

SUBSEQUENT TURKISH CASUALTIES WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSE 

PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT. 

THE TROOP DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE JUSTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT 

AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF TURKEY’S MULTI-FACETED POLICY AS 

A REGIONAL POWER WITH RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS A TROUBLED 

NEIGHBOR. ANOTHER MAJOR ASPECT OF THE POLICY THAT WOULD BE 

EMPHASIZED IS TURKEY’S DESIRE TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE 

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ. HOWEVER, THE TROOP ISSUE IS 

INEVITABLY AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE DECISION RELATING TO ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT DECISIONMAKERS IN 

WASHINGTON AS WELL AS ANKARA RECOGNIZE THAT THE UNDERLYING 

PROBLEMS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WHICH WERE REVEALED AND ACCENTUATED BY THE MARCH VOTE CANNOT BE ERADICATED SIMPLY BY 

SENDING TURKISH FORCES TO IRAQ. 

MR. CHAIRMAN, AS I ARGUED IN A JUNE 2003 CSIS TURKEY UPDATE I 

HAVE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR A 

REDEFINITION OF THE US-TURKISH ALLIANCE. THE RELATIONSHIP WAS 

A PRODUCT OF VITAL MUTUAL NEEDS DURING THE COLD WAR ERA AND 

CONTINUED WITH AD HOC ADJUSTMENTS EVEN AFTER THE COMMON 

FOE, THE SOVIET UNION, DISAPPEARED OVER A DECADE AGO. WHILE 

THE AVOIDANCE OF THE HUGE TASK OF RESTRUCTURING A MAJOR RELATIONSHIP STRETCHING BACK THROUGH FIFTY YEARS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, IT IS A LUXURY THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES CAN NO LONGER AFFORD. 

WASHINGTON AND ANKARA NOW HAVE TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHAT 

EACH COULD EXPECT FROM THE OTHER IN THE NEW GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REDEFINITION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WILL 

ALSO NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TURKEY’S EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP 

WITH THE EU, AS WELL AS ITS LINKS WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD. THE USTURKISH ALLIANCE THAT WILL EMERGE AT THE END OF THIS PROCESS 

WILL SURELY BE DIFFERENT BUT NO LESS VITAL. 

TURKEY UPDATE, JUNE 5, 2003, BY BULENT ALIRIZA, DIRECTOR, TURKEY PROJECT

SEEKING REDEFINITION: U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER IRAQ

It has been three months since the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 

failed to muster the appropriate number of votes to allow the United States to open 

a northern front through Turkey against Iraq. In retrospect it is clear that the 

March 1 vote reflected the public opposition to the imminent conflict, the perceptible 

ambivalence of the powerful military establishment and its reluctance to provide an 

unambiguous recommendation—in particular at the National Security Council 
25

(NSC) meeting one day before the vote—and the attitude of President Ahmet Necdet 

Sezer. It also reflected the inability of the governing Justice and Development Party 

(JDP) to overcome its deep misgivings about the war to give a sufficiently clear lead. 

However, despite the apparent consensus on the part of the unusual coalition of 

influential Turkish politicians, bureaucrats, soldiers and commentators that the denial of Turkish territory would constitute a major handicap to American war plans 

and might even force the Bush Administration to refrain from war, the United 

States proceeded to quickly defeat and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman commented on the fundamental Turkish miscalculation after the war by saying that the ‘‘U.S. mistake was to let the Turks believe that somehow they were so important to this operation that we could not do 

it alone, ultimately.’’

Notwithstanding its current problems in post-Saddam Iraq, the United States is 

now firmly engaged on its massive project to undertake the transformation of the 

Middle East. The use of massive American military power has certainly focused the 

minds of the leaders of the remaining Baathist regime in Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as all other Middle Eastern autocrats and potentates, on their 

long-term prospects. Although Turkey, a U.S. ally and a democracy, has little reason 

to share their sense of foreboding, the persistent frisson in U.S.-Turkish relations 

since the vote provides legitimate grounds for concern over the future of its alliance 

with Washington. 

For over fifty years since the Truman Doctrine and Turkish entry into NATO, successive U.S. administrations had unfailingly perceived Turkey as a strategically 

vital ally. Accordingly, Turkey received significant U.S. military and economic assistance, along with diplomatic support and understanding for periodic lapses in its 

democratic system and human rights record. Consequently, the unwillingness of 

Turkey to allow the United States to send ground troops to attack Iraq or to use 

bombers based at Incirlik air base came as an unwelcome surprise, particularly as 

the United States had proceeded to modernize Turkish airports and ports in accordance with an earlier TGNA vote in February to pre-position military equipment. 

‘‘The big disappointment,’’ as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz characterized the vote, was particularly galling to the Defense Department, Turkey’s most ardent defender in Washington. 

In the aftermath of the vote, it has become more apparent that the disappearance 

of the common Soviet foe had effectively removed the Cold War foundation of the 

strategic alliance between the two countries. Ironically, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and the immediate Turkish response under President Turgut Ozal had then 

helped carry the relationship into the post Cold War era. Incirlik was made available to U.S. aircraft during the Gulf War in 1991 and for humanitarian assistance 

to beleaguered Iraqi Kurds as part of Operation Provide Comfort. During the following decade, the U.S. was allowed to use Incirlik through Operation Northern 

Watch in the enforcement of the no fly zone in northern Iraq. Consequently, Ankara 

was able to provide Washington a functioning cooperative arrangement, which encouraged the United States to argue that the alliance was in tact and to seek to 

embellish it with additional cooperation in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Caspian Sea 

energy and even Afghanistan. 

LOOKING AHEAD

To be sure, there has been no formal announcement from Washington during the 

past three months that the strategic partnership lauded by President Bill Clinton 

in Istanbul in 1999 is over or even that it is being seriously reviewed. Long-standing 

alliances do not wither rapidly and the hastily arranged visit to Ankara of Secretary 

of State Colin Powell in early April, as well as two subsequent telephone conversations between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President George 

Bush apparently reassured the Turks that the damage could soon be repaired. After 

all, Erdogan had argued in the Washington Post on March 23, just after taking over 

as prime minister, Turkey was ‘‘part of the coalition,’’ it had done its ‘‘utmost’’ to 

cooperate and wished to ‘‘prevent any watershed’’ in the relationship. The Turkish 

sense of optimism was further reinforced by the inclusion of $1 billion for Turkey 

in the supplemental U.S. war budget, reportedly through the last-minute intervention of Secretary Powell. 

Clearly, sustaining an admittedly difficult relationship with a predominantly Moslem country led by a government with Islamist origins is of value to Washington 

in its wider diplomatic efforts directed at a mostly skeptical Islamic world. However, 

at the practical bilateral level, there is an urgent need for repairs as well as redefinition. To begin with, as it won the war without the anticipated Turkish participation, the United States forged a tactical alliance with Iraqi Kurdish militias and 
26

then forced Turkey to back down from its stated intention to send troops into Iraq 

to counter Kurdish advances into Mosul and Kirkuk and to protect the Turkmens. 

It is worth noting that if the TGNA vote had gone the other way, Turkey would 

have established a sizeable and deterrent military presence in a buffer zone in 

northern Iraq as part of the military, political and economic agreements laboriously 

negotiated with the United States. Equally importantly, Operation Northern Watch 

was terminated and U.S. planes assigned to Incirlik were withdrawn, raising serious questions over the future role of Turkey in American forward deployment. Significantly, Chief of Staff Hilmi Ozkok acknowledged at the end of April that the 

United States might establish permanent bases in Bulgaria and Romania, although 

he chose to avoid comments on speculation that there might be permanent American bases in Iraq itself. 

Washington and Ankara now confront the unavoidable and difficult task of determining exactly what each could expect from the other in the new geostrategic environment created by the Iraq war. For its part, the Bush Administration has made 

it clear that the immediate priority is for Turkey to prevent additional strains in 

the relationship by refraining from unilateral action in northern Iraq. The apparent 

medium-range U.S. goal is to ensure that Turkey will lend effective support to possible action against Syria and Iran. As Wolfowitz pointedly warned, ‘‘drawing closer’’ 

to those countries was ‘‘absolutely the wrong way to go’’ and Turkish policy towards 

‘‘Syria or Iran should fit into an overall policy with us.’’ In the longer run, Wolfowitz 

reportedly told a visiting Turkish business delegation in May, ‘‘the ball was in the 

Turkish court’’ to define the nature of the relationship. After the recent Turkish rebuff, Washington clearly preferred Ankara to take the lead by saying what it was 

prepared to do in the future. 

To be sure, there have been Turkish moves to repair the rift. A number of senior 

JDP officials were recently in Washington and Foreign Ministry Undersecretary 

Ugur Ziyal is due to arrive later this month. However, the Turkish task is not an 

easy one. While the Turkish government and the military are fully cognizant of the 

need to avoid misunderstandings with the United States in northern Iraq, serious 

Turkish misgivings over the enhanced position of the Kurds and the parallel weakening of that of the Turkmens could lead to future tensions. Moreover, while Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul condemned terrorism as a ‘‘scourge’’ that had to be 

‘‘eradicated’’ at the recent Islamic conference in Teheran and frequently stresses his 

coordination with Powell relating to ongoing contacts with Syria and Iran, Turkey 

may find it difficult to maintain its delicate balancing act if Washington eventually 

moves towards outright confrontation with Damascus and Teheran. In fact, the 

Turkish government could once again find itself in a situation similar to its predicament during the prolonged build up to the Iraq war when it was involved in ultimately fruitless negotiations with Washington while maintaining a dialogue with 

the doomed regime in Baghdad. At the broader level, Turkey will also need to somehow dispel the widespread impression that has developed within the Bush Administration, Congress, media and the American public at large that it is no longer a totally reliable ally. 

The redefinition of the U.S.-Turkish relationship will also require coordination 

and consensus in the Turkish system. For its part, in addition to the U.S.-Turkish 

relationship, the JDP government is also having to focus on the current recovery 

in the economy and the standby agreement with the IMF, as well as on its declared 

goal of beginning accession negotiations with the European Union (EU). However, 

as Erdogan and Gul have acknowledged, achieving the latter goal depends indirectly 

on a solution of the Cyprus problem. At the same time, there needs to be an adjustment of the Turkish civilian-military relationship to conform to European norms, in 

particular, of the composition and role of the NSC. Although the JDP has been moving very cautiously, the two issues have helped to bring to the surface strains between the JDP and powerful elements in the military establishment. The reported 

tensions recently prompted General Ozkok to publicly deny ‘‘growing discontent on 

the part of young officers’’ and Deputy Chief of Staff Yasar Buyukanit to reaffirm 

the military’s full support for EU membership. However, Ozkok also chose to stress 

that the entire military establishment had ‘‘deep concerns and sensitivities’’ and 

Buyukanit to warn the goal of EU membership could ‘‘not be used as a vehicle for 

the achievement of the aims of those opposed to the country’s unitary and secular 

system.’’ Consequently, it seems all too likely that the coming months will once 

again witness difficult negotiations and maneuvering within the Turkish system 

with their unavoidable effects on the repair of the relationship with Washington.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Aliriza, Thank you very much. 

Next, we will hear from Mr. Sedat Ergin. He graduated from the 

Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University where he studied 
27

international relations. He has been active in journalism since 

1975, moved his way up that ladder in various news organizations. 

He has written extensively on Turkish-American relations. He is a 

regular political commentator on CNN-Turk news channel. He is a 

recipient of the prestigious Sedat Simavi Journalism Prize. 

You can correct me on the pronunciation on that, Mr. Ergin. We 

are very pleased to have you as our witness as well. You may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF SEDAT ERGIN, SENIOR EDITOR, HURRIYET 

DAILY 

Mr. ERGIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I think I should 

begin by expressing my thanks for the invitation extended to me 

to speak before the Subcommittee. In my presentation, I would like 

to reflect on internal Turkish developments. 

Any analysis of the present political scene in Turkey has to begin 

with a sound reading of the elections which were held on November 

3, 2002. 

The Turkish electorate discharged the majority of the center 

right and left parties which had ruled the country since the mid 

1980s and ushered in a newcomer on the political scene, the Justice and Development Party, the AKP, of Mr. Recep Tayyip 

Erdogan. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Ergin, would you pull that directly in front 

of you, please? 

Mr. ERGIN. Yes. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I am not sure everybody is hearing it in the back. 

Mr. ERGIN. Is that fine now? Okay. 

The victory of the AKP means political stability after a decade 

of ongoing instability stemming from the struggles of the coalition 

governments and widespread corruption charges. 

Yet, the AKP victory also highlights an anomaly in the Turkish 

political system. This stems from a legally imposed very high 10 

percent election hurdle, which in the 2002 elections had the impact 

of nullifying almost 44 percent of the votes case. The hurdle is the 

highest in any European democracy. 

The AKP, which received one-third of the votes, secured twothirds of the seats in Parliament. Of the 31.5 million votes which 

were cast, 15.8 million, or almost 45 percent, were declared null 

and void. These votes having been cast for parties who did not receive the necessary 10 percent of the total were simply thrown 

aside. This figure equals almost the total populations of Israel, Ireland and at least two baltic states. 

By stating this, I am by no means suggesting that the elections 

were not held in a fair and correct fashion. It simply means that 

as presently construed, there is a representation problem in Turkish democracy today. The fact that the victor of the election was 

an offspring of the Islamist Welfare Party, Mr. Necmettin Erbakan, 

makes the picture more confusing. 

The Welfare Party was banned by the Constitutional Court in 

1998 on the grounds that it was advocating Sharia, the Islamic 

law. 

This court decision was upheld by the European Court of Human 

Rights in 2000, which was convinced of the evidence for closure. 
28

The court in Strausburg ruled that advocacy of Sharia does not 

comply with the freedoms granted by the European Court of 

Human Rights. 

The irony facing us is that the majority of the AKP deputies 

elected in the November 2002 were former members of the Welfare 

Party and therefore shared political responsibility of the activities 

of that legally banned entity. 

There is more to this irony. The AKP in its platform today and 

in its discourse drastically deviates from that formerly espoused by 

the Welfare Party. It is trying to move to the center. By adding 

several prominent figures from center right-liberal parties to its 

election ticket, it displayed a considerable effort to appeal to centrist votes. 

Indeed, the performance of the new government on many fronts 

suggests a transformation which would have been inconceivable in 

the 1980s for an Islamist political party in Turkey. 

In the course of the last 10 months, they have pursued a steadfast agenda to expedite Turkey’s accession to the European Union. 

They have delivered two landmark democratization packages to 

comply with the EU political criteria, including a major amendment curbing the powers of the National Security Council, besides 

they have concluded two major reviews with the IMF and received 

a strong enforcement from the fund. However, the ongoing debate 

in Turkey still would focus on the sincerity of the changes which 

the AKP is going through. 

There are three identifiable schools of thought in this debate. 

Proponents of the first school would strongly argue that the 

changes are genuine and the performance of the AKP government 

to date corroborates this interpretation. 

The second school argues that the whole story is a deception and 

that the party is nothing more than a sinister effort to deceive the 

whole nation. They claim the AKP has no true commitment to secularism, but rather has a hidden agenda whose purpose is to replace Ataturk’s secularism with Islamic dominated government. 

Finally, there is a third school, the skeptics. Their premise is 

that the Islamists have indeed embarked on a process of change, 

one which deserves encouragement, and that they are entitled to 

the benefit of doubt. They would also argue that the secular institutions and elements of society should carefully monitor any potential efforts by the party to dilute the secular foundations of the republic. 

Clearly, the AKP deserves some careful study and analysis. It 

would be fair to say that the party is still in a stage of transformation and represents a reinterpretation of the evolution of political Islam in Turkey. 

The fact that it is an eclectic structure, a coalition of many different political groupings with a strong Islamic flavor suggests that 

the dynamics of change are in the making and as they expose 

themselves to the center, the European Union and to the west in 

general, this interaction could lay the ground for moderation. 

Not every group or individual in the party would go in the same 

direction. It may be useful to observe how these groups and individuals will play out against each other. The outcome will determine the depth and scope of the change. 
29

For many political observers, what lies at the heart of the political controversy is the issue of confidence. If the leadership of the 

ruling AKP manages to establish confidence in the system and in 

the society, this no doubt will help the party to entrench itself and 

enable it to exist as a permanent player on the political scene. 

This largely depends on their ability to break away from their 

traditional Islamist agenda. Whether or not they will be held captive by their Islamist roots and agenda will be an important indicator. 

As you would recall, these difficulties became apparent when the 

AKP government and the party majority in the Parliament failed 

to deliver the famous motion for full cooperation with the U.S. for 

the northern front on March 1st. 

Mr. Chairman, I think I should stop here, but one last point. 

While I was boarding the plane on my way to Washington, DC, the 

Court of Appeals in Ankara came out with a ruling which could 

mean turbulence for the Turkish political system in the following 

weeks. The Court of Appeals decided to uphold the convictions for 

the leaders of the Democratic People’s Party who were found guilty 

of entering the November 3rd elections with false documents. This 

in a way invalidates the participation of this party in the elections. 

It has some legal and political ramifications for the Parliament and 

the government. 

The Supreme Election Board will soon look into the matter. 

There are many possibilities. The board could conclude that the 

election process has been finalized. One possibility discussed is redistribution of the seats in Parliament. Another possibility mentioned, it is not very likely, but still it is a possibility, is calling 

early elections. But under every possible scenario, it is likely that 

the governing AKP party will remain in office. 

This is a very complicated legal issue. You went through a similar problem during the presidential elections in 2000 and it took, 

I think, 2 or 3 months for your courts to decide. In our case, the 

Turkish courts do not work quickly. 

If any Member of the Subcommittee is interested, I would be delighted to explain the issue in length, but I would need time for 

this since it is very complicated. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ergin follows:]
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34
35
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Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Ergin, thank you very much. 

Next, we will hear and we are pleased to see once again in this 

capacity Ambassador Mark Parris. 

Mark R. Parris is currently a Senior Public Policy Advisor in the 

Washington, DC office of Baker, Donelson. Prior to joining Baker, 

Donelson, Mr. Parris served as our Ambassador to the Republic of 

Turkey from 1997 to 2000. From 1995 to 1997, he served as Special 

Assistant to the President, Senior Director, for the Near East and 

South Asia at the National Security Council. Prior to joining the 

NSC staff, Mr. Parris then served as Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. 

Mr. Parris has also served as the Deputy Chief of Miosssion in 

the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv from 1989 to 1992. He received his 

degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. 

Mr. Parris, nice to see you again. You may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK PARRIS, SENIOR PUBLIC POLICY ADVISOR, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, 

CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, P.C. 

Mr. PARRIS. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to see you again. It 

is a pleasure to be here. 

In the interests of time and as there are members of the panel 

clearly more qualified than I to discuss Turkish internal dynamics, 

including my friend immediately adjacent, I will with your permission focus, in my prepared remarks, on matters relating to United 

States-Turkish relations. 

During the late 1990s, the United States and Turkey worked together with unprecedented closeness and effectiveness to deal with 

a wide range of emerging challenges and opportunities. Among our 

common achievements during this period were making the BakuCeyhan pipeline a reality, protecting Muslim minorities in the Balkans, rolling up the PKK inside Turkey, and supporting the cause 

of Middle East peace. 

Even on issues where our perspectives were quite different, Iraq 

being a primary example, we were able to find solutions that accommodated by and large one another’s interests. 

In November 1999, President Bill Clinton gave this phenomenon 

a name. He called it ‘‘strategic cooperation.’’ Regardless of what you 

call it, the impact on mutual perceptions in both countries was 

striking. Polls at the time consistently showed that Turks viewed 

Americans as their best friends abroad and in America Turkey’s 

image as a reliable ally was finally gaining ground on its reputation as the setting for the film Midnight Express. 

I think it is safe to say, Mr. Chairman, that the relationship has 

lost ground since, and particularly since the Turkish Parliament 

last March 1st failed to authorize the transit of United States 

forces through Turkish territory to invade Iraq. You are probably 

familiar with polls released earlier this year suggesting that well 

over 50 percent of Turks today view American policies as the single 

greatest threat to Turkish security. 

Similarly, the typical reaction of average Americans when they 

find that I have served in Turkey is to ask how such good friends 

could have let us down last spring. 
37

The proximate cause of this dramatic shift has been the U.S. decision to depose Saddam Hussein, a decision, I state for the record, 

that I supported. 

Turks typically view that decision as legally questionable, as a 

dangerous precedent and as ill-advised from a geostrategic perspective. Their doubts have been reinforced by our inability promptly 

to restore order and essential public services in Iraq. 

There is a widespread suspicion that Turkish firms are being excluded from programs to rebuild Iraq in order to punish Turkey for 

the March 1st vote and that future United States economic aid has 

been conditioned on Turkey’s agreeing to dispatch troops to Iraq. 

Suspicions remain that ultimately the United States will accept 

an outcome in Iraq that leads to the establishment of a de jure or 

a de facto independent kurdish state. 

On the American side, it is clear that despite disclaimers, official 

confidence has been shaken that Turkey can be relied upon in the 

future to play the kind of role that it has played in the past in 

places like Somalia, or Kosovo or Afghanistan. 

There is a lingering sense that Turkey overplayed its hand in negotiations preceding the March 1st vote, and one can hear persistent speculation that Ankara is using the Turkomen population 

in northern Iraq to pursue some kind of hidden agenda. 

It would be easy to conclude, Mr. Chairman, based on things that 

have been said or whispered in Ankara or Washington since 

March, that this is a relationship on the rocks—or dangerously 

close to them. I think it is therefore important to state clearly that 

the reality is nowhere near as dire. 

First, with respect to Iraq, the Turkish government has as much 

at stake in Iraq’s coming out right as does Washington. That gives 

it a strong incentive to work with us there, and Turkish officials 

have repeatedly made clear before and after March 1st their readiness to do just that. 

At both the official and unofficial level, Turkey has made important contributions during and since the war to help meet Iraq’s humanitarian and practical needs. Turkish firms are, in fact, competing successfully for tenders by United States prime contractors 

in Iraq. 

On the United States side, meanwhile, it appears simply not to 

be true that Washington has conditioned new loans to Turkey on 

any specific quid pro quo regarding Iraq, and United States actions 

by and large have been consistent with its public commitments before and since the war to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity. 

I am convinced, moreover, that as policy makers in Washington 

and Ankara wrestle with the long-term implications of the dynamics unleased on September 11, 2001, two in particular are going to 

concentrate their minds. The first is that Turkey must come to 

terms with the fact that America has moved in next door, is likely 

to remain in the neighborhood a long time, and has brought with 

it an agenda that is going to have an important impact on Turkish 

interests. 

And, second, America will inevitably find as the focal point of our 

strategic thinking is inexorably drawn to the region surrounding 

Turkey and to the Muslim world more generally, that we have to 

work either with Turkey or around Turkey. I am willing to venture 
38

that both sides will normally conclude that ‘‘with’’ is a better solution than ‘‘around.’’ Which gets us to the question of the Bush Administration’s pending request that Turkey deploy troops to Iraq. 

There are those, Mr. Chairman, who see a Turkish decision to 

send such troops as a panacea for United States-Turkish relations. 

I am not so sure. It is probably true that such a decision would restore some of the luster scuffed off the bilateral relationship last 

spring. It is probably true that such a decision would give Turkey 

a stronger voice in coalition discussions of Iraq’s future. It is probably true that an outright refusal by Turkey would consign official 

relations to cool correctness for an indefinite period. 

But it is not clear to me that a deployment of Turkish forces, 

should it occur, would prove the boon for bilateral relations that 

some have predicted. 

I am struck, for example, by the extent to which Turkey’s political leadership has been at pains to differentiate any role Turkish 

forces might play there from United States policies. If we get to a 

point where there are actual Turkish boots on the ground, I am not 

sure one can simply assume that we and the Turks will always be 

on the same page. And, if God forbid, Turkish forces should be targeted in the way that the U.N. in Jordan already have been, whom 

would the Turkish man in the street hold responsible? 

I do not know whether or not Turkey will ultimately decide to 

send forces to Iraq. I must say it is hard for me to imagine its leaders recommending such a course until they have a good answer to 

the question of what we are doing to finish off the PKK in the 

north. 

On balance, my sense is that the current political and military 

leadership are trying to find a way to respond positively to our request. But this is not in the bag. 

What does it mean for the future? 

Well, obviously, a lot depends on how Iraq comes out. It is hard 

to speculate in much detail until we know that. 

This much, however, I am prepared to predict: United StatesTurkish relations are going to be qualitatively different in the future from what they were during the era of classic strategic partnership, or indeed during the past 50 years. The reason for that 

has less to do with how Turkey’s Parliament voted March 1st, or 

whether or not Turkey will send troops to Iraq, than with two fundamental shifts in underlying dynamics that I sense have not been 

fully digested in either Ankara or Washington. 

The first, on the U.S. side, is a function of the fall of Saddam 

Hussein. When Saddam disappeared last April, so did the relevance of the concept of containment as it applied to Turkey. Containment of the Soviet Union, of course, was the core of United 

States foreign policy for 4 decades. Containment of Saddam Hussein was a top priority for U.S. foreign policy for a decade more. 

Turkey was essential to both objectives. And that enabled Turkey 

from 1949 really until this spring consistently to box above its 

weight here in Washington in terms of the quality and level of the 

official attention it commanded. 

The post-Iraq phase of United States-Turkish relations will be 

unique in our recent history in that, with the possible exception of 

a nuclear armed Iran, there is no overarching threat to contain 
39

from Turkey. Circumstances will arise where Turkish cooperation 

is useful. Circumstances will arise where Turkish cooperation is 

important. But it is difficult to envision circumstances today in 

which Turkey’s contribution will be ‘‘essential’’ in the same sense 

that it was in containing the U.S.S.R. and Saddam. That cannot 

help, in my view, but make a difference in the way that Washington looks at Turkey in the future. 

On the Turkish side, the big change is a function of Turkey’s 

evolving relationship with Europe. After some mixed signals in the 

late 1990s, Europe at last December’s Copenhagen EU summit 

promised Ankara an up-or-down decision by the end of 2004 on 

opening the negotiations for EU membership. 

That is the single biggest fact in Turkish political life today. A 

commitment to grasp that opportunity was at the core of the successful election campaign last fall of Turkey’s ruling and Justice 

and Development, or AK, Party. It is AK’s highest priority today, 

as you have heard from previous panelists. Overwhelming popular 

support for that goal has given AK the parliamentary majority and 

self-confidence necessary to pass reforms that have the potential 

radically to transform Turkish politics and society, including in 

such previously taboo realms as the role of the military. 

It is too early to tell if the United States will give Turkey a green 

light. But as this drama plays out, I suspect we will find Ankara 

more closely attuned to European views than has been the case in 

the recent past. For some here, especially those who have held up 

a special relationship with the U.S. as a viable alternative to EU 

membership, that may take some getting used to. 

Does the end of containment on the American side and a growing 

preoccupation with Europe on the Turkish mean worse United 

States-Turkish relations in the future? 

No. Just different ones. 

For reasons that I have already described, America’s relationship 

with Turkey will remain a strategic one. My guess is that more 

often than not we will find ourselves working as partners, even if 

we do not describe ourselves formally as such. I can even envision 

circumstances under which Turkey could regain the pride of place 

in American strategic thinking that it enjoyed for the past 50 

years. 

The key to such an achievement, I have argued elsewhere, is for 

Turkey to close the gap between the potential that analysts have 

identified there for years and a reality that never quite measures 

up. 

In an epoch that America’s enemies would like to make a clash 

of civilizations, a Turkey that is democratic, prosperous, internally 

harmonious—in a word, a successful Turkey—will be a compelling 

fact, whether in Washington, or Europe or, for that matter, Baghdad, Damascus or Tehran. 

I will stop there. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Parris follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK PARRIS, SENIOR PUBLIC POLICY

ADVISOR, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, P.C. 

Mr. Chairman, in the interests of time, and as there are members of the panel 

more qualified than I to address Turkey’s internal dynamics, I will with your permission focus my prepared remarks on matters relating to U.S.-Turkish relations. 
40

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

In November, 1999, I had the honor to sit in the hall of Turkey’s Parliament 

Building and hear President Bill Clinton declare Turkey to be a ‘‘strategic partner’’ 

of the United States. 

On March 1 of this year, Turkey’s Parliament in that same hall failed to approve 

the transit of American forces through Turkey to invade Iraq. Ever since there has 

been a debate on both sides of the relationship as to whether or not U.S.-Turkish 

‘‘strategic partnership’’ is dead. 

Sometimes lost sight of in that debate is a clear sense of what ‘‘strategic partnership’’ meant when Bill Clinton said the words. From my perspective, the concept 

comprised three elements:

• First, the emergence, after the end of the Cold War, of a specific set of issues 

on which U.S. and Turkish interests largely overlapped;

• Second, an explicit recognition by both sides of that convergence of interests;

• And, third, a realization that, by working together, we were more likely to 

advance our common interests than by pursuing them separately.

The interplay of these three factors produced some impressive results in the late 

nineties. One could cite, for example, American-Turkish successes in making the 

Baku-Ceyhan pipeline a reality; in protecting Muslim minorities in the Balkans; or 

in rolling up the PKK inside Turkey. Even on issues where our perspectives were 

quite different—like Iraq—we found solutions that accommodated each other’s interests. 

In short, on a wide range of issues that mattered to both societies, and in very 

concrete terms, we were delivering for Turkey, and Turkey was delivering for us. 

Not coincidentally, polls at the time consistently showed that Turks viewed Americans as their best friends abroad. And in America, Turkey’s image as a reliable ally 

was finally gaining ground on its reputation as the setting for the film, ‘‘Midnight 

Express.’’

LOST GROUND

I think it is safe to say, Mr. Chairman, that the relationship has lost ground 

since. 

You are probably familiar with polls released earlier this year suggesting well 

over 50% of Turks today view American policies as the single greatest threat to Turkey’s security. Similarly, the typical reaction of average Americans when they find 

I have served in Turkey, is to ask how such ‘‘good friends’’ could have let us down 

last spring. 

The proximate cause of this dramatic shift has been the U.S. decision to depose 

Saddam Hussein. 

Turks typically view that decision as legally questionable, as a dangerous precedent, and as ill-advised from a geo-strategic perspective. Their doubts have been reinforced by our inability promptly to restore order and essential public services in 

Iraq. There is a widespread suspicion that Turkish firms are being excluded from 

programs to rebuild Iraq in order to punish Turkey for the March 1 vote, and that 

future U.S. economic aid has been conditioned on Turkey’s agreeing to dispatch 

troops to Iraq. Suspicions remain that ultimately the U.S. will accept an outcome 

in Iraq that leads to the establishment of a de jure or de facto independent Kurdish 

state. 

On the U.S. side, it is clear that, despite disclaimers, official confidence has been 

shaken that Turkey can be relied upon in the future to play the kind of role that 

it has in the past in places like Somalia, Kosovo or Afghanistan. There is a lingering 

sense that Turkey overplayed its hand in negotiations preceding the March 1 vote. 

And one can hear persistent speculation that Ankara is using the Turkomen population in northern Iraq to pursue a hidden agenda. 

It would be easy to conclude, based on things that have been said or whispered 

in Ankara and Washington since March, that this is a relationship on the rocks—

or dangerously close to them. 

REALITY CHECK

It is therefore important to state clearly that the reality is nowhere near as dire. 

First, with respect to Iraq:

• Ankara has as much at stake in Iraq’s coming out right as does Washington. 

That gives it a strong incentive to work with us there. And Turkish officials 

have repeatedly made clear their readiness to do just that.
41

• At both the official and unofficial level, Turkey has made important contributions during and since the war to helping meet Iraq’s humanitarian and practical needs.

• Turkish firms are, in fact, competing successfully for tenders by U.S. prime 

contractors in Iraq.

• On the U.S. side, meanwhile, it appears simply not to be true that Washington has conditioned new loans to Turkey on any specific quid pro quo regarding Iraq.

• And U.S. actions, by and large, are consistent with its public commitments 

before and since the war to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity.

I am convinced, moreover, that, as policymakers in Washington and Ankara wrestle with the long-term implications of the dynamics unleashed on September 11, 

2001, two in particular will concentrate their minds.

• Turkey will have to come to terms with the fact that America has moved in 

next door, is likely to remain in the neighborhood a long time, and has 

brought with it an agenda that will have an important impact on Turkish interests;

• America will inevitably find, as the focal point of its strategic thinking is inexorably drawn to the region surrounding Turkey and to the Muslim world 

more generally, that we will have to work either with Turkey or around Turkey.

I am willing to venture that both sides will normally find ‘‘with’’ a better solution 

than ‘‘around.’’

Which gets us to the question of the Bush Administration’s pending request that 

Turkey deploy troops to Iraq. 

TURKISH TROOPS TO IRAQ?

There are those, Mr. Chairman, who see a Turkish decision to send troops to Iraq 

as a panacea for U.S.-Turkish relations. I am not so sure. 

It probably is true that such a decision would restore some of the luster scuffed 

off the relationship last spring. It would certainly give Turkey a stronger voice in 

Coalition discussions of Iraq’s future. On the other hand, an outright refusal would 

probably consign official relations to cool correctness for an indefinite period. 

But it is not clear to me that a deployment of Turkish forces, should it occur, 

would prove the boon for bilateral relations that some are predicting. I am struck, 

for example, by the extent to which Turkey’s political leadership has been at pains 

to differentiate any role Turkish forces might play in Iraq from U.S. policies there. 

If we get to a point where there are Turkish boots on the ground, I am not sure 

one can simply assume that Ankara and Washington will always be on the same 

page. And if, God forbid, Turkish forces should be targeted in the way that the UN 

and Jordan already have been, whom would the Turkish man in the street hold responsible? 

Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether or not Turkey will ultimately decide to 

send forces to Iraq. I must say it is hard for me to imagine its leaders recommending such a course until they have a good answer to the question of what we 

are doing to finish off the PKK in the north. On balance, my sense is that the current political and military leadership are trying to find a way to respond positively 

to our request. But this is not in the bag. 

LOOKING AHEAD

What does all this mean for the future of the relationship? Well, obviously, a lot 

depends on how Iraq comes out. It’s hard to be speculate in much detail until we 

know that. 

This much, however, I am prepared to predict: U.S.-Turkish relations are going 

to be qualitatively different in the future from what they were during the era of 

classic ‘‘strategic partnership,’’ or indeed during the past 50 years. 

The reason for that has less to do with how Turkey’s parliament voted March 1, 

or whether or not Turkey will send troops to Iraq, than with two fundamental shifts 

in the underlying dynamics of the bilateral relationship that, I sense, have not been 

fully digested in either Ankara or Washington. 

The first, on the U.S. side, is a function of the fall of Saddam Hussein. 

When Saddam disappeared last April, so did the relevance of the concept of ‘‘containment’’ as it applied to Turkey. Containment of the Soviet Union, of course, was 

the core of U.S. foreign policy for four decades. Containment of Saddam Hussein 

was a top priority for U.S. foreign policy for a decade more. Turkey was essential
42

to both objectives. And that enabled Turkey from 1949 until this spring consistently 

to box above its weight here in Washington, in terms of the quality and level of the 

official attention it commanded. 

The post-Iraq War phase of U.S.-Turkish relations will be unique in our recent 

history in that—with the possible exception of a nuclear-armed Iran—there is no 

overarching threat to contain from Turkey. Circumstances will arise where Turkish 

cooperation is useful. Circumstances will arise where Turkish cooperation is important. But it is difficult to envision circumstances today in which Turkey’s contribution will be essential in the same sense that it was in containing the U.S.S.R. and 

Saddam. That can’t help but make a difference in the way Washington looks at Turkey in the future. 

On the Turkish side, the big change is a function of Turkey’s evolving relationship 

with Europe. 

After some mixed signals in the late nineties, Europe, at last December’s Copenhagen EU summit, promised Ankara an up-or-down decision by the end of 2004 on 

opening negotiations for EU membership. That is the single biggest fact in Turkish 

political life today. A commitment to grasp that opportunity was at the core of the 

successful election campaign last fall of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development (or 

‘‘AK’’) Party. It is AK’s highest priority today. Overwhelming popular support for 

that goal has given AK the parliamentary majority and self-confidence necessary to 

pass reforms that have the potential radically to transform Turkish politics and society, including in such previously taboo realms as the status of Turkey’s military. 

Will the EU give Turkey a green light? It is too early to tell. But as this drama 

plays out, I suspect we will find Ankara more closely attuned to European views 

than has been the case in the recent past. For some here, especially those who have 

held up a special relationship with the U.S. as a viable alternative to EU membership, that may take some getting used to. 

THE BOTTOM LINE

Do the end of ‘‘containment’’ on the American side, and a growing preoccupation 

with Europe on the Turkish, mean ‘‘worse’’ U.S.-Turkish relations. No. Just different 

ones. 

For reasons that I have already described, America’s relationship with Turkey will 

remain a ‘‘strategic’’ one. My guess is that we will more often than not find ourselves working as ‘‘partners,’’ whether or not we formally describe ourselves as such. 

One can even envision circumstances under which Turkey could regain the pride 

of place in American strategic thinking that it enjoyed for the past 50 years. 

The key to such an achievement, I have argued elsewhere, is for Turkey to close 

the gap between the potential that analysts have identified there for years and a 

reality that never quite measures up. In an epoch that America’s enemies would like 

to make a clash of civilizations, a Turkey that is democratic, prosperous, internally 

harmonious—in a word, ‘‘successful’’—will be a compelling fact. In Washington. Or 

Europe. Or for that matter in Baghdad, Damascus and Tehran. 

The economic, political and other reforms that have been undertaken by Turkey’s 

previous and current government, if carried to fruition, could produce such a Turkey 

in the years ahead. That would create the best foundation I can think of for a bilateral relationship that would serve U.S. and Turkish interests as well in the future 

as ‘‘strategic partnership’’ did in the late nineties.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Parris, and 

thanks to all of you for your oral testimony, as well as the written 

testimony. 

The Subcommittee will now proceed under the 5-minute rule for 

questions. 

Dr. Cagaptay, Dr. Aliriza, Mr. Ergin spent a substantial part of 

his time focusing on the JDP, the AKP, its roots, its history, its activities, its prospects. I wonder if there is anything with which you 

take exception or disagree or would like to add any kind of caveat. 

I would like to have some indication of whether this is some indication of whether this represents a consensus or to what extent it 

might. 

Do you have anything you would like to say in that respect? 
43

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for raising this 

very important issue. I will, I think, elaborate on what the other 

speakers have said and offer you my own views on AKP. 

I think the AKP is a coalition party, a coalition of different interests and groups. It is difficult to say that the party has no linkage 

to Turkey’s Islamist movement, it does, but it also has a lot of people and groups within the party who have no links to that sort of 

a movement, that is why I think it is a very large coalition. It is 

a conjunctoral coalition that was put together before the elections, 

as Mr. Ergin elaborated on it and the other speakers. 

When Turkey’s center-right was swept out of power in the last 

elections, the AKP came in to fill in the vacuum and, as a result 

of that, it was successful in coalescing many different groups 

around a common goal of establishing an alternative to Turkey’s 

outgoing parties. And that I think brings the issue of to what extent the AKP is sincerely following democratization in Turkey as 

well as the EU reforms. I think that there are groups in the party 

who would sincerely think that is the way to go for Turkey, but I 

also think that there are two takes on why the AKP is pursuing 

these reforms so vigorously. 

One is that AKP sincerely sees this as a process that is in Turkey’s interests to reform and put the country on a new track and 

the other take is that AKP sees this whole process as a means to 

an end, as a means to circumvent or restructure the powers of the 

Turkish military, the traditional guardian of Turkey’s secularist 

democracy. And this, I think, if that is in fact the issue, AKP has 

done this very successfully because, as the other speakers have 

highlighted, there is tremendous momentum in Turkey toward the 

EU reforms and you can achieve a lot of things in Turkey in the 

name of getting in to the EU. So I think whichever perspective you 

look at, the EU momentum has helped AKP’s goals in the future. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

Dr. Aliriza, would you wish to comment in any fashion on Mr. 

Ergin’s remarks about the party? 

Mr. ALIRIZA. Thank you. I had referred to the subjective redefinition by Erdogan and JDP of themselves as not being Islamists. 

Mr. BEREUTER. They reject that appellation, you said? 

Mr. ALIRIZA. Yes, specifically. If you refer to them as an Islamic 

or Islamists party, they say that they are not. I had also touched 

on the two other lineages that they now claim in addition to the 

lineage through the four Islamist parties many of the party members belonged to which have been banned. Understandably, they do 

not want to be the successors to the parties that have been banned. 

As I noted, they want to broaden their appeal by claiming lineage to the Democratic Party that was thrown out of office by the 

Army in 1960 and Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, which has virtually disappeared, but which was a very strong force in Turkey’s 

political life after the elections of 1983 for almost 2 decades. 

The problem the JDP faces is the objective definition by people 

who do not believe, as Sedat Ergin underlined, in the process of redefinition that the party is going through. It may be a coalition, 

they argue, but it is a coalition dominated by the Islamists. 

The armed forces are the guardians of the republic. The commanders who went into mandatory retirement because of age con-
44

straints at the end of August, went out of their way in their farewell speeches to blame the JDP for the deterioration in the vigilance against secularism. And their views have been echoed by 

other people still within the military establishment. 

This objective definition may be successful at the expense of the 

efforts by the JDP to redefine itself. This is behind much of the 

tensions in Turkish society, including the EU issue and changing 

civilian-military relations and the jury is out on how this will end. 

Mr. Erdogan spent time in jail because of his Islamist views. Mr. 

Gul, the Foreign Minister, previously the Prime Minister, was part 

of the government that was thrown out under military pressure in 

1997. So we do have history which cannot be ignored as we look 

ahead. It is difficult to be certain that there is not going to be trouble although the kind of domestic ferment that usually leads to 

military intervention, the four interventions that have happened, is 

simply not there. The majority of the Turkish public, the Turkish 

business community, the media, are not trumpeting problems as 

much as they did in the past. That may happen, but as of now, the 

JDP seems to be very much in charge. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

Ambassador Parris, maybe I could work in a question that you 

could answer quickly. 

You mentioned that Turkey will be interested to what extent the 

United States has been working to finish off the PKK in Iraq’s 

north, something like that, and I wonder if you sense that in any 

fashion, any information you have, that this is a priority or even 

is in a mission statement for U.S. forces or coalition forces. 

Mr. PARRIS. Well, it is clearly part of the mission statement, Mr. 

Chairman. As we speak, there is a State Department delegation 

headed by Cofer Black in Ankara which is discussing this issue as 

part of a process that began, I think, about a month ago. So clearly 

it is on Washington’s radar screen as something that is going to 

need to be addressed in some fashion as we continue this discussion with the Turks about the possibility that they are deploying 

forces. 

My sense or reading of the Turkish press and statements by 

Turkish officials is that, so far, we may not yet have come up to 

the mark in terms of giving the Turkish political leadership effective talking points to explain to their parliamentary group what 

the Americans are doing and why that should be sufficient for Turkey to take the risk of putting its own forces there. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Is that a reasonable assessment on their part? 

We have not come up to the mark? 

Mr. PARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the content of 

these discussions is. I think that the record is that so far there has 

been no action by United States forces on the ground in northern 

Iraq against these residual PKK operatives. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Ambassador. 

I would like to turn now to Mr. Wexler for his questions. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, like yesterday, I want to congratulate you and your staff 

for putting together a terrific assembly of witnesses. I think we are 

the beneficiary of your knowledge and expertise. 
45

I would like to, if I could, ask two questions, one with respect to 

this additional or newly focused interest in or by Turkey’s policy 

makers in more closely aligning themselves with a European foreign policy, however one may define that, and each of the speakers 

to a degree touched upon that. 

Dr. Cagaptay, I had a different experience when I was in Turkey 

twice during the March period. In all the meetings we had, all the 

people we spoke to with respect to the Parliament’s vote, I do not 

think on any single occasion any Turk suggested that part of the 

reason for what occurred was a focus or interest in more closely 

aligning Turkey with Europe. I suggested it once because to me at 

least it would be logical, but what I heard about was cartoons in 

American magazines that poorly depicted Turkey. I heard about 

America’s failure to include Turkmen in the original organization 

in northern Iraq. I heard about Paul Wolfowitz’s ultimatums on 

CNN and other public declarations. I heard about public opinion in 

Turkey. I heard a thousand things, but I never heard this is Turkey’s effort or a new strategy to align itself with Europe. 

But having said that, it is logical that in the time to to come Turkey will either by design or by happenstance will have to evaluate 

Europe’s foreign policy more closely, so taking that as a given, 

then, what does the group believe, then, how does Turkey play its 

cards with respect to Cyprus, which when I am talking to European leaders, invariably they will put out as a litmus test of Turkey’s entrance into the EU Turkey’s behavior with respect to Cyprus and what course Turkey follows. 

Second, if I could, with respect to the PKK, as I understand 

Prime Minister Erdogan’s position, which to me seems quite reasonable, he is articulating a view that America must demonstrate 

with concrete steps our desire to eliminate the infrastructure of terror that has inflicted, as many of you talked about, such extraordinary damage on the people of Turkey. 

I would hope that maybe you could share with me because I 

think Ambassador Parris essentially said I don’t want to put words 

in your mouth, to date we have really failed to address that concern in any meaningful way. 

What concrete steps should the United States or could the 

United States take that would in fact demonstrate to Turkey America’s commitment to eliminating the infrastructure of the PKK? 

Mr. ERGIN. Congressman Wexler, first of all, the United States 

Administration, the Bush Administration, is under a presidential 

obligation, a commitment, to the Turkish government to eliminate 

the PKK terrorist threat in northern Iraq. This is not limited to a 

commitment from the Bush Administration to the Turkish government only. As I recall, this commitment is also in the wording of 

the communique which was issued after the Azores summit, which 

was held on March 16th. Thus, President Bush made a commitment to the international community that Iraq would no longer be 

a sanctuary for terrorist groups. 

This, I think, was one of the basic objectives of the Bush Administration’s decision to move into Iraq militarily. So the Bush Administration is under obligation to the Turkish government and to 

the whole world to eradicate the terrorist infrastructure in Iraq. 
46

When we look at the terrorist infrastructure in Iraq, we see that 

for the time being, the PKK, which is mentioned by the State Department’s terrorism list as a terrorist group, has around 5,000 

guerrillas in the vicinity, most of them are stationed in the area 

which is controlled by Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union 

and most of them are in the vicinity of the Kandil Mountain. The 

American intelligence and the American commanders in Iraq do 

know the locations of these camps, so something has to be done 

about these groups. 

This is a highly sensitive issue in Turkey, especially at a time 

when the Turkish government and the Bush Administration are 

negotiating arrangements for the deployment of Turkish troops in 

Iraq. The Turkish government has already made this topic a condition indirectly. They would like to see that the Bush Administration takes concrete steps to eliminate the PKK groups in Iraq before Turkey decides to commit troops to Iraq. So it is part of the 

Gordian knot, if I may say so, on the question of sending Turkish 

troops to Iraq. 

Mr. BEREUTER. If other members of the panel wish to respond, 

just do so briefly, please. 

Mr. PARRIS. I think it would be easy to over-analyze the situation 

that we have been talking about here. I do not think that it is the 

case both from my previous experience government and my sense 

of what is going on now, that there is any love for the PKK or any 

games being played with the PKK in northern Iraq by the Bush 

Administration. I think that there are some specific, practical problems that are likely the reason for the restraint that has been 

shown thus far, rather than anything more insidious. 

My sense is that there is an understanding of that on the part 

of Turkish senior political leaders, which is one of the reasons that 

they have not formally made this a condition for a decision to deploy troops to Iraq. 

I think there is sort of a practical test that we will be coming 

up against, which is whether or not Mr. Erdogan has sufficient confidence in whatever he has from the administration when the time 

comes, to go up before Parliament and submit this motion to get 

the authorization necessary. He will be the best judge of that. My 

guess is he does not feel he is there quite yet. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. May I also respond? I am going to respond briefly 

to both of Congressman Wexler’s questions, very thought provoking, in fact. 

On the PKK, I think it is both in the Turkish and American interests, as well as the interests of a unified Iraq to disband or shut 

down the PKK because if the PKK does in fact survive in northern 

Iraq, then this area will likely turn into in southern Lebanon, an 

area of nominal government authority where terror groups operate 

freely and this is not in our interests. 

What can be done in terms of concrete steps? 

This is a non-conventional war. This is a terrorist organization, 

it is clear that you cannot shut it down by using conventional warfare. So I think creative thought is needed here. First idea, of 

course, is capturing the leadership which is substantial because we 

saw from past experience that once the PKK’s leader, Abdullah 
47

Ocalan, was captured in 1999, the organization was practically paralyzed. 

Now, his captains are on the field and I think they ought to be 

captured if you want to shut down the PKK. In this regard, I think 

the United States can provide valuable help to Turkey, by providing intelligence. But there are other ways. Another way of attacking the PKK is to shut down the organization’s network in Europe. 

Now, the PKK is on our terror list here, but it is not on the terror list in Europe. The organization transformed itself back a few 

years ago and re-named itself KADEK, the Kurdistan Freedom and 

Democracy Congress and the Europeans then put the former PKK, 

which is now defunct on its terror organizations list, so practically 

today the PKK-KADEK function freely within the EU collecting 

funds, and running cells and I think we have to tell our European 

allies that has to stop if you want to really shut down this organization. 

On the issue of the EU and to what extent it plays a role in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation, I had meant to suggest in my prepared remarks that an emerging pro EU tendency is one of the reasons why Turkey did not fully support the Iraq war and I am underlining the word fully. I think there were many other factors 

here from the Kurdish issue to the other factors that other speakers discussed, but let me elaborate a little bit more on this EU dimension. 

EU accession has created a euphoria in Turkey to such an extent 

that now it is seen as the second best thing that has happened in 

Turkey since sliced bread. The EU is very popular. And as a result 

of that, I think a lot of people in Turkey and some people here are 

confusing two things: That you want Turkey to go into the EU is 

one thing, and whether or not Turkey will go into the EU is another thing. A lot of people, because they want Turkey to join the 

EU, think as a result of this pro-EU tendency which is a growing 

force in Turkish foreign policy scenes in Ankara, that on Iraq and/

or other issues, if only Turkey did this or that also, then it would 

join the EU and Iraq is therefore seen as another accomplishment 

that Turkey has to achieve before it is given the green light by the 

Europeans. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. Could I just add something, if I may? 

There are differences between March 1 and what we are discussing now, particularly the issue of the PKK forces in northern 

Iraq, illustrates the point. Before March 1 there were negotiations 

between the two sides resulting in economic, military and political 

packages. Those would have kicked in if on March 1 the vote had 

gone the other way. 

What is happening now is that both sides are being very careful 

not to tie the various aspects of the discussions to each other. For 

example, with the $1 billion grant which gets converted into $8.5 

billion in loans, both sides stress that this money has nothing to 

do with the troop issue. Similarly, neither side is tying the troop 

issue to the PKK presence in northern Iraq. While there were disadvantages with the negotiations prior to March 1, the problem 

with this kind of situation is the uncoordinated and disjointed way 
48

in which we are preceding toward what will be a monumental decision by the Turks. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. McCotter, is 

recognized. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. To any member of the panel, what is the current 

state of relations between Turkey and Armenia, in your view? 

Mr. ERGIN. We know that recently, in the last 5 or 6 months 

there have been extensive talks behind the scenes between senior 

representatives of the foreign ministries of both sides. There has 

been a set of secret talks. We do not know much about the content 

of these talks. Recently, the Foreign Minister of Armenia went public saying that Turkey could soon open the border to Armenia. 

My understanding is that the dialogue between both governments covered the thorny issue of setting up a committee which 

will look into the historical facts. 

In the independence declaration of Armenia there is reference to 

western Armenia. Western Armenia refers to eastern parts of Turkey, eastern parts of Anatolia. 

I think, the government of Armenia has to make a strong statement that it is recognizing the eastern borders of Turkey if two 

countries are to engage in neighborly relations. 

So as seen from the Turkish side, my reading of the problem is 

that the Turkish government is ready to open the border, provided 

that the Armenian government would agree to form a committee 

which would be composed of historians, and this committee could 

look into the historical claims of genocide and so that the burden 

of history will no longer be an issue. 

I think it is up to the Armenian government to decide. I think 

they have two options: Either they engage in good relations with 

Turkey and look to the future and that the future of Armenia is 

no longer held hostage by the burden of history or they continue 

to press the claims of genocide, which means the border between 

Turkey and Armenia will always be a border of tension. 

But in my view, if this committee can be constituted, one of the 

psychological impediments in the process of building relations between Turkey and Armenia, can be overcome. Then close ties between two countries can be established. I think Armenia has only 

to gain from engaging in close cooperation with Turkey. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. Beyond what Sedat Ergin has said, there is also the 

issue of Karabakh. We are not just discussing a bilateral relationship between Ankara and Yerevan, there is also the fact that Turkey has a special relationship with Azerbaijan, and the dynamics 

of the triangular relationship between Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan have effectively given Azerbaijan a veto over Turkey opening 

its borders to Armenia and a rapprochement between the two countries until the Karabakh issue has been resolved. And what we see 

is a pattern of statements by Turkish officials, and even indications 

of an interest in opening the border, followed by a reaction from 

Azerbaijan and the Turks back off. And frankly I do not see that 

pattern changing in the near future. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. May I also add a point? On the question on the 

relation between Turkey and Armenia, I am going to give you a 

very brief anecdote. Every time I am at the airport in Istanbul and 

I am about to fly back here, if I have any time in my hands, I usu-
49

ally go in front of the departures/arrivals board and look at the cities to which I can fly directly from my great home city of Istanbul. 

The last time I was there, I found that there are direct flights 

going from Istanbul to Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. I think 

that epitomizes the answer to the question, that there are people 

in Turkey and there is the foreign policy elite that is looking for 

ways and means of dialogue with Armenia and a direct flight is 

only a symbol of that. A couple of months ago, there was a Turkish 

Ambassador who came to the United States to carry out a dialogue 

with the groups at the Armenia diaspora, to look for counterparts, 

and the Turkish Foreign Minister has recently met with this counterpart in Madrid, at the Iraq donor summit, as well as on a couple 

of other occasions. So I think there is room for dialogue. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, gentleman. Just to make sure I am 

clear on this, so the status really is that Turkey is a passive participant, according to what I heard, in its relations with Armenia; 

that if they unburden themselves of the past, which I find fascinating, if they unburden themselves of the past, and then they 

do not press claims to any part of Anatolia, then maybe Azerbaijan 

will not veto them having an open border with the Turkish government? Is that pretty much a synopsis of what I just heard? 

Mr. ERGIN. I did not say that. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. No, but the three of you collectively have laid 

that out. Is there anything affirmatively the government of Turkey 

can do in terms of its relations with Armenia to help improve 

those? 

Mr. ERGIN. These are separate issues which fall into the same 

picture. That is my understanding. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

Mr. Engel, the gentleman from New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I came in a little late, so I apologize, but I didn’t hear anybody 

mention the Cyprus situation and I am wondering, there has been 

a lot of talk about Turkey joining the EU, clearly, the whole question of Cyprus has to be put behind them if they are to join the 

EU. 

Why will Turkey not get out of Cyprus? It seemed to me that 

several months ago there seemed to be—we seemed to be moving 

toward a resolution of a Cyprus issue and then from my appearance either intransigence on the part of Mr. Denktash with support 

presumably from Ankara stopped it. I would like to see and hear 

your read on the whole issue of Cyprus. 

It seems to me that there has been an occupation there for a long 

time and it is time to end it and I am wondering how you gentlemen see that. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. I would like to refer you to my written testimony. 

I actually touched on this fairly extensively. What we have is a 

deadline put forward by the EU of May 1 when, with or without 

a settlement, the Island of Cyprus will enter the EU. 

And Mr. Verheugen, who is the EU commissioner for enlargement, in a meeting with Mr. Gul, the Turkish Foreign Minister, 

yesterday, made it clear that even though Cyprus is not a specified 
50

condition for EU entry for Turkey, nonetheless it is something that 

needs to be solved. 

Just today Verheugen made a statement saying in effect that the 

Greek Cypriots, acting in the name of the entire island, could veto 

Turkey’s entry into the EU after May 1. So looking at it from the 

perspective of Ankara and Turkey-United States relations, Cyprus 

is already an important component in that context. 

What we have ahead is a difficult decision by the current government, not just on Iraq and other issues, but also in Cyprus. They 

have to decide whether they are going to take on the forces of inertia which have been a factor in Turkey for a long time on this 

issue, or move ahead with a difficult decision to resume the negotiations, iron out the flaws in the current U.N. plan and end the 

problem that extends not to just to the arrival of the Turkish forces 

in 1974, but all the way back to 1963. 

Frankly, this issue needs to be taken off the international agenda. Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gul have made very positive statements 

about the need to solve this problem and I for one am optimistic 

that negotiations could be resumed and an amicable settlement 

leading to the satisfaction of all the parties involved, including Turkey, could be achieved. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. If I may also add a point, I am going to look at 

the Cyprus issue from the perspective of Turkey’s European Union 

accession, since this seems to be one of the stumbling blocks coming up on the way ahead of Turkey’s likely EU membership in the 

future. 

From the purely bureaucratic point of view, Cyprus is not part 

of the accession criteria into the European Union. The European 

Union has very well defined criteria called the Copenhagen rules 

and this involves a whole bunch of things, but not the Cyprus 

issue. But if the EU were in fact to make this issue a condition for 

Turkey’s EU accession, then I think it will be incumbent on the 

two sides to resolve the issue before they can join the EU and by 

two sides I mean Turkey which has troops in the northern part of 

the island and the internationally recognized government of Cyprus 

which is the Greek majority part of the island. 

Basically, I believe it takes two to tango and I think the EU is 

going to end up with a mess in its hands if it takes in one side of 

the island. This is going to create huge troubles on the way of Turkey’s into the European Union. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. McCotter had asked about Turkish relations with Armenia. 

What is the status of Turkish relations with Israel now? Obviously, 

before the new government of Turkey came in, it was excellent, the 

Ambassador talked about strategic cooperation between us and 

Turkey, certainly there was strategic cooperation between the 

Israelis and Turkey as well. 

What is the relationship now? Is it as good as it was before this 

government came to power? Has it deteriorated because of the Islamic nature of some of the people in the government? 

Mr. ERGIN. Mr. Congressman, I do not think the relationship between Turkey and Israel has been affected by the change of government in Ankara. In my view, the relationship between the two 

countries has been institutionalized and will remain so in the fu-
51

ture. Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul both went 

public on many occasions in expressing their resolve to expand the 

relationship with Israel and also it is important to note that relations recently have not been affected by the ongoing crisis on the 

ground. So it is immunity to the developments on the group. And 

I think it is widely held view in Ankara is that under the Justice 

and Development Party government the relationship will continue 

on full track. 

Mr. PARRIS. Congressman, I think it is worth remembering that 

this relationship really took root during the tenure in power of Mr. 

Erbakan’s Islamic government in 1996, 1997. Many at the time interpreted the fact that this relationship which grew initially between the two militaries as a means of showing Turks and the 

world that this government did not necessarily speak for Turkey. 

The Eberkan government was quite outspoken in terms of its 

unease over Israeli policies and this was a way of demonstrating 

that they were not perhaps quite in control. 

I think it is interesting that the AK government has gone out of 

its way not to be put in that position. There have been numerous 

high level visits between the two countries. They are in the final 

stages of concluding an agreement under which Israel will buy 

water which will be shipped from Turkey in tankers. There has 

been no calling into question of the military to miliary relationship, 

which has been a very important one for both countries. 

So there was certainly scope for question when the government 

came into office based on the previous history, but so far I would 

have to say that, whether in Turkey or in Jerusalem, or in the 

think tanks of this town, most people would say that the Turks are 

going out of their way to show that it is still intact and is likely 

to remain so. 

Mr. ENGEL. I know my time is up, but Ambassador Parris, you 

had said and I wrote this down in your testimony, when you were 

talking about United States-Turkish relations in the future, you 

said that we might look at it as Turkish cooperation is no longer 

essential because there is no more Soviet Union, we are now in 

Iraq—but I would think that because a high priority in this country has been placed on the Middle East peace process that Turkish 

cooperation is very essential, I think, in moving that process forward. 

Mr. PARRIS. Yes. I think what I said was, ‘‘essential in the same 

sense that it was not containing the Soviet threat and Saddam 

Hussein.’’

Turkey unquestionably is one of those few countries anywhere in 

the world that has credibility on both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide and can support what we are doing and what the international 

community is doing to try to bring them together, and has. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask unanimous consent to put Congressman Pallone’s statement in the record. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
52

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

I would like to express my thanks to Chairman Bereuter and Ranking Member 

Wexler for allowing me to submit this statement for the record. It is unfortunate 

that I was unable to attend this hearing, as it is of great importance to me. I wish 

to address Turkey’s relationship with two allies of the United States, Armenia and 

Cyprus. 

Although this hearing today is about Turkey’s future direction and its relationship 

with the United States, an examination of its past and present will give a much 

more accurate picture. In the past century, Turkey has stood as both friend and 

enemy to the United States. In World War I, the Turkish Ottoman Empire stood 

alongside Germany in its quest to reshape Europe. During that time, over 1.5 million ethnic Armenians were deliberately killed and 500,000 more displaced as part 

of the Ottoman Empire’s campaign of Genocide of the Armenian people. 

Turkey has also openly flouted international norms and laws over the last thirty 

years. In 1974, Turkey invaded the independent republic of Cyprus, ostensibly 

under the cover of protection of the ethnic Turkish Citizens. This invasion and subsequent military occupation that has divided a sovereign nation was been widely 

condemned by the international community, and serves to hamper Turkey’s chances 

of acceding to the European Union. 

TURKEY’S ONGOING BLOCKADE OF ARMENIA

• Turkey has imposed a blockade against Armenia since April of 1993. At the 

time, Armenia was still recovering from a devastating earthquake and experienced a severe energy crisis in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Armenia 

relied heavily on vital grain and kerosene shipments from the United States. 

By imposing a blockade against its neighbor, Turkey assisted Azerbaijan in 

its war against Karabakh’s Armenians.

• Turkey’s blockade of Armenia includes denying U.S. and international humanitarian assistance from crossing its borders, a violation of U.S. law, international human rights and humanitarian standards, and Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) commitments to which Turkey is a signatory. 

Organizations such as the European Union (EU) have repeatedly called on 

Turkey to lift its blockade against Armenia. The EU, in particular, has made 

normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations a pre-condition for Turkey’s accession to the organization. Turkey, along with Azerbaijan, are the only Council of Europe (CE) states which are engaged in a blockade against a fellow 

CE state.

• Earlier this year, a State Department report estimated that the blockade continues to inflate Armenia’s transportation costs by 30–35 percent, stifling its 

trade and economy. This report also stated that opening the border would 

catalyze commercial opportunities for Turkey and Armenia in the fields of energy, trade and tourism valued at $1 billion per year. 

TURKEY’S CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF CYPRUS

• On July 20, 1974, the Turkish military invaded Cyprus, and to this day continues to maintain 35,000 heavily armed troops in the occupied territory. 

Nearly 200,000 Greek Cypriots, who fell victim to a policy of ethnic cleansing, 

were forcibly evicted from their homes and became refugees in their own 

country.

• Turkey’s continuing occupation of the northern third of the Island of Cyprus 

is also one of Turkey’s most egregious violations of international law. This 

year marked the 29th anniversary of Turkey’s illegal military occupation.

• Tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots in the north have recently peacefully 

protested Denktash’s decision to reject the U.N. plan to reunify the island, 

and Turkish Cypriot citizens made this rare public rebuff of Denktash’s demanding reunification so that the coming prosperity of the European UnionCyprus partnership does not pass them by.

• Having signed the Accession Treaty to the European Union, along with nine 

other countries at a special ceremony in Athens, Greece, on April 16, 2003, 

Cyprus is on target to join the EU in May 2004. It would be desirable if a 

negotiated settlement to end the Turkish occupation and reunite the island 

were to be achieved prior to that date.

• Turkey’s own aspirations to join the EU would also be boosted by a resolution 

of the Cyprus question. Working in good faith to promote a resolution in Cy-
53

prus is a key criterion set by the EU members for Turkey’s eventual accession. U.S. and NATO interests would be well served by a stable, democratic 

Turkey firmly anchored to the West. Ending the occupation of over one-third 

of Cyprus’s territory would also end a major drain on Turkey’s military resources and its struggling economy.

• Since 1974, dozens of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus have been adopted, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the island, the return 

of the refugees to their homes in safety and respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus.

• On April 10, the House of Representatives voted unanimously for House Resolution 165, sponsored by Rep. Doug Bereuter, R–NE, Chairman of the European Subcommittee of the International Relations Committee, calling for a renewed effort to find a settlement to the Cyprus problem. The Resolution expresses the House’s ‘‘very strong regret that Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. 

Denktash, rejected the comprehensive settlement offered by the Secretary 

General and, by refusing to offer the settlement proposal to referenda, denied 

the Turkish Cypriot community the opportunity to determine their own future.’’

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, is 

recognized. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the 

Committee for having this important hearing on a vital ally of the 

U.S. and we get a meaningful opportunity to participate in. 

I want to thank the panel for joining us today. 

In the discussion on Cyprus, we talked about the Copenhagen 

criteria did not have any references to Cyprus per se and it would 

depend upon whether or not you made it an issue or not. Recent 

meetings that we have had with members of the European Parliament indicated that they are going to make it an issue and at 

least in the previous discussion, the brief discussion about it, it 

sounded like people were saying, well, we can resolve this, but the 

more I hear about the issue, what specifically can Turkey do to resolve this issue? I do not see how it can be easily resolved. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Congressman. I guess I will elaborate 

a little bit more on my earlier remarks to answer your question. 

The Cyprus issue is not part of the EU accession rules, the Copenhagen criteria. We know that very well. But if the EU were to 

make the resolution of the Cyprus issue a condition for Turkish accession, my point was that in the past the EU has done that, it has 

asked prospective member countries to resolve their disputes. They 

did this with Slovakia and Hungary before these two countries 

were allowed into the Union. So it can be the same for Turkey, but 

only if the same condition is also put on the internationally recognized government of Cyprus, too. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. But how can that be resolved? 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Well, I guess my point is for the EU to admit one 

side to the conflict into the union while leaving the other side out 

is a tactical mistake, which is going to make it even more difficult 

to resolve the conflict. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. To put into the broader context, Congressman, there 

are a lot of people in the EU who do not want to argue with Turkey 

on whether the Copenhagen criteria have been implemented sufficiently well for Turkey to be a member of the EU. It would be 

much easier for them to say you are maintaining troops on Cyprus, 

whatever your justification; the island has now entered the EU and 

therefore we simply cannot allow you in. As Mr. Verheugen said 
54

yesterday, the Greek Cypriots may even veto the Turkish application, which would take us into unchartered waters. 

You asked what Turkey can do. Frankly, if Turkey does nothing, 

then the enemies of Turkey’s membership of the EU would jump 

on the Cyprus issue to keep Turkey out. 

So therefore, what the Turkish government has to do, and I 

touched on this in my prepared testimony, is to calculate the costs 

of dealing with this issue. It is clear that there will be a major fight 

in Ankara with people who do not want to make any concessions 

whatsoever in Cyprus, who frankly doubt the motives of not just 

the Greek Cypriots, not just Greece, not just the Europeans, but 

also the United States for its willingness to back the current U.N. 

plan. The government has to balance these costs, the domestic 

costs, against the international costs of doing nothing. 

What Turkey can do is to encourage the process by which there 

can be negotiations on the current U.N. plan between the two 

sides. The U.N. Secretary General remains committed to the process. That is also the position of the EU and the U.S. and, frankly, 

I am an optimist. I think that the differences can be eradicated. 

After all, this is a small island. 

If nothing is done between now and May 1, we are going to run 

head into a train wreck, as my old boss Mordi Bramowitz used to 

say, it is something frankly that needs to be done. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. If I may follow up, the first thing I would like to 

clarify is that I am for a resolution of the conflict on the island and 

I would like to see the two parts of the island coexist in the spirit 

of the Cypriot tradition. But I also do not share the belief that the 

solution of the Cyprus issue will make it possible for Turkey to get 

into the EU. Even if the Cyprus issue were resolved, I think the 

bar, as Congressman Wexler stated earlier, is going to be raised a 

little further up by the EU, with other issues added on to Turkey’s 

list of homework or list of things to be completed. 

One very brief remark, Mr. Chairman. I teach at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, FSI, where I do a lecture on 

Turkish-Euro relations. And one of the very common questions I 

get is on my skepticism on Turkish membership. People say, well, 

do you think Turkey could get in if it was a Christian country? 

And the first time I got this question, I had to stop for a minute 

and think and I said, ‘‘Probably not, because it would have been 

orthodox.’’

That aside, I think the major issue that the EU has with Turkey 

is that this is a very large country and the EU simply does not 

have the money or the political will to deal with Turkey right now. 

So if not Cyprus, we will have many other things on the agenda, 

such as a strict implementation of the Copenhagen criteria where 

you will find a lot of glitches, as such glitches exist all over Europe. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. Congressman, I will put it another way. There is no 

guarantee that Turkey will get into the EU if it solves the Cyprus 

problem, but it is almost certain that Turkey will not get in if the 

Cyprus problem is not resolved. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Good point. Good point. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield. 
55

I believe unfortunately you are right, Dr. Cagaptay. This Member with the help of this Committee ventured into the area of introducing a resolution on Cyprus and in the past when we have had 

resolutions on the Floor on Cyprus, they were highly contentious. 

This one passed with only one two negative votes and I think they 

missed a great opportunity because apparently the Turkish Cypriot 

people would have voted in a referendum in agreement with coming into the EU then we would have had the federation. And then 

the question is did the Turkish government do anything positive in 

that respect or could they have done more. 

I want to go on to what seems to be happening and then get your 

reactions to it. The Erdogan government has hired up to a reported 

15,000 new imams, that some of them will be appointed to higher 

state and national governmental offices. Enrollment in the Imam 

Hatip schools is said to be up about 50 percent. Is the government 

moving in a direction of Imams for government positions? Is this 

worrisome? Why are the Imam Hatip schools so popular and should 

we be concerned about the popularity of their teachings? 

And all Members are welcome to address that. 

Mr. ERGIN. Mr. Chairman, could you please repeat the question? 

Imam schools, you mean religious schools? 

Mr. BEREUTER. The Imam Hatip schools. Yes. Why are they so 

popular? Should we be concerned about the popularity of their 

teachings. It is reported that their enrollment is up by 50 percent, 

for example. 

Mr. ERGIN. Fifty? 

Mr. BEREUTER. Five-zero. 

Mr. ERGIN. Percent of? 

Mr. BEREUTER. It is up 50 from the previous level. 

Mr. ERGIN. After the Justice and Development Party government 

took office, one of the areas of tension on the political scene, has 

become the area of education. So far, the Justice and Development 

Party government has refrained from taking steps which can be 

construed as challenging the secular institutions of the republic. 

They have been careful. But still on the question of education, 

there are misgivings and apprehensions and, from time to time, 

there are statements from several ministers and deputies of this 

party to the effect that they want to promote the status of the 

Imam Hatip schools. 

The practice of the Imam Hatip schools began in the 1950s. 

These schools were established as vocational schools just to educate 

Imams for the Mosques. So these are in a way technical schools. 

This is why these educational institutions were established. Yet in 

the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and in the 1980s, somehow the center right 

politicians, so as to accommodate the religiously conservative 

groups in Turkey, kept on opening new Imam Hatip schools. 

In the end, this led to a duality in the education system in Turkey. You had the regular government schools and the graduates of 

those schools are people with a pro-western orientation, with liberal values, with strong commitment to secularism, yet graduates 

of the Imam Hatip schools in the past came out with a different 

flavor. These were people who look to the East, not to the West. 

I think unity of education should be one of the basic pillars of a 

society and when you have a duality in the educational system, in 
56

the long run this could lead to a duality in the society. This could 

lead to a fragmentation. So this has been a very contentious issue 

with the new government. 

Four or five years ago, a new procedure was introduced so that 

the graduates of the Imam Hatip schools would not easily be enrolled in the universities, but this procedure does not only apply to 

Imam Hatip schools, but it also applies to all graduates of technical 

high schools as well. So all graduates of technical high schools in 

Turkey are not privileged when they want to enroll in the universities. 

There are rumors, there are reports that the new government 

may try to lift all these restrictions, but, as I said, this is a very 

sensitive issue in Turkey. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Do any of you wish to comment about the number? Because there are people moving into government positions, 

state and national. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. To refer back to my testimony, I talked about the 

objective definition of the JDP by its opponents, those who were 

suspicious of its motives, clearly this is one of the issues. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Is the suspicion well taken or not? Some suspicions are not, you know, accurate. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. Without getting into the arguments within Turkey 

itself but looking at it from the outside in an objective and academic matter, clearly the Turkish secular system is still as strong 

as it was. The JDP, not withstanding what they may really wish 

to do, have certainly not moved in the direction of establishing a 

state based on the Sharia. They are willing to live within existing 

limits. Nonetheless, it is not so much what they do as what they 

are and their background, including the fact that many of them are 

products of religious schools, that makes people suspicious of their 

motives, but it is not yet time to ring the alarm bells. Thank you. 

Mr. BEREUTER. We asked the same question the other day about 

KGB people in the Russian government. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. And what was the answer there, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. BEREUTER. ‘‘Worrisome,’’ they said. 

Would anyone else care to comment on this? 

[No response.] 

Mr. BEREUTER. All right. We will turn to Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

I have the utmost respect for and friendship with our colleague 

Mr. Engel, I am sorry he left, but I think the manner in which he 

presented the question as it relates to Turkey with respect to Cyprus in the context of when will Turkey leave Cyprus is an 

unhelpful presentation of the problem because it fails to recognize 

that there were atrocities committed by both sides and that there 

are legitimate concerns expressed by both sides and it seems to me 

an equally appropriate question or concern is when will the international community demand for Cyprus a resolution which adequately addresses the legitimate concerns of both sides? 

And without getting into a debate, because I do not wish to do 

so, it seems to me that if there was one thing I learned when I visited Cyprus recently from Mr. Denktash was that while we may believe the U.N. process has been a successful one and I do think it 

is the appropriate forum in which to proceed, that the proposal of-
57

fered by the United Nations was sufficiently vague in certain areas 

and that Mr. Denktash was not yet comfortable with the guarantees that were offered for his people. 

Now, I would hope that Mr. Denktash in the future would take 

a less stubborn position. I hope that he and his Greek Cypriot 

counterparts would engage in discussion again, but to phrase the 

issue as one in which when will Turkey leave as if there were no 

reasons for the Turkish invasion in 1974 I do not believe adequately or appropriately addresses what should be America’s perspective in Cyprus. 

Having said that, I was hoping that maybe the gentlemen could 

offer us an observation as to the perspective of the new or the current Turkish government as to Turkey’s relations with Iran and 

Turkey’s relations with Syria? Has there been a change? Is there 

a continuation? Or, more appropriately, what are Turkey’s objectives with respect to both Syria and Iran? 

Mr. ERGIN. Congressman Wexler, so far, in the course of the last 

10 months, I have not seen any major change in Turkey’s relations 

with Syria or with Iran. I have not detected any change in the emphasis or any new tone. We know that behind the closed doors the 

new government in Ankara is encouraging the Syrian government 

to take a firm position against terrorism. I am sure the same message is going to Iran as well. But just to sum up, I do not think 

there has been really much of a change in Turkey’s relations with 

both countries. I think the government is committed to keep good 

relations with both countries and expand their relations. 

Mr. ALIRIZA. If I may? Prime Minister Erdogan is apparently 

planning a trip to Iran in the near future and it is something that 

according to the press, the United States Government has expressed some displeasure to Mr. Erdogan about. Bashir Assad is 

due to make a state visit to Turkey for the first time, I believe, certainly since the Baath came to power in Damascus. 

Clearly, Turkey needs to balance any moves it makes with respect to both of these countries, with its this relationship with the 

United States and to a lesser extent with Europe, which has been 

somewhat less vigilant on these issues. 

Until now, as I suggested earlier, Mr. Erdogan has been very 

careful to focus on his commitment to continue the westernization 

process in Turkey. 

There is a danger here that there may be a misperception of 

what he is trying to do, not withstanding whatever message he 

gives behind the scenes, both in Iran and to his visitor from Syria. 

Mr. CAGAPTAY. When you talk to the foreign policy decision makers in Ankara on what methods Turkey uses vis-a-vis Syrian and 

Iran, Turkey likes to use the traditional methods that have worked 

in the past and they like to stick to these methods. With respect 

to Iran, I would say, the traditional Turkish approach has been engagement. And with respect to Syria it has been engagement and 

deterrence. And we have seen that work with Syria, back in the 

1990s, well, Turkey flexed its muscles and Syria stopped supporting the PKK and since then Turkey has been vigorously engaging Syria and that I think is going to be Ankara’s approach toward 

that country in the near future. 
58

With respect to Iran, I think engagement has been the method 

and it will be the method in the future, with one caveat. The 

nuclearization of Iran has not been debated in Turkey, it is not on 

the radar screen and this, I think, if it did come up on the radar 

screen would increase the Turkish perception of a threat emanating from Iran, but that is not yet there, so I would say engagement is still there vis-a-vis Iran and will be there for a little bit 

more in the future. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Whitfield, do you have other questions? 

We need to end this session very shortly and I wonder if I could 

hopefully for the good of the Subcommittee generally ask just one 

question to Ambassador Parris, since he is no longer in the government. 

Could you in bullet point fashion give your recommendations to 

what our government should be doing to improve Turkish-American relations? 

Mr. PARRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is no rocket science set of bullet 

points for this and I would say they are basically doing the right 

thing, which is to stay engaged and to be candid, be honest. 

I think that, to the extent that we had difficulties last winter in 

our discussion of whether or not we would be allowed to deploy 

troops across Turkey, there were breakdowns in a number of areas, 

among them communication. That was partly a function of new 

people coming in. It was partly a function of a lack of familiarity 

with the way these things are done. It was partly a function of 

American assumptions that everything worked the way it had always worked in the past, and that was not necessarily the case. 

I think that to the extent that anything good came out of that 

process, there is less of a readiness in Washington just to assume 

that nothing has changed and it is the same address and you can 

continue to get away with that. I think people are thinking more 

carefully about how properly and effectively to engage the Turkish 

leadership and I think it is working more successfully. 

If I had to focus on one specific thing that we really have to do, 

and it has been the key to everything we have done successfully 

in the past, it is to be honest with one another. Turks occasionally 

have a tendency to tell us what they think we want to hear and 

to be overly polite; and we have a tendency to talk and not listen. 

That can be a prescription for dropped balls. Something like that 

happened last spring. I think that both sides are playing better 

right now. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Ambassador. 

I think we have had some very good hearings recently and this 

is certainly right at the top of the list because you gentlemen have 

been so helpful in your written testimony, your oral comments and 

responses to our questions. 

I very much appreciate the fact you have come to spend your 

time with us to share some wisdom and apparently some of you 

have come twice as a result of the hurricane. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. Wexler, do you have any final comment to the panel? That 

would be welcome. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittee is adjourned. 
59

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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