The Common European Security and 

Defense Policy (ESDP)

Edward G. Gunning, Jr. 

INSS Occasional Paper 41 

Regional Security Series 

July 2001 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Atlantic Council, 

the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Navy, the 

Department of Defense, or the US Government. The paper is approved 

for public release by the Department of Defense; distribution is 

unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss

ISBN: 0-9710900-4-1 
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreward v 

Executive Summary vii 

Acknowledgements x 

Introduction 1 

Country Perspectives 4 

 -1999: A Busy Year for the EU 4 

 -The United Kingdom 6 

 -France 8 

 -Germany 9 

 -The United States 12 

Challenges toESDP—the Road Ahead 15 

 -Psychological Dimension 15 

 -The Focus on Capabilities 18 

 -Institution Building 25 

US Policy Recommendations 30 

 -Force Structure Implications 33 

Conclusion 36 

Endnotes 38 
v

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this forty-first volume in the Occasional Paper 

series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security 

Studies (INSS). As the United States continues to adjust to its role in the 

post-Cold War world, the transatlantic partnership remains fundamental 

to US security concerns. Commander Gunning’s paper is a wake-up call 

suggesting that Europe is concerned about US intransigence when it 

comes the security partnership with Europe. While the United States has 

often encouraged the Europeans to improve capabilities and take on a 

greater share of the defensive burden, their recent efforts to do so have 

often been viewed as paradoxical to US concerns. Policymakers on this 

side of the Atlantic worry that Europe in some ways is moving towards 

going it alone with the development of the European Security and 

Defense Policy (ESDP). Still, US desires for increased burdensharing 

need to be reconciled with ESDP. Commander Gunning highlights these 

differences and spells out how, in his opinion, it is possible for the 

United States to remain engaged in Europe and to allow the European 

Union to develop its own defense identity. The differences of opinion 

between the two sides are more “speed bumps” than “road blocks” and 

some disagreement and frustration is to be expected. The conclusion 

here is that security interests on both sides of the Atlantic will be served 

in the long run by encouraging the development of a more autonomous 

European defense capability and through American patience as that 

process unfolds. 

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vii

THE COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND 

DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

One clear outcome of the Kosovo conflict was a realization on the part of 

several leaders of the European Union (EU) that the EU’s current 

military capabilities are inadequate. Kosovo highlighted the EU’s 

inability to address crises in its own back yard. The United States bore 

the brunt of the air war against Serbian forces, notably in the areas of: 

(1) all weather delivery of precision guided munitions; (2) electronic 

warfare support and attack; (3) aerial refueling; (4) strategic lift; and 

(5) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Although European nations 

are providing most of the current ground units in Kosovo, European 

militaries are stretched to the limit to meet these requirements while 

deploying only two percent of their total forces. As the European Union 

moves forward with its integration, many EU leaders are focusing on the 

requirement to develop more autonomous defense capabilities to support 

the development of their Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 

In December 1999 at Helsinki the European Council decided to 

develop the EU’s crisis management capability with the commitment to 

build a force of 60,000 troops capable of out-of-area operations before 

2003. This force is designed to deal with future Kosovos and provide 

the operational basis for the new European Security and Defense Policy 

(ESDP). 

For ESDP to be successful it is sold as supporting a growing 

role for the European Union in world affairs. United States’ leaders are 

reluctant to sacrifice their dominance of European security affairs, 

especially when prospects for substantive capability improvements are 

remote. Without US support ESDP is unlikely to succeed in the long 
viii

run, and this might entail disastrous results for the transatlantic alliance. 

United States leadership must delicately balance expectations at home, 

and allow the Europeans to slowly develop their capability and lever 

their initial momentum. 

ESDP is a delicate balancing act for both the European Union 

and the United States. Its failure might damage transatlantic relations 

and threaten tenuous congressional support for American security 

burdens in Europe. Its success might raise the specter of an American 

withdrawal under the justification that US forces would no longer be 

needed in Europe. It is important for US policy and transatlantic 

relations as a whole that a middle ground be achieved in this effort. 

More equitable transatlantic relations best serve European 

security interests. This will require Europeans to shake the complacency 

of fifty years of American dependence and move forward with 

substantial capability improvements. In turn, the United States will have 

to accept a more balanced position in the area of European security. It 

will be a difficult road for both sides. 

In the near term, little will change with respect to US 

requirements in Europe. This continued burden would place a strain on 

ESDP development. American leaders will need to accept that ESDP is 

indeed a “European” development and allow it to take its course with 

measured support. United States relations will benefit from a stronger 

partner in Europe. Although it may take a decade to achieve greater 

capabilities, patience on the US side will reap its reward. The United 

States is a committed European partner. It does not have the option to 

withdraw from European affairs. 

United States interests are best served through encouraging the 

development of a more autonomous European defense capability. It is 

unrealistic to expect the United States to continue to dominate European 

security efforts indefinitely. The EU nations recognize this reality and 
ix

expect greater success in their collective efforts to develop improved 

capabilities on the basis of European integration. A more capable 

European partner will provide flexibility and strength to the transatlantic 

security relationship. A sustainable and viable security relationship with 

the European Union will remain the cornerstone of US peace and 

stability efforts worldwide. The United States cannot withdraw from 

Europe and cannot expect to sustain the current imbalance with respect 

to security. European Union efforts to develop a more autonomous 

defense capability may be the best avenue to solidify the crucial 

transatlantic security link. 
x

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This article is the result of research conducted on behalf of INSS while 

serving as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Special thanks are 

owed to both organizations as well as to David S. Yost, Professor at the 

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Although he 

commented on an earlier draft of this article, he naturally bears no 

responsibility for the views expressed herein. 
The Common European Security and Defense Policy 

(ESDP)

INTRODUCTION 

[ESDP] should be nominated to replace US-Canadian relations 

as the most boring issue on the transatlantic circuit. 

 --Richard Perle, former Pentagon official1

One clear outcome of the Kosovo conflict was a realization on the part of 

several leaders of the European Union (EU) that the EU’s current military 

capabilities are inadequate. Kosovo highlighted the EU’s inability to 

address crises in its own back yard. The United States bore the brunt of 

the air war against Serbian forces, notably in the areas of: (1) all 

weather delivery of precision guided munitions; (2) electronic warfare 

support and attack; (3) aerial refueling; (4) strategic lift; and (5) 

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Although European nations 

are providing most of the current ground units in Kosovo, European 

militaries are stretched to the limit to meet these requirements while 

deploying only two percent of their total forces. As the European Union 

moves forward with its integration, many EU leaders are focusing on the 

requirement to develop more autonomous defense capabilities to support 

the development of their Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 

In December 1999 the European Council met at Helsinki and 

decided to develop the EU’s crisis management capability. It committed 

to build a force of 60,000 troops, capable of deploying within 60 days for 

up to a year, and handling the so-called “Petersberg tasks.” These include 

humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and crisis 

management including peace making (or peace enforcement), but fall 

short of NATO Article 5 collective self-defense abilities.2

 The force is 
2

designed to deal with future Kosovos and forms the foundation of the 

new European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).3

 

The EU nations have had little success on a collective basis in 

developing more autonomous defense capabilities, and the task ahead of 

them is quite daunting. That is why skeptics like Perle consider Europe’s 

current effort un-exhilarating. But Perle’s skepticism highlights a crucial 

aspect of current European efforts—without credible operational 

capabilities, little will change. To overcome the EU’s frustration with its 

dependence on United States military might and US frustration with an 

unsustainable burden-sharing arrangement, the EU will need to 

demonstrate the capabilities and willingness to carry more of the load. 

This will require difficult decisions in Europe and patience among US 

policymakers. 

Continued progress with ESDP may be a requirement for the 

long-term viability of the alliance. To be successful, it should provide 

the European allies with a credible military force to meet the security 

challenges that they will face in the region in circumstances in which 

NATO is not fully engaged, while strengthening their core collective 

defense capability. At some point it may provide the United States more 

flexibility in its force deployments and demonstrate adequate burden 

sharing by European allies to help silence isolationist critics in Congress. 

The complete development of a viable European Security and Defense 

Policy may indeed strengthen the United States engagement in Europe 

and provide a solid anchor for European security. However, if the 

process is not properly orchestrated on both sides of the Atlantic, it may 

prove damaging to transatlantic ties that have provided the bedrock of 

security in Europe for more than half a century. 

Maintaining the viability of this transatlantic link is the focus of 

this study. It opens with an overview of the perspectives of three key 

European nations and the United States in the development of ESDP.4

 
3

What are the driving forces behind each country’s support for efforts to 

develop more autonomous defense capabilities in Europe? The study 

examines current challenges faced by European efforts to improve 

defense capabilities. What capabilities will the Europeans develop and 

improve and in what timeframe? What effect will European efforts to 

develop more autonomous defense capabilities have on the transatlantic 

relationship? The final section of the study provides recommendations 

for United States policy in support of ESDP. 

In a recent seminar focusing on the challenges of transatlantic 

relations with respect to ESDP, a European defense observer provided a 

clever anecdote about the challenges ahead. He began with a general 

description of a defense initiative on one side of the Atlantic that has 

confounded policymakers on the other side. The proponents had not 

adequately discussed the issue with their allies across the Atlantic, and 

the misunderstandings had the potential to disrupt transatlantic relations 

and the international security environment. He concluded, “of course I 

am referring to National Missile Defense (NMD).” This was a surprise 

ending for a group that had spent the day discussing ESDP, but an 

important lesson in how one’s perspective can skew perceptions. It 

highlights the importance of each side accepting the long-term 

probability of both NMD and ESDP; American efforts should therefore 

focus on smoothing the transition. 

Clearly the removal of the colossal threat once posed by Soviet 

military power has allowed differences in strategic threat perceptions to 

come to the forefront. Europe is currently focused on regional threats to 

security, while the United States is working to develop a system to 

protect against the threat of ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass 

destruction from nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. While 

Europeans are beginning to accept the inevitability of some form of US 

National Missile Defense and the US perspectives on its development, 
4

American policymakers are beginning to accept the inevitability of the 

European Security and Defense Policy. This paper is intended to clarify 

European perspectives on ESDP and to offer policy recommendations for 

the US government that will maintain the vitality of transatlantic 

relations. 

COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES 

1999: A Busy Year for the European Union 

Developments within the European Union are often monitored with a 

combination of ambiguity and schizophrenia in the United States. Some 

Europeans have noted a familiar pattern in US reactions to ESDP: “First 

inattention, then assertions that it cannot succeed, then warnings of 

danger once success appears imminent.”5

 However, some diligent US 

observers have noted an apparent watershed for the European Union in 

1999, likely instigated by the Kosovo crisis. In a short time-span of nine 

months, the EU made a series of firsts: 

It endorsed a hot war by NATO forces, with the full 

support of all EU neutrals; came to regard the Balkans 

not as the barbarian East but as a part of Europe that 

must be raised to European standards of human rights; 

was shocked by its own impotence relative to 

America’s electronic-weapons wizardry; held together 

for 78 days in the face of bitter popular opposition in 

Greece to the NATO war next door; agreed to fold the 

Western European Union (WEU) into the EU; 

appointed the high-profile politician Javier Solana 

rather than a faceless clerk to be Europe’s inaugural 

“Mr. Foreign Policy” and double-hatted him as interim 

WEU secretary-general, with ex officio right to sit in 

on North Atlantic Council meetings; set the goal of 

creating up to 60,000 European rapid-reaction troops 

that could be mobilized within two months for a twoyear deployment; held a joint meeting of EU foreign 

and defense ministers; and put Turkey on the candidate 

list for future EU membership.6

A general explanation for the progress within the European Union argues 
5

that it is a natural progression from the economic integration 

symbolically cemented with the initiation of the European Monetary 

Union (EMU) in January 1999. Building on their economic solidarity, 

the EU countries are moving toward political integration and the 

development of common policies with respect to external relations. This 

Common Foreign and Security Policy encapsulates the contentious issues 

of enlargement and ESDP. The EU is often accused of being an 

economic giant, but at the same time a political and military midget. The 

development of stronger autonomous defense capabilities is intended to 

change this reality by providing the necessary muscle behind CFSP. 

Yet there are more specific reasons why the European Union 

decided in June 1999 in Cologne to set a December 2000 deadline for 

substantive developments with respect to ESDP, creating a backdrop for 

an intensification of activity in 1999. In December 2000 at Nice 

(France) the European Union conducted an Intergovernmental 

Conference (IGC) on institutional reform and agreed on some necessary 

treaty amendments with respect to defense. ESDP, a new endeavor for a 

European Union not previously designed to handle security issues, has 

raised the prospect of significant institutional changes, some of which 

required treaty modifications. The sensitive nature of ESDP will wed it 

to the progress and pace of the IGC. 

Such complex institutional developments have moved to the 

forefront of policymaker agendas in the Foreign Offices and Ministries of 

Defense in London, Paris, and Berlin. The French held the presidency of 

the European Union in the latter half of 2000, and ESDP is a special 

priority for them. All three capitals seek tangible results within a short 

timeframe. To better understand what is driving ESDP developments in 

Europe, it is essential to take a closer look at policy developments in the 

three leading nations, beginning with the UK. Its transformation was 

most significant as it embraced the movement towards a more 
6

autonomous defense capability. 

The United Kingdom 

Getting Europe’s voice heard more clearly in the world 

will not be achieved through merging the EU and WEU 

or developing an unrealistic common defence policy. 

 --Tony Blair, UK Prime Minister7

It is unlikely that the British Prime Minister’s remarks after the 

Amsterdam Summit (1997) will come back to haunt him, but they clearly 

indicate that a reversal of the United Kingdom’s position on a European 

defense identity has taken place in the interim. During the EU Heads of 

State meeting in Pörtschach (Germany) during October 1998, the 

British—for the first time—supported the position that “the Union must 

have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 

forces, the means to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to 

respond to international crisis.” This agreement now forms the basis for 

the St. Malo British-French Declaration on European Defense (December 

1998).8

 The British had previously been reluctant to accept a greater 

security role for the European Union, preferring to focus on NATO as the 

principal security organization for Europe. The phrase “where the 

Alliance as a whole is not engaged” is peppered throughout documents to 

highlight the British (and for that matter European) position that a 

capacity for autonomous action is pursued not to compete with NATO, 

but rather to supplement and strengthen the transatlantic partnership. It 

is preparation for the probability of American reluctance to participate in 

the management of small-scale crises on the periphery of Europe. From a 

European perspective, the United States has continually asked the 

Europeans to contribute a greater share to support the defense burden 

while sending ambiguous signals about America’s commitment to crisis 

reaction. It is only prudent for them to prepare for the potential 

requirement to react to crises without complete US support. 

Prime Minister Blair has taken a keen personal interest in the 
7

development of the ESDP. For him it is an opportunity to capitalize on 

the traditional leadership position of the United Kingdom in security 

affairs in Europe. The Prime Minister struggles with a populace more 

and more reluctant to sign on to the Euro and a powerful Chancellor of 

the Exchequer Gordon Brown who is focused on building a legacy of 

fiscal responsibility.9

 This bodes poorly for the country’s choosing to 

seek EMU accession in the near future. To offset the marginalization that 

may result as the UK remains outside the EMU, Blair pursues a 

leadership role in Europe for himself and Britain within the ESDP 

framework. Due to the “special relationship” between the United 

Kingdom and the United States, the British have been tasked with the 

lead in selling the initiative to the US. 

British Minister of Defence, Geof Hoon, is facing accusations 

from his Tory shadow, Iain Duncan Smith, who traveled to Washington 

to “warn the Americans that Mr. Blair has abandoned Britain’s formally 

Atlanticist policy and is now part of a 40 year-old French agenda to 

separate the two halves of NATO and give the EU an army of its own.”10

Apocalyptic challenges from the Tories ring a bit shallow when their 

second in command, Michael Portillo, proposed as the Tory candidate 

Minister of Defence in 1996, said “that European countries acting 

without America should be able to use NATO equipment for 

humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks.”11 

More balanced critics, such as the noted historian John Keegan, 

question the political will of EU nations to develop viable autonomous 

capabilities, and the value of proposing their development prematurely. 

Europe is still far from establishing its military 

independence of the United States. Until it can do so, it 

should carefully consider whether it is desirable to 

make military gestures that do nothing to alarm the 

enemies of European security—the Balkan warlords, 
8

the resurgent Russian militarists—but may 

unnecessarily offend Europe’s transatlantic 

protectors.12

Indeed, it is a challenging tightrope for the British—maintaining their 

privileged position with respect to the United States while pursuing more 

influence in continental European affairs. They appear to have succeeded 

thus far. 

France 

The French do not face a similar internal political challenge with respect 

to ESDP as they have continually supported a greater security role for the 

European Union. For the French, ESDP is a natural progression of 

European integration and an essential element in the validity of the 

Common Foreign and Security Policy. Certainly the French consider a 

stronger unified Europe as a balance to United States dominance, a 

position shared by their European partners, but more freely expressed by 

the French. And although these developments should entail a balancing 

influence in transatlantic relations, the French (and their partners) 

consider a stronger Europe a better partner in the security arena, not a 

fiercer competitor. 

 As the French took over the presidency of the European Union 

in July 2000, ESDP remained a number one priority for them. Along 

with the Germans, the French have been the engine of European 

integration. France, more than any other European nation, champions 

the autonomous development of European Union institutions. The 

French were never comfortable with the American dominance of NATO, 

however essential it may have been to deter Soviet aggression. As the 

security aspects of the European Union were developed, French 

insistence on the EU’s internal development prior to negotiation with 

outside elements such as NATO was interpreted by some as a lack of 

transparency. Nonetheless, developments with respect to ESDP have in 

some ways openly integrated the French military more closely with 
9

NATO. For example, the Eurocorps headquarters assumed day-to-day 

command in Kosovo, placing the Eurocorps under NATO command for 

the first time.13

The French are often criticized for their cartesianism: a strategic 

and institutional focus on logical problem solving in accordance with 

specific principles, often at the expense of pragmatic results. Their 

emphasis on “verticality” with respect to ESDP is a clear example of 

French cartesianism. With verticality the French expect to ensure that 

ESDP has the proper mechanisms at all levels, most specifically with 

respect to strategic intelligence and command and control. The French 

and their European partners understandably wish to obtain adequate 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to make autonomous 

security decisions. Nevertheless, France’s European partners are unlikely 

to contribute adequate resources to produce the level of verticality for 

ESDP that the French would prefer. Much to the chagrin of the French, 

it is likely that the ESDP efforts of their European partners will focus 

resources on other capabilities and rely on American predominance in the 

C4ISR arena for the short term.14 

Germany 

Germany is clearly more comfortable than France with the predominant 

position of the United States within NATO as a whole. The Bundeswehr 

(the German military) has its origins within NATO; most Bundeswehr 

forces are attached to NATO; and unlike the United Kingdom or France, 

Germany is predominately reliant on the American nuclear umbrella. 

However, a diminished threat to the east has laid the groundwork for a 

normalization of German security policy on an unprecedented scale. 

Determined to remain within the multilateral context of the European 

Union and still reluctant to be perceived as in the forefront, Germany has 

underlying national concerns that are coming to light. 

Germany was in the presidency of the European Union in June 
10

1999, when the EU first released its plans for ESDP. Germany, with its 

tradition of incorporating military forces into multilateral organizations, 

is probably more willing to surrender the authority over its military forces 

to the European Union than Britain or France. The Germans are 

cognizant of the importance of transparency in the development of ESDP. 

 They share the sentiment of several European nations that the success of 

ESDP depends in part on how it is perceived in the United States. Only 

complete transparency with NATO and the US will help ensure a positive 

reception of ESDP in the United States. 

Germany is realistically restricted in its support with respect to 

ESDP after the fallout from the Weizsäcker Commission15 and the 

accompanying German Chief of Defense Staff reports on the future of the 

Bundeswehr. These major studies, in line with similar efforts ongoing or 

recently completed throughout Europe, furnished the fundamental 

groundwork for the future of the Bundeswehr. This future will be 

dominated by reduced defense budgets and a shrinking military. 

One of the fundamental issues addressed by these studies is 

conscription, a politically volatile issue that will help to determine the 

core force level and make-up of the military. Although a professional 

force is the centerpiece of other evolving militaries in Europe, it is 

unlikely that Germany will abolish conscription. According to Klaus 

Becher, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 

Conscription is enjoying not only majority support in 

terms of public opinion but, above all is considered 

indispensable for Germany for political as well as 

strategic reasons by most political leaders and by the 

Bundeswehr’s military leadership. The lasting 

advantage of the Bundeswehr’s accepted role as 

“citizens in uniform,” the value of conscription for 

recruitment, the strategic importance for a land power 

to maintain a sufficient pool for force regeneration, and 

the indispensable role of 170,000 conscientious 

objectors who currently opt for alternative service in 
11

social care are very likely to convince the German 

leadership that conscription should be preserved, 

though in an adapted way.16

Germans remind those who criticize their low levels of defense 

spending that Germany practically bought the Soviet military out of 

Eastern Europe with their financial assistance to Moscow in the early 

1990s. Many Germans consider their extensive financial investment in 

stability in eastern and central Europe a major contribution to European 

security. Germans argue that the slow progress of Bundeswehr reform 

may be attributed in part to the disruptive effects of incorporating the 

East German military and reducing an overall force of 521,000 soldiers in 

1990 to 323,000 by 2000.17 German military experts also highlight the 

fact that Germany’s central front-line position in Europe requires 

maintaining some of the heavy forces that are first on the chopping block 

in militaries more comfortably focused on crisis response. 

Initial indications from the Ministry of Defense are that the 

German military will face further reductions, but postpone other painful 

reforms. The Bundeswehr will be cut to about 285,000 troops while 

retaining 80,000 conscripts.18 This is likely to present the Germans with 

the challenge of making improvements while retaining conscription in 

some form, a potentially more costly endeavor. This framework should 

allow German policymakers to slowly develop a force more suited for 

crisis response but unable to commit to any new substantive 

improvements in capabilities. 

United States 

As in other areas of foreign policy, it is too early to pinpoint the Bush 

Administration’s view on ESDP. “Robert Zoellick, one of Bush’s longstanding foreign policy advisors and his new Trade Representative, has 

often argued that the Europeans are more likely to spend money on 

boosting military capabilities if they are going to be able to use them 

autonomously under an EU banner.”19 There are indications that 
12

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is much more skeptical and considers 

ESDP a threat to NATO: “I personally will be watching carefully to see 

how things evolve, because we have so much at stake with that [NATO] 

alliance. We need to be vigilant to see that we don’t do anything that 

would inject instability into the alliance.”20 It is unclear at this point 

where the dominant strain in foreign policy resides within the Bush 

Administration, but it is likely that resistance to ESDP will subside with 

further consultation. Nonetheless, ambiguity and tempered support are 

likely to remain as in the previous administration. 

The Clinton Administration’s view on ESDP attempted to strike 

“a delicate balance between doing too much and not doing enough.”21 

Doing too much encourages Europeans to “free ride” and jeopardizes 

American public and congressional support for US military engagement 

in Europe; doing too little challenges the credibility of the American 

commitment to Europe.22 The administration appeared to recognize that 

a stronger and more capable Europe could be a better partner. Still, the 

United States has not conveyed a unified vote of support for ESDP 

efforts by its European partners. 

On the whole, across most sectors, there is a unified voice in 

support of improved capabilities and the concept of Europeans taking on 

a larger share of the burden. However, beyond that point, there is much 

skepticism surrounding the prospect of European success in 

demonstrating improved capabilities. “For all their posturing about an 

independent security and defense identity, EU members have been wildly 

unenthusiastic about matching their rhetoric with their money,” warned 

John R. Bolton while a defense analyst at the American Enterprise 

Institute.23 As the only country that has devoted immense resources to 

develop the vast array of capabilities that European nations are striving 

for, the United States appreciates the challenge for Europe. Americans 

will scrutinize European capability improvements and use this assessment 
13

as a measure of the program’s success. 

Various factions within the US Congress have repeatedly 

questioned the large US commitment to European security, and recent 

concerns about a deteriorating European contribution in the Balkans have 

brought this issue to the forefront. Noting recent ESDP developments, 

Senator Carl Levin, present Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee (D- Michigan) observed: “I am mystified why our NATO 

allies have not provided more police for deployment in their own back 

yard.... On my scorecard, the European nations and the European Union 

are flunking the test.”24 In a further indication of distress in Congress, 

during his tenure as the former chairman, John W. Warner (R-Virginia) 

said he would seek to withhold half of the $2 billion appropriation for 

American troops in Kosovo unless European nations increased their 

financial contributions to efforts there.25 Senate Democrat Robert C. 

Byrd has recommended tying additional financing for Kosovo to a plan to 

turn over peacekeeping in Kosovo to the Europeans. 

It is just possible that the Europeans will excel at 

peacekeeping duties in Kosovo if ever they are allowed 

to emerge from the overwhelming shadow cast by the 

United States. Unfortunately, we will never know if 

we do not tie further American investment in Kosovo 

to a rock-solid plan to turn the peacekeeping operation 

over to them—sooner rather than later.26

Some Congressional sentiment clearly supports greater efforts with 

respect to ESDP. However, expectations are considerable, and many are 

not content with European progress to date. 

Members of Congress have also raised concerns about the effect 

of ESDP efforts on NATO. “I look upon it [ESDP] as being virtually an 

abrogation of European responsibility to NATO,” said Herbert Bateman, 

then Republican Chair of the House Armed Services Committee’s 

Military Readiness Panel.27 Although clearly an extreme position on 

ESDP within Congress, this view highlights the confusion associated 
14

with ESDP. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D- Delaware), now Chairman 

of the Foreign Relations Committee, has raised a more tempered and 

valid concern: 

The Europeans have raised the bar pretty high, and 

whether they go over it or under it, there are likely to 

be consequences. If this is handled badly from a public 

relations standpoint, it could well fuel a growing sense 

of isolationism in the United States. That’s why it’s so 

important to the Europeans to stay the course in terms 

of dollar and troop commitments to Kosovo, and with 

ESDI.28

ESDP will continue to face a skeptical group in Congress demanding 

more burden sharing yet wary of the effects of ESDP on transatlantic 

relations. 

There are indications in some circles, including statements from 

State Department representatives, that the growing “European” voice in 

security matters is not completely appreciated.29 There is a great 

reluctance to surrender the dominant voice of NATO (read the United 

States) in European security issues. These sentiments are reinforced 

through comments from traditional “Atlanticists” currently outside the 

government who are wary of the motivation behind European efforts for 

more autonomous capabilities.30 Skeptics could argue they are simply 

uncomfortable with the reality of the inevitable momentum towards a 

more balanced transatlantic relationship. But such a simplistic 

explanation for the sentiments of America’s most skilled observers and 

ardent supporters of the transatlantic link would be unwise. 

CHALLENGES TO ESDP—THE ROAD AHEAD 

Psychological Dimension 

A major challenge to the development of ESDP will be the psychological 

and political aspects that arise from the historical framework of the 

alliance and the uncharted intangible nature of European integration.31 

Some of the Europeans are tempted to define ESDP in opposition to a 

unilateralist and hegemonic United States with accompanying 
15

unproductive rhetoric. The United States, on the other hand, is tempted 

to either rely on the inertia of a bureaucracy unwilling to accept a more 

balanced relationship, or pack its bags and return to traditional 

isolationism. Clearly neither of these inclinations is productive, yet their 

management and packaging is crucial to the success of ESDP. 

Frequently the development of a counterweight to US 

dominance is used as a motivator for further European integration and 

ESDP. Several past and present European leaders couch the development 

of a more cohesive European voice in world affairs as a balance to 

concerns of American unilateralism. One of the most outspoken is 

French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine: “We cannot accept either a 

politically unipolar world, nor a culturally uniform world, nor the 

unilateralism of a single hyperpower.”32 In many cases the rhetoric takes 

on a cruder undercurrent of anti-Americanism from judgements against 

US manipulation of NATO in Kosovo to industrial espionage allegations 

of the Echelon surveillance system in the European Union.33 

Clearly the end of the Cold War has freed the inhibitions of 

some critics and raised concerns with others about the unbridled effects 

of American power. “There is a great deal of fear out there that the 

strength of America’s economy will impose not only economic changes 

but social changes as well. What they see is an America that has the 

ability to impose its values and they are not values that the Europeans 

believe in.”34 America’s critics abroad highlight disagreements on a 

number of issues from social welfare to the death penalty, at times by 

countries traditionally much more restrained in their criticism. Michael 

Steiner, chief diplomatic adviser to German Chancellor Gerhard 

Schröder, declared during the controversy over the managing director for 

the International Monetary Fund (IMF): “We have discovered that the 

superpower sees its global role not only in the military area but also in 

setting the rules of globalization through the IMF.”35
16

The United States has at times inflamed European concerns and 

fears through condescending behavior in the international arena. The 

continual proclamations that the United States is the “indispensable 

nation” only add fuel to the fire. Americans frequently transpose their 

policies internationally under the umbrella that what is good for the US is 

good for the world, a sentiment not universally appreciated. Some of 

America’s controversial policies such as sanctions against Cuba and Iran, 

and US efforts to impose them internationally, grate on the allies. 

America’s current effort in the development of a National Missile 

Defense, however limited in its intended scope, is fueling European 

concerns about decoupling and the threat of a renewed nuclear arms race. 

What has developed in some sense is an American concern 

about decoupling with respect to ESDP, and European concerns about 

decoupling with respect to NMD. Some Americans are concerned that 

the development of a viable European defense pillar will weaken the 

transatlantic link. Some Europeans are concerned that NMD 

development will remove the strategic nuclear threat from the United 

States and therefore decouple the US nuclear guarantee for Europe. 

However as Ivo Daalder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 

notes: 

The accusations flying across the Atlantic these days 

suggest a crisis atmosphere reminiscent of the one that 

beset NATO in the late 1970s and 1980s. Yet, the 

current “crisis” is more apparent than real. It feeds on 

worst-case fears about what might happen many years 

from now and ignores the underlying solidity of the 

transatlantic relationship. On every important 

European security issue today—from wanting to 

encourage Russian reform, to the promotion of 

democratization and economic prosperity throughout 

Europe, and the opposition against gross human rights 

violations throughout the world—Europe and America 

share a deep-seated perspective in common. That is the 

current reality that the worry about decoupling now 

being heard through the transatlantic echo chamber 
17

ignores.36

These differences are not roadblocks to the success of ESDP; 

they are simply speed bumps. As such their management from both sides 

of the Atlantic is crucial. In Europe, a certain level of competition and 

frustration with the United States and its international dominance is 

expected. However, official rhetoric must balance the requirements to 

play to domestic audiences with the unintended results of American 

vilification. From the American perspective, it is prudent to accept a new 

environment in which suspicions and frustrations are high. Balanced 

reactions and restrained and diplomatic responses will ensure continued 

good relations on a substantive level. 

The Focus on Capabilities 

European NATO partners currently have more military personnel, more 

combat divisions, more combat aircraft and more warships than the 

United States.37 However, this force for the most part is designed on a 

mobilization system to confront a non-existent Soviet threat, and only 

about twenty percent of that force is available in a reasonable timeframe. 

 The situation is even worse in the areas highlighted by the Kosovo air 

campaign such as C4ISR, precision munitions, strategic lift, electronic 

warfare, and aerial refueling. As Francois Heisbourg, the French expert 

who chairs the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, has pointed out: 

With defence spending close to 60 percent of America’s, the 

Europeans could in theory be expected to achieve 60 percent of 

US capabilities. They are probably below 10 percent in the 

realm of strategic reconnaissance and theatre-level C4ISR, and 

substantially less than 20 percent in airlift capacity (by volume 

or tonnage), and possibly at less than 10 percent in terms of 

precision guided air-deliverable ordnance.38

 Broad-brush assessments of a capability gap fail to incorporate 

the multitude of variables that have led to these differences. The United 

States has traditionally maintained an expeditionary focus and through 
18

NATO encouraged the role specialization that resulted in the current 

capability gap. “The challenge for the Europeans, therefore, has been to 

turn their large, static, and defensive force structures into leaner armies 

that are better able to “project power” beyond their borders.”39

From this base the European Union has established the 

“headline goal” of 60,000 troops, deployable within sixty days for up to a 

year, and capable of handling the full range of Petersberg tasks, all before 

2003. Although a good start, this “headline goal” is unlikely to be able to 

handle the upper end of the conflict spectrum. As demonstrated in 

Kosovo, high intensity conflict requires C4ISR, all weather precision 

guided munitions, aerial refueling and electronic warfare. European 

nations on the whole do not possess the political will to support the 

development of such a power projection force at this time. 

However, the European perspective on crisis reaction is intended 

to integrate all elements of peacekeeping and enforcement, from 

humanitarian assistance to actual military operations.40 In this arena the 

Europeans have a distinct advantage over the traditional high-intensity 

focus of the US military. Members of the European Union such as the 

Swedes and Finns provide extensive peacekeeping experience and lowend capabilities such as police forces that are essential to current efforts 

and clearly in short supply. The performance of the European forces on 

the ground in Kosovo, as in Bosnia, does not pale in comparison to the 

Americans. Quite the contrary, in many instances European 

peacekeepers have proved more flexible and adaptable, better able to 

understand what is happening on the ground and less obsessed with self 

protection.41 As the Europeans transform their forces to meet the crisis 

response requirements of the future, it is important not to dismiss the 

value added to European security of the lower-end capabilities of EU 

members. 

Although they are beginning to convert to more mobile forces, 
19

European nations are not prepared to join the United States in the current 

revolution in military affairs (RMA). The United States is cultivating a 

force designed to confront more advanced opponents, possibly with 

weapons of mass destruction, which threaten interests outside of Europe 

which are often as vital to Europe as to the United States. However, it is 

likely that Europe will continue to rely on the United States in this highintensity realm indefinitely. 

Resources are the clearest challenge to ESDP and a viable 

European autonomous defense capability. European nations on the whole 

are much more reluctant to dedicate resources to defense, ironically in 

some respects, due to the security traditionally provided by US forces. 

Economic conditions in Europe do not currently allow for the surpluses 

presently envisioned here in the United States, and solidifying the future 

viability of European social welfare systems is the primary focus of most 

treasuries, especially in light of demographic trends highlighted by the 

aging European population. 

Moreover, ESDP proponents argue that as a part of continued 

European integration, resources are more likely to develop to support the 

next logical step of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and its 

supporting military arm. There may be value in European initiatives that 

are not perceived as dictated by the United States. The European Union 

has gone to great lengths to differentiate ESDP from the NATO agreed 

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), a similar US led effort to increase 

European capabilities.42 The underlying EU premise is that as a 

European initiative, ESDP can garner the momentum of peer review 

which was so successful with the development of the EMU and overcome 

the recognized stagnation within NATO Europe with respect to capability 

improvements. As one European Defense Official noted, “I expect that 

the Italian Defense Minister will have more success requesting increased 

resources for the common European Security and Defense Policy than for 
20

DCI.” 43

Yet beyond the rhetoric there appears to be a reluctance of 

European leaders to place a priority on developments in Europe as a 

whole. In addition, it does not appear that the climate in Europe supports 

a greater focus on security. It is unlikely that leaders in the ministries of 

defense and foreign offices will be able to convince their treasuries, or for 

that matter their populace, that a “safe and secure” Europe needs to 

devote more resources to defense.44

With reduced prospects for more resources, proponents of 

greater European defense capabilities focus on more efficient 

expenditures. One expected windfall area stems from the trend away 

from conscription towards a more professional military force. Defense 

leaders are also hoping a more consolidated defense effort will reduce the 

duplication and waste of parallel industrial development. In addition, 

each defense ministry makes claims about streamlining processes and 

outsourcing for increased efficiencies. 

Yet claimed efficiencies appear at times to be political cover for 

further cuts. It is unlikely after over a decade of defense cuts and 

continual reorganization that much more substantive gains can be 

wrought from additional restructuring. It is unclear at this point that 

professional forces will result in reduced resource expenditures as the 

financial challenges of recruiting and retention highlight. Additionally, it 

is unlikely that Germany, a critical resource provider for future ESDP 

development, will quickly surrender its tradition of conscription. 

Although progress has been made in the area of European 

industrial defense consolidation, military leaders at this point are not 

comfortable promoting the pooling of resources or specialization required 

for substantive gains in efficiency. European militaries already trail the 

United States in the critical defense technologies prevalent in the current 
21

revolution in military affairs. This gap is only likely to increase due to 

insufficient European investment and American dominance of 

information technology. In addition, American controls on the export of 

technology and an accompanying growing European reluctance to rely on 

American military hardware inhibit the construction of the common 

technological base required for interoperability in the future. 

The US military has determined to garner the developments of 

information technology for decisive advantage, and has committed 

resources to pursue this information dominance. European militaries on 

the whole do not share the urgency of the requirement or the luxury of the 

resources to match US investments. What is developing is a divergence 

of forces that potentially will undermine the alliance. 

These differences are likely to keep US forces on the forefront 

of high-intensity operations, while its allies will handle the 

implementation of cease-fire agreements and peacekeeping. This will 

create unwanted tiers within the alliance, to the chagrin of European 

leaders. An ally on a lower tier will have little say in the development of 

a strategy to deal with a conflict. Furthermore, these gaps will highlight 

US military forces as visible terrorist targets for reactions to 

interventions, undermining US domestic support for the Alliance because 

of the appearance of inequitable burden sharing. 

This capabilities gap will create potential interoperability 

problems that must be addressed by both sides of the Atlantic. The 

United States must remain cognizant of the need to maintain legacy 

systems in order to continue the capability to work with its allies, while 

promoting greater technology transfer and transatlantic industrial 

partnerships. Congress is reluctant to widen defense procurement outside 

domestic sources and reducing the technological barriers will be 

problematic. Nevertheless, if America fails to provide a more balanced 

field for European defense development, and to include its allies in RMA 
22

developments on the procurement side, they are unlikely to keep pace. 

From the European perspective, a more difficult paradigm shift 

is required to accept a greater share of the burden throughout the 

spectrum of conflict. Without such a shift, the political will and 

accompanying resource commitment required to parallel US military 

developments will be absent. Europeans and Americans spend money on 

security in very different ways because they are less likely to deal with a 

shared threat in the same manner.45 Europeans focus much more on the 

soft side and are reluctant to project hard power, but they are slowly 

changing. 

What is most likely in the near term is that ESDP efforts will 

concentrate on basic improvements in the mobility and sustainability of 

European military forces. By American standards these improvements 

will not be drastic. However, from the European perspective, the 

transformation from fixed territorial defense to crisis response will be 

quite significant. In the near term the United States will be required to 

shoulder much of the burden with respect to the execution phase of high 

intensity operations. European forces will focus on the implementation 

phase with respect to crisis response. This limitation will certainly 

restrict European flexibility in operations when the alliance as a whole is 

not engaged. 

Nonetheless, European nations will work to transform their 

militaries to more flexible forces in order to meet the “headline goal.” To 

deploy a long-term fielded force of 60,000 troops, a pool of at least 

180,000 is required. For the forseeable future, most of the contributions 

to this force will come from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. 

The development of adequate headquarters units will be more 

problematic, but as the Eurocorps takeover of the Kosovo operation 

indicates, these efforts are in full swing. 

Air and sealift collaboration efforts are ongoing. Combined 
23

with a dedicated procurement effort it is likely that the European nations 

will meet their sustainability goals within their assigned timeframe. 

Combat aircraft should not present a difficulty. Although European 

navies have a clear shortage of amphibious shipping, sophisticated airdefense frigates, and command frigates, it is unclear that these shortages 

would markedly affect crisis operations on the low end of the spectrum. 

US policymakers will be tempted to judge European efforts with 

respect to ESDP on specific delivered capability improvements. 

Europeans are just as likely to expect a more equal seat at the table after 

dedicating efforts to improve capabilities. Without demonstrated 

improved capabilities, the European nations will not be provided much of 

a say, especially if a conflict similar to Kosovo arises. It is likely that 

both sides will be disappointed and the management of these expectations 

will be crucial in the maintenance of the strong transatlantic link. 

American expectations will center on Euro-improvements in the 

areas of deficiency identified during the Kosovo air campaign: (1) all 

weather delivery of precision guided munitions, (2) electronic warfare 

support and attack, (3) aerial refueling, (4) strategic lift, and perhaps most 

importantly, (5) C4ISR. Moreover, much focus from the American 

perspective will come from the broad scope of requirements delineated in 

the DCI. Aside from limited individual improvements in the United 

Kingdom and France, it is unlikely that ESDP as a whole will show 

marked improvement in any of these areas in the near term. Therefore, 

US leaders will feel pressured to condemn European efforts as a failure 

and are unlikely to support European efforts for greater input in security 

matters. 

However, in the interest of European security, the United States 

should demonstrate an unprecedented level of patience as the European 

Union nations slowly develop their defense capabilities. Although 

European developments will not address the broad scope of sub-points 
24

specified in the DCI, their limited efforts will move in the prescribed 

direction of improved flexibility, mobility and sustainability. There is a 

greater recognition in the United States that there may be value in 

European efforts to focus their improvements and package their efforts in 

a more European context. It will take at least ten years for the 

Europeans to develop a minimal credible autonomous defense capability. 

This timeline may be beyond US levels of patience, but Americans must 

recognize European limitations and patiently allow them to pursue what 

in the long run will benefit the alliance. 

Institution Building 

The European Union prefers compromise to confrontation, and 

norms to force. It has no tradition of power politics or energetic 

political actions. Its civil service is void of military or strategic 

culture, and is notably lax at protecting the security of the 

information it handles. So the EU is not the obvious institution 

in which to develop a military organisation.46

In March 1999, the European Union established three interim bodies in 

support of ESDP. The existing Political Committee was given a 

permanent standing with resident ambassadors to take on the ever-present 

security aspect of the CFSP (known as COPS by its French acronym). A 

Military Committee much like NATO’s military committee was 

established, and for many countries the representatives are dual hatted (sit 

on both committees). In addition, a European joint military staff will 

help the Military Committee to commission elaborate strategic options. 

The challenge of these new organizations is the development of more 

permanent institutions that meet a myriad of requirements. These 

challenges include: (1) allaying the concerns about transparency and 

adequate input from non-EU members of NATO (United States, Canada, 

Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland); (2) 

balancing the requirements of the non-NATO members of the EU who 

are traditionally more neutral in security matters (Ireland, Finland, 

Sweden, and Austria); (3) and maintaining the autonomy of 
25

decisionmaking required for an organization separate from NATO and 

cherished by the only non-integrated military member of NATO (France). 

The European Union, unlike NATO, is not a security institution. 

As it transitions to an entity with security aspects, it will experience 

tremendous internal change and stress upon established EU principles. In 

conjunction with incorporating the Western European Union (WEU) 

security organ, let alone efforts to incorporate new members into the EU, 

the enormity of this task is often overlooked. It is likely that these 

adjustments will require treaty changes and the ensuing cumbersome 

ratification process entailed therein. 

The treaty change requirements are most likely to derive from 

the complexity of incorporating WEU into the EU. Traditionally neutral 

non-NATO members of the EU have no interest in turning the EU into a 

collective defense organization like NATO. These countries are reluctant 

to take on the collective defense obligations resident in the WEU charter 

(the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, as amended in 1954) and will therefore 

require some form of relief from that commitment. In addition, the EU 

will need to formalize a decisionmaking regimen that could account for 

the interests of both the neutral EU members who may want to abstain, 

and the non-EU NATO members who may want to contribute to an 

operation. The December 1999 Helsinki Presidency report provides 

preliminary guidelines for decisionmaking and consultation which are 

being refined and formalized. 

It is with this backdrop that the EU interaction with NATO is 

developing. There is a clear need to maintain a level of transparency for 

non-EU members of NATO who are most likely to provide forces in 

support of EU-led operations. The exact level of this transparency and 

the timing and sequence of consultation are creating the biggest challenge 

for the institutional development of ESDP. 

Initially termed the “right of first refusal,” this principle was 
26

framed in US Senate resolution 208: ”the European Union would 

undertake an autonomous mission... only after NATO had declined to 

undertake the mission.”47 For the United States the clear concern is that 

somehow US forces would be dragged into some quagmire against their 

will by an overly ambitious or misguided European led force. American 

concerns have been subdued by statements such as from French Minister 

of Defense, Mr. Alain Richard: “Can one seriously imagine that the 

Europeans acting within the EU would consider getting involved in a 

politico-military operation while keeping the US in the dark or ignoring 

its advice and not seeking its support and participation?”48 The 

establishment of the four NATO-EU working groups in the summer of 

2000, and the various agreements reached at the end of that year, left 

most American policymakers reasonably satisfied on the issue of 

NATO’s relationship with the EU.49

However, the European non-EU NATO members are much less 

subdued in their reaction to current ESDP developments. On the whole 

these six nations (Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Norway, 

and Iceland) are much less interested in the development of a more 

autonomous defense capability and much more interested in collective 

defense and the vital role the United States plays as a strategic balance to 

a resurgent Russian threat. They are concerned about aspects of ESDP 

that are threatening the vital transatlantic link. Nonetheless, as long as 

the United States is comfortable with ESDP developments, these 

members (with the exception of Turkey) are likely to follow the 

American lead. 

The Turks are the most vociferous in their opposition to the 

current formula for the consultation and involvement of non-EU NATO 

members. They have vetoed the arrangements which would allow the 

EU, in normal circumstances, “assured access” to NATO planning. Even 

a personal phone call from President Clinton to Bulent Ecevit, the 
27

Turkish Prime Minister, could not persuade the Turks to lift their veto.50 

Turkey was still not happy with the role it had been offered in the EU’s 

new defense arrangements. The Turkish position would in essence 

provide NATO with a veto on EU decisions. The Turks have indicated 

they will work against ESDP within NATO if they continue to be 

excluded. 

It is difficult to determine the justification for Turkey’s hard line 

in this respect. They certainly perceive a reduced voice in European 

Security if ESDP moves to the forefront and they are not part of the 

process. Within NATO they enjoy a privileged position as a strategic 

ally of the United States, a luxury that they would not share within the 

European Union. 

The newer Central European members of NATO (Czech 

Republic, Poland and Hungary) find themselves in a difficult dilemma as 

aspirants to join the European Union. As members of NATO, their 

security is to a degree assured by the United States, and their relationship 

with the US is of vital importance. French Foreign Minister Hubert 

Védrine has voiced concerns that these newer members of NATO could 

serve as a “US Trojan Horse,” subverting French and German aspirations 

to make the union a proud and effective rival to the United States.51 With 

NATO membership in hand, these three countries are forced to drift 

towards EU positions as their economic challenges are at the forefront.52 

 Other nations such as Norway are concerned about being left out 

of the ESDP institutional development. They also have concerns about 

disrupting the transatlantic relationship. Norwegians are more 

accommodating to EU positions as they have chosen to remain outside 

the EU and feel no economic pressure at this time to join. They 

recognize the complicated dynamic of the institutional formula and the 

fact that the Turks and the French are at loggerheads. According to a 

senior Norwegian diplomat: “The French will never accept a formal 
28

hierarchy with NATO first and the EU second. We may need some 

constructive ambiguity. NATO will continue to be the main instrument. 

We would see that as reality, but we wouldn’t insist on formulating that 

reality.”53

 From the French perspective, it is a balance between the 

requirements for consultation and transparency against the requirements 

to retain an autonomous decisionmaking process within the EU. The 

French fear not just preemption within the European Union from a NATO 

or US inspired veto, but the complex management of the potential Greek 

veto on Turkish participation. From the French perspective (but not only 

the French), the EU is an infantile organization with respect to security 

matters. Prior to delineating hard and fast external relationships with 

NATO, it must mature internally. 

Clearly the French have no interest in developing an institution 

that like NATO is dominated by the United States. Although not alone in 

this position, once again the French are probably the most vocal. ESDP 

should be a European institution. There is certainly widespread interest 

in improving upon existing relationships and institutions currently 

dominating European security. This is a difficult challenge as a force 

planning mechanism must be developed which: (1) incorporates the 

French, who do not presently participate in the NATO collective defense 

planning process, (2) improves current NATO force planning, and (3) 

does not require a duplication or deviation unacceptable to the remainder 

of the alliance. The French are concerned about options that are too close 

to current NATO efforts without marked improvement. Most NATO 

allies are quite comfortable with the current system and reluctant to 

change tracks. This is an important obstacle that will require an 

imaginative solution by developers of ESDP. 

ESDP will certainly require a strategic planning capability that 

the military staff should provide. C4ISR capabilities will be inferior to 
29

those of the United States in the near term, but the commitment is there 

for future development, and the US will fill the gap in the interim. 

Operational planning will reside with NATO in an effort to avoid 

duplication, with agreed procedures for requests from the EU. This 

should provide a reassuring level of transparency as all NATO members 

will take part in the planning options for any contingency, and therefore 

influence decisions and provide feedback at a lower level. 

Institutional development of ESDP will remain one of the more 

controversial aspects challenging the defense initiative. The rapid pace 

of development combined with the daunting task of integrating European 

security structures will push the limits of transatlantic diplomacy. 

Capability developments will be limited and slow, requiring expectation 

management by skilled leaders. No matter what the rhetoric, there is 

much that binds the alliance, and measured consultations are the key to 

its continuation. 

US POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

An attention to the judgment of other nations is 

important to every government for two reasons. The 

one is that, independently of the merits of any 

particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various 

accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the 

offspring of a wise and honorable policy. The second 

is that, in doubtful cases, particularly where the 

national councils may be warped by some strong 

passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known 

opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide to 

be followed.54

In formulating policy, the leadership in the United States has continually 

ignored the sage advice of James Madison (quoted above) on the value of 

consultation. At a time when American power faces no relative 

challenger, the temptation is even greater to forge ahead unilaterally. 

However, the United States will not succeed as it ventures forth without 

the support of its allies. In the particular circumstance of ESDP, this will 

require surrendering considerable input on this European initiative, and 
30

patiently anticipating the long-term benefits from a stronger European 

partner. 

Unfortunately, not everyone is entirely convinced that a stronger 

Europe will be a better partner for the US. Owen Harries expresses the 

reluctance of some to give up US influence and concern about the 

intentions of a more unified Europe. 

If one believes, as I do, that there is a lot of 

accumulated but suppressed resentment in Europe of its 

subordination to and dependence on the United States 

over the last half a century, then one would expect the 

expression of that pent-up resentment to be a cardinal 

feature of the new superpower’s behavior—certainly in 

the form of an assertion of independence and 

difference; probably in the form of competition, 

obstruction, and rivalry; possibly in the form of 

outright hostility.55

Certain aspects of behavior exhibited by Europeans fit this description 

and feed the fires of skepticism in the United States. 

It is difficult to produce definitive evidence for those skeptics 

that a Unified Europe will not become a superpower competitor that 

America will live to regret. Those who embrace a stronger partner in 

Europe accept a level of risk. This risk is considered quite limited by 

those who recall the shared goals and work of the last half century as an 

indication of great potential for the future. It is in the US interest to 

embrace European integration, because it is a process that will proceed 

with or without the United States. Together the allies can build a 

stronger, more balanced alliance. 

One method to prevent the development of an anti-hegemonic 

European counterbalance to American power is to temper what Samuel 

Huntington has called a foreign policy of “rhetoric and retreat” and the 

growing US reputation of acting as a “hollow hegemon.”56 Frequent 

threats of military intervention often followed by tardy and ineffectual 

shows of force have seriously challenged the credibility of the military 
31

arm of diplomacy. From the numerous idle threats of military action in 

Bosnia through the disastrous withdrawal from Somalia, to the policy 

failures in Iraq, the post-Cold War displays of military force have on the 

whole been ineffectual. Even the “successful” military operation in 

Kosovo was marred by numerous shortcomings. 

With the abundance of US sanctions targeted at dictators around 

the world, which more than often punish the countries’ populace and are 

haphazardly and often unilaterally enforced, the United States is 

becoming to some the “rogue superpower.”57 Benign hegemony is a 

figment of the American imagination. The rest of the world is quite 

concerned with some of America’s policies and has no interest in 

allowing America to act as the world’s policeman. The United States can 

encourage a more cooperative partner in Europe by humbly 

demonstrating an interest in working together as equals. “Healthy 

cooperation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of 

American superpowerdom.”58

In developing the basis for a more effective policy it is 

important to recognize the backdrop for current US failures. Without a 

clearly defined threat, increased apathy with respect to foreign policy 

amongst the electorate provided an atmosphere ripe for divisiveness and 

inattention. Rather than capitalizing on a position of strength, 

The post-cold-war generation of American leaders 

(whether graduated from the protest movements or 

business schools) finds it possible to imagine that 

foreign policy consists of merely instructing the rest of 

the world. This turns diplomacy into nothing more 

than demands for compliance with an American 

agenda. When vast economic and military power is 

coupled with condescension and righteousness, 

dominance grows grating and leadership comes to be 

perceived as hegemony.59

Few would question the requirement for the United States to 

take the leadership role in transatlantic security affairs. Much of what 
32

has been discussed indicates it is unlikely that the United States will face 

a security equal across the Atlantic. However, this reality does not justify 

the level of condescension that is prevalent in US reactions to ESDP. 

Although it is clear that developments will not meet expectations, the 

most constructive US policy is one that encourages a stronger partner 

through consultation and support. 

Force Structure Implications 

Clearly the limited advances in capabilities expected with ESDP will not 

allow the Europeans to take on any of the major burdens borne 

predominately by the United States as part of NATO. Arguments 

supporting a near-term withdrawal of US forces from Europe fail to 

account for the reality of a more globalized world. Europe is a major 

trading partner and operations base for billions of dollars of US 

investment. Americans are not willing to withdraw completely from the 

European stage and sacrifice the leadership position of the United States 

in world affairs. That will require continued presence of US military 

forces in the European Theater for regional influence and as a base for 

operations in other theaters. 

As it is likely that US forces will remain at their current levels in 

Europe and that ESDP will not provide any substantive relief, US force 

planning in the region will not change markedly. The Kosovo conflict 

highlighted deficiencies in the areas of C4ISR, power projection, 

electronic attack and aerial refueling for the non-US NATO forces. The 

Europeans recognized the dire shortfall and some will make efforts in 

these areas, but due to their current inferior position and limited resources 

progress will be slow. Without any near-term contributions from the 

Europeans in these areas, US forces will continue to bear the full burden 

of operations. 

The Europeans may progress more rapidly in the arena of 

strategic lift. Concrete plans for a European airlift command are 
33

underway along with more tentative plans for a similar sealift cooperative 

effort. European forces on the whole have not structured their forces for 

mobility, resulting in a dwarfed strategic lift capability when compared to 

US forces.60 Nonetheless, intra-theater lift is an area where US forces 

may experience relief in the short term from more efficient European lift 

capabilities. 

Implementation forces are the expected areas of greatest 

improvement for European forces. It is likely that in the next few years 

the Europeans will be able to provide the entire contingent of ground 

troops to support current NATO operations in the Balkans. Although the 

United States will likely continue to provide C4ISR support in the near 

term, the US contributions may become more significant in supporting 

roles. This transition should provide a level of flexibility to US forces in 

the region and become a highlighted important first step in European 

efforts to share more of the burden of their regional security. 

 For the United States Air Force (USAF) ESDP developments 

will have a minimal effect on its force planning. It will continue to bear 

the brunt of power projection capabilities, most specifically all weather 

precision guided munitions and aerial refueling. The USAF integral role 

in C4ISR during high-intensity operations will certainly continue for the 

near term. However, the Air Force may experience some relief in the 

area of intra-theater lift. 

It is unlikely the United States Navy (USN) will be able to 

incorporate European contributions into its force planning efforts. As the 

Navy concentrates on power projection in the form of Tomahawk cruise 

missiles and aircraft carrier tactical aviation, the Europeans will continue 

to provide only symbolic force levels in these areas. Although European 

navies contribute substantial assets in the support areas of undersea 

warfare, mine clearing operations, and maritime interdiction, these 
34

contributions have already been incorporated into USN perspectives on 

European deployments. 

The United States Army is the most likely beneficiary of ESDP 

developments. As European forces consolidate to develop a mobile, 

sustainable force of 60,000 troops, the US Army is likely to reduce its 

peacekeeping force commitments in Bosnia and Kosovo. This should 

provide a welcome relief for a commitment that has strained unit 

readiness and challenged the patience of congressional leaders. It should 

be welcomed as an important first step in the right direction for Europe. 

Nonetheless, the force structure implications of ESDP highlight 

an important challenge to European security and transatlantic relations. 

Kosovo highlighted the gap between European and US forces with 

respect to RMA. This situation will only worsen in the near term 

challenging allied interoperability at the core. As US forces continue to 

bear the brunt of peace making and execution activities while European 

forces focus on peacekeeping and implementation, the military forces 

will divide more markedly into separate tiers. They will be less able to 

work together as a synergistic force, and the US will bear a larger share 

of the criticism that accompanies its powerful military role. This will 

only stoke congressional criticism of unsustainable inequitable burden 

sharing in the US while igniting further European frustration with their 

dependence on the United States. The challenge for policymakers on 

both sides of the Atlantic is to take steps to ensure these risks are averted.
35

CONCLUSION 

Though historically we are the children of Europe, with respect to the 

postwar evolution we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a 

grown-up son. He can always take the attitude that, since their interests 

are identical, he will continue to control the resources. He can challenge 

the son to name circumstances in which their interests might differ. He 

can tell him that no legitimate request will go unheeded. Such an attitude 

will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if accepted, will break his 

spirit. 

--Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State61

As we attempt to determine the proper course for American policy with 

respect to ESDP, Kissinger’s comments from an earlier crisis endured by 

the Atlantic Alliance are germane. Indeed, as he argued 35 years ago, 

America has grown accustomed to its hegemony and the belief that its 

views represent the general interest. Maybe this time around the United 

States can accept that “the assertions of European self-will which we find 

so irritating today can be the growing pains of a new and healthier 

relationship which ultimately is important for us as well.”62

Kosovo has highlighted an underlying problem in transatlantic 

relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States, in 

conjunction with its European partners, has provided an extensive 

security blanket for West European development over the last fifty years. 

The program has for the most part been successful, and recently Europe 

has taken declaratory and organizational steps to carry a greater share of 

the burden. However, due to the success of previous security efforts, 

Europeans feel secure and are unwilling to dedicate large resources to 

defense. 

For ESDP to come to fruition, it must be sold as supporting a 

growing role for the EU in world affairs. United States leaders are 

reluctant to sacrifice their dominance of European security affairs, 

especially when prospects for substantive capability improvements are 

remote. Without US support ESDP is unlikely to succeed in the long run, 

and this might entail disastrous results for the transatlantic alliance. 
36

United States leadership must delicately balance expectations at home 

and allow the Europeans to slowly develop their capability and lever their 

initial momentum. 

ESDP is a delicate balancing act for both the European Union 

and the United States. Its failure might damage transatlantic relations and 

threaten tenuous congressional support for American security burdens in 

Europe. Its success might raise the specter of an American withdrawal 

under the justification that US forces would no longer be needed in 

Europe. It is important for US policy and transatlantic relations as a 

whole that a middle ground be achieved in this effort. 

More equitable transatlantic relations best serve European 

security interests. This will require Europeans to shake the complacency 

of fifty years of American dependence and move forward with substantial 

capability improvements. In turn, the United States will have to accept a 

more balanced position in the area of European security. It will be a 

difficult road for both sides. 

In the near term, little will change with respect to US 

requirements in Europe. This continued burden would place a strain on 

ESDP development. American leaders will need to accept that ESDP is 

indeed a “European” development and allow it to take its course with 

measured support. US relations will benefit from a stronger partner in 

Europe. Although it may take a decade to achieve greater capabilities, 

patience on the US side will reap its reward. The United States is a 

committed European partner. It does not have the option to withdraw 

from European affairs. 

US interests are best served through encouraging the 

development of a more autonomous European defense capability. It is 

unrealistic to expect the US to continue to dominate European security 

efforts indefinitely. The EU nations recognize this reality and expect 
37

greater success in their collective efforts to develop improved capabilities 

on the basis of European integration. A more capable European partner 

will provide flexibility and strength to the transatlantic security 

relationship. A sustainable and viable security relationship with the EU 

nations will remain the cornerstone of US peace and stability efforts 

worldwide. The US cannot withdraw from Europe and cannot expect to 

sustain the current imbalance with respect to security. EU efforts to 

develop a more autonomous defense capability may be the best avenue to 

solidify the crucial transatlantic security link. 

 

ENDNOTES 1

Richard Perle, former senior defense official in the Reagan 

administration and advisor for then presidential candidate George W. 

Bush, quoted by Jeff Gedmin, Washington Times, 8 December 1999. 

2

The specifics of the EU’s “headline goal” for improved military 

capabilities (from the European Union Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 

10-11 December 1999) are: To develop European capabilities, Member 

States have set themselves the headline goal by the year 2003, 

cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and 

then sustain forces capable of the full range of “Petersberg tasks” as set 

out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in 

operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 troops). 

These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary 

command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat 

support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. 

Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 

days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available 

and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such 

a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of 

deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide 

replacements for the initial forces. Member States have also decided to 

develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and 

control, intelligence and strategic transport... They welcome in this 

respect decisions already announced by certain Member States which go 

in that direction: 1) to develop and coordinate monitoring and early 

warning military means; 2) to open existing joint national headquarters to 

officers coming from other Member States; 3) to reinforce the rapid 

reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces; 4) to 

prepare the establishment of a European air transport command; 5) to 

increase the number of readily deployable troops; [and] 6) to enhance 
38

 

strategic sea lift capacity. 

3

The titles and acronyms associated with the development of a 

stronger European defense pillar are ripe for confusion. In accordance 

with Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council on 10-11 

December 1999, this paper will refer to the common European Security 

and Defense Policy (ESDP). NATO documents continue to refer to the 

European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which, depending on 

one’s perspective, could be the same development. Nonetheless, as the 

relationship between the EU and NATO is not clearly defined, and the 

initiative is focused in the EU, the author chose ESDP as the appropriate 

term. 

4

Mainly due to resource constraints, interviews focused on 

defense officials in the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Clearly 

this focus omits important perspectives from the rest of Europe. 

However, every effort has been made to include the viewpoints of 

countries such as the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, Belgium, 

Greece; the non-EU NATO allies Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, 

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; and the non-NATO EU nations 

Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria. 

5

William Wallace and Jan Ziolonka, “Misunderstanding 

Europe,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 1998), in Steven Everts, 

The Impact of the Euro on Transatlantic Relations (London: Centre for 

European Reform, 1999), 51. 

6

Elizabeth Pond, “Come Together,” Foreign Affairs

(March/April 2000), 10-11. 

7

Prime Minister Blair, 1997Amsterdam Summit, quoted by Yves 

Boyer, “France and the European Project: Internal and External Issues,” 

in Kjell A. Eliassen, ed., Foreign and Security Policy in the European 

Union (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 105. 

8

British-French Summit, St. Malo, 3-4 December 1998, 

Declaration on European Defence. 

9

"[Gordon Brown] may formally be a mere chancellor of the 

exchequer but in practice often seems to act as prime minister to Mr. 

Blair’s president,” Economist, 25 March 2000, 18. 

10Economist, 11 March 2000, 64. 

11Ibid. 

12John Keegan, “The US Is Not Amused By Our Redundant 

Military Gestures,” London Daily Telegraph, 6 December 1999. 
39

 13The Eurocorps is an embryonic army drawn from five nations 

in the European Union (France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and 

Luxembourg). When the Eurocorps took over KFOR command in April 

2000 they were only able to provide about 350 of the 1200 person 

headquarters. Nonetheless, this was an important initial step in the 

development of an ESDP. Joseph Fitchett, “Eurocorps to Command 

Peacekeepers in Kosovo,” International Herald Tribune, 29-30 January 

2000, 1. 

14The French are planning to launch an additional optical 

satellite (Helios II) in 2003 with possible Italian and Spanish 

participation. In addition, the Germans are planning to purchase a radar 

satellite on the commercial market capable of looking through clouds. 

Both countries are not as comfortable as the British in relying on US 

intelligence. Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, 

Europe’s Military Revolution (London: Centre for European Reform, 

March 2001). 

15The Commission on Common Security and the Future of the 

Bundeswehr, chaired by former Federal President Richard von 

Weizsäcker, is composed not primarily of defense experts but of 

representatives from a wide spectrum of social groups and forces. Its 

main mission is to prepare the ground for a new consensus on defense 

across party lines, generations, and differing experiences after the 

revolutionary changes since 1989. Klaus Becher, Senior Fellow for 

European Security, The International Institute for Strategic Studies 

(IISS), London submitted—on an individual basis—to the House of 

Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Sub-Committee C 

(Common Foreign and Security Policy), 12 April 2000. 

16Ibid. 

17Ibid. 

18 Europe’s Military Revolution, 14. 

19 Ibid, 32. 

20Joe Murphy, “US Launches Attack on Euro Army,” London 

Sunday Telegraph, 18 March 2001, 1. 

21Stephen M. Walt, "The Clinton Foreign Policy,” Foreign 

Affairs (March/April 2000), 68. 

22Ibid. 

23David R. Sands, “Bid To Create EU Army Stalled,” 

Washington Times, 9 January 2000, C11. 

24Quoted in David R. Sands and Betsy Pisik, “Europeans 
40

 

Warned To Support NATO Forces In Kosovo,” Washington Times, 3 

February 2000, 11. 

25Jane Perlez, “Kosovo’s Unquenched Violence Dividing US 

and NATO Allies,” New York Times, 12 March 2000, 1. Warner was 

Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee until June 2001, 

when the defection of Senator Jeffords (Republican, now IndependentVermont) gave control of the Senate to the Democrats. 

26Robert C. Byrd, “Europe’s Turn To Keep The Peace,” New 

York Times, 20 March 2000. 

27Ron Laurenzo, “In House, Bipartisan Suspicions About 

European Defense Plan,” Defense Week, 22 February 2000, 5. 

28James Kitfield, “European Doughboys,” National Journal, 26 

February 2000, 610. The acronym used in this quote, ESDI—European 

Security and Defense Identity, has now been replaced with ESDP per my 

explanation in note 3. 

29The national security bureaucracy in Washington is 

accustomed to an obedient alliance and jealous of its prerogatives. 

Research attributes this tendency mostly to the State Department and its 

continual insistence that ESDP be developed within NATO (hence under 

US purview), a concept which is a complete anathema to the Europeans. 

The Department of Defense and the Clinton Administration are much 

more flexible on this issue. See William Pfaff, “Falling Out Over 

European Defense,” International Herald Tribune, 13 April 2000; 

Joseph Fitchett, “Eurocorps to Command Peacekeepers in Kosovo,” 

International Herald Tribune, 29-30 January 2000, 1; and Assistant 

Secretary of State for European Affairs Marc Grossman, “Building A 

New US-European Partnership for the 21st Century” (West Point, New 

York: US Military Academy, 14 September 1999). 

30Some of the biggest critics of ESDP are close observers, and in 

the past, active participants in the transatlantic relationship. See Casper 

W. Weinburger, “The EU’s Separate Defense—A Bad Idea,” Forbes, 3 

April 2000, 49; Peter W. Rodman, “EU Defense Plan: Proceed With 

Caution,” Wall Street Journal Europe, 28 December 1999; and Henry 

Kissinger, “The End of NATO as We Know It?” Washington Post, 15 

August 1999, B7. 

31 Peter W. Rodman, Drifting Apart? Trends in US-European 

Relations (Washington, D.C: The Nixon Center, June 1999), 6. 

32Védrine quoted in, Craig Whitney, “France Presses for A 

Power Independent of the US,” New York Times, 7 November 1999. By 

“hyperpower,” another author states that the French Foreign Minister 
41

 

argues that America’s simultaneous economic, military, technological 

and cultural dominance has rendered it so and he warns that the US trend 

toward unilateralism requires some form of counterbalancing. See John 

Vincour, “France Has a Hard Sill to Reign In US Power,” International 

Herald Tribune, 6 February 1999. 

33See Joshua Muravchik, “How to Wreck NATO,” Commentary

107 (April 1999), 30-32; Rodman, Drifting Apart? 55-57; and Suzanne 

Daley, “An Electronic Spy Scare Is Alarming Europe,” New York Times, 

24 February 200, 1. 

34Stéphane Rozés, Director General of CSA Opinion, quoted in 

Suzanne Daley, “More Vehemently Than Ever, Europe Is Scorning the 

US,” New York Times, 9 April 2000, 1. 

35Ibid, 8. 

36Ivo H. Daalder, “Europe and America Aren’t Divorcing,” Wall 

Street Journal Europe, 10 December 1999. 

37Several aspects of the following analysis of European military 

capabilities are taken from a paper presented by a senior European 

military analyst during a non-attribution seminar on European Security 

and Trans-Atlantic relations co-sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the 

United States and the National Defense University (NDU) conducted at 

NDU, 14 February 2000. 

38 François Heisbourg, “Emerging European Projection 

Capabilities,” paper presented at the Joint RAND and GCSP Workshop, 

“NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The 

Middle East,” Geneva, 15-16 July 1999, available online at 

www.gcsp.ch, and in David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and 

the European Union,” Survival 42 (Winter 2000-01), 99. 

39 Europe’s Military Revolution, 54. 

40The discussion on the broader scope of capabilities presented by 

ESDP crisis response was drawn from correspondence with Christopher 

Makins, President of the Atlantic Council, on 14 May 2000. 

41According to a senior European commander, nearly half the 

US contingent is pinned down by its self-protection mission, leaving only 

the other half available for actual peacekeeping duties. Europe’s Military 

Revolution, 58. 

42At the Washington Summit in April 1999, The NATO Heads of 

State and Government launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). 

DCI focuses on interoperability, deployability and mobility, sustainability 

and logistics, survivability and effective engagement, and command and 
42

 

control information systems. Since last April NATO has identified 58 subpoints that require improvement, 30 of which have stagnated in NATO 

circles for years. 

43"The Void in Europe,” The Economist, 20 May 2000, 22. 

44 Ibid. 

45Europe’s Military Revolution, 75. 

46Ibid, 39. 

47Senate Resolution 208, 106th Congress, 1st Session, 8 

November 1999. 

48Mr. Alain Richard, French Minister of Defense, “European 

Defense and the Transatlantic Link,” speech at Georgetown University, 

23 February 2000. 

49Europe’s Military Revolution, 32. 

50 Europe’s Military Revolution, 29. 

51Joshua Muravchik and Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Western Europe 

Tells the East: Keep Quiet,” Wall Street Journal Europe, 3 April 2000. 

52 See Gábor Papp, NATO Enlargement: The Hungarian Case

(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, February 2000), 

35-42. 

53Peter Finn, “Six in NATO Upset Over EU Corps Plan,” 

Washington Post, 9 April 2000, A16.

54James Madison in The Federalist, No. 63, quoted in Garry 

Wills, “Bully of the Free World,” Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999), 

53. 

55Owen Harries, “America and the Euro Gamble,” National 

Interest (Fall 1998), 127. 

56Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign 

Affairs (March/April 1999), 40. 

57Ibid, 40. 

58Ibid, 48. 

59Henry Kissinger, “The Long Shadow of Vietnam,” Newsweek, 

1 May 2000. 

60 US forces have had an expeditionary focus for over a century, 

whereas European forces were designed to “fight in place” during the 

Cold War. 
43

 61Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), 234. 

62Ibid.