IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs February 1, 2022

STATE OF TENNESSEE V. JASON KEVIN DEDREUX

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County 

No. 37811 Lisa Rice, Judge

No. E2021-00786-COA-R3-CV

After expiration of the maximum sentence imposed for a non-violent felony conviction, a 

petitioner sought full restoration of his citizenship rights. The trial court restored all of the 

petitioner’s rights, except for his firearm rights. Discerning that the trial court erred in 

limiting the restoration of the petitioner’s rights, we reverse and remand. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed 

and Remanded

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY 

and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined. 

Larry R. Dillow, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jason Kevin DeDreux.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Katherine Casseley Redding, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2013, Jason Kevin DeDreux pleaded guilty to a non-violent class E 

felony—driving under the influence (fourth offense). The trial court sentenced him to 150 

days in confinement followed by one year on community corrections, ordered him to pay 

$3,000 in fines, and revoked his driving privileges for five years.1 This conviction rendered 

 

 

1 Upon conviction of driving under the influence (fourth offense), a defendant must be sentenced “to 

serve not less than one hundred fifty (150) consecutive days nor more than the maximum punishment 

authorized for the appropriate range of a Class E felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-402(a)(4). The 

maximum sentence for Range I is two years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(5). The maximum sentence 

04/14/2022
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Mr. DeDreux infamous2and immediately prohibited him from exercising his civil rights, 

including his right to possess a firearm, under state law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-

1307(c). The conviction also prohibited him from possessing a firearm under federal law. 

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g).

 

Mr. DeDreux filed a petition to restore his citizenship rights pursuant to Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-29-101 on September 8, 2020, asserting that he was entitled to full restoration 

of his citizenship rights because he paid all fines and costs and completed his sentence 

without any infractions. He attached four witness affidavits to the petition, all stating that 

Mr. DeDreux had a reputation of “honesty, respectability, and veracity.” See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-29-102 (requiring that the petition be “sustained by satisfactory proof that ever 

since the judgment of disqualification, the petitioner has sustained the character of a person 

of honesty, respectability and veracity, and is generally esteemed as such by the petitioner’s 

neighbors”). After filing the petition, Mr. DeDreux sent copies of it to the Washington 

County District Attorney and to the U.S. attorney for the district of his residence. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-29-103 (stating that, before petition is heard, the petitioner must notify the 

district attorney general of the county where petitioner lives and of the county where 

convicted and the United States attorney for the district of petitioner’s residence”). Neither 

filed a pleading contesting Mr. DeDreux’s petition.

The trial court held a hearing on the petition on December 2, 2020. During the 

hearing, the court expressed concerns about whether it had the authority to restore any 

citizenship rights other than voting rights. Mr. DeDreux argued that the court did have 

authority to restore all citizenship rights and that, under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-29-101 

through -105, there was a presumption that his full citizenship rights should be restored. 

The assistant district attorney agreed with Mr. DeDreux’s assessment of the statutes and 

advised the court that the State had no objection to full restoration of Mr. DeDreux’s

citizenship rights. 

After reviewing all of the witness affidavits, the court instructed Mr. DeDreux’s 

attorney to prepare an agreed order restoring Mr. DeDreux’s full citizenship rights, send it 

to the assistant district attorney to review, and if the assistant district attorney approved it, 

send the order to the court. When the assistant district attorney approved the agreed order, 

Mr. DeDreux’s attorney sent it to the trial court. The order included the following sentence: 

“[T]he Petitioner’s full citizenship and all rights appertaining thereto pursuant to the laws 

 

for Range II is four years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(b)(5). The maximum sentence for Range III is 

six years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(c)(5).

 

 

2 Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-112 states that “[u]pon conviction for any felony, it shall be 

the judgment of the court that the defendant be infamous and be immediately disqualified from exercising 

the right of suffrage.” This statute is authorized by the Tennessee Constitution, article IV, section 2, which 

states, “laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage persons who may be convicted of infamous 

crimes.”
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of the State of Tennessee should be fully and completely restored to him.” Before signing 

the order, the court included the following handwritten notation immediately after the 

aforementioned sentence: “w[ith] exception of restoration of firearms rights.” 

Mr. DeDreux filed a motion for a new trial asserting that the trial court failed to 

consider the unrefuted presumption that his full citizenship rights should be restored and 

failed to state its reasons for limiting the restoration of his rights. He then filed an amended 

motion adding an assertion that the trial court’s decision was contrary to the law and the 

evidence. After hearing arguments on the motion, the trial court entered an order treating 

the motion as a request “for reconsideration” and stating that the court agreed with Mr. 

DeDreux in many respects but was denying the motion because it believed it could not 

restore his firearm rights due to a conflict between state and federal firearm statutes. 

On appeal, Mr. DeDreux presents only one issue for our review: whether the trial 

court erred in limiting the restoration of his citizenship rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal involves the interpretation of various statutes. When construing 

statutes, our primary objective “is to ascertain and give effect to the intention or purpose 

of the legislature as expressed in the statute,” In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 

808 (Tenn. 2007), “‘without unduly restricting or expanding’” the coverage of the statute 

beyond its intended scope. Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 828 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting 

Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002)). To achieve this 

objective, we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in the statute. Id. We 

must construe the words used “in the context in which they appear in the statute and in 

light of the statute’s general purpose.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 

(Tenn. 2010). “Construction of a statute is a question of law which the appellate courts 

review de novo without a presumption of correctness.” Hinkle v. Kindred Hosp., No. 

M2010-02499-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3799215, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2012) 

(citing Hill v. City of Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234, 237 (Tenn. 2000)). A trial court’s 

factual findings, on the other hand, are reviewed de novo with a presumption of correctness 

unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d). Evidence 

preponderates against a trial court’s factual findings if it demonstrates “‘that a finding of 

fact other than the one found by the trial court is more probably true.’” Williams v. City of 

Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 108 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting Nashville Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Great 

Am. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 415, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

ANALYSIS

Mr. DeDreux contends that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-101 entitled him to full 

restoration of his citizenship rights, including his firearm rights. The State agrees with Mr. 
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DeDreux and takes the position that the trial court should not have excluded Mr. DeDreux’s 

firearm rights when it restored his citizenship rights. 

When a person is convicted of a felony, Tennessee sanctions that person’s civil 

rights in addition to subjecting him or her to criminal punishment. Cole v. Campbell, 968 

S.W.2d 274, 275-76 (Tenn. 1998). These sanctions appear in “a series of specific disability 

statutes” that immediately revoke particular civil rights upon conviction. Id. at 276. The 

rights revoked include the loss of the right to serve on a jury, Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-

102; to possess firearms, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307; to vote, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

20-112; to hold public office, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-114; and to serve as a fiduciary, 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-115. However, a person convicted of a crime and “‘rendered 

infamous or deprived of the rights of citizenship,’” may seek to have his or her citizenship 

rights restored under the Restoration Statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-101 through -105. 

State v. Johnson, 79 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-

101); see also Blackwell v. Haslam, No. M2012-01991-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 3379364, 

at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2013). The purpose of this statute is to “wipe out the 

transgressions of the offending person and to give him another chance in society.” Bryant 

v. Moore, 279 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tenn. 1955). Unless restored by the procedures set forth 

in the Restoration Statute, civil disabilities that occur upon conviction “remain[] in effect 

throughout the defendant’s life.” Johnson, 79 S.W.3d at 527.

 

What procedures must a person follow to have his or her citizenship rights restored 

under the statute? The answer depends on the date of conviction. As relevant here, “a 

person rendered infamous by virtue of being convicted of a felony on or after July 1, 1996, 

. . . may petition for restoration upon the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed by 

the court for the infamous crime.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-105(c)(2)(B). The petition 

must: (1) be filed either in the circuit court of the county where the petitioner resides or 

the county where the conviction for the crime occurred, (2) “set forth the basis for the 

petitioner’s eligibility for restoration,” (3) state the reasons the petitioner believes his or 

her full citizenship rights should be restored, and (4) “be accompanied by the certified 

records, statements and other documents or information necessary to demonstrate . . . that 

the petitioner is both eligible for and merits having full rights of citizenship restored.” 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-105(c)(1), (3); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-104 (“The 

circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine applications to be restored to 

citizenship, made by persons who have been rendered infamous by the judgment of any 

court of this state.”).

 

When a petitioner seeks restoration of his or her rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-29-105(c)(3), “[t]here is a presumption that [the] petition . . . shall be granted and that 

the full citizenship rights of the petitioner shall be restored.” The presumption “may only 

be overcome upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that either the petitioner is not 

eligible for restoration or there is otherwise good cause to deny the petition.” Id. To 

determine whether the presumption has been rebutted, evidence of “the petitioner’s 
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conduct after his conviction, rather than before it, is the appropriate focus.” State v. Black, 

No. M2000-02935-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1364043, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2002) 

(citing Thomas R. McCoy, Special Project, the Collateral Consequences of a Criminal 

Conviction, 23 VAND. L.REV. 929, 1143 (1970).

We note that, although a petitioner may satisfy all of the requirements in the 

Restoration Statute, a court may decline to fully restore his or her rights because “a person 

who is adjudged infamous or deprived of rights of citizenship does not have an absolute 

right to the restoration of the full rights of citizenship.” Johnson, 79 S.W.3d at 527; see 

also In re Cox, 389 S.W.3d 794, 798-99 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). Rather, the process for 

restoring citizenship rights remains subject to the requirements and restrictions imposed by 

the General Assembly. In re Cox, 389 S.W.3d at 799. As pertinent to this case, “the 

restorable ‘full rights of citizenship’ . . . do not include firearm rights if those rights were 

removed pursuant to Section 39-17-1307(b)(1).” Blackwell, 2013 WL 3379364, at *11; 

see also Johnson, 79 S.W.3d at 528. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(b)(1) 

prohibits the following people from possessing firearms: (1) a person “convicted of a 

felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, or a felony 

involving use of a deadly weapon” and (2) a person “convicted of a felony drug offense[.]” 

Additionally, subsection (f)(1) bars the following from possessing a firearm: (1) a person 

“convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921,

and is still subject to the disabilities of such a conviction”; (2) a person subject to certain 

orders of protection; or (3) a person “prohibited from possessing a firearm under any other 

state or federal law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(f)(1). Thus, if a petitioner satisfies 

all of the requirements of the Restoration Statute but falls within the purview of Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-17-1307(b)(1) and (f)(1), a court must decline to restore his or her firearm rights. 

If none of these restrictions apply and a petitioner establishes his or her eligibility for 

restoration of civil rights, however, the petitioner’s firearm rights are included in the 

“restorable ‘full rights of citizenship,’” and a court should restore them unless a 

preponderance of the evidence shows that good cause exists not to restore them. Blackwell, 

2013 WL 3379364, at *11; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-105(c)(3).

 

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, we conclude that Mr. DeDreux 

satisfied all of the requirements of the Restoration Statute. The maximum sentence 

imposed by the trial court for his conviction was 150 days in jail followed by one year on 

community corrections and revocation of his driving privileges for five years. That 

sentence was entered in 2013 and expired before Mr. DeDreux filed his petition in 2020. 

The record shows that he filed the petition in the circuit court3 of the county where the 

 

 

3 We acknowledge that Mr. DeDreux filed the petition in the Washington County criminal court. As the 

Tennessee Supreme Court explained, however: 

When we consider the character of the courts in the state, we conclude a criminal court is 

to all intents a circuit court, and we are not permitted to isolate the few strictly criminal 

courts, and declare they have less power to maintain their respectability, safety, and 
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conviction occurred, that the petition set forth the reasons he believed he was eligible for 

restoration of his citizenship rights, and that the petition was accompanied by the records 

necessary to demonstrate his eligibility for full restoration. After satisfying all of the

Restoration Statute’s requirements, Mr. DeDreux established that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-

17-1307(b)(1) and (f)(1) did not apply to permanently bar him from restoration of his 

firearm rights because he was convicted of a non-violent felony for an alcohol-related 

offense. He also established that no other state or federal statute prohibited him from 

possessing a firearm.

The trial court agreed that Mr. DeDreux established his eligibility for restoration of 

his citizenship rights, but the court concluded that “otherwise good cause” existed to 

overcome the presumption that his full citizenship rights should be restored. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-29-105(c)(3). Specifically, the court believed that it was prohibited from 

restoring Mr. DeDreux’s firearm rights because the Restoration Statute conflicted with the

federal firearms statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922. Although there may be a situation where the 

statutes would conflict, we discern no conflict under the circumstances of this case.

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1), it shall be illegal for a person “who has been 

convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year” to possess firearms. Be that as it may, the federal code contains the following

exception to this rule that is based on the definition of such a “conviction”: 

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in 

accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were 

held. Any conviction . . . for which a person has . . . had civil rights restored 

shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such 

. . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, 

transport, possess, or receive firearms.” 

18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added). In other words, if a petitioner convicted of a 

felony under Tennessee law has his or her rights fully restored pursuant to Tennessee law, 

he or she no longer meets the federal law’s definition of “conviction.”4 

 

existence than have the many circuit courts clothed with a mixed civil and criminal 

jurisdiction. Criminal courts were only established in the most densely populated parts of 

the state, and for the relief of the circuit courts.

McCarthy v. State, 15 S.W. 736, 737 (Tenn. 1890). Therefore, we consider the Washington County criminal 

court to be a circuit court.

 

4 For those convicted of a felony under federal law, courts determining whether the exception in 18 

U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(20) applies “must look to whether [the felons’] civil rights were restored under federal 

law.” Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994). Thus, if a federal felon’s civil rights are restored 

under only state law, he or she would still meet the definition of “conviction.” Walker v. United States, 800 

F.2d 720, 728 (6th Cir. 2015). A federal felon may petition the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
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For federal law to recognize that a state has fully restored a state felon’s rights, 

however, the state restoration must include “the right to vote, hold public office, and serve 

on a jury.” Hampton v. United States, 191 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing United 

States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472, 1480 (6th Cir. 1992)). If the state restoration includes 

the aforementioned rights, the petitioner then may lawfully possess firearms under 18 

U.S.C.A. § 922(g) unless there “is some added firearms restriction under state law.” David 

L. Raybin, Stick to Your Guns: Restoration of Tennessee’s “Firearm Rights,” 39 TENN.

B.J. 17, 18 (Mar. 2003). For instance, 

[I]f the state says that a restored-rights felon may possess a shotgun but not 

a pistol, the state has allowed the felon to possess the shotgun under state law 

but, because the state has created some firearm restriction for a convicted 

felon, this means that the federal prohibition applies with full force 

notwithstanding a state restoration of rights. Thus, in the shotgun-pistol 

example, that person could be convicted under federal law for possession of 

the shotgun even though it would be perfectly lawful under state law. 

Id. (citing Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998)). 

As discussed above, Tennessee law contains additional firearm restrictions for 

felony drug convictions and certain violent felony convictions, neither of which applies to 

Mr. DeDreux. Therefore, because the rights restored to Mr. DeDreux included his right to 

vote, hold office, and serve on a jury, there would be no conflict between state and federal 

law if the trial court had not expressly limited the restoration of his rights by excluding his 

firearm rights. 

Besides believing there was a conflict between state and federal law, the trial court 

expressed no other basis for rebutting the statutory presumption that Mr. DeDreux’s 

citizenship rights should be fully restored, and this Court finds no evidence in the record 

to support any other basis. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court erred in determining 

that an “otherwise good cause” rebutted the presumption that Mr. DeDreux’s full 

citizenship rights should be restored. The trial court’s decision is reversed, and the case is 

remanded for entry of an order restoring Mr. DeDreux’s full citizenship rights, including 

his firearm rights. 

 

(“ATF”) to remove the federal firearm disability, but “ATF’s annual appropriation [from Congress] has 

prohibited the expending of any funds to investigate or act upon applications for relief from federal firearms 

disabilities” since 1992. United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 75 (2002). Therefore, absent receiving a 

presidential pardon, a federal felony conviction permanently bars possession of a firearm. 
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CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial 

court. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellee, State of Tennessee, for which 

execution may issue if necessary.

_/s/ Andy D. Bennett_______________

 ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE