FILED 

DEC 23,2014 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ) 

PARENTAGE OF A.L., ) No. 31711-1-111 

) 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 

) 

Respondent, ) 

) PUBLISHED OPINION 

v. ) 

) 

ERIN LEIGH ZASSO, ) 

) 

Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

LETICIA LOPEZ, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

FEARING, J. - Must a parent who equally shares residential placement ofhis child 

with the other parent be excused from paying child support when the parent earns more 

than the other parent and the other parent receives public assistance for the child? The 

trial court answered in the negative. We affirm. 

Erin Zasso, father ofA.L., appeals the trial court's order directing him to pay $336 

per month for child support. He claims he should pay no support since he shares 

residential placement ofthe child with the mother, Leticia Lopez, who agreed he need not 
No.31711-I-II1 

In re Custody ofA.I. 

pay support. The State of Washington provides Lopez, with Temporary Assistance for 

Needy Families (TANF) to support A.L., and the State initiated this petition for 

modification of support. 

FACTS 

On April 11, 2004, Leticia Lopez gave birth to A.L. For the first seven months of 

his life, A.L. lived in three different homes. He ultimately resided with his maternal 

grandmother after Erin Zasso, the father, assaulted Lopez, and Lopez served time in jail 

for drug crimes. Following the domestic violence incident, Zasso had no contact with 

A.L. for a year and a half, despite being permitted supervised visitation. Since released 

from jail, Lopez has lived in a household with her mother and A.L. 

On February 27, 2006, the State of Washington, who provided TANF support to 

Leticia Lopez, filed a parentage action to establish Erin Zasso as A.L.'s father. A.L.'s 

maternal grandmother filed a third-party custody action, which the trial court 

consolidated with the parentage action. On February 23, 2007, the trial court granted 

summary judgment, finding that Zasso fathered A.L., ordering Zasso to make a support 

transfer payment, and ordering Zasso to pay back child support in the amount of 

$7,138.00. 

On March 2, 2007, the trial court entered a temporary parenting plan that awarded 

Erin Zasso residential time with A.L. three nights per week in an alternating pattern with 

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No. 31 711-1-III 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

A.L.'s maternal grandmother. The temporary plan afforded Zasso 43 percent of the 

residential time with A.L. 

On March 23, 2007, Erin Zasso filed a motion to terminate his support obligation. 

The State did not object to the termination because it no longer provided T ANF support 

to Leticia Lopez. On April 13,2007, the lower court terminated Zasso's support 

obligation. The temporary parenting plan remained in place. In January 2012, the State 

resumed T ANF payments to Leticia Lopez. 

PROCEDURE 

On April 25, 2012, based on Leticia Lopez's receipt ofTANF funds, the State of 

Washington filed this petition to modify Erin Zasso's child support obligation. On 

July 31, 2012, after the filing ofthis petition to modify, Leticia Lopez and Erin Zasso 

entered an agreed parenting plan in a different case. The plan and attendant order equally 

allocated A.L.'s residential time between Zasso and Lopez. 

At the modification hearing in the present matter, Erin Zasso argued that his equal 

residential time with A.L. precluded the court from naming him as the obligor. He also 

complained that an imposition of a transfer payment would unfairly place the entire 

burden of supporting A.L. on him, particularly in light of shared custody of the child. He 

emphasized that Leticia Lopez had agreed that he owed no child support. 

On August 21,2012, the trial court issued rulings imposing transfer payments on 

Erin Zasso as a result of the T ANF payments by the State of Washington to Leticia 

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No. 31711-1-111 

In re Custody ofA.I. 

Lopez. In its orders, the court adopted the child support worksheets provided by the 

State. The court determined Zasso's monthly net income at $1,911, and, because Lopez 

was voluntarily unemployed, imputed her income at $1,351 per month. The trial court 

determined Zasso's contribution for A.L.'s support at $336 and Lopez's contribution at 

$187 per month. The trial court ordered no deviation from the standard calculation 

because Zasso requested no deviation. The court ordered Zasso to make a support 

transfer payment to the Washington State Support Registry in the amount of$336 per 

month, effective May 1, 2012. The trial court later denied motions for revision and 

reconsideration. 

LA W AND ANALYSIS 

STATE AUTHORITY FOR MODIFICATION PETITION 

Erin Zasso first contends that the State of Washington lacks the prerogative to 

seek a modification of child support obligations because Leticia Lopez, the party 

receiving T ANF benefits, is not the primary residential parent, since he equally shares 

custody of the minor child. We disagree. 

If the State pays public assistance for the care and maintenance of a child, the 

State may pursue a support action or a petition to modify support to obtain 

reimbursement of monies expended, in a process known as "subrogation." In re 

Parentage ofIA.D., 131 Wn. App. 207, 217,126 P.3d 79 (2006). In what could be 

considered excess, at least seven statutes confirm this authority. RCW 74.20A.030 

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No.31711-I-II1 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

provides, in pertinent part: 

(I) The [Department of Social & Health Services (DSHS)] shall be 

subrogated to the right of any dependent child or children or person having 

the care, custody, and control of said child or children, ifpublic assistance 

money is paid to or for the benefit of the child, or for the care and 

maintenance of a child ... , to prosecute or maintain any support action or 

execute any administrative remedy existing under the laws of the state of 

Washington to obtain reimbursement ofmoneys expended, based on the 

support obligation ofthe responsible parent established by a child support 

order. Distribution of any support moneys shall be made in accordance 

with RCW 26.23.035. 

RCW 74.20.330 demands that the recipient of public assistance assign any rights he or 

she has to collect child support to DSHS. RCW 74.20.330 prescribes: 

(1) Whenever public assistance is paid under a state program funded 

under Title IV-A ofthe federal social security act as amended by the 

personal responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act of 1996, and 

the federal deficit reduction act of 2005, each applicant or recipient is 

deemed to have made assignment to the department of any rights to a 

support obligation from any other person the applicant or recipient may 

have in his or her own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for 

whom the applicant or recipient is applying for or receiving public 

assistance. 

(2) Payment of public assistance under a state-funded program, or a 

program funded under Title IV-A, IV-E, or XIX ofthe federal social 

security act as amended by the personal responsibility and work 

opportunity reconciliation act of 1996 shall: 

(a) Operate as an assignment by operation oflaw; and 

(b) Constitute an authorization to the department to provide the 

assistance recipient with support enforcement services. 

The State may initiate "an action in superior court to obtain a support order or 

obtain other relief related to support for a dependent child on whose behalf the 

department is providing public assistance." RCW 74.20.220(1). Under RCW 

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No. 3 1 711-1-III 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

74.20A.030(l): 

The department shall be subrogated to the right of any dependent 

child or children or person having the care, custody, and control of said 

child or children, if public assistance money is paid to or for the benefit of 

the child, or for the care and maintenance of a child. 

(Emphasis added.) 

The State of Washington's authority to seek subrogation extends to the right to file 

a petition to modify support. RCW 26.09.170 reads: 

(9) The department of social and health services may file an action 

to modify or adjust an order of child support under subsections (5) through 

(7) of this section if: 

(a) Public assistance money is being paid to or for the benefit of the 

child. 

RCW 26.09.l75 reads: 

(3) As provided for under RCW 26.09.170, the department of social 

and health services may file an action to modify or adjust an order of child 

support if: 

(a) Public assistance money is being paid to or for the benefit of the 

child. 

Washington's version of the Parentage Act, chapter 26.26 RCW, prohibits the trial 

court from limiting or affecting the right of the State to seek reimbursement for support 

and services provided to the child. The relevant provision reads: 

The court shall not limit or affect in any manner the right of 

nonparties including the state of Washington to seek reimbursement for 

support and other services previously furnished to the child. 

RCW 26.26.130(5). 

When the State pays T ANF to one parent, but the court still requires the other 

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No. 31711-1-111 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

parent to make a monthly support transfer payment, the money collected is used to 

reimburse the State for its expenditures for public assistance. State ex reI. Sigler v. 

Sigler, 85 Wn. App. 329, 337, 932 P.2d 710 (1997) (citing RCW 74.20A.030). The 

policy behind subrogation is to lessen the burden on the taxpaying public by demanding 

that parents help pay for the child's maintenance. Sigler, 85 Wn. App. at 337 (citing 

RCW 74.20A.OlO). The State has an interest in placing the primary responsibility for the 

care and support of children on parents rather than on the taxpayers. State v. Wood, 89 

Wn.2d 97, 100,569 P.2d 1148 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by, Sw. Wash. 

Chapter, Nat 'I Elec. Contractors Ass 'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wn.2d 109,667 P.2d 1092 

(1983); Sigler, 85 Wn. App. at 337. 

Erin Zasso contends two Washington regulations circumscribe the State's 

authority to petition for a support modification under his circumstances. WAC 388-l4A2030(1) reads: "A custodial parent applying for or receiving cash assistance on behalf of 

a minor child assigns the family's rights to support as provided in WAC 388-14A-2035." 

In tum, WAC 388-14A-l020 defines a "custodial parent" as "the person, whether a 

parent or not, with whom a dependent child resides the majority of the time period for 

which the division of child support seeks to establish or enforce a support obligation." 

Zasso reads the two regulations together to argue that the State's subrogation rights 

extend only when the parent receiving the benefits resides with the child more than half 

of the time. Based on a reading of the Washington statutes and other regulations, we 

7 

No. 3 1 711-1-III 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

disagree. 

RCW 26.09.170 and .175 allow the State of Washington to request to modify an 

order of child support whenever public assistance is paid to benefit the child. We may 

admit that, under WAC 388-14A-1020, Leticia Lopez, the TANF recipient, is not the 

custodial parent, or at least not the sole custodial parent, because of shared placement of 

A.L. Nevertheless, Washington statutes do not limit the State's authority to file a 

modification to instances when the sole custodial parent is the recipient ofthe assistance. 

Because ofthe statutes demanding subrogation, in order for Zasso to prevail on his 

argument, he must show that some other statute or regulation precluded Lopez from 

receiving TANF assistance from the State. WAC 388-14A-1020 and WAC 388-14A2030 do not expressly preclude the assistance. Other regulations allow, rather than 

disallow, public assistance even when the recipient shares residential placement with 

another parent. Under the WAC child support scheme, assistance unit (AU) refers to "the 

group ofpeople who live together and whose income or resources [the State] count[s] to 

decide ... eligibility for [T ANF] benefits and the amount of benefits." WAC 388-408­

0005(1)(c). Pursuant to WAC 388-454-0005(2)(b) "[i]frelatives share physical custody 

of the child in equal amounts, [the State] include[s] the child in the AU of the parent or 

relative that first applies for assistance for the child." This latter regulation disassembles 

Zasso's contention. The parent who first applied here is Leticia Lopez. Erin Zasso 

disregards the explicit language of WAC 388-454-0005(2), which permits TANF 

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No.31711-I-II1 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

payments when parents share equal custody oftheir children. The language of WAC 

388-454-0005(2) indicates the drafters contemplated the type of shared custody parenting 

situation in the current case. 

Washington statutes and regulations directing the State of Washington to collect 

support from a parent whose child receives T ANF benefits fulfill federal T ANF 

requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3). The federal statute demands that a state, as a 

condition to participating in the T ANF program, require each recipient to assign rights to 

collect child support. The statute does not condition assignment on the amount of time a 

child spends with his or her parents. 

The State child support system, including the administrative scheme, statutory 

scheme, and public policy considerations, all negate Erin Zasso's argument that only 

custodial parents or parents who reside with the child more than half of the time can 

subrogate support rights to the State of Washington. The State had the authority to file 

the petition to modity the support obligations of Erin Zasso. 

ZASSO AS OBLIGOR WHEN SHARING RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 

The State of Washington may be subrogated to Leticia Lopez's rights to collect 

child support only ifLopez held the right to collect child support from Erin Zasso. 

Therefore, Zasso identifies the principal question raised by his appeal to be whether the 

father should be required to make a transfer payment to the mother when the two share 

custody ofthe child? Stated differently, may the court declare a parent who shares 

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No. 31711-1-III 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

residential placement with the other parent to be an "obligor" for purposes of support 

transfer payments? Zasso claims Washington has yet to clearly articulate standards for 

determining who the obligor parent should be in cases of shared custody. 

The legislature's stated intent in enacting legislation imposing child support 

transfer payments is "to insure that child support orders are adequate to meet a child's 

basic needs and to provide additional child support commensurate with the parents' 

income, resources, and standard of living." RCW 26.19.001 (emphasis added). The 

legislature also intended that the child support obligation be "equitably apportioned 

between the parents." RCW 26.19.001 (emphasis added). 

In Washington, both biological parents have an obligation to support their children 

regardless of marital status. Linda D. v. Fritz c., 38 Wn. App. 288, 300,687 P.2d 223 

(1984). A parent's obligation for the care and support of his or her child is a basic tenet 

recognized in this state without reference to any particular statute. State v. Wood,89 

Wn.2d at 100. 

When entering an order of child support, the trial court begins by setting the basic 

child support obligation. RCW 26.19.011(1); State ex rei. MMG. v. Graham, 159 

Wn.2d 623, 627, 152 P.3d 1005 (2007). This obligation is determined from the statute's 

economic table, which is based on the parents' combined monthly net income, as well as 

the number and age oftheir children. RCW 26.19.011(1), .020. The trial court next 

allocates the child support obligation between the parents based on each parent's share of 

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No. 31711-1-III 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

the combined monthly income. RCW 26.19 .080( 1). The court then determines the 

standard calculation, which is the presumptive amount of child support owed by the 

obligor parent to the obligee parent. RCW 26.19.011(8); Graham, 159 Wn.2d at 627. 

Erin Zasso emphasizes that RCW 26.19.011 fails to identify or establish any 

standards for who becomes the obligor or the obligee. We concede the statutory scheme 

could be clearer in answering the question of under what circumstances one may become 

an obligor. Nevertheless, we conclude the trial court held authority, under statutory 

sources as well as recent Washington precedent, to nominate Zasso as the obligor since 

he accrued the higher income and the mother received T ANF benefits for the child, 

despite shared residential placement. 

After determining the standard calculation and nominating the obligor, the trial 

court, if requested, considers whether it is appropriate to deviate upward or downward 

from the standard calculation. RCW 26.19.011 (4), (8). The court has discretion to 

deviate from the standard calculation based on such factors as the parents' income and 

expenses, obligations to children from other relationships, and the children's residential 

schedule. RCW 26.19.075(1). Ifthe court considers a deviation based on residential 

schedule, it must follow a specific statutory analysis: 

The court may deviate from the standard calculation if the child 

spends a significant amount of time with the parent who is obligated to 

make a support transfer payment. The court may not deviate on that basis 

ifthe deviation will result in insufficient funds in the household receiving 

the support to meet the basic needs of the child or if the child is receiving 

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No. 3 1 711-1-III 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

temporary assistance for needy families. When determining the amount of 

the deviation, the court shall consider evidence concerning the increased 

expenses to a parent making support transfer payments resulting from the 

significant amount of time spent with that parent and shall consider the 

decreased expenses, if any, to the party receiving the support resulting from 

the significant amount oftime the child spends with the parent making the 

support transfer payment. 

RCW 26. 19.075(l)(d). 

The trial court must enter written findings of fact supporting the reasons for any 

deviation or denial of a party's request for deviation. RCW 26.19.075(3); Graham, 159 

Wn.2d at 627-28. A court's decision to deviate from the standard calculation for child 

support based on residential time is discretionary, but the court cannot deviate if it will 

result in insufficient funds in the household receiving the support, or if the child is 

receiving TANF. RCW 26.19.075(1)(d); In re Marriage ofRusch, 124 Wn. App. 226, 

236,98 P.3d 1216 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by, In re Marriage of 

McCausland, 159 Wn.2d 607, 152 P.3d 1013 (2007). After determining the standard 

calculation and any deviations, the trial court then orders one parent to pay the other a 

support transfer payment. RCW 26.19.011(9). 

Erin Zasso never sought a deviation from the standard calculation. Granting a 

deviation may have been an abuse of discretion because ofthe mother receiving TANF 

benefits and having no other income. 

The residential schedule deviation was added to the child support schedule in 

1991. LAWS OF 1991, 1 st Spec. Sess., ch. 28, § 6. Before 1991, the Washington Child 

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No. 31711-1-111 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

Support Guidelines allowed for a residential credit if the child resided overnight with 

both parents more than 25 percent ofthe time. Helen Donigan, Calculating and 

Documenting Child Support Awards Under Washington Law, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 13,45 

(1991). A separate worksheet provided space for determining the residential credit for 

each parent. Donigan, supra, at 45. This special worksheet also applied to cases where 

parents split residential time. Donigan, supra, at 45-46. The legislature did not retain 

this formula for residential credit against child support with the 1991 addition of statutory 

deviations. See RCW 26.19.075(l)(d); In re Marriage ofSchnur man, 178 Wn. App. 634, 

639-41,316 P.3d 514 (2013), review denied, 180 Wn.2d 1010,325 P.3d 914 (2014). The 

change in legislation suggests an intent to afford wider discretion to the trial court when 

considering a deviation for residential credit. 

This court reviews a trial court's order of child support for abuse of discretion. In 

re Marriage ofGriffin, 114 Wn.2d 772, 776, 791 P.2d 519 (1990); In re Marriage of 

Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 638. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision rests 

on unreasonable or untenable grounds, or if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the 

law or involves incorrect legal analysis. Dix v. ICT Grp., Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826, 833, 161 

P.3d 1016 (2007); Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 638. The legislature intended to allow 

judicial discretion in appropriate circumstances when calculating child support payments, 

and a reviewing court must defer to the sound discretion of the trial court unless the lower 

court abused its discretion. In re Marriage ofGriffin, 114 Wn.2d at 776. 

13 
No. 31711-1-III 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

Recently, both the Washington Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals addressed 

the applicability of the standard child support schedule to cases of equally shared 

custody, such as the one currently at issue. The well-reasoned decisions compel denial of 

Erin Zasso's appeal. 

In State ex reI. MMG. v. Graham, 159 Wn.2d 623, 152 P.3d 1005 (2007), the 

Washington Supreme Court decided a custody case in which the parents evenly shared 

residential placement of their children. The father's income exceeded the mother's 

revenue by over $4,000 per month, and the trial court named the father as the obligor, 

requiring that he make a transfer payment to the mother. 

On appeal, the father in Graham argued that chapter 26.19 RCW did not 

adequately guide trial courts in determining parents' child support obligations when the 

parents shared equal custody and urged the court to adopt a new standard. The Supreme 

Court disagreed, and stressed that RCW 26.19.075 already provided trial courts with the 

discretion to deviate from the standard calculation, based on the residential schedule 

deviation found in RCW 26.19.075(l)(d). Graham, 159 Wn.2d at 636. Relying on RCW 

26. 19.075(l)(d), the Supreme Court explained, "[b]ecause the statute explicitly gives the 

trial court discretion to deviate from the basic child support obligation based on the facts 

of a particular case, a specific formula is neither necessary nor statutorily required to 

ensure the parents' child support obligation is properly allocated." Graham, 159 Wn.2d 

at 636. The court in Graham clarified that the trial court must still use the standard child 

14 

No. 31711-1-II1 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

support schedule and statutory deviations in cases of shared custody. Graham, 159 

Wn.2d at 636. 

More recently, Division One of this court addressed a case of shared custody in In 

re Marriage ofSchnur man , 178 Wn. App. 634,636,316 P.3d 514 (2013), review denied, 

180 Wn.2d 1010,325 P.3d 914 (2014). In Schnurman, the parenting plan dictated that 

the parents "share equal residential time with the children throughout the year." 

Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 637. The trial court first calculated the parents' child 

support obligation and found that the father's monthly net income was $6,338 and the 

mother's was $3,380. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 637. Although the couple shared 

custody of their children, the trial court named the father as the obligor and required that 

he make a transfer payment to the mother. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 637. The father 

requested a downward deviation from the standard calculation, but did not characterize it 

as a residential credit, instead arguing that the statutory deviations did not apply to cases 

of shared custody. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 637. The trial court dismissed the 

father's argument, while noting the absence of evidence that the father's shared time with 

the children would significantly increase his costs to support the children or reduce his 

wife's expenses to support the children. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 637. 

The father in Schnurman, like Erin Zasso, also argued that only parents with 

whom children spend the majority of their residential time are entitled to a support 

transfer payment. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 638. The court dismissed the father's 

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No. 3 1711-1-III 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

contention, stating that RCW 26.19.075, the statute governing deviations, applies in 

shared residential situations. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 637 n.4. Relying on the 

Supreme Court's holding in Graham, the Schnurman court specified "that the statutory 

child support schedule applies in shared residential situations like here." Schnurman, 178 

Wn. App. at 638 (citing Graham, 159 Wn.2d at 626). After describing the general child 

support determination process, the court explained the deviation procedure. Schnurman, 

178 Wn. App. at 640. The court noted that a trial court may deviate when children share 

residential time equally between parents, but "a deviation would still be discretionary and 

should focus on the legislature's primary intent to maintain reasonable support for the 

children in each household." Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 641 (citing State ex rei. 

MMG. v. Graham, 123 Wn. App. 931, 933, 99 P.3d 1248 (2004). As in Graham, the 

court refused to set forth a formula for 50/50 shared custody obligation determinations. 

Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 642. The court explained that the child support schedule 

still applies in cases ofshared custody; thus, RCW 26.l9.075(l)(d) already provides trial 

courts with the discretion to deviate based on residential time, precluding the need for a 

specialized formula. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 642. 

As in Graham and Schnurman, this case involves a case of evenly split residential 

placement. Consistent with both Graham and Schnurman, the superior court in this case 

used the standard support schedule to allocate the support obligation between Erin Zasso 

and Leticia Lopez, as well as to name Zasso as the support obligor. The trial court's 

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No.31711-1-II1 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

determination of Zasso's support obligation was consistent with the statutory scheme and 

Washington case law. 

Despite these precedents, Erin Zasso argues that he cannot be the obligor because 

Washington law lacks a procedure for identifYing the obligor in equal custody cases. The 

father in Schnurman raised this same argument, claiming that he was not seeking a 

downward deviation based on residential time. Division One explicitly rejected this 

argument. Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 637 nA. 

Erin Zasso contends that the holding of Schnurman is inapposite because the 

father in Schnurman claimed that the support schedules simply did not apply under 

shared placement circumstances. Zasso distinguishes his argument as one of 

contending no transfer can be ordered because he is not an obligor. According to 

Zasso, he does not maintain that the child support schedule does not apply. He simply 

argues that when two parties share equal visitation, there must be a reasoned basis for 

ordering one parent to make a support transfer payment to the other. We consider this 

distinction to lack any legal relevance. Under both situations, the parent seeks to avoid 

payment of child support because of shared custody. Anyway, the T ANF benefits and 

Zasso's higher income is a reasoned basis for isolating Zasso as the obligor. 

Nowhere does the statutory scheme or supporting case law state the parent 

receiving the support transfer payment must be the parent with whom the child resides a 

majority of the time. There is also no statutory provision, or case law, which prohibits a 

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No. 31711-1-111 

In re Custody ofA.L. 

transfer payment from the advantaged parent to the disadvantaged parent in an equally 

shared residential arrangement. 

Finally, Erin lasso relies on In re Marriage ofHolmes, 128 Wn. App. 727, 117 

P.3d 370 (2005) to support his contention that chapter 26.19 RCW does not provide for 

whether one parent should make a support transfer payment in shared custody cases. The 

court in Schnurman resolved Holmes' applicability to cases of shared custody when it 

stated: 

[R]eliance on In re Marriage ofHolmes, 128 Wn. App. 727, 117 

P.3d 370 (2005), does not compel a different conclusion. Holmes did not 

involve a 50/50 shared residential situation like here. The Holmes court 

simply held that the trial court acted within its discretion in terminating the 

father's child support obligation. Though the father made significantly 

more money than the mother, the residential schedule had changed and the 

son resided a majority ofthe time with the father. 

Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 642 n.6 (internal citations omitted). lasso's use of Holmes 

is misplaced. 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm the trial court's order compelling Erin lasso to pay a support transfer 

payment to the State of Washington by reason of his child's receipt ofTANF benefits. 

Fearing, J. . 

w~~(~O= Siddoway, C. . 

~)& Brown, J. 

18