[Cite as Johnson v. Michael, 2018-Ohio-234.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DUANE JOHNSON : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

KATHRYN MICHAEL : Case No. 2017CA00205 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 2017CV01799 

JUDGMENT: Dismissed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: January 22, 2018 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

DUANE JOHNSON, Pro Se MICHAEL J. DEFIBAUGH 

825 Diagonal Road JOHN CHRISTOPHER REECE 

Akron, OH 44320 161 South High Street 

 Suite 202 

 Akron, OH 44308 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00205 2 

Wise, Earle, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Duane Johnson, appeals the October 26, 2017 judgment 

entry of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, transferring venue to the Court 

of Common Pleas of Summit County, Ohio. Defendant-Appellee is Kathryn Michael. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On September 1, 2017, appellant filed a pro se complaint against appellee 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio. Appellant alleged bare claims for 

trespass and dereliction of duty, without including any facts regarding the nature of the 

allegations. 

{¶ 3} On October 5, 2017, appellee filed a motion to transfer venue to Summit 

County, Ohio. Appellee explained appellant's claims for relief centered on his arrest by 

the Akron Police Department for making false alarms and his subsequent prosecution 

and conviction in the Akron Municipal Court (Case No. 14CRB4243). Appellee was the 

presiding judge in his case. 

{¶ 4} On October 12, 2017, appellant filed a response, objecting to the motion for 

change of venue, but not disputing the explanation given by appellee. By judgment entry 

filed October 26, 2017, the trial court granted the motion and transferred the case to 

Summit County. 

{¶ 5} Appellant filed an appeal. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a 

final appealable order. This matter is now before this court for consideration. As appellant 

failed to list any assignment of error pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(3), we glean the following 

assignment from the state of the record: 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00205 3 

I 

{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO TRANSFER 

VENUE TO SUMMIT COUNTY. 

{¶ 7} Preliminarily, we note this case is before this court on the accelerated 

calendar which is governed by App.R. 11.1. Subsection (E), determination and judgment 

on appeal, provides in pertinent part: "The appeal will be determined as provided by 

App.R. 11.1. It shall be sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the 

reason for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form." 

{¶ 8} One of the important purposes of the accelerated calendar is to enable an 

appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision more quickly than in a case on 

the regular calendar where the briefs, facts, and legal issues are more complicated. 

Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn., 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655 (10th 

Dist.1983). 

{¶ 9} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned 

rules. 

I 

{¶ 10} Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting the motion to transfer venue 

to Summit County. Appellee argues the appeal should be dismissed because an order 

transferring a case for lack of venue is not a final appealable order. We agree with 

appellee. 

{¶ 11} To be final and appealable, an order must comply with R.C. 2505.02. 

Subsection (B) provides the following in pertinent part: 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00205 4 

(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 

modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following: 

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect 

determines the action and prevents a judgment; 

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special 

proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment; 

(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new 

trial; 

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which 

both of the following apply: 

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the 

provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the 

appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or 

effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all 

proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action. 

{¶ 12} As explained by this court in Mansfield Family Restaurant v. CGS 

Worldwide, Inc. 5th Dist. Richland No. 00-CA-3, 2000 WL 1886226, *2 (Dec. 28, 2000): 

The only possible applicable paragraph is paragraph 4, regarding 

provisional remedies. " 'Provisional remedy' means a proceeding ancillary 

to an action, including, but not limited to, a proceeding for a preliminary 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00205 5 

injunction, attachment, discovery of privileged matter, or suppression of 

evidence." R.C. 2505.02(A)(3). The statutory definition does not 

specifically refer to proceedings to transfer venue nor are any of the listed 

proceedings akin to a transfer of venue. See Duryee [v. Rogers, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 74963, 1999 WL 1204875 (Dec. 16, 1999)], supra. The 

basic purpose of R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) in categorizing certain types of 

preliminary decisions of a trial court as final, appealable orders is the 

protection of one party against irreparable harm by another party during the 

pendency of the litigation. Id. We find that a decision by a trial court to deny 

a request for change of venue does not involve the same degree of risk of 

irreparable harm to a party as the decisions made in the types of actions 

listed under 2505.02(A)(3). The types of provisional remedies listed under 

2505.02(A)(3) include decisions that, made preliminarily, could decide all or 

part of an action or make an ultimate decision on the merits meaningless or 

cause other irreparable harm. For instance, a preliminary injunction could 

be issued against a high school football player preventing him from playing 

football his senior year based on recruiting violations. The trial court could 

grant the attachment of property for which the owner has a ready buyer. 

Discovery of privileged material could force a person to divulge highly 

personal and sensitive information. If evidence critical to the prosecution of 

a criminal case is suppressed, the state could lose any meaningful chance 

at successful prosecution of a criminal. The decision to deny a change of 

venue does not result in any of the types of irreparable harm just listed. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00205 6 

There is an adequate legal remedy from a decision denying a change of 

venue, after final judgment. In other words, it may be expensive to get the 

cat back in the bag, if a trial court errs when it denies a change of venue, 

but it can be done. Whereas, when the types of decisions listed in 

2505.02(A)(3) are made, the cat is let out of the bag and can never be put 

back in. Therefore, denial of a request to change venue is not a final, 

appealable order. 

{¶ 13} The case sub judice involves not the denial, but the granting of a change 

of venue. As noted by this court in Jackson v. Friedlander, 5th Dist. Stark No. 

2016CA00053, 2016-Ohio-7503, ¶ 9: 

This Court and the Ohio Supreme Court have previously held that 

the denial or granting of a motion to change venue is not a final, appealable 

order. Gray v. Lloyd Ward, P.C., 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 13 CA 42, 2014-

Ohio-190; State of Ohio ex rel. Edwards v. Tompkins, 5th Dist. Muskingum 

No. CT2010-0035, 2011-Ohio-32; State ex rel. Lyons v. Zaleski, 75 Ohio 

St.3d 623, 665 N.E.2d 212 (1996). 

{¶ 14} Based upon the foregoing, we find the judgment appealed from is not a final 

appealable order. Appellee's motion to dismiss is granted. 

 
Stark County, Case No. 2017CA00205 7 

{¶ 15} This appeal is dismissed. 

By Wise, Earle, J. 

Delaney, P.J. and 

Baldwin, J. concur. 

 

 

 

 

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