Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1507-CR-1000 | April 29, 2016 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Jeffrey A. Baldwin

Tyler D. Helmond

Voyles Zahn & Paul

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Tyler Banks

Deputies Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sattore E. Cooper,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 29, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 29A02-

1507-CR-1000

Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Paul A. Felix, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 29C01-

1310-FB-8527

Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] In October of 2013, Appellant-Defendant Sattore E. Cooper was charged with 

Class B felony burglary and Class D felony theft. Cooper was also alleged to be 

a habitual offender. Cooper was subsequently found guilty of Class B felony 

burglary and not guilty of Class D felony theft. He also admitted to being a 

habitual offender. 

[2] On appeal, Cooper argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for Class B felony burglary. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History1

[3] At approximately mid-day on September 18, 2013, Gareth Evans returned to 

his residence at the Penn Circle Apartments in Carmel to eat lunch and walk 

his dog. While standing in a grassy area outside of his apartment building with 

his dog, Evans noticed a red Toyota Corolla parked directly outside the front 

door to the building. Evans observed that the Corolla appeared to be running 

and that both the driver’s side and passenger’s side windows were down. While 

still standing in the grassy area, Evans realized that he had left his cellular 

 

1

 We held oral argument in the instant matter at Shelbyville High School on April 14, 2016. We wish to 

thank the faculty, students, and staff of Shelbyville High School for their hospitality. We also wish to 

commend counsel on the high quality of their arguments.
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telephone (“cell phone”) in his apartment and returned to his apartment to 

retrieve it. 

[4] As he made his way back to his apartment, Evans, who was aware of recent 

break-ins in the apartment complex, saw a man exit the building. This man 

was subsequently identified as Cooper. Evans became suspicious because he 

did not recognize Cooper. After retrieving his cell phone, Evans decided to 

report the Corolla and suspicious man to leasing office. As Evans left his 

apartment, he encountered Cooper on a stairwell. Evans wrote down the 

license plate number on the Corolla as he made his way to the leasing office. 

Upon arriving at the leasing office, Evans reported the suspicious individual to 

the property manager, Katie Blackburn, and asked why an unknown individual 

was in his building. 

[5] Blackburn and Joseph Bir, the maintenance supervisor, then went to Evans’s 

building. As they approached the building, Bir noted the red Corolla. Once 

inside the apartment building, Bir heard a noise that seemed to come from the 

third floor. As Bir made his way to the third floor to investigate, Bir 

encountered Cooper and another man on the stairwell. Bir bumped shoulders 

and made eye contact with Cooper, who was carrying a laptop computer. 

Cooper and his companion then ran down the stairs. 

[6] Upon arriving on the third floor, Bir observed that two of the doors had been 

opened and their frames had “pry bar marks” on them. Tr. p. 69. Bir yelled to 

Blackburn that there had been break-ins. Meanwhile, Evans, who was 
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watching the building from the apartment complex’s clubhouse, observed 

Cooper and the other man exit the building carrying what appeared to be a flat 

screen television. Cooper and his companion then entered the Corolla and 

“sped off with the tires spinning.” Tr. p. 40.

[7] Carmel Police Department (“CPD”) Officer Robert Harris responded to a call 

reporting a “burglary in process” at the apartment complex. Tr. p. 86. Upon 

arriving at the complex, Officer Harris entered apartment 309, which was one 

of the apartments with signs of forced entry. This apartment belonged to Chad 

Bocock. Officer Harris observed that the apartment door had been forced open, 

drawers in the bedroom had been opened, a safe located in the bedroom closet 

had been forced open and its contents spilled onto the floor, and a laptop 

computer appeared to have been removed from a docking station in the spare 

bedroom. Upon returning to his apartment, Bocock confirmed that his laptop 

computer had been taken and indicated that he had not given anyone 

permission to enter his apartment, take his laptop computer, or open his 

drawers and safe. 

[8] CPD Detective Brad Hendrick subsequently located the Corolla, which was 

registered to Hertz Avis Rental Company (“Hertz”), using the license plate 

number provided by Evans. CPD Officer Scott Pilkington processed the 

Corolla, which included taking DNA swabs from inside the vehicle. The DNA 

was later tested against an exemplar of Cooper’s DNA. While the DNA 

comparison did not produce an exact match, it could not exclude Cooper as a 

contributor. 
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[9] Shortly after initiating his investigation into the burglary, Detective Hendrick 

identified Cooper as a “person of interest.” Tr. p. 177. Detective Hendrick 

then compiled a photograph array which was shown to both Evans and Bir, 

each of whom identified Cooper as one of the two men they had seen at the 

apartment complex. Also, while completing the investigation into the burglary, 

John Elliot, a CPD crime-scene examiner, came to believe that the door to 

apartment 309 appeared to have been forced open through use of a “wonder 

bar.” Tr. p. 124. Elliot subsequently described the “wonder bar” as a common 

carpentry tool which is used to “pry with.” Tr. p. 124.

[10] On October 15, 2013, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State”) 

charged Cooper with one count of Class B felony burglary and one count of 

Class D felony theft. The State also alleged that Cooper is a habitual offender. 

Cooper was tried before a jury on June 8 and 9, 2015. 

[11] Following the conclusion of Cooper’s trial, the jury found Cooper guilty of 

Class B felony burglary and not guilty of Class D felony theft. Cooper 

subsequently admitted that he is a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced 

Cooper to a term of twenty years, with ten years executed in the Department of 

Correction (“DOC”) and four years executed through the Hamilton County 

Community Corrections work release program. The remaining six years were 

suspended to probation. By virtue of Cooper’s status as a habitual offender, the 

trial court enhanced the executed portion of Cooper’s sentence by an additional 

ten years. This appeal follows.
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Discussion and Decision

[12] On appeal, Cooper contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for Class B felony burglary.

I. Standard of Review for Sufficiency Challenges

[13] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is the fact-finder’s role, not that 

of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to 

determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Drane v. State, 867 

N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). As such, 

[w]hen reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

underlying a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the 

evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Wright v. State, 

828 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind. 2005). The evidence—even if 

conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it are 

viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction. Rohr v. State, 

866 N.E.2d 242, 248 (Ind. 2007). “[W]e affirm if there is 

substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element 

of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have 

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Davis v. 

State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004). 

Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012) (first set of brackets added, 

second set of brackets in original). 

[14] It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence. Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 147. “The evidence is sufficient if an 

inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Id. “In 
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essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be reached based on 

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence presented.” Baker v. 

State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in original). Further, a

conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single 

witness, even when that witness is the victim. Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 135 (citing 

Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072-73 (Ind. 1991)). The jury, acting as the 

trier-of-fact, is free to believe whomever it sees fit. See Klaff v. State, 884 N.E.2d 

272, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

II. Requirements to Prove Charge of Class B Felony 

Burglary

[15] The version of Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 in effect in September of 2013 

provided that “[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of 

another person, with intent to commit a felony in it, commits burglary, a Class 

C felony.” However, the offense is a Class B felony if the building or structure 

is a dwelling. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. Therefore, in order to prove that Cooper 

committed Class B felony burglary, the State was required to prove that Cooper 

broke in and entered the dwelling of another with the intent to commit a felony 

therein.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Sustain Cooper’s 

Conviction for Class B Felony Burglary

[16] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for Class 

B felony burglary, Cooper raises the following claims: (1) the evidence is 
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insufficient to prove that he participated in the burglary, and (2) that he acted 

with the requisite intent.

A. Whether the Evidence is Sufficient to Prove that Cooper

Participated in the Burglary

[17] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he participated in 

the burglary, Cooper argues that the evidence is insufficient to link him to the 

red Corolla and that there were “issues” with the witnesses’ identification of 

him as one of the participants in the burglary. 

1. The Corolla

[18] Cooper argues that without the Corolla, his conviction is supported only by the 

eyewitness identification of Cooper by two witnesses who “had never before 

seen” Cooper. Appellant’s Br. p. 5. Cooper asserts that the evidence fails to 

link him to the Corolla “in a way that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude 

[that] he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Br. p. 6. We 

disagree.

[19] The record demonstrates the State presented evidence which linked Cooper to 

the Corolla. Both Evans and Bir provided the investigating officers with 

descriptions of the Corolla. In addition, both Evans and Bir identified Cooper 

as one of the men that they saw leave the apartment complex in the Corolla. 

Upon review, we conclude that the descriptions and identifications provided by 

Evans and Bir are sufficient to link Cooper to the Corolla. Cooper’s assertion 
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to the contrary merely amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the 

evidence, which we will not do. See Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 135.

2. Alleged Issues with Identification

[20] Cooper also argues that there were “issues” with Evans’s and Bir’s

identifications of him as one of the participants in the burglary. In making this 

argument, Cooper points out that Bir did not recognize him as the suspect at 

trial. Cooper also asserts that Evans and Bir gave conflicting testimony as to 

whether the windows of the Corolla were fully or partially open and whether 

there was music coming from the Corolla. Cooper further asserts that because 

he was described as wearing a short-sleeved shirt on the day of the burglary, 

concealing the “wonder bar” in his shirt sleeve would not have been an option.

[21] Initially, we note that Cooper fails to explain how his alleged inability to hide 

the “wonder bar” in his shirt sleeve impacted Evans’s and Bir’s identification of 

him as one of the participants in the burglary. Further, while Evans and Bir 

may have had conflicting memories about whether the Corolla’s windows were 

fully or partially open or whether there was music coming from the Corolla, 

both men identified Cooper from a photo array on the day after the burglary as 

one of the participants. Cooper does not challenge either of these 

identifications on appeal. 

[22] The fact that Evans and Bir had conflicting memories relating to whether the 

windows were fully or partially open and whether music was playing in the 

Corolla approximately twenty-one months after the date that the burglary 
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occurred is of little consequence considering that both Evans and Bir

unequivocally identified Cooper as one of the participants in the burglary the 

day after it occurred. Additionally, the fact that Bir did not recognize Cooper, 

whom he had never seen prior to the burglary, nearly two years after the 

commission of the burglary is also of little consequence given that Bir 

unequivocally identified Cooper as one of the participants in the burglary on the 

day after the burglary occurred.

[23] The jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, was in the best position to judge Evans’s and 

Bir’s credibility. Cooper’s challenge on appeal is merely an invitation for this 

court to reassess Evans’s and Bir’s credibility and to reweigh the evidence, 

which, again, we will not do. See Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 135.

B. Whether the Evidence is Sufficient to Prove that Cooper 

Acted with the Requisite Intent

[24] Cooper also claims that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he entered 

Bocock’s apartment with the intent to commit a felony therein. In raising this 

claim, Cooper points to the fact that he was found not guilty of the theft of 

Bocock’s laptop computer. Cooper acknowledges, however, that “[t]he 

acquittal on the theft count, in and of itself, does not compel an answer to the 

sufficiency question either way” because “one can break and enter with the 

intent to commit a felony but not actually commit the felony and still be guilty 

of burglary.” Appellant’s Br. p. 7.
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[25] With regard to the requisite intent, the Indiana Supreme Court has held as 

follows:

Burglars rarely announce their intentions at the moment of entry, 

and indeed many times there is no one around to hear them even 

if they were to do so. Hence, a burglar’s intent to commit a 

specific felony at the time of the breaking and entering may be 

inferred from the circumstances. Circumstantial evidence alone 

is sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction.

Evidence of intent need not be insurmountable, but there must be 

a specific fact that provides a solid basis to support a reasonable 

inference that the defendant had the specific intent to commit a 

felony. The evidentiary inference pointing to the defendant’s 

intent must be separate from the inference of the defendant’s 

breaking and entering. The inference of intent must not derive 

from or be supported by the inference of breaking and entering. 

In other words, the evidence must support each inference—

felonious intent and breaking and entering—independently, and 

neither inference should rely on the other for support. This is not 

to say, however, that the same piece of evidence cannot support 

both inferences.

Requiring independent evidence of intent is necessary to 

maintain the distinction between burglary and other criminal 

offenses involving property invasion such as criminal trespass or 

residential entry. Permitting the felonious intent element to be 

inferred from the inference of breaking and entering would 

render the intent element meaningless and read it out of the 

statute. 

Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 229-30 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

[26] In Baker, the defendant was charged with Class B felony burglary after he broke 

into a church and, while inside the church, opened several cupboards and 
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drawers. Id. at 228, 231. Upon review, the Indiana Supreme Court held that 

evidence demonstrating that defendant had opened several cupboards and 

drawers, standing alone, permitted a reasonable inference of the defendant’s 

felonious intent at the time of entry. Id. at 231. In reaching this holding, the 

Indiana Supreme Court explained that: 

Looking through the kitchen cupboards and drawers was not a 

necessary step in the act of breaking and entering the church. It 

was an additional act, separate and distinct from the breaking 

and entering, in which the defendant chose to engage. The 

opening of cabinets and drawers by an intruder suggests, among 

other things, that the person opening them was looking for 

something to take. From this, the jury reasonably could have 

concluded that the defendant broke and entered the church with 

an intent to commit theft. 

Id. 

[27] The facts presented in the instant matter support the reasonable inference that 

Cooper broke in and entered Bocock’s apartment with the intent to commit a 

felony, i.e., theft, therein. Again, upon entering Bocock’s apartment, Officer 

Harris observed that the apartment door had been forced open, that drawers in 

the bedroom had been opened, that a safe located in the bedroom closet had 

been forced open and its contents spilled onto the floor, and that a laptop 

computer appeared to have been removed from a docking station in the spare 

bedroom. Further, upon returning to his apartment, Bocock confirmed that his 

laptop computer had been taken and indicated that he had not given anyone 
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permission to enter his apartment, take his laptop computer, or open his 

drawers and safe. 

[28] We find the facts presented in the instant matter to be similar to those presented 

in Baker. As such, in light of the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Baker, we

conclude that Cooper’s act of looking through Bocock’s drawers, forcing open 

Bocock’s safe, and removing Bocock’s laptop computer from its docking station 

constituted additional acts that were separate and distinct from the breaking 

and entering from which the jury could reasonably infer an intent to commit 

theft. 

Conclusion

[29] The evidence is sufficient to sustain Cooper’s conviction for Class B felony 

burglary. As such, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

[30] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Baker, J., and Bailey, J., concur.