12 July 2007

Homeland Defense

Joint Publication 3-27
PREFACE

i 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides doctrine for the defense of the US homeland across the range 

of military operations. It provides information on command and control, interagency and 

multinational coordination, and operations required to defeat external threats to, and 

aggression against, the homeland. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination for defense of the homeland. It provides military guidance for the 

exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) 

and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for 

use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this 

publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the 

mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the 

accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

 a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of 

combatant commands, sub unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as 

part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 

ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational 

command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, 

regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

WALTER L. SHARP 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

ii JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

iii 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

• General .......................................................................................................................I-1 

• Threats.........................................................................................................................I-3 

• Global Active, Layered Defense ................................................................................I-5 

• The Homeland Defense Operational Framework .......................................................I-6 

• Homeland Defense Legal and Policy Considerations.................................................I-9 

• Key Planning Considerations for Homeland Defense Operations............................I-13 

CHAPTER II 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERAGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES 

• General...................................................................................................................... II-1 

• Command and Control Relationships and Responsibilities...................................... II-1 

• Interagency Responsibilities and Considerations ................................................... II-16 

• Command and Control Considerations for Multinational Operations.................... II-22 

• Synchronization and Integration of Homeland Defense Operations ...................... II-22 

CHAPTER III 

AIR OPERATIONS 

• General..................................................................................................................... III-1 

• Air Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense............................................. III-1 

• Homeland Air Defense ............................................................................................ III-3 

• Aviation Security Policy.......................................................................................... III-6 

CHAPTER IV 

LAND OPERATIONS 

• General.....................................................................................................................IV-1 

• Land Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense ..........................................IV-2 

• US Northern Command Land Operations................................................................IV-3 

• US Pacific Command Land Operations...................................................................IV-5 

• US Southern Command Land Operations................................................................IV-6 
Table of Contents 

iv JP 3-27 

CHAPTER V 

MARITIME OPERATIONS 

• General...................................................................................................................... V-1 

• Maritime Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense .................................... V-1 

• Joint Force Maritime Component Operations........................................................... V-4 

• United States Navy and United States Coast Guard Relationships .......................... V-5 

• Maritime Operations Requiring Interagency Coordination ...................................... V-7 

• Employment of Fires............................................................................................... V-11 

CHAPTER VI 

SPACE OPERATIONS 

• General.....................................................................................................................VI-1 

• Space Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense.........................................VI-1 

• Ballistic Missile Defense .........................................................................................VI-3 

CHAPTER VII 

OTHER SUPPORTING OPERATIONS AND ENABLING ACTIVITIES 

• General....................................................................................................................VII-1 

• Information Environment........................................................................................VII-1 

• Defense Critical Infrastructure................................................................................VII-8 

• Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction .............................................................VII-9 

• Sustainment...........................................................................................................VII-10 

APPENDIX 

A Transitioning Between Homeland Defense and Civil Support.............................. A-1

B Key Interagency Organizations...............................................................................B-1 

C North American Aerospace Defense Command Missions, Organization, 

and Structure ........................................................................................................C-1 

D Key Homeland Defense Legal and Policy Documents.......................................... D-1 

E References...............................................................................................................E-1 

F Administrative Instructions.....................................................................................F-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I -- Abbreviations and Acronyms .........................................................................GL-1 

Part II -- Terms and Definitions ...................................................................................GL-8
 Table of Contents 

v 

FIGURE 

I-1 Homeland Defense Strategic Threat Environment ............................................I-4 

I-2 Homeland Defense Operational Framework .....................................................I-7 

I-3 Sources of Guidance for the Homeland Defense Mission...............................I-10 

I-4 Guidance and Policy for the Intelligence Oversight Program .........................I-11 

II-1 Geographic Combatant Commanders’ Areas of Responsibility...................... II-2 

II-2 United States Northern Command Homeland Defense 

 Command Relationships .................................................................................. II-5 

II-3 US Territories, Possessions, and Freely Associated States Located in the US 

Pacific Command Area of Responsibility........................................................ II-8 

II-4 United States Pacific Command Homeland Defense 

 Command Relationships .................................................................................. II-9 

II-5 United States Southern Command Homeland Defense 

 Command Relationships ................................................................................ II-11 

II-6 Notional Interagency Coordination Construct............................................... II-20 

III-1 Considerations for Homeland Defense ........................................................... III-2 

III-2 National Capital Region – Integrated Air Defense System ............................ III-5 

IV-1 Homeland Defense Land Operations Rapid Response Process......................IV-4 

IV-2 Homeland Defense Land Operations Sustained Response Process................IV-6 

IV-3 Homeland Defense Land Operations in the US Southern Command Area of 

Responsibility .................................................................................................IV-7 

A-1 Notional Relationship Between Homeland Defense, Civil Support and 

Homeland Security Missions ........................................................................... A-2 

B-1 Combat Support Agencies ................................................................................B-2 

B-2 Department of Homeland Security Organization Chart....................................B-7 

C-1 North American Aerospace Defense Command Command Relationships ......C-5 

C-2 North American Aerospace Defense Command Operational Area ..................C-7 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

vii

Provides a Thorough Introduction to Homeland Defense Operations

Discusses Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities

Describes Air, Land, Maritime, and Space Operations in the Homeland

Defense Context

Outlines Other Supporting Homeland Defense Operations and Enabling

Activities

Introduction

Defense of the homeland is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s)

highest priority with the goal to defeat threats at a safe distance

from the homeland.

Homeland defense (HD) is the protection of US sovereignty,

territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure

against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed

by the President. DOD is responsible for the HD mission, and

therefore leads the HD response, with other departments and

agencies in support of DOD efforts.

In today’s complex threat environment, our approach to HD must

address all aspects of the operational environment. Externally,

the United States has sought to shape the international environment

through the application of diplomatic, economic, military, and

informational means.

The homeland is confronted by a variety of interrelated threats that

demand coordinated procedures and synchronized efforts among

US Government (USG) departments and agencies charged with law

enforcement and national defense. These threats include any

transnational activity including international terrorism, narcotics

trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime that

threatens the national security of the United States. These threats

also include extremists and opportunists who enter into

relationships of convenience that exploit the capabilities of the

other and cloud the distinction between crime and terror.

A secure US homeland is

the Nation’s first priority.

Threats.

The number of

adversaries that threaten

our ability to protect our

interests represents a

considerable challenge.
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Executive Summary

JP 3-27

Evidence suggests that terrorist organizations have grown more

extreme in their objectives and actions and are less concerned that

attacks on innocent civilians or public infrastructure will undermine

support for their causes. Some groups have attained a considerable

degree of financial independence and essentially “declared war”

on the United States with little regard as to how we will respond.

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support calls for

securing the United States from attack through an active, layered

defense in depth. This active, layered defense seamlessly integrates

US capabilities in the forward regions of the world, in the

geographic approaches to US territory, and within the US

homeland.

The purpose of HD is to protect against and mitigate the impact of

incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population,

and defense critical infrastructure (DCI). In order to accomplish this,

DOD HD objectives are to (1) identify the threat; (2) dissuade

adversaries from undertaking programs or conducting actions that could

pose a threat to the US homeland; (3) ensure defense of the homeland

and deny an adversary’s access to the nation’s sovereign airspace,

territory, and territorial seas; (4) ensure access to space and information;

(5) protect DCI; (6) deter aggression and coercion by conducting

global operations; (7) decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence

fails; and (8) recover from any attack or incident.

HD operations are conducted globally, throughout every

operational environment (this includes the air, land, maritime, and

space domains and the information environment). While each

domain is geographically separate, it is the actions conducted in

each of these domains that provide the pillars of HD; together

these actions provide the overall HD construct. The information

environment is also considered distinct but it resides within each

of the four domains. Outside of the United States (in the forward

regions and approaches), DOD conducts HD operations to detect,

deter, prevent and if necessary defeat adversaries that try to access

the homeland. Military activities within the homeland are

conducted within the land, airspace, and territorial waters of the

United States. These activities require freedom of movement and

access to information and space capabilities. Operations may

include protection of DCI, air interdiction, maritime interception,

land operations, and others.

The Constitution provided the basis for HD activitiesthrough the

guarantee of domestic tranquility and the provision for the common

Our enemies will continue

to employ a variety of

tactics that could

significantly affect the US

economy and global trade.

Global Active, Layered

Defense.

The Homeland Defense

(HD) Operational

Framework.

HD Legal and Policy

Considerations.
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Executive Summary

defense of the Nation. As Commander in Chief, the President must

carry out the Constitutional responsibilities of the chief executive,

including the protection of the United States from invasion and domestic

violence. Guidance to implement this authority comes in many forms

to include Presidential directives and orders, laws, court decisions,

strategic documents, and policy.

The commitment of military power to resolve crises has traditionally

involved the use of lethal weapons or the implicit or explicit threat

to use them. However, the nature of HD operations mandates

consideration for employment of a variety of weapon capabilities

to include those of the nonlethal variety. Self defense is an inherent

right and obligation, exercised by the unit commander in response to a

hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Individual self-defense is

exercised IAW establised SROE. Nonlethal capabilities provide an

effective alternative means of employing force to reduce the probability

of death or serious injury to noncombatants or belligerents. Employment

of nonlethal capabilities should be considered for inclusion in HD plans.

Commanders and their staffs should consider the interrelationship

between HD and civil support (CS) operations (i.e., the potential

for transition between the mission areas and simultaneous

operations) to address interagency coordination and

collaboration in their planning and execution efforts.

Understanding nonmilitary capabilities is key to successful

operations. Capabilities of our multinational partners are key

enablers for DOD planners to consider, particularly for operations

in the forward regions and defense of the approaches to the

homeland. Public affairs (PA) must be included in all phases of

planning and coordination from the onset of HD operations. Due

to the involvement of other federal agencies in HD missions,

military PA will operate in an interagency environment with

emphasis on cooperation, coordination, and unity of effort. The

goal of PA in HD operations is to ensure all federal agencies speak

with one voice and provide consistent, factual information to the

public. Protection applies domestically in the context of HD.

Training and joint intelligence preparation of the operational

environment must be conducted to ensure adequate planning and

implementation of protection measures. Finally, the Armed Forces

of the United States must be prepared to conduct prompt, sustained,

and decisive combat operations in all operating conditions.

During the conduct of HD

operations, US military

forces must be prepared to

use force.

Key Planning

Considerations.
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Executive Summary

JP 3-27

Combatant commanders (CCDRs) exercise combatant command

(command authority) of assigned forces, and are directly

responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef)

for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of

their commands. CCDRs prescribe the chain of command within

their commands and designate the appropriate authority to be exercised

by subordinate commanders. SecDef has overall authority for DOD

and is the President’s principal assistant on military matters concerning

HD. Assistant SecDef for Homeland Defense and America's

Security Affairs is responsible for the overall supervision of all DOD

HD related activities, including HD and CS missions within DOD.

Assistant SecDef for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict

and Interdependent Capabilities is the principal civilian advisor to

SecDef on special operations activities and resources. Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) advises the President and SecDef

on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting the

SecDef in implementing operational responses to threats or acts of

terrorism; and translating SecDef guidance into operation orders.

Because their areas of operation include US territory, Commander,

US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), Commander,

US Pacific Command, (CDRUSPACOM), and Commander, US

Southern Command (CDRUSSOUTHCOM) are the commanders

most closely associated with HD activities (they are also referred to in

this publication as CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities). They

are responsible for planning, organizing, and executing HD operations

within their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). The other

CCDRs support them and contribute to the protection of US homeland

either through actions within their own AORs or through global

responsibilities assigned in the Unified Command Plan. Commander,

US Strategic Command is responsible for providing the nation with

global deterrence capabilities and synchronizing DOD efforts to combat

adversary weapons of mass destruction worldwide. For HD,

Commander, US Special Operations Command serves as a

supported or supporting commander for selected counterterrorism

activities and serves as a supporting commander to the CCDRs with

geographic HD responsibilities within their respective AORs.

Commander, US Transportation Command provides airlift and

tanker forces, as well as base opening and command and control

capabilities to supported commanders. Commander, US Joint

Forces Command’s role in HD is to provide support as joint force

provider, integrator, and trainer. Finally, Reserve Component (RC)

forces are integral to the accomplishment of peacetime missions and

Military forces will always

remain under the control

of the established Title 10,

Title 14, or Title 32, US

Code chain of command

when conducting

operations.

Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities
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Executive Summary

conflict prevention. Guidelines for the utilization of RC forces are

found in Title 10, United States Code.

The complex environment in which HD operations are conducted

(characterized by an AOR of literally thousands of different jurisdictions,

many agencies and organizations, and several allies and coalition

partners) necessitates coordinated and integrated operations with our

HD partners to ensure the mutual security of our nations, safety of our

populations, and viability of our critical infrastructure.

At the strategic level, DOD interaction and participation is largely

performed by senior DOD and military leaders and their support

staff, to include SecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and

Vice-CJCS in such key committees as the National Security Council,

the Homeland Security Council, including their respective Principals

Committee and Deputies Committee, and the various policy

coordination committees. Operational coordination is conducted within

appropriate joint force command centers and their corresponding

federal, state, tribal, and local interagency facilities and intergovernmental

organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and/or the private sector.

Expedited procedures and protocols for coordination of USG defense

and security activities are vital to protection of the homeland.

Within the US homeland, DOD and US military forces must

effectively deal with time compression of actions, potential impact

on US domestic population and DCI, and unique legal and policy

guidelines. These forces face continuous media scrutiny, must be

sensitive to sovereignty and jurisdictional considerations and

mindful of political dimensions of a domestic response, yet

responsive enough to deal with the varied threats to the homeland.

This environment necessitates an effective interagency process

and program.

Multinational operations include alliances or coalitions between two

or more nations to best achieve their common interests. To conduct

the full range of HD operations, the CCDRs with geographic HD

responsibilities are required to coordinate actions with all instruments

of national power, as well as multinational and nonmilitary organizations.

The joint force commander (JFC) must be fully cognizant of the strategic

direction in order to establish the priorities, timelines, goals and

objectives for HD missions that allow synchronization and integration

of air, land, maritime, space and supporting operations for unified action.

DOD policies, international and command agreements, federal

constitutional and statutory law, security cooperation plans, and selected

Interagency coordination

and interoperability.

Command and control

considerations for

multinational operations.

Synchronization and

integration of HD

operations.
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Executive Summary

JP 3-27

operation plans provide guidance which must be integrated by the

CCDR to achieve synchronization.

DOD is charged with defeating air threats to the United States, such

as attacks from military aircraft and ballistic and cruise missiles. DOD

must also be prepared to intercept nontraditional threats, even when

the intent to harm the United States is uncertain. Early detection and

successful interception of these types of potential threats require very

close cooperation with DOD’s interagency partners.

The combatant commanders with geographic HD responsibilities

must consider the unique aspects of aerospace operations within

the homeland. Among these unique aspects are the vast areas of

operation, the civilian control of airspace, the peacetime

environment, the continuous nature of HD operations, and very

restrictive engagement criteria.

At the direction of the President through SecDef, DOD conducts

homeland air defense using defensive counterair operations, which

are comprised of active and passive air and missile defense.

Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) is the overall umbrella operation

covering HD for North America and Hawaii. As the binational leading

element of this operation, NORAD is tasked to support ONE by

employing the forces and command and control necessary to protect

North America from air attack. Further, because terrorists and other

adversaries consider an attack on the National Capital Region (NCR)

a continuing goal, it requires focused defense and security measures.

DOD employs an integrated air defense system as part of the aroundthe-clock, multilayered, joint military and interagency, effort. In addition,

the Transportation Security Agency and other elements of the

Department of Homeland Security, as well as the Department of Justice

and the Department of Transportation, conduct significant aviation

security efforts throughout the United States and in the NCR. Through

the NCR Coordination Center (NCRCC), various agencies have

improved situational awareness of the actions of their defense partners.

Representatives from other state and local law enforcement agencies

and the Joint Air Defense Operations Center also participate at the

NCRCC when threats or circumstances warrant.

The likelihood of conventional large-scale land attack on the US may

be remote, but the wide-range of threats that do exist must be addressed

by land forces conducting HD. Historically, US land forces have

HD air operations.

Air, Land, Maritime, and Space Homeland Defense Operations
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Executive Summary

concentrated on defeating threats as far away from the homeland as

possible, and that remains the over-arching goal.

Land operations conducted in support of HD require commanders to

consider unique elements during planning and execution. More so

than during traditional overseas military operations, HD operations

also require significant coordination and partnership between federal,

state, tribal, and local government and agencies, especially since there

is a significant overlap between DOD and law enforcement organization

roles and functions.

The CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities must anticipate, plan,

and be prepared for the possibility of land defense operations. Specific

defensive land operations in support of HD may include security

operations through force protection (FP) tasks or protection of critical

defense infrastructure. Offensive operations take the initiative from

the enemy, gaining freedom of action creating desired effects to achieve

operational objectives. Although land defense forces may be required

to defend in the short term, decisive results require shifting to the offense

as soon as possible.

As with other military operations, HD operations in the land domain

are planned and executed by the CCDRs, through their respective

combatant commands, and the subordinate commands; either

Service specific task force headquarters, joint task forces, or a

joint force land component commander.

Securing the maritime domain is essential to keeping the homeland

safe. DOD, through the relevant CCDR, is prepared to respond

to maritime threats from the forward regions to the homeland.

DOD plays the lead role in a maritime HD construct, where DOD

is identified as the federal agency with lead responsibility whether

it is by discovery of a threat during normal operations, which

requires immediate action, or through the protocols established

by the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan.

The MOTR protocols and procedures allow rapid response to shortnotice threats and require interagency partners to begin coordination

activities at the earliest possible opportunity. The MOTR coordination

process is conducted through a virtual network of interagency

national and operational command centers. This coordination

process is the key element in determining which agency is the right

choice for leading the USG response and what other agencies are

needed to support the response effort. The goal is to identify threats

HD land operations.

HD maritime operations.
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Executive Summary

JP 3-27

as early and as distant from the homeland as possible, but no later

than to allow time to defeat or otherwise overcome threats at a

safe distance from the United States.

The joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) plans and

executes operations in the maritime domain while supporting the

operations of the other components as directed. JFMCC planning

must be in consonance with the guidance of senior commanders, must

support the JFC concept of operations, and should support other

component commanders as well.

Maritime HD operations may be accomplished independently or in

support of other operations. When established, a maritime area of

operations can include international and territorial waters, harbor

approaches, ports, waterfront facilities, and those internal waters and

rivers that provide access to port facilities (including associated

airspace).

A close alliance of US maritime forces is increasingly crucial to contend

with challenges to US sovereignty and maritime HD that continually

grow more diverse and complex. Continuous US Navy and US Coast

Guard teamwork across the spectrum of maritime operations provides

a strong foundation for dealing effectively with emerging challenges

that include the global war on terrorism, regional conflict, crisis

response, sanctions enforcement, arms trafficking, weapons

proliferation, mass migration, smuggling, natural resource depletion,

and FP.

Maritime operations in support of HD that require a coordinated

government (federal, state, tribal, local) effort range from protection

of ports, harbor approach defense, and countermine and mine

countermeasures operations to littoral, boarding, and maritime

interception operations.

The region of space above the United States cannot be owned or

possessed like territory. It is USG policy, however, that purposeful

interference with US space systems will be viewed as an

infringement on the Nation’s sovereign rights. In order to deter or

preempt attacks and protect our military space assets, DOD conducts

space operations in support of HD through the space control, space

support, space force enhancement, and space force application mission

areas.

Space HD operations.
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Executive Summary

HD is a high-priority activity, requiring the marshalling of all available

space capabilities. Key to maximizing US space capabilities is the

successful integration of civilian space assets with military space

capabilities. Use of civilian space capabilities is essential to the

effectiveness of our ability to successfully accomplish the four space

mission areas.

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities are designed to detect,

deter, defend against and defeat adversary ballistic missile threats. The

goal is to build a layered, integrated capability to defeat inbound missiles

in all phases of flight and involves passive defense, active defense,

attack operations, and battle management. BMD of the homeland

includes the synchronization and integration of capabilities to destroy

or disrupt adversary missiles in flight or prior to launch. BMD fully

synchronizes and integrates offensive and defensive actions and

supporting systems to achieve unity of effort. GCCs are responsible

for planning and executing ballistic missile defense within their

geographic AORs, while CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for

planning, integrating, coordinating and advocating global missile defense

operations and support. BMD employs the operational elements of

missile defense to provide protection across the range of operations

and has a direct relationship to several other HD (and CS) operations,

such as consequence management, DCI, FP, space operations, and

combating weapons of mass destruction.

 Supporting operations and enabling activities should be considered in

the planning and execution of all HD operations. They often overlap

with other activities and specific tasks may be closely related. The US

conducts operations, including HD, in a complex, interconnected, and

increasingly global operational environment. The information

environment and activities conducted in each of the domains influence

and shape each other.

Information operations is the integrated employment of the core

capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations,

psychological operations, military deception, and operations security,

in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence,

disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision

making while protecting our own.

Knowledge of the enemy is one of the fundamentals of joint warfare.

Intelligence is the discipline that provides this knowledge and information

about an adversary’s capabilities, centers of gravity, and probable

Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities

The information

environment.

Intelligence.

Information operations.

BMD Operations.
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course of action. Intelligence assessments help the commander

determine the magnitude of the threat, which forces to deploy, the

most efficient manner in which to deploy those forces, and probable

enemy reactions.

As part of the overall information environment, the Global

Information Grid (GIG) represents the interconnected

communications system of DOD. In addition to the DOD GIG, the

HD information environment includes non-DOD information

infrastructures that can directly support HD operations. DOD requires

information from non-DOD organizations and thus, has a reliance on

some non-DOD processes, assets, and infrastructures to accomplish

the HD mission.

DOD must lead the way in transitioning from a “need to know” to a

“need to share” culture. The need to share information is an operational

necessity that avoids withholding information and minimizes the potential

for operational gaps. The overall goal is to attain seamless access to

the trusted information sharing environment for all response forces

throughout the AOR.

This publication provides doctrine for the defense of the US

homeland across the range of military operations. It provides

information on command and control, interagency and

multinational coordination, and operations required to defeat

external threats to, and aggression against, the homeland. It also

includes considerations for transitioning between homeland defense

and civil support operations.

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION

I-1 

1. General 

a. The Homeland. A secure US homeland is the Nation’s first priority. Defense of 

the homeland is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) highest priority with the goal to 

identify and defeat threats at a safe distance from the homeland. The US homeland, 

described as the physical region that includes the continental United States (CONUS), 

Alaska, Hawaii, US territories and possessions, and surrounding territorial waters and 

airspace, is exposed to the possibility of harm from hostile states or non-state actors. The 

Nation must always be vigilant against such threats. To preserve the freedoms guaranteed 

by the Constitution, the Nation must have a homeland that is secure from threats and 

violence, especially terrorism. 

b. Homeland defense (HD) is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, 

domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and 

aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. An “external” threat or 

aggression is an action, event, or circumstance that originates from outside the boundaries of 

“This nation must have ready forces that can bring victory to our country, and safety 

to our people . . . innovative doctrine, strategy, and weaponry . . . to revolutionize the 

battlefield of the future and to keep the peace by defining war on our terms . . . We 

will build the security of America by fighting our enemies abroad, and protecting our 

folks here at home.” 

President George W. Bush 

10 January 2002 at signing of the 

2002 National Defense Appropriations Bill

The Nation must have a homeland that is secure from threats and violence, especially terrorism. 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-27 

the homeland. Threats planned, prompted, promoted, caused, or executed by external actors 

may develop or take place inside the boundaries of the homeland. The reference to 

“external threats” does not limit where or how attacks could be planned and executed. DOD 

is responsible for the HD mission, and therefore leads the HD response, with other 

departments and agencies in support of DOD efforts. Note that HD differs from 

homeland security (HS). HS, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security 

(NSHS), is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist acts within the United States, 

reduce America’s vulnerabilities to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from 

attacks that do occur. HS missions are those typically conducted by federal, state, tribal, 

and/or local law enforcement, government agencies, and the private sector and include law 

enforcement missions related to terrorism and other criminal activities, as well. The 

distinction between HS and HD is explored further in Appendix A, “Transitioning Between 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support.”

 (1) While DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility for defending 

against traditional external threats and/or aggression (e.g., nation-state attack), against other 

threats (e.g., terrorism) DOD may be in support of the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), or another partner federal agency. DOD support 

must be properly requested by the agency and then approved by the President or the 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef). When ordered to conduct HD operations, DOD 

coordinates closely with other federal agencies or departments who may be 

undertaking simultaneous operations to counter the same or other threats. 

 (2) HD operations may be conducted in a complex environment characterized by 

numerous and varied threats, multiple jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state, tribal, and local), 

nontraditional partners (intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), and private sector), and international partnerships. This 

environment makes coordination with interagency and multinational partners 

imperative to ensure synchronized and integrated operations. DOD must be prepared to 

operate in concert with other United States Government (USG) forces that are conducting 

HS or other law enforcement activities to counter threats to the homeland. This may mean 

HD operations coincident in time or geography to DHS forces to counter terrorist threats, 

such as those of a hijacked commercial aircraft or attempts to perpetrate attacks using 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) carried on maritime conveyances, among others. The 

overlap in departmental roles, responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities amongst USG 

organizations has made the USG review its approach to coordination during operation 

execution. The approach promotes early identification of the desired USG outcome and 

subsequent collaboration with operational partners. Guidance such as the Maritime 

Operational Response (MOTR) Plan, is an example of this new approach to operations.

Interagency roles, responsibilities, and required coordination protocols for conduct of air 

defense and maritime security operations to counter threats to the US are contained in the 

President-approved Aviation Operational Threat Response (AOTR) and MOTR Plans, 

discussed later in Chapters III and V, respectively. Specific guidance on interagency 

headquarters planning and command center support of HD operations is found in annex V 

(Interagency Coordination) of HD concept plans (CONPLANs). 
 Introduction 

I-3 

 c. DOD must also engage in emergency preparedness (EP), which consists of 

measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to 

protect a nation’s institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency 

management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. EP is considered 

a part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities. EP is not a stand-alone activity, but an 

integral part of training, mitigation, and response for both HD and civil support (CS).

d. DOD’s other mission in securing the homeland is CS, which is conducted in 

support of other federal, state, tribal and/or local authorities when requested, and approved 

by the President or SecDef. HD and CS missions may occur simultaneously and require 

extensive coordination, integration, and synchronization. In addition, HD operations may 

transition to or from CS. Considerations regarding transition operations are covered in more 

detail, in Appendix A, “Transitioning between Homeland Defense and Civil Support.” 

For more information on CS, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, Civil Support. 

2. Threats 

 In today’s complex threat environment, our approach to HD must address all aspects 

of the operational environment. Externally, the United States has sought to shape the 

international environment through the application of diplomatic, economic, military, and 

informational means. Given the persistent nature of current threats, a proactive, 

comprehensive approach to HD is required. The uncertainty of the strategic environment is 

influenced by numerous factors (see Figure I-1). 

 a. The homeland is confronted by a variety of interrelated threats that demand 

coordinated procedures and synchronized efforts among USG departments and agencies 

charged with law enforcement and national defense, particularly those that have overlapping 

roles, responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities. These include transnational threats – 

defined in Title 50, United States Code (USC), Section 402 as “any transnational activity 

(including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens 

the national security of the United States.” These threats also include extremists (e.g., 

foreign terrorist organizations) and opportunists (e.g., drug cartels and alien smuggling 

organizations) who enter into relationships of convenience that exploit the capabilities of the 

other and cloud the distinction between crime and terror. 

b. Other threats originate from an adversary’s choice of weapons that ranges from 

nonlethal to lethal capabilities (e.g., conventional, psychological, informational, chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives [CBRNE] weapons). Weapons 

and tactics designed to kill or terrorize large numbers of people or destroy facilities of 

strategic importance are within the capabilities of many of our adversaries. 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-27 

c. Adversaries have or are obtaining WMD and the means to deliver them, including 

long-range ballistic missiles. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 illustrate an 

adversary’s capabilities and willingness to use asymmetric approaches. Successfully 

countering symmetric and asymmetric threats and reducing risks requires a concerted 

and coordinated effort by DOD and other federal agencies; state, tribal, and local 

governments; and every citizen. 

d. A complex, uncertain, and volatile threat environment presents the United States 

with a resource-intensive challenge at home and abroad. The number of adversaries that 

threaten our ability to protect our interests represents a considerable challenge. Our world 

appears smaller today because of the range, speed, and capability of modern weapons and 

the ease with which information can be made available. Today, technology and access to 

information present new challenges in an increasingly global economy. A number of 

regional powers, non-state actors, and transnational groups possess the capability to 

challenge the interests of the United States and those of our allies. Adversaries have taken 

advantage of this technology and employ it in their own operations, in areas such as moving 

money, communicating with cells in their organizations, approving missions, or conducting 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on potential targets. They are also using these 

advances, especially in information technology and media, to wage propaganda campaigns 

and various forms of information operations (IO) against the United States and our allies. In 

spite of intensive counterproliferation and arms control efforts, the likelihood that 

adversaries will employ WMD against the United States or its interests has increased. A 

HOMELAND DEFENSE STRATEGIC 

THREAT ENVIRONMENT

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

Diminished protection afforded by geographic distances

Traditional threats remain

Greater risk of a weapon of mass destruction attack

Increased potential for miscalculation and surprise

Increased potential for terrorist attacks

Increased challenges from weak and failing states and non-state actors

Increasing diversity in sources and unpredictability of the locations of 

conflict

Threats to US vital interests overseas

Increasing transnational threat challenging both the Department of Defense 

and law enforcement

Figure I-1. Homeland Defense Strategic Threat Environment 
 Introduction 

I-5 

CBRNE attack could come in a variety of forms, from release through conventional means 

such as a ballistic missile to unconventional means (e.g., a “suitcase” radiological device). 

e. Risk remains from terrorist (state and non-state sponsored) and traditional 

nation-state attacks. Among these, terrorist and extremist groups and their networks 

currently pose the greatest nontraditional threat and they remain determined to strike the US 

homeland. Evidence suggests that terrorist organizations have grown more extreme in their 

objectives and actions and are less concerned that attacks on innocent civilians or public 

infrastructure will undermine support for their causes. Some groups have attained a 

considerable degree of financial independence and have essentially “declared war” on the 

United States with little regard as to how we will respond. Regardless of source, our 

enemies will continue to employ a variety of tactics, in particular asymmetric employment 

of weapons, platforms, and information that could significantly affect the US economy and 

global trade. 

See JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, for more information on countering terrorist threats. 

f. There is a persistent threat to our homeland posed by the influx of illegal 

immigrants, special interest aliens, drugs, and contraband. Criminal organizations have 

established networks to move people, drugs, or other contraband; although these networks 

have been used for illegal immigrants seeking work, they can also be used for terrorists who 

want to conduct violent acts. While only in unique and/or extraordinary circumstances 

would DOD take the lead to secure our borders, transnational threats pose a serious danger 

to the Nation and require the combined efforts of law enforcement agencies (LEAs), 

intelligence agencies, and support from DOD assets to enhance LEA efforts to secure our 

borders and conduct counter illicit trafficking operations. 

See JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations and JP 3-28, Civil Support.

3. Global Active, Layered Defense 

a. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support calls for securing the United 

States from attack through an active, layered defense in depth. This active layered defense 

seamlessly integrates US capabilities in the forward regions of the world, in the geographic 

approaches to US territory, and within the US homeland. 

b. The Forward Regions. The forward regions are foreign land areas, sovereign 

airspace, and sovereign waters outside the homeland. In the forward regions, the objective 

is to detect, deter, prevent, or when necessary, defeat threats to the United States. Actions 

span the range of military operations and may include combat operations, engagement 

activities, peace operations, or preemptive measures such as direct action missions, 

computer network attack and defense or global strikes. 

c. The Approaches. The approaches extend from the limits of the homeland to the 

forward regions. The approaches are not uniformly defined, may not have boundaries and 

may be characterized based on a specific situation. The primary objective of actions within 

the approaches is to locate threats as far from the homeland as possible and defeat them at a 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-27 

safe distance. These actions conducted in the approaches to counter threats may span the 

range of USG operations. The National Military Strategy (NMS) emphasizes the importance 

of joining the efforts of multinational partners and other USG agencies to form an integrated 

defense of the air, land, maritime, and space approaches to US sovereign territory. 

Protecting these approaches requires enhanced, persistent surveillance that allows the United 

States to detect, track, and if required, interdict and defeat potential threats. 

d. The Homeland. The US homeland includes CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, US 

territories and possessions, and the surrounding territorial waters and airspace. In the event 

that defeating threats in forward regions and approaches fail, DOD must be postured to take 

immediate, decisive action to defend against and defeat the threat in the homeland. Actions 

in the homeland may take place simultaneously and in coordination with operations 

conducted in the approaches and/or forward regions.

4. The Homeland Defense Operational Framework 

a. The purpose of HD is to protect against and mitigate the impact of incursions or 

attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population, and defense critical infrastructure 

(DCI). The following are DOD HD objectives: 

(1) Identify the threat. 

(2) Dissuade adversaries from undertaking programs or conducting actions that 

could pose a threat to the US homeland. 

(3) Ensure defense of the homeland and deny an adversary’s access to the nation’s 

sovereign airspace, territory, and territorial seas. 

(4) Ensure access to space and information. 

(5) Protect DCI. 

(6) Deter aggression and coercion by conducting global operations. 

(7) Decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. 

(8) Recover from any attack or incident.

 b. The diversity of threats requires that the military instrument of national power take 

a broad role in preparing for, detecting, deterring, preventing, defending against, and 

defeating threats. It also has a broad role in supporting recovery from attacks. HD 

operations fall within this overarching framework and must be synchronized to ensure 

success. This requires coordination of activities across time, space, and purpose, as well as 

interagency coordination and coordination with IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector to 

defend the homeland. 
 Introduction 

I-7 

 c. HD operations are conducted globally, throughout every operational 

environment (this includes the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the 

information environment). While each domain is geographically separate, it is the actions 

conducted in each of these domains that provide the pillars of HD; together these actions 

provide the overall HD construct. The information environment is also considered distinct 

but it resides within each of the four domains. HD operations are conducted in accordance 

with the law; treaties and international agreements; national authorities; and DOD, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), joint, military department, and military 

Service policy, directives, and doctrine. DOD conducts offensive and defensive actions (to 

include preemptive activities) in order to deter, disrupt, and destroy adversary capabilities at 

their source. HD operations may be active or passive. Figure I-2 illustrates these 

relationships. 

(1) Outside of the United States (in the forward regions and approaches), DOD 

conducts HD operations to detect, deter, prevent, and, if necessary, defeat adversaries that 

try to access the homeland. Activities include maintaining our freedom to operate in space, 

access information, and conduct campaigns or operations to disrupt and defeat terrorists and 

other adversaries before they are able to launch an attack within the US homeland. Finally, 

DOD security cooperation initiatives (e.g., exercises, exchanges, experimentation, and 

counterproliferation and nonproliferation activities) foster positive working relationships 

and interoperability with friends and allies. 

HOMELAND DEFENSE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Air Land Maritime Space

HOMELAND DEFENSE

PREPARE

DETECT

DETER

DEFEND PREVENT

RECOVER

DEFEAT

Information Environment

Offensive Actions/Active and Passive Defenses

Figure I-2. Homeland Defense Operational Framework
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-27 

 (2) Military activities within the homeland are conducted within the land, 

airspace, and territorial waters of the United States. These activities require freedom of 

movement and access to information and space capabilities. Operations may include 

protection of DCI, air interdiction, maritime interception, land operations, and others.

 d. HD operations begin with thorough preparation. HD EP activities are 

undertaken to ensure DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the 

President and SecDef in designated national security emergencies. DOD EP activities at the 

strategic level may focus on actions associated with continuity of government (COG) and 

continuity of operations (COOP). However, at the operational level, DOD emergency 

preparations to defend the homeland include activities such as joint and interagency 

interoperability and coordination preparation, joint training exercises and experimentation, 

and development of information and intelligence architectures. 

 e. Early detection is imperative in facilitating timely response to and decisively 

engaging threats before they reach the homeland. In the forward regions and approaches 

persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) provides decision makers 

with early warning and assessments. For the CONUS portion of the air domain, this is 

integrated with North American Aerospace Defense Command’s (NORAD’s) tactical 

warning/attack assessments. The United States and its multinational partners seek a global 

awareness of all threats to our national security individually and collectively to increase our 

ability to deal with threats at home and abroad. 

 f. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible 

threat of unacceptable counteraction or the prospect of mission failure. Deterring 

adversaries is a key HD objective. DOD EP activities, coupled with offensive and defensive 

capabilities, may deter an adversary from threatening or attacking the homeland. Welltrained, rapidly deployable forces conducting realistic exercises provide another example of 

actions and capabilities that may serve as a deterrent. 

 g. Prevention of attacks on the homeland includes security procedures undertaken 

by the public and private sectors in order to discourage terrorist acts. The United States and 

its multinational partners work together to synchronize activities, which may also include 

diplomatic, economic, and political measures.

 h. If deterrence and prevention fails, DOD must be prepared to rapidly respond by 

defending against threats and aggression. DOD, as directed by the President, may 

conduct preemptive and/or offensive HD actions in accordance with international and 

domestic law, national policy, and directives. The objective of these operations is to 

destroy, degrade, disrupt, or neutralize weapons, launch platforms, supporting command, 

control, and communications, logistics and ISR capabilities before they are employed by an 

adversary. Air, land, maritime, space, and special operations forces (SOF) may conduct 

offensive actions. Examples of offensive operations may include global strikes. Global 

strikes may be described as rapidly planned, limited-duration, extended-range precision 

attacks that are conducted to achieve strategic objectives. They may be executed against 
 Introduction 

I-9 

highly valued adversary assets using lethal and nonlethal methods. Targets include 

adversary centers of gravity; WMD, their delivery systems, production facilities, and storage 

sites; key leadership; and critical infrastructure. Other examples of HD offensive actions 

include direct action, space denial, and computer network attack. 

 i. Primary defensive actions associated with HD missions include active and 

passive defense measures to defeat threats that are already deployed or en route to the target. 

Active defenses employ limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area 

or position to the enemy and are designed to reduce the effectiveness of or stop attacks on 

our sovereign territory, domestic population, and DCI. Active defenses employ air, land, 

maritime, space, and SOF. Defenses may also include IO capabilities to disrupt adversary 

information systems. The objective of HD passive defense is to reduce the probability of, 

and minimize the damage caused by, hostile actions. Passive defenses include force 

protection (FP) and critical infrastructure risk mitigation actions to reduce targeting 

effectiveness. They are normally developed and executed throughout the defending force. 

Passive defense measures include selected FP actions, deception, mobility, dispersion, 

systems hardening and protective construction, strategic, operational, and tactical warning 

and surveillance, and operations security (OPSEC). 

 j. Recovery actions from an HD perspective are those actions taken by a military 

force during or after operational employment to restore its combat capability to its full 

operational readiness. 

 k. Information Environment. The information environment is the aggregate of 

individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on 

information. The actors include leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. 

Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, apply, or 

disseminate information. The information environment is where humans and automated 

systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore the principal 

environment of decision making. Even though the information environment is considered 

distinct, it resides within each of the four domains of air, land, maritime, and space. The 

information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, 

informational, and cognitive. More on the information environment is provided in Chapter 

VII, “Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities.”

5. Homeland Defense Legal and Policy Considerations 

 a. There are a variety of documents that provide guidance for conducting HD 

operations. Figure I-3 lists a number of the key documents that assist military forces in 

planning and conducting HD missions. Specific planning factors, requirements, and 

objectives for HD operations are contained in operation plans (OPLANs) and CONPLANs 

associated with the HD mission. An additional list of documents that provide guidance for 

the HD mission is included in Appendix D, “Key Homeland Defense Legal and Policy 

Documents.” 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-27 

 b. Basic Principles. The Constitution provides the basis for HD activities through 

the guarantee of domestic tranquility and the provision for the common defense of the 

Nation. Under Article II of the US Constitution, the President is given the authority as the 

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and of the militia of several states when called 

into the actual service of the United States. As Commander in Chief, the President must 

carry out the Constitutional responsibilities of the chief executive. Article IV, Section 4 of 

the Constitution also requires the “United States” to protect the states from invasion and 

domestic violence. This includes the authority of the President as the Commander in Chief. 

Guidance comes in many forms to include Presidential directives and orders, laws, court 

decisions, strategic documents, and policy.

SOURCES OF GUIDANCE FOR THE 

HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSION

US Constitution

United States Code

Presidential Decision Directives and Executive Orders

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 

Key Assets

National Military Strategy

Unified Command Plan

Strategic

Contingency Planning Guidance

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support

Maritime Sentinel

Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security

Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan

Security Cooperation Guidance

North American Aerospace Defense Command Agreement

Canada-United States Basic Defense Document

National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directives

National Security Strategy

National Strategy for Homeland Security

National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

National Strategy for Maritime Security

National Defense Strategy of the United States of America

National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America

 Planning Guidance

Figure I-3. Sources of Guidance for the Homeland Defense Mission
 Introduction 

I-11 

 c. Special Considerations. Certain functions, such as intelligence operations, rules 

of engagement (ROE), and rules for the use of force (RUF), have specific applications and 

legal implications when conducted domestically. 

 (1) Intelligence Activities. Intelligence activities refer to all activities that DOD 

intelligence components are authorized to undertake in accordance with (IAW) DOD 

Directive (DODD) 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities. Intelligence activities include the 

collection, production, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence by 

DOD intelligence components. Counterintelligence is information gathered and activities 

conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 

assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, 

foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. IAW DODD 

5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities, foreign intelligence is information relating to the 

capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, but not 

including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities. 

 (a) Intelligence activities conducted by US intelligence organizations in the 

United States and its territories are strictly controlled. There are several regulations and laws 

that specifically govern the use of DOD intelligence assets and organizations in domestic 

operations. The program that covers the collection of information on US persons by the 

intelligence organizations is called intelligence oversight. Intelligence oversight ensures that 

intelligence personnel shall not collect, retain, or disseminate information about US persons 

unless done in accordance with specific guidelines. At the same time, intelligence oversight 

allows US intelligence organizations to obtain intelligence information required to protect our 

national security. Figure I-4 lists several policy and guidance documents for the intelligence 

oversight program. The guidance includes details on program implementation. 

GUIDANCE AND POLICY FOR THE 

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM

z

z

z

z

z

Executive Order 12333, 

DOD Directive 5148.11, 

DOD Directive 5240.1, 

DOD Directive 5240.1R, 

Geospatial Intelligence Policy Series, Section 6, 

 and Section 9, Part B, 

United States Intelligence Activities

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

Oversight (ATSD IO)

DOD Intelligence Activities

Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD 

Intelligence Components that Affect US Persons

“National Airborne Imagery 

Policy” “Domestic Imagery”

Figure I-4. Guidance and Policy for the Intelligence Oversight Program
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-27 

 (b) Publicly available open source information can be used to obtain basic 

situational awareness and regional industrial knowledge on any part of the world; however, 

intelligence oversight still applies to information gathered on US persons or companies. Open 

source information can enhance a commander’s awareness of the operational environment. 

 (c) Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations 

Not Affiliated with DOD. Some restrictions on information gathering apply DOD wide. 

IAW DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations 

not Affiliated with the Department of Defense, DOD policy prohibits collecting, reporting, 

processing, or storing information on individuals or organizations not affiliated with DOD 

except in those limited circumstances where such information is essential to the 

accomplishment of certain DOD missions outlined within the directive. Exceptions are 

defined in DODD 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities. 

Details on intelligence support to HD can be found in Chapter VII, “Other Supporting 

Operations and Enabling Activities,” and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

 (2) Psychological Operations. Under law, psychological operations (PSYOP) 

will not be conducted against US persons. However, PSYOP personnel and equipment may 

be used to support approved HD public affairs (PA) activities such as information 

dissemination, printing, reproduction, distribution, and broadcasting. 

A more complete discussion can be found in JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological 

Operations. 

 (3) Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force. During the conduct 

of HD operations, US military forces must be prepared to use force. The Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing 

Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces establishes fundamental policies and procedures 

governing the actions to be taken by US military commanders and personnel during global 

DOD operations including HD operations. 

 (a) ROE are directives issued by competent military authorities delineating 

the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate or continue operations. 

The standing ROE (SROE) establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the 

action to be taken by US commanders during all military operations, contingencies and 

routine military functions occurring outside US territory for mission accomplishment and 

the exercise of self-defense. SROE also apply to air and maritime HD missions 

conducted within US territory or territorial seas, unless otherwise directed by SecDef. 

SROE do not apply to law enforcement and security duties on DOD installations and 

off-installation while conducting official DOD security functions. Supplemental ROE 

may be necessary to meet mission-specific ROE requirements. 

 (b) RUF are directives issued to guide US forces on the use of force during 

various operations. The standing RUF (SRUF) apply to land HD missions occurring within 
 Introduction 

I-13 

US territory and to DOD forces, civilians, and contractors performing law enforcement and 

security duties at all DOD installations within or outside US territory, unless otherwise 

directed by SecDef. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) may augment SRUF by 

submitting a request for mission-specific RUF to CJCS for SecDef approval. 

 (c) ROE and RUF must conform to appropriate laws including federal law, 

the law of war, other relevant international law, and military law and they must conform to 

the situation and locality involved. In cases where National Guard (NG) forces are under 

state control, state ROE will apply. Commanders must educate their personnel on ROE 

and RUF and train them on the use of lethal and nonlethal force. Self-defense is an 

inherent right and obligation exercised by the unit commander in response to a hostile act or 

demonstrated hostile intent. Individual self-defense is exercised IAW established SROE. 

 (d) Employment of Fires. The commitment of military power to resolve 

crises has traditionally involved the use of lethal weapons or the implicit or explicit threat to 

use them. However, the nature of HD operations mandates consideration for employment of 

a variety of weapon capabilities to include those of the nonlethal variety. Nonlethal 

capabilities may provide an effective alternative means of employing force to reduce the 

probability of death or serious injury to noncombatants or belligerents. Employment of 

nonlethal capabilities should be considered for inclusion in HD plans, ROE, and RUF. 

Additionally, commanders should plan for and conduct ROE and/or RUF rehearsals to 

prepare their personnel for operations in defense of the homeland. 

Additional information on the employment of nonlethal capabilities can be found in multiService publication Field Manual (FM) 3-22.40, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 

(MCWP) 3-15.8, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.3.2, Air Force 

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.45 and US Coast Guard Publication 3-

07.31, NLW – Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.

6. Key Planning Considerations for Homeland Defense Operations 

 a. Interagency Coordination. Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency 

coordination is that which occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for 

the purpose of achieving an objective. It forges a vital link between the instruments of 

national power and other jurisdictional entities. DOD conducts interagency coordination at 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels through mutual sharing of situational awareness 

and participation in planning, training, exercises, education, and operations. Commanders 

and their staffs should consider the interrelationship between HD and CS operations 

(i.e., the potential for transition between the missions and simultaneous operations) to 

address interagency coordination and collaboration in their planning and execution 

efforts. Understanding nonmilitary capabilities is key to successful operations. 

 b. Multinational Coordination. The need to collaboratively develop operation plans 

extends to our allies and coalition partners. Capabilities of our multinational partners are 

key enablers for DOD planners to consider, particularly for operations in the forward 

regions and defense of the approaches to the homeland. 
Chapter I 

I-14 JP 3-27 

For more detailed information on interagency and multinational coordination see JP 3-08, 

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization 

Coordination During Joint Operations, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

 c. Public Affairs. The role of PA in HD operations is to support the joint force 

commander (JFC) by communicating truthful and factual unclassified information about 

DOD activities to US, allied, national, international, and internal audiences. Due to the 

involvement of other federal agencies in HD missions, military PA will operate in an 

interagency environment with emphasis on cooperation, coordination, and unity of effort. 

The goal of PA in HD operations is to ensure all federal agencies speak with one voice and 

provide consistent, factual information to the public. The federal agency with lead 

responsibility develops the key messages and provides PA guidance. Supporting agencies 

conduct their respective PA operations in concert with this guidance. PA must be included 

in all phases of planning and coordination from the onset of HD operations. 

For more information on PA, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

 d. Protection. The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force’s 

fighting potential in four primary ways — active defensive measures that protect the joint 

force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications from 

an adversary’s attack; passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and 

facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; applying technology and procedures to 

reduce the risk of fratricide; and emergency management and response to reduce the loss 

of personnel and capabilities due to accidents. It includes, but extends beyond, FP to 

encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of 

friendly nations; and other government agencies, IGOs and NGOs. The protection function 

applies domestically in the context of HD. 

 (1) There are protection considerations that affect planning in every joint 

operation. Even in a permissive environment risks exist from terrorism, criminal 

enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and computer hackers. Training and joint 

intelligence preparation of the operational environment must be conducted to ensure 

adequate planning and implementation of protection measures. 

 (2) GCCs are responsible for implementing an antiterrorism (AT) program in their 

areas of responsibility (AORs). The AT program is designed to prevent and detect terrorist 

attacks against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, resources, installations, and DCI, as 

well as the preparation to defend against, and plan the response to, the consequences of 

terrorist incidents. 

 (3) FP includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD 

personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. It does 

not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. All 

GCCs have FP responsibilities for their respective AORs to include those who’s AORs 

contain geographic areas of the homeland. Force health protection (FHP) compliments FP 
 Introduction 

I-15 

and includes all measures to provide for the health and safety of Service members (Chapter 

VII provides more information on FHP). 

 (4) Tactical control (TACON) for DOD FP provides directive authority and 

control for FP to a GCC; however, it does not necessarily provide TACON for non-FP 

missions. It allows the GCCs to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce FP conditions (of 

which AT measures are integral) for covered individuals. Commander, US Northern 

Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) has overall DOD AT program and FP responsibility in 

CONUS. However, CDRUSNORTHCOM’s TACON for FP authority does not apply to 

DOD family members. Day-to-day execution of the FP mission is accomplished by the 

Services, the DOD agencies, DOD field activities headquarters, and the combatant 

command headquarters located in the US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR. 

USNORTHCOM’s AT program and FP measures are outlined in the USNORTHCOM 

Antiterrorism (AT) Operations Order. 

For a complete description of the protection function and its elements, see JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations. For more information on DOD AT and FP programs, refer to DODD 2000.12, 

DOD Antiterrorism Program, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.16, DOD 

Antiterrorism Standards, and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

 e. Hazardous Operating Environments. The Armed Forces of the United States 

must be prepared to conduct prompt, sustained, and decisive combat operations in all 

operating conditions. This includes conditions resulting from deliberate or inadvertent use 

of CBRNE, man-made and accidental release of toxic industrial materials; and naturally 

occurring biological events such as pandemic diseases. Commanders and their staffs must 

take these potential conditions into account during planning and execution; ensuring that 

they plan, train, and exercise with their interagency counterparts in preparation for HD 

operations in any environment. 

Detailed information on conducting military operations in contaminated environments is 

found in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Environments and JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Chapter I 

I-16 JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER II 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERAGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES 

II-1 

1. General 

 a. For the HD mission, the President, exercising his constitutional authority as 

Commander in Chief, authorizes military action to counter threats to and within the 

United States. For the accomplishment of the HD mission, DOD conducts operations 

globally, throughout every operational environment. 

 b. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) exercise combatant command (command 

authority) (COCOM) of assigned forces, and are directly responsible to the President and 

SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their 

commands (Figure II-1 depicts the GCCs’ AORs). CCDRs prescribe the chain of 

command within their commands and designate the appropriate authority to be exercised 

by subordinate commanders. 

For detailed discussion of command relationships, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces 

of the United States and Section II, Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum.

2. Command and Control Relationships and Responsibilities 

 a. Military forces will always remain under the control of the established Title 10 

USC, Title 14 USC, or Title 32 USC chain of command when conducting operations. 

 (1) SecDef. As the President’s principal assistant on military matters, the 

SecDef has overall authority for DOD, hence the conduct and execution of the HD 

mission resides with SecDef. 

 (2) Assistant SecDef for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs 

(ASD[HD&ASA]). ASD(HD&ASA) is within the office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy (USD[P]). ASD(HD&ASA) is responsible for the overall supervision 

of all DOD HD related activities. The principal duty of ASD(HD&ASA) is to provide 

overall supervision of the HD and CS missions within DOD. For HD, ASD(HD&ASA) 

serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to SecDef, the USD(P) and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense for matters including, but not limited to the following: 

 (a) Preparedness to execute the national security missions of DOD pertaining 

to the HD of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and DCI. 

 (b) Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP). 

“In uniform, when I talk about terrorism it’s easy to assume that the war on terrorism 

is a military thing. It’s not at all. It demands the attention and action of all [sic. 

instruments] of national power.” 

Gen. Richard B. Myers 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

1 October 2001 – 30 September 2005 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-27 

 (c) DOD domestic AT in accordance with DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD 

Antiterrorism (AT) Program. 

 (d) DOD domestic counterterrorism (CT) activities, except those executed 

by SOF. 

 (e) DOD continuity-related activities, to include COOP, COG, and enduring 

constitutional government managed under the Defense Continuity Program. 

 (f) Policy guidance on HD-related education, training, and professional 

development programs. 

See JP 3-28, Civil Support, for specifics on CS operations. 

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS’ 

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

USCENTCOM

USEUCOM

USNORTHCOM

USPACOM

USSOUTHCOM

United States Central 

Command

United States European 

Command

United States Northern 

Command

United States Pacific 

Command

United States Southern 

Command

ANTARCTICA

ARCTIC

OCEAN

SOUTHERN

OCEAN

SOUTHERN

OCEAN

INDIAN

OCEAN

NORTH 

ATLANTIC 

OCEAN

SOUTH

ATLANTIC 

OCEAN

SOUTH 

PACIFIC 

OCEAN

NORTH

PACIFIC 

OCEAN

NORTH

PACIFIC 

OCEAN

ARCTIC

OCEAN

ARCTIC

OCEAN

USCENTCOM USPACOM

USEUCOM

USNORTHCOM

USSOUTHCOM

USPACOM

USCENTCOM

USNORTHCOM

ANTARCTICA

ARCTIC

OCEAN

NORTH 

POLE

USPACOM

USEUCOM

USEUCOM

USNORTHCOM

USSOUTHCOM

USNORTHCOM

Figure II-1. Geographic Combatant Commanders' Areas of Responsibility
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-3 

 (3) Assistant SecDef for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and 

Interdependent Capabilities (ASD[SO/LIC&IC]). ASD(SO/LIC&IC), under the 

USD(P), is the principal civilian advisor to SecDef and USD(P) on special operations/lowintensity conflict activities of DOD. This includes development and oversight of 

implementation of policy for DOD special operations (SO) activities and resources. 

 (4) Assistant to the SecDef for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 

Programs (ATSD[NCB]). ATSD(NCB) is directly responsible to SecDef for matters 

associated with nuclear weapons safety and security, chemical weapons demilitarization, 

and chemical and biological defense programs. 

 (5) Assistant SecDef for Health Affairs (ASD[HA]). The ASD(HA) is the 

principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness for all DOD health policies, 

programs, and activities. The ASD (HA) has the responsibility to effectively execute DOD's 

healthcare mission to maintain readiness and to provide healthcare services and support to 

members of the Armed Forces during military operations. In addition, DOD is a critical 

component in the Services activation of the federal coordinating centers that locate all 

civilian beds in a geographic location, arrange the transport of patients from arriving aircraft, 

and are responsible for all logistics of receiving mass casualties from a disaster area. 

 (6) Assistant SecDef for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA]). ASD(RA) is responsible 

for monitoring Reserve Component (RC) readiness and provides policy regarding the 

appropriate integration of RC forces into HD efforts. 

 (7) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As principal military advisor to the 

President and the SecDef, the CJCS has numerous responsibilities relating to HD and CS. 

These include advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, 

and programs; assisting SecDef in implementing operational responses to threats or acts of 

terrorism; and translating SecDef guidance into operation orders. The CJCS ensures that 

HD plans and operations are compatible with other military plans and assists CCDRs in 

meeting their operational requirements for executing HD operations that have been 

approved by SecDef. 

See JP 3-28, Civil Support for additional information. 

 b. Commander, NORAD and Geographic Combatant Commander 

Responsibilities. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the combatant 

commands’ missions, responsibilities, geographic AORs, and functions. As stipulated in 

the UCP, the GCCs of USNORTHCOM, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), and US 

Southern Command (USOUTHCOM) have specified tasks for HD activities (these 

commanders are referred to subsequently in this publication as CCDRs with geographic 

HD responsibilities). They are responsible for planning, organizing, and executing HD 

operations within their respective AORs. The other CCDRs support them and contribute 

to the protection of the US homeland either through actions within their own AORs 

(forward regions and approaches) or through global responsibilities assigned in the UCP. 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-27 

 (1) Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 

(CDRNORAD). By international agreement CDRNORAD leads the binational command 

composed of Canadian and US forces. NORAD’s primary missions are: aerospace warning, 

aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. CDRNORAD is responsible 

to the Canadian and US governments through the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and CJCS, 

respectively. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible to SecDef. While NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM have separate missions defined by separate sources, parts of the 

USNORTHCOM AOR overlaps with NORAD’s operational area (OA) (note that in the 

NORAD Agreement this is normally referred to as an area of operations “AO”). The 

organizations are separate commands, and neither is subordinate to the other or a part of the 

other, but their operational focus runs parallel in detecting, tracking, deterring, and if 

necessary, defeating threats in the air approaches and airspace of North America. NORAD 

and USNORTHCOM also share in the maritime warning mission. See Appendix C, “North 

American Aerospace Defense Command, Missions, Organization, and Structure” for 

detailed information on NORAD. 

 (2) CDRUSNORTHCOM. When directed by the President, 

CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for conducting military operations within the 

USNORTHCOM AOR utilizing forces to deter, detect, or defeat an incursion into sovereign 

territory. CDRUSNORTHCOM has COCOM over Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps 

component headquarters. When forces are attached to the command for HD operations, the 

deployment order (DEPORD) will establish command relationships. CDRUSNORTHCOM 

determines the appropriate joint command and control (C2) structure to employ these forces. 

CDRUSNORTHCOM may retain direct C2 of forces as the joint force commander (JFC), 

designate an existing joint task force (JTF) commander, or establish a new subordinate JTF. 

CDRUSNORTHCOM and subordinate JTF commanders will normally organize forces 

around a joint construct with functional component commanders. However, 

CDRUSNORTHCOM may conduct HD operations using any combination of subordinate 

JFCs and functional component, Service component, single Service task force (normally 

assigned to the Service component), or specific operational forces necessary to accomplish 

the mission. Figure II-2 provides the USNORTHCOM C2 structure. 

For additional information on C2, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States.

 (a) C2 for HD Air Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. C2 for HD 

air operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR is complex. When the NORAD OA and the 

USNORTHCOM AOR overlap, NORAD normally retains authority for the aerospace 

control and aerospace warning missions. For US-only air operations within CONUS 

Commander, Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH) may be designated the joint force air 

component commander (JFACC). Close coordination between the JFACC and NORAD is 

essential for synchronization of operations. For US-only air operations in Alaska, the 

Commander of the combined US-Canadian Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR) may be 

designated the JFACC. 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-5 

 (b) C2 for HD Land Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. Land 

defense forces generally plan and execute HD land operations using a mix of Service assets, 

primarily those of the Army and Marine Corps. Operations can be conducted through 

Service task forces or joint forces. Force size, composition and C2 relationships depend 

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND HOMELAND 

DEFENSE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

AFNORTH Air Forces Northern

JFACC Joint Force Air Component 

Commander

JFLCC Joint Force Land Component 

Commander

JTF-AK Joint Task Force Alaska

JFHQ-NCR Joint Force Headquarters 

National Capital Region

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime 

Component Commander 

JTF-CS Joint Task Force Civil Support

JTF-N Joint Task Force North

MARFORNORTH Marine Corps Forces North

NORAD North American Aerospace 

Defense Command

TF Task Force

USFFC United States Fleet Forces 

Command

USNORTHCOM United States Northern 

Command

NGB National Guard Bureau

SJFHQ Standing Joint Force 

Headquarters

USARNORTH US Army North 

USCG United States Coast Guard

COCOM

OPCON as Required

Coordination

Supporting Command

OPCON

TACON

NORAD/

COMBATANT 

COMMANDS

USNORTHCOM

SJFHQ

North

NGB USCG

JTF

AK

JTF

N

JTF

CS

TF TF

AFNORTH USARNORTH MARFORNORTHJFHQNCRUSFFC

JFACC JFLCC JFMCC

Figure II-2. United States Northern Command Homeland Defense Command 

Relationships
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-27 

upon the situation and mission requirements. Commander, US Army North 

(USARNORTH) generally is responsible for conducting HD land operations and may also 

be designated the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). USARNORTH 

provides two deployable task forces that become JTFs when augmented. Marine Corps 

Forces North (MARFORNORTH) can provide a functional component headquarters, with 

augmentation. If the Marine Corps component commander is assigned functional 

component commander responsibilities, execution of HD missions will normally be 

accomplished by an assigned Marine air-ground task force. 

 (c) C2 for HD Maritime Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. 

Commander, US Fleet Forces Command (COMUSFLTFORCOM) is a supporting 

commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM and is designated as the joint force maritime 

component commander (JFMCC). The flag officer serving as Commander, Coast Guard 

Atlantic Area serves separately as Commander, Coast Guard Defense Force East 

(CGDEFOR EAST). Additionally, Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area serves 

separately as Commander, Coast Guard Defense Force West (CGDEFOR WEST). US 

Coast Guard (USCG) forces under USCG Atlantic and Pacific area commanders may be 

designated operational control (OPCON) or TACON under the JFMCC, as required. The 

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of 

Homeland Security for Inclusion of the US Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland 

Defense and its annexes contain the specific C2 structure and relationships that ensure 

USNORTHCOM, through the JFMCC, is able to effectively bring all available resources to 

bear in conducting maritime operations to deter, detect and defeat threats and aggression 

against the US, its territories, and interest within the USNORTHCOM AOR. 

 (d) C2 for HD Special Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. C2 

relationships for SO are often complex. Commander, US Special Operations Command 

(CDRUSSOCOM) is assigned responsibility to lead, plan, synchronize, and as directed, 

execute global operations against terrorist networks. SOF in the US are normally under 

COCOM of CDRUSSOCOM. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM relinquishes 

OPCON/TACON of US based SOF and OPCON/TACON is assumed by 

CDRUSNORTHCOM for HD operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. Under certain 

circumstances, regardless of AOR, CDRUSSOCOM will exercise OPCON of SOF 

conducting operations in support of the global war on terrorism. C2 arrangements for SOF 

should be carefully delineated in operation orders and execute orders (EXORDs). 

 (e) Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (SJFHQ-North). SJFHQNorth is a standing joint C2 element within the USNORTHCOM staff. When 

USNORTHCOM is in routine, non-crisis operations, it functions as a combat operations 

staff organization that monitors and assesses activities that affect the AOR. When a crisis 

occurs, SJFHQ-North is prepared to immediately execute contingency operations by either 

standing up a JTF or augmenting the staff of a new or existing JTF or single-Service task 

force. 

 (f) Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR). 

JFHQ-NCR plans, coordinates, maintains situational awareness, and as directed, employs 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-7 

forces for land and maritime HD in the National Capital Region (NCR) to safeguard the 

Nation’s capital. NORAD provides air sovereignty protection to USNORTHCOM and 

JFHQ-NCR in the NCR through its aerospace and maritime warning and aerospace control 

missions and through the NCR integrated air defense system (NCR-IADS). 

 (g) Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK). JTF-AK is comprised of Alaskan 

Command (ALCOM) personnel, a subunified command of US Pacific Command 

(USPACOM). Placed under the OPCON of USNORTHCOM for HD (and CS) operations, 

JTF-AK is responsible for preventing, deterring, defending, and defeating national security 

threats within the Alaska joint operations area (JOA) as well as fulfilling FP requirements 

within the JOA. 

 (h) Joint Task Force North (JTF-N). JTF-N supports federal LEAs in the 

interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to CONUS. 

During operations, active duty military forces are placed in support of a federal agency with 

lead responsibility. JTF-N contributes to HD by deterring, detecting, monitoring, and 

supporting the interdiction of suspected transnational threats. The organization also fuses 

and disseminates intelligence; contributes to the common operational picture; coordinates 

support to principal federal agencies; and supports security cooperation initiatives to secure 

the homeland and enhance regional security. 

 (i) Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS). JTF-CS plans and integrates 

DOD support to the designated primary agency for CBRNE consequence management (CM). 

JTF-CS contributes to HD as the only dedicated military C2 organization focused on the CM 

core element of DOD’s active, layered defense to reduce the effects of WMD attack or event 

and assists in the restoration of essential operations and services. 

 (j) Ad hoc USNORTHCOM Joint Task Force. When combat forces for a 

joint HD operation are attached to USNORTHCOM, CDRUSNORTHCOM may decide to 

employ these forces, based upon the scope and objectives of the operation to establish one or 

more new subordinate JTFs. JTF-AK and JFHQ-NCR (when designated a JTF) could have 

combat forces attached to conduct HD operations within their respective JOAs. However, 

while USNORTHCOM has standing JTFs, these commands have specific operational 

missions and may not have the personnel or expertise to manage a new HD operation. 

CDRUSNORTHCOM may task assign component command headquarters or supporting 

commanders to provide the core of a new JTF headquarters with augmentation from the 

other Services. 

For detailed information on consequence management see JP 3-28, Civil Support and JP 3-

41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence 

Management. 

 (3) Commander, USPACOM (CDRUSPACOM). CDRUSPACOM integrates 

and synchronizes a broad range of military activities to defend the homeland against attacks 

and aggression. These activities include the protection of the domestic population and DCI 

of the United States and its territories. It also includes the domestic population and critical 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-27 

US TERRITORIES, POSSESSIONS, AND FREELY ASSOCIATED 

STATES LOCATED IN THE US PACIFIC COMMAND AREA OF 

RESPONSIBILITY

US TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS

America Samoa

Commonwealth of Northern Marianas

Guam

Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands

Johnston Atoll

Kingman Reef

Midway Islands

Palmyra Atoll

Wake Island

Federated States of Micronesia

Republic of the Marshall Islands

Republic of Palau

FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES

Figure II-3. US Territories, Possessions, and Freely Associated States Located in the US 

Pacific Command Area of Responsibility

infrastructure of the sovereign nations, commonly called freely associated states, under the 

Compact of Free Association located in the USPACOM AOR. These nations include the 

Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of 

Palau. Figure II-3 identifies the US territories located in the Pacific and the nations included 

in the Compact of Free Association. Additionally, in support of USNORTHCOM, military 

and intelligence operations contribute to the active, layered defense in-depth of the western 

approach to CONUS and Alaska. 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-9 

 (a) When a HD event occurs in the Pacific AOR, USPACOM is the 

supported command. Support relationships are coordinated among CCDRs with geographic 

HD responsibilities for all HD events. CDRUSPACOM approaches HD through a 

functional construct as shown in Figure II-4. The Commanding General, US Army Pacific 

(CG USARPAC) assumes functional component commander responsibilities as the land 

component commander for the USPACOM portion of the US and its territories. Dualhatted as the Commander JTF-Homeland Defense (CDR JTF-HD), CG USARPAC 

responsibilities include situational awareness of operations conducted against a direct threat 

to the JTF-HD JOA (this includes CBRNE CM and CS) and working closely with 

applicable federal, state, tribal, and local agencies when orchestrating DOD operations. All 

HD activities are coordinated with USNORTHCOM across AOR boundaries, including 

those concerning Hawaii and Alaska. 

 (b) The Commander, Pacific Air Forces (COMPACAF) assumes functional 

component commander responsibilities as the air component commander for the 

USPACOM portion of the US and its territories. In addition to the air responsibilities, 

COMPACAF assumes the responsibility for HD operations for space for the USPACOM 

portion of the US and its territories. Commander, Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT), as the 

JFMCC, assumes functional component commander responsibilities as the maritime 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND HOMELAND

DEFENSE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

AADC-GU Area Air Defense Commander, Guam

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, US Northern Command

AADC-HI Area Air Defense Commander, Hawaii

CDRUSPACOM Commander, US Pacific Command 

CGDEFOR WEST Commander, Coast Guard Defense Force WEST

CG USARPAC Commanding General, US Army Pacific

COCOM combatant command (command 

authority)

Coordination

Support

COCOM

OPCON

CDRUSNORTHCOM

AADC HI

AADC GU

Joint Task Force

Homeland Defense

(CG USARPAC)

COMPACFLT

CGDEFOR

WEST

Task Force Hawaii

(CG USARPAC)

Installations

Task Force Guam

(COMNAVMARIANAS)

Installations

COMPACAF

CDRUSPACOM COMSOCPAC

Homeland 

Defense

Coordination 

Team

Kwajalein

Homeland 

Defense

Coordination 

Team American 

Samoa

COMNAVMARIANAS Commander, Navy Forces Marianas

COMPACAF Commander, Pacific Air Forces

COMPACFLT Commander, US Pacific Fleet

COMSOCPAC Commander Special Operations 

Command

OPCON operational control 

Figure II-4. United States Pacific Command Homeland Defense Command 

Relationships
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-27 

component commander for the USPACOM portion of the US and its territories and 

coordinates maritime responsibilities with the Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area, who 

serves separately as CGDEFOR WEST. This includes planning and execution of maritime 

operations and security cooperation. US Coast Guard (USCG) forces under USCG Pacific 

area commanders may be designated either OPCON or TACON to the JFMCC, as required. 

The Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of 

Homeland Security for Inclusion of the US Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland 

Defense and its annexes contain the specific C2 structure and relationships that ensure 

USPACOM, through the JFMCC, is able to effectively bring all available resources to bear 

in conducting maritime operations to deter, detect and defeat threats and aggression against 

the US, its territories, and interest within its AOR.

 (c) To assist the CDR JTF-HD in accomplishing HD missions, organizations 

such as the USPACOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Joint Interagency Task Force 

West, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), and USPACOM Service 

components provide intelligence, interagency coordination, and military forces.

 (d) SO conducted in the USPACOM AOR are normally under the COCOM 

of CDRUSPACOM while OPCON is exercised through the theater SO component, 

SOCPAC. SOCPAC is tasked to conduct regional activities that may support future 

operations. 

 (e) As shown in Figure II-4, the CDR JTF-HD employs two task forces and 

subordinate coordination teams in two Pacific operational areas associated with Task Force 

Hawaii and Task Force Guam. These forces, along with local installations, conduct HD 

operations and respond to support requests by civil authorities. 

 (4) Commander, USSOUTHCOM (CDRUSSOUTHCOM) integrates and 

synchronizes military activities to defend the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the 

territory of the US Virgin Islands against attacks and aggression. CDRUSSOUTHCOM’s 

military activities in South and Central America and the Caribbean basin also contribute to 

the active, layered defense in-depth of the southern approaches to CONUS. 

 (a) CDRUSSOUTHCOM approaches HD through a functional construct as 

shown in Figure II-5. The CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities coordinate to 

provide mutual support for HD. Commander, US Army South (USARSO) assumes 

functional component commander responsibilities as the land component commander for 

the USSOUTHCOM portion of the US and its territories. Commander, US Air Forces 

South assumes responsibilities as the air component commander (to include space) for the 

USSOUTHCOM portion of the US and its territories and coordinates with NORAD for air 

defense of the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Commander, US Navy Forces Southern 

Command (USNAVSO) assumes responsibilities as the maritime component commander 

for the USSOUTHCOM portion of the US and its territories. 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-11 

 (b) The Joint Interagency Task Force South, Special Operations Command 

South, and US Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH) provide support for HD 

missions in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. 

 (5) Commander, US European Command (CDRUSEUCOM) and 

Commander, US Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM). CDRUSEUCOM and 

CDRUSCENTCOM play a vital role in HD by supporting the CCDRs with geographic HD 

responsibilities. Specifically, they provide a forward presence to obtain information on 

potential adversaries that may be planning attacks on the homeland and they deny 

adversaries air, land, and maritime approaches to the homeland. They also conduct 

operations within their AORs in support of HD. 

 c. Functional Combatant Commander Responsibilities 

 (1) Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). 

CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for providing the nation with global deterrence 

capabilities and synchronizing DOD efforts to combat adversary weapons of mass 

destruction worldwide. Specifically, CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for the following 

activities associated with HD: 

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND HOMELAND

DEFENSE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Coordination

Supporting Command

COCOM

OPCON

USNORTHCOM USSOUTHCOM USPACOM

USSOUTHAF

(JFACC)

NORAD

USNAVSO

(JFMCC)

USARSO

(JFLCC) MARFORSOUTH JIATF-S

OPCON operational control

USARSO US Army South

USNAVSO US Navy Forces Southern Command

USNORTHCOM US Northern Command

USPACOM US Pacific Command

USSOUTHAF US Air Forces South

USSOUTHCOM US Southern Command

COCOM commbatant command (command authority)

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force South

MARFORSOUTH Marine Corps Forces South

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense

Command

Figure II-5. United States Southern Command Homeland Defense Command 

Relationships 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-27 

 (a) Planning, integrating and coordinating global missile defense operations 

and support. 

 (b) Integration of global strike planning and C2 in support of theater and 

national objectives. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) normally supports the 

GCCs in the conduct of global strike missions, unless otherwise directed by the President. 

 (c) Planning, integrating, and coordinating global DOD IO activities that 

directly support national objectives to include computer network operations, as well as 

defense of DOD computers and computer networks of the Global Information Grid (GIG). 

 (d) Planning, integrating, and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and 

global operations. 

 (e) Planning and implementing security assistance relating to military space 

operations, and providing assessments. 

 (f) Planning, integrating, and synchronizing DOD combating WMD efforts 

in support of national security objectives. 

 (2) Commander, US Special Operations Command. CDRUSSOCOM leads, 

plans, synchronizes, and as directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks. 

US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) also trains, organizes, equips and deploys 

combat ready SOF in support of other combatant commands. For HD, CDRUSSOCOM 

serves as a supported or supporting commander for selected CT activities and serves as a 

supporting commander the CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities within their 

respective AORs. 

 (3) Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM). 

CDRUSTRANSCOM provides airlift and tanker forces, as well as base opening and C2 

capabilities to supported commanders. For HD operations, CDRUSTRANSCOM provides, 

upon request, a director of mobility forces to advise on air mobility operations. 

CDRUSTRANSCOM serves as the supporting commander to CDRUSSTRATCOM for 

designated global strike and selected CT activities for HD. 

 (4) Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM). 

CDRUSJFCOM’s role in HD is to provide support as joint force provider, integrator, and 

trainer. Through joint concept development and experimentation the command also 

provides concept validation for the combatant commands. 

 d. Reserve Component Responsibilities. NG (in a Title 10 USC status) and 

reserve forces are collectively referred to as RC and are integral to the accomplishment of 

peacetime missions and conflict prevention. They consist of the Army National Guard of 

the United States (ARNGUS), the US Army Reserve (USAR), the US Navy Reserve 

(USNR), the US Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), the Air National Guard of the United 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-13 

States (ANGUS), the US Air Force Reserve (USAFR), and the USCG Reserve 

(USCGR). Guidelines for the utilization of RC forces are found in Title 10 USC. 

Title 32 USC contains guidelines for the training of the Army National Guard 

(ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG), as well as their domestic use for 

homeland defense activities.

 (1) National Guard Bureau (NGB). NGB is a , joint bureau of the Department 

of the Army and Department of the Air Force, that serves as the NG channel of 

communications for all matters pertaining to the NG between the Army and Air Force, the 

50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the US Virgin 

Islands. While the NGB does not exercise operational authority, it provides coordination 

and communication between the states, DOD, and other federal agencies. This role is 

crucial when the states conduct domestic operations in a Title 32 USC status. The NGB, 

under provisions of Title 10 USC, Section 10503 is responsible for the following matters: 

 (a) Allocating unit structure, strength authorizations, and other resources to 

the ARNGUS and the ANGUS. 

 (b) Prescribing the training discipline and training requirements for the ARNG 

and the ANG and the allocation of federal funds for the training of the ARNG and the ANG 

 (c) Ensuring that units and members of the ARNG and the ANG are trained 

by the states in accordance with approved programs and policies of, and guidance from, the 

Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the 

Air Force. 

 (d) Monitoring and assisting the states in the organization, maintenance, and 

operation of NG units so as to provide well-trained and well-equipped units capable of 

augmenting the active forces in time of war or national emergency. 

 (e) Planning and administering the budget for the ARNGUS and the 

ANGUS. 

 (f) Supervising the acquisition and supply of, and accountability of the states 

for, federal property issued to the NG through the property and fiscal officers designated, 

detailed, or appointed under Title 32 USC, Section 708. 

 (g) Granting and withdrawing, in accordance with applicable laws and 

regulations, federal recognition of (1) NG units, and (2) officers of the NG. 

 (h) Establishing policies and programs for the employment and use of NG 

technicians under Title 32 USC, Section 709. 

 (i) Supervising and administering the Active Guard and Reserve program as 

it pertains to the NG. 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-27 

 (j) Issuing directives, regulations, and publications consistent with approved 

policies of the Army and Air Force, as appropriate. 

 (k) Facilitating and supporting the training of members and units of the NG 

to meet state requirements. 

 (l) Such other functions as the Secretaries may prescribe. 

 (2) Chief, National Guard Bureau. The CNGB, is the principal advisor on NG 

matters to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army 

and Air Force. This role does not include combatant command (warfighting) authority, nor 

does it include the requirement to organize, conduct training, and equip. 

 (3) National Guard. The NG has both state and federal missions and is at 

different times under the C2 of the governors or the President. Every NG member takes an 

oath to uphold the US Constitution and the constitution of his or her respective state. The 

NG trains under the control of the states according to the rules and regulations prescribed by 

the USG. 

 (a) The ARNG and ANG are established in 54 states and territories, 

including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territory of the US Virgin Islands, the 

Territory of Guam, and the District of Columbia. The head of the NG in each state is the 

adjutant general, who reports to the governor. However, in the District of Columbia, the 

head of the NG is called the commanding general, and he or she reports through channels 

ultimately to the President of the United States. The adjutant general usually heads either a 

state department of military affairs or a combined state department of military affairs and 

emergency management. The adjutant general may have other duties under state law such 

as state director of homeland security. 

 

 (b) The NG is both part of the organized militia and the RC (when in Title 10 

USC status). The ARNGUS and the ANGUS are the respective Service part of the RC. 

Every member belongs to either the ARNG or ANG of his or her state, and also to either the 

ARNGUS or the ANGUS. It is important to distinguish between NG forces acting under 

state authority and NG forces when called into federal service. The ARNGUS and ANGUS 

are RC organizations under the C2 of the President. The ARNG and ANG train for their 

federal military mission according to Title 32 USC, under state control as members of their 

respective state militias. 

 (c) A member of the National Guard can serve in three different statuses: 

 1. Title 10 USC Status – Federal Active Duty. The member is 

ordered to active duty under various sections of Title 10 USC. This status is almost 

always based on membership in the ARNGUS or ANGUS. The member’s pay and 

allowances are federally funded, and the member is under federal C2. This is the status 

members always serve in outside the United States, whether for training or operational 

missions. When NG personnel or units are activated by order of the President under 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-15 

Title 10 USC for HD missions, they respond under the same legal restrictions and C2 

structures as active component (AC) forces to include the provisions of the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice (see Appendix A, “Transitioning Between Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support”). 

 2. Title 32 USC Status – National Guard Duty. The member is 

ordered to duty under various sections of Title 32 USC. This status is used for both 

training and certain operational missions. The member’s pay and allowances are 

federally funded, but the member is under state C2. For training, this status includes 

weekend drills, annual training, and certain other types of training paid out of reserve 

force appropriations. Under the authority of special statutes, this status is also used for 

certain operational missions, including CD missions, HD activities, and the WMD civil 

support teams. 

 3. State Active Duty Status. The member is ordered to state active 

duty under provisions of state law in the state where he or she is a member of the state 

NG. This status is used for state responses to natural and man-made disasters and civil 

disturbances. The member’s pay and allowances are state funded, and the member is 

under state C2. The member’s pay and allowances in some states may not be the same 

under state law as they are under federal law. 

For additional information on state active duty status in relation to CS, see JP 3-28, Civil 

Support. 

 (d) Each state has a joint force headquarters (JFHQ), which integrates the 

ARNG and ANG resources. The JFHQs provide a focal point to interoperate jointly with 

combatant commands and any federal joint task forces that may perform HD (or CS) within 

a state’s boundaries. 

 (e) JTFs in each state facilitate the joint employment of state NG resources 

under the JFHQ-state for operational missions in either Title 32 USC status or state active 

duty. 

 (4) Reserve Forces. Each of the seven parts of the RC is structured and operated 

in a manner similar to its respective AC counterpart. Unlike the ARNGUS and ANGUS, 

the remaining five RC organizations (USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR, USCGR) operate 

under the same C2 relationships in both peacetime and wartime and do not have Statespecific relationships. When called to active duty, RC forces conduct HD operations under 

Title 10 USC guidelines exactly as AC forces. While on active duty, members of the 

USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR and the USCGR are subject to the provisions of the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice. Reserve forces are called to active duty through the 

mobilization process. 

For additional information on the RC mobilization/demobilization process, see JP 4-05.1, 

Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Call-up.
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-27 

3. Interagency Responsibilities and Considerations 

 a. Interagency Coordination and Interoperability. HD operations are 

conducted in a complex environment that is characterized by an operational environment 

with thousands of different jurisdictions (federal, state, tribal, and local), many agencies 

and organizations, and several allies and coalition partners. This necessitates coordinated 

and integrated operations with our HD partners to ensure the mutual security of our 

nations, safety of our populations, and viability of our critical infrastructure. 

 (1) The interrelationship between HS, HD and CS operations, and the potential 

for transition between the missions, creates a dynamic and fluid environment where 

interagency coordination and interoperability become a focal point. Giving the initiative to 

an adversary, because seamless operations with interagency partners could not be 

coordinated due to an inability to cooperate or be interoperable, is unacceptable. 

 (2) Although interagency coordination and interoperability can at times be a 

significant challenge and take considerable effort, it also provides numerous benefits and 

“force multipliers” for DOD, CCDRs, and HD partners. For example, NORAD, DOD, the 

Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and DHS 

(USCG, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Customs and Border Protection 

– Office of Air and Maritime Operations) have enhanced the integration and interoperability 

of systems and sensors; expanded information sharing and the number of liaison personnel in 

key operations centers; implemented interagency air defense related exercises; and, enhanced 

real-time warning conferences, all of which have improved HD (and CS) capabilities. 

 b. The Interagency Process and Coordinating Organizations 

 (1) Interagency coordination is conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels. At the strategic level, DOD interaction and participation is largely performed by 

senior DOD and military leaders and their support staff, to include SecDef, Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and Vice-CJCS in such key committees as the National 

Security Council (NSC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC), including their respective 

Principals Committee and Deputies Committee, and the various policy coordination 

committees. CCDRs with appropriate SecDef and CJCS direction, approval, and 

coordination, may interact with and provide input to select policy coordination committees 

on significant national and/or theater level issues on which the commander can add unique 

insight and value added recommendations. 

 (2) Homeland Security Council. The HSC is a national-level multiagency 

coordination entity to advise and assist the President on HS and other policy issues. 

Organized similar to the NSC, the HSC consists of the HSC Principals Committee, the HSC 

Deputies Committee and various policy coordination committees. 

 (3) NSC/HSC Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs). The PCCs are the primary 

forums used across the interagency for coordination of policy, including that associated with 

maritime security, aviation security, and border and transportation security. Additionally, the 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-17 

Counterterrorism Security Group, attended by the Joint Staff and appropriate Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) representatives, provides an operationally focused forum to 

coordinate USG activities associated with terrorist threats globally. 

 (4) National Operations Center. The National Operations Center (NOC) was 

established in May 2006 with the approval of an NRP change that linked together and 

integrated the functions of the former Homeland Security Operations Center, the Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis (OI&A), the National Response Coordination Center, the National 

Infrastructure Coordination Center, and the Planning Element from the Incident 

Management Planning Team (IMPT). The NOC provides critical functions and capabilities 

that are central for the DHS to lead the unified national effort to secure America and 

implement domestic incident management authorities, roles and responsibilities mandated 

by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents

and the Homeland Security Act. The NOC’s mission is to serve as the primary national 

level hub for domestic situational awareness, common operating picture, informational 

fusion, information sharing, communications, and operations coordination pertaining to the 

prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic incident management. 

 (a) The NOC is a 24x7, multiagency operations center that collects all threat 

and all hazards information from federal, state, tribal, local, private-sector, and open sources 

from across the US and abroad. 

 (b) The NOC serves as the National Fusion Center collecting and 

immediately fusing all-source information to quickly determine if there is a terrorism nexus 

and supports OI&A in deliberate fusion. 

 (c) The NOC fuses state fusion center, law enforcement, national 

intelligence, emergency response, and private sector reporting and disseminates homeland 

security information to appropriate intelligence and law enforcement agencies, other 

security partners, and the DHS and White House/HSC leadership. 

 (d) The NOC is the primary conduit to the White House and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security for domestic situational awareness for the prevention of terrorist attacks 

and domestic incident management within the US. 

 (e) The NOC maintains domestic situational awareness through a common 

operating picture. 

 (f) The NOC is comprised of five elements and operates as a matrix organization: 

 1. NOC-Watch (Multiagency) 

 2. NOC-IA (Intelligence) 

 3. NOC-PE (Planning Element/IMPT) 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-27 

 4. NOC-NRCC (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]: 

National Response Coordination Center) 

 5. NOC-NICC (National Infrastructure Coordinating Center) 

 (5) The combatant command interagency process complements and supports the 

higher level or strategic interagency process, and may involve such key elements as joint 

interagency coordination groups (JIACGs); security cooperation programs, plans and 

initiatives; country team interaction and coordination; and annex V (Interagency 

Coordination) to formal OPLANs and CONPLANs; all designed to enhance information 

sharing, effective joint and interagency planning, and maximize coordinated operations. 

The interagency coordination process is essential when HD operations are conducted in 

proximity to our domestic population and critical infrastructure. 

 (6) Operational coordination is conducted within appropriate joint force command 

centers and their corresponding federal, state, tribal, or local interagency facilities and IGOs, 

NGOs, and/or the private sector. Expedited procedures and protocols for coordination of 

USG defense and security activities are vital to protection of the homeland. 

 c. Importance of Interagency Communications, Coordination, Collaboration, 

and Cooperation in Homeland Defense Operations.

 (1) Within the US homeland, DOD and US military forces must effectively deal 

with time compression of actions, potential impact on US domestic population and DCI, and 

unique legal and policy guidelines. These forces face continuous media scrutiny, must be 

sensitive to sovereignty and jurisdictional considerations, and mindful of political 

dimensions of a domestic response, yet responsive enough to deal with the varied threats to 

the homeland. This environment necessitates an effective interagency process and program. 

 (2) Partner agencies and organizations of the USG in the homeland and overseas 

support and assist DOD in the conduct of HD operations. For example, the intelligence 

community (IC) and associated agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Defense 

Intelligence Agency [DIA], National Security Agency [NSA], National GeospatialIntelligence Agency [NGA]) identify, describe, and quantify external threats; DOJ/Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and partner law enforcement, counterintelligence, and 

security/FP agencies identify internal threats and conduct CT, security/FP, and 

counterespionage activities; DOT/FAA radars locate and identify aircraft; and DHS 

conducts operations in the maritime, border, and air security areas. These agencies perform 

functions supportive of DOD’s HD mission and are essential to the overall HD effort. 

However, to achieve unified action for HD, it is imperative that joint and interagency, 

communication, coordination, collaboration, and cooperation be optimized through the 

planning, training, and execution of any HD effort. 

 (3) Although the leads for HD (DOD) and CS (e.g., DHS and DOJ) are different, the 

distinction between the two operational activities may not easily be defined or discerned. There 

may be cases where HD and CS events take place concurrently, or the main threat and 

therefore the agency lead, transitions from one agency to the other. Therefore, the need to 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-19 

establish workable and effective interagency relationships and partnerships, in advance of a 

crisis or contingency, is critical. For example, DOD may support DHS activities in the US 

portion of the maritime domain, requiring continuous coordination between department-level, 

operational, and tactical organizations conducting operations. The MOTR Plan acts to mitigate 

overlap issues between HD and HS activities by providing a method for interagency integration 

(see Chapter V, “Maritime Operations” and Appendix A, “Transitioning Between Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support” for more information on the MOTR Plan and the relationship 

between HD and HS). To fully develop and verify such relationships and partnerships, an 

active interagency coordination program, backed-up by annual joint and interagency exercises 

or operations, is required. 

 d. Combatant Command Tools and Methods for Interagency 

Communications, Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation. Combatant 

commands that operate in the homeland and perform HD missions (or CS missions) need 

to take full advantage of the complete set of interagency and DOD “tools and methods” 

to maximize mission success; enhance coordinated and seamless operations with our HD 

mission partners; and, eliminate/minimize any adverse impact on the US population and 

critical infrastructure. Some specific tools and methods which combatant commands can 

use include the following: 

 (1) Interagency Coordination Offices. An interagency coordination office may 

be established as a staff element within a combatant command headquarters with the 

mission of facilitating coordination of interagency activities to promote mutual 

understanding and unity of effort. Each CCDR organizes or tailors the interagency 

coordination office and/or function differently based on the particular mission(s), 

AOR, and requirements. During an exercise or incident, this staff element expands to use 

the full capabilities of assigned or attached agency representatives and command liaison 

officers (LNOs) to reach-back and provide situational awareness to the CCDR and staff. A 

notional example of how an interagency coordination office conducts business is illustrated 

in Figure II-6. 

 (2) One construct for interagency coordination operations is of three areas of 

influence, all nested together. The inner area represents day-to-day activities of permanent 

party members on the interagency coordination staff. Day-to-day, these staff members 

provide situational awareness and advice to the commander and staff pertaining to 

interagency issues and implications. They attend command and interagency meetings, 

conferences, and exercises to build relationships with other agencies and commands. They 

also write the interagency portion of military plans and review DOD and interagency 

documents to ensure that interagency and DOD equities are considered from their combatant 

command perspective. 

 (3) Interagency Coordination Group (IACG)/Interagency Planning Cell 

(IPC). The IACG is the interagency incident management group for the JIACG during 

contingencies or exercises, and provides an interagency facilitation and planning capability 

on a 24-hour, 7-day per week basis, if required. The IACG is formed by members from the 

interagency coordination office (which provides people, resources, and reach-back 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 3-27 

capability for additional subject matter expertise) and is augmented by available and 

required agency representatives and command LNOs. These personnel collaborate to 

provide the CCDR and staff a clear picture of interagency activities and their implications. 

The IACG mission is to integrate and synchronize interagency activities to ensure mutual 

understanding, unity of effort, and full spectrum support. A group similar to the IACG is 

the IPC, which is activated upon receipt of CJCS’s warning or alert order or at the direction 

of the CCDR. The IPC is established to provide timely advice to the supported CCDR 

about the capabilities/resources of other agencies in the HD effort and/or associated CS 

requirements resulting from an attack on the homeland. An IPC will enable a coherent and 

efficient planning and coordination effort through the participation of interagency subject 

NOTIONAL INTERAGENCY COORDINATION CONSTRUCT

IACG Interagency Coordination Group

JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group

Interagency

Coordination

Office

(Core 

Supporting 

Entity)

IACG

(Exercise/Incident

Group)

JIACG

(IACG and 

Agency 

Representatives)

Figure II-6. Notional Interagency Coordination Construct
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-21 

matter experts. Whether an IACG or an IPC, the element provides the CCDR an 

interagency action group focused on contingencies that can assist and enhance the 

command’s planning and execution efforts. 

 (4) Joint Interagency Coordination Group. The mission of the JIACG is to set 

the conditions for operational success by synchronizing and at times integrating activities 

with the state and local governments, multiple national and intergovernmental agencies, and 

partner commands to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort across the full range 

of military operations. It is the CCDR’s primary interagency forum consisting of agency 

representatives, command LNOs, and staff representatives collaborating to share 

information, analyze ongoing activities, and anticipate future interagency actions, 

implications, and/or consequences. It’s important to note that the JIACG does not replace or 

supplant the normal combatant command operations and/or staffing process, but is a force 

multiplier to those processes. During a crisis or contingency, the operational arm of the 

JIACG is the IACG/IPC, which can be set up to operate 24-hours, 7-days per week, and is 

sourced by interagency qualified personnel from the interagency coordination office and 

JIACG membership, and is tailored to meet interagency operational and/or planning 

requirements for the commander and staff. 

 (5) Agency Representatives and Command Representatives. Subject matter 

experts from key partner agencies and commands facilitate effective two-way 

communication, coordination, and cooperation. A formally established liaison and 

representative link between the combatant command and the partner agency is mutually 

beneficial. Specific focus should be on agency or command LNOs whose organizations 

play a key part in successful and seamless execution of HD operations. Additionally, in an 

HD event or operation, CM response actions may be required due to significant resulting 

damage. Regardless of mission, having key partner agency and command representatives 

will be essential for the CCDR conducting operations on US territory. Representatives from 

organizations such as DHS, DOJ, DOT, Department of Energy (DOE), Department of 

Health and Human Services (DHHS), CIA, and from DOD agencies should be considered 

as a starting point. Equally important, combatant commands may locate a command 

representative or LNO at key partner agencies commensurate with their operational 

requirements. Agency representatives or command LNOs are more effective when they 

have access to command leadership, key staff, and key working groups. “On-the-ground” 

agency representatives and command LNOs located at a combatant command should 

typically be located where they will be most usefully engaged, supportive of command 

activities, and beneficial to their parent agency or command. However, they also need to 

have an ongoing interface with the interagency coordination office and functions and 

actively participate in and support the JIACG and the IACG/IPC groups. This maximizes 

their participation in and support of the interagency process and benefit to their particular 

agency or combatant command. Information on other government agencies is provided in 

Appendix B, “Key Interagency Organizations.” 

 e. Interoperability – Importance of Effective Interagency Communications, 

Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation. One of the most important facilitators 

of successful joint, and multinational operations or interagency coordination is the ability 
Chapter II 

II-22 JP 3-27 

to be interoperable and easily share pertinent information to effectively coordinate action. 

This is especially critical in HD operations where military operations may be conducted 

in close proximity to our domestic population and our critical infrastructure. Two 

elements are required for true interoperability: first is the intent and commitment to share 

information among HD partners; and second, that systems interface or work together to 

facilitate effective communications, information sharing, and coordination. It is vital for 

DOD, to be more than “administratively connected” to HD partner agencies. It is also 

essential to be operationally connected and interoperable to facilitate rapid and effective 

exchange of critical information and provide a dynamic environment for coordinating 

joint and interagency HD activities. Timely and accurate situation assessments and 

responses are important factors in saving lives and protecting infrastructure and property. 

The interagency partnership requires a common operational picture (COP) and 

interoperable systems. This is essential to ensure we can effectively conduct HD 

operations, while eliminating or minimizing injury to our domestic population and 

damage to our critical infrastructure. Chapter VII, “Other Supporting Operations and 

Enabling Activities” provides further discussion and guidance on improved information 

sharing. 

For further reference, see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organizations, and 

Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations (Vol 1 & 2).

4. Command and Control Considerations for Multinational Operations 

 

 Multinational operations include alliances or coalitions between two or more nations to 

better achieve common interests. To conduct the full range of HD operations, the CCDRs 

with geographic HD responsibilities are required to coordinate actions with all instruments 

of national power, as well as multinational and nonmilitary organizations. When a response 

force is resident within an alliance, the procedures and structure of the alliance will normally 

determine the strategic and operational level leadership. When a response force is based in a 

coalition (or a lead nation structure in an alliance), the designated lead nation will normally 

select both the strategic and operational level leadership. While the President and SecDef 

retain command authority over US forces it is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for 

reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place 

appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified 

military objectives. 

For further details (including restrictions) and additional information see, JP 1, Doctrine 

for the Armed Forces of the United States and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

5. Synchronization and Integration of Homeland Defense Operations 

 a. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and 

purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 

Integration should include military and civilian organizations as appropriate. The JFC 

must be fully cognizant of the strategic direction in order to establish the priorities, 

timelines, goals and objectives for HD missions that allow synchronization and 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-23 

integration of air, land, maritime, space and supporting operations for unified action. 

DOD policies, international and command agreements, federal constitutional and 

statutory law, security cooperation plans (SCPs), and selected OPLANS provide 

guidance, which must be integrated by the CCDR to achieve synchronization. 

 (1) Command arrangement agreements (CAAs) establish procedures and 

delineate responsibilities between two or more CCDRs concerning mutual support, 

interface, and cooperation. They prescribe the arrangement necessary to support the 

employment of forces from one CCDR to another and the control of these forces operating 

within a specific AOR or JOA. CAAs may also delineate information and intelligence 

dissemination requirements to enhance coordination for planning and execution of crossAOR operations. CAAs must remain consistent with DOD guidance as promulgated from 

SecDef and CJCS. 

 (a) The CAA between CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM 

establishes the methodology under which transfer of forces between the two combatant 

commands is executed in support of HD (and CS) missions. Processes, C2 arrangements, 

and communication requirements are representative items addressed in the document (note 

that the transfer of maritime HD forces is also addressed in current EXORDs). 

 (b) The CAA between CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSSOUTHCOM 

provides guidance for the planning and execution of operations conducted by both 

commands within the USNORTHCOM AOR. It prescribes the arrangements necessary for 

the control, support, and protection of forces operating, therein. 

 (2) Security cooperation is an enabler for HD. The United States seeks the 

cooperation of allies, coalition partners, and friends around the world to achieve its national 

security goals, and this cooperation is crucial to the defense of the homeland. CCDRs plan 

and conduct security cooperation activities to encourage and enable countries to work with 

the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Strengthening security relations with 

multinational partners increases their capabilities to contend with common challenges. 

Prevention and deterrence are crucial components of such a defense, but our friends and 

allies also require the capacity to defeat threats should they emerge. 

 (a) In the forward regions of the world, CCDRs and their components 

perform vital security cooperation activities with their partner countries that help provide the 

outer layer of HD. 

 (b) The CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities have AORs with very 

different characteristics. In addition to its vast airspace, the USPACOM AOR is 

predominantly maritime and comprises considerable political, religious, cultural, social and 

economic diversity. It encompasses the Asia-Pacific region, comprising numerous 

sovereign nations and one-half of the earth’s surface. The area includes five of the seven 

US security treaty allies, extensive international waters covered by international law, as well 

as US possessions and territories under US law, treaties or compacts. The US Southern 

Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR consists of Latin American and Caribbean nations. 
Chapter II 

II-24 JP 3-27 

These nations are strategically important to our national security and economic future. The 

US is linked with these nations by geography, history, demography, economics and a shared 

security environment. Security within this region is being undermined by a growing number 

of threats, not the least of which is international illicit trafficking. The same routes that 

allow the flow of drugs also permit the movement of illegal aliens, weapons, and potentially 

terrorists. The USNORTHCOM AOR is primarily continental, with extensive land borders 

and coastal regions, including Canada, Mexico, and 49 US states (including Alaska) with 

differing legal and policy concerns as well as varying state-to-state mutual support 

agreements. Additionally, as the Alaska region is within the overlapping AORs of 

USPACOM and USNORTHCOM and the USSOUTHCOM AOR contains portions of the 

homeland in the Caribbean, it is essential for these GCCs to coordinate issues relating to 

HD. While the geographic, political, and diplomatic environments may be different, each 

CCDR employs a SCP to promote the assurance of allies and friends, the dissuasion of 

adversaries, and the deterrence of aggression. 

 1. Engaging and Shaping. Security cooperation enhances access, 

readiness, and training to build competent regional partners by improving their low to 

high-end capabilities. Through their SCPs, the CCDRs with geographic HD 

responsibilities seek to diminish the conditions that terrorists exploit and support 

activities to deny sanctuary to terrorists. The plans also strengthen and improve 

collaboration between joint commands, agencies at all levels of government, and regional 

partners. CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities should address strategic 

communication in their security cooperation planning efforts. 

 2. Enabling Continental Defense. Effective security cooperation 

with North American partners (e.g., Canada, Mexico) is a vital aspect of HD. Achieving 

military and interagency interoperability and cooperation is key in enabling an effective 

defense of the continent. This capability begins by establishing and maintaining military 

relations, builds to combined education, training, and exercises, intelligence and 

information sharing, exchange of LNOs, and many other activities that enable 

multilateral operations to defend mutual homelands. CDRUSNORTHCOM’s goal is to 

strengthen HD through a mutually beneficial North American defense partnership to 

counter terrorism and WMD and their consequences, while contributing to global US 

security objectives. Additionally, it is important to foster appropriate interagency 

relationships in order to leverage complementary capabilities and capitalize on limited 

resources. 

 (3) A number of initiatives and agreements exist that forge relationships and 

provide for multinational coordination in the defense of the homeland. A representative 

sample of these initiatives and agreements is provided below: 

 (a) Regional Maritime Security is a partnership of willing nations enhancing 

capabilities and leveraging capacities through unity of effort to identify, monitor and 

intercept transnational maritime threats consistent with existing international and domestic 

laws. 
Command Relationships and Interagency Responsibilities 

II-25 

 (b) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a Department of State led 

program that focuses on reducing WMD proliferation by deterring suppliers and customers, 

and making proliferation more costly and difficult. 

 (c) The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America is an 

agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, established to identify new 

avenues of cooperation to make the continent safer and more secure, businesses more 

competitive, and economies more resilient. 

 b. Enhancing Multinational Coordination. There are many activities that can 

increase our partners’ capabilities to operate with us and create the conditions for 

establishing new multinational partnerships to contend with mutual challenges. SecDef’s 

Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) outlines a series of security activities that a CCDR 

can use to advance long-term security cooperation goals and objectives with 

multinational partners wherever feasible and mutually supportive. Some of these 

activities are presented below: 

 (1) Multinational exercises, training, education, and experimentation. 

 (2) Counternarcotics assistance. 

 (3) Counterproliferation and/or nonproliferation (includes Cooperative Threat 

Reduction, and International Counterproliferation Program). 

 (4) Defense and military contacts. 

 (5) Defense support to public diplomacy (for example, developing information 

programs in regional languages that complement other security cooperation activities). 

 (6) Security assistance. 

 (7) Other Programs and Activities – Regional Defense Counterterrorism 

Fellowship Program, Defense Environmental International Cooperation, etc. 

See the Secretary of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance for more information on 

security cooperation. 

 c. In today’s joint, multinational and interagency operating environment it is 

impossible to accurately view the contribution of any individual organization or 

capability in isolation from all others. This is particularly true when contemplating the 

complex environment within the homeland. Each may be critical to the success of the 

joint force, just as the joint force may be critical to interagency success. Each has unique 

capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other agencies. The challenge for the supported 

JFC is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at his disposal into joint 

operations against the adversary. 
Chapter II 

II-26 JP 3-27 

 d. To achieve the desired objectives of unified action and the synchronization and 

integration of military operations in time, space, and purpose, the JFC must consider 

many factors, some of which are: 

 (1) What objectives, when achieved, attain the desired end state? 

 (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve the objectives? 

 (3) How can the resources of the joint force and interagency and multinational 

partners be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? 

 (4) What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of 

actions? 

 e. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing the actions and 

capabilities of conventional and unconventional forces jointly within the operational 

environment, enables the JFC to apply the force necessary to shock, disrupt, and defeat 

opponents. 

For additional information on multinational coordination see JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations. 
CHAPTER III 

AIR OPERATIONS 

III-1 

“DOD leads military missions to deter, prevent, and defeat attacks on the United 

States, its population, and its defense critical infrastructure. This includes defending 

the maritime and air approaches to the United States and protecting US airspace, 

territorial seas, and territory from attacks...The bi-national North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is responsible for protecting the North 

American airspace over the United States and Canada. Aerospace warning and 

control are the cornerstones of the NORAD mission...” 

 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

June 2005

1. General 

 a. Since 9/11/01, significant changes in the conduct of aerospace defense have 

occurred in relation to the US homeland. To put these changes in context, it is important to 

understand the distinction between air defense and aerospace defense. The former is 

defined as “defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in 

the atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack.” The latter includes 

air defense, ballistic missile defense and the defense of US space assets. DOD, in 

partnership with NORAD, provides for the aerospace defense of the US homeland. 

 b. DOD is charged with defeating air threats to the United States, such as attacks 

from military aircraft and ballistic and cruise missiles. DOD must also be prepared to 

intercept nontraditional air threats, even when the intent to harm the United States is 

uncertain. These threats could include commercial or chartered aircraft, general aviation, 

ultralight aerial vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, radio controlled aircraft or even 

balloons. Early detection and successful interception of these types of potential threats 

require very close cooperation with DOD’s interagency partners. 

2. Air Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense 

 a. The combatant commanders with geographic HD responsibilities must consider the 

unique aspects of aerospace operations within the homeland. Figure III-1 highlights some 

of these considerations. 

 (1) Size. The AORs of the combatant commanders with geographic HD 

responsibilities include vast areas of airspace, land masses, and sea. North America in 

particular, is a huge land mass with multiple avenues of approach that an adversary could 

easily exploit to their advantage. To maintain an appropriate defense posture, the CCDRs 

are required to control the entire airspace over the approaches to and land masses within 

their AORs. 

 (2) Control of Airspace. DOD is responsible for defeating traditional and 

nontraditional aerospace threats to the United States. However, day-to-day US airspace is 

under the control of the FAA. Civilian control of airspace, as well as other functions vital to 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-27 

the security of the homeland, makes it essential to coordinate with other government 

agencies. 

 (3) Peacetime Environment. Operations must be conducted in peacetime, as 

well as in times of crisis. 

 (4) Duration. Defense of the homeland is continuous. For example, Operation 

NOBLE EAGLE (ONE), involving US and Canadian air, land, and maritime forces is a 

24/7 operation in peacetime as well as in times of crisis – it will continue for the foreseeable 

future - persistence is critical (ONE is discussed in detail, later in this chapter). 

 (5) Rules of Engagement. The airspace environment over areas of the homeland 

is dense – up to 5,000 aircraft at a given time over CONUS, for example. ONE operates 

with strict ROE in this very dense airspace environment. The ROE for operating in US 

airspace often produce a constrained engagement environment. 

 b. SecDef has designated CDRNORAD as the supported commander for 

aerospace warning and aerospace control aspects of HD within the NORAD OA. The 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE 

VAST AREAS OF 

OPERATION

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF 

AIRSPACE

PEACETIME ENVIRONMENT

CONTINUOUS OPERATION FOR 

DECADES

VERY RESTRICTIVE 

ENGAGEMENT CRITERIA

Figure III-1. Considerations for Homeland Defense
Air Operations 

III-3 

OA includes the portions of the homeland that fall within the USNORTHCOM and 

USSOUTHCOM AORs, specifically CONUS, Alaska, the US Virgin Islands and 

Puerto Rico. CDRUSPACOM is the designated CCDR for HD missions within the 

USPACOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported CCDR for HD missions 

within the USNORTHCOM AOR that are not under the direction of CDRNORAD. 

 c. The missions of NORAD and USNORTHCOM are complementary. NORAD 

conducts missions and operations in the NORAD OA and provides warning of all airborne 

threats to include aircraft and missile attack and threats existing in the maritime domain. 

USNORTHCOM conducts US-only air, land, and maritime defense. The commands work 

side-by-side and coordinate on many issues. NORAD is the cornerstone of the US homeland 

air defense capability and is an integral part of an active layered defense that relies on the 

early warning of an emerging threat to quickly deploy and execute a decisive response. 

NORAD plays a critical role in the aerospace defense of Canada and HD of the United 

States by providing aerospace warning and aerospace control. Aerospace warning consists 

of surveillance, detection, validation and warning of an attack against North America, 

whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles. Aerospace control consists of air sovereignty 

and air defense operations within US and Canadian airspace. 

For a more complete description of the NORAD missions, organization and structure see 

Appendix C, “North American Aerospace Defense Command, Missions, Organization, and 

Structure.” 

3. Homeland Air Defense

 a. The President, through SecDef, directs DOD to conduct operations in defense of 

the US homeland, sovereign territory and national critical infrastructure (including DCI and 

other key assets, as required). DOD conducts homeland air defense using defensive 

counterair operations, which are comprised of active and passive air and missile defense. 

 (1) Operation NOBLE EAGLE. ONE is the overall umbrella operation 

covering HD for North America and Hawaii. As the binational, leading element of this 

operation, NORAD is tasked to support ONE by employing the forces and C2 necessary to 

protect North America from air attack. In Hawaii, USPACOM provides command and 

control (through Pacific Air Forces) with the Hawaii ANG providing ONE support. While 

providing a formidable deterrent in itself, it is important to emphasize that DOD and 

NORAD air defense capabilities represent the last line of air defense that will be used only if 

the other layers of overseas defense and domestic aviation security, conducted by civilian 

LEAs, have proven unsuccessful. 

 (a) NORAD forces maintain a steady state, quick response posture to counter 

potential threats to North America. NORAD conducts irregular air patrols above major 

metropolitan areas and critical infrastructure facilities, in addition to maintaining an alert 

force of fighter, tanker, and control aircraft. Aircraft sorties and alert commitments are 

based on a tiered response system. As threat levels intensify, the number of aircraft on alert 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-27 

and on patrol increase. As the threat is evaluated, air patrol locations and frequencies are 

reviewed and updated. 

 (b) The US and Canadian governments have approved specific ROE to 

counter hostile acts within domestic airspace, which include expedited procedures and 

safeguards to account for the significant air traffic in domestic airspace. 

 (c) The authority and decision to engage is made at the highest levels of 

command. NORAD continues to refine its procedures and coordination with DHS; Public 

Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada; the FAA and its Canadian equivalent, NAV 

CANADA; civilian law enforcement organizations and other government agencies within the 

United States and Canada. 

The ONE Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Reference Guide provides detailed mission 

planning and employment considerations for NORAD aerospace and land forces. It is 

designed to assist those involved in the tasking, planning and execution of ONE. This 

NORAD produced document also provides supplemental details to the areas discussed in 

Appendix C, “North American Aerospace Defense Command Missions, Organization, and 

Structure.” 

 (2) National Capital Region - Integrated Air Defense System (NCR-IADS). 

Because terrorists and other adversaries consider an attack on the NCR a continuing goal, it 

requires focused defense and security measures. DOD employs an integrated air defense 

system as part of the around-the-clock, multilayered, joint military and interagency effort. 

Figure III-2 provides a pictorial of the NCR-IADS components. The NCR-IADS augments 

the ONE fighter defenses by providing “assets in-place” in a quick reaction posture to 

protect the seat of the US government, as well as other key locations in the NCR, from air 

attacks. 

 (3) Interagency Aviation Security Efforts. Interagency roles, responsibilities, 

and required coordination protocols for conduct of aviation security and defense operations 

to counter threats to the US are contained in the AOTR Plan. TSA and other elements of 

DHS, as well as DOJ and DOT, conduct significant aviation security efforts throughout the 

United States and in the NCR. Principal among the efforts designed to improve interagency 

coordination is the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), sponsored by 

TSA. The NCRCC enhances interagency coordination by providing a venue for 

representatives of the many organizations with a stake in the defense of the NCR to “stand 

watch” together. Through the NCRCC, various agencies have improved situational 

awareness of the actions of their defense partners. The NCRCC is a “coordination center” - 

no command or control of forces occurs. Participants include the FBI, TSA, FAA, US 

Capitol Police, US Secret Service, US Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and 

Marine Operations, USCG, JFHQ-NCR, and NORAD. Representatives from other state 

and local law enforcement agencies and the Joint Air Defense Operations Center also 

participate at the NCRCC when threats or circumstances warrant. 
Air Operations 

III-5 

 b. While not directly included in homeland air defense, offensive counterair (OCA) 

consisting of attack operations to include those on missile sites, airfields and C2 

infrastructure conducted in foreign territory, ultimately supports a secure homeland by 

removing adversary capabilities before they can present themselves as a direct threat to the 

homeland. Extending beyond OCA, and part of the national security arsenal, are strategic 

attack operations which are aimed at affecting our adversaries’ leadership, conflictsustaining resources, and/or strategy. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or 

will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a campaign, 

major operation, or conducted independently as directed by the President or SecDef. These 

attacks may directly or indirectly achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to 

achieve operational objectives as a precondition. 

 c. Additional air defense assets may be employed in the United States when threat or 

circumstances warrant, including cruise missile defense assets. NORAD also has a role in 

missile defense to include HD against cruise missiles. USSTRATCOM has the 

NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION -- INTEGRATED AIR 

DEFENSE SYSTEM

Visual Warning 

System

Warning 

Flares

Intercept and Warning

Visual

Warning

Visual 

Identification

Air- and Ground-Based Air Defense

Fixed and Rotary Wing Intercept Aircraft and 

Short- and Medium-Range Missile Systems

Voice Warning

Tracking

Detection

Potential Engagement

Voice Comm

Military Radars

Federal Aviation 

Administration Radars Video

Cameras

NORAD US National Capitol Region

Aircraft Detection, Warning and Defense Architecture

Figure III-2. National Capital Region – Integrated Air Defense System
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-27 

responsibility for planning, integrating and coordinating global missile defense operations 

and support. 

For more information on the full range of air operations consult the following doctrinal 

publications: JP 3-01, Countering Air & Missile Threats; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support; JP 

3-17, Air Mobility Operations; JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations; JP 

3-52, Airspace Control in a Combat Zone; and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

4. Aviation Security Policy 

 The US Aviation Security Policy (Homeland Security Presidential Directive [HSPD]-

16/National Security Presidential Directive [NSPD]-47) directs USG departments and 

agencies to accomplish specific tasks that will continue the enhancement of HD and HS, by 

protecting the United States and US interests from threats in the air domain. Necessary 

actions to focus on include: 

 (1) Protection of critical transportation networks and infrastructure, from terrorist 

attacks or hostile acts, and reduce the vulnerability of the air domain to such acts or 

exploitation. 

 (2) Improving situational awareness of, and enhancing the sharing of information 

related to the air domain; improving early identification of threats and actions in response to 

those threats. 

 (3) Ensuring seamless, coordinated efforts relating to the security of the air 

domain among all relevant authorities. 

 (4) In the event of an attack, ensuring the resilience and recovery of the Aviation 

Transportation System. 

 (5) Countering the illicit acquisition and use of stand-off weapons systems that 

pose significant risks to the lawful civilian and military use of the air domain. 

 (6) Enhancing international relationships and advance common security interests 

in the air domain by promoting the integration of US allies and other partners into an 

improved global aviation transportation security framework. 
CHAPTER IV 

LAND OPERATIONS 

IV-1 

1. General 

 The threat to the homeland is difficult to predict and increasingly diverse. The 

likelihood of conventional large-scale land attack on the US may be remote, but the widerange of threats that do exist must be addressed by land forces conducting HD. Historically, 

US land forces have concentrated on defeating threats as far away from the homeland as 

possible, and that remains the overarching goal. The central idea is to protect the homeland 

from external threats and aggression using integrated strategic, operational, and tactical 

defensive and offensive measures as the situation requires. The ability to detect, deter, 

prevent, or if necessary defeat land threats is a required capability for protection of the 

homeland. 

 a. Land operations conducted in support of HD require commanders to consider 

unique elements during planning and execution. More so than during traditional overseas 

military operations, HD operations require significant coordination and partnership between 

federal, state, tribal, and local government and agencies, especially since there is a 

significant overlap between DOD and law enforcement organization roles and functions. 

This environment presents unique and complex operational challenges due to the 

necessity to achieve unity of effort within a Constitutional framework of sovereign 

states, and the need to be prepared to interface with a large number of disparate 

government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. For example, the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 assigned the Secretary of Homeland Security the responsibility to prevent terrorists 

and instruments of terror from crossing our borders and our ports of entry. However, the Act 

did not confer any authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct the engagement 

of DOD forces in offensive or defensive operations. As a result, the authority to direct DOD 

land forces remains with SecDef and the Armed Forces remain the key resource in 

conducting HD operations. Additional information on DHS is contained in Appendix A, 

“Transitioning Between Homeland Defense and Civil Support,” and Appendix B, “Key 

Interagency Organizations.” 

 b. Successful commanders coordinate with appropriate agencies to clearly define 

responsibilities and missions, leverage capabilities of AC and RC forces, and to ensure 

efficient and effective application of military forces in HD. 

 c. Military operations in support of HD also require a significant partnership between 

state- and federal-controlled forces. National Guard and reserve forces provide significant 

capabilities during planning and executing missions in defense of the homeland, as they 

“We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength; they 

are invited by the perception of weakness. And the surest way to avoid attacks on our 

own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans. We are fighting that 

enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today so that we do not meet him again on our own 

streets, in our own cities.” 

President George W. Bush 

September 7, 2003 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-27 

provide a military presence throughout the homeland with unique working relationships 

with state and local entities. Commanders leverage benefits and costs of AC, National Guard 

and reserve forces when planning operations. The RC is structured and operated to support 

assigned responsibilities as authorized, defined, and funded by the gaining AC. In that 

regard, the RC remains an integral part of total force power projection capabilities to 

respond to threats to the United States in all theaters of operation, to include those within the 

homeland. Moreover, the ability to use the NG for domestic operations has been enhanced 

by the addition of Chapter 9 to Title 32 USC which provides the capability to appropriately 

fund and leverage NG forces in this status for HD activities within the homeland. DOD 

planning for land operations in the conduct of HD appropriately integrates the employment 

of AC, NG and reserve forces to execute HD operations within the homeland. More 

detailed information on authorized NG statuses is provided in Appendix A, “Transitioning 

Between Homeland Defense and Civil Support.” 

2. Land Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense 

 a. The CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities must anticipate, plan and be 

prepared for the possibility of land defense operations. HD land defense actions may 

include forcible entry from the land, sea, or air; decisive fires and maneuver; closing with 

and destroying a determined enemy; sustaining a joint force; and setting conditions for a 

return to peace. Specific defensive land operations in support of HD may include security 

operations through FP tasks or protection of critical defense infrastructure. Defensive land 

operations leverage existing federal agencies’ capabilities (e.g., DHS). 

 b. Offensive operations take the battle to the enemy. This takes the initiative from the 

enemy, gaining freedom of action creating desired effects to achieve operational objectives. 

Follow-on forces deploy to expand the combat power established by initial entry forces. 

Although land defense forces may be required to defend in the short term, decisive results 

require shifting to the offense as soon as possible. However, HD operations should be of 

limited duration and conclude when the land forces achieve the objectives of the operation: 

 (1) Disrupt enemy coherence and dissipate his power. 

 (2) Secure or seize important terrain. 

 (3) Deny the enemy resources for continued hostile operations. 

 (4) Fix the enemy in place for destruction or capitulation. 

(5) Gain information to support continuing operations against enemy forces. 

 c. As with other military operations, land operations in the conduct of HD are 

planned and executed by the CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities, through their 

respective combatant commands, and their subordinate commands; either Service specific 

task force headquarters, JTFs, or a JFLCC. As with land operations in other theaters, 

commanders consider the scope of the operational environment, specified and implied tasks, 
Land Operations 

IV-3 

and span of control when selecting the appropriate C2 relationship. In addition, commanders 

consider the interagency environment; the effect of current operations on the civilian 

populace; and the role of the state, tribal, and local LEAs, when determining the type of 

headquarters organization necessary to execute HD operations. Based upon available forces, 

each CCDR with geographic HD responsibilities has identified subordinate commands that 

establish or source headquarters for HD operations. 

3. US Northern Command Land Operations 

 a. CDRUSNORTHCOM may employ designated land component response forces 

from the Army or Marine Corps to deter, defend, and defeat threats or aggression within the 

AOR. Two Service component commanders, Commander, USARNORTH 

(CDUSRARNORTH) and Commander, Marine Corps Forces North 

(COMMARFORNORTH) may be organized as functional components and designated as 

joint force land component commanders. The ability to use or combine functional 

components, standing or ad hoc JTFs, and/or Service task forces, provides 

CDRUSNORTHCOM flexibility in selection of forces to address any HD event that may 

occur in his AOR. 

 (1) Figure IV-1 shows how land forces may be requested, provided, and 

employed to respond to a crisis requiring a rapid response. When directed by the President 

or SecDef to conduct HD operations, CDRUSNORTHCOM can consider several initial 

land force options, as part of the joint effort: employ a quick response force (QRF) or rapid 

response force (RRF), directly; employ a JTF with OPCON over a QRF or RRF; employ a 

JFLCC with OPCON over a QRF or RRF; or employ USARNORTH or MARFORNORTH 

as a single-Service headquarters with OPCON of a QRF or RRF. Based on his decision, the 

CDRUSNORTHCOM sends a request for forces (RFF) to the Joint Staff. Once the RFF is 

approved, force providers are directed to source personnel and equipment through Service 

components and provide them to CDRUSNORTHCOM. If a larger force is required, then 

follow-on forces can be employed. These follow-on forces may combine with the QRF or 

RRF as a task force, under a JTF. 

 (2) As the Army component command of USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH has 

two deployable task forces which serve as the permanent nucleus of JTFs that can be formed 

rapidly with augmentation. These task forces / JTFs provide C2 for Title 10 USC forces 

conducting HD missions. On order from CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSARNORTH has 

the mission to serve as the JFLCC in HD operations, including QRF / RRF missions. 

CDRUSARNORTH, when designated a JTF commander, also has the ability to provide C2 

for multiple JTFs as a JFC. Through continuous coordination with other Service 

components, federal, state, tribal, and local agencies including the NGB, state joint force 

headquarters, and Title 32 USC JTFs, CDRUSARNORTH plans and prepares for potential 

HD operations. CDRUSARNORTH also oversees the Army component DOD AT program 

and FP measures conducted in the USNORTHCOM AOR. Additionally, 

CDRUSARNORTH plans and implements the Army service component command portion 

of USNORTHCOM security cooperation activities undertaken with Mexico and Canada. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-27 

 (3) MARFORNORTH, has the ability to function as a JFLCC, with augmentation. 

Among the duties of COMMARFORNORTH are AT programs and FP responsibilities for 

Marine Corps installations. In addition to the command responsibilities, 

HOMELAND DEFENSE LAND OPERATIONS

RAPID RESPONSE PROCESS

CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of 

Staff

JFLCC Joint Force Land Component 

Commander

JTF Joint Task Force

MARFORNORTH Marine Corps Forces 

North

OPCON Operational Control

QRF Quick Reaction Force

RFF Request For Forces

RRF Rapid Response Force

SecDef Secretary of Defense

TF Task Force

USARNORTH United States Army 

NORTHCOM

USNORTHCOM United States Northern 

Command

Force Option OPCON

2. 

Approved

RFF

President

/SecDef

CJCS

Force 

Providers

TF

(Follow-on 

Force, If 

Employed

JTF

QRF 

or 

RRF

QRF 

or 

RRF

QRF or RRF

QRF 

or 

RRF

or or JFLCC

USARNORTH 

or MARFORNORTH

3. Forces

1. RFF

Commander

USNORTHCOM

EXECUTION

or

Figure IV-1. Homeland Defense Land Operations Rapid Response Process
Land Operations 

IV-5 

COMMARFORNORTH supports, coordinates, and provides advice to CDRUSNORTHCOM 

on the employment of Marine forces when they are attached to USNORTHCOM in the 

conduct of HD operations. 

 b. Although considered extraordinary, conditions may arise that require conventional 

land operations within the continental limits of the United States (to include Alaska). In 

such instances forces will be made available to USNORTHCOM. These operations will be 

guided by established doctrine, principles and fundamentals. Procedures for identifying C2 

structures, requesting and employing response forces, and coordinating actions will be 

consistent with established doctrine. Special considerations will likely apply due to the 

unique nature of operating in the homeland environment and requirement for DOD-wide 

and interagency coordination. Figure IV-2 illustrates how land forces may be organized to 

defend against a larger threat within the AOR requiring sustained operation with land forces. 

Conventional land forces are provided CDRUSNORTHCOM per the RFF process described 

above, and allocated to the JFLCC or the commander, JTF (CJTF) who has OPCON over 

these forces. 

4. US Pacific Command Land Operations 

 a. CDRUSPACOM established Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense as the 

headquarters responsible for land HD operations on all bases and in all the US territories 

within the USPACOM AOR. CG USARPAC is dual hatted as the CDR JTF-HD. CDR 

JTF-HD provides trained and ready forces in support of security operations, from 

engagement to warfighting; these forces promote regional stability, and ensure successful 

crisis response and decisive victory. USPACOM also provides an Alaska-based QRF and 

RRF via JTF-AK, for employment by USNORTHCOM for HD operations in the Alaska 

JOA. 

 b. Along with being designated CDR JTF-HD, CG USARPAC is Commander, Task 

Force-Hawaii. Commander, US Navy Forces Marianas, Marianas Islands is designated 

Commander, Task Force-Guam under CDR JTF-HD. For land operations, and in 

coordination with civil authorities, these units are assigned the following tasks: 

 (1) Detect and dissuade attacks within their assigned operational area. 

 (2) Plan and conduct deterrence operations. 

 (3) Defeat threats within the assigned operational area. 

 (4) Employ forces to protect military installations and assigned critical 

infrastructure. 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-27 

5. US Southern Command Land Operations 

 a. USSOUTHCOM established USARSO to serve as the headquarters responsible for 

land HD operations in Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands. USARSO is the joint force 

land component and provides planning and C2 functions for operations in those regions. 

Other Service components, such as MARFORSOUTH may augment USARSO capabilities 

HOMELAND DEFENSE LAND OPERATIONS 

SUSTAINED RESPONSE PROCESS

Force Option OPCON

President

/SecDef

CJCS

Force 

Providers

JTF

USMC

Forces

USMC

Forces

ARMY

Forces

ARMY

Forces

or JFLCC

EXECUTION

3. Forces

1. RFF

2. 

Approved

RFF

Commander

USNORTHCOM

CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

JTF Joint Task Force

JFLCC Joint Force Land Component 

Commander

OPCON Operational Control

RFF Request For Forces

SecDef Secretary of Defense

USMC United States Marine Corps

USNORTHCOM United States 

Northern Command

Figure IV-2. Homeland Defense Land Operations Sustained Response Process
Land Operations 

IV-7 

by providing a special purpose Marine-air ground task force, as directed by 

CDRUSSOUTHCOM. Figure IV-3 shows this relationship. 

 b. The CAA between CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSSOUTHCOM provides 

additional guidance regarding the defense of the homeland within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. 

HOMELAND DEFENSE LAND OPERATIONS IN THE 

US SOUTHERN COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

COCOM

Coordination

OPCON

President

/SecDef

EXECUTION

COCOM combatant command 

(command authority)

JFLCC Joint Force Land 

Component Commander

JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task 

Force South

OPCON operational control

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine 

Air Ground Task Force

USARSO US Army South

USMC Unites States Marine 

Corps

USNAVSO US Navy Forces 

Southern Command

USSOUTHCOM US Southern 

Command

USNAVSO JIATF-S

USMC Forces

(SPMAGTF)

ARMY Forces

(Reactionary 

Force)

JFLCC

(USARSO)

Commander

USSOUTHCOM

Figure IV-3. Homeland Defense Land Operations in the US Southern Command Area of 

Responsibility
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER V 

MARITIME OPERATIONS 

V-1 

1. General 

 a. Securing the maritime approaches is essential to keeping the homeland safe. 

DOD maritime assets must be able to detect, identify, localize, evaluate, sort, and when 

warranted, intercept or interdict to prevent or defeat an attack. This is a complex task as 

adversaries may not be easily differentiated from normal maritime activity, and any 

disruption of commercial trade may have economic and financial implications 

domestically and internationally. It is also critical for DOD to maintain unrestricted 

freedom of movement to ensure the ability to deploy forces overseas. 

 b. In this dynamic environment, responding to these unpredictable and 

transnational threats requires coordination across the USG to prevent attacks on the 

homeland. Coordination and interoperability with federal, state, tribal, and local LEAs, 

particularly the USCG, Customs Border Protection, and FBI, are important in this effort 

due to overlapping authorities, responsibilities and potential simultaneous presence of 

response assets for maritime operations in the conduct of HD. Additionally, sharing of 

information and cooperation with allied nations in regards to global maritime activities 

will greatly assist in the early detection and subsequent interception of maritime threats. 

2. Maritime Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense 

 a. DOD, through the relevant CCDR, is prepared to respond to maritime threats 

from the forward regions to the homeland. DOD maritime forces support an active 

layered defense through extensive operations in the forward regions, coupled with a high 

state of readiness and scalability to varying threat conditions in the maritime approaches 

and homeland. DOD plays the lead role in a maritime HD construct, where DOD is 

identified as the federal agency with lead responsibility whether it is by discovery of a 

threat during normal operations, which requires immediate action, or through the 

protocols established by the MOTR Plan. These protocols are based on existing law, 

desired USG outcome, greatest potential magnitude of the threat, response capabilities 

required, asset availability, and authority to act. In the HD construct, USCG assets may 

also come under the control of the US Navy (USN) to defeat the threat to the United 

States. Conversely, if it is determined to be a DHS mission, DOD assets could come 

under TACON of the USCG. 

“It is the policy of the US to take all necessary and appropriate actions, consistent 

with US law, treaties, and other international agreements to which the United States 

is a party, and customary international law as determined for the United States by the 

President, to enhance the security of and protect US interests in the maritime domain” 

President George W. Bush 

December 21, 2004
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-27 

 b. The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) and the MOTR Plan are 

directed in the NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy. The MOTR Plan 

operationalizes NSPD-41/HSPD-13 and the NSMS by achieving a coordinated USG 

response to a vast array of threats in the maritime domain, including: 

 (1) Nation-state military threats. 

 (2) Piracy. 

 (3) State/non-state criminal, unlawful or hostile acts such as smuggling and 

WMD proliferation activities. 

 (4) Threat vessels with cargo and/or personnel requiring investigation and 

disposition. 

 c. The MOTR plan predesignates federal agencies with lead responsibilities, 

clarifies interagency roles and responsibilities, and establishes protocols and procedures 

that are utilized for a coordinated response to achieve the USG's desired outcome for a 

particular threat. The MOTR predesignated leads were developed from the following 

criteria: 

 (1) USG desired outcome. 

 (2) Agency authorities. 

 (3) Agency capabilities. 

 (4) Agency asset availability. 

 (5) Magnitude of the threat. 

 (6) Existing law. 

 d. The MOTR protocols and procedures allow rapid response to short-notice (pop-up) 

threats and require interagency partners to begin coordination activities (i.e., MOTR 

conference calls) at the earliest possible opportunity when one of the following triggers are 

met: 

 (1) Any specific terrorist or state threat exists and US agency response action is or 

could be imminent. 

 (2) More than one federal department or agency has become substantially 

involved in responding to the threat. 

 (3) The agency or department either lacks the capability, capacity, or jurisdiction 

to address the threat. 
 Maritime Operations 

V-3 

 (4) Upon resolving the threat, the initial responding federal department or agency 

cannot execute the disposition of cargo, people, or vessels acting under its own authority. 

 (5) The threat poses a potential adverse effect on the foreign affairs of the United 

States. 

 e. The MOTR coordination process is conducted through a virtual network of 

interagency national and operational command centers. This coordination process is the 

key element in determining which agency is the right choice for leading the USG 

response and what other agencies are needed to support the response effort. Additionally, 

the MOTR protocols include a process for transition of the lead from one agency to 

another and dispute resolution (i.e., if the USG desired outcome cannot be resolved at the 

lower levels of government, the characterization of a particular threat could ultimately be 

elevated for resolution by higher authority). At the tactical level, it is important to realize 

that the MOTR process exists not only to achieve a USG desired outcome, but to 

coordinate and assist in bringing additional capabilities to bear on a threat. 

 f. Additionally, MOTR presents guiding principles that apply to all agencies at all 

times and sets the basic standards for interagency actions to overcome maritime threats to 

the United States: 

 (1) The USG takes all necessary steps to prevent terrorist attacks, WMD from 

entering the United States, its territories, and possessions; and catastrophic disruption of 

normal activities in the maritime domain. 

 (2) USG agencies are prepared to conduct MOTR quickly and decisively to 

intercept, apprehend, exploit, and, when necessary, defeat maritime threats. 

 (3) Any MOTR agency shall take those actions necessary to defeat a threat that 

presents an imminent risk of death, serious physical injury, or substantial destruction of 

property, consistent with the law and the rules on the use of force, including the use of lethal 

force. 

 g. Successful MOTR execution is fundamentally reliant on the operationalintelligence linkage. This linkage is optimized through ongoing efforts to achieve 

maritime domain awareness. Maritime domain awareness seeks to provide the requisite 

intelligence and information that facilitates timely decision making. The goal is to 

identify threats as early and as distant from the homeland as possible, but no later than to 

allow time to defeat or otherwise overcome threats at a safe distance from the US. This is 

accomplished through the effective understanding of anything associated with the global 

maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the 

US. Maritime domain awareness improvement efforts are guided by two NSMS 

supporting plans (i.e., Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness and the Global 

Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan). 
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-27 

For additional information on maritime domain awareness, refer to JP 3-32, Command and 

Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 

 h. DOD or USCG assets operating under Title 10 USC, under the control of the 

CCDR, maintain the ability to conduct a range of options against suspect ships and 

vessels in the maritime approaches to and the territorial waters of the United States. 

While USN ships and aircraft are conducting training in home waters prior to overseas 

deployments, they are rapidly scaleable for HD operations or to support other federal 

agencies should the situation dictate. These options range from surveillance and tracking, 

to maritime interception (MIO), including the application of lethal and nonlethal force if 

necessary. 

3. Joint Force Maritime Component Operations 

 a. The JFMCC plans and executes operations in the maritime domain while 

supporting the operations of the other components as directed. COMUSFLTFORCOM is 

designated as JFMCC North for CDRUSNORTHCOM and supports and is supported by 

the USCG in the USNORTHCOM AOR. COMPACFLT is designated the JFMCC for 

CDRUSPACOM, supports the USNORTHCOM JFMCC for HD, and supports and is 

supported by the USCG in the USPACOM AOR. Commander USNAVSO provides the 

JFMCC for CDRUSSOUTHCOM, support to USNORTHCOM JFMCC for HD, and 

support to and is supported by the USCG in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Additionally, 

CDRNORAD’s maritime warning mission supports HD operations as defined in the 

NORAD Agreement and Terms of Reference. 

 b. JFMCC Mission: JFMCC planning must be in consonance with the guidance 

of senior commanders, must support the JFC concept of operations, and should support 

other component commanders as well. The JFMCC’s operational concept is typically 

built upon the following strategic missions: 

 (1) Sea control. 

 (2) Maritime power projection and projection of defense from sea to land. 

 (3) Deterrence. 

 (4) Strategic sealift. 

 (5) Forward maritime presence. 

 (6) Seabasing operations. 

 (7) Other specified and implied tasks in the execution of HD can involve planning 

and directing naval operations (e.g., undersea operations, mine operations, strike operations, 

fires, interdiction, amphibious and expeditionary operations, and MIO), as well as providing 

communications systems support and FP. 
 Maritime Operations 

V-5 

For further information, see JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 

 c. Maritime HD operations may be accomplished independently or in support of 

other operations. When established, a maritime AO can include international and 

territorial waters, harbor approaches, ports, waterfront facilities, and those internal waters 

and rivers that provide access to port facilities (including associated airspace). The 

JFMCC plans and conducts HD operations to maintain sea control; strengthen port 

security and/or harbor defense (PS/HD) and harbor approach defense; ensure strategic 

mobility; provide a secure environment for US and coalition forces; and support other 

component commanders, as directed. 

 (1) The JFMCC ensures any supporting forces are properly integrated into the 

maritime plan, which in turn is integrated into the overall plan. 

 (2) The CCDR should establish corresponding relationships with the JFMCC and 

other components to coordinate security operations. For especially critical facilities, 

dedicated defense forces such as Marine Corps security forces, Air Force security forces, 

and Army military forces may be in the maritime AO, along with the Navy Shore Patrol and 

USCG security forces. 

 (3) Close liaison between the JFMCC and appropriate host nation, federal, state, 

tribal, and local agencies is necessary to effectively operate in the forward regions, 

approaches and within US territorial waters. During many types of maritime operations, 

civilian cooperation forms an important element of logistics, intelligence, and FP planning. 

Liaison with the standing area maritime security committees is a way to acquire support and 

coordination. 

 (4) The need to liaise extends to foreign and coalition countries and IGOs; and 

must take into consideration international agreements such as the Canada-US Rush-Baggot 

Treaty which impacts upon operations on the Great Lakes and Saint Lawrence seaway 

system. 

4. United States Navy and United States Coast Guard Relationships 

 a. USCG authorities are vested in both Title 10 USC, as a branch of the Armed 

Forces of the United States, and Title 14 USC for federal law enforcement and other 

duties. A close alliance of US maritime forces is increasingly crucial to contend with 

challenges to US sovereignty and maritime HD that continually grow more diverse and 

complex. Continuous USN and USCG teamwork across the spectrum of maritime 

operations provides a strong foundation for dealing effectively with emerging challenges 

that include the global war on terrorism, regional conflict, crisis response, sanctions 

enforcement, arms trafficking, weapons proliferation, mass migration, smuggling, natural 

resource depletion, and FP. 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-27 

 b. The USCG’s military readiness responsibility is complemented by a broad array 

of ongoing maritime missions and authorities (Title 14 USC) that include law 

enforcement; maritime threat response and advanced interdiction boardings; marine 

safety; ports, waterways and coastal security; search and rescue; aids to navigation; 

illegal drug and undocumented migrant interdiction; and defense readiness among others. 

These USCG core competencies include resources and capabilities that contribute 

significantly to HD. 

 c. During HD operations, the employment of maritime forces is governed by 

specific tasks in plans or orders. A USCG captain of the port (COTP) will normally be 

responsible for harbor control within the port while the JFMCC is responsible at sea for 

maritime communications, surveillance, detection, maritime interdiction and interception 

operations, protection of high value assets (HVAs), and the enforcement of exclusionary 

zones. 

 d. Each USCG COTP has legislative mandates and authorities for the safety and 

security of US ports including safeguarding harbors, vessels, and waterfront facilities 

from accidents, negligence, terrorism, sabotage, espionage, and other subversive acts. 

Port safety is focused on preventing accidental damage to vessels and port facilities 

through activities such as inspection, hazardous materials loading supervision, waterways 

management, and cargo transfer monitoring. Port security is usually carried out using 

law enforcement authorities. Port safety and security are closely related, mutually 

supportive, and are often conducted concurrently. In the United States, maritime port 

security operations supporting military missions are likely to be focused on the seaports 

of embarkation (SPOEs) and high-value unit escorts. USCG support to military outload 

operations involves all port safety and security activities related to port facilities and 

vessels involved with the movement of military essential cargos at SPOEs. The USCG 

also has the capability to carry out these port security missions at seaports of debarkation 

(PODs) established by GCCs. 

 e. The USCG is an integral force for maritime HD mission execution. USCG 

statutory authorities remain in effect at all times, including when USCG forces are 

transferred to DOD control to execute maritime HD operations. When USCG forces 

conducting maritime HD operations under DOD control are needed to exercise specific 

USCG authority, the appropriate USCG commander must ensure that a USCG chain of 

command is reestablished. Maritime HD C2 structure is pursuant to the “Memorandum 

of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland 

Security for the Inclusion of the US Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland 

Defense.” 

 f. The USCG’s core competencies (both Title 10 USC and Title 14 USC 

responsibilities) in high seas interdictions, waterways management, littoral operations, 

and law enforcement complement USN operations and enhance the USG’s ability to 

conduct unrestricted maritime operations worldwide. USCG forces may be used to 

support operations to include MIO to screen vessels for contraband (including terrorist and 

terrorist related materials), PS/HD, military environmental response to limit the potential 
 Maritime Operations 

V-7 

disruption to military operations by intentional marine pollution incidents that could occur 

in the AO, peacetime military engagement, and coastal sea control operations in the 

littorals to ensure the unimpeded use of designated offshore coastal areas by friendly 

forces and to deny the use of those areas to enemy forces. These operations can be 

conducted either independent of or in conjunction with a maritime HD operation. 

5. Maritime Operations Requiring Interagency Coordination

 Maritime operations in support of HD that require a coordinated government 

(federal, state, tribal, local) effort range from protection of ports, harbor approach 

defense, and countermine and mine countermeasures (MCM) operations to littoral, 

boarding, and MIO. 

 a. Protection of Ports. The harbor approaches will often be filled with shipping 

that is neither clearly friendly nor hostile. Most of these ships will have legitimate 

business in the port, and denying them entry may cause significant economic harm to the 

United States and possibly other countries as well. They must be cleared to ensure that 

they will not cause harm, intentional or unintentional, to the port. 

 (1) Approaches. USN and USCG units may challenge and clear suspect ships in 

the approaches before they enter port. These units are capable of remaining underway for 

weeks at a time and ensure that problems are defused before suspect maritime shipping is 

close enough to present a threat to the homeland (e.g., port). Once suspect maritime 

shipping is screened and is cleared to enter the port by the COTP, maritime forces may be 

used to escort the ship and provide security in and near the mouth of the harbor. 

 (2) Harbor Approach Defense 

 (a) Harbor approach defense involves the employment of maritime forces 

(surface and air) to conduct coastal sea control by tracking, identifying, and interdicting if 

necessary maritime threats within the designated defensive sea area (DSA). Harbor 

approach defense operations are an extension of PS/HD operations into the littoral and are 

normally conducted by USN and USCG units trained in MIO and capable of remaining 

dozens of miles offshore for weeks at a time, operating day and night in all weather. This 

area normally extends well beyond territorial waters to ensure that timely intercepts of 

inbound maritime shipping are made; boarding is completed prior to port entry to minimize 

commerce disruption; and to ensure that WMD remain well outside the homeland. 

 (b) Harbor approach defense operations are overt and defensive in nature, 

conducted primarily by units operating in littoral waters and include the following activities: 

 1. Show an overt harbor approach presence by conducting area 

patrols, to deter or preempt attacks. 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-27 

 2. Investigate and intercept inbound shipping, ensuring that all or 

some are boarded and searched for hazards that might intentionally (or unintentionally) 

pose a hazard to the port, while protecting outbound shipping. 

 3. Extend visual and sensor detection and intelligence collection 

capabilities. 

 4. Provide an immediate armed response upon seaward threat 

detection or classification. 

 (3) Harbor Defense. Harbor defense is the defense of a harbor or anchorage and 

its water approaches against external threats such as submarines, submarine-borne, or small 

surface craft attack; enemy minelaying operations; and sabotage (the defense of a harbor 

from guided missiles while such missiles are airborne is considered to be a part of air 

defense). It involves the employment of forces for the protection and management of 

harbors, ports, anchorages, shore facilities, and commercial, private, and naval vessels 

against waterborne and landward threats. DOD activities within the port or harbor are 

executed in close coordination with the COTP. In the port environment, the COTP, senior 

installation commander, and JFMCC will determine the appropriate assignment of maritime 

security and defense tasks based on threat conditions and necessary authorities, force 

capabilities, and availability. DOD forces generally remain under the C2 of DOD 

commanders for these activities. Coordination amongst federal, state, tribal, and local law 

enforcement and DOD forces both pier side and on the water is necessary. Thorough 

planning centered around the area maritime committee forum and IAW MOTR plan 

fundamentals provides a basis for unity of effort. The JFC, may form PS/HD units to 

support area defense efforts, if response time and forces are available. The JFC may appoint 

the harbor defense commander (HDC). The COTP when acting as the HDC normally sets 

the boundaries for harbor defense. Defense of the harbor is the responsibility of the HDC. 

The JFC may assign sub area operational commanders as needed for coastal sea control and 

harbor defense to conduct operations. 

 (4) Port Security. Port security missions involve the protection of designated 

marine terminals, pier areas, HVAs (including escorts while transiting into and out of ports 

or harbors), and other designated facilities. These missions are conducted for the 

safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from internal threats 

such as destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts; accident; thefts; 

or other causes of a similar nature. They also include port safety, marine environmental 

protection, waterway management, and search and rescue. 

 b. Countermining and Mine Countermeasures Operations 

 (1) Mining of homeland waters by enemies can be conducted by a variety of 

methods from surface vessels, air, submarines, or swimmers and/or divers. The objective of 

countermining is to prevent mining. Detection of such activity should be a priority for 

maritime surveillance systems monitoring the seaward approaches and internal waterways. 

Consistent with the MOTR Plan, DHS is the agency with lead responsibility for prevention 
 Maritime Operations 

V-9 

and detection of mining within waters subject to US jurisdiction. MCM operations can be 

conducted for the following reasons: 

 (a) Bottom mapping for operational environment awareness prior to an event. 

 (b) Exploratory operations to identify suspected mine threat and/or boundary 

of the threat area. 

 (c) Clearance operations to locate, identify, and neutralize mine threats. 

 (2) The support maritime forces may provide to MCM operations consists of 

protection for MCM assets and logistic support for ashore staging areas in the AO. 

Maritime forces provide air and surface patrol craft to enforce a security zone encompassing 

the MCM operational area, to protect MCM forces from harassment or attack. 

 (3) Logistic support to MCM forces is limited to messing, berthing, and potable 

water supplies. In the event that logistic support is required, consideration should be given 

to basing MCM assets with or adjacent to maritime forces to economize security and logistic 

support. 

For further information, see JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint 

Operations. 

 c. Littoral Operations 

 (1) Maritime security in the littoral region is attained through the use of a DSA 

where forces are employed to ensure the unimpeded use of designated offshore coastal areas 

by friendly forces and to deny the use of those areas to enemy forces. 

 (2) The conduct of maritime HD is the responsibility of the cognizant CCDR, 

which is CDRUSNORTHCOM for CONUS and Alaska; CDRUSPACOM for Hawaii, the 

US territories and possessions, and Freely Associated States located in the Pacific AOR; and 

CDRUSSOUTHCOM for Pueto Rico and US Virgin Islands. When directed by the 

President, responsibility for harbor defense, harbor approach defense, and sea control in the 

US littoral is shared between the USN and the USCG. 

 d. Sea Lines of Communications/Chokepoint Operations. Seaward security is a 

focused maritime operation that complements broader maritime operations designed to 

maintain sea lines of communications. The primary objective is to provide for the safe 

passage of strategic sealift and commerce to and from deep water and to deny use of 

these areas to enemy forces. Similarly, maritime forces can be employed in a chokepoint 

(e.g., narrow strait or canal) to provide for the safe passage of friendly forces through that 

chokepoint. Maritime units can be employed as part of a force—air, surface, and 

submarine units and their supporting systems, positioned across the likely courses of 

expected enemy transit—for early detection and rapid warning, blocking, and destruction 

of the enemy. 
Chapter V 

V-10 JP 3-27 

 e. Boarding Operations 

 (1) Uncertainty and a need to verify status and cargo, or suspicions about the 

intentions of a crew or its ability to inflict damage/harm should never be discounted and 

often leads to a decision to inspect a vessel. Patrol craft must increase surveillance of the 

vessel during approach and throughout the inspection. Similarly, all weapons and 

equipment must be readied for immediate emergency action. Mounted weapons should be 

manned and armed, and personnel briefed per the SROE and/or SRUF. 

 (2) Boarding teams may be employed either at sea or in port to stop and/or gain 

control of a noncompliant vessel, gather intelligence, detain suspect personnel or seize 

illegal cargo. The teams employ specific techniques and procedures during a boarding. 

Boarding team members must understand the systematic and proven techniques to conduct 

searches for contraband. 

For further reference see, NTTP 3-07.11/Coast Guard Publication (CGP) 3-07.11, 

Maritime Interception Operations. 

 (3) Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) 

 (a) MIO are designed to halt the movement of designated items into or out of 

a nation or area. Units involved in MIO not only provide unit presence but may also use 

reasonable force if a vessel is noncompliant. Each MIO varies from the next. The specific 

political, geographic, and tactical factors and the legal authority on which the MIO is based 

influence the enforcement procedures. 

 

 (b) MIO is a USN core competency. Many USN ships are capable of 

conducting compliant and certain types of noncompliant boardings. Maritime forces may 

also be tasked to conduct expanded MIO (EMIO). EMIO is authorized by the President 

through the SecDef to deter, degrade, disrupt, or prevent attacks against the US and its allies. 

EMIO involves interception of targeted personnel or materiel that possess an imminent 

threat to the US and its allies. EMIO may be implemented without sanctions and may 

involve multinational forces. USN ships must be augmented by other forces (e.g., Navy 

Seals or special operations capable Marines) to conduct high freeboard noncompliant 

boardings or to conduct opposed boardings against adversaries actively trying to escape 

capture. 

 (4) Boarding teams will be trained to board and search vessels in order to locate 

and defeat threats to the homeland. In addition, boarding teams must be sensitive to the 

tactical exploitation of evidence and personnel (e.g., proper identification, collection and 

protection of evidence; proper handling and custody of contraband, equipment, crew or 

other evidence found during an inspection; and training, planning and exercising intelligence 

collection and investigative techniques with LEAs). Boarding teams should anticipate 

augmentation by interagency, state, or local agency experts to deal with special situations 

such as WMD, immigration, etc. 
 Maritime Operations 

V-11 

 (5) Legal Authority 

 (a) Individuals in positions of leadership must understand applicable legal 

authorities for all boarding operations. Specific guidance is issued by the chain of command 

for all operating areas and scenarios to further define requirements and guide boarding 

actions. Military requirements or US laws will often guide the chain of command in 

providing direction regarding specific action to be taken or specific conduct of the 

inspection. All team members must understand enforcement action requirements so that the 

inspection is conducted appropriately. 

 (b) All actions undertaken by the United States must be in accordance with 

legal guidance provided by the chain of command. 

6. Employment of Fires 

 a. The range of lethal options available to maritime forces is significant. A limited 

number of nonlethal options exist, as well. Maritime forces can be employed to rapidly 

destroy, raid, or neutralize terrorist threats both at sea and ashore given actionable 

intelligence. 

 b. Maritime threats to the homeland may be presented in a variety of forms. From 

large cargo ships to fishing vessels, from cruise ships to pleasure craft. Once a vessel has 

been identified as a threat to the homeland, traditional anti-surface warfare options may 

be employed to disrupt, delay, disable or destroy the delivery of the weapons, cargo or 

people to its intended target. Naval forces may take action as defined by the chain of 

command and the SROE and supplementary measures, if any. 

 c. Depending on the threat, maritime HD options may be determined through the 

MOTR protocol process. Within the USNORTHCOM AOR, JFMCC NORTH will 

direct maritime HD operations that may include appropriate Service forces, USCG, or 

SOF to disrupt, delay, disable or destroy threat vessels. 
Chapter V 

V-12 JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER VI 

SPACE OPERATIONS 

VI-1 

1. General 

 The region of space above the United States cannot be owned or possessed like 

territory. It is USG policy, however, that purposeful interference with US space systems 

will be viewed as an infringement on the Nationís sovereign rights. In order to deter or 

preempt attacks and to protect military space assets, DOD conducts space operations in 

support of HD in the space control, space support, space force enhancement, and space force 

application areas. DOD DCI activities may be closely related to military space operations, 

given that selected space capabilities may be classified as DCI. These activities may serve 

to protect and defend our ability to operate in and through space. CDRUSSTRATCOM is 

the supported commander for protecting and defending the right to operate in space and is 

responsible for identifying, assessing, and securing DOD critical assets in space. 

2. Space Operations in the Conduct of Homeland Defense 

 Military space operations bring enabling information to the JFC. For example, initial 

threat detections and location, global communication, real-time weather, high-resolution 

imagery and signals intelligence helps the JFC determine the appropriate intercept vehicle, 

location and/or time of attack. Using the global communication capability, the JFC is able 

to exercise real-time C2 functions and post-mission assessment. Satellite communications 

(SATCOM) technology can link HD forces with interagency, intergovernmental, and other 

federal and state, tribal, and local partners in support of HD operations. In addition, Global 

Positioning System (GPS), SATCOM, and geospatial information and services are available 

to track incoming threats from air, land, sea, or space. Information from space provides 

decision makers advance warning to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and prevent 

threats to the homeland. 

 a. Roles and Responsibilities 

 (1) CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for developing desired characteristics and 

capabilities, advocating, planning, and conducting space operations (force enhancement, 

space control, and space support, including space lift and on-orbit operations and force 

application). These responsibilities include: 

 (a) Providing warning and assessment of space attack. 

 (b) Supporting NORAD by providing the missile warning and space 

surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement. 

ìTodayís national security depends more than ever on capabilities that can only be 

delivered from space; the only place we can achieve the degree of global situational 

awareness needed by the intelligence community and the Department of Defense.î 

Dr. Donald M. Kerr 

Director, National Reconnaissance Office 

March 16, 2006
Chapter VI 

VI-2 JP 3-27 

 (c) Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational 

matters, except as otherwise directed. 

 (d) Providing military representation to US national agencies, commercial 

entities, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations. This will 

be as directed and in coordination with the CJCS and other combatant commanders. 

 (e) Coordinating and conducting space campaign planning. 

 (f) Serving as the DOD Manager for Manned Space Flight Support 

Operations. 

 (2) CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities have specific responsibilities for 

HD and are the supported commanders responsible for conducting HD operations within 

their respective AORs: 

 (a) Communicate space capability requirements to USSTRATCOM when 

acting in an HD capacity. 

 (b) Provide FP for space assets located within their respective AORs. 

 b. Space Mission Areas. There are four primary space mission areas, each providing 

necessary contribution to HD operations. The mission areas are: space control, space 

support, space force enhancement, and space force application. 

 (1) Space control operations provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces 

while, when directed, denying it to an adversary, and include the broad aspect of protection 

of US and US allied space systems and negation of adversary space systems. Space control 

operations encompass all elements of the space defense mission. Space control may involve 

activities conducted by air, land, maritime, and space forces and/or SOF. To gain space 

superiority, space forces must surveil space and terrestrial areas of interest that could impact 

space activities, protect the ability to use space, prevent adversaries from exploiting US, 

allied, or neutral space services, and negate the ability of adversaries to exploit space 

capabilities. These forces would be brought to bear against space systems or facilities 

identified through the targeting process. Space control operations will provide freedom of 

action in space for friendly forces and, when directed, deny the same freedom to the 

adversary. They include offensive and defensive operations by friendly forces to gain and 

maintain space superiority and situational awareness of events that impact space operations. 

HD planners should consider protection of space and ground support assets within the 

AORs of the CCDRs with HD responsibility, when drafting FP plans. 

 (2) Space support operations consist of operations that launch, deploy, augment, 

maintain, sustain, replenish, deorbit, and recover space forces, including the C2 network 

configuration for space operations. Space support operations enable US space forces to 
 Space Operations 

VI-3 

continue to provide vital space capabilities to military and civilian activities in defense of the 

homeland. 

 (3) Space force enhancement operations multiply the effectiveness of HD 

operations by enhancing operational awareness and providing needed warfighter support. 

There are five force enhancement functions: ISR; integrated tactical warning and attack 

assessment; environmental monitoring; SATCOM; and position, velocity, time, and 

navigation (primarily GPS). Force enhancement functions are also often provided by 

agencies such as the National Reconnaissance Office, NSA, National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, commercial organizations, and consortiums. 

 (4) Space force application consists of attacks against targets carried out by 

military weapons systems operating in or through space. The force application mission area 

includes ballistic missile defense and force projection. 

 c. Integration of civilian space capabilities. HD is a high-priority activity, 

requiring the marshalling of all available space capabilities. Key to maximizing US space 

capabilities is the successful integration of civilian space assets with military space 

capabilities. In many cases, especially in the area of SATCOM, environmental monitoring, 

and some space imagery, the contribution of civilian systems provide an integral part of the 

total US space capabilities. Use of civilian space capabilities is essential to the effectiveness 

of our ability to successfully accomplish the HD mission. 

For additional information, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. 

3. Ballistic Missile Defense 

 Ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities are designed to detect, deter, defend 

against and defeat adversary ballistic missile threats. The goal is to build a layered, 

integrated capability to defeat inbound missiles in all phases of flight. The intent is to 

engage a target with multiple weapons systems through the depth and breadth of the ballistic 

trajectory of a missile. BMD involves passive defense, active defense, attack operations, 

and battle management. The BMD system consists of sensors (air, land, sea, and space), 

weapons (ground, air, and sea-based), C2, and manning and logistics systems, which are 

employed collectively. BMD of the homeland includes the synchronization and integration 

of capabilities to destroy or disrupt adversary missiles in flight or prior to launch. BMD fully 

synchronizes and integrates offensive and defensive actions and supporting systems to 

achieve unity of effort. BMD is a key element of HD, however, BMD activities do not 

include defense against cruise or tactical air-to-surface missiles. 

 a. Command Roles and Responsibilities. All combatant commands are tasked with 

deterring attacks against the United States, its territories, and possessions, and employing

appropriate force should deterrence fail within their respective AORs. GCCs are 

responsible for planning and executing ballistic missile defense within their geographic 

AORs. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating and 
Chapter VI 

VI-4 JP 3-27 

advocating global missile defense operations and support. The following organizations are 

highlighted because of their specific BMD responsibilities to support HD. Further 

considerations can be found in the UCP and JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

 (1) The CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities deter ballistic missile attacks 

on the United States, its territories, possessions, and bases within the respective AORs, and 

other areas as directed. In coordination with CDRUSSTRATCOM and other GCCs, they 

synchronize support for the execution of operation plans to defend against ballistic missile 

attacks on the homeland, and should deterrence fail and/or as directed by the President or 

SecDef, they employ BMD forces in a synchronized operation to protect the United States 

against ballistic missile attacks. 

 (2) CDRUSSTRATCOM serves as a coordinating authority for global missile 

defense and is responsible for the following items: 

 (a) Planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations 

that cross AOR boundaries. 

 (b) Providing missile warning and space surveillance to NORAD to fulfill the 

US commitment to the NORAD Agreement. 

 (c) Providing warning of missile attack to all other CCDRs. 

 (d) Developing the concept of operations for global missile defense. 

 (e) Supporting other combatant commands in the development, assessment, 

coordination, and recommendation of ballistic missile defense. 

 (3) CDRUSSTRATCOM established the Joint Functional Component Command 

for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) to optimize planning, execution, force 

management and coordination with other combatant commands for USSTRATCOM's 

global missile defense mission. The JFCC-IMD accomplishes CDRUSSTRATCOM UCP 

responsibilities for global integrated missile defense planning, coordination, and integration 

and ensures day-to-day operational support responsibilities are coordinated. JFCC-IMD 

coordinates activities with associated geographic combatant commands, other 

USSTRATCOM joint functional component commands, and the efforts of the Missile 

Defense Agency. 

 b. BMD Operations. BMD employs the operational elements of missile defense to 

provide protection across the range of operations. Through the balanced employment of 

passive and active defense and dynamic attack operations, BMD ensures the desired endstate of attaining favorable ratios for ballistic missile defensive weapons. This is supported 

by shared situational awareness, integrated battle management C2, adaptive planning, and 

accurate and responsive battle damage assessment. For further discussions on missile 

defense refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 
 Space Operations 

VI-5 

 c. Related operations. BMD has a direct relationship to several other HD (and CS) 

operations: 

 (1) CM. Employment of BMD assets for HD could result in situations requiring 

CM. CM operations may include responding to personal injury, property loss, or debris field 

cleanup resulting from BMD system engagements, or catastrophic failures during testing or 

fielding of BMD systems. For this reason the coordination of information between 

organizations planning or executing BMD operations with potential responders is critical.

 (2) DCI and FP. BMD is also closely related to DCI and FP actions as there may 

be a requirement to establish a missile defense umbrella over a site that is designated as 

DCI, (e.g., a CONUS port of embarkation). CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities 

must maintain a BMD priority defended asset list for the US homeland. It must be 

coordinated and in concert with DCI and FP programs. 

 (3) Space operations. Space operations are considered critical enabling activities 

for BMD. For example, space based surveillance and sensor capabilities provide ballistic 

missile early warning, assist in intelligence gathering, and facilitate tracking inbound 

missiles. For further space operation considerations reference JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for 

Space Operations. 

 (4) Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, contains doctrine on this joint mission that 

closely parallels BMD and air and missile defense in general. BMD planners should 

coordinate their attack operations and BMD efforts with these operations to optimize use of 

strike and attack assets, effectiveness of preemption measures and unity of effort. 
Chapter VI 

VI-6 JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER VII 

OTHER SUPPORTING OPERATIONS AND ENABLING ACTIVITIES 

VII-1 

1. General 

 Supporting operations and enabling activities should be considered in the planning and 

execution of all HD operations. They often overlap with other activities and specific tasks 

may be closely related. For example, when performing activities associated with DCI, 

planners must also consider AT and FP measures to protect Service members or specific 

facilities and equipment. Additionally, continued operation of information systems deemed 

vital to C2 is often reliant on IO to ensure computer networks are defended. 

2. Information Environment 

 The ìinformation environmentî is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, or 

systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information; also included is the 

information itself. It is broad in scope and directly supports military operations in any 

operational environment. It offers a framework of three dimensions; physical, 

informational, and cognitive. The information environment supports the HD framework. 

The US conducts operations, including HD, in a complex, interconnected, and increasingly 

global operational environment. The information environment and activities conducted in 

each of the domains influence and shape each other. Certain US military operations in the 

information environment are known as IO. 

 a. Information Operations. IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities 

of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. Properly implemented, IO conducted across the 

range of military operations will support defense of the homeland by affecting the attitudes 

and beliefs of potential adversaries and thus altering their behavior, specifically the planning 

and execution of aggressive and hostile acts against the United States. IO degrades their 

effectiveness and allows US defenses an opportunity to detect, interdict, and counter hostile 

acts. From a defensive perspective, IO protects DOD information systems, and thus 

enhances our situational awareness. IO also promotes accurate situational awareness for US 

decision makers charged with HD responsibilities. IO in general may involve complex legal 

and policy issues. Specifically, US citizens will not be targeted in IO. These issues do not 

prevent the application of IO for HD but temper it. 

Details on the employment of IO can be found in JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

"I am telling you all, this is the defense mission of the next century -- homeland 

defense, fair and simple. It will take several different forms. Protection against 

terrorist attacks using chemical or biological weapons. Protection against attacks, 

cyber attacks from people using computers to bring down air traffic control systems or 

utility systems or whatever. And homeland defense against world errant nations 

using a ballistic missile or two. So homeland defense is the mission of the next 

century." 

The Honorable John J. Hamre 

Deputy Secretary of Defense (1998)
Chapter VII 

VII-2 JP 3-27 

 b. Intelligence. Knowledge of the enemy is one of the fundamentals of joint warfare 

outlined in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Intelligence is the 

discipline that provides this knowledge and information to the commander about an 

adversaryís capabilities, centers of gravity, and probable course of action. Additionally, 

intelligence assists the commander in visualizing the operational environment within which 

both the adversary and friendly forces operate. To be of operational use, intelligence must 

be timely, accurate, usable, complete, relevant, objective, available, and disseminated to 

those decision-makers and operators who need it for successful HD operations. Intelligence 

assessments help the commander determine the magnitude of the threat, which forces to 

deploy, the most efficient manner in which to deploy those forces, and probable enemy 

reactions. 

 (1) Fusion is the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information 

to derive a complete assessment of activity. This process, by its very nature, involves both 

automation and human cognition. Intelligence fusion is an on-going process that involves 

the delineation of roles and responsibilities; creation of requirements; collection; integration; 

analysis; and dissemination of critical information. This data can be derived from a 

multitude of sources, technologies, and human review (cognition). 

 (2) The operational integration of ISR platforms and sensors provides key 

information to decision-makers at all levels of command. ISR capabilities provide strategic, 

operational, and tactical commanders situational awareness to support the unity of effort for 

HD. Collecting data from multiple sources is essential to remove the bias of a source, 

improving the accuracy and completeness of the analysis. Additionally, it can defeat the 

enemyís denial and deception efforts. A synchronized collection effort across various sources 

and disciplines facilitates cross-cueing among collectors and a more efficient application of 

limited resources. CDRUSSTRATCOM established the joint functional component command 

for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) to conduct planning to employ 

DOD ISR resources to meet national, departmental and combatant command requirements. 

Additionally, close and early coordination with JFCC-ISR provides access to and support from 

DOD and national ISR assets to support HD operations. 

 (3) Intelligence operations for HD present unique information sharing requirements 

for military intelligence and law enforcement entities. Each is governed by its own missions as 

well as applicable legal and policy constraints (see intelligence oversight, as outlined for DOD 

in Chapter I). The CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities are the lead commands for 

planning and executing DOD HD intelligence operations. As such, they will coordinate with 

other DOD and national intelligence agencies and federal, state, tribal, and local entities. For 

HD, it is particularly important to ensure effective fusion of intelligence, counterintelligence, 

law enforcement, and other available threat information to develop a complete assessment of 

threats to the homeland and prevent strategic or tactical surprise. 

 (4) For USNORTHCOM, effective intelligence fusion is energized through 

interagency collaboration and spearheaded by the NORAD USNORTHCOM Joint Intelligence 

Operations Center - North. Under the direction of CDRNORAD and/or USNORTHCOM, the 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-3 

Intelligence Directorate provides forums for information exchange, analysis, priorities, and 

strategy. The outcome of fusion provides decision makers and operators situational awareness 

and enables situational understanding. This enhances timely and effective decision making and 

supports successful operations and mission accomplishment. 

 (5) The joint intelligence process is continuous and includes the following steps: 

planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, 

dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. The dissemination and 

integration step is critical. Properly formatted intelligence products are disseminated to 

requesters, who integrate intelligence into the decision-making and planning process. The 

disseminated product can appear in multiple forms (e.g., voice reports, digital reports, 

formatted messages, estimates, or specialized products). Additionally, disseminated 

products can be categorized as indications and warning, general military intelligence, 

counterintelligence, and law enforcement information. Disseminating actionable 

intelligence to the user is fundamental to preparing for, preventing, responding to, and 

recovering from events. 

For more information on of intelligence fusion, see Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

 c. Global Information Grid 

 (1) As part of the overall information environment, the GIG represents the 

globally interconnected communications system of DOD. It includes the end-to-end set of 

information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, 

storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, 

and support personnel. The GIG includes all owned and leased communications and 

computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, 

and other associated services. 

 (2) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration/Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII)/DOD CIO) is 

responsible for establishing and implementing a network operations (NETOPS) information 

exchange process and authoring agreements to support DOD operations and activities. The 

ASD(NII)/DOD CIO coordinates this process with the ASD (HD&ASA), who is 

responsible for coordinating all HD mission area matters with other executive departments 

and federal agencies. 

 (3) Consistent with laws and policy, Services, DOD agencies, and non-DOD 

agencies should provide capabilities to support combatant command requirements to ensure 

the interoperability, availability, shared situational awareness and understanding, and 

effectiveness of the HD information environment. This includes capabilities to deter, detect, 

respond, and mitigate virtual and physical attacks against defense information infrastructure 

that directly or indirectly supports HD missions. 

 (4) There are three primary aspects to providing an available and effective HD 

information environment. These are providing a reliable, robust HD communications 
Chapter VII 

VII-4 JP 3-27 

system; improving information sharing among HD mission partners; and assuring and 

defending our critical information infrastructure against threats and aggression. 

 d. Communications System

 (1) The communications system enables centralized planning and the coordinated 

and mutually supporting employment of forces and assets. It includes command centers, 

operations centers, processing and distribution centers and associated systems, deployed 

systems, and data sources. Systems or information, and decisions generated by them, should 

be shared to the maximum extent possible to ensure synchronization of effort among 

mission partners. For example, the COP facilitates decentralized execution in rapidly 

changing operational environments and must be shared among appropriate agencies, to 

include law enforcement, to ensure consistent situational awareness. 

 (2) The AORs of the CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities are rich with 

existing commercial communications systems that can be leveraged to the maximum extent 

possible. For example, commercial cellular capabilities represent a choice medium that can 

provide immediate capability. Traditional DOD communications systems will serve as the 

backbone in support of HD operations. Nontraditional systems that are scalable, 

interoperable, and complementary with those used by coalition and civilian partners, will be 

essential to augment traditional ISR and C2 nodes, especially in the early phases of military 

operations. These communications must be mobile, secure, and voice and data capable. 

Wireless voice, data, and video are critical to effective C2. Planning for the integration of 

spectrum resource allocation will enable DOD; federal, state, tribal, and local responders; 

IGOs and NGOs; and private sector responders to operate in the same bands, ensuring 

interoperability. Planning for the integration of internationally-donated telecommunications 

resources, including hardware and SATCOM bandwidth, should be conducted in the event 

the USG accepts such offers of international aid.

 (3) Commercial infrastructure plays a critical role in enabling the communication 

systems that directly support HD operations. This infrastructure may be damaged to the 

point that military and supporting operations are adversely affected. DOD must identify 

capabilities that can help bridge the gap until local infrastructure is restored. These 

capabilities must be highly mobile, rapidly deployable, and commercially interoperable. In 

addition, DOD should seek innovative ways to leverage commercial technology (i.e., 

satellite and cellular capability). An example would be to foster a partnership with 

commercial industry to develop a concept similar to civil reserve air fleet for employment of 

commercial assets and manpower in response to HD. Another example would be to 

integrate interoperability with commercial communications and standards into DOD 

equipment during development and acquisition phases. 

 (4) The communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) is responsible for 

providing the communications system needed to support reliable and timely information 

flow in support of joint operations. The CCDR, through the communications system 

directorate, provides communications system guidance and priorities to supporting 

commands and components. The execution of theater guidance and priorities is through the 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-5 

theater NETOPS control center (TNCC). To effectively do this, the TNCC must maintain 

situational awareness of critical communications systems in the AOR. The TNCC will 

coordinate and direct as required, communities of interest within the AOR to ensure 

accurate, timely, and detailed reporting on these systems. These communities of interest 

include subordinate commands, supporting commands, Services and agencies, as well as 

non-DOD organizations. 

 e. Improving Information Sharing

 (1) Information sharing within DOD and the USG has undergone significant 

changes since 9/11/01. DOD must lead the way in transitioning from a ìneed to knowî to a 

ìneed to shareî culture. The need to share information is an operational necessity that 

avoids withholding information and minimizes the potential for operational gaps that 

characterized the pre-9/11/01 environment. The overall goal is to attain seamless access to 

the trusted information sharing environment for all response forces throughout the AOR. To 

accomplish this, DOD provides guidance and standards to ensure maximum flexibility and 

interoperability with mission partners. 

 (2) To improve information sharing, DOD along with its non-DOD partners, have 

initiated common solutions and data sets that ensure interoperability and allow them to 

communicate quickly and more accurately. A collaborative environment among HD 

mission partners is a critical aspect to facilitating information sharing and interoperability. It 

provides the ability to create and share data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, 

execute, and assess joint force operations, enabling a commander to make decisions faster 

than the adversary. The speed with which information is gained, processed (and if 

necessary, sanitized for required dissemination and/or sharing) and understood influences 

how well we engage during emerging events. 

 (3) The collaborative environment supports the multilevel partitioning of vital 

information to enable allied and coalition forces, as well as non-DOD mission partners, to 

participate in HD operations. Web technology, a standard set of collaborative tools and 

databases, and common protocols and access are solutions that enable a broader audience to 

more effectively share information. 

 (4) Proper organization of the battle staff support structure is another way to 

facilitate the synchronizing and sharing of information. NORAD and USNORTHCOM use 

an adaptive headquarters model for their staffs when organizing for specific operations and 

exercises. In the adaptive headquarters, the staff reorganizes from its traditional functional 

areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications, to 

working groups that address current operations, future operations, joint plans, joint support, 

and interagency coordination. The organization must also transcend culture, policy, and 

technical barriers to be effective. 

 (5) Within the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Headquarters Battle-Staff the 

information synchronization group (ISG) is an enabler of the collaborative environment and 

manages information flow and synchronization processes to improve the support of all 
Chapter VII 

VII-6 JP 3-27 

command elements. The ISG is responsible for synchronizing information and for 

facilitating information and intelligence sharing across the commands and the mission 

partners in support of HD operations. 

 (6) The primary ISG function is the fusion of all operationally relevant 

information across functional areas. The intent is to enable decision making by senior 

leadership resulting in timely actions for successful mission accomplishment. The ISG 

improves synchronization by employing information exchange brokers embedded within the 

various headquarters battle-staff elements, and subordinate commands. They are subject 

matter experts that facilitate information flow between headquarters elements, subordinate 

commands, and mission partners. 

 f. Assuring and Defending Critical Information Infrastructure

 (1) The USG has a primary role for preventing and responding to threats in 

cyberspace and incidents and identifying and prosecuting the perpetrators. National policy 

for managing such threats and incidents is provided for by HSPD ñ 5, Management of 

Domestic Incidents and HSPD ñ 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 

Protection, which establish national policy for mitigating vulnerabilities of our critical 

infrastructures to attack in cyberspace and for strengthening our capabilities to detect, 

prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of cyberspace incidents. The National 

Response Plan (NRP) implements the national policy for incident response and the National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan implements the national policy for critical infrastructure 

protection. 

 (2) DHSís National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) is the 

principal interagency mechanism for managing cyberspace incidents of national significance 

and other national cyberspace incidents and physical attacks that have significant cyberspace 

consequences. The NCRCG facilitates federal coordination of the various response 

activities conducted during a cyberspace incident pursuant to HSPDs 5 and 7, the NRP, and 

the inherent authorities of the agencies and departments that comprise the NCRCG. DOD 

has a statutory role in cyberspace security, cybercrime training, and protection of critical 

information infrastructure and key assets and is a member of the NCRGC. 

 (3) HD includes the protection of critical DOD networks and when directed, 

national networks against threats and aggression. This includes DOD critical information 

infrastructure. It is accomplished through physical and virtual protection. 

 (a) Physical protection of networks is the responsibility of all DOD 

components and non-DOD mission partners that own critical information infrastructure 

supporting HD missions. Combatant commands, Services, and agencies are supported in 

their physical protection efforts through the DCIP and the National Communications System 

(NCS). The NCS coordinates national security and/or EP communications for the USG as 

well as the communication emergency support function under the NRP. The National 

Coordinating Center (NCC) within the NCS serves as the Information Sharing and Analysis 

Center for the telecommunications industry. As such, the NCC and national coordinating 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-7 

center functions as an important link within the telecommunications industry. This link can 

be exploited to assist in commercial circuit restoration. Additionally, the NCS provides 

access to all USG priority communications systems including the Government Emergency 

Telecommunications Service, the Wireless Priority System and the Telecommunications 

Service Priority system. The NCS, as the lead for the National Critical Infrastructure 

Protection Telecommunications Sector, can also assist in critical infrastructure analysis of 

the commercial telecommunications assets upon which DOD depends. The CCDRs with 

geographic HD responsibilities have established relationships with the NCS and coordinate 

on all commercial infrastructure restoral plans to ensure unity of effort. 

 (b) Virtual protection complements physical protection. For DOD, it is 

accomplished through NETOPS and DOD support to the NCRCG. NETOPS is the 

operational construct CDRUSSTRATCOM uses to operate and defend the GIG. NETOPS 

operators are responsible for performing the functions to sustain the operational readiness of 

the GIG. NETOPS provides integrated network visibility and end-to-end management of 

networks, global applications, and services across the GIG in support of DODís full range of 

military operations. It assures the GIG will be available to support HD operations. The 

technical scope of NETOPS includes all GIG assets, the entire infrastructure, organization, 

personnel, procedures, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, 

disseminate, and act on information. There is no comparable program for non-DOD 

mission partners. 

 (c) A NETOPS event is a collective term for all NETOPS activities that have 

the potential to impact the operational readiness of the GIG. To effectively operate the GIG 

as a global enterprise while realizing the GCCsí requirement to direct GIG operations in 

their theaters, CDRUSSTRATCOM developed an event based C2 structure. C2 of GIG 

operations will be based on the situation at the time of an event. The two possible 

circumstances that determine the C2 of NETOPS are known as theater NETOPS events and 

global NETOPS events. Theater NETOPS events are under the control of the GCC and his 

Service components. Global NETOPS events occur less frequently, but when they do occur 

CDRUSSTRATCOM will direct the global response. USSTRATCOM, in conjunction with 

other CCDRs, establish tactics, techniques and procedures for executing the supported 

relationships within the NETOPS C2 structure. 

 (d) CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for global NETOPS 

events and issues orders and direction through Joint Task Force Global Network Operations 

(JTF-GNO) to the combatant commands, Services, and agencies and other members of the 

NETOPS community of interest. GCCs are responsible for leading the theater response to 

global NETOPS events within their theater in accordance with USSTRATCOM and JTFGNO direction. JTF-GNO Service component commands will support the execution of 

global NETOPS. Functional CCDRs are the supported commanders where NETOPS 

activities affect or have the potential to affect execution of their assigned missions. 

 (e) The Intelligence Community Incident Response Center is the ICís single 

focal point for IC network incident reporting and management. Activities involving IC 

networks, specifically sensitive compartmented information networks, will be coordinated in 
Chapter VII 

VII-8 JP 3-27 

accordance with joint procedures approved by SecDef and the Director of National 

Intelligence. Due to the close interdependencies that DOD and IC components have on each 

otherís networks, it is essential that reporting procedures be in place to ensure rapid 

coordination in network defense. Reporting on IC networks is accomplished through the 

JTF-GNO and shared with the TNCCs of the CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities. 

 (f) The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO) 

offers a comprehensive military strategy for DOD to enhance US military strategic 

superiority in cyberspace. The NMS-CO addresses three main roles: defense of the 

nation, national incident response, and critical infrastructure protection. CCDRs with 

geographic HD responsibilities should ensure unified action at the theater level for 

cyberspace operations. This includes coordinating with coalition and interagency 

partners as outlined in strategy, policy, and agreements.

3. Defense Critical Infrastructure 

 DCI is the DOD and non-DOD networked assets essential to project, support, and 

sustain military forces and operations worldwide. Assets are people, physical entities, or 

information. Physical assets would include installations, facilities, ports, bridges, power 

stations, telecommunication lines, pipelines, etc. The increasing interconnectivity and 

interdependence among commercial and defense infrastructures demand that DOD take 

steps to understand and remedy or mitigate the vulnerabilities of, and threats to, the critical 

infrastructures on which it depends for mission accomplishment. The DCIP is a fully 

integrated program that provides a comprehensive process for understanding and protecting 

selected infrastructure assets that are critical to national security during peace, crisis, and 

war. It involves identifying, prioritizing, assessing, protecting, monitoring, and assuring the 

reliability and availability of mission-critical infrastructures essential to the execution of the 

NMS. The program also addresses the operational decision support necessary for CCDRs to 

achieve their mission objectives despite the degradation or absence of these infrastructures. 

 a. The DCIP complements other DOD programs and efforts, such as FP, AT, 

information assurance (IA), and COOP. Overall responsibility for protection of non-DOD 

critical infrastructure rests largely with DHS. One exception is the defense industrial base 

(DIB), which falls under DOD for protection. DCIP activities related to the DIB are 

consistent with and complement the authorities outlined in DOD Directive 5220.22, 

National Industrial Security Program. Information on DCIP plans, programs, and assets are 

safeguarded IAW pertinent DOD issuances on information security and OPSEC. 

 b. DOD serves as the sector-specific agency for the DIB with responsibilities to 

collaborate with all relevant entities, conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments, and 

encourage risk management strategies. These responsibilities are outlined in HSPD-7, 

Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection, and further expanded in 

the National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets as 

well as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The ASD(HD&ASA) under the USD(P) 

acts as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to SecDef on DCIP activities and 

provides policy and strategy guidance. CJCS is the principal military advisor to SecDef on 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-9 

DCIP activities and is responsible for the coordination, integration, prioritization, and 

guidance for DCIP operations. GCCs and Service Chiefs are responsible for operational 

assessments, planning, integration, and protection of DCI. 

 c. CCDRs conducting HD missions are responsible for establishing a DCIP that 

conforms to DOD requirements and policy. DOD components are also responsible for 

establishing similar programs. The components must identify and assess the critical assets 

and infrastructure dependencies that are necessary for the successful execution of present 

and projected military operations, their fulfillment of HD operations, and protection of US 

interests at home. Components also address these issues at the installation level. 

 d. Force projection capabilities consist of both DOD-owned and non-DOD-owned 

assets, facilities, and systems that enable DOD to project military power globally. Examples 

include strategic military bases, ports of embarkation/PODS, mobilization staging and 

storage areas, rail and trucking transportation centers, etc. Protection and defense of nonDOD facilities is normally coordinated with federal, state, tribal, and local LEAs; however, 

if directed by the President, DOD may be tasked to provide the forces and have the overall 

responsibility to defend these facilities. 

For more information concerning critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and the DCIP see 

DODD 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP). 

4. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 a. Combating WMD contributes to HD by protecting the United States, our allies, 

partners, and interests through an active, layered, defense in depth. In the hands of 

adversaries, these weapons could enable them to inflict massive harm on the United States, 

including our military forces at home and abroad. The National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction sets forth the three pillars: counterproliferation to combat 

WMD use, strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation, and CM to respond 

to WMD use. 

 b. The military mission is to dissuade, deter, and defeat those who seek to harm the 

United States, its allies, and partners through WMD use or threat of use. This mission is in 

direct support of the three pillars. According to the National Military Strategy for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Armed Forces of the US may be called upon 

to carry out eight missions: 

 (1) Offensive operations. 

 (2) Elimination. 

 (3) Interdiction. 

 (4) Active defense. 
Chapter VII 

VII-10 JP 3-27 

 (5) Passive defense. 

 (6) WMD CM. 

 (7) Security cooperation and partner activities. 

 (8) Threat reduction cooperation. 

 c. The global WMD threat has grown more complex and diverse including both state 

and non-state actors and the rapid advance of technologies to develop and deliver WMD. 

DOD plays an essential role in combating WMD through a full range of operational 

capabilities to protect the United States, our military forces, and partners and allies from the 

threat or actual use of WMD. For example, DOD is one of many participating USG 

departments/agencies which support the multinational PSI, the program supported by the 

United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea and is designed 

specifically to counter the proliferation of WMD and precursors/material. 

For more information on Combating WMD see JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, and JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for 

Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments. 

5. Sustainment

 a. Personnel 

 (1) The core functional responsibilities of a joint force J-1, are accomplished 

during HD operations; with some exceptions such as, morale, welfare, and recreation; 

establishing a rest and recuperation program; coordinating military postal operations; 

monitoring joint personnel training and tracking activities; rotational policy planning; and 

identifying special pay and entitlements. 

 (2) A joint force J-1 may not be required to accomplish support and assistance 

to the office of primary responsibility for reserve component call-up, personnel recovery 

operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and detainee operations during HD 

operations. 

 (3) Personnel Support. The authorities and responsibilities for personnel 

support to HD operations are largely the same as those for any other DOD mission set. 

Some notable exceptions, however, apply to HD operations within the land, airspace, and 

territorial waters of the US. More specifically, those exceptions apply to areas within the 

USNORTHCOM AOR. 

 (a) Personnel Accountability. Personnel accountability is a command 

responsibility. Personnel accountability, strength reporting, and manpower management 

are the focal points for a joint force J-1 during HD operations. HD operations in CONUS 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-11 

pose specific challenges, one example being, units deploy from their home stations 

instead of a unique designated port of debarkation (POD). Service personnel elements 

supporting home station deployments must ensure that all processing and reporting 

requirements are met prior to unit deployment. In specific circumstance, such as 

operations in a WMD environment, the employing CJTF may establish a joint reception 

center to ensure arriving units are ready for employment, but this would be the exception. 

 (b) Individual Augmentation. USNORTHCOM forces are task organized 

when needed, causing a continuing requirement for individual augmentations. This 

particularly applies to AFNORTH, USARNORTH, and potentially MARFORNORTH in 

cases where they are required to form JTFs. These component commands must prepare 

joint manning documents listing the specific Service expertise required to meet their 

mission requirements. See CJCSI 1301, Individual Augmentation Procedures, for 

detailed guidance. 

 (c) Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Disasters. Attacks on 

the United States can affect DOD personnel and their dependents. Service components 

account for and report the status of all DOD-affiliated military and civilian personnel, 

including contractor and all family members immediately following a disaster or attack. 

Additionally, Service components should be prepared to report the number of Service 

members, DOD civilians, DOD contractors and their dependents requiring evacuation 

from an affected area. See DODI 3001.02, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction With 

Natural or Man-made Disasters. 

 

For detailed guidance on Personnel Support, see JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint 

Operations. 

 b. Logistics. The authorities and responsibilities for logistics operations in support of 

HD are largely the same as any other DOD mission set. Some notable exceptions, however, 

apply to HD operations within the land, airspace, and US territorial waters. More 

specifically, the exceptions apply to the USNORTHCOM AOR. 

 (1) JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, states that the 

ìexercise of directive authority for logistics (DAFL) by a CCDR includes the authority to 

delegate authority for common support capability to subordinate commandersî and that 

ìCCDRs exercise COCOM over assigned forces.î Within the USNORTHCOM AOR the 

CDRUSNORTHCOM does not have assigned forces and therefore executes OPCON or 

TACON over attached forces without DAFL. Given the robust logistics capabilities 

within each Service component and DOD support agency/commercial contracting 

infrastructure in the USNORTHCOM AOR, DAFL is generally not necessary for 

CDRUSNORTHCOM to execute the HD mission. It may be necessary at times for 

CDRUSNORTHCOM to exercise DAFL in responding to an HD threat, or more 

specifically in reacting in the aftermath of an actual attack against the homeland. For 

such instances, the President or SecDef may extend this authority to attached forces when 

transferring those forces for a specific mission. 
Chapter VII 

VII-12 JP 3-27 

For further information on logistic support refer to JP 4-0, Logistic Support for Joint 

Operations. 

 (2) Implementation and execution of logistic functions remain the responsibility 

of the Services and the Service component commanders. Each Service is responsible for the 

logistic support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by 

agreements with national agencies, allies or another Service. 

 (3) In the case where coalition operations are used for HD operations, coalition 

partners are ultimately responsible for providing logistic support for their own forces. 

However, the GCC should strive to negotiate, conclude, and integrate the use of acquisition 

and cross-servicing agreements and associated implementing arrangements and any other 

vehicle necessary to ensure needed logistics support. 

 (4) Functions of Logistics. Responsibilities for the functions of logistics as 

described in existing joint doctrine apply to HD operations with the following exceptions: 

 (a) Supply. USNORTHCOM will normally not establish supply buildup 

rates or determine theater stockage levels in the USNORTHCOM AOR. Based on mission 

requirements, Service components and DOD combat support agencies (CSAs) determine 

build up rates and stockage levels for supply. 

 (b) Maintenance and Salvage. Service components and CSAs will maintain 

administrative and coordination responsibilities for maintenance and salvage within the 

USNORTHCOM AOR. 

 (c) Transportation. HD airlift priorities are outlined in CJCSI 4120.02, 

Assignment of Movement Priority. The national importance of these mission areas is 

reflected in the elevated movement priorities that can be applied for these missions by the 

President or SecDef. For operations that demand expedited movement, 

CDRUSTRANSCOM will maintain on-call readiness levels necessary to meet 

CDRUSNORTHCOM mission requirements. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Deployment 

Distribution Operations Center (NDDOC) is embedded within the Joint Support Center and 

is composed of personnel from NORAD and USNORTHCOM and national partners as 

required (i.e., US Transportation Command [USTRANSCOM], Defense Logistics Agency 

[DLA], the Services, and other organizations). It is established as directed by 

CDRUSNORTHCOM to support HD (and CS) operations and operates under the direction 

of the NORAD-USNORTHCOM J-4. The NDDOC implements command movement 

priorities, anticipates and resolves transportation shortfalls, prioritizes transportation assets, 

synchronizes deployment force flow and distribution, and provides in-transit visibility. 

 (d) Mortuary Affairs. USNORTHCOM is responsible for controlling and 

coordinating mortuary affairs operations within its AOR. The local or state medical 

examiner or coroner will maintain jurisdiction over both military and civilian fatalities, 

unless the Armed Forces Medical Examiner requests and receives jurisdiction. However, 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-13 

DOD should also be prepared to assist with fatality management operations and emergency 

family assistance to DOD families. 

See JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, for details. 

 (e) Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS enhances combat capability and 

improves productivity by providing life-sustaining and essential services and critical supply, 

maintenance, and transportation services to enable the operating force to conduct HD 

missions, supporting force reception and beddown across the range of military operations. 

The primary focus of the CSS effort is to sustain and assist DOD forces employed in HD. 

 (5) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI). 

JRSOI is the essential process that assembles deploying forces, consisting of personnel, and 

equipment, and materiel arriving in theater, into forces capable of meeting the CCDRís 

operational requirements. In the USNORTHCOM AOR, portions of JRSOI identified 

below, are not appropriately regarded as discrete steps necessary for HD operations: 

 (a) JRSOI for a large force can/will most likely require resources beyond that 

of the designated base support installation (BSI). The supported CCDR must request 

sufficient JRSOI support to ensure that the designated BSI can perform JRSOI. 

 (b) Reception operations include all those functions required to receive and 

clear unit personnel, equipment, and materiel through the POD. For HD operations within 

the USNORTHCOM AOR, the personnel, equipment, and materiel may originate from 

within the JOA. In that case, personnel, equipment, and material are already accounted for 

at the home base, making the home base essentially the POD. Component support plans 

will address processes for in place personnel reporting to the CJTF. 

 (c) Staging assembles, temporarily holds and organizes arriving personnel, 

equipment, and material in preparation for onward movement. Similarly to reception, the 

personnel, equipment, and material to be employed for HD operations within the 

USNORTHCOM AOR may stage within the confines of their home installation. 

 (d) Onward movement is the process of moving units and accompanying 

material from reception facilities, marshalling areas, and staging areas to tactical assembly 

Base Support Installation (BSI) 

A BSI, when approved by the Secretary of Defense, serves as the main logistical hub 

for military support operations. Generally, most forces will deploy through, and the 

majority of sustainment will be positioned at the BSI. As a minimum, a BSI will 

normally have the following characteristics: an airfield and communications 

infrastructure sufficient to meet the surge of forces into an operational area, dry open 

areas for staging of supplies and equipment, a good road network, health and other life 

support services to include billeting, food service and force protection and be close to 

the focus of military operations/support to remain responsive and flexible to the needs 

of the joint force.
Chapter VII 

VII-14 JP 3-27 

areas (TAAs) and/or operational areas or other theater destinations. Because units and 

forces likely to be employed in HD operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR are likely 

to be geographically close to the JOAs, the TAA can be located at the unitís or forceís home 

base. Onward movement, in many instances, can be accomplished concurrently with and 

collocated with reception and staging activities ñ at the home base. When a unit or force is 

not geographically close to an operational area and a TAA other than the home base is 

desired, then traditional, discrete onward movement activities would be required. 

Oftentimes, a TAA would be located at a designated BSI that would provide logistic support 

and be located near the operational area. 

 (e) Integration is the synchronized hand off of units into an operational 

commanderís force prior to mission execution. HD operations within the USNORTHCOM 

AOR often require complex C2 structures, thus special attention to integration is required. 

Refer to Appendix A, ìTransitioning Between Homeland Defense and Civil Support.î 

 c. Engineering. Military Engineering support may be required simultaneously for 

HD and CS operations. The primary focus of engineering effort is to sustain and assist 

DOD forces employed in HD. The secondary effort will be CS, when requested and 

approved IAW DOD guidance and applicable plans. The scope of engineering support 

for HD focuses on AT and/or FP construction, force bed-down, and emergency 

stabilization and repair of damaged critical infrastructure. 

 (1) Planning Considerations. The duration and scope of DOD engineer 

involvement will be directly related to the severity and magnitude of the threat, situation, or 

actual event. Engineer planners working either contingency or crisis action planning should 

develop plans with forces capable of initial tasks and priority of effort. Engineer efforts in 

HD may evolve into CS engineer actions. Initial planning considerations should address but 

are not limited to the following: 

 (a) Necessary AT and/or FP temporary construction. 

 (b) Force bed-down construction. 

 (c) Expedient hardening measures for enhanced facility, area, and/or asset 

survivability. 

 (d) Emergency stabilization and repair of damaged critical infrastructure. 

 (e) Emergency clearance of debris from airfields, roads, bridges, ports, 

wharfs, tunnels and waterways necessary to allow access to critical areas. 

 (f) Humanitarian needs of the dislocated populace, such as the construction 

of temporary shelters and support facilities. 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-15 

 (g) Repairs/work-arounds to other critical public utilities, services, and 

facilities that will help restore the ability of the local authority to manage its own recovery 

efforts. 

 (h) Demolition of damaged structures/facilities. 

 (i) Other support to federal agencies and emergency support functions 

outlined in the NRP. 

 (j) Use of geospatial intelligence products. 

 (2) Engineer Assets and Capabilities. DOD engineer capabilities coupled with 

the commercial sector/contract capabilities provide extensive engineering depth and breadth. 

 (a) A total force perspective for achieving engineering objectives is 

necessary. Engineer support may be garnered from local, state and federal resources via a 

multitude of avenues or agreements. In all respects, maximum consideration will be given 

to the use of locally available facilities, support structures, and contract services. 

For more information on DOD engineering organizational structures and assets, see JP 3-

34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

 (b) State active duty NG engineer forces may be operational within the AO 

or incident area along with Title 10 USC engineer forces. All engineer forces should seek to 

coordinate efforts to maximize capabilities and results. 

 (c) Deployable assets for force beddown are primarily in the Army Force 

Provider, Navy Advanced Base Functional Components and Air Force Basic Expeditionary 

Airfield Resources equipment sets. Leasing, modification to existing DOD infrastructure, 

and expedient construction should also be considered as a primary source for beddown 

support. Expedient construction includes several types of rapid construction techniques 

such as prefabricated buildings, inflatable buildings, etc. Flexibility in forces and 

methodology of execution is essential to successful HD engineer operations. 

 (d) Contractor support has become an essential part of DOD engineering 

capabilities. HD planning and execution for engineer missions should maximize the use of 

contract resources where and when the use of contractors is economical and does not 

negatively impact HD mission accomplishment. Sufficient local contractors are expected to 

be available to support most heavy equipment and engineer and construction requirements. 

Coordination with DOD agencies with large-scale contract capability such as the US Army 

Corps of Engineers (USACE), Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Air 

Force Civil Engineer Support Agency and Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence 

should be conducted to ensure efficient resource utilization and gain economies of scale 

when possible. 
Chapter VII 

VII-16 JP 3-27 

 (e) HD operations may include engineering forces from countries with 

international agreements/treaties such as the Canada-US Combined Defense Plan and Civil 

Assistance Plan. These forces may be made available to support operations, particularly if 

an event occurs in close proximity to adjacent country boundaries and should be considered 

during mission planning. 

 (3) Engineersí Constraints. Disruption of the commercial sector transportation, 

communication, and supply systems as well as limited DOD airlift support, competing DOD 

HD forces and the exigency of engineer mission requirements may have an adverse effect 

on HD engineer missions during crisis operations. 

 (a) Several broad authorities have been established under Title 10 USC that 

may enable the responding force to carry out emergency and contingency construction, to 

include procuring materials for construction by military forces and funding of contracts in 

support of contingency operations. When required, protective construction shall be in 

accordance with the unified facilities criteria (UFC), DOD Minimum Standards for 

Buildings, UFC 4-010-01 and supporting Service standards. 

 (b) A catastrophic event may limit or place significant competing demands 

for Class IV materials. It is crucial that engineers articulate requirements for materials as 

expeditiously as possible. Expedient construction methods may be required when the HD 

action/situation limits time, material, manpower, or equipment. 

 (c) Acquisition of real property is not anticipated. However, short-term 

leasing may be necessary depending on location and duration forces are deployed. To the 

maximum extent possible, deployed forces will rely on the host of the critical infrastructure 

facility, the BSIs, or existing DOD facilities for real estate needs. Occupation of private 

land or facilities is not authorized without specific legal authority. Necessary rental/leasing 

support may be obtained from the General Services Administration, USACE, NAVFAC, or 

other government agency with an appropriately warranted contracting officer. 

For additional information on engineer organizations and assets of DOD military Services, 

see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

 (4) Environmental Considerations

 (a) Environmental Responsibilities. Military commanders are responsible 

for employing environmentally responsible practices that minimize adverse impacts to 

human health and the environment. During all operations, strategies will be developed to 

reduce or eliminate negative impacts on the environment. Similarly, strategies will be 

developed to minimize negative impacts to mission accomplishment caused by 

environmental degradation. 

 (b) Planning Considerations. Environmental considerations are an integral 

part of HD planning. Contingency planning for HD must include environmental 

considerations in planning and executing operations. Operational alternatives that minimize 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-17 

damage to the natural environment or cultural/historic resources must be considered. HD 

actions undertaken during crisis are considered emergency actions, whereby national 

security and protection of life or property are at risk. HD response in crisis circumstances 

may make it necessary to take immediate actions without preparing the normal 

environmental planning documents. Compliance with applicable federal, State, tribal and 

local laws during crisis circumstances is still a DOD goal to the maximum extent possible. 

 (c) Environmental Actions in the operational area. DOD forces should 

make every effort to document environmental conditions upon arrival in the operational area 

as well as documenting conditions upon departure. Documenting actions as soon as 

possible during and after operations will facilitate resolution and closure of environmental 

issues. An active environmental review of HD operations should be accomplished to 

identify possible environmental issues before a negative impact occurs. Close 

liaison/communication with the applicable DOD regional environmental coordinator will 

also aid in ultimate resolution of environmental issues with, federal, state, tribal, and local 

agencies. 

 (d) Remediation and Transfer to Civil Authorities. Environmental 

impacts will be addressed as soon as possible once the operations have stabilized. 

Environmental HD incidents may evolve from actions or operations where DOD is not the 

federal agency with lead authority. Emergency exemptions may be needed for disposal of 

contaminated and hazardous material. DODís goal is to initiate actions as soon as possible 

to curtail further environmental damage and to resolve environmental impacts. DOD forces 

should direct efforts to properly identify, contain, document, and transfer environmental 

issues to civil authorities as soon as possible.

 d. Religious Support. Religious support (RS) is defined as the full spectrum of 

professional duties performed by chaplains in their dual role as religious leaders and military 

staff officers. Chaplains support military forces conducting HD as part of a religious 

support team (RST). The RST normally consists of at least one chaplain and an enlisted 

assistant of the same service. 

 (1) Principles for Religious Support during HD

 (a) Command Responsibility. Military commanders are responsible for 

providing all authorized DOD personnel the opportunity to exercise their religious beliefs. 

RS for joint forces conducting HD is provided by service components and JTFs. RS during 

multinational events will be governed by appropriate agreements and plans with 

consideration for cultural differences and the commanderís guidance. 

 (b) Free Exercise and Accommodation. Free exercise of religion is the 

constitutional right of every American. The primary role for military chaplains is to provide 

for the free exercise of religion for DOD personnel, to include service members, their 

families and authorized civilians. See DOD Directive 1300.17, Accommodation of 

Religious Practices Within the Military Services. 
Chapter VII 

VII-18 JP 3-27 

 (c) Joint Area Religious Support. Joint area RS is religious support 

provided to all DOD personnel, regardless of service component or status, who are not 

part of the RST unit of assignment. As a primary mission, the RST will support the 

command to which assigned. When directed, the RST may also be responsible to provide 

joint area religious support to units without assigned chaplains, and to personnel from 

shortage or minority faith groups. As an example, a JTF may instruct chaplains in 

assigned units to provide RS to personnel from other services or components. In 

addition, an AC RST, when directed, may provide RS to NG personnel serving in state 

active duty or Title 32 USC (state controlled, federally funded) status during emergencies 

or exigent circumstances. Likewise, under these same circumstances, NG chaplains may 

provide joint area RS to AC personnel in Title 10 USC status if they are directed by the 

applicable joint force headquarters ñ state commander, and if the RS is conducted in 

accordance with state law. As an auxiliary of the Air Force, Civil Air Patrol chaplains 

are available to perform chaplain services on military installations or in performance of 

duties requested (see Air Force Instruction 10-2701, Organization and Function of the 

Civil Air Patrol). 

 (d) Guidance for Military Chaplains during HD. The RST will follow 

command direction, joint doctrine, supervisory chaplain guidance and legal counsel 

regarding permissible chaplain activities in the homeland. 

 e. Force Health Protection and Health Service Support (HSS)

 (1) FHP, the protection component of HSS, provides the framework for 

optimizing health readiness and protecting Service members from all health threats. FHP 

complements FP. FHP includes all measures taken by the JFC and the Military Health 

System to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of 

Service members across the range of military activities and operations. The JFC is 

responsible for FHP and must ensure that adequate HSS capabilities are appropriately 

planned for and in place to provide prevention and protection against health threats, and 

medical and rehabilitative care to maintain a healthy and fit force. The goal of HSS for HD 

is to minimize both disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) and battlefield injuries (BIs) to 

support mission accomplishment. 

 (2) HSS provides services that promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental 

or physical well-being of our forces. Specialized HSS capabilities characterize the potential 

occupational and environmental health (OEH) threats and provide commanders at all levels, 

risk mitigating recommendations to facilitate deployment preparation, prevent casualties, 

injury, and illness that occur in the field; and sustain operations. HSS is normally organized 

and determined by factors that include, and are not limited to: the joint forceís mission, 

intelligence, population-at-risk, duration and scope of the operation, and the threat (to 

include OEH threats). 

 (a) The provision of HSS for HD missions varies significantly from 

conventional combat operations. HSS concepts for response to HD missions should focus 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-19 

on the augmentation and expansion of medical capabilities found on installations, as an 

alternative to the projection of forces. 

 (b) Placing medical response capabilities at the installation level minimizes 

the burden on limited transportation assets, reduces the deployed footprint and advocates 

steady-state relationships between HSS organizations and community counterparts. The 

USNORTHCOM joint regional medical planners and USPACOM command surgeons are 

vital to coordinating this effort. 

 (3) Health Threat and Medical Intelligence. The health threat is a composite of 

ongoing or potential adversary actions; occupational and environmental threats; the 

employment of WMD; and endemic diseases that can reduce the effectiveness of the force 

through wounds, injuries, illness, and psychological stressors. Medical intelligence merges 

the capabilities of the medical and intelligence communities to gain a better understanding 

of potential threats, and identify mitigation and response options to minimize potential 

impacts. 

 (a) Through proactive analysis and increased situational awareness, medical 

intelligence is an essential component in understanding the threat environment and 

formulating policy and response options. Medical intelligence data is critical for the JFC to 

attain situational understanding of health threats; develop FHP and HSS policies and 

strategies that mitigate natural and intentional incidents; attain information superiority for 

the deterrence, prevention, mitigation and destruction of CBRNE threats and aggression; 

and redefine the battlespace from a medical perspective by employing strategic and 

preventative HSS response planning. 

 

 (b) In general, the US states and territories in the AORs of the CCDRs with 

geographic HD responsibilities are at low risk for endemic diseases during normal state of 

affairs. However, pandemic disease outbreaks have the potential to rapidly place the US 

military and wider population at risk. Nevertheless, man-made hazards (deliberate or 

accidental) may present the greatest potential health risk to forces conducting HD 

operations. Additionally, the physical areas of the homeland are heavily industrialized and 

have the potential for the accidental or deliberate release of a large variety of toxic industrial 

chemicals/materials at production sites and during transportation. 

 (4) Health Surveillance. Health surveillance is critical to FHP and includes the 

following activities: identifying the population at risk; identifying and assessing potential 

OEH hazards, documenting OEH and CBRNE risks and exposures; using specific risk 

management countermeasures; monitoring real-time health outcomes (medical 

surveillance); and reporting DNBI and BI rates and other measures in a timely manner. 

OEH surveillance is a key component of health surveillance and a key contributor toward 

DNBI prevention. Environmental and occupational monitoring for chemical, biological, 

and physical hazards such as indigenous communicable diseases, vectors, toxic industrial 

materials, field sanitation problems, and unsafe food and water is a continuous process over 

the entire deployment life cycle. During the pre-deployment phase, intelligence preparation 

activities must consider the available strategic and operational medical intelligence 
Chapter VII 

VII-20 JP 3-27 

pertaining to the operational environment to identify and protect against expected threats 

that may be encountered. The employment of appropriate HSS capabilities to provide 

comprehensive occupational, environmental, and operational exposure surveillance for 

forces deploying in support of HD operations is essential to the HD mission. Exposure 

surveillance must serve the real-time operational risk management decisions of the 

supported JFC. Additionally, exposure surveillance should be employed to conduct a 

retrospective analysis to improve force health protection for future operations and support 

follow-on medical care to previously deployed forces. 

 (5) Medical and Health Related Tasks. To support mission accomplishment 

and ensure effective and synchronized FHP and HSS for HD, CCDRs, Service, and 

component commands, should give consideration to the tasks provided below. 

 (a) CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities should: 

 1. Develop FHP implementing guidance and directives in coordination 

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, component commanders, 

the Services, NGB, DOD agencies and other unified commands. 

 2. Plan, coordinate and execute FHP and HSS tasks with component 

commands, other DOD components, state health authorities, interagency and multinational 

partners at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels. 

 3. Integrate medical intelligence, environmental surveillance, and 

syndromic surveillance efforts in collaboration with DOD components and other federal 

agencies via early warning systems to identify potential health threats. 

 4. Identify, prioritize, and coordinate risk mitigation for DOD health 

sector critical infrastructure in coordination with the OSD, the Joint Staff, component 

commanders, the Services, NGB, DOD agencies and the private sector. 

 5. Standardize and provide oversight for the health service aspects of 

vulnerability assessments. 

 6. Develop, establish and maintain patient movement operation plans, 

in coordination with CDRUSTRANSCOM. 

 7. Designate medical facilities at installations within the AOR to serve 

as regional medical response activities to coordinate and synchronize joint HSS in an 

operational area or medical support area to support an appointed CJTF. 

 8. Ensure awareness of bed capacity across the AOR. Obtain surge 

capacity data from national disaster medical system partners on a recurring basis. 
 Other Supporting Operations and Enabling Activities 

VII-21 

 (b) Joint force providers (US Joint Forces Command [USJFCOM], 

USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, Services and geographic combatant 

commands with assigned forces) should: 

 1. Plan, coordinate and execute FHP program IAW USNORTHCOM, 

USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, DOD, CJCS, and Service directives and guidance. 

 2. Joint force providers should also ensure all deploying forces and 

capabilities have met pre-deployment FHP requirements specified in the EXORD. 

 (c) Functional component commands (JFMCC, JFLCC, and JFACC) should: 

 1. Plan and coordinate FHP implementation with other JFCs, DOD 

components, state health authorities, interagency and coalition partners at the local, state and 

regional levels. Component commands should also implement FHP directives in 

coordination with DOD components. 

 2. Be prepared to assume FHP and HSS responsibilities for forces or 

capabilities made available to the functional component. Responsibilities include ensuring 

adequate HSS capabilities (to include preventive medicine assets) are requested and 

deployed to ensure comprehensive exposure assessments and health risk management as 

defined in FHP guidance documents. 

 (d) NGB should: 

 1. Plan, coordinate and execute an FHP program IAW directives and 

guidance from the CCDRís with geographic HD responsibilities, DOD, CJCS, and Services. 

 2. Ensure all deploying forces have met pre-deployment FHP 

requirements specified in the EXORD. Additionally, ensure deploying forces meet postdeployment FHP requirements. 

 (e) DOD agencies should: Plan, coordinate and execute an FHP program 

IAW directives and guidance from the CCDRís with geographic HD responsibilities, DOD, 

CJCS, and Services. 

 (f) USTRANSCOM should: 

 1. Establish patient movement guidance in coordination with the 

CCDRs with geographic HD responsibilities in response to an attack on the homeland in 

their respective AORs. Joint patient movement in support of HD within the USPACOM 

AOR is in accordance with the USPACOM HD plan, and is the responsibility of the 

USPACOM theater patient movement requirements center (TPMRC). Per the 

USNORTHCOM HD plan, the global patient movement requirement center under 

USTRANSCOM serves as the TPMRC responsible for joint patient movement in the 

USNORTHCOM AOR in support of HD. 
Chapter VII 

VII-22 JP 3-27 

 2. Provide patient movement planning and requirements identification 

for the USNORTHCOM AOR and validate CONUS patient movement missions. 

 3. Plan to establish or augment joint patient movement requirement 

centers (to include patient movement requirement centers for the national disaster medical 

system) to support HD contingency operations. 

 (g) Joint Blood Program Office should: Manage and coordinate all aspects 

of DOD blood product support and DOD blood distribution assets (in the AORs containing 

the homeland) in coordination with the Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO). 
APPENDIX A 

TRANSITIONING BETWEEN HOMELAND 

DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT 

A-1 

1. General

a. Relationships between Homeland Defense, Civil Support, and Homeland Security. 

(1) The homeland is confronted by a spectrum of threats and hazards. Some of 

these threats are ambiguous; essentially they are neither traditional military threats requiring 

only a DOD response capability, nor are they purely law enforcement threats requiring a 

nonmilitary response from DHS, DOJ, or another civilian agency. For example, a 

transnational threat can present a challenge in assigning lead responsibility to a particular 

agency. The characterization of a particular threat may, ultimately, rest with the President, 

but USG efforts are on-going to develop specific protocols and response options that address 

the coordination, integration and responsibilities of the federal agencies in responding to the 

full spectrum of threats and hazards. These new strategies, processes, and procedures are 

emerging out of documents such as the NSMS and US Aviation Security Policy, and their 

respective supporting plans (e.g., MOTR and AOTR Plans). These processes aid both the 

warfighter and civil authorities in identifying which agency or agencies are best suited to 

achieve the USG's desired outcome given the unique circumstances of the event. 

(2) HS, as defined in the NSHS, is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 

acts within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerabilities to terrorism, and minimize 

the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. However, the NSHS addresses HS 

beyond the definition, and includes law enforcement, CBRNE CM, and disaster 

preparedness and relief missions. Either DHS or DOJ will usually be the federal agency 

with lead responsibility, and supported by DOD, when requested. The NSHS addresses a 

very specific and uniquely challenging threat—terrorism against the United States—and 

provides a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, tribal, 

local, and private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national 

security. The NSHS complements the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United 

States and provides a framework for creating and seizing opportunities that strengthen our 

security and prosperity. The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for ensuring 

the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and 

actual domestic terrorist attacks, non-terrorist security threats (e.g., drug and migrant 

smuggling), major disasters, and other emergencies. 

(3) DOD protects the homeland through two distinct but interrelated missions –

HD and CS. While these missions are distinct, some department roles and responsibilities

overlap, and operations require extensive coordination between lead and supporting 

agencies. Figure A-1 illustrates a notional relationship between HD, CS and HS lead and 

supporting relationships with examples of the types of operations that can take place for 

each mission. The HD, CS, and HS missions are separate, but have areas where roles and 

responsibilities may overlap and/or lead and supporting roles may transition between 

organizations. DOD serves as the federal agency with lead responsibility for HD, which 

may be executed by DOD alone (e.g., BMD) or include support provided to DOD by other

agencies such as DHS or DOT (e.g., FAA support to DOD/NORAD). CS is the overarching 

term for DOD's support to civilian authorities. DOD’s role in the CS mission consists of
A-2

JP 3-27 Figure A-1. Notional Relationship Between Homeland Defense, Civil Support, and Homeland Security 

NOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOMELAND DEFENSE, CIVIL SUP

AND HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS

DOD Lead Role DOD Supporting Role

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, R

Nuclear and High-Yield 

FAA Federal Aviation AdminNORAD North American Aerosp

Command

Discrete activities that can take place as homelanddefense, civil support, or homeland security operations

123456789

10

Ballistic Missile DefenseDOD Support for Disaster RelEnforcement ActivitiesCBRNE Consequence ManageAirport SecurityMaritime SecurityFAA Support to DOD (NORADNational Guard Title 32 US CoNational Guard Title 10 US CoEmergency PreparednessDOD / Community Relations

HOMELAND SECURITY

4

HOMELAND

DEFENSE

CIVIL SUPPORT

5

9

8

6 2

7

10

1

3
 Transitioning Between Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

A-3 

support to US civil authorities (DHS or other agency) for domestic emergencies and for

designated law enforcement and other activities. HD and CS operations may occur in 

parallel and require extensive integration and synchronization. In addition, operations may

also transition from HD to CS to HS or vice versa (e.g., maritime security) with the lead

depending on the situation and USG’s desired outcome (annotated by the arrows). While 

the lead may transition, a single agency has the lead at any given time for a particular 

activity. However, in the areas of overlapping responsibility, the designation of federal 

agency with lead responsibility may not be predetermined. In time-critical situations, onscene leaders are empowered to conduct appropriate operations in response to a particular 

threat. The MOTR protocols provide guidance for maritime security, that can transition

between HD, CS, or HS (see Chapter V, Maritime Operations). The NG and the reserves 

also play a vital role in the defense of the homeland. In the HD, CS and HS construct, the 

NG Title 10 USC authorities are depicted with HD and CS under DOD command and 

control (i.e., the NG can conduct HD and CS under Title 10 USC). Title 32 USC authorities 

are depicted as HS under the state or territory’s command and control. Details on the 

employment of the NG for these missions are provided later in this appendix. EP is 

considered a part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities. It spans HD, CS and HS and 

includes DOD’s lead, support, and enable functions. Mobile command centers and DOD 

aviation support to the US Secret Service are just two examples of how DOD prepares for 

and supports EP operations. 

2. Command and Control Options for Transition 

In DOD, integration includes the synchronized transfer of units into an operational 

commander’s force prior to mission execution. HD operations require special attention to 

integration, since the C2 possibilities are extensive. Traditional considerations for 

integration are adequate when DOD is the lead and is defending against traditional external 

threats/aggression. However, when DOD is simultaneously performing HD operations and

supporting DHS or other federal agencies, the C2 becomes more complex. DOD uses 

military command structures, while the USCG and other federal, state, and local agencies 

utilize the Incident Command System, as adopted by the National Incident Management 

System. While they both provide the requisite C2, additional considerations regarding 

interagency coordination are required when transitioning to CS operations. 

a. CCDRs cannot predict when an HD operation will transition to CS or vice versa. 

Additionally, CCDRs may be called on to execute HD and CS simultaneously. C2 in 

support of HD and CS operations must have a straightforward C2 template that will permit 

the CCDR to respond as the supported commander, supporting commander, or both. Recent 

changes in law and DOD policy have increased the CCDR’s C2 options. Options include 

using a standing JTF headquarters, augmenting a core Service component headquarters, or 

forming an ad hoc organization from various contributors. When organizing C2 involving 

state NG forces, the CCDR may also seek appointment of a “dual status” commander. 

Regardless of the organizational structure, there are fundamental rules for forming and 

operating a JTF. 

For details on forming a JTF, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-27 

b. NG Dual Status Commander. A unique C2 relationship may be established 

when Title 10 USC and NG (Title 32 USC) forces operate together. Title 32 USC Section 

325 allows a single commander to still fulfill NG requirements while serving on active duty 

if in command of a National Guard unit—if the President authorizes such service in both 

duty statuses; and the governor of the NG state or territory or the Commanding General of 

the District of Columbia NG, as the case may be, consents to such service in both duty 

statuses. A NG dual status commander retains his state NG commission when ordered to 

active duty under Title 10 USC. However, if a NG officer is activated to command an AC 

unit only, then NG requirements cannot be fulfilled by this section of Title 32 USC. As 

such, the “dual status” commander is able to command NG and federal Title 10 forces via 

separate state and federal chains of command. 

c. Title 10 Dual Status Commander. Title 32 USC, Section 315 authorizes a Title 

10 USC officer to obtain a state NG commission as detailed by the Secretary of the Army. 

By doing so, a Title 10 USC commander may command both state NG and Title 10 USC 

forces via separate state and federal chains of command. An officer so detailed may accept 

a commission in the NG without prejudicing his rank and without vacating his regular 

appointment. A Title 10 USC dual status command also requires the consent of both the 

President and the state governor involved. 

d. A memorandum of agreement (MOA) must be signed by the governor and the 

President or their respective designees before a dual status command can be established. 

The MOA should be prepared by staff judge advocates (SJAs) from both chains of 

command to ensure the concerns of both are addressed. The dual status commander will 

receive orders from a federal chain of command and a state chain of command. As such, the 

dual status commander is an intermediate link in two distinct, separate chains of command 

flowing from different sovereigns. While the dual status commander may receive orders 

from two chains of command, it must be recognized that the dual status commander has a 

duty to exercise all authority in a completely mutually exclusive manner, i.e., either in a 

federal or state capacity, but never in both capacities at the same time. Additionally, the 

assigned or attached forces are not dual status. Thus, the commander should take care to 

ensure the missions of the forces are kept separate. This is best accomplished by 

maintaining separate staffs for the NG and Title 10 USC forces; especially separate J-2s, J3s, and legal advisors, so that the separate chains of command remain distinct. 

e. The intent of dual status command is coordination of operations to achieve unity of 

effort. The NG may be the first military organization engaged at the state level at the 

incident area. The NGB Joint Operations Center (JOC) in coordination with joint force 

headquarters – state JOCs provide situational awareness and status information to the 

combatant command and other federal stakeholders as the “first line of situational 

awareness.” Likewise, due to the NG’s proximity and speed of response, the CCDRs must 

leverage NG resources and capabilities, including existing C2 structures, into HD 

operations. Ultimately, the C2 structure should have the flexibility to rapidly transition from 

one mission set to another to ensure the efficient provision of assistance required from DOD 

as a supporting agency, per the NRP and the successful conduct of HD operations. 
 Transitioning Between Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

A-5 

3. Planning Considerations for Transition 

a. Employment of RC Forces. All RC forces are structured and operated to support 

assigned requirements. These requirements are based on mission assignments derived from 

the incident that the reserve force capabilities meet. Army Reserve forces supporting these 

operations are accessed either through Presidential reserve call-up (PRC) under Title 10 

USC Section 12304 or by direct activation under another status. Mobilization under PRC or 

activation under annual training, active duty training, or active duty special work are 

accomplished from the unit’s home station as a direct employing unit for US based 

operations. RC resources (personnel, equipment, and skills) should be appropriately 

leveraged and effectively integrated into DOD’s HD and CS plans and operations. The 

USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR, and USCGR operate under the same C2 relationships at 

all times, whereas the ARNG and ANG also have a Constitutionally mandated responsibility 

to provide military support for state/territory requirements which are performed under the 

C2 authority of their respective governors unless they are formally mobilized to Title 10 

USC status. Although the NG can also be employed in Title 10 USC status in support of 

HD missions, Title 32 USC Section 902 authorizes SecDef to provide funds to state 

governors for NG forces to perform specified HD activities without first activating these 

forces under Title 10 USC status. Title 32 USC Section 502(f) also provides authority for 

SecDef and the President to use the NG in a Title 32 USC status for other duty missions and 

operations, which may include domestic operations when appropriate. When placed on 

active duty, all RC forces conduct HD operations under Title 10 USC guidelines exactly as 

AC forces, and are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

(1) NG Forces. The unique ability of the NG to function in either a federal (Title 

10 USC) status or state (Title 32 USC) status must be considered for effective planning and 

should be leveraged to optimize DOD’s preparedness to execute both HD and CS missions. 

The following are key planning factors that apply to optimally leverage NG forces for HD 

and CS: 

(a) The homeland is a unique operational environment due to the need to 

achieve unity of effort within a constitutionally mandated relationship between federal and 

state governments as it impacts on military operations. HD operations are often described as 

those in which DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, whereas CS operations 

are those in which DOD supports another federal agency. Whereas this distinction is fairly 

unambiguous in missions such as air defense, which is often accomplished by the ANG 

assets transitioning between federal and state status through the use of “standing orders,” it 

is not so straightforward when applied to missions such as prevention of or response to, 

critical infrastructure, CBRNE, or attacks in cyberspace, where clear procedural 

employment in a federal status has not been established. Executing these missions will 

require consideration of the laws, emergency management capabilities and processes, and 

existing interstate/territory arrangements established within each of the individual states and 

territories. The NG, by virtue of its unique ability to function in both a state and federal 

status and community-based presence is a de facto forward military presence throughout the 

54 states and territories which has capabilities that can be readily leveraged for HD mission 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-27 

support as the “first line of military support,” and to provide early situation and status 

information to CCDRs and other federal stakeholders. By virtue of its established working 

relationships with governmental and NGOs at the state/territory and local levels, the NG is 

in a unique position to serve as a bridge between state/territory/local governmental and 

NGOs and federal capabilities, including AC forces. 

(b) Because the NG remains under the C2 of the state governor until 

activated under Title 10 USC or otherwise placed into federal service, unique arrangements 

have been devised to allow NG forces to rapidly transition to a federal status to perform 

federal missions that need to be conducted under a federal chain of command. For example, 

the Air Force employment of the NG in support of air defense (AD) missions utilizes 

“standing orders” that allow ANG forces to automatically transition to Title 10 USC status 

upon the declaration of an air sovereignty event. This model illustrates that NG forces can 

be a vital component of a wide range of critical HD operations by executing carefully 

structured MOAs and other appropriate measures that ensure responsiveness to mission 

requirements, while preserving the spirit and intent of relevant legal and operational 

requirements. 

(c) With its dual state and federal missions, as well as its community-based 

presence throughout each state and territory, the NG is uniquely positioned to assist with 

extension of DOD’s HD information environment to the state/territory/local-levels, and to 

any deployed location throughout the United States and its territories. Both the ARNG and 

ANG have networks and other information technology services (e.g., e-mail, audio and 

video teleconferencing, data access, deployable communications systems, etc.) that 

interconnect all joint force headquarters-state with each other, to ARNG and ANG facilities 

and organizations nationwide, and to the NGB and beyond. USNORTHCOM and the NGB 

have jointly pursued strategies to leverage and enhance NG information technology 

capabilities to bridge gaps and extend the HD information environment to encompass all 

required levels. These joint planning constructs have been outlined in the separate 

USNORTHCOM guidance and concept of operations. 

b. State RUF/SRUF. The state RUF should be reviewed in conjunction with the 

SRUF to ensure consistency and understanding by the dual status commander. 

c. Geographic Coordinate System. Federal, state, regional, local, and urban 

governmental entities use a variety of state and local grid systems and methodologies for 

specifying geographic locations. This may complicate coordinating activities between 

federal military units, NG units, and state and local law enforcement and first responders. 

d. USCG. Although a part of DHS, USCG is a military service and a branch of the 

Armed Forces of the United States as well as a federal law enforcement agency (Title 14 

USC Section 1 and Title 10 USC Section 101). The USCG is at all times an “armed force” 

under Title 14 USC. The USCG does not require Title 10 USC authority to participate in 

the national defense of the United States. Upon the declaration of war if Congress so directs 

in the declaration, or when the President directs, the USCG transfers to the Department of 

the Navy (Title 14 USC Section 3). Even after transfer, the USCG retains full Title 14 USC 
 Transitioning Between Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

A-7 

law enforcement authorities. Absent such declaration or direction, the service operates 

under the auspices of DHS and closely cooperates with the Navy regarding maritime 

security issues (Title 14 USC Section 145), and assists DOD in the performance of any 

activity for which the USCG is especially qualified (Title 14 USC Section 141). The USCG 

plays a vital role in the overall maritime defense of the homeland and is a key player in the 

maritime HD command and control structure pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement 

Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for the 

Inclusion of the US Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense. The 

Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of 

Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for 

Maritime Homeland Security documents capabilities, roles, missions, and functions for 

DOD support to the USCG and facilitates the rapid transfer of DOD forces to the USCG for 

support of maritime HS operations. As the federal agency with lead responsibility for 

maritime HS, the USCG executes the following missions: ports, waterways, and coastal 

security; maritime threat response and advanced interdiction boardings, drug interdiction; 

migrant interdiction; defense readiness; civil maritime search and rescue, and other law 

enforcement. 

(1) The USCG has the lead for maritime HS and conducts that under Operation 

NEPTUNE SHIELD, both within the port and at sea. 

(2) The USCG supports tactical law enforcement operations using maritime threat 

response integrated force packages (IFPs) consisting of tactical law enforcement teams, 

maritime safety and security teams, the maritime security response team, rotary wing air 

intercept assets, and supporting lift and surface assets within US ports and waterways, or 

well forward into the maritime approaches. IFPs conduct intercept, interdiction, and 

boarding operations within the context of threat response on a graduated scale. USCG 

assets will conduct operations balancing risk mitigation with evidentiary necessities for 

further prosecution and intelligence exploitation in support of other federal agencies. 

e. US Air Force Auxiliary. The Air Force Auxiliary, also known as Civil Air Patrol 

(CAP), has forces with unique capabilities that can contribute to the successful prosecution 

of HD air operations. Air Education and Training Command serves as the force provider of 

CAP to CCDRs. CAP, a volunteer federally chartered nonprofit organization, may function 

as an auxiliary of the Air Force IAW Title 10 USC Section 9442 to support Air Force 

noncombatant programs and missions. Such missions may include the use of airborne 

surveillance and reconnaissance using visual observation and imagery, search and rescue, 

light airlift, or utilizing CAP aircraft as an “airborne target” during air intercept training. 

f. Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 USC, Section 1385). PCA does not apply 

outside of the homeland. However, if an HD operation transitions to a CS operation, this 

federal statute, and the court cases that interpret it, places limits on the use of military 

personnel for civilian law enforcement duties, except as expressly authorized by the 

Constitution or Act of Congress. Specifically prohibited activities include: interdiction of a 

vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity; search and/or seizure; arrest, apprehension, 

“stop-and-frisk” detentions, and similar activities; and use of military personnel for 
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-27 

surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or 

interrogators. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 

sets forth several forms of assistance to civilian authorities, which are allowed under the 

PCA. Exceptions to the PCA include: 

(1) Support to LEAs under Title 10 USC, Chapter 18; 

(2) Presidential directed support under the Enforcement of the Laws to Restore 

Public Order Act (formerly the Insurrection Act) (Title 10 USC Sections 331-335); 

(3) Emergency situations involving WMD (Title 10 USC Section 382); 

(4) Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials (Title 18 USC Section 

831). 

g. Chapter 18 (Title 10 USC, sections 371-382). This chapter concerns military 

support for civilian law enforcement agencies and provides statutory authority for specific 

types of military support to law enforcement. Title 10 USC Section 375 directs SecDef to 

promulgate regulations that prohibit “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, 

Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless 

participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.” This 

guidance is currently set forth in DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law 

Enforcement Officials. 

h. Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order Act (formerly the Insurrection 

Act, Title 10 USC, Sections 331 - 335.) These statutory provisions allow the President, at 

the request of a state governor or legislature, or unilaterally in some circumstances, to 

employ the armed forces to suppress insurrection against state authority, to enforce federal 

laws, or to suppress rebellion. 

i. Critical Infrastructure Protection. Most infrastructure assets are inherently 

interconnected and part of larger integrated systems. Therefore, the removal of one asset’s 

functionality due to an outage or attack could have devastating effects on larger 

infrastructure networks, causing broad service disruptions and potentially adverse regional 

impacts. Almost all of the national and defense response capabilities rely to some extent on 

commercial infrastructures. National and DCI supporting national security functions must 

be available when required to protect our homeland. These will include DCI assets and DIB 

assets, the protection of which is the responsibility of the DOD. JFCs must be prepared to 

conduct CIP in either a HD or CS role. 

For complete details on the CS mission, see JP 3-28, Civil Support. 
APPENDIX B 

KEY INTERAGENCY ORGANIZATIONS 

B-1 

1. General

 DOD is the lead for HD missions and will be supported by other federal agencies for 

such missions. Conversely, an agency other than DOD will be supported for CS missions 

and DOD will play a role in providing that support. 

2. Combat Support Agencies

 CSAs provide direct support to the combatant commands performing HD during 

wartime or emergency situations and are subject to evaluation by CJCS. Figure B-1 

identifies the seven CSAs within DOD. The paragraphs below address general and specific 

missions, functions, and capabilities of DOD CSAs in support of HD activities. 

 a. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). DISA is responsible for 

planning, engineering, acquiring, fielding, and supporting global net-centric solutions and 

operating the Defense Information System Network to serve the needs of the President, Vice 

President, SecDef, and the other DOD components across the range of military operations. 

DISA supports national security communications requirements and functions within the 

following core mission areas: communications; C2 capabilities; information assurance (IA); 

computing services; interoperability, testing, and standards; GIG Enterprise Services; 

engineering; and acquisition. 

For more information on DISA, see DODD 5105.19, Defense Information Systems Agency 

(DISA) and its home page at www.disa.mil.

 b. Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA is responsible for satisfying military and 

military related intelligence requirements for SecDef, CJCS, other DOD components, and, 

as appropriate, non-DOD agencies. With over 7000 military and civilian employees 

worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence. It 

provides military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners in 

DOD and the IC. 

 (1) The Director of DIA serves as principal adviser to SecDef and to CJCS on 

matters of military intelligence. The Director also chairs the Military Intelligence Board that 

coordinates activities of the defense IC. Moreover, the Director serves as the principal 

intelligence advisor to ASD(HD&ASA) and the military commands. 

 (2) With respect to HD, DIA manages DOD warning system that alerts DOD and 

the USG of potential threats to the nation. DIA’s Directorate for Intelligence Production, 

particularly the Defense Warning Office assesses the most likely developing threats and the 

high impact threats to military capabilities, and US national infrastructures upon which the 

military depends for stateside operations, training, and deployment. 

 (3) DIA’s Disruptive Technology Innovations Partnership (DTIP) program 

provides HD and US infrastructure sectors with actionable information or time-sensitive 

intelligence assessments for correcting serious vulnerabilities. DTIP assessments prioritize 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-27 

vulnerabilities according to their national security impact were they to be exploited by state 

or non-state actors. DTIP assesses and warns of the impact of potential threats stemming 

from innovative applications of technologies against vulnerabilities. 

 (4) DIA’s Joint Intelligence Taskforce Combating Terrorism is responsible for 

executing the intelligence component of the DOD campaign against terrorism. It provides 

warning and threat assessment regarding terrorist activities. 

 c. Defense Logistics Agency. DLA provides worldwide logistic support for the 

missions of the Military Departments and the combatant commands across the range of 

military operations. Specifically: 

 (1) DLA provides logistic support to other DOD components and certain federal 

agencies, foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, and others as authorized. 

 (2) DOD policy states that the primary means of supporting federally declared 

domestic emergencies is that other federal agencies have the lead and DOD has a supporting 

role. DLA must be prepared to provide support to CCDRs or other federal agencies. 

COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCIES

Defense

Contract Management 

Agency

Defense

Information Systems 

Agency

Defense 

Intelligence 

Agency

Defense

Logistics

Agency

Defense

Threat Reduction 

Agency

National

GeospatialIntelligence Agency

National

Security

Agency

Figure B-1. Combat Support Agencies 
 Key Interagency Organizations 

B-3 

 (3) DLA enhances support to USNORTHCOM in the form of a LNO who works 

directly with USNORTHCOM J-4, Logistics and Engineering Directorate and through a 

DLA contingency support team (DCST) when activated. The DLA LNO to 

USNORTHCOM is the primary focal point for disseminating, coordinating, and tracking 

USNORTHCOM issues and concerns with DLA. DLA will provide forward-deployed 

DCSTs (as required) in the USNORTHCOM AOR to meet real-world and contingency 

requirements within 24 hours after a valid requirement is identified. 

 (4) The DLA Customer Handbook, a reference guide to everything DLA sells and 

supplies, is available at http://www.dla.mil/J-4/publication.asp#Customer. A toll-free 

customer number is also available at 1-877-DLA-CALL. 

 d. National Security Agency. The resources of the NSA are organized for the 

accomplishment of the following missions: 

 (1) Provides the solutions, products and services that contribute to IA. 

 (2) The signals intelligence (SIGINT) mission allows for an effective, unified 

organization and control of all the foreign signals collection and processing activities of the 

United States. NSA is authorized to produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives, 

requirements and priorities established by the Director, National Intelligence with the advice 

of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. 

 (3) NSA/Central Security Service executes SIGINT and information systems 

security activities and conducts related activities, as assigned by SecDef, including 

managing and providing operational control of the US SIGINT System. Executive Order 

(EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, describes in more detail the 

responsibilities of NSA. 

 e. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). DCMA works directly with 

defense suppliers to help ensure that DOD, federal, and allied government supplies and 

services are delivered on time, at projected cost, and meet all performance requirements. 

DCMA performs all contract audits for DOD and provides accounting and financial 

advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DOD components responsible 

for procurement and contract administration. Within the DCIP, DCMA [subordinate to the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)] is DOD’s lead for the 

defense industrial base sector. 

For more information go to the DCMA webpage at www.dcma.mil. 

 f. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. NGA provides timely, relevant, and 

accurate geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) in support of national security objectives. 

GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, 

assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the 

earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial 

information. Title 10 USC Section 467(5). NGA also: 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-27 

 (1) Supports customers in the defense, law enforcement, intelligence, federal and 

civil communities with its analytic GEOINT capabilities. 

 (2) Supports DOD and civil authorities by building integrated datasets to support 

the COP and situational awareness. These datasets will provide a common frame of 

reference for federal decision makers and operational planners for critical infrastructure 

vulnerability analysis and for domestic crisis management (CrM) and CM. 

 (3) In concert with other federal partners, serves as the imagery and geospatial 

data broker, integrator, and consolidator in building a single database to support domestic 

situational awareness, CrM and CM, and CIP. 

 (4) Provides integrated geospatial information in support of the planning and 

execution of HD exercises where there is federal, DOD, state and local government 

participation. 

 (5) Deploys fully equipped geospatial analytic teams to support military and 

civilian exercises as well as other crisis and national special security events in real time. 

 (6) Provides direct, tailored geospatial information support. 

 (7) Provides externally assigned support personnel as part of the NGA support 

team (NST) program to combatant commands, Services, intelligence community partners, 

and civilian agencies such as Department of State, FBI, and DHS. These embedded NST 

personnel provide day-to-day GEOINT support to the commands or agencies with the 

capability to reach back to NGA for requirements that exceed the capacity or capability of 

the team at the command. In addition, NGA maintains a group of support personnel as part 

of NGA voluntary deployment teams (NVDTs) that can deploy to augment a NST. NST 

members or individuals from the NVDT can be called upon to participate as part of a 

national intelligence support team, along with other members of the intelligence community 

in response to a crisis or emergency situation to augment the staffs of a joint intelligence 

operations center, command, or agency. 

 g. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA provides services and 

support to DOD components engaged in war and combating threats to national security. 

DTRA offers a range of capabilities relating to CBRNE. 

 (1) DTRA’s Operations Center maintains situational awareness and serves as a 

point of contact for access to a variety of support including: 

 (a) Secure communications 

 (b) Technical reach-back for warfighters and first responders, on a 24-hour, 

7-day per week basis, in the form of subject matter experts on DTRA computational tools 
 Key Interagency Organizations 

B-5 

 (c) Video and audio teleconferencing (secure and nonsecure) 

 (d) Liaison and coordination of assistance from CCDRs and other federal 

agencies in response to an accident or incident 

 (e) Exchange of information with other agencies 

 (f) Technical expertise, advice, and assistance, including targeting 

 (g) Technical information, including data files on CBRNE materials 

 (h) Data on effects of radiation on electronics 

 (i) Modeling/simulation for CBRNE analysis and hazard/consequence 

prediction. DTRA has the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability and Consequence 

Assessment Tool Set to forecast damage such as blast, heat, radiation, and hazardous 

material release and the effects of unpredictable phenomena such as natural or manmade 

disasters 

Note: The Interagency Modeling and Assessment Center provides atmospheric hazard 

predictions in support of the federal response for incidents of national significance. 

 (j) Information on location and capabilities of specialized DOD and DOE 

assets capable of responding to accidents or incidents involving radioactive materials 

 (k) Nuclear forensics for domestic nuclear event attribution 

 (l) Support to law enforcement investigations 

 (2) DTRA can deploy the following kinds of support assets: 

 (a) Liaison Officers. While already on-site at certain combatant commands, 

additional LNOs could be dispatched to other commands as required. 

 (b) CM Advisory Teams. Teams of two to nine experts, including planners, 

modelers, lawyers, PA specialists, CBRNE specialists, radiation physicians, and health 

physicists. 

 (c) Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams. Assess 

mission, personnel, and installation vulnerability to terrorist attack. 

 (d) Balanced Survivability Assessment Teams. Assess essential mission 

systems and critical infrastructure survivability. 

 (e) Technical Support Teams. Provide on-site and direct technical support 

of DTRA computational tools to warfighters supporting their full spectrum of mission areas. 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-27 

 (f) Aerial Imagery Collection Support. Provide leadership and imagery 

annotation support for joint teams that deploy onboard Air Force OC-135B platforms to 

collect imagery in support of consequence management. 

 (3) In addition, DTRA operates the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, which 

offers a range of courses on WMD topics, with emphasis on nuclear issues. 

 (4) DTRA is the executive agent for DOD’s International Counterproliferation 

Program. The program works cooperatively with the FBI and DHS to train law enforcement 

and border security officials of selected countries to investigate, identify, detect, and 

interdict the illegal transfer of WMD and related materials. 

3. Other Federal Agencies and Responsibilities 

 a. Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC). HSAC provides advice to the 

President through the Assistant to the President for HS. The Council is advised by four 

Senior Advisory Committees for HS. The advisory committees include members from state 

and local government, academia, policy research organizations, the private sector, 

emergency services, law enforcement, and the public health community. The Council 

provides advice on: 

(1) The development, coordination and implementation of the national strategy to 

secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. 

 (2) Recommendations to improve coordination, cooperation, and communications 

among federal, state, and local officials. 

 (3) The feasibility of implementing specific measures to detect, prepare for, 

prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist threats or attacks. 

 (4) The effectiveness of the implementation of specific strategies to detect, 

prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist threats or attacks. 

 b. The Department of Homeland Security. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 

established this department. Figure B-2 shows the organizational structure of DHS. Key 

directorates, components and the Incident Advisory Council are discussed below. 

 (1) The Office of National Protection & Programs bolsters the 

nation’s security through a multilayered system of preparedness measures based on risk 

assessment and management. Working with state, local, and private sector partners, the 

directorate identifies threats, determines vulnerabilities, and targets resources where risk 

is greatest. Through grants and training on both national and local levels, DHS fosters a 

layered system of protective measures to safeguard our borders, seaports, bridges and 

highways, and critical information systems. 
B-7

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATION CHART

SECRETARY

Deputy Secretary

Chief of Staff

Execu

Milit

UNDER SECRETARY

MANAGEMENT

UNDER SECRETARY

SCIENCE &

TECHNOLOGY

ASSISTANT

SECRETARY

TRANSPORTATION

SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION

DIRECTOR

LAW ENFORCEMENT

TRAINING

CENTER

CHIEF FINANCIAL

OFFICER

UNDER SECRETARY

DIRECTORATE FOR

PREPAREDNESS

COMMISSIONER

US CUSTOMS &

BORDER

PROTECTION

DIRECTOR

DOMESTIC NUCLEAR

DETECTIONS

OFFICE

ASSISTANT

SECRETARY

OFFICE OF

INTELLIGENCE &

ANALYSIS

ASSISTANT

SECRETARY

OFFICE OF POLICY

DIRECTOR

US SECRET SERVICE

FEDERAL COORDINATOR

RECOVERY AND

REBUILDING OF THE GULF

COAST REGION

DIRECTOR

OPERATIONS

COORDINATION

GENERAL COUNSEL

OFFICE OF THE

GENERAL COUNSEL

DIRECTOR

US CITIZENSHIP &

IMMIGRATION

SERVICES

DIRECTOR OFFICE

OF COUNTERNARCOTICS

ENFORCEMENT

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OFFICE OF

LEGISLATIVE & INTERGOVERNMENTAL

AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT

SECRETARY

US IMMIGRATION &

CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT

OMBUDSMAN

CITIZENSHIP &

IMMIGRATION

SERVICES

ASSISTANT SECRET

OFFICE OF PUBL

AFFAIRS

UNDER SECRETARY

FEDERAL

EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

CHIEF PRIVAC

OFFICER

CO

US 

Figure B-2. Department of Homeland Security Organization Chart
Appendix B 

B-8 JP 3-27 

 (2) The Office of Science and Technology is the primary research and 

development arm of DHS. The S&T Directorate provides Federal, state and local 

officials with the technology and capabilities to protect the homeland. 

 (3) The Office of Management is responsible for budget, appropriations, 

expenditure of funds, accounting and finance; procurement; human resources and 

personnel; information technology systems; facilities, property, equipment, and other 

material resources; and identification and tracking of performance measurements relating 

to the responsibilities of DHS. 

 (4) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for using 

information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and 

future threats to the United States. 

 (5) The Directorate of Operations (Operations Directorate) is responsible 

for monitoring the security of the United States on a daily basis and coordinating 

activities within DHS and with governors, advisors, law enforcement partners, and 

critical infrastructure operators in all 50 states and more than 50 major urban areas 

nationwide. 

 (6) The Office of Policy strengthens HS by developing and integrating 

Department-wide policies, planning, and programs in order to better coordinate DHS’s 

prevention, protection, response and recovery missions. 

 (7) The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is a jointly staffed office 

established to improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to 

import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against 

the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time. 

 (8) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assists the federal, state 

and local authorities in preparing for all hazards; manages Federal response and recovery 

efforts following any national incident, and administers the National Flood Insurance 

Program. 

 (9) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) protects the nation's 

transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. 

 (10) Customs and Border Protection is responsible for protecting our nation’s 

borders in order to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, 

while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. 

 (11) Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the largest investigative arm of 

DHS, is responsible for identifying and shutting down vulnerabilities in the nation’s border, 

economic, transportation and infrastructure security. 
 Key Interagency Organizations 

B-9 

 (12) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provides career-long training to 

law enforcement professionals to help them fulfill their responsibilities safely and proficiently. 

 (13) Citizenship and Immigration Services is responsible for the administration 

of immigration and naturalization adjudication functions and establishing immigration 

services policies and priorities. 

 (14) The USCG protects the public, the environment, and US economic 

interests—in the nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in 

any maritime region as required to support national security. 

 (15) The US Secret Service protects the President and other high-level officials 

and investigates counterfeiting and other financial crimes, including financial institution 

fraud, identity theft, computer fraud; and computer-based attacks on our nation’s financial, 

banking, and telecommunications infrastructure.” 

 

For more information on the Incident Advisory Council, see the NRP. 

 c. Department of Energy. DOE serves as a support agency to the FBI for technical 

operations and a support agency to DHS/FEMA for CM. DOE provides scientific and 

technical personnel and equipment in support of the federal agency with lead responsibility 

during all aspects of WMD incidents. DOE assistance can support both CrM and CM 

activities with capabilities such as threat assessments, domestic emergency support team 

(DEST) deployment, federal agency with lead responsibility advisory requirements, technical 

advice, forecasted modeling predictions, and assistance in the direct support of operations. 

Additionally, DOE provides expertise to the DHS Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) 

that provides DHS with a nuclear/radiological response capability. When activated, the NIRT 

consists of specialized federal response teams drawn from DOE and/or Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA). These teams may become DHS operational assets providing 

technical expertise and equipment when activated during a crisis or in response to a 

nuclear/radiological incident as part of the DHS Federal response. Deployable DOE 

scientific technical assistance and support includes capabilities such as search operations; 

access operations; diagnostic and device assessment; radiological assessment and monitoring; 

identification of material; development of federal protective action recommendations; 

provision of information on the radiological response; render safe operations; hazards 

assessment; containment, relocation and storage of special nuclear material evidence; postincident cleanup; and on-site management and radiological assessment to the public, the 

White House, and members of Congress and foreign governments. All DOE support to a 

federal response will be coordinated through a senior DOE official. 

 d. DOJ/FBI. As the lead for CrM and CT, the Attorney General is responsible for 

ensuring the development and implementation of policies directed at preventing terrorist 

attacks domestically, and will undertake the criminal investigation and prosecution of acts of 

terrorism. DOJ has charged the FBI with execution of its lead agency responsibilities for the 

management of a federal response to threats or acts of terrorism that take place within US 

territory or those occurring in international waters that do not involve flag vessels of foreign 
Appendix B 

B-10 JP 3-27 

countries. As federal agency with lead responsibility, the FBI will implement a federal CrM 

response, and will designate a federal on-scene commander to ensure appropriate 

coordination with federal, state and local authorities until such time as the Attorney General 

finds it necessary to transfer the overall lead to DHS/FEMA. 

 e. Department of Transportation / Federal Aviation Administration. The 

mission of DOT is to serve the United States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible 

and convenient transportation system that meets our vital national interests and enhances the 

quality of life of the American people. It provides air movement and flight plan data for all 

commercial and other aircraft operations that are critically important in determining if any 

aircraft are deviating from normal planned flight operations. The FAA, under DOT, 

oversees the safety of civil aviation and maintains primary jurisdiction over all air space 

within the US National Airspace System. In close coordination with DOD and NORAD, 

FAA clears air traffic as need to expedite intercept operations. The safety mission of the 

FAA is first and foremost and includes the issuance and enforcement of regulations and 

standards related to the manufacture, operation, certification and maintenance of aircraft. 

The agency is responsible for the rating and certification of airmen and for certification of 

airports serving air carriers. It also regulates a program to protect the security of civil 

aviation, and enforces regulations under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act for 

shipments by air. The FAA, which operates a network of airport towers, air route traffic 

control centers, and flight service stations, develops air traffic rules, allocates the use of 

airspace, and provides for the security control of air traffic to meet national defense 

requirements. Other responsibilities include maintaining most of the radars performing air 

surveillance over the CONUS FAA control centers, providing cueing for targets of interest, 

and providing maintenance and logistics support for nearly all ground to air radios used by 

the air defense sectors. These and other support activities and procedures are governed by a 

series of agreements and FAA orders pursuant to a capstone National Agreement -120. 

 f. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA serves as a support agency to the FBI 

for technical operations, and a support agency to DHS/FEMA for CM. In certain situations, 

the EPA may also act in a lead role IAW Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund). EPA provides technical personnel and 

supporting equipment to the federal agency with lead responsibility during all aspects of 

WMD incidents. EPA assistance may include threat assessment; DEST and regional 

emergency response team deployment; advice to the federal agency with lead responsibility, 

technical advice, and operational support for chemical, biological, and radiological releases; 

consultation; agent identification; hazard detection and reduction; environmental 

monitoring; sample and forensic evidence collection/analysis; identification of 

contaminants; feasibility assessment; clean-up; and on-site safety, protection, prevention, 

decontamination, and restoration activities. EPA and USCG share responsibilities for 

response to oil discharges into navigable waters and releases of hazardous substances, 

pollutants, and contaminants into the natural and physical environment. EPA provides the 

predesignated federal on-scene coordinator for inland areas while USCG coordinates 

resources for the containment, removal, and disposal activities and resources during an oil, 

hazardous substance, or WMD incident in coastal areas. 
 Key Interagency Organizations 

B-11 

 g. Department of Health and Human Services. DHHS assistance supports threat 

assessment, DEST deployment, epidemiological investigation, advice to the federal agency 

with lead responsibility, and technical advice. Technical assistance to the FBI may include 

identification of agents, sample collection and analysis, on-site safety and protection 

activities, and medical management planning. DHHS serves as a support agency to the FBI 

for technical operations, and a support agency to DHS/FEMA for CM. DHHS provides 

technical personnel and supporting equipment to the federal agency with lead responsibility 

during all aspects of an incident. DHHS can also provide regulatory follow-up when an 

incident involves a product regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. Operational 

support to DHS/FEMA may include mass immunization, mass prophylaxis, mass fatality 

management, pharmaceutical support operations (Strategic National Stockpile), contingency 

medical records, patient tracking, and patient evacuation and definitive medical care provided 

through the National Disaster Medical System. In the event of a CS operation simultaneous 

to a HD event, the DHHS is the federal agency with lead responsibility for Emergency 

Support Function 8, Public Health and Medical Service. DHHS monitors blood availability 

and maintains contact with the American Association of Blood Banks Inter-organizational 

Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism, of which the ASBPO is a member. 

 h. US Department of Agriculture (USDA). USDA serves as the primary support 

agency to DHS/FEMA for disaster relief and CM for firefighting, food, and agro-terrorism 

issues. USDA, through the US Forest Service, manages and coordinates firefighting activities 

by providing personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of state and local agencies 

involved in firefighting operations. During major disasters and emergencies, USDA is 

responsible for identifying food assistance required, securing needed supplies, and arranging 

for the transportation of food assistance to affected areas requiring emergency rations. 

 i. General Services Administration (GSA). GSA serves as the primary support 

agency to DHS/FEMA for resource support during disaster relief and CM operations. GSA 

provides emergency supplies, space, office equipment, office supplies, telecommunications, 

contracting services, transportation services, and security services through its contracting 

authorities. 

 j. American Red Cross. The American Red Cross serves as the primary support 

agency to DHS for coordinating mass care support with other NGOs during disaster relief 

and CM operations. Support may include shelter, feeding, emergency first aid, disaster 

welfare information, bulk distribution, supportive counseling, blood, and blood products. 
Appendix B 

B-12 JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX C 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND MISSIONS, 

ORGANIZATION, AND STRUCTURE 

C-1 

1. North American Aerospace Defense Command Overview 

 a. Since 1958, Canada and the United States have defended the skies of North 

America through NORAD, a binational command. Using data from satellites, as well as 

airborne and ground-based radars, NORAD monitors, validates, and warns of attack against 

the Canadian and US homelands by aircraft, missiles, and space vehicles; symmetric as well 

as asymmetric threats. The command ensures Canadian and US air sovereignty through a 

network of alert fighters, tankers, airborne early warning aircraft, and ground-based air 

defense assets cued by military and interagency surveillance radars, such as those of the 

FAA and its Canadian equivalent, NAV CANADA. Since the unexpected historic events of 

9/11/01, NORAD has made significant changes ñ primarily from looking only outward, 

toward suspected threats, to additionally monitoring both maritime and aerospace threats in 

the approaches, inland waterways, and internal air space of the United States and Canada. 

 b. As a properly executed international covenant, the NORAD Agreement is binding 

under international law. The Canadian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the US CJCS 

provide the Terms of Reference to the NORAD Agreement to supplement and clarify 

military responsibilities directed or implied by the Agreement. 

 c. In the context of NORADís missions, ìNorth Americaî means Alaska, Canada, the 

CONUS, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, to include the Air Defense Identification 

Zone, the air approaches, maritime approaches and territorial seas, and the internal 

navigable waterways (principally the Gulf of St. Lawrence, St. Lawrence Seaway System, 

Great Lakes and other internal waterways of concern as identified by CDRNORAD). 

Responsibility for aerospace warning and aerospace control of US territory outside North 

America (e.g., Hawaii and Guam) lies with the appropriate combatant commander. 

ìNORAD is the cornerstone of our air defense capability. Our air defense success 

rests on an integrated system for air surveillance and defense against air threats at all 

altitudes.î 

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

 June 2005

The 2006 NORAD Agreement Establishes Three Primary Missions For NORAD: 

a. Aerospace Warning for North America. 

b. Aerospace Control for North America. 

c. Maritime Warning for North America.

NORAD Agreement Terms of Reference
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-27 

2. Missions 

 a. Aerospace Warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating 

intelligence and information related to man-made objects in the aerospace domain and the 

detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, 

missiles or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and 

agencies. An integral part of aerospace warning entails monitoring of global aerospace 

activities and related developments. NORADís aerospace warning mission for North 

America includes support of United States commands that are responsible for missile 

defense. 

ISR ñ INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND SPIN ñ SPECIAL INSTRUCTION 

 b. Aerospace Control consists of providing surveillance and exercising OPCON of 

the airspace of the United States and Canada. OPCON is the authority to direct, coordinate, 

and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made 

available to NORAD. 

 c. Maritime Warning (new mission tasking per the 2006 NORAD Agreement)

consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information related to 

the respective territorial seas and internal waterways of, and the maritime approaches to, the 

United States and Canada, and warning of maritime threats to, or attacks against North 

America utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies 

responsible for maritime defense and security. Through these tasks, shall develop a 

comprehensive shared understanding of maritime activities to better identify potential 

maritime threats to North American security. Maritime surveillance and control shall 

continue to be exercised by national commands and, as appropriate, coordinated 

bilaterally. 

RECONNAISSANCE SSN ñ SPACE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK

3. Supporting Mission Areas and Systems 

 a. Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA). The essence 

of the aerospace warning and control missions is embodied in the commandís ITW/AA 

responsibilities. Integrated tactical warning is defined as warning after initiation of a 

strategic or tactical aerospace threat event based on an evaluation of information from all 

available sources. Attack assessment is defined as an evaluation of information to determine 

the potential or actual nature and objectives of an aerospace attack for the purpose of 

providing information for timely decisions. The ITW/AA system is a critical component of 

the US nuclear C2 system and is comprised of the sensors, command centers, and 

communications networks required to detect, assess and communicate its information to 

designated users. The main purpose of the ITW/AA system is to provide timely, 

reliable, and unambiguous warning information of ballistic missile, space and air 

attacks on North America. To provide ITW/AA of an aerospace attack on North America, 

NORAD, as a supported command, correlates and integrates relevant information. Space 

surveillance, nuclear detonation detection and ballistic missile warning information is 

provided by USSTRATCOM for NORAD to execute its aerospace warning mission for 

North America. CDRUSSTRATCOM, as a supporting commander retains OPCON over 

USSTRATCOM-assigned ballistic missile and space surveillance and warning systems, the 
NORAD Missions, Organization, and Structure 

C-3 

Nuclear Detonation Detection System, and command, control and communications systems. 

CDRNORAD retains the authority to redirect operational priorities of the ITW/AA systems 

to execute NORAD assigned missions in accordance with the priority assigned to attacks 

against North America. 

 b. Routine Air Operations. NORAD is responsible for providing surveillance and 

control of North American airspace, this includes: 

 (1) Day-to-day surveillance and control of the airspace approaches to and the 

airspace within North America to safeguard the sovereign airspace of both Canada and the 

United States. 

 (2) Surveillance and control includes the capability to detect, identify, monitor 

and, if necessary, take appropriate actions (ranging from visual identification to destruction) 

against manned or unmanned air-breathing vehicles approaching North America. 

 (3) In times of crisis or war, air defense against manned or unmanned airbreathing weapon systems attacking North America 

 c. Information and Intelligence Sharing. NORAD aerospace warning, maritime 

warning and aerospace control missions require effective information and intelligence 

sharing by many organizations and agencies within Canada and the United States. A ìneed 

to shareî philosophy facilitates the effective execution of these NORAD missions on behalf 

of the governments of Canada and the United States. 

 d. Interagency Cooperation. The effective execution of NORAD missions requires 

significant cooperation with agencies outside of the Department of National Defence 

(NDHQ) in Canada and the DOD in the United States. NORAD is authorized direct liaison 

with these agencies in order to solicit and acquire the necessary cooperation, while keeping 

appropriate national commands and authorities informed. 

 e. NORAD, Canada Command (Canada COM) and US Northern Command. 

NORAD supports Canada COM and USNORTHCOM in their assigned missions to defend 

Canada and the United States. NORAD is supported by both commands in the conduct of 

missions assigned to NORAD. NORAD provides binational situation awareness of the 

aerospace and maritime domains to Canada COM and USNORTHCOM. 

 f. Information Operations. NORAD conducts IO on an ongoing basis to achieve 

and maintain information superiority while enhancing deterrence. NORAD plans, 

ìClose cooperation, liaison, and intelligence and information sharing among these 

commands will ensure the ability of our armed forces to act, in a timely and 

coordinated fashion, to deter, identify, disrupt and defeat threats to Canada and the 

United Statesî 

CANUS Basic Defense Document 

 July 2006
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-27 

coordinates and directs IO as delineated in each nationís IO doctrine. Operations are 

primarily defensive in nature. However, in consultation with each national authority, 

actions can be directed to safeguard information superiority and NORADís ability to 

execute its assigned missions.

 g. Direct Communications. CDRNORAD is authorized direct communications 

with the CDS and the CJCS and with Commander, Canada COM, CDRUSNORTHCOM, 

CDRUSPACOM, CDRUSSTRATCOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and other commanders on 

matters of HD interest. This includes requests to appropriate agencies to expedite the 

release of classified information to facilitate the accomplishment of NORADís missions. 

 h. Conference Calls. NORAD uses a series of telephonic conferences as a secure 

means of rapidly sharing information among combatant commands and other organizations 

and to inform and alert senior military and government leadership of a developing situation. 

The purposes of these telephonic conferences is to improve the situational awareness of all 

concerned organizations, to increase the time available for senior leadership to make 

informed decisions and finally to increase the time available for NORAD and other military 

forces and civil agencies to respond to the situation at hand. 

 i. Counterdrug (CD) Operations. The aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs 

into North America has been identified as a threat to the national security of Canada and the 

United States by both governments. To counter this threat, the 1989 National Defense 

Authorization Act assigned DOD as the federal agency with lead responsibility in the 

detection and monitoring of illegal airborne and maritime drug trafficking into the United 

States. To accomplish this mission the SecDef tasked CDRNORAD and selected combatant 

commanders to conduct detection and monitoring operations. Likewise, the Canadian 

National Drug Strategy named the NDHQ as a supporting department to the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police. As a result, 1 Canadian Air Division is responsible for conducting CD 

operations when directed by the NDHQ. To accomplish this mission, NORAD conducts 

operations to detect and monitor aerial transit of drug trafficking into North America; 

coordinates with other federal, provincial, state and local agencies engaged in detecting, 

monitoring and apprehending aerial drug traffic; and integrates NORAD operations into an 

effective CD network. 

It is important to understand the differences between Canadian and US law with regard to 

military support to LEAs. NORAD Instruction 10-24 provides additional detail on this 

subject and should be consulted by those planning or executing CD activities for NORAD. 

4. North American Aerospace Defense Command Organization

 

 NORAD is organized on three distinct levels. The Headquarters NORAD staff and the 

Command Center operate at the ìstrategicî level. The three NORAD regions conduct 

activities at the ìoperationalî level and the air defense sectors and their TACON forces 

operate at the ìtacticalî level. CDRNORAD conducts operations through or with the 

support from the elements shown in Figure C-1. 
NORAD Missions, Organization, and Structure 

C-5 

 a. Missions are accomplished through a combination of assigned and attached 

Canadian and US forces (AC, National Guard, and reserves). These forces are employed in 

three NORAD regions, further described in paragraph 6.b. 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

COCOM

OPCON

Supported/Supporting

Coordinating

USNORTHCOM USPACOM

PACAF

ALCOM

NORAD

ANR

CONR

11 AF

Joint Task 

Force Alaska

Alaskan 

Command

CANR

1 CAD ACC

ACC Air Combat Command

AF Air Force (Numbered)

ALCOM Alaskan Command

ANR Alaskan NORAD Region

CAD Canadian Air Division

CANR Canadian NORAD Region

COCOM Combatant Command (Command Authority)

CONR Continental NORAD Region

OPCON Operational Control

PACAF Pacific Air Force

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

Figure C-1. North American Aerospace Command Command Relationships
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-27 

 (1) Commander NORAD. CDRNORAD and the Deputy Commander (ND 

NORAD) cannot be from the same country, and their appointments must be approved by 

both the Canadian and the US governments. The jurisdiction of CDRNORAD over those 

forces specifically made available to NORAD by the two governments is limited to 

ìOPCON,î which is defined as the authority to direct, coordinate, and control the 

operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available. 

 (2) Commander US Element NORAD (CDRUSELEMNORAD). 

CDRUSELEMNORAD is the senior US officer assigned to NORAD. US Element 

NORAD (USELEMNORAD) serves as an administrative construct to permit the 

assignment of US forces to perform NORAD missions. Global Force Management 

Guidance Section II, Assignment of Forces (Forces For Unified Commands) states, 

ìAlthough not a combatant commander, Commander, United States Element North 

American Aerospace Defense Command (CDRUSELEMNORAD), exercises COCOM 

over US forces made available to NORADî. 

 (3) Headquarters NORAD. Headquarters NORAD, through the NORAD ñ

USNORTHCOM Command Center, provides the strategic guidance necessary for the 

regions to execute their assigned missions. Additionally, the headquarters coordinates with 

the senior military staffs of both countries as well as other combatant commanders who may 

be in a supporting role. Headquarters NORAD and the command centers must be composed 

of integrated staffs with representatives of both countries. 

 (4) Headquarters NORAD Staff Organization. The Headquarters NORAD staff 

is organized along the traditional US joint staff J-code construct. In addition, the 

commanderís staff includes both Canadian and US political advisors, an interagency group, 

a Washington Office, and special assistants for NG and reserve affairs. A unique aspect of 

the Headquarters NORAD staff is that all these staff elements are ìdual-hattedî as both 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM organizations, with the exception of the operations 

directorate (J-3), which is a NORAD-only organization. Despite the fact that the majority of 

the staff is ìdual-hattedî with USNORTHCOM, the commands are separate with 

complementary missions, roles and responsibilities. 

5. North American Aerospace Defense Command Relations With Other Commands 

 a. United States Northern Command. NORAD and USNORTHCOM share a 

special and unique relationship. A majority of USNORTHCOMís AOR and NORADís OA 

overlap as indicated in Figure C-2 (note that in the NORAD Agreement this is normally 

referred to as an ìAOî). Each command has its missions defined by separate sources. 

NORAD is a binational military organization which exists under the authority of the North 

Atlantic Treaty and the NORAD Agreement, The NORAD Agreement Terms of Reference, 

and the Canada-US (CANUS) Basic Defense Document between Canada and the United 

States. Conversely, USNORTHCOM is a purely US military organization based on the US 

UCP. Specific support and coordination between NORAD and USNORTHCOM include: 
NORAD Missions, Organization, and Structure 

C-7 

 (1) USNORTHCOM forces operating in the same area as NORAD forces may 

provide collateral support by giving tactical intercept information and control to NORAD 

forces. Conversely, NORAD air defense control assets may provide tactical intercept 

information and control to USNORTHCOM forces while they remain under the OPCON of 

their respective commander. 

 (2) USNORTHCOM coordinates with NORAD for the air defense of and 

maritime approaches to North America and support to civil authorities, to include drug 

interdiction. 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

OPERATIONAL AREA

ALASKAN NORAD 

REGION (ANR)

CANADIAN NORAD 

REGION (CANR)

CONTINENTAL US NORAD 

REGION (CONR)

Eastern

Air Defense Sector

(EADS, CONR)

Western

Air Defense Sector

(WADS, CONR)

Elmendorf 

Air Force 

Base

McChord

 Air Force 

Base

Rome

Air National 

Guard Base

Tyndall

Air Force 

Base

Patterson

Air Force 

Base

US SOUTHERN COMMAND

Area of Responsibility

US PACIFIC COMMAND

Area of Responsibility

US NORTHERN COMMAND

Area of Responsibility

HQ NORAD

US EUROPEAN COMMAND

Area of Responsibility

Winnepeg

US SOUTHERN COMMAND

Area of Responsibility

Figure C-2. North American Aerospace Defense Command Operational Area
Appendix C 

C-8 JP 3-27 

 (3) In conjunction with USPACOM, via ALCOM and Army Pacific, 

USNORTHCOM coordinates with NORAD for the ground defense of Alaska. 

 (4) USNORTHCOM coordinates with NORAD for the ground defense of 

CONUS. 

 (5) In conjunction with the Canadian Chief of Maritime Staff, USNORTHCOM 

coordinates with NORAD for the defense of maritime approaches to North America 

including air defense coordination. 

 b. United States Strategic Command. USSTRATCOM support to NORAD 

includes the following: 

 (1) Provide the missile warning and space surveillance information necessary to 

fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD Agreement. 

(2) Provide ITW/AA of space, missile and air attacks on CONUS and Alaska if 

NORAD becomes unable to accomplish the aerospace warning mission. 

(3) Coordinate with NORAD to support accomplishments of both commandsí 

missions during crisis and war. 

c. United States Transportation Command. USTRANSCOM provides commonuser and commercial air, land and sea transportation, terminal management and aerial 

refueling to support the global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of 

US forces. As such, USTRANSCOM is responsible for the following support to NORAD: 

(1) Provide air-refueling support to NORAD, as required. Ensure refueling at 

forward operating locations and main operating bases are capable of supporting designated 

operations. 

(2) Support NORAD deployment, resupply, and redeployment with air, sea and 

assets, as directed by the SecDef. 

(3) Coordinate force movement requirements and related materials (including 

strategic aeromedical evacuation) involving common user lift. 

ìNORAD and USNORTHCOM are two separate commands. Neither command is 

subordinate to the other or a part of the other, but work very closely together. 

Members of the two commands work side-by-sideÖand, in many cases, United States 

military members are dual-hatted in positions on both staffs.î 

General Ralph E. Eberhart 

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 

March 2003 
NORAD Missions, Organization, and Structure 

C-9 

d. United States Pacific Command. USPACOMís AOR and NORADís OA 

overlap. As a result, NORAD entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with 

USPACCOM to address issues of mutual concern; listing support rendered by one party to 

the other and to deconflict their operations, when necessary. 

e. United States European Command (USEUCOM). USEUCOMís AOR extends 

across the Atlantic Ocean to the west coast of Greenland and east of approximately 45 

degrees West longitude. Accordingly, NORADís OA and USEUCOMís AOR overlap. 

f. United States Southern Command. NORADís OA and USSOUTHCOMís 

AOR overlap. NORAD has an MOU with USSOUTHCOM to address issues of mutual 

concern, to list support rendered by one party to the other and to deconflict their operations 

when necessary. Of particular interest to NORAD, this MOU addresses CD operations and 

US military operations in the vicinity of Cuba. 

6. North American Aerospace Defense Command Subordinate Commands 

 a. All NORAD air sovereignty and air control operations are conducted by its 

subordinate NORAD regions. The individual regions are the ìwarfightersî and function at 

the operational and tactical levels of war. Each region is further subdivided into one or more 

air defense sectors (ADSs). The ADS is responsible for tactical execution of the NORAD 

missions through detection, identification and required tactical response. The ADS also 

provide the C2 node for coordination to higher headquarters, either their parent region or 

NORAD. 

 b. Each ADS is divided into two functional areas: a battle staff and the sector air 

operations center (SAOC). When formed, the battle staff directs sector/region air 

sovereignty and air control activities. Additionally, it directs and coordinates activities of 

subordinate radar units, relays instructions from senior NORAD elements to subordinate and 

lateral units and coordinates allocation and employment of air defense resources. The battle 

staff is assigned or allocated air defense resources (e.g., interceptors, airborne warning and 

control system or tankers) that are necessary to defend its assigned OA. 

 

 c. The SAOC is tasked to support the NORAD mission and operates on a continuous 

basis. It is the focal point for the conduct of weapons, surveillance, identification and 

interface control functions. All fighter, tanker, airborne early warning and military radar 

sites are assigned to an air defense sector for operational and tactical control. The ADS 

controls the air battle while managing their tactical assets to include both aircraft and 

surveillance equipment, such as ground-based radars and tethered aerostat balloons. Each 

SAOC closely coordinates air sovereignty activities with FAA air traffic control centers 

to ensure HD activities can be safely and successfully executed. 

 d. The tactical level of NORAD also includes ground based air defense units in 

certain locations such as the NCR and under certain circumstances, such as a national 

special security event. Such units report directly to the region and share air picture 

information with their associated ADS. A geographic depiction of NORADís regions and 
Appendix C 

C-10 JP 3-27 

sectors is provided at Figure C-2. A more detailed description of each of the three NORAD 

regions is provided below. 

 (1) Alaskan NORAD Region. ANR is the binational organization responsible for 

performing the NORAD air sovereignty and air control mission over the state of Alaska as 

well as the northwest approaches to North America. HQ ANR is collocated at Elmendorf 

Air Force Base (AFB), Alaska with HQ ALCOM, a subunified command of USPACOM 

and JTF-AK a subordinate unit of USNORTHCOM. The ANR Commander is also the 

Commander of ALCOM, and JTF-AK. ANR is supported by both active duty Canadian 

forces and US forces, as well as Alaska Air National Guard units. The ANRís Regional Air 

Operations Center is manned by both US personnel and Canadian forces to maintain 

continuous surveillance of its OA. The Alaska Air Defense Sector is the single ADS within 

the ANR and is collocated at Elmendorf AFB. 

 (2) Canadian NORAD Region (CANR). CANR is the binational organization 

responsible for performing NORADís air sovereignty and air control mission over Canada 

as well as the polar approaches to North America. CANR is located at Canadian Forces 

Base (CFB) Winnipeg, Manitoba. The SAOC for Canada is located at CFB North Bay, 

Ontario. The CANR Commander is also the Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division 

(CAD). CANR is manned by both 1 CAD and US personnel. 

 (3) Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR). CONR is the 

subordinate, binationally staffed command responsible for the air sovereignty and air control 

of the airspace over the CONUS, to include the approaches to North America. The CONR 

Commander exercises OPCON over all air defense forces within CONUS from Tyndall 

AFB, Florida. Air Combat Command (ACC) and USJFCOM are the force providers for 

ground, sea, and air units apportioned through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to 

support the NORAD missions. ANG support is liaised through USJFCOM and ACC. 

CONR operates in an extremely complex, binational and multi-command environment 

where political, military and economic conditions interrelate. CONR is collocated with a 

numbered air force subordinate to ACC. The CONR Commander is also the Commander, 

AFNORTH, located at Tyndall AFB, Florida, and may be designated the JFACC for 

USNORTHCOM for unilateral US air operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR. CONR 

ADSs are identified below: 

 (a) CONR ADSs and the National Capital Region Integrated Air 

Defense System (NCR ñ IADS) are identified below. NCR-IADS is a unique sub-element 

of CONR, which was established in response to terrorist air threats to the NCR. NCR-IADS 

is OPCON to CONR and has a coordination relationship with Eastern Air Defense Sector 

(EADS). 

 (b) Eastern Air Defense Sector (EADS). EADS, located in Rome, New 

York is the binational SAOC responsible for all CONR operations east of 97 degrees West 

Longitude. 
NORAD Missions, Organization, and Structure 

C-11 

 (c) Western Air Defense Sector (WADS). WADS, located at McChord 

AFB, Washington, is the SAOC responsible for all CONR air operations west of 97 degrees 

West Longitude (roughly the Mississippi River). 

 

7. Other Forces 

 a. US Element NORAD. USELEMNORAD is an organizational construct created in 

response to the requirements of Title 10 USC that specifies that US military forces must be 

kept in a US military ìchain-of-commandî, and may not be assigned directly to a 

multinational, or binational command. CDRUSELEMNORAD is the senior US officer 

assigned to NORAD 

 b. First Canadian Air Division. Winnipeg, Manitoba is home to the dual 

headquarters for 1 CAD and the CANR. The headquarters serve as the central point of C2 

for Canada's operational Air Force and oversees the monitoring of Canada's airspace in 

support of commitments to the NORAD. 

8. North American Aerospace Defense Command Regulations and Operating

Instructions 

 Details on the NORAD processes and procedures for any of its particular mission areas 

are documented in the various NORAD instructions published by the Command. These 

documents are to be considered directive for all NORAD personnel both at the headquarters 

and subordinate units. A complete list of these documents is maintained on the NORAD 

portal on the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) 

(www.noradnorthcom.mil). Content of classified NORAD instructions may be found on the 

classified releasable to Canada (RELCAN) and SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

(SIPRNET) networks. 
Appendix C 

C-12 JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX D 

KEY HOMELAND DEFENSE LEGAL AND POLICY DOCUMENTS 

D-1 

1. Legal and National Policy and Guidance 

 There are a variety of documents that provide guidance for the HD mission. These 

range from the US Constitution to CJCSIs. 

 a. The Constitution. The Preamble states that two of the purposes of the 

Constitution are to ensure domestic tranquility and provide for the common defense. 

Furthermore, Congress has the power to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and 

maintain a Navy, and provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, 

suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. The President is the Commander in Chief of the 

Armed Forces. The Constitution provides the basis for HD through the guarantee of 

domestic tranquility and provision for the common defense of the nation. 

 b. Key Executive and Legislative Guidance. The following documents are key 

references when addressing HD operations: 

 (1) Title 10 USC (Armed Forces). Title 10 USC provides guidance on the Armed 

Forces of the US. Guidance is divided into five subtitles. One on general military law and 

one each for the US Army, USN and US Marine Corps, the US Air Force and the Air Force 

Auxiliary (Civil Air Patrol), and the Reserve Components. 

 (2) Titles 14, 33, 46 and 50, USC. These statutes define the statutory authority for 

the USCG to conduct HD and HS missions. 

 (3) Title 32 USC, National Guard. Title 32 defines the organization, personnel, 

training, and equipping of the NG. Additionally, Title 32 USC provides the authority to 

allow for the NG to conduct HD activities under state C2 and for a NG commander to retain 

his/her state commission (Title 32 USC) after ordered to active duty (Title 10 USC) 

allowing for a ìdual-hatî commander to ensure unity of effort for state and federal military 

forces. 

 (4) Title 50 USC, War and National Defense. Title 50 provides guidance on war 

and national defense. Among the major provisions of Title 50 are: Establishes a Council of 

National Defense to coordinate industries and resources for national security; authorizes the 

detention and removal of individuals from foreign nation(s) with which the United States is 

at war; authorizes financial reward for information concerning the illegal introduction, 

manufacture, acquisition, export or conspiracies concerning special nuclear material or 

atomic weapons; and regulations for the anchorage and movement of vessels during national 

emergency. Other major provisions of Title 50: Addresses insurrection; definition and 

declaration of national security; air warning and defense; internal security and subversive 

activities; national defense contracts; chemical and biological warfare programs; war powers 

resolution and definition of national emergencies; international emergency economic 

powers; foreign intelligence surveillance; and defense against WMD. 

 

 (5) HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council. 

HSPD-1 established the Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all HS-related 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-27 

activities among the executive departments and agencies and promote the effective 

development and implementation of all HS policies. 

 (6) HSPD-2, Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies. HSPD-2 

established policies and procedures to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist 

activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens 

who are within the United States. 

 (7) HSPD-3, The Homeland Security Advisory System. HSPD-3 provides the 

guidelines for a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding 

the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state and local authorities and the American people. This 

document establishes the five threat conditions and their respective protective measures. 

 (8) HSPD-4/NSPD-17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. HSPD-4 states that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the 

possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges 

facing the United States and that we must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this 

threat in all of its dimensions. It describes three pillars for our national strategy to combat 

WMD: counterproliferation to combat WMD use, strengthen nonproliferation to combat 

WMD proliferation, and CM to respond to WMD use. Each pillar iterates specific actions 

to be pursued within the pillar. 

 (9) HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents. Assigns the Secretary HS as 

the principal federal official for domestic incident management to coordinate the federal 

governmentís resources utilized in response to, or recovery from terrorist attacks, major 

disasters, or other emergencies. The federal government assists state and local authorities 

when their resources are overwhelmed, or when federal interests are involved. Nothing in 

the directive impairs or otherwise affects the authority of SecDef over DOD, including the 

chain of command for military forces. SecDef provides civil support for domestic incidents 

as directed by the President. SecDef retains command of military forces providing CS. 

Additionally, HSPD-5 directed the development of a National Incident Management System 

to provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, local and tribal governments 

to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

domestic incidents. It also directed the development of a National Response Plan (NRP) to 

provide a unified approach for coordinating the federal, state, and local response to an 

incident of national significance. 

(10) HSPD-6, Integration and Use of Screening Information. HSPD-6 provides for 

the development and maintenance of accurate and current information about individuals 

known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct related to 

terrorism; and that information, as appropriate and permitted by law, can be used to support 

screening and protective processes via the Terrorist Screening Center. 

 (11) HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. 

HSPD-7 established a national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and 

prioritize US critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist 
 Key Homeland Defense Legal and Policy Documents 

D-3 

attacks. This directive identifies roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, and other departments and recognizes DOD as the sector-specific agency for the 

defense industrial base. 

 (12) HSPD-8, National Preparedness. HSPD-8 established policies to strengthen 

US preparedness to prevent and respond to threats and actual domestic terrorist attacks, 

major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards 

preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of federal preparedness 

assistance to state and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness 

capabilities of federal, state, and local entities. 

 (13) HSPD-10/NSPD-33, Biodefense for the 21st Century. HSPD-10 provides a 

comprehensive framework for US biodefense and, among other things, delineates the roles 

and responsibilities of federal agencies and departments in continuing their important work 

in this area. 

 (14) HSPD-11, Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures. HSPD11 establishes procedures to enhance terrorist-related screening through comprehensive, 

coordinated procedures that detect, identify, track, and interdict people, cargo, conveyances, 

and other entities and objects that pose a threat to HS. 

 (15) HSPD-12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal 

Employees and Contractors. HSPD-12 establishes a policy of the United States to enhance 

security, increase government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy 

by establishing a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of 

identification issued by the federal government to its employees and contractors. 

 (16) HSPD-13/NSPD-41, Maritime Security Policy. HSPD-13 establishes US 

policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to enhance US national security and HS by 

protecting US maritime interests. 

 (17) HSPD-14/NSPD-43, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. HSPD-14 

establishes the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) resident within the DHS and 

assigns it with the responsibility to develop the global nuclear detection architecture and to 

acquire and support the deployment of the domestic detection system and directs DOD to 

conduct close cooperation and coordination with the DNDO. 

 (18) NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System. NSPD-1 

established the national Security Council system as a process to coordinate executive 

departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national 

security policies. 

 (19) HSPD-16/NSPD-47 US Aviation Security Policy. The US Aviation Security 

Policy establishes US policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to continue the 

enhancement of HS and national security by protecting the United States and US interests 

from threats in the air domain. It directs multiple USG departments (including DOD) and 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-27 

agencies to accomplish specific tasks that will improve the security and defense of the US 

homeland. Specifically, protection of critical transportation networks and infrastructure, 

enhancement of situational awareness, and enhancement of international relationships with 

allies and other partners. 

 (20) NSPD-23, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense. NSPD-23 

acknowledges the various emerging threats to the United States ñ especially from WMD, 

and directs the SecDef to proceed with plans to deploy a set of initial missile defense 

capabilities. 

 (21) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-24, US Counterintelligence 

Effectiveness. PDD-24 is designed to foster increased cooperation, coordination and 

accountability among all US counterintelligence agencies. It directed the creation of a new 

national counterintelligence policy structure under the auspices of the NSC and directed the 

creation of a new National Counterintelligence Center. Nothing in this directive amends or 

changes the authorities and responsibilities of the SecDef. 

 (22) EO 13223, Ordering the Ready Reserves of Armed Forces to Active Duty and 

Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 

Transportation. Resulted from the September 14, 2001 Presidential Proclamation 7463: 

Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks and recognition 

of immediate threat of further attacks on the United States. It provides the DOD and DOT 

(now DHS) additional authorities, among them the ability to order any unit or member of 

the Ready Reserve to active duty and the transfer of select Title 10 USC provisions from the 

President to the respective department secretaries. 

 (23) EO 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. 

Designed to ensure the protection of information systems for critical infrastructure, 

including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support 

such systems. Establishes national policy, scope of effort, and the Presidentís Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Board. The order specifically identifies SecDef and Director of 

Central Intelligence with responsibility for National Security Information Systems. 

 (24) Military Order of November 13, 2001, Federal Register: (Volume 66, 

Number 222). Military order from the President declaring a state of armed conflict exists 

since various terrorist attacks against the United States, which requires the use of the Armed 

Forces of the US. Acknowledges the use of the armed forces to identify terrorists and their 

supporters, to disrupt their activities, and to eliminate their ability to conduct or support 

terrorist attacks. 

 (25) EO 13292, Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, 

Classified National Security Information. Prescribes a uniform system for classifying, 

safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, including information relating 

to defense against transnational terrorism. 
 Key Homeland Defense Legal and Policy Documents 

D-5 

 (26) EO 13354, National Counterterrorism Center. Established the National 

Counterterrorism Center under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence. The 

center is intended to strengthen intelligence analysis and strategic planning and intelligence 

support to operations to counter transnational terrorist threats against the territory, people 

and interests of the United States. Support is intended for all agencies (includes DOD) 

consistent with applicable law. 

 (27) EO 13381, Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for 

Access to Classified National Security Information. Addresses the protection of classified 

national security information against unauthorized disclosure and agency functions relating 

to determining eligibility for access to classified national security information. 

 (28) EO 13385, Continuance of Certain Federal Advisory Committees and 

Amendments to and Revocation of Other Executive Orders. Extended (until 30 September 

2007) the existence of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council created by EO 13231. 

 (29) EO 13388, Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to 

Protect American. Further strengthens the effective conduct of US CT activities and is 

intended to protect the territory, people and interests of the United States, including against 

terrorist attacks. 

 (30) The National Strategy for Homeland Security. Prepared for the President by 

the Office of Homeland Security, this document lays out the strategic objectives, 

organization and critical areas for HS. The strategy identifies critical areas that focus on 

preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the nationís vulnerabilities, minimizing the damage 

and recovering from attacks that do occur. These critical areas are compatible with DODís 

framework for HS that is discussed in this publication. 

 (31) National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America. This 

document, among other objectives, has an enterprise objective to build an integrated 

intelligence capability to address threats to the homeland, consistent with US law and the 

protection of privacy and civil liberties. US intelligence elements must focus their capabilities 

to ensure that: 

 (a) Intelligence elements in the DOJ and HS are properly resourced and 

closely integrated within the larger IC. 

 (b) All IC components assist in facilitating the integration of collection and 

analysis against terrorists, WMD, and other threats to the homeland. 

 (c) State, local, and tribal entities and the private sector are connected to HS 

and intelligence efforts. 

 (32) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Expands on the NSHS and the 

NSS by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the war of ideas, and 

strengthen Americaís security at home and abroad. While the NSHS focuses on preventing 
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-27 

terrorist attacks within the United States, this strategy is more proactive and focuses on 

identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders. The direct and continuous 

action against terrorist groups will disrupt, and over time, degrade and ultimately destroy 

their capability to attack the United States. 

 (33) National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 

Key Assets. Defines the road ahead for a core mission area identified in the Presidentís 

NSHS ñ reducing the nationís vulnerability to acts of terrorism by protecting our critical 

infrastructures and key assets from physical attack. It identifies a clear set of national goals 

and objectives to achieve our protection goals. The strategy identifies thirteen critical 

infrastructure sectors. Key asset protection represents a broad array of unique facilities, 

sites, and structures whose disruption or destruction could have significant consequences 

across multiple dimensions. Examples include, but are not limited to nuclear power plants, 

national monuments, and commercial centers where large numbers of people congregate. 

 (34) National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. An implementing component of the 

NSHS, it engages and empowers Americans to secure the portions of cyberspace that they 

own, operate, control, or with which they interact. This will require a coordinated and 

focused effort from our entire society ó the federal, state, and local governments. This 

strategy outlines a framework for organizing and prioritizing efforts, and calls upon 

individual Americans to improve our collective cyberspace security. It identifies three 

strategic objectives: prevent attacks in cyberspace against American critical infrastructure, 

reduce national vulnerability to attacks in cyberspace, and minimize damage and recovery 

time from attacks in cyberspace that do occur. 

 (35) National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan provides a coordinated approach to critical infrastructure and key resource 

protection roles and responsibilities for federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector security 

partners. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan sets national priorities, goals, and 

requirements for effective distribution of funding and resources that will help ensure that our 

government, economy, and public services continue in the event of a terrorist attack or other 

disaster. 

 (36) National Strategy for Maritime Security. This document aligns all federal 

government maritime security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive and cohesive 

national effort involving appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector entities. There 

are eight supporting plans which when combined with the national strategy, presents a 

comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate 

activities while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the maritime domain. The document 

provides three broad principles as overarching guidance for maritime security: 

 (a) Outlines the Presidentís vision for a fully coordinated USG effort to 

protect US interests in the maritime domain. 

 (b) Provides an overarching plan addressing all of the components of the 

maritime domain including domestic, international, public, and private components. 
 Key Homeland Defense Legal and Policy Documents 

D-7 

 (c) Incorporates a global, cross-disciplined approach centered on a layered, 

defense-in-depth framework that may be adjusted on the threat level. 

 (d) This Strategy directs the coordination of the United States Government 

maritime security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive national effort 

involving appropriate federal, state, tribal, local, and private sector entities. In support of 

this Strategy, eight national implementation plans provide amplifying detail and 

specificity: 

 1. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the 

foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime 

domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United 

States, and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible. 

 2. Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing 

capabilities to integrate al available intelligence regarding potential threats to US interests 

in the maritime domain. 

 3. Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan aims for coordinated 

United States Government responses to threats against the United States and its interests 

in the maritime domain by establishing roles and responsibilities that enable the 

government to respond quickly and decisively. 

 4. International Outreach and Coordination Strategy provides a 

framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign 

governments and international organizations, and solicits international support for 

enhanced maritime security. 

 5. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends procedures 

and standards for the recovery of the maritime infrastructure following attack or similar 

disruption. 

 6. Maritime Transportation System Security Plan responds to the 

Presidentís call for recommendations to improve the national and international regulatory 

framework regarding the maritime domain. 

 7. Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive 

plan to secure the maritime domain. 

 8. Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-Federal input to assist with the 

development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from HSPD13/NSPD-41. 

 (37) National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. The NSS 

establishes broad strategic guidance for advancing US interests in the global environment 
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 3-27 

through the instruments of national power. The NMS, derived from the NSS, focuses on 

how the Armed Forces of the United States will be employed to accomplish national 

strategic objective. The NSS and the NMS continue to reflect the first and fundamental 

commitment to defend the Nation against its adversaries. 

 (38) National Southwest Border Counter Narcotics Strategy. Addresses the land 

and air domains of the southwest border and the Mexican approaches and includes tasks for 

DOD. This Strategy affirms that the USGís counterdrug, counterterror, and immigration 

enforcement missions are interrelated and serves as an integrated component of the nationís 

efforts to secure the southwest border against all threats to the health and safety of the 

American people.î 

 (39) National Strategy for Aviation Security. The strategy presents a vision for 

aviation security aimed at securing the people and interests of the United States. It 

underscores the Nationís commitment to strengthening international partnerships and 

advancing economic well-being around the globe by facilitating commerce and abiding by 

the principles of freedom of the airways. 

 (40) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, 

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning 

Information Sharing. This agreement provides a framework and guidance to govern 

information sharing, use, and handling among the following individuals and their agencies: 

Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, and 

any other organization having federal law enforcement responsibilities (other than those that 

are part of the DHS). The agreement mandates minimum requirements for information 

sharing, use, and handling and for coordination and deconfliction of analytic judgments. 

 (41) National Military Strategic Plan For The War On Terrorism (NMSP-WOT). 

This constitutes the comprehensive military plan to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism 

for the Armed Forces of the United States. This document reflects the lessons of the first 

four years of the Global War on Terrorism, including the findings and recommendations of 

the 9-11 Commission and a rigorous examination within DOD, personally led by the SecDef 

and the CJCS. The NMSP-WOT outlines DODís strategic planning and provides strategic 

guidance for military activities and operations in the Global War on Terrorism. The 

document guides the planning and actions of combatant commands, the military 

departments, combat support agencies and field support activities of the United States to 

protect and defend the homeland, attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at 

home and abroad, and support mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism. 

 (42) North American Aerospace Defense Agreement. Agreement between the 

Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on the 

NORAD. Establishes the primary missions of NORAD that are: aerospace warning for 

North America; aerospace control for North America, and maritime warning for North 

America. 
 Key Homeland Defense Legal and Policy Documents 

D-9 

2. DOD Policy and Guidance 

 a. Implications. Specific authorities for HS missions are contained in federal and 

state law and policy documents. These form the basis for the development of DOD 

guidelines. These guidelines are promulgated in a variety of methods that include national 

strategy documents, planning guidance, and DODDs. These policy documents are 

consistent with and complementary to the federal statutes and guidelines discussed earlier in 

this appendix. DODDs specifically address HD mission. 

 b. Key DOD Guidance. The following discussion identifies a number of key 

documents to make commanders and planners more aware of material that may assist in the 

planning and execution of the HS mission areas. 

 (1) Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Articulates strategic 

goals and objectives and provides direction to relevant HD activities across DOD. These 

activities include deterring and preventing attacks, protecting critical defense and designated 

civilian infrastructure, providing situational understanding, and preparing for and 

responding to incidents. The strategy focuses on building needed transformational 

capabilities, enhanced maritime awareness and response capability, strengthened allied 

contributions to collective security, and improved support to civil authorities. 

 (2) Joint Planning Guidance is part of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 

Execution Process to allocate resources within DOD. The Joint Planning Guidance is the link 

between planning and programming and it provides guidance to the DOD components for the 

development of their program proposal, known as the Program Objective Memorandum. 

 (3) Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) provides guidance to the combatant 

commands concerning contingencies and includes the prioritized regional objectives for DOD. 

The CPG is a concise, classified document that SecDef uses to inform CJCS of general and 

specific strategic areas of concern to the civilian leadership for which contingency planning 

should be conducted. The Joint Staff collaborates with OSD in the initial drafting of the CPG. 

The final draft is coordinated with CJCS before it is forwarded to SecDef for his approval and 

subsequent submission to the NSC for presidential approval. After the CPG is published, the 

Joint Staff translates the policy guidance into specific planning guidance and tasks and inserts 

them into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). 

 (4) Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The SPG provides direction for DOD 

components to develop the Future Years Defense Program and the Presidentís budget 

submission. The four defense policy goals are to assure, dissuade, deter, and decisively 

defeat. The goals are articulated in a planning construct of deterring forward and winning 

decisively while defending at home. The SPG additionally lists the priorities of SecDef: 

winning the Global War on Terrorism, strengthening our ability to meet our responsibilities, 

transforming the joint force, optimizing intelligence capabilities, counterproliferation, 

improving force manning, developing and implementing new concepts for global 

engagement, strengthening our ability to fulfill our responsibilities in HS, streamlining DOD 
Appendix D 

D-10 JP 3-27 

processes, and reorganizing DOD and the USG to deal with prewar opportunities and postwar responsibilities. 

 (5) Strategic Military Intelligence Review establishes core intelligence issues of 

highest priority, identifies needs and gaps, and provides a common framework and 

substantive guidance for allocating intelligence collection and production resources. 

 (6) Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The JSR helps the Joint Staff integrate 

strategy, operational planning, and program assessments. It covers the short, mid and longterm periods: 0-2, 2-10, and 10-20 years in the future. The JSR assesses the global strategic 

setting for issues affecting the NMS. 

 (7) Unified Command Plan. The UCP provides basic guidance to all unified 

CCDRs; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the 

general geographical AORs for geographic CCDRs; and specifies functional responsibilities 

for functional CCDRs. 

 (8) Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG). Security cooperation is the means 

by which DOD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to 

achieve strategic objectives. The SCG provides the foundation for all DOD interactions 

with foreign defense establishments and supports the Presidentís National Security Strategy. 

It describes the SecDefís priorities for creating new partnerships and building the capacity of 

existing partnerships.î 

 (9) DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Program. This directive updates 

policies and assigns responsibilities for implementing the procedures for DODís AT 

program. It establishes CJCS as the principal advisor and focal point responsible to SecDef 

for DOD AT issues. It also defines the AT responsibilities of the Military Departments, 

combatant commands, DOD agencies, and DOD field activities. Its guidelines are 

applicable for the physical security of all DOD activities both overseas and in the homeland. 

 (10) DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. This directive provides guidance on stability 

operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons 

learned develop. It establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within DOD for 

planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the 

authority vested in SecDef under Sections 113 and 153 of Title 10, USC, and the guidance 

and responsibilities assigned in the SPG for Fiscal Year 2006-2011. 

 (11) DODD 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program. This directive 

establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DCI activities as they apply to DOD, and 

authorizes ASD (HD&ASA) to issue instructions and guidance for the implementation of 

this directive. 

 (12) DODD 4630.5, Interoperability and Supportability of Information 

Technology and National Security Systems defines a capability-focused, effects-based 
 Key Homeland Defense Legal and Policy Documents 

D-11 

approach to advance information technology and national security systems interoperability 

and supportability across DOD. 

 (13) DODD 5100.78, United States Port Security Program outlines the 

authorities, responsibilities, and functions relative to appropriate security measures and 

programs to counter the threat posed to US ports. 

 (14) DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and 

Organizations not Affiliated with DOD. This directive establishes the Defense 

Investigative Program general policy, limitations, procedures, and operational guidance 

pertaining to the collecting, processing, storing, and disseminating of information 

concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD. 

 (15) DODD 5205.5, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program provides 

policy and responsibilities governing DOD’s OPSEC program and incorporates the 

requirements of National Security Decision Directive, 298 that apply to DOD. It 

underscores the importance of OPSEC and how it is integrated as a core military capability 

within IO that must be followed in daily application of military operations. 

 (16) DODD 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities provides guidance to DOD 

intelligence components to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning US 

persons. 

 (17) CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System provides joint policy and 

guidance on, and describes the responsibilities and functions of, the joint strategic planning 

system. Provides expanded guidance on the process for developing combatant command 

theater engagement plans and identifies the plan approval process. 

 (18) CJSCI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement and Standing Rules for 

the Use of Force for US Forces (U). This instruction establishes rules regarding the use of 

force by DOD personnel during military operations. 

 (19) CJSCI 3213.01B, Joint Operations Security. Provides policy and guidance 

for planning and executing OPSEC in support of joint military operations. 

 (20) CJSCI 3610.01A, Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict 

Airborne Objects provides guidance to the Deputy Director for Operations, National 

Military Command Center, and operational commanders in the event of an aircraft piracy 

(hijacking) or request for destruction of derelict airborne objects. 

 (21) CJCSI 3710.01A, DOD Counterdrug Operational Support. This instruction 

promulgates SecDef delegation of authority to approve certain CD operational support 

missions. It also provides, in accordance with the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense 

Authorization Act, as amended, instruction on authorized types of DOD (Title 10 USC) CD 

support to the federal agency with lead responsibility, other government agencies, and 

foreign nations. 
Appendix D 

D-12 JP 3-27 

 (22) CJCSI 5221.01B, Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Combatant 

Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and 

International Organizations. This instruction explains the authority delegated by CJCS to 

the CCDRs concerning the disclosure of classified military information for which they are 

the originating component to foreign governments and international organizations. 

 (23) CJCSI 5810.01B, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program

establishes joint policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides guidance regarding the US law 

of war obligations. It also assigns specific responsibilities within DOD to ensure 

compliance with the law of war. 

 (24) Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and 

Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United 

States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security. Identifies and documents 

appropriate capabilities, roles, missions and functions for DOD in support of the USCG 

when conducting maritime HS operations, and to facilitate the rapid flow of DOD forces to 

the USCG in support of maritime HS operations. 

 (25) Memorandum of Agreement between Department of Defense and 

Department of Homeland Security for the Inclusion of the US Coast Guard in support of 

Maritime Homeland Defense. Establishes DOD joint C2 structure for maritime HD 

operations that include USCG forces and to identifies and documents appropriate roles, 

missions, and functions for the USCG in support of maritime HD operations.
APPENDIX E 

REFERENCES 

E-1 

The development of JP 3-27 is based on the following primary references: 

1. General 

a. US Constitution. 

b. EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities. 

c. EO 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities. 

d. EO 13228, Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland 

Security Council. 

e. EO 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. 

f. EO 13388, Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect 

Americans. 

g. EO 13223, Ordering the Ready Reserves of Armed Forces to Active Duty and 

Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 

Transportation. 

 

h. Military Order of 13 November 2001. 

i. EO 13293, Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, 

Classified National Security Information. 

j. EO 13316, Continuance of Certain Federal Advisory Committees. 

k. EO 13354, National Counterterrorism Center. 

l. EO 13381, Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access 

to Classified National Security Information. 

m. EO 13385, Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect 

American. 

n. National Response Plan. 

o. NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System.

p. HSPD-1, Organization and Operations of the Homeland Security Council. 

q. HSPD-2, Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies. 

r. HSPD-3, Homeland Security Advisory System. 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-27 

s. HSPD-4/NSPD-17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

t. HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents. 

u. HSPD-6, Integration and Use of Screening Information. 

v. HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. 

w. HSPD-8, National Preparedness. 

x. HSPD-10/NSPD-33, Biodefense for the 21st Century. 

y. HSPD-11, Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures.

z. HSPD-12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees 

and Contractors. 

 

aa. HSPD-13/NSPD-41, Maritime Security Policy. 

ab. HSPD-14/NSPD-43, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. 

ac. HSPD-15/NSPD-46, US Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror. 

ad. HSPD-16/NSPD-47, US Aviation Security Policy.

ae. National Military Strategy. 

af. NSPD-23, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense. 

ag. NSPD-33, Biodefense for the 21st Century. 

ah. National Security Strategy. 

ai. National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

aj. National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. 

ak. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

al. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. 

am. National Strategy for Maritime Security. 

an. National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America. 
 References 

E-3 

ao. Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security. 

ap. Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan. 

aq. National Industrial Security Program. 

ar. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Agreement and 

Terms of Reference. 

as. Canada-US Rush-Baggot Treaty. 

at. CANUS Basic Security Document 100/35. 

au. NORAD Instruction 10-24. 

av. Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Reference 

Guide. 

aw. PDD-14, Counternarcotics. 

ax. PDD-24, US Counterintelligence. 

ay. PDD-67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government 

Operations.

az. Title 10, USC, Armed Forces. 

ba. Title 14, USC, United States Coast Guard. 

bb. Title 18, USC, Section 1385, The Posse Comitatus Act. 

bc. Title 32, USC, National Guard. 

bd. Title 33, USC, Navigation and Navigable Waters.

be. Title 42 USC Section 9601, ìComprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act.

bf. Title 46, USC, Shipping.

bg. Title 50, USC, War and National Defense.

bh. The Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

bi. UFC 4-010-01, DOD Minimum Standards for Buildings.
Appendix E 

E-4 JP 3-27 

bj. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act). 

bk. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2002.

bl. Unified Command Plan. 

bm. United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations 

Plan.

bn. US Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and 

Sharing Information and Intelligence in the New World.

bo. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, Federal 

Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning 

Information Sharing. 

2. Department of Defense Documents 

a. SecDef Memorandum, Forces for Unified Commands. 

b. DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program. 

c. DODD 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military 

Services. 

d. DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. 

e. DODD 3020, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program. 

f. DODD 3020.26, Defense Continuity Program. 

g. DODD 3020.36, Assignment of National Security EP(NSEP) Responsibilities to 

DOD Components. 

h. DODD 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 

Protection Defense Critical Infrastructure Program. 

i. DODD 4630.5, Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology and 

National Security Systems. 

j. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the DOD and Its Major Components. 

k. DODD 5105.19, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). 
 References 

E-5 

l. DODD 5100.78, United States Port Security Program. 

m. DODD 5148.11, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight 

(ATSD IO). 

n. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and 

Organizations not Affiliated with the DOD. 

o. DODD 5205.5, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program. 

p. DODD 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD 

Personnel in Law Enforcement and Security Duties. 

q. DODD 5220.22, National Industrial Security Program. 

r. DODD 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities. 

 

s. DODD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence 

Components that Affect United States Persons.

t. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. 

u. DODI 3020, Implementation of the Critical Infrastructure Program. 

v. DODI 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards.

w. Joint Planning Guidance. 

x. Strategic Planning Guidance. 

y. Contingency Planning Guidance. 

z. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Geospatial Intelligence Series (GIPS). 

aa. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 

ab. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

ac. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the 

Department of Homeland Security for Inclusion of the US Coast Guard in Support of 

Maritime Homeland Defense. 

ad. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the 

Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United 

States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security.
Appendix E 

E-6 JP 3-27 

ae. Global Force Management Guidanceî Section II, Assignment of Forces (Forces 

For Unified Commands).

af. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. 

ag. National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. 

ah. Strategic Planning Guidance. 

ai. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. 

3. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

c. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

d. JP 1-05, Religious Support for Joint Operations. 

e. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

f. JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

g. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

h. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

i. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction Operations. 

j. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

k. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations. 

l. JP 3-08 (Vols I & II), Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and 

Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations. 

m. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).

n. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

(NBC) Environments. 

o. JP 3-13, Information Operations.
 References 

E-7 

p. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

q. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. 

r. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

s. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

t. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

u. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 

v. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 

 

w. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

x. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

y. JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

z. JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

aa. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives 

Consequence Management. 

ab. JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 

ac. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. 

ad. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

ae. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 

af. JP 4-0, Logistic Support of Joint Operations. 

ag. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

ah. JP 4-05.1, Joint Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve 

Component Call-up.

ai. JP4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations. 

aj. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

ak. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.
Appendix E 

E-8 JP 3-27 

al. Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates. 

am. Maritime Law Enforcement Manual. 

an. CJCSI 1301.01C, Individual Augmentation Procedures. 

ao. CJCSI 3110.01, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002 (U).

ap. CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System. 

aq. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces (U).

 

ar. CJCSI 3213.01B, Joint Operations Security. 

as. CJCSI 3610.01A, Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict 

Airborne Objects. 

at. CJCSI 3710.01A, DOD Counterdrug Support. 

au. CJCSI 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priority. 

av. CJCSI 5113.02A, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Counterproliferation 

Charter (U). 

aw. CJCSI 5120.02A, Joint Doctrine Development System. 

ax. CJCSI 5221.01B, Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Combatant 

Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and 

International Organizations. 

ay. CJCSI 5810.01B, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. 

4. Multi-Service Publications 

a. FM 3-22.40 / NTTP 3-07.3.2 / MCWP 3-15.8 / AFTTP 3-2.45 / USCG Pub 3-

07.31, NLW – Tactical Employment of Non Lethal Weapons.

b. FM 3-01.1 / NTTP 3-26.1.1 / AFTTP) 3-2.50, ADUS -- Air Defense of the 

United States (U).

c. NTTP 3-07.11 / CGP 3-07.11, Maritime Interception Operations. 

5. Army Publications 

a. FM 1, The Army. 
 References 

E-9 

b. FM 3-0, Operations. 

6. Navy Publications 

a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare. 

b. Naval Warfare Publication 3-10, Naval Coastal Warfare. 

7. Marine Corps Publications 

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, 6 March 1989. 

8. Air Force Publications 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. 

b. AFDD 2-10, Homeland Operations.

c. AFDD 2-4.2, Health Services. 

d. Air Force Instruction 10-2701, Organization and Function of the Civil Air Patrol. 

9. Coast Guard Publications 

a. Coast Guard Publication-1, US Coast Guard: Americaís Maritime Guardian. 

b. Coast Guard Publication 3-01, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security. 

10. USNORTHCOM Publications 

a. USNORTHCOM Concept of Operations. 

b. USNORTHCOM Homeland Defense Concept of Employment. 

c. USNORTHCOM-NGB Joint Continental United States (CONUS) 

Communications Support Environment (JCCSE) Concept. 

d. USNORTHCOM Antiterrorism (AT) Operations Order. 
Appendix E 

E-10 JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX F 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

F-1 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center ATTN: 

Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These 

comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), 

writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is CDRUSNORTHCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine 

sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-01.1, 04 November 1996, Aerospace Defense of North 

America. This publication, in conjunction with the publication of JP 3-28, 14 September 

2007, Civil Support, supersedes JP 3-26, 02 August 2005, Homeland Security. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

 

 TO: CDR NORTHCOM 

 INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDR USJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOCGP// 

 Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info to the lead agent and the Director for 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JEDD. 

 b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, 

that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its 

proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, 

J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

 CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

 NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix F 

F-2 JP 3-27 

5. Distribution of Publications 

a. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1 R, Information Security 

Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local 

embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 

7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.
GLOSSARY 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AC Active Component 

ACC Air Combat Command 

ADS air defense sector 

AFB Air Force base 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFNORTH Air Forces Northern 

AFTTP Air Force tactics techniques, and procedures 

ALCOM US Alaskan Command 

ANG Air National Guard 

ANGUS Air National Guard of the United States 

ANR Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region 

AO area of operations 

AOR area of responsibility 

AOTR Aviation Operational Threat Response 

ARNG Army National Guard 

ARNGUS Army National Guard of the United States 

ASBPO Armed Services Blood Program Office 

ASD(HA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) 

ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and 

America’s Security Affairs) 

ASD(NII) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information 

Integration) 

ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) 

ASD(SO/LIC&IC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) 

AT antiterrorism 

ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical 

and Biological Defense Programs 

BI battlefield injury 

BMD ballistic missile defense

BSI base support installation 

C2 command and control 

CAA command arrangement agreement 

CAD Canadian air division 

CANADA COM Canada Command 

CANR Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command 

Region 

CANUS Canada-United States 

CAP Civil Air Patrol 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives 

CCDR combatant commander 

CD counterdrug 

CDR commander 

CDRNORAD Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-27 

CDRUSARNORTH Commander, US Army North 

CDRUSCENTCOM Commander, United States Central Command 

CDRUSELEMNORAD Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace 

Defense Command 

CDRUSEUCOM Commander, United States European Command 

CDRUSJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CDRUSSOUTHCOM Commander, United States Southern Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command 

CDS Canadian Chief of Defence Staff 

CFB Canadian forces base 

CG commanding general 

CGDEFOR Coast Guard defense force 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CIO chief information officer 

CIP critical infrastructure protection 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CM consequence management 

CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau 

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COG continuity of government 

COM command 

COMMARFORNORTH Commander, Marine Corps Forces North 

COMPACAF Commander, Pacific Air Forces 

COMPACFLT Commander, Pacific Fleet 

COMUSFLTFORSCOM Commander, US Fleet Forces Command 

CONPLAN concept plan 

CONR Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense 

Command Region

CONUS continental United States 

COOP continuity of operations 

COP common operational picture

COTP captain of the port 

CPG Contingency Planning Guidance 

CrM crisis management 

CS civil support 

CSA combat support agency 

CSS combat service support 

CT counterterrorism 

DAFL directive authority for logistics 
Glossary 

GL-3 

DCI defense critical infrastructure 

DCIP Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 

DCST Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) contingency support team 

DEST domestic emergency support team 

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DIB defense industrial base 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DNBI disease and nonbattle injury 

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DSA defensive sea area 

DTIP Disruptive Technology Innovations Partnership 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EADS Eastern Air Defense Sector 

EMIO expanded maritime interception operations 

EO executive order 

EP emergency preparedness 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EXORD execute order 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FHP force health protection 

FM field manual (Army) 

FP force protection 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

GIG Global Information Grid 

GPS global positioning system 

GSA General Services Administration 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-27 

HD homeland defense 

HDC harbor defense commander 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

HS homeland security 

HSAC Homeland Security Advisory Council 

HSC Homeland Security Council 

HSPD homeland security Presidential directive

HVA high value asset 

IA information assurance 

IACG interagency coordination group 

IAW in accordance with 

IC intelligence community 

IFP integrated force package 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IMPT incident management planning team 

IO information operations 

IPC interagency planning cell 

ISG information synchronization group 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

ITW/AA integrated tactical warning/and attack assessment 

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff 

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff 

J-A judge advocate directorate of a joint staff 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFCC-IMD Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile 

Defense

JFCC-ISR joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 

Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 

JFHQ joint force headquarters 

JFHQ-NCR Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JOA joint operations area 

JOC joint operations center 

JP joint publication 

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JSR Joint Strategic Review 

JTF joint task force 
Glossary 

GL-5 

JTF-AK Joint Task Force-Alaska 

JTF-CS Joint Task Force – Civil Support 

JTF-GNO Joint task Force-Global Network Operations 

JTF-HD Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense 

JTF-N Joint Task Force-North 

LEA law enforcement agency 

LNO liaison officer 

MARFORNORTH Marine Corps Forces, North 

MARFORSOUTH Marine Corps Forces South 

MCM mine countermeasures

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MIO maritime interception operations 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MOTR maritime operational threat response 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

NCC National Coordinating Center 

NCR National Capital Region (US) 

NCRCC National Capital Region Coordination Center 

NCRCG National Cyber response Coordination Group 

NCR-IADS National Capital Region – Integrated Air Defense System 

NCS National Communications System 

NDHQ Department of National Defence 

NDDOC US Northern Command Deployment and Distribution Operations 

Center 

NETOPS network operations 

NG National Guard 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 

NIRT Nuclear Incident Response Team 

NLW nonlethal weapon 

NMS national military strategy 

NMS-CO National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations 

NOC National Operations Center 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NRP National Response Plan 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSC National Security Council 

NSHS National Strategy for Homeland Security 

NSMS National Strategy for Maritime Security 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-27 

NSS National Security Strategy 

NST National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency support team 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NVDT National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency voluntary deployment 

team 

OCA offensive counterair 

OEH occupational and environmental health 

OI&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS) 

ONE Operation NOBLE EAGLE 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPSEC operations security

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PA public affairs 

PCA Posse Comitatus Act 

PCC policy coordination committee 

PDD Presidential decision directive 

POD port of debarkation 

PRC Presidential Reserve Call-up 

PS/HD port security/harbor defense 

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative 

PSYOP psychological operations 

QRF quick response force 

RC Reserve Component 

ROE rules of engagement 

RFF request for forces 

RRF rapid response force 

RS religious support 

RST religious support team 

RUF rules for the use of force 

S&T science and technology 

SAOC sector air operations center 

SATCOM satellite communications 

SCG Security Cooperation Guidance 

SCP security cooperation plan 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SJFHQ-North Standing Joint Force Headquarters - North 

SO special operations 

SOCPAC Special Operations Command Pacific 
Glossary 

GL-7 

SOF special operations forces 

SPG Strategic Planning Guidance 

SPOE seaport of embarkation 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

SRUF standing rules for the use of force

TAA tactical assembly area 

TACON tactical control 

TNCC theater network operations (NETOPS) control center 

TPMRC theater patient movement requirements center 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

UFC Unified Facilities Criteria 

USACE US Army Corps of Engineers 

USAFR United States Air Force Reserve 

USAR United States Army Reserve 

USARNORTH US Army Forces North 

USARPAC United States Army Pacific Command 

USARSO United States Army Southern Command 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USCGR United States Coast Guard Reserve 

USDA United States Department of Agriculture 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USELEMNORAD United States Element North American Aerospace Defense 

Command 

USEUCOM United States European Command 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve 

USN United States Navy 

USNAVSO US Naval Forces Southern Command 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USNR United States Navy Reserve 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

WADS Western Air Defense Sector 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

GL-8 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. JP 1-02 will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

base support installation. A Department of Defense service or agency installation within 

the United States, its territories, or possessions tasked to serve as a base for military 

forces engaged in either homeland defense or civil support operations. Provides 

general support logistics and administrative support to military forces. Also called 

BSI. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for 

inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-28.)

defense critical infrastructure. Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense 

networked assets and essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and 

operations worldwide. Also called DCI. (JP 1-02) 

domestic emergencies. Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 

50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and 

territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, 

insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or 

equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of 

government. Domestic emergencies include civil defense emergencies, civil 

disturbances, major disasters, and natural disasters. (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

global strike. A rapidly planned, limited-duration, extended-range precision attack that is 

conducted to achieve strategic objectives. (This term and its definition are applicable 

only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this 

publication.) 

homeland. The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, 

United States territories and possessions, and surrounding territorial waters and 

airspace. (JP 1-02)

homeland defense. The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression 

or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

homeland security. As defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, a 

concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 

America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from 

attacks that do occur. The Department of Defense contributes to homeland security 

through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil 

authorities. Also called HS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term 

and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

primary agency. The federal department or agency assigned primary responsibility for 

managing and coordinating a specific emergency support function in the National 

Response Plan. (This term and its definition are provided for information and 

proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-28.) 

quick response force. A company-sized force providing responsive, mission-tailored, 

lightly armed ground units that can deploy on short notice, with minimal lift assets, 

and capable of providing immediate or emergency response. Also called QRF. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

rapid response force. A battalion minus-sized force providing responsive, missiontailored, lightly armed ground units that can deploy on short notice, with minimal lift 

assets, and capable of providing immediate or emergency response. Also called RRF. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-27 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

anlalysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-27 Operations