UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DANESH RAHIMI, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. SCOTT SWEAT, MCKAY KING, Hon. O. LANE MCCOTTER, Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-4167 (D.C. No. 2:16-CV-00874-CW-DBP) (D. of Utah)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , MATHESON , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Dr. Danesh Rahimi, proceeding pr o se, appeals the district cour t’s order dismissing his request for injunctive relief against defendants Scott Sweat, McKay King, and Judge O. Lane McCotter. Exercising jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 16, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. On or about February 28, 2013, P laintiff-Appellant Dr. Danesh R ahimi purchased a hotel condominium, m arked on the door as unit 107, at the Zermatt Resort in Midway, Utah. Dr. Rah imi owned unit 107 for over a y ear without incident; at some point, however , it was discovered that the nu mbering of the units on the original plat to the Resort did not correspond with the num bering on the unit doors. As a result, affected own ers are uncertain of whether t hey possess clear title to the units in which they res ide. A group quiet title action involving the owners is ongoing in Wasatch County Distric t Court to resolve the confusi on generated by the

errors. Outside the quiet title action, D r. Rahimi pressed the claim th at he actually owned unit 207, which was occupied by another individual. Afte r the Resort refused to give him keys to unit 207, Dr . Rahimi contacted the Wasatch County Sheriff’s Office in August 2014, making se veral complaints of criminal wr ongdoing by both the occupier of unit 207 and the Resort. The Sheriff’s Office referred the complaints to the Wasatch County Attorney’s Office. Deputy Wasatch County Attorney McKay King wrote to Dr. Rahimi, informi ng him that his complaints wer e civil in nature and could “not be prosecuted under th e criminal standard of proof b eyond a reasonable doubt.” Dr. Rahimi sued King and Wasatc h County Attorney Scott Sweat in Wasatch County Justice Court, and the cases were assigned to Judge O. L ane McCotter. Because the cases involved allega tions against Wasatch County e mployees, Judge3 McCotter transferred the cases to Utah County Justice Court. I n a separate action by Dr. Rahimi against the owner of unit 207, Judge McCotter ruled against Dr. Rahimi and dismissed the case without prejudice. Subsequently, Dr. Rahimi filed th e present civil rights complai nt under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 1 in the Third Judicial Distric t Court of Salt Lake County, Utah against King, Sweat, and Ju dge McCotter. Defendants remov ed the case to federal district court. The cas e was assigned to United States District Court Judge Clark Waddoups, who then referred it to United States Magistrat e Dustin B. Pead under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). D r. Rahimi alleged in his comp laint that he was the “victim of bait and switch by a gr oup of people in Midway[,] Ut ah.” He contended that defendants King and Sweat v iolated his civil rights by “de ny[ing]” his property rights and refusing to assist hi m in obtaining possession of un it 207. He further alleged that Judge McCotter “ignor ed” his case and deprived him of his rights by “allowing trespassing.” Essentia lly, Dr. Rahimi requested an o rder demanding defendants take action regarding his trespassing allegations an d help him gain possession of unit 207.

1 Section 1985 prohibits a conspir acy to interfere with civil ri ghts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district cour t noted that “at oral argument , Dr. Rahimi acknowledged that he did not bri ng a conspiracy claim in this c ase.” Whether or not Rahimi abandoned the § 1985 argument below, Rahimi has waived a ny right to pursue it on appeal. Although Rahi mi’s opening brief contains a passing reference to his § 1985 claim, he does not dev elop any argument related to t hat claim, or take issue with the district court’s assertion that the claim was dr opped at oral argument. Any arguments related to the § 19 85 claim are therefore waived. See, e.g. , Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co , 439 F.3d 1197, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 2006) (underdeveloped and inadequately b riefed arguments are waived).4 District Judge Waddoups construe d the complaint as a claim that defendants violated Dr. Rahimi’s Fourteen th Amendment rights by depriving him of property without due process of law. J udge Waddoups adopted Magistrate Pead’s recommendation that absolute j udicial and prosecutorial immunit y shielded defendants from any claim for da mages. Judge Waddoups noted th at Dr. Rahimi “disavow[ed] any request for mone tary damages,” perhaps mooting the issue. Nevertheless, Judge Waddoups foun d that absolute immunity prote cted defendants because their actions “about which Dr. Rahimi comp lains were wi thin or intimately associated with the judicial process” (citing Snell v. Tunnell , 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A judge acting in his judicial capacity is absolut ely immune from [suits for damages], unless the judge acts clearly without any colorab le claim of jurisdiction. A prosecu tor is absolutely immune for activities which are intimately associated with the judicial pr ocess such as initiating and pur suing a criminal prosecution.”) (citations and quo tations omitted)). Dr. Rahimi reiterates to this court that his requested remedy does “ not include monetary damages,” but “only injunctive relief.” Aplt. Br. a t 4, 5. Because Rahimi now unequivocally states that he seeks only injunctive relief, we need not address Judge Waddoups’ rul ing that the defendants are immune from money damages. Additionally, Judge Waddoups rule d that Dr. Rahimi’s claim for injunctive relief failed because (1) Dr. R ahimi could not s how that he had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property at i ssue, and (2) defendants did no t act to deprive Dr. Rahimi of his interest in th e disputed property.5 Dr. Rahimi filed a timely noti ce of appeal. We now affirm.
II. “We review a district court’s gr ant of a summary judgment de no vo, applying the same legal standard a s the district court.” Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 814 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016). A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no ge nuine dispute as to any materia l fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a ma tter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 6(a). Because Dr. Rahimi is proceeding pro se, he is entitled to a liberal constr uction of his pleadings. Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2008). We will not, however , serve as his advocate. Id. Section 1983 provides that a pe rson acting under color of state law who “subjects, or causes to be subj ected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privi leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the par ty injured[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 198 3. Here, Dr. Rahimi contends that defendants violat ed his rights under the Fourteen th Amendment, which proclaims that “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life , liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “‘To h ave a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire’ and ‘more than a unilateral exp ectation of it. He must, instea d, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales , 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). “Such entitl ements are . . . create d and their dimens ions are defined by6 existing rules or unde rstandings that stem f rom an independent source such as state law.” Id. (quotations omitted). Additionally, “a plaintiff can [ not] recover under § 1983 from a government official . . . without demonstra ting that official violated his constitutional or statutory rights[.]” Dodds v. Richardson , 614 F.3d 1185, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Section 19 83 Litigation 91 (3d ed. 2014) (“ The proximate cause requirement applies to a ll § 1983 claims[.]”).
III. After careful consideration of t he record, we agree with the d istrict court that Dr. Rahimi has not demonstrated e ntitlement to injunctive relie f under Section 1983. We express no opinion regarding wh ether Dr. Rahimi possesses a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to unit 207 such t hat his property interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Roth , 408 U.S. at 564. We note onl y that a group quiet title action is ongoing in state court to resolve the ownership inter ests of parties affected by the controversy at t he Zermatt Resort. However, we are conv inced that defendant Judge McCotter is immune from inj unctive relief under Section 1 983, and defendants Sweat and King did not deprive Dr . Rahimi of a property interes t and therefore cannot be liable. See Dodds , 614 F.3d at 1193–94. Dr. Rahimi requests “judicial rec ognition of his possessory rig hts to enter and occupy [unit 207], to be escorted to the premises by relevant c ounty officers, and an apology.” His claim against Judge McCotter cannot stand becaus e of the clear language of section 1983: “in an y action brought against a judi cial officer for an act7 or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable” (emphasis added); see also Ysais v. New Mexico , 373 F. App’x 863, 866 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“Judicial officers are explicit ly immunized not only against damages but also agains t suits for injunctive relief un der 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Accordingly, judicial immunity s hields Judge McCotter from Dr. Rahimi’s request for injunctive relief. As for defendants King and Swea t, Dr. Rahimi has not explained how they deprived him of his property in terest. Dr. Rahimi does not all ege that these defendants were involved in the unit-numbering dispute that is the basis of the alleged property deprivation. R ather, the defe ndants are count y attorneys who declined to initiate criminal proceedings a gainst individuals a t the Zermatt Resort. In this action, Dr. Rahimi does not now ask them to press charges against any individuals, but seeks “escort[] t o the premises.” Because Dr. Rahimi has not demonstrated that the defendant s caused the violation of a cons titutional or statutory right, his request for injunc tive relief cannot succeed. See Dodds , 614 F.3d at 1193–
94. Dr. Rahimi purports to be the v ictim of fraud ulent activity, p erpetrated by management, owners, or other in dividuals associated with Zermat t Resort. But neither those claims, nor those de fendants, are before this cou rt. We conclude that Dr. Rahimi’s assertion of a cons titutional violation by these d efendants fails as a matter of law.8 IV. Based on the foregoing, we affi rm the district court’s judgmen t granting summary judgment for defendants. Entered for the Court

A llison H. Eid Circuit J udge