U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

60–899 CC WASHINGTON : 1999

S. HRG. 106–234

CONFRONTING THREATS TO SECURITY IN THE

AMERICAS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

PEACE CORPS, NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 22, 1999

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director

EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

PEACE CORPS, NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM

PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia, Chairman

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Joseph R., Jr., prepared statement ............................................................ 3

Wilhelm, Gen. Charles E., U.S. Marine Corps, Commander in Chief, United

States Southern Command, Miami, FL ............................................................. 4

Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 8

Responses of Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm to additional questions submitted

by Senator Jesse Helms ....................................................................................... 22

Responses of Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm to additional questions submitted

by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. ......................................................................... 30

(III)

(1)

CONFRONTING THREATS TO SECURITY IN

THE AMERICAS

TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1999

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE CORPS, NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD–562, Dirksen

Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Coverdell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senator Coverdell.

Senator COVERDELL. I am going to call this meeting of the West- ern Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee

to order and welcome Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Commander in Chief,

United States Southern Command, Miami, Florida.

General, if you would bear with me a minute, I am going to take a little more prerogative this morning on an opening statement

than I normally would, but I want to get this in the record and

then I will turn to you for your opening statement and we will take

it from there. I do want to say how appreciative I am. I know this

has been difficult for you to do, and we are very appreciative that

you would make this time available this morning.

The purpose of this hearing today is to examine what I consider

to be very real threats to the security and stability of the hemisphere. I cannot remember another time in recent history when we

have paid less attention to developments in our own hemisphere.

The current administration has failed to engage the region on a

consistent basis or to articulate and implement a coherent policy

for the hemisphere. Most of our attention has been focused recently

on the Balkans, the Middle East, China, North Korea, and rightly

so. These places certainly demand our immediate attention, but we

simply cannot afford to ignore serious developments in this hemisphere in our own back yard.

In a hearing this subcommittee held several weeks ago, we discussed the notion that the United States is good at responding to

crises, coups that actually change governments. It was asserted

that we are not as good at preventing situations from reaching

these crisis stages. And the reason why is we tend to ignore problems and neglect them until we must take action. We fail to engage

in a regular, consistent manner, and this has been a standard foreign policy flaw of the current administration.

I want to talk briefly about Panama, a subject which in my mind

has been largely ignored. At the end of this year, almost one cenVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:10 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 60899 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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tury of a strategic U.S. presence in Panama is scheduled to come

to a close. If the schedule remains unchanged, by the end of the

year the United States will hand off the Panama Canal to Panamanian authorities and will completely withdraw all military forces.

The ramifications of this, as it relates to our ability to effectively

fight the war on drugs and in relation to general security and stability in the region, are troubling. For years Panama has been at

the heart of our drug interdiction efforts in the hemisphere. U.S.

bases in Panama have provided secure staging for detection, monitoring, and intelligence collecting and have provided critical support to our Latin American neighbors through aerial reconnaissance and counternarcotics training.

The administration’s response to the withdrawal of the military

from Panama has been to negotiate agreements for three forward

operating locations, FOL’s, in the region, with another one possibly

to follow. While current events make the FOL concept a necessity,

I have serious doubts. Among them is the cost of improving and updating infrastructure at the FOL’s, which is estimated to be several

hundred million dollars, money that has already been invested in

Panama. In addition, the negotiated agreements for FOL’s are

short-term agreements. Long-term agreements may be more difficult to secure.

I find it difficult to give up on U.S. military assets so strategically positioned. I do not understand why, as State Department officials have recently affirmed, the administration has not raised the

issue of a continued U.S. troop presence with the Panamanian

President-elect. She herself is on record as willing to negotiate

some type of continued U.S. military presence.

I am also concerned that we are leaving Panama without the

ability to defend itself from certain destabilizing threats, such as

incursions by Colombian guerrillas, narcotraffickers, and paramilitary forces.

Less tangible, but no less important, is the fact that our presence

in Panama represents America’s strong commitment to cooperative

security in the region. It also serves to reassure investors, and provides a visible deterrent to those in the hemisphere who would

threaten U.S. interests.

Now to Colombia. Nowhere has this administration’s failure to

consistently engage the hemisphere more apparent than in Colombia. Few seem to be taking notice that the situation there continues to deteriorate. Despite President Pastrana’s well-intentioned efforts at resolving the decades old conflict, the number of casualties

of both combatants and civilians continues to rise. More than

38,000 Colombians have been killed in 30-plus years of conflict, and

according to the Department of State, more than 300,000 people

were internally displaced last year alone. The administration’s policy of neglect has contributed to the balkanization of Colombia.

While the Pastrana Government continues to make concessions

to the guerrillas, including ceding them control over large tracts of

land in southern Colombia, the guerrillas have only increased their

efforts to undermine peace and stability. Most recently members of

the National Liberation Army, ELN, Colombia’s second largest

guerrilla group, hijacked a domestic flight with 41 people on board.

This was followed by the kidnapping of more than 140 innocent ciVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:10 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 60899 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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vilians from a church in Cali, Colombia. While many of the hostages have since been freed, these shocking occurrences serve to

further undermine the rule of law and erode any sense of stability

that remains. This obviously cannot be allowed to continue.

We know from General Serrano of the Colombian National Police, the guerrillas have tapped into the vast resources of the illicit

drug industry. Estimates of guerrilla income from the drug trade

reach as high as $1.5 billion. The result is a well-funded and wellarmed guerrilla movement with little incentive to compromise

against an underfunded and undermanned Colombian military.

As we have seen, the conflict in Colombia also threatens peace

and stability in neighboring countries. President Chavez of Venezuela has had to move troops to its western border with Colombia

as a result. Recent reports indicate that increased fighting in

northeast Colombia between paramilitaries and guerrillas has

forced hundreds of innocent civilians across the border into Venezuela. Just over a week ago, 600 Colombian civilians from the region petitioned the Venezuelan Government for refuge.

The conflict is also spilling over the border into Panama with

greater frequency. Reports indicate that FARC guerrillas move

freely across the border and have the citizens there vacating in

their wake. This is understandable considering that Panama does

not have a standing army to defend itself.

So, as we can clearly see, there are serious security issues which

must be addressed immediately in the hemisphere.

With this said, General Wilhelm, I look forward to your remarks

this morning and then engaging in an important session of questions and answers. Thank you again for appearing before the committee today.

[The following opening statement of Senator Biden was submitted for inclusion in the record.]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. General Wilhelm, welcome. Before we start, I have to tell you that I don’t envy you. The good news is that Latin

America is becoming an increasingly important economic partner for the United

States and the majority of the region continues to work to solidify democratic political systems and the open civic institutions necessary to support democracy. The bad

news is that illegal narcotics organizations continue to become more diversified and

agile. The plague of violence and corruption that these organizations bring with

them continues to spread throughout the region.

I am very interested, General, in hearing more about the Administration’s plans

to replace the counterdrug and other capabilities once maintained in Panama and

your views of the current situation in Colombia. I also hope you will let us know

what sort of resources you need to do your missions, particularly regarding the illegal narcotics threat.

On the subject of replacing the capabilities we are losing in Panama, I have more

questions than answers General Wilhelm. I’ve been a student of illegal narcotics for

most of my career here in the Senate. I know that the traffickers adapt to our tactics fairly quickly, so I am interested in hearing how you and the Administration

are incorporating the military’s new focus on flexible, expeditionary forces into the

new operational architecture that must be created with the loss of Panamanian facilities.

While we are losing a significant capability, we also have an opportunity to really

re-think our tactics in Latin America and the Caribbean. I hope that you will be

able to go through some of that thought process with us today to explain how the

Administration arrived at the current plan for new Forward Operating Locations

and why this makes operational sense. I also hope you will share with us your

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thoughts on how significant an operational hindrance it will be if Venezuela continues to deny the use of its airspace for counterdrug missions.

On the subject of Colombia, I don’t think there are any easy answers. The security

challenges confronting President Pastrana and the people of Colombia are monumental. The guerrilla forces of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, or

FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN, control the eastern lowlands and

southeastern jungles of Colombia. Paramilitary groups have significant control and

free reign in the northern and central parts of Colombia. These groups operate outside the law and threaten everyone—the people of Colombia, the people and governments of the region, and, tragically, foreign visitors.

Efforts by Colombian military units to confront these groups are often tainted by

the lawlessness behavior of some of those units. While the military is beginning to

clean-up its human rights record, they have only just begun.

For the people of the United States and the world, those challenges remain a significant security threat because Colombian traffickers are still responsible for most

of the world’s cocaine production and wholesale distribution. The Colombian traffickers are also major suppliers of heroin and marijuana. The dominance of Colombian traffickers in heroin supply is new this past decade. It is a sobering reminder

that traffickers will adapt and take advantage of any laxity.

In Colombia, the traffickers have a unique advantage because of their links to

rebel and paramilitary groups. The ability of illegal narcotics organizations to use

both guerrilla and paramilitary groups for security gives them tremendous flexibility and reach. The mutual dependence that is created by the need of both paramilitary and guerrilla groups for funding is extremely dangerous. The money generated by illegal narcotics is sustaining various lawless groups in Colombia and poisoning democratic institutions.

So, for Colombia and her allies, the challenge is not merely to disband violent,

well-funded, and lawless organizations. The real challenge is to create democratic

Colombian institutions that are Colombia feel safe.

I am not sure President Pastrana’s initiatives and the risks he is taking will lead

to peace. In fact, I am concerned that some of the initiatives aimed at peace may,

in the short-term, undermine our counter narcotics efforts. But, I support President

Pastrana because I am absolutely sure that peace has never been created without

a willingness to take risks.

I was extremely pleased to hear that official talks between the government and

the FARC guerrillas will begin on July 4th. In the long-term, we will never win the

war on drugs if there is no peace in Colombia.

In sum, as I said in the beginning General, I do not envy you the challenges you

face. Illegal narcotics organizations do not provide easy and obvious targets. They

are much more difficult to fight than an opposing military force because they are

so interwoven with the emerging institutions and economies of the region. I look forward to hearing your thoughts regarding our strategy and the resources you need

for defeating these threats.

Senator COVERDELL. I now turn to you, General Wilhelm.

STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES E. WILHELM, COMMANDER IN

CHIEF, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND, MIAMI, FL

General WILHELM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Coverdell, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before

the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, and we appreciate your

interest and the interest of the members of the subcommittee in

United States Southern Command and in its area of responsibility.

Beyond that, sir, I wanted to tell you that we very much appreciate your personal interest in the region which became so apparent to us when, right on the heels of the last rainstorm from Hurricane Mitch, you appeared in Central America. That was a tremendous morale shot in the arm to our folks, and it really let them

know that the Congress is aware of what they are doing and the

conditions that they are doing it under. So, sir, from all of them

and from me, thank you very much.

Senator COVERDELL. I appreciate your acknowledging that.

5

General WILHELM. Sir, in your letter of 20 May you were very

explicit about the subjects that you wanted to address at this hearing, and you mentioned that you wanted to discuss our drug interdiction capabilities and certain other threats and that you wanted

to examine them in light of the upcoming withdrawal of our forces

from Panama, as you discussed in your opening remarks, and specifically the closing of Howard Air Force Base.

Sir, rather than to go through the customary opening statement,

which is normally very general, I thought this morning I might ask

your indulgence for another approach. Really what we are talking

about is geography, and we are talking about resetting the United

States Southern Command theater architecture for the next century. So, I brought some charts, sir, and if you do not mind, I

thought I might suggest that we begin this hearing by my providing you and up-to-the-minute report on precisely where we are,

what progress we have made in setting this new architecture in

place. Will that be OK, Senator?

Senator COVERDELL. That is absolutely fine. Thank you.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir. Senator, I think the best way to do

this is to simply walk from north to south down the map through

the region, and I will provide an update concerning each key note

of our relocation and repositioning plan for the theater.

I will start, sir, right at our home base, the headquarters in

Miami, Florida. As you know, the command officially moved to

Miami on the 28th of September 1997, and that move was made

after extensive deliberations about the best next site for Southern

Command headquarters as it departed its previous home at Quarry

Heights in Panama. Miami was selected from 126 sites and 26 cities. Sir, at this point, we now have about 20 months’ experience operating on the ground in Miami, and I would just like to reaffirm

this morning the wisdom of the decision to position the headquarters in Miami. In my judgment, sir, we are in the right strategic location to do the business that Southern Command must do

during the next century. And, sir, I would be glad to expand on the

reasons for that opinion during the question and answer period, if

you would like.

Senator COVERDELL. Very good.

General WILHELM. Sir, moving about 150 miles south of Miami

down to Key West, as I know you are aware, prior to the emergence of the requirement to relocate all of our forces from Panama,

we had intended to maintain Joint Interagency Task Force South

as our organization in Panama, really the central element around

which we intended to build the United States component of the

multinational counterdrug center. That element would have continued to plan and oversee our counterdrug operations in the source

zone.

When the negotiations with Panama were closed, we had to

think our way through a new approach. The new approach has

been to relocate Joint Interagency Task Force South to Key West

where we have merged it with Joint Interagency Task Force East,

which previously planned and supervised the execution of our

counterdrug operations in the transit zone. So, now we have a single Joint Interagency Task Force that plans and oversees the exeVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:10 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 60899 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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cution of counterdrug operations all the way from the Florida

Straits to the Southern Cone.

This was achieved with some savings. The numbers of Department of Defense and Coast Guard people required to man two independent joint interagency task forces was 378. The merged organization operates with 279. We previously had a requirement for 31

interagency representatives, Department of Transportation, Department of Justice, Customs. Under the new organization, we will

up that by 3 to 36.

We have not achieved full manning, but we are convinced that

with the thoughtful use of the information technologies that are

available to us, we will be able to assemble a single organization

that will be able to look from north to south and execute from

south to north. The attraction of a single task force of unity of command: we will have eliminated that line between the source and

transit zone, one of the seams which we tend to be attacked along.

So, we think there are some efficiencies of scale to be realized in

this, and if the architecture for command and control comes together in the way that we would like, it may well be a more efficient organization than the two that we had before.

Sir, moving over to the southeast, I would like to comment on the

forces that will be moving to Puerto Rico. As a very general statement, I think it is correct to observe that Puerto Rico will now assume the role that Panama has for Southern Command for about

the last 50 years. Puerto Rico will really become the hub for our

operations in both the source and the transit zone.

The first organization that I would like to discuss is U.S. Army

South. U.S. Army South at this moment is in the process of moving

from its previous home at Fort Clayton to Fort Buchanan in Puerto

Rico. The organization that existed in Panama had 3,860 members.

The new organization at Fort Buchanan will be 1,382. Now, that

is a substantial decrease in the number of active component personnel in the Army component command headquarters. We hope to

compensate for the reduction in numbers by forging a very close relationship between our active component planners at the headquarters with the 16,000 Army and Air Force Guardsmen and Reservists on Puerto Rico, all of whom are bilingual, so they have

equal applications and will be equally effective whether they are

operating in the eastern Caribbean or in Latin America.

The second organization that has located to Puerto Rico is the

Special Operations Command South, our special operations component. Our previous strength in Panama was about 353 people on

the ground. We have about 297 now occupying facilities at the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station. The command actually completed the

move. They are operating out of tents there right now because permanent facilities are not yet groomed for them, but I instructed

them that they must accomplish the move and that we could accept

no interruption to the operating tempo or the flow of deployments

into the region. They accomplished everything that I asked them

to do, and as I mentioned, sir, they were up and operating on the

1st of June.

I would backtrack and mention as well, sir, that the merged joint

interagency task force was fully operational on the 1st of April and

7

assumed responsibility for the broad area mission for the transit

and the source zones.

The third element in Puerto Rico that I would like to talk about

is our Air Force element. Previously our business in the air was

conducted by the 24th Wing located at Howard Air Force Base in

Panama. We closed the runway at Howard on 1 May, just as we

had forecasted we would have to in order to comply with the provisions of the Panama Canal treaties. We have relocated a small

number of aircraft to Puerto Rico. These are principally our intratheater airlift assets, our C–130’s. We have relocated six air frames

to Puerto Rico. They are now providing inter-theater airlift support

for both U.S. South elements and, perhaps most importantly, for

Special Operations Command South.

Sir, closing out that portion of the Panama equation, I would like

to talk very briefly about some of the modifications that we have

made to the force structure at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. As

I know you are aware, sir—and I know you visited Soto Cano—we

have had a continuous U.S. presence there since 1983. When it became necessary to reset the architecture in the ways that we are

discussing, we took a very careful look at Soto Cano and tried to

come up with the best mix of forces that would, one, be politically

acceptable to the Honduran Government and, two, that would best

fit with the existing structure of Joint Task Force Bravo.

We determined that this would be the best place to move the additional helicopter assets from the first of the 228th Aviation Battalion which has been traditionally aligned with U.S. Army South

in Panama. So, we moved four CH–47 Chinook medium lift aircraft

and we moved four additional Black Hawk helicopters, some in a

utility configuration and some in a medevac configuration, to Soto

Cano. We now have between 18 and 20 helicopters on the ground

there on any given day. So, that has become our rotary wing operating hub for the region.

Sir, I saved really what has emerged as probably the most contentious issue for last, and that is the forward operating locations.

As I mentioned, probably the biggest loss that we confront coming

out of Panama and our bases there are the 8,500 feet of concrete,

the ramps and taxiways, maintenance facilities that have served us

so well, as you pointed out, for a great many years at Howard.

That has been our single base for most of our counterdrug assets.

It supported AWACS operations, P–3 operations, F–16’s, ARL’s,

Customs trackers and Customs domes, Citation 550’s. Just about

everything we have put into the air in the drug struggle has been

based at Howard at one time or another. So, it was a very difficult

proposition coming up with offsetting locations to sustain those operations in the future.

We selected three sites as potential locations for what we termed

forward operating locations, as I have gone to great pains to point

out, throughout the region. These are not U.S. bases. These are

simply access agreements to host country facilities that will enable

us to prosecute the operations of shared interest against

narcotraffickers.

The first sites are at Curacao and Aruba, and in truth, sir, those

are two. There are about 35 miles that separate the two islands.

Those negotiations were undertaken with the Dutch. They were

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successfully concluded during April. An exchange of diplomatic

notes has occurred and we are now today operating from both facilities, as I will show you in just a minute.

The second location that has been successfully negotiated is the

airfield at Manta in Ecuador. Negotiations were successfully concluded and an exchange of diplomatic notes with Ecuador also occurred during April. There we have some refurbishment and repair

to do before we can open the field to unrestricted operations by

U.S. counterdrug aircraft, but we are operating out of there today.

The third FOL will be somewhere in Central America. We looked

initially at Costa Rica. As to whether or not we can successfully negotiate an access agreement with Costa Rica is somewhat problematic, sir. But we do need a third FOL and that third FOL should

be in Central America and it should afford us access to the eastern

Pacific operating areas and movement vectors for narcotics, which

of course is an area that we do need to oppose.

Sir, just a quick thumbnail to show you where we are today because I know there was a lot of justifiable concern in Congress as

to exactly what would happen on 1 May when we put the sawhorses across the end of the runway at Howard Air Force Base.

Well, sir, we are up and operating at the FOL’s and other traditional operating locations in the AOR. Very quickly, we are operating AWACS and tankers out of MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.

We are operating E–2C Hawkeyes and Navy P–3’s out of Roosevelt

Roads in Puerto Rico. We are operating Customs, the double eagle

package, the slicks and the domes, out of Aruba, along with Citation 550 trackers. And in Curacao—I visited there just week before

last—we have five F–16’s on the ground and we have a C–130 variant aircraft with a classified mission there as well. In Manta today

we have just one Navy P–3, but some modifications and refinements have been made to the facility. And I am looking to expanded operations in Manta by the end of the month.

Sir, I will close this out by just very, very quickly giving you a

sketch of the capabilities that these three FOL’s deliver. These arcs

display the ranges. P–3’s here with the small dotted line. AWACS

with the bold dotted line operating out of Aruba and Curacao, and

then we have range arcs that show the P–3 operating range out of

both Manta, Ecuador and Costa Rica. With any one of these FOL’s,

sir, we will have about 65 percent of the coverage that we previously enjoyed from Howard Air Force Base. With two, with Curacao/Aruba and with Manta, we will have about 80 percent of the

reach and operational coverage that we had before, and with all

three, we will have about 110 percent. This arc happens to be inscribed on the Liberia airfield at Costa Rica.

Sir, in a nutshell, that is precisely where we are at this moment,

and I thought that would be as good a point of departure as any

for our dialog today.

[The prepared statement of General Wilhelm follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES E. WILHELM

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to provide you my assessment of counterdrug (CD) efforts in the United

States Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM’s) Area of Responsibility (AOR).

9

SOUTHCOM’s specific role is to provide and coordinate Department of Defense

(DOD) support to Goals Four and Five of the National Drug Control Strategy. All

of our CD efforts are focused on providing this DOD support to the Department of

State, U.S. law enforcement agencies, U.S. Country Teams and our regional partner

nations in order to stem the growth, production, and shipment of illegal drugs to

the United States.

Today, I will provide you with the following: my personal assessment of the region’s overall security and stability; a strategic overview of the regional drug trafficking threat; an overview of our post Panama Theater Architecture; a brief discussion of resource constraints; our CD strategy; country and regional assessments; and

finally my vision of the future.

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE SOUTHCOM AOR

The strategic and economic importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to the

United States continues to grow and cannot be overemphasized. Our growing dependence on oil from the region, which includes Venezuela as our single largest

source of imported fuel—18 percent annually, combined with the region’s growing

dependence on U.S. imports, fully justifies a consistent and balanced engagement

strategy in the region. Latin Americans currently spend 44 cents of every dollar on

imports from the U.S. By 2000 Latin America is expected to buy more U.S. goods

than Europe, and by 2010 more U.S. goods than Europe and Japan combined. These

figures are expected to increase as initiatives of the Free Trade Area of the Americas take root.

For many years most Americans looked south and only saw problems: coups, military dictatorships, communist-inspired insurgencies, and economic crises. Over the

last two decades, the Caribbean and Latin America have embraced democratic governance—of the 32 nations in our theater, all but one are governed by leaders who

serve at the pleasure of the people. The military forces of Latin America are also

contributing to this process by supporting civilian authority and the rule of law.

Human rights are accorded more respect, and in a region where military governments and coups were commonplace, great progress has been made. In fact, the only

non-democratic country within the entire SOUTHCOM AOR is Cuba, a sad remnant

of the Cold War. We remain hopeful that the people of Cuba will eventually enjoy

the personal liberties and increased economic opportunities that are inherent in a

free society with a market economy.

While we are encouraged by these political and economic trends, we are mindful

that many of these democracies are fragile. In a region that fears no external power,

is essentially at peace with itself, and on a per capita basis, spends less on arms

than any other region of the world, transnational threats have emerged as the

greatest dangers to regional stability. There is a growing realization throughout the

region, from the tip of the Southern Cone to the Straits of Florida, that the corrupting influences of drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime are undermining the foundations of democracy and impeding economic development. It is

against these transnational threats, and specifically illicit drug trafficking, that

SOUTHCOM has framed its CD strategy.

THE DRUG THREAT

The entrenched and increasingly diverse illegal drug business continues to demonstrate an ability to meet the world demand, and poses increasingly complex challenges to CD efforts throughout our area of responsibility. Cocaine and heroin continue to be a formidable industry in the Source Zone. Coca is grown almost exclusively in the three Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. It is refined

into finished cocaine Hydrochloride, primarily in Colombia, then transported to the

United States. Colombian poppy fields are a primary source of the opium that is

converted into heroin also destined for the United States. Finally, there are also numerous growing areas in the Caribbean that supply significant amounts of marijuana for U.S. consumption.

Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)

The nature and modus operandi of DTOs are well known. Their primary strategic

strength is their ability to operate with significant financial backing and freedom

of action in the source and transit zones. Nurtured by a constant demand for their

product, these transnational criminal organizations are resilient, dynamic, and

agile. They have transformed and survived through the dissolution of traditional

drug cartel organizations. They have proven over time that they can rapidly adjust

transit routes and modes in response to U.S. and Participating Nation interdiction

efforts.

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Motivated by profit, DTOs are increasingly gaining control over Colombia’s infrastructure, economy, and security apparatus. In some areas, they operate with near

impunity, controlling ports and many of the rural areas of the Andean Ridge. An

integral part of their ‘‘security arrangement’’ involves the cooperation of insurgents.

These insurgent groups, in turn, have become increasingly dependent on drug profits to sustain themselves. As a result, this mutually beneficial relationship has allowed DTOs to realize profit levels that support sustained secure operations in rural

areas—areas that are increasingly encroaching on civilian population centers.

DTOs possess a large amount of capital and resources, which are increasingly invested in legitimate businesses. Their disregard for national sovereignty allows

them to cross national frontiers with impunity and gain unfair advantage over legitimate business enterprises, which further undermines the civil government. However, DTOs are not invulnerable. Inefficiencies caused by an effective CD effort can

drive up the price of illegal drugs to the point where U.S. demand wanes. With the

right amount of effort, the profit from drug trafficking can be reduced to a point

where it becomes a far less profitable and lucrative business.

We know DTOs intend to maximize profits. To that end, they are continuing to

expand cocaine production and export to the United States, Europe, Asia and new

secondary markets in South America. They are also continuing to plant higher yield

varieties of cocaine in the Putamayo and Caqueta growing areas in Colombia and

expand cocaine production within Peru and Bolivia. In the future, DTOs will likely

seek to expand cultivation within the border regions of Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela. DTOs will also attempt to strengthen security alliances with insurgent

groups that undermine regional governments.

THEATER ARCHITECTURE

To sustain our support to on-going CD efforts in the region and to compensate

for our redeployment from Panama, we have worked hard to reset a viable theater

support architecture. Our goal is to continue support to detection, monitoring and

tracking operations as well as sustain the logistics base for regional engagement activities.

Looking at the map of the hemisphere and taking into account SOUTHCOM’s two

primary missions, regional engagement and counterdrug, Howard Air Force Base

has served us well. However, in compliance with our treaty obligations, we will turn

over all facilities to the government of Panama by the end of 1999. We are establishing a theater architecture to support operations into the 21st century.

Puerto Rico will replace Panama as our main operating hub in the theater. The

United States Army South (USARSO) is in the process of relocating its headquarters to Fort Buchanan. Once reestablished, this force of 1,382 active and reserve component soldiers and civilians will undertake the missions previously carried out by a contingent of 3,868 in Panama. To compensate for reduced manning,

USARSO will rely heavily on the more than 16,000 Army and Air Force Guardsmen

and Reservists stationed in Puerto Rico. In a great many ways this is an ideal marriage. Puerto Rican guardsmen and reservists are bilingual, making them equally

effective whether conducting engagement activities with members of English-speaking militaries in the Eastern Caribbean, or with Spanish-speaking counterparts in

Central and South America.

Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) is our most heavily committed

component. Each year the soldiers, sailors and airmen of our theater Special Operations Command conduct nearly 150 deployments into our Area of Responsibility.

SOCSOUTH provides the quick reaction force we need to respond to crises and

other fast-breaking requirements. To perform these demanding missions Special Operations forces must be close to the action and keep a sharp edge on their language

and cultural skills. We are relocating approximately 350 members of SOCSOUTH

to Naval Air Station, Roosevelt Roads. We are also finalizing basing arrangements

for selected command and control and intra-theater airlift assets on Puerto Rico.

Collocation of ground and air forces is imperative for precise planning and rapid

execution of crucial missions.

Another important organization, strategically located, at the Soto Cano Airbase in

Honduras since 1983, is Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo. JTF Bravo is a contingent

of about 500 soldiers and airmen who have for 16 years occupied temporary, expeditionary facilities on the east side of the airfield. Soto Cano has been, and will continue to be, our main hub for operations throughout Central America. To preserve

adequate tactical mobility, some of the 228th Aviation Battalion helicopters formerly

based in Panama will reinforce the limited aviation assets assigned to JTF Bravo.

The superior performance of JTF Bravo during the tragic, early hours of Hurricane

Mitch underlined the importance of this unit’s presence to the people of Honduras.

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The SOUTHCOM Headquarters has now operated in Miami for 20 months. I am

convinced that we are in the right place to implement our engagement and CD

strategies. Miami is widely accepted by the nations of this hemisphere as the de

facto capital of Latin America. With its economic, cultural, academic, transportation,

and consular ties to our area of responsibility, Miami has proven to be the most

credible location in the continental United States from which we can engage the entire region. Relocating from Panama to Miami has supported our mission, and afforded us opportunities to pursue ‘‘smart business’’ practices in providing support

services to the SOUTHCOM military community. Consistent with my desire to nurture and fully support ‘‘smart business’’ and business reform efforts, I believe the

United States Government will be best served by purchasing our headquarters

building and land. An initial review of the development trends in this part of Miami

reveals dramatic increases in the value of real property.

Until its recent deactivation, Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South),

operated from its headquarters at Howard Air Force Base and served as our primary planning and execution agent for CD operations and activities in the source

zone. Our departure from Howard has caused us to redesign our counternarcotics

command and control mechanism. We have merged JIATF-South with its counterpart organization JIATF-East in Key West. Through deliberate integration of communications and information systems we have created a single organization capable

of ‘‘seeing’’ from the Florida Straits into the Andean Ridge. The merged JIATF will

be responsible for planning, coordinating and supervising the execution of detection,

monitoring and tracking and other CD missions in both the source and transit

zones. To achieve a streamlined and cost-effective organization, the SOUTHCOM

Headquarters will assume responsibility for some administrative, logistical and programmatic activities previously performed by both JIATFs.

We have also made significant progress towards establishing Forward Operating

Locations (FOLs) to support the air coverage that Howard Air Force Base formerly

provided. Interim access agreements have been signed with the Government of Ecuador for the use of Manta and with the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the use

of Aruba and Curacao.

On 16 April 1999, Secretary Cohen designated the Department of the Air Force

as Executive Agent for Manta, Ecuador and Aruba/Curacao and the Department of

the Navy as Executive Agent for a future Central American location. We are aggressively moving to establish these FOLs to support on-going air operations. Expeditionary CD operations began in May in Aruba and Curacao and will be expanded

in the coming months. Our focus will be on executing strategic/high payoff operations designed to keep our level of support at the 1997 levels achieved from Howard Air Force Base.

In order to sustain the 1997 level of CD operations, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, through his Drug Enforcement Policy and Support office, submitted a proposed reprogramming action of

$45,000,000 from the DoD Working Capital Fund into the Central Transfer Account

in February of 1999. To meet immediate Post 1999 theater CD architecture requirements I deferred $17,000,000 of current year SOUTHCOM CD requirements, some

of which are Congressional high interest items, and $15,000,000 of Post 1999 architecture requirements. Unless the requested reprogramming action is approved in

the very near future, the full Post 1999 CD architecture will not be in place at the

start of Fiscal Year 2000. Additionally, I will face the challenge of determining

which cuts to make to the theater CD mission in Fiscal Year 2000 to fund these

one-time relocation expenses.

RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

In addition to an effective theater architecture, SOUTHCOM requires sufficient

resources to support the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy.

The U.S. military services have continued to contribute CD detection and monitoring resources to SOUTHCOM in the form of dedicated CD aircraft flying hours and

ship steaming days. The standing Joint Chiefs of Staff CD Execute Order establishes specific requirements. However, while the Air Force and Navy are tasked to

provide a specific number of platforms, higher priority contingencies, maintenance

requirements, and exercises have prevented consistent and full allocation of these

platforms to SOUTHCOM. Over the past years, we have lost some capabilities. For

example, a degraded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability

is eroding the effectiveness of our CD efforts. Adequate ISR capabilities are key to

quickly and successfully reacting to drug traffickers’ changes in operational patterns.

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CD requirements place additional demands on low-density/high demand forces. As a result, we are confronted with a large mission and limited resources. In response

to this challenge, we have devised creative approaches that will enable us to effectively and productively carry out our CD responsibilities in a resource-constrained

environment. We have developed a three-part strategy to sustain our CD efforts.

COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY

The key components of the strategy are: (1) promoting effective regional re- sponses, (2) pursuing better coordination and more effective employment of interagency resources, and (3) applying innovative tactics, techniques and procedures.

Regionalizing the Effort

By expanding joint and combined operations, we are moving toward multilateral

and regional responses. For example, through the SOUTHCOM sponsored Caribbean Nations Security Conference and the Association of Caribbean Command Military Chiefs, we are strengthening our relationships with European forces in the region. Subsequently, the contribution of British, Dutch, and French surface and air

assets to multinational CD operations in the Caribbean has resulted in greater operational efficiency and has lifted some of the burden from U.S. forces in the region.

Exercise United CD 98 (UCD 98) is a prime example of how we are supporting

regional initiatives of the Summit of the America’s. Fifteen countries were represented at UCD 98, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela, and the United States. UCD 98 brought together national CD

teams that compiled positive and negative lessons learned from air and maritime

CD operations. The exercise provided an opportunity to evaluate operations, discuss

information sharing, and increase CD cooperation and coordination. In this regard,

the Organization of American States is now a full co-sponsoring partner for this

year’s exercise.

Interagency Involvement

In much the same way that we have sought better and more complete coordination and cooperation with our European and Latin American partners, we are pursuing a better integrated CD effort with the Departments of State, Justice and

Transportation. A Coast Guard Rear Admiral commands the merged Joint Interagency Task Force in Key West, which has 34 designated interagency billets in its

new structure. We have also instituted quarterly coordination meetings between CD

resource sponsors from State, Defense and the Office of National Drug Control and

Policy. In combination, these initiatives are generating a better-managed and more

fully coordinated CD effort.

Innovative Approaches

We have learned that the traffickers study and analyze our operating patterns in

much the same way we study and analyze theirs. Therefore, we have developed innovative ways to maximize the use of our limited resources.

One example of this is the series of ‘‘pulse’’ operations we have conducted in the

Caribbean. The first such operation, ‘‘FRONTIER SHIELD,’’ successfully disrupted

the heavy flow of drugs through Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the

Eastern Caribbean. Anticipating that traffickers would shift their maritime routes

westward through the Central Caribbean, we conducted a follow-on operation,

‘‘FRONTIER LANCE,’’ that targeted routes to and through Hispaniola. A third operation, ‘‘FRONTIER SABER,’’ sequentially targeted transit routes through the Bahamas and the Northern Caribbean.

We are now conducting follow on phases to these operations to stay ahead of the

drug traffickers in the Eastern and Central Caribbean. Additionally, Operation

‘‘COSTA ESMERALDA’’ was recently completed along the Western Caribbean movement vector and Operation ‘‘CAPER FOCUS,’’ designed to disrupt and interdict drug

traffic along the Eastern Pacific movement vector, is underway today.

As a companion to these maritime efforts, we have initiated Operations ‘‘CENTRAL SKIES’’ and ‘‘WEEDEATER.’’ These initiatives involve surge operations by

U.S. aviation assets in support of Central American and Caribbean CD forces. These

operations concentrate our limited helicopter lift assets in specific areas where focused intelligence tells us they will have the greatest effect.

In the Source Zone, we continue to provide Peru and Colombia with night vision

equipment and training, improvements and modifications to their interceptors, as

well as detection and monitoring support. Our focus is to ensure they maintain the

pressure on the long-haul airbridge between Peru and Colombia. It appears that

this route remains essentially disrupted.

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This has forced drug traffickers to shift their air routes over Brazil and increase their reliance on the region’s extensive river systems. Anticipating this shift, we

have embarked on an ambitious five-year program to enhance the riverine interdiction capabilities of Peru and Colombia. In 1998, the first year of the program, Peru

opened a joint riverine training center at Iquitos. Additionally, indigenous riverine

support craft have either been launched or are under construction and a training

and provisioning program is underway that will ultimately result in the fielding of

12 operational Riverine Interdiction Units in Peru. In Colombia, we have supported

improvements to their riverine infrastructure and the formation of seven additional

Riverine Combat Elements. We are optimistic that this type of support will enable

Peru and Colombia to exert greater control over their inland waterways. We are

considering extending the program to other nations in the region.

SOUTHCOM is also assisting Colombia in its efforts to reform and restructure its

Armed Forces, transition the Colombian Army from its defensive mindset, forge a

better union with the National Police, and improve its overall CD capabilities. Colombian leadership is in the process of creating a Counterdrug Joint Intelligence

Center and a Colombian Army Counterdrug Battalion. This battalion is a highly

mobile unit, designed from the ground up to work with the Colombian National Police, other Colombian Army units, or independently, taking the fight to traffickers

in the safe havens of Southeastern Colombia where the majority of cocaine production takes place. SOUTHCOM is working closely with the Colombian Armed Forces

providing them guidance, advice, and training, as they develop these new, important

and very relevant capabilities.

COUNTRY AND REGIONAL ASSESSMENTS

With the exception of Paraguay, which was granted a waiver based on vital interests of the United States, all nations within the AOR have passed the counternarcotics certification process.

Peru and Bolivia

For the second consecutive year, we have observed significant reductions in coca

cultivation, leaf production and base production in both Peru and Bolivia. During

1998, cultivation dropped 26 percent in Peru and 17 percent in Bolivia, while leaf

and base production dropped by roughly 25 percent in both countries. It is clear that

Peru and Bolivia are making steady and significant inroads into cocaine production

and we are assessing equipment and infrastructure development options that will

enable them to sustain or accelerate these positive trends.

Colombia

Colombia is the producer of 75 percent of the world’s cocaine HCl. Lack of government control over nearly 40 percent of the countryside has allowed cocaine cultivation in Colombia to increase by 28 percent in the last year. Colombia’s situation is

especially complex because the sophisticated international narco-criminal organizations cooperate with a mature insurgency and an illegal paramilitary movement. Colombian security forces confront a triangle of violence with themselves on one point,

two well entrenched insurgent groups on another, and brutal paramilitary organizations on the third. Together, these agents of instability and violence threaten not

only the democratic and economic security of Colombia, but provide a sanctuary for

a thriving narco-criminal element. Operating from safe havens in eastern and southern Colombia, they are enlarging their domains into Panama’s Darien Province, as

well as Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru.

We have long recognized that Colombia’s problems are international in their dimensions. The events of the past year have brought that point home to all of the

countries I have mentioned. We are aggressively working with all of the affected nations to encourage unity of effort against a threat they are individually incapable

of defeating.

Despite this dim picture, I believe Colombia is headed in the right direction and

I am cautiously optimistic. While the Government of Colombia seeks a negotiated

settlement with the insurgents, Colombia’s military leaders are purposefully pursuing reform and restructuring initiatives that will make the security forces increasingly competitive on the battlefield.

Venezuela

We have adopted a ‘‘wait and see’’ posture in the aftermath of Hugo Chavez’ landslide victory in Venezuela’s December presidential elections. We have been encouraged by President Chavez’ declaration that he desires closer and broader cooperation with the U.S. on CD matters. It is notable that on several occasions since taking office, President Chavez has pledged ‘‘absolute and total’’ commitment to the reVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:10 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 60899 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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gional CD effort. However, Venezuela has recently denied CD overflight requests.

My staff is conducting an assessment of the impact of this stance by the Venezuelan

Government. A U.S. delegation will visit Venezuela soon to discuss CD cooperation.

It is imperative that we come to closure with Venezuela on CD cooperation, otherwise our efforts throughout the region will suffer in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

Panama

As our forces withdraw in compliance with the treaties, I have concerns about the

ability of local security forces to deal with the security challenges that confront Panama. The Panamanian Public Forces (PPF) are neither organized nor equipped to

deal with incursions by Colombian insurgents into the Darien and San Blas Provinces. The Maritime Service has already expressed reservations about their capabilities to provide for canal security requirements and we have detected recent indications of an upsurge in drug trafficking in and around Panama. It will be necessary to completely reassess our security relationship with Panama as our forces depart. We have voiced strong support for increased security assistance

funding for Panama to enable the maritime service to strengthen its capabilities,

and we are prepared to intensify our engagement with the PPF to assist them in

meeting other emerging security challenges.

Central America

Beyond Panama, the other nations of Central America have become a vital link in hemispheric efforts to stem the flow of drugs. Fueled by concerns over their emergence as transshipment points and increases in internal drug use, over the past

year we have seen the nations of Central America take a more aggressive stance

against narcotics trafficking. Interagency estimates tell us that as much as 59 percent of the cocaine destined for the U.S. travels along the Western Caribbean/Eastern Pacific/Central American movement corridor. We have increased our involvement and engagement with the nations of Central America in the counterdrug

struggle. Through Operation ‘‘CENTRAL SKIES’’ we are providing tactical airlift

support to host nation security and law enforcement elements, enabling them to respond instantly to intelligence cues. Some significant seizures have occurred as a

result of these operations. We have also forged maritime agreements with several

of these countries that have facilitated interdiction efforts in their territorial waters.

Increased cooperation with Central American countries is slowly but steadily increasing the risk to traffickers along a heavily used movement corridor.

Caribbean Basin

The Caribbean serves as the conduit for 30 percent of the cocaine destined for the

United States. Two primary conveyances are used. The first is small aircraft that

depart South America and fly to areas off Puerto Rico, Haiti, Cuba, and the Bahamas where they conduct airdrops to waiting high-speed boats that retrieve the drugs

and bring them ashore. These high-speed boats are the second common conveyance

and are referred to as ‘‘go-fasts.’’ These ‘‘go-fasts’’ conduct open-ocean transits or

skirt the Central American coast to crossing points on the Yucatan Peninsula. As

in Central America, many Caribbean nations have aggressively taken up the fight

against drug traffickers by participating in operations, such as ‘‘WEEDEATER.’’

Even so, the ability of DTOs to selectively exploit the limited security and law enforcement capabilities available to Caribbean nations, and particularly Haiti and the

small island states of the Lesser Antilles, creates a pressing need for U.S. support

and close coordination of regional responses to drug transshipment operations. SOUTHCOM, in partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the De- partment of State, and the U.S. Coast Guard, continues to work to enhance regional

interdiction capabilities by providing host nations with training, infrastructure repair, modernization, and support for maritime operations in support of host nation

CD goals. The Caribbean Support Tender, soon to be deployed with a multinational

crew, will provide Caribbean nations with a mobile training classroom for their

Navy and Coast Guard forces.

CONCLUSION

My vision of the future for this region is succinctly stated in our recently published Theater Strategy:

‘‘A community of democratic, stable and prosperous nations successfully

countering illicit drug activities and other transnational threats; served by

professional, modernized, interoperable security forces that embrace democratic principles, respect human rights, are subordinate to civil authority,

and are capable and supportive of multilateral responses to challenges.’’

15

Printed in Spanish and English, the document containing this statement has been

delivered to every military leader in our area of responsibility. I consider this vision

to be realistic, achievable and affordable.

In SOUTHCOM we do not need armor divisions, carrier battle groups, fighter

wings or Marine Expeditionary Forces. We need modest numbers of the right kinds

of people, with the right skills, doing the right things at the right times and places.

This is an economy of force theater and I have every intention of keeping it that

way. However, cheap does not mean free. Our modest requirements for forces and

resources must be met and the unique needs of this region must be considered. I

have mentioned several areas where levels of support have receded unacceptably

placing the mission at risk. These shortfalls must be addressed and our forces must

be positioned where they will do the most good. I request your continued support

of SOUTHCOM, especially our efforts to create an efficient and effective theater architecture for the next century.

Senator COVERDELL. I appreciate it very much.

General WILHELM. Thank you, sir.

Senator COVERDELL. That was very informative. It does raise a

series of questions, General. If I might begin.

We are going to have to kind of work our way through this.

Going back to my opening statement, apart from the architectural

reconstruction that you have outlined here, would you comment on

the condition of or your view of Panama and its situation without

any presence at all and no standing military in concert with the

other forces that are now so obvious in the area? Your general

overview of that situation beyond security for that immediate area,

beyond the assets that it provided us in terms of the logistics you

described here.

Second, what your general observation is about the Presidentelect’s overture. What is your view that that means?

Let us start with those two, and then we will come back to some

of these technical issues that you have raised here.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir. First, sir, regarding the future security posture of Panama, I certainly believe that there can be no

mistake about it. The United States presence in Panama was really

an essential element in the nation’s security posture for a great

many years and probably even more so in the aftermath of Just

Cause in 1989 when their military forces were disassembled and

were replaced by the Panamanian Public Forces.

At this moment, as we look at Panama, we do see some rather

significant challenges, and you mentioned one of them in your

opening comments. One of the first manifestations that we have

seen of Panama’s inability to protect the sovereignty of its borders

has been the repeated incursions by FARC guerrillas into the

southern Darien Province. You mentioned some of the conditions

that have emerged in municipalities such as La Miel where Panamanians have actually been displaced from their homes by insurgents either seeking safe passage to other parts of Colombia

through Panama or are there for purposes of rest and recuperation.

So, I think that is certainly one source for concern, and the Panamanian Public Forces in my judgment are neither manned,

trained, nor equipped to contend with the kind of threat that the

fronts of the FARC can present on their southern border.

Another concern that has surfaced within Southern Command is

what we perceive to be the beginning of a more vigorous thrust by

narcotraffickers into Panama and into areas in and around the

canal. We conducted Operation Conjuntos, which did enjoy some

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successes in terms of interdicting the flow of narcotics, but by

interdicting it, we confirmed the fact that it is an active movement

vector and that narcotics are moving into Panama and in quantities that we had not seen in recent times.

We have had a dialog with the Panamanian Maritime Service,

their Coast Guard equivalent, and that dialog has centered primarily on the responsibilities that both nations have under the second treaty, the treaty concerning the neutrality of the Panama

Canal, and specifically our shared obligation to ensure right of free

passage and the neutrality of the canal. It was not my program,

but if the information at my disposal is correct, I think the Department of State attempted to get about a half a million dollars in additional funding to help the Maritime Service expand and improve

their capabilities to provide some of the maritime protection for the

canal.

As you would appreciate, sir, we are very mindful, of course, of

our responsibilities under the neutrality treaty, and we know that

we have the obligation to intervene either cooperatively with the

Panamanians or unilaterally if the condition dictates. So, we are

conducting contingency planning to that end.

We also have concerns about the transits of what we refer to as

our high value assets transiting the canal. Previously this was a

relatively simple mission because we had forces on the ground to

provide additional security for these high value transits, and now

we are having to come up with alternative approaches, some of

which involve cooperation with Panamanian security forces.

We have maintained an active dialog with Ambassador Simon

Ferro in Panama.

We look forward, sir, to establishing a new relationship with

Mrs. Moscoso and her administration when she takes office in September and the development of cooperative security arrangements

will be very high on our agenda.

Senator COVERDELL. Well, I take it from what you are saying

that if there was a possibility yet of negotiating not the same presence, because that is obviously impossible here to retrench this architecture—it is so far implemented that it just stands out from

seeing this presentation that we would be going backward if you

tried to rebuild what had been there. But I do take it that you

think it would be valuable for there to be a modern presence associated with the changes that have already occurred in Panama if

the Panamanian Government were to ever agree to that.

General WILHELM. Senator, I think you hit the nail squarely on

the head. Of course, when the negotiations were terminated last

June, we had to make alternative arrangements because of the

prosecution of counternarcotics and other operations must be continuous. So, as you pointed out, yes, we have moved ahead aggressively.

None of that, however, moves Panama or in any way alters its

geographic significance. Truly in every respect, it was the optimum

location to conduct counterdrug operations in the transit zone and

the source zone, eastern Pacific and Caribbean. I would certainly

say that if in the future it were possible to conclude an FOL-like

arrangement with Panama, it might well be in the best interest of

both countries.

17

Senator COVERDELL. Potentially the third, the still illusive third,

FOL would be ideal if it could be established in Panama.

General WILHELM. That would certainly appear to me to be a

possibility, yes, sir.

Senator COVERDELL. It would strike me that this 110 percent figure would be even larger given where you are now if that were one

of the FOL’s in the picture.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir. I really hate to hang my hat too

heavily on that 110 percent figure.

Senator COVERDELL. I understand.

General WILHELM. As you would guess, that causes people to say,

oh, OK, so you got 10 percent excess capacity or excess capability.

So, we will just pare you back a little more.

I do need to put the caveat with that, that if we had every asset

that is currently obligated to us under the JCS execute order under

which we work, we could cover 15 percent of the total area 15 percent of the time. So, that would be 110 percent of a fraction of the

area. So, I do like to make that point very clearly that we are not

seeking an overmatch in capability.

But I would have to do the geometry on that, sir. Part of the expanding coverage we get using Costa Rica is that it is a little bit

further north, so it gives us some eastern Pacific coverage that we

probably would not have out of Panama, but I am not sure that

that would be statistically significant. I would have to scribe the

arcs again to come up with a correct geographic computation of the

coverage we would get.

Senator COVERDELL. Is the assertion that there are very significant costs in the build-out—you acknowledged certain savings that

are occurring in terms of a more productive force, smaller force, but

maintaining the mission. But the material we are looking at suggests considerable sums of money are necessary to make these

FOL’s, the three of them, give you the capacity to achieve this

reach that you are talking about here.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir. There are an awful lot of numbers

that have floated in open source and in various briefings about the

cost of doing the necessary refurbishments to the FOL sites to

make them fully functional. I got a briefing, sir—I believe it was

Thursday or Friday of last week—from Lt. Gen. Lansford Trapp

who is my Air Force component commander, and General Trapp

had just finished doing a pretty rigorous scrub of the requirements

with his staff. What they came up with was a military construction

requirement of about $122.5 million for all three FOL’s.

Having said that, I regard that as being somewhat overpriced because it contained facilities that I do not think are necessary, bachelor officers’ quarters and enlisted quarters, where I believe we

could make use of local hotels at probably a substantial savings

and avoid the recurring maintenance costs.

So, the $122.5 million sounds like a lot of money, but as a practical matter, sir, to operate Howard Air Force Base ran us $75.8

million per year. This would be a one-time cost to create the expeditionary facilities we would need to operate in Curacao, Aruba,

and Manta, those three locations. After that, the annual recurring

cost would be significantly less than the $75.8 million that we

18

spent in Panama. So, I think we need to look at the economics on

a pretty broad scope.

Senator COVERDELL. Would you comment on the developments in

Colombia? I suppose I should ask you to do it specifically as it relates to Panama, but I would like to hear your observations just

in general with regard to developments there of late.

General WILHELM. Senator, I would be pleased to do that.

I run the risk of being a real minority speaker here, but Senator

Coverdell, I am cautiously optimistic about Colombia. I have personally been in and out of Colombia for about 20 years, so I have

had an opportunity to watch the problems grow. I think I have

probably a better than average acquaintance with most of the key

players on the military side.

The reason that I am cautiously optimistic about Colombia is I

think that with the inauguration of President Pastrana on the 7th

of August of last year and with the installation of the new team

that he put in charge of the nation’s defense structure, I think really a first-rate team assumed the reins. They took a loss. No question about it. The leader of the team was Minister of Defense

Rodrigo Lloreda, and when Minister Lloreda stepped down, I think

that was a loss for Colombia. But he left behind people like General Fernando Tapias who is the commander of their armed forces,

General Mora Rangel, the commander of the army; Admiral Garcia,

commander of the navy. These are gentlemen who I have known

for quite some time. It is a solid leadership team. They know their

business. They are professionals. The country has, in fact, published a national strategy to combat the many ills that plague

them. The frequent lament of the military in the past has been the

armed forces are at war, but Colombia is not. And, sir, there was

more than a little bit of truth to what the generals and admirals

were saying. So, I see competent leadership.

I see an aggressive and I think constructive approach to future

defense structure. Minister Lloreda was really the leader of a

movement to overhaul the way the armed forces were organized. As

I know the Congress is aware, for a great many years there has

been a privileged class of soldiers. Those who lost out in the draft

lottery but had a high school degree were categorized as bachelaris,

and by a function of law could not participate in combat operations,

and that was over 30,000 troops. You cannot run an army that

way.

Minister Lloreda’s plan, which has been adopted by General

Tapias and is being carried forward, would place 15,000 additional

combat troops in the field this year, next year, and the following

year. So, that would be 45,000 more trigger pullers off of overpasses in Bogota and out in the southeastern part of the country

where the real battles are to be fought.

As I know you are aware, sir, Southern Command is very heavily

engaged with the Colombian armed forces now in the construction

of a counterdrug battalion. I was down there about 3 weeks ago

and visited the troops in training at Tolemida. Sir, if you would

like, I will get into that in more detail. I will not now in the interest of leaving the floor open for other questions.

So, for all of these reasons, I think I see a tighter national team

forming. I see a country that is beginning to realize that it has

19

problems instead of just a national police force led by an outstanding man like Jose Serrano, and I see better team work between the

Colombian National Police on one hand and the armed forces of Colombia on the other.

This team work I think has been demonstrated fairly recently,

though it did not make front page news in the Miami Herald or

any other newspapers in the United States. In a kind of quiet but

effective way, the armed forces of Colombia boxed the ears of the

FARC on at least three occasions: once in Arauca, once in Uraba,

and once I believe it was in Cordoba, three provinces where they

inflicted what I would call mid-level tactical defeats on the FARC.

And this is on the tail of those 10 very widely publicized major tactical reverses that the armed forces and police suffered at the

hands of the FARC beginning at Las Delicias and extending all the

way up to Mitu. So, sir, that is some of the rationale for the cautious optimism that I feel at this time.

Senator COVERDELL. Well, that is most encouraging, the first encouraging news that I have heard in recent months. I hope your

optimism is borne out. Obviously, moving 45,000 new and, according to you, highly trained people into the field is going to change

the balance, that is a significant force.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir.

Senator COVERDELL. General, the extension of Colombian

narcotrafficking agents has been talked about recently here as it

relates to Cuba. I was curious as to any observation you might

have about any changes or acceleration of activity that intertwines

itself with Cuba.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir. I think probably the one event that

probably spiked interest in this I think it was about a 7 metric ton

seizure, if I remember correctly, that occurred off the north coast

of Colombia, and I think it was determined to be en route to Cuba,

which caused some speculation about where it might go from that

point forward.

Senator, as I know you are very much aware, Cuba has bilateral

conterdrug agreements with 18 nations, obviously not the United

States. I know of no move afoot on our part to establish such relationships.

I really am not aware—and I talk with the Colombians very frequently about this—of any aggressive desires on their part to expand beyond the existing relationships they have with Cuba, which

to the best of my knowledge are primarily information sharing. I

do not know of any tactical cooperation or any ability for their

forces to tactically cooperate. And in fact, Colombia does not really

have the operational reach to get to Cuba, and Cuba does not have

the operational reach to get to Colombia. So, I am personally unaware of any designs that might exist in Bogota to expand that relationship.

Senator COVERDELL. General, if you were about to conclude a career and contemplate doing other things, as you were to leave this

post, what would your general sense be as you walked away, your

reflections about the level of concern because of your unique oversight and knowledge of how we are doing in general in this region,

for which you have had charge? Do you feel better? Are you optimistic as the point you made about Colombia? Do you harbor conVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:10 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 60899 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
20

cerns about the direction? What would be your general demeanor

when you had a cup of coffee with one of your former colleagues

and you were thinking about the future of the United States, this

hemisphere of democracies, a new millennium? What would be the

tone of that meeting?

General WILHELM. Senator, that is a great question that could

lead to a very long answer.

Senator COVERDELL. Take your time.

General WILHELM. I will try to be as concise as I can possibly be.

First, when I assumed command of Southern Command on the

26th of September 1997, I have always felt that I sort of assumed

command of a success story, a team that was in first place in an

international sense. I say that because I looked at the region and

then I thought about the region in the context of the national security strategy and its two principal tenets of engagement and enlargement. Yes, we were engaged, but more important was the

whole subject of enlargement. There I stared at a region consisting

of 32 countries, which is what my operating domain consists of, and

31 of them had functioning democracies with free market economies. It certainly was not that way 20 years ago when most of Central America was embroiled in civil wars. There were either military strongmen or outright Communist dictators who held sway in

most of the nations, and the majority of the people went to bed at

night serving under the rule of someone other than a leader that

they had popularly elected. So, that really is I think kind of an inspiring success story in a lot of ways: 31 out of 32 countries.

And I have made the observation to others because life is a competitive business and I compete with the other four CINC’s for

every resource that I get, but I said, you know, if you want to look

around the world and study your globe for a minute and then

nominate to me a region where we can say our national security

strategy has really worked, I defy you to beat my region. I think

it is a success story.

Sir, I have been doing this for 36 years now and I have come to

reach the conclusion that sometimes we do not handle success as

well as perhaps we ought to. I would like to see us do a bit more

in the region, sir. Having said that, I recognize that there are an

awful lot of claimants for very few resources. We have certainly

seen that in spades in the Balkans. That was a humanitarian outrage that absolutely demanded our attention, but every time you

respond to one of those humanitarian outrages, there are other bill

payers. And again, our region was a bill payer for that.

The principal point that I try to make, sir, is that we really need

to look at Latin America and the Caribbean in a very pragmatic

way and we need to ask ourselves where our future is. And I just

cite a few facts.

Very interesting to me that Chile, a country of 14.5 million people, 14.5 million folks, we do more business with them every year

than we do with India which has 952 million.

Brazil, big country, biggest one we have got, 164 million. We do

more business with Brazil every year than we do with China which

has 1.3 billion.

And the beat goes on and on and on. There are many examples.

I point out that there are 411 million people living in my area of

21

responsibility, and they all have a requirement for imported goods

and services. They do an awful lot of trade among themselves, but

even when they have completed all of that, 44 cents out of every

dollar that they spend on imported goods and services are imported

goods and services from the United States of America.

Then we look at, to me very, very important, demographic

trends. Where is the world and the region going? Right now we are

the fifth largest Spanish speaking country in the world, the United

States. By about 2005, we will be the third largest Spanish speaking country in the world. And since we did the measurement in

1997, we used 2047 as the benchmark year when there will be

100,000,000 people of Hispanic descent in the United States.

My observation is what we have previously referred to as an

American culture will really become a culture of the Americas.

When you see events like the free trade area of the Americas,

which is I hope heading toward a successful implementation in the

year 2005, and when we think about the projections made by

economists that by the year 2010, we will do more business with

our neighbors to the South than we will with all of Europe and

Japan combined, it really points the way I think toward a future

in which the Caribbean and Latin America play a very, very important part for our country.

So, for all of those reasons, I advocate and argue, just as strongly

as I possibly can, for sufficient resources to do the job that needs

to be done in Latin America to sustain these democracies because

many of them are fragile. We know that. They are youthful. They

have got a lot of rough roads to go down. There are many, many

economic problems that confront the region. The near total absence

of a middle class in a lot of the countries troubles me greatly,

though it is not primarily a military matter.

So, sir, I guess you are preparing me for September of the year

2000 when I do have to take this suit off, and I have no earthly

idea what I am going to do with myself. But I think those are a

few of the things that might be going through my mind.

Senator COVERDELL. Well, General, I appreciate the observations

very much. I think that I take some comfort. They are reinforcing

when you take the data that you were referring to, the interaction

between this region and the United States. I only think it underscores what a high priority that ought to suggest to us. I have always felt that we have tended to take too much of its value for

granted.

I think that coming into this new century, for all of us, us and

our neighbors, all these countries you allude to, we probably all

ought to take note of, so to speak, a doctrine of democracy, a criteria of standing democracy, so that our focus is quickly drawn to

any incident or circumstance that destabilizes that doctrine and

that we not let things slide in such a way that there is a retrenchment which is possible. You mentioned the fragility of these governments. When you look at the power of the narcotic base, it is

enough to make you nervous, or me anyway, particularly when it

confronts a small or new and fragile government with all the resources they have to destabilize it.

So, I am hopeful that over the next short period of time that we

might be able to, with the good work of people such as yourself and

22

your team and others, bring more focus, resource to making sure

that we have done everything we know to do to secure these democracies and make them be the overriding component of the next

century versus what we have been dealing with in the past.

I have heard so many facts about the interaction between our

countries here, but you have shared yet some new ones. I need to

get those from you. They are very, very moving.

General, I am going to keep the record open for 5 days for other

Senators so they may pose several particular questions. We may

yet pose several others over the next day or 2 to you, both on and

off the record. So, you might be prepared over the next several days

to have a few more questions that might come from other members

who could not attend here today.

I want to thank you for your willingness, as I said at the outset,

to be here. And I always want to take the opportunity to thank

somebody that has devoted their entire life to the welfare of our

country. You represent so many of your colleagues. So, if you would

first accept the thank you from a citizen and extend it on to the

others who work with you as well, I would be most appreciative.

General WILHELM. Senator Coverdell, that is very kind of you,

and I will certainly pass your words along personally to my people

and I have lots of ways to do that. It is much appreciated, sir.

Senator COVERDELL. Well, thank you for your service and duty.

Thank you.

We are going to move, after the general has gotten his material

here, to expedite the hearing of the nomination of Gwen Clare to

be U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Ecuador.

Thank you, General.

General WILHELM. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Additional Questions Submitted Subsequent to the Hearing

RESPONSES OF GEN. CHARLES E. WILHELM TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JESSE HELMS

PANAMA

#1. SENATOR HELMS. How important have the U.S. military facilities in Panama

been to the overall effort to combat drug trafficking in the region? Has the Department of Defense done any cost comparisons of utilizing military facilities other than

those in Panama to perform the same functions? Please explain their conclusions.

GENERAL WILHELM. U.S. military facilities in Panama have been essential to supporting our overall counterdrug efforts. In addition to providing basing for over

2,000 counterdrug sorties per year, Panama also supported source and transit zone

interdiction operations, pierside boardings and searches, and hosted training facilities for U.S. and host nation counterdrug units. Since 1995, missions flown from

Panama supported host nation counterdrug operations resulting in the shootdown,

forcedown, and/or destruction of 123 narcotrafficking aircraft.

We studied several alternatives for replacing our Panamanian airfield facilities

with emphasis on sustaining our level of counterdrug effort at a reasonable cost. We

considered existing U.S. military bases, specifically MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;

Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; and Naval Station Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba. These alternatives were inadequate because they reduced total Detection and

Monitoring (D&M) coverage to fifty percent of that previously provided from Howard

Air Force Base.

To maintain an operational counternarcotics reach into the Source and Transit

Zones, we require a network of Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), covering three

areas: the Caribbean, South America, and Central America. This geographic covVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:10 Dec 07, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 60899 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
23

erage allows U.S. Southern Command to continue supporting the National Drug

Control Strategy effectively but at a reduced cost. The cost of enhancing and operating three FOLs for 10 years is 40 percent of the cost required to operate Howard

Air Force Base for the same period.

FOLs provide an effective and efficient alternative to maintain our presence in the

region for counterdrug operations.

#2. SENATOR HELMS. Is there any doubt in your mind that you could carry out

your anti-drug mission better and easier if we were able to keep U.S. troops in Panama?

GENERAL WILHELM. Keeping U.S. troops in Panama is not critical to the success

of our counterdrug mission. Panamanian facilities and its geographic advantage provided an optimum location to support aircraft conducting counterdrug missions in

Central America, South America, the Eastern Pacific, and the Caribbean. To compensate for the loss of Panamanian facilities, we developed and implemented an option to replicate our counterdrug Detection and Monitoring (D&M) efforts, at a reduced cost.

Using a network of Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in three regions—the

Caribbean, South America, and Central America—we can sustain counterdrug D&M

coverage, without the troop presence, base infrastructure, and costs associated with

Howard Air Force Base. We are currently conducting counterdrug operations from

a Caribbean FOL (Aruba/Curacao) and a South American FOL (Manta, Ecuador).

Improvements to runways, taxiways, ramps and other support facilities are needed

in order for these sites to meet fully our operational and safety requirements. When

these improvements have been made, our D&M coverage will be approximately

eighty percent of that previously provided from Howard Air Force Base. Once we

begin operations from a Central American FOL, our overall D&M coverage will increase to approximately 110 percent of that provided from Panama.

#3. SENATOR HELMS. After we turn over the Panama Canal, this country retains

a treaty obligation to help preserve the neutrality and stable operation of the canal.

Is there any doubt in your mind that you could do that job better and easier if we

were able to keep U.S. troops in Panama?

GENERAL WILHELM. Southern Command can fully support its treaty obligations

with the new theater architecture, continued engagement, exercises, and contingency plans. For future negotiations, I would support a Forward Operations site in

Panama, with a reduced presence, to maintain operational flexibility and reach

within the theater.

#4. SENATOR HELMS. What is your assessment of Panama’s planning for reverted

military facilities? Since the return to democratic rule in 1989, what has been Panama’s record in utilizing land, buildings, and other facilities that have been transferred back to Panamanian control?

GENERAL WILHELM. The Secretary of Defense approved SOUTHCOM’s Panama

Canal Treaty Implementation Plan on 3 February 1992. At this point we have returned approximately 90 percent of lands and 65 percent of facilities to the Government of Panama. I defer comments on Panama’s reutilization of reverted facilities

to the United States Ambassador to Panama.

#5. SENATOR HELMS. When we speak of keeping U.S. troops in Panama, many

think of a U.S.-run ‘‘base.’’ But could you explain how we might fashion an access

agreement that allows us to deploy troops there using facilities jointly operated with

the Panamanians?

GENERAL WILHELM. We have already executed a majority of the actions necessary

for all U.S. forces to leave Panama prior to noon on 31 December 1999. Southern

Command headquarters is established in Miami; Howard Air Force Base has ceased

air operations; our two Joint Interagency Task Forces have merged in Key West;

the Special Operations Command South has relocated to Naval Station Roosevelt

Roads, Puerto Rico; and U.S. Army South stood up operations at Fort Buchanan,

Puerto Rico on 31 July 1999. All transition actions are in motion, and in my opinion,

irreversible.

We are currently completing the final critical step of resetting the theater architecture—the establishment of Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Manta, Ecuador; Aruba and Curacao; and a yet-to-be determined Central American location in

support of Department of Defense and Interagency counterdrug air operations.

A similar access agreement for Panama might be a subject for discussion if raised

by the new Panamanian government after it assumes office in September.

24

FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS (FOLS)

#6. SENATOR HELMS. You have seen the estimated costs of operating the ‘‘forward operating locations’’ in Peru, Aruba, and Ecuador. Is it cost-effective to build secondrate facilities elsewhere when the U.S. taxpayer has already paid for first-rate facilities in Panama?

GENERAL WILHELM. We are resetting the theater architecture to accomplish our theater engagement and counterdrug missions. The new architecture includes the

capability to maintain Detection and Monitoring (D&M) coverage from FOLs in

three regions: the Caribbean, South America, and Central America. A network of FOLs allows us to sustain our counterdrug D&M footprint effectively and efficiently. By investing in moderate improvements to host nation airfields and

operating facilities, we will mitigate risks and create a safe operating environment

for our deployed forces.

To accomplish our missions, and meet requisite safety and operational standards,

the military construction requirement at our two operational FOLs will be $122.47

million. After adding this investment to an estimated ten-year FOL operating cost,

the total FOL option will require only 40 percent of the funds needed to operate

Howard Air Force Base for the same period with deployed forces. From an operational and safety standpoint, these will not be second-rate facilities.

#7. SENATOR HELMS. We understand that you have described the ‘‘forward operating locations’’ (FOLs) as ‘‘expeditionary’’ facilities—meaning that the U.S. deployments will be small and brief (and perhaps) not even military. In light of our longterm struggle against drugs and our permanent security obligations in this Hemisphere, could these FOLs ever fill the void of losing access to Panama?

GENERAL WILHELM. FOLs in Curacao/Aruba; Manta, Ecuador, and a future Central American (CENTAM) location will meet and, in most cases, exceed the capabilities provided from Panama. Manta provides better deep source zone (SZ) and Eastern Pacific transit zone (TZ) coverage. Curacao/Aruba provides for both SZ and TZ

coverage. A CENTAM location will provide TZ coverage in both the Eastern Pacific

and Western Caribbean. FOLs will provide more geographic coverage, longer station

times in key areas, and greater flexibility in positioning assets.

When compared with area coverage provided by Howard Air Force Base, one FOL

(Manta or Curacao/Aruba) provides approximately 65 percent area coverage; two

FOLs (Manta & Curacao/Aruba) provide approximately 80 percent area coverage;

and three FOLs (Manta, Curacao/Aruba, and CENTAM) will provide approximately

110 percent area coverage.

TENDING TO THREATS AND ENGAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS WITHOUT FORWARD

DEPLOYMENT

#8. SENATOR HELMS. One of your jobs is to tend to the security threats in the

Western Hemisphere. Is there any doubt in your mind that you could do your job

better by keeping troops in Panama (particularly because after we withdraw from

Panama, the only sizable deployment under your command outside the continental

United States will be in Puerto Rico)?

GENERAL WILHELM. The closure of Howard Air Force Base and Rodman Naval

Station coupled with the relocation and reduction of Southern Command component

forces has challenged our ability to react quickly to events in the southern and western reaches of our Area of Responsibility (AOR). Southern Command’s restructured

theater architecture will allow us to continue to conduct regional engagement and

support to counterdrug operations from bases in Puerto Rico, the Continental

United States, and forward operating locations in the AOR.

Southern Command has been evaluating and revising theater contingency and

functional plans to accommodate the loss of U.S. basing in Panama, and adjusting

to the downsizing and relocation of our components to Puerto Rico and the Continental United States.

COLOMBIA

#9. SENATOR HELMS. Critics of our ‘‘war on drugs’’ have criticized policies that

they say, ‘‘militarize’’ our anti-drug efforts. In Colombia, we have seen what happens

when the other side, the narcotraffickers, militarize their operations by allying with

the guerrillas. Under that circumstance, is there any substitute for the military

playing a key role in confronting the narco-guerrilla threat?

GENERAL WILHELM. Under current conditions, I see no viable substitute for Colombian military involvement in countering the intertwined narcotics trafficking

and insurgent threats in Colombia. Even though the Colombian National Police

(CNP) charter requires them to take the lead in addressing the counterdrug effort,

25

current circumstances justify aggressive engagement and support by Colombian

armed forces in counterdrug operations. The Colombian military plays a key role by

providing security during CNP counterdrug operations.

Recognizing a need for specially trained and equipped forces, the Colombian government has recently demonstrated its commitment to improve military support to

counterdrug operations. The development and fielding of a dedicated Army counternarcotics battalion reflects this commitment. This highly mobile organization, designed from the ground up to work with the CNP, is focused on supporting CNP

counterdrug law enforcement activities in remote areas. The airlift and security provided by the military allows the CNP to ‘‘get to the fight,’’ in the jungles, in the

insurgent-controlled safe-havens, where the majority of cocaine production takes

place.

This is a big step. I am encouraged by Colombia’s commitment to provide their

National Police with the mobility and firepower needed to minimize operational

risks and maximize opportunities for success during counterdrug law enforcement

operations. The CNP and military, when used together, offer Colombia the best option for countering their growing narcoguerrilla threat. The U.S. can bolster this

joint team by providing increased support to the Colombian Armed Forces while

maintaining its current level of support to the Colombian National Police.

#10. SENATOR HELMS. Please describe the U.S. military support being provided to

the Colombian armies ‘‘counter narcotics battalion.’’ How much does this operation

cost? What kind of equipment is being donated? What additional forms of support

are being considered for this battalion?

GENERAL WILHELM. U.S. military training and material support is being provided

for the Colombian Army Counterdrug Battalion. Battalion Training is being conducted in phases by Special Operations Forces from the 7th Special Forces Group.

Phase One training, April through June 1999, included basic instruction for the battalion staff, one line company, the reconnaissance platoon, the medical platoon, and

the mortar platoon. Phase Two training, July through September 1999, will include

the remaining two line companies and the rest of the battalion combat support and

combat service support personnel. Finally, Phase Three training is scheduled for October through December 1999 and will include company and battalion level collective training. All branches of the Colombian military and national police will participate in field exercises during Phase Three. The total cost of training is approximately $3.9 million.

Material support provided to the battalion comes from two sources. The Office of

the Department of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (DEP&S)

funds material support of $3.5 million. Equipment provided includes uniform items,

field gear, medical equipment, and communications equipment. Section 506 Drawdown equipment for Fiscal Year 1998 will be directed by the Colombian Military

Group Commander as supplement for the battalion.

Additional uniform items, field gear, communications equipment, Meals Ready-toEat (MREs), and ten 5-Ton trucks were among the items requested. Drawdown material requests total $1.2 million.

In all, the training and material support is approximately $8.6 million. This allows an independent, skilled, self-sufficient, and technologically smart counterdrug

battalion to enter the jungles of Colombia and, with intelligence support from the

Joint Intelligence Center, wage a winning counternarcotics war against

narcotraffickers in Colombia.

#11. SENATOR HELMS. You know the Colombian army and its leadership better

than anyone else in our government. What steps have they taken to become more

effective and to improve their human rights record?

GENERAL WILHELM. I dedicate a great deal of my time as Commander in Chief

to dealing with issues concerning Colombia. Human rights is at the top of the list.

Imbedding the ethic of human rights in our counterpart security forces is and will

remain a key element of our strategy in Latin America. I emphasized this commitment to the previous Minister of Defense Lloreda, the current Armed Forces Commander, General Tapias, and the Commander of the Army, General Mora, and I see

encouraging improvements in the attitudes and actions of Colombian Armed Forces

with respect to human rights under the leadership of these officers. Allow me to discuss areas where I consider the Colombians to have made substantial progress.

Overall human rights performance: Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) regularly

monitors statistics on human rights violations in Colombia. The Department of

State (DoS) provides this data. In their 1998 annual human rights report, DoS reported the Colombian security forces were responsible for three percent of the

extrajudicial killings where the perpetrator could be credibly identified. While no

number is acceptable here except zero, this does represent substantial progress.

26

Military officers prosecuted for human rights violations: Past attitudes on the impunity of high level officers are changing for the better. In the last three months,

three general officers have been suspended from duty on suspicion of involvement

in human rights violations. One of them was subsequently arrested, which I believe

sends a strong signal to the rest of the armed forces that the impunity which military officers have traditionally enjoyed has ended.

Commitment to Human Rights Training: General Tapias and General Mora continue to work with SOUTHCOM to expand the Colombian military’s human rights

training program. SOUTHCOM developed a human rights/law of war handbook

jointly with the Colombians and the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC). This important handbook incorporates international human rights and

international humanitarian law standards and will simply and effectively convey

the basic code of conduct and international human rights standards to Colombian

military personnel of all services.

Severing ties with irregular armed groups ‘‘paramilitaries:’’ Colombian military

leaders have ceased collaboration with the paramilitaries and are now pursuing

them as enemies of the state. General Tapias reported the Colombian Armed Forces

apprehended over 400 paramilitary members in 1998. The military makes it clear

that paramilitaries are not their partners.

Military justice reform: SOUTHCOM is working with the Colombian military to

establish a Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps in the Colombian Armed Forces.

This JAG Corps will guide essential institutional reforms and ensure human rights

violators in the Armed Forces are investigated and prosecuted when allegations are

substantiated. We are in the early stages of developing this program.

Other actions in progress: Other developments which represent measurable

progress towards improving Armed Forces support of human rights in Colombia include disbanding the 20th Intel Brigade, cooperation on the End-Use Monitoring

Agreement, willingness of the Armed Forces to comply with the Leahy legislation

certification requirements, participation in hemispheric human rights conferences,

and military subordination to the civilian control by the Pastrana administration.

This subordination includes providing support to the peace process. While challenges remain, Colombian military support of human rights programs is on the right

track, and their leadership is committed to making the fundamental changes required.

#12. SENATOR HELMS. If the guerrillas can count on endless financing from the

drug traffickers and the army is incapable of defeating them as, a military force,

what incentive is there for the guerrillas to reach a peaceful settlement?

GENERAL WILHELM. As I see it, for as along as the insurgents and paramilitaries

have access to financing provided by drug traffickers, and security forces remain

non-competitive on the battlefield, there will be little if any incentive for the insurgents to engage in meaningful negotiations leading to settlement of Colombia’s four

decade of internal conflict.

In my judgement the success of President Pastrana’s peace process is inextricably

linked to the battlefield performance of Colombia’s security forces. I am firmly convinced that it is within the capabilities of the security forces to meet this challenge.

The much improved performance of the armed forces and national police during

July’s countrywide insurgent offensive and reform initiatives currently underway

within the armed forces provide reason for cautious optimism.

This question is closely linked to question #14. For specifics concerning the points

raised above, please see my answer to that query.

#13. SENATOR HELMS. What if President Pastrana’s peace initiative fails and he

is forced to ask the United States for increased military support, including money

and equipment for his Army? Are we prepared to tell him ‘‘no,’’ even if doing so

means the war in Colombia will spiral out of the control?

GENERAL WILHELM. President Pastrana’s peace initiatives support a larger plan

to end the ills and violence that plague Colombia. Should the peace process not

achieve the Government’s objectives, I do not foresee the situation in Colombia spiraling out of control.

The Colombian Government’s establishment of a demilitarized zone and demonstrated commitment to upcoming peace talks has not mitigated the internal bloodshed. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have become increasingly aggressive in recent months, conducting highly publicized kidnappings and initiating clashes with Colombian security

forces. There have been over 50 such incidents during the last 90 days, highlighted

by the Avianca airliner hijacking and the abduction of churchgoers in Cali.

The situation in Colombia is threatening long-term regional stability, peace, and

economic prosperity. Additional U.S. government support to Colombia in the form

27

of increased detection and monitoring, information sharing, equipment and training

must remain an option. Raising the level of support for the Colombian military

equal to that of the Colombian National Police will help strengthen the Colombian

Government’s position at the negotiating table and improve their ability to achieve

success in the peace process and reverse current trends.

#14. SENATOR HELMS. What sort of impact does the Colombian conflict have on

neighboring countries. We understand that Peru and Venezuela have been concerned enough to deploy additional troops on their borders with Colombia and that

Panama is practically defenseless against Colombian guerrillas operating in its territory. What can we do to address this threat to regional security?

GENERAL WILHELM. Your question cuts to the heart of an issue that I have pursued continuously since coming to Southern Command. The problems that confront

Colombia cannot be viewed in isolation. In one way or another and to varying degrees or extents, the problems that plague Colombia plague each of its five neighbors. Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Brazil have all been affected by the

Colombian crisis, and I believe those affects are increasing in their severity. As you mention, both Peru and Venezuela have deployed forces along their bor- ders with Colombia to prevent or limit intrusions by insurgents, narcotraffickers

and paramilitaries. In the case of Venezuela, I have personally visited the majority

of their outposts. On any given day, Venezuela has approximately 10,000 troops

along the Colombian frontier. The cessation of hostilities between Peru and Ecuador

and implementation of the peace accords has freed troops from both nations for commitment on their borders with Colombia. Thus far, Peru has initiated the strongest

response. The continuing economic crisis in Ecuador has limited President Mahuad’s

options; however, the border is a source of deep concern to the Ecuadorian military.

Brazil long asserted that it was exempt from the drug problem. Incursions by insurgents and narcotraffickers into the coveted Amazon region have caused Brasilia to

rethink its position. Brazil has reinforced its northwestern garrisons and during the

past year has initiated focused military operations to protect its sovereignty. Panama’s position is a difficult one. The disbanding of its military forces following Operation Just Cause has left the country with only police forces. The Panamanian Public Forces are neither manned, trained, nor equipped to deal with the FARC formations that have made repeated incursions into the southern Darien province.

We have emphasized to all of the militaries in the region that this is a regional threat that can only be effectively countered by a regional response. We have encouraged cooperation at the tactical level among the forces positioned along the borders. We have enjoined the armed forces to vigorously pursue information and intelligence sharing initiatives, and we have provided assistance within our capabilities

to develop pathways for these exchanges. Counterdrug operations provide additional

opportunities for regional cooperation. The host nation rider program is but one of

many examples. Through our exercise program we provide forums where military

and civilians leaders can come together to explore ways and means to combat these

share threats.

When all is said and done, the decisive battle must be waged and won within Co- lombia. Based on our experiences elsewhere in Latin America, I am convinced that

the solutions to Colombia’s problems, which are now the problems of the region, lie

in depriving the FARC and ELN of the revenues they receive from narcotraffickers

and in achieving and negotiated settlement to the four decades old insurgency. To

achieve these goals the armed forces must improve their battlefield performance.

The string of tactical defeats suffered by the security forces at the hands of the

FARC over the past two years have created a situation whereby the FARC have little incentive to engage in meaningful or substantive negotiations. To improve their

combat capabilities, the Colombian armed forces need help that only the United

States can or will provide. During the Samper administration we continued to provide assistance to the Colombian National Police, but provided little in the way of

meaningful assistance to the armed forces. As a consequence Colombian national capabilities are out of balance. In my judgement, we must increase our support for

the armed forces while sustaining our assistance to the Colombian National Police.

Though a reputable and well-led force, the national police are overmatched by the

heavily armed and increasingly aggressive mobile columns of the FARC. I am encouraged by the performance of the armed forces during the FARC’s countrywide July offensive. In most engagements government forces gave better than

they got and we saw new and encouraging levels of cooperation and coordination

among the various services and between the armed forces and the police. This may

be a harbinger of better things to come. The newly created Counter Drug Battalion

is coming together smoothly and we are on schedule to activate the Colombian Joint

Intelligence Center in mid-December at Tres Esquinas. I predict that these will be

high performance units that will give an excellent account of themselves in the field

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and set new standards for the armed forces. To reiterate, our continued support will

be essential for the success of these initiatives and for the long-term success of Colombia.

#15. SENATOR HELMS. Have you consulted with regional defense leaders about

this problem? (Refer to question #14)

GENERAL WILHELM. Yes, the situation in Colombia has been a topic of frequent

discussion with civilian and military leaders in the bordering countries of Ecuador,

Peru, Venezuela, Brazil and Panama. All are concerned about the violence in Colombia and its potential spread across the borders. Concern is not limited to the Andean

nations. I have had recent discussions with officials from Chile, Argentina and all

of the nations of Central America about the pervasive impacts of narcotrafficking

and the ills it breeds.

#16. SENATOR HELMS. One of the reasons that our policy has avoided military

help for Colombia is because of human rights concerns. Do you think increased U.S.

material support and training for the Colombian military will help or hurt the

human rights situation in Colombia?

GENERAL WILHELM. Unquestionably, increased U.S. material support and training

for the Colombian military will help the human rights situation in Colombia. First

I’ll address the training issue. All training provided by U.S. Southern Command

(SOUTHCOM), including every course, seminar, exchange, or exercise, contains a

human rights component. The Colombians already have a vigorous human rights

training program in place. We aggressively supplement that program with our own

additional training. SOUTHCOM’s training serves both to reinforce the importance

we place on human rights and to bring an international perspective to bear on the

human rights efforts of the Colombian Armed Forces. As a matter of public law, we

allow only those members of the Armed Forces who demonstrate respect for human

rights and compliance with international rights standards to receive the benefit of

U.S. military training.

Insofar as material assistance is concerned, the Leahy legislation requires full

compliance with human rights as a prerequisite for providing material assistance.

Units with a history of human rights abuses cannot receive U.S. material assistance. These restrictions, which we rigidly enforce, provide the Colombian Armed

Forces powerful incentives to prevent human rights violations.

VENEZUELA

#17. SENATOR HELMS. What are the practical implications of the Venezuelan government’s refusal to allow anti-drug flights over its territory?

GENERAL WILHELM. The Venezuelan Government’s recent denial of overflight

rights for United States aircraft conducting counternarcotics missions has two significant practical or operational implications. First, denial of overflight impedes our

ability to maintain contact with suspect aircraft for ultimate handoff to host nation

forces and prosecution of end games. The countries most significantly effected are

Venezuela and Colombia. Second, denial of Venezuelan overflight adds one to one

and one-half hours transit time for detection, monitoring and tracking aircraft proceeding from Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Curacao and Aruba on missions over the heart of the source zone in Colombia and Peru. Increased transit time

ultimately results in reduced on-station time.

This situation has reinforced the need to attain full operational capability and capacity at the FOL in Manta, Ecuador. Given the ability to operate the full complement of detection, monitoring and tracking assets from Manta, we would have

an immediate workaround to Venezuelan overflight restrictions. For this and other

reasons it is essential that FOL enhancements be fully funded.

UNITED STATES SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS (USARSA)

#18. SENATOR HELMS. What is your response to those who say the School promotes human rights violations and that it should be shut down? Please provide your

best argument for keeping the School.

GENERAL WILHELM. Senator Helms, I appreciate this question and the opportunity that it gives me to speak out again in support of the United States Army

School of the Americas (USARSA) and the unique and singularly valuable role it

is playing in support of the United States Southern Command mission. In my professional view there is every reason in the world to keep the doors of this institution

open and there are none at all for closing them. USARSA must be judged on its

current merits, not on isolated past deficiencies. As it stands today, USARSA conforms strictly to all United States Army training standards, it vigorously and effectively supports our nation’s strategic goals and objectives in this hemisphere, and

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it has the most expansive and effective human rights training program of any Department of Defense training institution. As Commander in Chief of the United States Southern Command, I am one of

the primary benefactors of the School and the great work that it does. My position

on USARSA has been clear, consistent and unambiguous. This School plays a key

and essential role in our regional engagement and counterdrug programs. It serves

as an engine for positive change within the militaries of the region. Graduates of

USARSA leave Fort Benning with a greatly increased appreciation for the proper

role of armed forces in a democratic society; with a clear understanding of the reasons why militaries must be subordinate to civilian leadership, and with greatly

heightened awareness of the imperative requirement for respect for human rights

and absolute compliance with the tenets of International Humanitarian Law.

I regard professional military education as a long-term investment in healthy re- lationships with our neighbors to the south. Since its inception more than 50 years

ago, the School has trained nearly 60,000 officers, cadets, noncommissioned officers

and civilians from North and South America. The School has been a place where

lifelong friendships and professional relationships are forged. USARSA critics make

much of the handful of graduates who have violated the lessons that were taught

to them at the School. No mention is made of the legions of diligent, honorable,

principled and highly professional officers who have returned to their countries and

played leading roles in enterprises such as the forging of the peace accords between

Peru and Ecuador and the recovery of devastated communities from the ravages of

Hurricane Mitch. Ignored are the constructive, disciplined, apolitical approaches

taken by USARSA graduates when confronted with challenges to democracy and the

rule of law as have recently been the cases in Paraguay and Ecuador.

Because of USARSA’s critical importance to United States Southern Command

and to United States interests in this hemisphere I will make again a statement

I have made before . . . if we were to lose USARSA today, I would have no option

other than to recreate it tomorrow at considerable expense and with an unacceptable loss in the continuity of one of the centerpieces of our regional engagement

strategy.

MILITARY’S COMMITMENT TO COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS

#19. SENATOR HELMS. Many informed observers believe that the U.S. military has

been and remains wary of getting involved in counter-drug operations. What is your

opinion of the level of commitment within the military to this mission? What should

be done to increase the level of support for this mission?

GENERAL WILHELM. As reflected by our Global Military Forces Policy (GMFP)

counterdrug missions are accorded a lower priority than missions that support

major theater wars, contingency operations, training, and exercises. Therefore, when

we are confronted with contingencies such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and tensions between

China and Taiwan, forces are reassigned from counterdrug missions to address

these higher priority national military requirements. Though the reasons for these

diversions of forces are apparent, it is equally apparent that the inconsistent availability of resources makes coherent planning and execution of counterdrug operations problematic. In simple terms, we face a strategy and forces mismatch. The

same high-demand/low-density assets that are required for higher priority contingencies are those most urgently needed for effective and productive counterdrug operations. Thus, we are confronted not with a lack of Department of Defense (DoD)

commitment, but with real world operational and resource constraints.

Our most critical deficiency is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

We generally have sufficient ISR assets to cover 15 percent of the source and transit

zones 15 percent of the time. That is more a statement about the magnitude of the

task than of our commitment to it. We need accurate, focused, and timely intelligence in order to effectively commit limited assets and to obtain maximum results

from their employment. We are working with the Joint Staff and the intelligence

community to address these deficiencies.

In summary, I am convinced that DoD is committed to its role in support of the

National Counterdrug Strategy. Because a change in DoD mission priorities is unlikely, I will continue to advocate for increases in total force structure that will provide a broader base of capabilities to meet counterdrug requirements.

TERRORISM THREATS IN THE HEMISPHERE

#20. SENATOR HELMS. What is the level of the terrorism threat in the Americas?

GENERAL WILHELM. Although we assess the overall terrorist threat to U.S. interests in Southern Command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) as low, Colombia is the

exception. Despite recent success in combating terrorism, the presence of terrorist

30

and criminal groups in Southern Command’s AOR continues to pose a credible

threat to U.S. individuals, businesses, and government interests. Latin America accounted for 110 of the 273 (40 percent) international attacks conducted by terrorist groups according to 1998 Department of State Statistics. Of

these attacks, 87 were directed against U.S. interests in Latin America. Almost all

the anti-U.S. attacks in Latin America happened in Colombia or were connected to

Colombian terrorist groups. Of the 87 anti-U.S. attacks in the region, 77 were bombings of multi-national oil facilities in Colombia, in which U.S. businesses have an

interest. An oil pipeline-bombing incident in October killed 71 people and injured

more than 100.

The National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co- lombia (FARC) continue to pose the most significant terrorist threat to Americans,

as evidenced by the recent kidnapping and execution of three U.S. citizens by the

FARC (04 MAR 99) and the aircraft hijacking by the ELN (12 APR 99). These two

groups continue to increase attacks (kidnappings, bombings, and extortion campaigns) against Colombian security forces and civilians despite the current peace

process with the Colombian government. So far this year, 13 American citizens have

been kidnapped in Colombia. Four of those victims are still being held. Additionally,

three members of the New Tribes Mission abducted in 1993 remain missing.

Arrests of terrorist leaders from the Sendero Luminoso (SL) and robust

counterterrorism operations against the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement

(MRTA) have significantly diminished terrorist capabilities to conduct attacks in

Peru, particularly in urban areas.

Recently, we have witnessed the development of militarized criminal groups

(MCG), also known as criminal enterprise armies (CEA), using terrorist-type tactics

to achieve their goals and objectives. Reportedly, one such group of bandits is operating along the border of Belize and Guatemala. These groups pose a higher threat

throughout our AOR and their capabilities to conduct criminal operations challenge

the response of law enforcement agencies.

TERRORISM THREATS IN THE HEMISPHERE

#21. SENATOR HELMS. What efforts should be taken to address the insecurity in

the ‘‘Tri-Border’’ area with Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil?

GENERAL WILHELM. Terrorist support elements are primarily in the Tri-Border

area to generate revenue. They, and other criminal organizations, are attracted to

the financially lucrative opportunities offered by contraband trade, particularly in

the large duty-free zone. Illicit profits are well hidden and can easily be diverted

to fund terrorist organizations and operations in other parts of the world. Similar

corruption and contraband opportunities exist in other major duty-free zones in the

Southern Command Area of Responsibility, such as those located in Colon, Panama

and Margarita Island, Venezuela. The presence of terrorist support elements and

sympathizers, and the ease of entering the region with counterfeit travel documents,

attract terrorists to the area to hide, rest and recuperate, and possibly to plan, and

coordinate operations worldwide.

Security in the Tri-Border area has improved as a result of combined efforts by

the Governments of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. Security can be further augmented through greater multi-lateral information sharing between the region’s law

enforcement, security, and intelligence services, as well as with U.S. counterparts.

Improved communications and computer connectivity between these agencies would

allow the development and shared use of databases and other information to detect

and deter the movement and actions of terrorists and their support elements.

The attractiveness of the Tri-Border area to both terrorist and criminal groups

can be greatly reduced by increased customs and immigration control measures and

improved law enforcement efforts that counter corrupt activities, money laundering

operations and illegal migration. Establishing effective information sharing networks between the U.S. Government and those of the region is critical to the enhancement of security in the Tri-Border region.

RESPONSES OF GEN. CHARLES E. WILHELM TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS (FOLS)

#1. SENATOR BIDEN. General Wilhelm, studies show that we get more bang for

our buck from investing in drug treatment than by investing in source country control. As you know, we already devote two thirds of the national drug budget (65.8

percent) to supply reduction. I am not convinced that this is the most effective use

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of funds. In your Area of Responsibility we are now looking at establishing three

new fully operational Forward Operating Locations in Manta, Aruba and Curacao.

I have heard various estimates of what this will cost, and all of them make it sound

like this will be an expensive endeavor. How much do you expect the new Forward

Operating Locations to cost and from which accounts would this money come from?

Please provide a detailed explanation of how you envision these new locations working to combat illegal narcotics organizations. In other words, I want a tactical match

up—how our use of these bases will impact the methods of the ‘‘bad guys.’’

GENERAL WILHELM. The National Drug Control Policy has a budget of $17.9 bil- lion for Fiscal Year 1999. The total budget for Goal 5, Break Foreign and Domestic

Sources of Supply, is $2.28 billion or 13 percent of the total national counterdrug

budget. The Department of Defense (DoD) has a $937 million counterdrug budget

for Fiscal Year 1999. Goal 5 accounts for $277.4 million, or 29.6 percent of the DoD

counterdrug budget. The following validated and prioritized MILCON projects support Southern Com- mand Concept of Operations for the Counterdrug Forward Operating Locations at

Aruba, Curacao, and Manta Air Base (AB):

1. $10.60 million—Consolidated Planning and Design

2. $33.15 million—Manta AB—Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements

3. $31.00 million—Curacao—Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements

4. $ 9.10 million—Aruba—Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements

5. $ 9.20 million—Curacao—Aircraft Maintenance Hangar/Nose Dock

6. $ 6.70 million—Manta AB—Aircraft Maintenance Hangar/Nose Dock

7. $ .50 million—Aruba—Aircraft Maintenance Hangar

8. $ 2.13 million—Manta AB—Crash/Fire/Rescue Station

9. $ 3.10 million—Curacao—Maintenance Facilities

10. $ 4.96 million—Manta AB—Petroleum/Maintenance Facilities

11. $ 2.20 million—Curacao—Squadron Operations/Aircraft Maintenance Unit

(AMU)

12. $ 2.61 million—Manta AB—Squadron Operations/AMU

13. $ .90 million—Aruba—Squadron Operations/AMU

14. $ 4.70 million—Manta AB—Visiting Airman Quarters/Dining Facility

15. $ 1.62 million—Manta AB—Visiting Officers Quarters

———————

$122.47 million—Total

The $122.47 million will come from the Air Force Project Code (PC) 9500. PC 9500

is for Curacao, Aruba and Manta FOLs. The $122.47 million total is for MILCON

projects. The U.S. Air Force allocated approximately $14 million per year in their

Program Objective Memorandum for Fiscal Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2001 for combined operating expenses at Curacao, Aruba and Manta.

I was pleased to receive your question concerning the tactical impacts of the

FOLs. Too often, these kinds of issues are relegated to programmatic debates with

little or no emphasis on strategic and operational dimensions. The counterdrug mission is a challenging one. When we have every asset that is committed to this mission through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Execute Order we are able to cover just 15

percent of the source and transit zones, 15 percent of the time. This actually says

more about the magnitude of the task than it does about the adequacy of resources.

We have two absolute requirements. The first is, for the best possible intelligence

support. Timely and accurate intelligence enables us to commit limited resources at

the right places and at the right times to achieve the best possible effect against

narcotics traffickers. The second requirement is to position our assets in such a way

that we maximize coverage of key trafficking routes and cultivation and production

areas. Once all FOLs (to include Central America) are fully activated, we will have

roughly 110 percent of the area coverage or operational reach that we enjoyed from

Howard Air Force Base in Panama. Of greater importance, transit time to critical

areas will be significantly reduced permitting us to spend more time in, astride or

over key mission areas. The Marita FOL is particularly important. When improvements are complete and the airfield is capable of supporting operations by the full

complement of detection, monitoring and tracking assets, we will have more responsive and much improved coverage of the critical southern source zone. This includes

Southern Colombia where the majority of coca is grown and much of the cocaine

is produced, the air bridge between Colombia and Peru, Northwestern Brazil and

points of origin for maritime trafficking through the Eastern Pacific. Curacao and

Aruba will provide improved coverage of the northern source zone (Colombia and

Venezuela), and heavily used trafficking routes through the Eastern, Central and

Western Caribbean. The Central American FOL will provide blanket coverage of

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Central America which is emerging as a major transit area, and much improved access to and coverage of the Eastern Pacific routes that we regard as an open backdoor to Mexico and ultimately to the United States. In addition to purely geographic

advantages, the FOLs will give us greater flexibility. We will be able to concentrate

assets at the location or locations best suited for operations based on weather patterns, cultivation and production cycles and alterations in routes and methods used

by traffickers to move their product and evade our interdiction efforts. If we execute

the FOL plan as it is framed, we will emerge with a significant tactical advantage

in comparison with previous single site operations from Panama.

#2. SENATOR BIDEN. Currently our short-term agreements allow use of bases in Manta for six months and Aruba and Curacao for one year. All three sites will require significant military construction to achieve full operational capacity. Cost estimates have varied and we have yet to see a solid cost-estimate and a detailed plan

for post-Panama operations. At the moment we have short-term agreements for our

Forward Operating Locations in Manta, Aruba and Curacao. What kind of military

construction will be required to bring these locations to full operational capacity and

how much will it cost? What are we doing to guarantee that we will have use of

these sites for long enough to justify additional investments there? Is there a more

limited, less costly set of construction options that would allow us to increase capability in the interim, until we have longer-term agreements in place?

GENERAL WILHELM. The military construction required to bring these existing facilities to U.S. standards is primarily safety and maintenance-related. Runway and

parking ramp upgrades, hangers, navigation aids, fire rescue, operations office space

and quarters are among the items that total $122.47 million for the next two years

with $42.8 million needed in Fiscal Year 2000. Costs by site are listed below.

Temporary facilities like the Air Force’s ‘‘Harvest Bare’’ are currently being used

for interim facilities. Their use will continue until permanent facilities are completed. These expeditionary facilities (tents and prefabricated structures) are effective, but have a limited service life. After 18–24 months they require replacement

or significant maintenance. Additionally, they will not withstand hurricane and

storm force winds prevalent in the Caribbean and coastal regions of South America.

Permanent facilities will be constructed using materials and methods, which will result in the least cost, both in terms of initial construction and routine Operations

and Maintenance (O&M). ‘‘Expeditionary’’ type facilities (preengineered buildings,

K–spans, etc.) will be used where practical.

Ambassador Rich Brown, continues to serve as the State Department negotiator

for the FOLs. Ambassador Brown is heavily involved in negotiating long term agreements (10 years), and has already held initial discussions with both the Dutch and

the Ecuadorians. I have been informed of no significant impediments to reaching the

long term agreements we seek.

Economy has been a watchword during FOL concept development and negotiation.

Based on 10 year cost projections, we estimate that operations from the FOLs will

cost 60 percent less than continued operations from Howard Air Force Base. We will

strive to achieve additional economies each step of the way. To answer more fully

your questions concerning costs associated with FOL development, I provide the following prioritized list of MILCON requirements by site:

[In millions of dollars]

Common costs ($10.60)

Consolidated Planning and Design ......................................................... $10.60

Manta ($55.87)

Airfield Pavement/Site movements ......................................................... 33.15

Aircraft Maintenance Hangar/Nose Dock ............................................... 6.70

Fire Crash/Rescue Station ....................................................................... 2.13

Visiting Airmen Quarters/Dining Facility .............................................. 4.70

Squadron Operations/Aircraft Maintenance Unit (AMU) ..................... 2.61

Petroleum Oil & Lubricants/Maintenance Facilities ............................. 4.96

Visiting Officers Quarters ........................................................................ 1.62

Curacao ($45.5)

Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements .................................................... 31.00

Aircraft Maintenance Hangar/Nose Dock ............................................... 9.20

Maintenance Facilities ............................................................................. 3.10

Squadron Operations/AMU ...................................................................... 2.20

Aruba ($10.5)

Airfield Pavement/Site Improvements .................................................... 9.10

Aircraft Maintenance Hangar ................................................................. .50

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Squadron Operations/AMU ...................................................................... .90

Total ................................................................................................... 122.47

#3. SENATOR BIDEN. On May 25th, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez said, ‘‘We

cannot accept U.S. counternarcotics flights because Venezuela is a sovereign country.’’ In contrast to that refusal, President Chavez told reporters in the United

States ten days ago that Venezuela’s commitment to cooperating with the United

States on drug issues is ‘‘absolute and total.’’ In the past, Venezuela has allowed

U.S. Customs planes to use its airspace for counterdrug missions, but it has been

inconsistent. How effective can the new Forward Operating Locations be if Venezuela continues to deny the use of its airspace for counternarcotics work? To what

extent are your operations not based at the new Forward Operating Locations hindered by Venezuela’s denial of the use of its airspace?

GENERAL WILHELM. The Venezuelan Government’s recent denial of overflight

rights for United States aircraft conducting counternarcotics missions has two significant practical or operational implications. First, denial of overflight impedes our

ability to maintain contact with suspect aircraft for ultimate handoff to host nation

forces and prosecution of end games. The countries most significantly effected are

Venezuela and Colombia. Second, denial of Venezuelan overflight adds one to one

and one-half hours transit time for detection, monitoring, and tracking aircraft proceeding from Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Curacao and Aruba on missions over the heart of the source zone in Colombia and Peru. Increased transit time

ultimately results in reduced on-station time. Though we are paying some operational penalties as a result of the Venezuelan overflight issue, I would hasten to

add that we are continuing to conduct the full spectrum of counterdrug air operations, albeit at reduced efficiency. Discussions are currently underway with Venezuela and we anticipate that the overflight issue will soon be resolved.

This situation has reinforced the need to attain full operational capability and capacity at the FOL in Manta, Ecuador. Given the ability to operate the full complement of detection, monitoring, and tracking assets from Manta, we would have

an immediate workaround to Venezuelan overflight restrictions. I should add that

these workarounds would be equally valuable if other conditions, such as inclement

weather precluded or restricted operations from a single FOL. For these and other

reasons it is essential that our plan for enhancement of the FOL network be fully

funded.

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