[Cite as State v. Partin, 2023-Ohio-4056.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellant

v. 

JAMES T. PARTIN

 Appellee

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C.A. No. 29845

Trial Court Case No. 2020 CR 03124

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on November 9, 2023

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellant

 

ARVIN S. MILLER, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} The State of Ohio appeals from the trial court’s decision granting DefendantAppellee James T. Partin’s motion to suppress. The State contends that the trial court 

erred by finding that the police officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to justify 

the stop and seizure, which led to Partin’s eventual arrest. For the reasons outlined 

below, we agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court; the matter will be remanded 
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for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} In the late evening hours of August 8, 2020, Englewood Police Officer 

Andrew Bronsord was patrolling the area of the Motel 6 in Englewood, which was an area 

known to him as a high-crime and high-drug area; he observed what he believed, based 

on his 19 years of training and experience as a law enforcement officer, to be a hand-tohand drug transaction between an individual later identified as Partin and another man. 

When the two men observed Bronsord’s cruiser, they quickly separated. After gathering 

further information, including from the clerk of the hotel who advised Bronsord that Partin 

was not a guest at the hotel, Bronsord interacted with Partin and later detained and 

arrested him and placed him in a cruiser. After Partin was moved from Bronsord’s cruiser 

to that of another officer, drugs were found in the area where Partin had been seated in 

the first cruiser. 

{¶ 3} Partin was subsequently indicted for possession of drugs, and he filed a 

motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his detention and arrest. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Officer Bronsord had lacked 

reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the stop of Partin and granted his motion 

to suppress. The State appeals from the trial court’s decision.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 4} The State’s sole assignment of error states:

Officer Bronsord had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity sufficient to justify Partin’s investigatory detention. The trial court 
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erred, therefore, in sustaining Partin’s motion to suppress.

{¶ 5} The State contends that the trial court improperly found that the police officer

did not have reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring for the 

purpose of an investigatory detention of Partin. According to the State, the motion to 

suppress should have been overruled by the trial court, and the trial court’s judgment 

must be reversed. We agree.

{¶ 6} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. 

When ruling on a motion to suppress, “the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and 

is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). 

“Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 

19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must 

then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, 

whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 

124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.1997).

{¶ 7} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, 

Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee ‘the right of people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ”

(Emphasis sic.) State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 747, 667 N.E.2d 60 (2d 

Dist.1995). “The United States Supreme Court has created three categories of police-
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citizen contact to identify the situations where these guarantees are implicated.” Id.,

citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-507, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1982). 

These categories are: consensual encounters; Terry stops or investigative detentions; 

and seizures equivalent to arrests. Id. at 747-749. The first two categories of police 

encounters are implicated here.

{¶ 8} “Consensual encounters are not seizures, and Fourth Amendment 

guarantees are not implicated in such encounters.” State v. Keister, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 29081, 2022-Ohio-856, ¶ 27, citing Taylor at 747-749, citing United 

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). 

“Consensual encounters occur when the police merely approach a person in a public 

place and engage the person in conversation, and the person remains free not to answer 

and to walk away.” State v. Lewis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22726, 2009-Ohio-158, 

¶ 21, citing Mendenhall at 553. Therefore, “[a] consensual encounter can occur when a 

police officer approaches and questions individuals in or near a parked car.” (Citations 

omitted.) State v. Schott, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1415, 1997 WL 254141, *3 (May 16, 1997); 

see also State v. Jones, 188 Ohio App.3d 628, 2010-Ohio-2854, 936 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 20 

(10th Dist.). Moreover, “[t]he request to check a person’s identification does not make 

the encounter nonconsensual; nor does the request to check one’s belongings.” 

(Citation omitted.) State v. Crum, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22812, 2009-Ohio-3012, 

¶ 14. “The Fourth Amendment guarantees are not implicated in such an encounter 

unless the police officer has by either physical force or show of authority restrained the 

person’s liberty so that a reasonable person would not feel free to decline the officer’s 
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requests or otherwise to terminate the encounter.” Taylor at 747-748. “Only once a 

person’s liberty has been restrained has the encounter lost its consensual nature and [it] 

falls into a separate category beyond the scope of a consensual encounter.” (Citations 

omitted.) Crum at ¶ 14. 

{¶ 9} “Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a 

police officer who lacks probable cause to arrest may, consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer 

has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in 

criminal activity.” State v. Tidwell, 165 Ohio St.3d 57, 2021-Ohio-2072, 175 N.E.3d 527 

¶ 19, citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 

(2014). ”Unlike consensual encounters, an investigatory detention constitutes a seizure; 

therefore, Fourth Amendment protections are implicated in an investigatory detention.” 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Shern, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27976, 2018-Ohio-5000, 

¶ 13. “An individual is subject to an investigatory detention when, in view of all the 

circumstances surrounding the incident, by means of physical force or show of authority, 

a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave or is compelled 

to respond to questions.” Lewis at ¶ 22, citing Mendenhall at 553 and Terry at 16, 19. 

In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court listed several factors that might indicate a seizure, 

including the display of a weapon by an officer, physical touching of the person, the use 

of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be 

compelled, and blocking the citizen’s path, among others. Mendenhall at 54. “The 

mere presence of multiple officers does not necessarily establish a seizure.” State v. 
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Thomas, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27588, 2017-Ohio-8606, ¶ 12.

{¶ 10} Investigatory detentions do not violate the Fourth Amendment “as long as 

the police have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Ramey, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26705, 2016-Ohio-607, ¶ 22, citing Taylor at 748-749, citing 

Terry at 21. “The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct 

a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances ‘viewed through the eyes of 

the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they 

unfold.’ ” State v. Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 363, 2019-Ohio-1622, 126 N.E.3d 1132, 

¶ 10, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). “An 

assessment of the totality of the circumstances ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but 

with probabilities.’ ” Id., quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 

690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). When reviewing an officer’s actions, the court “must give 

due weight to his experience and training and view the evidence as it would be understood 

by those in law enforcement.” Andrews at 88, citing Cortez.

{¶ 11} “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification 

for making a stop – that is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” 

State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557, 591 N.E.2d 810 (2d Dist.). “Reasonable 

suspicion for a Terry stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed 

by police and its degree of reliability.’ ” Id. at ¶ 20, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 

325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). “ ‘Both factors – quantity and quality 

– are considered in the “totality of the circumstances – the whole picture,” * * * that must 
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be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’ ” Id., 

quoting White at 330, quoting Cortez at 417. “The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ 

analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” 

(Emphasis sic.) State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 

1282, ¶ 19, citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct.744, 151 L.Ed.2d 

740 (2002). The “Supreme Court has held that, while a series of events appear innocent 

when viewed separately, taken together, they can warrant further investigation.” State 

v. White, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18731, 2002 WL 63294, *2 (Jan. 18, 2002), citing 

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

{¶ 12} “An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing 

alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is 

committing a crime.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 

L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 

(1979). However, “officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristic of a 

location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant 

further investigation,” and, thus, a stop occurring in a high crime area is a relevant 

contextual consideration in a Terry analysis. Id., citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 

422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 

1, 6, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984); Sokolow at 8-9. 

{¶ 13} Nervous and evasive behavior also constitute pertinent factors in 

determining the existence of reasonable suspicion. State v. Henderson, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 25184, 2013-Ohio-1369, ¶ 11. The reaction to police presence is a 
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relevant factor to consider in evaluating whether the totality of the circumstances 

demonstrate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Murray, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 20301, 2004-Ohio-6229, ¶ 18. This court has found that the reactions 

of two individuals who abruptly end their conversation, immediately part company upon 

seeing an officer approach in his cruiser, and walk in different directions represents a 

relevant factor in evaluating whether the totality of the circumstances support the officer’s 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to support the stop of one of the 

individuals. State v. Oglesby, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21648, 2006-Ohio-6229, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 14} The State argues that Officer Bronsord had reasonable and articulable 

suspicion for the purpose of a Terry stop when he initially approached Partin. According 

to the State, the record supports that the officer approached Partin during night-time hours 

and knew the area to be a high-crime area where drug, prostitution, and domestic 

disturbance arrests as well as warrant arrests had been made by him and other officers 

in the past. The officer also observed what he believed, based upon his training and 

experience as a police officer for 19 years, was a hand-to-hand drug transaction between 

Partin and another individual; Partin was standing near the second man with his hand 

extended and then withdrew his hand and put it in his pocket. Upon observing Officer 

Bronsord, the two men went in different directions, and Partin looked away from the officer 

with his head down; the officer then observed what he perceived to be Partin’s evasive 

behavior of ascending to the second floor of the hotel, not entering into any room or 

engaging any individual, and “wandering” around the property. Prior to approaching 

Partin, Officer Bronsord also learned from the motel clerk that Partin was not a guest at 
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the property and that the clerk believed Partin was with individuals with whom he was 

“having trouble” around the back of the motel. Following an initial consensual encounter, 

Bronsord told Partin to “stay put, man” while he gathered additional information and 

obtained a request from the motel clerk to trespass Partin from the property. After Partin 

repeatedly refused to provide his identifying information for the officer, he was placed 

under arrest. Bronsord then learned that Partin had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. 

Illicit drugs were eventually found in Bronsord’s cruiser in the floor area where Partin had 

been sitting.

{¶ 15} In response to the State’s argument, Partin argues that he was detained of 

his liberty from the moment Officer Bronsord asked to speak with him, despite no show 

of force or commands from the officer. Partin also argues that Officer Bronsord 

possessed nothing more than a mere “hunch” relating to the nature of his activities, which 

was insufficient to form a basis for a Terry stop. We disagree. The encounter between 

the two was consensual until the time the officer asked Partin to “stay put, man,” and the 

detention was based on reasonable and articulable suspicion, rather than a mere hunch.

{¶ 16} In sustaining the motion to suppress, the trial court found that on August 8, 

2020, Officer Bronsord had more than ten years of experience as a police officer and had 

significant training, including as an evidence technician. It further found that Bronsord 

arrived at the Motel 6 at approximately 9:50 p.m. and was aware that the area was known 

for drug activity and as a high call-out area where he had previously made drug arrests. 

Officer Bronsord observed two males interacting near one of the buildings and, while it 

was dark outside, the area was lighted; upon seeing the cruiser, one of the men, later 
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identified as Partin, turned away and placed his hand in his right pocket. Although Officer 

Bronsord was not able to see anything in Partin’s hand, he suspected that Partin had 

placed something in his pocket. The officer observed Partin proceed to the second floor 

of the building and walk in front of the rooms. A few moments later, after seeing Partin 

then in the area of the office, Officer Bronsord learned from the clerk that Partin was not 

a resident of the motel and that the clerk was having difficulties with people, which 

included Partin, behind one of the buildings. When Officer Bronsord approached Partin, 

he appeared nervous and refused to provide his name when asked. The trial court found 

that Partin had denied being on the second floor of the building, but he advised the officer 

that he was present with a friend, was confused about his room number, and wanted a 

room close to his overheated work truck which contained tools. Officer Bronsord did not 

respond to Partin’s questions about what crime he was suspected of having committed. 

After advising Partin to “stay put,” Bronsord was asked by the clerk to trespass Partin 

from the property. Partin continued to refuse to provide his name, despite being asked 

repeatedly by Bronsord for the information for the trespass notice. Partin was then 

arrested. A short time later, illicit drugs were found in the area where Partin had been 

seated in a cruiser. 

{¶ 17} The trial court found that Officer Bronsord’s instruction to Partin to “stay 

put” constituted a detention, requiring reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity to support the officer’s actions. Instead of focusing on the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether the officer possessed reasonable and articulable 

suspicion sufficient to warrant Partin’s detention, though, the trial court evaluated each 
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individual piece of information possessed by the officer as either “innocent” or “not illegal”

and concluded that there was not reasonable articulable suspicion that Partin was 

engaging in criminal behavior at the time he was told to “stay put.” Whether conduct is 

illegal or legal is not a part of the analysis in determining reasonable and articulable 

suspicion. A series of seemingly innocent and legal acts, taken together, can be

sufficient to form reasonable and articulable suspicion that an individual is engaged in 

criminal activity. Additionally, the trial court strayed from evaluating the information 

known to Officer Bronsord by highlighting that there were no other witnesses to the 

observed behavior between Partin and the other male, that the officer did not attempt to 

confirm his observations with other guests or persons present on the property, and that 

the officer contacted his supervisor. The center of a court’s inquiry must lie in what an 

officer knew, and not what he could have learned from further investigation. Still further, 

despite the trial court’s findings, Officer Bronsord was unaware of Partin’s claim that his 

truck had overheated and he wanted a room near his vehicle at the time he told Partin to 

stay put. While Partin so testified at the oral hearing before the trial court, that 

information was not within the totality of the circumstances known to the officer when he 

detained Partin. A review of the video from Officer Bronsord’s body camera confirms 

that Partin did not advise the officer that his truck had overheated or that he wanted a 

room near his truck; instead, after denying he had been on the second floor of the building, 

when the officer told Partin that he had seen him on the upper floor, Partin claimed that 

he was on the second floor of the building because he thought his room number was 238 

rather than 138 as he then claimed. The trial court also found that Officer Bronsord 
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contacted his supervisor because of his uncertainty about what he had observed, thereby 

implying that the officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion for the detention of 

Partin. But the analysis of the totality of the circumstances is not focused on Bronsord’s 

subjective belief about the information in his possession, but instead that of a reasonable 

officer under the circumstances.

{¶ 18} Accepting the facts as true as found by the trial court, we must 

independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether 

the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard for a Terry stop. While standing alone, 

an individual fact may be insufficient to create a reasonable and articulable suspicion of 

criminal wrongdoing, the totality of the circumstances in this instance supported Officer 

Bronsord’s detention of Partin to investigate. We must view the facts through his eyes 

as a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene who is guided by his own 

experience and training. Guided by his training and experience as a law enforcement 

officer for 19 years, Bronsord was familiar with the area around the motel. He saw Partin 

in a high-crime area in which drug activity had often occurred; based on his training and 

experience as well as his observations of Partin’s activity, he believed he had witnessed 

Partin engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Contrary to the trial court’s 

evaluation, Officer Bronsord was not required to be certain that a hand-to-hand drug 

transaction had taken place in order to support his reasonable and articulable suspicion, 

based upon the totality of the circumstances, that Partin was engaged in criminal activity. 

Hand-to-hand drug transactions, by their very criminal nature, are surreptitious and not 

conducted in open view. When viewed in light of all of the information known to Officer 
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Bronsord, the circumstances justified the conclusion that reasonable and articulable 

suspicion was present to authorize the detention of Partin for further investigation. 

{¶ 19} After review of the record, we conclude that, upon consideration of the 

totality of the circumstances, Officer Bronsord had a reasonable and articulable suspicion 

that Partin was involved in criminal activity to warrant an investigatory stop, and that 

Bronsord’s suspicion was not based solely on a “hunch.”

{¶ 20} Because we have found that Partin’s detention was supported by a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, we reject the trial court’s conclusion 

that the illicit drugs found as a result of the detention and subsequent arrest were fruit of 

the poisonous tree. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 21} Having sustained the State’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial 

court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.