OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

OCTOBER 1, 2013, t o MARCH 31, 2014

U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOUSING 

AND URBAN 

DEVELOPMENT

A S S E S S I N G T H E C O S T O F 

BAD MORTGAGE LOANS
As the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the 

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 

we remain an independent and objective organization, conducting 

and supervising audits, evaluations, and investigations relating 

to the Department’s programs and operations. 

• We promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

in these programs and operations as we also prevent 

and detect fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. 

• We are committed to keeping the HUD Secretary, 

Congress, and our stakeholders fully and currently informed 

about problems and deficiencies and the necessity for 

and progress of corrective action.

OUR MISSION

1 Collaboration: The commitment to work 

jointly with HUD, Congress, and our stakeholders for the benefit 

of all citizens. 2 Accountability: The obligation and willingness 

to accept responsibility and account for our actions. 3 Integrity: 

The firm adherence to high moral and professional standards, 

honesty, and fairness in all that we do. Acting with integrity is 

a core job responsibility for every employee. 4 Stewardship: 

The careful and responsible management of that which has been 

entrusted to our care. 5 Diversity: The promotion of high standards 

of equal employment opportunity for employees and job applicants 

at all levels so that our workforce is reflective 

of our country’s citizens.

OUR VALUES
OUR VISION

1 To promote fiscal responsibility and financial 

accountability in HUD programs and operations,

2 To improve the execution of and accountability for grant funds,

3 To strengthen the soundness of public and Indian housing 

programs, 4 To protect the integrity of housing insurance and 

guarantee programs, 5 To assist HUD in determining whether 

it is successful in achieving its goals, 6 To look ahead for emerging 

trends or weaknesses that create risk and program inefficiencies,

7 To produce innovative work products that are timely and of high 

quality, 8 To benchmark best practices as a means to 

guide HUD, and 9 To have a significant impact 

on improving the way HUD does business.
The promotion of high standards of equal employment opportunity

for employees and job applicants at all levels. HUD OIG reaffirms its 

commitment to nondiscrimination in the workplace and the recruitment 

of qualified employees without prejudice regarding their gender, race, 

religion, color, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other 

classification protected by law. HUD OIG is committed and proactive in 

the prevention of discrimination and ensuring freedom from retaliation 

for participating in the equal employment opportunity process in 

accordance with departmental policies and procedures.

DIVERSITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
PROFILE OF PERFORMANCE

Audit profile of performance for the period October 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014

RESULTS THIS REPORTING PERIOD

Recommendations that funds be put to better use $1,130,566,054

Recommended questioned costs $125,061,696

Collections from audits $33,897,499

Administrative sanctions 6

Subpoenas 54

Investigation profile of performance for the period October 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014

RESULTS THIS REPORTING PERIOD

Total restitution and judgments $48,567,967

Total recoveries and receivables to HUD programs $23,892,030

Arrests 149

Indictments and informations 189

Convictions, pleas, and pretrial diversions 267

Civil actions 7

Total administrative sanctions 96

 Suspensions 36

 Debarments 43

 Limited denial of participation 3

 Removal from program participation 5

 Evictions 6

 HUD/HUD OIG personnel actions 3

Systemic implication reports 1

Search warrants 24

Subpoenas 376
DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD, WE HAD 

MORE THAN $1.1 BILLION IN FUNDS PUT 

TO BETTER USE, QUESTIONED COSTS OF 

MORE THAN $125 MILLION, AND NEARLY 

$34 MILLION IN COLLECTIONS RESULTING 

FROM 44 AUDIT REPORTS AND NEARLY 

$24 MILLION IN RECOVERIES DUE TO OUR 

INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS.
During this reporting period, 

we had more than $1.1 

billion in funds put to better 

use, questioned costs of 

more than $125 million, 

and nearly $34 million in 

collections resulting from 44 

audit reports and nearly $24 

million in recoveries due to 

our investigative efforts. We 

also had 189 indictments and 

informations, 267 convictions, 

and 149 arrests during this reporting period. These results can 

only be described as extraordinary work by dedicated public 

servants who, even in the face of uncertain budgets, rise to levels 

of effort that make me proud to be their Inspector General. Their 

efforts have contributed to better accountability of HUD programs 

and operations, which benefits all Americans.

Our high-profile audit and investigative work continues 

to target HUD’s high-risk areas. In particular, civil fraud 

investigations continue to be an area of emphasis in addressing 

fraud against the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) 

single-family programs. During the reporting period, I am 

pleased to report on the results to date of our ongoing reviews 

of FHA lenders. To help recover FHA’s losses, OIG continues 

to aggressively review lender origination and underwriting 

practices, working closely with the U.S. Department of Justice, 

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and HUD’s Office of General Counsel. 

Of particular note is a settlement reached with JPMorgan Chase 

totaling $614 million, of which $564.4 million directly relates 

to FHA loans, in which the bank admitted to and accepted 

responsibility for improperly approving thousands of mortgage 

loans for government insurance and agreed to implement an 

enhanced quality control program.

A report on the latest annual audit of HUD’s financial 

statements was issued during this reporting period, which, 

unfortunately, reflected deterioration in HUD’s fiscal 

stewardship. It was necessary for us to qualify our opinion on 

HUD’s financial statements because of deficient budgetary 

accounting for HUD’s community planning and development 

programs and because HUD lacked proper accounting to 

meet U.S. Treasury cash management requirements. We also 

reported on four internal control material weaknesses, up from 

just one the previous year, as well as other significant control 

deficiencies. The problems are longstanding and stem from 

HUD’s inability to establish a compliant control environment, 

implement adequate systems, recognize required changes, or 

identify appropriate accounting principles and policies.

A key area of investigative activity has been grant fraud. 

To highlight a significant case, after pleading guilty to diverting 

Federal funds, a developer was sentenced to 87 months 

imprisonment and 24 months probation and was ordered 

to pay restitution totaling almost $21 million to multiple 

victims. These victims included the City of Harrisburg, PA, and 

Dauphin County, PA, which incurred more than $6 million in 

losses associated with HUD Community Development Block 

Grant-Section 108 Guaranteed Loans. From 2005 through 

2009, the developer raised funds from multiple sources for 

the construction of the Capital View Commerce Center in 

Harrisburg. The developer then diverted millions of dollars of 

those loan funds into investment accounts he controlled and a 

company he secretly owned, which was purportedly working 

on the contract. The project was heralded as an opportunity 

for economic growth for Harrisburg, which at the time of the 

scheme was experiencing financial difficulties.

Since its creation in 1974, HUD OIG has been a leader in 

the effort to fight waste, fraud, and abuse in nearly 300 HUD 

programs, along with its oversight of American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act stimulus funding, disaster recovery efforts, 

and the recent financial crisis. I would once again like to 

express my appreciation to Congress and the Department for 

their sustained commitment to addressing the top challenges 

facing HUD’s programs. I also extend my sincere appreciation 

and admiration to the staff of HUD OIG for its dedication and 

commitment to our mission and conducting its work in the 

most outstanding fashion.

David A. Montoya | Inspector General

A MESSAGE FROM INSPECTOR GENERAL DAVID A. MONTOYA

IT IS WITH A SENSE OF SINCERE GRATITUDE AND COMMENDATION

TO OUR STAFF that I present to you the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 

Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) Semiannual Report to Congress for the first half of fiscal year 2014. This 

report is the culmination of amazing efforts by a dedicated group of auditors, investigators, evaluators, 

attorneys, and various support staff. I am grateful to be surrounded by a remarkable and talented staff.
SUPERSTORM SANDY

The destruction and aftermath of 

Superstorm Sandy will continue to 

be a focus and challenge for the U.S. 

Department of Housing and Urban 

Development, Office of Inspector 

General (HUD OIG). Congress 

provided $16 billion in supplemental 

appropriations through HUD’s 

Community Development Block 

Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR). 

program to help communities recover 

from the superstorm. To address the 

enormous task of enforcement and 

oversight, we have designated the New 

York and Philadelphia regions (Regions 

2 and 3) to perform the bulk of Sandy 

oversight. Our audit, investigative, 

and evaluations staff will provide 

a continuing and comprehensive 

review of the expenditure of funds and 

program administration.

HUD OIG has been working jointly 

with HUD’s disaster staff to ensure 

that the lessons learned from previous 

disasters will be considered in the 

approval of the grantees’ work plans 

and HUD’s disaster guidance. 

During this reporting period, the 

Office of Investigation opened a total 

of 36 complaints and investigations. 

Four training session were provided to 

HUD personnel, grantees, and other 

law enforcement partners tasked 

with investigating disaster fraud. 

Lessons learned from previous disaster 

programs were highlighted as well as 

tips on identifying fraud. A total of 

17 outreach sessions were conducted 

with grantees and administrators of 

Superstorm Sandy funds in the New 

York and New Jersey areas. 

HUD OIG has proactively engaged 

in oversight of the Hurricane Sandy 

disaster funds. It has held strategic 

planning meetings, conducted training 

sessions, held monthly meetings with 

HUD’s Disaster Recovery officials, 

conducted auditability surveys, and 

initiated audits. During this reporting 

period, the Office of Audit has completed 

two disaster audits. In addition, the 

Office of Audit has seven ongoing 

disaster audits. More specifically, 

it is performing audits of New 

Jersey’s Tourism Marketing program, 

homeowner resettlement program, 

and the Sandy Integrated Recovery 

Operations and Management System 

(SIROMS), the automated solution that 

will allow the State to quickly deploy 

its CDBG-DR funds, as well as New 

York’s health and hospital payments, 

homeowner buyout program, and the 

effectiveness of Vermont’s disaster 

program. 

CIVIL FRAUD

Civil fraud investigations continue to 

be an area of emphasis for HUD OIG, 

particularly with regard to mortgage 

fraud. HUD OIG’s Joint Civil Fraud 

Division, a distinct team of forensic 

auditors and special agents located 

in various field offices, serves as the 

central hub in HUD OIG’s efforts to 

investigate fraud and pursue civil 

actions and administrative sanctions 

against those that commit fraud 

against HUD. The Division has been 

primarily focused on investigating 

mortgage fraud and its ill effects on 

HUD’s Federal Housing Administration 

(FHA) loan insurance fund. It should 

be noted, that the FHA insurance fund 

is not the only victim, as numerous 

failed mortgages negatively affect 

neighborhoods by creating empty 

homes and causing declining home 

prices, and borrowers can be left with 

mortgages that they cannot readily 

afford, which frequently creates credit 

issues that haunt borrowers for years.

Mortgage fraud played a major 

role in the country’s financial troubles, 

and HUD was directly affected when 

its FHA insurance fund repeatedly 

fell victim to the reckless disregard 

of lenders and other real estate 

professionals that failed to follow 

FHA loan origination requirements. 

Relying on assertions made by FHAapproved and trusted lenders, HUD 

insured an untold number of mortgage 

loans that did not meet underwriting 

requirements. As a result, the FHA 

fund incurred unprecedented losses 

on loans that did not meet minimum 

underwriting requirements. 

HUD OIG is active in the national 

Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 

Force and, more specifically, it’s 

Mortgage Fraud Working Group. 

FHA mortgage fraud investigations 

begun under the task force’s efforts 

places HUD OIG in close working 

relationships with the U.S. Department 

of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and 

HUD’s Office of General Counsel to 

investigate and convey civil cases. 

These partnerships recently yielded a 

$614 million civil settlement in which 

JPMorgan Chase took responsibility for 

not following Federal loan origination 

requirements on thousands of federally 

insured loans. Nearly $565 million 

TRENDING
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 – Single-Family Programs.................................12

Audit................................................................................................... 12

Investigation..................................................................................... 12

Chapter 2 – Public and Indian Housing Programs...........15

Audit................................................................................................... 15

Investigation..................................................................................... 18

Chapter 3 – Multifamily Housing Programs .....................20

Audit...................................................................................................20

Investigation..................................................................................... 21

Chapter 4 – Community Planning 

and Development Programs ...............................................23

Audit...................................................................................................23

Investigation.....................................................................................25

Chapter 5 – Disaster Relief Programs................................27

Audit...................................................................................................28

Chapter 6 – Other Significant Audits, Investigations, 

and Evaluations.....................................................................29

Audit...................................................................................................29

Investigation.....................................................................................32

Evaluations........................................................................................32

Investigation of Lobbying Activities.............................................34

Chapter 7 – Legislation, Regulation, and Other Directives ....36

Chapter 8 – Audit Resolution.............................................39

Appendix 1 – Peer Review Reporting ................................51

Appendix 2 – Audit Reports Issued....................................52

Appendix 3 – Tables.............................................................56

OIG Telephone Directory ....................................................75

Acronyms List .......................................................................78

Reporting Requirements ....................................................79

of the total settlement related specifically to 

the FHA program, and the FHA insurance fund 

will significantly benefit from a portion of the 

settlement.1

 HUD OIG continues to work closely 

with these same Federal partners to pursue civil 

cases against additional lenders for the fraudulent 

underwriting of FHA-insured mortgages and 

against real estate professionals and borrowers 

that committed fraud in pursuit of FHA-insured 

mortgages. 

 While mortgage fraud is a current focus 

of the Joint Civil Fraud Division, the Division 

continues to expand its focus to conduct and 

coordinate more investigative work in HUD’s 

other program areas, to include community 

planning and development, public housing, and 

multifamily housing.

JOINT INITIATIVES

As part of its strategic plan this year, OIG 

identified nine initiatives that are being worked 

jointly between our Offices of Audit and 

Investigation. These initiatives were selected as 

they are some of the most troublesome problems 

that OIG repeatedly finds in its work. Therefore, 

the joint working groups are looking for root 

causes. This initiative is also focused on bringing 

together diverse skill sets from the Offices of Audit 

and Investigation, in hopes of developing new 

approaches to these longstanding issues.

The initiatives are

• FHA appraisals and high-risk appraisers,

• Strengthening HUD’s real estate-owned 

program,

• Community planning and development 

program oversight and grantee performance,

• Review of lender oversight,

• Operation Home Rules – Englewood Joint 

Initiative,

• Community planning and development 

subrecipients and developers,

• Multifamily housing programs,

• Preforeclosure sales, and

• Joint Public and Indian Housing Initiative.

1

 Although the JPMorgan Chase case settled in February 

2014, due to pending distributions of the settlement 

amount, HUD OIG will report in detail on the settlement 

in the next Semiannual reporting period.
12

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

ONE SINGLE-FAMILY PROGRAMS 

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) single-family programs provide mortgage insurance to mortgage 

lenders that, in turn, provide financing to enable individuals and families to purchase, rehabilitate, or construct 

homes. Some of the highlights from this semiannual period are noted below.

AUDIT

STRATEGIC INITIATIVE 1: CONTRIBUTE TO THE REDUCTION OF FRAUD IN SINGLEFAMILY INSURANCE PROGRAMS

Key program results Questioned costs Funds put to better use

Audit 2 audits - -

REVIEW OF HUD’S LOSS MITIGATION PROGRAM

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Inspector General (HUD OIG), audited 

the Wyoming Community Development Authority in Casper, WY, to determine whether the Authority properly 

administered HUD’s Loss Mitigation Program for FHA-insured mortgages.

The Authority properly administered HUD’s Loss Mitigation Program for the FHA loans reviewed. OIG 

made no recommendations, and no further action is necessary. (Audit Report: 2014-DE-1001)

INVESTIGATION

PROGRAM RESULTS

Administrative-civil actions 42

Convictions-pleas-pretrial diversions 116

Financial recoveries $8,732,645
13

CHAPTER ONE SINGLE-FAMILY PROGRAMS

PRISON TIME IN FORECLOSURE RESCUE SCHEME

The owner of foreclosure rescue businesses, US Mortgage Bailout, USMortgageBailout.com, and iLoanAudit, was 

sentenced in U.S. District Court to 60 months incarceration and 3 years supervised release and ordered to pay 

restitution in the amount of $1.4 million following guilty pleas to mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and 

bankruptcy fraud. The owner ran a multiyear scheme to collect money from thousands of distressed borrowers 

by promising to provide loan modifications. The companies’ Web sites claimed to be “an experienced legal 

team made up of attorneys and paralegals to handle all of the negotiations with your current lender,” which 

had “helped thousands of homeowners avoid foreclosure” and boasted a 97 percent success rate, when no 

foreclosure rescue assistance was provided. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG. (South Bend, IN) 

SOVEREIGN CITIZEN INCARCERATED FOR FORECLOSURE RESCUE SCHEME

A member of the sovereign citizen movement was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 30 months incarceration 

and 5 years probation after pleading guilty to passing fictitious obligations to homeowners in a debt elimination 

scheme that left homeowners in foreclosure. From February 2009 through June 2012, the sovereign citizen and 

her father, who was found guilty of 13 felony counts, preyed on struggling homeowners by defrauding them of 

thousands of dollars and promising to access a “secret” stash of Federal money for use in eliminating their debt, 

while instructing them to stop payments on their mortgages and other debt. In exchange for eliminating their 

debt, the homeowners were required to join their sovereign citizen program. This investigation was conducted 

by HUD OIG and the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI). (Hartford, CT)

FORMER MORTGAGE COMPANY MANAGER SENTENCED TO PRISON

A former assistant manager of a mortgage origination company called Madison Funding was sentenced in 

U.S. District Court to 16 months incarceration for conspiracy, false statements to HUD to obtain FHA 

insurance, and aiding and abetting. Between October 2006 and at least June 2008, the assistant manager 

submitted loan applications, which contained false information about the borrowers and were often 

supported by falsified, forged, and altered documents. Each funded loan generated thousands of dollars in 

commissions to Madison Funding and its employees. Eight of the properties involved in this scheme were 

FHA-insured mortgages totaling approximately $1.1 million, with losses to FHA totaling more than $111,000. 

This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation OIG, and the 

Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) OIG. (Allentown, PA)

CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OWNERS SENTENCED IN FLIPPING SCHEME

The owners of two construction companies pled guilty in U.S. District Court to charges of conspiracy and 

wire fraud and were sentenced to 18 months incarceration and 3 years supervised release and ordered to pay 

restitution in the amount of more than $1.2 million, with $566,684 payable to HUD. Between March 2008 

and February 2010, the owners recruited straw buyers to purchase properties at inflated prices and submitted 

fraudulent bank statements, IRS Forms W-2, pay stubs, and tax returns to lenders in support of loan applications 

for more than $837,000 in mortgage loans. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG, the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), FHFA OIG, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. (Trenton, NJ)
14

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

LOAN MODIFICATION COMPANY OWNER SENTENCED FOR HAMP FRAUD

The owner of a mortgage loan modification telemarking business was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 

1 month incarceration and 3 years probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $121,400 to 

victimized homeowners after pleading guilty to mail fraud and aiding and abetting. Between 2009 and 2011, 

the owner solicited distressed homeowners, claiming that his telemarketing business was affiliated with 

HUD and could provide assistance through the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) for a fee. 

The owner then collected fees from an estimated 124 distressed homeowners but did not attempt to help the 

homeowners avoid foreclosure. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG. (San Diego, CA) 

REALTORS AND MORTGAGE LOAN OFFICER IMPRISONED FOR FRAUD

Two realtors and a mortgage loan officer were sentenced in U.S. District Court after earlier guilty pleas 

to conspiracy, wire fraud, and money laundering. The two realtors were sentenced to 48 months and 18 

months, respectively, and 3 years supervised release. The mortgage loan officer was sentenced to 36 months 

incarceration and 3 years supervised release. From 2001 to August 2011, these individuals acquired more 

than 40 properties and then recruited buyers to purchase the properties at inflated prices. The three acted 

as the buyers’ real estate agents, prepared loan applications with false information for the borrowers, created 

false documents in support of those applications, and then processed those applications for mortgage loans 

through the loan officer. Many of those mortgages resulted in foreclosure, and losses to FHA are expected to 

reach $3.7 million. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG, IRS-CI, the FBI, and the Special Inspector 

General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program. (Hartford, CT)
15

CHAPTER TWO PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING PROGRAMS

PUBLIC AND INDIAN 

HOUSING PROGRAMS

TWO

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides grants and subsidies to more than 

4,100 public housing agencies (PHA) nationwide. Many PHAs administer both public housing and Section 8 

programs. HUD also provides assistance directly to PHAs’ resident organizations to encourage increased resident 

management entities and resident skills programs. Programs administered by PHAs are designed to enable 

low-income families, the elderly, and persons with disabilities to obtain and reside in housing that is safe, decent, 

sanitary, and in good repair. Some of the highlights from this semiannual period are noted below.

AUDIT

STRATEGIC INITIATIVE 2: CONTRIBUTE TO THE REDUCTION OF ERRONEOUS 

PAYMENTS IN RENTAL ASSISTANCE

Key program results Questioned costs Funds put to better use

Audit 10 audits $95,003,635 $ 4,548,410

PUBLIC HOUSING

The HUD Office of Inspector General (OIG) audited HUD’s oversight of public and Indian housing program 

interfund transactions to determine whether HUD (1) had adequate procedures to identify, monitor, and 

evaluate PHAs with interfunds and (2) took appropriate actions to curtail improper practices when borrowing 

from restricted HUD programs was found.

HUD officials adequately identified interfund balances, communicated this information to field offices, 

and adequately evaluated annual contributions contracts and regulatory restrictions on interfunds. However, 

they did not always take timely and effective action to enforce program fund restrictions by notifying PHAs 

to reimburse interfunds in a timely manner, maintain proper accounting controls, and avoid recurring 

interfunds. As a result, there were recurring interfund balances at 161 PHAs involving the use of restricted 

Section 8 funds for nonprogram purposes. The most serious of these deficiencies were at two PHAs, where 

more than $2.2 million in Section 8 program interfund transaction balances continued to exist.
16

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

OIG recommended that HUD develop and implement standard procedures to ensure the timely and 

effective control of PHAs’ use and reimbursement of interfunds and ensure the reimbursement of interfunds

to the appropriate programs by the two PHAs identified. (Audit Report: 2014-BO-0001)

HUD OIG audited the Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport, CT, to determine whether Authority 

officials ensured that expenses charged to Federal programs were eligible, reasonable, and supported.

Authority officials did not always ensure that expenses charged to the Authority’s Federal programs 

were eligible, reasonable, and supported. Specifically, they did not (1) properly charge and support all 

costs allocated to Federal housing programs, (2) adequately manage maintenance costs, and (3) ensure 

that employee health care and liability insurance policies were obtained at the most cost-effective price.

As a result, ineligible costs of more than $895,000 were incurred, and more than $790,000 in charges was 

unsupported. These improper charges weakened the projects’ financial position and left fewer funds for 

operations. Also, with diminishing budgets and staffing levels, diverting staff from Federal to non-Federal 

properties could result in degraded maintenance at the Federal properties.

OIG recommended that HUD require Authority officials to (1) repay the ineligible costs and support or repay 

the unsupported costs charged to the Authority’s Federal programs, (2) measure and monitor the maintenance 

staff’s productivity and rotate work schedules to avoid unnecessary overtime costs, (3) develop procedures to 

competitively obtain insurance, and (4) train staff on asset management rules. (Audit Report: 2014-BO-1001)

SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM

HUD OIG audited the Housing Authority of the City of Paterson, NJ’s Housing Choice Voucher program to 

determine whether Authority officials had implemented adequate controls to ensure that the program was 

administered in accordance with HUD regulations and the Authority’s own administrative plan.

The Authority lacked adequate controls to ensure that its program was administered in accordance with 

regulations. Specifically, it lacked documentation showing that assisted rental units were inspected annually 

and annual quality control inspections were performed, and some units did not comply with housing quality 

standards. As a result, housing assistance of nearly $3.8 million was paid for units without evidence that 

they complied with housing quality standards. In addition, documentation was inadequate to support that 

rental subsidy amounts were accurately calculated, all tenants were eligible for subsidies, and applicants were 

properly selected from the waiting list. Consequently, nearly $185,000 in questionable housing assistance was 

disbursed, and HUD lacked assurance that tenants were properly selected from the waiting list.

Further, financial controls were not adequate to ensure that port-in receivables were collected, duplicate 

housing assistance payments were not made, and uncashed checks disbursed to landlords and tenants 

were adequately monitored. As a result, Authority officials failed to collect all receivables on behalf of 

port-in tenants and lacked assurance that housing assistance payments were not made for vacant units 

and outstanding checks to landlords and tenants were cashed within a reasonable timeframe. In addition, 

Authority officials did not properly execute a contract or adequately monitor the status of the contractor’s 

performance against the contract provisions. Consequently, the contractor was paid in excess of the small 

procurement threshold.

OIG recommended that HUD instruct Authority officials to provide documentation to support that 

assisted units complied with housing quality standards and strengthen controls over the unit inspection, 

tenant certification, port-in receivables collection, and procurement processes. (Audit Report: 2014-NY-1001)
17

CHAPTER TWO PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING PROGRAMS

HUD OIG reviewed HUD’s monitoring and administration of the Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program 

under the Housing Choice Voucher program to determine whether HUD officials sufficiently monitored 

PHAs’ use of the program and evaluated its outcome. OIG also wanted to determine whether HUD ensured 

that PHAs properly monitored the participants’ progress while in the program and upon graduation and 

documented the program benefit.

Due to the priority of the Housing Choice Voucher program over the FSS program and a lack of resources, 

HUD officials did not (1) sufficiently monitor PHAs, (2) encourage the use of the FSS program, (3) evaluate 

its overall outcome, and (4) determine whether PHAs properly monitored the participating families’ progress 

while in the program. In addition, HUD officials did not require PHAs to track participating families after 

program graduation or document the program benefit in terms of realized cost savings resulting from reduced 

or eliminated rental assistance.

OIG recommended that HUD develop policies and procedures to periodically verify the timeliness, 

completeness, and accuracy of key performance data, such as FSS program enrollment, participant progress, 

escrow accounts, and program exits that PHAs self-report through HUD’s Public and Indian Housing 

Information Center system. In addition, if the fiscal year 2014 program coordinator funding for the Housing 

Choice Voucher and public housing FSS programs is combined, HUD should consider disbursing the new 

grant through its Line of Credit Control System, which would require PHAs to request the grant payments and 

enable HUD officials to manually approve payment requests, if necessary, to prevent the misuse of funds or 

ensure that required performance reports are submitted. Also, HUD should establish and implement a system 

to identify best practices and recommendations that would improve the effectiveness of the FSS program. 

(Audit Memorandum: 2014-NY-0801)

AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009

HUD OIG audited HUD’s Boston, MA, Office of Public Housing to determine whether the Boston Office’s 

oversight of public housing environmental reviews within its jurisdiction ensured that (1) the responsible 

entities (for example, local municipalities such as a city government) performed the required reviews and (2) 

HUD did not release funds until all required documents were submitted.

The Boston Office did not provide adequate oversight to three PHAs to ensure that the responsible entities 

properly completed and documented environmental reviews. Further, it did not maintain sufficient internal 

control records. As a result, three PHAs spent more than $85 million, including more than $39 million in 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) grant funds, for projects that either did not have 

required environmental reviews or had environmental reviews that were not adequately supported. 

OIG recommended that HUD require the three PHAs to (1) repay HUD, for transmission to the U.S. 

Treasury, more than $4.8 million and support or repay more than $34 million in ARRA funds, (2) support or 

repay HUD more than $45 million in Public Housing Capital Fund grant funds, and (3) take available actions 

against the three PHAs and their responsible entities. (Audit Report: 2014-FW-0001)

HUD OIG reviewed the public housing programs of the Colfax Housing Authority in Colfax, LA, to 

determine whether the Authority administered its HUD public housing programs in accordance with 

regulations and guidance.

The Authority did not properly oversee its public housing programs. Specifically, it (1) made 

disbursements that lacked adequate supporting documentation; (2) made unsubstantiated payments to its 

employees; (3) issued payroll checks to the previous executive director’s wife, a nonemployee; (4) cashed 

certificates of deposit without sufficient explanations; (5) misused cash received from salvaged equipment; 

(6) did not follow HUD’s and its own procurement requirements; (7) could not account for 22 of 89 appliances 
18

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

purchased with ARRA funds; (8) did not maintain true and accurate records of its board meetings and 

resolutions; and (9) did not properly maintain adequate documentation for its housing programs’ waiting lists.

OIG recommended that HUD require the Authority to (1) support or repay more than $1 million to its 

programs or HUD, as applicable, for questioned costs, including more than $100,000 in ARRA funds; (2) 

provide complete, accurate inventory records to identify the appliances purchased with ARRA funds and 

the number of missing appliances; (3) develop adequate written accounting and disbursement policies and 

procedures; (4) maintain an adequate contract administration system; and (5) provide HUD-approved training 

to its board to ensure that the commissioners receive written instructions on their roles and responsibilities. 

(Audit Memorandum: 2014-FW-1801)

INVESTIGATION

PROGRAM RESULTS

Administrative-civil actions 35

Convictions-pleas-pretrial diversions 104

Financial recoveries $4,790,023

FORMER PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY EMPLOYEE SENTENCED

A former maintenance worker of the Philadelphia Housing Authority was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 

13 months incarceration and 3 years probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $348,900 to 

the Authority. From 2002 through 2011, the maintenance worker conspired with others to purchase building 

materials with Authority funds, steal those materials, and then sell them for his own profit. This investigation 

was conducted by HUD OIG and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (Philadelphia, PA)

FORMER HOUSING AUTHORITY DIRECTOR AND HUSBAND SENTENCED

A former executive director of the Taos County, NM, Housing Authority was sentenced in U.S. District Court 

to 30 months incarceration, and her husband was sentenced to 24 months incarceration for embezzling 

more than $800,000 in HUD Section 8 rental subsidy funds. The two were also ordered to pay restitution in 

the amount of $786,014, jointly and severally. From 2003 through 2011, the former executive director created 

fraudulent Section 8 checks, made payable to her husband, and deposited those checks into bank accounts 

she and her husband controlled. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG. (Taos, NM)
19

CHAPTER TWO PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING PROGRAMS

NARRAGANSETT INDIAN WETUOMUCK HOUSING AUTHORITY OFFICIAL SENTENCED

The former executive director of the Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing Authority was sentenced in 

U.S. District Court to 1 year and 1 day in prison and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $120,000 

based on her earlier guilty plea to theft from programs receiving Federal funds. Between October 2008 and 

June 2009, the executive director embezzled money from the Authority and used it for personal expenses, 

including gambling and purchases of electronics, cameras, and Christmas decorations. This investigation was 

conducted by HUD OIG. (Providence, RI)

HOUSING AUTHORITY EMPLOYEE ORDERED TO REPAY $600,000

A former employee of the Housing Authority of New Orleans was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 5 years 

probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $661,094 to the Authority. Between April 2007 and 

May 2009, the employee conspired with a former Authority procurement officer to create fraudulent purchase 

orders to steal Authority funds. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG. (New Orleans, LA) 

FORMER HUNTINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY EMPLOYEE SENTENCED

The former Shelter Plus Care coordinator for the Huntington, WV, Housing Authority was sentenced in U.S. 

District Court to 12 months and 1 day imprisonment and 36 months probation and ordered to pay $23,173 in 

restitution to the Authority. While employed at the Authority, the coordinator diverted payments to a fictitious 

landlord that she had created and used those funds for her own purposes. This investigation was conducted 

by HUD OIG and the FBI. (Huntington, WV)

DEVELOPER SENTENCED TO 51 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR EMBEZZLEMENT

A former developer for the Navajo Housing Authority was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 51 months 

imprisonment and 36 months supervised release following a conviction of two counts of embezzlement from 

an Indian tribal organization. From 2003 through 2005, the developer submitted grant payment requests to 

the Fort Defiance Housing Corporation, a subgrantee for the Authority, for specific construction costs and then 

used more than $2 million of those grant funds for personal expenses, including gambling and thoroughbred 

racehorse training. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG. (Las Vegas, NV)
20

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

In addition to multifamily housing developments with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 

(HUD)-insured mortgages, HUD owns multifamily projects acquired through defaulted mortgages, subsidizes rents 

for low-income households, finances the construction or rehabilitation of rental housing, and provides support 

services for the elderly and handicapped. Some of the highlights from this semiannual period are shown below.

AUDIT

STRATEGIC INITIATIVE 2: CONTRIBUTE TO THE REDUCTION OF ERRONEOUS 

PAYMENTS IN RENTAL ASSISTANCE

Key program results Questioned costs Funds put to better use

Audit 4 audits $3,046,833 $21,423,291

OVERSIGHT OF SECTION 202 MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROJECT REFINANCES

The HUD Office of Inspector General (OIG) audited HUD’s oversight of Section 202 multifamily housing 

project refinances to determine whether HUD had adequate controls to ensure that Section 202 refinancing 

was conducted in an effective and efficient manner.

HUD did not have adequate controls to ensure that all Section 202 refinancing resulted in economical 

and efficient outcomes. Specifically, (1) HUD did not ensure that at least half of the debt service savings that 

resulted from refinancing was used to benefit tenants or reduce housing assistance payments, (2) consistent 

accountability for the debt service savings was not always maintained, and (3) some refinancing was processed 

for projects that had negative debt service savings, which resulted in higher debt service costs than before 

the refinancing. As a result, millions of dollars in debt service savings may not have been used to benefit 

tenants or for the reduction of housing assistance payments, HUD funds were not properly accounted for 

and available, and some refinanced projects ended up costing HUD additional housing assistance payments 

because of the additional cost for debt service.

OIG recommended that HUD (1) develop and implement consistent nationwide policies for oversight and 

monitoring of debt service savings, thereby ensuring that more than $21 million per year is used to benefit 

tenants or reduce housing assistance payments; (2) direct field offices to account for debt service savings 

and when possible, require the savings to be used to offset housing assistance payments; and (3) implement 

procedures to ensure that refinancing complies with the requirement to generate positive debt service savings. 

(Audit Report: 2014-NY-0001)

THREE MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS 
21

CHAPTER THREE MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS

OVERSIGHT OF THE MCKINNEY ACT BOND REFUND PROGRAM

HUD OIG audited certain portions of HUD’s multifamily housing programs to determine whether (1) HUD 

properly enforced requirements that regulated the application of automatic adjustment factors to Section 8 

rents for projects that had bond refund savings to prevent excessive rents and (2) adjustments to receivables 

due to HUD from bond refunds were properly supported.

Violations occurred relative to HUD’s calculation of rents using automatic annual adjustment factors 

for bond-refunded projects and justification and support for writeoffs of receivables due to HUD from 

bond refunds. Specifically, HUD paid more than $2.6 million in excessive Section 8 rents due to a pattern of 

violations. More than $2.7 million in questionable writeoffs of receivables due to HUD for bond refund savings 

was also identified. This amount included more than $2.6 million, which HUD wrote off without proper 

justification, and more than $139,000 for which HUD could not locate or provide proper documentation to 

show whether the writeoff was justified and supported. OIG also identified the release of more than $143,000 

in trust fund balances to entities outside HUD without proper support.

OIG recommended that HUD develop and implement procedures for (1) monitoring the calculation 

of annual rent increases for Section 8 projects and the remittance of trust fund balances and (2) ensuring 

that requests for adjustments to bond receivables are in accordance with requirements. In addition, OIG 

recommended that HUD initiate actions needed to ensure the enforcement of program requirements and the 

proper resolution of the questioned costs. (Audit Report: 2014-AT-0001)

INVESTIGATION

PROGRAM RESULTS

Administrative-civil actions 18

Convictions-pleas-pretrial diversions 30

Financial recoveries $2,154,489

PROPERTY MANAGER PLEADS GUILTY TO EMBEZZLEMENT

A property manager for a HUD-funded assisted living facility that services elderly and disabled persons pled 

guilty in U.S. District Court. In 2009, the manager took responsibility for the company’s payroll and payment 

functions and embezzled $588,121 in HUD program funds by manipulating the payroll systems to give herself 

unauthorized salary increases and unauthorized mileage reimbursements. The manager also failed to report 

the extra funds to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), resulting in a tax loss of $126,019. This investigation was 

conducted by HUD OIG and IRS-Criminal Investigation. (Columbus, OH)

PROJECT MANAGER GETS 3 YEARS IN PRISON FOR THEFT

A former multifamily apartment manager was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 41 months incarceration and 

36 months probation and ordered to pay $206,000 in restitution to HUD and $28,737 to the IRS for her role in 

a nearly $400,000 fraud scheme involving several HUD-insured and -subsidized apartment complexes. From 

2003 through 2009, the manager processed new subsidies for Section 8 tenants. During the initial reports, 

the manager reported the tenants’ incomes correctly. Over time, as the tenants reported higher incomes, 
22

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

the HUD subsidy should have decreased, and the tenants’ portions of the rents should have increased. The 

manager told the tenants that their share of the rent had increased but delayed entering the change into 

HUD’s computer system. The manager embezzled the increased amount of the tenants’ rent payments. This 

investigation was conducted by HUD OIG. (Kansas City, KS)

PRISON TIME FOR PROPERTY MANAGER – CIVIL CASE AGAINST COMPANY

The former assistant property manager of a HUD-subsidized apartment complex was sentenced in U.S. 

District Court to 54 months incarceration and 3 years probation and ordered to pay $303,000 in restitution 

to HUD. From 2005 through 2010, in exchange for cash bribes, the assistant property manager accepted 

counterfeit citizenship documents from 24 illegal aliens and falsely reported to HUD that the tenants were 

legally present and eligible to receive Section 8 housing subsidies. The tenants then received $519,165 in 

Section 8 housing subsidies they were not eligible to receive. Ten of the tenants were sentenced to time 

served and ordered to pay $133,000 in restitution, jointly and severally with the assistant property manager, 

who also used the identity of another person to obtain $34,142 in Section 8 housing subsidies for herself. The 

management company entered into a settlement in a related False Claims Act civil case and agreed to pay 

HUD $640,000. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG. (Kansas City, KS)
23

CHAPTER FOUR COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD) seeks to develop viable communities by promoting 

integrated approaches that provide decent housing, suitable living environments, and expanded economic 

opportunities for low- and moderate-income persons. The primary means toward this end is the development of 

partnerships among all levels of government and the private sector. Some of the highlights from this semiannual 

period are shown below.

AUDIT

STRATEGIC INITIATIVE 3: CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF COMMUNITIES

Key program results Questioned costs Funds put to better use

Audit 12 audits2 $26,651,401 $101,476,470

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Inspector General (HUD OIG), audited 

HUD’s oversight of former redevelopment agencies, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 

program, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME), and economic development programs. 

OVERSIGHT OF FORMER REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

HUD OIG audited HUD’s San Francisco and Los Angeles, CA, CPD field offices’ monitoring of CPD-funded 

assets transferred by former redevelopment agencies to determine whether the field offices monitored grantees’ 

CPD-funded assets transferred by former redevelopment agencies to successor entities to minimize HUD’s risk.

The San Francisco and Los Angeles CPD field offices did not (1) monitor grantees’ CPD-funded assets 

transferred by former redevelopment agencies to successor entities to minimize HUD’s risk and (2) did not 

record and maintain accurate and complete lists of grantees’ CPD-funded assets or track CPD-funded assets 

managed by the grantees’ former redevelopment agencies during the State’s mandated shutdown of the agencies.

Therefore, there was no assurance that CPD had a complete and accurate account of CPD-funded assets. As a 

result, more than $99 million in CPD funds used to acquire assets by the defunct redevelopment agencies is at 

risk of being transferred to entities that may not continue to meet HUD’s CPD program objectives.

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND 

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

FOUR

2 The total CPD audits, questioned costs, and funds put to better use amounts include any disaster recovery (2 audits) type 

audits conducted in the CPD area. The writeups for these audits may be shown in chapter 5 of this semiannual report.
24

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

OIG recommended that HUD (1) develop policies and procedures that allow for more proactive 

monitoring of grantees’ CPD funding and assets, (2) establish a formal listing of assets funded through CPD, 

and (3) require its grantees to provide adequate documentation supporting the grantees’ enforceable rights to 

CPD-funded assets. (Audit Report: 2014-LA-0001)

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAMS

HUD OIG audited the City of Norfolk, VA’s CDBG program to determine whether the City justified its program 

activities by ensuring that they were properly supported by adequate documentation and met national 

objectives as required.

The City could not provide adequate documentation to justify nearly $2.5 million of more than $4 million 

it spent on 12 of 16 activities reviewed. In addition, 14 of the 16 activities were required to meet a national 

program objective; however, the City could not demonstrate that the activities met or would meet their 

designated objectives. Of the 14 activities, 10, associated with nearly $4.1 million in program fund draws, were 

more than 10 years old. Further, the City was unable to provide documentation within a reasonable timeframe 

to support more than $5 million it had drawn for 15 additional activities in the audit sample. As a result, many 

activities reviewed were extensively delayed, and the City could not demonstrate that a significant amount 

of the program funds it drew was used to meet designated program objectives, such as benefiting low- and 

moderate-income persons and eliminating slums or blight.

OIG recommended that HUD require the City to (1) provide documentation or evidence to justify 

unsupported program costs or repay the costs to its program from non-Federal funds, (2) provide a plan to 

complete extensively delayed program activities, (3) implement policies to improve its record keeping and ensure 

that program funds are fully supported by adequate documentation, and (4) implement effective planning 

policies to ensure that program activities are not subjected to long delays. (Audit Report: 2014-PH-1001)

HUD OIG audited the San Juan, PR, Office of the Commissioner for Municipal Affairs’ (OCMA) Puerto 

Rico State CDBG Section 108 Loan Guarantee program to determine whether OCMA used Section 108 loan 

proceeds on a project that met a national objective of the CDBG program and fully provided the intended 

benefits.

OCMA did not ensure that the Municipality of Vieques completed a Section 108 Loan Guarantee project 

to construct a sports complex. The project was abandoned and not completed, materials and equipment 

acquired for its construction were unaccounted for, and the intended benefit was not realized. As a result, 

program objectives were not met, preventing low- and moderate-income persons from receiving the intended 

benefits. HUD also lacked assurance of the allowability of more than $10.8 million in State CDBG funds 

invested in the unfinished project. In addition, in 2006, more than $37,000 was withdrawn from HUD to repay 

the Section 108 loan; however, the loan was paid in full in 2003. No evidence was found to support that the 

proceeds corresponded to a repayment. 

OIG recommended that HUD require OCMA to (1) submit a plan for the sports complex project within 

30 days without proposing the use of additional HUD funds to implement it, (2) support the eligibility of 

the State CDBG funds spent for the sports complex, (3) ensure that the Municipality maintains adequate 

documentation related to the sports complex project, (4) submit supporting documentation showing the 

eligibility and propriety of more than $37,000 drawn from HUD, and (5) correct any inaccurate information in 

HUD’s information system related to the sports complex. (Audit Memorandum: 2014-AT-1801)
25

CHAPTER FOUR COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

HOME INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS PROGRAM

HUD OIG audited the Municipality of Arecibo, PR’s HOME program to determine (1) whether dwelling units 

acquired under its home-ownership program complied with HUD’s housing standards and affordability 

requirements and (2) whether the Municipality disbursed HOME funds within HUD-established timeframes and 

reported accurate and supported information in HUD’s Integrated Disbursement and Information System.

The Municipality did not ensure that home-buyer acquisition-only activities met housing standards and that 

the principal residency requirement was met for the duration of the period of affordability. In addition, it failed to 

return more than $26,000 in unexpended drawdowns to HUD and did not support the eligibility of $30,000 in program 

charges. As a result, HUD had no assurance that more than $1 million disbursed was used solely for eligible purposes 

and that HOME-funded activities met program objectives and fully provided the intended benefits.

The Municipality failed to reprogram and put to better use more than $3,900 in unexpended obligations 

associated with an activity that was terminated, did not report more than $1,400 in program income, and 

overstated the commitment amount for two activities by $919. It reported other inaccurate information 

concerning HOME-funded activities. As a result, HUD had no assurance that the Municipality met HOME 

program commitment and disbursement requirements.

OIG recommended that HUD require the Municipality to (1) support that it spent more than $1 million on 

eligible activities, (2) remit the unexpended drawdowns, (3) reprogram and put to better use nearly $5,000 in 

unexpended and overstated commitments, and (4) develop and implement an internal control plan to ensure 

that only supported and accurate information is reported to HUD. (Audit Report: 2014-AT-1001)

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

HUD OIG audited the City of Detroit, MI’s Neighborhood Stabilization Program-funded demolition activities under 

the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 to determine whether the City complied with Federal regulations 

in its (1) maintenance of accounting records for activities and (2) drawing down of Program funds for activities.

The City did not maintain records that adequately identified the source and application of funds provided for 

its activities. Further, it inappropriately drew down Program funds (1) when it had fire insurance funds and Program 

refunds available and (2) for duplicate demolition costs. As a result, nearly $2.3 million in Program funds was not 

available for eligible Program costs. Further, the U.S. Treasury paid more than $76,000 in unnecessary interest on 

Program funds that the City inappropriately drew down when it should have used available fire insurance funds.

OIG recommended that HUD ensure that the City spent nearly $2.1 million in fire insurance funds and 

Program refunds for eligible Program costs. OIG also recommended that HUD require the City to (1) use 

nearly $204,000 in fire insurance funds and duplicate Program drawdowns for eligible Program costs, (2) 

reimburse HUD from non-Federal funds for the unnecessary interest paid by the U.S. Treasury, (3) maintain 

adequate accounting records for activities, and (4) implement adequate procedures and controls to address 

the finding cited. (Audit Report: 2014-CH-1002)

INVESTIGATION

PROGRAM RESULTS

Administrative-civil actions 12

Convictions-pleas-pretrial diversions 17

Financial recoveries $8,214,873
26

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

FORMER NONPROFIT EMPLOYEE SENTENCED

A former nonprofit employee was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 32 months incarceration and 36 months 

probation and ordered to pay $385,242 in restitution after an earlier guilty plea for theft of government funds. While 

working at a nonprofit organization, which receives supportive housing funds and homelessness prevention funds 

from HUD, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Michigan State Housing Development Authority, 

the former employee converted Federal funds for her own personal use. This investigation was conducted by HUD 

OIG, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (Detroit, MI)

THREE YEARS IN PRISON FOR FORMER NONPROFIT EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

A former executive director of a now-defunct nonprofit organization in New York was sentenced in U.S. 

District Court to 3 years imprisonment and 2 years probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 

$642,680 to HUD and the New York State Department of Welfare after earlier guilty pleas to conspiracy, theft of 

Federal funds, and mail fraud. From 2007 through 2011, the executive director falsely certified to HUD that he 

was operating and managing transitional housing units in Brooklyn, NY. However, he used HUD’s Supportive 

Housing Program funds for his personal use. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG. (Orlando, FL)

DEVELOPER SENTENCED IN KICKBACK SCHEME

A developer was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 24 months supervised release and ordered to pay $98,333 

in restitution to the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development following an earlier 

guilty plea to theft or bribery concerning federally funded programs. From approximately January 2006 

through October 2011, the developer solicited and received kickback payments in return for the award of 

general contracting work on Department projects. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG, the U.S. 

Department of Labor (DOL) OIG, the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), the FBI, and 

the New York City Department of Investigations. (Brooklyn, NY) 

DEVELOPER GETS 7 YEARS IN PRISON FOR $21 MILLION SCHEME

A developer was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 87 months imprisonment and 24 months probation and 

was ordered to pay restitution totaling almost $21 million to multiple victims, including more than $6 million 

in HUD CDBG-Section 108 guaranteed loans from the City of Harrisburg, PA, and Dauphin County, PA, after 

pleading guilty to diverting Federal funds. From 2005 through 2009, the developer raised funds from multiple 

sources for the construction of the Capital View Commerce Center in Harrisburg. The developer then diverted 

millions of dollars of those loan funds into investment accounts he controlled and a company he secretly 

owned, which was purportedly working on the contract. At the time of the scheme, the City of Harrisburg was 

experiencing financial difficulties. The project was heralded as an opportunity for economic growth for the 

local economy. This investigation was conducted by HUD OIG, IRS-CI, and the FBI. (Harrisburg, PA)

FORMER COLUMBUS URBAN LEAGUE DIRECTOR INCARCERATED

A former director of an education services corporation was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 42 months 

incarceration and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $85,181 to the corporation and its insurance company 

following earlier guilty pleas to bank fraud and identity theft. From 2004 to 2010, the director prepared and 

submitted false invoices for payment to the corporation, which received HUD CDBG funds and American Recovery 

and Reinvestment Act funds for community outreach and education programs. The staff then prepared checks 

to pay the invoices, and the checks were deposited by the director into bank accounts under his control. This 

investigation was conducted by HUD OIG, DOL OIG, and the Columbus Police Department. (Columbus, OH)
27

DISASTER RECOVERY PROGRAMS 

As a result of the high number of disasters, Congress has regularly provided supplemental appropriations 

through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block 

Grant (CDBG) program to help communities recover from natural and man-made disasters. HUD has used 

the CDBG program because it is a flexible program, which allows CDBG Disaster Recovery (CBDG-DR) grants 

to address a wide range of challenges. Over the past several years, disaster funding for HUD has exceeded $36 

billion. These active disaster grants nationwide have approximately $31 billion in obligations and $25 billion in 

disbursements. A breakdown is provided as follows:

• Of the total $16 billion ($15.18 billion after sequester) that was provided for Superstorm Sandy, $10.4 billion 

has been allocated for the recovery area, and approximately $1.7 billion has been obligated with $1.2 billion 

disbursed to date.

• Of the $19.6 billion that was provided for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, $18.1 billion, or 92 percent of 

the funds, has been disbursed for the period ending March 31, 2014.

• Of the $6.1 billion that was provided for Hurricanes Ike, Gustav, and Dolly, $3.1 billion, or 52 percent of the 

funds, has been disbursed for the period ending March 31, 2014.

• Of the $3.4 billion provided for the “9-11” disaster in New York, $3.0 billion, or 87 percent, has been disbursed 

for the period ending March 31, 2014.

• Of the $780 million remaining for all other active disasters, $304 million, or 39 percent of the funds, has been 

disbursed for the period ending March 31, 2014.

In the wake of Superstorm Sandy, the HUD Office of Inspector General (OIG) received $10 million from the Sandy 

Emergency Supplemental appropriation for necessary costs of overseeing and auditing the disaster funds made 

available. Superstorm Sandy was the deadliest and most destructive hurricane of the 2012 Atlantic hurricane 

season, as well as the second costliest hurricane in United States history. As a result, Superstorm Sandy was 

blamed for at least 181 deaths in the United States – including 68 in New York and 71 in New Jersey – and 

property damages estimated at $65 billion.

FIVE

CHAPTER FIVE DISASTER RECOVERY PROGRAMS
28

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

STRATEGIC INITIATIVE 3: CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF COMMUNITIES

AUDIT

Key program results Questioned costs Funds put to better use

Audit 2 audits3 $2,165,915 $0

HUD OIG audited the State of Mississippi’s CDBG-DR program to determine whether the State ensured that 

(1) appraisers complied with the terms of appraisal agreements and Federal requirements and (2) projects and 

growth projections were reasonable and adequately supported.

The State did not ensure that its subrecipient, Harrison County Utility Authority, and its appraisers 

complied with the terms of appraisal agreements for the appraisal of property acquired under the State’s Gulf 

Coast Regional Infrastructure Program. The State could not support more than $7,000 paid for appraisals that 

did not meet standards and lacked assurance that land purchased for more than $2.1 million was appraised 

at a reasonable price. Further, the State did not fully implement adequate controls and procedures to ensure 

(1) that the need for and capacity of water and wastewater treatment facilities constructed addressed needs 

created by Hurricane Katrina or supported economic development and (2) the proper designation and 

completion of emergency activities. As a result, disaster funding of more than $653 million was approved to 

construct 67 facilities that may include some plants, the capacity of which was either too small or excessive, 

and other plants that may not have been needed. In addition, more than $9.6 million in disaster funds was 

approved for a facility based on an emergency requirement when the facility did not meet the definition of an 

emergency requirement.

OIG recommended that HUD require the State to support the unsupported appraisal fees and 

property acquisition costs and fully implement procedures and controls to address the findings cited. 

(Audit Report: 2014-AT-1004)

HUD OIG audited the City of Joplin, MO’s CDBG-DR program to determine whether the City complied 

with CDBG-DR regulations.

The City complied with CDBG-DR regulations. It generally performed contracting activities, obligated 

and expended its disaster funds, and conducted other initial program actions in accordance with applicable 

regulations. This was a limited audit since the City had procured only two CDBG-DR-related items, obligated 

only $50,000, and expended more than $20,000 of its $45.2 million in CDBG-DR funds at the time of the audit.

OIG audited 100 percent of the City’s obligations and 49 percent of its expenditures. 

OIG made no formal recommendations, and no further action is necessary. (Audit Report: 2014-KC-1002)

3 The disaster recovery program reviews are community planning and development audits. 
29

CHAPTER SIX OTHER SIGNIFICANT AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS

OTHER SIGNIFICANT AUDITS, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS

SIX

AUDIT

STRATEGIC INITIATIVE 4: CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVING HUD’S EXECUTION 

OF AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FISCAL RESPONSIBILITIES AS A RELEVANT AND 

PROBLEM-SOLVING ADVISOR TO THE DEPARTMENT

Key program results Questioned costs Funds put to better use

Audit 16 Audits $148,000 $1,002,866,852

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Inspector General’s (HUD OIG) more 

significant audits are discussed below.

AUDIT OF HUD’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 AND 2012 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

HUD OIG is required to annually audit the consolidated financial statements of HUD in accordance with 

the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 as amended. This report supplements OIG’s report on the results 

of its audit of HUD’s principal financial statements for the fiscal years ending September 30, 2013 and 

2012 (restated). Also provided are assessments of HUD’s internal controls and OIG’s findings with respect 

to HUD’s compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and governmentwide policy requirements and 

provisions of contracts and grant agreements.

In OIG’s opinion, HUD’s fiscal years 2013 and 2012 (restated) financial statements were fairly 

presented except for the (1) statement of budgetary resources lines impacted by the accounting for 

programs from the Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD) and Government National 

Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) and (2) accounting and presentation of balance sheet and statement 

of net cost lines affected by HUD’s implementation of U.S. Treasury cash management requirements in 

the Office of Public and Indian Housing’s Housing Choice Voucher program. 
30

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

OIG’s audit and the reports of the other auditors4 disclosed a total of 4 material weaknesses, 

11 significant deficiencies in internal controls, and 5 instances of noncompliance with applicable laws 

and regulations.

Material Weaknesses

• CPD’s formula grant accounting did not comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), 

resulting in misstatements on the financial statements.

• The Office of Public and Indian Housing’s Housing Choice Voucher program cash management process 

departed from GAAP and U.S. Treasury requirements.

• Financial management systems weaknesses continued to challenge HUD.

• There were weaknesses in HUD’s consolidated financial statement preparation and reporting processes.

Significant Deficiencies

• HUD lacked GAAP-compliant policies for accruals.

• Weaknesses in the reporting of HUD’s accounts receivable continued.

• Weaknesses in HUD’s administrative control of funds system continued.

• HUD continued to report significant amounts of invalid obligations.

• HUD’s financial management governance structure and internal controls over financial reporting were ineffective.

• Weaknesses in HUD’s rental housing assistance program monitoring continued.

• Financial and program management controls over the Emergency Homeowners Loan Program were weak.

• HUD’s computing environment controls had weaknesses.

• Federal Housing Administration (FHA) undelivered orders should be reviewed annually and deobligated promptly.

• FHA’s new system reporting and reconciliation capabilities need improvement.

• Ginnie Mae’s master subservicer provided inaccurate accounting reports.

Noncompliance

• HUD did not substantially comply with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act.

• HUD did not substantially comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act.

• HUD did not comply with the HOME Investment Partnerships Act.

• HUD did not comply with the Federal Information Security Management Act.

• FHA did not comply with the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.

OIG identified $259 million in excess obligations and recommended that HUD recapture at least $643.6 million 

in excess Section 8 funding held in public agencies’ net restricted asset accounts. (Audit Report: 2014-FO-0003)

4

 2014-FO-0002, Audit Report of the Federal Housing Administration’s Financial Statements, issued December 13, 2013, and 

2014-FO-0001, Audit Report of the Government National Mortgage Association Financial Statements, issued December 6, 2013
31

AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION’S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR 

FISCAL YEARS 2013 AND 2012

In accordance with the Government Corporation Control Act as amended (31 U.S.C. (United States 

Code) 9105), HUD OIG engaged CliftonLarsonAllen LLP to audit the fiscal years 2013 and 2012 FHA 

financial statements. The report contained two significant deficiencies in FHA’s internal control 

and one reportable instance of noncompliance with laws and regulations. It contained 11 new 

recommendations. 

The first of the two significant deficiencies related to a review of FHA’s undelivered orders, 

which found (1) inactive obligations, (2) disbursements in excess of obligated amounts, and (3) 

deobligations of inactive contracts not recognized in the Single Family Asset Management System. 

While the FHA Comptroller’s Office requests followed up on open obligations, OIG did not identify 

any FHA policies and procedures that would implement HUD’s annual review of undelivered orders 

and obligations. If undelivered orders are not reviewed on a timely basis, unobligated balances 

carried forward could be misstated. In addition, inadequate controls could lead to Anti-Deficiency 

Act violations and disbursements without proper approval, and evidence of payments may lead to 

waste and abuse of resources.

The second significant deficiency related to data integrity issues as a result of FHA’s transition 

to a new system (Home Equity Reverse Mortgage Information Technology (HERMIT)) for managing 

insured and assigned home equity conversion mortgage loans. There were discrepancies between 

the reports generated from the new system and reports from the general ledger and other source 

systems that could not be adequately explained during the reconciliation process. These differences 

raised concerns about the completeness and accuracy of the data in the HERMIT system and about 

the movement of data among other FHA systems and the general ledger. Further, they indicated a 

weakness in internal controls. Due to the unexplainable differences, OIG was unable to determine 

whether the discrepancies were caused by timing differences among files or reports, interface issues 

among systems, conversion problems with HERMIT data, or any combination of these causes. The 

reported law and regulation noncompliance was due to FHA’s failure to comply with the CranstonGonzales National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 requirement that FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance 

(MMI) Fund maintain a minimum level of capital sufficient to withstand a moderate recession. This 

capital requirement, termed the “capital ratio,” is defined as capital resources (assets minus current 

liabilities), less the liability for future claim costs (net of future premiums and recoveries), divided by 

the value of amortized insurance-in-force. The Act requires FHA to maintain a minimum capital ratio 

of 2 percent and conduct an annual independent actuarial study to, among other things, calculate 

this ratio. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires that the HUD Secretary submit a 

report annually to Congress describing the results of the study, assess the financial status of the MMI 

Fund, recommend program adjustments, and evaluate the quality control procedures and accuracy 

of information used in the process of underwriting loans guaranteed by the MMI Fund. As of the 

date of the audit, this report for fiscal year 2013 had not been submitted to Congress, but preliminary 

FHA data indicated that this ratio remained below the required 2 percent throughout fiscal year 2013. 

(Audit Report: 2014-FO-0002)

CHAPTER SIX OTHER SIGNIFICANT AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS
32

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

AUDIT OF THE GOVERNMENT NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION FISCAL YEARS 

2013 AND 2012 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

In accordance with the Government Corporation Control Act as amended (31 U.S.C. 9105), HUD OIG 

engaged the independent certified public accounting firm of CliftonLarsonAllen LLP to audit Ginnie Mae’s 

fiscal years 2013 and 2012 financial statements. The report contains one significant deficiency in internal 

control over financial reporting. 

Ginnie Mae’s significant deficiency relates to contractor-prepared monthly loan-level accounting 

reports that contain inaccurate information. Ginnie Mae first noted, in fiscal year 2012, discrepancies 

within different elements of the accounting reports. It also noted that loans, which were being transferred 

to FHA as a claim, were still being reported to Ginnie Mae as open on the accounting reports. These 

reports were used by Ginnie Mae and are an integral part of its financial reporting process. The monthly 

accounting reports were inaccurate because the contractor did not have effective integrated systems to 

accumulate data necessary to generate monthly accounting reports accurately and reliably for Ginnie 

Mae. (Audit Report: 2014-FO-0001)

INVESTIGATION

FORMER HUD EMPLOYEE IMPRISONED FOR STALKING AND THREATS

A former HUD employee was sentenced in Rancho Cucamonga Superior Court to 3 years for 

stalking, threats, and computer fraud. From 2010 through 2012, the former employee telephonically 

stalked at least nine individuals, four of whom were HUD employees, sending them threatening 

and obscene text messages. During that time, the former employee also used a thumb drive to 

access a HUD employee’s computer to record her typing and gain access to her information. This 

investigation was conducted by HUD OIG and the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office. (Rancho 

Cucamonga, CA) 

EVALUATIONS

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY PROGRAM

HUD’s information technology (IT) systems contain sensitive information that is central to its 

mission and is used to administer its programs. OIG is required to annually evaluate HUD’s 

information security program. During this semiannual period, OIG completed its fiscal year 2013 

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) evaluation and annual report to the Office 

of Management and Budget. OIG found that many areas in HUD’s information security program did 

not comply with FISMA, and HUD had not established or implemented a risk-based program that 

allowed it to effectively manage its information and IT security risks. HUD lacked several foundational 

components that are essential for an effective Federal agency IT security program. Specifically, HUD 
33

CHAPTER SIX OTHER SIGNIFICANT AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS

is required to report on 109 metrics, established by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which 

span 11 IT program areas. OIG determined that HUD had not satisfied 75 percent of those metrics and 

improvements were needed in all program areas. HUD’s system inventory and system authorization 

boundaries were not fully documented, and all systems did not have a valid authority to operate. The 

governance structure for HUD’s IT security program was underdeveloped and had experienced ongoing 

staff turnover in key leadership positions. HUD has a major management challenge ahead as it moves 

forward in establishing a compliant and effective program. During fiscal year 2013, OIG made 62 

recommendations for improving HUD’s information security program.
34

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

INVESTIGATION OF HUD LOBBYING ACTIVITIES

On February 26, 2014, Inspector General Montoya testified before the U.S. House of Representatives, 

Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. The hearing was entitled 

“Inspector General Report: Allegations of Improper Lobbying and Obstruction at the Department of Housing 

and Urban Development.”

The hearing was a result of a request from the subcommittee regarding an email communication sent 

by former HUD Deputy Secretary Maurice Jones on July 31, 2013. The email called on recipients to contact 

specific U.S. senators and encourage them to vote in favor of procedural motions to advance consideration of 

legislation making appropriations for fiscal year 2014 for the U.S. Department of Transportation, HUD, and 

related agencies. The email also urged recipients to oppose certain amendments and suggested that they 

encourage named senators to support final passage of the bill. 

The subcommittee’s correspondence suggested that the directness and specificity of the email appeared 

to violate well-established Federal restrictions on lobbying by Federal agencies and, based on the apparent 

violations of Federal law, requested that OIG thoroughly investigate the matter and advise the subcommittee. 

The following is an excerpt of Inspector General Montoya’s oral testimony:

Our subsequent investigation disclosed that the decision to send the July 31st email was based on having 

the HUD Secretary or Deputy Secretary engage in a more “aggressive lobbying effort” [sic] relative to 

legislation or an appropriation. The catalyst for this new posture was then General Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations, Elliot Mincberg. We determined this email 

was a grassroots lobbying campaign on a matter that was pending before Congress.

At the time the July 31st email was drafted and sent, HUD’s internal policies regarding lobbying were 

longstanding and designed to create not only the appearance of ethical behavior, but to include actual 

guidelines to ensure ethical behavior by all employees of the Department, including presidentially 

appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. In spite of clear departmental policies, which were rooted in 

statutory provisions, our investigation disclosed that the interest for HUD to be “more aggressive” in its 

lobbying activities overrode their adherence to their own longstanding policies. 

While our investigation did not result in criminal or civil prosecution, it did discern an institutional 

failure to follow HUD’s existing internal policies. At a certain level, HUD’s actions leave the impression 

of impropriety and ethical lapses. The Department should have more fully scrutinized the decision to 
35

send the email, as well as its content and its list of recipients. This inattention was particularly evident 

when one examines the types of organizations represented on the list of email recipients, which 

included 46 HUD employees. While our investigation determined that including 46 HUD employees 

was inadvertent on the part of the Deputy Secretary, the lack of due diligence by those preparing the 

email may have caused the Deputy Secretary to commit a prohibited personnel practice and to violate 

Federal law prohibiting an official from coercing a Federal employee’s political activities.

Equally troubling was the fact that the email was sent to individuals at organizations that receive HUD 

funding. Such organizations are generally prohibited from using Federal funds to carry out certain lobbying 

activities. In fact, one of the recipients, a large public housing authority, had recently been found by my 

office to have violated Federal requirements by using Federal funds to carry out lobbying activities.

Of significant concern to me and one thing that I will not tolerate as Inspector General and a Federal 

law enforcement official was interference with our investigation. Specifically, Mincberg not only 

interrupted and inserted himself into an ongoing witness interview, he threatened to terminate it, 

threatened not to allow the witness to provide documentation as requested by investigators, and 

contacted witnesses prior to our interview of them to, in my opinion, “create the story.” Finally and 

most troubling, was his threat to have my investigators charged merely for doing their duty in an 

attempt, as I see it, to intimidate them into not proceeding further. 

This series of events illustrates what may happen when senior government officials veer from the 

concept of ethical behavior and act in a manner that is ultimately not in the Department’s best 

interest. There were breakdowns in communication and in responsibility, and the conduct of several 

individuals resulted in the Deputy Secretary being misled, embarrassed, and ill served. In particular, 

Mincberg’ s obligation to exercise sound ethical judgment and avoid violating well-established HUD 

policy was mitigated by his eagerness in being “more aggressive” with regard to lobbying. 

As of this semiannual reporting period, HUD had not reported any administrative action taken against any 

individual involved in this matter. 

CHAPTER SIX OTHER SIGNIFICANT AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS
36

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

LEGISLATION, REGULATION, 

AND OTHER DIRECTIVES

SEVEN

Reviewing and making recommendations on legislation, regulations, and policy issues is a critical part of the Office 

of Inspector General’s (OIG) responsibilities under the Inspector General Act. During this 6-month reporting period, 

OIG has committed approximately 373 hours to reviewing 84 issuances. The draft directives consisted of 34 notices, 

15 mortgagee letters, and 35 other directives. OIG provided comments on 35 of the issuances (42 percent) and 

provided no nonconcurrences. A summary of selected reviews for this 6-month period is below. 

NOTICES, POLICY ISSUANCES, AND FINAL RULES

SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSING

Underwriting standards - The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) submitted a mortgagee letter for review 

regarding clarifying policy guidance for revised manual underwriting requirements published in the Final 

Federal Register Notice, FR 5595-N-01, on December 11, 2013. The mortgagee letter explains maximum 

qualifying ratios for manually underwritten loans and revises and clarifies the compensating factors that 

must be cited in order to exceed FHA’s standard qualifying ratios for manually underwritten loans. It also 

explains the new reserve requirements for manually underwritten loans for one- and two-unit properties. OIG 

expressed continued concerns that a ratio of 40/50 is too high and no amount of compensating factors should 

be allowed for that risk level. Mortgagee letter 2014-2 was issued January 21, 2014, and is effective for case 

numbers assigned on or after April 21, 2014. 

Electronic signatures - FHA submitted a mortgagee letter through the clearance process announcing 

the acceptance of electronic signatures conducted in accordance with outlined performance standards 

on documents requiring signatures included in the case binder for mortgage insurance, servicing and loss 

mitigation documents, FHA insurance claim documentation, and HUD’s real estate-owned sales contract and 

related addenda unless otherwise prohibited by law. Some of the performance standards outlined include that 

(1) a lender’s electronic signature technology must comply with all requirements of the Electronic Signatures 

in Global and National Commerce Act; (2) a lender must be able to prove that the signer certified that the 

document is true, accurate, and correct at the time signed; (3) an authentication process is in place to confirm 

an individual’s identity as a party to the transaction; and (4) a process is in place to associate the identity of an 

individual with his or her signature. Lenders must require a separate action by the signer, evidencing intent 

to sign, in each location where a signature or initials are to be applied. However, this provision does not apply 

to documents signed by lender employees or lender contractors provided the lender obtains the consent of 

the individual for the use of his or her electronic signature. OIG expressed concerns that this may lessen the 

chance that a review is performed before the lender employee or contractor signs each document. Mortgagee 
37

Letter 2014-3 was issued on January 30, 2014, and its policies were effective immediately. 

Qualified mortgage definition - OIG reviewed FHA’s final rule on the definition of a qualified mortgage 

that is insured, guaranteed, or administered by HUD. The final rule became effective on January 10, 2014, 

and applies to mortgages with a case number assignment on or after that date. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act required HUD to propose a qualified mortgage definition that is aligned 

with the “ability-to-repay” criteria set out in the Truth-in-Lending Act as well as HUD’s historic mission to 

promote affordable mortgage financing options for underserved borrowers. HUD’s rule is an extension 

of the existing qualified mortgage rule finalized by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2013. To 

meet HUD’s definition, mortgage loans must (1) require periodic payments without risky features, (2) have 

terms not to exceed 30 years, (3) limit upfront points and fees to no more than 3 percent with adjustments to 

facilitate smaller loans (except for Title I, Title II, Manufactured Housing, Section 184, and Section 184A loans 

and others), and (4) be insured or guaranteed by FHA or HUD. The rule establishes two types of qualified 

mortgages that have different protective features for consumers and different legal consequences for lenders. 

HUD’s qualified mortgage classifies a loan as either a rebuttable presumption or safe harbor qualified 

mortgage depending on the relation of the loan’s annual percentage rate to the average prime rate offer, the 

rate for the average borrower receiving a conventional mortgage. 

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

Various waivers – OIG reviewed the Notice on Clarifying Guidance, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements 

for Grantees in Receipt of Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Funds under the Disaster 

Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 on February 26, 2014. After OIG’s review, HUD published a Federal Register 

notice on March 27, 2014, announcing additional guidance for Hurricane Sandy grantees. This notice granted 

a waiver to the City of New York to allow it to measure the benefit to low- and moderate-income households 

in multiunit residential projects by using either the existing Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 

requirements or the unit approach. For projects using CDBG Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funds for 

rehabilitation, reconstruction, or new construction, current requirements state that the low- and moderateincome national objective will not be met unless at least 51 percent of the units are occupied by residents who 

are income eligible. To further support mixed-income housing in large-scale developments as seen in New 

York City, the unit approach may be more compatible. The unit approach allows the city to meet the low- and 

moderate-income national objective on a project when it provides CDBG-DR assistance equal to the cost of 

the units occupied by low- and moderate-income households.

The notice also granted a waiver to the City of Minot, ND, reducing the required overall benefit provided 

to low- and moderate-income households from 50 to not less than 23 percent. HUD deemed the waiver 

necessary for flood buyout and street repair programs in the flood inundation area with a low- and moderateincome population of 45.2 percent. In particular, HUD notes that the City has already prioritized the needs 

of low- and moderate-income populations with its first allocation; the low- and moderate-income population 

in the flood inundation area is close enough to 50 percent that it nearly qualifies under the overall benefit 

waiver in the March 5, 2013, notice; and given that the flood inundation area is likely to flood again, the City 

has identified getting people out of harm’s way as a top priority and this waiver will allow low- and moderateincome families to take advantage of Minot’s program for this purpose.

In addition, the State of New York and the City of Joplin, MO, were granted waivers allowing the restriction 

on payments of rental assistance and utilities to be increased from 3 months to 2 years on behalf of homeless 

and at-risk households when the payments are part of a homelessness prevention or rapid rehousing program 

or activity. The waiver allows the requestors to minimize the time households are homelessness by providing 

rehousing and rental assistance. 

CHAPTER SEVEN LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND OTHER DIRECTIVES
38

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

OFFICE OF MULTIFAMILY HOUSING

Limited denial of participation - HUD Notice H 2014-5 was issued in March 2014 to establish internal 

requirements and procedures to initiate proceedings against FHA-insured multifamily borrowers who have 

failed to meet program requirements. The limited denial of participation process ensures that borrowers that 

have caused a claim to be made against the insurance fund are prevented from initiating new business with 

FHA for at least a year. A list of the principles associated with the borrowers is publicly available. With this 

Notice, HUD intends to increase the use of limited denial of participation actions, thereby reducing the risk of 

future claims against the fund. 

Standard templates - In February 2014, HUD issued Notice H 2014-02 and related Mortgagee Letter 2014-05. 

These updated standard templates are for the multifamily FHA application submission process. These updates 

will allow HUD to better expedite the application review process while reducing its risk during the underwriting 

analysis of the application. Missing or inconsistent data in the nonstandardized former underwriter’s narrative 

often lacked pertinent facts about the proposed multifamily housing project. These inconsistencies or oversights 

caused inefficiencies. In addition, new underwriting requirements were included in the updates. 
39

In the audit resolution process, Office of Inspector General (OIG) and U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development (HUD) management agree upon needed actions and timeframes for resolving audit 

recommendations. Through this process, OIG strives to achieve measurable improvements in HUD programs and 

operations. The overall responsibility for ensuring that the agreed-upon changes are implemented rests with HUD 

managers. This chapter describes significant management decisions with which OIG disagrees. It also contains a 

status report on HUD’s implementation of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA). 

In addition to this chapter on audit resolution, see appendix 3, table B, “Significant Audit Reports for Which Final 

Action Had Not Been Completed Within 12 Months After the Date of the Inspector General’s Report.”

Audit Reports Issued Before Start of Period With No Management 

Decision as of March 31, 2014

HUD LACKED ADEQUATE CONTROLS TO ENSURE THE TIMELY COMMITMENT AND 

EXPENDITURE OF HOME FUNDS, ISSUE DATE: SEPTEMBER 28, 2009

HUD OIG audited HUD’s HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME). The OIG report included 

a recommendation that the HUD Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD) establish and 

implement controls to ensure that field offices require participating jurisdictions to close out future HOME 

activities within a timeframe that will permit reallocation and use of the funds for eligible activities in time to 

avoid losing them to recapture by the United States Treasury under provisions of Public Law 101-510.

Since the report’s issuance, management has issued three proposals on how to address recommendation 

1D, with the latest proposal being presented on August 27, 2012. OIG rejected all three management decisions 

proposed by CPD to address the recommendation because they did not provide for the establishment and 

implementation of all of the controls that are needed to address the recommendation. 

A portion of the recommendations dealt with the first-in, first-out (FIFO) issue, on which OIG submitted 

a request to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) for an opinion. OIG received a response to 

that request on July 17, 2013. While both HUD and OIG agreed to wait on the final request from GAO before 

responding to the issues noted during the audit for recommendations 3A, 3B, and 3C, no agreement was made in 

relation to recommendation 1D, which also addressed FIFO issues. This issue was referred to the Acting Assistant 

Secretary on March 28, 2014, and the decision was pending as of March 31, 2014. (Audit Report: 2009-AT-0001)

EIGHT AUDIT RESOLUTION

CHAPTER EIGHT AUDIT RESOLUTION
40

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

HUD’S PROPOSED HOME REGULATIONS GENERALLY ADDRESSED SYSTEMIC 

DEFICIENCIES, BUT FIELD OFFICE MONITORING AND DATA VERIFICATION NEED 

IMPROVEMENT, ISSUE DATE: FEBRUARY 12, 2013

As OIG reported to Congress, OIG has longstanding concerns regarding administration of the HOME program, 

and additional oversight is necessary to ensure that grantees comply with HOME program requirements. 

Congress has also mandated that HUD increase controls over the HOME program and implement OIG’s 

recommendations to improve controls.5

 To help HUD comply with that mandate, OIG completed this audit 

and determined that if properly implemented, HUD’s proposed regulatory changes and controls should 

adequately address the systemic deficiencies identified in prior HUD OIG audit reports with the exception of 

(1) the program office’s oversight of grantee monitoring and (2) validating the reliability of HOME data. OIG 

made its recommendations because clarifying the regulations and imposing new requirements on grantees 

to monitor themselves is only the first step in implementing adequate management controls. However, HUD 

continues to be nonresponsive to OIG’s findings and recommendations. 

OIG’s objective was to determine whether HUD’s proposed regulation6

 changes and controls would 

mitigate the systemic deficiencies identified in prior OIG audit reports.7

 During OIG’s review, it summarized 

the results of 77 OIG-issued audit reports on HUD’s HOME program and identified 10 systemic HOME 

deficiency areas. OIG determined that if properly implemented, HUD’s proposed changes to HOME 

regulations and controls should mitigate the systemic deficiencies identified in prior HUD OIG audit reports 

with the exception of (1) the program office’s oversight of grantee monitoring and (2) validating the reliability 

of HOME data. 

CPD program officials’ oversight of field office monitoring and grantee compliance required improvement 

because the quality management review process they relied on failed to identify systemic monitoring flaws and 

officials did not use onsite monitoring data to assess monitoring efforts. As a result, officials could not ensure 

that monitoring was complete and effective and may have missed opportunities to identify systemic issues 

requiring corrective action, such as seldom- or never-monitored and longstanding noncompliant grantees. 

Although CPD officials had improved controls over HOME data in the Integrated Disbursement and 

Information System (IDIS), they lacked a complete process for validating the data. They focused their efforts 

on training, moving the database to a Web-based system, and implementing system controls to improve 

grantee compliance and data reliability. However, the HOME data were not fully validated, and the reliability 

of the data as a whole was unknown. With hundreds of grantees and thousands of subgrantees, reliable data 

are critical in overseeing the program, identifying high-risk grantees to monitor, and responding to public and 

congressional requests regarding the program.

The OIG report included recommendations that the Acting Assistant Secretary for Community Planning 

and Development (1) develop and implement procedures to oversee and assess the effectiveness of field 

offices’ monitoring efforts and (2) develop and implement a quality control system to validate the accuracy 

and reliability of HOME data in IDIS.

HUD CPD did not accept OIG’s findings or recommendations that CPD develop and implement 

procedures to assess the effectiveness and completeness of monitoring efforts (finding 1) and on June 24, 2013, 

provided management decisions that stated, “No action will be taken.” HUD CPD provided management 

decisions for finding 2 on June 20, 2013, that stated, “No action will be taken,” although HUD did agree to add 

a specific, mandatory question to the HOME Monitoring Exhibits for Homeowner Rehabilitation Projects, 

5

 The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012 specifically required the Secretary to (1) take actions 

necessary to improve data quality, data management, and grantee oversight and accountability for programs administered by 

CPD and (2) address the problems identified by the Inspector General audit reports since 2006, including ongoing audits.

6 The final rule was issued July 24, 2013.

7

 The audit scope generally covered the period between January 2006 and January 2012.
41

CHAPTER EIGHT AUDIT RESOLUTION

Homebuyer Projects, and Rental Projects as part of its management decision for recommendation 2B. 

OIG rejected HUD CPD’s proposed management decisions on September 6, 2013, because OIG believes 

that its findings are substantiated and that a “No action will be taken” stance is not acceptable. Congress 

has tasked OIG and HUD to increase controls over the HOME program. Program officials could not show 

that monitoring efforts were effective and complete. As a result, the fraud risk for grantees that were seldom 

or never monitored was not known and may not have been mitigated; systemic deficiencies may not have 

been tested, identified, and mitigated; findings may not have been resolved in a timely manner; continually 

noncompliant grantees may not have been identified; and appropriate corrective action may not have been 

taken to preserve the integrity of the program and conserve HUD resources. 

At a minimum, CPD officials’ oversight should provide reasonable assurance that known instances of 

noncompliance are addressed and corrected. Finding 1 was based in part on the fact that CPD officials did not 

know that the 591 HOME compliance and performance findings reported to Congress had been resolved. OIG 

reported finding 2 because HUD uses IDIS to monitor compliance and prior OIG audit reports showed that 

IDIS data were not reliable. Further, during OIG’s review, CPD officials did not have auditable and verifiable 

procedures to show that HOME IDIS data were verified and reliable. 

Consequently, program officials’ oversight of field office monitoring efforts was insufficient. OIG 

attributed this condition to reliance on ineffective quality management reviews and the lack of procedures to 

evaluate monitoring results in the Grants Management Program database.

OIG and HUD CPD continue to disagree over OIG’s findings and recommendations. The issues 

were referred first on December 11, 2013, to the Acting Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and 

Development, who did not respond, and then on March 28, 2014, to the Acting Deputy Secretary. (Audit 

Report: 2013-BO-0001)

FOLLOW-UP OF THE INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS DIVISION ON ITS 

INSPECTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA’S ROAD HOME ELEVATION INCENTIVE 

PROGRAM HOMEOWNER COMPLIANCE (IED-09-002, MARCH 2010), ISSUE DATE: 

MARCH 29, 2013

HUD OIG conducted a follow-up review regarding its recommendations made to HUD pertaining to its 

inspection of the State of Louisiana’s Road Home Elevation Incentive program, IED-09-002, issued in March 

2010. The objective of the review was to determine whether the State of Louisiana had implemented the four 

recommendations in OIG’s March 2010 report. 

OIG agreed to close three of the four recommendations cited in its March 2010 report. For the remaining 

recommendation regarding the recovery of $3.8 million awarded to 158 noncompliant homeowners, 

documentation showed that the State had recovered nearly $201,000 of the awarded funds. As of August 

31, 2012, the State’s documentation showed that a total of 24,042 homeowners either were noncompliant, 

including those who had not elevated their homes; were nonresponsive; or did not provide sufficient 

supporting documentation. Therefore, the State did not have conclusive evidence that the $698.5 million in 

Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program funds had been used to elevate 

homes. As a result, this recommendation remains open and has been revised based on OIG’s follow-up review 

due to the increased noncompliance among homeowners who received elevation grants. 

OIG recommended that HUD CPD require the State to enforce program remedies for noncompliance as 

stated in grant agreements, starting with the recovery of $437.3 million in elevation grant funds from the 15,027 

homeowners who did not elevate their homes within 3 years of the grant agreement date and the State had not 

collected any of the funds (recommendation 1A); determine whether the 8,462 homeowners who did not respond 

to its monitoring survey used the $245 million in elevation grant funds to elevate their homes or recover these 

funds from the noncompliant homeowners (recommendation 1B); obtain documentation to validate whether the 
42

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

553 homeowners who received $16 million in grant funds elevated their homes or recover these funds from the 

noncompliant homeowners (recommendation 1C); enforce its grant review and recovery procedures to ensure that 

homeowners comply with the terms of their elevation grant agreements (recommendation 1D); and reimburse the 

uncollectible elevation grant funds from non-Federal funds (recommendation 1E). 

On June 5, 2013, OIG received a letter from the State of Louisiana’s Senate. The letter included Senate 

Resolution No. 53, which directed the State Office of Community Development to comply with OIG’s 

recommendations.

On July 26, 2013, OIG obtained HUD’s CPD management decisions for all five recommendations. HUD’s 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Grant Programs agreed with OIG recommendations 1A-D, stating that “CPD will 

continue to ensure program remedies are enforced.” Additionally, CPD provided the following recommended 

proposed actions:

a) The State will work with HUD on proposed action plan amendments targeted to individuals who have not 

complied with elevation requirements but who have completed the required rehabilitation of their home.

b) Within two weeks of the action plan amendment approval/disapproval, the State will launch its 

final compliance notifications, requiring homeowners to demonstrate compliance within 120 days. 

Homeowners that fail to meet the compliance deadline will be turned over to the State’s Attorney 

General’s Office for collections.

c) The State will implement a comprehensive grant collections policy inclusive of additional remedies 

for homeowners unable to repay their full grant amount within the prescribed timelines. The policy 

offers these homeowners the option to repay the entire amount due, repay with a 10-year promissory 

note, submit an alternative payment request based on income and relevant circumstances, or identify 

a settlement amount depending on the homeowner’s income (the State is in the process of establishing 

details for this approach).

d) Within one year of the date of this management decision, the State must identify all noncompliant 

households and, excluding those homeowners with Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) 

applications, must reimburse its line of credit from non-Federal funds for the amount associated with 

non-compliant households.

Regarding recommendation 1E, CPD disagreed but proposed the following recommended action:

e) CPD will continue to ensure program remedies are enforced. Once the State has exhausted all efforts 

to recapture elevation grant funds from non-compliant actions homeowners and contractors, the State 

will have satisfied its due diligence in executing its recapture and recovery procedures. The State will 

undertake the actions identified in Finding Recommendation 1A to obtain repayment, as applicable, 

from non-compliant actions.

On the same day (July 26, 2013) OIG received the proposed management decision, CPD’s Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Special Needs Program responded to the State of Louisiana, concurring with the State’s action 

plan amendments 58, 59, and 60 for CDBG-DR supplemental funding. Specifically, the State’s amendment 60 

allowed homeowners who received a grant under the Road Home Incentive Elevation Program to demonstrate 

that they used those funds to either elevate or rehabilitate their home. 

OIG disagrees with all five proposed management decisions because it has concerns with CPD’s approval 

of the State’s amendment 60.
43

CHAPTER EIGHT AUDIT RESOLUTION

• OIG takes exception to amendment 60 because the elevation incentive agreement indicated that the funds 

were intended to assist the homeowners only to elevate their homes. If the funds were not used for that 

purpose, the funds must be repaid to the State. 

• OIG believes CPD’s changing the scope of work for the expired elevation incentive agreements, entered into 

as early as 2006, to now allow homeowners to rehabilitate their homes overrides the intent of the program 

and is unfair to the homeowners who either elevated their homes or paid back the funds.

• CPD’s approval of amendment 60 leaves those homeowners potentially exposed to home destruction again since 

those homes were not elevated. More importantly, this is more than an issue of homeowners repaying funds. 

These homes remain vulnerable to future storms, and scarce resources were used for an alternative purpose.

• Finally, OIG is concerned with CPD’s completion of the management decision process. On July 26, 2013, 

OIG received HUD’s proposed management decision. The management decision indicated that HUD 

would work with the State on proposed action plan amendments, giving the impression that it was still 

working with the State to reach an agreement on what actions should be taken. However, CPD concurred 

with the amendments on the same day it provided a proposed management decision to OIG. This action 

demonstrates a lack of good faith between the two organizations. Thus, OIG was left with no choice but to 

nonconcur on the proposed management decision.

OIG acknowledges CPD’s and the State’s efforts. However, OIG cannot overlook the expired 3-year compliance 

period and that the Road Home Elevation Incentive homeowners had not elevated the homes, were 

nonresponsive, or did not provide sufficient documentation. Therefore, the State did not have conclusive 

evidence that the $698.5 million in CDBG-DR funds had been used to elevate homes.

OIG reported in its April 1, 2013, through September 30, 2013, Semiannual Report to Congress that it 

disagreed with all five of CPD’s management decisions because of its concerns with CPD’s approval of the 

State’s amendment 60. OIG also previously reported that it had referred the issue to CPD’s Acting Assistant 

Secretary on September 17, 2013. On March 31, 2014, OIG referred the recommendations to HUD’s Acting 

Deputy Secretary because no management decisions had been reached to correct the deficiencies OIG 

identified. The Acting Deputy Secretary’s decision was pending as of March 31, 2014. (Audit Memorandum: 

2013-IE-0803)

HUD’S OVERSIGHT OF THE WAGE RESTITUTION AND DEPOSIT ACCOUNT NEEDS 

IMPROVEMENT, ISSUE DATE: APRIL 16, 2013

HUD OIG audited the Office of Labor Relations deposit account to determine whether (1) controls used 

to administer and distribute restitution payments were adequate and (2) the correct workers received the 

restitution payments.

Labor Relations violated the Miscellaneous Receipts Act when it retained liquidated damages, which 

should have been transferred to the U.S. Treasury. It also indefinitely retained in its deposit account funds 

categorized as unclaimed funds, unfound depositors, and unfound workers. As a result, more than $1.3 

million in funds was withheld from use by various programs within the Federal Government.

Labor Relations mismanaged project deposit funds; specifically, it did not conduct a recurring 

reconciliation of the deposit account. It also expended $20,000 to cover the project payments, which was more 

than the actual balance for the project deposit. As a result, its deposit account balance did not reconcile with 

the balance maintained by the Office of the Chief Financial Officer and the U.S. Treasury.

Labor Relations did not (1) pay the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 2010 taxes withheld from the employee’s 

wage restitution in a timely manner and (2) properly address the employer’s share of the taxes. As a result, it 

delayed paying the IRS more than $200,000 for the 2010 employee’s share of the taxes and could owe the IRS an 

additional $40,000 for the employer’s share of the taxes.
44

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

Labor Relations determined that some workers were deceased or incarcerated, but it paid wage restitution to 

individuals other than these workers. As a result, it paid nearly $12,000 to individuals who were not actual workers. 

Among other things, OIG recommended that HUD work with the Office of the Chief Information Officer to 

improve the deposit module’s reporting capabilities so that Labor Relations staff is able to report and analyze 

the deposit account transactions and taxes or replace the system. 

On July 31, 2013, OIG obtained HUD’s Office of Labor Relations management decisions. HUD’s Director 

of the Office of Departmental Operations and Coordination (ODOC) agrees with OIG’s recommendation to 

improve the deposit module’s reporting capabilities. However, Labor Relations stated that the Office of the 

Chief Information Officer will not provide additional funding to improve the deposit module or replace the 

system. Specifically, Labor Relations stated, “The Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) has not provided 

development funds to the LR2000 system in seven (7) years. For the remainder of FY [fiscal year] 2013, the 

current contract has in fact been de-scoped for maintenance only. However, ODOC has agreed to become part 

of a new Department-wide Enforcement system that will cover the work for OLR [Office of Labor Relations], the 

Office of Healthy Homes and Lead Hazard Control, the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, and the 

Office of General Counsel. The new system is to be called HEMS [HUD Enforcement Systems].” 

In response to OIG’s disagreement referral, issued on September 27, 2013, ODOC’s Director stated that 

“over the past three years that they have endeavored to enhance the LR2000 automated system’s functionality 

and make it compliant with Department’s standards.” She also acknowledged that the referral accurately 

reflected the Office of Labor Relations’ progress to date and inability to obtain working capital funds to 

develop a new system or modernize the existing system. She further agreed that the matter should be referred 

to the Deputy Secretary for a management decision. 

 OIG disagreed with ODOC’s management decision because OIG had not been provided documentation 

that HEMS will have the capabilities necessary to support all of Labor Relations’ activities and functions. OIG 

is specifically concerned that the implementation of the planned departmentwide enforcement system may 

not fulfill the needs of Labor Relations as a replacement for LR2000. The five other systems that are being 

consolidated are all systems that track, monitor, and support departmental investigations to find efficiencies 

and cost savings. While LR2000 allows Labor Relations to track the deposits made, the system also requires the 

functionality to generate vouchers for payments to underpaid workers and 941 payments to the IRS, generate 

IRS Forms W-2 for the workers who receive restitution payments, and interface with electronic payroll review 

systems as well as Office of the Chief Financial Officer systems. The system should also be configured to 

allow for reconciliation of the overall deposit account balance as well as reconciliations of individual project 

balances. LR2000 is a markedly different system from the other departmental enforcement systems, and OIG 

is not sure that consolidating LR2000 into HEMS will provide Labor Relations with the necessary capabilities 

for its activities 

On September 27, 2013, OIG referred the recommendation to the Director of the Office of Departmental 

Operations and Coordination because OIG could not resolve this recommendation. On November 19, 2013, 

OIG referred the recommendation to HUD’s Acting Deputy Secretary because disagreement remains on the 

actions necessary to correct the deficiencies OIG identified. The Acting Deputy Secretary’s decision was 

pending as of March 31, 2014. (Audit Report: 2013-HA-0001)
45

CHAPTER EIGHT AUDIT RESOLUTION

THE CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH DID NOT ALWAYS PROPERLY ADMINISTER ITS 

HOME PROGRAM, ISSUE DATE: SEPTEMBER 30, 2013

HUD OIG audited the City of West Palm Beach’s HOME program to determine whether the City administered 

its program in accordance with applicable HUD requirements.

The City did not always administer its HOME program in accordance with applicable HUD requirements. 

Specifically, it did not properly commit HOME funds or accurately report activity information in IDIS. These 

conditions occurred because the City did not enforce HUD’s 24-month commitment deadline requirement 

and did not have effective procedures to ensure that it reported current and accurate information in IDIS. This 

deficiency resulted in nearly $560,000 in HOME funds not being properly committed because activities were 

committed after the 24-month deadline, and two activities totaling $1 million were canceled, but the funds 

were not made available for other eligible HOME activities.

In addition, the City did not ensure that it charged adequately supported and eligible expenditures to the 

program. These expenditures were related to project delivery and operating costs. This condition occurred because 

City staff did not exercise due care in reviewing and supporting the City’s expenditures. As a result, the City charged 

the HOME program more than $1.2 million in unsupported costs and nearly $230,000 in ineligible costs.

Among other things, OIG recommended that HUD require the City to (1) recapture nearly $560,000 in 

HOME funds that it did not commit by the 24-month statutory deadline (recommendation 1A), (2) recapture 

more than $157,000 in remaining HOME funds for activities not committed by the 24-month statutory 

deadline (recommendation 1B), and (3) reprogram more than $28,000 in remaining funds and deobligate 

nearly $43,000 for funds not expended by the 5-year deadline (recommendation 2C). 

 HUD disagrees with OIG on recommendations 1A, 1B, and a portion of 2C related to the expenditure 

deadline. Regarding recommendations 1A and 1B, HUD states that the method used to determine 

compliance with the statutory HOME 24-month commitment requirement is detailed at 24 CFR (Code of 

Federal Regulations) 92.500(d)(2). Further explanation of this method is found in HUD Notice CPD 07-

06, Commitment, CHDO [community housing development organization] Reservation, and Expenditure 

Deadline Requirements for the HOME Program (June 1, 2007). While HUD understands that its method of 

determining compliance was recently found by GAO to be noncompliant with the statutory language found 

in section 218(g) of Title II of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, as amended, HUD is 

making regulatory and systematic changes that will allow HOME participating jurisdictions to fully comply 

with the HOME statutory commitment requirement in the future. At the time the participating jurisdiction 

committed funds to the activities identified by OIG in finding 1, it was found to be in compliance with the 

HOME regulation at 24 CFR 92.500(d)(2). HUD cannot hold HOME participating jurisdictions accountable 

for requirements that are not set forth in regulation or guidance, especially when the participating jurisdiction 

was determined by HUD to be in compliance with the current regulation and guidance.

Regarding recommendation 2C, HUD agrees that the City must reprogram more than $28,000 in 

remaining funds for completed activity 699. However, HUD does not agree that nearly $43,000 in unexpended 

funds should be deobligated based on the rationale provided for recommendations 1A and 1B. 

OIG rejected HUD CPD’s proposed management decisions on March 12, 2014. At this time, HUD has 

not provided proposed corrective action on HUD OIG Audit Report 2014-FO-0003, recommendations 1A, 1B, 

1C, 15A, 15B, and 15C that address how HUD’s cumulative method for determining compliance and the FIFO 

method of accounting for grants violated statutory and generally accepted accounting principles. Any corrective 

action provided needs to take into account the FIFO effect on past grants and its impact on the funding of the 

grantees. Thus, OIG cannot accept any management decision that does not take into account the corrective 

action HUD plans to take to address GAO’s8

 and the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) decision. These 

issues were referred to the General Deputy Assistant Secretary on March 31, 2014. (Audit Report: 2013-AT-1008)

8 GAO issued a legal opinion on HUD HOME program grants – Statutory Commitment Deadline. Opinion number B-322077, 

issued July 17, 2013. 
46

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

Significantly Revised Management Decisions

Section 5(a)(11) of the Inspector General Act, as amended, requires that OIG report information concerning 

the reasons for any significantly revised management decisions made during the reporting period. During the 

current reporting period, there were significantly revised management decisions on five audits.

BAYTOWN HOUSING AUTHORITY, BAYTOWN, TX, IMPROPERLY ADVANCED, 

TRANSFERRED, AND ENCUMBERED ITS PUBLIC HOUSING FUNDS, ISSUE DATE: 

DECEMBER 13, 2005

OIG issued an audit report entitled “Baytown Housing Authority, Baytown, TX, Improperly Advanced, 

Transferred, and Encumbered Its Public Housing Funds.” For recommendation 1C, the Houston Office of 

Public Housing agreed with the recommendation that the Authority should repay its public housing program 

$200,000 for a certificate of deposit used to encumber HUD funds and repay its low-rent program nearly 

$100,000 for a second certificate of deposit unless the Authority could provide evidence that it purchased 

the certificate from non-HUD funds. In September 2011, Public Housing revised the management decision 

to having the Authority’s nonprofit transfer land in lieu of cash repayment. OIG concurred with the revised 

management decision. In 2012, the Authority began constructing new housing on the land, and in 2013, 

it completed construction and placed the housing under an annual contributions contract with HUD. An 

appraisal has determined the value of the land and housing to be $475,000, which was $175,000 more than the 

recommendation. The $475,000 was entered as property recovered in lieu of cash. OIG concurred with the 

revised costs, and the recommendation was closed on February 12, 2014. (Audit Report 2006-FW-1002)

ANCHOR MORTGAGE CORPORATION, CHICAGO, IL, LOAN ORIGINATION 

FRAUD – VIOLATIONS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, ISSUE DATE: 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2010

HUD OIG conducted a review of FHA loan origination practices of Anchor Mortgage Corporation. Based 

in part on OIG’s results, the U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Northern District of Illinois sued the lender and its 

owner under the False Claims Act. In August 2010, the district court concluded that Anchor had provided 

false information or violated HUD regulations when submitting 11 loans for FHA insurance. The district court 

entered a judgment of nearly $2.8 million in damages and penalties against the lender and more than $226,000 

in damages and penalties against its owner. The owner later paid the judgment against him; however, the 

owner appealed the judgment against Anchor in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appeals 

court reconsidered the assessment of damages under the False Claims Act and reduced the judgment against 

Anchor to a little more than $1.4 million. 

OIG initially recorded the original judgment against Anchor at nearly $2.8 million, with HUD’s Office 

of General Counsel agreement as to the outcome of the case. However, due to the appeals court decision to 

significantly reduce the judgment to $1.4 million, OIG and HUD agreed to revise the case outcome through a 

revised management decision to reflect the final judgment amount imposed against Anchor. OIG concurred 

with HUD’s March 18, 2014, revised management decision. (Audit Memorandum: 2010-CF-1801)
47

CHAPTER EIGHT AUDIT RESOLUTION

THE LAFAYETTE PARISH HOUSING AUTHORITY VIOLATED HUD PROCUREMENT 

REQUIREMENTS AND EXECUTED UNREASONABLE AND UNNECESSARY CONTRACTS, 

ISSUE DATE: JUNE 22, 2011

HUD OIG issued an audit report relating to the Lafayette Parish Housing Authority’s violation of HUD 

procurement requirements. For recommendation 1K, the New Orleans Office of Public Housing agreed with 

the recommendation that the Authority should remain under HUD receivership for at least a year or until it 

can demonstrate to HUD that its procurement and other practices consistently meet Federal requirements. 

After the HUD receivership was lifted and an executive director was hired, HUD agreed to place the Authority 

on a zero dollar threshold for at least a year or until it can demonstrate to HUD that its procurement and 

other practices consistently meet Federal requirements. In September 2012, HUD placed the Authority under 

HUD receivership, with HUD staff assigned as the receiver, and the Authority hired a chief operating officer. 

It was the intent that the chief operating officer would benefit from the receiver’s presence and ultimately be 

considered as the potential executive director of the Authority when it was returned to local control. However, 

resolution had not been reached by September 2012, and HUD requested OIG approval to extend the final 

action target date until September 30, 2014. OIG denied this request due to a lack of adequate information to 

justify an extension. 

In March of 2013, HUD again requested OIG approval to extend the final action target date until 

December 31, 2013. At that time, the next board of commissioners could not be appointed by the mayor of 

Lafayette until a court hearing, scheduled for March 27, 2013, was concluded. The purpose for the hearing 

was for the court to render a decision on the mayor’s appeal to a contempt of court citation against him by 

the deciding judge. The court’s decision was needed to determine whether the mayor would be required to 

reappoint the removed board members or to appoint new board members. After the court hearing, HUD 

planned to request that the mayor appoint a new board and require the board to participate in a 3-month 

training before HUD could make a determination of when the Authority would be released from receivership. 

OIG agreed to extend the final action target date to December 31, 2013. 

By December 24, 2013, HUD’s many attempts to get the parish president or mayor to appoint a new 

board had failed, thereby making it impossible for HUD to return the Authority to local control and meet the 

December 31, 2013, final action target date. Therefore, on December 27, 2013, HUD proposed to change the 

management decision to (1) request that HUD’s Assistant Secretary or General Deputy Assistant Secretary 

reach out to the parish president to discuss the urgency of making the appointments and give the parish 

president 60 days to have the advisory board in place and (2) if the parish president continues to refuse to 

appoint the advisory board, notify the parish president that HUD may consider taking alternate actions, such 

as withholding HUD funding, including CDBG and HOME funding, or merging the Authority with another 

housing authority. HUD also proposed extending the final action target date to December 31, 2014. On 

December 30, 2013, OIG concurred with the revised management decision and extended the final action target 

date to December 31, 2014. (Audit Report 2011-AO-0001)

THE MANAGEMENT AND BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE HOUSING 

AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, TX, FAILED TO EXERCISE THEIR 

FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES, ISSUE DATE: JUNE 12, 2012

OIG issued an audit report entitled “The Management and Board of Commissioners of the Housing Authority 

of the City of Port Arthur, TX, Failed To Exercise Their Fiduciary Responsibilities.” For recommendation 4A, 

OIG recommended that the Director of the Houston Office of Public Housing recapture more than $469,000 

that the Authority drew as replacement reserves from its 2006 and 2007 Capital Fund grants. HUD agreed to 
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SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

recapture the funds if the Authority did not meet certain deadline dates for the disposition and replacement of 

the Authority’s Carver Terrace project. In March 2014, Public Housing indicated that the Authority had entered 

into agreements and closed on the mixed financing for the project. HUD submitted a revised management 

decision indicating that the Authority had met the deadline dates and asked OIG to record more than $469,000 

as nonrecovered. OIG concurred with this revision on March 27, 2014. (Audit Report 2012-FW-1008)

THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF EL PASO, TX, DID NOT FOLLOW 

RECOVERY ACT OBLIGATION REQUIREMENTS OR PROCUREMENT POLICIES, ISSUE 

DATE: APRIL 12, 2013

OIG issued an audit report relating to the Housing Authority of the City of El Paso, TX, not following 

procurement policies. For recommendation 2A, the Fort Worth Office of Public Housing disagreed with the 

recommendation that the Authority should support 11 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 

procurements totaling nearly $5.9 million or repay the amounts to HUD, which would return the funds to 

the U.S. Treasury. The recommendation was elevated to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Housing 

and Investments. In August 2013, the Deputy Assistant Secretary indicated that the Authority would submit 

a request for a waiver of the competitive requirements of 24 CFR Part 85 under the public exigency exception 

as detailed in Public and Indian Housing Notice 2009-12. If a waiver could not be granted, the funds would 

be returned to HUD. In December 2013, the Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing granted the 

Authority a waiver of Federal procurement requirements. HUD stated that exemptions were needed because 

the Authority did not completely follow ARRA procurement procedures or Public Housing’s ARRA notices and 

the Authority did not document its files to suggest that these were noncompetitive procurements. HUD noted 

that ARRA’s shortened obligation period led to the errors and that it was convinced of the public exigency 

related to the funding with respect to each of the 11 contracts. Thus, HUD determined that there was good 

cause to grant 11 exceptions for the Authority’s processing of the contracts. Based on these waivers, HUD 

determined that the contract amounts questioned as unsupported in the recommendation were supported. 

OIG concurred with the revised management decision on December 23, 2013, that the amounts were 

supported. (Audit Report 2013-FW-1004)

Significant Management Decision With Which OIG Disagrees

During the reporting period, there was one report in which OIG disagreed with the significant management 

decision.

GENERALLY, HUD’S HURRICANE DISASTER RECOVERY PROGRAM ASSISTED THE 

GULF COAST STATES’ RECOVERY; HOWEVER, SOME PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS ARE 

NEEDED, ISSUE DATE:  MARCH 28, 2013

HUD OIG audited HUD’s State CDBG-DR program for hurricanes that hit the Gulf Coast States from August 2005 

through September 2008. The audit objective was to assess the program overall. Specifically, OIG wanted to (1)

determine what had been accomplished using the funding and the funds remaining to be spent; (2) compare 

actual versus projected performance; and (3) identify best practices, issues, and lessons to be learned.

The Gulf Coast States had made progress in recovering from the presidentially declared disasters as a 

result of several hurricanes. Although the States had made progress, based on OIG’s prior audits and a review 

of the program’s data, there have been some lessons to be learned regarding deadlines, program guidance, 

information system technology acquisitions, procurements, and homeowners’ insurance. If HUD makes 

needed changes, it should improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the program.
49

The audit found that some States did not take sufficient steps to protect the invested Federal funds, which 

the States used to rebuild or rehabilitate homes. OIG recommended that CPD’s Director of the Office of Block 

Grant Assistance adopt a best practice to address the issue of homeowners’ insurance for homes assisted with 

disaster funds to ensure that Federal funds invested in the homes are protected (recommendation 2H). CPD 

disagreed with the recommendation, preferring to offer training and technical assistance to grantees regarding 

different strategies that can be used to improve insurance coverage. CPD also stated that it would continue to 

highlight examples of how grantees can mitigate the risk of damage from future disasters, including requiring 

that future grantees elevate properties to higher standards and recommending that grantees identify insurance 

requirements as part of their program design for any CDBG-DR-funded rebuilding program. Although OIG 

continues to believe that having CPD establish a best practice concerning homeowners’ insurance would 

better protect the Federal funds invested in rebuilt homes, OIG closed the recommendation as agreeing to 

disagree. (Audit Report: 2013-FW-0001)

Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996

HUD did not substantially comply with FFMIA during fiscal year 2013. HUD made limited progress in 

bringing its financial management systems into compliance with FFMIA. For this reason, HUD’s financial 

management systems continued to not meet current requirements. HUD’s systems were not operated in an 

integrated fashion and linked electronically to efficiently and effectively provide agencywide financial system 

support necessary to carry out the agency’s mission and support the agency’s financial management needs.

HUD’s financial systems, many of which were developed and implemented before the issue date of 

current standards, were not designed to provide the range of financial and performance data currently 

required. HUD has been working to replace its current core financial management system since fiscal year 

2003. The previous project, the HUD Integrated Financial Management Improvement Project (HIFMIP), was 

based on plans to implement a solution to replace two of the applications currently used for core processing. 

In March 2012, work on HIFMIP was stopped. Project sponsorship was transferred from the Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer (OCFO) to the Deputy Secretary. The Deputy Secretary and a working group comprised of 

OCFO, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, and the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer reassessed 

HUD’s options and determined that the planned HIFMIP solution was not a viable option. As a result, the 

HIFMIP effort was canceled. HUD spent more than $35 million on the failed HIFMIP project.

In the fall of 2012, HUD determined that it would reevaluate alternatives for meeting HUD’s original 

program objectives. As a result of that decision, the New Core Project was created to move HUD forward to 

implement a new core financial system. The New Core Project has the same scope as HIFMIP, to replace, at 

a minimum, the functionality of two of the applications currently used for core processing during the initial 

phase of the project. On July 30, 2013, HUD signed an interagency agreement with the Bureau of Public Debt 

(BPD) to obtain full Federal shared services. Full service leverages BPD’s financial management, procurement, 

human resources, and travel applications. BPD will support full transaction processing to operate these 

systems. HUD concluded that this option provided the most value to HUD by leveraging modern technologies 

in cloud computing and by reducing implementation risks. In September 2013, HUD began the definition 

stage of the project to determine what business process changes will be required as a result of the transition. 

FFMIA requires OIG to report in its Semiannual Reports to the Congress instances and reasons when an 

agency has not met the intermediate target dates established in its remediation plan required by FFMIA. At the 

end of 2013, HUD reported that 5 of the 39 financial management systems were not in substantial compliance 

with FFMIA. These five systems are (1) Ginnie Mae Financial Accounting System, (2) IDIS, (3) Facilities 

Integrated Resources Management System (FIRMS), (4) HUD Procurement System (HPS), and (5) Small Purchase 

System (SPS). OIG reported two additional non-FFMIA-compliant systems (HUD Integrated Acquisition 

CHAPTER EIGHT AUDIT RESOLUTION
50

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

Management System (HIAMS) and HUD Central and Accounting Processing System (HUDCAPS)). OIG and 

HUD were in disagreement about HUD’s substantial compliance with FFMIA with respect to these systems. 

The FIRMS application does not interface with any other HUD system as required for a property 

management system. Currently, HUD uses a manual process to track and account for the acquisition, 

depreciation, and disposition of fixed assets. Although steps had been taken and efforts were underway to 

address the issue in fiscal year 2013, FIRMS was not fully operational in fiscal year 2013. HUD anticipated 

remediating the FIRMS issue by February 2014. Therefore, FIRMS was not compliant with the requirements of 

FFMIA for fiscal year 2013.

HUD acquired a new application, HIAMS, to replace HPS and SPS on September 30, 2010. The HIAMS 

application went live on October 1, 2011. The HIAMS implementation used a phased approach; therefore, 

HPS and SPS were still operational and used during fiscal year 2012. OIG performed a limited review of 

the implementation of HIAMS during fiscal year 2012 and found that obligation balances in HIAMS were 

inaccurate and did not match the balances in HUDCAPS. Because HPS and SPS did not contain the same 

level of contract data that is required in HIAMS, OCPO developed a data cleanup and transfer process that 

used a combination of electronic and manual migration of data from the legacy systems to HIAMS. Due to 

the legacy systems’ limitations in capturing subaccount line data, the contracting officials used hardcopy 

award documents to manually enter the appropriate subaccount line data into the HIAMS application. 

Discrepancies were identified, and HUD initiated a reconciliation process to correct the data within HIAMS. 

As a result of the data discrepancies between the HIAMS and HUDCAPS applications, the HIAMS application 

was not compliant with the requirements of FFMIA for fiscal year 2012. 

HUD asserted that the data discrepancies between the HIAMS and HUDCAPS applications were resolved 

in September 2013. OIG is working to verify this assertion. 

During fiscal year 2013, OIG performed a review of HUDCAPS and determined that the application 

was noncompliant with FFMIA requirements. To be FFMIA compliant, a core financial application or an 

application performing core financial functions must be compliant with core financial system requirements. 

The core financial system requirements state that the agency core financial system must contain automated 

processes to perform payment management functions. HUDCAPS does not import or update vendor data in 

accordance with requirements and does not meet all accounts payable, invoicing, disbursing, and payment 

follow-up requirements related to how payments are processed. For instance, HUDCAPS does not record full 

or partial receipt and acceptance of goods and services by document line item; perform matching options 

that match invoices to obligations, receiving reports, and acceptance data; and validate invoice period of 

performance and invoice delivery and performance dates and is not used to calculate the payment amount, 

including discounts, interest, and penalties. Therefore, HUDCAPS does not meet the core financial system 

requirements for the payment management function, making it noncompliant with FFMIA. HUD did not 

declare the HUDCAPS application to be noncompliant with FFMIA.

Although HUD certified 34 individual systems as compliant with Federal financial management systems 

requirements, HUD did not perform independent reviews of all of its financial management systems in 

accordance with OMB Circular A-127 in the last 4 years. Instead, HUD relied upon the results of OMB 

Circular A-123 and Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) annual internal control reviews 

for individual applications. In fiscal year 2013, OIG determined that HUD’s information security program had 

significant deficiencies and many areas of the program were not FISMA compliant. Collectively and in the 

aggregate, systems deficiencies continued to exist. 
51

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Public Law No. 111-203), section 989C, requires 

inspectors general to report the latest peer review results in their semiannual reports to Congress. The purpose in 

doing so is to enhance transparency within the government. Both the Office of Audit and Office of Investigation are 

required to undergo a peer review of their individual organizations every 3 years. The purpose of the review is to 

ensure that the work completed by the respective organizations meets the applicable requirements and standards. 

The following is a summary of the status of the latest round of peer reviews for the organization. 

OFFICE OF AUDIT

PEER REVIEW CONDUCTED ON HUD OIG

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Inspector General (HUD OIG), received a 

grade of pass (the highest rating) on the peer review report issued by U.S. Department of Education Inspector 

General on September 28, 2012. There were no recommendations included in the System Review Report. The 

report stated: 

In our opinion, the system of quality control in effect for the year ended March 31, 2012, for the 

audit organization of the HUD OIG has been suitably designed and complied with to provide the 

HUD OIG with reasonable assurance of performing and reporting in conformity with applicable 

professional standards in all material respects. Federal audit organizations can receive a rating of 

pass, pass with deficiencies, or fail. The HUD OIG has received a peer review rating of pass. 

PEER REVIEW CONDUCTED BY HUD OIG ON DOD

HUD OIG conducted an external peer review of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) OIG, Office of Audit, 

and issued a final report November 13, 2012. DoD OIG received a peer review rating of pass (with a scope 

limitation). There are no outstanding recommendations. A copy of the external quality control review report 

can be viewed at www.dodig.mil/pubs/reviews.html.

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION

PEER REVIEW CONDUCTED BY HUD OIG ON SSA OIG

HUD OIG conducted an external peer review of the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) OIG, Office of 

Investigation, and issued a final report on August 12, 2013. HUD OIG determined that SSA OIG complied with 

applicable quality standards.

PEER REVIEW CONDUCTED ON HUD OIG

The most recent peer review of the Office of Investigation was conducted in 2011 by the U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services OIG. The results of the peer review found HUD OIG compliant (the highest rating) with the 

quality of standards established by the inspector general community and the attorney general guidelines.

APPENDIX 1 PEER REVIEW REPORTING

APPENDIX 1 PEER REVIEW REPORTING 
52

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

INTERNAL REPORTS

AUDIT REPORTS

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

2014-DP-0001 Information System Control Weaknesses Identified in the Line of Credit Control System, 

11/07/2013.

2014-DP-0003 Information System Control Weaknesses Identified in the Housing and Urban Development 

Central Accounting and Program System, 01/15/2014.

2014-DP-0004 Information System Control Weaknesses Identified in the Financial Data Mart, 03/13/2014.

2014-FO-0003 Additional Details To Supplement Our Report On HUD's Fiscal Years 2013 and 2012 (Restated) 

Financial Statements, 12/16/2013. Better use: $902,859,352.

CHIEF PROCUREMENT OFFICER

2014-KC-0001 HUD Awarded an Architectural and Engineering Contract Without Conducting an Adequate 

Price Analysis and Paid the Contractor Without Adequate Support, 03/04/2014.

 COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

2014-LA-0001 CPD Did Not Monitor Grantees’ CPD-Funded Assets Transferred by Former Redevelopment 

Agencies To Minimize HUD’s Risk, 02/28/2014. Better use: $99,291,911.

2014-LA-0002 CPD Did Not Monitor NSP Grantees’ Payments of Developer Fees to Developers, 03/10/2014.

GOVERNMENT NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION

2014-FO-0001 Government National Mortgage Association Fiscal Years 2013 and 2012 Financial Statements 

Audit, 12/06/2013.

HOUSING

2014-AT-0001 Violations Increased the Cost of Housing’s Administration of Its Bond Refund Program, 

03/14/2014. Questioned: $2,761,593; unsupported: $139,969; better use: $279,639.

2014-DP-0002 Application Control Weaknesses Identified in the Asset Disposition and Management System, 

01/14/2014.

2014-FO-0002 Federal Housing Administration Fiscal Years 2013 and 2012 Financial Statements Audit, 

12/13/2013. Better use: $100,000,000.

APPENDIX 2 AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED 
53

APPENDIX 2 AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED

2014-NY-0001 HUD Did Not Provide Effective Oversight of Section 202 Multifamily Project Refinances, 

02/19/2014. Better use: $21,097,996.

PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING

2014-BO-0001 HUD’s Procedures Do Not Always Ensure the Proper Use and Timely Reimbursement of Public 

Housing Agency Interfund Transaction Balances, 03/21/2014. Questioned: $2,216,321.

2014-FW-0001

The Boston Office of Public Housing Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Environmental 

Reviews of Three Housing Agencies, Including Reviews Involving Recovery Act Funds, 

02/07/2014. Questioned: $85,642,077; unsupported: $80,759,094.

AUDIT-RELATED MEMORANDUMS9

CHIEF PROCUREMENT OFFICER

2014-FO-0801 HUD’s Semiannual Purchase Card Violation Report, 03/19/2014.

PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING

2014-NY-0801 HUD's Monitoring and Administration of the Housing Choice Voucher Family Self-Sufficiency 

Program, 10/30/2013.

EXTERNAL REPORTS

AUDIT REPORTS

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

2014-AT-1001 The Municipality of Arecibo Did Not Properly Administer Its HOME Program, Arecibo, PR, 

12/03/2013. Questioned: $1,057,491; unsupported: $1,057,491; better use: $30,919.

2014-AT-1003

The City of Memphis Did Not Have Effective Controls To Administer Its Housing and 

Rehabilitation Program Activities, Memphis, TN, 12/30/2013. Questioned: $401,719; 

unsupported: $381,855.

2014-AT-1004

The State of Mississippi Did Not Ensure That Its Subrecipient and Appraisers Complied With 

Requirements, and It Did Not Fully Implement Adequate Procedures For Its Disaster 

Infrastructure Program, Jackson, MS, 12/30/2013. Questioned: $2,165,915; unsupported: 

$2,165,915.

2014-CH-1001 The City of Flint Lacked Adequate Controls Over Its HOME Investment Partnerships Program, 

Flint, MI, 11/15/2013. Questioned: $303,040; unsupported: $107,587; better use: $102,880.

9 The memorandum format is used to communicate the results of reviews not performed in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards, to close out assignments with no findings and recommendations, to respond to requests for 

information, to report on the results of a survey, or to report the results of civil actions or settlements.
54

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

2014-CH-1002

The City of Detroit Lacked Adequate Controls Over Its Neighborhood Stabilization ProgramFunded Demolition Activities Under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Detroit, 

MI, 01/06/2014. Questioned: $298,635; unsupported: $18,083; better use: $2,050,760.

2014-KC-1002 The City of Joplin Complied With CDBG Disaster Recovery Regulations, Joplin, MO, 01/29/2014.

2014-KC-1003

The City of Kansas City Did Not Properly Obligate Its NSP1 Grant Funds and Allowed Its 

Subrecipient to Enter Into Contracts Without the Required Provisions, Kansas City, MO, 

02/05/2014.

2014-PH-1001 The City of Norfolk Generally Failed To Justify Its CDBG Activities, Norfolk, VA, 12/17/2013. 

Questioned: $11,548,506; unsupported: $11,548,506.

2014-SE-1001 Allegations Against Clare View Seniors Apartments, LP, Had Been Corrected or Did Not Violate 

HUD Requirements, Spokane, WA, 02/04/2014.

HOUSING

2014-DE-1001 The Wyoming Community Development Authority Properly Administered HUD's Loss Mitigation 

Program, Casper, WY, 01/22/2014.

2014-KC-1001

Windridge Apartments Did Not Administer Its Program in Accordance With HUD Rules and 

Regulations and Its Own Policies and Procedures, Wichita, KS, 11/07/2013. Questioned: 

$239,827; unsupported: $200,362.

2014-LA-1001 Marina Village Apartments Was Not Always Administered in Accordance With HUD 

Requirements, Sparks, NV, 10/24/2013. Questioned: $45,413; better use: $45,656.

PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING

2014-AT-1002

The Housing Authority of the City of Lumberton Did Not Administer Its Public Housing Program 

in Accordance With Requirements, Lumberton, NC, 12/05/2013. Questioned: $159,361; 

unsupported: $157,861.

2014-BO-1001

The Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport Did Not Always Ensure That Expenses Charged 

to Its Federal Programs Were Eligible, Reasonable, and Supported, Bridgeport, CT, 01/23/2014. 

Questioned: $1,686,407; unsupported: $790,555; better use: $45,276.

2014-NY-1001

The Paterson Housing Authority Had Weaknesses in Administration of its Housing Choice 

Voucher Program, Paterson, NJ, 01/15/2014. Questioned: $4,148,434; unsupported: 

$4,060,604; better use: $4,132,900.

2014-PH-1002

The Hopewell Redevelopment and Housing Authority Generally Used Housing Choice Voucher 

and Public Housing Program Funds in Accordance With Applicable Requirements, Hopewell, VA, 

02/04/2014.

2014-PH-1003

The Housing Authority of the County of Lackawanna Needs To Improve Its Controls Over Its 

Operations To Comply With HUD Requirements, Dunmore, PA, 02/28/2014. Better use: 

$370,234.
55

APPENDIX 2 AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED

AUDIT-RELATED MEMORANDUMS10 

COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

2014-AT-1801

Vieques Sports City Complex, Office of the Commissioner for Municipal Affairs, Section 108 

Loan Guarantee Program, San Juan, PR, 03/20/2014. Questioned: $10,876,095; unsupported: 

$10,876,095.

GENERAL COUNSEL

2014-AT-1802 Leo Thomas-Lender Official Settled Violations of FHA Lending Requirements, Raleigh, NC, 

03/26/2014. Questioned: $115,000.

2014-AT-1803 Final Civil Action: Kenneth Register-Lender Official Settled Violations of FHA Lending 

Requirements, Raleigh, NC, 03/26/2014. Questioned: $10,000.

2014-CF-1801 Violations of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Real Estate Owned Program 

Requirements, Dayton, OH, 01/29/2014. Questioned: $7,500.

2014-CF-1802 Real Estate Agent Violated U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Real EstateOwned Program Requirements, Dayton, OH, 02/24/2014. Questioned: $5,000.

2014-CF-1803 Real Estate Broker Violated U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Real EstateOwned Program Requirements, Dayton, OH, 02/24/2014. Questioned: $500.

2014-CF-1804 Section 8 Landlord Settled Violations of the Housing Choice Voucher Program, Orlando, FL, 

02/26/2014. Questioned: $10,000.

2014-PH-1801 Final Civil Action, James B. Nutter & Co. and Underwriter, Lender Settled Alleged Violations of 

Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Program, Washington, DC, 03/27/2014. Better use: $7,500.

2014-PH-1802 Final Action, Bank of America, NA, and Underwriter, Lender Settled Alleged Violations of Home 

Equity Conversion Mortgage Program, Washington, DC, 03/27/2014.

PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING

2014-FW-1801

The Colfax Housing Authority Did Not Properly Administer Its Programs, Including Its 2009 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Grant, Colfax, LA, 11/08/2013. Questioned: 

$1,034,694; unsupported: $1,031,961.

2014-FW-1802

The Management of the Housing Authority of the City of Nixon Did Not Exercise Adequate 

Oversight and Allowed Ineligible and Unsupported Costs, Nixon, TX, 03/31/2014. Questioned: 

$116,341; unsupported: $109,861.

10 The memorandum format is used to communicate the results of reviews not performed in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards, to close out assignments with no findings and recommendations, to respond to requests for information, 

to report on the results of a survey, or to report the results of civil actions or settlements.
56

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

TABLE A

Audit Reports issued before the start of period with no management 

decision at 03/31/2014 

REPORT NUMBER & TITLE REASON FOR LACK OF MANAGEMENT DECISION ISSUE DATE

2009-AT-0001, HUD Lacked Adequate 

Controls to Ensure the Timely Commitment and Expenditure of HOME funds11

See chapter 8, page 39 09/28/2009

2013-BO-0001, HUD’s Proposed 

HOME Regulations Generally Addressed 

Systemic Deficiencies, but Field Office 

Monitoring and Data Validation Need 

Improvement

See chapter 8, page 40 02/12/2013

2013-IE-0803, Follow-up of the Inspections and Evaluations Division on 

Its Inspection of the State of Louisiana’s 

Road Home Elevation Incentive Program 

Homeowner Compliance (IED-09-002, 

March 2010)

See chapter 8, page 41 03/29/2013

2013-HA-0001, HUD’s Oversight of the 

Wage Restitution and Deposit Account 

Needs Improvement11

See chapter 8, page 43 04/16/2013

 2013-AT-1008, The City of West Palm 

Beach Did Not Always Properly 

Administer Its HOME Program11

See chapter 8, page 45 09/30/2013

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

11 Significant audit reports described in previous semiannual reports 
57

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2002-AT-1002 Housing Authority of the City of Tupelo, 

Housing Programs Operations, Tupelo, MS

07/03/2002 10/31/2002 07/01/2015

2002-KC-0002 Nationwide Survey of HUD's Office of 

Housing Section 232 Nursing Home Program

07/31/2002 11/22/2002 Note 1

2005-AT-1013

Corporacion Para el Fomento Economico 

de la Ciudad Capital Did Not Administer Its 

Independent Capital Fund in Accordance 

With HUD Requirements, San Juan, PR

09/15/2005 01/11/2006 Note 1

2006-NY-0001

HUD’s Controls over the Reporting, Oversight, 

and Monitoring of the Housing Counseling 

Assistance Program Were Not Adequate

06/08/2006 01/08/2007 10/01/2015

2006-KC-1013

The Columbus Housing Authority 

Improperly Expended and Encumbered Its 

Public Housing Funds, Columbus, NE

08/30/2006 10/17/2006 11/30/2014

2006-DP-0802

Assessment of HUD’s Compliance With 

OMB Memorandum M-06-16, “Protection 

of Sensitive Agency Information”

09/21/2006 11/24/2006 09/30/2014

2007-KC-0002 HUD Can Improve Its Use of Residual Receipts 

To Reduce Housing Assistance Payments

01/29/2007 01/29/2007 Note 1

2007-KC-0003 HUD Did Not Recapture Excess Funds 

from Assigned Bond-Financed Projects

04/30/2007 08/27/2007 Note 1

2007-AT-1010

The Cathedral Foundation of Jacksonville 

Used More Than $2.65 Million in Project 

Funds for Questioned Costs, Jacksonville, FL

08/14/2007 12/03/2007 04/10/2017

2008-AO-1002

State of Louisiana, Road Home 

Program, Funded 418 Grants Coded 

Ineligible or Lacking an Eligibility 

Determination, Baton Rouge, LA

01/30/2008 05/12/2008 Note 1

TABLE B 

Significant Audit Reports for which final action had not been completed 

within 12 months after the date of the Inspector General’s report
58

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2008-AT-0003

HUD Lacked Adequate Controls Over 

the Physical Condition of Section 8 

Voucher Program Housing Stock

05/14/2008 09/10/2008 10/31/2014

2008-DP-0004 Review of Selected FHA Major Applications’ 

Information Security Controls

06/12/2008 10/08/2008 Note 1

2008-LA-1012

The Housing Authority of the City of Calexico 

Did Not Comply With Public Housing 

Program Rules and Regulations, Calexico, CA

07/01/2008 10/14/2008 12/31/2014

2009-BO-1002

Orchard Court Multifamily Project Was 

Not Properly Managed in Accordance 

with HUD Regulations, Bath, ME

11/06/2008 01/16/2009 02/19/2015

2009-AO-1001

State of Louisiana, Road Home Program, 

Did Not Ensure That Road Home Employees 

Were Eligible To Receive Additional 

Compensation Grants, Baton Rouge, LA

05/05/2009 09/16/2009 Note 1

2009-AO-1002

State of Louisiana, Road Home Program, 

Did Not Ensure That Multiple Disbursements 

to a Single Damaged Residence Address 

Were Eligible, Baton Rouge, LA

05/05/2009 09/16/2009 Note 1

2009-CH-1008

The City of East Cleveland Did Not Adequately 

Manage Its HOME Investment Partnerships 

and CDBG Programs, East Cleveland, OH

05/11/2009 09/08/2009 07/31/2014

2009-NY-1012

The City of Rome Did Not Administer 

Its Economic Development 

Activity in Accordance With HUD 

Requirements, Rome, NY

05/20/2009 09/23/2009 01/30/2032

2009-DP-0005 Review of Implementation of Security 

Controls Over HUD's Business Partners

06/11/2009 11/17/2009 12/31/2014

2009-CH-1011

The Housing Authority of the City of 

Terre Haute Failed To Follow Federal 

Requirements and Its Employment 

Contract Regarding Nonprofit 

Development Activities, Terre Haute, IN

07/31/2009 11/24/2009 04/01/2015

2009-AT-0001

HUD Lacked Adequate Controls To 

Ensure the Timely Commitment and 

Expenditure of HOME funds

09/28/2009 03/18/2011 Note 3
59

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2010-KC-1003

The City of East St. Louis Did Not Properly 

Allocate Salary and Building Expenses or 

Properly Document Its Process To Secure a 

Consulting Services Contract, East St. Louis, IL

03/26/2010 07/22/2010 Note 1

2010-AT-1003 The Housing Authority of Whitesburg 

Mismanaged Its Operations, Whitesburg, KY

04/28/2010 08/26/2010 11/29/2035

2010-PH-1008

Sasha Bruce Youthwork, Incorporated, 

Did Not Support More Than $1.9 Million 

in Expenditures, Washington, DC

05/11/2010 11/03/2010 Note 1

2010-AT-1006

The Puerto Rico Department of 

Housing Failed To Properly Manage 

Its HOME Investment Partnerships 

Program, San Juan, PR

06/11/2010 10/08/2010 Note 1

2010-CH-1008

The DuPage Housing Authority 

Inappropriately Administered Its Section 8 

Project-Based Voucher Program, Wheaton, IL

06/15/2010 10/08/2010 07/31/2014

2010-AT-1011

The Puerto Rico Department of Housing 

Did Not Ensure Compliance With HOME 

Program Objectives, San Juan, PR

08/25/2010 12/06/2010 Note 1

2010-FW-0003

HUD Was Not Tracking Almost 13,000 

Defaulted HECM Loans With Maximum Claim 

Amounts of Potentially More Than $2.5 Billion

08/25/2010 12/03/2010 Note 1

2010-KC-1008

The City of East St. Louis Awarded Block 

Grant Program Funds to Recipients 

Without Adequately Verifying Their 

Eligibility, East St. Louis, IL

09/28/2010 01/26/2011 Note 1

2011-CH-1001

The City of Flint Lacked Adequate Controls 

Over Its HOME Program Regarding 

Community Housing Development 

Organizations’ Home-Buyer Projects, 

Subrecipients’ Activities, and Reporting 

Accomplishments in HUD’s System, Flint, MI

10/13/2010 02/03/2011 Note 2

2011-FO-0003

Additional Details to Supplement Our 

Report on HUD's Fiscal Years 2010 

and 2009 Financial Statements

11/15/2010 08/08/2011 06/15/2015
60

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2011-NY-1004

The City of Binghamton Did Not 

Always Administer Its Section 108 Loan 

Program in Accordance With HUD 

Requirements, Binghamton, NY 

12/21/2010 04/20/2012 Note 2

2011-PH-1005

The District of Columbia Did Not Administer 

Its HOME Program in Accordance With 

Federal Requirements, Washington, DC

12/23/2010 04/22/2011 Note 1

2011-CH-1003

The City of Cleveland Lacked Adequate 

Controls Over Its HOME Investment 

Partnerships Program and American 

Dream Downpayment Initiative-Funded 

Afford-A-Home Program, Cleveland, OH

12/27/2010 04/26/2011 04/01/2014

2011-CH-1004

The State of Indiana’s Administrator 

Lacked Adequate Controls Over the 

State’s HOME Investment Partnerships 

Program and American Dream 

Downpayment Initiative-Funded First 

Home/PLUS Program, Indianapolis, IN

01/31/2011 05/25/2011 Note 2

2011-KC-1001

The City of East St. Louis Did Not 

Properly Manage Housing Rehabilitation 

Contracts Funded by the CDBG 

Program, East St. Louis, IL

02/09/2011 06/09/2011 Note 1

2011-CH-1006

The DuPage Housing Authority 

Inappropriately Administered Its 

Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher 

Program, Wheaton, IL

03/23/2011 07/28/2011 07/31/2014

2011-KC-1003

The Missouri Housing Development 

Commission Did Not Always Disburse 

Its Tax Credit Assistance Program 

Funds in Accordance With Recovery 

Act Requirements, Kansas City, MO

04/01/2011 07/29/2011 Note 1

2011-NY-1009

The East Orange Revitalization and 

Development Corporation Did Not Always 

Comply With HOME Program Requirements 

and Federal Regulations, East Orange, NJ

04/07/2011 08/03/2011 07/01/2015

2011-AT-1006

The Municipality of Mayaguez Did 

Not Ensure Compliance With HOME 

Program Objectives, Mayaguez, PR

04/08/2011 08/05/2011 Note 1
61

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2011-NY-1010

The City of Buffalo Did Not Always 

Administer Its CDBG Program in Accordance 

With HUD Requirements, Buffalo, NY

04/15/2011 01/25/2012 Note 2

2011-AO-1005

The State of Mississippi Generally Ensured 

That Disbursements to Program Participants 

Were Eligible and Supported, Jackson, MS

04/18/2011 08/16/2011 Note 1

2011-FW-0002

The Office of Healthcare Programs Could 

Increase Its Controls To More Effectively 

Monitor the Section 232 Program

04/26/2011 08/17/2011 06/30/2015

2011-CH-1008

The State of Michigan Lacked Adequate 

Controls Over Its NSP Regarding Awards, 

Obligations, Subgrantees’ Administrative 

Expenses and Procurement, and Reporting 

Accomplishments, Lansing, MI

06/03/2011 11/30/2011 Note 2

2011-AO-0001

The Lafayette Parish Housing 

Authority Violated HUD Procurement 

Requirements and Executed Unreasonable 

and Unnecessary Contracts

06/22/2011 10/13/2011 12/13/2014

2011-NY-1802 The City of Dunkirk Used CDBG Recovery Act 

Funding for an Ineligible Activity, Dunkirk, NY

07/14/2011 11/10/2011 Note 1

2011-LA-1016

The City of Compton Did Not Administer 

Its HOME Program in Compliance With 

HOME Requirements, Compton, CA

08/18/2011 12/15/2011 04/01/2014

2011-NY-1016

The City of Buffalo Did Not Always 

Disburse Homelessness Prevention and 

Rapid Re-Housing Program Funds in 

Accordance With Regulations, Buffalo, NY

09/22/2011 01/25/2012 Note 1

2011-AT-1018

The Municipality of San Juan Did Not 

Properly Manage Its HOME Investment 

Partnerships Program, San Juan, PR

09/28/2011 01/12/2012 12/31/2014

2011-CH-1014

The City of Cleveland Lacked Adequate 

Controls Over Its HOME Investment 

Partnerships Program-Funded 

Housing Trust Fund Program HomeBuyer Activities, Cleveland, OH

09/29/2011 01/26/2012 Note 2
62

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2011-CH-1015

The Springfield Metropolitan Housing 

Authority Did Not Administer Its Grant 

in Accordance With Recovery Act and 

HUD Requirements, Springfield, OH

09/30/2011 01/24/2012 05/01/2015

2012-NY-1002 The City of New York Charged Questionable 

Expenditures to Its HPRP, New York, NY

10/18/2011 02/16/2012 Note 1

2012-NY-1003

The City of Syracuse Did Not Always 

Administer Its CDBG Program in Accordance 

With HUD Requirements, Syracuse, NY

10/25/2011 02/22/2012 Note 1

2012-PH-0001

HUD Needed to Improve Its Use of Its 

Integrated Disbursement and Information 

System To Oversee Its CDBG Program

10/31/2011 02/28/2012 Note 1

2012-FO-0003

Additional Details To Supplement Our 

Report on HUD's Fiscal Years 2011 

and 2010 Financial Statements

11/15/2011 05/10/2012 04/01/2014

2012-LA-0001

HUD Did Not Adequately Support the 

Reasonableness of the Fee-for-Service 

Amounts or Monitor the Amounts Charged

11/16/2011 03/27/2012 04/15/2015

2012-AT-1007

The Shelby County Housing 

Authority Mismanaged Its HUDFunded Programs, Memphis, TN01/26/2012 05/25/2012 Note 2

2012-LA-1004

MetLife Bank’s Scottsdale, AZ, 

Branch Office Did Not Follow FHAInsured Loan Underwriting and 

Quality Control Requirements

01/26/2012 05/18/2012 Note 2

2012-FO-0004

Information System Deficiencies 

Noted During FHA's Fiscal Year 

2011 Financial Statement Audit

01/27/2012 05/21/2012 Note 2

2012-PH-0004

HUD Controls Did Not Always Ensure 

That Home Equity Conversion Mortgage 

Loan Borrowers Complied With 

Program Residency Requirements

02/09/2012 06/08/2012 Note 2

2012-DP-0001

Audit Report on the Fiscal Year 2011 

Review of Information Systems Controls in 

Support of the Financial Statements Audit

02/14/2012 07/02/2012 Note 2
63

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2012-CH-1004

The State of Indiana’s Administrator 

Lacked Adequate Controls Over the 

State’s HOME Investment Partnerships 

Program Regarding CHDOs’ Activities 

and Income, Indianapolis, IN

02/24/2012 06/22/2012 Note 2

2012-KC-1002

The East St. Louis Housing Authority Did Not 

Properly Manage or Report on Recovery 

Act Capital Funds, East St. Louis, IL

03/02/2012 06/29/2012 04/30/2014

2012-FW-1005

The State of Texas Did Not Follow 

Requirements for Its Infrastructure and 

Revitalization Contracts Funded With CDBG 

Disaster Recovery Program Funds, Austin, TX

03/07/2012 07/05/2012 Note 2

2012-LA-1005

The City of Los Angeles Did Not Expend 

Brownfields Economic Development Initiative 

and Section 108 Funds for the Goodyear 

Industrial Tract Project in Accordance With 

HUD Requirements, Los Angeles, CA

03/13/2012 09/19/2012 03/13/2015

2012-PH-1008

Mountain CAP of WV, Inc., Did Not 

Administer Its HPRP in Accordance 

With Applicable Recovery Act and HUD 

Requirements, Buckhannon, WV

03/15/2012 07/12/2012 Note 2

2012-CH-1007

The State of Michigan Lacked Adequate 

Controls Over Its Use of NSP Funds Under 

the HERA for a Project, Lansing, MI

03/30/2012 07/26/2012 Note 2

2012-LA-1006

Amar Plaza Was Not Administered 

in Accordance With HUD Rules and 

Regulations, La Puente, CA

05/21/2012 09/17/2012 09/19/2014

2012-AT-1009

The Municipality of Bayamón Did Not 

Always Ensure Compliance With HOME 

Investment Partnerships Program 

Requirements, Bayamon, PR

05/23/2012 09/18/2012 Note 2

2012-LA-1007

Los Angeles Neighborhood Housing 

Services Did Not Always Properly Administer 

Its NSP2 Grant, Los Angeles, CA

06/05/2012 09/21/2012 09/23/2014
64

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2012-LA-1008

The City of Phoenix Did Not Always 

Comply With Program Requirements 

When Administering Its NSP1 and 

NSP2 Grants, Phoenix, AZ

06/15/2012 10/15/2012 Note 2

2012-AO-1002 The Jefferson Parish Housing Authority 

Violated Federal Regulations, Marrero, LA

07/30/2012 12/31/2012 06/30/2014

2012-CH-1009

The Hammond Housing Authority Did 

Not Administer Its Recovery Act Grants in 

Accordance With Recovery Act, HUD’s, and 

Its Own Requirements, Hammond, IN

08/03/2012 11/30/2012 02/01/2015

2012-PH-1011

Prince George’s County Generally Did Not 

Administer Its HOME Program in Accordance 

With Federal Requirements, Largo, MD

08/03/2012 11/30/2012 Note 2

2012-NY-1011

The City of Elizabeth Did Not Always 

Administer Its CDBG Program in Accordance 

With Regulations, Elizabeth, NJ

08/15/2012 12/07/2012 Note 2

2012-KC-0003

HUD Did Not Effectively Oversee 

and Manage the Receivership of the 

East St. Louis Housing Authority

09/05/2012 01/15/2013 12/31/2014

2012-AT-1015 Little Haiti Did Not Fully Comply With Federal 

Rules When Administering NSP2, Miami, FL

09/06/2012 01/03/2013 Note 2

2012-FW-1014 The State of Louisiana Generally Complied 

With Recovery Act HPRP, Baton Rouge, LA

09/07/2012 02/08/2013 Note 2

2012-LA-1010

Innotion Enterprises, Inc., Did Not 

Always Comply With Its REO Contract 

Requirements, Las Vegas, NV

09/12/2012 01/10/2013 Note 2

2012-KC-0004

FHA Paid Claims for Approximately 

11,693 Preforeclosure Sales that Did 

Not Meet FHA Requirements

09/18/2012 01/14/2013 Note 2

2012-LA-0003 HUD Did Not Always Enforce REO 

M&M III Program Requirements

09/18/2012 01/09/2013 Note 2

2012-LA-0004

HUD Did Not Ensure Public Housing 

Agencies’ Use of Property Insurance 

Recoveries Met Program Requirements

09/21/2012 12/19/2012 Note 2
65

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2012-LA-1801

Shea Mortgage, Inc., Allowed the 

Recording of Prohibited Restrictive 

Covenants, Aliso Viejo, CA

09/26/2012 03/01/2013 10/09/2014

2012-CH-1011

The Stark Metropolitan Housing Authority 

Did Not Always Administer Its Grant in 

Accordance With Recovery Act, HUD’s, 

and Its Own Requirements, Canton, OH

09/27/2012 01/15/2013 12/31/2018

2012-CH-1012

The Saginaw Housing Commission 

Did Not Always Administer Its Section 

8 Housing Choice Voucher Program 

in Accordance With HUD’s and Its 

Own Requirements, Saginaw, MI

09/27/2012 01/07/2013 01/01/2023

2012-CH-1013

The Flint Housing Commission Did 

Not Always Administer Its Grants in 

Accordance With Recovery Act, HUD’s, 

and Its Own Requirements, Flint, MI

09/27/2012 01/24/2013 10/31/2014

2012-FO-0006 HUD’s Oversight of Recovery ActFunded Housing Programs09/27/2012 03/05/2013 Note 2

2012-KC-1006

The City of St. Louis Did Not 

Effectively Manage Its Recovery 

Act Funding, St. Louis, MO

09/27/2012 01/25/2013 Note 2

2012-CH-0801

HUD's Office of Community Planning 

and Development Needs To Improve Its 

Tracking of HOME Investment Partnerships 

Program Technical Assistance Activities

09/28/2012 02/13/2013 Note 2

2012-CH-1014

Mortgage Now Inc. Did Not Always Comply 

With HUD’s Underwriting and Quality 

Control Requirements, Shrewsbury, NJ

09/28/2012 01/25/2013 Note 2

2012-CH-1803

A Summary of the Foreclosure and Claims 

Process Reviews for Five Mortgage 

Servicers That Engaged in Improper 

Foreclosure Practices, Washington, DC

09/28/2012 01/30/2013 04/30/2014

2012-DP-0005

Review of Controls Over 

HUD’s Mobile Devices

09/28/2012 12/18/2012 11/08/2014
66

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2012-NY-1802

Village of Spring Valley, Hotline 

Complaint, Federal Housing Finance 

Agency Complaint Number Z-12-

0445-1, Village of Spring Valley, NY

09/28/2012 01/28/2013 Note 2

2012-CH-1015

Allen Mortgage, LLC, Did Not Comply 

With HUD Requirements for Underwriting 

FHA Loans and Fully Implement Its Quality 

Control Program in Accordance With 

HUD's Requirement, Centennial Park, AZ

09/30/2012 02/04/2013 Note 2

2013-PH-1001

Luzerne County Did Not Properly 

Evaluate, Underwrite, and Monitor a 

High-Risk Loan, Wilkes-Barre, PA

10/31/2012 01/31/2013 Note 2

2013-PH-1002

The City of Baltimore Did Not Administer 

Its Homelessness Prevention and Rapid 

Re-Housing Program Grant According to 

Recovery Act Requirements, Baltimore, MD

11/09/2012 02/08/2013 05/05/2014

2013-FO-0003

Additional Details To Supplement Our 

Report on HUD’s Fiscal Years 2012 

and 2011 Financial Statements

11/15/2012 05/15/2013 12/31/2014

2013-AT-1001

The Municipality of Ponce Did Not 

Always Ensure Compliance With 

HOME Investment Partnerships 

Program Requirements, Ponce, PR

11/30/2012 03/29/2013 Note 2

2013-NY-1001 The City of Albany CDBG Recovery 

Act Program, Albany, NY

12/06/2012 04/03/2013 04/03/2014

2013-PH-0002

HUD Policies Did Not Always Ensure 

That Borrowers Complied With 

Program Residency Requirements

12/20/2012 04/19/2013 04/16/2014

2013-SE-1001

The Idaho Housing and Finance 

Association Did Not Always Comply 

With HOME Investment Partnerships 

Program Match and Compliance 

Monitoring Requirements, Boise, ID

12/21/2012 12/21/2012 Note 2

2013-CH-0001

HUD Did Not Always Provide 

Adequate Oversight of Its Assisted 

Living Conversion Program

01/04/2013 05/03/2013 Note 2
67

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2013-FO-0004

Information System Deficiencies Noted 

During Federal Housing Administration’s 

Fiscal Year 2012 Financial Statement Audit

01/15/2013 08/22/2013 Note 2

2013-LA-1801

Standard Pacific Mortgage, Inc., 

Allowed the Recording of Prohibited 

Restrictive Covenants, Irvine, CA

02/05/2013 06/04/2013 06/05/2014

2013-NY-1004

The City of Paterson Had Weaknesses in the 

Administration of Its Housing Opportunities 

for Persons with AIDS Program, Paterson, NJ

02/25/2013 04/15/2013 04/08/2014

2013-DP-0004 Technical Security Control Weaknesses 

in Selected Ginnie Mae Applications

02/28/2013 06/26/2013 Note 2

2013-FW-1001

The Cherokee Nation Generally Administered 

Its Recovery Act Funds According to 

Requirements, Tahlequah, OK

03/12/2013 06/28/2013 05/31/2014

2013-LA-1003

Bay Vista Methodist Heights Violated Its 

Agreement With HUD When Administering 

Its Trust Funds, San Diego, CA

03/14/2013 05/15/2013 05/14/2014

2013-AT-1003

The Municipality of Arecibo Did Not 

Always Ensure Compliance With CDBG 

Program Requirements, Arecibo, PR

03/22/2013 06/14/2013 05/31/2014

Significant Audit Reports issued within the past 12 months that were described in previous 

semiannual reports for which final action had not been completed as of March 31, 2014

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2013-FW-1004

The Housing Authority of the City 

of El Paso Did Not Follow Recovery 

Act Obligation Requirements or 

Procurement Policies, El Paso, TX

04/12/2013 08/27/2013 04/30/2014

2013-LA-1802

Pulte Mortgage LLC, Allowed the 

Recording of Prohibited Restrictive 

Covenants, Englewood, CO

04/18/2013 01/10/2014 07/29/2014

2013-LA-1803

CTX Mortgage Company LLC 

Allowed the Recording of Prohibited 

Restrictive Covenants, Dallas, TX

04/18/2013 01/10/2014 07/29/2014
68

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2013-LA-1004

The City of San Bernardino Did Not 

Administer Its CDBG and CDBG-Recovery 

Act Programs in Accordance With HUD 

Rules and Regulations, San Bernardino, CA

04/23/2013 09/06/2013 09/09/2014

2013-PH-1803

Review of the Philadelphia Housing 

Authority's Compliance with Federal 

Lobbying Disclosure Requirements 

and Restrictions, Philadelphia, PA

04/26/2013 11/15/2013 08/26/2014

2013-NY-1006

Nassau County Did Not Administer 

It's HOME Investment Partnerships 

Program in Accordance With HUD 

Requirements, Nassau County, NY

05/13/2013 09/06/2013 07/01/2014

2013-LA-1006

The City of Santa Ana Did Not Administer 

NSP2 Funds in Accordance With HUD 

Rules and Requirements, Santa Ana, CA

06/17/2013 09/30/2013 06/16/2014

2013-FW-1006

The Management and Board of 

Commissioners of the Harris County 

Housing Authority Mismanaged 

the Authority, Houston, TX

06/19/2013 02/11/2014 11/30/2014

2013-NY-1007

Authority Officials Generally Administered 

Recovery Act Funds in Accordance 

With Requirements but Budgetary 

and Procurement Controls Had 

Weaknesses, New Brunswick, NJ

06/21/2013 08/27/2013 08/15/2014

2013-KC-0002

HUD Did Not Enforce the Reporting 

Requirements of Section 3 of the 

Housing and Urban Development Act of 

1968 for Public Housing Authorities

06/26/2013 10/24/2013 07/31/2015

2013-LA-1007

The County of Santa Barbara Did Not 

Comply With HOME Investment Partnerships 

Program Requirements, Santa Barbara, CA

07/09/2013 11/04/2013 10/24/2014

2013-PH-1005

The Charleston-Kanawha Housing Authority 

Needs To Improve Its Housing Quality 

Standards Inspections and Apply Correct 

Payment Standards When Calculating 

Housing Assistance Payments, Charleston, WV

07/17/2013 11/14/2013 04/15/2014
69

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2013-NY-0002

HUD Can Improve Public Housing Agencies 

Use of Housing Choice Vouchers by 

Consistently Implementing All Utilization 

Protocols and Improving Controls

07/18/2013 11/15/2013 09/27/2014

2013-NY-0003

HUD Officials Did Not Always Monitor 

Grantee Compliance With the CDBG 

Timeliness Spending Requirement

07/19/2013 11/26/2013 10/03/2014

2013-AT-1006

The Puerto Rico Housing Finance 

Authority Did Not Always Comply With 

HOME Requirements, San Juan, PR

07/23/2013 11/20/2013 11/15/2014

2013-BO-1002 The City of Worcester Did Not Properly 

Administer Its CDBG Program, Worcester, MA

07/29/2013 12/19/2013 12/04/2014

2013-NY-1009

Essex County's HOME Investment 

Partnerships Program Was Not Always 

Administered in Compliance With 

Program Requirements and Federal 

Regulations, Essex County, NJ

08/09/2013 11/05/2013 07/09/2014

2013-FW-1007

The City of Eagle Pass Housing 

Authority Generally Followed Recovery 

Act Public Housing Capital Fund 

Requirements, Eagle Pass, TX

08/14/2013 11/13/2013 05/14/2014

2013-LA-1008

The Lending Company, Inc., Did Not Always 

Comply With FHA Underwriting and Quality 

Control Program Requirements, Phoenix, AZ

08/20/2013 12/24/2013 09/19/2014

2013-AT-0003

Economic Development Programs 

Lacked Adequate Controls To 

Ensure Program Effectiveness

09/03/2013 01/28/2014 12/31/2014

2013-BO-1003

The Housing Authority of the City of Lowell 

Did Not Always Operate Its Public Housing 

and Recovery Act Capital Fund Programs 

in Compliance With HUD Regulations 

and Its Own Policies, Lowell, MA

09/04/2013 01/08/2014 07/31/2014

2013-LA-0002

FHA Paid Claims for Approximately 4,457 

Preforeclosure Sales That Did Not Meet 

Minimum Net Sales Proceeds Requirements

09/05/2013 03/31/2014 09/04/2014
70

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2013-DP-0006

Weaknesses Identified in HUD’s Fiscal 

Year 2012 Security Program

09/12/2013 01/13/2014 06/30/2014

2013-LA-1009

The City of Hawthorne Inappropriately 

Used Nearly $1.6 Million in HOME Funds 

for Section 8 Tenants, Hawthorne, CA

09/13/2013 01/06/2014 12/23/2014

2013-CH-1006

The State of Michigan Lacked Adequate 

Controls Over Its NSP Under the 

American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act of 2009, Lansing, MI

09/15/2013 01/13/2014 01/06/2015

2013-CH-1008

Community Advocates Did Not Properly 

Administer Its Program and Recovery 

Act Grant Funds, Milwaukee, WI

09/17/2013 01/15/2014 03/31/2015

2013-KC-0004

HUD Paid Claims That Lacked Contact or 

Collection Activities With Coborrowers

09/18/2013 01/07/2014 09/17/2014

2013-LA-1010

The City of Hawthorne Did Not Administer 

Its CDBG Program Cost Allocations 

in Accordance With HUD Rules and 

Requirements, Hawthorne, CA

09/20/2013 01/06/2014 12/23/2014

2013-KC-0005

HUD Had Made Progress in Reducing 

Oversubsidization in the Housing Choice Voucher 

Program, but the Problem Continued To Exist

09/23/2013 12/12/2013 10/30/2014

2013-LA-0803

Reviews of Six FHA Lenders Demonstrated 

That HUD Needs To Strengthen Its Oversight 

of Prohibited Restrictive Covenants

09/23/2013 01/14/2014 09/23/2014

2013-FW-1008

The City of New Orleans Did Not Have 

Adequate Financial and Programmatic 

Controls To Ensure That It Expended 

and Reported Funds in Accordance With 

Program Requirements, New Orleans, LA

09/24/2013 01/06/2014 05/09/2014

2013-FW-1805

The Malakoff Housing Authority Did Not Have 

Sufficient Controls Over Its Public Housing 

Programs, Including Its Recovery Act Funds, 

Malakoff, TX

09/26/2013 12/19/2013 05/02/2014

2013-NY-1010

The City of Auburn Did Not Always 

Administer Its CDBG Program in Accordance 

With HUD Requirements, Auburn, NY

09/26/2013 01/24/2014 06/30/2015
71

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

REPORT 

NUMBER REPORT TITLE ISSUE DATE

DECISION 

DATE

FINAL 

ACTION

2013-CH-1009

The Flint Housing Commission Did 

Not Always Administer Its Grant in 

Accordance With Recovery Act, HUD’s, 

and Its Own Requirements, Flint, MI

09/27/2013 01/14/2014 01/23/2015

2013-IE-0804 Evaluation of HUD’s Property 

Inventory System

09/27/2013 03/26/2014 09/30/2015

2013-PH-0004 HUD’s Oversight of Its Moving to Work 

Demonstration Program Needs Improvement

09/27/2013 01/24/2014 01/31/2015

2013-AT-1008

The City of West Palm Beach Did Not 

Always Properly Administer Its HOME 

Program, West Palm Beach, FL

09/30/2013 01/17/2014 Note 3

2013-CH-1010

The City of Toledo Did Not Always Administer 

Its CDBG-R Program in Accordance With 

HUD’s and Its Own Requirements, Toledo, OH

09/30/2013 01/15/2014 01/15/2015

2013-CH-1011

The Michigan State Housing Development 

Authority Did Not Follow HUD’s 

Requirements Regarding the Administration 

of Its Program, Lansing, MI

09/30/2013 01/15/2014 07/31/2029

2013-CH-1012

The Hamtramck Housing Commission Did 

Not Administer Its Grant in Accordance 

With Recovery Act, HUD’s, and Its Own 

Requirements, Hamtramck, MI

09/30/2013 01/21/2014 01/23/2015

2013-DE-1005

The Jefferson County Housing Authority 

Did Not Properly Use Its Disposition 

Sales Proceeds, Wheat Ridge, CO

09/30/2013 01/24/2014 02/28/2020

2013-DP-0007 Information System Control Weaknesses 

Identified in the Hyperion Application System

09/30/2013 01/29/2014 08/29/2014

AUDITS EXCLUDED: 

81 audits under repayment plans

32 audits under debt claims collection processing, formal judicial review, investigation, or legislative solution

NOTES:

1 Management did not meet the target date. Target date is over 1 year old.

2 Management did not meet the target date. Target date is under 1 year old.

3 No management decision
72

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

TABLE C 

Inspector General-issued reports with questioned and unsupported 

costs at 03/31/2014 (thousands)

AUDIT REPORTS

NUMBER 

OF AUDIT 

REPORTS

QUESTIONED 

COSTS

UNSUPPORTED 

COSTS

A1 For which no management decision had been made 

by the commencement of the reporting period

43 $861,560 $384,763 

A2 For which no management decision had been made 

by the commencement of the reporting period

5 $8,960 $5,299 

A3 

For which litigation, legislation, or 

investigation was pending at the 

commencement of the reporting period

- $212 $177 

A4 

For which additional costs were added 

to reports in beginning inventory

0 $0 $0 

B1 For which costs were added to noncost reports 23 $124,850 $113,406 

B2 Which were issued during the reporting period 0 $0 $0 

SUBTOTALS (A + B) 71 $995,582 $503,645 

C For which a management decision was 

made during the reporting period

4512 $152,743 $113,572 

1) Dollar value of disallowed costs: 

Due HUD 

Due program participants

2013

31

$37,153

$87,472

$22,118

$73,471

(2) Dollar value of costs not disallowed 714 $28,118 $17,983 

D 

For which a management decision had been 

made not to determine costs until completion 

of litigation, legislation, or investigation

5 $8,960 $5,299 

E For which no management decision had been 

made by the end of the reporting period

21

< 50 >15

$833,879 

< $820,354 >15

$384,774 

< $371,500 >15

12 Twenty-four audit reports also contain recommendations with funds be put to better use. 

13 Seven audit reports also contain recommendations with funds due program participants. 

14 Six audit reports also contain recommendations with funds agreed to by management. 

15 The figures in brackets represent data at the recommendation level as compared to the report level. See Explanations of Tables C and D. 
73

APPENDIX 3 TABLES

TABLE D 

Inspector General-issued reports with recommendations that funds be put 

to better use at 03/31/2014 (thousands) 

AUDIT REPORTS

NUMBER 

OF AUDIT 

REPORTS

DOLLAR 

VALUE

A1 For which no management decision had been made by the 

commencement of the reporting period

30 $424,986 

A2 For which litigation, legislation, or investigation was pending 

at the commencement of the reporting period

4 $17,375 

A3 For which additional costs were added to reports in beginning inventory - $251 

A4 For which costs were added to noncost reports 0 $0

B1 Which were issued during the reporting period 13 $1,130,315 

B2 Which were reopened during the reporting period 0 $0 

SUBTOTALS (A + B) 47 $1,572,927 

C For which a management decision was made during the reporting period 3116 $373,255 

(1) Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management: 

Due HUD 

Due program participants

1017

18

$305,980

$51,891

(2) Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed 

to by management

518 $15,384 

D For which management decision had been made not to determine 

costs until completion of litigation, legislation, or investigation

3 $4,811 

E For which no management decision had been made by the end of the 

reporting period

13

< 35 >19

$1,194,861 

< $1,093,953 >19

16 Twenty-four Audit Reports also contain recommendations with questioned costs. 

17 One Audit Report also contains recommendations with funds due program participants. 

18 One Audit Report also contains recommendations with funds agreed to by management. 

19 The figures in brackets represent data at the recommendation level as compared to the report level. See Explanations of Tables C and D.
74

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

EXPLANATIONS OF TABLES C AND D

The Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988 require inspectors general and agency heads to report cost 

data on management decisions and final actions on audit reports. The current method of reporting at the 

“report” level rather than at the individual audit “recommendation” level results in misleading reporting of cost 

data. Under the Act, an audit “report” does not have a management decision or final action until all 

questioned cost items or other recommendations have a management decision or final action. Under these 

circumstances, the use of the “report” based rather than the “recommendation” based method of reporting 

distorts the actual agency efforts to resolve and complete action on audit recommendations. For example, 

certain cost items or recommendations could have a management decision and repayment (final action) in a 

short period of time. Other cost items or nonmonetary recommendation issues in the same audit report may 

be more complex, requiring a longer period of time for management’s decision or final action. Although 

management may have taken timely action on all but one of many recommendations in an audit report, the 

current “all or nothing” reporting format does not recognize their efforts.

The closing inventory for items with no management decision in tables C and D (line E) reflects figures at 

the report level as well as the recommendation level.
75

OIG TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

HUD OIG TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

Office of Audit

HEADQUARTERS Washington, DC 202-708-0364

OFFICE OF AUDIT

REGION 1-2 New York, NY 212-264-4174

 Albany, NY 518-462-2892

 Boston, MA 617-994-8380

 Buffalo, NY 716-551-5755

 Hartford, CT 860-240-4837

 Newark, NJ 973-776-7339

REGION 3 Philadelphia, PA 215-656-0500

 Baltimore, MD 410-962-2520

 Pittsburgh, PA 412-644-6372

 Richmond, VA 804-771-2100

REGION 4 Atlanta, GA 404-331-3369

 Greensboro, NC 336-547-4001

 Jacksonville, FL 904-232-1226

 Knoxville, TN 865-545-4400

 Miami, FL 305-536-5387

 San Juan, PR 787-766-5540

REGION 5 Chicago, IL 312-353-7832

 Columbus, OH 614-469-5745

 Detroit, MI 313-226-6280

REGION 6 Fort Worth, TX 817-978-9309

 Baton Rouge, LA 225-448-3976

 Houston, TX 713-718-3199

 New Orleans, LA 504-671-3715

 Albuquerque, NM 505-346-7270

 Oklahoma City, OK 405-609-8606

 San Antonio, TX 210-475-6800
76

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

REGION 7-8-10 Kansas City, KS 913-551-5870

 St. Louis, MO 314-539-6339

 Denver, CO 303-672-5452

 Seattle, WA 206-220-5360

REGION 9 Los Angeles, CA 213-894-8016

 Las Vegas, NV 702-336-2100

 Phoenix, AZ 602-379-7250

 San Francisco, CA 415-489-6400

 

Office of Investigation

HEADQUARTERS Washington, DC 202-708-0390

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION 

REGION 1-2 New York, NY 212-264-8062

 Boston, MA 617-994-8450

 Hartford, CT 860-240-4800

 Manchester, NH 603-666-7988

 Newark, NJ 973-776-7355

REGION 3 Philadelphia, PA 215-430-6758

 Baltimore, MD 410-209-6533

 Pittsburgh, PA 412-644-6598

 Richmond, VA 804-822-4890

 Washington, DC 202-287-4100

REGION 4 Atlanta, GA 404-331-5001

 Birmingham, AL 205-745-4314

 Columbia, SC 803-451-4318

 Greensboro, NC 336-547-4000

 Jackson, MS 601-965-4700

 Memphis, TN 901-554-3148

 Miami, FL 305-536-3087

 San Juan, PR 787-766-5868

 Tampa, FL 813-228-2026
77

OIG TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

REGION 5 Chicago, IL 312-353-4196

 Cleveland, OH 216-357-7800

 Columbus, OH 614-469-6677

 Detroit, MI 313-226-6280

 Grand Rapids, MI 616-916-3715

 Indianapolis, IN 317-226-5427

 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 612-370-3130

REGION 6 Fort Worth, TX 817-978-5440

 Baton Rouge, LA 225-448-3941

 Houston, TX 713-718-3221

 Little Rock, AR 501-324-5931

 New Orleans, LA 504-671-3700

 Oklahoma City, OK 405-609-8603

 San Antonio, TX 210-475-6819

REGION 7-8-10 Kansas City, KS 913-551-5866

 St. Louis, MO 314-539-6559

 Denver, CO 303-672-5350

 Billings, MT 406-247-4080

 Salt Lake City, UT 801-524-6090

 Seattle, WA 206-220-5380

REGION 9 Los Angeles, CA 213-894-0219

 Las Vegas, NV 702-366-2144

 Phoenix, AZ 602-379-7252

 Sacramento, CA 916-930-5691

 San Francisco, CA 415-489-6683
78

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

ACRONYMS LIST

ARRA ......................................................................American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009

BPD.........................................................................Bureau of Public Debt

CDBG......................................................................Community Development Block Grant

CDBG-DR...............................................................Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery

CFR.........................................................................Code of Federal Regulations

CI.............................................................................Criminal Investigation (Internal Revenue Service)

CPD.........................................................................Office of Community Planning and Development

DOL.........................................................................U.S. Department of Labor

FBI...........................................................................Federal Bureau of Investigation

FFMIA .....................................................................Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996

FHA.........................................................................Federal Housing Administration

FHFA.......................................................................Federal Housing Finance Agency

FIFO........................................................................first-in, first-out

FIRMS.....................................................................Facilities Integrated Resources Management System

FISMA.....................................................................Federal Information Security Management Act

FSS ..........................................................................Family Self-Sufficiency

GAAP ......................................................................generally accepted accounting principles

GAO ........................................................................U.S. Government Accountability Office

HEMS......................................................................HUD Enforcement Systems

HERMIT..................................................................Home equity reverse mortgage information technology

HIAMS ....................................................................HUD Integrated Acquisition Management System

HIFMIP......................................................................HUD’s Integrated Financial Management Improvement Project

HOME.....................................................................HOME Investment Partnerships Program

HPS.........................................................................HUD Procurement System

HUD........................................................................U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

HUDCAPS ..............................................................HUD’s Centralized Accounting Program System

IDIS.........................................................................Integrated Disbursement and Information System

IRS ..........................................................................Internal Revenue Service

IT.............................................................................Information Technology

MMI ........................................................................Mutual Mortgage Insurance

OCFO......................................................................Office of the Chief Financial Officer

ODOC.....................................................................Office of Departmental Operations and Coordination

OIG .........................................................................Office of Inspector General

OMB........................................................................Office of Management and Budget

PERMS....................................................................Performance Measurement System

PHA.........................................................................public housing agency

SPS..........................................................................Small Purchase System

U.S.C.......................................................................United States Code

VA............................................................................U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
79

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The specific reporting requirements as prescribed by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended by the 

Inspector General Act of 1988, are listed below.

SOURCE-REQUIREMENT PAGES

Section 4(a)(2)-review of existing and proposed legislation and regulations 36

Section 5(a)(1)-description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies 

relating to the administration of programs and operations of the Department. 12 - 35

Section 5(a)(2)-description of recommendations for corrective 

action with respect to significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies. 39

Section 5(a)(3)-identification of each significant recommendation described in 

previous Semiannual Reporton which corrective action has not been completed. Appendix 3, table B, 57

Section 5(a)(4)-summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities 

and the prosecutions and convictions that have resulted. 12 - 35

Section 5(a)(5)-summary of reports made on instances where information or 

assistance was unreasonably refused or not provided, as required by Section 6(b)(2) of the Act. No instances

Section 5(a)(6)-listing of each audit report completed during the reporting period, 

and for each report, where applicable, the total dollar value of questioned and 

unsupported costs and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use. Appendix 2, 52

Section 5(a)(7)-summary of each particularly significant report. 12 - 35

Section 5(a)(8)-statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports 

and the total dollar value of questioned and unsupported costs. Appendix 3, table C, 72

Section 5(a)(9)-statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports and 

the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use by management. Appendix 3, table D, 56

Section 5(a)(10)-summary of each audit report issued before the commencement of the reporting 

period for which no management decision had been made by the end of the period. Appendix 3, table A, 56

Section 5(a)(11)-a description and explanation of the reasons for any significant 

revised management decisions made during the reporting period. 46

Section 5(a)(12)-information concerning any significant management 

decision with which the Inspector General is in disagreement. 48

Section 5(a)(13)-the information described under section 05(b) 

of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996. 49
80

SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

FRAUD ALERT

Every day, loan modification and foreclosure rescue scams rob vulnerable homeowners of their money and their 

homes. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Inspector General, is the 

Department’s law enforcement arm and is responsible for investigating complaints and allegations of mortgage 

fraud. Following are some of the more common scams:

COMMON LOAN MODIFICATION SCAMS

Phony counseling scams: The scam artist says that he or she can negotiate a deal with the lender to modify 

the mortgage — for an upfront fee. 

Phony foreclosure rescue scams: Some scammers advise homeowners to make their mortgage payments 

directly to the scammer while he or she negotiates with the lender. Once the homeowner has made a few 

mortgage payments, the scammer disappears with the homeowner’s money.

Fake “government” modification programs: Some scammers claim to be affiliated with or approved by the 

government. The scammer’s company name and Web site may appear to be a real government agency, but the 

Web site address will end with .com or .net instead of .gov. 

Forensic loan audit: Because advance fees for loan counseling services are prohibited, scammers may sell 

their services as “forensic mortgage audits.” The scammer will say that the audit report can be used to avoid 

foreclosure, force a mortgage modification, or even cancel a loan. The fraudster typically will request an 

upfront fee for this service.

Mass joinder lawsuit: The scam artist, usually a lawyer, law firm, or marketing partner, will promise that he 

or she can force lenders to modify loans. The scammers will try to “sell” participation in a lawsuit against the 

mortgage lender, claiming that the homeowner cannot participate in the lawsuit until he or she pays some 

type of upfront fee. 

Rent-to-own or leaseback scheme: The homeowner surrenders the title or deed as part of a deal that will let 

the homeowner stay in the home as a renter and then buy it back in a few years. However, the scammer has 

no intention of selling the home back to the homeowner and, instead, takes the monthly “rent” payments and 

allows the home to go into foreclosure.

Remember, only work with a HUD-approved housing counselor to understand your options for assistance. 

HUD-approved housing counseling agencies are available to provide information and assistance. Call 888-

995-HOPE to speak with an expert about your situation. HUD-approved counseling is free of charge. 

IF YOU SUSPECT FRAUD, CALL THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 

DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL. 
81

APPENDIX THREE CHARTS

Faxing the OIG hotline: 202-708-4829

Emailing the OIG hotline: hotline@hudoig.gov

Sending written information to

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Inspector General Hotline (GFI)

451 7th Street, SW

Room 8254

Washington, DC 20410

Internet

http://www.hudoig.gov/hotline/index.php

ALL INFORMATION IS CONFIDENTIAL, AND YOU MAY REMAIN ANONYMOUS.

Report fraud, waste, and mismanagement 

in HUD programs and operations by
U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOUSING 

AND URBAN 

DEVELOPMENT

Report Number 71

www.hudoig.gov

HUD OIG Hotline: 1-800-347-3735