Inthe matter of BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
DocketNo. FAA-2013-0291 FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING SERVICES Respondent Administrative Law Judge J.E. Sullivan
ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO COMPLIANANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT Onlybyignoring therecord compiled in this matter, the Federal Aviation Administration ("Complainant" or "FAA") has filed a motion for summaryjudgment against Respondent ("FAAMotion") claiming that the evidence ofthe alleged improper maintenancebyAirborne Maintenance and Engineering Services ("AMES") is "uncontroverted." FAAMotion at 15, 19 and 22. The FAAMotion shouldbe denied and thepending motion for summaryjudgment submittedbyAMES shouldbe granted. I. Introduction TheFAAMotionvirtuallyignores the central issue ofthis case, and that is whether there is substantial, reliable andprobative evidence that AMES, a certificated Part 145 repair station, failed to performmaintenance inaccordance with its customer's AircraftMaintenance Manual ("AMM") giventhe substantialpassage oftime and intervening maintenancebetweenthe dates AMES performedthe work and the date of the FAAinspection ofthethree aircraft betweentwo and almost 10 months later. The FAAalso completelyignores the evidence establishing the minor nature ofall ofthe post-inspectionrepairs done to address the discrepancies writtenupbytheprincipal FAAinspectoror at the request ofthe aircraft operator. Further, some ofthe corrective actions takenwere not, in fact required to bedone as the aircraft operator instructed AMES to makethe aircraft "like new" evenifthe AMM did not compelthe installation ofnew parts. See Exhibit I (BeckerTr. at 76, 85-86)(describing AMES' "marching orders" from CCIA, its customer, to makethe landing gear and flying doors "likenew" and "immaculate"). Further, upon a more complete inspection, some ofthe discrepancies initiallyidentified, such as "improperhardware stackup," werefound notto be the case. Moreover, theFAA seeks to attribute many ofthe discrepancies to AMES regarding hinge covers (called access doors inthe AMM) andhingepins eventhoughAMM 32-ll00 does not direct the maintenanceproviderto install hinges orotherwise disassemble the doorbythehinge. See pages 26-27 below. Onlybyignoringthese critical, established facts couldthe Complainant arguethat it is entitledto summaryjudgment. Onthe otherhand, thepending summaryjudgment motion filed byRespondent is based onall ofthe evidence, includingthe important andrevealingtestimonyofMr. Jeffrey Becker, AMES DirectorofQuality Assurance and Training, who had personal knowledge ofthe facts and who testified inresponse to questions fromFAA counselthat the corrective action needed to rectifY any discrepancywas ofa minornature, such as "blend and treat" type repairs, and canreadilybe explainedbythe obvious impact of normalwear and tearonthe aircraft. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 86-88, 102-104). Mr. Becker's testimonywas fully consistent withthe expertreportprovidedbyAMES to FAA counselonMay2, 2014regarding the nature oftherepairsrequired to address the Inspector's list ofdiscrepancies. See Exhibit 2 consisting oftheExpert Report ofDaniel J. Hancher, dated April30, 2014. Specifically, Mr. Hancher finds, basedonhis review of

- 2 -the corrective actions documented byAMES, that he has "no difficulty concluding that the issues requiring attentionwere ofa 'wearand tear' variety and notthe result of improperreinstallation ofthe MLGs and flying doors." Id (Expert Report ofDaniel J. Hancher

**at~** 5). FAA counsel maynot have liked the answers providedbyMr. Becker or the expert opinionofMr. Hancher, but simply ignoring themdoes not a summary judgment motionmake. AMES specifically noted in its motionthe undisputed facts upon which it is relying in support ofits motion. Complainant, for its part, did not bother to include a statement ofundisputed facts-but rather simply states thepurportedfacts on whichrelies without any attempt to put the facts in context orto make any claim as to theirundisputed nature. Having obviouslyignoredthe substantial contraryevidence, the FAA's dispositive motionmustbe denied. As an important preliminarymatter, Respondent notes thatthe FAA included as Exhibit A to its Motion anExpert Declaration ofMichael Christensen. In doing so the FAA was fully aware that Respondent had a pending Motionbefore Your Honorto preclude the testimonyofSpecialist Christensen. See Respondent's Rule 37 Declaration and Renewal ofMotion for Sanctions, dated December 16,2014, and Respondent's Reply to Complainant's Response to Renewed Motion for Sanctions and Answerto Complainant's Motionto Compel and Exclude, dated January 5, 2015, atpages 1-7. Respondent moved to preclude thetestimonyofSpecialist Christensenbecausethe FAA didnot serve its initial expert disclosures onRespondent untilDecember 1, 2014

-- 13 days afterthe deadline set byYour Honor's September 30, 2014 scheduling order-- and becausethe FAAdid not provide a good causebasis for failing to request additional time for the late service ofits initial expert disclosures. Further, as Your Honor is aware,

- 3 -Complainantrefused to make Specialist Christensen available to be deposed beforethe period set for dispositive motions as Respondent's counsel had requested. See Respondent's Rule 37 Declaration and Renewal ofMotion for Sanctions at I and 4; Order Granting Respondent's Motionto Exclude, and Granting/Denying Other Motions, served February 11, 2015, at 6 ("February 11, 2015 Order"). The inclusion ofSpecialist Christensen's Declarationin support ofthe FAA's Motion for SummaryJudgment, without Respondent's counsel having the opportunityto examine the declarant

-- aright that is expresslyprovided for inFRCP 26(b)(4)

-- is preciselythe type ofprejudice that YourHonor identified inthe February II, 2015 Order that warranted granting Respondent's Motion for Sanctions to preclude Specialist Christensen as an expert witness for the FAA. As noted in theFebruary 11, 2015 Order, Respondent is correct thatprejudice has occurred
.... As ofthedate ofthis Order, the parties have already filed dispositive motions. Itis unfair to the Respondent, after a year ofactive discovery, for the FAAto identify a new expert witness after the final deadline set for expert identification and disclosures, and thenrefuse to set a depositionpriorto the final close of discovery (December 12, 2014) or evenpriorto the close ofextended discovery.... The FAAis also unreasonable in its argument thatthe Respondent should beprecluded from taking anexpert deposition. February 11, 2015 Order at 7 (citations omitted). Complainanthas trampled uponRespondent's procedural and substantive rights byincluding in its Motion for SununaryJudgment what is ineffect the expert's report that should havebeenmade available at amuch earlier stage oftheproceeding and to have allowed Respondent to questionthe conclusions ofSpecialist Christensen at a deposition. This counsel for Complainantrefused to do, and has now compounded the prejudice flowing fromhis refusal by seekingto rely onthereport ofthe Specialist to rebut the positionthat Respondent has taken consistentlythroughouttheproceeding that

-4-wear and tear fully explainthe condition ofthe aircraft as observed bythe FAAonMay 25,2010. Accordingly, and consistent with Your Honor'sruling contained in the February II, 2015 Order, the Expert Declaration ofMichael Christensenmust be disregarded in evaluating the FAA Motion. The FAAMotion contains two lines ofargument. First, that the initial discrepancies documentedbyAMES on so-called "non-routine cards" are evidence ofthe fact that AMES did not properlyrig the flying doors after completion ofthe main landing gearremovals and replacements. See FAAMotion at 4-5, 6-7 and 9; FAAExhibits N, T and DD. In so arguing, the FAAvirtually ignores the undisputed facts that the FAA inspectionofthe three aircraft onMay25, 2010 came months afterthe AMES maintenance was performed, afterthe aircraft conducted hundreds offlights and after intervening maintenance was performed. Indeed, the FAAhas made no attemptto explain whythe intervening months ofin-service operations and maintenance can simply be ignored when asserting that the condition ofthe aircraft months afterthe subject maintenance was accomplished, and whichthe FAAhas undoubtedly exaggerated, is sufficientto support a finding ofthe alleged violations based onthe §13.223 standard of proof, whichthe FAAhas the burdento meet. §13.224. The other line ofargument put forth byComplainant is that AMES has admitted it had improperly installed the flying doors onthe three aircraft. As detailed in SectionIV below, there have beenno such admissions onthepart ofAMES. The FAA's feeble attempt to intentionallymisinterpret certain documents onwhichit relies discredits the Movant and its Motion.

- 5 -As a final preliminarymatter, and as noted above, becausethe Christensen Declaration cannotbe considered, there is no contraryevidenceput forth inthe FAA Motionto that presentedbyAMES throughthetestimony ofMr. Becker, and the expert report ofMr. Hancher (that Complainant choose notto challenge at a deposition or otherwise) establishing that whatever discrepancies were documentedregarding the condition ofthe flying doors, the corrective actions inthe non-routine cards that describe the low level maintenancerequired to address the discrepancies were all indicative of normalwear and tear. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 86-88, I02-104); Exhibit 2 (Expert Report ofDaniel J. Hancher at '1[5). Withthis backgroundin mind, AMES now addresses the specific arguments put forth bythe Complainant in support ofits dispositive motion. II. The Records ofthe CorrectiveAction Taken by AMES After the FAA Inspection Prove the Condition ofthe Flying Doors Was the Result of NormalWear and Tear and that Certain OtherDiscrepancies Were Simply Not Attributable to the Maintenance AMES Performed.
Whilethe FAA chooses to focus onthe discrepancies that were documented as a result ofthe FAA's initial inspection ofthe three aircraft, the Complainant ignores the
moretelling and dispositive evidence and that is the corrective actions that were actually necessaryto betakento address the discrepancies. It is onethingto note all possible issues that a mechanic is directed to subsequentlyinspect and correct as maybe necessary. 1 It's quite another to see what corrective actionwas actuallyaccomplished in response to the written discrepancy as onlythe corrective action description explains the

1Mr. Beckertestifiedthat he was instructedbythe air carrier customer "to write up every nick, everyminor flaw" evenifnotrequired bythe applicable AMM. Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 76).

- 6-real extent ofthe discrepancy and whether it required a major orminorrepair, orwhether the discrepancy existed at all whichwas determined not to bethe case, for example, with respect to the alleged improperhardware stack up? As testified to byMr. Becker, a discrepancywrite up isjust an "initialjudgment." Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 113). Moreover, it is hardly appropriateto assume every discrepancy as noted was reflective of the condition ofthe aircraft onthe dayAMES replaced the landing gearpursuantto its agreement with its custom, Capital Cargo International Airlines ("CCIA"). TheFAA makes the whollyincorrect assumptionthat everynoted discrepancy canbe attributedto the workperformedbyAMES onthe daythe workwas accomplished eventhough the aircraft operated for many months thereafter. AMES completedthe landing gear change onN899AAonJuly 31, 2009, on N898AA on September 29, 2009, and onN287SC onMarch22, 2010. The FAA did not inspect the aircraft until May 25, 2010- betweentwo and ahnost 10 months later. As the FAA concedes, inthat interim, the landing gear onN899AA were extended and retracted 1,586times (784 complete cycles), the landing gear onN898AA were extended and retracted 1,256times (628 complete cycles) and the landing gear onN287SC were extended andretracted 344times (172 complete cycles). See FAA Enforcement Investigative Report, SectionB, Page 3; FAAMotion at 3, 5 and 9. To disregard, as has the FAA, that the landing gear and flying doors hadundoubtedly experienced at least the normal amount ofwear and tear during this time (see Exhibit 3 (Lipinski Tr. at 204-205) is to ignore the applicable case law requiring the FAAto present sufficient evidence

2 Mr. Beckertestified that the need to make only a minorrepair, as distinguished from a majorrepair, is evidence that the aircraft would stillbe in airworthycondition. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at I02).

- 7-(meeting the standard required by§13.223) to showthe alleged deficient condition ofthe three aircraft existed at thetime AMES completed the landing gear changes months earlier and to ignore the laws ofphysics.3 N899AA Exhibit N to the FAA Motion is a compilation ofthe so-called "non-routine" workcards for N899AA which, with supporting documents, call outthe discrepancy and the corrective actiontakenbyAMES in responsethereto. Complainant lists the discrepancies at pages 4-5 ofthe FAAMotion, yet makes no attempt whatsoever to address the almost I0 month gap in time during whichthe aircraft was in continuous allcargo line operations. Incredibly, the FAA is not even claiming that the discrepancy list describes the condition ofthe aircraft onJuly 31, 2009-thedaythe FAA alleges in its Complaint that AMES, byfailing to follow the AMM, left the aircraft in a discrepant condition. See FAA Complaint at 'll 4.a. For this reason alone, the Complaint should be dismissed withrespect to N899AA and N898AA and N287SC, consistent with Respondent's pending motion for summaryjudgment. To provethepoint, below each discrepancythat the FAAdescribes at pages 4-5 ofits Motion, and whichthe FAAclaims is proofofAMES' failure to properlyrig the flying dooronN899AA, AMES has responded with an explanation for the discrepancy and its significance. Boththe left-hand and right-hand flying doors had improperhardware stackups onboththe aft and forward flying doorhinges, (ExhibitN at 2-7; non-routine cards 0003, 0004, 0005, and 0006);
o AMES Explanation: "Improper stackup"refers to the discrepancy as

3Administratorv. Lewis, NTSB OrderEA-1177, 3NTSB 1241, 1978 NTSB LEXIS 51 (Aug. 17, 1978),

- 8-written onthe non-routine fonn (Exhibit N to the FAAMotion) based on InspectorLipinski's initial assessment ofthe condition ofthe aircraft. The corrective actions for each ofthese non-routine forms states "verified hardware" whichwas then "reinstalled" meaning there was no "improper stack up" found to exist whichwouldbethe case ifthe hardware had been "replaced"
..

- There was excessive play at the gear fitting ofthe left-hand flying door, which was addressed byinstalling new gimbalhardware, Exhibit N at 8-9 (non-routine card 0007);
o AMES Explanation: The corrective actiontakenbyAMES determined that the excessiveplaywas in the linkage andjointthat includes the tubularbearing atthe actuationrod. AMES records show, without dispute, that when it changed the main landing gearit accomplished AMM steps 5.AL (10) and (11), covering this hardware and fitting. See Exhibit 4. After installationthe landing gear had extended and retracted 1,586 times sincethe C check was performed. The wearing ofthehardware was to be expected giventhis number ofoperations. Further, giventhis time the aircraft was in line operation, tire, wheel andbrake changes would have necessitated the movement ofthe flying doorto facilitate such maintenance. Ifincorrect methods to move the flying door were used as evidencedbythe hinge door cracks that existed and even thoughBoeing warned ofthe consequences ofdoing so (see Exhibit 5 (B-727 AMM, Section 32-45-01), then one ofthe consequences wouldbethe loose gear fitting as documented. Finally, after AMES reinstalled this hardware during theinitial gear change, iftherewas and excessive playin the linkage it would havebeen found during gear swings and gap checks it performed. Therewas excessive play at the gear fitting ofthe right-hand flying door, which was addressed byreshimming the saddle support fitting, ExhibitN at 10-11 (nonroutine card 0008);
o AMES Explanation: The noted corrective actionwas reshimming saddle support fitting in accordance withthe B-727 overhaul manual32-10-0l. The reference to the overhaul manual, and notthe AMM, means that the saddle support fitting and gearbuild up was the responsibilityofthe landing gear supplier. AMES was not responsible for the conditionofthe landing gear assembly as provided to it byits customer. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 110). The aft angle onthe fairing for the right-hand forward flying door cutout was damaged, which was addressed byreplacing the angle, Exhibit N at 12 (nonroutine card 0009);
o AMES Explanation: The non-routine card does not documentthe extent of

- 9-the damage but in any event the aft angle was replacedbyAMES. Referring to FAAMotionExhibit N, non-routines 0012 and 0013, it appears that the consequence ofthe crackedright hand hinge loops resulted inthe damage to the aft angle onthe right hand fairing. There is no evidence that the aft angle was damaged whenAMES completed the landing gear change onN899AA onJuly 31, 2009. Ifthe aft anglehad beendamaged it would havebeenreplaced byAMES at the time ofthe landing gear change. Thehinge loop onthe forward outboardhinge cover for the right-hand flying door was cracked, which was addressed byreplacing the hinge, Exhibit N at 15-16 (non-routine cards 0012 and 0013);
o AMES Explanation: Nothing in AMM 32-11-00 requires a maintenance technicianto insert pins inhinge access doors as part oftheprocess of removing andreinstalling the flying doors in connectionwith a main landing gear change. See FAAExhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 3.F (I) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page423)4 Therefore, discrepancies associated with anyhinge cover orhinge pinare not directly orindirectly attributable to the main landing gear change AMES performed onbehalf ofCCIA. Further, as discussed above, cracking at these locations are an indication ofoverextending the doors beyond "normal serviceposition"- apractice Boeing specificallycautioned against in BoeingAMM 32-45-01 as testified to byMr. Becker. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 124-125). The aft hinge cover onthe right-wing flying doorwas wornto the point that the hingehad to bereplaced, ExhibitNat 17 (non-routine card 0014);
o AMES Explanation: The condition was noted as "worn," indicating that it was subjectedto wear and tear aftermonths ofoperation. As described by Mr. Becker, AMES was under instructions to replace any wornparts, even ifstill within limits, withnew hardware, etc. to make it structure "like new" to prevent any further concernsbythe operatororthe FAA. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 76, 85-86).

- Thebracket forthe forward hinge cover onthe left-hand flying doorwas wornto thepoint thatthe hingehad to be replaced, Exhibit N at 18 (non-routine card 0015).
o AMES Explanation: Same as above (non-routine card 0015).

4 Exhibit L ofthe FAAMotionis a picture ofhinge cover (referred to as an access door inAMM 32-11-00) fromN287SC according to theFAA. See FAAMotion, footnote 6. Inthe process ofremoving the flying doors, the maintenanceprovider is instructed to unscrewthe three screws shown in thepicture. There is no requirement to remove a hinge pinorreinstall ahinge as part oftheprocedure for either removing orreinstalling the flying door as part ofthemainlanding gear changeprocedure.

- 10-N898AA Next, the FAA states that Respondent executed various maintenance actions to address discrepancies associated withN898AArelying for its informationthe non-routine workcardsreproduced in Exhibit T to theFAAMotion. Once again, the FAA lists only thenoted discrepancies and is silent about thenature ofthe corrective actiontaken, which, as noted, is thebest evidence ofthe actual condition ofthe flying doors since not every discrepancy wasprovento be accuratebased onthe corrective actionperformed. Norwas everycorrective action even mandatory since AMES wasundertheinstruction ofCCIAto makethe flying doors "like new"whichis not the standard contained inthe AMM. Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 76). Further, as testified to byMr. Becker, a discrepancywriteup isjust an "initial judgment." Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 113). Inaddition, depending uponwhat part ofthe flying doorwas writtenup, AMES mayormaynothavehadresponsibility for the item basedontherequirements and instructions set forth in AMM 32-11-00-theAMMthe FAA alleges AMES failed to follow. Obviously, ifanitemlike a finding ofa migrating hingepinandresulting damage to surrounding structureis allegedbythe FAAto be attributable to AMES, the FAAwill haveto show to establish a violationthat as part of theMLG change orlanding doorriggingthatthe AMMrequired AMES to ensure access doorhinge pins were installed correctly. However, the AMM contains no such instruction andtherefore AMES cannotbeheld legallyliable for the conditionofthe hinge pins months after the landing gearwere changed. Finally, Exhibit T offers no evidentiary support for the FAA contention inparagraph4. c. and d. ofthe Complaint thatthe flying doors onN898AA were notproperlyrigged onSeptember 29, 2009

--

- 11

-eight months before theFAA's May25,2010 inspection.
At pages 6-7 ofthe FAAMotion, Complainantlists the following discrepancies for N898AA. After eachone AMES has completedthe analysis bydescribing the corrective actiontaken to address the discrepancy. In everycase, the discrepancy involved an area ofthe flying doorthat is not withinthe scope ofthe AMM landing gear changeprocedures, orwas ofaminornature indicating the effect ofwear and tear onthe structure. Followingup onreports that there wereproblems with the hardware onthe righthand flying door, Respondent replaced the forward hinge (because it was cracked), the aft hinge (because it was loose), and severalbushings (because they were wornbeyond limits), Exhibit Tat 1-3 (non-routine card 0001).
o AMES Explanation: Nothing inAMM 32-11-00 requires a maintenance technicianto insert pins in hinge access doors as partoftheprocess in removing and reinstalling the flying doors in connectionwith a main landing gear change. See FAAExhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 3.F (I) (Page402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423). Crackedhinges are attributable to the movement ofthe flying doorbeyond its "normal service position" that occurred during the course ofline operations, suchas whentires are changed, and not actions attributable to AMES maintenance activities. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 124-125). Therefore, discrepancies associated with any hinge cover orhinge pinare notdirectly orindirectly attributable to the main landing gear change AMES performed onbehalf ofCCIA. As to thebushingstheywereremoved and checked with a micrometer for wear limits lAWAMM 32-12-11, Figure 601, see Exhibit 6 (AMM 32-12-11, Figure 601), and were replaced whentheywere determinedto have beenwornbeyond limits. However, AMM 32-11-00 does not direct the maintenanceprovider to reference AMM 32-12-11, Figure 601 in connectionwith a landing gear change and therefore AMES did not deviate from therelevant AMM as alleged. Further AMM 32-11- 00 step 3.F. (4) (Page 402) (FAA Exhibit C) contains a noteto "observe the number and position ofwashers under nuts and boltheads" as they are to bereplaced inthe same ordertheywereremoved. AMM instructions specifying thereuse ofexistinghardware, as is the case here, is typical and means AMES was notrequired to install new hardware at the time ofthe landing gear change. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. 132-133). Followingup onreportsthat there wereproblems withthe hardware onthe left-

- 12-hand flying door, Respondent replaced severalbushings (because theywere worn beyond limits), the forward hinge (because it was cracked), andthe aft hinge (because a pinhad come out ofthe hinge), Exhibit Tat4-7 (non-routine card 0002).
o AMES Explanation: Same explanation as above regarding hingepins and cracked and wornbushings.

- Therewas a crack onthe inner skin oftheright-hand flying door at the hinge fitting, whichwas addressed byrepairing the damage, Exhibit T at I0-13 (nonroutine card 0004).
o AMES Explanation: AlthoughtheFAA did not include in its description ofthe discrepancythe corrective action, ifit had YourHonorwould have seenthatthe crackwas noted as a "possible small crack." The crack had to be confirmedusing EddyCurrent methods (amethodusedto identify cracks that are so small that they arenotusuallyvisible). Itwas blended and treatedmeaning the repair was minor in nature and did not affect the airworthiness ofthe aircraft. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 102). Further, the development ofsmall (invisible) cracks is entirely consistent withwear and teartype damage. See id (Becker Tr. at 86). The skin onthe right wing hadbeengougedbythe flying door, which was addressed byrepairing the damage, Exhibit T at 14-15 (non-routine card 0005).
o AMES Explanation: To correct the noted condition, the gougewas addressed byfirst, preparing the surface for paint and thenpainting over it, a processreferred to as "blend and treat". Mr. Beckertestified that this type ofrepair is indicative ofnormal wear and tear. See id(Becker Tr. at 86-87).

- Therewas damage onthe left-hand inboard flap track fairing adjacent to the flying door's aft hinge, whichwas addressedbyrepairing the damage, Exhibit T at 16-17 (non-routine card 0006).
o AMES Explanation: The damage was described inthereferenced nonroutine card as the fairing beingmerely "chafed." AMES Engineering found the damage tobe withinthe limits establishedbythe Boeing StructuralRepair Manual ("SRM") and therefore the fairing was simply blended. See discussion ofnon-routine card 0005 aboveregarding the minor nature ofsuchrepairs, which are indicative ofnonnalwear and tear.

- The forward hinge onthe left-hand flying doorwas cracked, and hadto be replaced, Exhibit T at 18-19 (non-routine card 0008).
o AMES Explanation: The subject hinge cover was found cracked and replaced. Again, as noted above, nothing in AMM 32-11-00requires a maintenance technicianto insert pins inhinge access doors as part ofthe

- 13

-process inremoving and reinstalling the flying doors in connectionwith a mail landing gear change. See FAAExhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 3.F (1) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423). Cracked hinges are attributable to the movement ofthe flying doorbeyond its "normal service position" that occurred during the course ofline operations, such as when tires are changed, and not actions attributable to AMES maintenance activities. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 124-125). Therefore, discrepancies associated with anyhinge cover or hinge pin are not directly orindirectlyattributable to themain landing gear change AMES performed onbehalfofCCIA. There were gouges inthe skin ofthe left-hand flying doornearthe mid attach bracket, which was addressed byrepairing the damage, Exhibit T at 20-21 (nonroutine card 0015).
o AMES Explanation: The damage was to the surface areathat faces the runwayontake offand landing and the existence of"gouges" was very likely caused bydebris from runways (causing foreign object damage known as FOD) that was kicked up bythe aircraft tires during take-offor landing. There is no proofthese gouges were present atthe time AMES completed the main landing gear change onN898AA on September 29, 2009.

- There were gouges inthe skin ofthe left-hand flying door near the stop bracket, whichwas addressed byrepairing the damage, Exhibit T at 22-23 (non-routine card 0017).
o AMES Explanation: To correctthe noted condition, the gouges were analyzed to determine ifthey were within allowable limits perthe Boeing SRM. When determined that theywere, theywere addressed byfirst, preparingthe surface for paint and thenpainting over it, aprocessreferred to as "blend and treat." Mr. Beckertestified that this type ofrepair is indicative ofnormal wear and tear. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 86-87).

- The aft hinge cover onthe left-hand flying doorhad a migrating hinge pin and a crackedhinge lobe, whichwere addressedbyreplacingthe hinge, Exhibit T at 24- 25 (non-routine card 0020).
o AMES Explanation: Nothing in AMM 32-11-00 requires a maintenance technicianto insertpins inhinge access doors as part ofthe process in removing and reinstalling the flying doors in connectionwith a mail landing gear change. See FAAExhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 3.F (1) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423). Crackedhinges are attributable to the movement ofthe flying doorbeyond its "normal service position" that occurred during the course ofline operations, such as tire changes, and not actions attributable to AMES maintenance activities. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 124-125). Therefore, discrepancies associated with any hinge cover orhingepin are not directlyorindirectly attributable to the

- 14-main landing gear change AMES performed onbehalfofCCIA. There was a cracked bushing in the left-hand flying door fitting, whichwas addressed byreplacing thebushing, Exhibit Tat 27-28 (non-routine card0023).
o AMES Explanation: This bushing was found cracked afterremoval of flying doorwhenthe aircraft returnedto the AMES facility. AMM Section 32-11-00 step 3.F. (4) (Page 402) (FAA Exhibit C) contains a note to "observe the number and position ofwashers undernuts and boltheads" as they are to be replaced in the same ordertheywereremoved. AMM instructions specifYing the reuse ofexisting hardware, as is the case here, is typical and means AMES was notrequired to install new hardware at thetime ofthe landing gear change. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 132- 133). Whenthebushing was subsequentlyfound to be cracked, it was replaced. There is no evidence the bushing was cracked when the landing gear were installedbyAMES.

- The aft internal stiffener onthe left-hand flap trackfairing was cracked in two places, which was addressed byrepairing the damage, Exhibit T at 31 (nonroutine card 0027), see also Exhibit Tat 29-30 (non-routine card 0024).
o AMES Explanation: The flap track fairing is not removed during gear changes and it would not havebeenobservedbyAMES when it performed the gear change. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 148). Further, theinspection andreplacement ofthe part is not part ofthe applicable AMMrequirements for changing the landing gear. Subsequently, when the flap track fairing was removed and the stiffeners found cracked they were repaired.

- The forward attachplate for the left-hand fairing was cracked, andhad to be replaced, Exhibit T at 32-33 (non-routine card 0028).
o AMES Explanation: As is the case with non-routine card 0024 discussed immediately above, the forward attachplateis not exposed during the landing gear change and the inspection and replacement ofthe partis not partofthe applicable AMMrequirements for changing the landing gear. Therefore, the conditionofthe attachplateis not attributable to AMES. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 148).

- Anattach plate for theright-hand fairing hadbeenchafed allthe waythrough, and had to bereplaced, Exhibit Tat 34-35 (non-routine card 0029)
o AMES Explanation: As is the case withnon-routine cards 0024 and 0028 addressed above, the attach plate for the right-hand fairing is notexposed duringthe landing gear change and the inspection and replacement ofthe partis notpart ofthe applicable AMMrequirements for changing the landing gear. Therefore the condition ofthe attachplateis not attributable to AMES. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 148-149).

- 15-After the above workwas accomplished, Respondent was stillunable to getthe left-hand flying door adjusted to properlyfit onthe aircraft, and the left-hand flying doorwas replaced entirely, Exhibit T at 8-9, 36-39 (non-routine cards 0003 and 0031).
o AMES Explanation: After AMES completed its corrective action, it reinstalled the door, this time with newhardware installed as directed by the customer. Withthe newhardware installed, the door failed the initial adjustment/rig checks. AlthoughAMES could havere-rigged the door, since the door had to beremoved to accomplishthere-riggingprocess, Charles Werking (CCIADirectorofMaintenance) ordered AMES to install a new door since CCIAhad one in stock. The customer madethe determination to install a replacement door, ratherthanre-rigging the existing door, in the interest ofexpediency. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 137). N287SC Finally, werespect to aircraftN287SC, the FAA Motion listed the following discrepancies withrespectto the left-hand flying door. 5 See FAAMotion at 9. Again, AMES has indicatedbelow each discrepancythe nature ofthe corrective actiontaken and thebasis onwhichAMES can and does assert that there is no indicationbased onthe corrective actionthat AMES did not correctlyrig the flying doors onN287SC. Dueto reports ofdiscrepant condition ontheleft-hand flying door, anunspecified number ofbushingwere replaced, Exhibit DD at 1-2 (non-routine card 0001).
o AMES Explanation: This non-routine card only states "suspect worn bushings." The corrective action notedthatbushings werereplaced. There is no documentation (substantial evidence) ofthe actual condition of theremoved bushings. Moreover, underthe direction ofCCIA, AMES was instructed to replace hardwareto make the aircraft flying doors "like new." See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 76, 85-86). Finally, AMM Section 32- 11-00 step 3.F. (4) (Page 402)(FAAExhibit C) contains a note to "observe the number andposition ofwashers under nuts andboltheads" as they are to bereplaced in the same ordertheywereremoved. AMM instructions specifying the reuse ofexistinghardware, as is the case here, is typical and
5 TheFAAnoted in its Motionthat "thequestion ofthe relationship ofthe discrepancies ontheright-hand mainlanding gear flying door and associated structures to the maintenanceperformed byRespondent does not appearto be a suitable subject for a motionfor summaryjudgment[]" and thatthe status ofthe right mainlanding gear on N287SC after April 20, 2010 would notbe further addressed. FAAMotion at 9, fu. II.

- 16-means AMES was notrequired to install newhardware at thetime ofthe landing gear change. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 132-133). The aft and forward hinge cover pins onthe left-hand wing doorwere improperly installed, whichwas addressed byinstalling new pins, Exhibit DD at 7 (nonroutine, card 0008).
o AMES Explanation: As explained, nothing in AMM 32-11-00requires a maintenance teclmicianto insert or secure pins inhinge access doors as partofthe process inremoving and reinstalling the flying doors in connectionwitha mail landing gear change. See FAA Exhibit C, AMM Sections 32-11-00 3.F (I) (Page 402) and 5. AL (18) (Page 423); Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at I01). Subsequentlywhenthepins were found to be loose, theywere secured. As a precautionarymeasure only, AMES provided subsequent instructionto its teclmicians to follow a non-mandatory Boeingreconunendationonthe method to secure hingepins. See FAA Motion Exhibit 0; Exhibit I (Becker Tr. 157-158). The left-hand flap trackfairing had slight damage at the wing door forward hinge opening, whichwas addressed byrepairing the damage; Exhibit DD at 8-9 (nonroutine card 0009).
o AMES Explanation: This appears tobe damage from theprotruding or loose hingepin. As noted, the subject AMM does not include any instructions for installing or securing access doorhingepins. Becker Tr. I0I. In any event, the initial damage descriptionwas documented as being minor (i.e., "slight") and was repaired bymerelyblending and treating the area. Again, Mr. Beckertestified that this type ofrepair is indicative of normalwear and tear. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 86-87). lll. The FAA CannotEstablish thatAMES Was Responsible for the Missing Tubular Bearing onN287SC Withrespect to the landing gear change that AMES performed onN287SC, the FAAargues that a missing tubularbearing alone is sufficient to establishthat AMES did not follow the AMM, failed to follow the CCIA maintenance program and therefore violated sections 41.13(a), 43.13(b) and 145.205(a) ofthe FARs. See FAAMotion at 20- 21. As theFAA states it, the tubular bearing was found to bemissing from the actuating rod assembly oftheright-hand flying door onN287SC during anoccurrence investigation conducted shortly after anApril16, 2010 aircraft vibration incident. See id

- 17-at 20. The FAAclaims that since the tubular beariug was missiugwhenthe aircraft was iuspected in April 2010 that this "demonstratesthat Respondent did not installthe tubular beariug at all." I d at 21. The FAA summarilydismisses the fact that interveniug maiutenance was performed onN287SC (i.e., an outboard tire change that CCIAperformed onN287SC after AMES installed the MLG onthe aircraft butbefore the vibrationiucident) and that the iuterveniug maintenance very likely caused the tubularbear to go missiug. See idat 21. The FAA concludes, withoutjustification, that "the onlyrational explanation for the missiugbeariug is that it was not iustalled byRespondent iu the first place[.]" !d. The FAA, however, simply ignores the persuasive testimony that JeffreyBecker, AMES DirectorofQualityAssurance and Traiuiug, gave during his depositionregardiug the veryrealpotential for the tubular beariug to go missing as aresult ofthe iuterveniug tire change. See Exhibit I (BeckerTr. at 42-49, 123-127). On March25, 2010, three days afterAMES completedreplaciug the MLG on N287SC and released the aircraft, a tire was replaced onthe aircraft's right-hand outboardwheel. See id(Becker Tr. at 42-45); Exhibit 7 (CCIAAircraft TechnicalLog Report). Mr. Becker explained during his depositionthat outboardtire changes onB-727 aircraft require the landiug gear door (or flyiug door) to berepositioned so the mechanic
can gaiu access to the wheel and the B-727 AMM contaius specific steps for usiug the actuating rodto move the landiug gear door for this purpose. See Exhibit I (BeckerTr. at 45-46). Mr. Becker confirmed to FAAcounsel that inorderto change an outboardtire it is necessaryto repositionthe flyiug door and thatthis repositioniug requires moving the

- 18

-landing gear door further than would bethe case by simplyopening the landing gear. See id (Becker Tr. at 47). FAA counsel then directly asked Mr. Beckerthe following: "And it is AMES' beliefthat it'spossible that the [tubular] bushing could've fallen out during that procedure?" Mr. Becker answered "Correct." See id(Becker Tr. at 47) 6 Mr. Becker also tookthe opportunityduring his depositionto explain to FAA counselthat it was incorrectto state as CCIA did in its letterto the FAAthat no additional maintenance was done ontheright-hand MLG ofN287SC after it left the AMES facility and stated "infact, there was maintenance performed, and maintenance that did involve the flying door." Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 46, 124); FAAExhibit BB (Letter from CCIA, Benjamin Buck, to Inspector BobbyEvans, dated June 8, 2010). FAA counsel also asked Mr. Beckerifhe agreed that CCIA indicated ina letterto the FAA thatthereasonfor the missing bushingwas AMES leaving it out when installing the main landing gear door. Inresponse, Mr. Beckerquestioned how CCIA (Benjamin Buck) could have reached such a conclusion since the dateofthe letter (June 8, 2010)
was priorto completionofAMES' investigationofthe matter and statedhis beliefthat Mr. Buck did not conduct athoroughinvestigation orusethebenefit ofthe AMES investigationresults in his answers to the FAA. See id (Becker Tr. at 48-49). FAA counsel returned to the issue ofthe tubularbearing later inMr. Becker's deposition. See id(Becker Tr. at 123-127). Mr. Becker then explained that as partof AMES' investigation he had discussed the missingtubular bearing withMike Ebert, then director oflinemaintenance for AMES, who had had a conversionwith a CCIA

6 Mr. Becker also confirmed for FAA counselthat the AMM sometimes refers to "tubular bushing" and to "tubularbearing" but that they arethe same component. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 47).

- 19-representative to learn how tire changes were actuallyperfonned byline maintenance personnel. Mr. Becker testified that the CCIArepresentative advised Mike Ebertthat "at times line maintenance people willremove that boltthat contains the tubular bearing and hold up the flying doorout ofthe way as theychange the wheel." Id(Becker Tr. at 124). Mr. Becker explained to FAA counsel that the BoeingAMMhas a notethat specifically cautions mechanics not to remove thebolt inthis manner because it will damage the hinge cover. See id(Becker Tr. at 125). Specifically, the B-727 AMM wheel change instructions advise mechanics "CAUTION: DONOT REMOVE ACTUATION ROD ATTACHMENT BOLT AND RAISE DOORABOVE NORMAL SERVICE POSITION AS HINGE COVERMAY BE DAMAGED." Exhibit 5 (B-727 AMM, Section 32-45- 01). The actuationrod attachment bolt holds the tubularbearing in place. FAAMotion, Exhibit A, Figures 401 and 402; Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 115). Removal ofthe actuationrod attachment bolt was no doubt such a commonway for mechanics to reposition landing gear doors during outboard tire changes that Boeing felt compelled to include the cautionarynotein its AMM. Consistent withthe notations ofdiscrepancies ofbrokenordamages access doorhinges andhinge covers (see Section II above) Mr. Becker notedthat ahnost everyaircraft had some form ofhinge cover damage (see Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 125)), which suggests that when changing outboard tires orwheels mechanics did remove the actuation rod attachment bolt and manually raising the door above the nonnal servicepositiontherebyresulting inthe observed damage, despite the cautionary note inthe AMM. Further, Mr. Beckernoted that during AMES' investigationthe mechanic who performed work onN287SC specifically stated

- 20-that he recalled putting the tubularbearingback in whenrigging the landing gear door after the MLG change. See id(Becker Tr. at 125-126). Finally, Mr. Beckernotedthat AMES performed a gear swing after replacing the MLG and rigging the landing gear doors and the doors met all the fair conditions. See id (Becker Tr. at 126). Mr. Becker explained that it would havebeenevident during the function check ifthe tubularbearing was missing because "there would've beenissues or problems withthat door ifthat tubularbearing was missing when it left the AMES facility." Id (Becker Tr. at 126). Further, Mr. Beckernoted that RandyBuol, the CCIA VP ofMaintenance, advised AMES in an email that the aircraft flew perfectly, and that
no problems were noted afterthe gear change. See id (Becker Tr. at 126); Exhibit 8 (EMail Correspondence from CCIA VP ofMaintenance to AMES ComplementingAMES
onits Work). Taking all ofthesefacts into consideration, Mr. Beckertestified that he is "fairly confident that AMES left that tubular bearing in" and that he "fmd[s] it hardto believe that AMES left outthat tubular bearing." Jd(Becker Tr. at 126). Thus, Mr. Becker explained that althoughAMES was willing to help its customer as much as it could, he could not state in the Corrective Action Report thatAMES sent to CCIA (Benjamin Buck) that AMES left out the tubular bearing. See id(Becker Tr. at 126-127; Exhibit EE to FAA Motion. The FAA simplydisregarded in its Motion for SummaryJudgment the compelling testimonyofferedbyJeffrey Beckerregardingthe high likelihood that the missingtubularbearing was caused by an intervening tire change that was not performed byAMES. While the FAAMotion acknowledges the fact thatthere was anintervening tire change, it summarilydismisses the implications ofthisintervening maintenance on

- 21

-this case. 7 See FAA Motion at 21. TheFAAhas theburden ofproving, based on reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, that thepassage oftime and the conduct of hundreds offlights, and documented intervening maintenance, did not alter the condition ofthe aircraft from when AMES first replaced the landing gearHaving failed to explain awaythe fact that intervening maintenance was documented, and lacking any evidence that thebearing was missing when AMES replaced the landing gear morethan 25 days priorto the discovery ofthe missingbearing, the FAA failed to satisfy itsburden of proof Accordingly, this aspect ofthe FAA's Motion should be denied.

IV. AMES Has Never Admitted That ItFailed to Properly Install and Rigthe Flying Doors The FAA repeatedly claims that the Respondent "admitted" that it failed to properly install andrig the flying doors. See FAA Motion at 16, 18 and 22. This assertion, however, is based onthe FAA's faulty logic and a misreading ofthe documents Complainant cites to support its claim. To substantiateits claim ofanAMES admission, the FAArelies upon a series of documents that do not, in fact, statewhat the FAA claims. Withrespect to aircraft N899AA, CCIA, AMES' customer and the aircraft operator, created a document known
as a "Corrective ActionRecord" ("CAR") and designated QAACVG004. Exhibit P attached to FAAMotion. Intum, AMES produced a DiscrepancyNotice which simply quotes word-for-word the description ofthe discrepancy as statedbyCCIAinthe CAR.

7 The FAA, citing the ExpertDeclaration ofMichael Christensen, statesthat thetire change "hasnothing to do with the tubular bearing." FAAMotion at 21. As addressed above, the ChristensenDeclaration cannot be considered leavingno evidence to contradict the testimonyofMr. Becker establishingthe logical connectionbetweenthe intervening tire change onN287SC and the discoveryofthe missing tubularbearing more than25 days after AMES completedthe landing gear change onthe aircraft.

- 22-See Exhibit 0 to FAAMotion. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 152 (explaining that the description ofthe discrepancies inthe AMES DiscrepancyNotices were "cut and past" directly from CCIA's CARs for administrative tracking purposes).8 The CCIA CAR QAACVG004, relating to N899AA, states: "Duringthe FAAramp check, ourPMI discovered the RIH flying door fwd hinge has damaged the mid section ofthemid section ofthe inboard flap fairing. After an evaluation, ourmechanics determined the damage to the fairing was out oflimits. The conditionwas due to the flying doorhinge pinmigrating out ofthe hinge assembly. The aircraft had the RIHMLGreplaced at its last "C" check, this was accomplished at AMES on 8-26-2009. The hinge assemblywas notproperly installed allowing thepinto migrate[.]" FAA Motion Exhibit P. The same statement is reproduced verbatim inthe AMES DiscrepancyNotice. See Exhibit 0 to FAA Motion. As noted in SectionII hereof, the steps described inthe AMMto remove and replace the main landing gear and removal and reinstallationofthe flying door do not require the maintenance provider (AMES) to remove and reinstall hingepins as part ofthe flying doorremoval/reinstallationprocess. Therefore, hingepin migration is notthe result ofany maintenance performedbyAMES, as claimedbythe FAA. Exhibit V to the FAAMotion sets outthe CCIA CAR designated QAACVG005 relating to N898AA. FAAMotionExhibit EE sets out the CCIA CAR designated QAACVG006 relating to N287SC. CAR QAACVG005 asserts that the flying door

8 Complainant observes at pages 5 and 7 ofthe FAAMotionthat the AMES Discrepancy Notice (FAAMotionExhibits 0 and U) are categorized as "Major" as ifto suggest something sinister. AMES designated the discrepancy notice as "major" onlybecause theFAA had sent a letterofinvestigation inconnectionwiththe matter. Had that not beenthe case, the notice wouldhavebeen deemed "minor". The designationhad nothing to do withthe extent ofthe maintenance required to address a discrepancy.

- 23

-rigging was not properlydone at the time ofthe gear change and that its condition should have beendiscovered byCCIAmaintenance during intervening aircraft inspections known as "A checks." CAR QAACVG006 contained a similar statement thatthe flying doors were not properlyrigged when AMES replaced the main landing gear, but notes that CCIAmaintenance should have discovered the issue during the intervening A checks. FAAExhibit U is the AMES DiscrepancyNotice that simplyrepeats verbatim CCIA's statements from CAR QAACVG005 and QAACVG006 and notes that to the extent anyA checks were performed byAMES under contract to CCIA, thattechnicians would receive additional training to specifically inspect the condition ofthe flying doors for thetype ofdamage allegedly observed byCCIA. Noting contained in the AMES DiscrepancyNotices (FAA Exhibits 0 and U) admit that AMES failed to follow the applicable AMM inperforming its services. In additionto directing Your Honor's attention to the CCIA-produced CARs and the AMES DiscrepancyNoticesreferred to above, the FAA also attempts to rely onthe March 21, 2011 response ofAMES to the FAA's Letter oflnvestigation. Exhibit HHto FAAMotion. Init response, AMES stated: Theresults ofourreview and action takenwere documented on CCIA's Corrective Action Report#'s QACVG004, QAACVG005 and QAACVG006
.... The details ofthe investigation and results have been sentto youby CCIA in a letter dated October 25, 2010 inresponse to your letter dated October 4, 2010
.... We workedverycloselywith the operator to put a corrective actionplantogetherthat wouldpreventthe reoccurrence for bothour operations. The FAA attempts to spinthis statement (see FAAMotion at 15-16, 18-19,22- 23) into anunqualified "admission" whenno suchinference can or shouldbe drawn since nowhere does AMES admit that it improperly installedthe flying doors in question.

- 24-AMES only states that it putinplace corrective actionplans withthe operator. And as discussedbelow, the corrective actionplans have nothing to do withthe AMM steps required to be followed whenreplacing mainlanding gear. In fact, counsel for the FAAquestioned theAMES witness, Mr. Becker, at his October 29, 2014 deposition at whichtime Mr. Becker, as the author ofthe letter reproduced as FAAExhibit HH, explained thathis response was intended to tell the FAA Inspector (Lipinski) that AMES was not going to be seeing anydifferent corrective action than whathad alreadybeen statedbyCCIA. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 176-177). He thenwent onto tell FAA counsel thathis letter sought to conveythe fact that AMES and its customer, CCIA, were working together and, since the matterhad not yet maturedinto

a civilpenaltyproceeding, he did not want to starttheprocess ofstating all ofthereasons whythe statements madebyCCIAinits response to the FAALetterofinvestigation (attachedto the FAAMotion as Exhibit H) werewrong orbased onincomplete information all thewhile working withthe AMES customer. See id (Becker Tr. at 178- 180). Mr. Becker, however, explained howhe didnotbelieve CCIA's Mr. Benjamin Buckwas looking at the entire event and that CCIA did not do a completeinvestigation. See id. Likewise, Mr. Beckernotedthat InspectorLipinski was simplyrelying uponthe information suppliedby CCIA, without any critical analysis ofit. See id. The FAAargues, unconvincingly, what it claims the documents sayand it cando

so onlybyignoring the testimony ofthe author ofthe AMES responseto the FAALetter ofinvestigationregarding its true meaning and intent. The fact remains, however, that AMES has not admitted anyviolations. As Complainant surelyknows, from dayone of this proceeding, AMES has unequivocallymaintainedthat the FAA's claims are



### - 25-unsubstantiated and shouldbe dismissed. See AMES Answer to the FAA Complaint, datedJuly 18, 2013. The FAA inspections inMay 2010 were months afterthe landing gear changes were accomplished and the FAA has yet to offer anyreasonable explanation for the veryreal impact ofwear and tearonthe landing gear doors other than to make the unsubstantiated claimthat it does not explain the noted discrepancies. Further, the FAA ignores thatthe critical information is actuallycontained in the non-routine cards where the corrective actions takento address the discrepancies are described and which show that no discrepancy actually existed (e.g., "verified hardware") or evidence the minor nature ofthe discrepancy (e.g., "blend and treat"). See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 86) Instead, the FAArelies onthe preliminary and unfiltered write up ofthe discrepancies that werebased on a simple visual inspection orincluded because CCIA asked AMES to make the landing gear doors "like new" and to look "inunaculate. Exhibit 1(Becker Tr. at 76, 85-86) Moreover, the FAA's claim ofmisrigged doors is not oncebased on any FAAobservation ofa "gear swing," whichis the only conclusive wayto determine inthe flying door is properly faired. See Exhibit I (Becker Tr. at 71). The "admissions," such as they are, relateto training concerninghinge pin installationbest practices (as to QAACVG0004) and training for effective visual inspections offlying doors during A checks (as to QAACVG005 and QAACVG006). As to the hingepininstallations, two important points must bemade. First, nothing in AMM 32-11-00requires the maintenance provider to remove orreinstall any access doorhinge pins. See FAAExhibit C consisting ofAMM section 32-11-00. Nonetheless, AMES, in the interest ofassisting its customers in everypossible way, provided training in the technique suggested, but not mandated, byBoeing contained in a Product Standard

- 26-Process (BAC 518, page 34) for ensuring hingepins are secure should AMES everbe called uponto provide suchmaintenance. As noted, however, AMM 32-11-00 does not call for theremoval or insertion ofanyhinge access doorpins. See Exhibit 1 (Becker Tr. at 101, 144-145). Therefore, AMES cannot be alleged to have failed to follow the AMM based on allegations ofhinge pinmigration orrelated discrepancies. Similarly, the FAA's attempt to stretchthe meaning and import ofQAACVG005 and QAACVG006 (FAA Exhibit U) to support its argument that AMES admitted violations is nonsensical since these forms only call for training in A check inspections. Again, the subject matterofthese CAR's do notrelate to the allegations that AMES did notproperlyreinstall andrig the flying doors onthe CCIA aircraft that hadbeenremoved solelyto facilitate maintenance (inthis case, the replacement ofthe main landing gear). Rather, theyrelateto the manner inwhich maintenance technicians are to conduct A checkvisual inspections ofthe aircraft. Nothing inthe CCIACAR's orthe AMES DiscrepancyNotices in anyway add up to an "admission" and it is misleading to suggest otherwise. 

### V. Conclusion The FAAMotion is wide ofthe mark. As amplydemonstrated above, the evidence on whichthe FAA seeks to rely is disputed and cannot support an affirmative ruling onits Motion. Complainanthas presented no evidence ofthe conditionofthe flying doors and related assemblies onthe dates theywerereinstalled afterthe landing gear changes were completedup to almost tenmonths beforethe date ofthe FAA inspection. Nordid the FAA make anyattempt to explain awaythe obvious impact of
wear and tear onthe structure otherthanto assert it could nothavebeen a factor at all

-27-(see Exhibit 3 (Lipinski Tr. at 204-205)--an assertionthat is simplyunsupportable. On the otherhand, throughthe testimonyofMr. Becker, AMES was able to state that whatever discrepancies were documented, the corrective actions takento address them
were minor innature and the product ofnormal wear and tear. In addition, many discrepancies do not relate to the actions ofAMES, as directed byAMM 32-11-00, when replacing the landing gear. The report ofthe AMES expert, Mr. Hancher, supports this AMES position.

- 28-While the FAA's motionmustbe denied, Respondent's pending motion for summaryjudgment is based onthe undisputed fact that the FAAlacks any evidence of the condition ofthe flying doors whentheywere replaced after removalto allow for the landing gear change. The FAA's May25,2010inspectionwas conductedupto ahnost l0months afterthe fact and the agency simplycannot establish anyreasonable inference that the alleged deficient condition existed at the time ofthe much earlier performed maintenance. Consequently, the Respondent's pending dispositive motion should be granted.

Dated: February 16, 2015 Respectfully submitted, SILVERBERG GOLDMAN, L.L.P. Attorneys for 

### AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGI

### NGSE~/ZCES
/ 

### / 

# . "**By:~~~~r~--~~~~~-4~-** Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 1101 30th Street, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20007 Tel: (202) 944-3304 Fax: (202) 944-3306 Email: rsilverberg@sgbdc.com

-29-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Ihereby certify that onthis 16'h day ofFebruary 2015, I causedthe foregoing Respondent's Answer in Oppositionto Complainant'sMotion for SummaryJudgment to be servedbyFedEx upon the following: Federal AviationAdministration 600 Independence Avenue, S.W. Wilbur Wright Building Suite 2W1000 Washington, D.C. 20591 (Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430) Tel: (202) 267-0377 (original and one copy)
The Hon. J.E. Sullivan Administrative LawJudge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) Washington, D.C. 20590 Tel: (202) 366-2132 Fax: (202) 366-7536 Christopher R. Stevenson, Attorney Federal Aviation Administration Office ofthe Regional Counsel, AS0-7 SouthernRegion 1701 ColumbiaAvenue College Park, GA 30337 Tel: ( 404) 305-5200Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4

Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6
Exhibit 7
Exhibit 8 List ofExhibits TranscriptPages from Deposition ofJeffrey Beckertaken Oct. 29,2014 Expert Report ofDaniel J. Hancher, datedApril30, 2014 TranscriptPages from Deposition ofFrank Lipinski taken Dec. 18,2014 AMES PartialWork SheetNo. 79 Showing Completion ofAMM Section 32-11-00, Para. 5, Steps AH throughAL in Connectionwiththe Original Left-Hand MLG Change onN 899AA B-727 AircraftMaintenance Manual (AMM), Section 32-45-01 B-727 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), Section 32-12-11, Figure 601 CCIA Aircraft Technical Log ReportDocumentingTire Change on AircraftN287SC E-Mail Correspondence from CCIA VP ofMaintenance to AMES Complementing AMES onits Work

### Exhibit 1 TranscriptPages from Deposition ofJeffreyBeckertaken Oct. 29, 2014

## In The Matter Of: AirborneMaintenance andEngineeringServices

JeffreyBecker October29, 2014

LegalRealtimeReporting 622 E. 

## CentralBlvd.

Orlando, FL 32801

OriginalFile 102914 Becker fmal.txt1 2 3 4 

### BEFORE THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

In the matter of 5 

### AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND 6 ENGINEERING SERVICES 7 

### Respondent 8 9 

## * * * * * * * * Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 Case No. 2011S0290032 Administrative Law Judge J.E. Sullivan


## * * * * * * 10 DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY BECKER 11
. DATE TAKEN: 12 TIME: 13 PLACE: 14 October 29, 2014 COMMENCED: 8:55 a.m. CONCLUDED: 2:55 p.m. 215 North Eola Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 

## *

15 REPORTED BY: Rita G. Meyer, RDR, CRR, CBC, CCP 16 

## * 

## * * * * 

## * * * * 

## * * * * * * 17 

### 18 19 20 21 22 

### 23 24 25 142 

### 1 specific individuals. 2 

### Q. But my understanding from what you just said is 3 that at the time that AMES was internally investigating 4 this, you interviewed these people and they could not 5 

### provide any information other than 6 

### A. Correct. 7 

### Q. This is what the records are? 8 

### A. Correct. 9 

### Q. Okay. And again, same question. With regards 10 to N287SC and the main landing gear replacement performed 11 in March of 2010, is that the same situation, those 12 individuals cannot provide additional information beyond 13 identifying the records? 14 A. 

### Correct. 15 

### Q. Okay. Now, there have been references in your 16 discovery responses to a, if I 

### understand correctly, a 17 tire replacement on N287SC that occurred after AMES 18 replaced the main landing gear but before the vibration 19 incident on April 10 of 2010. Do I 

### understand that 20 correctly? 21 

### A. Right. 22 

### Q. Okay. And how do you know that the tire was 23 changed? 24 

### A. I was provided, from Capital Cargo, 25 

### of the maintenance performed on that aircraft a print
..

# ~ut I over a

### t~

### 43 1 period

-- I believe it was from the time it left our 2 facility on or about the middle of March to the time that 3 it left Cincinnati after the vibration work. 4 5 i 6 7 8 9 

### 10 11 

### 12 13 14 

### 15 out?

the Q. Okay. And do you have a copy of that print

MR. SILVERBERG: It's in our materials. A. I believe it is part of the omnibus. I mean discovery materials. MR. SILVERBERG: I have a copy of it. MR. STEVENSON: Okay. MR. SILVERBERG: You should have a copy of it. MR. STEVENSON: Can you identify what number that was? 

### MR. SILVERBERG: 111. While you're rooting through your files, let's go off the record. I'm 16 going to take a quick bathroom break. 17 (Proceedings recessed at 9:43 a.m.) 18 (Proceedings resumed at 9:53 a.m.) 19 BY MR. STEVENSON: 20 Q. All right. So I understand correctly, the tire 21 change took place on March 25th, 2010, which would've 22 been three days after the landing gear was approved for 23 return to service by AMES? 24 

### 25 A. Q. 

### Correct. And do you know what physically is involved in

### 44 1 changing the tire on a 727? 2 

### A. Yes. Based on the procedures both published by 3 Capital Cargo and that are in the AMM, yes. 4 5 6 

### Q. And can you summarize those? A. Well, again, I'd like to have the documents because I can point specifically to it. It's easier for 7 me to communicate the steps and make sure I don't miss 8 any key items. 9 

### Q. I understand. I'm not asking you to go into it 10 in detail. But I mean, you said you knew what the 11 procedures were. I'm just asking you in general terms 12 what the procedure is. We can look at the documents at 13 some later time if we want, but right now I'm just asking 14 you -- 15 16 17 18 19 20 

### 21 22 23 

# :: MR. SILVERBERG: Do you have the document that you're referring to? MR. STEVENSON: I'm guessing no, unless you provided it to me, since this document was not identified in your discovery response such that I realized what it was. MR. SILVERBERG: So you're just asking this witness to summarize his understanding of the document? We don't have the document in front of us? MR. STEVENSON: We're not
-- I'm not handing**~------------~**1 2 3 

### him a document. MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. MR. STEVENSON: I'm asking him to summarize 45



### 4 his understanding of what is involved in changing 5 the tire on one of the main landing gear on a 727. 6 

### A. As it applies to the flying door, one of the 7 

### steps
-- and this is for the outboard tires only

-- the 8 flying door is in the way of removing the tire. And 9 

### there is a banana link or what's called an actuating rod, 10 I believe, in the maintenance manual, and there's some 11 steps in order to move the door out of the way in order 12 to get access to the wheel. 13 BY MR. STEVENSON: 14 

### Q. Okay. And how do you know

-- okay. Let me -- 15 you said that that was for an outboard tire? 16 

### 17 A. Q. Mln-hmm. 

### Do you know if this was an inboard or outboard 18 tire that was replaced on March 25, 2010? 19 

### 20 21 22 

### 23 24 

### A. On March 25th, it was an outboard. number four, based on my memory. It was a

Q. 

### Okay. And are those

-- how are the tires numbered for the A. Q. Left to right, it's 1, 2, 3, 4. And just for the clarity of the record, as is 25 usual with aviation, I presume that left to right is from46 

### 1 the point of view of somebody sitting in the cockpit? 2 3 

### 4 5 6 

### 7 8 9 A. Correct. Q. And so, if I understand correctly, AMES' position is that it's possible that the missing bushing that was observed in April of 2010, could or would've been caused by some -- whoever was doing the tire change? A. What I believe

-- what our belief is is that there was a statement that no additional maintenance was done on that right-hand side after it left our facility. 10 And what our point is, is in fact, there was maintenance 11 performed, and maintenance performed that did involve the 12 flying door. 13 14 

### 15 16 17 

### 18 19 

### 20 Q. Okay. Is that something

-- do you dispute that there was a missing bushing on the aircraft at the time of the vibration incident in April of 2010? 

### A. No. Q. Okay. So how would that bushing have come to be fallen off or be left off during the course of the tire change? A. Again, it's a line maintenance environment. 21 Line maintenance has to move the flying door out of the 22 way in order to change the tire. That link is what holds 23 the flying door to the landing gear. 24 

### Q. When you say that they moved the flying door 25 out of the way, are they removing the flying door?

### 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 

### L_ A. No. They are just repositioning it. Q. Okay. And are they repositioning it

-- may I presume that you're saying they repositioned it further than they would just by opening the landing gear? A. Correct. Q. And it is AMES' belief that it's possible that the bushing could've fallen out during that procedure? MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Asked and answered. Go ahead and answer. A. Correct. BY MR. STEVENSON: 47

Q. There are some -- with respect to this component, there are references to a bushing or a tubular bearing. Are you aware of any difference between those
or are they referring to the same thing? A. I've seen it listed different ways in the AMM depending on where you look. I've seen it stated as a tubular bearing or tubular bushing. Q. Okay. But those would be references to the
same component? A. Right. Q. You're aware that CCIA told the FAA that the missing bushing was the result of AMES' actions in reinstalling the landing gear in March of 2010? MR. SILVERBERG: Objection as to the form of

### the question. Leading. A. I'm aware that they responded to Frank stating something like that. BY MR. STEVENSON: 48 

### 1 2 3 4 5 

### Q. I'm going to mark this as Deposition Exhibit C. 6 On its face, this is identified as a -- it's a letter on 7 Capital Cargo letterhead dated June 8, 2010 and addressed 8 to Aviation Safety Inspector Bobby Evans and signed by 9 Benjamin L. Buck. Can you review that, Mr. Silverberg? 10 Now if you would take a moment to review that, 11 Mr. Becker, and let me know when you have
.. 12 (Exhibit C Received and Marked) 13 14 

### 15 A. Yes. BY MR. STEVENSON: 

### Q. And was this a document that you had seen prior 16 to today? 17 A. Yes. 18 

### 19 

### 20 21 22 23 24 

### Q. Okay. And would you agree with me that in this letter from CCIA, that they indicate that the reason for the missing bushing was AMES leaving it out when installing the main landing gear door? MR. SILVERBERG: Objection as to the form of the question. Leading. A. It states that in the letter. But looking at 25 the date, which is dated June 8, 2010, that was prior to

### 1 us completing our investigation, so I'm not sure how Ben 2 Buck came to that conclusion. 3 BY MR. STEVENSON: 4 5 

### 6 

### Q. Okay. Do you believe that Mr. Buck is biased against AMES? A. I really don't

-- I don't know. Based on some 7 of the documents that I've seen from Ben Buck, I don't 8 believe he did a thorough investigation or used the 9 

### benefit of our investigation results in his answers. 49



### 10 Q. 

### I'd like to ask you now about late May of 2010. 11 It's my understanding that from approximately May 25 to 12 May 27 of 2010, several FAA inspectors were looking at 13 CCIA aircraft in Toledo and it's my understanding that 14 you were present for some or all of that? 15 16 

### 17 18 19 

### 20 21 22 23 24 25 A. 

### Yes. I came in to work

-- I don't remember. I'm assuming it was the 25th of May. I came in to work and I didn't even have my door open and my boss called and said, hey, we're having, or Capital Cargo is having
some problems with some airplanes in Toledo. They are claiming that it might have something to do with some maintenance we had performed. So please drive up there with Dan Boggs

-- who was then the director of heavy maintenance issues are. and meet with Frank and see what the


### Q. Okay. And when you say your boss, to whom are1 

### Q. Okay. And this is the aft hinge on 287? 2 A. Right. Yeah. You notice there are no hinges 3 or no washers on each side. And I remember him pointing 4 to that. 5 Now, you know, just like us, I don't expect 6 

### Frank to have the AMM memorized. I'm sure, you know, he 7 pointed to it and he said, hey, look there's no washers, 8 not knowing that per the AMM, there's not supposed to be 9 any washers there. 10 Q. Okay. Do you know at the time that you 11 observed 287SC on May 25th and 26th, whether the flying 12 doors on that aircraft were out of rig? 71

13 A. First of all, you can't check the rig of a door 14 unless you swing the gear. So seeing an airplane, I 15 don't know how anybody, including Mr. Lipinski can look 16 at a door and say, hey, it's misrigged. You can't do 17 that until you swing it. 18 

### Q. Okay. Did you -- I'm going to provide you with 19 a document that's been marked for this deposition as 20 Exhibit E. It is identified on its face as an FAA 21 memorandum dated September 28, 2010 from Jack Gasche to 22 Frank Lipinski. It was contained in the EIR. I'll let 23 Mr. Silverberg review it. 24 (Exhibit E Received and Marked) 25 MR. SILVERBERG: It appears to be one of the1

! 2 3 

### 287SC? A. Q. Yes. Okay. And what, if anything, do you remember 4 observing about the condition of those aircraft? 5 

### A. Yeah, I 

### mean, we were under direction

-- we 6 

### were under direction from Charles Working. We were -- I 

### 7 recall that our marching orders from the operator, which 8 

### is completely understandable in the case, was we need to 9 

### make this like new. We want this

-- we want these 10 landing gear or these flying doors immaculate. We don't

# 761

11 want any opportunity for Frank or any other FAA inspector 12 to inspect any of these airplanes after the fact and find 13 

### any more problems. 14 

### So I 

### do recall that my inspectors were asked to 15 inspect the flying doors and the areas with a fine tooth 16 

### comb. They wanted us to write up every nick, every minor 17 flaw

-- which is not normal, by the way, in a "C" Check 18 environment or anything else. Unless there's a specific 19 job card that drives you to a specific area. 20 Q. Sure. Do you have any personal recollection of 21 what, if any, nicks or flaws were on these aircraft? 22 

### A. Um, no. I 

### mean, most of my dialogue

-- I 

### mean, 23 

### I knew that there was nonroutines. Written, many 24 

### nonroutines. I remember talking to Dan Boggs about it 25 and saying, yeah, there's a lot of nicks and bumps and

### 1 the point where the door was not faired. 2 

### Q. Okay. So when you say not faired, that would 3 mean that if there was an improper stack up, that would 4 mean that the door was not fairing properly and was out 5 of rig? 6 

### A. 

### Right. Right. Did not pass the rig checks. 85



### 7 Q. Okay. Now, you had indicated, before we took a 8 break, that you were -- I think your phrasing was that 9 you were under marching orders from CCIA to make these 10 doors like new? Mi:n-hmm. 

### 11 12 A. Q. 

### So were there actions that AMES took, were 13 there maintenance actions that AMES took with regards to 14 these three aircraft that were unnecessary in your 15 opinion, then? 16 A. I mean, again, we're under the direction of 17 Capital Cargo. Capital Cargo, the rep, Charles Working, 18 I mean, he reviewed every nonroutine. He looked at all 19 the wheel wells and the flying doors, himself. 20 Again, our direction was, you know, we want to 21 make this thing so that there was absolutely no 22 misunderstanding about whether these doors are rigged or 23 24 

### 25 

### not. So, I'm sorry, I don't know if I answered your question directly. 

### Q. Yeah. I don't think you did. Let me try to

### ask it again. Are you aware of any maintenance actions that AMES took that weren't necessary? And by necessary I
mean that would not have been called for by CCIA's maintenance requirements, or the Boeing AMM, but were just things that you were doing because CCIA wanted them done? 86 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

### A. Yeah. I mean, really, you know, in my opinion,

10 

### almost all the work done, I mean, again, we've never stated or agreed that the doors were misrigged to begin 11 with. And specifically, not misrigged when they left 12 AMES's facilities or control. 13 You know, when I reviewed the specific 14 nonroutines, again, all I see is wear and tear, blend and 15 treat. You know, fixing nicks. Replacing a worn seal. 16 Again, to me, these are normal operational type wear and 17 tear items. When the airplane comes in for a "C" Check, 18 yes, a lot of these things may be written up, but not to 19 the detail that was written up in the May visit. 20 

### Q. I'm curious. I think you referred a couple 21 times today to blending damage and the impression that I 22 get when you refer to that is that you don't consider it 23 a significant thing. 24 25 

### A. 

### No. MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Leading. If you

### have a question about what blending means, you can certainly ask him that. 87 1 2 3 

### 4 5 

### MR. STEVENSON: Are you instructing him not to answer? MR. SILVERBERG: No. I'm just noting the 6 objection. 7 MR. STEVENSON: Okay. 8 A. I mean, my definition of a blend and treat, it 9 comes from my engineering background. If you don't have 10 to repair something, if all you're doing is prepping a 11 surface and putting paint on it, that's what I 12 consider

-- what I believe is a blend and treat. That's 13 what I refer to as a blend and treat. And, no, if you're 14 15 

### 16 17 18 

### not adding any material back, if you're not performing a repair, no, it's not a repair. It's a minor

-- it's a scratch. It's a nick. It's, you know. BY MR. STEVENSON: 

### Q. So your understanding, if I'm reading AMES 19 maintenance documents and it says that there was damage 20 and it was blended, that means that it was just a new 21 coat of paint was applied to make it smooth? 22 A. Right. Yeah, basically, you blend the surface 23 to remove any rough spots and you prime and paint it. 24 

### Q. Okay. What do you mean by blend the surface to 25 remove rough spots?

### 88 

### 1 A. Well, using a piece of sandpaper or, you know, 2 again, just smoothing it out so that the paint adheres. 3 Q. Okay. So there's some imperfection in the 4 surface and you're using sandpaper or some other 5 abrasive 6 

### 7 8 

### 9 10 

### A. 

### Q. A. 

### Correct.

-- to scrape away some small bits of the

-- Yes.

MR. SILVERBERG: Let him finish. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 11 BY MR. STEVENSON: 12 13 

### 14 15 16 

### 17 18 19 

### 20 21 

### 22 23 

### Q. 

### So you would be

-- there's a rough surface and you're using some sort of abrasive to scrape away part of the surface of that component? MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Asked and answered. A. I guess, yeah. To be more specific, airplanes
are made out of aluminum; aluminum corrodes. The only way you prevent corrosion is to make sure that there's a coat of paint over everything. Any time there's a nick
or an abrasion on an aluminum surface, yeah, you would go ahead and you would do what I'd say is a blend and treat. Which is buff the area so that the paint adheres and you 24 put paint on it. 25 Q. 

### Okay. And was that something that AMES

### 1 

### 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

### 10 11 

### 101 

### needed to be replaced or A. I mean, it's a stop strip. So, you know, my recollection is, yeah, it's a wear strip. It's something that a stop stops against. So it became dislodged. Item number 10, left-hand main landing gear wing door forward and aft hinge cover, hinge pins improperly installed. This is on the left-hand side. These hinge pins are part of a hinge pin cover assembly. It's part of the landing gear change procedures. My recollection is we don't do anything with these hinge pins. So again, I have no comment about what they mean 12 

### by improperly installed or whether AMES, you know, had 13 

### done that. Because as far as I know, there was no work 14 

### done on these hinge covers when it was in the

-- when 287 15 

### was in our facility in March. 16 

### Q. Do you know if that was something that needed 17 

### to be done? 18 19 20 21 A. 

### I'm the description. yeah. I'm sorry, I'm just looking at Improperly installed. It doesn't tell
me if they were loose or exactly what was going on. Q. Okay. 22 A. But then again, it was in operation for two 23 months after it left our facility. So if a line mechanic 24 found a loose hinge pin and did something, we wouldn't 25 have known about it.**'--------~-----------------------~------------__j**

### 102 1 Item Number 9, left-hand inboard flap fairing 2 has slight damage in forward main landing gear wing door 3 

### hinge at, I'm sorry, at forward main landing gear wing 4 5 6 7' 8 

### door hinge opening. Blended. It was a blend and treat. Q. Do you know whether or not that was something that would've been needed to be done in accordance with the AMM or the MIP? A. This says we requested engineering to evaluate 9 

### it. 10 11 

### 12 13 14 15 16 

### MR. SILVERBERG: If you know. A. Yeah. I mean, no. I'm thinking. I don't

-- yeah. No, I don't know. I don't know if it again, just based on the, you know, this could've been something
as minor as chips on paint or, you know, something, but bottom line, it was blended. So based on my knowledge of what defines an airworthy or unairworthy condition, 17 blending is a minor repair. A minor repair, by 18 definition, doesn't impact airworthiness. 19 

### Item number 8, again, another hinge opening, 20 blended damage. It was a blend and treat repair. So 21 again, minor. And that's all the items in Exhibit M. 22 23 

### BY MR. STEVENSON: Q. 

### Okay. So would it be fair to say that, setting 24 aside the pinched conduit, your opinion would be that 25 almost all of that work was not something that was

### 103 1 necessary to be done but was either minor or cosmetic? A. Or customer
-- 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

### MR. SILVERBERG: Objection to the form of the question. Leading. A. All those items are either wear and tear or customer requests. BY MR. STEVENSON: 

### Q. Well, let me make a distinction. An item

-- a 9 component could be so damaged by wear and tear that it's 10 necessary to do a repair, right? 11 

### A. Correct. 12 Q. Okay. So just for the purpose of clarity, I'm 13 not asking whether or not you think it's what the 14 cause of it was, but am I understanding correctly that 15 you did not think that any of that damage was to the 16 point where it would've been a required repair? 17 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection, leading. 18 A. I guess we're talking about all eight items. 19 May I take a look at those again and just look through 20 them real quick? 21 BY MR. STEVENSON: 22 23 24 25 

### Q. Sure. I will provide you with M. MR. SILVERBERG: Could we have the question read back, please? (Reporter Complied with Above)

### 104
1 

### A. The answer would be no. 2 BY MR. STEVENSON: 3 

### Q. Okay. I would now like to switch from 287SC to 4 899AA. Again, I'm talking exclusively in the late May 5 2010 time frame. 6 So this first document I'm going to show you is 7 from Toledo, but then most of them are going to be from 8 Wilmington. I'm going to show you what's been marked as 9 Government's Exhibit N as in Nancy. This was identified 10 by the Respondent as Document 58 in its production. And 11 what I'm specifically going to be asking about is item 3, 12 when you guys are familiarizing yourself. I don't plan 13 on asking about the other discrepancies. 14 MR. 

### SILVERBERG: Specifically number 3? 15 16 

### 17 about.MR. STEVENSON: Is what I'm going to be asking

MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. Go ahead. 18 (Exhibit N Received and Marked) 19 BY MR. STEVENSON: 20 Q. All right. Do you have

-- do I understand 21 correctly that that is a CCIA write up? 22 23 A. Q. Yes. Okay. And do you have any reason to doubt the 24 accuracy of the discrepancy write up on that, 25 specifically of Discrepancy 3?1 

### 2 113 improper hardware stack up. Q. Well, but this says discrepancy left-hand main 3 4 

### landing gear flying door aft hinge has improper hardware stack up. 5 A. Mm-hmm. 6 

### Q. Now, I would not normally expect a mechanic to 7 write that hinge has an improper hardware stack up if 8 they didn't have a reason to believe that the hinge had 9 an improper hardware stack up. 10 

### 11 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection, argumentative. don't know that your understanding of what a 12 mechanic would do is relevant, but if you can, 13 answer the question. 14 A. Again, regardless of the discrepancy, the I



### 15 discrepancy is just an initial judgment. We always go to 16 

### the corrective action. The corrective action says they 17 verified hardware. There are no problems. There were no 18 problems with it. And they signed it off per the 19 maintenance manual. Or in this case -- actually, I'm 20 sorry, they signed it off to the service bulletin. 21 I mean, what you'll find on each one of these 22 cases is we removed the doors and we verified the 2 3 hardware. 

# 241 Q. 25

# L______ Sure. That was item 3? MR. SILVERBERG: Correct.

### have the partial work accomplished for item 

# I
11? 

### I 2 A. Yes. 3 

### Q. One of the entries in the discrepancy it says 4 

### for entry number one it says, as written, door removed 5 

### FOM. What would a technician mean when he says FOM? 6 

### A. To facilitate maintenance. Facilitation of 7 maintenance. 8 

### Q. All right. 9 

### A. So in order to check the hardware stack, he had 10 to remove the door. 11 

### Q. Sure. Proceed. 12 A. 

### Item number 7, left-hand main flying door has 13 excessive play at gear gitting. They really meant 14 fitting, misspelled fitting. And they checked and 15 replaced hardware. 16 Now, it says in the corrective action, 17 installed gimbal hardware as required per 32-11. The 18 gimbal, when they refer to the gimbal fitting, it is the 19 end of the actuation rod. This is the fitting where the 20 

### tubular bearing is. So, again, this airplane was in 21 service for nine months. They found some play and so 22 they fixed it. 23 24 25 

### Q. Now, as I review this, since, ultimately the question we ask is necessary or unnecessary. When I look I 

### at this, it says that they installed the gimbal



## hardw~

### 123 1 are repairing it. MR. STEVENSON: All right. Now, I note that 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

### it's after noon. I don't know what your gentlemen's

10 11 

### 12 preferences for lunch are, but now it's sort of time if you wanted to, I'm okay for now. But

-- MR. SILVERBERG: I can keep going except for a walk down the hall. I had much too much coffee this morning. I apologize for that. But it's up to you, because you're the THE WITNESS: I'm fine. I'm fine. MR. SILVERBERG: We can keep going. MR. STEVENSON: Okay. That's fine. Off the 13 record. 14 (Proceedings recessed at 12:16 p.m.) 15 (Proceedings resumed at 12:20 p.m.) 16 BY MR. STEVENSON: 17 

### Q. All right. Mr. Becker, I wanted to go back a 18 moment before we delve into 898AA, and ask you a little 19 bit about the tire replacement on 287SC from, sorry, that 20 occurred in late March of 2010. 21 If I understand correctly, you had indicated 22 that it was possible that during that tire replacement, 23 the bushing fell out or was not reinstalled or something 24 along those lines. A. Mm-hmm.

### 124 1 Q. I'm sorry, just for clarity, was that a yes or 2 a no? You said mm-hmm and I'm just trying to
-- 3 4 

### A. Yes. Yes. My contention is, is that there's a possibility. There was another maintenance event. Ben 5 Bucks' statement in one of the letters was that there 6 were no other maintenance events and I'm just stating 7 it's incorrect. There's a possibility that that could've 8 happened. 9 

### Q. Sure. Based on, you know, your knowledge and 10 experience, do you know how likely that would be? 11 

### MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. But go ahead. 12 A. Where my frame of reference comes from is my 13 discussions with Mike Ebert, who was then the director of 14 line maintenance for AMES. 15 When the tubular bearing came up missing as 16 part of the investigation, I talked to Mike and I said, 17 

### okay. So what's, you know, what's the line maintenance 18 version of what goes on? You know, how does that work? 19 And he said that he had had conversations with somebody 20 

### in Capital Cargo I don't know who. It may have been 21 Mark Summers, it may have been some other line 22 maintenance folks from Capital Cargo, but that at times, 23 the line maintenance people will remove that bolt that 24 contains the tubular bearing and hold up the flying door 

# 251 out of the way as they change the wheel.

### 125
1 

### That procedure is not in the Capital Cargo 2 procedures for changing the wheel. And in the Boeing 3 procedures for changing the wheel, it has that note that 4 specifically says, hey, you'll damage the hinge cover if 5 you remove the link that way. Because you're holding up 6 the door, it's not steady. 7 So that's where my, again, that's where my 8 frame of reference is coming from. That there was an 9 opportunity for that tubular bearing to be missing. That 10 

### 11 12 13 

### 14 coupled with when we did our investigation, the mechanic that performed the work specifically said in his statement, I recall putting the tubular bearing back in. Q. Sure. So if I understand correctly, for the tubular bearing to have come out while the mechanic was 15 changing the tire, that mechanic would have to have been 16 doing that maintenance action in a way that the Boeing 17 AMM specifically tells him not to do because it might 18 damage these hinge covers? 19 A. Yeah. All I recall is it has a note specific 20 that says, if you do not use this other procedure, that 21 hinge cover damage can occur. And as we found, almost 22 every single one of the airplanes that came in had some 23 form of hinge cover damage. 24 Q. Do you think that it is more likely that the 25 bushing was left out when the MLG was installed at AMES1 

### 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

### 10 

### or more likely that this mechanic violated the AMM and lifted that door such that the bushing fell out? 126

A. I think as I stated in my response to the Ben Buck, we did not have any proof or even any inkling that that bushing or that tubular bearing was missing. And not only did we have a statement from the technician that says he specifically recalls putting the bearing back in, but again, the doors were swung. They met all the fair conditions. We can only assume that if you're gonna go ahead and do a function check to make sure that all the 11 procedures followed, that that door, there would've been 12 issues or problems with that door if that tubular bearing 13 was missing when it left the AMES facility. 14 So all I could say is, I am fairly confident 15 that AMES left that tubular bearing in. Also that 16 airplane flew and we got an e-mail from Randy Buol, the 17 vice-president of Capital Cargo said the airplane flew 18 perfect. No problems noted after the gear changes. You 19 would think that if that tubular bearing missing had 20 caused vibration, that you would've felt it immediately. 21 Again, you know, putting, stringing all those 22 conclusions together, I find it hard to believe that AMES 23 left out that tubular bearing. And that's why I stated 24 it in the, in the CAR that I responded to Ben Buck, that, 25 you know, we're here to help as much as we can, which is

### 1 the way we work, but I can't tell you that we left that 2 

### out. 3 

### Q. Okay. Let's turn to 898. If I am 

### keeping 4 track correctly, we're up to Exhibit P. And this is a 5 

### one-page document that was identified by the Respondent 127

6 

### as Number 16 

### in his document production. And I will give 7 opposing counsel the opportunity to look at that. 8 

### MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. 9 (Exhibit P Received and Marked) 10 BY MR. STEVENSON: 11 

### Q. All right. Now, would I understand correctly 12 that this supplemental sheet contains one discrepancy 13 that was written up by CCIA? 14 15 

### A. Q. Correct. Okay. And do you have any reason to doubt the 16 

### accuracy of the discrepancy they wrote up? 17 18 A. 

### Q. No. Okay. All right. What I have here are the 19 

### I have one large document that I'm going to mark as 20 Exhibit Q. This should be Item of Proof 25. It's the 21 package as contained in the EIR of the nonroutine cards 22 

### from AMES for 898AA in late May 2010. I will note for 23 you that like the similar ones, the highest numbered card 24 25 

### I have is 33. And I do not seem to have 23 or 31. So unless we notice them while we're going through here

-- 1.·-----------------------------**·--·---·~~** ..**~**1 2 3 4 5 6 

### 7 8 9 

### 10 11 

### 12 13 14 MR. SILVERBERG: Nor by the

-- there are the first one is the May 29th. Here's one for the 28th. Here's the 27th. chronological order. So they are out of

MR. STEVENSON: They are not. MR. SILVERBERG: They have been reordered in item number. Just so you know, Jeff. THE WITNESS: Okay. 132

MR. SILVERBERG: I don't know if that's going to make a difference to you, but I just want to make
sure it's clear on the record. THE WITNESS: Okay. MR. STEVENSON: Thank you. A. Okay. So, yeah. Again, just like the other 15 aircraft, this aircraft was in service seven months after 16 

### 17 18 19 20 21 we changed the gear, after AMES changed the gear. So a lot of these discrepant conditions we may or may not have had any control over at the time. One of the distinctions I did want to mention when I saw the words suspected worn bushing in this nonroutine, again, to make the matter of record 32-11-00, 22 when you remove the gear door, it says to use the 23 existing hardware. Right? 24 So what we did at the time we changed these 25 bushings and/or changed these landing gear, is we removed

### 1 the doors. We kept all the existing hardware and we 2 replaced it. As long as the doors faired, per the 3 adjustment and test procedures, we did not replace 133

4 bushings and shims and hardware at the time unless we had 5 6 

### problems rigging the doors. Q. Do you consider that to be an absolute? That 7 the mechanic can pull out the burnings and shims and 8 other hardware and put it back in and regardless of the 9 observed condition or configuration? 10 

### A. If the mechanic saw that the bushings or 11 washers were damaged or worn or whatever, he may replace 12 them. But again, the procedures, which he signed off to, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

### doesn't require him to replace them. So that's

-- I want to make that distinction as we go through some of these where we've replaced, we replaced shims and bushings and
so forth. That was part of the Charles Working direction when the airplanes came back 

### in May. requirement when we changed the gear. Okay. It was not the
Q. A. All right. So on this item number 1, right 21 main gear wing door reported for discrepant condition. 22 Suspect worn bushings and hardware. 23 The corrective action is that we replaced all 24 the hardware with brand new hardware, basically. 25 

### Q. When I look at this, what I would infer from

### 137
1 the door back into fair? 2 

### A. My recollection was Charles Working, again, was 3 managing all this. When the airplanes were flown to 4 Wilmington, Capital Cargo go ahead and check their 5 inventory and ship wing doors as just a precautionary at 6 the time. 7 Based on the nonroutine record, it failed to 8 check

-- in order to fail, in order to rerig this door, 9 you have to drop the door anyways. The customer decided 10 to go ahead and replace the door. I can't tell whether 11 they saw something that caused them to make that decision 12 or not, but they did

-- he did decide to replace the 13 door. 14 I do recall comments along the lines

-- and I 15 don't know if it applies to this door or the right main 16 landing gear door of 287 that was replaced but, quote 17 unquote, Capital Cargo had doors in stock. So they may 18 have felt it was quicker and more expedient to just try 19 to put up a new door instead of trying to rerig the old 20 

### 21 22 23 24 25 

### door. MR. SILVERBERG: What number? A. Item number 6. Right-hand main landing gear door, wing door, hinge fitting, possible small crack. They repaired it per an engineering REA. The REA is a blend and treat REA. So they must not have had a1 

### 2 144
my inspectors. It was written up the same day the airplane came in. So I'm trying to determine whether it 3 was something we caused and we tried to repair it or 4 whether it came in like that. I'm not sure. But this 5 did require

-- this looks like they drilled out the 6 damage and installed the fastener or installed the rivet. 7 8 9 

### 10 11 

### 12 13 

### Q. Now, and this says, when I read tool mark, that makes it sound to me like, I don't know, not that it's really like, yeah, somebody had a drill or a screwdriver, something, and it slipped and A. And dinged the

-- Q.
-- 

### hit the side? A. 

### Yeah. And that's what I was trying to 14 determine based on the dates, whether it was something 15 maybe we did or somebody else, but I can't determine that 16 based on the nonroutine. Either way, my inspector found 17 it. We repaired it and we evaluated it; we blended it. 18 MR. SILVERBERG: Next item. 19 

### A. Next item, item number 20. This time corrosion 20 on lower inner surface of left main landing gear flying 21 door. And it says clean minor surface corrosion. So it 22 was a blend and treat, even though it was corrosion. 23 Item number 21 is a loose or migrating hinge 24 pin. And the hinge lobe was cracked, so they removed and 25 replaced the hinge. Again, like we said, this hinge pin

### 145 1 is not covered in the procedures for changing the flying 2 door. So it's one of those things that if when it is 3 in our I would think that they would've written up a 4 migrating hinge pin if that was noted when they were 5 doing the gear changes and would've fixed it at that 6 time. 7 Item number 22, swivel clamps are installed on 8 the left-hand main landing gear. Hose swivel clamp 9 installed incorrectly. We repositioned them and again, 10 this is

-- the reference here for the corrective action 11 is overhaul manual. Again, the AMM procedures do not 12 reference the swivel clamps, only the overhaul manual. 13 So the vendor, the landing gear vendor would've been 14 responsible for locating these swivel clamps. 15 BY MR. STEVENSON: 16 17 18 19 

### 20 

### 21 Q. 

### But now, when this is being signed off by

-- I mean, what is the significance of the signature by AMES at the bottom of this then? A. Oh, I mean, the nonroutine was that we found the clamps installed incorrectly. The corrective action
was that we referenced the overhaul manual to locate the 22 clamps correctly. My comment is that AMES, during a 23 landing gear change, would not have located or changed 24 these swivel clamps. It would've come in as part of the 25 assembly of the landing gear.

### 148
1 would've removed the door and then they would've found 2 this condition after they removed the door. It wouldn't 3 have been visible unless you dropped the door. 4 Item number 28, left wing forward fairing, aft 5 internal stiffeners cracked in two places. Actually, 6 

### 7 8 

### 9 10 

### 11 12 13 

### 14 15 16 17 

### 18 19 20 21 

### 22 23 24 25 

### this was referenced in another nonroutine. So this is after they removed the fairing. It was an internal stiffener and they would not have seen this stiffener until they removed the fairing. And then they repaired it in accordance with SRM. Again, that's something you would not have seen and it would not be part of the AMM procedures for changing a gear. 

### Q. But that was something that once detected, needed to be replaced? A. Correct. Item number 29, left wing forward fairing, inboard attach plate is cracked, so they replaced the attach plate. Again, this is an internal part of the fairing, so we wouldn't have seen this item unless we removed it. Item number 30, right wing forward fairing inboard attached plate is chafed through on the right-hand side. The same attach plate as in the left-side had to be replaced. Again, you wouldn't have
seen it unless you removed the fairing. Item 33, left-hand main landing gear flying1 

### door requires replacement. Cannot adjust. So this 2 refers

-- this is the nonroutine referred to when that 3 other nonroutine said that the left-hand door failed, 4 this provides the procedures for changing that door. 5 And again, rightfully so, this nonroutine was 6 initiated on May 31st. So, yes, well after they 7 performed the gear swings. 

### 149

8 Item number 32, remove and

-- remove right-hand 9 

### main landing gear antiskid conduit for transfer to 287. 10 So they robbed the antiskid conduit to send it off to 287 11 and then they replaced it. 12 MR. SILVERBERG: Robbed in the technical 13 sense. 

### 14 

### A. Yeah. Cannibalized, took it off of one 15 airplane so it could be installed on another. 16 MR. SILVERBERG: I wanted to make sure Rita 17 didn't assume we're a bunch of thieves. 18 

### 19 20 

### A. And then, yeah, Exhibit 

### Q includes a copy of the RFTS. I'm sorry. And RFTS means request for technical service. It's a memo document that comes from 21 heavy maintenance to engineering, requesting assistance. 22 BY MR. STEVENSON: 23 24 

### Q. A. Okay. So, yeah, these are a number of the items and 25 the nonroutines are referenced.

### 1 2 3 

### confir.m; 77

-- and 77. (Exhibits S & T Received and Marked} A. Okay. 152

4 BY MR. STEVENSON: 5 Q. Now, Mr. Becker, before we get into the details 6 of any of this, just looking at the first two pages, 7 these are titled Discrepancy Notice; the second page 8 seems to have handwriting on it. The first page is 9 primarily typed. 10 

### What are these discrepancy notices? What's the 11 function of them in AMES' interaction with CCIA? 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 

### A. First of all, the verbiage up in the description area is cut and paste from Capital Cargo's, they call them CARS, but it's the same thing as the Discrepancy Notice. So we basically cut and paste that procedure; we put it into our form for our tracking. Instead of trying to track all the different customers, you know, type thing, we just put it in our for.m and we submit it to the, in this case, Brady Stevens, who's the line maintenance manager at CVG. The handwritten one is usually the handwritten
one we get back from them. It's just as a matter of putting it into our database and everything. It's easier 24 for the auditors to type everything, so they actually 25 type it all out. So that's the difference between those.

### 157 1 

### 1 sure that there's a thorough investigation. A root cause 2 or a corrective action is identified. And then at that 3 point, then, for instance, if there's a follow-up listed, 4 such as the manual changes are going to be done or, in 5 this case, maybe some training that's published or going 6 to be taken, then the QA auditor will follow up and make 7 sure whatever they say they're going to do, they're going 8 to do. 9 

### Q. All right. Now, my understanding is that as 10 part of the corrective actions resulting collectively 11 from the issues with these three aircraft, that AMES 12 ended up doing some additional training with its 13 mechanics on 727 landing gear. 14 

### 15 16 

### MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Leading. Go ahead. A. 

### We put together some training. It included the 17 input from Frank from Capital Cargo and was also in the 18 middle of

-- I mean, we listed several corrective 19 actions. 20 One of the things we do and we do with any sort 21 of issues that arise, whether it's something that's 22 brought to our attention by a customer or their FAA or 23 our FAA, is we focus on increasing the awareness among 24 the technicians and we do that by issuing computer-based 25 training modules or MILS. We call them maintenance


### , ____________________________________________________________ __j

### 1 information letters. And our initial purpose is to get 2 

### that information out to the technicians where we're a 1581

3 

### transparent organization so if one area is having issues, 4 we communicate it throughout the organization because we 5 

### want to prevent it from happening again. 6 

### During this time, yeah, there was an awful lot 7 

### of confusion about applicability, about the manual and 8 

### all that other stuff, but we took what we felt was a very 9 

### conservative course and developed the training module for 10 

### it. 11 

### Q. Okay. Let me mark this as Exhibit U. My 12 

### understanding is that this is a training course that was 13 

### as of June lOth, 2010 

### that AMES used. There have been a 14 

### couple of different presentations of that as IOPs and in 15 

### your discovery responses, the one that was slightly 16 

### shorter. I'm sorry. It's shorter because there's two 17 

### slides per page, not because there are slides that are 18 19 

### 20 21 

### missing. (Exhibit U 

### Received and Marked) MR. SILVERBERG: What's the source of this? MR. STEVENSON: That was in the EIR. 22 

### BY MR. STEVENSON: 23 

### Q. And if you have the chance, Mr. Becker, let me 24 

### know if you are familiar with that. 25 

### A. Mm-hmm. 

### Yes. So that's, as I stated prior,

### 176 1 Again, I don't have any quotes or anything specific, but 2 I do remember having conversations with Mike. In fact, I 3 do remember that Mike Loline specifically said that Frank 4 told him to issue these CARS to AMES. 5 

### Q. Okay. We're up to 

## v. I'm going to mark as 6 Exhibit V, the March 21, 2011 letter that

-- my 7 understanding is this is the letter that you sent to 8 Inspector Lipinski in response to his letter of 9 investigation. You'll be able to correct me if that 10 impression is incorrect in a moment. 11 (Exhibit V Received and Marked) 12 MR. SILVERBERG: That looks right. 13 

### A. Yeah. That's correct. 14 BY MR. STEVENSON: 15 

### Q. Okay. Now, I notice in there that you, at 16 least as I read it, you take the time to identify several 17 things that you believe are errors in Inspector 18 Lipinski's letter of investigation. Yes. 

### 19 20 21 A. 

### Q. But I note that you -- if we're looking at the last full paragraph on this page, it says: "The details 22 of the investigation results were sent to you by CCIA in 23 a letter dated October 25, 2010." 24 So did you, at the time you were writing this 25 letter, did you believe that the contents of the CCIA1 

### 2 3 

### 4 5 6 

### 7 8 9 

### letter you were referencing, were accurate? A. No, I didn't. Q. 

### Why, in response to a letter of investigation to the FAA, would you tell the inspector to go look at the results of a particular set of results of an investigation if you did not believe that those results were accurate? A. What I was referring to here is, what I was trying to advise Frank was that he was going to see the same corrective actions that he saw with Ben Buck's 177

10 11 

### letter. In other words, he wasn't going to see anything 12 new. He was going to see the same we wrote the main 13 landing gear change card. We did the additional 14 training. I mean, he wasn't going to see anything new. 15 So in my verbiage there

-- and that's why I 16 reference specifically Capital Cargo's corrective 17 actions, he's going to see the same information. 18 

### Q. Sure. 19 A. I wasn't really sure why Frank would issue an 20 LOI to one entity and then the same LOI to another 21 entity, so I was a little bit confused about why he did 22 that, but I didn't know if he was looking for different 23 

### information. So I added those comments to say, you've 24 already seen this information and I'm sending you the 25 same information.

### 178 1 

### Q. During the course of this litigation, AMES has 2 identified what it asserts are a variety of errors in the 3 letter of investigation that Inspector Lipinski sent to 4 you. 5 

### 6 

### A. 

### Q. And in the EIR. Yes. Now, in this letter, you identify some 7 things that you assert are errors in the letter of 8 investigation, but there are many, many things that you 9 are now asserting are errors that you didn't assert were 10 errors at the time. Why the change in what you're 11 asserting is errors? 12 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Argumentative, 13 14 

### but you may answer. A. Well, I mean, this is an LOI, right? So at 15 this point, we weren't talking civil penalties. What I 16 was doing my best is trying to put a face to Frank of 17 AMES and the operators are working together to correct 18 the problems. 19 As I stated, I forget what that other issue 20 was -- is. I wasn't going to point fingers at Capital 21 Cargo. I, again, wanted to go ahead and put forth to the 22 FAA we're working together to fix the problems. I wasn't 23 about to list in my LOI, all the problems I saw with 24 Capital Cargo's letter. I didn't agree with those. 25 I talked to Ben Buck about them and all I can

### 179 

### 1 say is he was very -- he was very opinionated, you know. 2 I had my opinions and he had his. And he's the operator, 

### 3 so he I don't change what he's writing to the 

### FAA and 4 

### he doesn't change mine, either. 5 

### Q. When you say he was very opinionated, do you 6 

### mean opinions beyond those expressed in his letter of 7 response? 8 

### A. I can remember having a conversation and his 9 

### only response to me was, Jeff, I only look at the facts 10 

### and this is the paper in front of me and I don't look at 11 

### anything else. And that was his response. And I 12 

### remember telling him that I didn't think he was looking 13 

### at the whole event. Again, I'm working

-- they are my 14 

### customer. So you have that customer/supplier 15 

### relationship. I can't dictate to him how he responds to 

### 16 an 

### FAA investigation. 17 

### Q. 

### Can you think of

-- I mean, AMES has asserted 18 

### in this litigation that a variety of opinions and 19 

### statements made by Inspector Lipinski are the result of 20 

### his bias. Do I understand that correctly, right? 21 A. 

### Yes. 22 Q. 

### Benjamin Buck, in his letter of response to the 23 

### FAA, makes many of the same or similar statements as 24 Inspector Lipinski does. Why would Mr. Buck be making 25 those assertions?

### MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Calling for speculation as to what Mr. Buck would or wouldn't have done or did do. 180
1 

### 2 3 

### 4 A. 

### I mean, the answer is I don't know. I would be 5 speculating and guessing about why he made the decisions 6 he did. 7 I do know that I talked to him and I do know he 8 did an incomplete investigation. And it's pretty 9 obvious, based on the comments in the EIR, that Frank 10 didn't go any farther than that, either. 11 Q. 

### What sort of investigation, if any, did AMES 12 perform in this matter above and beyond what CCIA had 13 done as referred to in their letter of response to 14 Inspector Lipinski? 15 16 17 

### 18 

### 19 20 

### MR. SILVERBERG: Do you understand the question? A. Q. 

### A. I don't know. I guess it's kind of broad. Let me clarify. I would have to look at their letter again to refresh my mind about the exact points. But I do know 21 there were many -- there were inaccuracies in Ben Buck's 22 letter. 23 

### Q. You indicated a moment ago that, correct me if 24 I misunderstood you, that CCIA had conducted an 25 incomplete investigation into this situation.

### Exhibit2 ExpertReportofDaniel

### J.Hancher, datedApril30,2014REPORT OF DANIEL J. HANCHER
1. My name is Daniel 

### J. Hancher. Since 2010 I have been a consultant to major air carriers, maintenance repair organizations, and aircraft manufacturers on aircraft maintenance shop processes, quality control principles, and aircraft maintenance inductions. Since 1964 and in various capacities I have been engaged in aircraft maintenance organizations, including air carrier maintenance departments and major repair station organizations. My resume is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 2. In my capacity as a line mechanic, as a supervisor of line mechanics and in senior management positions at repairstations and at air carriers, I estimate that I have had control or responsibility for the proper removal and replacement of B727 main landing gear assemblies on well over 700 aircraft. This figure does not include changes of main landing gear assemblies, overwhich I had some aspect ofcontrol or responsibility, on otherthan B-727 aircraft. I consider myselfan expert in the field ofaircraft maintenance in general, and rnain aircraft landing gear removal, replacementand routinemaintenance, in particular. In addition I consider myselfas expert in the matter of routine aircraftmaintenance, daily service checks, and more in-depth checks such as "A" checks. I am expert in categorizing minor aircraft discrepancies, resulting from inevitablewear and tear resulting from normal line operations as distinguished from either minor or major damage. 2. Iwas contacted by counsel forAMES with a requestto review maintenance records associated with the AMES-accomplished three main landing gear changes performed on N898AA, N899AAand N287SC. The records consisted ofthose created byAMES when itfirst changed out, atthe request of its customer, Capital Cargo InternationalAirlines ("CCIA''), the main landing gear ("MLG") in connection with a "C" check ofthe three aircraft. I also reviewed the records created by AMES in connection with the work performed by AMES after the aircraftwere flown to the AMES facility to address any ofthe FAA's alleged deficiencies in connection with the condition ofthe MLG doors, often referred to as "flying doors". I also reviewed the FAA-compiled Statementofthe Case in this matter. 3. As a result ofa FAA-conducted ramp inspection ofthe three aircraft, FAA Inspector Lipinski claimed the flying doors were damaged and improperly rigged by AMES when the repair station had previously peformed MLG removals and replacements. Significantly, the ramp inspection was performed anywhere from 2 to 9 months afterAMES completed the "C" checks on each ofthe aircraft and the interval between the completion ofthe "C" checks and the May 201 0 ramp inspection is as follows: Aircraft N287SC N898AA Date of MLG 

### RIR March 2010 October 2009 628 Cycles Movements 172 344 1256N899AA August2009 3. The FAAs complaint alleges that as ofthe dates AMES completed the MLG changes and reinstallation ofthe flying doors that it improperly did so based on the condition observed by the FAA inspector on May 25-26, 2010, which as noted above, is anywhere from 2to 9 months before the FAA inspected the aircraft. I have notseen any records produced by the FAA in this matterwhich details the condition ofthe MLG and flying doors on the dates AMES performed the MLG changes. I question howthe FAAcan allege the three aircraftwere in discrepant condition on a dates certain when it never inspected the aircraft on said dates. 4. Apart from this obvious issue ofproofofa violation, and based on my review ofthe discrepancies noted atthe time ofthe ramp inspection coupled with my review ofthe corrective action taken by AMES based on the discrepancies, it is my opinion that none ofthe items noted as a result ofthe FAAs ramp inspection were ofa serious airworthiness nature that required an immediate attention or repair in my opinion and could have continued in operation until the nextA or C check. 5. Based on my review ofthe corrective actions as documented byAMES, 1 have no difficulty concluding thatthe issues requiring attention were ofa "wear and tear" variety and notthe result ofimproper reinstallation ofthe MLGs and flying doors. The Inspector's ramp inspection noted minor imperfections offlying, door hinge fairing wear, migrating hinge pins, chafing ofthe wing doors, wear of flying door bushings and misrouting ofthe anti skid harness. Where the Inspector documented more serious findings, they were not born out based on the types of corrective actions required by AMES to clear the noted discrepancies. Also, the FAA noted the absence ofa required bushing on N287SC, although the missing bushing is not necessarily attributable to AMES because the aircraft in question had two tire changes and a landing gear cylinder replacement afterAMES performed its MLG change in March 2010. My experience with the landing gear ofthe B-727 aircraft is that the FAAgenerated ramp inspection findings could be generated on any in-service B-727 after months offlying and it is too simplistic to assume thatthe noted items were the result ofimproper maintenance by AMES.

6. Based on my experience, were the flying doors not properly rigged by AMES atthe time it performed the "C" checks as alleged by the FAA, the aircraft operatorwould have immediately noticed the discrepancies when the aircraft returned to performing line service. There is no evidence this was the case as each aircraft flew for months without any indication ofaerodynamicflight issues resulting from misfitted flying doors until N287SC returned to the departure airport due to a pilot report ofairbornebuffeting. Although the FAA Inspector attributed this event to a flying door thatwas not properly faired, it seems more likely that the air return was the result of rudder vibration caused by ceased rudder assembly bushings. As noted, were the need for the air return attributable to AMES' mis-installation ofthe flying doors, the issues would have manifested themselves immediately upon the aircraft being returned to service and not months later.6. After the ramp check the three subject aircraftwere repositioned to AMES' facility to address the Inspector's findings. The wing doors cited by the Inspector were removed and bushing's replaced (due to wear) and in two instances the doors replaced as a precaution and to satisfy CCIAand the FAA. However, the replacement ofthe doors does not necessarily mean they were damaged by the actions ofAMES as alleged by the FAA. In my experience it is typical of operators to exceed the work required to address wear and tear issues when FAA inspectors are questioning some aspect ofcarrier or repair station practices. The hallmark of being a good operator is being responsive to FAAinspector requests even ifthere are asking work be performed that is not mandatory based on applicable aircraft maintenance programs. 7. In reviewing the relevant documents including the applicable aircraft maintenance manual provisions, I note thatthe Inspector Lipinski claimed that AMES failed to follow the applicable AMM provisions when performing the gear change and reinstalling the flying doors. From the maintenance records I observed that AMES cited Section 32-11-00. The FAA contends thatAMES should have referenced AMM section 32-11-12 for the purpose of installing and rigging the flying doors. The FAA erred in reaching its conclusion. Not citing the wing doorwing installation section 32-11-12 does not mean that improper maintenance was performed. Reference to section 32-11-00 encompasses the instructions for installing the main gearwing (flying) doors. This is shown on page 423 of32-11-00, Step AL. Step 19 ofStep AL states: "Adjust (rig) wing door (AMM 32-12-11/501). The FAA allegation thatthe lack ofa reference to section 32-11-12 means the correct maintenancewas not performed is based on an incorrect reading ofAMM section 32-11-00. I reserve the right to modify, revise or enlarge my opinions as information is made available to me. Executed on April30, 2014



## - 1 -

## Exhibit 1
Daniel 

## J. Hancher
4926 Esplanade Street, Bonita Springs, Florida 34131, (407)314-8317 Experience 2010-Present Consultant to major airline, MROiJ€fMs and aircraft manufacturers on shop processes, contract negotiations, quality and aircraft inductions, 1996-2010Airtran Airways, Orlando, Florida GeneralManagerMaintenance Managed and directed the Maintenance Control, Line Maintenance and Heavy Maintenance Departments. Oversaw the Maintenance of Airtrans' DC-9, B-717 and B-737 fleet of aircraft. Responsible for overall operations of the 145 repair stations that accomplishes heavy maintenance of Airtrana€TMsfleet of aircraft. Accountable for the day-to-day scheduled maintenance checks perAirtraniJ€fMs General Maintenance Manual and FARs. 1996-1999 Pemco World Air Services, Dothan, Alabama President Responsible for the overall management of a 145 repairstation and day-to-day supervision of all aircraft maintenance and Quality Assurance activities. Accomplished modifications, maintenance checks, and structural repair to fulfill contractual obligations of the repair station. Regular customers were Northwest Airlines, Air Jamaica, Avianca, ILFC, UPS, TWA and military aircraft. Performed various structural modifications, heavy maintenance visits and cargo door modifications on DC-9, MD-80, 757, 767, 727, DC-1 0, A300, A31 0 and A320. 1991-1996 The Dee Howard Company, San Antonio, Texas Vice President Managed the day-to-day operation of the repair station, including the supervision of all aircraft maintenance and Quality Assurance activities. Accomplished modifications, maintenance checks and structural repair to fulfill contractual obligations of the repair station. Frequent customers included Northwest Airlines, UPS, Federal Express, TWA and ContinentaL Performed various structural modifications, heavy maintenance visits and cargo door modifications on Dc-9, MD-80, 757, 767, 727, DC-1 0, A300 and other nonscheduled aircraft. 1964-1991 Eastern Airlines, Miami, FloridaDirector ofAtlantic Region Maintenance Began as a mechanic of line maintenance and progressed through the company to fulfill the directors position. Worked the line maintenance, C Checks, D Checks on all Eastern Fleet: 8727, 757, DC-9, A300, L1011. Received certificates of training on all of the listed aircraft. References References are available on request.

### Exhibit3 TranscriptPages from Deposition ofFrankLipinski takenDec. 18, 2014

## In The Matter Of: In the matter ofAirborneMaintenance andEngineering

FrankLipinski December 18, 2014

LYONREPORTING, INC.

Certified CourtReporters P.O.Box81124 Atlanta, Georgia 30366 770/458-5500 800/767-2030

Original File 121814airb-jlp.txt1 2 3 

### BEFORE THE US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, DC
4 In the matter of: ) Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 ) FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 5 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND) ENGINEERING SERVICES, ) 6 ) Administrative Law Judge Respondent ) J.E. Sullivan 7 ) 8 9 

### FRANK LIPINSKI 10 11 

### Deposition of FRANK LIPINSKI taken on behalf of 12 Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services, at the 13 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional 14 Counsel, Southern Region, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College 15 Park, Georgia, commencing on December 18, 2014, at 16 9:25a.m. before Jennifer L. Pope, Certified Court 17 Reporter and Registered Professional Reporter. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LYON REPORTING, INC. Certified Court Reporters P.O. Box 81124 Atlanta, Georgia 30366 770/458-5500 800/767-2030 LYON REPORTING, INC. 1 '

### 1 indicating up to a point, going along with

-- 2 THE WITNESS: I'm listening to you. 3 MR. SILVERBERG:

-- by the nodding of his 4

1 

### head

-- 5 THE WITNESS: I'm listening to you. 6 BY MR. SILVERBERG: 7 

### s' 9 

### Q. A. 

### Q. Okay. We agree that's the case? Yeah. Those are facts which are not in dispute. 10 You didn't see the aircraft at those times 11 I just indicated? 12 13 

### A. Q. 

### That's correct. Okay. Now, so whether or not the work 14 performed months earlier was substandard such that 15 it presented itself on May 25th when you saw the 16 aircraft, after those intervening months and hours 17 of operation, you -- your position is that, based on 18 your observation of the condition of the flying 19 doors

-- 20 21 

### A. Q. Yeah.

-- and the rigging, that all of that, all 22 of those discrepancies you noted were all, without 23 exception, attributable to the original work that 24 was done by AMES? 25 A. I would say yes. LYON REPORTING, INC. 2041 

### Q. With no intervening event that would 2 preclude any other finding? 3 A. I would say yes. 4 5 6 

### Q. And that includes any intervening maintenance? A. (Nods head affirmatively.) 7 Q. And tire changes, wheel changes, brake 8 changes? 9 A. (Nods head affirmatively.) 10 Q. And that includes wear and tear? 11 A. Yes. 12 13 14 

### 15 16 Q. A. Okay. That's your position? As I previously stated, yes. MR. SILVERBERG: Off the record.

(Recess from 3:16p.m. to 3:21p.m.) MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. Those are our 17 questions for today. Do you have any redirect? 18 MR. STEVENSON: I have no follow-up. We 19 are going to request a read and sign. 20 (Deposition concluded at 3:21p.m.) 21 22 23 24 

### 25 (Signature reserved.)

LYON REPORTING, INC. 205

### Exhibit4 AMESPartialWork SheetNo. 79 Showing Completion of

AMM Section 32-11-00, Para. 5, Steps AHthrough AL in Connectionwith the Original Left-Hand MLG Changeon N899AA

# c PARTIAL WORK

# SHEET NO. R-11A 08FEB09

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### Exhibit5
B-727 AircraftMaintenanceManual (AMM), Section 32-45-01

# DOE~~~ MAINTENANCE MANUAL MAIN GEAR WHEELS

- REMOVAL/INSTALLATION 1. General A. Matching of tires on dual wheels is necessary so that each tire will have the same contact area with the ground and carry an equal share of the load. Whenever possible, install .tires having equal pressure and inflated diameters within 1/2 inch. Tires with diameters that differ more than 3/4 inch must not be used in pairs. Position larger diameter wheel assemblies on inboard side of gear. 2. Equipment and Materials A. Wheel Change Dolly- Commercially available B. Main landing Gear Wheel Retaining Nut Wrench

- 3ME65-72761 C. Airplane jack for main gear D. Torque wrench E. Grease C1> Aeroshell 5 (preferred> <AMM 20-60-02) (2) MIL-G-81322 (alternate) (AMM 20-60-02) F. Dow Corning 200 fluid or No. 10 machine oil <AMM 20-60-02) G. Axle Thread Protector

- F72880-3 or F72913-3 3. Remove Main Gear Wheel A. Set parking brake to hold brake disks aligned for when the wheel is installed. NQII: If brake disks misalign when brake pressure is off it will be necessary to align brake disks before installing wheel. B. Jack main gear until wheel clears and deflate tire (Ref Chapter 7, Jacking). WARNING: YOU MUST NOT REMOVE THE TWO WHEELS AT THE SAME TIME. IF THE AIRPLANE ACCIDENTALLY FALLS OFF THE JACK, INJURIES TO PERSONS AND DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE CAN OCCUR. WARNING: FAILURE TO DEFLATE TIRE COULD RESULT IN INJURY IF ADEFECTIVE TIRE/WHEEL SHOULD EXPLODE. (1) If tire cannot be deflated, back off valve stem slowly while applying a slight pressure on the valve stem during removal. WARNING: EXCESSIVE TWISTING FORCE CAN CAUSE SEPARATION OF VALVE CORE PARTS. STAY OUT OF VALVE PATH DURING REMOVAL OR INJURY MAY RESULT. 

## c. Remove hubcap bolts <Fig. 201) and hubcap. D. Remove axle nut lockbolt.

EFFECTIVITY·------------, 

# 32-45-01 ALL 01 Page 401 Dec 01/05 BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished Work- See title page for details.E. 

# < **ao.e"~:=l·R~~** MAINTENANCE MANUAL Remove axle nut using special wrench. Remove washer and outer bearing, To remove outboard wheels, remove two bolts through wing door actuating rod, raise wing door to servicing position and replace one bolt. CAUTION: DO NOT REMOVE ACTUATION ROD ATTACHMENT BOLT AND RAISE DOOR ABOVE NORMAL SERVICE POSITION AS HINGE COVER MAY BE DAMAGED. H. Install axle thread protector. I. Position wheel change dally, raise wheel, and remove. J. Mark the reason for the tire removal on the tire to aid the inspectors when they examine the tire. · · K. Check that inner main wheel bearing and dust seal remain in wheel.

**~:** On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal-felt-type dust seal, inner main wheel bearing and dust seal are retained in wheel with a retainer ring. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal-rubber-type dust seal, inner main wheel bearing and dust seal are not retained with a retainer ring. 4. Install Majn Gear Wheel NOTE: Main landing gear may have one of two types of dust seals supplied with the wheels. ·one type consists of a metal-felt-type seal used with a wiper ring and a retaining ring. The ather type consists of a metal-rubber-type seal used without a wiper ring and retaining ring. A.

B. On airplanes .using wheels equipped with metal-felt-type dust seal, check that·dust seal and inner bearing are held in place in wheel by a retainer ring and that antirotation tab on dust seal ring is in notch in wheel hub. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal-rubber-type dust seal, check that dust seal and inner bearing are positioned properly in wheel. Installation instructions are imprinted on side of seal: THIS SIDE TOWARD BEARING. Ensure that bearing has been packed with grease before wheel installation. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal-felt-type dust seal, ensure that felt has been soaked in light machine oil or Dow Corning 200 fluid for 5 minutes and let drain for 15 minutes prior to installation.

EFFECTIVITY'---A-LL---------,1 " 

# 32-45-01

BOEliLG PROPRIETARY - Copyr1gt-.t (C} -

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### \ 

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### Exhibit6
B-727 AircraftMaintenanceManual (AMM), Section 32-12-11,Figure601)



# HDEI~ MAINTENANCE MANUAL



## !NBD~ **~FWD** I 1 I \ \

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### ' 

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### ' I SECTION A-A

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flain Gear Wing Door
- Wear Limits Figure 601 (Sheet 1J 

# 32-12-11 Page 602 Dec 01/05 

# gEFFECTIVITY---A-L-L---------., D'

BOEitlG PROPRIETARY .. Copyr-ight (C) -Unpublished \lcrk

**~** see titte page for details.INDEX PART NO. NAME DIM

1 ROO 10 2 BOLT 00 3 BUSHING 10 4 BUSHING 00 5 BUSHING ID 6 GIMBAL OD 

## 13::> BUSHING ID

7 

## B> BUSHING ID

8 BUSHING OD §:> BUSHING 10

9 

## B> BUSHING ID

10 BUSHING OD H BUSHING 10 12 BUSHING 

### 1 oo BUSHING 13 TO - BUSHING WASHER 

### !I> TO WASHER 

# -- fi> IF INSTALLED. 1

# DUEl~ MAINTENANCE MANUAL
DESIGN LIMITS WEAR LIMITS

DIAMETER MAX MAX D!A REPlACE WEAR CLEAR WORN MIN MAX DIM ANCE PART 0.5625 0.5640 0.5685 X 0.0070 0.5605 0.5615 0.5575 X 0.7510 0.7520 0.7560 X 0.0070 0.7485 0.7490 0.7440 X 1.2490 1.2500 1.2535 X 0.0060 1.2470 1.2475 1.2430 X 0.5010 0.5020 0.5050 0.0050 X 0.5032 0.5052 0.5114 0.0114 X 0.4995 0.5000 0.4960 0.0050 X 0.5010 0.5020 0.5050 0.0050 X
0.5032 0.5052 0.5114 0.0114 X 0.4995 0.5000 0.4960 0.0050 X 0.6250 0.6265 0.6310 X 0.0070 0.6230 0.6240 0.6180 X
1.9380 1.9640 1.9220 X 0.094**~** 1.966 2.016 - X REPAJR WORN REPAIR PART INSTR.**~** DESIGN CLEARANCE IS O.OOZINCH MINIMUM, 0.0781NCH MAXIMUM. IFWEAR IS IN EXCESS OF 0,086 INCH, INSPECTTHRUST FACEOF BOTH BUSHING. IF EITHER FACE SHOWSWEAR THROUGH SINTERED BRONZE SURFACE, REMOVEAND REPLACE BUSHINGS. 

### 13:> AIRPLANESNOT INCORPORATING SB 32-234 

## B> AIRPLANES INCORPORATING SB 32-234
!-lain Gear Wing Door- Wear Limits Figure 601 (Sheet 2) EFFECTIVITY------------. ALL 01 

# 32-12-11 Page 603 Dec 01/05 BQE:ING Pfl:ilPRIETARY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished lt'otk - Se;e title page for detail.s.

### Exhibit7
CCIAAircraftTechnical Log Report DocumentingTire Change on AircraftN287SC

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**TIME~** 16.:il ACFT; N287SC • B727 ''· " 

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# ( ··: .Capital Cci.rgo :tnter:r:l:.atibtLal - AMIS-2.0·12

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### 1-
.'REF. AMM 32"11-.00
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AcCoM>'i.Isimo STEP X (S) .TfiRU COMPLETION R/!1 -MLG ·RBF...AMM 32-ii-·06.. NoJiMA+_, ESTENSION/RE:TIU!.t:I'IbN :&. 'EMER EXTENSION..(,!KS NORMAL
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**~WING** DOOR 'ON RT GEAR TO NORMiiL ·POSITION .PER AMM -3.2 'l'4l-32

:mSTALI.E:!;'f #3 TIRE ASSY· PER J\MM 32-45-01, 'NO DISC

**NOTED~** "OK FOR 'CON'!' SERVICE

. 

### !t.TIRE.
INSTAiiLED #4 TIRE >ASSY PER AMM :3·2-45-01 1 NO DISC NOTED. bK FOR .CONT SERVICE f-'L=:.,.T;;:.::N·o ;;:.::SB

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**'32-4-5-~~.** NO DISC I{OTEO. OK FOR .CQET SERVICE

### Exhibit 8
E-Mail Correspondencefrom CCIAVP ofMaintenance to AMES ComplementingAMES on its Work

### ·' {InArchive} Capital Cargo AircraftN287SC RandyBuol to:· · daniel.boggs@aitbornemx.com



# . i**··~22/2010**05:43

### ~M

· ''Brady.Templeton@airbomemx.com", CharlesWerking

Hide Details
·From: Randy

### Buol <rbuol@capitalcargo.com>

# '!~o: ·"daniel.boggs@airbornemx.com" <daniel.boggs@airbomemx.com> Page 1of

### 1

,.Cc: "Brady.Templeton@airbomemx.com" <Brady.Templeton@airbornemx.com>, Charles :. lw,erking <cwerking@capitalcargo.com>

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.. '**Dan~** ': ·, : :· '

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### . lli8tory: This message has been forwarded. :;,,Archive: Thismessage is beingviewed in an archive.**t;·~-.** .'

..,.,;..:.·**.•.;:.~** .. ·:-·:·,; l wanted towritea quick note tosaythankyou foran on-time, high quality delivery ofour aircraft. Afterthetest,flight our aircraftisnow inToledo and on schedule for its next revenue flight. Please pass on**~o**yourteam my thanks for ajob well done. Best regards,

. Randy Buol :;:'·. VP Maintenance • Capital Cargo.**~**

### i ;. : '·--··

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