FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J UNE 17, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

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N o. 07- 1289 7 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- D. C. Docket N o. 06-21590 -CV -PCH DONAL B. BARRETT, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us PHILIP J . SCUTIERI, J R., De fendant-Appellee.

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- (J un e 17, 200 8) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, MA RC U S an d W IL SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Plaintiff-Appellant Donal B. B arre tt, procee ding pro se, appeals the district court’ s dism issal of his second am ended com plaint allegin g fraud and prom issoryBa

rre tt, a Massac husetts resident, broug ht his suit ag ainst Scutieri, a F lorida re sident, in feder al 1 court ba sed on diversity

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C . § 1332.

2 es top pe l a ga ins t D ef

en dant P hil ip J . S cu tie ri , Jr . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed the co m pla int w ithpr ej udi ce f

or f ai lur e to s ta te ac la im

upo n w hic h r el ie f can be gr an te d, Fe d.R .Civ .P. 12 (b )(6 ). No rev ers ib le erro r ha s b een sh own ; we af fir m . 1 InBarr ett’ s se co nd am en de d c om pla int , he a lle ge d th e fo llo w ing f ac ts: ( 1) in 199 5, he f

ound ed Ne tFax Incorporated ( “Ne tFax”) and, w hen the com pany later be gan to e xpe ri en ce f

inanc ia l tro ubl es , he c ontro lle d it by vir tue of his ow ne rs hip of am aj or ity

of it s st oc k; ( 2) a t a

D ec em be r 2001 m ee tin g, he dis cu sse d hi s pl an s fo r the f inanc ia l r eo rg an iz at ionof the c om pany w ithit s di re ct or s and s om e fe llo w stockho lders, including Scutieri; (3) shortly after this m eeting, Sc utieri called Barr ett and f

al se ly r ep re se nte d to him

that he de sir ed

to co lla bor at e w ithBarr ett on the c ont em

pla te d r eo rg an iz at ionplan; ( 4) ove r the ne xt s ix w ee ks, Barr ett and Sc uti er i “ co lla

bor at ed c los el y [ ] a s c o- ve nture rs ” in e ff ec tin g th e tr an sf

er of control of NetF ax from

Bar rett to Scutieri; ( 5) during th is period, Scutieri int en tio na lly

c onc ea le d f

ro m Barr ett hi s tr

ue int en tio ns w ithN et Fa x, w hic h w as to pla ce it int o C ha pte r 7 li qui da tio n pr oc ee din gs; ( 6) N et Fa x, in fa ct , w as li qui da te d, ef fe ct ive ly e xti ngui shi ng any

ow ne rs hip int er es t B ar

re tt ha d; and ( 7) ha d B ar

re tt“A f

eder al cour

t applies t he subst antive law of the for um state in a diversity

case , unless fede ral 2 constitutional or statutory law require s a contr ary result.” Ga lindo v. ARIMut. I ns. Co., 203 F.3d 771, 774-75 (11th Cir. 2000) (c itation omit ted). 3 known S cu tie ri ’ s tr

ue int en tio ns, Barr ett ne ve r w oul d have tr an sf er re d hi s in te re st to hi m . O n a ppe al , Barr ett arg ue s th at the se f ac ts, a s a lle ge d, c onst itu te d le ga lly co gni za ble c la im s f

or f ra ud and p ro m iss or

y e sto ppe l. H e al so c ont en ds tha t hi s fr au d c la im

w as ple ad ed

w iththe r equis ite le ve l of part ic ulari ty . W e re vie wde novo adis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al f or f ai lur e to s ta te ac la im

pur suant t o R

ule 1 2 (b )( 6 ). Ma g l u t a v . S amp l es , 3 7 5 F. 3 d1 2 6 9 , 1 2 7 3 (1 1 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 4 ). An d“ [w ]e ac ce pt the f

ac ts o f the c om

pla int a s tr ue a nd v ie wthe m

in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to th e n on m ov in g p art y .” Id . To state a claim for f raudulent ind ucem ent under Florida law a plaintiff 2 m ust a lle ge that ( 1) the de fe ndant m ad e a fa lse state m en t a bout am at er ia l f

ac t; (2 ) the de fe ndant k

ne wthe state m en t w as f

al se w he n he m ad e it or

w as w ith out know le dge of

it s tr uthof f al sity ; ( 3) the de fe ndant i nte nde d th at the pla int if

f re ly an d a ct on the f al se state m en t; an d ( 4) the pla int if f j ust if ia bly r el ie d onthe f

al se statem ent to his d etrim ent. S im on v. Celebration Co., 883 So. 2d 82 6, 832 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004 ). In addition, Fed. R.C iv.P. 9(b) re quires a plaintiff to plead wit h p art ic ul ari ty the cir cu m st an ces co ns ti tu ti ng frau d.Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a lso c on c lud e d that B arr e tt d id n ot a lle g e fr a ud ba se d o n Sc uti e ri ’s fa ilure to 3 disclose his intention of liqui d at i ngNetF ax because there was no fiduc iary relationship between them and, thus, Scutier i ha d no duty to disclose. We see no e rror in this conclusion. Bar

rett did not alleg e that an e x press c ontrac t exi sted betwe en him an d S cutieri, but alleg ed only that they collaborated toge ther in the reor g anization of NetF ax; nothing e vidence d that Ba rre tt was a we aker party depende nt on Scutier i in the collaborative relationship. See Taylor Woodrow Homes F la., Inc. 4 Barr ett’ s fraud claim

fails procedurally

and subs tantively . H e did not set forth a specific oral or w ritten statem ent or om issio n by Scutieri a

bout a m aterial fa ct . S ee Z ie m

bav. Ca sc ad e In t’ l, I nc . , 256 F . 3d 1 194, 120 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ( to satisfy the particularity

requirem ent of Rule 9(b), a plaintiff m ust, am ong o ther thing s, set f

orth “ precisely

what statem ents wer e m ade in what docum ents or oral represe ntation s or what om issio ns were m ade”). Bar rett only vaguely alleged that Scutieri f alsely stated an intention to collaborate on the im plem entation of a re or ganiz at ionplan f

or N et Fa x. B ut t o gi ve r ise to ana ct ionf or f ra ud, the f al se state m en t m

ust be about apa st o r ex ist ing f

ac t, not af uture a ct ion . S ee V an ce v. In dian H am

m oc k H unt

& Ri din g C lub , L td. , 403 S o. 2d 1 367, 137 1 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 198 1) . Whil e a pla int if f can st at e a ca

use of a ct ionf or f ra ud i f a de fe ndant m ak es apr om ise to pe rf

orm am at er ia l m atte r in the f uture w ithno i nte nti on o f perform ing, see id. at 1372, here, Bar rett does not even allege that Scutieri m ade a pr om ise to pe rf

orm , but ins te ad , sim

ply a lle ge d th at

he e xpr es se d an in te re st i n co lla bor at ing . B ar

re tt did not se t f orth f ac ts a bout w ha t S cu tie ri pr om ise d to do o r to r ef ra in f ro m doi ng and, thu s, did

not suf fi ci en tly a lle ge f ra ud. 3v. 4/4 6- A C orp., 85 0 So . 2 d 5 36 , 5 40 (F la . D ist . Ct . App . 2 00 3) (“ [t]o e sta bli sh[an imp lic it] fiduciar y relationship, a pa

rty must alleg e some de g ree of depe ndency on one side a

nd some deg ree of under takingon the other side to a dvice, c ounsel, and prote ct the we aker party”). 5 T h e ab s e n c e o f

ap r o mi s e a l s o d e f

e a t s B a rr e t t ’s p r o mi s s o ry e s t o p p e l c l a i m. See Mount Sinai Hosp. of G reate r Miam i, I nc. v. Jordan, 290 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 1974 ) (e xpl ai nin g th at

the doc tr ine of

pr om iss or

y e sto ppe l a

ppl ie s w he n apr om ise is m ad e an d th at

pr om ise is re as ona

bly e xpe ct ed to ca use the pr om ise e ei the r to ta ke so m e act io n o r fo reg o t ak in g a ct io n) . Barr ett a lso a rg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d no t have dis m iss ed his se co nd am en de d c om

pla int w ithpr ej udi ce . D ism iss al of ac as e w ithpr ej udi ce is a sanc tio n of

la st r es ort, appl ic ab le onl y in ex tr em e ci rc um stanc es . S ee G of orth v . Ow ens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11 th Cir. 1993 ) (in the context of a F ed.R. Civ.P. 4 1 (b ) d i s m i s s al fo r f

ai l u re t o co m

p l y wi t h a c o u rt o rd er ). Al s o , ad i s t ri ct co u rt ’s dis cr et ionto dis m iss ac om pla int w ith out le av e to am en d is r es tr ic te d by Fed. R.C iv.P. 15(a), which direc ts that leave to am end shall freely be given when j ust ic e so r equir es ; bu t i f the re ha s be enar ep eate d f ai lur e to c ur e de fi ci en ci es by am en dm en ts p re vio usl y

a llo w ed , the dis tr ic t c ourt do es not ha ve to al lowthe party to am end the pleading . See Bry ant v. D upree, 252 F.3d 1161 , 1163 (11th Cir. 2001 ). Shortly

after Bar rett filed his original com plaint, he filed a f

irst am ended co m p l ai n t , wh i ch t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt d i s m i s s ed wi t h o u tp re ju d i ce o n Sc u t i er i ’s6

m oti on t o di sm iss . T he dis tr ic t c ourt i nstru ct ed Barr ett tha t he c oul d f

ile d ase co nd am en de d c om

pla int . H er e, the dis tr ic t c ourt c om m itt ed no a buse of dis cr et ionin dism issin g the second am ended com plaint with prej udice because the court pr ev iou sly

ha d e xpl ai ne d to Barr ett the de fi ci en ci es in his f ir st am en de d c om

pla int an d h adall owe d h im

to co rrec t t he m , bu t h e fai le d t o d o s o. AFFIR MED.