NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, 

Appellee,

v.

MARIO RAUL MARTINEZ, 

Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0099 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2015-118455-001

The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Linley Wilson 

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 5-18-2021
STATE v. MARTINEZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Mario Raul Martinez appeals his convictions and sentences 

for second-degree murder, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. He challenges two of the superior court's evidentiary 

rulings at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The victim and his girlfriend, L.C., were staying at a friend's 

apartment when Martinez arrived to enquire about money the victim owed 

him for some speakers. After an argument ensued, the victim unexpectedly 

pushed Martinez into the wall, and the two "ended up grabbing onto each 

other." 

¶3 L.C. returned to the apartment after taking out the trash, and 

she heard Martinez and the victim arguing about money in the bathroom. 

L.C. opened the bathroom door and saw the two men fighting on the floor.

The victim was on his back, and Martinez was kneeling over him. Martinez 

then stabbed the victim in the chest, stood up, and left.

¶4 L.C. called police. When officers arrived, they found the 

victim—alive but unresponsive—laying on the ground outside the 

apartment. Officers also discovered a knife in the bathtub and another knife

on the ground outside the apartment. The victim ultimately died from the 

knife wound inflicted by Martinez.

¶5 After interviewing L.C. and D.W., a neighbor who also 

witnessed portions of the confrontation between Martinez and the victim, 

officers turned their attention to locating Martinez. They found him driving

his vehicle in a hospital parking lot. Upon arresting Martinez, an officer 

found a baggie of marijuana in his pocket. Martinez's ear and knuckle 

appeared injured, and he had a puncture wound on his back.

¶6 The State charged Martinez with second-degree murder, a 

dangerous class 1 felony, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug 
STATE v. MARTINEZ

Decision of the Court

3

paraphernalia. At trial, Martinez presented a self-defense case, testifying

he feared for his life when the victim "[tried] to put something into my 

back." 

¶7 The jury found Martinez guilty as charged. Based on 

additional factors also found by the jury, the superior court imposed an 

aggravated prison sentence of 23.75 years for the second-degree murder 

charge. For the remaining counts, the court imposed presumptive prison 

terms. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 

9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 

and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Evidence of the Victim's Reputation for Violence.

¶8 Martinez argues the superior court erred by precluding 

evidence of the victim's reputation for methamphetamine-induced 

paranoia and violence. According to Martinez, the evidence was 

admissible to support his self-defense claim—specifically that the victim 

was the initial aggressor—and the court's preclusion of the evidence 

therefore violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. 

¶9 L.C. testified that, on the day of the stabbing, she and the 

victim had used methamphetamine. During cross-examination, Martinez

asked L.C.: "And it's a fact, isn't it, that [the victim] would get highly 

paranoid when he consumed methamphetamine, correct?" The State 

objected on relevancy and Rule 404 grounds. See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)

("[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.").

During the ensuing bench conference, Martinez explained, "[the question] 

directly goes toward the victim's capacity for violence. [L.C.] observed him 

being violent on many occasions." The court sustained the objection, a 

ruling we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 

156, ¶ 40 (2006). 

¶10 Martinez correctly asserts that evidence of a victim's 

reputation for violence may be admissible in a self-defense case. Ariz. R. 

Evid. 404(a)(2), 405(a); State v. Zaid, 249 Ariz. 154, 159, ¶ 18 (App. 2020). But 

Martinez did not ask L.C. about the victim's violent reputation. Cf. State v. 

Griffin, 99 Ariz. 43, 46 (1965) (describing "reputation in the community for the 

character traits of argumentativeness, belligerence and quarrelsomeness" as

admissible in self-defense case (emphasis added)). Notably, Martinez 

proffered that L.C. "observed [the victim] being violent on many occasions,"
STATE v. MARTINEZ

Decision of the Court

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and never proffered any evidence of the victim's reputation for violence. 

Instead, as demonstrated by the question and the offer of proof he 

provided, Martinez sought "to lay the foundation that [L.C.] observed this 

behavior before" to prove the "fact" that the victim becomes paranoid and

acts violently after he consumes methamphetamine. Such observations are 

not evidence of the victim's general reputation for violence. Cf. id. at 46-47 

(citing authority that discusses the admissibility of the deceased's "general 

reputation"). 

¶11 Further, because Martinez did not claim that, at the time of 

the knife fight, he knew of prior instances where the victim behaved 

violently after ingesting methamphetamine—nor did he identify 

circumstances that would otherwise corroborate his assertion that the 

victim was the initial aggressor—the proposed evidence was improper 

character evidence to prove the victim's propensity to behave violently. See 

State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 121, ¶ 35 (App. 2009) ("[A] defendant may not 

introduce evidence of specific acts unknown to the defendant at the time of 

the alleged crime to show that the victim was the initial aggressor."); see also 

Zaid, 249 Ariz. at 158-59, ¶¶ 14-16 (discussing Fish and the circumstances in 

a self-defense case necessary to render admissible a victim's prior acts that 

are unknown to the defendant at the time of the offense). The evidence was 

therefore inadmissible under Rule 404(b). And in light of the evidence 

admitted at trial, namely expert testimony regarding the violent behavior

exhibited by methamphetamine users and the victim's use of the drug on 

the day of the incident, Martinez was not denied "the opportunity of 

presenting to the trier of fact information [that] bears . . . on the issues of the 

case . . . ." State v. Foshay, 239 Ariz. 271, 279-80, ¶ 41 (App. 2016) (quoting 

State v. Fleming, 117 Ariz. 122, 125 (1977)). No error occurred, and the 

superior court therefore did not abuse its discretion. 

¶12 Alternatively, if the superior court did err, the error was 

harmless because the overwhelming evidence at trial contradicted 

Martinez's self-defense claim. See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993) 

("When an issue is raised but erroneously ruled on by the trial court, this 

court reviews for harmless error."). As instructed, the jury could consider 

Martinez's "running away" as evidence of his guilt. And in this case, the 

evidence demonstrated Martinez fled twice. First, as noted, he left the scene 

before police arrived. Then, Martinez attempted to flee when police drove 

into the hospital parking lot to apprehend him.

¶13 Other evidence also contradicted Martinez's defense. 

Significantly, Martinez did not claim he was defending himself during his 

post-arrest police interview. Indeed, Martinez initially denied being in a 
STATE v. MARTINEZ

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knife fight altogether, and when he eventually admitted to fighting the 

victim, he said he did not think the victim was going to kill him.

¶14 Finally, although Martinez was prohibited from asking L.C. 

whether she previously observed the victim behave violently while on 

methamphetamine, the court permitted Martinez to enquire whether the 

victim was paranoid or behaving violently after he used methamphetamine 

the day he was murdered. When Martinez posed those questions to L.C., 

she responded, "No."

¶15 Considered collectively, the foregoing evidence establishes 

beyond a reasonable doubt that, had Martinez been permitted to ask L.C. 

about the victim's previous methamphetamine-induced violence, the 

verdicts would have remained unchanged. See Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588

(stating error is harmless if "we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict").

II. Evidence of L.C.'s and D.W.'s Methamphetamine Use.

¶16 Martinez next argues the superior court erred by precluding 

evidence of L.C.'s and D.W.'s prolonged methamphetamine use during the 

week before the victim's murder. Martinez contends the precluded 

evidence "would have undercut the reliability of these witnesses'

observations . . . ." Again, we review for an abuse of discretion. McGill, 213 

Ariz. at 156, ¶ 40.

¶17 During his cross-examination of L.C. and D.W., Martinez 

asked whether they used methamphetamine just before they observed the 

fight between Martinez and the victim. Both responded that they did and,

when Martinez proceeded to question L.C. whether she was "doing meth 

all week prior to [the day of the incident]," the superior court sustained the 

State's objection on relevance grounds. The court did, however, allow 

Martinez to ask about L.C.'s drug use the day before the incident, which he 

subsequently did, and L.C. admitted to using methamphetamine then as 

well.

¶18 Martinez's argument is not persuasive. On crossexamination, L.C. admitted that she did not remember parts of that day and 

her lack of memory was "probably" caused by her consumption of 

methamphetamine. Considering the testimony regarding the witnesses'

drug use the day of—and for L.C., the day before—the incident, further 

evidence of their drug use during the previous week was cumulative and

only marginally relevant to challenge their ability to perceive the altercation 

between Martinez and the victim. We discern no abuse of discretion. 
STATE v. MARTINEZ

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶19 Martinez's convictions and sentences are affirmed.