IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 9, 2021 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MARTIN RILEY, III

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Putnam County

No. 2018-CR-1148 Gary McKenzie, Judge

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No. M2020-01242-CCA-R3-CD

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A Putnam County jury convicted the defendant, Martin Riley, III, of felony evading arrest

in a motor vehicle, a Class D felony, and the trial court imposed a twelve-year sentence.

On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the 

statutory defense available under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-603(b)(2). 

After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER

and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

Seth B. Pinson, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Martin Riley, III.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; T. Austin Watkins, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Bryant C. Dunaway, District Attorney General; and Bret Gunn, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

This case stems from the August 26, 2018, traffic stop of the defendant conducted 

by Officer Colby Fox of the Cookeville Police Department. Though the defendant 

complied with the initial traffic stop, he fled the scene when Officer Fox asked him to step 

out of his vehicle. Officer Fox, along with Sergeant Daniel Trivette, pursued the defendant

until the defendant crashed. After the crash, officers took the defendant into custody and

conducted a search of his vehicle, locating a syringe and a marijuana cigarette.

12/22/2021
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Subsequently, the defendant was indicted for felony evading arrest, simple possession of 

marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-603, -17-418, 

-17-425. 

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a 

result of the traffic stop and subsequent search of his vehicle, including the syringe, 

marijuana, and the statements he made while in custody. The trial court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing during which Officer Fox testified. 

While on patrol around 12:07 a.m. on August 26, 2018, Officer Fox saw the 

defendant drive past him in a silver Pontiac. Officer Fox noticed “a crack in the passenger 

side taillight” of the defendant’s vehicle and began following him. While behind the 

defendant, Officer Fox again observed damage to the taillight, describing the damage as a 

hole no “bigger than a golf ball” with white light shining through the hole. As a result, 

Officer Fox activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. 

The defendant complied with the stop, Officer Fox approached the vehicle, and 

Sergeant Daniel Trivette of the Cookeville Police Department arrived on the scene to assist. 

Officer Fox observed a female in the passenger seat and obtained the defendant’s driver’s 

license. He returned to his patrol vehicle, contacted dispatch, and learned the defendant 

had an outstanding parole violation. Upon learning of the violation, Officer Fox returned 

to the defendant’s vehicle and asked him to step out. The defendant, however, did not 

comply. Instead, the defendant “stomped the accelerator and slammed the vehicle into 

Drive and took off.” Both Officer Fox and Sergeant Trivette returned to their respective 

vehicles, activated their emergency lights and sirens, and began pursuing the defendant.

During the pursuit, the defendant exceeded 70 miles per hour, failed to stop at 

multiple stop signs and stop lights, and caused another vehicle “to get over into someone’s 

yard to avoid being struck in the rear of their vehicle.” The pursuit ended after the 

defendant struck “a tall sidewalk with the vehicle and rolled into a grassy area.” Officer 

Fox initially believed the defendant fled on foot but learned from other officers on the scene 

that the defendant was unconscious and “slumped over in his car.” Officers called

emergency medical personnel, and the defendant was taken to Cookeville Regional 

Hospital. 

While still on the scene, officers asked the defendant if he had anything illegal, 

including syringes, in his vehicle because the officers “thought [the defendant] may have 

ingested some drugs.” According to Officer Fox, the defendant “said he did not know if 

there was a syringe, but there might be.” Officers searched the defendant’s vehicle and 

found “a syringe, and in a cigarette pack, what we believed to be a marijuana joint.” Officer 

Fox also learned that the license plate for the defendant’s vehicle was improper and that 
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the defendant did not have proof of ownership. The defendant’s vehicle was subsequently 

towed from the scene and subjected to an inventory search. According to Officer Fox, the 

items found during the initial search of the vehicle would have been found during the 

inventory search.

During cross-examination, Officer Fox explained that the defendant initially passed 

him while driving in the opposite direction. As the defendant passed, Officer Fox looked 

in his driver’s side mirror and noticed a crack on the inside corner of the passenger’s side 

taillight. Though he did not recall how far away the defendant was when he noticed the 

crack, Officer Fox stated, “you can see white light from pretty far in a side mirror.” Officer 

Fox began following behind the defendant and again observed the damaged taillight though 

he did not observe any other problems with the defendant’s vehicle. After the pursuit 

ended, several other officers arrived at the scene, but Officer Fox did not recall if he told 

the officers why he initially stopped the defendant. He also acknowledged that he did not 

check the taillight at issue after the crash.

Officer Fox’s interactions with the defendant were captured by a camera mounted 

on the dash board of his patrol vehicle. The video at issue began a few seconds before

Officer Fox activated his blue lights and continued until the defendant’s vehicle stopped

after the pursuit. The dash camera footage was entered into evidence and played during 

the hearing. A still frame photograph taken from the video footage was also entered into 

evidence. Officer Fox, however, stated the photograph was “blurry and distorted,” and he 

could not see the hole in the taillight as a result. Regardless, Officer Fox circled on the 

photograph the area of the taillight that was damaged. The defendant presented another 

still frame photograph taken from other video footage, but Officer Fox was unable to 

identify the image. This photograph was entered into evidence for identification only.

At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court determined Officer Fox had reasonable 

suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because he believed the defendant was in violation of 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-402.

1 Ultimately, the trial court ruled the 

evidence found in the defendant’s vehicle admissible at trial but any statements the 

defendant made while in custody inadmissible.

Pertinent to this appeal, the defendant filed an additional, pre-trial motion wherein 

he requested two jury instructions “which differ from the pattern instruction” for evading 

arrest while operating a motor vehicle and its statutory defense. 7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern Jury 

Instr. T.P.I. Crim. 27.05(b)(1), (2). The pattern instruction provides:

 

1 This section of the code details the lighting requirements for motor vehicles in Tennessee. 
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Any person who commits the offense of [fleeing from][attempting to

elude] a law enforcement officer while operating a motor vehicle is guilty of 

a crime.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, the state must have 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following essential 

elements:

(1) that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on 

a [street][road][alley][highway] in this state;

and

(2) that while the defendant was operating such vehicle the defendant 

received a signal from a law enforcement officer to bring the vehicle to a 

stop;

and

(3) that after receiving such signal, the defendant, while operating such 

vehicle, [fled from][attempted to elude] the law enforcement officer;

and

(4) that the defendant acted intentionally.

[and]

[(5) that the defendant’s flight created a risk of death or injury to innocent 

bystanders [only for offenses committed on or after 7/1/16: pursuing law 

enforcement officers] or other third parties.]

. . . . 

[It is a defense to prosecution for this offense that the attempted arrest was 

unlawful. If evidence is introduced supporting this defense, the state has the 

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the attempted arrest was 

lawful. If you find that the attempted arrest was unlawful, or if you have a 

reasonable doubt thereof, you must find the defendant not guilty.]

7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern Jury Instr. T.P.I.-Crim. 27.05(b) (footnotes omitted).
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As to the statutory defense, the defendant argued “the pattern instruction regarding 

the unlawful arrest defense does not mirror the elements of the offense, and the jury should 

be given an instruction which addresses a ‘signal to stop’ rather than an ‘attempted arrest’” 

and “the jury should be given an instruction on when a ‘signal to stop’ is or is not unlawful.” 

The defendant also requested the jury “be instructed that reasonable suspicion means 

‘having specific and particular facts which would lead a reasonable officer to suspect an 

individual is committing a crime or is about to commit a crime.’” The State responded 

with its own proposed instructions to which the defendant objected. At the outset of trial, 

the defendant orally requested the special jury instructions detailed in his motion. The trial 

court preliminarily denied the defendant’s request but determined it would revisit the issue

at the conclusion of the proof. The State then proceeded with its case-in-chief.

Officer Fox detailed his interactions with the defendant on August 26, 2018. While 

on patrol around midnight, he observed “a small crack/hole on the inside corner of the 

passenger side taillight” of the defendant’s vehicle. As a result, Officer Fox activated his 

blue lights and initiated a traffic stop. The defendant complied and stopped his vehicle on 

the right-hand side of the road. Officer Fox approached the driver’s side of the defendant’s 

vehicle, informed the defendant as to why he stopped him, asked the defendant for his

driver’s license, and observed a female in the passenger seat. Officer Fox returned to his 

patrol vehicle and asked the dispatch unit to check for any outstanding warrants for the 

defendant.

2

 During this time, Sergeant Trivette parked behind Officer Fox’s patrol vehicle,

approached the passenger’s side of the defendant’s vehicle, and asked the female 

passenger, Angela Headrick, to exit the vehicle. The defendant remained in the driver’s 

seat. When Officer Fox returned to the vehicle and asked the defendant to step out, the 

defendant “floored it,” “peeled out, and sped off.” 

Officer Fox ran to his patrol vehicle and began pursuing the defendant with his blue 

lights and siren activated. Sergeant Trivette also joined the pursuit. According to Officer 

Fox, the defendant was driving “very fast” even though the speed limit was only 

approximately 35 miles per hour. Officer Fox estimated he reached over 70 miles per hour 

but “never really gained ground on [the defendant] until the end, because I had slowed 

down and cleared all of the intersections to make sure no one was coming.” Additionally, 

during the pursuit, the defendant ran a “red light at a very high rate of speed” and ran two,

four-way stop signs. Officer Fox also observed a “SUV in the grass, kind of on the curb.” 

The SUV was driven by Emily Ann Lee who also testified, stating while driving with her 

daughter, she looked in her rearview mirror and saw “a car coming and lots of blue lights 

 

2The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude “any mention or introduction of evidence that 

[the] [d]efendant might be charged with, or had an active warrant for, a violation of parole at the time of 

the incident underlying this case.” The trial court granted the motion, and as a result, the State did not 

introduce evidence of the defendant’s outstanding parole violation during trial.
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coming behind that.” The car was driving faster than the posted speed limit which Ms. Lee 

believed to be approximately 35 or 45 miles per hour. Upon realizing she “was in the 

middle of a chase,” Ms. Lee felt like she and her daughter were in danger and began 

slowing down in order to pull off of the road. In doing so, Ms. Lee hit a curb and drove 

“through someone’s front yard before [she] stopped in their yard.” The defendant and 

officers passed Ms. Lee within seconds of her pulling off of the road. 

A mounted camera in Officer Fox’s patrol vehicle captured his pursuit of the 

defendant. The footage was entered into evidence and played for the jury. While watching 

the video, Officer Fox identified Ms. Lee’s vehicle pulled over on the right-hand side of 

the road and indicated additional vehicles driving on the opposite side of the road during 

the pursuit. 

Officer Fox followed the defendant until the defendant struck a “very tall curb” with 

his vehicle, knocking “a couple” of tires off of the rims. Officer Fox did not initially see 

the defendant inside the vehicle, believing he had fled on foot. However, additional 

officers from the Cookeville Police Department arrived and informed Officer Fox that the 

defendant was actually “slumped over in the vehicle.” When officers pulled the defendant 

from the vehicle, they could not feel his pulse. Officers began rendering aid and called an 

ambulance before searching the defendant’s vehicle. 

During the search, Officer Fox found “a cigarette pack that contained what we 

believed to be a marijuana cigarette. . . . And also a syringe.” The marijuana cigarette was 

entered into evidence along with testimony from Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Agent 

Laura Cole, an expert in forensic chemistry. Agent Cole examined the cigarette and 

prepared a drug analysis report which indicated that the cigarette contained marijuana, a 

Schedule VI substance. The report was entered into evidence.

During cross-examination, Officer Fox explained that when the defendant initially 

drove past him, he did not observe any damage to the defendant’s vehicle. However, after 

the defendant passed, Officer Fox looked in his side mirror to observe the rear of the 

defendant’s vehicle, noting he always looks in his side mirror after a vehicle passes in order 

to “see if their tags are illuminated, or if their rear lights are not working or damaged.” 

Upon doing so, Officer Fox immediately noticed the damaged taillight. In response to why 

he was able to remember specific details during trial that he was unable to recall during his 

testimony at the defendant’s preliminary hearing, Officer Fox stated he reviewed the dash

camera video footage prior to trial but not prior to the preliminary hearing. Officer Fox 

again noted that he saw white light coming out of the defendant’s taillight and that is why 

he stopped the defendant.
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Upon stipulation of counsel, the defendant entered into evidence a still frame 

photograph taken from the body camera of Officer M. Franey along with the accompanying 

video footage. Officer Fox stated the defendant’s taillight did not appear to be damaged 

from the angle captured on Officer Franey’s body camera but again stated the damaged 

taillight was on the passenger’s side of the defendant’s vehicle. However, Officer Fox 

testified that he would not be surprised if he had told Sergeant Trivette on August 26, 2018, 

that the driver’s side taillight was damaged. 

Finally, Sergeant Trivette testified, stating he responded to the initial traffic stop in 

order to assist Officer Fox. When he arrived, Officer Fox was speaking with the defendant 

and Ms. Headrick who “were showing signs of consistent nervousness, reaching around in 

the vehicle, very talkative and so forth.” Sergeant Trivette asked the defendant and Ms. 

Headrick if there was “anything illegal” inside the vehicle, and they stated there “shouldn’t 

be.” The defendant also stated that he purchased the vehicle the previous day “and so the 

tags probably didn’t match the vehicle.” Based upon “some of the signs of nervousness” 

he observed, Sergeant Trivette asked the defendant for consent to search the vehicle and 

whether the defendant or Ms. Headrick “were on probation or parole.” Both the defendant 

and Ms. Headrick consented to a search, and Sergeant Trivette asked Ms. Headrick to exit 

the vehicle in order for him to conduct the search while Officer Fox “work[ed] on the 

citations[] and [took] care of the paperwork.” 

When the defendant fled the scene, Sergeant Trivette ran back to his vehicle, 

activated his blue lights and siren, and pursued the defendant. Video footage from Sergeant 

Trivette’s body camera was entered into evidence and played for the jury. In the video, 

Sergeant Trivette noted that Officer Fox mentioned a “driver’s side taillight” issue when 

asked why he pulled the defendant over initially.

At the close of the State’s proof, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal 

and again requested the trial court instruct the jury on the statutory defense provided under 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-603(b)(2) along with his special, related jury 

instructions. The trial court denied the defendant’s requests, ruling the defense had not 

been fairly raised. Subsequently, the jury convicted the defendant for felony evading arrest 

while operating a motor vehicle (count 1) but acquitted him of the remaining charges, 

including simple possession of marijuana (count 2) and possession of drug paraphernalia 

(count 3). For the conviction, the trial court imposed a 12-year sentence on the defendant, 

a career offender. 

The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, amongst other issues, that the 

trial court erred “in denying all of the defendant’s pretrial requests for special jury 

instructions” and “in failing to instruct the jury on the defense created by T[ennessee] 
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C[ode] A[nnotated 39-16-603(b)(2).” The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal 

followed.3

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error by failing 

to instruct the jury on the defense created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-

603(b)(2) and by denying his requests for special jury instructions on the defense and on 

the definition of reasonable suspicion. The State asserts “the trial court properly declined 

to give a jury instruction on the statutory defense because it was not fairly raised by the 

proof,” and we agree.

“It is well-settled in Tennessee that a defendant has a right to a correct and complete 

charge of the law so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the 

jury on proper instructions.” State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 204 (Tenn. 2001) 

(citing State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 

249 (Tenn. 1990) ). “The issue of the existence of a defense is not submitted to the jury 

unless it is fairly raised by the proof.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-203(c). In order “to 

determine whether a statutory defense is fairly raised by the proof so as to require its 

submission to the jury, a court must, in effect, consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the defendant, including drawing all reasonable inferences flowing from that 

evidence.” State v. Shropshire, 874 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). “The 

question of whether the facts in a criminal case require the jury to be instructed regarding 

a particular defense is a mixed question of law and fact” which is reviewed de novo, with 

no presumption of correctness. State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Tenn. 2013) 

(citations omitted). “Errors in jury instructions are generally subject to a ‘harmless error’

analysis.” Id. (citing State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 104-05 (Tenn. 1998)). “However, 

when the jury instructions mislead the jury as to the applicable law or fail to ‘fairly submit’

the relevant legal issues, such as available defenses, we hold such deficiencies to be 

prejudicial error.” Id. (citing State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 101 (Tenn.1998)). “A trial 

court’s refusal to grant a special instruction is error only when the general charge does not 

fully and fairly state the applicable law.” Id. at 129 (citations omitted).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-603(b)(1) states: “It is unlawful for any 

person, while operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, alley or highway in this state, 

to intentionally flee or attempt to elude any law enforcement officer, after having received 

any signal from the officer to bring the vehicle to a stop.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-

 

3 The record indicates the defendant filed his notice of appeal one day late. However, in the interest 

of justice, this Court may waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal, and we choose to do so in this 

case. Tenn. R. App. P. 4.
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603(b)(1) (2016). The statutory defense of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-

603(b)(2) provides that “[i]t is a defense to prosecution under this subsection (b) that the 

attempted arrest was unlawful.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603(b)(2) (2016). 

The defendant’s appellate arguments all relate in some manner to the validity of the 

initial traffic stop. According to the defendant, Officer Fox’s testimony was “rife with 

inconsistencies and holes” and “the photographic evidence shows a taillight [] in perfectly 

acceptable working order.” As such, the defendant asserts the trial court erred by not 

instructing the jury on the statutory defense created under Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 39-16-603(b)(2), arguing that because the initial stop was unlawful, the defense 

was fairly raised. The defendant’s arguments, however, are misplaced because they ignore 

the fact that the defendant’s conviction for felony evading arrest while operating a motor 

vehicle stems from the new and distinct crimes he committed after he fled the scene of the 

initial traffic stop.

The record indicates Officer Fox observed a damaged taillight on the defendant’s 

vehicle, followed behind the defendant, activated his blue lights, and initiated a traffic stop. 

The defendant complied and provided his driver’s license to Officer Fox. When Officer 

Fox learned the defendant had an outstanding parole violation, he returned to the 

defendant’s vehicle and asked him to get out. Instead, the defendant “floored it,” “peeled 

out,” “sped off,” and initiated a high-speed chase with Officer Fox and Sergeant Trivette. 

The officers separately pursued the defendant in their patrol vehicles with their blue 

lights and sirens activated but the defendant failed to stop. During the pursuit, which was 

captured on video, the defendant committed numerous traffic violations, including 

speeding and failing to stop at a red light and stop signs. “There is a strong policy reason 

for holding that a new and distinct crime, even if triggered by an illegal stop, is a sufficient 

intervening event to provide independent grounds for arrest.” State v. Abernathy, 159 

S.W.3d 601, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (citing United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 

619 (4th Cir. 1997). Here, after the initial stop which the defendant complied with, the 

defendant refused a subsequent request to exit his vehicle and sped away from the scene. 

He then committed several new and distinct traffic violations after having received signals 

from the officers to stop. Thus, the defendant’s actions during the pursuit served as 

sufficient intervening events which provided independent grounds for the officers’ 

attempted arrests. Abernathy, 159 S.W.3d at 604. The officers’ attempted arrests of the 

defendant were thus lawful and eliminated the availability of the statutory defense at trial. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603(b)(2). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the

defendant’s request for an instruction on the statutory defense as it was not fairly raised by 

the proof.
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However, even if we determined the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as 

to the statutory defense, we conclude this alleged error was harmless “because no 

reasonable jury would have accepted” the defendant’s theory that the initial stop was 

unlawful, thus warranting the defense. State v. Benson, 600 S.W.3d 896, 907 (Tenn.), cert.

denied, 141 S. Ct. 427 (2020) (quoting State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 404-05 (Tenn. 

2017)). The record shows that after a suppression hearing, the trial court ruled the initial 

traffic stop was lawful based upon Officer Fox’s testimony that he stopped the defendant 

after observing damage to the defendant’s taillight. Appellate courts are bound by a trial 

court’s findings of facts determined after a suppression hearing unless the evidence 

preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996); State v. 

Matthew T. McGee, No. E2011-01756-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4017776, at *2 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2012). Here, nothing in the record indicates the initial stop was 

unlawful or preponderates against the trial court’s findings of fact related to the stop. 

Therefore, even under the defendant’s theory, the statutory defense does not apply. Rather, 

the record makes clear the defendant intentionally fled and attempted to elude the officers 

in his motor vehicle after receiving signals from the officers to bring his vehicle to a stop. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603(b)(1). The defendant is not entitled to relief.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

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J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE