An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with 

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA15-43

Filed: 6 October 2015

Person County, No. 09CRS052132, 09CRS001009

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

FELIX EUGENE ALLEY, IV, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 30 May 2014 by Judge Michael 

O’Foghludha in Person County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 

August 2015.

Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General 

Kimberly D. Potter, for the State.

Kimberly P. Hoppin, for the Defendant.

DILLON, Judge.

Felix Eugene Alley, IV, (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered upon 

jury verdicts finding him guilty of second-degree murder and discharging a firearm 

into an occupied vehicle. We find no error.

I. Background

The evidence at trial tended to show the following: In the early morning hours 

of 14 October 2009, Defendant and Frankie Napier became involved in an altercation 
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at Defendant’s residence. Mr. Napier physically subdued Defendant and began 

making his way outside to leave. As he did, Defendant retrieved a handgun and

began firing it in Mr. Napier’s direction. Autumn Martin, who had been waiting 

outside in a vehicle, was struck several times by the shots and died a short time later

from her wounds.

Shortly thereafter, Defendant was indicted with first-degree murder and 

discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle by a Person County grand jury. At the 

conclusion of a lengthy trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder 

and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle. The court sentenced Defendant 

to 188 to 235 months in prison for the murder and 25 to 39 months for discharging a 

firearm into an occupied vehicle, and ordered that the sentences run consecutively. 

Defendant entered notice of appeal in open court.

II. Analysis

Defendant makes two arguments on appeal, which we address in turn.

A. Testimony by Paramedic

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony 

by the paramedic who treated him once he was in police custody. Specifically, 

Defendant contends that the paramedic’s testimony violated his rights under the 

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 23 of the 

North Carolina Constitution. However, while Defendant objected to the introduction 
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of this testimony at trial, he failed specifically to make a motion to suppress it, as 

would have been required to preserve the issue for appellate review. Under North 

Carolina law, “a motion to suppress is the exclusive method of challenging the

admissibility of evidence on constitutional or statutory grounds,” see State v. Howie, 

153 N.C. App. 801, 804, 571 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2002) (internal marks omitted), and the 

failure to make such a motion constitutes waiver of the right to suppression of the 

evidence alleged to have been illegally obtained, see State v. Holloway, 311 N.C. 573, 

578, 319 S.E.2d 261, 264 (1984). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-974(a)(1) (2014). 

Accordingly, this argument is dismissed.

B. Jury Instructions

Defendant next argues that the trial committed plain error in failing to 

instruct the jury adequately regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication. 

Specifically, Defendant contends that voluntary intoxication negates the specific 

intent necessary for proof of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle, and his 

conviction for second-degree murder demonstrates that the jury found he lacked this

intent. However, as Defendant concedes in his reply brief, discharging a firearm into 

an occupied vehicle is a general intent crime, and voluntary intoxication does not 

negate the existence of general intent. State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 148, 451 S.E.2d 

826, 844 (1994). Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err – much less commit 
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plain error – in failing to instruct the jury otherwise. Accordingly, this argument is 

overruled.

III. Conclusion

We believe Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.

NO ERROR.

Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).